This post will be updated as the story develops and more expert reactions come in.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Alex Plitsas: The world cannot afford to wait until the brink again

Srujan Palkar: The US should correct its strategic imbalance in South Asia

Shuja Nawaz: By focusing on water, extremism, and trade, the cease-fire can become an enduring peace

Rudabeh Shahid: What the cease-fire and its violations mean for South Asia’s non-nuclear states

Manal Fatima: India suffers a reputational blow, while the fate of Kashmiris remains perilous

The world cannot afford to wait until the brink again

The recent cease-fire between India and Pakistan marks a critical juncture in averting a potentially catastrophic escalation in South Asia. The decades-long rivalry, rooted in territorial disputes over Kashmir and fueled by mutual distrust, has repeatedly brought these nuclear-armed neighbors to the brink. This latest de-escalation, while fragile, underscores the urgent need for restraint and timely international intervention, both of which were dangerously absent as tensions spiraled.

The conflict had gone too far. Cross-border skirmishes, artillery exchanges, and inflammatory rhetoric intensified, with each side miscalculating the other’s resolve. India’s aggressive posturing, often tied to domestic political pressures, clashed with Pakistan’s defensive yet provocative responses. Both nations’ militaries, equipped with advanced weaponry and nuclear arsenals, risked missteps that could have triggered a broader conflict. The 2019 Balakot airstrike and subsequent retaliation demonstrated how quickly localized incidents can escalate, yet lessons from that crisis were poorly applied. Mismanagement was evident in the failure to prioritize diplomacy over brinkmanship, with both governments amplifying nationalist sentiments rather than seeking de-escalation.

World powers, particularly the United States, China, and the United Nations, were alarmingly slow to intervene. Their delayed response allowed the situation to fester, emboldening hardline factions and undermining moderates who sought dialogue. Global attention, distracted by other crises, underestimated the stakes of a potential India-Pakistan war, which could destabilize the region and disrupt global security. The cease-fire, brokered only after significant loss of life and economic strain, highlights the need for proactive international mediation.

This truce is not a solution but a reprieve. It averts immediate disaster, preserves economic stability, and opens a window for dialogue. However, without sustained global pressure and a commitment to address root causes like Kashmir, the cycle of escalation will persist. The world cannot afford to wait until the brink again.

 —Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the head of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project, and a former chief of sensitive activities for special operations and combating terrorism in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The US should correct its strategic imbalance in South Asia

Saturday’s cease-fire had a degree of US involvement. But India’s recent counterterrorism operations under Operation Sindoor, followed by retaliatory strikes and escalation, have exposed an imbalance in US policy toward South Asia. As negotiations continue in the coming weeks, there is one policy shift the United States could take that would ensure it builds trust with India while putting the onus on the Pakistani establishment to play its part in counterterrorism—and that is revoking Pakistan’s Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status.

Despite deepening ties with India—a key Indo-Pacific partner—the United States continues to extend MNNA status to Pakistan, a country whose military-intelligence apparatus has long tolerated, if not enabled, cross-border terrorism. The recent Pahalgam attack, timed with a high-level US visit, highlights a recurring pattern of militant violence during diplomatic moments—echoing the 2000 Chittisinghpura massacre on the eve of a visit by President Bill Clinton.

From New Delhi’s perspective, the MNNA designation for Pakistan—which India does not have—sends contradictory signals. While US policymakers express solidarity with India during crises, they continue to offer Pakistan privileged military status without conditioning it on measurable counterterrorism compliance. This undermines deterrence, weakens regional crisis management, and emboldens actors who operate outside the norms of accountability from Pakistani soil.

The original justification for Pakistan’s MNNA status—logistical cooperation during the US war in Afghanistan—has expired. Today, China is Pakistan’s primary defense partner, and US assistance has largely dried up. Revoking MNNA would rebalance Washington’s ties with Islamabad and recognize strategic realities. It would also reinforce India’s role as an independent regional security provider, not dependent on US largesse, while establishing that Washington will hinge its support on alignment with counterterrorism and regional stability goals.

—Srujan Palkar is the global India fellow at the Atlantic Council. 

By focusing on water, extremism, and trade, the cease-fire can become an enduring peace

Now that both India and Pakistan have executed their military responses to each other’s real or perceived actions against the other in Kashmir, good sense has prevailed in the shape of a cease-fire. If the announcement holds, this stops the ratcheting up of hostilities that were putting both nuclear-armed rivals on a steep escalation ladder. Historically, both sides try to gain some tactical advantages by extending the cease-fire limits. And there are many trigger-happy local commanders on both sides of the line of control in Kashmir, which would explain reports of clashes in the hours after the cease-fire announcement.  

I am hearing from Pakistani sources that the agreement to cease hostilities emerged after closed and direct talks between the directors general of military operations of both armies and representatives of the two national security advisors. It helped that in the case of Pakistan, the national security advisor, Lt. Gen. Asim Malik, was also the current director general of the Inter-Services Intelligence (likely preparing himself for that generally civilian role post-retirement in a few months). Helping the process to put the lid on this regional flashpoint was the behind-the-scenes encouragement of US President Donald Trump, his Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and possibly Saudi Arabia.

What next? Having raised domestic emotions to a high pitch, leaders on both sides will want to take a much-needed pause and then begin the process of what Rubio identified as the beginning of “talks on a broad set of issues at a neutral site.” It will be interesting to see what is considered a neutral site. The Gulf is one possibility.

Three main items should be on the agenda.

1. The Indus Basin Water Treaty

Front and center should be the discussion of the effects of climate change on both India and Pakistan and the need to update the Indus Basin Water Treaty, originally agreed upon with US help and under the aegis of the World Bank. That treaty, signed in 1960, took nine years of negotiation. Both countries have been dancing around the shared waters issue in the past. India recently unilaterally abrogated the treaty—a debatable action. Regardless, the Himalayan and Karakoram glaciers feeding their rivers are declining, and time is running out for measures to counteract that reality. Both nations will suffer the consequences of dying waterways. Moreover, the shared aquifers of the Indian and Pakistani Punjabs badly need recharging. The misuse of tubewells has dropped the water tables, and overwatering has produced waterlogging and salinity. Combined efforts to revive underground water resources will help fight climate change. Otherwise, agriculture will suffer, and the population may die of thirst. …

Read more from Shuja Nawaz, a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center, here:

New Atlanticist

May 10, 2025

By focusing on water, extremism, and trade, India and Pakistan can turn this cease-fire into an enduring peace

By Shuja Nawaz

Having raised domestic emotions to a high pitch, leaders on both sides will want to take a much-needed pause and then begin negotiations.

What the cease-fire and its violations mean for South Asia’s non-nuclear states

The recently brokered cease-fire between India and Pakistan, hailed just this morning as a sign of returning stability, was violated shortly thereafter—underscoring the fragility of such diplomatic pauses in South Asia. The shaky agreement, facilitated by the Trump administration, highlights a deeper regional truth: while the logic of Mutually Assured Destruction may avert full-scale war, it does little to halt the cycles of escalation driven by mistrust and historical grievance.

In a region marked by volatility and deep-seated animosity, cease-fires are never just about halting gunfire. They are signals of restraint, tactical pause, or strategic recalibration. Their violation carries meaning too: It hardens political rhetoric, narrows diplomatic space, and amplifies insecurity far beyond the Line of Control in Kashmir. For South Asia’s non-nuclear states, this renewed conflict is more than a bilateral affair. It is a regional stress test with asymmetric consequences.

In Bangladesh, where an interim government has replaced Sheikh Hasina’s long-standing pro-India administration, anti-India sentiment has intensified further. The recent protests, which have successfully pressured the interim government to ban the Awami League under the country’s Anti-Terrorism Act, are now also inflected with broader regional anger. India’s posture during and after the cease-fire may be seen as coercive, deepening the backlash and weakening Dhaka’s willingness to align with New Delhi on strategic matters.

Sri Lanka, navigating domestic fragility and a delicate geopolitical balance, will attempt to remain neutral. Yet neutrality is not invisibility. Muslim communities in the country remain attuned to wider Islamophobic narratives, and Indian pressure may provoke political ripples. Meanwhile, China’s deepening footprint in Colombo further constrains Sri Lanka’s room for maneuver.

Nepal’s balancing act between India and China might also come under strain. Heavily reliant on Indian trade and remittances, India may grow increasingly wary of Kathmandu’s neutrality, especially amid heightened security anxieties. In this environment, Nepal’s neutrality could be interpreted as disloyalty, thereby placing the landlocked country in an increasingly untenable position.

Bhutan, while closely tied to India through the 1949 Treaty of Friendship, is not insulated either. Bhutan may again face increased Chinese pressure along its contested border, particularly if India redirects strategic focus northward—just as it did during the Doklam standoff in 2017.

The Maldives, too, might face growing pressure. As India reasserts its strategic role in the Indian Ocean, Malé’s policy of hedging between New Delhi and Beijing becomes harder to sustain. Domestic political undercurrents, including Islamist sentiment, may complicate Malé’s ability to respond to Indian pressure without facing internal pushback.

Above all, the shaky cease-fire underscores the chronic dysfunction of South Asia’s regional institutions. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) remains paralyzed, thereby lacking any mechanism for mediation, de-escalation, or collective response. Non-nuclear South Asian countries remain vulnerable to the centrifugal pull of India-Pakistan tensions, without a regional forum to cushion the fallout.

For the United States, the original cease-fire may have seemed like a diplomatic win. Saturday night’s violations, however, reveal the limits of transactional diplomacy. More significantly, it reflects a broader regional transformation: A more assertive regional posture by India will be perceived by non-nuclear neighbors as encroaching on their strategic autonomy—prompting deeper engagement with China as a counterbalance.

The real challenge is no longer merely avoiding the next crisis. It is about envisioning a regional order where diplomacy is consistent, non-nuclear South Asian states are not treated as collateral, and cooperation—not coercion—defines the regional norm.

—Rudabeh Shahid is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.  

