The frontier has become the front line.

Canada’s choice is binary: secure its portion of the Arctic or suffer the consequences of foreign powers acting with impunity in and around Canada’s Arctic. Ottawa’s central challenge, therefore, is to harden its Arctic presence with dual-use infrastructure and supply chain resilience while hostile powers increase their influence around the pole.

This task gets more difficult the longer Ottawa dithers because change manifests across many vectors concurrently. The infrastructure and supply chains critical to the region are underdeveloped and ill-suited for the future—and they do not improve with age. Climate change continues to alter the contours of the region, often to Canada’s strategic disadvantage. An ascendant generation of US strategists proclaim that the Canadian Arctic is the “new soft underbelly” of North America. And it is no longer fantasy to suggest that the Arctic is ground zero for the new ‘Great Game’ between the United States, Russia, and China.

The region has been one of strategic contest since 1921, when Joseph Stalin claimed the North Pole for the Soviet Union, a claim re-animated by Moscow in 2015. It may lack the trenches and dragon’s teeth in Europe, or the clashes between fishing vessels and coast guard ships in southeast Asia. But the Arctic is no longer a low-threat, low-force posture environment that can be defended by a couple Coast Guard icebreakers and some Canadian Rangers on snowmobiles.

It is a region of strategic consequence and likely to be more so in the coming decades, which begs the question—why does Canada lag allies and adversaries alike in both the defense and development of its Arctic territory?

The simplistic answer is that Ottawa is torn among competing interests and an inability, or an unwillingness, to marshal the domestic resources necessary to protect its Arctic from a growing cast of players keen to exploit perceived vulnerabilities in pursuit of their interests.

The Atlantic Council delved deeper into Canada’s challenge to bolster infrastructure and supply chain resilience in the region. Research included literature reviews, interviews, and off-the-record conversations with a broad range of government and private-sector stakeholders. Interviews yielded constructive, if passionate, views from respondents who expressed repeatedly how much they want Canada to secure its part of the Arctic and enable its full development.

Analysis revealed that Ottawa knows the region well; the Canadian government has few peers in understanding the Arctic and what is required to right supply chains there. Geological surveys and development plans are completed to a gold standard. Stakeholders know the problem and solution space—and have for decades. But domestic policy, not climate change or geopolitical calculus, is the primary factor influencing strategic decisions for Canada’s north.

Key players (and honorable mentions)

Climate change has made the Arctic accessible. Glacier melting has created new sea routes, extended shipping seasons, and unveiled vast natural resources. But it has also created an opening in the region for strategic contest. Three threat vectors shape the region’s security dynamics for Canada.

Russia

More than half of the Arctic Circle’s population and half its economy are Russian. Russia sits at the end of one of the Arctic’s most accessible regions. Russia is opening old bases and building new infrastructure throughout the region. It holds more than 50 percent of Arctic investment (made between 2017 and 2022), and its military doctrine treats the north as central to economic and national defense. Since 2014, the Kremlin has launched Cold War-style investments in Arctic airfields, radar systems, submarine networks, and year-round basing. Russian military planners are considering anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) domes extending over the Northern Sea Route.

Moscow likely observes that Canadian defense planning remains rooted in an outdated peace dividend mindset—one that grossly underestimates the threat of state-on-state conflict in the Arctic. Canada’s lack of comprehensive undersea surveillance renders its Arctic maritime approaches effectively blind, and its military presence in the region—symbolized by a modest footprint of Canadian Rangers—leaves much to be desired in terms of deterrence or rapid response. Equipment remains outdated, modernization plans languish in bureaucratic limbo, and logistics chains are stretched perilously thin. These gaps create space for Russian forces to maneuver below the threshold of war, exploiting ambiguity and Canada’s limited detection capabilities to assert influence or project force unchallenged.

The Kremlin likes to see how Canada’s strategic dependence on the United States substitutes alliance commitments for genuine sovereign deterrence. Ottawa’s whole-of-government approach—while inclusive in theory—has fragmented decision-making in practice, rendering Canada slow and reactive at a time when speed and coherence are strategic advantages. Indigenous consultation, while legally and morally necessary, remains procedurally rigid and politicized, often becoming a brake on critical national security decisions rather than a channel for partnership and empowerment.

While Russia invests heavily in its Arctic capabilities, Canada’s Arctic capability is stuck in the twentieth century. Surveillance assets are aging, space-based platforms are insufficient, and investment in modern ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) technology remains anemic. Communications remain unreliable across vast regions, exposing both civilian and military systems to disruption. Cyber defenses—especially around critical infrastructure—are poorly funded and unevenly deployed, inviting adversaries to strike via code rather than missile.

China

China considers itself a “near-Arctic power” and its Polar Silk Road links Arctic shipping to its global Belt and Road ambitions. China’s white papers frame the region as a commons to be commercially and scientifically accessed. Icebreaker construction in Chinese shipyards matches the tempo of a nation preparing for permanent presence.

Beijing understands that Canada’s economic infrastructure in the Arctic is brittle. Melting permafrost, seasonal reliance on ice roads, and a near-total absence of deepwater ports make northern logistics vulnerable to both climate and conflict. These choke points offer asymmetric opportunities to disrupt supply chains or sabotage dual-use facilities. China could exploit these vulnerabilities by embedding itself through ostensibly civilian investments in Arctic mining, telecommunications, or transportation infrastructure—investments that are strategic positioning by other means. In such a fragile environment, any hybrid attack or technological failure could sever vital arteries with catastrophic effects.

From China’s vantage point, Canada’s Arctic declarations are noble but hollow—bold in language but weak in execution. For Beijing, which has increased defense spending every year for three decades, Canada’s plan to reach two percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense spending by 2030 is symbolic. Procurement remains tangled in inefficiency and overregulation, hampering modernization and undermining operational readiness. Economic pressures, shifting political winds, and lukewarm support for military spending are likely to derail Canada’s commitments before they mature. Moreover, China likely sees Canada’s overreliance on its NATO allies as a strategic liability. The Arctic can be probed or pressured just below NATO’s collective defense thresholds—ensuring ambiguity, diffusing Western resolve, and highlighting Canada’s limited unilateral options.

Manpower shortages, insufficient Arctic basing, and the long-delayed Nanisivik port all point to structural underinvestment in hard infrastructure. These gaps offer Beijing a rich menu of asymmetric opportunities to: subvert Arctic economies through proxy investments; cultivate cultural ties through scholarships, research partnerships, and diplomatic outreach; sabotage digital and physical infrastructure through cyberattacks or dependency entrapments; and sow political dissent by financing Indigenous, environmental, or anti-militarization movements within Canada’s own democratic fabric.

The United States (and others)

For Washington, Canada’s failure to defend its Arctic territory is not merely a function of limited resources, but of deliberate strategic neglect. The refusal to acquire nuclear-powered submarines—essential for year-round under-ice patrols and true sovereignty enforcement—reveals a deeper aversion to the burdens of great power responsibility. While adversaries invest in undersea dominance and dual-use Arctic infrastructure, Ottawa opts for half-measures: diesel patrol submarines that can’t operate under the polar ice, minimal surveillance capabilities, and no permanent military basing north of 60.

The US view is shifting from a posture of “monitor and respond” to one of “prepare and deter.” Pentagon reports no longer downplay the Arctic as a region of strategic importance. Even smaller powers have taken notice. India published its Arctic strategy in 2021, emphasizing scientific diplomacy. Turkey signed the Svalbard Treaty to gain access rights to the Arctic in 2023. France and Germany are also exploring greater footprints in the region.

While the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (ICE) Pact with Canada and Finland represents a trilateral effort to rebuild icebreaker capacity and harden the Arctic industrial base, it is not enough. Canada remains trapped in a peacetime posture and mentality—symbolic patrols and seasonal exercises—while the region becomes increasingly contested by powers that are, at best, are neutral to Canada’s concerns and, at worst, openly hostile to them.

This inertia is rooted in a political culture that prioritizes accommodation over assertiveness. Successive governments have deferred to progressive special interest groups whose influence blunts hard security policies. Environmentalist and Indigenous consultations, while important, are often weaponized procedurally to paralyze decisive action. The result is a government debilitated by process, one that speaks of sovereignty but shrinks from the instruments necessary to enforce it. Even modest defense initiatives face resistance if they challenge entrenched activist orthodoxies or require confronting Canada’s internal contradictions. This includes the legal quagmire of provincial and territorial jurisdiction in the North, which Ottawa remains unwilling to override or reform.

Perhaps most damning for Washington is Canada’s lack of strategic coherence. Ottawa provides a strategic framework for the Arctic but fails to dedicate the resources to achieve the objectives contained therein. Policy and strategy without resource commitments are unseriousness ideas. Moreover, Canada’s policies do not form a doctrine of Arctic deterrence, convey no idea on how to mobilize federal will, and fail to weave a unifying narrative that connects Arctic defense to the survival of Canada as a sovereign nation in an increasingly anarchic world.

America cannot—and will not—permit a soft underbelly to fester in a domain as critical as the Arctic. It is not inconceivable for US forces unilaterally securing parts of the Canadian Arctic in the event of a crisis. Such actions, while diplomatically uncomfortable, would be strategically necessary if Canadian gaps remain unaddressed. To be blunt: if pressed and in a fight with Russia or China in the Arctic, the US will almost certainly be “Elbows Up” in defense of North America, even if it offends Canadian sensitivities.

Five “cold kills”

Our research unearthed five factors that contribute to Canada’s Arctic inertia. Each of these “cold kills” continues to impede progress on increasing supply chain and defense resilience.

1. Lacking multipartisan consensus on the region as “ground zero” for a new “Great Game.”

Canada cannot do much in the Arctic if it lacks enduring political will to support and fund dual-use infrastructure over decades. The growing importance of the Arctic for great-power competition underscores the need for politicians, defense planners, local communities, industry partners, and other relevant stakeholders to walk in the same general direction, if not in lockstep. Despite the urgency of this task, no sustained, cross-partisan strategy for Arctic defense exists. Without it, investments, infrastructure development, and operational planning will almost certainly come up short. In 2025, Natural Resources Canada is projected to invest $12.1 million toward climate adaptation projects in the North—which is necessary, but insufficient when compared to similar efforts by other Arctic powers.

Yet, allies offer a contrast. Norway’s Arktis 2030 fund and its defense pledge of 3 percent of GDP underscore a whole-of-society approach. Finland’s NATO entry boosted its participation in Arctic exercises. Sweden utilizes Arctic data to create a stronger and better informed national defense policy. Denmark leverages Greenland’s geostrategic importance in its Arctic defense. While Canada’s Arctic is inaccessible by comparison, it can look at what NATO allies do right in the region and their whole-of-society approaches.

2. Placing too much of the strategic burden on local communities.

The Canadian government continues to place disproportionate responsibility for Arctic security on local communities, revealing a dangerous strategic asymmetry between rhetoric and capability. The Canadian Rangers, though a symbol of national resolve and cultural integration, are not a substitute for a modern, standing military presence. They are lightly armed, part-time volunteers—valuable in their knowledge of the land but structurally unfit to deter or respond to the increasing threats posed by adversarial state actors operating just beyond the line of sight. This over-reliance has created a strategic mirage: Ottawa appears engaged in Arctic defence, but the burden is unfairly borne by those with the fewest resources and the highest exposure.

In effect, Canada’s Arctic is not treated as an equal part of Confederation, but as a frontier outpost whose primary function is surveillance and symbolic sovereignty. The political imagination to raise Arctic communities to the standard of living of rural southern Canada is absent. There is no serious nation-building project underway—no long-term vision to tie infrastructure, broadband, energy, healthcare, and education in the North to the national grid of opportunity.

The region is home to significant deposits of iron ore, gold, diamonds, and rare earth elements. The Mary River Mine on Baffin Island is one of the world’s richest reserves of high-grade iron ore, producing millions of tons annually. Similarly, the Hope Bay and Meliadine gold mines contribute substantially to Canada’s mineral output. These resources are critical for economic development and for national security, given their importance in defense manufacturing and technology. Yet, the extraction and transportation of these resources are hampered by limited infrastructure that eludes further development due to lack of coordination and investment at all levels of government. While the Yukon Security Advisory Council can be a model for shared governance federal, territorial, and Indigenous jurisdictions overlap without coherent authority. The result is a bureaucratic bottleneck that limits response agility and accountability, especially in scenarios involving mass casualty events or foreign incursions below the threshold of war.

3. Misunderstanding the Arctic as a land- or maritime-centric domain, instead of a multidomain one.

Canada’s Arctic strategy remains anchored in a legacy mindset—fixated on land and maritime domains—while the battlespace has already expanded far beyond the ice and tundra. The Canadian Arctic is a multi-domain operating environment in the most rigorous sense: a crucible where air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace domains converge. Focusing primarily on ground mobility or maritime choke points is antiquated.

In an era defined by precision-guided conflict, gray zone incursions, and orbital competition, the North requires integrated deterrence across all domains. The space domain is already decisive; Russia and China have launched dual-use satellites optimized for polar reconnaissance, while Canada’s surveillance constellation remains limited and aging. Cyberspace, too, is an active front. Persistent foreign probing of Canada’s critical Arctic infrastructure—from power grids to fiber lines—underscores the need for zero-trust architectures and sovereign cyber capacity hardened against both disinformation and sabotage. The air domain, often overshadowed, remains underutilized despite offering cost-effective ISR opportunities via high-altitude, long-endurance drones and balloon-based sensors that can supplement space assets in degraded environments.

Canada must approach the Arctic as a multi-domain region. Infrastructure nodes at Iqaluit, Yellowknife, and Inuvik must be conceived not as mere logistics hubs, but as permanent and staffed bases in a broader multi-domain lattice of deterrence. Airfields should be hardened, satellites shielded, networks encrypted, and data fused in real time. The resilience and infrastructure footprint must be multi-domain: ISR in orbit, radar on ice, seaborne logistics hubs, and hardened cyber networks. It might even be cheaper to establish and easier to maintain air-based sensors to augment space-based sensors, such as high-altitude, long-endurance drones and high-altitude balloons.

4. Missing the point that infrastructure spending enables both military and local resilience.

Canada’s policy frameworks fail to grasp a foundational truth: infrastructure is not ancillary to defence; it is defence. Roads, railways, hospitals, and power stations in the Arctic are bulwarks of resilience and lifelines to national unity. The harsh environment demands more than token outposts; it demands permanence that begins with infrastructure designed for both civilian and military pursuits.

Canada’s persistent underinvestment in Arctic infrastructure can be attributed largely to sticker shock. Building in the north is expensive at the outset, but those initial costs conceal long-term value. Roads, railways, and ports that facilitate the movement of Canadian forces and provide necessary infrastructure for local communities also enhance NATO mobility and resilience.

The Grays Bay Road and Port Project is unlikely to open before 2035. Until then, the Port of Churchill remains Canada’s only Arctic deepwater port for more than 106,000 miles of coastline—and even it is more than 800 kilometres south of the Arctic Circle. The overland situation is equally stark. The long-considered Mackenzie Valley Highway remains unbuilt. Meant to replace unreliable winter roads and connect remote Arctic communities, the highway should be considered as a defense artery.

Moreover, the North needs cyber towers as much as radar domes; fibre optic cables as much as sonar arrays. Schools and post-secondary institutions—anchored by Arctic research centres—should be erected alongside hardened military installations to attract families, not just forces. In Alaska, the dual-use success of the University of Alaska Fairbanks and the Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport provides a model: educational and aerospace ecosystems aligned with the broader security posture of the United States.

Still, there are signs of acceleration. The Department of National Defence has committed $230 million to extend the main runway at Inuvik Airport. The upgrades include modern lighting and arrestor systems—investments tailored for sustained military operations and a rare example of a concrete commitment in a domain often shaped by abstraction. Canada should build Arctic spaceports and drone launch facilities for persistent surveillance and communications dominance—assets that would likely qualify as defence expenditures under a broadened NATO definition. And that definition is evolving. With calls to raise the alliance-wide benchmark to five percent of GDP, the line between civil and military investment will blur. Forward-thinking allies are already redefining defence to include national resilience, critical infrastructure, and technological redundancy.

5. Failing to call out the need to achieve A2/AD capability.

Canada’s current Arctic strategy is more performative than purposeful. It remains anchored in rituals of presence rather than a doctrine of deterrence. The reasons are structural and cultural: A2/AD sounds too aggressive for a nation wedded to peacekeeping identity and constrained by intergovernmental jurisdictional frictions. But if Canada is to hold the Arctic, it must defend it—not merely inhabit it. That demands something Canada has never attempted: a comprehensive anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy adapted for the circumpolar battlespace.

A2/AD refers to the deployment of integrated capabilities that prevent an adversary from operating freely within a region. This includes long-range fires, persistent surveillance, advanced radar, cyber denial tools, hardened command-and-control infrastructure, and air and maritime denial platforms. Canada does not mention A2/AD in its Arctic lexicon because it fears what it implies: that the North is no longer a sanctuary but a frontier. Building an Arctic A2/AD network would require political will, sustained investment, and a strategic mindset that accepts confrontation as a precondition for sovereignty. It would also provoke diplomatic risk—Russia would label such a move provocative, and China would test the perimeter with gray-zone maneuvers masked as scientific exploration or commercial navigation. Yet the absence of such a posture risks far greater cost: a hollow sovereignty, subject to erosion by increments.

Investments in some areas do not amount to A2/AD. True, Canada’s $38.6-billion commitment over twenty years to modernize NORAD is substantial. If fully implemented, this would be the largest reinvestment in continental defense since the early Cold War. Arctic over-the-horizon radar systems will track threats from the US-Canada border to the Arctic Circle. A more powerful polar variant will extend coverage into the Arctic archipelago and beyond. Crossbow—a classified network of advanced sensors—will supplement these systems with real-time precision. And the Defence Enhanced Surveillance for Space (DESSP) project will allow space-based tracking of adversary launch and maneuver capabilities. Canada has partnered with Australia on a next-generation Arctic early-warning detection system. But even these investments are insufficient; they do not achieve A2/AD in the Arctic. Canada has ISR blind spots, insufficient logistical depth, and infrastructure degraded by thawing permafrost. RADARSAT’s capabilities are aging; the Northwest Passage is functionally unmonitored. There is no cruise missile defense layer.

A Canadian A2/AD architecture would extend ISR reach from geostationary orbit to the ocean floor. At its core: Over-the-Horizon Radar (AOTHR), high-altitude drones, and advanced satellite constellations fused via a hardened C4ISR backbone. Any credible A2/AD structure must project deterrence not only northward but outward via NORAD, integrating seamlessly with allied efforts across the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap and the European High North.

Challenge and opportunity

We recommend the following six steps to shape decision-making vis-à-vis Canada’s Arctic. Addressing each of them is necessary for more resilient supply chains and robust infrastructure for defense of the Canadian Arctic.

1. Achieve enduring domestic political consensus.

Without sustained, bipartisan consensus on the strategic value of the Arctic, Canada’s northern policy will remain fragmented, underfunded, and vulnerable to reversal.

Canada should establish a nonpartisan Arctic Strategy Council, drawing on members from federal, provincial, territorial, and Indigenous governments, as well as the private sector. This council could be modeled loosely on the United Kingdom’s National Security Council, with a standing mandate to oversee and report on Arctic development milestones.

To correct course, Parliament should adopt a minimum percentage of GDP for Arctic infrastructure and defense investments—similar to how NATO’s 2-percent defense spending benchmark frames national priorities. A 0.5-percent GDP floor specifically earmarked for Arctic readiness would send a powerful signal to allies, adversaries, and Canadians alike.

2. Build permanent bases and infrastructure.

Sovereignty requires presence. Canada cannot assert command over its northern territory while maintaining a transient, seasonal military posture.

Canada must develop at least two permanent Arctic bases by 2035 and reinforce the air infrastructures in Yellowknife. These installations should support multi-domain enablers: ground forces, drone squadrons, ISR satellites, and cyber defense detachments. One proposed location is Resolute Bay in Nunavut—a strategic logistics point halfway through the Northwest Passage. Another is Tuktoyaktuk in the Northwest Territories, where the Inuvik-Tuktoyaktuk Highway provides ground access to the Beaufort Sea.

Canada need not sacrifice environmental stewardship to bolster its dual-use infrastructure in the region. On the contrary, the development of small modular reactors (SMRs) offers a way to meet energy needs in a sustainable and flexible manner. These compact, deployable energy systems would enable off-grid installations to power radar stations, bases, and airstrips—allowing the Canadian Armed Forces to operate autonomously across a vast and power-starved frontier.

Canada can and should discover best practices in other nations and adopt to the fullest extent possible. The Arctic Remote Energy Networks Academy is training a new generation in clean energy implementation, building the intellectual and technical foundation for sustainable Arctic energy systems. It is one example of innovation that can help make strides in the Arctic.

3. Reorient superclusters toward strategic innovation.

Canada’s innovation ecosystem is misaligned with its strategic realities.

To adapt, Canada must integrate Arctic operational challenges into supercluster mandates. The focus of these superclusters has strayed too far from core security imperatives, and redirecting their mandate toward the defense and security sector could allow Canada to reanimate its atrophied defense industrial base, stimulate Indigenous research and development, and provide a platform for strategic innovation drawn from academic and private-sector talent.

The Global Innovation Cluster for Advanced Manufacturing could sponsor development of modular Arctic housing for deployed forces. The Digital Technology Cluster could support remote communications networks hardened against magnetic interference. And the Protein Industries Cluster could help devise shelf-stable, high-calorie rations adapted to extreme environments.

Canada should establish a national challenge prize—modeled on the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Grand Challenge—to spur innovation in climate-resilient infrastructure, Arctic mobility, and remote power generation. Such efforts should be coordinated by a Defence Innovation Agency akin to the United Kingdom’s Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA), ensuring alignment between technological output and operational need.

4. Integrate civil-military infrastructure.

Canada must adopt a whole-of-society approach to Arctic logistics—one that erases the line between civilian and military use.

Every kilometer of highway, every meter of runway, and every watt of power grid must serve dual purposes. Similarly, the Grays Bay Road and Port Project, which aims to connect the rich mineral fields of western Nunavut with the Northwest Passage, must be prioritized for its economic benefits and geopolitical value. Its completion would give Canada a second deepwater Arctic port—an essential node for resupply, power projection, and emergency response.

Meanwhile, the feasibility of Arctic spaceports must be considered thoughtfully. With global competition accelerating in polar orbit surveillance, Canada’s geography is a latent advantage. Nunavut and the Northwest Territories are prime candidates for launching satellites into sun-synchronous and polar orbits, a domain critical for ISR.

5. Accelerate NORAD modernization and ISR integration.

Canada must modernize its Arctic surveillance and early-warning capabilities through the renewal of NORAD and deep integration of orbital, aerial, and terrestrial ISR platforms.

Canada must move decisively to modernize its contributions to NORAD and integrate a layered, multi-domain ISR architecture that meets the threats of the 21st century. The existing North Warning System (NWS)—a relic of the Cold War—is functionally obsolete. It is increasingly vulnerable to kinetic destruction, electronic warfare, and deception by adversaries leveraging hypersonic, low-flying, and space-enabled strike platforms. While Canada has acknowledged this through its stated commitment to over-the-horizon radar (OTHR) and new space-based capabilities, progress has been halting, piecemeal, and under-resourced.

Canada should fast-track its involvement in key pillars of NORAD modernization alongside the United States by:

1. Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTHR): Advance procurement and installation of Arctic-facing OTHR systems based in Labrador and Nunavut to create a persistent early-warning envelope stretching across the polar approaches. These systems must be hardened against electromagnetic disruption and integrated into NORAD’s command-and-control nodes in real time.
2. Ballistic Missile Defence and the Golden Dome: Canada must shed outdated policy inhibitions and join the continental Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) architecture. A Canadian contribution to a “Golden Dome” over North America—built on Aegis Ashore components, ship-based interceptors, and ground-based midcourse defence systems—would reinforce deterrence and mitigate the strategic vacuum currently inviting adversary escalation. Participation in the US Missile Defense Review and integration into layered BMD command structures should begin immediately.
3. Space and High-Altitude ISR: The integration of RADARSAT Constellation Mission (RCM) assets with Gray Jay microsatellites must be complemented by investment in high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) UAVs, stratospheric balloons, and commercial space partnerships. Persistent polar orbit surveillance is not a luxury—it is the sinew of a sovereign Canadian deterrent.

A modern NORAD without a full Canadian partner is a NORAD weakened in scope, credibility, and political cohesion. In an age of hypersonics, space militarization, and AI-driven surveillance, Canada’s northern shield must be not just symbolic but steel-wrought—an active, intelligent barrier underpinned by the best minds and machines the alliance can field. The window to shape this future is closing fast. Canada must step forward now, not as a follower, but as a co-architect of North America’s defence.

6. Integrate the Arctic with broader national and allied defense postures.

Canada’s Arctic strategy must not be treated in isolation.

Canada must integrate its Arctic strategy into a broader, assertive national defence posture—one that acknowledges the indivisibility of Canadian sovereignty and its responsibilities as a G7 power. The Arctic is not a separate theatre, but the forward glacis of the North American fortress. What begins as radar coverage over Baffin Bay ends in deterrence posture from Vilnius to the Taiwan Strait. Canadian defence policy must therefore harmonize Arctic readiness with strategic power projection abroad, ensuring the nation can respond decisively to threats—whether they emerge from the Beaufort Sea, the Black Sea, or the South China Sea.

The Arctic remains critical—but it is not Canada’s only defence priority. A myopic focus on the North risks undermining broader global responsibilities. Canada must project credible force across multiple domains and theatres. That means integrating Arctic surveillance—through over-the-horizon radar, low Earth orbit satellite constellations, and AI-driven ISR—directly into NORAD’s early warning lattice. These capabilities must be interoperable with US Northern Command, NATO’s Arctic flank, and allied sensors in the Indo-Pacific. Surveillance is not enough; it must be paired with striking power and forward basing.

Strategic mobility and offensive reach are essential. Arctic airbases must be upgraded to sustain F-35 squadrons year-round, with rapid deployment capabilities for long-range precision fires and mobile expeditionary forces. Arctic-class naval platforms should anchor presence and power projection into contested waters, with the logistical depth to pivot between the Arctic archipelago and Pacific choke points. Canadian-built UAVs and high-altitude drones should patrol both the Northwest Passage and Western Pacific, forming a twin-hemisphere presence. Above all, Canada must act as a sovereign Arctic nation capable of defending its territory, while remaining a credible contributor to the rules-based international order. The Arctic is the crucible, but Canada’s responsibilities—and its enemies—do not stop at the pole.

Canada’s Arctic infrastructure and supply chain resilience are foundational components to its basic expression of sovereignty. But the future of the Arctic belongs to those who show up first and endure longest. The question is not whether Canada can afford Arctic sovereignty, but whether it can afford its absence.

Jeff Reynolds is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Kristen Taylor is an assistant director with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

This research was made possible by the generous support of the Canada Mobilizing Insights in Defense and Security (MINDS) program.

New Atlanticist Mar 10, 2025

Experts react: What Mark Carney means for the US-Canada relationship

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New Atlanticist May 1, 2025

Foreign policy was a hot topic in Canada’s election. Now it’s on Carney to make it last.

By Imran Bayoumi, Maite Gonzalez Latorre

The campaign is over. Now, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney faces several important choices, from how to increase defense spending to what a new relationship with the United States should look like.

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The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

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The post The frontier is the front line: On climate resilience for infrastructure and supplies in Canada’s Arctic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Earlier this week, US President Donald Trump made headlines by stating what many Iranians have known for years: a corrupt “water mafia” has looted the nation’s resources while its leaders have “managed to turn fertile farmland into dry deserts.” He underscored the regime’s role in fueling the crisis, declaring that “their corrupt water mafia—it’s called the water mafia—causes droughts and empty riverbeds. They get rich, but don’t let the people have any of it.”

For millions of Iranians displaced by environmental degradation and water scarcity, it was the first time a sitting US president openly echoed what whistleblowers and environmental advocates have been shouting for decades.

The term “water mafia” has been used by Iranian journalists, scientists, and activists for more than a decade to describe a powerful and politically connected network responsible for pushing ecologically catastrophic megaprojects. These actors thrive on opacity, benefiting from unchecked dam-building, wasteful water transfers, and the relentless overextraction of groundwater, often under the guise of development and national security. Trump’s remarks may have been blunt, but they captured the essence of the crisis: Iran is not just running out of water, it is being robbed of it.

The aftermath of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal offered a clear warning. Billions of dollars flowed back into Iran, yet no serious reforms followed. Instead, environmental destruction accelerated. Expensive dam-building and ill-conceived water transfer projects continued unchecked, groundwater depletion worsened, and land subsidence spread across critical plains. Agricultural practices remained wasteful, and environmental priorities were ignored.

In the Islamic Republic, the reflexive belief that crises can be drowned in money has repeatedly backfired. Over the past four decades—particularly since the Iran-Iraq War—financial windfalls without transparency, accountability, or public participation have fueled corruption, exacerbated environmental damage, and triggered deeper social unrest. Funds intended for resilience and renewal have instead bankrolled inefficient megaprojects, enriching politically connected contractors while pushing the country’s ecosystems closer to collapse.

Parliament and oversight bodies have long been reduced to hollow institutions, offering little more than a façade of accountability. Public dissent—especially from provinces ravaged by water scarcity—has been met with suppression, not solutions. Now, with the prospect of ongoing US negotiations delivering some sanctions relief, the economic arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, stands ready to tighten its grip. Under the banners of “development” and “poverty alleviation,” it will likely expand its empire of megaprojects—ventures that, without environmental safeguards or transparency, have consistently deepened corruption, entrenched inefficiency, and accelerated environmental collapse.

Widespread corruption and lack of oversight

Water governance in Iran is tightly controlled by the Supreme Water Council—a body that exists more as a rubber stamp for elite interests than a forum for sustainable planning. Dominated by the Ministry of Energy, with the president or vice president merely present in name, the council has consistently prioritized unsustainable development over ecological integrity. In practice, it has functioned as a front for the water mafia—an entrenched network of bureaucrats, contractors, and cronies whose goal is profit, not preservation.

The Ministry of Agriculture, as the largest water consumer, is a major influencer within this council. Civil society and non-governmental organizations are almost entirely excluded from decision-making, and local stakeholders lack the ability to prevent resource destruction. The Department of Environment, while occasionally voicing concerns, has been reduced to a ceremonial role.

Most large-scale water projects in recent decades have either bypassed environmental permits or obtained them under pressure, often through compromised processes involving firms with direct ties to the water mafia. In cases where local courts attempted to intervene, rulings were ignored or overruled by higher judicial officials loyal to political interests. Environmental defenders and whistleblowers who challenge these projects face intense security pressures, harassment, and, in many cases, exile.

Powerful consulting firms, many of which have long benefited from insider connections, have greenlit projects that have devastated entire ecosystems, displacing upstream communities, triggering deforestation, damaging cultural heritage sites, salinizing rivers, depleting aquifers, and contributing to widespread land subsidence in urban and agricultural zones alike. From Tehran to Isfahan, cities are literally sinking under the weight of institutional negligence. These aren’t development projects—they’re environmental crimes disguised as infrastructure. And if sanctions are lifted and new capital flows into the system without strict oversight, the water mafia will seize the opportunity to expand its empire, accelerating Iran’s ecological collapse.

IRGC involvement

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), through its Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, has become Iran’s largest and most politically untouchable contractor, positioned squarely at the center of what many now call the “water mafia.” This deeply entrenched network includes senior officials within the Ministry of Energy, politically favored consultants, and powerful construction and engineering firms. Shielded by military influence and judicial complicity, they operate with near-total impunity. Whenever a major dam or inter-basin water transfer project is launched, Khatam is either directly involved or quietly profiting through layers of subcontractors. Although sanctions have constrained some of its operations in recent years, the IRGC has routinely sidestepped these limits by deploying a spiderweb of front companies to keep cash and construction flowing behind the scenes.

Any future sanctions relief would give Khatam and the broader IRGC-industrial complex even greater control over state development budgets, further emboldening the water mafia. Since its post-1989 transformation, engineered by former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and sanctioned by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Khatam has overseen disastrous megaprojects.

Those include the Karkheh and  Gotvand dams, which have inflicted irreversible ecological damage across Khuzestan. Its inter-basin water transfer schemes, including the Garm-Siri project, not only jeopardize domestic water security but risk igniting future disputes with Iraq over shared river systems. Far from alleviating Iran’s water crisis, the JCPOA-era influx of capital largely served to reinforce the very machinery driving the collapse.

Lack of environmental impact assessment

Today, major multinational projects funded by international loans typically require rigorous Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) to ensure that long-term benefits outweigh ecological and social costs. In Iran, however, EIAs have become a hollow formality. They are often conducted by firms with vested interests in project execution, many of them closely tied to the water mafia. There is little to no independent review, and virtually no public scrutiny.

In many cases, projects begin without any assessment at all. Only after public outrage or activist pressure do authorities scramble to produce retroactive EIAs—by then, the damage is often done. The Gotvand Dam remains one of the most damning examples: its post-construction mismanagement of saline layers in the reservoir has created a chronic, man-made disaster.

Then there’s Lake Urmia—once the largest lake in the Middle East, now a stark reminder of systemic mismanagement. Over forty dams and multiple diversion tunnels throttled its inflows, all while upstream expansion of water-intensive crops like sugar beets continued unchecked. Climate variability may have accelerated the decline, but the collapse was largely engineered. Today, it’s exposed salt flats that feed dust storms that damage farmland, corrode infrastructure, and pose serious public health risks across the region.

Despite the efforts of environmental activists and a handful of parliamentary investigations, Iran’s annual budget continues to greenlight hundreds of new projects without proper assessments, many pushed through by consulting firms and contractors aligned with the water mafia. Without strict environmental conditionalities and oversight, sanctions relief will only accelerate this destructive trajectory, handing more capital to those who profit from ecological collapse.

More recently, the water mafia has set its sights on large-scale seawater desalination projects—particularly along the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman—without seriously accounting for the massive carbon footprint or the ecological harm to already stressed marine ecosystems. These projects are not only energy-intensive and environmentally hazardous, but the plan to pump desalinated water to central Iran comes with astronomical upfront and long-term maintenance costs. For the water mafia, however, it’s a goldmine: billions in unaccountable contracts, minimal oversight, and endless opportunities for profit—another expensive illusion sold as a solution.

The absence of a comprehensive plan

Countries facing severe water scarcity have developed innovative governance models that Iran could learn from—not by copying policies wholesale, but by embracing their core principles.

After enduring the Millennium Drought, Australia implemented the Murray–Darling Basin Plan, establishing basin-level governance and water trading systems to balance ecological sustainability with agricultural needs. Singapore, lacking natural freshwater sources, has become a global leader in integrated water management through its “Four National Taps” strategy, which includes water catchment, desalination, imported water, and wastewater recycling (NEWater). Spain utilizes river basin councils (Confederaciones Hidrográficas) that involve stakeholders from various sectors in decentralized water decision-making. Israel, situated in one of the world’s most arid regions, has achieved a high level of water security through a mix of technological innovation and strict efficiency standards, including the reuse of over 85 percent of its wastewater for agriculture.  

These models share a commitment to transparency, adaptability, and inclusive governance—qualities that are currently lacking in Iran’s centralized and opaque water management system. For Iran to address its escalating water crisis, it must shift from supply-centric megaprojects to participatory and sustainable resource management.

The billion-dollar question: What should be done?

With sanctions relief, poor water governance, inefficient management, and structural corruption will not disappear. Scientists like Kaveh Madani, head of the United Nations University’s Institute for Water, Environment and Health, believe that Iran has become a water-bankrupt nation due to misguided policies, weak governance, and decades of poor management. Even if billions of dollars are released, absent a genuine will for reform, these resources will merely accelerate the execution of costly, unnecessary, and environmentally damaging projects.

A system resistant to methodical review and structural rebuilding will only collapse faster when flooded with money. The core problem lies in decision-making behind closed doors, the exclusion of public participation, and neglect of environmental imperatives.

To change course, Iran needs immediate, transparent, and measurable actions:

• Halt all projects lacking legitimate environmental assessments.
• Mandate the public release of water resource data and project budgeting details.
• Reform budget allocation laws to prevent the approval of scientifically unjustified projects.
• Establish an independent national body composed of experts, academics, farmers, and civil society actors to oversee and redefine macro water policies.
• Pilot participatory governance models in critical watersheds to lay the groundwork for institutional learning and environmental democracy.

Ultimately, drafting a comprehensive, sustainable national water plan—regularly reviewed and adapted—is crucial for restoring balance to Iran’s fragile environment. As long as policymaking focuses on “increasing water supply at any cost” rather than preserving and optimizing resources, every newly injected dollar will only deepen the crisis, not resolve it.

Nik Kowsar is an Iranian-American journalist and water issues analyst based in Washington, DC. He produces and hosts a weekly TV program on Iran’s water crisis. He is also known for his past work as a political cartoonist.

The post Feeding the ‘water mafia’: Sanctions relief and Iran’s water crisis appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Building on the Atlantic Council’s previous report on the nuclear innovation ecosystem, this new report by Kemal Pasamehmetoglu explores the role of the United States in establishing a full domestic nuclear fuel cycle.  

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Kemal Pasamehmetoglu

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative

Global Energy Center

Energy & Environment Nuclear Energy

Report Feb 24, 2025

Atoms for Appalachia: The role of nuclear energy in economic development

By Lauren Hughes

Advanced nuclear technologies can drive economic security and energy security within Appalachian states.

Economy & Business Energy & Environment

EnergySource Mar 7, 2025

The US can reduce Russia’s nuclear energy—and geopolitical—influence

By Marina Lorenzini

As the Trump administration outlines its energy priorities, strengthening the US nuclear industry remains a point of bipartisan agreement. Revitalizing this sector will lead not only to domestic economic growth, but also a reduction in Russia’s dominance in global nuclear markets and its geopolitical leverage.

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

Issue Brief Apr 4, 2025

Building a path toward global deployment of fusion: Nonproliferation and export considerations

By Sachin Desai, Michael Hua, Amy Roma, Jessica Bufford, Jacqueline Siebens, Andrew Proffitt

With commercial fusion on the horizon, questions around the process for regulating fusion power plants have arisen.

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

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The post The United States’ role in managing the nuclear fuel cycle appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On April 27, 2025, Africa Center nonresident senior fellow Oluwayemisi Ajumobi published an article in Globalization and Health, “Safeguarding global health security amidst a scramble for Africa’s minerals for the clean energy transition.”

“The global transition to renewable energy is increasing the demand for critical minerals mining in Africa. Without appropriate safeguards, expansion of mining operations on the continent increases the risk of mining-associated infectious disease outbreaks with epidemic and pandemic potential,” Ajumobi writes.

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Oluwayemisi Ajumobi

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Africa Center

Technology & Innovation Non-Traditional Threats

The post Ajumobi in Globalization and Health: “Safeguarding global health security amidst a scramble for Africa’s minerals for the clean energy transition” appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Localized climate awareness through interactive mapping: A policy tool

Public opinion is pivotal for shaping climate policy. Awareness of climate risks can help accelerate the development and implementation of effective climate policy. A recent nationally representative survey reveals some surprising insights: Despite 82 percent of Indians believing in global warming (once it’s explained), only 10 percent feel informed about it and over half have little to no understanding of the concept. What is particularly worrying is that Indians’ awareness levels about climate change have barely changed since 2011, when the survey was first conducted as part of our studies.

National surveys only provide a single number, however, to characterize the opinions of an entire country. Recent advances in statistical modeling now allow us to pool survey data from local areas and pair it with relevant geographic, census, and environmental data to construct accurate estimates of climate change opinions for subnational administrative areas. Using this approach, we mapped climate opinions across the country, and found that the knowledge gap about climate change varies widely by region (see figure 1). For example, the western state of Gujarat shows greater climate awareness compared to its southern neighbor Maharashtra, with the understanding ranging between 52 percent and 33 percent, respectively. Likewise, about half the residents in the southern state of Tamil Nadu say they “know something” or “a lot” about global warming, while only 31 percent feel knowledgeable in neighboring Andhra Pradesh. These differences present opportunities to increase local support for climate initiatives, especially in states where awareness lags.

Figure 1: Knowledge about global warming

Public opinion maps are powerful tools for bridging these knowledge gaps. The interactive version of the India climate opinion maps show variations in public beliefs and attitudes across thirty-four of India’s thirty-six states and union territories and in 604 districts. These maps aren’t just diagnostic: By exactly identifying where knowledge is low, these maps enable policymakers and technologists to align awareness campaigns with regional needs, fostering a stronger foundation for climate action.

Imagine Maharashtra, where awareness is lower, having more support for climate action at the grassroots level. This could make local adaptation efforts—like water conservation or heat wave preparedness—more successful because the public better understands the urgency. Extreme heat is one of the most direct and widespread threats to human health from climate change, and these risks cascade to economic sectors through reduced labor productivity, decreased crop yields, and increased energy demands for cooling, straining infrastructure and resources, and exacerbating income inequality. Recent heat waves, intensified by global warming, have killed many thousands of people around the world, and yet most heat-related deaths are preventable with appropriate preparation. Many members of the public do not adequately understand the risks associated with extreme heat, however, and many are unprepared, underscoring the characterization of heat waves as “silent killers.”

Turning data into action: Targeting interventions with technology

Interactive maps based on scientific public opinion surveys do more than illustrate what people know—they guide real, on-the-ground actions to address specific regional risks. Take Bihar, a state in eastern India, for instance, where 74 percent of residents expect more severe heat waves in the coming years. This awareness has driven the state to create an early warning system and use mass texts to send heat advisories to millions. However, in regions with limited technological access, low-tech community-based solutions remain critical. Localized data about awareness levels can help identify these more vulnerable populations and inform tailored interventions. For example, Bihar’s Heat Action Plan (HAP) includes drum-based village announcements, ensuring even the most remote populations are better prepared.

Figure 2: Perceptions of severe heat waves

But there’s still room to grow. Also in Bihar, a state with high solar insolation levels, the installed solar capacity reached approximately 193 MW in 2023, reflecting steady growth in this area. But while 59 percent here believe India should rely more on renewable energy, many don’t yet connect extreme heat with fossil fuel use (figures 2 and 3). And solar adoption here is slower compared to neighboring states like Uttar Pradesh and Jharkhand, which have both set ambitious solar installation targets and have slightly higher public support for renewables (62 percent and 63 percent, respectively). Closing these gaps with targeted information could shift behaviors and foster broader support for sustainable practices. This is where region-specific insights can make a huge difference—not just in preparing for immediate risks but also in encouraging lasting climate resilience.

Bridging knowledge gaps for real climate action

India’s linguistic and cultural diversity adds complexity to its climate strategies. At least twenty-two major languages are spoken across the country, and thousands of regional publications inform the public. Yet many media outlets, both English and regional, miss the chance to connect climate events like heat waves directly to climate change. Only about 10 percent of media articles covering the 2022 record-breaking heat waves also mentioned climate change. By understanding what different communities believe and know, journalists, educators, and activists can tailor messages that resonate locally, bringing climate awareness directly into people’s lives.

This is where data equity comes into play. Making climate data accessible and relevant to communities is essential to ensure that everyone—from rural villages to crowded cities—can understand and act on it. Empowering people with accurate, actionable information is key to building a resilient society that is prepared to handle the challenges ahead.

India’s twenty-eight states and eight union territories each have distinct identities and approaches to climate action. Backed by a clear National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) and with tailored State Action Plans on Climate Change (SAPCCs) in place, regional governments play a major role in addressing their specific challenges. Public opinion data offer a unique opportunity for each state to adapt its strategies to local concerns, making climate policies more effective and sustainable. For example, states with higher awareness, like Gujarat, can attract investments and public-private partnerships in clean energy technology, while states with lower awareness might prioritize educational programs alongside infrastructure projects. Companies like ReNew Power and Tata Power, for example, are helping to drive renewable energy adoption and smart grid integration across India. Pursuing these kinds of collaborations with a greater awareness of how district-level opinions vary can help accelerate local climate action and ensure that each region’s unique needs and perspectives shape its climate approach.

Figure 3: Perceptions of fossil fuels and renewable energy

Localized climate insights can power the changes that India needs, accelerating the shift to clean energy and building resilience against climate impacts. However, current policies—like fossil fuel subsidies and price caps —present significant challenges. These measures, while aimed at shielding low-income households from rising energy costs, often lock in dependence on fossil fuels and divert resources away from renewable investments. For example, fossil fuel subsidies in India still outweigh subsidies for renewables, undermining the economic incentives for a clean energy transition.

Public opinion surveys provide a valuable opportunity to address these misalignments by demonstrating that support for renewable energy is strong, even in states with significant fossil fuel reliance (figure 3). By leveraging localized public opinion data, India can reframe subsidy reforms as not only economically prudent but also widely supported by the public. By better aligning policies with both national and regional data, India can ensure that efforts to reduce emissions and prepare for climate impacts reflect the voices of its people.

The future of climate resilience in India depends on both bridging the gap between data and action through enabling renewable energy technologies and gaining greater awareness of public understanding about climate change causes and solutions. When interactive maps and survey data are accessible and used to guide local strategies, they become invaluable tools. Scaling models using insights from localized data can transform regional adaptation strategies, including the deployment of clean technologies and renewable energy solutions; this can be done by aligning public knowledge with practical policy initiatives such as job training for the renewable energy industry, which also has widespread support (figure 4). Emphasizing technology-driven, equitable access ensures interventions resonate with India’s diverse population.

Figure 4: Perceptions on national training programs

By building awareness of public opinion among diverse stakeholders and reflecting the insights from the data back to the public, policymakers build trust and alignment in decision-making. This approach allows everyone—from local communities to state governments to national policymakers—to have confidence in collective efforts that aim to tackle climate change head-on. By building a common sense of purpose, India can catalyze the testing and scaling of technology-based interventions to achieve its long-term strategic goal of becoming a vishwa guru, a global leader in climate action.

Jennifer Marlon is a senior research scientist at the Yale School of the Environment and the executive director of the Yale Center for Geospatial Solutions.

Jagadish Thaker (JT) is a senior lecturer at the University of Queensland and research associate at the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication.

Issue Brief Mar 13, 2025

India’s path to AI autonomy

By Mohamed Elbashir, Kishore Balaji Desikachari

India is taking a distinctive approach to the global race for artificial intelligence (AI) supremacy.

Artificial Intelligence Digital Policy

New Atlanticist Mar 25, 2025

Starlink’s India launch is a crash course on New Delhi’s approach to tech sovereignty

By Trisha Ray

A recently announced partnership to deploy the Elon Musk-led company’s satellite internet in India offers a window into New Delhi’s “hybrid” approach.

Economy & Business India

New Atlanticist Sep 20, 2023

Carbon removal is a once-in-a-generation opportunity to reduce the risks of overshooting global warming targets  

By Mahmoud Abouelnaga, Raul Brens Jr.

Carbon dioxide removal technologies offer a crucial pathway to achieving net-zero emissions and minimizing the extent and duration of any overshoot.

Climate Change & Climate Action Economy & Business

The GeoTech Center champions positive paths forward that societies can pursue to ensure new technologies and data empower people, prosperity, and peace.

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The post Mapping public opinion to drive climate action in India appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While the fund was officially established at the 2022 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Egypt, known as COP27, it was operationalized this past year at COP29 in Azerbaijan. An executive director of the fund was appointed and initial financing agreements with the World Bank were finalized. The decision to operationalize the fund moved the conversation on loss and damage from a fringe issue to a prime example of what global collaboration on climate must look like.

Now, however, just fifteen weeks after COP29 ended, the Trump administration has decided to withdraw the United States from the management of the fund. The withdrawal was marked “effective immediately,” and the consequences will be, too.

In its withdrawal from the fund’s management, the United States has given up its seat at the international table. It has limited its long-term ability and credibility to shape debate and take leadership on climate finance. As one of the future managing members of the board for the government of Peru, I am deeply aware that this withdrawal marks a striking missed opportunity.

But even more immediate, the United States has damaged its own economic resilience.

The underlying reasons for the fund have not changed. Climate change is disproportionately affecting countries on the frontlines. Between 2000 and 2019, climate change cost an estimated $2.8 trillion in loss and damage. Notably, loss and damage is the last threshold of climate costs. When countries prepare for the impacts, most look first to mitigate the emission of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. However, the planet now faces locked-in costs, so leaders then have to turn to adaptation to prepare people for impacts such as hotter average temperatures.

Still, these adaptation actions are also limited. At some point, humanity’s ability to adapt to climate change moves beyond what is feasible—becoming losses (permanent) and damages (reversible in principle). This accounts for property loss and damage for individuals, or severe damage to infrastructure. It can also capture lost earnings or irreparable harm to entire sectors. While these costs are staggering, they are also borne unequally. Often, those countries that have contributed the least to global emissions are the same ones dealing with the worst impacts of climate change. The African continent, for example, faces devastating and disproportionate climate costs but has contributed the least to greenhouse gas emissions.

If the United States continues to reduce its investments in and focus on climate, it comes with an economic cost for its own economy. In an interconnected world, inaction on climate means lower growth worldwide. Not only will climate inaction negatively impact global trading routes (for example, the noted and increasing traffic jams at the Panama Canal, which handles 5 percent of sea-based trade), but it will also cost the United States in terms of its own imports.

The less countries invest—especially high-emitting countries, including the United States—on addressing the causes of climate-related losses and damages, the more it will cost countries on the climate frontlines to produce essential goods and resources. Whether it’s an immediate realization or revealed in the years to come, these policies and inaction will hurt the United States and its ability to source agricultural products, manufacturing goods, or raw resources.

Climate change transcends borders. It’s impossible to build invisible walls around its impacts. The Trump administration has an opportunity and obligation to reconsider its climate policies and to fully recognize the economic costs associated for the country if it continues down an isolationist climate path.

Jorge Gastelumendi is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Climate Resilience Center. He previously served as chief advisor and negotiator to the government of Peru, and he will serve as board member of the UN Fund for responding to Loss and Damage, representing the government of Peru.

The post The US pullout from the climate loss and damage fund will prove costlier in the long run appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Bakir in Middle East Institute of Singapore: Insight 315: Draining Diplomacy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Welcome to the fourth edition of Global Foresight from the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, home for the last decade to one of the world’s premier strategic foresight shops.

In this year’s installment, which is part of the Atlantic Council Strategy Papers series, our experts present exclusive findings from our survey of leading strategists and experts around the world on how human affairs could unfold over the next ten years across geopolitics, the global economy, climate change, technological disruption, and more. Our next-generation foresight team spots six “snow leopards”—under-the-radar phenomena that could have major unexpected impacts, for better or worse, in 2025 and beyond. And our foresight practitioners imagine three scenarios for how the world could transform over the next decade as a result of China’s ascendance, worsening climate change, and an evolving international order.

Welcome to 2035

What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts

To survey the future, we polled global strategists and foresight gurus on our most burning questions about the biggest drivers of change over the next decade. Check out their forecasts on everything from the likelihood of another world war to the outcome of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

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Six snow leopards to watch in 2025

The underappreciated phenomena that could have outsize global impact

Because it receives relatively little attention in the press, the “snow leopard” does not appear significant enough to warrant much scrutiny as a driver of change and shaper of the future. Yet just like the real cat in the wild, the figurative snow leopard is something that could sneak up and vividly remind us of its power.

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Three worlds in 2035

Imagining scenarios for how global affairs could be transformed over the next decade

The Atlantic Council’s foresight team brought their globe-spanning expertise to the task of envisioning three potential future paths for humanity.

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Meet your expert guides to the future

Full survey results

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series

Feb 12, 2025

The Global Foresight 2025 survey: Full results

In the fall of 2024 after the outcome of the US presidential election, the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security surveyed the future, asking leading global strategists and foresight practitioners around the world to answer our most burning questions about the biggest drivers of change over the next ten years. Here are the full results.

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Alexander V. Mirtchev

Editor-in-chief

Matthew Kroenig

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James L. Jones
Odeh Aburdene
Paula Dobriansky
Stephen J. Hadley
Jane Holl Lute
Ginny Mulberger
Stephanie Murphy
Dan Poneman
Arnold Punaro

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Consider the snow leopard. Panthera uncia sports some of the most effective camouflage in the animal kingdom, its white coat with gray and black spots blending in perfectly with the rocky, snowy Himalayan landscape it inhabits. It’s known as “the ghost of the mountains,” seeming to appear out of thin air on the rare occasions it is seen in the wild. 

There’s an equivalent phenomenon in global affairs: under-the-radar trends and events that elude even the most seasoned observer. When their effect on world affairs eventually becomes apparent, they may seem to have come out of nowhere. But these “snow leopards” were there all along. Trends slowly gathering momentum while the crisis du jour dominates headlines, technological developments whose real-world application is still theoretical, known but underrated risks—all of these phenomena have the power to reshape the future. Some already are. 

Any forecast of the future needs to account for these snow leopards. As we brought together experts across the Atlantic Council for our annual look into the future, our next-generation staff took on the challenge of spotting the hard to spot. They surveyed the world around them for overlooked risks, trawled scientific journals and the websites of obscure government departments, and came up with a list of potentially world-changing trends and developments. 

In the year to come and beyond, keep an eye on these six snow leopards. 

When you send a message on WhatsApp to a friend in Colombia or share a video call with family in India, the data—images, text, and video—gets broken down into packets and travels along undersea cables that connect continents in fractions of a second. Nearly 99 percent of international data passes through these cables, including terabytes of sensitive data sent by the US military to command posts overseas as well as an estimated ten trillion dollars transferred every day through the global financial system. In an increasingly interconnected world, nonstate actors pose a serious threat to this critical digital infrastructure, which often lies in shallow waters where it is vulnerable to everything from cyber threats to explosive devices to dragging anchors. 

It doesn’t take advanced equipment like submarines to damage these undersea cables. In 2013, for instance, Egyptian authorities arrested three divers who had used underwater explosives to slice through the South East Asia-Middle East-West Europe 4 internet cable, which runs for 12,500 miles and connects three continents. This incident came five years after a similar attack on the same cables and three years after terrorists in the Philippines successfully cut cable lines near the Filipino city of Cagayan de Oro. While the possible involvement of China and Russia in recent cord-cutting incidents has drawn international scrutiny, these prior incidents indicate that nonstate actors also perceive these cables as an opportune target.  

In late 2023, a Telegram channel affiliated with Yemen’s Houthi rebels threatened this vital underwater infrastructure by posting a map showing the subsea communications cables in the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, and the Persian Gulf. An ominous message accompanied the map: “There are maps of international cables connecting all regions of the world through the sea. It seems that Yemen is in a strategic location, as internet lines that connect entire continents—not only countries—pass near it.” Of note, the Houthis possess an arsenal of underwater mines, and Houthi militants have reportedly undergone combat diver training in the Red Sea.  

The Houthis’ bold assertion could inspire other nonstate actors to put undersea cables in their crosshairs, expanding the threat to this vital infrastructure beyond the region. The same day the Telegram post appeared, a Hezbollah-affiliated Telegram channel shared a similar message and questioned whether the Houthi statement was a “veiled message to the Western coalition.” 

Since these cables facilitate financial transactions and are the only hardware capable of accommodating the huge volumes of military sensor data that inform ongoing operations, terrorist groups may see them as high-value targets that can be attacked at a relatively low cost. Furthermore, non-state actors with growing cyber capabilities could exploit vulnerabilities in these networks, potentially disrupting services or stealing sensitive data. This confluence of high-tech and low-tech threats should sound alarms about the future security of global communication networks. 

Emily Milliken is an analyst focusing on Gulf security issues, and the associate director of media and communications for the N7 Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. 

In 2023, the United States produced more oil in a single year than any other country in history—largely due to fracking, which injects fluid under high pressure into rocks, cracking them open to access oil stored within them. The same technique can be used to draw cleaner sources of energy—such as the heat trapped in the earth’s crust—to the surface and send it out to homes across the United States. Geothermal energy harnesses that heat and constitutes a low-carbon energy source. With new technology on the horizon that could make it easier to utilize geothermal energy in more parts of the country, the United States is poised to unlock a major source of energy.  

Geothermal-power extraction is currently confined to traditional hydrothermal regions, mostly in the western continental United States plus Hawaii and Alaska. In these regions, conventional geothermal systems tap into the naturally occurring hot water or steam from the earth to drive turbines that generate electricity.  

Through enhanced geothermal systems (EGS), geothermal-energy production could be expanded far beyond traditional hydrothermal regions. According to the US Department of Energy, by replicating the physical dynamics present in these regions, EGS has the potential to power more than 65 million homes—a little under half of all American homes. EGS is similar to fracking in that it involves injecting fluid into the ground to create new fractures or reopen old ones, resulting in increased permeability. The hot fluid is then pumped to the surface, where it is used to generate electricity. This method works in areas where the ground is hot enough but there may not be enough naturally occurring fluid or permeability to make geothermal power viable without the addition of EGS. 

Currently, the United States has utilized less than 0.7 percent of its geothermal-electricity resources, with the remaining potential expected to become available via EGS. The Department of Energy has started to recognize the potential of EGS, funding projects in Nevada, California, and Utah. The department’s Enhanced Geothermal Shot initiative seeks to reduce the cost of EGS by 90 percent by 2035 to $45 per megawatt hour. It’s an ambitious goal, but one that, if successful, would dramatically increase access to this low- or no-carbon energy source across the United States.  

That could help address an urgent need. One analysis estimates that power demand in the United States will grow 4.7 percent over the next five years, outpacing the 0.5 percent growth in annual demand over the last decade. Though not a silver bullet, expanding access to geothermal power could help meet this demand in a clean, predictable, and relatively cheap way. 

Imran Bayoumi is an associate director at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Given the political and technical difficulties of getting countries to reduce the amount of greenhouse gases they pump into the air, the quest for technologies that can remove these gases has grown ever more important. One such technology, direct air capture (DAC), involves pulling carbon dioxide (CO2) out of the air and permanently storing it somewhere else, usually deep underground in rock formations. Because current methods of direct air capture are costly and energy-intensive, they have made only a marginal contribution to meeting global climate goals.  

Yet carbon capture might be poised for a transformation thanks to a yellow powder. DAC technologies are expensive to scale because they use substantial amounts of water and energy and are designed to capture concentrated sources of carbon such as the exhaust from a power plant. A new CO2-absorbing material called COF-999, created by a University of California at Berkeley-led team of scientists, could collect CO2 far more cheaply, using substantially less water and energy, than current DAC processes. Utilizing a covalent organic framework—involving the strongest chemical bonds in nature—the material promises to be dependable and sustainable. The powder is less likely to be damaged by humidity, reaches half its capacity in only eighteen minutes, is reusable (it can be used through one hundred cycles of the carbon-removal process, with minimal capacity loss), and might effectively pull CO2 out of the air around us, which has far lower concentrations of carbon than, for example, power-plant exhaust. 

Current carbon-capture technology, according to some estimates, could account for 14 percent of the global-emissions reductions needed to meet climate targets by 2050. The market is already expected to rapidly expand, with a projected compound annual growth rate of 6.2 percent over the next five years and estimated value of four trillion dollars by 2050. The invention of COF-999 could supercharge these numbers. It could be easily implemented in existing carbon-capture systems, or scientists could experiment with ways to take advantage of its ability to clean ambient air. “We took a powder of this material, put it in a tube, and we passed Berkeley air—just outdoor air—into the material to see how it would perform … It cleaned the air entirely of CO2,” said Omar Yaghi, a Berkeley chemistry professor who worked on the study. As atmospheric CO2 levels hit record highs, and extreme heat waves, wildfires, floods, and hurricanes increase in frequency, the yellow-powder breakthrough is one example of the creative science needed to counter inaction on rising global emissions.

Ginger Matchett is a program assistant with the GeoStrategy Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. 

If you have fifteen million dollars to spare, an unused ancestral estate, or even a small plot of land in need of transformation, you too can get in on the hot new trend of rewilding—or the process of rebuilding natural ecosystems on landscapes disrupted by humans. The concept represents a fundamental shift in the way governments, ecologists, and ordinary people view conservation. It focuses on restoring to health native environments—including their balance of plants and animals—rather than on trying to protect scarce undisturbed areas such as wilderness (only 3 percent of the Earth’s land surface is ecologically intact). The idea first took off in North America and has spread like kudzu, including to the estates of the ultra-wealthy. Although rewilding remains a niche solution to various conservation problems, it may be on the verge of an explosion, with major consequences for the global climate. 

Some estimates already put the global total of land available for rewilding at a billion acres, which is roughly half the area of the Australian landmass—and even more is set to become available over the course of this century as a combination of factors reduce pressure for the intensive use of land. Some two-thirds of humanity is projected to live in cities by 2050, and the world’s total population (urban and rural) is expected to peak by the mid-2080s. At the same time, agricultural productivity is increasing, technology and innovation are decoupling food output from land input, and alternative proteins, which are far less land- and carbon-intensive than animal-based proteins, are becoming increasingly popular. 

A 2024 study found that a quarter of land in Europe is suitable for rewilding, with Scandinavian countries, Scotland, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal at the top of the list. A lot of land is viable for rewilding beyond Europe, too, including in Japan and North America. In the United States alone, around thirty million acres of cropland has been abandoned since the 1980s.  

Rewilding may help the environment by absorbing carbon and reversing biodiversity loss. Recent declines in biodiversity around the world, including a 73 percent decrease in wildlife populations over the last fifty years and one million species on the verge of extinction, are linked to accelerated climate change and the spread of infectious diseases. There could be economic benefits as well. Nature tourism is responsible for $600 billion in revenue globally and twenty-two million jobs; revitalized natural spaces and the reintroduction of large animals into them can help raise those numbers. Restoration and rewilding can also increase farming yields, the availability of water, and global fish populations, while also reducing the degradation of agricultural land. Mangroves, coastal wetlands, and coral reefs can lessen flood risk. Putting large herbivores back into their native areas can lower wildfire risk. 

Just as the potential benefits of rewilding are becoming clearer, so too are its possible costs. Some experts fear that rewilding efforts may, like some net-zero carbon pledges, allow governments and industry to sidestep decarbonization efforts in favor of carbon offsets, which are unregulated and can be reversed. The reintroduction of animals and plants, particularly large predators, can also induce a public backlash, which may harm rewilding and restoration. Restoration of ecosystems might increase the risks of tick- and other vector-borne diseases as well. As the world grows hotter, it could prove difficult to reintroduce some desired species. 

Nevertheless, if the land resources and financial incentives for ecological restoration combine with messaging and public sentiment in favor of individual and community action, rewilding may become a movement capable of restoring wide swathes of land to their original states. In so doing, it might open a new route to address the effects of a changing climate.

John Cookson is the editor of the Atlantic Council’s New Atlanticist.  

Sydney Sherry is an assistant director with the GeoStrategy Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. 

In 2019, scientists Akira Yoshino, M. Stanley Whittingham, and John B. Goodenough won the Nobel Prize in chemistry for their development of the rechargeable, renewable lithium-ion battery. The committee commended the trio for having “laid the foundation of a wireless, fossil fuel-free society.” Since their debut in the 1990s, batteries have become ubiquitous in all kinds of electronics. But there’s something even better on the horizon, and not a moment too soon: quantum batteries. 

These novel batteries store energy by drawing on quantum mechanics (the study of physics on a microscopic scale) and particularly quantum chemistry, which is crucial to battery research and allows scientists to understand the chemical structure and reaction of atoms at significantly quicker speeds than current models. It’s a promising emerging technology to watch amid a broader exploration of alternative battery chemistries that could offer the energy density and stability to perform better than lithium-ion batteries for certain functions. 

One application is medical devices. About 26 percent of the US adult population has some type of disability that requires a medical device—such as cochlear implants or a pacemaker—and these devices rely on lithium-ion, lithium, or lithium-iodine batteries for energy. Supply of such batteries isn’t guaranteed; beginning in 2022, for instance, a lithium-ion battery shortage upended electric-vehicle and medical-device supply chains in the United States. These batteries also often require recharging or a replacement, which can necessitate additional surgeries if the medical device that uses them is implanted.

Since quantum batteries could have higher energy density, quantum devices could provide more efficient and long-lasting performance than lithium-based options, reducing the number of battery exchanges that put patients at risk. The energy stored in quantum batteries also could power medical facilities and electric vehicles, improving emergency services in vulnerable and remote areas—a crucial concern worldwide, as climate change brings stronger storms along with longer and more intense heat waves, which not only raise health risks but also strain power grids. During power outages, most hospitals today rely on fossil-fuel and battery-system generators, which often experience complications. In the future, quantum batteries could power these facilities instead. Additionally, since quantum batteries could accelerate charging times for electric vehicles from the current thirty minutes to seconds at high-speed stations (and from about ten hours to a few minutes at home), electrically powered ambulances and medical devices could be charged and ready to go in seconds—a unit of time that can make all the difference for first responders.  

Tatevik Khachatryan is an assistant director for events at the Atlantic Council.

Picture someone falling for an online hoax. If an elderly internet user came to mind, think again. A recent study from Cambridge University revealed that the generation that grew up with the internet—and that reported in the study spending the most time online—had a hard time telling real headlines from fake ones. 

Though they tend to be tech savvy and certainly are not the only generation vulnerable to inaccurate information, members of Generation Z (those born in the late 1990s and early 2000s) are more susceptible to mis- and disinformation than widely assumed. Often relying on social media as a primary news source, digital natives are vulnerable to manipulation. In the Cambridge study, as well as in research conducted by the Center for Countering Digital Hate, they demonstrated a propensity to believe in conspiracy theories. Gen Z might be conscious of the threat posed by biased feeds and manipulated media, but its members continue to scroll and share—and their amplification of mis- and disinformation will be a serious challenge in the future.

Social media is a central fact of life for the vast majority of Gen Zers in the developed world, and it has become an indispensable informational tool for those in developing countries as well. In 2024, a report surveying nearly 4,500 individuals across the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Australia found that 91 percent of Gen Z social media users are on Instagram and 86 percent are on TikTok. Gen Z is forming judgments based on the content appearing on their social media feeds—often curated by algorithms that privilege content with higher engagement levels regardless of whether it is true or false—and circulating it to their digital communities. Their decisions about who to follow on social media are not necessarily rooted in the authenticity or credibility of those figures. Instead their social media consumption is often parasocial: They tend to follow media streams and engage with the causes of individuals who they don’t know personally, be they influencers or politicians. 

A generation growing up with seemingly unlimited access to information and extensive knowledge about what digital technologies like algorithms do, but with limited ability to verify that information, represents a significant sociological change. As members of Gen Z proceed in their careers and assume more powerful positions, there is a real risk that they have been left ill-prepared to navigate the overwhelming scale of online information ecosystems. The mis- and disinformation surrounding global challenges ranging from war to migration to climate change may also make Gen Zers more mistrustful of both institutions and other individuals, rendering them less capable of addressing these challenges. Collaborative efforts between Gen Z and older generations—engaging private companies, governments, and individuals—are needed to manage a transformed information landscape and prevent subsequent generations from growing up in an era of misinformation or falling for online hoaxes. 

Ginger Matchett is a program assistant with the GeoStrategy Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. 

Srujan Palkar is a Global India fellow and assistant director with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Global Foresight 2025

In this year’s Global Foresight edition, our experts share findings from our survey of global strategists on how human affairs could unfold over the next decade. Our team of next-generation scholars spot “snow leopards” that could have major unexpected impacts in 2025 and beyond. And our foresight practitioners imagine three different scenarios for the next decade.

Learn More Full Survey

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Welcome to 2035: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts

In the fall of 2024 after the outcome of the US presidential election, the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security surveyed the future, asking leading global strategists and foresight practitioners around the world to answer our most burning questions about the biggest drivers of change over the next ten years. Here are the full results.

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Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2025

By Emily Milliken, Imran Bayoumi, Ginger Matchett, Srujan Palkar, Sydney Sherry

Atlantic Council foresight experts spot the underappreciated phenomena that could have outsized impact on the world, driving global change and shaping the future.

Civil Society Climate Change & Climate Action

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Three worlds in 2035: Imagining scenarios for how the world could be transformed over the next decade

2024 was marked by increased climate shocks and collaboration of autocratic adversaries. What will the world look like in the next decade? The Atlantic Council’s top experts brought their globe-spanning expertise to the task of forecasting three different scenarios for the future.

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The post Six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2025 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

By Mary Kate Aylward, Peter Engelke, Uri Friedman, and Paul Kielstra

Not all the projections were pessimistic. Fifty-eight percent of those who participated in our Global Foresight 2025 survey, for example, felt that artificial intelligence would, on balance, have a positive impact on global affairs over the next ten years—an increase of 7 percentage points from our Global Foresight 2024 survey. Roughly half of respondents foresaw an expansion of global cooperation on climate change.  

But the grimmer forecasts were in keeping with a dark global outlook overall, with 62 percent of respondents expecting the world a decade from now to be worse off than it is today, and only 38 percent predicting that it will be better off.  

The 357 survey respondents were mostly citizens of the United States (just under 55 percent of those polled), with the others spread across sixty countries and every continent but Antarctica. Respondents skewed male and older, and were dispersed across a range of fields including the private sector, nonprofits, academic or educational organizations, and government and multilateral institutions.  

So what do these forecasters of the global future anticipate over the coming decade? Below are the survey’s ten biggest findings. 

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series

Feb 12, 2025

The Global Foresight 2025 survey: Full results

In the fall of 2024 after the outcome of the US presidential election, the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security surveyed the future, asking leading global strategists and foresight practitioners around the world to answer our most burning questions about the biggest drivers of change over the next ten years. Here are the full results.

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1. Forty percent of respondents expect a world war in the next decade—one that could go nuclear and extend to space 

For the first time in our annual survey, we asked respondents whether they expected there to be another world war by 2035. We defined such a war as involving a multifront conflict among great powers. And the results were alarming, with 40 percent saying yes.  

While this was a new question, our Global Foresight 2024 survey surfaced a similar concern, with nearly a quarter of respondents pointing to war between major powers as the greatest threat to global prosperity over the next ten years.

The finding tracks with worries expressed by other experts amid major wars in Europe and the Middle East, growing tensions between the United States and China, and increasing cooperation among China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Surveying this treacherous global landscape this past summer, for example, the historian and former US diplomat Philip Zelikow assigned a 20 to 30 percent probability to the prospect of “worldwide warfare” and warned of a “period of maximum danger” within the next one to three years. 

Judging by our respondents’ answers, another world war might feature nuclear weapons. Forty-eight percent of respondents overall (and 63 percent of those predicting World War III) expected nuclear weapons to be used in the coming decade by at least one actor.  

Such a conflict also may play out in outer space. Forty-five percent of respondents overall (and 60 percent of those predicting World War III) expected the next decade to include a direct military conflict fought, at least in part, in space.  

And it could be devastating to the global economy. Twenty-eight percent of respondents identified war among major powers as the single biggest threat to global prosperity over the next ten years. 

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2. Tensions with China and Russia are potential vectors for major conflict 

By definition, a world war would involve more than two belligerent nations. But across multiple questions in the survey, respondents forecast a future in which today’s strategic competition and geopolitical tensions between the United States and China in particular could sharpen into something more dangerous.  

Survey respondents, for instance, were significantly more inclined than a year earlier to foresee a military conflict over Taiwan, which could draw in the United States in support of the island and against China. Sixty-five percent of all respondents somewhat or strongly agreed that China will try to retake Taiwan by force within the next decade, and only 24 percent somewhat or strongly disagreed. In our Global Foresight 2024 survey, that split was 50 percent to 30 percent. Among those predicting the breakout of another world war, the proportion was even higher: Seventy-nine percent believed China will attempt to forcibly retake Taiwan over the next ten years. 

Expand to read expert insight by Markus Garlauskas

Though this year’s survey findings may seem worrisome at first because respondents see increasing risks of war, I find them reassuring. The change from last year shows a greater awareness of the nature of the threats we face in the Indo-Pacific, particularly the risk of confronting simultaneous conflicts with multiple adversaries and nuclear attacks.

That a clear majority of respondents now expect Beijing to try to take Taiwan by force in the coming decade is actually a hopeful signal to me. Chinese President Xi Jinping has been clearly building up military forces suited for offensive operations and has repeatedly stated that he will not renounce the use of force to bring Taiwan under control. Meanwhile, polls suggest that the vast majority of the people of Taiwan are disinclined to be ruled by Beijing, favoring either the status quo or outright independence.

This would seem to set Beijing and Taipei on an inevitable collision course. Yet there is also good reason to believe that China overwhelming Taiwan is not inevitable, in part because invasion would be a far more difficult operation than is commonly recognized. It will take the increasing sense of threat of force identified by the survey to prompt Taiwan and the United States to make the investments necessary to increase their preparedness for deterring and defeating such use of force.

This growing awakening on the part of the United States and its allies can become the basis for a call to action for the populations, governments, and militaries of these countries. The United States has typically waited until war was thrust upon it before preparing comprehensively. Now is the time to act, to prepare, ideally to deter such aggression, and to be ready to hold firm if deterrence fails and we face either a short, sharp war or a protracted one. 

—Markus Garlauskas, director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

A US-China confrontation is not the only potential pathway to a multifront conflict among great powers. Forty-five percent of respondents somewhat or strongly agreed that Russia and NATO will engage in a direct military conflict within the next ten years—a significant increase from the 29 percent who felt this way in our Global Foresight 2024 survey. Among respondents expecting another world war within the next decade, 69 percent anticipated a direct clash between Russia and NATO.

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3. Just under half of respondents expect China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea to be formal allies within a decade, potentially in a world featuring China- and US-aligned blocs 

Other geopolitical dynamics forecast by survey respondents could serve as the kindling for whatever spark ignites a wider war or, alternatively, emerge as byproducts of such a conflict.  

Forty-seven percent of respondents predicted that, by 2035, the world will largely be divided into China-aligned and US-aligned blocs; among that group, nearly 60 percent expected the China-aligned bloc to include Russia, Iran, and North Korea as formal allies, presumably with China leading the alliance.  

Overall, just under half of our survey respondents (46 percent) agreed that the emerging axis of Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea will be formal allies in 2035. While this was the first time we asked this question regarding all four countries, in our Global Foresight 2024 survey 33 percent of respondents thought Russia and China would be formal allies in ten years’ time. 

Many respondents appeared to associate these potential developments with the prospect of a world war. Among respondents who foresaw both the world being divided into China- and US-aligned blocs and China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea becoming formal allies, 62 percent also anticipated another world war over the next decade; among other survey respondents, that figure was far lower at 33 percent. 

Expand to read expert insight by Melanie Hart

Economically, there is movement underway toward a US-and-allies versus China-aligned bloc structure, but this movement is still nascent. How far it goes will largely depend on whether the United States can overcome its domestic political reticence to actively shaping the global economic order and once again begin negotiating market-access trade deals.

Beijing seeks a global system in which other nations must abide by its wishes and there are no constraints—legal, normative, or otherwise—limiting Beijing’s own actions. Beijing is using global commerce to enforce this approach. For nations that depend on trade or investment with China, Beijing is increasingly willing to shut off the flow of goods and capital to enforce its demands in other issue areas. Beijing is also using those partners as consumption dumping grounds, exporting excess capacity across a wide array of goods (such as steel and electric vehicles) at rock-bottom prices, which addresses over-supply in the China market but drives local producers out of business. This is leading many nations to reduce their exposure and vulnerabilities to Beijing’s market interference. Many of those nations increasingly view Western, US-centric supply chains as a more attractive option.

As this shift unfolds, it could lead to new economic blocs—for example, a new multilateral trading structure in which the United States and its allies are at the center of a global trading bloc that China is not allowed to join. However, that will depend on Washington shaking off its trade malaise and figuring out how to negotiate new trade deals that create new, formal structures centered on US and allied rules of the road. China is busy creating its own options—such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in Asia—but the United States is hanging back. Without more assertive US-led action on the trade front, the biggest risk is that China will form a new, massive global economic bloc and write the rules to benefit itself at our expense, while the United States and its allies watch from the sidelines.

As for China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, these four nations are partners with a clear shared interest—namely, their desire to undermine the United States and the liberal international order—but they are not true allies. China’s need for integration with the global economy is likely to limit the degree to which today’s partnership evolves in the future into a more formal alliance similar to the alliance the United States enjoys with its NATO partners.

The Chinese Communist Party has staked its regime legitimacy—its pitch for the Chinese people’s continued support—largely on its ability to deliver economically. Unfortunately, the party has also decided that the reforms required to deliver next-level economic growth are too risky, as they would require the party to cede more internal political control over the nation’s economy, legal system, and society. As long as Chinese leaders are unwilling to do that, they will lag behind the West in technology innovation, and they will depend on access to Western companies, universities, and markets to help fill that gap. That dependence limits China’s willingness to sign up for a comprehensive alliance with Russia, Iran, or North Korea, because Beijing does not want to join those nations in an economic wilderness that cuts Chinese companies off from the world’s leading technology powers.

—Melanie Hart, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub 

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4. The proliferation and use of nuclear weapons is a growing risk, with nearly half of respondents expecting a nuclear weapon to be used by 2035

Since the dawn of the Atomic Age and particularly since the latter part of the Cold War, nuclear nonproliferation efforts have sought to prevent additional countries from acquiring the world’s most destructive weapons, with varying success. And after the United States did so in 1945, no country has used nuclear weapons in war. But according to our survey respondents, the coming decade could bring very concerning developments on both these fronts. 

Iran is the most likely—but not the only potential—new nuclear-weapons power on the horizon 

In our latest survey, 88 percent of respondents expected at least one new country to obtain nuclear weapons in the coming decade, a slight uptick from 84 percent in the Global Foresight 2024 edition. As in our previous survey, just under three quarters of respondents predicted that Iran will go beyond its current threshold status and join the nuclear-weapons club within the next ten years, making it the survey’s most-cited candidate to become a nuclear-weapons state in the future.  

The coming years could bring a range of policy responses to this anticipated development, from strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities to a new round of nuclear negotiations with Tehran. Perhaps in recognition of these scenarios, more than a third of respondents expected Israel to have engaged in a direct war with Iran by 2035.

Expand to read expert insight by Alan Pino

Is Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon inevitable or at least highly likely in the next decade? Far from it. Whether Iran acquires a nuclear weapon will depend on policy choices made by Iran, Israel, and the United States regarding Tehran’s nuclear program.

Currently, Iran still officially disavows an intent to produce a nuclear weapon, but there has been much more talk among Iranian officials during the past year of the need for one as pressure on Iran has increased due to Israeli military actions against Tehran’s “resistance axis” and Iran itself.

Iran’s military and economic weaknesses have intensified an ongoing debate between moderates and hardliners in Iran over the direction of the country’s foreign and nuclear policy. Moderates want to negotiate a freeze on Iran’s nuclear program in return for the lifting of economic sanctions and an opening of trade and investment with the West and Arab Gulf states. Hardliners argue Iran must double down on its expansionist regional policies, its threshold status as a military nuclear power, its growing ties to Russia and China, and its hardline stance toward the United States and the West to rebuild deterrence and resilience.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will have to make the call on which policy to pursue, and uppermost in his mind will be which approach—or mixture of the two—best ensures the survival of the Islamic Republic, his overarching priority.

Israeli officials continue to monitor Iran’s nuclear program closely and have reiterated warnings that Israel will resort to military force if Iran seeks to acquire a nuclear weapon. Israel under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been emboldened by its military successes over the past year, including the destruction of Hamas’s and Hezbollah’s military capabilities and Iran’s air defenses, as well as the weakening of Iran’s missile-production capabilities. Senior Israeli officials probably believe conditions are ripe to destroy or set back Iran’s nuclear program without major threat of retaliation, given the Islamic Republic’s current vulnerability, but also seem to recognize that Israel would need US military support to do lasting damage.

The Trump administration is committed to restoring its previous maximum-pressure campaign of sanctions against Iran to compel it to agree to a new nuclear deal and curbs on its malign regional behavior. Trump’s transition team reportedly discussed the possibility of a preemptive attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities given that Iran now has enough highly enriched uranium for several bombs and that sanctions could take a long time to work. They may have leaked this option to frighten Iran into agreeing to negotiations, but clearly the Trump administration is signaling a willingness to go beyond sanctions and diplomacy to achieve its objectives.

With Iran’s axis of resistance shredded, and Iran itself weakened militarily and economically, the United States has an extraordinary opportunity—working with Israel, Arab allies, and European countries—to use economic and diplomatic pressure backed by the threat of military force to secure an agreement that walks Iran back from the nuclear brink and curbs its destabilizing regional policies.

—Alan Pino, former US national intelligence officer for the Near East 

What is new is the jump in the percentage of respondents expecting other countries to get these weapons. In our Global Foresight 2024 survey, for example, a quarter of respondents thought South Korea would acquire nuclear weapons. In our most recent survey, that figure was 40 percent. The percentage of respondents expecting Japan—the only country ever subject to a nuclear-weapons attack, where the survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings are a prominent national presence—to acquire nuclear weapons also increased ten percentage points over 2024, from 19 percent to 29 percent. (Notably, while the percentage of respondents anticipating a nuclear Iran in ten years’ time remained steady year over year, so did the roughly 40 percent of respondents expecting nearby rival Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons as well.) 

North Korea and Russia are considered the most likely to launch a nuclear-weapons attack

Forty-eight percent of respondents expected nuclear weapons to be used in the coming decade, up from 37 percent in our previous survey.  

Expand to read expert insight by Matthew Kroenig

This finding demonstrates that nuclear weapons have returned to the center of geopolitics. For years after the end of the Cold War, many assumed that nuclear weapons were obsolete relics from the past. The Obama administration made eliminating nuclear weapons a top priority. At the time, Washington assessed that there was virtually zero chance of a nuclear war among states and the greatest nuclear threats came from terrorism or accident.

Now, nearly half of our respondents assess that nuclear weapons will be used in the coming decade. This shows that nuclear weapons are not twentieth-century curiosities but the ultimate instrument of force and essential tools of great-power competition. China is engaging in the most rapid nuclear buildup since the 1960s, Russia is issuing regular nuclear threats, North Korea’s nuclear arsenal continues to grow, and Iran’s dash time to the bomb is now measured in weeks.

This means that the United States will need to once again strengthen its strategic forces to deter adversaries and assure allies. By doing so, I hope the United States can prove our respondents wrong and ensure that the world’s most powerful weapons are never used again.

—Matthew Kroenig, vice president and senior director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security 

Roughly one-quarter of respondents predicted that Russia will use a nuclear weapon by 2035, with around the same percentage saying the same regarding North Korea, amid reports of near-Russian nuclear use early in its war against Ukraine and concerns about crumbling deterrence on the Korean peninsula. Both cases represent significant increases relative to our previous survey, when only 14 percent expected Russia to employ a nuke and 15 percent believed North Korea would do so. 

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5. The United States is still likely to be dominant militarily in 2035—but with relatively less economic, diplomatic, and soft power as it navigates a multipolar world

Three-quarters of respondents in our latest survey agreed that the world in 2035 will be multipolar, with multiple centers of power, in line with the findings in our previous survey. 

A slightly smaller percentage of respondents—71 percent—expected the United States to remain the world’s dominant military power by that time. A majority (58 percent) envisioned the United States being the world’s dominant technology innovator a decade from now.  

On other measures of power—economic, cultural, and diplomatic—respondents predicting US dominance in 2035 were in the minority, if only ever so slightly in the case of economic power, in which 49 percent of respondents expected the United States to be dominant. 

Between our latest survey and the previous year’s, confidence in US dominance over the next decade dropped across several measures of power, particularly diplomatic and military clout. Those forecasting US dominance in ten years’ time declined from 81 percent to 71 percent for military power, 63 percent to 58 percent for technological innovation, 52 percent to 49 percent for economic power, and 32 percent to 24 percent for diplomatic power. (The Global Foresight 2024 survey did not ask about future US dominance in cultural or soft power, which 35 percent of respondents expected in our most recent survey.) Slightly more respondents (12 percent) relative to our prior survey (7 percent) forecast that the United States will be dominant in none of these areas by 2035. 

A bright but more uncertain future for US alliances 

While a majority of respondents (61 percent) expected the United States to maintain its security alliances and partnerships in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East in 2035, this figure was markedly down from our previous survey (79 percent), with much of the shift seeming to stem from those answering that they “don’t know” (26 percent in the Global Foresight 2025 edition relative to 12 percent in the 2024 edition).  

Responses on the future of US military dominance and alliances appear correlated. Among those who expected the United States to retain such dominance by 2035, 67 percent believed that it would maintain its network of alliances. Among those who did not think the United States would be the world’s dominant military power in a decade, only 46 percent believed that the country would preserve its alliance network. 

In our Global Foresight 2024 survey, just under a third of respondents expected Europe to have achieved “strategic autonomy” within the next decade by taking more responsibility for its own security and thus relying less on the United States. In our latest survey, however, almost half of respondents (48 percent) expected Europe to achieve “strategic autonomy” over the next ten years—a notable increase as President Donald Trump presses European countries to substantially increase their defense spending.

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the state of alliances and partnerships in 2035:

The dangers of a diminished United States 

Those who anticipate a diminished United States over the next decade may link such a scenario to worse outcomes for the world. Among respondents who said that by 2035 the United States will be the dominant power in none of the domains listed in the survey, for instance, only 24 percent believed that the world will be better off in a decade’s time. Among other respondents, 40 percent expected the world to be better off ten years from now. Similarly, among those who didn’t expect US dominance in any domain of power in a decade, 62 percent envisioned a world war occurring over that timeframe. For the rest of the survey pool, 38 percent anticipated another world war.  

Expand to read expert insight by Matthew Kroenig

In the United States, declinism is a national pastime with a poor track record. In the 1970s, many thought the Soviet Union was on a trajectory to overtake the United States as the world’s leading superpower. In the 1980s, economists projected that Japan would unseat the United States as the world’s leading economy. In the 2010s, many thought it was inevitable that China would become the world’s largest economic power.

All of those predictions turned out to be incorrect.

The United States is now a rising power, claiming 26 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP), its largest share in two decades. Meanwhile, China is declining; Xi Jinping’s desire to assert Chinese Communist Party control over all aspects of Chinese society is stifling Chinese growth, and his aggressive foreign policy is undercutting the global economic engagement strategy that fueled China’s rise. Europe’s share of global GDP has fallen from a quarter in the 1980s to roughly 15 percent today. Russia’s GDP is smaller than Italy’s and Spain’s. To whom then is the United States supposedly ceding all of this power?

Is the United States in decline? I wouldn’t bet on it.

—Matthew Kroenig, vice president and senior director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security 

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6. Many respondents are pessimistic about the war in Ukraine ending on terms favorable to Ukraine

Amid a push by the incoming Trump administration to bring the war in Ukraine to an end three years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country, and as Ukraine and Russia each seek to secure the best possible terms in any future negotiated peace deal, respondents were split on the likely outcome of the conflict. Forty-seven percent predicted that Russia’s war against Ukraine will end on terms largely favorable to Russia and 43 percent forecast that it will result in a “frozen conflict.” Only 4 percent expected the war to end on terms largely favorable to Ukraine.  

Our previous survey a year earlier, which asked a different and more detailed question about Ukraine in ten years’ time, reflected more optimism, with 48 percent of respondents predicting that Ukraine would emerge from the war as an independent, sovereign state in control of the territory it held before Russia’s escalated assault on the country in 2022. 

Expand to read expert insight by John Herbst

Expectations about the future change in the wake of historic developments and perceptions of those developments. Perhaps the single most important factor in determining the outcome of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine is US policy.

Simply put, a strong US policy providing Ukraine the weapons to drive Russian forces largely out of Ukraine and rallying the political West to supply Ukraine’s economic needs would lead to a clear defeat for Russian President Vladimir Putin that would return much of occupied Ukraine to Kyiv’s control, and with a US-led effort would vouchsafe Ukraine’s security and territorial integrity via NATO membership. Alternatively, a US decision to cut off aid to Ukraine would likely lead to a disaster that would ensure Kremlin political control of the country, produce a direct threat to NATO, and encourage aggression by US adversaries in the Far and Middle East.

US President Joe Biden gave substantial support to Ukraine, but he stopped well short of giving Ukraine the arms and permission to take back most of the country. Trump has stated that he wants Ukraine to survive and would not abandon the country, but he is seeking a durable peace that requires compromise from Ukraine as well as Russia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has indicated a readiness to compromise; Putin has not. Recognizing this, Trump and his team have identified Putin as the recalcitrant party and have spoken of major economic measures—tougher sanctions, transferring the $300 billion in frozen Russian state assets to Ukraine—to persuade Russia to negotiate. Respondents to the survey pay attention to the major factors affecting this war, including the Trump angle. But respondents to surveys are not seers, and survey questions are not written to explore the insights that seers might provide.

What therefore might we expect to happen with the war this coming year? First, Trump will roll out a peace initiative that likely includes four elements already public. Two are hard for Zelenskyy: territorial concessions (at least de facto) and no NATO membership for Ukraine for twenty years minimum. And two are hard for Putin: the demilitarized zone enforced by European troops and arming Ukraine to the hilt to prevent future Russian aggression. We can expect Putin to try hard to get Trump to drop those last two points before and then during the talks. But if Putin is persuaded that Trump will arm Ukraine with far more advanced weapons if Russia is unyielding, he might agree to terms that he intends to violate. Trump’s hopes for a Nobel Peace Prize depend on him insisting that Russia compromise to the point of ensuring a viable and stable future for Ukraine, and being ready to confront the ever-treacherous Russian dictator if Putin violates an agreement whose terms would yield that outcome.

—John Herbst, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center 

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7. Respondents are much more optimistic about a breakthrough in Israeli-Saudi relations than in Israeli-Palestinian peace  

Ever since Hamas’s October 7, 2023 terrorist attacks against Israel and Israel’s ensuing war in Gaza set off transformative changes in the broader Middle East, US officials have linked reviving work on normalizing diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia with renewing the push for a pathway to a Palestinian state as part of an eventual Israeli-Palestinian peace deal, with the Saudis insisting on the latter as a condition for the former.  

But our survey respondents—who, notably, shared their views before Israel and Hamas reached their January cease-fire and hostage deal—were much more bullish about the prospects for Israeli-Saudi normalization in the coming decade than about the chances of an Israeli-Palestinian two-state solution. Fifty-six percent envisioned Israel having normalized diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia by 2035—roughly similar to the percentage who said the same in our post-October 7, 2023, Global Foresight 2024 survey—relative to 17 percent who expected Israel to be coexisting next to a sovereign, independent Palestinian state within that timeframe. More than 60 percent of respondents predicted that when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, today’s status quo, with occupied Palestinian territories, will persist. 

Expand to read expert insight by Alan Pino

In 2035, will Israel have the status quo that exists today, with occupied Palestinian territories?

Hamas’s surprise attack on Israel on October 7, 2023 has taught us the dangers of thinking a status quo will continue indefinitely. Israeli leaders’ belief that Hamas had reconciled itself to the status quo in Gaza—in which Gazans received economic benefits in return for Hamas not attacking Israel—left them unprepared for the most devastating attack on the Jewish state since its war of independence in 1948.

And the war in Gaza that resulted from Hamas’s attack has brought further surprises: Israel’s almost complete destruction of Hamas as a military and political organization; the killing of most of Hezbollah’s military leaders and elimination of a majority of its vaunted rocket and missile arsenal; direct Iranian and Israeli attacks on each other’s territory, with Israel wiping out all of Iran’s most advanced air-defense systems; and the almost overnight collapse of the Syrian military and the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in the face of a renewed rebel offensive.

The Middle East’s geopolitical landscape has been dramatically transformed, and Iran’s image as a regional hegemon and defender of the Palestinians badly tarnished. Israeli leaders have been emboldened by Israel’s military successes and seem to believe that maintaining military dominance alone will deter the country’s enemies.

But some observers, looking ahead, ask whether the cycle of violence since October 7 is likely to repeat itself at some point if Israel doesn’t address the issue of Palestinian aspirations for independence. The Biden administration and others have called for a return to the idea of a two-state solution as necessary to forestall future cycles of Israeli-Palestinian violence.

Admittedly, the current environment is not propitious for discussion of a Palestinian state. A large majority of Israelis, still traumatized by Hamas’s horrific attack on October 7, reject the idea as posing a grave risk to Israel’s security. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly refused calls from the United States to incorporate the concept of an eventual Palestinian state into Israel’s post-war strategy, and right-wingers in the current Israeli government want to annex a large part of the West Bank, keep long-term control of the Gaza Strip, and return Israeli settlements to Gaza.

But the Palestinian issue is not likely to go away. Anti-Israel militancy and violence by Palestinians is growing in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, and Israel hasn’t totally suppressed attacks by Hamas in Gaza after more than a year of fighting. Arab publics are seething with anger over the large number of Palestinians killed and displaced by Israeli military operations in Gaza. And world opinion has increasingly turned against Israel as Palestinian casualties have mounted.

The Palestinian issue remains a roadblock to Israel becoming fully integrated into the region, a key goal of Netanyahu’s that he hopes will put a capstone on his legacy as Israel’s longest-serving prime minister. Responding to popular sentiment, Saudi leaders have indicated that Riyadh won’t normalize relations with Israel—an essential step to create a political and security bulwark against renewed threats from Iran—unless Jerusalem endorses a clear pathway to Palestinian statehood.

New elections will probably need to take place in Israel, bringing new leadership open to the idea of a political horizon for the Palestinians, if the current status quo is to change. The United States has an important role to play here by encouraging Israeli leaders to think about how to translate their military success into a regional strategy that includes a vision for ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The odds of such a development seem long right now, but October 7 is a reminder that clinging to an unstable status quo can be riskier than seeking to change it.

—Alan Pino, former US national intelligence officer for the Near East 

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8. As global organizations become less capable of solving the world’s problems, regional groupings and the BRICS may rise in importance   

Respondents foresaw many global institutions growing less effective over the coming decade. Seventy-five percent expected the United Nations (UN) to be less capable of solving challenges core to its mission by 2035 relative to today, compared with 9 percent who anticipated it becoming more capable of doing so. The figures for the United Nations Security Council are only slightly better, with 67 percent of respondents predicting less capability and 9 percent more capability. Sixty percent of respondents envisioned the World Trade Organization being less capable in a decade than it is today.  

Respondents also may be skeptical about the UN’s capacity to tackle global-governance challenges such as climate change. Just under 40 percent of respondents predicted that greenhouse-gas emissions will have peaked and begun to decline by 2035, despite signs that this tipping point is already near. Only about half of respondents believed that renewable energy technologies will be the dominant form of electricity production globally by then, despite significant growth in demand for renewable energy. 

The forecast was less dire for the World Bank, with 46 percent predicting less capability and 19 percent more capability, and International Monetary Fund (IMF), with 41 percent predicting less capability and 20 percent more capability. A similar if slightly more sanguine picture emerged regarding organizations consisting of the world’s leading powers. Forty-nine percent of respondents predicted less capability and 21 percent more capability for the Group of Seven (G7), while 38 percent expected less capability and 29 percent more capability for the Group of Twenty (G20). 

But respondents seemed to hold out even more hope for regional blocs and the BRICS, which is now expanding its membership beyond Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Forty percent of respondents predicted that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations will be more capable of fulfilling its mission by 2035, while 20 percent said the opposite. For the European Union, those figures were 40 percent and 33 percent. (Respondents from EU countries were even more optimistic, with 50 percent expecting greater capability and 22 percent less capability.) For the BRICS, the numbers were 43 percent and 31 percent. 

Expand to read expert insight by Josh Lipsky

The findings show in hard data what many analysts believe—that the international financial institutions, in particular the Bretton Woods institutions, remain the most functional parts of the multilateral system. That’s because they deliver real money every day to countries around the world. 

But the responses also show a growing recognition that these institutions are not self-perpetuating. The tenuous consensus that allows them to go about day-to-day business is predicated on an understanding that functioning IMF and World Bank institutions serve every country (including the United States) better than dysfunctional ones. With Donald Trump’s return to office, there are questions about whether that consensus will hold. For what it’s worth: The first time Trump was in office, it did, and Trump and his team saw the value in both institutions, even if they disagreed with some policy decisions. 

The one area of the findings that seems off-target is on the BRICS. The likelihood of the BRICS succeeding in fulfilling their main goals seems vastly overstated in these findings (likely a product of media reporting on BRICS expansion during 2023 and 2024). Here’s the question that is much tougher to answer: What do the BRICS actually want to achieve? What they oppose—the Western-led system—is clear. But what is their proactive agenda? Until they answer that question, the ability of BRICS to succeed as an institution will be limited at best.   

—Josh Lipsky, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center 

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9. Today’s democratic recession may deepen into a democratic depression

Overall, respondents appeared gloomy about the prospects for democracy around the world by 2035. Just under half envisioned the current “democratic recession” worsening and becoming a “democratic depression,” while only 17 percent anticipated a “democratic renaissance” instead. The remaining 37 percent expected the global state of democracy to remain much as it is today, with some encouraging progress but also considerable headwinds and backsliding. 

Sixty-five percent of respondents also forecast that global press freedoms will decrease by 2035, with another quarter expecting them to stay about the same as they are today and very few anticipating those freedoms increasing over the coming decade. 

Our question on the state of global democracy in our previous survey was not identical and therefore not directly comparable. Nevertheless, its results—24 percent expected more democracies a decade hence, 38 percent forecast fewer democracies, and another 37 percent foresaw stasis—presaged the dim outlook expressed in our latest survey. 

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10. Women are more pessimistic about the global future than men are 

Women notably expressed a bleaker outlook across many questions in the survey related to conflict, their own rights, and US clout over the next decade. 

For instance, 61 percent of female respondents predicted that nuclear weapons will be used in the coming decade, compared with 44 percent of male respondents who said the same. Women (54 percent) were also more likely than men (44 percent) to expect a democratic depression. Thirty-two percent of women pointed to women as the most likely group to have their rights curtailed in the coming decade—twice the proportion of men who gave the same answer. Women, moreover, were less likely than men to envision the United States as the world’s dominant military power (58 percent relative to 76 percent) and technological innovator (47 percent relative to 61 percent) in a decade’s time.  

Expand to read expert insight by Nicole Goldin

The pessimism from women likely reflects persistent inequities in military, economic, and political representation and participation, as well as the disproportionate impacts of crises and shocks—whether those are economic (like inflation), security-related (from wars such as those in Ukraine or Gaza), the result of political turmoil or transition, or the product of natural disasters and climate events.

Compounding these situations are the challenges of child or family care and pay gaps, which limit the work and earnings of many women, and worsening domestic and gender-based violence, which devastates women’s lives in all dimensions. In the United States, the rollback of Roe v. Wade has left many women believing their rights and protection more broadly are at risk.

—Nicole Goldin, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and head of equitable development at United Nations University Centre for Policy Research 

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About the authors

Mary Kate Aylward, Publications Editor, Atlantic Council

Aylward was an editor at War on the Rocks and Army AL&T before joining the Council. She was previously a junior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Peter Engelke, Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

Engelke is on the adjunct faculty at Georgetown University’s School of Continuing Studies and is a frequent lecturer to the US Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute. He was previously a member of the World Economic Forum’s Global Future Council on Complex Risks, an executive-in-residence at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, a Bosch fellow with the Robert Bosch Foundation, and a visiting fellow at the Stimson Center.

Uri Friedman, Senior Editorial Director, Atlantic Council

Friedman is also a contributing writer at The Atlantic, where he writes a regular column on international affairs. He was previously a senior staff writer at The Atlantic covering national security and global affairs, the editor of The Atlantic’s Global section, and the deputy managing editor of Foreign Policy magazine.

Paul Kielstra, Freelance Analyst

Kielstra is a freelance author who has published extensively in fields including business analysis, healthcare, energy policy, fraud control, international trade, and international relations. His work regularly includes the drafting and analysis of large surveys, along with desk research, expert interviews, and scenario building. His clients have included the Atlantic Council, the Economist Group, the Financial Times Group, the World Health Organization, and Kroll. Kielstra holds a doctorate in modern history from the University of Oxford, a graduate diploma in economics from the London School of Economics, and a bachelor of arts from the University of Toronto. He is also a published historian.

Global Foresight 2025

In this year’s Global Foresight edition, our experts share findings from our survey of global strategists on how human affairs could unfold over the next decade. Our team of next-generation scholars spot “snow leopards” that could have major unexpected impacts in 2025 and beyond. And our foresight practitioners imagine three different scenarios for the next decade.

Learn More Full Survey

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Welcome to 2035: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts

In the fall of 2024 after the outcome of the US presidential election, the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security surveyed the future, asking leading global strategists and foresight practitioners around the world to answer our most burning questions about the biggest drivers of change over the next ten years. Here are the full results.

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Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2025

By Emily Milliken, Imran Bayoumi, Ginger Matchett, Srujan Palkar, Sydney Sherry

Atlantic Council foresight experts spot the underappreciated phenomena that could have outsized impact on the world, driving global change and shaping the future.

Civil Society Climate Change & Climate Action

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Three worlds in 2035: Imagining scenarios for how the world could be transformed over the next decade

2024 was marked by increased climate shocks and collaboration of autocratic adversaries. What will the world look like in the next decade? The Atlantic Council’s top experts brought their globe-spanning expertise to the task of forecasting three different scenarios for the future.

Africa China

The post Welcome to 2035: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts appeared first on Atlantic Council.

By Peter Engelke, Greg Lindsay, and Paul Saffo

Welcome to three possible worlds in the year 2035. As resident and non-resident senior fellows in the Atlantic Council’s foresight practice, we produced these scenarios by assessing how current trends and uncertainties across a variety of categories—including geopolitics, the economy, demography, the environment, technology, and society—might interact with one another in the years to come. 

These are not forecasts or predictions of what the future will bring. Instead, these scenarios are intended to inspire imagination and spur readers to consider possible futures, including future worlds that do not align with the readers’ expectations. To paraphrase a sentiment often expressed by the physicist and futurist Herman Kahn, the point of working with future scenarios is to find out what you don’t know and should know but that you didn’t even know you didn’t know. 

We invite readers to interpret these scenarios in that spirit. Consider the interplay among the cause-and-effect elements that lead to each of the potential future worlds, as well as the myriad other possible scenarios that could emerge in the years to come.

Perhaps the world of 2035 might vaguely resemble one of the three scenarios presented here, but that is not the central purpose of this exercise. The primary reason why we crafted these scenarios is to generate deeper insights into how today’s actions and inactions might create a better or worse world ten years from now.

The reluctant international order

Global governance has never been more complicated than it is in 2035. But although the problems are complex, thus far the governance landscape is proving capable of containing at least some of them, as occurred several years ago when we endured a near-miss catastrophe from a bioweapon-fueled pandemic.  

We might not be experiencing the halcyon days of a revitalized multilateralism, but thankfully we’re also not inhabiting a kill-or-be-killed nihilistic hellscape. We seem to be living through what some commentators are now calling the “Reluctant International Order.” 

Let’s begin with what has not happened: neither the much-feared collapse nor the much-hoped-for revitalization of what often is called the rules-based international order (we’ll use the acronym “RBIO”). Which means that neither the 1930s nor the 1990s have returned.  

The international order that the United States and its allies created and maintained after 1945 delivered benefits for decades—benefits that were admittedly partial and often uneven but nonetheless real. Embedded within the RBIO are norms, such as non-aggression toward other countries and respect for human rights, that are laudable ideals. And at its core are multilateral institutions, including the United Nations (UN), World Bank, and World Health Organization (WHO), which were designed to contain conflict, assist with economic development, anticipate and then manage crises of various kinds, and provide some governance in an otherwise anarchic world. The whole order is premised on the notion that international cooperation, combined with the open exchange of ideas and goods, will lead to a better and more peaceful world. 

Yet there has long been dissatisfaction with the RBIO. Today, as before, many countries are unhappy with the RBIO and seek to upend or reform it. China and Russia, the two most powerful and vocal of these states, have remained steadfast in their opposition to at least parts of this order, although it also has become clear that their ends are not identical. A decade ago, both began to join with North Korea and Iran to form a grouping that was labeled an “axis of aggressors” because of widespread concern about those countries coordinating to directly challenge the West and the international order, militarily and otherwise. Numerous other countries, often middle and emerging powers in the so-called Global South have sought, at a minimum, to modify the RBIO. These states—with India and Brazil the most prominent examples—have accused the RBIO of being unrepresentative and its defenders of being hypocritical because of their selective application of the order’s underpinning norms. Even the core group of democratic nations that historically defended the order, including the United States, often have acted against the RBIO when it suited their interests. 

Resilient rules

Despite all this, the various challenges to the RBIO have never been powerful enough to destroy it. Neither the axis of aggressors nor the partnership between China and Russia ever amounted to real military alliances, reflecting weak rather than strong bonds among them. These revisionist states have acted in disjointed fashion, as a result of their divergent interests, and never staged a coordinated attempt to directly confront the West. Partly for that reason, there has been no global war and thus no wholesale shock that reset the global governance system, as occurred after World War II.  

Russia emerged from its war against Ukraine (which ended in a negotiated peace in 2026) far weaker than it was when the conflict began, and it has yet to sufficiently recover to mount another similar challenge westward in Europe. China has made no overt move to seize control of Taiwan either. Evidently, Chinese President Xi Jinping has decided he does not want to gamble his country’s future in a confrontation with the United States, which after all remains a great economic and military power with a formidable nuclear deterrent. (The United States’ increased investment in defense of the Western Pacific also appears to have influenced Xi’s calculations.) It does not help China that Russia is a much-debilitated junior partner. 