India suffers a reputational blow, while the fate of Kashmiris remains perilous

Saturday’s US-mediated cease-fire between India and Pakistan is a welcome development after a tense week that brought South Asia alarmingly close to a broader military confrontation. This recent exchange revealed not only the heightened lethality of modern warfare between the two nuclear-armed neighbors, far surpassing past skirmishes, but also reinforced a recurring pattern in contemporary conflicts—the emergence of social media as a significant new front. With widespread misinformation circulating, the narrative war was self-evident. Against this backdrop, Pakistan lifted its fifteen-month ban on X, while India ordered the takedown of over eight thousand X accounts for allegedly spreading disinformation.

However, this pause also invites deeper scrutiny into the outcomes of the past few days. India’s decision to launch airstrikes based on unproven allegations of Pakistani involvement in the tragic April 22 Pahalgam massacre naturally raises questions about their effectiveness. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s India, eager to assert its role as a rising global power, arguably emerges from this crisis with a dented posture. Reports confirm the loss of at least two Indian military aircraft, including a French Rafale reportedly brought down by Pakistan’s Chinese-made J-10. Analysts have viewed the downing of the Rafale by a comparatively lower-cost Chinese aircraft as a blow to India’s defense credibility and a sign of tactical underperformance. Additionally, while some Indian media outlets circulated lists of terrorists allegedly killed in the initial strikes under Operation Sindoor—individuals linked to Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba—the unclear results of the operation make it difficult to ascertain New Delhi’s actual achievements and the effectiveness of these measures in realizing its intended goals.

Interestingly, Pakistan’s government finds itself on a relatively stronger footing. It has been under considerable scrutiny in recent months, particularly following the contentious 2024 general elections, or reasons including its handling of unrest in Balochistan and Balochi human rights activists, and its dealings with internal opposition. The external threat appeared to unify fractured political forces domestically. Amid this, the Pakistani Supreme Court’s controversial decision to allow civilians accused in the May 9, 2023 riots to be tried in military courts simply faded into the background as nationalist fervor dominated the country’s political atmosphere.

On the international/diplomatic front, Islamabad also appears to hold an advantage over New Delhi, which seems displeased with the Trump administration’s tone in mediations, viewing it as unfairly equating Pakistan with India. Further, Trump’s commitment to work with both countries “to see if … a solution can be arrived at concerning Kashmir” aligned more with Islamabad’s preference for international involvement rather than New Delhi’s desire to keep it a bilateral matter.

However, the fate of Kashmiris still hangs perilously between the two countries. While the ceasefire may have halted the immediate escalation toward all-out war, unrest in the disputed territory and the deeper conflict persist. For Kashmiris, caught between militants, military crackdowns, and political repression, the reality remains largely unchanged. In fact, there is a potential for an increase in the crackdown that followed the April terrorist attack by the Indian government, and within the ambiguous category of “suspected” terrorists, many may be unjustly targeted.

—Manal Fatima is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. 

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Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Srujan Palkar: These strikes follow a predictable pattern—and a water treaty could provide an off-ramp

Shuja Nawaz: Further escalation is possible in this combustible conflict

Michael Kugelman: The Gulf states are well placed to provide much-needed mediation

Manal Fatima: Ordinary Kashmiris continue to bear the brunt of these tensions

Atman Trivedi: The question is not if Pakistan will retaliate, but when and how

Alex Plitsas: Escalation appears unlikely after calibrated strikes

Rudabeh Shahid: India-Pakistan tensions will cause spillover problems across the region

These strikes follow a predictable pattern—and a water treaty could provide an off-ramp

This is not a surprise attack. In such military operations, predictability and patterns are important. India has upheld its reputation for reliability while preparing the world by briefing diplomats from Group of Twenty (G20) countries and others. The surgical 2016 strikes in response to the killing of nineteen Indian soldiers, the 2019 Balakot airstrike in response to the killing of forty Indian paramilitary personnel, and now Operation Sindoor, in response to a targeted, religiously motivated terrorist attack killing twenty-six men, follow a strategy that India has showcased since 2001. (In 2001, Operation Parakram, in response to terrorist attacks on the Indian parliament, lasted ten months in the form of a military standoff, the second since both countries tested nuclear weapons in 1998. It did not result in wider war.) 

The Indian Defense Ministry’s statement immediately following the strikes assures non-escalatory intentions. Given this reliable history and a two-week diplomatic blitz following the terrorist attack, a further, immediate escalation or mobilization from India is unlikely.   

The Pakistani leadership’s responses declaring that Indian actions constitute an act of war are also part of the pattern. Pakistan’s former foreign minister and its current defense minister have admitted to previous Pakistani involvement in funding extremist groups, and Pakistan must be transparent if it is to prove that it is not training terrorists or arming them with deadly military-grade weapons such as the AK-47s and M4 rifles used in the terrorist attacks.

India too ought to remain transparent and communicative with the global diplomatic community, while continuing its approach of counterterrorism. It should not take the bait of the terrorist attacks or of Pakistani leadership, and should instead play to its tactical, economic, and diplomatic advantages. In the long run, that will prove to be the most effective way to protect against further terrorist threats to the lives of Indian citizens and preserving Kashmir’s path to peace. 

The United States, for its part, must push for transparency and dialogue. A key method of dialogue could be the renegotiation of the Indus Water Treaty, which was signed in 1960 and does not take into account modern climate and technological changes. Indian peacetime requests for renegotiations went unanswered. The treaty does not have an exit clause or renegotiation mechanism, and as such the parties need to be willing to converse. Water, instead of a source of tension, can be a source of conversation. 

—Srujan Palkar is the global India fellow at the Atlantic Council. 

Further escalation is possible in this combustible conflict

After deliberating and planning, India has attacked several sites inside Pakistan and in Pakistan-administered Kashmir (Azad Jammu and Kashmir), while claiming it chose to avoid military targets. Pakistan has a policy of “quid pro quo plus.” So expect a tougher response inside India and Indian-administered Kashmir, perhaps using standoff air-to-air weapons. Unlike in 2019, chances are that Pakistan may also target the launch or control centers responsible for the Indian missile attack. It has built up its electronic warfare capacity over the years.

The escalation ladder is steep. And, as in the past, captive local media and jingoistic politicians across the spectrum are baying for blood.

The world doesn’t need another flashpoint where both sides possess nuclear weapons, and standoff air and drone attacks could easily lead to the use of heavier weapons.

Sadly, the United States seems to have little clue about how to handle this situation. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s calls to leaders in both countries didn’t stop escalation. Is it time for China to play a positive role?

—Shuja Nawaz is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

The Gulf states are well placed to provide much-needed mediation

India and Pakistan are experiencing their most serious crisis in several decades. The airstrikes that India carried out in Pakistan early Wednesday morning represented some of the most high-intensity and large-scale military activities that India has deployed there since 1971. A muscular Pakistani response is all but inevitable. Unlike the last two military crises between India and Pakistan, in 2016 and 2019, there is a strong likelihood of additional hostilities—and greater escalation risks—beyond an initial strike and counterstrike. This is no small matter given that India and Pakistan are both nuclear-armed states.

International mediation is of the essence to ensure the current confrontation doesn’t reach a point where nuclear escalation risks come into play. While there’s a strong international consensus in favor of de-escalation, few countries have the deep relationships and leverage to be effective mediators in this dangerous crisis. The United States has previously played the role of mediator, including during the 2019 India-Pakistan crisis under the first Trump administration. But the Arab Gulf states—especially Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—may be best placed to intervene. They all have deep ties to both New Delhi and Islamabad. They’re also key suppliers of fuel and other assistance to Pakistan. And there is at least one precedent: In 2021, the UAE helped mediate an India-Pakistan border truce—an accord that kept bilateral ties relatively stable until the events of recent weeks.

Careful diplomacy from trusted interlocutors can help bring the two sides back from the brink. But given the scale of hostilities up to this point and the mood in each capital—and across the Indian and Pakistani publics—it won’t be easy.

—Michael Kugelman is a South Asia analyst and the writer of Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief.

Ordinary Kashmiris continue to bear the brunt of these tensions

India’s airstrikes, launched amid Pakistan’s call for an evidence-based inquiry into the April 22 Pahalgam terrorist attack that killed twenty-six civilians, underscore the fragile and volatile dynamics of the region’s security environment. The response was anticipated, shaped by domestic pressure on the hyper-nationalist government in New Delhi and a long-standing precedent, including the 2019 Pulwama attack, which similarly escalated into cross-border hostilities. This cyclical exchange of strikes, rhetoric, and retaliations is not new. However, this very familiarity underscores a disappointing failure to learn from past mistakes. 

In the immediate aftermath of the Pahalgam attacks, both governments reverted to entrenched narratives: India pointed to Pakistan’s record of harboring insurgent groups, and Pakistan alleged that the attack was a false-flag operation. This mutual blame game reflects a deeper strategic paralysis, an inability or unwillingness to address the root causes of the conflict. 

At the center of this confrontation are the people of Kashmir. In recent days, Kashmiris have faced harassment and physical assaults in parts of Indian-administered Kashmir, reportedly targeted in retaliation for the Pahalgam attack. These incidents, compounding decades of political repression and securitized control in the region, highlight how ordinary Kashmiris continue to bear the brunt of both state and societal backlash amid renewed India-Pakistan tensions. 

Strategically, a full-scale war serves neither side. Pakistan’s military strength would be offset by economic precarity, and military action would harm the country’s focus on attracting foreign investment. India, which is positioning itself as an emerging global economic power, cannot afford instability. In a nuclear neighborhood, the costs of escalation, whether accidental or intentional, are simply incalculable. 

The United States has so far been very engaged on the issue in a neutral manner. Rubio has engaged both New Delhi and Islamabad in recent days, indicating that Washington would urge for de-escalation. “I just hope it ends very quickly,” US President Donald Trump said Tuesday evening in Washington. The administration should apply all possible pressure to make sure of it. Further, a broader diplomatic push that includes behind-the-scenes efforts by the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and others with regional influence is essential. This brinkmanship endangers regional economic endeavors and threatens both countries’ security. Regional prosperity is dependent on sustained peace, which is not possible with the persistent specter of a confrontation between two nuclear-armed states. 

—Manal Fatima is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. 

The question is not if Pakistan will retaliate, but when and how

The latest confrontation between India and Pakistan provides a stark reminder that the nuclear-armed nations have recently grown all-too-comfortable flexing their military muscle. India characterized its military strikes as measured and restrained. Nevertheless, the decision to target purported terrorist camps deep inside Pakistan, well beyond the disputed Kashmir region, will likely be interpreted by Pakistan’s generals as a significant escalation.  

The question now is not whether Pakistan will respond, but when and how. Earlier this week, Pakistani Ambassador to Russia Muhammad Khalid Jamali threatened to use the country’s “full spectrum of power” in reply to an Indian military strike. Pakistan’s “quid pro quo plus” defense strategy is intended to inflict greater damage in retaliation than it first suffers, to deter Indian military action in the first instance. Pakistan’s powerful chief of army staff, Asim Munir, is a wild card, known to indulge in provocative rhetoric about Kashmir. He may prioritize ideological convictions over pragmatism. Meanwhile, China’s heightened involvement in and around South Asia, highlighted by its growing military and economic ties with Pakistan, introduces additional risks. The region finds itself at a moment where miscalculation, accidents, or plain bad luck could conspire to produce a major conflict. 

In the past, the United States and other countries have used quiet diplomacy to help defuse regional crises. In the first Trump administration, for instance, senior US officials worked the phones to help de-escalate tensions in South Asia. Six years later, Washington and like-minded partners are distracted and inward-focused.   

The dangerous mood on South Asia’s streets, fueled by jingoistic media outlets that border on hysteria, is hardly conducive to disciplined and careful crisis management. Cooler heads may yet prevail, but not before the region edges closer to war. 

—Atman Trivedi is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and a partner at Albright Stonebridge Group.

Escalation appears unlikely after calibrated strikes

India’s “Operation Sindoor” is a limited counterterrorism operation targeting nine terrorist camps in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. The strikes were a direct response to the April 22, 2025, Pahalgam attack in Indian-administered Kashmir, where militants from the Resistance Front (TRF), allegedly linked to Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, killed twenty-six civilians, mostly Indian tourists. India’s Ministry of Defense described the operation as “focused, measured, and non-escalatory,” emphasizing that it struck only terrorist infrastructure, such as training camps in Muzaffarabad and Kotli, and avoided Pakistani military or government facilities. However, Pakistan denied that the strikes hit terrorist targets, claiming that they hit civilian areas. Indian forces used precision missiles, and aircraft did not cross into Pakistani airspace, signaling restraint meant to prevent broader conflict.  

India’s actions aimed to neutralize immediate threats while minimizing the risk of escalation. By publicly framing the strikes as counterterrorism-focused and avoiding sovereign Pakistani targets, New Delhi sought to limit retaliatory pressure on Islamabad. Pakistan condemned the strikes, alleging civilian casualties. In response, there have been reports of clashes along the line of control with artillery and small arms fire being exchanged by both sides with unconfirmed reports of limited civilian casualties. The operation’s design mirrors India’s 2016 and 2019 strikes, which targeted militants without triggering full-scale war, suggesting a pattern of calibrated responses. 

Despite heightened tensions, including prior diplomatic and economic measures like trade suspensions and airspace closures, escalation appears unlikely. Both nations, aware of their nuclear capabilities and under international pressure from the United States and United Nations, have incentives to avoid war. Diplomatic channels, including back-channel communications, remain open, and historical precedents show both sides can de-escalate after limited actions. While the situation in Kashmir remains volatile, India’s restrained approach and Pakistan’s cautious rhetoric suggest a mutual interest in containing the crisis. 

 —Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the head of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project, and a former chief of sensitive activities for special operations and combating terrorism in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

India-Pakistan tensions will cause spillover problems across the region

As non-nuclear members of the South Asia Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) surrounding India, countries such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives would find themselves increasingly constrained in a scenario of India-Pakistan escalation over Kashmir—a development that would further entrench the paralysis of regional cooperation under SAARC. 

If tensions between the two nuclear-armed neighbors escalate, the geopolitical and domestic consequences for these smaller South Asian states will be complex. Most exposed is Bangladesh, where the recent regime change has removed Sheikh Hasina’s pro-India administration and installed an interim government navigating a deeply polarized landscape. Anti-India sentiment is running high, fueled by perceptions of Indian interference and growing frustration at India for hosting the former Bangladeshi prime minister. The interim leadership, lacking a political mandate, will face acute pressure from sections of civil society to adopt a more assertively nationalist, possibly anti-India, stance. At the same time, India is likely to increase expectations of diplomatic alignment, leaving Dhaka in a highly precarious position. 

In Sri Lanka, the government is likely to maintain a cautious neutrality while quietly accommodating India’s regional security posture. However, an intensification of the Kashmir conflict could create unrest within Sri Lanka’s Muslim communities, particularly if the issue is framed as part of a broader crackdown on Muslim populations. These internal dynamics could destabilize a government already managing economic fragility. 

Nepal would attempt to preserve its balancing act between India and China, but India may view Nepal’s neutrality with suspicion. Recent bilateral tensions, including territorial disputes and Kathmandu’s assertion of greater sovereignty, make it vulnerable to diplomatic pressure. Nepal’s large labor force in India also adds an element of economic dependency that could be leveraged. 

Bhutan is most likely to align quietly with India, given its close strategic ties, but any Indian military distraction could embolden Chinese activity along the contested northern border.  

The Maldives, meanwhile, will face rising Islamist sentiment at home if Kashmir becomes a rallying point. At the strategic level, increased Indian Ocean militarization will reduce space for Malé’s hedging strategy. 

Overall, a Kashmir flashpoint would harden regional alignments, reduce strategic autonomy, and raise the domestic political costs of neutrality for South Asian non-nuclear states. 

This, in turn, would have implications for US Indo-Pacific strategy. Washington views India as a cornerstone of its regional balancing efforts against China, particularly through platforms such as the Quad. A protracted India-Pakistan crisis would not only divert India’s strategic focus away from the maritime Indo-Pacific and toward its western land borders, but also constrain its ability to act as a net security provider in the region.

—Rudabeh Shahid is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. 

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Previously, the US Treasury Department sanctioned MS-13 as a Transnational Criminal Organization under Executive Order 13581. The Trump administration similarly designated Foxtrot, which has been used by Iranian intelligence, under the same authority last month.

This should lay the groundwork for Washington to respond to an increasingly aggressive Iran, which has rallied more extraterritorial operations in both the United States and Europe, using a network of criminal gangs.

The statutory criteria for the Secretary of State to designate FTOs are as follows: it must be a foreign organization; the organization must engage in terrorist activity or retain the capability and intent to do so; and it must threaten the security of US nationals or the national security of the United States.

Washington and its allies should capitalize on the momentum from the Trump administration’s increased designations and begin sanctioning these criminal networks as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).

Iran’s expanding criminal gang network

Tehran has long offered a safe harbor and a platform for dangerous organized criminal syndicates to plot assassinations, kidnappings, and sabotage around the world. These partnerships with criminal gangs are often flexible, offering plausible deniability for Tehran’s attempts to silence its foes, especially in the West.

In a recently unearthed interview with Mohsen Rafighdoost, the former cabinet minister in charge of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the 1980s, he admitted the regime employed the Basque separatist movement to carry out killings on its behalf in Europe. Both Iran’s Intelligence Ministry and the IRGC retain relationships with these organizations, which are non-Iranian and have access to the United States and Europe in ways that the Iranian regime itself lacks.

These groups include the Mocro-Mafia, which engages in murder-for-hire and drug trafficking across Europe. The organization was implicated in the attempted killing of Alejo Vidal-Quadras, a Spanish politician and former member of the European Parliament. Last year, the Mocro-Mafia’s leader, Riduoan Taghi, was sentenced to life imprisonment for his campaign of violence in the Netherlands, including the murder of an Iranian in Amsterdam. There is evidence that Taghi visited Iran multiple times to engage with the regime and was arrested in Dubai, from where he was plotting killings for Tehran.

Others include the Foxtrot Network, a criminal gang in Sweden that was responsible for an attack on the Israeli embassy on behalf of Iran’s Intelligence Ministry. There exists another such gang active in Sweden and beyond, Rumba, which enlisted a 14-year-old boy to engage in a shooting targeting the Israeli embassy in Stockholm. Iran was also behind that episode. Rumba is led by Ismail Abdo.

Thieves-in-Law, an eastern European organized criminal enterprise, schemed to assassinate journalist and activist Masih Alinejad on behalf of the Iranian government in New York. Two of its operatives were convicted in U.S. federal court last month for this crime. The IRGC has also employed the Hell’s Angels gang to commit arson attacks against synagogues in Germany, as well as the attempted murder of an Iranian defector living in Maryland. A leader of the Hell’s Angels, Ramin Yektaparast, found refuge in Iran until he was killed there in 2024. Narcotics trafficker Naji Ibrahim Sharifi-Zindashti, whom Iran’s Intelligence Ministry has contracted, has also used his network to enlist Hell’s Angels for similar Iranian extraterritorial operations. The Irish Kinahan Organized Crime Group likewise has links to Iran, which is thought to have afforded shelter for its leader.

The case for US FTO designations

The entities listed above are foreign organizations given their operations, predominantly throughout Europe. There are some questions as to the cohesiveness of some of the groups as formal organizations, but in cases where they exist, the Trump administration should sanction them as such.

These organizations also engage in “terrorist activity,” as defined by US law. Under the legal definition, “terrorist activity” can mean “assassination.” Given the long history of the Islamic Republic’s use of these criminal gangs, which engaged in both attempted and actual assassinations—for example, Thieves-in-Law—they have participated in terrorist activity. In the US State Department’s designation of Cártel de Sinaloa as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, it also cited its use of “violence to murder, kidnap, and intimidate civilians, government officials, and journalists.” Organizations like Hell’s Angels, Foxtrot, and Rumba have done the same, with attacks against Israel’s embassies in Europe, which were geared to threaten government officials there. Incidents of arson against synagogues in Germany—in which Hell’s Angels was implicated—also fall into this category.