The case of Taiwan is important for another reason. It underscores that, so far, China and the United States have decided that coexistence is the preferable direction for their relationship, which has prevented the international system from collapsing altogether. Their rivalry has been channeled through other pathways short of war, including diplomatic efforts to curry favor abroad and support for various minilateral and multilateral institutions. And they’ve found, more than occasionally, that their interests actually intersect. In the realm of nuclear nonproliferation, for example, both China and the United States have continued working in tandem to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, albeit by utilizing very different mechanisms and forms of leverage. 

But while the RBIO has not collapsed—meaning there has been no repeat of the era between World War I and World War II—it also has not been revitalized. There has been no return to a triumphalist end of history, no 1990s-style heyday wherein major and middle powers mostly work in concordance with one another toward peaceful and prosperous coexistence within what they perceive as a benign set of global norms and institutions. Hence the increasing references to a “Reluctant International Order,” if meant in jest. 

What has happened instead has been an evolution rather than a revolution, characterized more by experimentation and incrementalism than by some jarring disruption. This has occurred because the world’s problems demand coordinated responses even for countries reluctant to do so and because those countries recognize that the opportunity costs of not engaging are so high.  

Today, the outward institutional trappings of the RBIO remain in place. The UN continues its work as before, partially because China does not want to destroy it. (The UN’s embrace of state sovereignty, for example, appeals to China’s interests.) Global trade is still growing, despite the tariff wars of the mid-to-late 2020s, owing in part to technological developments that have continued to lower the cost of trade. And the norms underpinning the RBIO haven’t disappeared, either, since many around the world—national and sub-national governments, civil-society and non-profit organizations, grassroots groups and ordinary citizens—want to preserve them and continue to see value in cooperative approaches to transnational problems. 

Trading places

Consider trade. More than a decade ago, many nations began curtailing their exposure to global trade flows out of justifiable concern that trade was having detrimental impacts on their security, economies, and societies. Yet despite extensive anti-globalization rhetoric and policies (with the tariff wars the best example), the prevailing perception is that the benefits of trade continue to outweigh the costs. China and the United States, for instance, still have one of the largest bilateral trade relationships of any two countries in the world, despite their now lengthy history of trade disputes, including tariffs and a range of trade restrictions in sensitive technologies.  

The leaders of many countries have realized that they have a compelling interest in remaining engaged in trade and talks to increase trade. This has resulted in the creation, maintenance, or expansion of a number of regional free-trade agreements. Several of these efforts have proven quite successful, perhaps best illustrated by the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Over the past fifteen years, African states have joined with the African Union to extend and deepen AfCFTA and, in so doing, to realize several of its longer-term objectives such as the reduction of intra-continental tariffs and loosening of visa restrictions. The case of AfCFTA and others like it—for instance, strengthened trade agreements between the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Asian countries—underscore that while global trade volume has grown since the mid-2020s, the geography of trade continues to shift.   

Nonstate actors have been critical to the maintenance of this system. Multinational companies around the world have made their support for trade well-known, which has helped compel countries to continue defining their interests in pro-trade terms. 

Bioweapon-inspired cooperation

Nothing underscored both the value of cooperation and the powers (positive and negative) of nonstate actors like the 2029 bioweapon scare.  

That year, a shadowy, transnational doomsday cult—akin to Aum Shinrikyo, which terrorized Japan with sarin gas in 1995—used an artificial intelligence (AI)-enhanced synthetic biology (“SynBio”) process to develop a deadlier and more easily transmissible strain of smallpox. Because the cult’s plot to release it was foiled at the last minute, owing to frantic collaboration among national intelligence services and INTERPOL, the world narrowly avoided a pandemic that would have been far worse than the COVID-19 pandemic.  

Horrified by this close call, most of the world’s governments—including the United States, China, and Russia—grasped for solutions. Since pandemics do not respect boundaries, world leaders recognized that there was an upper limit on how much they could protect their people on their own. In response, they quickly sought to deepen collaboration with one another and with leading multilateral public-health institutions such as the WHO, multinational corporations including companies that develop major AI platforms, and the global scientific community that sets standards and runs laboratories. The mandate was clear: Determine how to monitor and regulate the biotechnology space more effectively—or risk perhaps hundreds of millions dying in an AI-enhanced, SynBio-caused (“AIxBio”) pandemic along the lines that the doomsday cult had almost willed into existence.  

One of this new coalition’s proposals, which was quickly funded and implemented, was to create an institution similar to the International Atomic Energy Agency but focused on AIxBio. Its formal membership is based on a novel multi-stakeholder model that includes national governments, big-tech firms, and scientific organizations.  

The smallpox bioweapon scare vividly illustrated, even for adversarial major powers, the intolerably high risk of countries not engaging with one another through international institutions and on international norms to address the world’s greatest challenges—and on the enduring relevance and value of the RBIO ninety years after its creation. Halting progress in some areas of the international system doesn’t qualify as a renaissance. But even a Reluctant International Order is better than retreat. 

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China ascendant

Welcome to 2035, and a world whose center of gravity has shifted decisively toward Beijing.  

China now has more influence on world affairs than does any other country, including the United States. It is ascendant on every metric of power—diplomatic, military, economic, and technological. That power has enabled Beijing to begin remaking the world to its liking. It has been busy recasting the global system, including multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN), in its preferred image, and is in the process of dismantling the democratic norms that have animated the international order since 1945.  

China has arrived at this ascendant position in part because the United States has not done much to stand in its way. At the turn of this century, such an outcome would have been impossible to imagine. Even a decade ago, when Washington’s commitment to the rules-based international order showed initial signs of wavering, such an outcome would have been difficult to forecast. But US leaders have been consumed by the challenges of dealing with the country’s weakening economy, fraying societal bonds, and unrelentingly harsh domestic politics. These dynamics have eliminated the longstanding bipartisan consensus around defending the global order that the United States, along with its many allies and partners, had built and maintained for decades.  

The result has been that the United States no longer has an unwavering commitment to its allies and partners, the core multilateral institutions at the center of the order that it built, and the norms and principles that it stood behind all those years. Instead, the United States has definitively turned inward. By nearly every metric, the United States remains a major power. But it no longer has much interest in maintaining its leadership role in the world. It has ceded that ground to others, especially to China. 

Taiwan-style tipping points

The impact of the US withdrawal from global affairs is evident in various flashpoints around the world, including in Taiwan. While the prevailing fear in the 2010s and early 2020s was of a devastating clash between the United States and China over the island, the Taiwan issue was resolved without firing a shot. China subordinated Taiwan by applying intense pressure—via sabotage, cyber operations, propaganda campaigns, overt and covert influence campaigns within Taiwan, espionage, murky hybrid operations on the island and around its waters—to influence Taiwanese domestic politics toward a cross-Straits settlement with the People’s Republic of China. Its efforts to shape domestic politics within Taiwan succeeded. In 2030, Taiwan’s government agreed to (among other things) such a settlement, which included ceasing defense cooperation with foreign governments and reducing Taiwan’s direct engagement with foreign officials. The United States, which did not respond to China’s various forms of pressure against Taiwan, ultimately could not prevent the cross-Straits agreement, given the Taiwanese government’s support for it. None of China’s individual provocations were dramatic enough for an already hesitant United States to risk a direct military confrontation with China over it.  

What happened in Taiwan has also played out on a global scale. There was no one exceptional event or even set of events that triggered a transformation of the international system—no explosion that China engineered to blow up the global order. Thus, there never was a single focal point for China’s rivals—especially the United States—to rally their citizens around and respond to in a coordinated and decisive way. Rather, there has been a gradual and now inexorable shift away from the US-led order and toward a Chinese-led one. This shift resulted from decisions made by both US and Chinese leaders: inward-looking in the case of the former, outward-looking in the case of the latter. It was, in short, a slow-motion fait accompli. 

China has positioned itself as the world’s inevitable leader, seizing on its strengths to curry favor with other countries and on the opportunity presented by the United States’ implosion to diminish its rival. Take the performance of the two countries’ economies as an example. A decade ago, the economic outlook was bleaker for China than it was for the United States. But over the past ten years, that script has flipped. In the mid-2020s, Chinese President Xi Jinping managed to right China’s sputtering economy, stabilizing it and returning it to steady growth (if less spectacular growth than during the country’s long boom). He did so by successfully transitioning the country to what many are now calling “an innovation system with Chinese characteristics,” striking a balance of rewarding innovation and entrepreneurialism while maintaining the Chinese Communist Party’s control over the nation’s political apparatus.  

All this has enabled China to return to selling itself and its economic rebound on the one hand, plus the United States’ economic stagnation (due to dysfunctional politics) on the other, as a compelling reason why the United States is both unreliable and a poor economic model for the rest of the world, and by extension why China represents a better model. That message has even more resonance around the world now than it did ten years ago.  

Because of the pull of China’s growing economy, which remains integrated within global trade flows, plus the relative weakness of the US economy, foreign governments have become more willing to sign onto China’s various economic diplomacy efforts, such as the Global Development Initiative. Beijing now hosts a robust schedule of international economic forums that position it at the center of the economic universe, and thus as the destination for intergovernmental bargaining and influence on issues such as trade and investment. To outside observers, the economic pull of Beijing has eclipsed that of Washington and, for that matter, of Brussels, London, Paris, Seoul, or Tokyo.  

As a result, China’s influence has grown in many parts of the world. In the Global South, lower- and middle-income countries in Africa, Latin America, and South Asia (where China remains engaged with India in a long-running contest for influence) have been even more eager to trade with and receive investment from China than they were in the 2020s. This outcome is the product of years (in some cases decades) of aggressive economic diplomacy by China and disinterest from the US government. It also stemmed from reform to China’s overseas lending and investment vehicles, which China recognized needed fine-tuning to make them more palatable abroad and deflect rising criticism of the unsustainable debt and other problems they engendered. Thus far, these policy shifts appear to have worked. China has also become the world’s largest trading nation for both imports and exports, ahead of the United States. Shifting trade in goods also has accelerated movement away from trade denominated in US dollars and toward trade denominated in renminbi—a sure sign of the relative strengths of the two economies.  

For China, the advantages are enormous: more wealth at home and influence abroad. China’s diplomatic ties with major materials exporters such as Brazil (soybeans and other crops), the Gulf Cooperation Council states (oil), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (critical minerals such as cobalt) have increased. For the United States, the reverse has been true. For the average American, wages and incomes have stagnated, and imported goods are more expensive. Abroad, US goods are less competitive in foreign markets than Chinese goods are.   

Allies hedging 

The United States still has numerous allies and partners, but the bonds that held them together are weaker now than they were in the past owing to the rise of China and the self-induced retreat of the United States. 

In Asia, nervous US allies including Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines are hedging between China and the United States in more ways than they were in the 2020s. But now, having witnessed what happened in Taiwan, these countries are even more concerned about the security guarantee that the United States has provided to them. Both Japan and South Korea have admitted that they are exploring options to acquire nuclear weapons in order to deter China and North Korea, and most analysts expect both to become nuclear-weapons states by 2040. Various forms of US-led minilateral diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific such as the Quad have died slow deaths, the result of both US indifference and Asian countries’ doubts about the value of these efforts to counter and contain a rising China. India, for example, believes it can achieve more through its own bilateral actions to check Chinese influence than it can by working through such forums.  

Also contributing to the deep unease of US allies is the growth of China’s military in size and capabilities, and its increasing forward presence in the Asia-Pacific and elsewhere around the world. China has been steadily increasing its number of basing agreements globally to the point where, just as US intelligence services feared a decade ago, China now has bases in Africa, South Asia, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and the islands in the Pacific and Indian oceans.  

A similar story is playing out in Europe, albeit focused on a different threat. There, European NATO members are arming themselves rapidly, spending well above the 2 percent of gross domestic product threshold for defense spending that Washington had been requesting for decades. Although that amounts to a victory of sorts for US foreign policy, it really is a defeat because the spending is an expression of serious doubt about the United States’ commitment to NATO and the Alliance’s Article 5 collective-defense pledge should war come again to the continent. Although the previous war in Ukraine ended in a negotiated stalemate, most European observers believe that it is only a matter of time before a rearmed and resurgent Russia decides to test NATO, likely through a long-feared invasion focused on the Baltics.  

In this climate, many are pinning their hopes on Beijing rather than Washington, believing that China will restrain Russia, its junior partner, from going on the offensive in Europe. Partly for this reason, and the fact that China is now Europe’s largest trading partner (having surpassed the United States in the early 2030s), European leaders have muted their criticisms of China’s record on human rights, including privacy rights, and have eased China’s access to the common market despite ongoing concerns about dumping, intellectual-property theft, and other such practices.  

Institutional shifts 

In part because China never has been interested in tearing down the entire international system and replacing it with something else entirely, few Western leaders have paid much attention to how China has been busy recasting these institutions in its image. And indeed, the UN system and the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and International Monetary Fund) continue, with China maintaining its representation in them as it has for decades.  

But there have been important changes within the UN system. Recently, for instance, China has been far more successful than it was in previous decades at getting its appointees installed within various technical standard-setting bodies such as the UN’s International Telecommunication Union—a function of China’s unrelenting focus on these specialized bureaucracies plus its rising economic, scientific, and technological prowess.  

Or consider the UN’s historic role in maintaining peace and security. China was long willing to support UN peacekeeping operations around the world by providing troops and funds, at least to an extent. Yet with the United States and its democratic allies among the UN Security Council’s five permanent members—France and the United Kingdom—now far less willing to spearhead these operations, China has yet to pick up the leadership mantle. China remains willing to contribute to peacekeeping but generally not to lead large-scale efforts, whether in terms of the Security Council’s broad peacekeeping mandates or the financial, human, and technical resources necessary to build them. The result has been fewer such operations and weaker ones as well, leaving more of the world’s conflicts to devolve and even in some cases metastasize.  

Perhaps the most worrisome change has to do with the norms and principles that underpin the global system—both within the UN and more generally as well. Although China expresses support for some of the system’s principles—for example, the UN’s emphasis on state sovereignty and territorial integrity—it manifestly does not support others and especially those based upon democratic values. As a result, serious emphasis on human rights and related norms, as well as global oversight of them, has collapsed within multilateral institutions, including the UN.  

These developments are having real, on-the-ground impact. China has successfully built a more robust surveillance apparatus globally that includes more sophisticated cyber-espionage operations capable of tracking the communications of ordinary people around the world, along with a major expansion of China’s overseas police stations. The Chinese government claims that these stations are designed only to service the Chinese diaspora, but their true purpose seems to be to keep track of and pressure both the diaspora and China’s external critics as well.   

The erosion of global human-rights enforcement speaks to a broader trend: The so-called democratic recession that has been plaguing the world since the early 2000s is now bordering on a depression. With China ascendant, the world’s autocratic leaders are acting with greater confidence at home and abroad. Midway through the 2030s, the long-running contest between democratic and authoritarian systems appears to be resolving—in favor of the latter. 

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Climate of fear

In 2035, the Earth’s climate is hotter and less stable than it’s ever been in human history. This instability is causing people to turn on one another—and politics to become more abrasive than it was a decade ago. Climate-driven turbulence is making nearly every other problem—be it geopolitical or conflict-related—harder to solve. These challenges transcend national boundaries and afflict every country, whether rich or poor, to the north or south. Numerous local conflicts and one tense regional standoff (in South Asia) have been fueled by the consequences of a changing climate. 

These trends have produced some positive outcomes as well, but in the 2030s it’s difficult to foresee a bright future. As a result, many are looking to radical solutions to get humanity out of its predicament. 

Ecological crisis

There is almost no good news to be found in the natural world. A range of climate-induced problems are all worse than they were a decade ago. Observable, on-the-ground environmental changes have consistently outpaced scientists’ predictions from twenty or even ten years ago.  

The data indicates that several climate tipping points—including the drying of the Amazon rainforest, the melting of the West Antarctic ice sheet, and the ongoing slowing of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation system, which regulates temperatures and precipitation in Europe, Africa, and elsewhere—are nearer than we previously thought. Scientists’ modeling, based on real-world data in the 2030s, now points even more strongly toward one or more of these or other critical systems collapsing in the next few decades. When these systems begin to collapse, there will be no practical way back from truly horrific ecological disasters.  

Even short of such disasters, the world today lacks the capacity to adjust quickly enough to the climate impacts that are here already. Chronic heat is a problem nearly everywhere in the world, with lengthy heat waves now routine on every continent—including on Antarctica, where record highs, well above freezing, are increasingly common. Most frightening is the rapid increase in “wet bulb” days in some regions near the equator, where high heat plus high humidity make it impossible for humans to survive for long outdoors. Massive storms—flash flooding in the wake of record-breaking torrential rainfall, for example, or hurricanes and cyclones that strike well inland—are commonplace now as well. Several coastal cities around the world, including Bangkok, Miami, and Jakarta, regularly flood, even more frequently than they did a decade ago. In 2029, China’s low-lying Pearl River Delta was hit by a massive typhoon that crippled the region’s manufacturing output for months, disrupting global supply chains. 

These developments have numerous second- and third-order consequences. The world’s forests, for example, have become tinderboxes, which means that firefighting has become a significant part of national-security planning for an ever-lengthening list of the world’s governments. 

(Geo)political upheaval

Politics and geopolitics are changing with the natural world, largely for the worse. Climate change has weakened the world’s democracies, which already had suffered through decades of decline. From Spain and Greece to South Africa, Nepal, and Panama, storms and suffocating heat waves have disrupted elections by making it harder for some voters to cast their ballots. Such events have also affected who participates in elections in the first place, given how they have influenced the outflows and inflows of people through cities and countries, and the voter registration and verification problems that have followed.  

Many years ago, when climate-driven migration was first hypothesized in the scientific literature, few paid attention. Not so today, as fears about the consequences of so-called climate migrants or climate refugees have generated real policies involving real people. These fears often have been based on lurid imagination about crime and chaos rather than on facts.

In 2035, there are an estimated 150 million migrants worldwide who are either temporarily displaced or permanently on the move because of climate impacts, although no one knows the true number because migration is such a complex, multifaceted phenomenon. Yet everyone agrees that more migrants are coming.  

Most climate-driven migration remains within national boundaries, often coming in the form of rural-to-urban migration into cities such as Bogotá and Karachi. Or it is intra-regional migration within areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia. Such trends are also occurring within wealthy regions and countries such as the United States.  

These migration patterns have reminded many of the Syrian crisis of the early 2010s, which was preceded by drought-stressed migrants fleeing the countryside for the cities. Although that internal migration likely was only an indirect cause of the subsequent uprising against the Assad regime—which lasted well over a decade and ultimately resulted in the regime’s overthrow—many now see repetition of that past. They point to how climate-fueled internal displacements have increased recruitment into armed nonstate groups. They note the increasing number of communities around the world where climate impacts have exacerbated preexisting vulnerabilities to cause local conflicts, too many of which have started to become deadly. And they cite the increasing number of failed and failing states resulting in part from climate-driven disasters such as intense, multi-year drought. 

Governments have responded through pull-up-the-drawbridges measures—and not just in Europe or the United States, where one might expect that to happen, but around the world, including within the Global South. Border walls designed to keep migrants out were already widespread ten years ago. They are everywhere now.  

India, for example, has clamped down on its borders with Bangladesh and Myanmar, heavily fortifying them with more personnel, fencing, sophisticated electronic-surveillance systems, and autonomous enforcement technologies such as drones. Numerous critics, both within India and outside of it, have voiced objections, but the Indian government insists that it is only doing what its voters want. This has led to a volatile diplomatic situation in South Asia. Pakistan, which long ago patched up its relations with Bangladesh, has joined Bangladesh and Myanmar in loudly and publicly pushing India to reverse its border policies, to no avail. The region is not at war, nor is there an immediate risk of one. But it is at a knife’s edge, with climate-driven migration having become one of the biggest sources of friction. 

Turbulence-induced transformations

There are some bright spots in this otherwise discouraging picture. Renewables are now firmly established as the world’s dominant sources of energy, reflecting both their market competitiveness and the rapid electrification of the global economy. And nuclear energy has begun making a comeback in much of the world, with the latest reactor designs now seen as safely providing reliable, zero-emission electricity. (New power plants, however, remain rare.) In addition, green-technology markets are expanding rapidly across many industries such as food, water, energy, transportation, and consumer goods. Nearly a third of the world’s stock of cars and trucks is fully electric. 

The challenge lies in the rate at which decarbonization is occurring—a pace that simply has not been fast enough. Although global greenhouse-gas emissions finally peaked in the late 2020s, humankind nonetheless surpassed the carbon budget required to stay within the target of keeping global warming above pre-industrial levels to 1.5 degrees Celsius, as laid out in the 2015 Paris Agreement. Scientists had prioritized staying below this target to limit the worst impacts of climate change.  

One of the factors contributing to this challenge is that much of the world’s legacy energy infrastructure remains in place. Decommissioning such infrastructure, particularly coal and natural-gas plants, is expensive. Too many of the world’s high-carbon plants still exist, especially coal-fired power plants concentrated in China.  

Behind all this is global energy consumption, which has continued to rise fast, consistently outstripping renewables’ capacity to fully meet the demand. (A challenge here is that interest rates for borrowing in riskier storm-affected regions have increased, constraining the expansion of capital-intensive renewables such as offshore wind farms.) There are many drivers of this increasing demand, including technological developments such as advances in artificial intelligence (AI). As was feared in the mid-2020s, the infrastructure necessary to support AI’s growth—in the form of computing power and data centers—boosted global energy demand. Although tech companies have greened their models, the problem is about scale: AI’s ubiquity translates into a massive source of energy usage. Some tech companies have become players in the nuclear-energy space for this reason. 

As they navigate this turbulence, and as already foreshadowed in the 2020s, both right- and left-wing populist governments are no longer reflexively hostile to policies to combat climate change like they once were. There is renewed interest in accelerating decarbonization efforts, including revitalizing the moribund United Nations-led process for mitigating climate change.  

Another response to the unsustainable status quo has been the embrace of more radical solutions. Geoengineering—and specifically solar radiation modification (SRM), which refers to atmospheric and even space-based efforts to reduce warming by reflecting sunlight back into space—has rapidly gone from a scientific curiosity to a subject of serious research. Although SRM engineering is complex, compared with other approaches it is straightforward and inexpensive. As a result, already in 2035 both state and nonstate actors are experimenting with SRM in the atmosphere. There is great fear that the implementation of these new approaches will be a nightmare, as for-profit companies, tech billionaires, and rogue states initiate their own unilateral solutions, while countries fight over the expected (but dimly understood) impacts on their regions. Although the scientific community is warning that SRM’s consequences aren’t yet sufficiently understood, there is a growing sentiment among many (though not all) politicians that it should be tried at scale. But everyone is asking whether effective geoengineering is even possible without some sort of global governance and regulatory regime.  

Meanwhile, the clock is ticking and the climate is changing. Humankind’s efforts to master the natural world during the post-industrial era produced the climate crisis. Now, in 2035, the Earth increasingly seems the master of human affairs rather than the other way around.  

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Peter Engelke, Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

Engelke is on the adjunct faculty at Georgetown University’s School of Continuing Studies and is a frequent lecturer to the US Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute. He was previously a member of the World Economic Forum’s Global Future Council on Complex Risks, an executive-in-residence at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, a Bosch fellow with the Robert Bosch Foundation, and a visiting fellow at the Stimson Center.

Greg Lindsay, Nonresident Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

Lindsay is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s GeoStrategy Initiative, as well as a nonresident senior fellow of the Arizona State University Threatcasting Lab and the MIT Future Urban Collectives Lab.

Paul Saffo, Nonresident Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

Saffo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s GeoStrategy Initiative and co-editor of Futures Research Methodologies, which will be released later this year.

Global Foresight 2025

In this year’s Global Foresight edition, our experts share findings from our survey of global strategists on how human affairs could unfold over the next decade. Our team of next-generation scholars spot “snow leopards” that could have major unexpected impacts in 2025 and beyond. And our foresight practitioners imagine three different scenarios for the next decade.

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In the fall of 2024 after the outcome of the US presidential election, the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security surveyed the future, asking leading global strategists and foresight practitioners around the world to answer our most burning questions about the biggest drivers of change over the next ten years. Here are the full results.

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Atlantic Council foresight experts spot the underappreciated phenomena that could have outsized impact on the world, driving global change and shaping the future.

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Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Three worlds in 2035: Imagining scenarios for how the world could be transformed over the next decade

2024 was marked by increased climate shocks and collaboration of autocratic adversaries. What will the world look like in the next decade? The Atlantic Council’s top experts brought their globe-spanning expertise to the task of forecasting three different scenarios for the future.

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The post Three worlds in 2035: Imagining scenarios for how the world could be transformed over the next decade appeared first on Atlantic Council.

• Executive summary
• Introduction
• A vital resource, a complicated history
• Country updates
• The future
• Opportunities and policy development
• Policy recommendations
• Conclusion
• About the authors

Executive summary

Water security is an urgent issue that demands immediate attention from Central Asian governments, businesses, civil society, and their international partners. Climate change, population growth, infrastructure problems, a lack of government foresight, and the unequal distribution of precious water resources between the upstream countries (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and the downstream nations (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) have created a “perfect storm” of pressing water insecurity. The 2021 Central Asia drought, the loss of the Aral Sea, the evaporation of glaciers in the Tian Shan mountains, and the alarming shrinking of the Caspian Sea are reminders of how natural and man-made disasters have destructive consequences on Central Asia’s strained water resources.

This report addresses the status of water security across the five Central Asian countries, outlining recent developments, ongoing challenges, and opportunities for improvement. Geopolitically, interstate tensions and the role of international politics—e.g., influence from the West, Russia, and China and tensions with Afghanistan—all will continue to affect the region’s water security. This report will address international cooperation in projects for water sharing, including the current and future role of agencies like the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea and partners like the United States Agency for International Development, the World Bank, and extraregional governments. The report concludes with a holistic set of policy recommendations to help improve water security in Central Asia.

Water security is a complex and challenging topic for the five Central Asian countries (C5), a region heavily dependent on shared water sources. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan face increasing water-related challenges due to the unequal distribution of water resources across the region (upstream vs. downstream nations), interstate tensions, the legacy of Soviet-era water management systems, corruption and lack of good governance, and the effects of climate change. Despite efforts to modernize, countries still rely on outdated and insufficient water infrastructure that struggles to meet the demands of growing populations, as well as water-intensive industries like cotton.

Relevant recent developments in this region include the collapse of the Aral Sea, the declining water levels of the Caspian Sea, border conflicts over water access between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and the Taliban’s construction of a controversial canal in Afghanistan. Challenges also offer opportunities, including regional agreements on sharing and protecting bodies of water, applying new water-management technologies, and using newly arid lands for new projects.

This report analyzes the current state and future of water security across the five Central Asian states while also considering external players such as Afghanistan, China, and the Caspian littoral countries. The region’s division between water-rich upstream countries and water-scarce downstream states is a key focus of this report. A useful map published in a 2017 report by German think tank Adelphi demonstrates how large swathes of the downstream countries—Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—depend on water resources that flow from the mountainous regions of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan upstream. Water security impacts domestic politics, foreign policy, economic stability, infrastructure, and energy security. Thus, our recommendations address a wide range of cross-cutting issues, as a holistic view of water security is necessary to improve living conditions, the environment, economies, and industries while addressing regional geopolitical concerns.

A vital resource, a complicated history

There are several challenges to the health and integrity of Central Asia’s precious water resources, particularly the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers, the Aral Sea, Lake Balkhash, and the Caspian Sea. Challenges include climate change, pollution, and issues related to human development, like population growth, urbanization, industrialization, and the all-important agricultural industry, among other human activities. Glacial melt also threatens the Pamir and Tien Shan mountain ranges, located in the region’s two upstream countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Changes to the water flow will (literally) have a trickle-down effect that will affect the two countries and the downstream nations, namely Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. In other words, water security in Central Asia is heavily linked to transboundary water bodies.

But other challenges must be considered to understand the evolving situation across the region. They include irregular rainfall patterns, which lead to extended droughts in some areas while others suffer from unseasonable rainfalls causing floods; extreme weather patterns that affect both human life and the local environment; and the fragile state of water infrastructure due to neglect in the post-Soviet era.

Central Asia knows how catastrophic water disasters can be. Nearly all of the Aral Sea—90 percent of what had been the fourth-largest inland sea in the world—is simply gone due to poor water mismanagement. The problem commenced in the 1960s due to Soviet-era, large-scale irrigation projects, which included the diversion of the sea’s tributaries, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, and benefited, for instance, Uzbekistan’s important cotton industry. The negative consequences include soil salinization, waterlogging, and a sea-level drop, resulting in new dry lands. The Aral Sea’s diminishment has prompted economic decline and job loss for noncotton industries, not to mention health challenges for regional populations and devastation of their way of life. Astana has attempted to protect what remains of the Kazakhstani side of the sea, which nowadays mostly resembles a group of interconnected and fragmented lakes rather than a unified body of water, by constructing the Kok-Aral Dam, for example. Unfortunately, the Uzbekistani government still prioritizes its cotton industry over the protection of Aral Sea, parts of which are likely lost forever.

In a similar vein, the Caspian Sea is becoming increasingly precarious. The sea’s northern coast, which borders Kazakhstan and Russia, is already becoming shallower. While desalination projects are a growing part of the problem, the limited amount of water reaching the sea is insufficient to keep it healthy. For instance, the Soviets constructed dams and reservoirs in the Volga River that inhibit water (and marine life) flows into the Caspian. These include Russia’s Cheboksary Dam and the Volga Hydroelectric Station. There will be severe repercussions akin to what the Aral Sea is experiencing if the Caspian’s water level is not safeguarded. Besides the obvious challenges to human life and the regional environment, trade and commerce also will be affected. Specifically, the maritime and transportation sector will be impacted by the Caspian’s disappearance. Bypassing Russian territory, the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), commonly known as the Middle Corridor, is integral to the transport of commodities and goods from China and Central Asia to Europe: The Caspian Sea serves as a crucial component of the TITR, with tankers and cargo ships sailing from Baku and Aktau to Turkmenbashi and vice versa. Declining water levels would put heavier ships at risk of being trapped and unable to access ports—and undercut the usefulness of the TITR.

The complexity of water

The C5 states have common problems regarding water security. Obsolete water infrastructure is Central Asia’s greatest water challenge. Overall, their Soviet-era water infrastructure requires repairs, replacement, or full modernization. Unfortunately, the Central Asian governments have been slow to invest in this area. While managing the flow of water across regional rivers or addressing the effects of climate change are challenging long-term issues, improving water infrastructure can significantly protect scarce water flows in the region. Outdated water infrastructure can result in up to “40 percent of water losses during irrigation and up to 55 percent of losses when supplying drinking water.” In other words, improving the transit of water in Central Asia would buy time, allowing regional governments to address some of the more complex problems stemming from climate change and water-diversion projects.

The intersection between water security and energy production is complex, particularly regarding hydroelectric power. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have extensive water resources that generate electricity through hydroelectric dams. However, this strategy creates tensions with downstream nations that depend on these rivers for agricultural irrigation and human consumption. Hydroelectric dams, like Tajikistan’s Rogun Dam, may become a source of conflict between upstream and downstream countries if relationships are not managed carefully. As climate change intensifies, the unpredictability of water flow can worsen interstate relations. Map I shows changes in river flows of major river systems in Central Asia.

The 2021 Central Asian drought highlighted the region’s vulnerability to water shortages. Kazakhstan, in particular, experienced serious agricultural losses, underscoring the risks of dependence on transboundary water sources. Kazakhstan’s Lake Balkhash, fed by the Ili River from China, presents another example of water insecurity. China’s upstream development projects threaten to reduce the water flow into Lake Balkhash, which could lead to a disaster on the Aral scale. Tensions exist between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan over the Syr Darya, which originates in Kyrgyzstan and flows through Uzbekistan. Around 80 percent of Uzbekistan’s water originates from neighboring countries, leaving it vulnerable to upstream water-management decisions.

The political landscape in Central Asia complicates efforts to manage water resources. The region features a range of political systems, from strongly authoritarian Turkmenistan to the more open Kazakhstan. This contributes to differing levels of commitment to regional cooperation on water management. For example, Astana has identified water security as a problem. It promotes dialogue and proposes the creation of regional water mechanisms to address water-access issues, such as the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea, which originated in the early 1990s. On the other hand, Ashgabat has a more limited engagement with the rest of the region and the wider world including on environmental issues. Similarly, during the rule of Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan was reluctant to engage with neighbors to discuss water cooperation. However, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev is willing to engage. Meanwhile, Bishkek and Dushanbe’s growing reliance on hydropower to address domestic energy crises will exacerbate water-security problems with their downstream neighbors. More open governments tend to be more willing to discuss sensitive issues, including shared water resources, and admit their shortcomings and erroneous policies.

Finally, water quality tends to receive insufficient attention. Pollution from agriculture, industry, and aging infrastructure impacts water supplies, meaning that even when water reaches a household, drinking it may not be safe.

Country updates

Each C5 country grapples with unique issues driven by geography, infrastructure, and governance affecting water. There are efforts to address these challenges, with projects ranging from cross-border cooperation to investment in new infrastructure and international partnerships. However, political instability, lack of transparency, and outdated technologies impede progress.

Joint coordination is critical to addressing transboundary water issues. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev will be the president of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS) from 2024 to 2026. Astana aims to implement development and scientific programs to “[reduce] the negative impact [of the Aral Sea catastrophe] on the entire region and ensure stability and sustainable development of Central Asia.” Similarly, in 2018, the five Caspian states signed a convention in Aktau, Kazakhstan, to end a long-standing border dispute over the sea. Moreover, the five states signed the Tehran Convention in 2003, a much-needed environmental legal framework to protect the sea. While the territorial dispute was resolved, interstate cooperation to protect the Caspian remains limited and challenges continue.

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan faces significant water challenges due to its dependence on transboundary water resources: The Aral Sea, Lake Balkhash, the Ural River, and the Caspian Sea are all shared with neighboring countries and fed by rivers originating outside of their boundaries, leading to complex management issues. The Ili River, which feeds Lake Balkhash, originates in China’s Xinjiang region, where ongoing development projects and increased agriculture strain water flows to China’s Central Asian neighbor. The Ural River, shared with Russia, suffers from pollution and declining water levels due to industrial activities including oil refining and chemical production. High zinc concentrations in the Ural make the water unsuitable for consumption once it reaches Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan is closely monitoring the health of Lake Balkhash. However, long-term solutions depend on cooperation with Beijing, which sees the Ili’s waters as a domestic issue despite the river’s flow into Kazakhstan. Astana is engaging Beijing and Moscow to address transboundary water issues. There is reason to be cautiously optimistic, as a Kazakh-Russian commission has been established to protect the Ural River. At the same time, Beijing and Astana are drafting an agreement to address river waters.

Water challenges in Kazakhstan take various shapes. The country already suffers from droughts, which are exacerbated by climate change. Moreover, shared water bodies mean Astana must engage in multivector diplomacy with neighboring countries to manage domestic water problems. For Kazakhstan, water security involves more than human consumption and agriculture: Trade is a component, as the country relies on the health of the Caspian Sea to transport goods and commodities, such as oil, from Aktau port to Baku.

The government of Kazakhstan has been straightforward about the need to address water challenges. In his September 1, 2023, address to the nation, President Tokayev was blunt about worst-case scenarios and the need to restructure water management. “The issue of water availability and quality remains critical. Given the population growth and the economy by 2040, the water deficit in Kazakhstan may reach 12-15 billion cubic meters,” he explained. The government soon after created the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation to improve water management and usage in Kazakhstan. This ministry announced rules for regulating water relations between regions in December 2023, which came into force on August 31, 2024. In mid-2024, the ministry reestablished the National Hydrogeological Service to develop a state policy in underground water management, exploration, and state monitoring. Without a doubt, Astana recognizes water security as a clear and present danger, while agreements with neighboring states and more water-related projects need to occur faster to avoid a catastrophe.

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan faces severe water shortages. Approximately 80 percent of its water resources originate from neighboring countries. Major rivers like the Syr Darya and Amu Darya, crucial for Uzbekistan’s agriculture and population, have reportedly lost 20 percent of their volume over the past five decades. Uzbekistan’s reliance on Soviet-era water infrastructure further compounds the problem, leading to inadequate water access in rural areas, where villagers often drink from irrigation ditches or travel to other settlements to collect water.

Tashkent’s Aral Sea strategy differs from Kazakhstan’s. Rather than replenishing the sea’s waters, Tashkent aims to improve newly dry territories. For example, the country is planting trees and shrubs along the Akkum ridge and Muynak district to combat wind erosion and stabilize sand dunes. These projects aim to prevent salt and dust from spreading to other regions, improving environmental conditions.

Uzbekistan also is introducing new technologies to address water security. According to Tashkent, around 1.26 million hectares, or 30 percent of irrigated areas, are now utilizing water-saving technologies, including sprinklers and drip irrigation, though up-front and maintenance costs are high. Tashkent is also analyzing several options to improve water management, according to the Uzbek media, including “transferring 50 percent of internal irrigation networks to closed irrigation systems,” increasing the annual capacity of local water-saving technology enterprises, reducing water salinity, and fortifying canals with concrete. Reforestation and environmental projects also can alleviate the environmental damage caused by the Aral Sea’s desiccation.

However, Uzbekistan’s economy depends heavily on the cotton industry, which requires large quantities of water. In 2012, the amount of water consumed to grow Uzbekistan’s cotton was estimated at sixteen billion cubic meters annually. Moreover, 90 percent of water consumed by Uzbek cotton originates upstream, and over 85 percent of arable land is further reliant on upstream-sourced water irrigation. With roughly 25 percent of the country’s GDP dependent on cotton, Uzbekistan is in no hurry to divest itself of its water-hungry cash crop. Attempts to convince Uzbek farmers to switch to fast-ripening, water-efficient, and climate-resilient cotton varieties have made limited impacts.

Uzbekistan is also exploring hydropower to address its growing electricity consumption. Tashkent aims to build a cascade hydroelectric power station along the Naryn River in the Namangan region, a project expected to cost around US$434 million. It remains to be seen how this hydropower plant will affect water flows for human consumption and other projects.

Reliant on water sourced from neighboring countries like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Uzbekistan is highly vulnerable to regional water policies and usage. Any upstream activities, such as dam construction or increased agricultural water use, directly impact Uzbekistan’s water availability. Moreover, Uzbekistan’s water infrastructure largely dates to the Soviet era. Some rural communities lack functional water pipelines or access to reservoirs. Modern upgrades are either incomplete or malfunctioning. In the village of Armandasht, new pipelines are failing to supply water two years after installation, leaving residents to rely on unsafe alternatives like irrigation ditches and wells. This disparity in water availability contributes to economic and health issues, particularly for impoverished communities.

Despite progress on the Kazakhstani side of the Aral Sea, areas on the Uzbek side are considered irreparably lost. The sea’s continued desiccation results in severe environmental consequences, including salt and dust storms that negatively affect agriculture and human health.

At a 2023 IFAS meeting, President Mirziyoyev said, “The problem of water shortage in Central Asia has become acute and irreversible and will only worsen further.” If the situation in Uzbekistan does not improve, authorities expect the national water shortage to reach 15 percent to 25 percent by 2050, with a desert area expanding to 123 million square meters. Ultimately, Tashkent must make difficult choices regarding its vital but water-intensive cotton industry. Diversifying toward nuts, fruits, and vegetables is advisable, though that would undoubtedly send shockwaves throughout the country’s economy and social order because it would require a major and expensive retraining and readjustment of farming techniques, equipment, and lifestyle, not to mention the search for customers for noncotton goods. For Uzbekistan, water and economic security are inextricably linked.

Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan has ample water resources but lacks proper infrastructure and effective water-management policies. Despite its rivers, streams, and vast glaciers, the country faces significant challenges in delivering clean water to its population, especially in rural areas. In 2017, UNICEF identified Kyrgyzstan as one of Central Asia’s most vulnerable countries to climate change, which is expected to disproportionately affect the country’s poorest communities. Children will be particularly affected by the deteriorating situation, according to the UN agency.

Rapid population growth, particularly in urban areas like Bishkek, has outpaced the capacity of the water infrastructure, leading to frequent shortages. The city’s population numbers about 1.15 million, but the underlying and largely Soviet-era infrastructure was designed for around 650,000 people. In 2023, Bishkek experienced severe water shortages, first affecting the southern areas and later spreading to other parts of the city. Authorities cited insufficient glacier thaw as one cause, but rapid urbanization and poor urban planning also play a significant role. Bishkek has announced plans to provide a centralized drinking water system for 95 percent of the urban population and two million rural citizens by 2026. The project and promises are not new; a similar program, called Taza Suu, was launched in the early 2000s with financial support from the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank. It resulted in new pipelines and service for many villages, but the project was plagued by “corruption schemes . . . and construction issues, and the equipment supplied failed to meet the requirements.”

Even when water arrives at a residence, it may not be safe for human consumption. “About 33 percent of piped water services throughout the country do not meet sanitary standards,” said Kyrgyzstan’s Department of Disease Prevention and State Sanitary and Epidemiological Surveillance in 2017. Yet conditions may be improving. In 2022, a World Bank delegation visiting Kyrgyzstan noted that access to and the quality of water supply and sanitation services across Kyrgyz rural communities were improving. The World Bank is currently funding a Sustainable Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Development Project, which costs around US$28 million.

In 2023, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) announced loans to Kyrgyzstan to renovate its water-supply networks, procure operational and maintenance equipment, and introduce household metering in Aidarken, Kadamzhai, Kok-Jangak, and Tash-Komur in the Batken and Jalal-Abad oblasts. Nevertheless, much of the infrastructure dates to the Soviet era, with little modernization having been done. The government is attempting to address this by expanding and upgrading water pipelines and storage reservoirs. However, the country needs short- and long-term projects, financial assistance, and technical expertise to overhaul its water infrastructure, and a recent World Bank report indicates that one-third of the rural population does not have access to clean drinking water.

Kyrgyzstan’s high vulnerability to climate change exacerbates its water challenges. The country relies on glacial melt for water, but inconsistent thawing patterns (due to climate shifts) cause seasonal water shortages. Additionally, more frequent, severe droughts will disproportionately affect lower-income communities.

Tajikistan

Despite being the most water-rich country in Central Asia, Tajikistan’s water future looks grim. The country’s Department of Water and Energy Policy predicts a drastic reduction in water consumption, from 2,520 cubic meters per person per year to just 1,167 cubic meters by the decade’s end. This projected drop is not just a symptom of poor rainfall or climate change (although these are significant factors), but also due to poor policy, outdated and inadequate infrastructure, lack of investment in water supply, and competing interests among different industries, the national government, and the country’s neighbors.

Tajikistan relies heavily on hydropower, which produces around 95 percent of its electricity. The country’s future crown jewel is the Rogun Hydroelectric Dam. The construction project began in 2016 and the dam, once operational, is intended to help Tajikistan become energy independent—though when exactly that will occur is debatable. According to a 2019 projection, the six planned energy generating turbines would be operational by 2026; now, though, the hope is that the third unit will come online sometime in 2025. The project comes with a hefty price tag, estimated at roughly US$6 billion. Once completed, it is expected to become one of the largest hydropower plants in the region, generating 3.6 gigawatts to power the aluminum industry, help meet domestic energy demand, and potentially export electricity to neighboring countries.

Efforts are underway to modernize critical water infrastructure. Tajikistan is working with international partners to address issues related to water quality, groundwater management, and the overall efficiency of water use across different sectors of the economy. The country also struggles with water distribution, quality, and efficiency. Increasing demand from growing urban populations and industrial sectors compounds the challenge. As competition for water resources between economic sectors intensifies, there is growing concern over the impact on groundwater quality. Tajikistan’s water systems are already under strain, and without significant improvements, water contamination could pose severe health and environmental risks shortly.

Tajikistan also faces increasing pressure from neighboring countries over shared water resources. For example, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan share the Syr Darya River with Tajikistan. Moreover, while hydropower provides the lion’s share of the country’s electricity, the sector is vulnerable to water-level fluctuations caused by climate change. More than twenty billion cubic meters of glacial ice, or about 2.5 percent, melted during the last century. A further temperature increase will accelerate glacial melting. The reliance on hydropower could become a double-edged sword if water resources continue declining, affecting energy security and water availability.

Turkmenistan

In stark contrast to realities observed on the ground, Turkmenistan’s government claims the country does not face significant water challenges. The Voluntary National Review of Turkmenistan in 2023 presents an optimistic view of the nation’s water security, boasting that “95 percent of the population has access to clean water” and “99.9 percent uses water services organized in compliance with safety requirements.” However, residents outside of the capital, Ashgabat, disagree. A resident from Turkmenbashi highlighted the neglect of rural areas, noting that the authorities “don’t see anything except the city of Arkadag [Ashgabat],” and described persistent water and heating shortages during the winter of 2023-24. The country’s failure to invest in modernizing infrastructure and its dependence on water-intensive industries like cotton agriculture exacerbate the challenges. Turkmenistan’s rigid authoritarian government limits civil discourse on environmental concerns, slowing progress toward meaningful solutions.

Turkmenistan’s water supply primarily comes from irrigation canals and dated Soviet-era infrastructure. While the central government has focused on providing water to the capital and vital economic hubs while neglecting rural and peripheral regions, water rationing is common, especially during the summer, when residents may only have access to water for a limited time each day.

The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) is working with Turkmenistan to address its water challenges. In August 2024, Turkmen Foreign Affairs Minister Raşit Meredow held virtual discussions with UNEP’s executive director, Inger Andersen, about establishing a regional center for technologies related to climate change in Ashgabat. This initiative aims to improve water management and mitigate the effects of climate change, including rising temperatures and arid conditions in Turkmenistan. Supported by USAID, Turkmen officials installed water metering systems along the Karakum Canal, which should improve water efficiency in the agricultural sector, which consumes a sizable portion of Turkmenistan’s water resources. (Water meters help farmers measure the amount of water delivered to different crops, maximizing the productivity of said crops, while reducing energy costs and water waste).

The future

The region’s long-term stability hinges on collaborative water management, transparency, and sustainable development initiatives. Without concerted and cooperative action, Central Asia risks further exacerbating interstate tensions, environmental degradation, social inequalities, and economic disruptions caused by water shortages.

The possibility of conflict

Water conflicts are already on Central Asia’s horizon. Between 2021 and 2022, there were violent clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan over unmarked borders and land claims. While water was not the direct cause for many of these skirmishes, access to water—an issue for local communities—has intensified militarist political impulses and sharpened local suffering during the conflict. While Bishkek and Dushanbe appear to have resolved tensions for the time being, there is always the possibility of fighting over water to erupt again if conditions do not improve or continue to deteriorate—and dispute-resolution mechanisms are not in place.

Map III (below) shows the relative uses of irrigation in Central Asia, with the density of irrigated land in the Fergana Valley naturally visible. A significant number of farmers have abandoned their crops to focus on keeping fruit trees alive. If another severe drought occurs, protests and violence over water among border communities could escalate into low-intensity conflict. Lack of water could lead to widespread protests at the local level, resulting in government crackdowns.

Additionally, there is concern about the Taliban’s resurgence in Afghanistan. With the exception of Tajikistan, the other four Central Asian governments are engaging the Taliban to secure economic and trade agreements and peace along the borders, potentially leading to the establishment of a North-South corridor via Afghanistan to Pakistan and India. However, the possibility for conflict is still present: In early 2022, Turkmen border guards and Taliban fighters engaged in border clashes.

The controversial 285 kilometer Qosh Tepa canal in northern Afghanistan could foment conflict. The Central Asian states—except Tajikistan—took a “business as usual” approach when the Taliban took control of Afghanistan. However, the significant percentage of water that Qosh Tepa will divert from the Amu-Darya River upstream in Afghanistan will impact tens of thousands of people downstream in Uzbek and Turkmen communities, disrupting their agricultural capabilities and potentially forcing the resettlement of at least a portion of those affected. It will also interfere with Kazakhstan’s attempts to ameliorate the drying of the Aral Sea. While the project is proceeding, the Taliban is engaged in discussions with neighboring Uzbekistan “to address matters related to the construction of the Qosh Tepa Canal.” Meanwhile, even having agreements in place is no guarantee of quiet—Iran and Afghanistan have had a water treaty in place since 1973 concerning water in the Helmand River, yet tensions over inadequate supply resulted in a cross-border clash in May 2023.

The Taliban government has no partner for the large-scale canal project and is proceeding with construction on its own. In November 2023, satellite imagery showed water escaping from what was supposed to be a completed portion of the canal, sparking fears that either miscalculation of the pressure of flowing water had caused a breach or the project had been sabotaged, sending water into the surrounding dry land to be absorbed by the sand for over a month. Kabul claimed that the outflow had been set up deliberately to manage the groundwater level in the area, yet there are ongoing serious concerns that the open-topped canal risks doing more harm and wasting more water in a region where poorly designed and outdated water transport systems are already responsible for the loss of a large proportion of this vital resource.

Climate change

Central Asia is no stranger to natural disasters, but climate change will exacerbate them. The region suffered a massive heatwave and drought during the summer of 2021, significantly damaging farms and animal husbandry. Mudslides also can result from intense rains or heat waves that melt glaciers. Melting means more water flowing downstream, leading to floods and, eventually, the disappearance of the glaciers themselves. Flooding can also endanger the populations living downhill and may spur migration, furthering societal pressure in the region.

The governments and nongovernmental organizations in the region, as well as international climate and water organizations and experts, recently participated in a series of discussions on climate change. For example, in May 2024, the Central Asian Climate Change Conference (CACC-2024) occurred in Almaty, Kazakhstan. A month later, Astana, the Kazakh capital, hosted the Sub-Regional Workshop on Integrated Planning for Climate and Air, organized by the UNEP-convened Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC) and the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) secretariat. Similarly, the Dushanbe Water Process takes place in the Tajik capital, organized by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in cooperation with the EU and Tajikistan’s Ministry of Energy and Water Resources.

Central Asia is rapidly warming. A study published in Geophysical Research Letters found that “over the past 35 years, temperatures have increased across Central Asia [while] mountain regions have become hotter and wetter—which might have accelerated the retreat of some major glaciers.” The ADB presents similar troubling data: The decrease in glacier surface area in Central Asia over the past fifty to sixty years—due to changing climate conditions—has reached 30 percent. If the situation is not addressed, climate change will have several destructive effects. Economic damage from droughts and floods in Central Asia could reach “1.3 percent of GDP annually, while crop yields are expected to decrease by 30 percent by 2050,” leading to around 5.1 million internal climate migrants by that time.

Salt flats, new dry lands, and energy infrastructure

A challenge for the C5 is what to do with vast territories affected by climate change and other environmental issues. Not only has the Aral Sea dried up but parts of the landscape are contaminated and toxic due to Soviet testing of biological weapons on Vozrozhdeniyia Island, which used to be in the middle of the Aral Sea. Now that the sea has dried up, it is larger and no longer an island. A lack of reporting on the pathogens there means the nature of the danger is unclear.

However, there are possible uses for this land. The dried-up portions of the Aral and Caspian seas and glacier/snow-free territories could be used for agricultural projects, planting trees and greenery, or installing green energy infrastructure. For example, Uzbekistan is planting trees and shrubs along more than eight thousand hectares of the Akkum ridge, Muynak district, and by the Sudachye system of lakes. Creating a forest in the area will reduce wind erosion, consolidate moving dunes, and prevent salt and dust from moving to other regions and populated areas. The new dry lands could be utilized for green energy projects like solar and wind farms. Kazakhstan already operates the large Burnoye solar plants, while Uzbekistan has the Zarafshan wind farm and is constructing the Bash wind farm.

The region’s salt flats, like the Asht Salt Flat, or Asht Namak, in the Fergana Valley (on Tajik territory but close to the border with Uzbekistan), and Shalkarteniz and Sor Tuzbair in Kazakhstan, must also be protected. Protecting Central Asia’s environment from climate change while capitalizing on areas like the new dry lands is a complex, long-term, and expensive task. Regional authorities have highlighted the need to protect their nations’ environments.

During his speech at the UN Climate Change Conference in Dubai at COP28, Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev explained that a new environmental code will facilitate the implementation of green technology, and “there is extraordinary potential for wind and solar power in my country and for green hydrogen.” The objective of the code is to introduce and support the best available techniques (BAT) and regulate activities that have or may have a negative impact on the environment. Since its introduction, government announcements and media reports suggest that Astana is increasingly interested in green technology to address internal energy demand. In early 2024, The Astana Times announced a green hydrogen production project in Mangystau Region.

Opportunities and policy development

Central Asian countries are aware of the water crisis and the need to develop policies and technologies to ameliorate the situation. International partners are engaged in cooperative efforts in hydrogeology, infrastructure buildup, utilities maintenance, and agricultural/irrigation modernization. EU countries, which have an elevated level of development in water management and environmental protection and prioritize climate-related policies, are particularly fit for this role as they seek new areas for engagement and partnerships in the region. Similarly, USAID is the primary US governmental agency engaging Central Asia on environmental issues. There also is an opportunity for greater diversification and participation on the part of other US federal agencies.

Extraregional partners

French entities are engaging with Central Asian nations. In 2023, the French Geological Survey (Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minières, or BRGM) signed an agreement on water management with Kazakhstan’s Geology Committee of the Ministry of Industry and Infrastructure Development. In Uzbekistan, the Suez Group of France signed a seven-year contract with the water company Uzsuvtaminot, the Municipality of Tashkent, and the Ministry of Investment and Foreign Trade to expand and improve drinking water access in Tashkent.

Moreover, France partnered with Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, and the World Bank in organizing the One Water Summit, held in Riyadh on December 3, 2024. The event was announced by President Emmanuel Macron and Kazakh President Tokayev at the seventy-ninth session of the UN General Assembly in New York (on September 25), and the summit was held on the margins of the sixteenth session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD COP16). These meetings serve as an important links between Central Asia and actors with capital and expertise on water management.

As for other European countries, in August 2024, a Kazakhstani delegation traveled to Germany for working meetings that resulted in four agreements on agriculture and water management. The Netherlands is engaging Astana to share knowledge on good practices. And at a 2023 conference in Astana, Slovak water companies presented research results and proposals to address water-related problems, particularly in Kazakhstan, including resource management and safety of water structures.

The EBRD has provided a sovereign loan of US$8.93 million and another US$8.93 million in investment grants to improve the Kyrgyz Republic’s water supply. The Central Asia Water & Energy Program (CAWEP) aims to expand and improve access to drinking water among the C5 nations and Afghanistan. According to the annual 2022-2023 CAWEP report, current projects include improving water resources and environmental conditions along the Aral Sea and adjacent basin areas of Kazakhstan.

USAID is active in Central Asia. In April 2024, USAID launched a new water supply system in Tajikistan’s Rokhati village, Rudaki District, to provide drinking water to more than 3,000 people. Over the period of October 2020 to September 2025, USAID is investing US$21.5 million to strengthen regional capacity to manage shared water resources and mitigate environmental risks in the Syr Darya and Amu Darya river basins. These initiatives include organizing online lectures, sponsoring academic training, establishing national intersectoral committees and a regional coordination committee, and organizing a study tour of the Syr Darya River basin for water specialists and journalists to raise awareness.

Turkmenistan may turn to Israel for assistance: During an April 2023 visit by Foreign Minister Eli Cohen to open the Israeli embassy in Ashgabat, he met with President Serdar Berdymukhamedov to share experiences in agriculture and water-saving techniques. Meanwhile, Korea Water Resources Corp. (K-Water), a state-run water management agency, has signed agreements with Kyrgyzstan to foster cooperation in the water sector and climate crisis. Finally, Azerbaijan (which borders the Caspian and Baku) could engage Central Asia via international organizations like the Organization of Turkic States to develop water projects to protect the Caspian Sea and capitalize on its close relationship with Kazakhstan.

Working together

For years, Central Asia has been moving toward greater regional integration for economic, cultural, and geopolitical reasons. Geopolitically, regional integration enables interstate cooperation in the face of the ever-present influence of neighboring actors like Russia and China. Initiatives to mitigate water insecurity provide an opportunity to strengthen regional cohesion in a concrete sphere of shared interest. Working together to address common water-related challenges can serve as a confidence-building mechanism to deepen C5 integration.

When the C5 presidents met in Astana in early August 2024 to discuss water issues, President Tokayev emphasized that it is “necessary to develop a new consolidated water policy, based on equal and fair use of water and strict fulfillment of obligations.” Kazakhstan, known for supporting regional cooperation and integration via its multivector foreign policy, is engaging partners. In 2023, Astana and Bishkek approved the Strategic Action Program for the Chu and Talas river basins to protect the combined three million residents of the area. The 2022–2030 program, drafted by UNDP and UNECE, addresses water quality, volumes, and ecosystem conservation.

The third International Conference on the Decade of Action, “Water for Sustainable Development, 2018–2028,” took place in June 2024 in Dushanbe, part of the Dushanbe Water Process. Tatyana Bokova, head of Tajikistan’s Revenue Administration Department, said: “Over decades of cooperation with neighboring countries, various mechanisms for the integrated management of shared waters have been introduced. Our oldest intergovernmental agreement turns sixty this year, and it, like others, continues to meet modern needs.” Similarly, the fourth meeting of the Joint Uzbek-Turkmen Intergovernmental Commission on Water Management met in Turkmenabat on April 30, 2024. The parties agreed to expedite the registration of Uzbek water-management facilities in Turkmenistan and to implement a project to build an antifiltration wall at the Sultan Sanjar dam of the Tuyamuyun hydroelectric complex. The C5 governments are discussing outstanding water-related issues; however, the combined effects of climate change, population growth, water scarcity, and environmental degradation are becoming more pressing. A broad array of effective actions is urgently needed.

Policy recommendations

The C5 forum has sought to increase regional cooperation and connectivity. Initiatives like the Middle Corridor and regional blocs promote cooperation and dialogue, but the C5 does not act as a unified bloc. Kazakhstan relies on its multivector foreign policy, and Uzbekistan is opening to the world. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have deteriorating relations with the West; Bishkek tends to cooperate more closely with Russia and China. Meanwhile, Turkmenistan maintains a relatively isolationist foreign policy. In other words, the C5 governments have different foreign policies, objectives, and partners.

The C5 format to engage the rest of the world has brought mixed results, though summits with the United States, Europe, and the Gulf states have resulted in positive announcements, investment, and trade projects. Yet Central Asia must increase intraregional connectivity and confidence-building mechanisms to deepen C5 integration to address regional problems in a holistic and unified manner. Challenges like water security do not recognize borders, and no single government can successfully address them without working together with neighbors. As this report has noted, distrust and border incidents, including over access to water, continue to prevent a more cohesive regional bloc from engaging the broader world. A joint, high-level C5 water policy body could improve water management, prepare legislation and regulation, and identify and work with investment partners both in the international assistance space and the private sector. Now that the United States and Central Asia have held a presidential-level C5+1 (regional diplomatic platform) in 2023 and a B5+1 in 2024, a blue C5+1 focused on water issues could prove very fruitful.

Regional cooperation

• Strengthen the Central Asian water agencies. Regional agencies exist, tasked with managing water bodies, namely IFAS and the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC). Regional bodies also have subagencies devoted to environmental affairs. For example, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) has a Directorate for Energy, Minerals, and Environment, while one of the objectives of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) is cooperation among the ministers of environment and ecology. There also are regular high-level conferences focused on water, such as the Dushanbe Water Process. Moreover, there is a legal environmental framework: the Tehran Convention, which entered into force in 2006, tasked with environmental protection of the Caspian Sea. However, ongoing water challenges, including the troubling Caspian situation, demonstrate that the existing environmental agencies and legal frameworks must be revised.
  • Restructure the ICWC (established in 1992) or create a new Central Asia Water Council/Secretariat. A challenge: deciding how much power a restructured ICWC or new agency would have in executing its mandate without raising concerns about national sovereignty. Water is a critical resource that demands greater cooperation and integration. A state-of-the-science entity exclusively focused on this resource is clearly needed but would require buy-in from all parties in the region to be effective.
  • Address the deteriorating Soviet-era water transport network throughout the region as a starting point, with progress in this critical area providing confidence-building and establishing credibility (as noted earlier in this report), so that more sensitive issues can begin to be discussed and acted upon. An ICWC with a broader mandate (and resources) or a new Central Asian water agency could then help regional governments search for joint solutions to sensitive regional topics. Because stopping hydropower projects in Tajikistan would protect Kazakhstani and Uzbekistani agricultural industries but prolong Tajikistan’s energy woes, for example, it would be important to identify and apply mutually agreed upon and accepted measures.
• Heighten the prominence of Tajikistan’s Dushanbe Water Process. Organized by a Central Asian state, this forum specifically focuses on water issues. The conference’s name and international recognition could grow if linked to preparations and negotiations for future One Water Summits, for example.

International engagement and partnerships

International activities in Central Asian water management, infrastructure development, and investment are important sources of funding and expertise; proper coordination can avoid or limit wasteful redundancies. Therefore, a strengthened regional agency, as suggested above, is crucial. Specifically, the Central Asian countries should pursue the following formats:

• Green 5+1: To build on the US-C5 presidential-level meeting and platforms, a ministerial environmental summit between Central Asian and US environmental officials should occur. This summit could have the additional positive outcome of keeping the New York Declaration alive (signed during the historical presidential 5+1 summit in 2023 between Biden and the Central Asian leaders). A Green 5+1 could occur, for example, at the 2025 Astana International Forum: Proper preparation would be needed, and the aim could be announcing specific initiatives with earmarked funding, which would put its earlier publicized general good intentions into action.
• Hold a green EU + Central Asia head-of-state summit: Europe engages with Central Asia on both country-to-country and bloc-to-region levels: EU-Central Asia summits, EU-Central Asia ministerial meetings, high-level political and security dialogues, and other high-level meetings. In September 2023, there was a C5+Germany summit in Berlin between the C5 presidents and the German chancellor. These meetings often address water. At the 2023 EU-Central Asia Ministerial Meeting in Luxembourg, participants highlighted the need to address the nexus of water and climate change “in a strong and holistic manner.” In June 2024, Dushanbe hosted the High-level Central Asian Forum on “Water and Climate Change” organized by UNDP, with support from Brussels. The next step should be a high-level summit, ideally at the presidential/head of state level, between the EU and Central Asia on environmental challenges, especially water. The EU is interested in expanding cooperation with the region beyond the usual topics of energy, transportation, and civil society—and water is a perfect subject matter. Paris, The Hague, and Astana could spearhead this initiative in collaboration with the UN.
• Hold Green East Asia (i.e., Japan, South Korea) + Central Asia summits: The first C5+Japan meeting at the presidential/prime minister level occurred in August 2024. Meanwhile, South Korea’s then-President Yoon Suk Yeol toured Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in June 2024, with the first presidential summit scheduled for 2025. To increase engagement, a Green C5 + East Asia summit at the ministerial level could occur, leading to a presidential C5-East Asia Green summit.
• Further engage the international donor community: Engaging with the international donor community, like the World Bank and EBRD, is nothing new for Central Asian governments looking to attract investment and aid agreements. While Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are quite active, the situation is more challenging for the three other countries that are less open to deeper relations with the West. Nevertheless, more donor coordination and participation are advisable to develop regional water conservation, efficient use strategies, and country-specific projects—and to avoid redundancies, incorporate lessons learned, and move away from revisiting project ideas that have not worked before. A donor coordination policy conference focusing on water and climate policy, conducted in the region, and leading to the establishment of a proposed coordinating authority, could go a long way to improve water-management and climate-response strategies.

Confidence building

It is vital that the Central Asian states engage both within the region and with upstream and Caspian littoral countries in high-level international discussions of water issues, raising the profile of the region and communicating the critical nature of the problem. Two conferences provide an opportunity for Central Asia and its neighbors to act.

• COP29: Azerbaijan hosted the 2024 United Nations Climate Change Conference in November. Azerbaijan had openly stated its hopes that COP29 would avoid some of the criticism of previous COPs by acting as an accelerator for smaller regional initiatives and creating workable frameworks for developing countries to act pragmatically on environmental issues. These foci perfectly complement Central Asian challenges. Central Asian calculations should carefully incorporate the COP29 outlook, especially given the importance of Azerbaijan’s cooperation on many issues.
• Regional climate summit: Kazakhstan will host a Central Asian environment summit in 2026. Water security in Central Asia must be a critical item on the agenda. Astana should rally support for effective initiatives and solutions. Summit workshops can identify high-priority projects for cooperative execution. COP29 provides a basis for this action. It is highly desirable that the suggested Central Asia Water Council or agency be established either prior to or at this event.

Technology, accountability and jobs

• Do what works: In recent years, national and regional governments and utilities around the world have implemented technologies like water-measuring systems, drip irrigation, recycling of gray water, and pump stations. Each of these technologies should be field tested in the region and utilized where appropriate.
• Encourage and incorporate new technologies: Water-saving technologies are being developed in several countries including Japan. Agencies like the Astana International Financial Centre (which has a Green Finance Center), USAID, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), or EBRD can create special funds for innovative water projects and provide grants to scientists (mainly from the C5) who are developing new technologies to address water security.
• Upgrade regional water infrastructure such as canals. To eliminate seepage, Soviet-era canal bottoms must be paved and insulated until they are watertight. Moreover, the tops of the canals could be covered with solar panels, which would provide energy to pump and measuring stations along the canal while reducing evaporation. Kazakhstan’s lengthy Irtysh–Karaganda Canal, the Arys-Turkistan Canal, and/or the Kyzylkum Canal could be testing grounds for solar panels. These initiatives are especially promising since they have already attracted the interest of private investors.
• Ensure transparency and accountability: As more money pours into water infrastructure, there is the increasing likelihood of misappropriation, theft, and corrupt practices. Regional governments must consider hiring international accountability agencies that can audit projects to ensure funds are appropriately spent. The citizenry’s trust in their leaders will grow if authorities take concrete steps toward transparency and efficient spending; and the confidence of international donors and partners would be strengthened, which is key to paving the way for continued future cooperation.
• Create jobs and prioritize training: New projects should contribute to job creation in countries with high unemployment. Prioritizing job training in the water sector will require collaboration between the water and professional education authorities. In this context, it is worth noting the opening of the Kazakh University of Water Management and Land Reclamation in September 2024. Water-related projects will create jobs, as occurred through Uzbekistan’s South Karakalpakstan Water Resources Management Improvement Project.
• Involve foreign donors and obtain end-user feedback: Government officials must engage with the general population to discuss water security and what citizens need. Kazakhstan’s “Listening State” initiative, for example, could have a specific water component. Other governments can follow Astana’s models and have town halls and meetings between community leaders and senior policymakers about what water-related challenges they face and what the residents of affected communities propose. Ideas should not only come from international agencies or a country’s senior leadership; local populations can also provide valid and helpful recommendations regarding how to manage water challenges. Engaging in listening initiatives will have the added benefit of fostering stakeholder buy-in.

Conclusion

Water shortage is a limiting factor for Central Asia’s regional development. To improve the current situation, the five countries of the region need to accelerate the renovation and upgrading of the regional water infrastructure, field test and incorporate new water-saving technologies, and attract international partners and foreign investment in area water infrastructure at a significantly higher rate. Coordination of these activities on the regional level is paramount.

A previous version of this report misstated the year Kazakhstan will host a Central Asian environment summit. It will be in 2026.

Ariel Cohen, LLB, PhD, is an internationally renowned expert on energy policy, Russia/Eurasia, Eastern and Central Europe, and the Middle East. He is a recognized authority on political and security risk man-agement; economic development and investment policy; the rule of law; crime and corruption; market-entry strategies; and other aspects of state/business relations.

Cohen is a senior fellow at the International Tax and Investment Center, a nonprofit research and edu-cation organization in Washington, and director of its Energy, Growth and Security Program. He also serves as a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

He has authored six books and monographs, has been involved in journalism since 1981, and has pub-lished over 900 articles in professional and popular media. A columnist for Forbes, he regularly appears on CNN, NBC, CBS, FOX, C-SPAN, BBC-TV, Al Jazeera, and all Russian and Ukrainian national TV networks.

He also writes for Newsweek, The National Interest, Huffington Post, the Atlantic Council’s New Atlanticist blog, and UPI, and has written numerous guest columns for The New York Times, Christian Science Moni-tor, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Times, and National Review Online. He is widely published in Europe and the Middle East.

Until July 2014, Cohen was a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation in Washington. Dr. Cohen conducts White House briefings and regularly lectures at the request of US government institutions including the US Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Training and Doctrine and Special Forces Commands of the US Armed Forces, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. He frequently testifies before committees of the US Congress—including the Senate and House Foreign Relations Committees, the House Armed Services Committee, and the House Judiciary Commit-tee—and the Helsinki Commission. He also directs high-level conferences on a wide array of topics.

Cohen is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the American Bar Association, and the Amer-ican Council on Germany.

Wesley Alexander Hill is the assistant director and lead analyst for the Energy, Growth, and Security Program at the International Tax and Investment Center. The program focuses on critical natural resources, energy transformations, infrastructure, and geopolitics in Eurasia while exploring opportunities for investment and policymaking.

Hill is an accomplished foreign policy professional with expertise in energy policy, security studies, grand strategy, Chinese politics, Sino-American relations, Sino-African relations, and Sino-Eurasian relations. Hill has been featured in Al Jazeera, The Hill, Newsweek, Voice of America, The National Interest, and many other outlets. Hill is also a contributor to Forbes.

Earlier in his career, Hill was a political science lecturer and researcher at Tulane University. Hill is a fellow of the National Bureau of Asian Research, having conducted research at Beijing’s Tsinghua University and Taipei’s National Normal University. Hill began his career conducting foreign policy research and analysis in the constituent services office of Congresswoman Dina Titus.

Hill graduated from Tulane University.

Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is an analyst who focuses on geopolitical, trade, and defense and security issues across the Western Hemisphere, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. He is president of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm based in Washington, DC.

His analyses have appeared in numerous refereed journals, including the SAIS Review of International Affairs, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Defence Studies, Polar Journal, the Journal of Slavic Military Studies, European Security, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, and Perspectivas. He has published book chapters on Bolivia’s foreign policy, separatism in Moldova, and economic diversification in Kazakhstan. His essays and commentaries appear in The Diplomat, NE Global, Geopolitical Monitor, World Politics Review, e-International Relations, among others, and have been published by the Center for International Maritime Security.

Sánchez holds a master’s degree in international peace and conflict resolution from American University’s School of International Service. He has attended the Institute of World Politics, Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, and studied in Austria, Belgium, and France. He also studied at the National Defense University’s William J. Perry Center (formerly the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies) in Washington.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to promote policies that strengthen stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

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New Atlanticist Nov 27, 2024

The West’s role in solving Central Asia’s water crisis

By Ariel Cohen, Wesley Alexander Hill, and Wilder Alejandro Sánchez

US and Western engagement with Central Asian states on their water crisis can help reduce the region’s dependencies on Moscow and Beijing.

Central Asia Geopolitics & Energy Security

Russia Tomorrow Oct 1, 2024

Russia’s war on Ukraine: Moscow’s pressure points and US strategic opportunities

By Ariel Cohen

A new Atlantic Council report explores Russia’s modern day domestic and international vulnerabilities.

Defense Industry Europe & Eurasia

The post Central Asia needs regional and international cooperation to bolster water security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While the withdrawal is an important global signal and will make efforts to combat climate change more difficult, the new administration’s de-prioritization of climate action will have immediate and concrete consequences for Americans themselves. The country will bear a heavier burden of inaction as well as the losses of delayed national investment in adaptation and resilience if Trump succeeds in fully repealing the Biden administration’s climate investments.

This month provided a stark example of that opportunity cost. The Los Angeles wildfires killed twenty-seven people and burned through over 12,000 structures. The loss is visible and immediate. Notably, the true cost is still being calculated. Analysts are projecting economic losses of as much as $150 billion and anticipate more deaths as the ramifications of degraded air quality and smoke take full effect.

The deeper concern is that this withdrawal, coupled with Trump’s other executive orders to facilitate the fossil fuel industry and backtrack on climate investments, will have significant impacts on the American public, since increasing greenhouse gas emissions has a direct effect on increasing the frequency and intensity of natural disasters.

Hence, if in addition to these decisions, the Trump administration opts out of actively investing in disaster preparedness, its economic and financial losses will rise exponentially. In fact, it is estimated that each dollar spent on disaster preparedness and climate adaptation saves twelve dollars in recovery and response. Without climate-related action and resilience-building efforts, it will fall to the American taxpayer to cover that additional eleven dollars.

The United States is stepping back on climate at a critical moment for action. The public and private sectors need to be taking this moment to coordinate and align. But instead, the new administration is signaling, at least initially, a lack of political will that could set the country back both in terms of individual preparedness and long-term economic opportunity.

Other countries are seizing the economic opportunities of climate adaptation and resilience. Germany is set to invest at least €1.6 billion in artificial intelligence, including for climate efforts, by 2025; Japan has committed to doubling adaptation finance to $14.8 billion by 2025; and countries such as Uruguay, Denmark, and Lithuania are recognized for having scaled up the share of solar and wind energy in their electricity mix by at least 6 percentage points annually over a five-year span.

Trump’s recent executive orders mark not only a lack of commitment to climate action but also a backtracking on notable climate investments under the Biden administration. The private sector will likely no longer have the government’s support in fast-tracking adaptation initiatives. As other countries scale up incentives, this will make it more difficult for the United States to hold any competitive advantage in the long term.

In the short-term, however, it’s lives and livelihoods that are at risk. Without mitigation and adaptation, climate change is set to kill 3.4 million people each year by the end of the century. While the United States’ retreat from climate leadership has significant geopolitical implications, the more pressing concern is on the national impacts. Americans will face the consequences of inaction. They will have lower capacity to overcome climate shocks and stresses, putting their own health, finances, and well-being on the line. In fact, our Climate Resilience Center estimated that heat-related labor-productivity losses could cost half a trillion dollars annually by 2050 in the United States alone. Ignoring or denying the reality of climate change will not avoid its impacts.

Indeed, the world will feel the loss of US leadership under the Trump administration. Progress can—and must—continue, but the average American will feel the weight of these decisions on a personal, financial, and social level for years to come. Although Trump has made his climate stance clear in his first few hours back in the White House, there is time for his administration and the president himself to reassess and reinvest in a new way forward.

Jorge Gastelumendi is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Climate Resilience Center. He previously served as chief advisor and negotiator to the government of Peru during the adoption of the Paris Agreement.

The post The US retreat on climate comes with steep costs for the economy and the American people appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Clabough in Real Clear Energy: “Don’t Turn Back: The Great Debate on Energy Subsidies” appeared first on Atlantic Council.

2024 was a transformative year for Latin America and the Caribbean. Elections brought some surprises, but the region also bucked the global trend as continuity was the theme in the Dominican Republic and Mexico, where Claudia Sheinbaum made history as its first female president. Further south, Brazil played a pivotal role as the host of the Group of Twenty and Peru welcomed the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit, asserting Latin America’s leadership on the global stage.

Meanwhile, the region faced enduring challenges—from Nicolas Maduro’s ignoring electoral results in Venezuela to the growing influence of transnational criminal organizations. The region remains trapped in a low-growth economic environment with considerable strains on fiscal revenue, while a strong hurricane season reinforced the importance of building greater resilience across the Caribbean. China’s influence surged, with increased, notable new investments and Colombia’s decision to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

What might be in store for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2025?

How might the incoming Trump administration engage with the region? Can economies across the hemisphere grow beyond current predictions? How will leaders address security challenges? Might new tech hubs emerge?

Take the quiz and see if you agree with our predictions for 2025!

The post Latin America and the Caribbean in 2025: Ten predictions to shape the year ahead appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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A low-carbon vision meets untold natural resource wealth

Guyana had embarked on an ambitious journey toward sustainable development long before ExxonMobil’s massive oil discoveries off its coast in 2015. In 2009, recognizing the value of its vast rainforests in the fight against climate change, Guyana launched its pioneering Low Carbon Development Strategy (LCDS). This wasn’t merely an environmental policy; it represented a fundamental rethinking of how a developing nation could approach economic growth.

The strategy’s origins lay in a holistic understanding of Guyana’s natural wealth. The country’s rainforests, covering roughly two thirds of its territory, store an estimated 19.5 billion tons of carbon dioxide equivalent. Rather than viewing these forests as obstacles to development, Guyana recognized them as vital assets in the global fight against climate change.

An early partnership with Norway—which pledged up to $250 million to help preserve Guyana’s rainforests—established the LCDS’s credibility. It provided vital seed funding, helping Guyana develop the institutional capacity and technical frameworks necessary for environmental asset management on a national scale.

The 2015 oil discoveries placed Guyana at a crucial decision point—over 11 billion barrels of oil equivalent were enough to transform the nation’s economic trajectory overnight. Many nations might have abandoned their environmental commitments in the face of such wealth. Instead, Guyana chose to update and strengthen its low-carbon strategy, creating LCDS 2030.

The balancing act of LCDS 2030

Guyana’s approach reflects a sophisticated understanding of its natural capital. Rather than treating environmental protection and resource extraction as mutually exclusive, Guyana developed parallel value streams from its natural assets.

The country’s forests, for instance, generate revenue through both sustainable forestry and carbon credits, which monetize environmental stewardship. In 2022, Guyana made history by becoming the first nation to receive private sector validation for forest conservation-based jurisdictional carbon credits, leading to a landmark $750 million agreement with Hess Corporation.

The groundbreaking deal involves the sale of 37.5 million carbon credits (about 30 percent of Guyana’s credit issuance) between 2022-32, with increasing minimum prices from $15 to $25 per ton and a 60 percent revenue share for Guyana if market prices exceed these floors. The credits are independently verified under the United Nations (UN) ART TREES standard and meet UN social and environmental safeguards.

The country has further pushed boundaries by launching a Global Biodiversity Alliance aiming to develop a biodiversity credits system that extends beyond carbon, creating a comprehensive framework for valuing ecosystem services. By combining carbon credits, biodiversity credits, and sustainable forestry income, Guyana’s sustainable finance approach offers a new paradigm for how developing nations can maximize the value of their natural assets while preserving them for future generations.

Similarly, rather than treating petroleum wealth as an end in itself, Guyana views it as a means to finance its climate transition. Oil revenues are channeled into renewable energy projects, climate-resilient agriculture, coastal protection, and green job training. For example, the government has invested 12 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product in upgrading drainage and irrigation networks and expanding rehabilitation of sea and river defense structures at critical locations. These investments are complemented by planned water treatment facilities and comprehensive flood management programs.

By 2027, Guyana is projected to produce 1.2 million barrels of oil per day, rivaling some OPEC members. But unlike many oil producers, this production surge is balanced with concrete environmental commitments.

The power of inclusion

The most innovative aspect of Guyana’s approach lies in its governance framework. The Multi-Stakeholder Steering Committee overseeing the LCDS represents a comprehensive model of inclusive decision-making, drawing representatives from government, civil society, Indigenous organizations, the private sector, and academia. Specifically, Indigenous communities—traditional stewards of the forests—are integrated through village-level consultations, dedicated representation in decision-making, and capacity-building programs, ensuring they play a central role in shaping Guyana’s national sustainable development strategy.

Guyana’s global leadership

The strength of Guyana’s commitment to this balanced approach was powerfully articulated at the 16th Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity in 2024. There, Vickram Bharrat, Guyana’s minister of natural resources, presented his nation’s journey not as a compromise, but as a pioneering model for development:

“As a developing, oil-producing nation with ambitious infrastructure projects, we face the challenge of balancing economic growth with environmental preservation. However, through the Low Carbon Development Strategy 2030, we are committed to ensuring that development proceeds without compromising our natural capital. Our forests will continue to serve as vital carbon sinks and biodiversity hotspots, supporting both climate action and ecosystem resilience.”

The minister’s words were backed by one of the most ambitious conservation commitments globally: expanding Guyana’s protected areas from 9 to 30 percent of its land mass by 2030.  At COP29 in Azerbaijan, Guyana further demonstrated its leadership by receiving the Transparency Award and co-chairing the Forest and Climate Leaders’ Partnership. Bharrat’s call to move beyond theoretical debates to “measurable, accountable action” underscored Guyana’s role as a practical innovator in global climate solutions.

Lessons for a world in transition

Guyana’s ability to transform potential contradictions into complementary strengths offers a compelling model for managing the energy transition. The same government that oversees a rapidly expanding oil sector is also pioneering biodiversity credits and expanding protected areas. This isn’t coincidental—it reflects a nuanced understanding that modern development requires balancing multiple priorities and revenue streams.

The strategy treats oil wealth not as an end goal, but as a bridge to a sustainable future. Oil revenues are systematically channeled into building the infrastructure, institutions, and human capital needed for a low-carbon economy. This approach recognizes that the oil boom, while significant, is temporary. The benefits of preserved forests and biodiversity, however, are permanent.

For other oil producers, particularly those in the developing world, Guyana offers a template that could be adapted to local conditions. The success of this model is already providing compelling evidence that developing nations need not choose between economic development and environmental stewardship. Instead, they can pursue a more balanced path that recognizes and monetizes the value of all their natural assets and builds toward a more sustainable future.

Liliana Diaz is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center and an adjunct professor of energy, climate policy, and markets in the Americas at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.

EnergySource

EnergySource is the Global Energy Center’s (GEC) online publication providing commentary and analysis on developments in the energy and climate sector from a wide-array of thought leaders, politicians, and experts.

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Liliana Diaz

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Global Energy Center

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

New Atlanticist Nov 15, 2024

Following COP16, can Latin America and the Caribbean lead the creation of biodiversity markets?

By Isabel Chiriboga

By developing robust biodiversity credit markets, countries in the region will not only safeguard invaluable ecosystems but also set a global standard in climate finance.

Climate Change & Climate Action Colombia

EnergySource Nov 6, 2024

Tackling the energy-water challenge at COP29

By Robert F. Ichord, Jr.

Energy and water have a complex and inextricable relationship, especially as growing populations, expanding cities, and the changing climate strain resources around the globe. Leaders at COP29 must come together in Baku to promote policies, strategies, and investments to meet the water and energy challenge.

Climate Change & Climate Action Energy & Environment

EnergySource Nov 16, 2023

Six steps Guyana can take to avoid the resource curse

By David L. Goldwyn

Guyana is on a rapid path to potentially becoming the fourth largest oil producer in the world. Now, the government has an opportunity to show the world how to do resource development right.

Energy & Environment Geopolitics & Energy Security

The Global Energy Center develops and promotes pragmatic and nonpartisan policy solutions designed to advance global energy security, enhance economic opportunity, and accelerate pathways to net-zero emissions.

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The post Guyana’s low-carbon model for resource-led development appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Since the inception of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, the international community has pursued both top-down and bottom-up approaches to address climate change. The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 exemplified a top-down approach, imposing legally binding emission-reduction targets on developed nations. However, its impact was limited due to several large emitters not participating. This included the United States, which withdrew its support, and Canada and Australia, which later followed suit.

The Paris Agreement was the next major multilateral effort. After years of extensive negotiations, countries reached a breakthrough in drafting a new legal instrument to address the climate crisis in 2015. Unlike previous frameworks that primarily targeted industrialized nations, this new approach aimed to be universal. It marked a fundamental shift in multilateralism: Instead of setting international norms and obligations to be implemented at the national level, this strategy reversed the process. The global effort would now be the collective sum of what individual nations commit to at the national level—a bottom-up model rather than the traditional top-down approach, allowing countries to set their own emission reduction targets, known as Nationally Determined Contributions. 

The Paris approach was aimed in part to accommodate the United States, where domestic political dynamics resist externally imposed mandates (US lawmakers and politicians do not accept that other countries can dictate how the US economy should be run). Todd Stern, the former US special envoy for climate change and one of the architects of the Paris Agreement, explained in a recent podcast that a major objective was to design an agreement that the United States could join without repeating its usual pattern of negotiating terms only to back out later. The Paris Agreement, tailored to accommodate the US context, successfully brought the United States on board initially. But despite initial widespread participation, the United States withdrew from the Paris Agreement in 2017 during the first Trump administration, then rejoined in 2021 during the Biden administration. The return of President-elect Donald Trump to the White House is likely to see the United States again leave the agreement. 

Both approaches—top-down and bottom-up—have now been attempted in global climate governance. The Kyoto Protocol embodied the former and the Paris Agreement introduced the latter. While progress has undoubtedly been made, much of it attributable to the Paris framework, the world is still falling short of what is necessary to achieve the ultimate goal of limiting global temperature rise. The recent NCQG aims to mobilize $300 billion annually by 2035 to assist developing countries. However, this figure falls far short of the estimated $1.3 trillion per year that experts deem necessary to limit global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels. 

Why, despite deploying these two fundamentally different approaches, has the multilateral system failed to deliver at the required scale?

The root cause, in my view, is that leaders are not focused on the heart of the problem of the climate crisis, which lies in the underlying global economic model. The current global economy is overly focused on profit generation and wealth accumulation, often at the expense of sustainability. This profit-driven model not only fuels the climate crisis but also creates systemic barriers to meaningful international cooperation and transformative change. It is a significant barrier to progress in achieving sustainable development since it treats natural resources (land) merely as factors of production rather than as integral components of ecosystems. In the current economic model, the four factors of production are: capital, human resources, land and natural resources, and entrepreneurship. This perspective leads to environmental degradation and hinders sustainable development. Economists such as Joseph Stiglitz and Thomas Piketty have advocated rethinking this model to prioritize ecological sustainability, social well-being, and more equitable development.

I tried myself in 2013 and 2014, in the context of my participation in the UN General Assembly’s Open Working Group on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which discussed and developed the SDGs, to draw attention to and bring the focus on the need to address systemic issues and reengineer the global economic model. I made this case because I believe it is necessary to truly achieve sustainable development. Unfortunately, my calls did not resonate as much as I would have hoped.

Large corporations, often through influential governments, resist systemic changes that could disrupt profit margins. The Paris Agreement sought to signal to corporate and investment circles that they needed to initiate transitions toward sustainability. While some progress has been made on this front, the transition lacks the necessary depth, speed, and equity. The current economic “software” still prioritizes profit maximization, impeding the rapid and comprehensive changes required. So, like any software, the economic machinery will follow and execute, no matter what we do. We need to rewrite the software.

A new economic model addressing climate change while prioritizing environmental and ecosystem conservation would integrate principles of sustainability, inclusivity, equity, and resilience. It should assign economic value to ecosystems (e.g., carbon sequestration, water purification, biodiversity), encourage investments in natural capital, promote a circular economy to minimize waste and maximize resource efficiency, and focus on transitioning from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources. In order to decouple emissions from economic development and growth, massive investments and resources should be directed at accelerating and scaling up technological solutions.

Every year, the climate crisis gets worse. To effectively tackle this crisis, it is imperative to reengineer the economic model to prioritize the wellbeing of people and the planet rather than profit generation. This shift is urgent and essential for achieving sustainable development and ensuring that multilateral efforts yield tangible and meaningful outcomes. Time is not on our side. 

Mohamed Khalil is a senior Egyptian diplomat and expert in sustainable development and climate policy. He has played a key role in international climate negotiations, from COP17 in 2011 till COP29 in 2024, particularly regarding achieving the Paris Agreement in COP21 in 2015, shaping policies on climate adaptation, mitigation, and sustainable financing. 

The post To solve the climate crisis, the world doesn’t just need a new international framework. It needs a new economic model. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Underwhelming COP29

Participants at COP29 managed to reach an agreement on international carbon market standards, a key step to establishing such a market under the United Nations (UN), as envisioned in Article 6.4 of the 2015 Paris Agreement. However, COP29 became stuck on the key objective of the meeting: producing a new collective quantified goal (NCQG) as a new climate finance target for the next ten to fifteen years. This is meant to replace the current $100 billion annual figure—a pledge of financial aid to developing countries made by developed countries in 2009, but viewed as totally inadequate.

The most important issue to be settled is the quantum of the NCQG. Participating countries have disparate expectations, which are unlikely to be bridged. Developing countries have coalesced around the target of $1.3 trillion a year of international climate finance aid, based on a report by the High Level Expert Group on Climate Finance. Developed countries spearheaded by the European Union (EU) have reportedly toyed with a range of $200-300 billion, but are reportedly leaning toward $200 billion and a 2035 deadline.

The issue of the contributor base has also been important. Developing countries want to stick to the Paris Agreement, which calls for developed countries to provide climate finance to developing countries. Developed countries want to widen the contributor base to include rapidly growing emerging market countries. These countries, such as China and the Gulf countries, are able to contribute and should do so because of their high levels of emissions. Many developing countries, in particular China, have strongly objected to these demands. As part of the debate, China announced that it has voluntarily provided 177 billion yuan ($24 billion) in project financing to help other developing countries deal with climate change since 2016. This statement highlights China’s preferences for a bilateral approach. China is using climate finance as a tool to further its geopolitical agenda, instead of contributing funds to multilateral efforts. If other countries decide to follow a similar bilateral approach, they could strike another blow against the unraveling multilateral world order.

A day after the COP29 officially ended, an agreement on NCQG was reached, calling for developed countries to provide $300 billion a year by 2035 to help developing countries in their climate efforts. No one is happy with the agreement. Developing countries have criticized it as  too little. Developed countries have tried to lower expectations about official aid, emphasizing that the funding would have to come from a wide variety of sources, including the private sector. In any event, the agreements concluded at the COP29 will be overshadowed by the fact that Trump would most likely pull the United States out of the 2015 Paris Agreement for a second time—and could even withdraw from the 1992 UN Treaty that provides the framework for the COP process. This time around, Argentina could follow suit and quit the Paris Agreement. President Milei already recalled his negotiators midway through the COP29 meetings. Without the US and possibly Argentina, the rest of the world would have to struggle to come up with meaningful nationally determined commitments to achieve net zero emissions and to mobilize climate finance to help developing countries. This outlook does not augur well for the COP30 to be hosted by Brazil in 2025.

A divided G20 Summit

The G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro has been described by media reports as chaotic and divided. Nevertheless, it managed to produce a Leaders’ Declaration, even though the debate about wording was cut short by Brazil’s President Lula—leaving a bitter taste among Western leaders. The Declaration contains watered-down language on practically all agenda items. A major result is the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty, Lula’s signature project, which gathered support and was launched.

However, the facade of cooperation has been rocked by Argentina’s statement that while Milei did not want to prevent other leaders from signing the declaration, he strongly criticized key elements of the agenda. His targets included anything to do with the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Goals and strengthening the role of governments in fighting global hunger (which according to Milei should be promoted by removing the involvement of governments). At the same time, Milei stressed that he would prioritize economic development over environmental protection, having dissolved Argentina’s Environment Ministry after taking office. These arguments are in line with Trump’s views. They will likely be advanced more forcefully in future G20 meetings, undermining the chance of agreements for joint actions and weakening the G20 itself.

Prospects for international cooperation: more turbulence

President Trump will likely reverse or ignore many of Biden’s environmental and climate change initiatives. However, as several red states have seen job creation thanks to IRA programs, he may continue some programs on a case-by-case basis. Overall, Trump’s approach would weaken environmental protection home and disengage from international climate efforts.

In the vacuum created by the United States and Argentina, China has already stepped in to champion international climate efforts under the Paris Agreement and open trade, as Xi Jinping claimed in his speech at the Rio G20 Summit. China has appealed to the EU to “collaborate effectively on the COP29 agenda…(to) establish a strong foundation for re-aligning their broad green and economic initiatives and improve their bilateral relationship.” China’s approach may appeal to the EU when it’s confronted with Trump’s denial of climate change and his protectionist unilateralism. However, if the EU were to cooperate with China on climate and trade issues, it would find itself at greater odds with a Trump administration already unhappy with the EU for free riding the US security umbrella while posting a trade surplus with the United States. The EU would be in a very difficult position, as it still very much depends on Washington for security, especially against a revanchist Russia emboldened by its successes in Ukraine.

The rest of the world can find ways to deal with climate change without the US federal government, as it did during Trump’s first presidential term—including working with US states and cities still keen to promote a green agenda. But the whole exercise would be inefficient and more difficult, especially when mobilizing climate finance.

As summarized by Bloomberg, the Rio G20 Summit has shown “how quickly the guardrails are coming off the international rule-based order…(as) the looming return of Trump hung over the proceedings like the proverbial sword of Damocles.” Expect more of the same, at future summits—starting with the 2025 G20 under the presidency of South Africa.

Hung Tran is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center, a former executive managing director at the Institute of International Finance and a former deputy director at the International Monetary Fund.

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

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The post Divided COP29 and G20 Summits: A taste of things to come appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Eight Latin American countries attended this year’s G20 leaders’ summit. Besides Argentine President Javier Milei, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and newly inaugurated Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum, delegations from Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, and Uruguay traveled to Rio as guest countries of the Brazilian G20 presidency. These countries face shifting international winds and are growing apart as governments respond in different ways to external developments, from growing US-China competition to the incoming US presidential administration.

Brazil’s G20 marks the third year in a row in which an emerging market is setting the G20 agenda, following the presidencies of Indonesia (2022) and India (2023). In this context, these countries have paved the way for greater harmonization of objectives between developed and developing countries, pushing for progress in key areas, including climate finance, hunger and poverty, digital public infrastructure, and reforming international financial institutions. Over the same period, Latin American G20 members have worked together to raise the importance of regional priorities, such as development and climate finance and the reform of multilateral institutions. This year, however, policy coordination has become more challenging as governments veer apart from one another in how they plan to adapt to a changing international landscape, risking a division of the region into competing groups.

Here is how the three Latin American countries in the G20 approached this year’s summit.

Brazil

Brazil faced the challenging task of balancing the disparate demands and priorities of all twenty-one permanent members of the G20 with its own priorities: social inclusion, global reform, and sustainability. The end goal, the successful signing of a (nonbinding) final declaration, was a complex task in a heavily divided world, and key Brazilian priorities such as promoting a billionaire tax to finance hunger relief faced opposition from the United States. The proposal, which was supported by France, Spain, and South Africa, was actually most vehemently opposed by fellow South American nation Argentina. Brazil ultimately succeeded in gaining consensus for a declaration that espoused its key objectives, including calls for multilateral reform, cooperation for more effective taxation of “ultra-high-net-worth individuals,” and a redoubling of efforts to end world hunger and fight climate change, among other topics. 

Yet Brazilian leaders are also aware that they will have more opportunities beyond the G20 to shape the agenda. Next year, the Lula administration will host the 2025 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP30) and will preside over the BRICS summit. It will be an important year for international climate negotiations that coincides with President-elect Donald Trump’s first year back in office, which has raised uncertainty about the United States’ continued participation in the Paris climate accords. This sentiment was perhaps best exemplified by Lula himself, who concluded in his final remarks that leaders had “worked hard,” but that they had “only scratched the surface of the deep challenges that the world has to face.”

Mexico

Under Sheinbaum, Mexico is reemerging as a more active participant in the G20 process and the world stage. This is the first time a Mexican president has attended the G20 in six years, ending that country’s limited presidential diplomacy under former President Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador. During her participation, Sheinbaum signaled support for three areas of focus: gender equality, sustainable development, and digitalization. She also supported Brazil’s proposed Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty—which was a high mark of the Brazilian presidency—and presented the Sowing Life program to divert 1 percent of global military spending to sustainable development and reforestation.

Mexico’s return to international fora pleased domestic and international observers, and images of Sheinbaum in meetings with world leaders have set a clear break from her predecessor. However, Mexico’s deep ties to the US economy present a different calculus for the Mexican president when compared to Lula for 2025 and beyond, likely inspiring greater caution in her approach to the international arena, particularly as she prepares her country for potential confrontation with the incoming administration in the United States. She did nonetheless use the stage to defend the government’s controversial judicial reform. Her first major international appearance in Rio de Janeiro set the stage for how she plans to move forward in years to come.

Argentina

The main source of regional misalignment among the three Latin American G20 members came from Argentina, which in past days had made a series of symbolic gestures at the United Nations (UN) to signal the country’s new course under Milei. The country had stood out as the sole vote against UN resolutions this month on indigenous people’s rights and combating gender-based online violence. Argentina also recalled its delegation from the ongoing COP29 in Azerbaijan, raising concerns over the country’s continued commitment to the Paris agreement and the international climate regime, echoing Trump’s own withdrawal of the United States from the agreement in 2017. (Milei was also the first foreign leader to visit Trump on the Thursday following the US presidential election.)

Brazil was quick to respond through Environment Minister Marina Silva and Vice-President Geraldo Alckmin, who criticized Argentina’s move. In Brazil, there was also apprehension that these moves by its southern neighbor set a bad precedent for what may happen during the leaders’ summit. Across negotiations over the G20’s final declaration, Argentine representatives sought to block the inclusion of references to gender equality, women’s rights, a tax for billionaires, and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In the end, Milei decided not to block the leaders’ declaration but dissociated himself from those issues. An official involved in the negotiations told the Associated Press that Argentina adopted the statement “under intense pressure from world powers.” Other areas, such as the promotion of regional democracy, artificial intelligence governance, and the energy transition, fared better in exchanges over the communiqué. Underscoring the tensions between Brasilia and Buenos Aries, Argentina is the only country not to have requested a bilateral meeting with Lula in Rio.

Trade, Trump, and beyond

Developments in Europe are also changing diplomatic calculations in the region. For months, it was expected that the long-delayed trade deal between the European Union (EU) and Mercosur, a South American trade bloc, might finally be announced by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and her Mercosur counterparts during the G20 leaders’ summit. Brazil’s invitation of Paraguay and Uruguay, the bloc’s other members together with Argentina (plus Bolivia, which is completing its accession process), was partially inspired by this objective. France, however, has made its opposition to the agreement clear: French Prime Minister Michel Barnier warned last week that the government is “employing all means” to block it in its current form. French President Emmanuel Macron, who faces a steep legislative battle over France’s 2025 budget and is being pressured by farmers to block the deal, met Milei in Buenos Aires this past Sunday before traveling to Rio. After that meeting Maron told reporters that Milei “was not satisfied with the deal” and that he was “not satisfied with the way Mercosur worked.” Other EU members, including Austria, Hungary, Ireland, and Poland, may also step in to block the deal. Interestingly, French officials explained that Macron played an instrumental role to convince Argentina “to contribute to the international consensus” and refrain from blocking the G20 process.

Ultimately nothing transpired in Rio, although the agreement’s main proponents, including Germany, Spain, the Mercosur countries, and the European Commission, remain optimistic that significant progress may still be reached before the end of the year. This would constitute one of the largest trade agreements in history and would bring the two regions closer at a time when fears of renewed trade wars and higher tariffs are spooking international markets. Nevertheless, there is also concern that Argentina’s withdrawal from COP29 may still be used by the deal’s detractors in the EU to block progress over environmental policy, similar to how deforestation in Brazil has fueled anti-treaty momentum in previous years. European officials, including Kaja Kallas, the leading candidate to become the next high representative of the EU for foreign affairs and security policy, have made clear their belief that if the deal fails it will create a “void” that will be filled by China.

Meanwhile, Beijing presented a clear framing for Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s participation in the G20: “to champion cooperation, multilateralism,” a strategy meant to preemptively present China as an alternative to Trump’s “America First” approach to international affairs. The inauguration of the port of Chancay in Peru and the announcement of new economic cooperation agreements with partners in Latin America and the Caribbean further cemented the perception of China’s outsized competitive advantage vis-à-vis the United States in its ability to deliver tangible economic results.

As the G20 leaders’ summit concludes, its leaders should redouble their efforts to find common ground and work together, or they will face the risk of having their shared interests being swept away by rising global uncertainty and volatility.

Ignacio Albe is a project assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post How Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina approached this year’s G20 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Biodiversity loss is especially urgent in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). The region is home to 60 percent of the world’s biodiversity and six of the planet’s seventeen megadiverse countries. The Amazon rainforest, for instance, is a critical global ecosystem that is under increasing threat from illegal mining and other activities. Conservation investments there and throughout the region are both an urgent local need and a strategic imperative with global implications.

It should be no surprise, then, that LAC countries are at the forefront in seeking to reduce biodiversity loss. Colombia just hosted the 2024 United Nations Biodiversity Conference, also known as COP16, where representatives from nearly two hundred countries met to discuss this issue. Next year, Brazil will host the annual United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP30) in Belém, on the Amazon River, where conservation efforts remain a priority.

I was at COP16, and over the two weeks it was held I heard an array of ideas about how do address global biodiversity loss. A surprising number of discussions, however, eventually landed on one core idea: biodiversity credits. In practice, the key difference between credits and offsets is their impact on biodiversity. A biodiversity credit is focused on creating a net-positive impact. This typically involves companies or governments buying a portion of or all of the credits of a project that preserves biodiversity for a set price. This encourages environmental stewardship and can meet an organization’s internal environmental goals. 

On the other hand, biodiversity offsets allow companies to purchase credits in a secondary market to compensate for environmental damages. Offsets are focused on compensation for emissions, deforestation, and other dangerous impacts, while credits are focused on investing in projects that enhance biodiversity and mitigate the impacts of climate change.

If kickstarted effectively, biodiversity credits would be part of larger biodiversity markets, which are projected to reach nearly seventy billion dollars by 2050. Drawing on lessons from carbon credit markets, the LAC region has a unique opportunity to drive a well-structured biodiversity credit market. Such a market offers a path toward ecological resilience, sustainable economic diversification, and social welfare for the region.

However, the market for biodiversity credits is currently in its infancy. Few institutional frameworks or regulatory structures support these credits, making it difficult for LAC countries to develop them to their full potential. And while biodiversity credits could catalyze conservation efforts, they face substantial challenges: The demand for them is small, they are largely voluntary, and they lack the policy backing necessary for market growth. The region’s biodiversity is under threat from illegal activities, and without significant investment, ecosystems that serve as global carbon sinks and biodiversity reservoirs are at risk.

A framework for action

To unlock the full potential of biodiversity credits, LAC leaders, international organizations, and private sector stakeholders must act with purpose. Here are five ways that regional and global actors can build momentum for biodiversity credits:

1. Develop institutional frameworks and ensure market integrity. The Biodiversity Credit Alliance (BCA), facilitated by the United Nations, is already bringing together multiple stakeholders to build credibility and equity in biodiversity markets. BCA’s role in aligning private sector investments with global biodiversity targets through standardized frameworks and its community engagement platform with nearly five hundred members offer LAC governments and the private sector an ideal partner to cultivate a transparent and accessible biodiversity market. 
2. Spur efficient regulatory policies to drive demand. Unlike carbon credits, which have seen substantial growth in demand through regulatory requirements, biodiversity credits currently rely on voluntary markets. Governments should ensure they implement strong regulatory frameworks, which are essential to boost demand, create consistency, and build trust among potential investors. These regulations would allow companies in LAC and abroad to integrate biodiversity credits into broader carbon and biodiversity finance strategies, ensuring these markets grow sustainably and support conservation goals.
3. Clarify biodiversity credit applications and standards. Biodiversity credits are distinct from biodiversity offsets and carbon credits, and the differences need to be understood if they are to be used effectively. Third-party regulators and multilateral development banks should define these credits in terms of their conservation goals to ensure metrics are carefully evaluated and transparent, which will enable integration into projects that enhance ecological resilience. This clarity can ensure that biodiversity credits are used appropriately, supporting true conservation rather than merely offsetting environmental damage.
4. Emphasize community-centered projects with accountability. To foster genuine trust in biodiversity markets, it is vital to center efforts around communities and transparency. Governments should take lessons learned from the carbon market, which underscore the importance of putting transparency and community benefit at the forefront of the agenda, particularly for projects that engage Indigenous and local populations. By partnering with local communities, LAC governments and multilateral banks can design projects that both protect biodiversity and help foster sustainable livelihoods.
5. Promote knowledge sharing and collaboration. Effective biodiversity credits require knowledge-sharing partnerships that avoid fragmentation and strengthen scientific knowledge. Collaborations with local coordinators, universities, and international agencies can help transfer expertise, fill data gaps, and deepen understanding of ecosystem health in the region. By linking Indigenous and local communities with academic resources, LAC countries can ensure that conservation is both scientifically sound and locally relevant.

LAC countries are rich in biodiversity, which also puts them on the front lines of potential biodiversity loss. They therefore need to be central in helping to pioneer biodiversity markets, a climate financing tool that, along with other mechanisms, can help create a path toward ecological resilience, economic diversification, and environmental conservation. By developing robust biodiversity credit markets, they could not only safeguard invaluable ecosystems like the Amazon but also set a global standard in climate finance, showing how natural resources can be both protected and leveraged for sustainable growth.

Isabel Chiriboga is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post Following COP16, can Latin America and the Caribbean lead the creation of biodiversity markets? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On the campaign trail, Trump made his climate plans clear—and they are not currently aligned with global goals and targets. Instead, he has stated that he will again withdraw from the Paris Agreement and end many of the climate policies launched during the Biden administration. 

His “America first” approach doesn’t align with the scientific reality of climate change. While Trump has signaled that his administration will put boundaries on its international commitments, the consequences of climate change do not recognize national boundaries.

With the looming threat of reduced climate commitments from the world’s largest economy (in terms of nominal gross domestic product), the negotiations at COP29 will take on a new significance. In 2016, when Trump was last elected, US negotiators were unable to make strong commitments at COP22 in Marrakesh. While they participated in these negotiations, they were encouraged to avoid any legally binding commitments until the next administration came into office. As the United States begins another transition from one administration to another, the same expectations could be placed on US negotiators this year.