Lastly, the Islamic Republic’s roving extraterritorial gangs undoubtedly threaten the security of US nationals or US national security. The documented history of their targeting of American citizens—for example Masih Alinejad—make them an acute threat. Their ability to penetrate U.S. soil also positions them as a risk to American national security, as successive Worldwide Threat Assessments produced by the US intelligence community have highlighted Iran’s commitment “to its decade-long effort to develop surrogate networks inside the United States” for violence.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted in his January confirmation hearing that Iranian surrogate groups “have long planned contingencies for attacks” against the American homeland. Should Washington and/or Israel decide to launch military operations to destroy Tehran’s nuclear program, Iran could potentially respond by activating these terrorist contingency plans, in part because they would camouflage Iranian complicity via use of non-Iranian criminal gangs to avoid the very US military escalation against Tehran that the Islamic Republic seeks to keep away from. This would enable the system to thread the needle in responding to such a US strike while attempting to duck a direct confrontation with the American military.

This very architecture, using criminal gangs, necessitates their designation as FTOs. The sanction would further reduce the space such groups have to operate on US soil, especially by criminalizing the provision of material support or resources to them. It would also pressure US allies and partners to sanction them under their respective national authorities. Trump has been creative in designating international cartels as FTOs. He should apply the same standard to those criminal syndicates under the tutelage of the Iranian intelligence services.

Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI). His research specialties include Iranian leadership dynamics, Iran’s military and security services, and Iran’s proxy and partner network. He is on X @JasonMBrodsky.

The post The case for designating Iran-linked crime networks as FTOs appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Islamist insurgents, including al-Shabaab and the Somali affiliate of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS-S), are making territorial gains. These two groups represent distinct but overlapping threats—each transnational, each integrated into broader jihadist ecosystems, and each capable of destabilizing regional and global security if left unchecked. They are also quickly evolving, including by increasing connections with other groups and malign state actors such as the Islamic Republic of Iran—creating larger geostrategic implications.

To address this evolution, the United States must remain engaged in Somalia; but that does not necessarily require escalation. Strategic engagement through a forward embassy, regional partnerships, and calibrated intelligence operations can disrupt the evolution of the terrorist threat in Somalia—and it costs far less than what it would take to contain fully metastasized, adaptive adversaries down the road.

Increasingly adaptive

For too long, ISIS-S has been treated as an afterthought in Somalia’s counterterrorism landscape, but the group can no longer be ignored: Since 2019, it has evolved significantly, becoming the Islamic State’s most agile, digitally integrated, and externally operational franchise. This has aligned with the Islamic State’s global shift toward a decentralized, node-based network managed by the General Directorate of Provinces. Formerly a localized insurgency attempting to replicate elements of the core caliphate in miniature, ISIS-S is now modular, externally focused, and nonterritorial, with unique technical capabilities that elevate its threat beyond that of traditional insurgent groups.

It does not seek to hold Mogadishu; rather, ISIS-S bypasses the Somalian capital to exploit ungoverned spaces through coordinated disruption. Its efforts destabilize governance; it coordinates its operations via encrypted messaging apps, blockchain-based payment systems, commercial off-the-shelf obfuscation tools, and artificial intelligence-generated multilingual propaganda that enables large-scale recruitment.

The ISIS-S threat is transnational and no longer confined to Somalia; that is apparent with the group’s implication in terror plots overseas, including in Sweden. Perhaps most critically for the United States, the ISIS-S al-Karrar office is understood to serve as a funding node for ISIS-Khorasan, which has proven capable of devastating terror plots, including the 2021 Abbey Gate bombing in Afghanistan that killed thirteen US service members.

Al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s East African affiliate, has also proven to be far more than a local insurgency—it is a deeply entrenched and militarily assertive force in Somalia, capable of executing complex operations, controlling territory, and challenging both national and international security efforts. This transnational terrorist organization has already exerted influence beyond Somalia, having executed mass-casualty attacks in Kenya and Uganda. In 2020, its operatives struck US and Kenyan forces in Manda Bay, killing three Americans. The group explicitly targets US and Western interests throughout East Africa. Withdrawing now, as al-Shabaab regains momentum, risks allowing it to strengthen its position and expand its influence.

Metastizing menace

Of parallel concern is the mounting evidence of cooperation between al-Shabaab and the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen. This partnership represents a dangerous escalation. The Houthis have repeatedly demonstrated the ability to strike maritime targets in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden using anti-ship missiles, drones, and explosive-laden boats. These asymmetric maritime attacks have disrupted vital shipping lanes, endangered commercial vessels, and necessitated multinational naval responses. They also offer a template for al-Shabaab’s future posture.  

Growing evidence exists that Houthi weaponry, supplied by Iran, has been transferred into Somalia and reached both al-Shabaab and ISIS-S. These transfers suggest an intensifying convergence of interests but not ideologies. While al-Shabaab, ISIS-S, and the Houthis remain doctrinally divergent, they share three critical traits: a reliance on illicit maritime logistics, the use of asymmetric tactics, and a willingness to cooperate when it serves operational goals. This alignment adds complexity to counterterrorism efforts in the Horn of Africa, blurring the lines between ideological enemies and functional partners.

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, just north of Somalia, is a critical chokepoint for global trade, funneling approximately 12 percent of seaborne oil trade flows. Increased attacks or insecurity in these waters would drive up insurance costs, increase shipping expenses, and worsen instability across East Africa and the Middle East. Should al-Shabaab or ISIS-S, either independently or in partnership with the Houthis, begin to harass this artery, it would have immediate implications for the global economy.

But in addition to the potential economic impact, there is also a clear strategic threat from this cooperation. Hostility to the West and asymmetrical warfare exercised by these groups and the militias included in Iran’s Axis of Resistance could pose an enduring threat to US allies and partners in the region. For example, the US Navy could see its operational freedom eroded, and militant activity in the sea lanes around the Horn of Africa—which connect the Mediterranean to the Indo-Pacific—could complicate the United States’ ability to surge naval forces in response to crises involving China in the Taiwan Strait or Russia in the eastern Mediterranean.

Continuity as containment

The 2021 US withdrawal from Somalia offered a preview of what disengagement would yield. Following the withdrawal, al-Shabaab and ISIS-S regrouped, expanded their respective operations, and forged deeper regional ties that present the greater challenges that the United States faces today. Although US forces returned in 2022, the withdrawal had already proved costly.

Today, ISIS-S internally exploits the geography of Somalia, clan connections, and instability to thrive. Al-Shabaab forces inch ever forward in their ongoing campaign to isolate and potentially capture the capital of Mogadishu. Each debate over whether to stay or go provides strategic space that the groups use to adapt.

The post-9/11 experience has demonstrated that power vacuums can be quickly filled by hostile actors. The 2011 withdrawal from Iraq enabled ISIS’s rapid rise. Strategic ambiguity in Libya yielded terrain for jihadist experimentation. Afghanistan’s rapid collapse under the Taliban offered ISIS-Khorasan and al-Qaeda a second wind. Somalia is not an exception: It would be the next domino.

But it’s not just a matter of being present. For example, the 2012 Benghazi attack was not a failure of presence; it was a failure of planning, coordination, and establishing an adequate security posture. Similarly, abandoning Somalia without a coherent containment strategy creates the risk of empowering a transnational terrorist organization with international ambitions while simultaneously allowing Iran to extend its strategic reach. 

To maintain its foothold at the most critical junction of East Africa’s security architecture, the United States must prioritize continuity. This includes keeping the US embassy in Mogadishu open, as it provides a platform for intelligence coordination, interagency operations, and diplomatic leverage. Without it, the United States cannot assess—let alone contain—a threat that is actively recombining in real time and posing risks to maritime security, the regional balance of deterrence, and potentially the US homeland.

The terrorist groups based in Somalia are adapting faster, making broader connections, and integrating deeper than Washington’s withdrawal advocates seem to realize. To misread that evolution as localized or static is strategic negligence. A decision to withdraw at this moment will not be remembered as a tactical recalibration but as an unforced error. To leave is to license the evolution of these terrorist groups; to stay is to disrupt it. 

Danielle Cosgrove is a senior advisor to the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Group. She is a distinguished guest lecturer at Stanford University, a Stanford Medicine X scholar, and the founder of an acquired threat mapping startup.

Doug Livermore is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Group, the national vice president for the Special Operations Association of America, and the deputy commander for Special Operations Detachment–Joint Special Operations Command in the North Carolina Army National Guard.

Disclaimer: The views expressed are the authors’ and do not represent official US government positions.

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On March 18, Thomas Warrick, a nonresident senior fellow with the Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative, was quoted in the Associated Press on personnel cuts to the Department of Homeland Security’s Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships. He argues that the center is central in averting terrorist attacks by identifying individuals before they perpetrate acts of violence.  

Fellow

Thomas S. Warrick

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative GeoStrategy Initiative

National Security Terrorism

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Given the threat that the Houthis continue to pose to the region, the United States is seeking to weaken the militant group. But to be successful in that goal, Washington needs a strategy that considers Yemen from within, rather than solely through the lens of the Houthis. A comprehensive strategy toward Yemen is the best way—and really the only way in the medium and long term—to avoid causing further pain to the Yemeni people while weakening the Houthis’ grip on power and deterring it from regional aggression.

So, what should this comprehensive strategy include? To begin with, the United States should work with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to empower the internationally recognized Yemeni government and weaken the Houthis to force the group into pursuing peace with its domestic opponents. A US Yemen policy that has a defined political goal and leverages Saudi and UAE is the best way to both ensure stability in Yemen and protect US interests in the Middle East by hindering the Houthis’ ability to menace the region and maritime trade.

Why the Houthis cannot be ignored

The Houthis’ behavior at the onset of the war in Gaza left the world with no option but to view the Houthis as a global security threat. First, the rebel group attacked maritime trade in the Red Sea, disrupting one of the world’s main trade arteries. Then, it launched missile and drone strikes at Israel. Since the start of this campaign, a concern that the Houthis might next target Saudi Arabia and its oil infrastructure has been constant. 

After the blows suffered by Lebanon’s Hezbollah in 2024, the Houthis have become the leading player in Iran’s network of regional allies. They pose a threat to the United States’ regional ally, Israel, and while the direct damage that Houthi attacks have inflicted against Israel so far has been limited, the militant groups has nevertheless threatened Israel’s economy through its attacks. Moreover, there is the persistent possibility that the Houthis will increase their collaboration with other radical nonstate actors, such as al-Qaeda in Yemen and al-Shabaab in Somalia. 

Locally, the Houthis have been the main obstacle to achieving peace in Yemen since the civil war ended with a shaky truce in 2022. The group has been unwilling to engage in genuine peace talks with the internationally recognized Yemeni government and its various factions on an equal basis. Prior to the October 7 attacks, Yemen was on the verge of a peace process that, while imperfect, offered a glimmer of hope for the Yemeni people. But instead of committing to peace with other Yemeni factions that could save the country from further fragmentation and economic deterioration, they chose the false heroism of targeting international shipping. Building regional status and winning populist plaudits have now become the Houthis’ major preoccupations.

The Houthis’ regional threat

Roughly three years ago, Saudi Arabia, in its attempt to exit the conflict in Yemen by presenting itself as a neutral broker, was closing in on an agreement with the Houthis that was to encompass basic issues. This included a comprehensive cease-fire, salary payments to public sector employees, and the resumption of talks among the Yemeni parties themselves. But the deal was negotiated exclusively between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, keeping the other Yemeni players in the dark. This allowed the Saudi side to offer one concession after the other in the absence of the internationally recognized government. As a result, the Houthis became bolder in their demands and less interested in genuine talks with their Yemeni rivals.

It was with the objective of neutralizing security threats from their south that the Saudis reopened backchannel talks with the Houthis in 2022. This resulted not only in a cease of hostilities in 2022 but also in an unforeseen, unprecedented level of closeness between the two sides.

But in one important respect, Saudi Arabia’s policy of rapprochement with the Houthis was short-sighted: it allowed the group to refrain from engaging directly with the Yemeni government, preventing a lasting peace agreement.

Today, Saudi Arabia is at more risk militarily than it likes to admit. The Houthis have expanded coordinated military operations with Iraqi militias that are also tied to Iran, including some that operate in the Saudi-Iraqi border area. Such encirclement against Saudi Arabia by Iran and its allied militias are what provoked Riyadh into launching its war against the Houthis in the first place. For now, though, Riyadh seems unconcerned, perhaps out of an optimistic sense that its recent rapprochement with Iran has neutralized the threat the Houthis and its allied groups pose. 

But the Houthis understand Saudi concern about any attacks on its $1.3 trillion worth of giga-projects at the heart of its Vision 2030 economic development plan, which includes major sporting events in the coming years, such as the Asian Winter Games and the World Cup. By the later years of the civil war, the Houthis were able to strike Aramco energy facilities and to do so during international sporting events such as a Formula 1 race in Jeddah. Riyadh does not want to risk any more such attacks in the future, so it has likely concluded that peace with the Houthis on the militant group’s terms is a small price to pay.

Now that the Houthis have become a key player in Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” and they have tested their powers to impact regional politics, however, they are unlikely to remain quiet. There is a growing sense that the Houthis need a war to distract from a deteriorating economic situation in Yemen, which the FTO will certainly worsen. In recent years, the Yemenis who live under Houthi control—a majority of the population—have suffered the worst economic and humanitarian conditions in living memory. This has been coupled with an apparent rise in arbitrary detentions, disappearances, and sometimes the outright murder of civilians under the Houthis.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the two regional backers of the recognized Yemeni government and its various elements, have gravitated toward a policy of neutralizing the Houthi threat through political and economic deals with Iran, China, and Russia that in different ways integrate Yemen and recalibrate Saudi ties with the Houthis. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have taken this course in part because of a lack of trust in the United States for, in their view, having let them down in the past. A key turning point was the US decision to help end the battle in Hodeidah in 2018 through the Stockholm Agreement. Both countries also viewed the lack of a US reaction to Iranian and Houthi attacks on their respective soils in recent years as a sign of Washington’s unwillingness to support its Gulf partners. The United States took no retaliatory action in the wake of the Iranian attacks on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq oil plant in September 2019, during the first Trump administration, or to the Houthi attacks on Aramco installations in Jeddah and on Abu Dhabi airport in early 2022, during the Biden administration. 

An approach that addresses Yemen as a whole

The United States and its regional partners and allies need to recognize the threat that the Houthis continue to pose to the region. The responses to the group’s aggression so far have been highly reactive—imposing sanctions, restricting humanitarian aid, and conducting military strikes. But these measures hurt the civilian population while Houthi leaders hide in Yemen’s mountainous recesses. Removing them militarily seems like a tall order; indeed, continuing with the current policies may only further entrench their rule. A better approach is to seek to weaken the Houthis to force them into serious talks with the recognized Yemeni government.  

Recent US actions are likely to be counterproductive to this goal. For example, cutting off aid to Yemen that flowed through the US Agency for International Development (USAID) amounts to giving up on Yemen, among other parts of the world. For Yemen, the blow is particularly harsh given the lack of a supporting hand to help it out of its economic and political crises. This will destabilize parts of the country, giving more space for radical groups such as al-Qaeda and other nonstate actors to prevail, not to mention exacerbating the suffering of the people. It will also increase the leverage of regional actors such as Iran and international actors such as Russia, to the detriment of the interests of US allies in the region. That will not make the United States safer or stronger, the rubric for foreign policy decisions recently set out by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio. 

So, what should the United States do? The Trump administration should press Saudi Arabia and the UAE to work together to strengthen the fragmented Yemeni government. Each country has its roster of clients within the government, but their bickering and infighting needs to stop if there is to be real hope of forcing the Houthis into peace talks. The Houthis believe that the Presidential Leadership Council, the internationally recognized government’s executive body, will sign off on whatever they are presented with by the Saudis. Thus far, they have no reason to think otherwise. The Saudis have kept the government deliberately weak to ensure there is no resistance to the final Saudi-Houthi normalization deal, which is currently in the works.  

Without sufficient diplomatic support, economic aid, and coordinated military assistance that reinforces the official Yemeni government’s capacity to rule and negotiate on equal terms, the Houthis are going to continue to be the number one political player in Yemen, a de facto authority en route to de jure. The Houthis will not be deterred from their aggression in the region as long as their domestic opponents are weak and fragmented. The Houthis’ increasing grip on parts of Yemen and their ability to threaten its neighbors is not in the interests of the United States, the Gulf countries, or the Yemeni people.

For all these reasons, the Trump administration needs to have a comprehensive Yemen policy; not just a policy against Houthis. In partnership with the Yemeni government, its Gulf partners, and other regional actors, the United States must fashion a strategy that weakens the Houthis, curbs Iran’s reach, and contributes to a more stable and prosperous Yemen. Such a policy would not only protect US interests but also render the world more secure and prosperous—for example, by preventing a repeat of the Houthis’ attacks on Red Sea shipping. It may seem counterintuitive to the Trump administration’s stated goals of reducing entanglements in distant conflicts, but a comprehensive Yemeni and regional approach to combating the Houthis is in fact the best way to put “America first.”

Osamah Al Rawhani is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the executive director for policy and partnerships at the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies.

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Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Daniel E. Mouton: The US will now need to ramp up diplomacy and other resources

Emily Milliken: Expect Houthi retaliation against US targets in the region

Danny Citrinowicz: An important change in strategy for coping with the Houthis

Osamah Al Rawhani: The bombings risk prolonging Yemenis’ suffering—which the Houthis can exploit to rally support

Alex Plitsas: Saturday’s airstrikes are probably the first of many

Andrew Borene: A more comprehensive allied approach will be needed

Thomas S. Warrick: A few days of strikes alone will not end Houthi attacks

The US will now need to ramp up diplomacy and other resources

Between March 2015 and March 2022, the Saudi-led coalition conducted between 25,054 and 75,135 airstrike sorties against Yemen’s Houthi movement. The Saudi-led coalition operated modern US and European aircraft, launched precision guided munitions, and received indirect US military support. Seven years of airstrikes across the breadth of Houthi-controlled territory failed to inhibit the Houthis’ ability to conduct counter-strikes against Saudi Arabia’s energy, aviation, and other civil infrastructure. In the face of the massive amount of ordnance the Saudi-led coalition dropped on Yemen and the amount of Saudi air-defense missiles fired at Houthi drones and missiles, the Houthis’ demonstrated their ability to increase their attacks over time. 

Importantly, large-scale Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia and corresponding coalition airstrikes ended with a truce in March 2022. Although a formal cease-fire remains unfulfilled, the Saudis, at least, have no desire to see a resumption of hostilities as the Houthis could just as easily target Saudi Arabia’s NEOM project or energy infrastructure. This explains why Saudi Arabia called for restraint when the United States and United Kingdom began airstrikes against the Houthis in 2024. Despite multiple rounds of strikes in Yemen, the Houthis demonstrated the same level of resilience that they demonstrated against the Saudi-led coalition.

Moving to the most recent round of strikes against the Houthis, Trump’s statement, if followed through, gives us a clear indication of the US direction in the Middle East. Trump wrote that he “ordered the United States Military to launch decisive and powerful Military action against the Houthi terrorists in Yemen,” and concluded with the threat that if Houthi attacks don’t stop, “HELL WILL RAIN DOWN UPON YOU LIKE NOTHING YOU HAVE EVER SEEN BEFORE!” 

Given the long history of Houthi resistance, first against the central Yemen government that they overthrew and later against the Saudi-led coalition, the current round of airstrikes are unlikely to deter the Houthis. Given that the Houthis receive support not only from Iran, but also from procurement networks in China and Russia, the United States will need to employ more resources than Saturday’s airstrikes. 

These additional resources will include diplomatic engagement with Russia and China, additional maritime resources to interdict resupply to the Houthis, and effective pressure on Iran. These resources do not include the potential need to increase the defenses of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, both of which the Houthis have targeted in the past. These resources will be considerable in terms of military assets and international coordination. Signs of the seriousness of US intentions to do more than in the past will be clear in the coming days and weeks. This level of commitment, more than Saturday’s strikes, will be what sends a message of US seriousness to Iran and the region.