Notably, the outcomes on the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on Climate Finance will bear the consequences of those expectations. The goal was mandated under the Paris Agreement and officially set at COP15, where developed countries agreed to mobilize $100 billion annually to enable climate action in developing countries. Now, the world is revisiting that $100 billion benchmark since the scope of the climate crisis has dramatically increased since 2009. 

With a noncommittal United States, there are two likely scenarios. The first scenario is that the decision on the NCQG is deferred to next year’s COP in Brazil. The second scenario is a new, nonbinding goal that is less ambitious and that will lack a mechanism to enforce it.

In short, the wording will matter. Instead of words like “commit,” the second scenario could result in a new finance goal with more ambiguous language. Nevertheless, it would serve as an important political signal. It could be a reference point that emphasizes the value of the process and the need to accelerate climate finance. It would keep the pressure on governments, ensuring that they recognize their responsibility to mobilize financial resources toward reducing emissions and protecting people from the impacts of climate change. In its ability to set a precedent, the agreement itself can inspire action not only in the public sector but also the private sector. COP negotiators should therefore seek to make the wording that sets this financing goal as strong as possible.

In recent years, the rising costs of global warming have become increasingly and painfully clear. It is in every country’s interest—including the United States’—to increase international financial commitments. After all, every one dollar invested in prevention saves sixteen dollars in disaster response.

As COP29 begins and the world looks ahead to COP30 where substantial commitments are expected, the value of US leadership cannot be overstated. This is not just a moral responsibility, but a survival mechanism. Climate change is a global issue. If the United States refuses to cut emissions further and ends the policies and investments launched under the Biden administration, the Trump administration would put even more Americans’ health, finances, and safety at risk as they face the rapidly intensifying consequences of climate inaction.

Jorge Gastelumendi is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Climate Resilience Center.

The post What Trump’s return as president means for COP29 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

At this month’s COP29 in Baku, greater attention must be given to the complex relationship between energy and water. The meeting should promote long-term policies, strategies, and investments to meet this challenge.

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Hydropower’s role in the global energy system

Hydropower is the world’s single-largest source of renewable power. But most clean energy development analyses, including the 2024 World Energy Outlook by the International Energy Agency (IEA), emphasize the role of solar and wind in the energy transition. Their growth over the past decade has indeed been unprecedented; the IEA forecasts that global hydropower generation will be overtaken by solar photovoltaics in 2029 and by wind in 2030. Nevertheless, hydropower still contributes 14 percent of global power generation and 35 percent of the world’s non-fossil electricity. Hydropower is widespread in all regions, with 89 countries boasting installed capacity over 1,000 megawatts. Nine countries across four continents depend on hydropower for over 75 percent of their electricity generation, while another fourteen rely on it for more than half.

But drought and flood conditions have left this important power source vulnerable—after remaining constant for over a decade, hydropower output fell in 2021 and 2023 despite new capacity additions and improvements to older units.

New stresses, new demands

Climate change has exacerbated water stress. The World Resources Institute finds that a quarter of the world’s population lives in countries facing extreme drought conditions, notably in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. Many other nations experience high water stress for at least one month a year.

This has a serious impact on power production. Droughts reduced hydropower generation by 8 percent in India during the first half of 2024. Droughts not only require increased thermal power use; they also reduce the availability of water for cooling thermal plants. In 2020, about 22 percent of global energy-related water use was for cooling thermal plants, drawn largely from freshwater sources. These volumes are projected to increase to at least 35 percent of world water use by 2050.

The agricultural sector is being profoundly affected by increased drought and record high temperatures. Irrigation systems, especially the expansive diesel and electric groundwater tubewell systems of South Asia, require increased energy supplies. A 2024 study suggests that future irrigation system expansion could increase energy consumption in irrigation worldwide by 28 percent.

Demand for desalination has risen about 7 percent per year in order to meet growing freshwater needs and groundwater depletion. Desalination plants are energy intensive, with total plant electricity consumption ranging from 1.3 kilowatt-hour (kWh) per cubic meter of water in new plants to as much as 3 kWh in older ones. This energy load and associated costs may strain electricity and water systems, as well as increase emissions if powered by fossil fuels. Desalination is expanding in a number of regions, notably in the Middle East and North Africa, which has the largest regional desalination capacity. Since 2022, the Algerian Energy Company has begun building five new desalination plants to augment the nineteen currently in operation. To reduce dependence on natural gas, the government is looking to use renewable energy to power these units.

Climate-induced severe weather comes at high cost

The severity of storms and floods have intensified in recent years, inflicting damage on energy and water infrastructure. Communities are being left devastated by severe weather events, such as the back-to-back hurricanes Helene and Milton in the United States.

The destruction of watersheds, including by wildfires that have reduced their ability to retain water, has resulted in mudslides and polluted lakes, rivers, and reservoirs with debris. Dams are critical to controlling water flows, but large floods put them under stress, with older facilities particularly impacted. In the United States alone, it is estimated that rehabilitating approximately 15,200 high-hazard dams will cost $24 billion.

The time for action is now

The energy-water nexus is creating new uncertainties for energy and climate planning, requiring a more integrated analytical framework for decisions on strategic investment. COP29 should support the development of improved data and monitoring of key energy-water indicators—such as reservoir and river flow levels, energy use and efficiency in water utilities, water prices, and infrastructure investment—that can be incorporated into national climate and energy plans.

Although it would be wise for hydro-dependent countries to diversify their clean generation, there still exists significant potential for new hydropower capacity, even though the IEA sees only marginal future growth contributing to emissions reduction. The International Hydropower Association estimates global hydropower potential stands at 1,782 gigawatts (GW), even larger than total installed capacity in 2023 of 1,416 GW, which includes pumped storage. Africa has the largest regional potential at 487 GW, but the lowest installed capacity of only 42 GW.

The International Renewable Energy Agency estimates that to meet net-zero emission goals, hydropower needs to double by 2050, requiring a much higher level of investment than the current $50-60 billion annually. Although China has been the largest international financier of hydropower projects, multilateral financial institutions have increased their funding over the past decade. The African Development Bank’s $1 billion program to upgrade twelve hydropower plants in Africa is an example of such funding.

Private sector participation is also critical to achieving net-zero goals through hydropower. Promising areas for private investment include pumped storage projects that can contribute to grid stability and store water, as well as desalination plants, which require large amounts of clean energy.

As COP29 pursues its mission to enhance ambition and enable climate action, clearer and stronger commitments—such as those that emerged on methane from public and private actors at COP28—are needed to meet the energy and water challenge. Addressing this critical issue is central to enabling emissions reduction and adaptation, and remedying loss and damage.

Robert F. Ichord, Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

EnergySource

EnergySource is the Global Energy Center’s (GEC) online publication providing commentary and analysis on developments in the energy and climate sector from a wide-array of thought leaders, politicians, and experts.

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Robert F. Ichord, Jr.

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Global Energy Center

Nuclear Energy Energy Transitions

EnergySource Oct 15, 2024

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The Global Energy Center develops and promotes pragmatic and nonpartisan policy solutions designed to advance global energy security, enhance economic opportunity, and accelerate pathways to net-zero emissions.

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The post Tackling the energy-water challenge at COP29 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As Europe and the United States navigate leadership change and turnover on both sides of the Atlantic, the Europe Center’s new report Transatlantic horizons: A collaborative US-EU policy agenda for 2025 and beyond offers a productive vision for transatlantic relations with forward-looking policy recommendations for the next US administration and European Commission. 

On this special edition of the #AtlanticDebrief, Europe Center Nonresident Senior Fellow and Fellow with the Jain Family Institute Carol Schaeffer unpacks her section of the report “Treating the green transition like the geopolitical imperative it is” and recommendations for policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic.

Staff

Nicole Lawler

Assistant Director

Europe Center

Digital Policy Economy & Business

The post #AtlanticDebrief – How can US-EU leadership approach the green transition? | A debrief from Carol Schaeffer  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As Europe and the United States navigate leadership change and turnover on both sides of the Atlantic, the Europe Center’s new report Transatlantic horizons: A collaborative US-EU policy agenda for 2025 and beyond offers a productive vision for transatlantic relations with forward-looking policy recommendations for the next US administration and European Commission.

On this special edition of the #AtlanticDebrief, Europe Center Nonresident Senior Fellow Daniel Mullaney discusses his section of the report “Closing the gap between Mars and Venus on trade” and recommendations for policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic.

Staff

Jörn Fleck

Senior Director

Europe Center Transform Europe Initiative

Digital Policy Economy & Business

The post #AtlanticDebrief – How can Washington and Brussels close the gap on trade policy? | A debrief from Daniel Mullaney appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Growing near-term risks from climate change create a need for more and faster research on the most promising and rapid form of climate intervention: solar radiation modification (SRM), its methods, efficacy, and side effects.¹

In light of the rapid escalation in harms to date from climate change, sunlight reflection and other climate interventions are a growing topic of global dialogue. The United Nations and the European Union have called for more scientific research in this area, and the US government has issued a congressionally mandated report describing the research required to assess SRM’s potential to reduce climate risks.

The world’s safety, security, and the basic needs of the most vulnerable people are at risk from the increasingly catastrophic impacts of climate change. All UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) scenarios for emissions reduction project that the climate system will continue to warm over the next several decades, with impacts and risks growing further. Increased suffering and mortality, economic and environmental loss, and instability are expected. Breaching natural systems’ tipping points would risk irreversible change.

Society currently lacks sufficient ability to predict and reduce these near-term risks and impacts. This makes reducing uncertainty in their projection and expanding the portfolio of available responses an urgent matter of global safety and security.

An increase in greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere is the primary cause of climate change. The only long-term remedy is to reduce their atmospheric concentrations by eliminating emissions and pursuing the withdrawal of gases already emitted. Due to the long lifespan of GHGs and the difficulty of withdrawing them from the atmosphere, the climate is projected to continue to warm for several decades in all scenarios.

According to scientific assessments, a promising approach to rapidly reducing significant heat energy (warming) in the climate system is to slightly alter the amount of incoming or outgoing sunlight (the phenomena that causes Earth to appear luminous, sometimes called solar radiation modification, or SRM). Proposed approaches generally fall into three categories:

• Reflecting sunlight from the Earth’s surface.
• Reflecting sunlight or releasing infrared energy from the atmosphere.
• Reducing the amount of sunlight reaching Earth.

This paper examines SRM approaches, research needs, and potential risks and benefits as a near-term climate response or “intervention” and US and international policy options on SRM. It then makes recommendations on responsibly advancing SRM research, international cooperation, and governance.

Background: A perilous setting

Catastrophic near-term climate risk

Due to greenhouse gasses and warming already present in the climate system, global warming is projected to continue rising for several decades. This is the case in every IPCC scenario for emissions reduction, with recent evidence indicating that these projections underestimate the risks. At the current rate, warming will likely cross the long-term average threshold for dangerous climate change of 1.5°C soon (also called “overshoot”) and surpass 2.0°C by 2050.

Warming causes increased weather extremes, which cause natural systems to change. This impairs the sustainability of plants and accelerates the loss of species, which in turn further changes the chemical and physical environment. It also pushes some natural systems nearer to tipping points for substantial, abrupt, and often irreversible changes that cause catastrophic damage, make rapid large-scale contributions of GHGs or warming into the system (“feedbacks”), or both. These changes are hard to predict and underrepresented in current climate models—which leads to underestimation of catastrophic risks. Some, like large-scale forest burn, Amazon “die-back,” and changes in the earth’s major oceanic circulation system, give indications of being underway already.

Climate-linked weather extremes and ecosystem changes have wide-ranging impacts on people and human systems including: health and welfare impacts of heat exposure; disease vectors; displacement; economic disruption of industries such as agriculture, transportation, and tourism; infrastructure damage such as buckling railways and failing energy grids; and coastal erosion and flooding. Most economic sectors are affected by climate change, including many with substantial climate-related risks. Climate change is happening significantly faster than human systems’ ability to adequately adapt, and human systems also face tipping points from economic and societal shocks.

“This Council [on Foreign Relations] Report builds a compelling case [for increased research on SRM] . . . It is sad that such a report is necessary, but it will be even sadder still if we do not make exploring the potential of sunlight reflection an urgent priority.”

Council on Foreign Relations President Richard Haass, https://www.cfr.org/report/reflecting-sunlight-reduce-climate-risk.

The United States and developed countries

The United States is currently experiencing deadly, costly, and disruptive climate-linked disasters. They are occurring in the context of ongoing changes in weather conditions that threaten agriculture, livestock, and fisheries; water supplies; real estate; natural parks and protected areas; forest-adjacent and coastal cities and towns; and military infrastructure and operations.

No country is safe from the large-scale impacts of climate change. Countries like Canada that were thought to be advantaged have been devastated by fires and surface heat. Europe has faced a wide array of impacts including extreme weather conditions, which its infrastructure was not designed to support. Still, the United States and many of its allies are comparatively advantaged economically for climate adaptation and disaster recovery.

The world’s most vulnerable

Climate change has the greatest impact on the world’s most vulnerable people and regions. Many of the world’s most climate-vulnerable countries are also its poorest and least developed. Poor and vulnerable populations in every country are the most heavily affected by food and water scarcity, cannot easily migrate, and lack resources for protective adaptation.

Climate change amplifies disparities and creates disruptions in vulnerable populations, increasing domestic and international security threats and risks. Current projections suggest that more than one billion people may be displaced by 2050—estimates that may be conservative. Billions of people face food and water insecurity, loss of livelihood, and extreme weather exposure. These circumstances increase the risk of violence and instability, fostering heightened political risks and global security threats.

Global systemic risks

The interplay between natural system changes and human responses is likely to produce large-scale unanticipated shocks. These could be economic, as extreme storms drive insurers from a market, government backstops are exhausted, and a large property market bottoms, setting off a cascade effect in financial systems and markets. They also could be nature-induced, where the collapse of a major ice sheet creates substantial, rapid sea level rise, devastating large parts of numerous coastal cities across the globe.

As these ongoing processes and escalating pressures and shocks continue, human systems will grow more taxed, less resilient, and less able to respond to subsequent developments and disasters.

“Sunlight reflection . . . could—in light of current warming trends and risk projections—make what is likely to be a lengthy transition to a decarbonized world tolerable. . . . It would be vastly preferable for the world to make progress on the science of sunlight reflection today, so that policymakers are prepared to make informed decisions tomorrow, rather than being forced to act out of ignorance on the fly when all other options have failed.”

Council on Foreign Relations Special Report No. 93, April 2022, https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/Patrick-CSR93-web.pdf.

Addressing a major climate portfolio gap

As conditions become increasingly hazardous for human and natural systems, society faces a critical gap in the knowledge and options to evaluate and respond to near-term climate risks. Addressing this gap is now a matter of considerable urgency.

The present climate response portfolio, reducing GHG emissions, is itself jeopardized by climate-linked changes in human and natural systems that worsen the problem. Weather extremes dramatically increase demand for energy for heating and cooling. Food and water scarcity and economic disruption induce other unsustainable practices.

The current policy portfolio lacks viable means for substantially reducing warming in the climate system within a few decades, leaving enormous risk exposure and a substantial portfolio gap that is now critical to fill.

In assessments by scientific bodies in the United Kingdom, United States, and the UN, scientists evaluated promising approaches to countering climate change more rapidly than is possible through emissions reductions alone. The broadest categories of these are:

• Actively removing GHGs from the atmosphere, i.e., greenhouse gas removal (GGR) or carbon dioxide removal (CDR).
• Increasing the reflection of sunlight from Earth to space to reduce trapped heat energy, or warming, i.e., solar radiation modification (SRM).

GGR has many proposed variations, from mechanical filtration (direct-air capture, DAC) to massive-scale cultivation of plants and ocean flora to absorb carbon. GGR could directly reduce the negative effects of climate change by reducing its cause (increased GHG concentrations). However, it comes with significant technological uncertainty (for DAC), currently very high costs, and scaling uncertainties; for approaches that involve leveraging natural systems, there are very likely to be trade-offs. While likely an important climate portfolio element in this century, GGR is not projected to slow warming significantly prior to 2050 in any of the scenarios considered by the IPCC. It is not safe, or even reasonable, to assume that GGR could meaningfully reduce the catastrophic near-term risks of climate change.

In 2017, Wallace Broecker, the oceanographer who coined the phrase “global warming,” concluded—in his last statements on the subject before his death—that, given the seriousness of the warming, the present response of cutting emissions alone was insufficient. He called for focusing also on SRM research.

SRM: Background and approaches

All SRM approaches share the benefit of rapidly reducing heat energy or warming in the climate system—within months or years, once developed and implemented at appropriate scale. Research suggests that stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI) might be the most feasible method in the near-term, as will be seen below, but all methods need further research.

SRM approaches do not address the GHG cause of climate change or offset all of the damage caused by excess GHG in the atmosphere. They do not directly reduce the increase in ocean acidity caused by the increased uptake of CO₂ from the air. However, SRM would address the cause of many of the impacts of climate change: excess heat energy. By directly reducing this heat energy, SRM could significantly reduce climate extremes and impacts, including GHG release from natural systems into the air and ocean, thereby reducing future climate and acidity risk.

Approaches for increasing the reflection of sunlight from the Earth’s surface include planting lighter colored crops, painting infrastructure white or using special reflective coating, covering melting snowcaps and ice sheets with reflecting beads or material, and generating foam on the ocean’s surface. All surface-based approaches face similar drawbacks: implementing at a scale sufficient to offset significant global warming is not generally considered to be feasible and involves substantial environmental side effects associated with disrupting natural surface-atmosphere interactions.

Approaches for altering sunlight reaching Earth from space include placing a large surface area (billions of square meters) of light-filtering surfaces at the L₁ Lagrange point between the Earth and the Sun and the generation of a filtering layer of dust from the moon. These methods are theoretically estimated to be effective at reducing incoming heat energy but entail engineering in space at a massive scale that is not achievable with today’s technology. Even if such techniques were practically feasible, little is known about the engineering challenges associated with this approach, and it is not likely to be something that could be implemented in the near-term (e.g., within thirty years).

Promising approaches

Scientific assessments indicate that the most promising approaches for rapidly reducing climate warming are those that increase the reflection of sunlight from the atmosphere by dispersing particles (aerosols) to reflect sunlight or alter the properties of clouds. This phenomenon already is naturally occurring: Earth is cooled by the effects of particles emitted from ocean spray, dust, and ecosystems into the atmosphere. It is cooled in a less continuous way when large volcanoes emit material into the atmosphere.

An unintentional form of atmospheric SRM is also produced by particulates from pollution (e.g., SO₂ from coal burning and vehicle exhaust); these currently cool the climate to a significant but uncertain degree, estimated to be between 0.2℃ and 1.0℃. Reducing these emissions has been a priority for human health, but is also exposing us to the increased warming caused by GHGs.

Proposed approaches to SRM in the atmosphere include:

• Dispersing particles to reflect sunlight directly in the stratosphere (stratospheric aerosol injection, or SAI).
• Brightening low-lying clouds over the ocean (marine cloud brightening, or MCB).
• Inducing precipitation in high-altitude clouds to allow more ultraviolet light to escape outward (cirrus cloud thinning, or CCT).

The approaches differ in terms of duration and localization, their projected efficacy and potential side effects, and the current level of uncertainty in their projection.

Stratospheric aerosol injection

SAI involves dispersing particles or gases that turn into particles into one of the outer layers of the atmosphere, the stratosphere, to slightly increase the reflection of sunlight (about 1 to 2 percent). Particles in the lower atmosphere (troposphere) fall to Earth within days, but particles that reach the stratosphere, such as emissions from forceful volcanoes, become entrained and remain for a year or more before falling back to Earth. Observation of the cooling effects of volcanic emissions prompted consideration of SAI.

In 1991, the eruption of Mount Pinatubo released sulfate particles into the stratosphere that measurably cooled the climate by over 0.3℃ for over a year. This cooling was associated with a substantial recovery in Arctic ice mass in the year following the eruption. Such observations have led scientists to express confidence in the effectiveness of SAI for reducing warming and in its environmental safety over short periods of time at levels comparable to that 1991 eruption.

While this confidence has made SAI the primary candidate for rapid climate intervention, what is less certain—and critical to evaluate—are its possible negative side effects over longer periods or at higher levels. The most significant side effects include damage to the ozone layer, warming of the stratosphere that changes the dynamics and circulation of the atmosphere, and changes in the insulating cirrus cloud layer that lies just below the stratosphere. Other potential side effects include changes in weather patterns in particular regions and changes in incoming light and solar energy that affect plants. Relatively low concentrations of sulfates in the lower atmosphere makes impacts on human health from direct exposure unlikely. While not considered a major risk, SRM could, however, slightly worsen acid rain in places that already have high concentrations of sulfate.²

Implementing SAI in a way that optimizes benefits and minimizes risks requires understanding and projecting relevant atmospheric processes before dispersing quantities of optimally sized particles (generally small and relatively uniform) into the stratosphere in the manner suggested by these projections and monitoring the atmosphere closely. Delivering large volumes of material to the stratosphere is challenging. While less scientifically informed efforts have undertaken demonstration efforts using balloons, the more prominently considered delivery mechanism is high-altitude aircraft, which may require a new generation of aircraft capable of flying large payloads to the stratosphere. No technologies currently exist for generating optimally small particles in narrow size ranges at the scales required.

Effective evaluation, implementation, and regulatory governance of SAI would require substantially expanded atmospheric observing systems and improved climate and atmosphere models. This implies an investment of billions of dollars in both general climate and specific SAI research to assess whether approaches are viable. Costs would be in the tens of billions of dollars annually for implementation (though it may be cheaper and easier to do it poorly). This level of cost relies on existing infrastructure for stratospheric research and high-performance computing, which together limit effective execution to a small number of nations and other actors with access to advanced aerospace and computing technology.

It is not possible to adequately detect or measure SAI with the current portfolio of satellite and air observations or project its effects, leaving a considerable governance and security gap. However, platforms carrying material are observable, so security concerns are less likely to lie in identifying clandestine activity by rogue actors than in the lack of information on potential climate effects to inform an appropriate response to observed activity by a nation or other actors seeking to address catastrophic climate impacts.

Marine cloud brightening

Marine cloud brightening (MCB) would involve dispersing sea salt particles from seawater into targeted regions of low-lying clouds over the ocean to slightly increase the reflection of sunlight from the clouds.³ The concept is based on observations of the bright streaks in clouds created by pollution particles in exhaust from ships passing below. Ships’ pollution particles attract moisture from clouds, creating more and smaller cloud droplets and increasing the overall surface area of water in the clouds, making them brighter. In some cases, this also causes the clouds to last longer. The initial effect is localized to the area where the particle plume mixes into the clouds, with the effects on clouds continuing for about two to three days, as the affected air is transported downwind. The effect is strongest in marine stratocumulus clouds and under favorable meteorological conditions; in other conditions, effects can be weak or even counterproductive.

The effect of particles (aerosols) on clouds is one of the key drivers of present-day climate change. A cooling effect from cloud brightening is produced accidentally today by pollution emissions (mostly sulfates) from coal-fired power plants, transportation exhaust, smoke, and other sources. Collectively, this aerosol “shield” is estimated to cool the climate by between 0.2°C and 1.0°C, a significant level of cooling with a very high degree of uncertainty. Because aerosols only last for a few days to a week in the lower atmosphere, aerosol cooling stops shortly after aerosol emissions are removed. Clouds are extraordinarily complex, and these effects are one of the greatest areas of uncertainty in climate science.

Meanwhile, that shield is affected by successful actions to decrease particulate pollution—a drive to stem its negative impacts on health and the environment, e.g., acid rain—which, in turn, could spur a rapid increase in warming in the coming decade or two. MCB can be thought of as a cleaner, more managed replacement for the cooling currently being provided by pollution particles.

The candidate material for MCB is the tiny salt particle from seawater.⁴ Salt attracts water, making it an optimum material for forming cloud droplets. It is readily available and already present in the atmosphere in that environment, acting as one of the particles on which cloud droplets form. Sulfates from ship emissions have been evaluated less favorably, but no other candidate material has been seriously considered. Aerosolizing salt (or any solid material) at the tiny size and massive scale required is a significant engineering problem. Some progress on this problem has been made over the last decade in the United States.

In the primary candidate approach to MCB, regions of susceptible (marine stratocumulus) clouds would be targeted for brightening. Early studies suggest that brightening clouds in these areas equivalent to 3 percent or 5 percent of the ocean’s surface could offset 2°C or more of global warming. Initial simulations of MCB are consistent in showing that this would produce significant cooling over nearly all of the globe. Technical and field research are needed to determine the number of vessels required to deliver the required material, with estimates varying by an order of magnitude from several thousand to tens of thousands. Autonomous, clean-energy vessels are likely to be most efficient and would require a major manufacturing effort. Aircraft dispersal may be possible, but it is estimated to be far more costly and less efficient for continuous delivery.

Recently, scientists have begun to leverage AI techniques to explore the potential for climate cooling effects from aerosols in other types of clouds or by scattering sunlight in cloudless conditions (“marine sky brightening,” or MSB). Early findings point to potential promise for existing ships to contribute as platforms for marine atmosphere SRM.

The localized nature of MCB has led to proposals to explore its potential to reduce climate impacts such as coral bleaching and extreme storms by cooling ocean waters or to restore sea ice by cooling polar regions. A research effort and small demonstration project in Australia is exploring MCB to protect the Great Barrier Reef, but there is scant research on local applications. In general, localized approaches to cooling the ocean and atmosphere are limited by the interconnected nature of these systems: their efficient transport of heat energy circulates more heat into localized areas of cooling, offsetting MCB effects. For this reason, efforts to counter Arctic warming solely through localized MCB may be limited in effectiveness while producing unusual climate anomalies with uncertain risks.⁵

Because air and water circulate, changing the properties of clouds and producing cooling in large, isolated areas can have large effects on distant regions, which is why MCB, while implemented locally, could produce cooling globally. However, unlike SAI, this cooling would not be uniform everywhere. MCB is expected to produce variations in cooling that more significantly affect circulation patterns and weather. The greatest side effect risks are associated with these “teleconnection” effects on other regions and the difficulty in predicting and minimizing them. This includes the possibility of significantly reduced precipitation in some areas and other changes in weather patterns.

MCB is a challenging approach to SRM because of uncertainties in the magnitude of its cooling effect, the need to target favorable meteorological conditions, the potential for undesirable weather patterns, and the scale of continuous delivery. However, pollution aerosols produce an effect similar to MCB at global scales today, and research on the processes underlying MCB can help us evaluate the risks of removing this cooling influence—one of the greatest uncertainties in our projections of near-term climate. Research on cloud-aerosol effects and MCB is therefore an urgent priority.

This uncertain cooling from pollution has come to widespread attention recently with the coincidence of the enforcement of new regulations reducing sulfate emissions from ships and record global and ocean surface temperatures, elevated by an analysis by prominent climate scientist James Hansen substantially raising estimates of near-term climate risk, partly due to accelerated warming from the reduction of pollution aerosols.

Cirrus cloud thinning

Cirrus cloud thinning (CCT) would entail dispersing aerosols to induce precipitation in high-altitude clouds that block some infrared energy from leaving the atmosphere. Under the right conditions, such precipitation could “thin” the cloud, letting more infrared energy out to space.

Conversely, emissions from aircraft can, in the right conditions, produce contrails, some of which can evolve to become cirrus clouds. The warming effect on climate from the influence of these aircraft aerosols is estimated to be equivalent to the warming produced by their GHG (CO₂) emissions. Researchers have proposed optimizing the altitude and flight path of aircraft to minimize the production of “contrail cirrus” to reduce air traffic warming.

Aerosol effects on cirrus clouds are highly uncertain, with substantial research required for projecting and optimizing these effects. Overall, 3.5 percent of climate warming is attributed to airline emissions, making the potential impact of these changes modest overall but potentially substantial for the industry.

Uncertainties in contrail effects and CCT include the effects of aerosol sizes and composition, the processes controlling cirrus cloud formation and dissipation, and the influence of climate change on these processes. Because CCT and contrail reduction have the potential to rapidly reduce a fraction of climate warming, research in this area—the most underinvested SRM approach—is warranted.

“Multiple scientific assessments have concluded that, as a complement to greenhouse gas emissions reductions and CDR, the most rapid way to potentially counter some near-term climate warming is through an important class of [SRM] techniques . . . Given the above findings, we believe that scientific research should be conducted to support the assessment of:

• The effectiveness of different SRM interventions to reduce climate warming;
• How different SRM interventions would affect climate change and climate impacts under different greenhouse gas scenarios; and
• The capabilities for detecting and attributing the impacts of various SRM interventions.”

Open letter from physical scientists, including James Hansen, regarding SRM research, February 2022, https://climate-intervention-research-letter.org.

Science and technology requirements and state of play

Limited research on SRM approaches and insufficient societal investment in climate basic research, notably in aerosol influences on clouds and climate, have left significant uncertainties about the underlying atmospheric processes tied to the feasibility and risks of SRM. Substantial research is required to inform decision-making, to help design mechanisms for governance, to understand how to best monitor and report on any potential SRM activity, and to identify optimum approaches for maximizing benefits and minimizing risks.

Governance and decision-making on large-scale environmental influences are generally informed by expert scientific assessments that review and report on available science. Such assessments of SRM were separately recommended in 2023 by the UN, the EU, and the US government. Given the limited research to date on SRM, making a robust assessment in a period of five years would require substantial, concerted research efforts.

Driven by a bipartisan direction from the US Congress, the US government’s interagency report described the research required to inform scientific assessment of the potential for SRM to reduce near-term climate risks. Needs include direct research on specific SRM approaches via computer modeling, observations, and, importantly, small-scale experimental releases of aerosols to inform models of their impacts at larger scales. Needs also include significant advances in observations, models, and climate basic science in general, including key climate drivers such as clouds’ aerosols effects, feedbacks, and tipping points—areas that have had flat or declining funding for several decades. These research needs were quantified in a recent report that recommended an investment of US$13 billion over five years in climate basic science and observations. The majority of these investments would be dual-purpose: improving the ability both to observe and project the near-term climate and to predict aerosol influences on clouds and climate.

Even incremental steps in SRM research have provided large benefits to understanding the nature of the problem and real versus perceived areas of concern. New analysis is helping to clarify the limitations of proposals to use SRM locally to restore Arctic sea ice. And in 2021, major modeling centers began the first high-fidelity global model simulations of the median pathway for GHG emissions with and without stratospheric SRM (SAI). These simulations indicated that, rather than increasing climate extremes, as many have highlighted as a concern, SRM reduced extremes in most of the world, and significantly reduced disparities in climate impacts.

Recent research indicates that SRM research and implementation are capital-intensive tasks and require advanced technology (e.g., supercomputing, stratospheric aircraft, aerosol generation expertise, and observational systems). SRM research is also surfacing gaps and limitations in climate modeling and risk analysis capabilities and flaws in interpreting their outputs.

SRM research needs to compare real-world impacts of projected climate change against those under various SRM approaches. However, projections of climate change today insufficiently represent important factors, including feedbacks and tipping points. Climate model design has affected such limitations. Also, climate change has yet to equivalently benefit from the analytical techniques used in other complex fields such as portfolio and risk analysis.

No significant technology yet exists for aerosol generation with the characteristics and scale required for SRM, and no platforms have been developed for the efficient delivery of aerosols in the stratosphere or marine environment. While critics fear a rapid “slippery slope” from research to scaled implementation, the greater risk is the delays imposed by the inherent, substantial technology barriers and costs. For example, the first research-grade spray system, which achieved scale and particle requirements, had high energy consumption and other features unsuitable for scaled use, costing several million dollars to develop a single unit. A single small-scale release study (equivalent to one ship’s plume) is estimated to cost in the low millions of dollars. Many such studies would be required to evaluate the localized effects of particles on clouds under different conditions. Technology for scaled use would require tens of millions of dollars or more in research and development and billions for the development of platform systems.

Globally, direct investment in SRM physical sciences and technology research amounts to less than $50 million annually and is growing only modestly. Investment in cloud-aerosol influences on climate, feedbacks, and tipping points remains relatively flat against 1990 levels.

This low level of investment is not justifiable. The US Planetary Defense program, for instance, receives $200 million annually to protect against the risk of an approximately 1/20,000 probability catastrophic asteroid strike within fifty years, while the odds of breaching at least one major climate tipping point in that period range from 10 percent to 50 percent. Society’s investment in research on the most promising rapid climate interventions needs to be a more reasonably proportioned fraction of the major ongoing investments in energy transition, emissions reductions, and disaster response—which are each three orders of magnitude (1,000 times) greater.

Improvements in knowledge, data, and capabilities would reduce uncertainties in analysis of whether or not SRM might reduce the worst effects of climate change and under what circumstances SRM approaches are safe. It would greatly reduce the very real risk of the inability to respond to a “ready or not” implementation amid escalating climate crises. It would support evaluation of the high near-term climate and environmental risks of changes in anthropogenic aerosol emissions. In these ways, investment in research on the climate effects of atmospheric aerosols and SRM could be among the highest return-on-investment areas in society.

Political and societal considerations

A number of societal factors influence incentives for research on climate interventions. These are likely to grow as the climate warms.

Human and economic outcomes

In physical terms, the potential for SRM to improve human and environmental outcomes and the uncertain climate effects of its pollution analogue warrant its thorough investigation as a science problem and policy matter. Because SRM would not fully offset climate change and may have harmful side effects, extensive research is required to understand SRM in the context of near-term climate change well enough to support effective decision-making.

For human welfare, SRM has the potential to reduce mortality by alleviating warming linked to climate extremes. It also has the potential to reduce direct harms from surface heat and climate-linked disasters and indirect harms that include water and food scarcity, increased tropical disease, displacement, and instability. Understanding the potential for SRM approaches to reduce these effects, and how they would be distributed, requires concerted research.

SRM could also help reduce climate-linked economic losses in many sectors of the global economy. It has the potential to prevent future economic shocks associated with large-scale disruptions and improve global economic welfare relative to a world under currently projected warming.

Political instability

Rising economic and human costs from climate change increase the potential for political instability and conflict that could be reduced by SRM. For example, reduced warming could decrease natural disasters, displacement, food scarcity, and other factors that contribute to political instability.

SRM also could reduce the political costs of decarbonization policies, such as the 2018 Yellow Vest protests of gas taxes in a wealthy country like France. The risk of this kind of backlash against policy costs can be even greater in countries of the Global South, where there is not the cushion of wealth that France has. Similarly, SRM might smooth the transition in countries with heavy debt loads that “stand to lose economically” amid climate change. As the world experiences more climate extremes, energy demand rises to meet demand for cooling, heating, and other adaptive responses—and available transition resources fall due to the escalating costs of climate impacts. Where the political costs of carbon mitigation grow higher in a warming world, reducing climate extremes through SRM could reduce political turmoil and resistance to national decarbonization efforts.

Moral and temporal hazards

Concerns persist about SRM research acting as a disincentive to reducing emissions—a “moral hazard.” This type of concern has been the primary objection and barrier to SRM research. The same concern, until relatively recently, also inhibited research on adaptation, carbon removal, and methane mitigation, delaying research, limiting evidence for decision-making, and even inducing overly optimistic estimates of their potential effectiveness.

These posited moral hazard effects are not well-supported by the evidence to date.⁶ In fact, some studies indicate that SRM research may actually motivate support for emissions reduction by sending a disaster signal to society. Evidence generated by SRM research may also reduce magical thinking about its effectiveness in consideration of its very real limitations and risks.

Misaligned financial incentives create a different concern. A handful of early-stage companies have marketed “cooling credits” based on small releases of pollution aerosols into the atmosphere. Unchecked profit incentives could motivate releases at ever-increasing scales—irrespective of the benefits or significant risks, making such credits as yet a form of fraud. Substantially more research and evidence are needed for governance and regulation of SRM and alignment of economic incentives for its use.

Lack of information can also create counterincentives or societal hazards: supporting the retention of a fixed view, free from pressure to alter it in conjunction with new evidence, reducing incentives to move away from positions that diverge from reality and that increase physical risks for others (i.e., those most at risk from climate change), and delaying research and actions that evidence suggests could help reduce harm. Given the overwhelming value and time-sensitivity of evidence with the potential to help reduce climate change impacts and risks, a new category of societal hazard is needed: “temporal hazard.”

Temporal hazard of research delay

Rapidly escalating risks from climate change create major imperatives for increasing scientific understanding of the potential for SRM and other rapid climate interventions to reduce catastrophic impacts to people and natural systems in the next few decades. A proactive, urgent approach to climate intervention research will put the world in a stronger position for reducing climate risk, potentially add new options to the policy portfolio, and promote improved understanding of the benefits and risks of intervention approaches.

In recent years, both opponents and some supporters of research have recommended extensive consultation processes and nonscience influence on research, including many of the kind that are currently associated with long delays in clean energy development. Creating burdens or incentives that slow, delay, or bias SRM research, even where not overtly rejecting it, puts the world in a weak and dangerous position with respect to escalating climate risks: a temporal hazard.

Ignorance regarding climate interventions leaves national policymakers and the international community in a weak position for responding to unilateral use of SRM for climate risk.

Objections to research and related depression of funding have inhibited the field for several decades. This limits our understanding today. As risk impacts grow, the cost of additional delay rises. Projections of the costs of climate change over the next fifty years are in the tens of trillions of dollars, even without full accounting for potential tipping points and systemic shocks.⁷ Unknown and hard-to-model factors will likely drive real costs higher than projected, as we are already seeing in the costs of unexpectedly severe and frequent climate-linked disasters.

Catastrophic risks are increased by lack of information on options to reduce actual catastrophic impacts. The scale of the risks underscores the value and urgency of research to reduce them. Should conditions deteriorate to where SRM is required to forestall tipping events, is demanded to counter impacts, or is used in desperation by some countries, the cost of incremental information foregone through delay will have proved enormously high. As nations and communities face ever-growing costs from climate change, the likelihood grows that some actor will, in desperation, try whatever means are currently available to deliver aerosols into the atmosphere—a very risky proposition with today’s level of knowledge and capability.

This is a substantial further temporal hazard that underscores the enormous value of any research undertaken in advance of reactive attempts at SRM and the cost of procedural or other delays to the research needed to inform responses. It increases the value of facilitating rather than inhibiting open research of the kind undertaken by academic and public institutions in democratic countries and made available through intergovernmental bodies. In fact, only thorough research could provide sufficient evidence to rule out SRM approaches or to inform sufficient mechanisms to govern any use of them.

Delay in research also has political costs. Yielding to political or ideological pressures to limit open scientific research into SRM would enhance the potential for misinformation, which stokes fear and increases polarization. It inhibits trust among stakeholders and, more broadly, the public’s trust in the integrity of public and scientific comment on SRM and climate policy. Scientific research efforts can themselves reduce the politicization and enhance the ability to address the issue constructively.

“We need to know the risks which [SRM] would bring, and compare them with the risks brought by climate change.”

Professor Inés Camilloni of the University of Buenos Aires, December 7, 2022, Tedx Río de la Plata, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kVCsFLALGsg.

Governance and security

International cooperation and effective governance mechanisms are vital for cooperatively mitigating the risks of escalating climate change and responding to the possible use of climate interventions by independent actors. For this, it is crucial to ensure that relevant mechanisms facilitate scientific research and assessment and do not impose undue process delay or political influence that would inhibit objective scientific assessment. Mexico’s nonspecific ban on SRM activity and the contents of a public “non-use” letter from academics are recent examples of policies likely to inhibit governance-enabling research.

Great power competition adds a troubling dimension to the work of scheduling the research and developing global governance. For example, should the United States move slowly on SRM research, China could decide to fill the void, potentially leading to its dominance over forward use of SRM and to exploiting its advanced position to win considerable global soft power.

With respect to military security, SAI is not easily weaponizable. It is slow-acting, diffuse, and difficult to aim locally. It is a transboundary climate security issue—but not a significant military one. Other, localized forms of SRM, such as interventions in the lower atmosphere (troposphere), can, however, produce differentiated effects with negative outcomes for some. Today, there is substantial and escalating cloud-seeding activity around the world and interest in cloud brightening for local and regional applications. These activities can produce real and perceived effects far from where they are undertaken and their growth in the world is likely to present a challenging strategic security concern.

Global SRM, particularly diffuse SRM/SAI in the stratosphere, is likely to produce far fewer differential impacts than either localized SRM/MCB or the projected warming. This gives SRM a potential to reduce security tensions relative to other forms of climate action.

Governance considerations

Climate intervention is relevant for, and potentially largely governable within, a number of intergovernmental organizations and treaties: the UNFCCC, the Montreal Protocol operating under the Vienna Convention, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the UN Environment Programme, the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, and the London Convention that functions through the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Many of these bodies are actively taking steps on scientific assessment, international cooperation, and governance considerations for SRM—some constructive, and some more obstructive.

Elements of effective governance and decision-making on SRM include:

• Open, transparent, internationally cooperative scientific research.
• International cooperation on scientific research, with funding and technology support for developing countries to more equitably participate in research and decision-making.
• Establishment of a robust scientific assessment function to review and report on the efficacy, feasibility, risks, and benefits of different approaches, and the requirements for monitoring and reporting.⁸
• Scientific input to, and international dialogue on, the requirements for SRM governance.
• International governance and regulation by an international body with universal participation, equitable influence among countries, and the ability to monitor and enforce activity, such as the Montreal Protocol.⁹
• Advancing consideration of SRM in the array of intergovernmental bodies relevant to this issue.¹⁰
• Development of robust assessment, monitoring, and regulatory functions at the national level, particularly for those countries at the forefront of research. These can also inform international governance efforts.

Internationally, scientific cooperation is advancing with the announcement of a new Lighthouse Activity on Climate Intervention in the World Climate Research Programme, the framework under WMO, the International Science Council (ISC), and the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) of UNESCO for international cooperation on climate research. Steps toward scientific assessment have advanced in the Montreal Protocol, limited to the stratosphere and focused on atmospheric effects, but advancing rigorous review of the science. UN reports have called for scientific assessment, and language and actions have been brought forward in many UN bodies requesting consideration of SRM.

Some have also called for a moratorium on large-scale experimentation or use of SRM. However, an impactful scale of SRM is not likely to be feasible for many years given the technical barriers, and focusing efforts on negotiating a formal moratorium would tend to inhibit the research and policy efforts needed to develop more effective governance mechanisms.

At the national level, various scientific cooperation structures and steps are visible. US bipartisan efforts on scientific research related to SRM are ongoing, although the subject remains politically delicate. The UK recently announced a program in its new science agency ARIA, and European universities have a variety of efforts in this field.

The picture is less clear elsewhere, though SRM meetings or workshops have occurred in India, Jamaica, Ghana, Pakistan, and Thailand, among other places. China has hosted modest SRM modeling efforts. Scientists in India have previously undertaken modeling research and participated in assessments. In general, SRM research around the world is limited by funding and technical constraints on climate research broadly, an acute problem in low-income and developing countries.

The position of developing and climate-vulnerable countries is complicated, as they stand to gain from successful climate intervention but face intense resource constraints and other acute areas of public concern. Positions vary, from opposition to climate intervention research and activity to requests from highly vulnerable countries such as Micronesia for more scientific information and assessment in treaty bodies on potential climate interventions.

National and global interests in SRM

Climate policies have often faced political tension between the global public good they seek to provide and public resistance to their increased costs. SRM, if viable, could be expected to reduce this tension, serving both the global climate policy interest and national socioeconomic interests. It is worth stressing this, in order to support national political will.

The United States, other Western countries, and more recently China have contributed disproportionately to the total GHG concentrations inducing climate change while benefiting from related technological progress that affords them greater capabilities to address it. They arguably bear a greater responsibility to address the climate problem faced by the world.¹¹

With its substantial climate research capacity and open science policies, the United States and its allies can help to evaluate the potential for climate interventions to reduce climate change-related damages—for themselves and for the world’s most vulnerable peoples. This exploration of alternatives could promote mutuality and reduce animosities and disputes over compensation, fostering healthier global relationships.

For the United States, such a program, undertaken openly and supportively of other countries’ interests, could also enhance its diplomatic influence and soft power. The West currently supplies the majority of data and science that informs international assessment and governance of the climate and environment. Government and academic research efforts in these countries promote open, transparent access by stakeholders around the world. By leading research on near-term climate risks and SRM, it can support open science, international scientific cooperation, international scientific assessment, and equitable, science-based international governance in forums like the Montreal Protocol, where all countries of the world have a standing. Without this leadership role, research and development will move forward in closed communities—such as within defense and commercial sectors or autocratic regimes—with less transparency and equitability and heightened risks.

The interests of vulnerable and developing countries warrant special consideration. They are often on the front line of climate change impacts, despite their limited contribution to the increased concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere. The severe near-term repercussions of global warming, such as droughts, floods, and cyclones, disproportionately affect these regions. Climate interventions—and notably SRM—might be the most promising way, or only way, to provide near-term relief, avoid projected regional instability, and prevent overwhelming population displacements in coming decades.

“While many hazards may now be inevitable, for communities living in already vulnerable conditions these interventions as suggested will help traverse the breakthroughs needed in the regions of Africa and Asia where there’s rising concerns of food security and migration, and displacement of people.”

Joshua Amponsem, founder, Green Africa Youth Organization; current strategy director, Youth Climate Justice Fund; and former climate lead, UN Youth Envoy’s Office, “Climate Intervention: An Option for Global South to Reduce Near-term Climate Risk?” World Economic Forum, November 2022, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/11/will-climate-intervention-sustain-the-global-monopoly-order-or-define-moment-for-global-south-s-ascendancy/.

Climate interventions could promote improved well-being and economic security in the developing world. They could provide intergenerational benefits, promoting safety, welfare, and prosperity and preserving natural systems for youth and upcoming generations. By slowing down the adverse effects of climate change, climate interventions could offer humanity precious time: time for reducing emissions, for technology investments to accelerate decarbonization, for building adaptive capacity, and for pursuing other vital societal goals, from human rights to sustainable development, without disrupting the climate program.

Overall, consideration of climate interventions as part of the climate portfolio of responses provides an avenue to manage the potentially catastrophic risks of climate change more successfully and comprehensively. Research on climate intervention, as it grows, has indicated that it may actually help manage these risks more equitably, peacefully, and securely. National and global interests would align.

Recommendations

The immense security and welfare risks of near-term climate change warrant concerted research on climate interventions and development of international scientific assessment, cooperation, governance, and decision-making mechanisms for them. Immediate steps should include:

For Group of Seven members:

• Undertake an ambitious agenda of research on the potential for SRM to reduce near-term climate risks in a program that delivers the information and capabilities to support robust scientific assessment within five years.
• Establish a mandate for monitoring, reporting, and projecting the composition of the atmosphere.
• Increase basic climate research funding to a level more commensurate with the value of better information and with the scale of other climate-related funding, with emphasis on atmospheric observations and modeling, e.g., increase US funding for basic climate and atmospheric research and observations by 70 percent to 80 percent ($2.6 billion) per year.
• Support open international availability of data, models, and scientific findings.

For the global community in general:

• Support international scientific cooperation on research and observations with transparent access to data, tools, and findings.
• Advance scientific assessment of SRM in qualified expert bodies (e.g., the Montreal Protocol and World Climate Research Programme).
• Establish a fund for developing countries’ research on the impacts of near-term climate change with and without SRM to foster more equitable participation.
• Promote science-based governance, decision-making and enforcement mechanisms that function through or similarly to the Montreal Protocol.

Conclusion

Climate change poses enormous threats to global welfare and security. These threats will grow rapidly in the coming decades—but society’s ability to respond is inadequate, leaving the world exposed to globally catastrophic risks. The present climate policy portfolio leaves a critical gap: it does not mitigate near- and mid-term risks and impacts, including potentially devastating tipping events in human and natural systems.

Research on the potential for climate interventions, including SRM, to reduce climate risks as well as substantial investments in climate observations and basic science are now a critical priority for the world. Global cooperation on this research would support equitable and effective decision-making, reduce tensions, and promote the common good. Applying the ensuing knowledge, cooperatively and equitably, to promote the safety of the world’s people and natural systems is now essential for us all.

Kelly Wanser is the executive director of SilverLining.

Ira Straus is a senior advisor at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a councilor of the Atlantic Council.

The GeoStrategy Initiative works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to tackle security challenges.

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The post Accelerating climate intervention research to improve climate security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Watch the full event

Transatlantic Forum on GeoEconomics

SEPTEMBER 30, 2025 BRUSSELS, BELGIUM The Transatlantic Forum on GeoEconomics is an annual conference convening economic and financial leaders from both sides of the Atlantic.

Speaker

R. Nicholas Burns
US Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China, Department of State

Moderator

Josh Lipsky
Senior Director, GeoEconomics Center, Atlantic Council

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

R. NICHOLAS BURNS: With that, good morning to all—to you, and to Sigmar, and to everybody in New York City. I really do wish I could be with you, despite the traffic in New York, which is catastrophically bad in UNGA week. It’s the place to be in the world this week, at UNGA. But I have a full-time job here, as you know, in Beijing. And sometimes I have to be in Beijing to do that job. So that’s why I’m speaking to you virtually.

But I want to pay tribute to Fred and Sigmar, and to both institutions—to the Atlantic Council of the United States and to the Atlantik-Brücke. When I think about the transatlantic relationship, and as Fred said I spent a lot of my diplomatic career focused on it as ambassador to NATO but also as undersecretary of state, I really can’t think of two private organizations that played more of a foundational role in creating the modern relationship that we have, in the late 1940s through the 1950s, all the way through the end of the Cold War, and beyond, than these two organizations. And I want to pay tribute to Sigmar, who has been a great friend over many years, and to the Atlantik-Brücke. I’ve been involved with them for many years. And certainly, to the Atlantic Council. And so thank you for sponsoring this forum this morning.

I’m going to speak rather briefly about a very complicated subject, and that’s US-China relations. But I’m looking forward to being—to hearing your views, to answering questions, and mixing it up a little bit in an audience filled with Americans, Europeans, and people from all around the world, because I can’t think of anything more vital for the future of both the United States and our European allies than getting this relationship with China framed correctly and getting it moving forward.

I will say this at the beginning, to state the obvious. From an American government perspective, we have no more consequential relationship than we do with China, with the People’s Republic of China. It’s enormously complicated because, of course, we’re both a competitor with China and we are trying to be a partner, in some respects, with the Chinese as well. And I know that does mirror the strategic dilemma facing the NATO countries and the European Union as well.

I’d start talking about our relationship with some good news that might reassure everybody on a Thursday morning in New York. I’m going to have to give you some bad news in the middle of the presentation, and then we’ll go from there. Here’s the relatively better news about the US-China relationship. I think we’ve been able to stabilize it over the last nine or ten months, since President Biden met President Xi Jinping in San Francisco, on the margins of the APEC summit.

Prior to that, we’d had a very, very rocky time. I was sworn in in 2021. We had the visit of Speaker Pelosi to Taiwan, which we supported, which really led to a downturn—a significant downturn in our relationship. The government of China cut off many of our key strategic channels. Then you’ll remember, in February 2023 a strange balloon floated across the national territory of the United States, from Alaska all the way across the Great Plains to South Carolina, where it was shot down on orders of the president of the United States. That led to a downturn in our relationship on the Chinese side.

And so we went through a period of time through most of 2022 and part of 2023. We did not have any significant cabinet channels that were workable between the two countries. And as a diplomat, that concerned me greatly especially in a relationship filled with sometimes acrimony and competitiveness, and sometimes even bitterness. You need to have people at the highest level talking. And I think that’s what we’ve been able to recreate.

We now have—Secretary Tony Blinken has a very close working relationship with Wang Yi, the foreign minister of China. Jake Sullivan has a strategic dialog underway with Wang Yi. Janet Yellen with her counterpart, Vice Premier He Lifeng. Gina Raimondo, Secretary Raimondo, with her counterpart, Wang Wentao. And I think we are fortunate in this relationship to be led by President Biden, who has a very strong and long-lasting relationship over twelve to thirteen years now with President Xi Jinping.

So what do I mean by stabilizing the relationship? We’ve recreated the cabinet channels that you need to succeed, especially in a difficult bilateral relationship. What are some specific examples of that? We had not had our military leaders in contact through the two crises that I talked about. We now have our secretary of defense, our chairman of the joint chiefs, both have established contact and relationships with their Chinese counterparts. And very significantly, our admiral who leads our Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Sam Paparo, has recently had two meetings with the southern theater commander of the People’s Liberation Army.

And that’s significant because, you know, one thing I worry about, and many of us worry about, is unintended conflict—perhaps ships or planes colliding. It’s happened before, unfortunately, in this relationship. In the South or East China Sea, you want to have the ability to put our senior military commanders in touch with each other to reduce the temperature, separate with the accidental forces, and have a peaceful conclusion. And so that has begun to work for us, closer military to military ties.