—Daniel E. Mouton is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He served on the National Security Council from 2021 to 2023 as the director for defense and political-military policy for the Middle East and North Africa for Coordinator Brett McGurk.

Expect Houthi retaliation against US targets in the region

The latest US strikes targeted Houthi strongholds that are known locations for Houthi leadership and infrastructure. These operations align closely with previous statements by Trump and members of his administration that the United States needs to take a tougher stance against the rebel group. 

While strikes targeting the Houthis’ bases, leaders, and missile defenses may impact their ability to operate in the short term, the Houthis have proven resilient in the past and were able to still pose a regional threat after successive strikes by the Saudi-led coalition and more recently the United States and United Kingdom. Looking ahead, the group will likely launch a retaliatory strike, potentially on the USS Truman strike group in the Red Sea or US bases in the region, in an attempt to demonstrate to Yemenis living under their control, their backers in Tehran, and the wider international community that they remain undeterred by US operations.

The rebels may also continue ground operations in Marib, the last remaining Yemeni government stronghold and a key hub for oil and gas resources, or launch attacks on key Saudi infrastructure, in an attempt to force the government in Riyadh into a vulnerable position ahead of potential peace negotiations.

—Emily Milliken is the associate director of media and communications for the N7 Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

An important change in strategy for coping with the Houthis

The attacks conducted in Yemen by US Central Command, which mark the beginning of a targeted campaign against the Houthis, constitute an important change in the US policy toward the Yemeni terrorist organization. 

The US military has taken the initiative and begun targeted operations against the Houthi leadership and weapons production sites in Yemen.

These attacks highlight the US administration’s view regarding the need to prevent the Houthis from disrupting the freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and are an important signal to US friends in the region about Washington’s willingness to seriously confront the Houthis.

In order for the campaign to be effective, it must be continuous and ongoing while damaging the Houthis’ command and control sites and their ability to produce and launch missiles and drones. The campaign also must block Iran’s ability to support the Houthis’ power-building (via the Arabian Sea and Oman) while relying on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which are well acquainted with the Yemeni arena. 

Looking ahead, this campaign must also lead to the overthrow of the Houthi regime, a step that will seriously harm Iran’s presence in this strategic region and its ability to threaten Saudi Arabia.

Given the existing high tensions, these attacks—especially if the United States suspects that Iran is continuing to assist the Houthis—also bring Tehran and Washington closer to confrontation.

—Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and a member of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project working group.

The bombings risk prolonging Yemenis’ suffering—which the Houthis can exploit to rally support

The US bombing on Saturday in Sana’a and elsewhere in Yemen marks another escalation of the war with the Houthis. Purportedly aimed at weakening the group’s military, the attack is a direct response to persistent Houthi assaults on Red Sea shipping and broader regional aggression and threats. The difference between these attacks and those in the past is that Saturday’s attacks are meant to directly target Houthi leadership.

Although the attacks themselves may not show results at the moment, they deliver a strong deterrence message from the United States to Houthi leadership. However, the Houthis are likely to show resistance, meaning the US policy of deterrence will take time to show its effectiveness.

While the attacks also focus on military installations and equipment, draining Houthi resources, the group has consistently demonstrated the ability to adapt and recover.

Beyond their direct impact on the Houthis, these airstrikes deeply affect civilians, as Houthi-controlled territory represents more than 60 percent of Yemen’s population. This instills fear and increases resentment toward the United States from citizens who do not support the Houthis. Large-scale destruction and civilian casualties are bound to provoke outrage, which the Houthis can exploit to rally more support. Without a comprehensive approach that disrupts weapons and parts smuggling from Iran, and addresses the political and economic drivers empowering the Houthis, this week’s bombings risk prolonging the suffering of Yemenis.

—Osamah Al Rawhani is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the executive director for policy and partnerships at the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies.

Saturday’s airstrikes are probably the first of many

Since late 2023, the United States, alongside coalition partners, has conducted repeated strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen, aiming to curb the Iran-backed group’s escalating aggression. The Houthis’ attacks on Red Sea shipping have inflicted significant economic damage, disrupting international trade routes and slashing traffic on the Suez Canal, a critical artery for global commerce. Their campaign, which they tie to solidarity with Palestinians amid the Israel-Hamas war, has forced shipping firms to reroute, leading to spiking costs and delays.

Beyond merchant vessels, the Houthis have launched unprecedented drone and missile assaults on US naval ships, alongside ballistic missile and drone strikes targeting Israel. Despite over a year of US-led airstrikes, these efforts have failed to deter the Houthis, who have exploited the conflict to bolster their domestic and regional legitimacy. In early 2025, they threatened to resume Red Sea ship attacks, underscoring their resilience.

The Houthis’ ability to persist stems from their dispersal of weapons across Yemen’s rugged terrain, complicating targeting efforts. A lack of actionable intelligence has further hampered coalition strikes, despite extensive collection efforts spanning months. The group’s adaptability—hiding assets and leveraging Iran’s support—has rendered suppression elusive.

The extensive US airstrikes carried out Saturday were likely driven by months of painstaking intelligence work and are likely the first of many if they are to be successful in achieving the goal of stopping attacks on international shipping and US interests in the region.

 —Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the head of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project, and a former chief of sensitive activities for special operations and combating terrorism in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

A more comprehensive allied approach will be needed

Counterterrorism can be a powerful unifying force. In a time of challenges to some military alliances elsewhere, this may be one area where the United States, European powers, Israel’s allies, and a Saudi-led Arab coalition can all agree on needed action. Each shares motivations to combat the terrorist group and begin degrading Iran’s decades-long role as the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism.

History suggests that without a more comprehensive allied approach to the Houthi-Iran connection, airstrikes alone won’t be enough to push the Houthis out of Yemen or restore stability to one of the world’s most vital trade routes. Understanding the history behind these tensions is key to making sense of the present and what might come next.

The Houthis, an armed political and religious movement, have controlled large parts of western Yemen since 2015 and—despite years of airstrikes and some ground offensives led by Saudi Arabia, augmented by targeted US and UK strikes in response to last year’s attacks on commercial shipping—the Houthis remain entrenched. Airstrikes alone have not been enough to dislodge them, as they’ve adapted with asymmetric tactics, fortified defenses, and, most critically, sustained support from Iran.

That Iranian backing is central to their operations. The Houthis have positioned themselves within Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” alongside Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Without direct Iranian arms, training, and intelligence, their battlefield resilience and ability to target commercial shipping with precision would not be possible.

The first Trump administration already demonstrated a willingness to aggressively confront Iran’s most direct proxies and even Iranian top military leadership. That precedent may be relevant now as the United States responds again to Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping that have disrupted a sea route critical to 15 percent of global trade, forcing major companies to at times abandon the waterway and reroute around Africa, driving up costs and causing economic ripple effects worldwide.

—Andrew Borene is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project and a former senior official in the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

A few days of strikes alone will not end Houthi attacks

Most Americans have learned not to think of the Trump administration as patient, but the Houthis got a very pointed lesson this week of Trump’s impatience. Virtually every outside observer had concluded long ago that the Biden administration’s limited strikes since the Houthis started attacking international shipping in the Red Sea were not deterring the Houthis from continuing to strike when it suited them. 

Now, the Trump administration has decided to ramp up the attacks to see if a more painful demonstration will stop the attacks. The biggest risk for both the United States and the Houthis is that no amount of destruction short of targeting both the Houthi leadership and its military capabilities may actually achieve what the Trump administration wants. A few days of strikes will probably not bring about an end to the Houthis’ attacks—unless the Trump administration is prepared to go even further.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security.

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On February 1, AFRICOM conducted airstrikes targeting a local branch of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in the remote Golis Mountains in northern Somalia. AFRICOM later announced that the airstrikes managed to kill their main target: Ahmed Maeleninine, an ISIS recruiter, financier, and leader responsible for the deployment of jihadists to the United States and Europe. Following that strike, there have been a series of strikes against both al-Shabaab (a branch of al-Qaeda) and ISIS-Somalia, firmly placing the region at the forefront of the new administration’s kinetic military activities.

While most of the conversation about US military presence around the world has focused on paring back, in Somalia, the United States appears to be taking the opposite approach. The approach surprised some, in part because US President Donald Trump had withdrawn seven hundred US troops from Somalia during his first term. But the shift shouldn’t come as such a shock. It shows a broader understanding of a new reality: That combating terror globally starts in Africa.

Africa is at the forefront of the war on terror; in 2024 alone, the African Union reportedly recorded more than 3,400 terrorist attacks and 13,900 resulting deaths on the continent. And what is happening on the continent affects the wider world—Somalia in particular is an unfortunate showcase of that.  

ISIS-Somalia, for example, shows how terrorist groups have become embedded in the continent. Since breaking away from al-Shabaab in 2015, the Somali branch of ISIS has been growing exponentially. AFRICOM reported that just last year, the group had doubled in size. What’s more, rumors persist that Abdul Qadir Mumin, the leader of ISIS-Somalia who reportedly became the global leader of ISIS in 2023, survived a US strike last year. Thus, it’s clear why the United States is placing such attention on the group. While unconfirmed, the mere possibility that the leader of ISIS is not of Arab decent and is based in Africa signifies just how terror and the continent have become intertwined.

The involvement of terrorist groups on the continent is by no means limited to Somalia. From the Great Lakes of Central Africa to Mozambique, terrorist groups are prevalent—as are their financiers. Nowhere, however, are terrorist groups more prevalent than in the Sahel, where they have been expanding and strengthening for years. An array of groups—including Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, the Islamic State in West Africa Province, and Boko Haram, among others—now call the Sahel home. They even battle each other for territory and power.

In the past several years, a series of coups have driven out democracies from the Sahel and sought to replace US and European Union support with Russian mercenaries. But, as has been seen across the region, Russian support has hard limits. For example, in Mali—where leaders turned to Russia for military support—al-Qaeda jihadists briefly took over Bamako’s airport last year and posed for photos with the presidential jet. Even away from the hotbed of the Sahel, the limits of Russian mercenary support were made clear in Mozambique, where the Wagner Group was pulled from an operation targeting al-Shabaab after twelve mercenaries died. As this broader dynamic changes in the Sahel, jihadists groups are still gaining power.

So, what’s next?

Expect increased US attention toward Africa from a counterterrorism perspective. From what has been displayed so far, the United States’ tactics are looking quite muscular. Will this attention include rapprochement with the Sahelian juntas? That is still unclear. In weighing rapprochement, the Trump administration is sure to remember the lessons of the 2017 Tongo Tongo ambush in Niger, in which a joint US-Nigerien mission pursuing a leader of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara was attacked, resulting in the deaths of four US Special Forces soldiers. At the time, the ambush was the deadliest attack against the US military in Africa in decades. 

In recent years, global attention has focused on Eastern Europe and conflict in the Middle East rather than African conflicts. Yet, with international terror and jihadist groups now entrenched in the continent and pursuing global aspirations greater than carving out territory in Africa—presenting a major threat to the United States and its allies—attention is needed. The war on terror will be fought in Africa, and whatever direction that takes, the United States will need to be involved.

Some involvement is already underway. Notably, at a time when discourse about US global deployments is focused on withdrawals and wind-downs, discussions over US presence in Africa are taking the opposite direction. US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, whose first visit overseas conspicuously included the AFRICOM base in Germany, said, “Africa is very much the front lines of a fight from Islamists . . . We’re not going to allow them to maintain a foothold, especially to try to strike at America.” Notably, it was in a meeting with AFRICOM leaders that Hegseth signed a directive easing restraints and executive oversight on foreign US airstrikes and the deployment of US commandos.

Last month’s airstrikes in Somalia are likely the first of many. And while many analysts are loath to guess what this US administration will do on the foreign affairs front, the fact remains that combating terror in the modern era will require action in Africa.

Alexander Tripp is the assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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Trump indeed should take a close look at the Arab plan as a starting point for negotiations, as there is no other realistic plan on the table. Trump’s proposal for forced displacement is counterproductive; a group of 144 Democrats in the US House of Representatives pointed out that Trump’s plan undermines the United States’ principled moral position. Trump’s plan also threatens the long-standing peace between Egypt and Israel, according to Egyptian officials. But beyond the fact that the Egyptian plan is the only realistic one on the table, it is still in the United States’ interest to embrace a version of this plan, because it is politically and financially affordable for Washington.

The Egyptian plan, swiftly endorsed by Arab leaders last week, allows Palestinians to remain in the Gaza Strip while reconstruction takes place. Such reconstruction includes three phases: interim measures (six months), which would include the clearing of damage and initial construction overseen by a group of Palestinian technocrats paving the way for the Palestinian Authority to return to Gaza; reconstruction (two years), which would involve building additional housing and restoring services such as water and electricity; and governance (three years), which would see industrial zones built and would ensure that the technocratic committee has oversight over aid and governance.

The plan’s $53 billion price tag would be sourced from international organizations and investments. In calling for a group of Palestinian technocrats to manage the reconstruction, and for the Palestinian Authority to eventually lead Gaza, the plan stresses Palestinian ownership of the process. The Arab leaders who have backed the plan have committed to making their case for this plan internationally and for hosting an international conference in Cairo in April dedicated to Gaza’s recovery and reconstruction, in cooperation with Palestinians and the United Nations.  

On the other hand, Trump’s plan neglects the Palestinians, echoing policies and plans he released during his first term. But the Palestinian question remains pivotal in the Middle East and can’t be disregarded in favor of broader regional peace that doesn’t include the Palestinians. Trump’s Gaza plan also fails to answer many questions about the logistics of moving two million Palestinians out of the Gaza Strip (likely against their will) and about strategies for the countries that will receive them and how to secure Arab cooperation. Meanwhile, the Egyptian plan answers critical questions, specifically ones about Gaza’s political future (one without Hamas in power).

The Trump administration would benefit from supporting the Egyptian plan. Throughout his campaign and initial months in office, Trump has vowed to bring peace to the Middle East; backing the Egyptian plan would enable him to keep his word. Any attempted forced removal of Palestinians from Gaza, as implied by the Trump plan, would likely lead to armed resistance—and a return to war. That war would be costly for the United States, at a time when the Trump administration has prioritized reducing the government’s expenditures. The resumption of war would likely lead to more US aid to Israel: Since the start of the Israel-Hamas war, Israel received at least twelve billion dollars in military aid from the United States. This estimation doesn’t include the cost of the US military operations in the wider Middle East (including around the Red Sea) or any economic assistance to Israel. Trump’s plan would be costly morally, politically, and financially, not only for the United States, but any other party that would cooperate to implement this plan. Given that the White House has said that the United States won’t pay for this plan, it will be challenging to find partners to fund it. 

Witkoff’s comments on the Egyptian plan last week reflected two main sticking points for the Trump administration. The first is the timeline. While the Egyptian plan outlined reconstruction that would take place over five years without displacing Gazans, Witkoff suggested a longer period between ten and fifteen years and reiterated the administration’s concerns that the Strip would be uninhabitable during that time. A joint technical committee of engineers from Gaza and other parties could help resolve this issue by recommending what is possible in terms of the reconstruction timeline and process. The second point is the future of Hamas. Witkoff has concerns about the future of Hamas as a militant group. The Egyptian plan did not deal with this point, but it did suggest a political process in Gaza that results in the return of the Palestinian Authority. US officials should engage with different Palestinian groups, including the Palestinian Authority, as they did with Hamas. This may carry the promise of a long-term security arrangement in parallel with a political horizon to settle this conflict.    

Israel also dismissed the plan last week, arguing that it “fails to address the realities of the situation,” in a statement that focused on the political and security future of Gaza. Although the Egyptian plan emphasizes the Palestinian ownership of this process, it does overlap with Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid’s vision for Egypt to assume responsibility of Gaza for eight to fifteen years. That echoes an Israeli request from 2005—when Israel said it disengaged from Gaza—to no longer bear responsibility for the Gaza Strip. With the Egyptian plan, Arab countries have taken a leadership role that will likely amount to taking de facto responsibility of Gaza, even if the Palestinian Authority is in power.   

The Egyptian plan offers a base to secure many parties’ interests and create the required regional stability to buy time for diplomacy. US backing would help in the implementation of the plan and in addressing threats to the plan such as the resumption of war in Gaza, tensions resulting from the Israeli military operations in the West Bank, Israeli rejection of Palestinian power in Gaza after the war ends, and Israeli refusal of a Palestinian state. Trump should support the Egyptian plan or at least engage with it, both for the plan’s political and financial benefits and also for regional peace.

Ahmed Nabil is an adjunct lecturer at the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies at Wayne State University.

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Hezbollah desperately needed a lifeline to secure its future in Lebanon. The massive turnout to Nasrallah’s funeral on February 23 may have provided one, deterring Beirut from either seizing its arms or undermining its domestic standing.

Hezbollah derives its domestic strength—and its longstanding immunity from disarmament or restraint by the Lebanese government—not through force of arms alone but through widespread popularity among Lebanese Shiites, Lebanon’s likely largest and fastest-growing sect. In Lebanon’s May 2022 parliamentary elections, the group garnered 356,000 of the 1.8 million votes cast—the most of any party by approximately 150,000 votes. Polls from January and September of 2024 showed that between 89 percent and 93 percent of Lebanese Shiites support Hezbollah.

This extensive support reflects the group’s “Nation of Hezbollah” model of membership, first articulated in its foundational 1985 Open Letter, which prioritized a party’s “responsiveness with the masses” over territorial control. As a result, Hezbollah developed a broad, flexible concept of membership to attract as much support as possible. 

This served a pragmatic purpose. Gaining Shiite support at all granted Hezbollah domestic legitimacy and secured its place in Lebanon’s sectarian-power sharing system. The larger that support, the more influence Hezbollah had within that sectarian system—and therefore adopting a membership model designed to maximize support was vital.

Road to reconstruction

Popular support will also prove critical to Hezbollah achieving its post-war priorities, the first of which is retaining its arms. In his December 5 speech, the group’s new Secretary-General Naim Qassem bowed to reality and the Lebanon-Israel ceasefire agreement, agreeing that “the presence of armed individuals and the resistance’s weapons” would be “banned south of the Litani River”—amounting to a tactical withdrawal from most of south Lebanon. However, Qassem and the rest of Hezbollah have insisted that the agreement does not apply north of the Litani, meaning that the question of Hezbollah’s arms in the rest of Lebanon must be resolved through Lebanese consensus and dialogue on a national defense strategy. 

Hezbollah’s other, equally important priority is ensuring that post-war reconstruction funds reach its battered community. Qassem insisted that this must also be the Lebanese government’s priority, after ensuring Israel’s complete withdrawal from southern Lebanon. Seeking to shifting the onus of reconstruction—and the potential backlash if aid does not materialize—from Hezbollah squarely to the Lebanese state, Qassem stated that Beirut had a “responsibility” to “attract donations or call for [aid] conferences or rely on [help] from [foreign] countries” for reconstruction. 

Securing these two priorities is of existential importance for Hezbollah as they are essential to regain whatever trust Shiites lost in the group for inviting the recent war with Israel. Without its arms, the group could no longer claim to be “The Resistance.” After all, that image is the basis of much of Hezbollah’s appeal, and it also serves as its justification for retaining the figurative stick it uses—often as a last resort—to deter hostile action within Lebanon and, more vitally, dissent from within the Shiite community. 

As for reconstruction, Iran has allegedly been channeling funds to its main regional instrument—one billion dollars the day after the ceasefire went into effect. However, that’s a pittance compared to the estimated eight billion to eleven billion dollars in war damage. Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s access to Iranian coffers has been complicated by a combination of Assad’s downfall and Israeli threats, which led Beirut to temporarily clamp down on Hezbollah’s alternate funding route through Hariri International Airport by, for example, seizing cash shipments. If reconstruction aid does not materialize, Hezbollah will likely face an unprecedented eruption of anger from within its own support base. 