On fentanyl—and for the Europeans present, fentanyl is the leading cause of death in the United States of Americans eighteen to forty-five—it’s a true national health crisis. And the majority of the precursor chemicals that make up the synthetic opioid that are made up by the drug cartels in Central America, the majority of those precursor chemicals come from black-market Chinese firms.

And so, after President Biden met with President Xi and the government of China pledged it would cooperate with us—and we’ve made progress together in trying to reduce the flow of those precursor chemicals, attack the illicit finance that funds it, and try to move down this road together of trying to resolve a major global-health problem involving the US and many other countries with the assistance of the government of China. We haven’t done enough yet. We haven’t gone fast enough. There’s more to do. But I do think that we’ve been able to at least head down the same road together. And that gives us some comfort.

Artificial intelligence is another example of a topic that we’re beginning to grapple with together. Obviously, we see in our country the benefits of AI, but we also see the risks. And we’ve begun a strategic conversation with the government of China to deal with the military risks associated with AI. We’re at the beginning of that, and we’re going to go much further. But at least we are at the beginning. And, of course, with our allies in NATO but also out here in the Indo-Pacific, we’ve gone much further.

And I’ll give you another example, a final example, Fred and Sigmar and Josh, and that is climate change. China’s about 28 percent of global emissions. The United States is 10 percent. But we’re the two leading emitters of carbon. I think we understand we have a shared responsibility to each other, to our citizens, but especially to, you know, the other eight billion people in the world to make sure that we’re working together on the Paris climate-change commitments that we undertook together back in 2015 when President Obama was in office, working with President Xi Jinping. John Podesta, who many of you know is our climate negotiator, he just visited us in Beijing three weeks ago; had a series of, I think, productive, constructive meetings.

You know, we disagree on some subjects. We would wish that the Chinese would do more on methane, more on nitrous oxide, and be very aggressive in their national declared commitments that they’re going to have to make in the next year or two. And we hope to see further progress at COP29. But I think so far, so good, in at least putting us on the same side of this effort.

And so, in those respects, I think we do have a more stable relationship in terms of high-level communication. And that allows us to have the type of conversations that are sometimes very difficult that can drive down the possibility or the probability that disagreements might lead to conflict, because obviously we don’t want that to happen. And we’re trying to be very responsible in the way we manage this relationship.

So that’s the—believe it or not, that’s the better news in this relationship. That’s point one.

Point two—and this would really be what I want to focus on, and then I’ll stop and we can have a good conversation—point two is that this remains, in large part, this relationship between the US and China, extremely competitive. We’re the two largest and strongest economies in the world. We’re the two strongest militaries in the world. We’re two countries with enormous global reach and potential to have an impact on the world. In our case, we think it’s positive.

And so we’ve got to be careful about how we handle this relationship. We’re systemic rivals, and I think we’ll be systemic rivals well into the next decade, perhaps even beyond. And that rivalry and competition plays out in four different spheres.

Certainly it plays out in the security realm here in the Indo-Pacific, where the United States has done a lot of work over the last four years, under President Biden’s leadership, to strengthen our security alliances with Japan, with the Republic of Korea, with the Philippines, with Thailand, with Australia. We’ve built up a very promising strategic initiative called AUKUS with the United Kingdom and Australia; important to keep the peace out here in the Indo-Pacific and provide for a very strong deterrent.

And you just saw the president—our president, Joe Biden—host the Quad leaders at the president’s home in Delaware just this past weekend. And India, Japan, Australia and the United States working together, that is an enormously capable and powerful quartet of countries designed, really, to work on positive issues about how to strengthen democracy, how to strengthen market capitalism, how to take on big global issues all together. So we think we’ve strengthened our relationship in the security realm out here in the Indo-Pacific.

I would also say, however, that one of the big gamechangers has been the degree to which both NATO and the European Union have begun to think about their security interests in this part of the world. When NATO leaders meet we have four security partners from the Indo-Pacific who meet with us in Western Europe or the United States or Canada or where that meeting is being held. That’s a game changer.

We see an enormous number of European members of parliament and members of the individual parliaments of the European governments traveling to Taiwan to stand up for an association with the Taiwan authorities that we hope will maintain the peace in the cross-strait basis and that’s been very, very helpful, I think, to us in this part of the world.

So competitive on the security realm, and the United States certainly is determined to maintain our leading position with our allies as a security force here in the Indo-Pacific. That’s a first order of competition. But I think both technology and economics have really taken center stage in the US-China relationship.

You know about the commercial rivalry or competition between American and Chinese companies when it comes to the development of artificial intelligence. But, obviously, as we think about AI and think about biotechnology and quantum computing there will be technologies developed in the military sphere based on what’s happening in the commercial marketplace.

And so the United States is determined to main our tech lead—to maintain our tech lead, I should say—and determined to work with other like-minded democratic countries on that basis, and the technology competition is white hot.

You’ve seen the United States shut down the possibility of American companies to export advanced semiconductors into the Chinese market. There are limits now on the ability of American private equity and venture capital firms to invest in artificial intelligence enterprises here in China.

Those are taken, this small yard high fence approach, not really for commercial reasons on our part but for national security reasons. We don’t want the PLA to gain access to our most sensitive commercial technologies that can be transformed into military capability and we’ve seen other countries begin to take these steps as well.

So technology is center stage and economics is center stage. We have a very complicated economic relationship with China. China is actually the third largest trade partner of the United States after our North American border states in Canada, in Mexico, and we have declared—and Secretary Yellen, our secretary of the Treasury, has said on multiple occasions we’re not trying to decouple the enormously large trade and investment relationship—over $600 billion last year—between the United States and China but we are going to derisk. . .

Technology and economics have combined to make this I think one of the most active areas and one of the most important in our overall relationship, and the issue of overcapacity, and I hope we get a chance to talk about that in some detail here, has taken on added importance.

We believe, and Secretary Yellen made this very clear when she visited Guangzhou and Beijing here in April, that China is engaged in massive overproduction of EVs and solar panels, of lithium batteries, of steel, of robotics, and biotechnology as well, and then in some of those areas producing two to three times here in China domestic demand and now trying to dump those products at artificially low prices in markets around the world.

I know that the European Union is engaged in a spirited debate about what action the EU should take. And I don’t want to comment on what the EU should or shouldn’t do. That’s up to the EU. But if you look around the world you’ll see that South Africa and Turkey have both raised tariffs on Chinese exports into their country to protect their markets. Chile, Brazil, Mexico, Canada, and the United States have done the same.

You saw President Biden put a hundred percent tariffs on sales of EVs—Chinese EVs—into the US market. We do this because what the Chinese are engaged in is patently unfair under international trade and we are not going to in any way tolerate a second China shock in the United States.

The first one, we lost well over a million American manufacturing jobs. We’re going to protect those jobs in the United States. And I think many other countries are reacting the same way against this overcapacity problem of the People’s Republic of China. Let’s talk more about that.

We should also talk in the economic national security domain about the fact that thousands of Chinese companies have been exporting dual-use components into Russia to strengthen the Russian defense industrial base and to allow Russia and strengthen Russia in its nefarious, brutal, illegal campaign in Ukraine and in firing Russian rockets and missiles, drones into Ukraine to kill Ukrainian civilians. We’re determined to stop this. We sanctioned over three hundred Chinese firms over the last several months. Unfortunately, we’ve not seen a change in Chinese behavior. And so they should expect that we’ll continue in this punitive effort to make our voice clear that we’re not going to stand by as China significantly helps Russia strengthen its armaments potential, but also its defense industrial base.

So in the security realm in the Indo-Pacific, on technology issues, on economic and trade issues, we have an intense competition underway between our two countries. And there’s a last—a last area. And it really is, in many ways, the most important. We have profound differences with the government of China on human rights. And we do not shy away from talking about those problems. People being held unjustly, like Ekpar Asat and Gulshan Abbas, for speaking out for freedom and the rights of the Uyghur peoples in Xinjiang.

The same is true in Tibet. The same is true in Hong Kong. The same is true in religious rights. And so we have a major disagreement with China on those issues. And we work in the UN Human Rights Council, along with many of the countries represented in the room today, to try to shine a light on the—on those terrible human rights practices of the government of China. So that’s the main bulk that would describe the very intense competition underway between our two governments.

But let me end, Sigmar, Fred, and Josh, on a slightly more positive note. I think we’re going to be competing with China. We in the United States, the European countries, and many of the Indo-Pacific countries, for a long time to come. Because we have to defend democracy. We have to defend the rule of law. We have to defend the rights of countries like the Philippines not to be subject to gross intimidation by the PLA. But we also want to make sure that we are responsible stewards of this relationship. And so we are dedicated to maintain a peaceful relationship between the United States and China.

I know that’s true for the European countries as well and for all of our Indo-Pacific allies, but it’s important to say it. And we put a lot of time and effort into creating these communication channels, into endless meetings with the Chinese leadership, so that our differences can be adjudicated peacefully and not through force of arms. The relationship’s a lot more complicated than this very short presentation that I’ve just given you. But let’s see if we can get into some of the details in the Q&A. And thanks so much, again, for inviting me to be with you.

JOSH LIPSKY: Ambassador, thank you for that. Thank you for overview and summary of the complexity of this relationship. It’s the perfect way to begin our conference today, because everything we talk about throughout the day—finance, and technology, and economic competition, and diplomacy—China is the major factor. And having you there—even though we wish you were here with us in New York—having you there from Beijing I think sends an important message. And we are very fortunate as Americans to have you as our representative in China right now. And we thank you for your service.

R. NICHOLAS BURNS: Josh, thank you very much. If I could just say to the audience one thing about Josh Lipsky. I think what Josh is doing on geoeconomics at the Atlantic Council, working with Fred and others, is really pivotal as we think about American national security interests. And I got to know Josh when he was a student in my class at Harvard Kennedy School. And I can tell you how smart he is, how courageous he is intellectually. And I really admire the start—the brilliant start of his public service career. So thanks for having me with you, Josh.

JOSH LIPSKY: Thank you, Professor.

So let’s get into economics, one of the challenges you identified. It’s been an interesting forty-eight hours in China. First we saw the People’s Bank of China introduce a form of stimulus in a way we hadn’t seen them do before, and then we saw some fiscal announcements overnight here in the US in the last twenty-four hours from Beijing. I’m curious from your perspective there how you think Chinese policymakers think about the state of the Chinese economy, how you take these latest signals. And is it an indicator that maybe things are worse domestically for their economy than some forecasts are looking at right now?

R. NICHOLAS BURNS: Josh, thank you. I think you’re right to point to this issue. It’s been an extraordinary couple of days looking at some of these major announcements that have been made by the Central Bank of China and others in the government here.

This is not a dodge, but we’re still looking at what they’ve announced and trying to, you know, do an analysis of how—the impact we think it’s going to have, both inside China but also on global markets. I think it’s a little bit too early to tell to make predictions, but certainly it’s a serious effort meant to try to address some of the short- and longer-term economic challenges that the government of China has.

It’s not for me to try to describe what the policymakers here are thinking. That’s their job; I’ll leave that to them. But I will say from an American economic perspective we want to see a market here that treats American firms more equitably. There are still lots of examples—and I meet with nearly every American CEO who comes through China—lots of examples of intellectual property theft, of forced technology transfer, of a dramatically unlevel playing field for American investors. And you’ve seen a dramatic drop in foreign direct investment by American investors, European investors, Asian investors—30 percent in this year alone. So that’s a major problem. And we would hope that the government here would continue to take the type of actions that would reassure foreign investors—in our case, American investors—that they can get a fair shake here and that they will be—if they make an investment or if they’re trading in a significant way, they’re going to be treated equally. And that is not always the case here.

Second, I’d say that, you know, you—we read and talk to some of the leading economic risk firms and analysis firms here, and there’s no question that China seems to be in a systemic transition as an economy, structural transition. The Rhodium Group put out a report a couple of weeks ago saying that China was in structural economic decline. Whether it’s in decline or a transition, it’s a fairly significant period. The drivers of growth in China—the property sector, the infrastructure sector—no longer are driving economic growth. And so I think, obviously, the government here has to take measures to try to increase nominal GDP growth rate. We would expect over time that growth rate would likely slow down, and continue to slow down in the second half of this decade into the next decade.

But our primary responsibility here is just to make sure that as American companies look at this market they have an accurate portrayal of what’s happening, but they’re also being treated fairly. And so Secretary Gina Raimondo and I have worked very closely together to try to make sure that American firms have that fair shake in this market, and that’s a consistent message that we’ve been sending to the government here. But certainly, what happens in the economy here is, obviously, one of the central issues that’s taking place here, and we’ll just have to see what the impact of these latest measures are.

JOSH LIPSKY: So you brought up earlier the issue of overcapacity. And based on what you’re saying of the structural slowdown, decline, however you term it, it seems the shift in China is away from the property sector and back into manufacturing, and that’s where this overcapacity problem stems from. But you’ve also said this is not the early 2000s, meaning the world is not going to react the same way that they did in the past China shock.

I’m curious what you’re seeing from other countries. You know, we talk about what the US is doing in tariffs and EVs. It’s not the early 2000s in the US. We seem to recognize that in our politics here and in our policy. But what about, as you engage with your colleagues in other countries both in Europe and beyond, how do they see this overcapacity problem and their unified or perhaps more aligned response to it?

R. NICHOLAS BURNS: Well, Josh, I think you won’t be surprised—this is a very good question—that there is concern all over the world, including in countries that are close to China politically, about this overcapacity problem. It’s been a frustrating debate.

We started talking about this issue privately, obviously, with the government, and that was particularly true during Secretary Yellen’s visit here in early April. But it quickly became clear to us that the people—that the People’s Republic government was going to make a case that what they were engaged in, they say, is comparative advantage. And they simply were in a better position to manufacture products than, say, Europe or the Global South or the United States. And we contest that. Jay Shambaugh, our really able undersecretary of the treasury, made an important speech about why this was overcapacity on the part of the government of China and why, in economic terms, that was indisputable.

And so we’ve continued to press the government here for redress for American companies. But we’re not seeing much action. I think they’ve doubled down, the government here, on the overcapacity strategy. They call this the new productive forces. And so it’s been most visible, I think, the excess demand, by two to three times, domestic demand, OK, so excess demand then dumped around the world, most visible in EVs, lithium batteries and solar panels. But we also worry that this could now lead into biotechnology, into robotics, into other fields that are critical for the future.

If there’s one lesson, I think, that all of us around the world, in every single country, learned from the pandemic, don’t be reliant on a single source for critical materials, critical minerals, critical supplies that you need for your own economy. That’s the lesson we have digested and internalized in our government. And you hear that in what President Biden says about this issue. We are not going to tolerate a second China shock. And so that’s our message to the government of China.

So they shouldn’t be surprised when we, the United States, have raised tariffs on EVs, on solar panels, on lithium batteries and on other goods, and to see other countries doing it. I talk to all of my colleagues here, ambassadors from other countries—we’re all represented here in China—and to see it from Global South countries as well as Western Europe, as well as South America, as well as East Asian countries, has been a remarkable thing to see. So I think it’s a global issue. It’s a global pushback. And it’s a message that I hope the government here is going to understand and do something about.

JOSH LIPSKY: I’m really glad you mentioned the Global South countries, because that to me seems like such an important shift from when we went through this before in the early 2000s and their pushback. We’ve seen things Brazil have done and otherwise send, I hope, an important signal to China.

But there’s one country, of course, that’s happy to accept China’s support and industrial capacity, and that’ s Russia. Obviously, Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell recently said China’s directly supporting China’s war effort. We had former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice here Tuesday at an Atlantic Council event. Fred interviewed her, your former boss at the State Department when you were undersecretary for political affairs. She talked about their union and alliance between China and Russia.

Do you see any recognition on the part of China that there has to be a retrenchment about this relationship? Or do you see it only further deepening?

R. NICHOLAS BURNS: Unfortunately, Josh, there’s no indication that China’s going to back away from its no-limits partnership with Russia. And it’s greatly disturbing, I know, to a roomful of Europeans, as it is to Americans, as it is to a lot of people around the world. The Chinese like to say that they’re neutral in this war, that they want to be a peacemaker. But they’ve done nothing to try to end the war on terms that would be fair to the victim, and that’s the people and the government of Ukraine.

And so the Chinese have doubled down on political support, diplomatic support for the Russians in New York, at the Security Council. They have not provided—but we watch this every day—we don’t believe the Chinese have provided lethal military assistance, meaning entire armaments to complete weapon systems, to Russia, but they’ve supplied very important, critically badly needed components, dual-use technologies, to the Russian Federation, so much so that, you know, a lot of people think that the Russian defense-industrial base now is stronger than it was even at the beginning of the war, in large part because of the assistance they have from China.

And so the Chinese can’t have it both ways. And I know the depths of emotion and pushback that we’re seeing from Europe. We tell the Chinese, as do our European allies, this is a vital issue for Europe, Canada and the United States, the fact that Putin has divided Europe once again. He’s brought war to Europe in the most reckless way. And we Americans point out that we fought in the First World War, in the Second World War. We maintained three hundred thousand troops in Europe during much of the Cold War. We are an actor by virtue—on the continent—by virtue of our membership in NATO. This is a vital interest for the United States, that Europe return to being what George H.W. Bush first said on the American side it should be—whole, free, and at peace. And I look at, you know, all my friends in Germany who believe that to their core, that that’s what Europe should be, and China isn’t helping. And not just isn’t helping, it’s aiding and abetting the Russian war machine.

So this issue has really defined direct—you know, an open, direct disagreement between the countries of NATO and the EU, including my own, and the Chinese government. And I think they’ve heard that message but unfortunately, they haven’t acted on it. And so you see, as I said before, Josh, I think one of the biggest changes that I’ve seen in my over two and a half years as ambassador on the ground here is that Europe is now thinking strategically about Taiwan and about security in East Asia in a way that it hadn’t before.

And many of the countries of the Indo-Pacific, our democratic allies, want to have some kind of, you know, closer strategic relationship with Europe, with the European Union, with individual European countries, and on a partner basis with NATO. And so the Chinese have brought this upon themselves. And it’s an own goal. And I hope at—we all hope, at some point they may wake up and decide that they’ve got to cut their losses and not just have this outright 100 percent support for the Russian Federation in this bitter, cruel war.

JOSH LIPSKY: So I’m going to ask you one follow up on that. We have about ten minutes left. I want to get to some audience questions. So please use AskAC.org on your phones, or if you’re watching virtually, and we’ll get to a few if we can.

But just one follow up, Ambassador. Secretary Rice said what we should be doing is actually different than what we’re doing now. We should be highlighting the partnership between Russia and China, and by highlighting it—she called it, “slamming them together,” I think, in the conversation—show how much they don’t have in common, show the differences between them. And I just wonder, based on China’s seemingly lack of response to the policy call so far, does anything different need to be done to call China out on its support of Russia?

R. NICHOLAS BURNS: Well, you know, I think that a lot of governments have been trying to do that, pointing to the reckless relationship, for instance, between Putin and Kim Jong-un, with the North Koreans supplying ballistic missiles to Russia, and the Russians agreed to have a closer military relationship. That can’t possibly be in the interest of the People’s Republic of China. Condi Rice and Bob Gates have also, as private citizens, spoken out against the loose cooperation, but very important cooperation—not an alliance, but cooperation—among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. We see that well as a malevolent force. And so I think a lot of us, in many governments but certainly in our government, have tried to do just what Secretary Rice, I think, so rightly says, call out the obvious problems to China for a long—for hitching themselves to Russia over the—over the mid to long term.

JOSH LIPSKY: Thank you. OK, I have a lot of questions coming in. I’m going to try to bridge them together. But let me ask you one of a theme we’re going to get to at the end of the day. At the end of the day today we’re going to talk about the future of the dollar. Obviously, that’s core to our work at the geoeconomic center. We produce a wide body of research on this. How do you think China sees the yuan’s role in the global economy? There’s obviously been e-CNY, their digital currency. But I think there’s some maybe misconceptions or misunderstanding of what they want from their own currency, and how they want China and its currency—and more broadly, their economy—to play in the global economy.

R. NICHOLAS BURNS: Well, certainly. I’ll just take one little step back, Josh, and say that there’s no question that China has ambitions to become the world’s strongest economic, as well as military, power eventually. Remember, all the—you remember all those predictions that China would pass the United States in nominal GDP by 2025, or 2026 or 2027? Well, that’s not going to happen, given the strength of the American economy and given some of the problems of the slower nominal GDP growth rates here in China.

On the currency, I’d just point you to data. I think the latest data, I hope—I think—I think this is right, that 4.7 percent of global payments were made in the RMB last year. And 47.8 percent were made in the dollar. So that gives you an indication of the relative strength in terms of international effect of the dollar versus the RMB. In our country, our Treasury secretary speaks about the dollar, and is the only person who really should go into depth speaking about it. So I’m going to maintain that tradition, as an American diplomat, of letting Secretary Yellen speak to that question.

But I can tell you on a comparative basis the Chinese do have ambitions for their digital currency but also for the RMB internationally. But they’re far behind the dollar at this point, and I’m, obviously, pleased about that.

JOSH LIPSKY: Well, I had to try.

So let me take a few questions here. We have—there are basically several online about AI and I’ll try to put it together for you, Ambassador. But I think the theme of the questions I see online is, is there any ability—you talked in the beginning of your presentation about areas where we can work with China. Is there anything you see on this ability to set standards on AI? It seems that this technology competition where it’s coming from is most critical, most key to our national security. Is there any traction on that front in the general use of AI or AI in the military domain, maybe most concerningly?

R. NICHOLAS BURNS: Josh, I think there’s recognition, certainly in our country and in our government from the president on down, that we understand how transformative AI is going to be not just for the global economy but for our global society in a multitude of ways.

And so you’ve seen both the president this week at UNGA and Secretary Blinken talking a lot about AI, meeting with other world leaders. This has been going on for several years now but it’s very intense this week at UNGA purposefully because we understand that we’ve got to get this right, the balance between the promise of AI and risks associated with it, both in terms of the impact on human society, the impact on global economics, the impact on the balance of power, and the impact on war and peace as we look at those scenarios in the future. So that’s point one.

Point two, we’re at a very early stage, as I said, in our conversations with the Chinese leadership on AI. We had one meeting between our experts in Geneva a couple of months ago. We want to go beyond that meeting.

We would like to have an in-depth discussion particularly to address the risks associated with AI in the military sphere and that’s an exceedingly important conversation to have, and we hope the Chinese will be ready to meet us to have that dialog and we’re ready to have that dialog.

I think where we’re most advanced, Josh, is in our strategic conversations with our NATO allies, with our leading trade partners, and with our Indo-Pacific allies in terms of the geopolitical impact of AI in the future.

But we’ve got to do more. We hope to get to a more sophisticated, deeper discussion with the Chinese leadership and, as I said, we’re ready for that. We hope they are, too.

JOSH LIPSKY: A final question for me—I know it’s late in Beijing—you began your tenure in the middle of the pandemic. That’s an extraordinary difficult time to start anywhere but especially in China with the zero lockdown policy—zero COVID.

What have you seen over the past few years that surprised you and what would you like to share back with this audience here about your engagements with the Chinese people? Because I think that often gets lost in the conversations.

R. NICHOLAS BURNS: Josh, thank you very much.

You know, I calculated—I added up the other day I think I’ve spent sixty days, six zero, in quarantine in two and a half years in China. That’s quite something when you think about it. The start that I had here and that many of my colleagues had here was lockdowns and daily testing and the inability to travel, and what has changed my perspective since the end of zero COVID—the Chinese government policy which ended in December 2022—is the ability to get outside of the capital city and to interact with people all over China.

People in the provinces remember, for instance, that the United States was a good friend to China here in China during the Second World War. They remember the Flying Tigers. They remember General Stilwell.

People understand the impact that American educational institutions have had in China. There are millions of Chinese who have studied in our country since China opened up under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership in the late 1970s.

We currently have just under three hundred thousand Chinese students at our universities and our door is open to them. We issued 105,000 new student visas in 2023 to Chinese students to go to the United States and we’re well ahead of that pace as we near the end of 2024.

So I think what surprised me the most and what I feel passionate about is that as we compete as two geopolitical rivals—economic and military and strategic rivals—the last thing in the world we should do is to see our peoples disconnected from each other and the data points here are very stark.

Before the pandemic there were 345 direct flights a week between the United States and China. We went down to twelve direct flights in April of 2023, and we’re up only to eighty-nine direct flights now.

When it comes to students, we had fifteen thousand American students here ten years ago. We were down to about eight hundred students, we thought, at the beginning of this academic year. We’re now actually counting to try to see if we’re at a thousand American students here. But we’re way down in terms of students.

We had millions of tourists—over five million Chinese and American tourists going both ways—in 2019, but that dropped precipitously during the pandemic.

So it’s very important that we reconnect these two countries: tourists, business travelers, students, university links, nongovernmental-organization links, think tanks like the Atlantik-Brücke and the Atlantic Council coming back to China to interact. Because in a very competitive, long-term, difficult relationship of the type that we have between our two governments, what you need to do is have some ballast in the relationship, and people are the ballast.

Condi Rice—and you’re right, I worked for Condi twice in my government career and I greatly admire her—she wrote a very important Foreign Affairs article published two weeks ago and she makes this point, that we’ve got to keep the two societies connected. We believe that in our administration. President Biden’s talked about it. Secretary Tony Blinken and I have talked about it at great length. And we’re trying to do that, keep the societies connected. That’s one way to keep the peace. It’s one way to make sure that we have a basic understanding of each other.

And, Josh, from a national security perspective, I worry about the fact that we only had eight hundred students here last year. In ten or fifteen years, those twenty-year-olds in America today are going to be running many of our institutions in the United States—our corporate boardrooms, our newspapers, our TV channels, and they’ll be the American diplomats and military officers. And if we don’t have young men and women learn Mandarin now, have had an ability to live in this country and travel widely, then we’re not going to be as adept as we should in understanding this society.

So I think there’s really almost nothing more important than keeping our two societies connected. It’s the thing that’s surprised me the most, the degree that we have been separated by the COVID pandemic. And I think we do share a desire with the government of China to reconnect the two peoples.

Maybe we should end there, Josh. It’s something that China and the United States can agree on. It’s, I think, what most people, I would hope, present today would agree, that we should be connected between our two societies.

JOSH LIPSKY: We will end it there, Ambassador, on a challenge and an optimistic note. Please join me in thanking Ambassador Nicholas Burns for joining us to open.

R. NICHOLAS BURNS: Thanks, Josh.

JOSH LIPSKY: Thank you, Ambassador, and have a good evening. Thank you so much.

Watch the full event

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The international community must lift this regulatory burden with greater support for private sector climate financing. Banks, insurers, and investors can be a north star for climate resilience. They have the resources and expertise to inform more impactful approaches to climate finance.

Indeed, the United Nations (UN) Climate Conference, also known as COP, has acknowledged that finance is “a great enabler of action.” Last week, the COP presidency announced a new action agenda ahead of COP29 in Azerbaijan in November. It called for a new Climate Finance Action Fund, which will be funded by voluntary contributions from both governments and private sector energy companies. It also outlines grants, pledges, and declarations that governments can voluntarily adopt. Notably, climate finance is woven throughout the text.

As Climate Week NYC gets under way, policymakers and business leaders have a clear call to action. But it is also clear that they cannot achieve impact at scale alone.

In the lead up to COP29 and the 2024 UN Biodiversity Conference, the world has a unique opportunity to collaborate with the private sector on climate adaptation and resilience. This week in New York, more than one hundred companies will be on the ground to drive these conversations forward. It is on governments to understand how to work more effectively with them.

The private sector is starting to open its eyes to the fact that the only way to survive is to internalize climate risks and costs. Industries have contributed disproportionately to the consequences of climate change without accounting for them. In 2021, the private sector accounted for 84 percent of global emissions. It is now clear to businesses and companies that the climate crisis comes with clear costs—from consequences with the supply chain to reduced labor productivity. Investing in resilience protects private sector interests. So, rather than being a barrier to participation, governments around the world must ensure that their policy environment enables private sector action and ambition when it comes to climate adaptation and resilience.

The question is: What can the public and private sector do to make these changes? First, we need to drive dialogue. Through the Atlantic Council’s Climate Resilience Center, we created the space for these conversations to happen. We have worked with the UN Climate Change High-Level Champions to connect banks, insurers, and private finance actors to understand how the public and private sector can more effectively work toward a systemic solution. These conversations have made clear that the appetite for partnership is there, but better efforts are needed to develop the instruments and public sector bodies that can mobilize private sector investments. For instance, the public sector must create taxonomies for climate adaptation. We need these new taxonomies to understand what types of investment count toward adaptation, so there can be effective incentives for private sector funding and more investor confidence to make the returns clearer.

The moment is ripe. Last year, when we launched the Call for Collaboration at COP28, governments and companies signed on immediately. Climate Week NYC is multiplying these opportunities. Many of the events are hosted by the private sector, showing companies’ increasing motivation to be a part of these conversations. The world is changing, and we need to capitalize on this momentum. What remains is to ensure that these conversations can turn into real action.

Jorge Gastelumendi is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Climate Resilience Center. He previously served as chief advisor and negotiator for the government of Peru during negotiations that led to the Paris Climate Accords.

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The Atlantic hurricane season runs from June through November. The storms can begin as far away as the waters off the coast of Africa, gain power as they cross the ocean, and curl their way up through the Gulf of Mexico to make landfall in the United States. For example, eastern Texas and southern Louisiana have suffered from severe hurricanes and other weather events in recent years. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina flooded New Orleans, leading to more than 1,300 fatalities and vast economic disruptions. In 2017, Hurricane Harvey devastated entire sections of Houston. In early July of this year, Houston was hit by Hurricane Beryl, a Category 1 storm when it made landfall. Even though Category 1 is the least intense on the five-point scale, Beryl left nearly one million customers of CenterPoint Energy, a local utility, without electricity more than a week after the hurricane made landfall. This year, the Atlantic hurricane season is expected to be more active than normal, due to record-high sea surface temperatures and the shift from El Niño to La Niña.

This latest hurricane season is part of a trend: Gulf Coast hurricanes are increasingly worrisome. There is a strong correlation between Atlantic sea surface temperatures and the power dissipation index, an aggregate measure of Atlantic hurricane activity, accounting for frequency, intensity, and duration. Both have sharply risen since the 1970s. So, as climate change driven by greenhouse gas emissions continues to warm ocean surfaces, hurricanes will likely become more intense, with greater wind speeds and rainfall.

While hurricanes pose significant humanitarian risks along the Gulf Coast, they also disrupt world energy markets. The Gulf Coast is one of the world’s most important export markets for oil, LNG, and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), which is typically used for petrochemical feedstock. It is also a top export site for refined products—sometimes called clean products—such as gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel.

LPG

The US Gulf Coast is a critical LPG exporter, sending huge shipments of propane and butane abroad. LPG is used as feedstock for the petrochemical sector, heating fuel, and engine fuel. In 2023, the United States shipped 1.6 million barrels per day (MMBPD) of propane abroad, with Japan, mainland China, Mexico, and South Korea serving as the largest export destinations. Total US butane exports totaled about 0.46 MMBPD. US Gulf Coast LPG export infrastructure is primarily located in the Houston Ship Channel, home to the Gulf Coast’s two largest LPG export terminals, although nearby Freeport and Nederland also host facilities. The Mont Belvieu natural gas liquids complex is also sited fewer than thirty miles from the Houston Ship Channel.

In the event of a major disruption to US LPG exports, importers across Asia would scramble to find alternative supplies.

LNG

US LNG facilities are already at significant risk of hurricanes due to their concentration in eastern Texas and western Louisiana. And as regional export capacity grows and hurricane intensity increases, there could be even greater disruptions to global LNG markets.

Significant hurricanes have passed throughout this corridor in recent years, causing major export disruptions. Sabine Pass LNG shook off the effects from Category 4 Hurricane Laura in 2020 after about a week. Cameron LNG, less than eighty miles away but directly in the eye of the hurricane, shut down for over a month. There is an uncomfortable tradeoff between electrifying operations at LNG terminals and making them more resilient. On the one hand, electrifying export terminals reduces their operational carbon dioxide–equivalent emissions footprint. On the other hand, facilities that receive power from underground gas pipelines are less vulnerable to hurricane-related disruptions than terminals that receive electricity from above ground wires.

Future hurricanes could be much more disruptive. Sabine Pass LNG, Golden Pass LNG, and Port Arthur LNG are all located along Sabine Lake on the Texas-Louisiana border, no more than eight miles from one another.

These three terminals will account for 66 million tons per annum (MTPA) peak throughput capacity, once Golden Pass and Port Arthur finish construction. For context, total US LNG exports totaled 13.6 billion cubic feet per day in December 2023, or roughly 103 MTPA. If these three facilities’ exports are disrupted by hurricanes, a price shock to global natural gas markets will result.

The US Gulf Coast has rapidly come to dominate global LNG flows, accounting for 19 percent of total volumes (79 million tons) in 2023, according to data from commodity firm Kpler. Notably, Sabine Pass LNG is already the single largest LNG export facility in the United States, shipping 29.5 million tons last year. A hurricane passing through the area could significantly delay the construction of Golden Pass LNG and Port Arthur LNG, and any US Gulf Coast hurricane-related outages this summer will have major impacts on world markets. Europe and Asia, the two largest recipients of US LNG exports, would be disproportionately affected.

Crude oil

The US Gulf Coast has also become a critical source of oil exports, accounting for just under 10 percent of total global seaborne departures in 2023, according to Kpler. Over half of all US crude oil exports (2.2 MMBPD) flowed through the Corpus Christi, Texas, export hub in 2023, on a volume basis. Houston was a critical second loading point (1.1 MMBPD), followed by smaller volumes out of Beaumont/Port Arthur (0.28 MMBPD), and other ports, such as Louisiana’s LOOP (0.26 MMBPD), shipping smaller volumes. While exports are concentrated at Corpus Christi, pipelines can ensure that these volumes are directed to other hubs—albeit only to a degree.

Refinery capacity and oil products

The Houston and Beaumont/Port Arthur regions are the country’s largest refinery markets, with approximately 2.5 MMBPD and 1.8 MMBPD of throughput capacity, respectively.

Disruptions to either refinery market would impact domestic and international markets for crude products, such as gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. For instance, after Hurricane Harvey hit Houston and Port Arthur in September 2017, US retail gasoline prices rose by 13 percent in a matter of weeks. Surging prices were especially striking given that gasoline prices tend to decline in the fall, after peak driving season passes.

The US Gulf Coast is also a critical source of refined products, especially for Latin America. In 2023, Gulf Coast refiners exported 0.64 MMBPD of gasoline, 0.92 MMBPD of gasoil/diesel, and 0.14 MMBPD of jet fuel/kerosene, with roughly 80 percent of this volume flowing toward Latin America. However, US diesel exports have become an increasingly important source of supply into Europe, picking up to 0.17 MMBPD last year, up from just 0.07 MMBPD in 2022.

The time to deepen preparation is now

US natural gas and oil exports are growing, and much of the supporting infrastructure is located along the Gulf Coast. Unfortunately, these facilities are potentially vulnerable to hurricanes, and outages could have significant and persistent effects on US and world energy markets. Policymakers and industry actors, both in the United States and abroad, should carefully consider potential impacts from increasingly dangerous hurricanes and conduct further contingency planning. Concentrating energy infrastructure maximizes benefits from agglomeration and economies of scale while minimizing the tyranny of distance. Yet concentration poses significant risks that could prove disastrous in the future. With hurricanes only growing worse, the US Gulf Coast oil and gas complex must recognize and adapt to changing realities.

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center. 

Reid I’Anson is a macroeconomist at the commodities firm Kpler. 

Anya Herzberg is an intern at the Global Energy Center. 

This article reflects their own personal opinions. 

The post Hurricanes could upend US oil and gas exports and global energy markets. Here’s what to know. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As part of an ongoing project, we have been seeking to answer these and related questions about NATO’s adaptation to climate change. To do so, we have thus far interviewed sixty-three political and military officials from allied delegations and other offices from sixteen member states across all of NATO’s geographic regions. Our project, which began in the spring of 2023, is funded by the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC).

While our analyses are still underway, we heard several themes emerge from our interviews. Almost all officials acknowledged climate threats as important. But many framed these as long-term threats, rather than immediate ones, and a handful of officials were dismissive of the issue as a priority. Few officials maintained the belief that human-made climate change is not a real phenomenon. Some officials viewed climate issues as not particularly relevant to NATO’s everyday work. For some with climate security in their portfolios, it could be difficult to convince colleagues to devote political capital to it.

Repeatedly, we heard about a widely perceived tradeoff between investing in climate adaptation or mitigation measures and investing in deterrence—particularly in the context of Ukraine. Many officials reported that the war in Ukraine had shifted the focus from a broader climate security agenda to one more narrowly focused on energy security. We were also told that some colleagues feared that elevating climate security would come at a cost to operational effectiveness. At the same time, others expressed concerns about operations in the context of soldiers’ safety and health in extreme heat and changing security dynamics within the Arctic as ice sheets melt. Others acknowledged the impact of wildfires on training and flooding on bases.

As our research continues, it is important to note that, while NATO has made some strides in setting goals for climate change adaptation, we suggest several ways that NATO can improve on how it incorporates climate security into its training, exercises, and operational planning to become a leader on this issue.

NATO’s climate action

As one of us has discussed earlier, past research has identified NATO as behind the curve on climate adaptation relative to other international organizations. Compared with the European Union (EU), which began setting greenhouse emissions targets as early as 1998, NATO’s targets, implementation plans, and institutional changes have all occurred much more recently. This is not to say that the EU is perfectly on track, but NATO has a ways to catch up with its institutional neighbor with whom it shares twenty-three member states. NATO allies did set their first emissions targets in 2022, committing to reduce greenhouse gases by 45 percent by 2030 and to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. Additionally, over the past several years, NATO’s secretariat has hired climate security experts to bolster its expertise in this critical arena.

It was not until three years ago, in June 2021, that allies agreed to adopt a game-changing and comprehensive climate change and security action plan. The high-level agreement deserves to be lauded given the diversity of political views on the nature and importance of climate security. It made four ambitious promises: to increase awareness, to adapt across ten areas, to “contribute to the mitigation” of climate change, and strengthen outreach to partners and relevant organizations.

Since then, NATO has officially opened the Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence (CCASCOE), funded primarily by Canada but with contributions from a growing list of allies. NATO has also issued a list of best practices and conducted three annual assessments—highlighting the detrimental consequences for the organization’s assets, equipment, and operations. Officials from NATO have also been reaching out to relevant think tanks, climate security experts, and academics via meetings, hosting roundtables and workshops to expand internal knowledge of what works and what doesn’t on climate adaptation.

Ultimately, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg worked hard with allies to put climate on the agenda in transatlantic security debates in Brussels, as he stressed at the 2023 United Nations Climate Change Conference, also known as COP28. But with Stoltenberg’s tenure coming to a close, it is unclear how sustainable these efforts will be. Will Rutte keep the issue on the agenda and collaborate with climate champions within and outside the Alliance to make NATO a key player in climate adaptation and mitigation? There is reason for optimism; in his role as Dutch prime minister, Rutte worked hard—despite challenges—to cut emissions in the Netherlands, and he announced a commitment of fifteen million euros to those countries that have experienced damage and loss from climate change.

Achieving climate leadership

To build on the Alliance’s climate agenda and achieve NATO’s objective of becoming a leader in climate change adaptation, here are five areas on which allies and the incoming secretary general should focus.

• Leadership: One way to ensure that climate security is taken seriously within NATO going forward is to establish a high-level position dedicated to this area, which would be modeled after NATO’s special representative on women, peace, and security. A special representative on climate security could work at NATO headquarters and advise the secretary general on climate concerns and plans. The representative could also meet regularly with allies at committee meetings, increase awareness of climate security issues across the Alliance, and meet with allies to address requests and needs. Additionally, this individual could coordinate with NATO’s Human Security Unit and the special representative on women, peace, and security to ensure that the gender dimensions of climate change and climate security are incorporated into decisions and planning.

• Training: To mainstream climate awareness across NATO, the Alliance should also broaden the training on climate security it offers—both by creating courses focused solely on climate security and by incorporating this issue into existing courses. Presumably, CCASCOE will be an excellent hub but there are other opportunities, as well. In Germany, the NATO School Oberammergau and the Military Engineering Centre of Excellence offer courses on environmental protection; these could be expanded to address the broader spectrum of climate security issues facing NATO. Also, SWEDINT (the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre), which already offers training to soldiers for NATO operations, could also provide climate security specific courses tailored to Alliance forces’ needs. For example, curricula for operational planning courses could be updated to include material on operating in and adapting to extreme-weather environments and sudden climate-related disasters. Further, NATO’s Allied Command Transformation could offer a baseline, accredited climate awareness course to all incoming political and military officials rotating through the NATO enterprise. Such training would give incoming officials and soldiers a shared awareness of the consequences and implications for NATO activities, missions, and operations.

• Climate advisers: If NATO intends to incorporate a climate perspective in the same way that it seeks to incorporate a gender perspective into planning, then climate advisers need to be hired across the organization—not just in a few places (e.g., CCASCOE, Innovation, Hybrid, and Cyber division of NATO’s International Staff). Our initial research suggests that there may only be a small number of dedicated individuals currently working on climate security across NATO’s two major command structures—suggesting room for expansion. Climate events appear to affect defense planning and operational effectiveness. Therefore, if it isn’t already, climate change should be a part of allies’ conversations at the Defense Policy and Planning Committee (the senior NATO advisory body on defense matters that controls NATO’s Defense Planning Process).

• Exercises: Exercises, war games, and simulations all present opportunities for incorporating climate-related events, such as natural disasters and unexpected extreme temperatures. Both military leaders and forces from across NATO would benefit from a deeper understanding of how their range of  activities, missions, and operations will be impacted by changing environments.

• Operational planning: Climate security—particularly as it relates to more predictable climate-change driven events—could also be included in operational plans. Just as NATO has included gender-related language into annexes of operational plans, NATO could include annexes to address potential environmental disasters or emergencies to ensure that troops are prepared in such events.

Ultimately, NATO is moving forward with climate change adaptation efforts despite the wide range of threats on the horizon outlined in its Strategic Concept. In many of our interviews, allied officials expressed great enthusiasm about the work that CCASCOE will be doing to increase awareness and understanding of climate security across the Alliance. It is important that the center’s work be integrated throughout the organization, that climate security be elevated on NATO’s political and military agendas, and that work on this issue not be siloed, as has occurred with certain issues in the past. From October 1 onward, it will be up to Rutte to work with allies to tackle the list of challenges continuing to hinder NATO’s efforts at climate adaptation.

Heidi Hardt is an associate professor of political science at the University of California, Irvine. From 2021-2022, she was a Council on Foreign Relations international affairs fellow and worked for a US Congresswoman, a US Senator, and the NATO desk at the US State Department. She is the author of two books with Oxford University Press, including NATO’s Lessons in Crisis and Time to React. Her views are hers alone and do not represent any institution or government.

Jacqueline Burns is a PhD student at the University of California, Irvine and a senior policy analyst at RAND. She previously served as an adviser in the US Department of State from 2011 to 2018, with the National Security Council from 2012 to 2013, and in the US Air Force Reserves from 2001 to 2013. Her views are hers alone and do not represent any institution or government.

The post NATO wants to be a leader on climate security. Here are the next steps to get there. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Where does Europe stand on the green agenda? Are concerns over a wide spread “greenlash” in Europe exaggerated? Why did climate policy not play as much of a significant role in the last European Parliament elections compared to the elections in 2019? Under her next Commission mandate, will Commission President von der Leyen bring continuity on climate change policy in the EU?

On this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Carol Schaeffer sits down with Nils Redeker, Deputy Director Jacques Delors Centre, to discuss European voter sentiment on climate policies and the future of the EU’s approach.

Fellow

Carol Schaeffer

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

The post #AtlanticDebrief – Where does Europe stand on the green agenda? | A debrief from Niels Redeker appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Climate change cost estimates by 2049 will be close to $40 trillion per year for countries such as Germany and the United States. How is Germany managing both the scale of the climate problem and related economic costs? What is the German government doing to get citizens onboard to support climate change policies? What is the role of technological innovation in Germany when it comes to combatting climate change? And what is Germany doing to decarbonize its industrial sector? What role can a post-war Ukraine play in the green energy sector in Europe, and what are the possibilities for bilateral energy trade between Ukraine and Germany?

On this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Carol Schaeffer sits down with Dr. Lukas Köhler, member of the German Bundestag, to discuss Germany’s approach to climate policy and green energy opportunities.

Fellow

Carol Schaeffer

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Energy & Environment Energy Transitions

The post #AtlanticDebrief – What is Germany’s approach to climate policy? | A Debrief from Lukas Köhler MdB appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Berlin joins “Climate Chat” to discuss the Financing and Achieving Cost Competitive Solutions project appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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In the Call to Action, the secretary-general makes clear that governments and policymakers must protect and care for the lives and livelihoods of frontline communities, protect workers, advance the evidence base to drive innovative resilience solutions, and limit global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius. 

This clear recognition from the Office of the Secretary-General is an important moment for us all. Extreme heat is often underestimated and ignored, but its impacts are unavoidable. The planet is heating up faster than we thought. We are outside scientific model predictions and extreme weather events are becoming more frequent and devastating. 

Rising heat affects our major critical systems—such as water, energy, food, transportation, and communications. It also feeds mega droughts, wildfires, and storms, creating cascading and compounding crises. It’s a global crisis. But we are not ready for any of it. We’re sleepwalking.

In my work as global chief heat officer and first chief heat officer for the city of Athens, I have worked directly with cities and have seen the impacts of heat firsthand. Cities are heating up at twice the rate of the global average. At 1.5 degrees Celsius of global warming, sixty-seven cities will experience 150 or more days per year of temperatures exceeding 35 degrees Celsius (95 degrees Fahrenheit). At 2 degrees Celsius, the number jumps to ninety-four cities. At just under 3 degrees Celsius of global warming, it soars to 197 cities.  

Policies to address extreme heat so far remain scattered, disjointed, and underfunded. But the rising temperatures mark a global crisis with local impacts. That’s why the global focus of the UN’s Call to Action is so crucial. Increasingly, our world is facing challenges that go beyond the capacity and limited mandate of single nation states. We’re facing crises, like climate change, that need international cooperation to support and facilitate equitable, multilevel, science-based decision making and solutions. The UN is the only legitimate multilateral governance structure able to address issues that need global mobilization and localized solutions. As cities take on climate change, they need support at every level.  

In 2022, globally, humanity spent a little over one trillion dollars on adapting to and mitigating the effects of climate change. For comparison, the world spent $11.7 trillion on COVID-19 emergency fiscal measures in 2020 alone. As temperatures rise, this funding gap is a dangerous threat. And there is another issue that needs to be urgently addressed: In 2022, about one trillion dollars went to financing emissions mitigation, while only one hundred billion dollars went to adaptation and resilience-building initiatives. We urgently need both climate adaptation and resilience financing. 

The UN’s Call to Action is an important milestone for climate resilience, but it is also only the beginning. As the document explains, the world urgently needs a Global Action Strategy to “mobilize governments, policy makers, and all stakeholders to act, prevent, and reduce heat risk.” A dedicated trust fund for urban heat resilience initiatives is also needed, because cities are on the frontlines of extreme heat, and they are where more than half of the world’s population lives—a share that is expected to rise to seven-in-ten people by midcentury. Finally, more dedicated heat champions, like the community of chief heat officers established by the Arsht-Rock Resilience Center, with heat resilience departments that can articulate the challenges and co-create the best solutions are needed. These champions are critical to ensuring that the dangers of—and the solutions to—extreme heat are understood widely.

Each of these essential efforts, as well as others, requires building an international consensus around the scope of the problem and its solutions. Here, the UN’s Call to Action on Extreme Heat can help shape conversations in positive directions at upcoming conferences such as Climate Week NYC and this year’s UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties, also known as COP29. Heat resilience must be at the top of the agenda at these and other international meetings, and work is needed at every level to ensure that cities have the support and finances they need to scale solutions.

As the Call to Action makes clear, everyone is at risk from extreme heat, and we must enable resilience at the local and international level, taking “bold decisions to change the way we live to avoid an even more scorched Earth in the future.” 

Eleni Myrivili is the world’s first global chief heat officer, a role jointly created and appointed by the Atlantic Council’s Arsht-Rock Resilience Center and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat).

The post The world is sleepwalking into an era of extreme heat. The UN just issued a wake-up call.  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On July 22, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi was quoted in Deutsche Welle regarding Japan’s strategic competition with China in the Pacific Islands. He emphasized that Japan aims to be a reliable partner to Pacific nations through infrastructure development and climate change efforts, in contrast to China’s significant investments and security agreements.  

Fellow

Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Indo-Pacific

The post Hinata-Yamaguchi quoted in Deutsche Welle on Japan’s efforts in the Pacific Islands appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Read up on the events shaping the democratic world order.

Reshaping the order

This month’s topline events

Tensions mount within the Israeli government as conflict grinds on. As June ended, Israel and Hamas still had not agreed on a cease-fire, despite hopes earlier in the month that both sides would sign onto a previously floated three-phase plan. Although the United States assured that Israel accepted, it is unclear whether Israel declined the latest three phase. Yet Hamas requested some unworkable changes after all the parties alleged acceptance. Even as the two sides haggled over cease-fire terms, Israeli military operations in Gaza slowed due to operational tempo, but there remained an increase in intensity in the continued tit-for-tat exchanges between Israel and Iran-backed Hezbollah, driving global concern over a potential war between them that could evolve into a broader regional conflict. Netanyahu dissolved his war cabinet, the unit established to bring a unified approach to Israel’s fight against Hamas. The decision came following the resignation of former military chief Benny Gantz from the cabinet. Gantz resigned amidst protests over the continued lack of a strategic plan to defeat Hamas. Illustrating further divisions within the Israeli government over war aims, the Israeli army’s chief spokesman publicly questioned the government’s articulated goal of destroying Hamas, noting, “Hamas is an idea, Hamas is a party. It’s rooted in the hearts of the people—whoever thinks we can eliminate Hamas is wrong.” Tens of thousands of Israeli people protested in Tel Aviv to demand a cease-fire and the return of hostages.

• Shaping the order. Tensions within the Israeli government, between Netanyahu and his military leadership, came to a head as the two sides seemed at odds over end goals for Israel’s military operations. There remains limited consensus on the way forward. In February, Netanyahu presented a post-war plan aiming for local officials to govern Gaza, with Israel preparing to test the experimental model with “humanitarian bubbles.” Allies have collectively strategized various pathways and there remains widespread skepticism of the plan. Yet the Israeli government continues to struggle to advance a post-conflict plan and receive sufficient buy-in from the United States, Arab states, and others, which remains a key priority for regional stability and US interests.
• What to do. The Biden administration should continue to work with allies in Doha and Cairo to pursue a path to a temporary cease-fire and hostage-for-Palestinian-prisoners deal—that would also enable a flood of humanitarian relief in Gaza—despite the low probability of success.

The United States and its allies step up support for Ukraine. The United States expanded its policy to allow Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike “anywhere that Russian forces are coming across the border from the Russian side to the Ukrainian side to try to take additional Ukrainian territory,” according to US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan. This builds on its May decision to allow Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike a limited set of targets, largely across the border from Kharkiv.

The Biden administration, following the G7 meeting in Italy, announced it would rush the delivery of air-defense interceptors to Ukraine by delaying the delivery of them to most other nations. The G7 also agreed to use interest on immobilized Russian sovereign assets to collateralize a fifty-billion-dollar loan to Ukraine. The United States added new and strong US sanctions against Russia and finalized a US-Ukraine ten-year memorandum of understanding on security cooperation.

As US munitions began to reach the front lines in Ukraine, the Russian offensive against Kharkiv lost momentum. Although Russian attacks on Ukrainian energy generation did considerable damage (taking down almost half of Ukrainian electric generation), the US decision to rush delivery of air-defense interceptors may help further mitigate such attacks, as will Romania’s decision to send to Ukraine one of its Patriot batteries. Meanwhile, Ukrainian attacks on Russian military infrastructure in Crimea were taking an increasing toll, and Russian President Vladimir Putin visited North Korea to shore up his relationship with dictator Kim Jong Un and ensure Pyongyang continues providing munitions and arms to Moscow for the war in Ukraine.

On the diplomatic front, Russia escalated its demands for a cease-fire in an unrealistic fashion, insisting that Ukraine must first abandon territory it currently holds in the four provinces partly occupied by Russia, land that Russia has been unable to take by force. Days after that, from June 15 to 16, ninety-three countries attended a peace conference in Switzerland to discuss Ukrainian terms (its ten-point plan) for a settlement and seventy-eight countries signed a document that called for the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, a key Ukrainian point (more countries have signed on since). China did not attend, however, and some key countries in the Global South such as South Africa, India, Brazil, and Mexico did not sign the conference document.

• Shaping the order. The Biden administration’s decision to allow Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike inside Russia, beyond initial restrictions on targets near Kharkiv, is a significant, positive step in Western support for Ukraine. Using frozen Russian assets to collateralize a loan for Ukraine is another positive step, but the United States and its allies may find they need to go further, using said assets themselves rather than continuing to use their own funds exclusively.
• Hitting home. Some US experts argue that Ukraine is a strategic liability and that US focus there diverts resources better used in the Indo-Pacific. Russian victory in the war, which is likely to result from a US withdrawal, would cause cascading security problems in Europe that would draw on even more US resources.
• What to do. The United States and its allies must marshal continued military assistance for Ukraine, including air defense and weapons that support Kyiv’s attacks on Russian military targets in occupied Ukraine, especially Crimea. The United States has the means to intensify pressure on the Russian economy and should use such tools. Washington should consider enforcing sanctions to hit smugglers of technology subcomponents utilized for Russian weapons and evaders of the oil price cap (the latter missing from the otherwise strong June 12 US sanctions package). A successful Ukrainian land offensive may not be possible in the near term. 

The center holds, but the right makes gains, in European Parliament elections. Across the EU’s twenty-seven member states, voters cast ballots to select their representatives to the European parliament. The election saw gains for the center-right and right, but it was a disappointing showing for French President Emmanuel Macron’s centrist Renew party. The European People’s Party, the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni), and Identity and Democracy—the hard right—were the main beneficiaries of the elections. These results were overshadowed by Macron calling for a snap parliamentary election after his party’s incredibly poor performance in the European Parliament election (garnering less than half the votes of their far-right rivals, the National Rally): The snap election resulted in the left-wing New Popular Front on top, Macron’s  centrist alliance placed second, and  Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally, which finished third. Yet, the right did not do well in Scandinavia, Spain, and Romania, and had only a modest uptick in Poland, where the ruling Civic Platform came in first place. The parties in Germany’s ruling coalition—the Social Democrats, the Free Democrats, and the Greens—all lost ground in Germany, but the center-right alliance between the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union did well.

• Shaping the order. Snap elections in France overshadowed the fact that the center mostly held its ground in the EU elections. The far right’s marginal gains will matter, however, if said forces can unite and if center-right parties are willing to engage with the far-right. Even so, the incoming parliament is likely to be more fragmented and polarized than its predecessor. And the French elections, the first round having wrapped, are pointing to a major defeat for Macron and a surge of the right, which is both nationalist and wary about the extent of French support to Ukraine.
• Hitting home. Even though the center largely held in the European Parliament elections, the increased fragmentation will likely mean less clarity on policy issues that impact US companies.
• What to do. The United States should constructively engage the European Parliament, encouraging it to hold firm to its moderate stances and not bend to the far right’s proposals.

Quote of the Month

“The votes cast put the far-right forces at almost 40 percent and the extremes [on the right and left] at almost 50 percent. This is a political fact that cannot be ignored.“
—French President Emmanuel Macron, speaking after the European Parliament elections.

State of the Order this month: Unchanged

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order

Democracy ()

• On June 30, the far-right National Rally won in the first round of the parliamentary elections, although it’s unclear whether they will get a majority with the second-round vote upcoming on July 7. Many French citizens have been protesting against the National Rally out of concern for women’s rights and minority rights, where thousands of women marched in dozens of French cities, including Paris, to protest against Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally.
• Mexico elected Claudia Sheinbaum, its first female president, in the country’s largest election in history with 98 million registered voters. As Mexico City’s former mayor and the favored successor of outgoing President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Sheinbaum was favored to win. Promising to continue López Obrador’s policies, she believes the government has a strong responsibility to address economic inequality and establish robust social security.
• On balance, the democracy pillar was unchanged.

Security ()

• Chinese forces seized Philippine small boats that were attempting to resupply a Philippine military outpost at Second Thomas Shoal. Multiple Philippine vessels were damaged, and sailors were injured in the incident. One US official called China’s actions “deeply destabilizing.”
• Houthi rebels launched an aerial drone, striking and damaging the Transworld Navigator in the Red Sea, one of more than sixty attacks targeting specific vessels. The attack comes after United States recalled its USS Dwight D. Eisenhower after an eight-month deployment. Shipping in the corridor—crucial for connecting Europe, the Middle East, and Asia—has slowed significantly. The Houthis said they would continue the attacks as long as the Israel-Hamas war continues.
• On balance, the democracy pillar was unchanged.

Trade ()

• Amid the European Commission’s anti-subsidy investigations into electric vehicles (EVs) coming from China , the European Union announced additional tariffs on  imported Chinese EVs. The tariffs range from 17.4 to 38.1 percent—and that’s on top of the 10 percent duty already in place. As a result, Chinese car companies may consider raising prices or establishing factories in Europe, as the continent recently became China’s largest EV export market.
• On balance, the democracy pillar was unchanged.

Commons (↓)

• The United Nations conducted a worldwide poll that revealed 80 percent of people want governments to take more action on addressing climate change. The survey noted majority support for stronger climate action in twenty of the world’s biggest greenhouse gas emitters and majority support globally a quicker transition away from fossil fuels. Despite the increasing state of global conflict and rise of nationalism, the desire to set aside geopolitical differences and work together on climate change is expanding.
• Record-breaking heat, fueled by climate change, affected millions around the globe, scorching four continents and surpassing last summer as the warmest in two thousand years. There were more than forty thousand suspected heat stroke cases in India between March 1 and June 18, and in Saudi Arabia, over one thousand people died participating in the Hajj pilgrimage amid soaring temperatures. Devastating forest fires spread in Europe and northern Africa, and a heat dome trapped large regions of the United States, preventing cool air from getting in.
• On balance, the commons pillar was weakened.

Alliances (↑)

• For the first time in twenty-four years, Russian President Vladimir Putin and dictator Kim Jong Un met in North Korea, reinforcing their commitment to cooperate and protect each other’s interests. As part of the meeting, they signed a mutual military-assistance treaty, with Putin announcing that Russia could provide weapons to North Korea—with potentially destabilizing effects for the democratic world order.
• The leaders of the G7 convened in Apulia, Italy, for the 2024 G7 Summit to discuss supporting Ukraine, pushing back on unfair economic practices, combating climate change, addressing food and health insecurity, leveraging critical technologies, and partnering with like-minded countries around the globe.
• On balance, the alliances pillar was strengthened.

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

What is the democratic world order? Also known as the liberal order, the rules-based order, or simply the free world, the democratic world order encompasses the rules, norms, alliances, and institutions created and supported by leading democracies over the past seven decades to foster security, democracy, prosperity, and a healthy planet.

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order

• Michael Doyle, in Foreign Affairs, argues that democratic peace is back in vogue and great powers can prevent the tensions between democracies and autocracies from escalating into full-blown global cold war.
• Robert C. O’Brien, in Foreign Affairs, outlines a Trump administration foreign policy centered on the return of peace through strength.
• Célia Belin and Mathieu Droin explore in Foreign Policy what a far-right victory would mean for French foreign policy.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weight in on this month’s events

• Niva Yau, in an  Atlantic Council report, shows how China is training future authoritarians overseas in order to secure its interests in Global South countries and beyond.
• Matthew Kroenig and Dan Negrea, in Foreign Policy, explain that the United States’ competition with China should be focused on weakening and defeating the Chinese Communist Party regime.
• Daniel Fried, in the New Atlanticist, offers seven ways to reboot G7 sanctions on Russia, stating that United States and its allies must commit to dedicating resources to identifying targets for taking economic steps against Russia.
• Andrew Michta, in a piece for the German Council on Foreign Relations, contends that Germany must commit to significantly expanding its defense industrial base so that it will be well positioned to establish strong cooperation with whichever candidate wins the next US presidential election.

__________________________________________________

The Democratic Order Initiative is an Atlantic Council initiative aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. Sign on to the Council’s Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Prosperity, and Peace by clicking here.

Patrick Quirk – Nonresident Senior Fellow
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Ginger Matchett – Project Assistant

If you would like to be added to our email list for future publications and events, or to learn more about the Democratic Order Initiative, please email pquirk@atlanticcouncil.org.

The post State of the Order: In June, the world’s alliances strengthened—but concerning risks for the democratic order remain appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s pitch is that the government will be focused on “mission delivery” with mission delivery boards chaired by Starmer personally. He has said that his approach to all issues will be “country first—party second.”

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Almost all members of the Shadow Cabinet have been appointed to those same portfolios in government and, in addition, Starmer has also brought back some former ministers from the Tony Blair/Gordon Brown years. They are all therefore familiar with their portfolios, widely respected, and able to hit the ground running. It is also clear that the prime minister wants to work closely with the private sector in order to make early progress on the government’s priorities.

Ed Miliband has been appointed as secretary of state for energy security and net zero. This is broadly the role he held when Labour was last in government before 2010, so he knows the issues well and is a genuinely passionate advocate for tackling climate change and delivering net zero.

With the UK government now one the most secure among the large western nations (with a five-year mandate and a very large majority), the United Kingdom is expected to reassume a leading role in the international discussions on climate change. As the only country to have reduced its carbon emissions by over 50 percent since 1990, many will welcome that leadership once again.

In most areas, there will not be a huge difference in UK government energy policy under the new administration, but there will be a few distinct changes.

Labour has set a very challenging target to decarbonize the electricity grid by 2030. Until there is much more detail about how this can be done, industry will understandably be skeptical about the feasibility of such a goal, the costs involved, and how local communities will be brought on board. This will involve a significant further commitment to renewables, including a welcome early announcement to end the ban on onshore wind. The United Kingdom’s success in developing offshore wind will be continued.

There is evident government support for new nuclear, including next generation small modular reactors, and in the longer-term for fusion. The government wants to see a significant role for hydrogen and for tidal power, but these cannot deliver at scale in time for the 2030 target, so expect to see an acceleration of carbon capture utilization and storage programs. Starmer has spoken recently about the continuing role for gas in the mix, to deliver energy security, and this can only happen if its use can be decarbonized.

Labour is committed to ending the granting of new oil and gas licenses for the North Sea, while respecting the licenses that have already been issued. In reality, these would be for field developments that are many years off, so they would not make any significant difference to the United Kingdom’s energy security in the short-term. Of more immediate impact, there will be a new levy on companies operating in the North Sea oil and gas sector, and here the detail will be crucial—if not done carefully, companies may simply choose to leave the United Kingdom, as many have already done.

At the heart of its energy policy, there will be a new government organization, Great British Energy, and although its full details are still to be clarified, its purpose is to drive forward the clean energy sector and accelerate the transition. If done properly, it will help ensure the roll-out of the grid infrastructure needed to harness the wealth of renewable energy that the United Kingdom has in abundance.

Also of value will be greater attention on issues that have not had the attention they deserve, such as energy efficiency, decarbonizing heat, and an acceleration of demand-side response measures that are already starting to transform the electricity market. The government already knows that the success of its energy policy will be judged in large part by whether people can afford their bills.

Sadly, energy rarely seemed to be center-stage under the Conservative government (unless in response to a crisis), and that seems to be changing fast. There is already a sense that energy deeply matters to this administration—not just to deliver energy security but as an economic driver, helping to decarbonize homes and businesses, and creating a mass of new green jobs.

As a former Conservative energy minister, I wish this new administration well. If they can get these policies right, they stand a very good chance of delivering the holy grail in energy terms—clean, and secure energy, at a price people can afford.

Charles Hendry is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center, a former member of the UK Parliament, and former UK minister of state for energy.

EnergySource

EnergySource is the Global Energy Center’s (GEC) online publication providing commentary and analysis on developments in the energy and climate sector from a wide-array of thought leaders, politicians, and experts.

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Charles Hendry

Distinguished Fellow

Global Energy Center

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EnergySource Jun 12, 2023

Leader perspective: Forging a green special relationship between the United States and United Kingdom

By The Rt Hon. Chris Skidmore, MP

The United Kingdom had long been a climate leader, but other countries have caught up. By working with its close ally the United States, the United Kingdom can reassert its climate leadership through a green special relationship that can galvanize net-zero objectives domestically and abroad.

Climate Change & Climate Action Energy & Environment

EnergySource Mar 11, 2021

Can green finance compensate for London’s post-Brexit losses?

By Paddy Ryan

Supporters of Brexit suggest that making London a “world leader” in green finance could compensate for the City’s post-Brexit losses. Green financial leadership could boost Britain’s domestic industry and transform its foreign policy. But competitive advantages for its financial sector may not materialize.

Economy & Business Energy & Environment

EnergySource May 3, 2024

G7 pledges to end coal—but only inclusive action will make a real climate impact

By Elena Benaim

During the G7 energy ministerial in Turin, Italy, climate, energy, and environment ministers made a historic pledge to phase out coal power plants by 2035 among other agreements. But members ultimately need to turn pledges into action to blunt the impacts of climate change.

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The Global Energy Center develops and promotes pragmatic and nonpartisan policy solutions designed to advance global energy security, enhance economic opportunity, and accelerate pathways to net-zero emissions.

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The post The UK sets a path for clean, affordable energy—and renewed climate leadership appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has proposed new federal regulations to protect workers. When the heat index reaches or exceeds 80 degrees Fahrenheit, employers would be required to monitor workers and provide water and rest areas. At 90 degrees Fahrenheit, more protections kick in, including mandatory fifteen-minute rest breaks every two hours and monitoring employees for signs of heat-related illnesses.

Heat-related illnesses have been recognized as occupational hazards for a decade, with an estimated 2,300 workers in the United States dying from extreme heat exposure last year alone. However, this number is likely an undercount and does not capture the many more who suffered nonlethal or chronic heat-related illnesses, as well as workers who injured themselves on the job due to the heat. For instance, researchers at the University of California, Los Angeles found that workers in California are up to 9 percent more likely to suffer a workplace injury on days with temperatures over 90 degrees Fahrenheit than on days that are between 50 to 60 degrees Fahrenheit. This is a problem that will only get worse. The summer is only a few weeks underway in the Northern Hemisphere, and already more than one hundred million US residents have been exposed to extreme heat.

What comes next?

Despite the need for action, OSHA’s proposal will have significant opponents. Industry groups are gearing up for battle, arguing that the rule will be both administratively cumbersome and costly. This is a sentiment that some political leaders have already embraced. Earlier this year, both Florida and Texas enacted state-wide bans to prevent localities from instituting their own worker-protection ordinances. Both state governments are unlikely to accept OSHA’s proposal without protest. In fact, despite the persistent threat of extreme heat, only five states have extreme heat worker protections: California, Colorado, Minnesota, Oregon, and Washington.  

The argument that extreme heat worker protections will come at a cost often ignores the very real cost of maintaining the status quo under dangerously high temperatures. Aside from the price that workers pay with their health, extreme heat in the workplace has significant economic impacts, from lost labor productivity to healthcare costs. The high and growing price of extreme heat on US residents’ lives and livelihoods illustrates not only that this new rule is necessary, but also that, on its own, it is not enough.

Since 2021, the Biden administration has worked to reestablish the role of the United States as a leader in the fight against climate change, both domestically and abroad. This new rule could help cement the United States’ leadership role on climate—but only if it is properly enforced and expanded upon. For the rule to be effective, the administration should continue significantly utilizing OSHA’s National Emphasis Program for Outdoor and Indoor Heat-Related Hazards, which gives it latitude to direct resources toward both employer education on heat safety protocols and inspections that will better ensure compliance.

The Biden administration should also leverage existing funds to ensure that workers remain safe even when they head home for the day. As temperatures rise across the United States and the world, workplace regulations alone will not be enough to adequately protect workers. Federal agencies should incentivize states to direct Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) funding toward cooling assistance in vulnerable households, and lawmakers should ensure that LIHEAP is funded adequately to cover energy needs during both the summer and winter months. Currently, only approximately 5 percent of LIHEAP’s four billion dollars in funding goes to cooling assistance (heating receives ten times as much), despite the accelerating demand for relief from high nighttime temperatures that place a significant burden on the human body, and which can lead to heat exhaustion while on the job.  

Ultimately however, this issue cannot be solved at the federal level alone. It also requires efforts at the state and local level to ensure that the most vulnerable communities and individuals are being identified and solutions tailored to local contexts are being implemented. The appointment of a Chief Heat Officer (CHO), at the city, county, or state level, is one tool that can address the local challenges of extreme heat. Local governments such as Miami-Dade County, Phoenix, and Los Angeles have already taken this approach. Local climate leaders—like CHOs—are well positioned to work closely with their communities to tailor solutions to meet their specific needs and to create a unified response to build resilience to extreme heat both during the workday and off the clock.

Catherine Wallace is the associate director of strategic partnerships and advocacy for the extreme heat resilience pillar of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht–Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center (Arsht-Rock).

Owen Gow is the deputy director for the extreme heat resilience pillar at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht–Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center (Arsht-Rock).

The post Feeling the heat? Biden’s proposed protections for workers are a welcome start. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Unfortunately, this is a familiar scene for the region, which routinely battles the effects of extreme weather events and climate change. Hurricane Beryl once again spotlights why focusing on the mitigation of climate change, through such methods as cutting carbon emissions, alone is insufficient. Caribbean countries must prioritize climate adaptation as the primary mechanism to withstand hurricanes and other baked-in effects of climate change.

Climate adaptation is the answer to these extreme weather events, but it requires significant investment that governments in the Caribbean cannot afford. International support, including private finance, is needed. In five months, the United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties, also known as COP29, will take place in Baku, Azerbaijan. It has been dubbed the “finance COP,” and there governments and the private sector should come together and show the commercial utility of prioritizing climate adaptation. Doing so can unlock new financing and create project pipelines that are commercially attractive to global investors.

The Caribbean is often categorized as the world’s most vulnerable region to climate change. Seventy percent of the region’s population lives or works on the coast, meaning that storm surges from hurricanes affect businesses, lifestyles, and government operations. Hurricanes and strong storms also bring the tourism industry to a halt, disproportionately affecting the region’s tourism-dependent economies and severely slowing economic growth. Hurricane Maria in 2017 cost Dominica an estimated 225 percent of its gross domestic product, while Hurricane Irma in the same year cost Antigua and Barbuda more than $136 million in damages, of which the tourism industry represented 44 percent.

Strong storms damage critical infrastructure. Downed power lines cause widespread power outages, while flooded roads and bridges can prevent rescue operations. Already, Hurricane Beryl has caused power outages in Saint Lucia, and homes in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines have lost their roofs. And stronger storms lead to longer recovery periods, which can increase governments’ public debt as they borrow at high interest rates from multilateral institutions to rebuild after the storm has passed. Six years after Hurricane Maria, for example, citizens in Dominica are still rebuilding.

Withstanding strong storms and other effects of climate change requires new climate adaptation projects. For hurricanes with high wind speeds (such as Beryl, which sustained wind speeds of 150 mph at its peak), it is necessary to retrofit infrastructure to be resilient. To achieve this, governments need to require building codes for new homes and infrastructure that ensure sufficient resilience across structures. To brace for storm surges, governments need to move water and energy infrastructure underground where possible to avoid damage. New sea walls and flood protection systems also need to be built.

In all, the region needs more than $100 billion dollars in investment to meet its climate adaptation goals, but it has only been approved for less than one billion dollars from various climate funds. Governments are often left to fend for themselves, taking high-interest loans (due to the classification of many Caribbean nations as middle- and high-income economies by the World Bank) since they often do not qualify for concessional financing. At the same time, governments have borne the brunt of the responsibility because these types of climate adaptation projects are not always attractive to the private sector. Retrofitting infrastructure and other climate adaptation projects, for example, have high upfront costs with little return on investment.

COP29 is an opportunity to bring the public and private sector together to unlock new financing and advance climate adaptation projects. The private sector—both in the region and around the world—has access to needed technologies and has the capacity to undertake climate adaptation projects, from providing drainage on roads and bridges to help ease flash flooding to building decentralized energy grid infrastructure to limit widespread blackouts. Climate adaptation is, after all, in the private sector’s interest. If the effects of hurricanes and climate change worsen and the region’s economies slow, then businesses’ profits will be affected.

What will it take to get the private sector more involved? Attracting private sector participation requires regulatory reforms and carve outs by governments to ensure that companies yield a return on projects. Governments can provide incentives, such as giving exclusive benefits to companies participating in projects and providing subsidies or tax exemptions on materials used. Equally important is access to low-cost finance and capital. Governments can work with institutions such as IDB Invest and global donors that provide grant finance to funnel capital to companies undertaking long-term developments while engaging with insurance agencies that can underwrite riskier projects. 

Caribbean leaders have begun to explore private sector participation in climate adaptation projects, notably through the Bridgetown Initiative and the Blue Green Investment Corporation, but there is still work to be done. COP29 might well be the ideal forum to strengthen these initiatives and encourage commitments from governments and the business community. Doing so requires flexibility from both sectors and a focus on projects that are investment-friendly and can attract global donors. 

In the lead-up to COP29, governments will need to begin laying the regulatory groundwork and soliciting the required technical assistance from development institutions to encourage private sector participation. Moreover, Caribbean governments should consider adding or increasing the size of the private sector groups to their delegations for COP29 to ensure they have a seat at the table and are bought into any signed agreements. Building these public-private relationships can go a long way toward showing global donors and companies the viability of investing in climate adaptation projects in the Caribbean and unlock needed capital that can save lives in the long run.

Wazim Mowla is the associate director and fellow of the Caribbean Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post Hurricane Beryl spotlights the importance of climate adaptation in the Caribbean appeared first on Atlantic Council.

• Introduction
• Severe consequences of energy insecurity
• Energy-transition barriers
• Applying the CEWG roadmap
• A global call to action
• Acknowledgments
• About the author
• About the Caribbean Energy Working Group Co-Chairs

Introduction

Countries in the Eastern Caribbean¹ are among the world’s most energy insecure nations. These countries grapple with high electricity costs that undercut economic competitiveness and growth, are heavily dependent on petroleum products, and are uniquely vulnerable to the effects of climate change. At the same time, a World Bank designation as middle- or high-income economies significantly limits access to concessional financing. The result is a slow transition to renewable energy power generation, including attracting commercial interest for the relevant infrastructure and unbundling utility systems that often stymie regulatory changes and curtail needed investments in the energy sector.

The time may be ripe for accelerating the pace of the transition in the Eastern Caribbean. A broad consensus exists among regional governments, the business community, and multilateral partners to further usher in a transition to renewable energy, given the unique vulnerabilities facing Eastern Caribbean countries. Meanwhile, countries in the Southern Caribbean (Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and Suriname) are leaning into their hydrocarbon reserves as they balance their own energy transition, while other countries are either attracting commercial interest or are far along in their renewable energy development relative to the Eastern Caribbean. Though there is an abundance of solar and wind power potential in the Eastern Caribbean—along with significant geothermal reserves in Dominica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Saint Kitts and Nevis—countries in this region are faced with defining how a realistic, affordable, and just energy transition can take place and unlocking new private sector and multilateral resources.

The Atlantic Council’s Caribbean Initiative engaged in a series of consultations with the Caribbean Energy Working Group (CEWG), whose members identified two main constraints to the region’s transition: the top-down vertically integrated nature of state-owned utility systems; and limited access to low-cost financing and credit to governments and clean energy developers. While recognizing that an energy transition requires a holistic approach, CEWG members propose that the starting points must be addressing utility constraints and access to finance to ensure a reliable and resilient energy system transformation that is sustainable and affordable for consumers, governments, and the private sector in the Eastern Caribbean. An energy transition in the Eastern Caribbean must ensure reliable power to combat price volatility for consumers while energy infrastructure should be resilient to the effects of climate change, hurricanes and strong tropical storms, and rising temperatures.

The CEWG brings together up to fifteen policy and technical experts from across the Caribbean, and was first convened in 2023 by the Atlantic Council. This publication builds off the CEWG’s first report, “A roadmap for the Caribbean’s energy transition,” which was published last year and outlined a five-step process that governments, developers, and regional partners can undertake to facilitate an energy transition in the Caribbean. The five-step process includes: conducting energy modeling and analysis; modernizing energy grids; diversifying utility structures; creating bankable projects; and scaling project investment to national and subregional levels. This publication focuses on applying steps three and four of the roadmap.

The CEWG met as part of two roundtable discussions, followed by five one-on-one consultation sessions across the group to identify barriers and solutions to accelerating a reliable and resilient energy transition in the Eastern Caribbean. This publication serves as a complement to existing initiatives and projects dedicated to facilitating an energy transition, with the aim of raising additional awareness of the reality and the urgency of the moment for the world’s most vulnerable countries.

Severe consequences for energy insecurity

Countries in the Eastern Caribbean are open facing, small market economies, vulnerable to ebbs and flows of the global financial system. The region’s import dependence means that supply chain constraints and rising global interest rates have a disproportionate effect on these economies. For example, when Russia’s war in Ukraine stemmed the flow of fertilizer to agriculture commodity exporters, food inflation in the Eastern Caribbean skyrocketed and remained high even as prices eventually declined in industrialized nations.² And although the price of renewable energy, such as solar photovoltaic (PV) power, has declined dramatically over the past decade, capital and investment in this sector naturally gravitated to the bigger economies in the Global North.

Stronger storms, more outages
Climate change is a significant driver of the energy transition in the Eastern Caribbean. Hurricanes and strong tropical storms cause flash flooding and high wind speeds that damage energy infrastructure. Global warming, as a result of increasing greenhouse gas emissions (GHG), is fueling stronger and more frequent tropical storms. The result is lost power for days and weeks, as was the case in 2017 when Hurricane Irma hit Antigua and Bermuda, damaging transmission lines and generators. Similarity, in 2019, Hurricane Dorian caused widespread power outages in Dominica.³

The makeup of these economies has resulted in Eastern Caribbean countries paying some of the highest electricity prices in the Americas, including double and sometimes triple of what the average consumer pays in the United States ($0.109 per 1 kilowatt-hour (KW/h).⁴ On average, consumer costs in Antigua and Barbuda ($0.367 per 1 KW/h) and Saint Kitts and Nevis ($0.333 per 1 KW/h) rank on the higher end of the spectrum, with Saint Vincent and the Grenadines ($0.185 per 1 KW/h) on the lower end, and the rest of the countries falling in between. These high costs coincide with an import dependence on petroleum products, with Antigua and Barbuda (100 percent), Dominica (92 percent), Grenada (93 percent), Saint Lucia (98 percent), Saint Kitts and Nevis (87 percent), and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (95 percent) all relying on fossil fuels to satisfy almost all of their energy demand.⁵ The cost of these imports account for almost 7 percent of the subregion’s gross domestic product, cutting into public expenditure needed to invest in climate adaptation projects and social sectors such as education and health services.⁶

High electricity prices and energy imports undercut the competitiveness of key economic sectors in the Eastern Caribbean—notably the hospitality sector—and limit the purchasing power of consumers. According to the Inter-American Development Bank, six of the countries prioritized in this publication rank in the global top ten of tourism-dependent economies.⁷ The tourism industry accounts for a significant share of energy demand in these countries, increasing the prices for hotel rooms due to high usage of air conditioning and lighting.⁸ Given that the tourism industry is an economic driver, high energy costs can make industries uncompetitive vis-à-vis other tourist hubs in the region such as Jamaica and the Dominican Republic. Beyond the tourism sector, more than a quarter of energy demand in the Eastern Caribbean is for residential use.⁹ High power bills can take up a large share of household income and decrease the purchasing power of individuals, leaving them unable to spend money on local products and services, like food and transportation, which help to stimulate economic growth.

Despite the challenges facing the Eastern Caribbean, bright spots exist. Renewable energy, such as solar, wind, and geothermal reserves, are abundant. Across the region, the sun shines more than 200 days annually,¹⁰ has an estimated potential of almost 70 gigawatts of available offshore wind (excluding Dominica), and (excluding Antigua and Barbuda) houses an estimated 6,290 megawatts (MW) of available geothermal reserves.¹¹ But this potential has not been tapped. Current installed capacity of renewable energy (as a percentage) stands at: Antigua (4 percent), Dominica (25 percent including hydroelectric power), Grenada (4 percent), Saint Lucia (3 percent), Saint Kitts and Nevis (5 percent), and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (17 percent including hydroelectric).

Geothermal development is a high priority in the Eastern Caribbean
Dominica has an estimated 1,390 MW of geothermal potential. The country’s small population and energy grid had not provided adequate incentive to develop that capacity, due to the high capital costs of exploring its geothermal reserves at scale- until recently. Commitment by the government in 2023 to develop its reserves and support this year from the World Bank have helped the country begin developing its geothermal potential. The World Bank is financing a new project at $38.5 million to support drilling of new geothermal wells and helping construct new transmission lines and substations to connect the future geothermal plants to consumers. Meanwhile, St. Kitts and Nevis is consistently looking for new partners to support its own geothermal ambitions for close to a decade, with a total project cost estimated at US $505 million. A mixture of bilateral and multilateral financing will be needed to bring this project closed to Dominica’s stage.¹²

Energy-transition barriers

The utility systems in the Eastern Caribbean are state-owned entities—excluding Saint Lucia, which has a public-private model—tasked with providing power to citizens. Tax revenues are used by governments to invest in critical and social services. These are top-down systems in vertically integrated structures, meaning that they single-handedly operate the generation, transmission, and distribution of power. This model can stifle innovation and competition, leaving customers without alternative choices and increasing the cost of electricity. Further, it means that introducing new clean energy technologies, when possible, must be financed and implemented by the utility, which is often devoid of the needed capital and technical assistance to act. Therefore, incorporating renewable energies into this model can be expensive—particularly since these technologies have high upfront costs. It is both a political and economic challenge that clean energy is not necessarily cheap energy.

However, unbundling utility systems is not a straightforward solution and not all state-owned entities are necessarily bad. Breaking these systems apart might divide consumer bases and may not lower the cost of electricity given the small size of Eastern Caribbean countries’ populations. Instead, as discussed below, the best-case scenario is to introduce innovation into the utility system, such as diversifying the utility structure across generation, distribution, and transmission by using public-private models. Maintaining an intact customer base is critical for utilities to keep the costs low for consumers while ensuring that utilities and the private-sector entities are still turning a profit. This does not mean that breaking up systems is the sole way to ensure low prices for renewable energy generation. Some markets, particularly in micro economies like in the Eastern Caribbean, might be too small to introduce competition and keep prices affordable. There is no one-size-fits-all solution, as changes in utility structures need to adapt to and be contextualized for each individual country.

Changing the business model of the utilities can help to create more incentives to incorporating renewable energy generation by factoring in the social cost externalities (the associated costs of fossil fuels on the broader public and society) of depending on fossil fuels as a realistic price comparison. Current models determine the price of electricity based on the cost of petroleum imports. But the emissions of fossil fuels—not just carbon dioxide but also other toxins that cause respiratory illnesses—increase cancer risks and, generally, overall poor health. The future healthcare costs for the consumer and the burden on governments to invest in adequate healthcare infrastructure are typically not added to the total cost of importing fossil fuels. If a full cost analysis and reformed business model are developed, then the price of importing fossil fuels might be higher than renewable power generation.

Commercial developers fund projects initially on their own before seeking to make projects bankable by obtaining loans that are backed by cash flow. Projects in the Eastern Caribbean take a long time to develop, given financing challenges due to unclear regulations and permitting, and a lack of investment-grade utility systems to guarantee payments under negotiated power purchasing agreements. Due to the long period of development, investors and governments look to derisk their projects by seeking full grants or convertible loan grants to help them clear these hurdles.

Commercial renewable energy projects also suffer from limited access to low cost and concessionary finance and capital. As discussed, state-owned utilities and governments are responsible for financing new renewable energy projects. These countries do not have the fiscal space or national budgets to self-finance these projects, leaving them to seek loans and grants from multilateral development banks (MDBs) and bilateral lenders. However, the World Bank classifies Eastern Caribbean countries as middle- and high-income economies, disqualifying them from accessing low-cost loans from the World Bank and those that also use this classification, such as the US Development Finance Corporation. This also applies to the business community and energy developers who need access to financing during the pre-project phase (prefeasibility studies, production of design drawings, and environmental social and impact assessments, among others).

Applying the CEWG roadmap

Addressing utility constraints and unlocking new access to finance and capital both are needed, but a well thought-out process that takes the context and nuances of each country into account is needed. To the international community, these countries are bound by their similarities (e.g., population and market size, and geographic location). Realistically, there are enough differences between them that suggest that no solution to the region’s energy transition challenges can be a one-size-fits-all approach. Each country’s context will determine how the below solutions are applied, from unbundling utility structures to attracting finance and capital based on renewable energy. While each country needs a transition that is contextualized to its own reality, technical assistance and transmission upgrades are at the core of the energy transition. Policy action and financial resources are both required, and Caribbean governments and regional institutions will need the assistance of partners like the US Trade and Development Agency and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to deploy the assistance throughout the transition process.

Based on the small consumer bases and state-owned nature of utility systems in the Eastern Caribbean, unbundling utilities might not actually lower electricity costs. Instead, the structure of the utility might be reformed to a public-private partnership (PPP) model that also accounts for price comparisons between fossil fuel imports with social cost externalities attached to a transition to renewable energies. In essence, PPPs are a collaborative model that leverages the strengths of both the public and private sectors, which can help accelerate the deployment of renewable energy infrastructure while ensuring cost-effectiveness and financing sustainability. For example, needed transmission upgrades can be undertaken by governments to help absorb costs and prevent them from being passed to consumers. And the private sector can take responsibility for generation projects, driving down costs and improving competitiveness. Governments and utilities are still able to benefit from the revenue to use for public-sector investments while private-sector entities can streamline innovation in the energy sector, helping to attract more commercial interest.

Designing PPP models will be complex. Each country and its utility or utilities are unique. The challenge will be designing the appropriate model. Here, entities such as the IDB should work with the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), and use input from private-sector companies in the region, to design a PPP model for utility structures. The IDB houses the experience and expertise in designing PPP models, and through its new One Caribbean program is already building a project preparation facility that can incorporate PPP designs into its model.¹³ The challenge is that Eastern Caribbean countries are not members of the IDB, though they are borrowing member countries of the CDB. In the past, the CDB and the IDB have worked together to streamline assistance to and analysis for the Eastern Caribbean. The same can be done here, with the added benefit of the CDB already understanding the nuances of each of the countries in the subregion.

However, designing and implementing a PPP model requires political will and government support. Governments might not be anxious to adopt renewables if the cost of the electricity does not lower prices—affecting key political constituents—and if accelerating an energy transition comes with increased public debt through high-interest loans. Simply put, a transition is only possible if governments are given assurances and feel comfortable that incorporating renewables will not affect their standing with their constituents, meaning that entities like the IDB, CDB, and partners, such as the United States, will have to secure government support before an energy transition can take place.

As utility systems are able to reform their models to ensure that renewable energy projects are affordable for governments and consumers, support to countries and investors is needed to finance projects through the project pipeline. As discussed in the CEWG’s first report, the projects in the Caribbean tend to fall in the “valley of death,” due to project delays ranging from limited site access to an inability to secure additional financing. Key to moving projects through the pipeline is to derisk them and ensure their bankability. Two steps are needed. First, Caribbean countries need access to the expertise and capacity to conduct feasibility studies, environmental social and impact assessments, and design power purchase agreements, among other things. Second, Eastern Caribbean countries need access to investment vehicles that prioritize grants or low-cost loans for the upfront costs of renewable energy projects. Entities like IDB Invest have pockets of financing that allows the institution to inject equity into projects, but the pool of funds is small relative to what is available for other countries or subregions in Latin America.

This is where regional partners like the United States and existing regional programs like the CARICOM Development Fund (CDF) and the Bridgetown Initiative¹⁴ should be utilized. The United States government, through the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), should take advantage of the current DFC reauthorization process to create a carve out for clean energy projects in the region. The scale of investment is minimal compared to other DFC-financed projects and would have outsized effects in the small markets and grids in the Eastern Caribbean. This would take an act of the US Congress—particularly for a middle-income country exception—but there is precedent and increasing appetite to prioritize energy security in the Caribbean. Further, the United States should encourage the IDB and the CDB to work with the CDF and the Bridgetown Initiative to create a project pipeline (with attached equity investments available) to attract large-scale financing and grants from global donors. Capital and finance around the world are available if regional partners and entities are able to build mechanisms that streamline funding to energy projects in the Eastern Caribbean and build a project pipeline to attract commercial investors.

A global call to action

An energy transition in the Eastern Caribbean requires political will, regional coordination, and consistent technical assistance. Relative to the cost of the global energy transition, the needed capital in the Eastern Caribbean is minimal. But the tides are changing in the region, as more political actors and financial institutions are thinking creatively of how to accelerate an energy transition. Still, human capital and capacity limitations stifle the region’s ability to undertake this process alone. Partner governments like the United States and Canada have committed to the region’s energy security in the past few years, but these two countries do not have the funding or domestic political will to direct their attention consistently to the Eastern Caribbean. Addressing the climate crisis and facilitating a global energy transition is increasing in urgency each day, meaning that more actors across governments, international bodies, the business community, and foundations are unlocking new forms of support. Tapping into these resources will be critical. Regional governments and their partners need to continue raising the profile of the Eastern Caribbean and using regional and global platforms, from the Group of Twenty to the UN General Assembly to the COP29 climate talks in November to ensure that these countries are not left behind.

Acknowledgments

The Atlantic Council thanks board member Melanie Chen for her financial support of this publication and the corresponding working group. A thank you also goes to the CEWG members who joined the numerous one-on-one consultations and roundtables that informed this publication, including co-chairs David Goldwyn and Eugene Tiah. A special thank you goes to Jason Marczak, vice president and senior director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, which houses the Caribbean Initiative, for his guidance and comments throughout the working group and during the drafting of this publication. Maite Gonzalez Latorre managed the production flow of this publication.

About the author

Staff

Wazim Mowla

Fellow and Lead of the Caribbean Initiative

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Caribbean China

Wazim Mowla is the associate director and fellow of the Caribbean Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. He leads the development and execution of the initiative’s programming, including the Financial Inclusion Task Force, the US-Caribbean Partnership to Address the Climate Crisis (PACC) 2030 Working Group, and the Caribbean Energy Working Group. Since joining the Council, Mowla has co-authored major publications on the strategic importance of sending US COVID-19 vaccines to the Caribbean, strategies to address financial derisking, and how the United States can advance new policies to support climate and energy resilience.

About the Caribbean Energy Working Group Co-chairs

David Goldwyn is president of Goldwyn Global Strategies, LLC (GGS), an international energy advisory consultancy, and chairman of the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center’s Energy Advisory Group. He is a globally recognized thought leader, educator, and policy innovator in energy security and extractive-industry transparency.

Eugene Tiah is a senior business executive with in-depth knowledge and more than forty years of experience in the oil and gas business within the United States and the Caribbean region. He is also the president and CEO of the Caribbean Energy Chamber.

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Executive summary

The European Union (EU) has increasingly raised its climate ambition, especially since the launch of the European Green Deal in 2019, which set a target of climate neutrality by 2050. The bloc’s achievement demands a contribution from all sectors: power, industry, buildings, and transport. The latter is sizable, accounting for almost a quarter of the total emissions of the twenty-seven EU members (EU-27) in 2021—with road transport responsible for more than 75 percent of the transport sector’s total emissions given its reliance on fossil fuels. Additional policies and measures are required since the sector’s emissions have substantially increased since 1990, unlike the other sectors.

While EVs are gaining relevance and are set to become an increasingly important factor in decarbonization, policymakers will need to address critical issues, especially relating to enabling infrastructure (i.e., charging stations) to have a sustainable and smooth transition. Italy, one of the largest car markets in Europe, has much to do to decarbonize road transport. It has developed alternative fuels, but electricity still accounts for less than 0.3 percent of vehicle fuels. It has set ambitious EV targets to achieve by 2030: 6.6 million cars including 4.3 million BEVs.

This article explores Europe’s rising ambition in electrifying this sector and the political and market drivers at work; presents the case of Italy, including its national objectives, trends, and challenges in the transition; and provides a summary of takeaways and policy recommendations to further support the electrification of the road transport sector, especially in Italy.

Pier Paolo Raimondi is a researcher in the Energy, Climate and Resources Program at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in Rome. His main research topics are related to energy markets, energy policy, energy geopolitics, and geoeconomics. He also is a PhD student in institutions and politics at the Catholic University of Milan. He holds a master of international relations and a bachelor degree in political science from the University of Milan.

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The post Electrification of the road transport sector in Europe and the case of Italy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

But now, climate-skeptic voices and opposition to climate efforts are gaining political weight, as shown by recent trends in the European Parliament election results earlier this month. While Europeans still see climate change as a major challenge, discontent with financial developments and concerns about defense and security rank even higher in their priorities, according to the latest Eurobarometer polling.

With the changing composition of the European Parliament, some of the biggest implications will concern climate policy. A weakened EU climate agenda could result in the continent falling short of decarbonization targets. It could also influence partners abroad to mirror more lax climate policies. In the face of these shifts, Europe’s policymakers need a resilient environmental policy profile that endures political shifts and builds trust in the longevity of EU climate action among voters and international partners. 

The legacy of a climate consensus

In the 2019 European Parliament elections, climate change was a decisive topic for voters. Following the vote, the then nominee for European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, promptly pledged a strong focus on climate action as part of her eventually successful bid to secure the approval by the European Parliament. The Commission turned her pledge into action with the European Green Deal, which comprised numerous ambitious decarbonization policies. Von der Leyen called it Europe’s “man on the moon” moment.

To align EU legislation with the intermediate goal of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 percent by 2030, the Fit for 55 package expanded the EU emissions trading system, introduced the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism for carbon-intensive imports, and set new standards for the land use, transportation, and energy sectors, among other policies. Furthermore, at least 30 percent of the European recovery package funding was allocated for climate action.

Despite the initial progress, the wind in the sails of the EU’s green agenda now appears diminished. A sluggish economic recovery, stubbornly persistent inflation, and rising energy costs—in part, a downstream effect of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022—have resulted in the green agenda as a target for farmers’ protests and rallies.

Interest group pressure and conservative opposition to climate action have hampered green policies at the national level, too. A watered down German climate change law, climate-skepticism among Italian political leadership, and French President Emmanuel Macron calling in May of last year for a “pause” of EU environmental regulations exemplify the simultaneous nature of developments on the member state and the EU level.

Green parties lost in this year’s European Parliament elections, greatly diminishing their political weight in the body. Some commentators have already written the obituary of the bloc’s green agenda, arguing that “Europe’s green moment is over.” 

What’s next for the Green Deal?

The center-right European People’s Party (EPP), von der Leyen’s party group and the largest in the European Parliament, reaffirmed Europe’s leading role in global climate action in its 2024 party platform. At the same time, it advocates for technological neutral approaches and distances itself from the Greens and Socialists, whose position the EPP calls “ideological” in their manifesto. The rejection of a contentious bill on pesticide use in 2023 demonstrates the group’s ambiguous stance on environmental legislation as it restrained von der Leyen’s Green Deal objectives to foster sustainability in the agricultural sector. Newly and reelected EPP members are “completely divided on where to go with the Green Deal,” according to Greens/EFA co-president Terry Reintke, emphasizing the limbo in which the project currently hangs.

In the incoming European Parliament, support for the Green Deal will continue to come from the center-left Socialists and Democrats (S&D) group, which highlights the social aspects of a just climate transition, and the liberal Renew Europe group, which emphasizes the need for pragmatic implementation. While the Greens proposed an even more ambitious Green and Social Deal as a major investment plan, other left groups are more critical of the bloc’s approach to decarbonization.

Further to the right, the green backlash has become a rallying cry for conservative and far-right political groups, such as the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and the populist Identity and Democracy (ID), which oppose the Green Deal, advocate for local climate strategies, and call decarbonization targets unrealistic. A more prominent role of the ECR and ID in the European Parliament, following their gains in the European elections could slow down the already insufficient emissions reduction and impede the effective implementation of Green Deal policies.

However, it’s too soon to declare the death of the green agenda. It will, instead, likely be deprioritized, contending with competing policy interests. While the overlapping crises of climate change, pandemic recovery, the war in Ukraine, and the resulting inflationary trends have drawn away the electorate’s focus on climate issues, environmental concerns remained salient for voters. It is unlikely that the European Green Deal will be abandoned, especially if von der Leyen stays on as European Commission president.

The new distribution of the parliamentary seats opens possibilities for a more conservative majority but also for coalitions with center-left parties. While the three main centrist groups have reportedly reached an agreement on top European Union posts with von der Leyen as Commission president, it is not a given that she will gather enough votes in parliament. Given the new distribution of parliament seats, Green parties might therefore be the key to securing von der Leyen a second term and thus exert influence on climate protection to remain prioritized.

Regardless, even a weakened climate agenda would be a mistake. Both for political and strategic reasons, European policymakers cannot abandon the green transition. Other priorities may, rightly, deserve attention, but the climate crisis must not be ignored. Europe is, after all, the fastest-warming continent, according a recent report by the United Nations and EU. Temperatures there are rising at around twice the global average.

To ensure the viability and centrality of the Green Deal in the new European parliament, officials will need to link policy issues and make the case that the green transition can help the competitiveness agenda. A focus on implementation rather than new legislation is likely. In this consideration, a nonpartisan commitment to technologically sound and ecologically just climate action is necessary to accommodate voters’ demands and bridge party gaps. This will require political leadership, especially from von der Leyen and her EPP party group, which has yet to find a common line regarding the future of the European Green Deal.

Moritz Ludwig is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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But that assessment seems to be more of an issue of semantics than an accurate reflection of voter sentiment. Widespread discontent among Indian farmers and agricultural laborers (sectors that represent 43 percent of the country’s total workforce), persistent inflation, and a lack of jobs for India’s youth, have all been cited as reasons for the BJP’s slide. All of these problems, at least in part, are caused by climate change, whether post-election coverage acknowledges this or not. To maintain popular support, the coalition government will need to adopt long-term climate solutions that connect directly to the livelihoods and economic needs of India’s youth and agricultural sector.

Farmers have been struggling with the impacts of extreme weather events on their crops for years (not to mention their anger over Modi’s attempts to disincentivize crop residue burning). The corresponding rise in agricultural product prices has stoked inflation. Additionally, disruptions in supply chains caused by flooding, cyclones, and droughts exacerbated already high costs for consumer products. Certainly, extreme heat impacted worker productivity in the agricultural and construction sectors, contributing to lackluster hiring of young workers, who often fill these jobs. Climate change is the hidden hand behind many of these worrying economic trends.

Notably, the BJP did take some significant actions on climate change prior to the elections: Modi made pledges that India would achieve energy independence by 2047, have five hundred gigawatts of renewable energy by 2030, and become central to the manufacture of green technologies. While these are laudable goals, it seems that they were not ambitious enough, or targeted for dates too far into the future, to quell voters’ concerns. Going forward, Modi and his coalition government will need to do more to connect climate change initiatives with kitchen table issues.

An example of a winning climate change solution already exists in Punjab. India’s largest bio-compressed natural gas (CNG) facility became operational in Lehragaga, Punjab, in 2022, with support from the BJP’s Sustainable Alternative Towards Affordable Transportation program, even though Punjab is not a BJP-controlled state. This facility converts paddy stubble (the leftover plant debris after a rice harvest) into bio-CNG, which significantly reduces the need for stubble burning, a major cause of air pollution throughout India. The stubble is collected directly by the facility, alleviating the cost and time that normally burdens farmers, thereby making the harvesting process more profitable. The byproduct of the facility’s process is biomanure, which can be used to enrich soil, further benefitting farmers. Ultimately, the plant produces cost-effective renewable CNG, which can be used for cooking, automotive fuel, and other applications. Duplicating this kind of facility throughout the agricultural regions of India could win over disgruntled farmers, provide new renewable energy jobs for young people, address the harms caused by climate change, and strengthen India’s energy security. The BJP’s Waste to Energy Programme under the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy could be expanded and more aggressively mobilized to facilitate this.

Likewise, the use of vetiver grasses to mitigate the impacts of flooding, which has markedly increased due to climate change, has a long history in India. Unfortunately, a byproduct of the industrialization of agriculture in the name of enhanced productivity has caused traditional, yet effective, practices like the use of vetiver grasses to be left behind. These hardy grasses, when planted along rivers and other sources of floodwaters, strengthen embankments and can largely prevent the soil erosion responsible for catastrophic landslides. These grasses also absorb carbon from the atmosphere and help recharge local groundwater. A new coalition government program that encourages vetiver use would help farmers avoid crop damage from flooding, while also reducing the cost of irrigating fields. The program could create vetiver planting jobs (suitable for youth and agricultural workers) and dovetail with national goals for planting more carbon-sequestering vegetation. This is a climate change solution with a direct connection to the issues that voters care about. Notably, vetiver can also be harvested for use in cosmetics, perfumes, and other personal care products. It can also be used as a feedstock for producing cellulosic ethanol, a renewable fuel. Producing these products domestically using vetiver would also give a boost to Modi’s “Make in India” initiative.

While Modi’s emphasis on building infrastructure for transportation, power, and sanitation has proven popular with the Indian public, more can be done to improve the country’s water management. Rainwater and floodwater retention systems have a long history in India, with the famous Rani Ki Vav stepwell and rainwater retention system (located in Modi’s native state of Gujarat) even being featured on the one-hundred-rupee note. A government coalition program that emphasizes such kinds of water catchment systems would help recharge local groundwater and reduce the impacts of flooding, creating value for the agricultural sector while also allowing Modi to lean into traditional practices that provide a source of national pride. 

There are many climate change programs that connect with kitchen table issues and resonate especially well with farmers and youth; Modi has an opportunity to strengthen support for the BJP by redirecting some of his energies to these programs. His prior use of short-term subsidies on grain and cooking gas temporarily obscured underlying problems without fixing them (which likely had the effect of inhibiting the development of long-term climate solutions). Similarly, export restrictions on rice and other agricultural commodities dampened market demand and farmers’ incomes in the name of marginally helping the common person. Instead of these approaches, Modi and his coalition government would be well served by promoting long-term, job-creating solutions, such as those involving bio-CNG, vetiver grasses, and water retention and detention.

Whether acknowledged or not, climate change influences the Indian electorate and underlies the discontent felt by many voters. Importantly, making progress on climate change in ways that are highly visible to the common person will help galvanize support from India’s youth, who currently have pessimistic views of humanity’s prospects of enduring climate change. They also happen to be the key to winning future elections.

Shék Jain is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and chairman of the Pura Terra Foundation.

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The most consequential new class of AI, generative AI, is able to analyze and create text, audio, code, and even molecular design—doing so faster and often with higher quality than human-created counterparts. Generative AI uses extraordinary volumes of training data and novel data-processing mechanisms which require unprecedented computational power. Data center load growth, driven by a range of factors, is forcing utilities across the United States and Europe to revisit system planning needs. Indeed, this added demand is—in some regions—delaying the retirement of coal-fired power plants. To ensure that climate targets are met, data center growth must coincide with transmission upgrades, energy efficiency improvements, and new low-carbon generation capacity. More broadly, policymakers must also consider how to harness the potential from generative AI while managing complex uncertainties, from inaccurate outputs and data leakage to AI-enabled cyberattacks on critical infrastructure. The deployment of generative AI will require rigorous human oversight, particularly in the early stages.

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Given the capabilities of generative AI, integration into organizational workflows can help energy stakeholders in multiple ways—for example, lower regulatory compliance costs, consider strategic planning options, and evaluate the financial risk around their low-carbon investments, among others.

1. Strategic planning

Recent demonstrations of generative AI capabilities are impressive. Generative AI can already outline, summarize, and draft documents cheaper and faster than many humans. It can also help humans conduct strategic tasks more effectively. A study by Harvard Business School examined the effects of GPT-4—the model behind ChatGPT—on knowledge workers’ productivity, finding that GPT-4 significantly improved workers’ abilities to generate effective ideas and develop implementation plans. Another study from University College London found that a collection of LLMs could give strategic recommendations at a comparable level to human experts. As strategic planning use cases are systemic and across industries, improvements in productivity would apply across the decarbonization value chain.

2. Regulatory compliance

Some generative AI use cases will directly enhance clean energy project developers’ ability to manage cumbersome regulatory processes. As generative AI capabilities are integrated into institutional workflows, they will assist on tasks ranging from simple emails to complex, costly, and time-consuming regulatory processes. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, as part of its PolicyAI, initiative, recently found that LLMs could streamline the public comment-review process under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which is burdensome for many renewables firms.

Importantly, generative AI may aid regulators by accelerating reviews of a variety of environmental impact studies. For instance, after New York State attempted to ease traffic and pollution by passing traffic congestion pricing, an exhaustive environmental review took five years and more than 4,000 pages of analysis. By streamlining portions of these document-intensive regulatory tasks, generative AI can speed up environmental reviews, giving infrastructure projects a quicker go/no-go decision.

3. Decarbonization investment analytics

A range of AI tools, using both existing techniques and generative AI, are being developed to assist with financial and economic modeling, a critical but resource-intensive task for renewable energy projects. While still at the early stages, generative AI tools may be able to partially or even fully build financial models or propose complex scenario plans. In addition, AI is already being used to enhance corporate due diligence by detecting anomalies in financial statements, summarizing earnings call transcripts, or rapidly analyzing trade press. These capabilities will continue to assist both investors and corporate mergers-and-acquisitions teams in their decarbonization investments.

4. Energy asset management

Financial and economic modeling tools overlap with another essential aspect of decarbonization: advanced energy asset management. Currently, communications with energy asset field operators are typically executed via middle management and dashboards with both planned and ad hoc analytics. Generative AI may enable more simplified analytics and communication with the workers physically assessing and repairing assets. At the energy asset management level, generative AI tools could deliver improvements in compiling, summarizing, and communicating asset performance in a customized manner for financial managers. 

5. Wildfire risk assessment

In parallel to generative AI, another area of quiet yet significant advancement has been machine-learning (ML) models for weather forecasting, which have produced some extraordinary results. Further advances in weather forecasting could help mitigate the climate change-driven fire season. Wildfires themselves exacerbate the climate crisis—global fires produce emissions of about 2 gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent per year, equal to 4 percent of total global emissions. These fires can also force large populations indoors for weeks due to health risks and poor air quality. Further investment in AI/ML-based modeling could help manage these risks by predicting the probable location and magnitude of potential wildfires and improving real-time surveillance of smoke, enabling firefighters to combat the over 80,000 wildfires that occur in the United States alone every year. 

Despite the current AI hype cycle and the early-stage risks around generative AI, improving the broad range of AI models will be integral to developing a low-carbon economy. The magnitude and pace will be difficult to predict, as models are integrated into institutional workflows. Human oversight, particularly around critical infrastructure, must remain comprehensive. If managed appropriately, these emergent capabilities will yield important advances in regulatory analysis, environmental management, strategic planning, and an array of challenges essential to achieving net-zero emissions.

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

Shaheer Hussam is a partner at Aetlan, an energy advisory and analytics firm.

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EnergySource Oct 14, 2020

Artificial intelligence can protect all companies in the energy transition from cyberattacks

By Leo Simonovich

The operational and information technologies responsible for running energy systems today were never engineered to be secured in a digital environment, posing a technical challenge tough to solve and difficult for small and mid-sized operators to afford. New developments in artificial intelligence-based solutions can help all energy companies put defenders ahead of attackers, while adapting to the changing energy landscape.

Cybersecurity Energy & Environment

EnergySource Jan 21, 2021

Why digitalization is the future of energy as big oil and gas players decarbonize

By Leo Simonovich

The way companies handle the rapid transformation caused by digitalization across their value chains—and their resilience and security against cyberattacks—will become a major market differentiator. As the oil and gas industry increasingly relies on digitally connected energy assets, automation, and remote operations, cyber risks will have a direct, and growing, impact on operations. Cybersecurity is quickly becoming a key enabler of companies’ competitive advantage in the digitized energy future, protecting core value by ensuring trust and providing stability of operations and resilience against unplanned outages.

Cybersecurity Energy & Environment

EnergySource Aug 9, 2023

The IRA supercharged US R&D. But does it go far enough?

By William Tobin

The IRA intends to stake a claim for US leadership in decarbonization by providing much needed funding for key clean energy research programs. However, US R&D spending has still not reached parity with historical levels.

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The post Generative AI provides a toolkit for decarbonization appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A recent survey by the Yale Program on Climate Change shows that Indians are highly aware of climate change and its impact on India’s future: A staggering 86 percent “favor the Indian government’s commitment to reduce India’s carbon pollution to nearly zero by 2070.” According to the survey, 85 percent agree that “transitioning from coal to wind and solar energy to produce electricity will reduce air pollution,” and 82 percent say “doing so would reduce global warming.” Surprisingly, the survey revealed that 84 percent “favor banning the construction of new coal power plants, closing existing ones, and replacing them with solar and wind energy.”

At the same time, Indians are concerned about the unintended consequences of climate change policies. The Yale survey showed that 61 percent say transitioning from coal to wind and solar energy to produce electricity “will increase unemployment in India,” 58 percent say “it will cause electricity outages,” and 57 percent say “it will increase electricity prices.” 

Indians are aware that they are among the world’s top emitters of greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide (CO2). India’s CO2 emissions are relatively low per capita, ranking just sixteenth in Asia and ninety-ninth globally. But India’s burgeoning population, need for economic and job growth, and role in the global digital and technology ecosystem mean that India will need multiple power sources, including coal and other fossil fuels, for the near future. In fact, the International Energy Agency’s 2021 India Energy Outlook notes that the country needs to add a power system the size of the entire European Union grid to meet its energy requirements over the next twenty years. A blend of energy sources that moves swiftly toward green energy is the only viable option.

Indian leaders have committed to lowering their country’s dependence on coal and other fossil fuels, reduce its carbon intensity by 45 percent, and achieve 50 percent cumulative electric power from renewables by 2030. Equally ambitious, India would like to achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2070. A 2023 report by the International Energy Agency stated that India is expected to produce over half of the world’s new capacity for renewable energy over the next three years. Much of this should be credited to India’s aggressive renewable energy policies.

Three opportunities for Modi to boost clean energy

But with Prime Minister Narendra Modi winning a historic third consecutive term, leading a coalition government, he has the mandate to go beyond issuing regulations and providing government financing. There are three opportunities that the Modi government could take right away to further support and strengthen its clean energy agenda.

First, businesses require certainty. Indian laws and regulations are not required to have sunset provisions and can be revoked or terminated at any time. This discourages large-scale private sector commitments and investments. Defined regulatory and legislative terms articulate the government’s commitment to its policies and allow businesses to accurately assess its financial commitments. Similar to the United States’ 2022 Inflation Reduction Act, the Modi government could commit to a ten-year sunset for its clean energy programs. After ten years, when the regulations need to be reauthorized, the laws can be updated to meet current demands.

Second, to help support clean energy businesses, the government needs to expand its institutional capacity at the state level and properly invest in education systems to produce a skilled workforce.

Third, with the increase in power generation, India must ensure that its electrical grids can receive and transmit the power to customers (the last mile). Failure to do so could cause India to miss its clean energy targets and lead to a slowdown in economic and job growth.

Over the past three decades, more than 3,500 climate policies have been announced by nations around the world, according to the World Economic Forum. From 2010 to 2015, China issued the highest number of climate policies. But from 2015 to 2022, India took the lead by issuing more than fifty climate change policies. These ranged from production-linked incentive schemes to policies that encourage the use of clean energy products such as rooftop solar energy. This multifaceted approach is backed with the objective of reducing India’s carbon intensity by 45 percent compared with 2005 levels and generating 50 percent of electric power from renewable sources by 2030.

What the private sector is already doing

The private sector has positively responded to India’s ambitious goals. For example, in 2022 the Adani Group* started developing the world’s largest renewable energy park. Through an ecosystem of manufacturing, generation, and transmission, the Khavda renewable energy park, located in the deserts of Gujarat, is combining wind and solar power to generate 30 gigawatts of energy for the national grid. When completed in 2029, the park will power 16.1 million homes and eliminate 58 million tons of CO2 emissions annually, the developers say. To put that in perspective, it is the equivalent of planting more than two billion trees or not burning 60,300 tons of coal each year. Another massive Indian conglomerate, Tata Group, recently completed India’s largest solar and battery energy storage system via its Tata Power Solar Systems subsidiary. Tata says that the facility, which is in Chhattisgarh, combines a 100 megawatt solar photovoltaic project combined with a 120 megawatt hour battery storage system. The developers expect the project to reduce India’s carbon footprint by 4.87 million tons of CO2 over twenty-five years.

However, more is needed. The Adani Group has the size and diversity of businesses to marshal the necessary resources to build something like Khavda. It was able to develop the basic infrastructure—including the roads and telecommunications systems, an airstrip, a self-sustaining ecosystem for a workforce of more than eight thousand, and the transmission lines—within twelve months of launching the project. But Adani, Tata, and other major Indian conglomerates are the exception more than the rule in terms of ability to marshal resources.

To encourage even more private capital and participation, public-private partnerships (PPPs) will be needed. For example, earlier this year, First Solar inaugurated India’s first fully vertically integrated solar manufacturing plant in Tamil Nadu. Buoyed by a $500 million loan from the US International Development Finance Corporation, the First Solar facility will produce its Series 7 photovoltaic solar modules supported by an annual capacity of 3.3 gigawatts while employing approximately one thousand people. This can be a model for future PPPs.

India’s emissions will continue to grow before they peak and fall. The question is, can a third Modi administration continue creative policies that fulfill India’s ambitious climate goals—and will the rest of the world meet India both where it is today and can be tomorrow?

Kapil Sharma is the acting senior director and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

Note: The Adani Group is a donor to the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

The post Modi should make India’s energy transition his third-term legacy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This is a report from the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center in partnership with the US Department of State. This readout was informed by multi-stakeholder dialogues focused on facilitating greater, constructive exchange among multi-sectoral thought leaders and government leaders as they work to implement commitments made at the Ninth Summit of the Americas.

Executive summary

On March 14, the Atlantic Council’s Caribbean Initiative partnered with the US Department of State to organize the PACC 2030 Road to Implementation Summit on the sidelines of the Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas Ministerial Meetings in the Dominican Republic. The summit built on the PACC 2030 Climate Resilient Clean Energy Summit, which took place on the sidelines of US Vice President Kamala Harris’s inaugural trip to the Caribbean in June 2023, and previous partnerships with the Department of State to advance commitments adopted at the Ninth Summit of the Americas in Los Angeles in 2022. Since then, the Atlantic Council has organized a PACC 2030 Working Group and has worked closely with governments, the business community, and civil society organizations to support the implementation of PACC 2030’s objectives.

5 recommendations for implementing PACC 2030’s commitments:

Report

Apr 16, 2024

Advancing health and resilience policies in Latin America and the Caribbean

By Isabel Chiriboga, Martin Cassinelli, Diego Area

During an off-the-record private roundtable, thought leaders and practitioners from across the Americas discussed how to further enhance access to and finance for health services and products in the region.

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Summit of the Americas

An initiative led by the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center of the Atlantic Council in partnership with the US Department of State focused on facilitating greater, constructive exchange among multi-sectoral thought leaders and government leaders as they work to implement Summit commitments.

Online Event Fri, May 31, 2024 • 1:30 pm ET

Hurricane readiness: Building climate resilience in the Caribbean

The conversation is part of the Caribbean Initiative’s continued focus on how climate change impacts the region.

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Road to the Summit. Responding to the next disaster: Building health and climate resilience in the Americas

A conversation to generate strategies for creating stronger hemispheric collaboration ahead of the ninth Summit of the Americas.

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The joint future of the Caribbean working with Latin America

A series of discussions featuring heads of state and government following the conclusion of the Summit of the Americas.

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Severe weather is not a new phenomenon for the state, which has seen record-breaking rainfall in recent years. A foretold tragedy, the flooding in Rio Grande do Sul is the fourth weather-related crisis to hit the state in less than a year. At the end of 2023, Rio Grande do Sul saw a similar situation, when a heat wave exacerbated intense storms and major flooding.

The region is prone to weather-related disasters, and the current flooding has been linked to the periodic El Niño weather phenomenon. In the past few decades, the state’s capital city, Porto Alegre, has adapted to control the extent of the impact of torrential rains on the city. However, the infrastructure in place must be updated to the new reality of extreme weather events, which are more intense due to climate change. Designing suitable financial instruments for resilient infrastructure with support from international and domestic financial institutions will be crucial.

The extent of this disaster is immense. To put it into perspective, about 90 percent of the 497 municipalities in Rio Grande do Sul were impacted by the rain and flooding. Brazilians are bearing the immediate brunt of these floods, including on their economy. There will also be implications for global trade and food security in the weeks and months ahead.

Rio Grande do Sul is an important state for Brazil. It represents 6 percent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP), the fifth largest state GDP in the country. A major agribusiness state, it accounts for 70 percent of Brazil’s rice production. It is a significant producer of soybeans—of which Brazil is a leading producer and exporter—and an important meat-producing state. And while in Rio Grande do Sul rain continues to fall, not too far from there, in other regions of Brazil, farmers are suffering through a winter drought.

The governor of Rio Grande do Sul, Eduardo Leite, estimates that a yearslong reconstruction plan costing some nineteen billion reais (around $3.7 billion) will be needed in his state. Private sector investments and insurance could play a crucial role in supporting the recovery of the region, implementing adaptation measures and building the resilience of the affected communities. This level of support now will be critical to reduce future losses and tap into the immense economic, social, and environmental benefits of investing in adaptation and resilience. According to one recent estimate, each dollar invested in resilience and adaptation could generate up to twelve dollars in economic benefits.

Local and federal governments must take on the responsibility to put climate adaptation at the core of their strategic plans and development efforts. Countries must prioritize adaptation and resilience investment plans that strategically crowd in private sector investments and ensure that subnational governments and local communities can access insurance and financing to adapt and build resilience. Brazil is in a unique position to do so. With Brazilian municipal elections in October, this is a crucial moment for Brazilians to institutionalize climate mitigation and adaption efforts as part of local governments’ agendas.

At the geopolitical level, the G20 Leaders’ Summit in Rio de Janeiro in November will be an opportunity for Brazil to drive the climate adaptation agenda forward and to obtain buy-in and financing from the largest economies in the world. COP30 in Belém, Brazil, in 2025 is another such opportunity. The site for COP30, located in the Amazon rainforest in Brazil’s north, was chosen in part to showcase the roles of biodiversity, sustainability, and conservation in climate action. The flooding in the country’s south will be a tragic reminder of the importance of adaptation being central to the climate agenda, as well.

Valentina Sader is a deputy director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she leads the Center’s work on Brazil, gender equality and diversity, and manages the Center’s Advisory Council.

The post Brazil’s tragic floods should put climate adaptation at the top of the G20 and COP agendas appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Select Committee’s report, published in December with minimal fanfare, proposes that the United States reset the terms of economic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), prevent US capital and technology from aiding China’s military buildup and human rights violations, and build US technological leadership alongside allies and partners. This bipartisan blueprint, though not perfect, is a useful foundation for US policy toward the PRC for the next Congress and the next administration—regardless of who wins the November elections.  

The authors of this article come from different political perspectives, but we agree that it’s time for a comprehensive economic strategy to advance US interests and deter the PRC’s ability to do them harm. Building on the Select Committee’s work, here are eight principles to inform a comprehensive playbook.

1. Be affirmative, agile, and systemic

Defense alone is not enough to prevail in the United States’ strategic competition with the PRC. The economic playbook needs to be affirmative in its outlook, agile in its execution, and systemic in its analysis. Those qualities will be required to simultaneously strengthen the US industrial base, foster innovation and new technologies, and pursue a positive economic agenda with partners and allies while taking the necessary defensive actions.

2. Get industrial policy right

Policymakers should look to history and geopolitics to develop a prudent two-pronged approach to industrial policy that focuses on strengthening the US domestic manufacturing base in targeted sectors (e.g. semiconductors) and investing in innovation and broad industrial infrastructure and training. Investment in research and development and a favorable tax and regulatory environment may be more effective than direct subsidies, which, although potentially needed in narrow circumstances, are more susceptible to industry capture and extra-economic considerations.   

3. Arrest the PRC’s market distortions and manipulations

The PRC has not lived up to the commitments it made when it joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001. Nowhere is this more obvious than with respect to the PRC’s brazen and persistent excess capacity in electric vehicles, solar panels, steel, semiconductors, and pharmaceuticals, just to name a few. It is imprudent for the United States to afford China the same tariff treatment as other WTO members. However, merely revoking the PRC’s permanent normal trade relations status and reverting to Smoot-Hawley tariffs would be inefficient, outdated, and counterproductive. The Select Committee report puts forth a more sophisticated and effective approach by creating a new tariff column for China and renewing certain WTO safeguard mechanisms. This offers a promising foundation for a more modern and modulated trading framework with the PRC and should be put in action in close coordination with Group of Seven (G7) and Quadrilateral Security Dialogue members.

4. Stop US capital and technical knowhow from aiding the adversary

Export control measures on semiconductors and other advanced technologies put forth by the Biden administration and Congress to thwart the PRC’s military modernization are an important start. Next should come screening of outbound investments to prevent US investors from unintentionally aiding China’s military and human rights violations. This calls for a modulated approach involving both specific entities and sectors. Additionally, the US government should work with domestic and allied academic and research institutions on a principled, pragmatic, and robust cross-border research protocol to preclude the PRC’s intellectual theft and unauthorized technology transfer. 

5. Pursue a positive economic agenda with partners and allies

Punitive measures such as tariffs, investment restrictions, and export controls are necessary but insufficient for winning the strategic competition. A positive economic agenda with partners and allies is needed to incentivize the private sector—both in the United States and overseas—to diversify important supply chains away from China. The Select Committee report promotes bilateral trade negotiations with Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and Japan based on the high standards set out in the US-Mexico-Canada trade agreement. If a new free trade agreement is practically or politically challenging, the report suggests targeted agreements with trusted trade partners in areas such as the medical sector or critical minerals. As part of this effort, a comprehensive review and modernization of the Bretton Woods institutions to better reflect geoeconomic realities is urgently needed. 

6. Win the transition to the green economy

The road to the green economy rests wholly within the geopolitical and geoeconomic contest between the United States and the PRC. The United States should leverage its substantial advantages over the PRC in traditional and renewable energy and technology to address the immediate energy security needs of its partner nations while also offering them a credible energy transition toward a greener economy.

To ensure that its energy supply chains remain secure and that it remains energy independent, the United States should aggressively pursue sectoral agreements and minerals security partnerships recommended by the Select Committee report. Furthermore, the United States should remain vigilant against climate engagement with the PRC without due reciprocity and must avoid unwittingly facilitating the PRC’s declared intent to monopolize and dominate future green industries.

7. Set the trends around standards for the digital economy

As the world’s largest digital economy, the United States bears the responsibility to articulate the rules, norms, and practices of digital governance—including over artificial intelligence—that favor Western values over China’s model of censorship and control. The United States must lead on digital standards in order to keep its superiority in technology and financial markets. 

8. Modernize US policies, instruments, and institutions

Unlike defense and diplomacy, there is no identified lead US agency to engage and prevail in the economic competition with the PRC. The diverse and often discordant set of economic policies, instruments, and institutions engaged in the effort are frequently found wanting in both efficacy and efficiency. In short, US institutions are underprepared for the complexity of economic competition with the PRC. The United States has a long history of modernizing its government levers to address the challenges it confronts, from the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation to reinforce the military chain of command after problems surfaced during military operations in Iran and Grenada, to post-9/11 reforms to federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies. A similar endeavor is needed to improve US economic diplomacy, coordination, and engagement.

Prevailing over the PRC in economic competition calls for total national commitment and engagement. It requires a comprehensive, nuanced, and tailored playbook utilizing not only the proverbial hammer and scalpel, but all the multipurpose tools in the toolbox. The Select Committee has done the nation a service by unequivocally identifying the PRC as an adversary and a rival, and it put forth a useful framework with pragmatic recommendations to bolster national economic security. Its report represents a useful transition from the initial chapter prioritizing industrial policy and tariff measures to the next chapter of working with allies and partners to prevail in the global marketplace.

Domestic prosperity depends on the United States leading the global economy. Now is the time to develop and execute a new US economic playbook to maintain that lead. 

Kaush Arha is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and previously served as the senior advisor for global strategic engagement at USAID and the G7 Sherpa for the Blue Dot Network during the Trump administration.

Peter Harrell is a nonresident senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and previously served as senior director for international economics with a joint appointment to the National Security Council and National Economic Council during the Biden administration.

Clete Willems is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and previously served as deputy assistant to the president for international economics and deputy director of the National Economic Council during the Trump administration.

The post A new US economic playbook to lead the world economy and counter China appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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The commitment of “phasing out coal by 2035 or on a timeline consistent with the 1.5 temperature limit” marks a further step in the direction indicated last year by the UN climate summit, known as COP28, to reduce the use of fossil fuels, of which coal is the most polluting. Mentioning the IEA’s Net-Zero Roadmap report, G7 countries say that “phase-out of unabated coal is needed by 2030s in advanced economies and by 2040 in all the other regions, and that no new unabated coal power plant should be built.” This represents the first agreement on a timeline for phasing out coal after the initiative had previously failed due to opposition by some members. However, it should be noted that, despite the positive step towards a common goal, by using the term “unabated” in the communication, members of the G7 leave open a potential path for the use of coal beyond the indicated timeline. 

In addition to the importance of ending coal reliance, it is now widely recognized that the success of the energy transition is linked to a technology-inclusive approach both for reaching climate neutrality and strengthening energy security. The communication of the G7 promotes members’ increasing use of diverse low-carbon energy technologies including renewable energy, energy efficiency, hydrogen, carbon management, storage, nuclear energy, and fusion.

Energy ministers fully committed to the “implementation of the global goal of tripling installation of renewable energy capacity by 2030 to at least 11 terawatts (TW)” and to “double the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements by 2030 to 4%,” signaling the intention to create a strong connection with COP28 pledges.

On energy storage, G7 members agreed to a global goal in the power sector of 1500 gigawatts (GW) in 2030, a more than six-fold increase from 2022. Introducing this target for storage is very important to support renewable implementation and ultimately reach the installation capacity target set in Dubai.

The communication highlights the importance for countries to reduce reliance on civil nuclear technologies from Russia and commits to strengthening the resilience of the nuclear supply chain. Countries opting for nuclear energy would work to deploy next generation nuclear reactors.

Fusion made it in the final text with a strong emphasis on the potential of this technology to provide a lasting solution to the global challenges of climate change and energy security in the future, marking an important addition to the G7 joint communication, since in the Hiroshima Communique, fusion was not mentioned.

In order to implement these targets and scale technologies, the G7 countries this year also reaffirmed their commitment to jointly mobilize $100 billion per year until 2025 and their intention to scale up public and private finance. “We stress the need to accelerate efforts to make finance flow consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development,” and “we acknowledge that such efforts involve the alignment of the domestic and international financial system.” Attention is now directed toward the upcoming G7 finance meeting, the G20 in Brazil, and the “finance COP” in Azerbaijan.

Finally, convergence and cooperation with countries outside the G7 will play a crucial role in the success of the transition. The joint communication acknowledges that developing countries represent “an important partner in the just energy transition” and recognizes “the great potential of the African continent in becoming a global powerhouse of the future.”

At this year’s energy ministerial meetings, Azerbaijan’s Deputy Minister on Energy Elnur Soltanov (representing the 2024 COP29 presidency), Brazil’s Minister of the Environment and Climate Change Marina Silva (representing the 2024 G20 presidency), and Kenya’s Principal Secretary on Energy Alex K. Wachira, participated along with the G7 partners. This approach shows recognition of the fundamental role that inclusivity plays in a successful transition and the willingness to create strong synergies with the upcoming multilateral forums.

It would be difficult to overstate just how critical pragmatism and convergence are to the energy transition. But this message, in addition to being successfully incorporated in the communication was further reinforced during the Future of Energy Summit, a half-day event hosted by the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center, Politecnico di Torino, and World Energy Council Italy as part of Planet Week on the sidelines of last weekend’s G7 ministerial meeting. Experts and speakers at the Summit emphasized the need to strengthen a technology-inclusive, not exclusive, approach and cooperation among countries.

The IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario (NZE) envisages that by 2030, advanced economies would end all power generation by unabated coal-fired plants, making the new G7 historic commitment unfit for purpose. However, the overall success of the transition will not be determined by pledges, but more so by the will of countries to transform pledges into action. Whether G7 countries will be able to succeed in the energy transition will depend on their capacity to create resilient clean energy supply chains, implement diversified energy mixes, promote collaboration with developing countries, scale up public and private finance, and it seems like many steps are being taken in the right direction. 

Elena Benaim is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

EnergySource

EnergySource is the Global Energy Center’s (GEC) online publication providing commentary and analysis on developments in the energy and climate sector from a wide-array of thought leaders, politicians, and experts.

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EnergySource Apr 3, 2024

Central and Eastern Europe needs to rethink its approach to energy security

By Pawel Czyzak and Nolan Theisen

The upcoming Three Seas Initiative Summit is an opportune time for Central and Eastern European leaders to pivot toward clean, affordable, and local renewables to build energy security.

Central Asia Central Europe

EnergySource Dec 13, 2023

The US and NATO must clamp down on Russian fossil fuels to end the war in Ukraine

By Svitlana Romanko and Oleh Savytskyi

The US and its EU allies have made several attempts to diminish Russia’s fossil fuel exports, with mixed results. the West must do more to staunch the flow of Russian oil and gas—and restore peace for Ukraine.

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EnergySource Dec 5, 2023

The Oil and Gas Decarbonization Charter is a start, but more work remains

By David L. Goldwyn, Andrea Clabough

Although the Oil and Gas Decarbonization Charter is laudable, the pace of change for this industry (as represented in this charter) is not fast enough, deep enough, or broad enough to materially address the yawning gap between the Paris commitments and the present Dubai reality.

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The post G7 pledges to end coal—but only inclusive action will make a real climate impact appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What can Europe learn about decarbonization from the US Green New Deal? How can climate action now save costs for healthcare later? Do we need more advanced renewable energy technologies to successfully reduce carbon emissions at the necessary rates?

On this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Carol Schaeffer sits down with ark Z. Jacobson, Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering and Director of the Atmosphere/Energy Program at Stanford University about what challenges policymakers need to consider in developing renewable energy infrastructure.

You can watch #AtlanticDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast.

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With wars raging in Ukraine since 2022 and in Gaza since October 2023, not to mention other conflicts, one question that comes to mind is the cost in terms of climate change. First, direct conflict-related emissions from military equipment, damage to facilities that cause emissions—such as fuel reserves and chemical plants—or fires, and a reversion and reliance on carbon-heavy fuels, including coal. Most estimates quantify emissions from the Ukraine conflict, for example, as equivalent to Belgium’s annual emissions. The other is the opportunity cost of the lack of cooperation on climate issues across borders. (For more on this topic, see the author’s forthcoming report for the Atlantic Council to be released in summer 2024.) 

As long as Israel and Lebanon, for example, cannot agree how to cooperate on optimizing exportation from the region and eventually transition out of natural gas reserves from any shared sources towards cleaner sources of energy, both countries and the wider region will lose. (It’s worth noting that under the important Lebanese-Israeli Maritime Agreement, brokered by the United States, there are some provisions for how the parties will exploit any said gas fields and any revenue therein, but as long as the parties are not in direct contact and dependent on mediation, any additional prospect for cooperation beyond exploitation and border demarcation likely will be limited.) The same principle applies to cooperation in mitigation of extreme weather impacts through exchange of meteorological data, for example. The first cost is more straightforward to quantify, but the consequences of the second cost will only be assessed by future generations. These are the “double costs” of conflict-driven climate change impacts.

With the ongoing wars, it’s easy to dismiss the notions of climate change cooperation across borders as detached from reality. Unfortunately, the devastating impacts of climate change are not going away because of the existential threats posed by conflict. Instead, they are being worsened because of conflict.

For most countries, climate change has become a national security issue as they face mounting challenges from its impacts. In the MENA region, the risk for conflicts increases as the region becomes dryer, with scarcer sources of water, food, and energy. As the region looks to undertake an effective energy transition—which entails sharing of emission-reduction technology such as carbon capture, interconnecting electricity grids that are also capable to include increasingly renewable energy-based electricity, etc.—cooperation across borders becomes critical. Unless countries in the region and beyond find ways to work to mitigate and adapt together, it will turn into a race to the bottom—a lose-lose situation. 

As long as the world has reckless and authoritarian leaders who are bent on continuing to rule by force and conflict, the rest of the world will suffer. Beyond the immediate loss of human life in conflict zones—including Ukraine, the Israel-Hamas war, Sudan, and Myanmar—other parts of the world will suffer the impacts of the “double cost” of climate change due to these events. 

The trouble is that most politicians think short-term due to election cycles. So, medium- to long-term climate impacts are often not prioritized. Democratic countries governed by policies endeavoring to tackle climate change impacts can play an important role, as has been demonstrated by governments in Europe and North America. However, the continued success of such policies only works as long as a new government isn’t sworn in with a change of policy towards climate change, which undermines the milestones achieved. This was evident when then US President Donald Trump withdrew from the Paris Climate Accord in 2020. If he returns to the White House, Trump may repeal the Inflation Reduction Act, a move that would take away incentives for companies to invest in cleaner energies and, rather worryingly, send a strong signal to other global players that the United States is not a reliable partner for dealing with climate change.

A successful energy transition will address developing and developed economies’ current real energy needs, including hydrocarbons, for a defined period. However, it will critically establish medium- to long-term plans to scale up green energies. Moreover, democratic systems of government with policies and agendas in place to adapt and mitigate the effects of climate change would be wise to consider establishing mechanisms that help ensure the longevity of these policies beyond a change of government. This is a tall order to ask democratic governments to do, especially as the tools they have to limit the ability to reverse such policies are restricted. Nonetheless, the more such policies are enshrined, for example, in international relations, and with clear economic incentives, the more difficult it is to undo them. 

While it is tempting to focus on the here and now, especially with respect to devastating live conflicts, it is critical to equally take steps to enable climate change mitigation and adaptation cooperation across borders—including across conflicting ones. Although nearly impossible to contemplate in the midst of conflict, this is precisely what needs to be done. Warmongering leaders in the region and beyond inflict not only direct losses today, but the impacts will be felt for generations to come. In the national security realm of climate change, this means that damage done to the planet is not just the direct emissions from conflict but also the opportunity cost of the lack of cooperation in dealing with the largest threat facing humanity. The “double costs” of conflict-driven climate change need to be understood and acted upon today in the MENA region and beyond.

Ariel Ezrahi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. Ezrahi currently serves as the director of climate strategy at a fintech fund. Ezrahi is also on the board of the MENA2050 Climate Action Committee and the chairman of its Energy Transition Subcommittee. He was the architect of the Gas for Gaza project, the inaugural director of energy at the Office of the Quartet, and the Energy Adviser to the Quartet Representative, former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. 

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The second half of the twentieth century experienced significant economic integration. International trade, cross-border migration, capital flows, and technological diffusion increased per capita incomes across countries and reduced global poverty.1 However, events such as the global financial crisis of 2007 to 2009, Brexit, and the COVID-19 pandemic—all against the backdrop of escalating great power rivalry and tensions between the United States and China—have demonstrated the rise of geoeconomic fragmentation (GEF). Since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, a growing numberof world leaders have addressed the impacts of GEF on global energy and agricultural markets. For one, higher and increasingly volatile food and energy prices have made it increasingly difficult for developing nations to prioritize environmental concerns and implement sustainable development initiatives.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) describes GEF as a pattern of “policy-driven reversal of global economic integration” that threatens capital flows to low-income countries, hinders innovation in emerging markets, and discourages cooperation on international crises. Stemming from the prioritization of national security objectives, GEF takes the form of policies that reduce reliance on other countries by incentivizing domestic production and employment. In our increasingly fragmented world, nations have focused on reshoring essential goods and supply chains, including minerals crucial for green technologies, semiconductors, and military hardware due to concerns over national security and geopolitical motives. These transformations are in direct opposition to the founding principles of the Bretton Woods institutions (BWIs)—the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO)— which collectively seek to promote free trade, globalization, unified and competitive exchange rates, and the reorientation of public expenditures to achieve reductions in global poverty and increased economic prosperity for developing nations.

The costs of GEF are far-reaching and include higher import prices, segmented markets, diminished access to technology and labor, reduced productivity, and lower living standards. A June 2023 article in the IMF’s Finance & Development magazine points to diminished output in a scenario where countries must align with either a US-EU as 2.3 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP). Advanced economies and emerging markets could face permanent losses of between 2 percent and 3 percent, while low-income countries are at risk of losing more than 4 percent of their GDP. These losses could deepen risks of debt crises, exacerbate social instability, and increase food insecurity. The most vulnerable nations, heavily dependent on the imports and exports of key commodities, will find it particularly costly to adapt to new suppliers under fragmented trade conditions. Moreover, a 2023 IMF paper with a comprehensive analysis of GEF and its potential effects on the future of multilateralism found that increasing international trade restrictions could lead to a long-term decline of up to 7 percent in global economic output, or approximately US$7.4 trillion. Building on these findings, an October 2023 IMF blog, titled “Geoeconomic Fragmentation Threatens Food Security and Clean Energy Transition,” argued that disruptions in the global trade of goods induced the spike in inflation experienced globally in 2022, heightened food insecurity in lower-income nations, and contributed to a deceleration in global economic growth. In addition, GEF is posing a threat to food security and the clean energy transition, namely by impacting the trade of essential minerals and agricultural goods, according to the blog co-authors.

GEF also risks short-circuiting the multilateralism needed to coordinate climate change mitigation and sustainable development in the years to come. An IMF policy report, titled “Geo-Economic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism,” noted signs of GEF including:

• Formation of regional economic blocs.
• Declivities in cross-border capital flows.
• Prioritization of resilient supply chains over and above efficiency.
• Growing income inequality.
• Rising geopolitical tensions.
• Increasing discontent associated with a free trade system.

Among the goals of the BWIs is to achieve global net-zero emissions by 2050; however, GEF has limited these organizations’ abilities to work with governments, businesses, civil society organizations, and other stakeholders to mobilize resources and accelerate the transition to a low-carbon economy. Policymakers and scholars have raised growing concerns, suggesting that increased GEF will have implications for sustainable development outcomes. However, there remains a paucity of research on the impact of GEF on net-zero targets specifically. This report builds on previous scholarly work to examine the impacts of GEF on the ability of nation states to attain their net-zero targets to combat climate change.

In conclusion, the paper calls for a democratized governance structure in the BWIs, emphasizing the need for reevaluating quota allocations and diversifying leadership roles. By addressing these foundational challenges, the BWIs can navigate the complexities of today’s global economic landscape more effectively, fostering trust, representation, and robust leadership. The authors also argue persuasively that BWI reform can not only reinforce the legitimacy of the IMF and World Bank but also indirectly help the soft and hard power of the states most hesitant to reform the international monetary system.

Shirin Hakim is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Middle East and Global Order and a former Bretton Woods 2.0 Fellow with the GeoEconomics Center.

Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou is the macroeconomist with the GeoEconomics Center and an assistant professor of Economics at the American University in Washington, DC. He leads GeoEconomics Center’s Bretton Woods 2.0 Project.

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

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Executive summary

As the geopolitical relevance of the Pacific Islands has grown, so too has the attention paid to them by the outside world—including an influx of diplomatic attention, development assistance, and more as external powers seek to curry favor with the sixteen countries. Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—which collectively comprise the Quadrilateral Dialogue (known as the Quad)—have independently and collectively scaled up their engagement with the Pacific Islands.

In doing so, the Quad has sought to pursue a positive, practical agenda that aligns with the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)’s 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent.

Broadly speaking, the PIF members welcome the Quad, but some are critical of the “free and open Indo-Pacific” narrative that undergirds it. As the Quad seeks to bolster its engagement in the Pacific Islands, it should ensure that it accounts for the unique challenges facing this vast maritime region, which relies heavily on foreign assistance.

In 2023, the Quad announced a range of programmatic initiatives intended to address key regional issues, including climate, connectivity, economic development, and maritime security. The bloc is currently standing on solid ground, but the group is still finding its footing as a new player in the complex multilateral architecture in the Pacific Islands.

Looking forward, it should embrace four broad-based, cross-cutting policy recommendations that align with the stated priorities of the Quad, its member states, and Pacific Island countries:

1. Prioritize programs that bolster physical and digital connectivity, such as the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience that was announced at the 2023 Quad Leaders’ Summit.

2. Emphasize maritime domain awareness and enforcement by providing partners with tools to facilitate greater enforcement capacity and enhanced monitoring.

3. Implement positive, practical programs in areas of strategic advantage that fit into an already-complex regional donor landscape and meet Pacific needs.

4. Take a forward-leaning approach to public diplomacy, including through elevated branding that proactively communicates intent, emphasizes shared values, and does not overemphasize geopolitics.

Introduction

As the geopolitical relevance of the Pacific Islands has grown, so too has the attention paid to it by the outside world. Other issues, from climate change to fisheries, drive engagement as well—but geopolitics is what has drawn the lion’s share of international media coverage and interest from decision-makers in foreign capitals who do not focus on the region day-to-day.

This, in turn, has brought an influx of diplomatic attention, development assistance, and more as external powers seek to curry favor with the sixteen Pacific Island countries.¹ As the most aid-dependent region in the world, this recognition is welcomed, but Pacific Islanders remain leery about geopolitical competition and the detrimental impact it could have on their sovereignty and well-being.

Australia, India, Japan, and the United States have independently and collectively scaled up their engagement with these Pacific Islands. In 2007, the four countries formed the Quadrilateral Dialogue (the Quad), which has become an increasingly important element of the Indo-Pacific’s growing multilateral architecture. It serves as a forum for addressing shared challenges across the Indo-Pacific, including in the Pacific Islands.

In February and March 2024, the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative (IPSI) of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security convened public and private discussions with governmental and nongovernmental experts from Quad member states and Pacific Island countries to formulate policy recommendations for the bloc as it expands activities in the region.

The collective output of those discussions, in turn, is the basis for this policy brief, which provides an overview of the relationship between the Quad and the Pacific Islands as it stands today, followed by a series of policy recommendations for the former as it seeks to bolster its engagement with the latter over the coming years.

The Quad and the Pacific Islands: An overview

It is no coincidence that the Quad’s revival in 2017 came at a time of heightened geopolitical competition in the Indo-Pacific. As noted in the 2023 Joint Leaders’ Statement, its members are committed to ensuring “a free and open Indo-Pacific that is inclusive and resilient” and one where “all countries are free from coercion, and can exercise their agency to determine their futures.”

Alongside other fora, the Quad has become an increasingly important node in the Indo-Pacific’s growing “minilateral” architecture. Cooperation within it focuses on six key areas—climate, critical and emerging technology, cyber, health security, infrastructure, and space—that are reflected by the bloc’s formal leader-level working groups.

While they may skate around thornier issues that could divide the bloc, these agreed-upon priority areas have helped the Quad formulate a positive, practical agenda that will benefit not just the four Quad countries but also partner nations. Leaders’ meetings have become an annual occurrence and overall cohesion in the bloc has increased—no small feat, considering how quickly it went dormant after being first conceived in 2007.

Along with its thematic focus areas, the Quad has emphasized cooperation with countries in three key Indo-Pacific subregions—Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands, and Indian Ocean rim—and expressly acknowledged the centrality of their respective multilateral forums: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA).

In the Pacific Islands, the Quad has sought to align itself with the objectives of the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent (2050 Blue Pacific Strategy), a long-term road map for addressing key regional issues that were agreed upon by PIF members in 2022. The PIF strongly encourages external partners to work within this framework, and the Quad’s commitment to supporting its objectives is an important sign of respect for regional institutions.

It should be noted that the PIF is not the only regional institution in the mix; others, such as the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), cater to subregions and may deviate from the PIF at times and contend with it for influence. Furthermore, each of the sixteen Pacific Island countries have unique cultures, histories, and interests. It is therefore important that the Quad members build bilateral relationships with each country rather than opting for the easier route of painting the region with a monolithic brush.

Regional footprint of Quad members

Outside of the Quad framework, Canberra, New Delhi, Tokyo, and Washington also independently maintain regional presences that reflect each country’s unique priorities and interests. The added value of the bloc is its ability to capitalize on members’ regional initiatives to maximize the efficiency and impact of joint initiatives.

Of the four, Australia has historically been the most engaged in the region. It is a PIF member, maintains a comprehensive diplomatic footprint with missions in all sixteen Pacific Island countries, and is by far the single largest aid donor to the region. Canberra possesses unmatched levels of deep and long-term engagements with the Pacific Island countries, but, as with any long-standing bilateral relationship, this inevitably comes with areas of tension.

India has long maintained an interest in Fiji due to the latter’s large Indo-Fijian population but remains a relatively new player in the Pacific Islands region. Its amplified Pacific Islands engagement flows from a broader effort by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to enhance India’s global footprint. For instance, Modi’s 2023 visit to Papua New Guinea included the announcement of a strategic action plan to expand cooperation on a diverse issue set with Pacific Island countries.

Japan has a long history in the region and ramped up its modern-day engagement in the late 1990s, initiating the Japan-Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM) mechanism in 1997. It is the region’s second-largest provider of overseas development assistance and well-known for its focus on infrastructure and fisheries. As the originator of the “free and open Indo-Pacific” concept, it has been a leading voice for increasing regional cooperation through mechanisms like the Quad.

The United States has deep regional roots due to its ties with the three freely associated states² (FAS) and the geographic location of the US State of Hawaii within Polynesia. The United States significantly scaled back its regional presence in the early 1990s and only truly returned to previous levels of engagement in the late 2010s due to rising geopolitical competition. Since then, it has reestablished itself as a regional player by amplifying development aid, opening new embassies, and more—but questions linger about its long-term reliability and staying power.

All four countries have broadened their engagement in the region. Although Australia is the only full member of the PIF, India, Japan, and the United States hold observer status. They also maintain their own dialogue mechanisms with Pacific Island countries—for example, India’s Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation and the now-annual US-Pacific Island Forum Leader’s Summit. Additionally, Australia, Japan, and the United States are members of the Partners in the Blue Pacific (PBP) mechanism.

The view from the Pacific Islands

With a collective exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of over sixteen million square kilometers, the Pacific Islands occupy nearly 10 percent of the world’s maritime space. In recent years, Pacific Island countries have sought to define themselves as “large ocean states” instead of the more common moniker of “small island states.” Their maritime nature is a defining, cross-cutting feature of the region.

Broadly speaking, the Quad has been welcomed, albeit not universally. Some are critical of the “free and open Indo-Pacific” narrative that undergirds it, arguing among other things that it is incompatible with the 2050 Blue Pacific Strategy and could “funnel resources away from investment in Blue Pacific interests and objectives.” Others contend that the Quad is an unnecessary addition to an already complex multilateral landscape.

As the Quad expands its engagement with the Pacific Island countries, it is important to consider how regional actors define and view key international challenges, especially when such definitions and views may differ from those espoused by Quad members. The PIF’s 2018 Boe Declaration, which incorporates traditional and nontraditional security issues into a single definition of security, is perhaps the most pertinent example.

Climate change, which Pacific Island countries see as their single greatest threat, is central to their definition of security. Quad members, in the 2023 Joint Leaders’ Statement, did expressly acknowledge the significance of climate change as it pertains to global security. However, their words have not always aligned with actions taken on the issue at home, which in turn has periodically strained relations due to perceptions that Quad members’ climate rhetoric is more talk than action.

There are diverging views on geopolitics, but a general through line is a desire to maintain peace, stability, and positive relations with external parties. This is exemplified by Fijian Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka’s Zone of Peace concept, which is “deeply rooted in Pacific ideas of family and relationships,” and was welcomed by many Pacific Island leaders at their 2023 PIF retreat.

The development and economic challenges facing Pacific Island countries may be similar to those faced by other developing countries, but they are exacerbated by the region’s vast maritime nature and imminent challenges stemming from climate change. Although there are notable variances between the individual countries, the common priorities include but are by no means limited to disaster management, fisheries, labor mobility, infrastructure, public health, and regional connectivity.

Current Quad-Pacific Islands initiatives

Although the Pacific Islands were briefly referenced in the 2021 Joint Statement of Quad Leaders, the focus on this expansive subregion has grown exponentially since then. A range of programmatic announcements, many of which pertain to the Pacific Islands, were made at the 2023 Leaders’ Summit, including:

• Climate: Quad Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Package to accelerate regional cooperation on climate resilience.

• Critical and Emerging Technology (CET): Establishment of an Open Radio Access Network (Open RAN) with Palau, the first of its kind in the Pacific Islands.

• Cyber: Quad Joint Principles for Cybersecurity Partnership to strengthen defenses against cyber threats to critical infrastructure and services.

• Health Security: Quad Health Security Partnershipto strengthen coordination and collaboration in support of health security in the Indo-Pacific.

• Infrastructure: Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience to strengthen cable systems in the Indo-Pacific.

• Space: Exploring avenues to deliver Earth observation data and other space-based applications to assist nations across the Indo-Pacific in strengthening climate early warning systems.

The Joint Leaders’ Statement positively signals the Quad’s intent to work in partnership with the Pacific Islands region and to align programs with the 2050 Blue Pacific Strategy, stating that, “In these efforts, Quad Leaders will listen to and be guided at every step by Pacific priorities.” These programs are only in the preliminary stages of implementation, though, and successful delivery will be crucial to achieving long-term goals.

Policy recommendations

As the Quad looks ahead this year and beyond, it is both standing on solid ground and still finding its footing in the Pacific Islands. Moving forward, the bloc should continue to pursue achievable, practical policies that deliver on Pacific needs while ensuring the Quad is not stretched too thin. In addition, the Quad should take a forward-leaning public diplomacy approach that helps it win over public opinion and build stronger ties with Pacific Island countries.

To support these efforts, IPSI convened a February 2024 public panel discussion, “Bolstering Cooperation among Quad and Pacific Island Countries,” that featured speakers from all four Quad members and the Pacific Islands, including His Excellency David Panuelo, the former president of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM). IPSI also convened a private track 1.5 workshop, which was attended by thirty-three government and nongovernment experts.

What resulted from the panel discussion and workshop are four broad-based, cross-cutting policy recommendations. These are by no means exhaustive; rather, they reflect the themes most frequently raised and are intended to align with the stated goals of the Quad, its member states, and the Pacific Island countries.

1.  Prioritize programs that bolster physical and digital connectivity

As noted previously, the region’s expansive maritime scale cuts across every issue facing it. Pacific Island countries are geographically isolated, and their isolation is further exacerbated by limited physical connectivity. Physical infrastructure is an issue that is frequently raised in the region, and there are urgent needs for the construction and refurbishment of new and existing facilities: ports, highways, airports, and the like.

Digital connectivity presents a crucial opportunity to circumvent geographic barriers, but most Pacific Island countries are not adequately connected to transnational undersea cable systems. Furthermore, they face challenges with building sufficient telecommunications networks within their own borders. That is why technology and connectivity emerge as one of the seven thematic areas of the 2050 Blue Pacific Strategy

Improving physical and digital connectivity would unlock opportunity across the region, especially on the economic front. The Quad has acknowledged the issue’s centrality in joint statements and laid out concrete programs to improve it throughout the Indo-Pacific. For the Pacific Islands region, this includes the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience initiative (noted above), and at a country-level includes the Palau Open RAN program (also noted above).

In this and coming years, the Quad should maintain its focus on programs that improve connectivity, especially in the digital realm. The CET and infrastructure working groups are well positioned to continue their work on cables. As the digital realm increases in complexity, the Quad should consider how the space working group can help deliver satellite-based internet coverage—which is in high demand in the Pacific Islands.

It should be noted that this is an area where the Quad can capitalize on existing programs initiated by one or more member states. One example is Australian and US support for incorporating eight Pacific Island countries into US-based Google’s plans for a trans-Pacific subsea cable. Through such a mechanism, the Quad can build upon existing work rather than start from scratch. It also demonstrates the value of bringing private-sector partners into the fold to maximize impact.

2. Emphasize maritime domain awareness and enforcement

Maintaining the territorial integrity of their maritime space is a daunting task for Pacific Island countries. To illustrate, the FSM has an EEZ of almost three million square kilometers and the Solomon Islands has an EEZ of one and a half million square kilometers. Both countries face acute difficulties when seeking to monitor and enforce these EEZs owing to a wide range of resource limitations, from patrol boats to human capital.

The significance of this issue is noted in the 2050 Blue Pacific Strategy, which calls to protect “sovereignty and jurisdiction over our maritime zones and resources” and to “strengthen our ownership and management of our resources.” Yet the ability to do so is under imminent threat from foreign state and nonstate actors on matters ranging from narcotics trafficking to illegal fishing, both of which have increased in recent years.

Echoing this, the Quad announced the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) initiative at the 2022 Leaders’ Summit, which aims to “provide near-real-time, integrated and cost-effective maritime domain data to maritime agencies in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.” This, in turn, provides each country with useful tools to help navigate responses to natural disasters and monitoring of climate patterns.

Looking forward, the Quad should consider how the resources it offers can facilitate greater enforcement capacity and enhanced monitoring for Pacific Island countries. One area worth exploring is coordinating the provision of patrol boats, which individual members have historically provided on a bilateral basis. The Quad should not duplicate existing programs; instead, it should serve as a coordination hub to ensure maximally beneficial allocation across the region.

3. Implement positive, practical programs in areas of strategic advantage

While the Quad holds a lot of promise, it should be careful to not overextend itself and become another flashy diplomatic initiative that overpromises and underdelivers. To do so, the Quad can align its strategic advantages with priorities identified by the Pacific Island countries themselves.

As outlined earlier, individual Quad members have unique histories with specific Pacific Island countries. However, the Quad itself is viewed with some skepticism due to its relatively new advent, collapse, and reemergence onto the scene. Australia, India, Japan, and the United States seem to be cognizant of this issue, and their emphasis on positive, practical programs with tangible outcomes will help allay skepticism.

In addition, Quad members should clearly and consistently communicate what they can and cannot do, and how they envision Quad-driven initiatives fitting into an already-complex donor landscape. Doing so will help manage inevitable misunderstandings that tend to come with new initiatives and allow it to focus on producing results that earn credibility and trust from Pacific Islanders.

The bloc has been met with fanfare and gained staunch support in Canberra, New Delhi, Tokyo, and Washington. However, the attention of and priorities for these capitals are becoming split in multiple directions as increasing threats across the world lead to limit the resources and time that can be devoted to the Pacific Islands. Quad and Pacific Island countries alike should be careful not to place all their bets on the Quad, lest it collapse under its own weight.

4. Take a forward-leaning approach to public diplomacy

Globally, the information domain has become more competitive, fast-moving, and fragmented. At both a regional and country level, the Pacific Islands region has a particularly unique information space due to limited digital connectivity and a geographic location that any external actor must fully comprehend in order to seek engagement with local populations.

The Quad may have started off on the right foot, but there is still much to be accomplished to maintain an advantage in the information space, especially as it becomes increasingly contested due to geopolitical competition. Ultimately, Quad members’ status as the partners of choice for many Pacific Island countries is at risk if a forward-leaning approach to public diplomacy is not implemented.

Specific recommendations for implementing this approach include the following:

• Proactively communicate intent: Stress that the Quad is meant to complement, not supersede or replace, the existing regional architecture. Building upon the shift in its official name from the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue to the Quadrilateral Dialogue, it should make a more concerted effort to expand its focus beyond just traditional security issues. Doing so will quell apprehensions from the region regarding the true nature of the Quad’s intentions for the region.

• Emphasize shared values: Quad and Pacific Island countries share democratic values—democracy, rule of law, freedom of speech, and more—that should be actively highlighted. But doing so requires that Quad members practice what they preach at home, lest they open themselves up to charges of hypocrisy.

• Do not overemphasize geopolitics: Pacific Islanders are well aware of the growing geopolitical competition in the Indo-Pacific and the impact it may have on their region. Overly aggressive rhetoric about it may resonate in the capitals of Quad member states, but much less so in the Pacific Islands. It certainly should be discussed at times, but it should not be the overarching crux of public interactions.

• Elevate branding: If the Quad is to achieve its goals, it must back up its rhetoric with concrete evidence of successful implementation of initiatives on the ground. One of the best ways to do so is through physical and digital branding that clearly indicates that the Quad or one of its member states is delivering and working with Pacific Island countries to implement a project. Although Australia and the United States have sometimes been reluctant to elevate branding alongside their individual development programs, the Quad presents an opportunity for a fresh approach.

Parker Novak, the primary author of this issue brief, is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, where he specializes in Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands, Indo-Pacific geopolitics, and US foreign policy. He previously served as the Indonesia and Timor-Leste country director for an international non-governmental organization.

Kyoko Imai, the project lead and contributor to this issue brief, is the associate director for the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative (IPSI) of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She spearheads IPSI’s work on US-ROK-Japan, Quad, AUKUS, and other multilateral frameworks, in addition to the Japan, Southeast Asia, and Pacific Islands portfolios. Imai’s functional expertise centers on non-traditional security including but not limited to economic security, human rights, climate security, and migration.

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