Numbers game

Enter Nasrallah’s funeral, the purpose of which, as Qassem stated, was not only an outpouring of grief but also a domestic show of force. Vast attendance was therefore necessary. 

Turnout numbers varied. Citing event organizers, Al-Jadeed and the Lebanese National News Agency offered a slightly implausible preliminary estimate of 1.4 million people, while Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International reported “hundreds of thousands” both in Camille Chamoun Stadium, Lebanon’s largest sports arena where the funeral began, “and surrounding areas.” Meanwhile, Reuters estimated one million attendees based on an unnamed “Lebanese security source,” anonymous Hezbollah sources told AFP that the event drew “around 800,000” participants, and a Lebanese official speaking on condition of anonymity to the Associated Press put the number at 450,000. The newspaper Al-Joumhouria claimed that 200,000 people from the Beqaa valley alone had headed to Beirut to participate in the funeral.

The final say on turnout, however, goes to the Beirut-based research and consultancy firm Information International. It dismissed both the inflated 1.4 million figure provided by the funeral organizers and the minimal estimate of a 200,000-person turnout, calling the latter “very low” and illogical, “given nearly 40 percent of attendees were in the stadium.” Instead, they estimated that 700,000 to 900,000 people attended Nasrallah’s funeral, with “no more than 15,000” of them coming from abroad, “based on [Hariri International Airport’s] daily activities.”

For comparison, the February 16, 2005, funeral of slain former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri attracted around 150,000 people.

Arms control

Hezbollah’s gambit, it would therefore appear, paid off—seemingly rebutting claims that the war and its effects had drained the group of a critical mass of supporters and left it domestically vulnerable. But that turnout now also serves to forestall any potential action by Lebanese authorities, who are already wavering on reining in the group. Both the ostensibly sovereigntist President Joseph Aoun and longtime ally, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, have accepted Hezbollah’s position on resolving the question of its arms.

This is also likely to critically impact Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, who has already made concessions to Hezbollah while forming his cabinet—Lebanon’s real executive authority—in recognition of the country’s political realities. Salam, if his government and its policy statement win a parliamentary vote of confidence, will hold the premiership until Lebanon’s May 2026 parliamentary elections, when his government will dissolve by operation of law. Meanwhile, Salam has a long list of vital tasks to accomplish during his short term in office, including steering Lebanon through economic recovery, repairing and upgrading the country’s dilapidated infrastructure, enacting political and judicial reforms, and overseeing post-war reconstruction. These would be monumental tasks in a functioning state. In Lebanon, accomplishing them will require all hands on deck and avoiding political infighting. 

With the numbers it brought out on February 23, Hezbollah can threaten the premier with—at a minimum—obstructionism if the group senses his government is moving against its arms or withholding or conditioning reconstruction aid to areas under its control. At worst, clashing with a Hezbollah that has retained pre-war levels of Shiite support could risk igniting a civil war.

Most Shiites who support Hezbollah are not unwavering Khomeinists. They back the group for practical reasons: its extensive social-clientelist network, the protection from external threats they believe Hezbollah’s private arsenal provides, and the domestic dignity and equality the traditionally disenfranchised sect derives from the group’s domestic political weight. But the relationship between party and population isn’t entirely transactional. Hezbollah has spent decades building an emotional symbiosis between the two—one that has remained relatively unchallenged by Shiite opposition alternatives, whose already small numbers are disunited and lack resources.

By bringing the community out to Nasrallah’s funeral in the hundreds of thousands, Hezbollah sent a message to its domestic opponents and the government: An attack on Hezbollah is an attack on the Shiites writ large. That doesn’t mean Hezbollah’s survival is absolutely guaranteed. But it has now, to Lebanon’s and the region’s misfortune, created a bridgehead that it can widen—over years, perhaps decades, and quite likely in fits and starts—to ensure it remains a fixture in Lebanon’s future.

David Daoud is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, focusing on Hezbollah, Israel, and Lebanon issues. Follow him on X: @DavidADaoud.

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After having withdrawn from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) during his first term, Trump has since expressed an interest in a negotiated settlement with Tehran. But with all deals, the details matter. And while it is true that the Trump administration has not yet given its blessing to Israel for military strikes against Iran—as US intelligence reportedly portends—it was unrealistic to expect such a move from Trump as the opening act of his presidency. Trump needed time to build his team, formulate a policy, and secure international legitimacy and support for military action should it become necessary. The third task requires leaving open a lane for diplomacy to make it possible to blame Tehran should negotiations fail and to secure political support from US allies and partners.

Right now, signs indicate that the United States and Iran are headed towards confrontation, not a successful diplomatic outcome.

The Islamic Republic has not yet softened its position on the nuclear file, even after being weakened by a series of killings of leaders across its proxy network and by the degrading of a chunk of its air defenses and missile capacities. While Iranian decisionmakers have recognized the reality that the 2015 text of the JCPOA is long dead, they have clung to the vision of resurrecting a new deal premised on the basic bargain of temporary nuclear constraints in exchange for sanctions relief, using the JCPOA as a reference point or framework. 

Some Iranian officials have taken to the airwaves to hint that there may be willingness to discuss nonnuclear concerns, but those who are the real decisionmakers on these issues—the supreme leader and commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—have shunned talks over its missile and drone programs and other regional files. Their stances speak louder than the propagandists trying to give an impression to Western constituencies and others that such fundamental change is possible. History has shown that it is not.

In February, the supreme leader himself delivered public remarks warning against negotiations with the Trump administration: “One shall not negotiate with a government like this,” he said. “Negotiating is unwise, unintelligent, not honorable.” Already this has triggered hardened rhetoric from Iranian officials, such as President Masoud Pezeshkian, who had previously made more conciliatory comments towards the Trump administration. Since Khamenei’s speech, the Pezeshkian administration has experienced further headwinds with the impeachment of Economy Minister Abdolnaser Hemmati as well as the resignation of Vice President for Strategic Affairs Javad Zarif, who has long been seen as the face of the Islamic Republic’s engagement with the United States.

But Khamenei’s warning last month was not the sweeping ban he laid down in September 2019, when he said, “the policy of maximum pressure on the Iranian nation is of little importance, and all the officials in the Islamic Republic unanimously believe that there will be no negotiations at any level with the United States.” The Islamic Republic under Khamenei will likely never truly walk away completely from the negotiating table, as its political weaponization is a valuable tool to buy time for the regime and divide the United States from within and from its allies. This does not necessarily mean there will be direct and public diplomacy with the Trump administration at this juncture. However, Khamenei’s latest comments seem to leave some room for diplomacy in that they do not necessarily rule out indirect discussions. Such discussions could take place through various channels of communication that Tehran has long maintained with Washington, including through Arab regional interlocutors and European governments. Russia has also reportedly agreed to serve as an intermediary. Still, the obstacles are significant.

For now, on substance, Iran and the United States are talking past each other about “deals.” Iran is still speaking in the language of the JCPOA. But US officials appear to have something different in mind. In a recent interview, Trump publicly disavowed the JCPOA formula, complaining about its short-term duration. This was followed by his national security advisor expressing a willingness to talk to Iran as long as Tehran wants to give up its entire nuclear program. The US secretary of state hinted at a similar demand, noting that in the past, “efforts that Iran has undertaken diplomatically have been only about how to extend the time frame” for its nuclear program and to continue to enrich, sponsor terrorism, build long-range weapons, and “sow instability throughout the region.” 

Trump’s National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 (NSPM-2) included related pledges, vowing to “deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon and end the regime’s nuclear extortion racket.” NSPM-2 also employed mandatory language stating that the US ambassador to the United Nations will “work with key allies to complete the snapback”—or restoration—”of international sanctions and restrictions on Iran.” This language evokes past US demands for zero enrichment or reprocessing in Iran, which the first Trump administration endorsed. Triggering snapback would also restore previous UN Security Council resolutions, inked before the 2015 JCPOA, which included demands for Iran to suspend “all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities . . . and work on all heavy-water related projects.”

NSPM-2 likewise declared that it is US policy that “Iran be denied a nuclear weapon and intercontinental ballistic missiles,” among other measures to counter Iran’s malign behavior beyond its nuclear program. These US positions are reminiscent of the 2003 Libya disarmament deal, in which the country pledged to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction programs, including nuclear, and to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime. However, this is a fundamentally different paradigm from the JCPOA, which allowed Iran to enrich uranium up to 3.67 percent purity and did not touch its missile program.

In fact, Iran’s supreme leader has warned that US officials “intend to systematically reduce Iran’s nuclear facilities, similar to how they did with a North African country”—a hint at Libya—”ultimately leading to the shutdown of Iran’s nuclear industry.” In 2011, Khamenei (referring to Libyan dictator Muammar Ghaddafi) said that “this gentleman wrapped up all his nuclear facilities, packed them on a ship and delivered them to the West and said, ‘Take them!’” He added, “Look where we are, and in what position they are now.” In 2023, after talks about reviving the JCPOA stalled, Khamenei reiterated that “there is nothing wrong with the agreement [with the West], but the infrastructure of our nuclear industry should not be touched.” 

Despite forty-six years of failed diplomacy, outside observers have been insisting Iran is ripe for a durable diplomatic arrangement with the United States. Some supporters of negotiations with Iran have also been wishcasting that Trump suddenly adopted the Obama administration’s Iran policy based on an overreading of the new president’s rhetoric and the absence of certain officials, such as former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo who took a hardline stance, from the policymaking process. But this is a false narrative, one that even some Islamic Republic officials like to promote while arguing that Trump was suckered into an Iran policy that was not his own, despite him expressing disapproval of the JCPOA during his first presidential campaign, well before his national security team was assembled.

There is no public evidence to date that the maximum Tehran is prepared to give—a JCPOA-style arrangement—will meet the minimum the Trump administration is prepared to accept. If current positions hold, this sets the stage for a showdown, not a deal, in the near term, necessitating the development of a robust pressure architecture to further sharpen Tehran’s choices.

Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI). His research focus includes Iranian leadership dynamics and Iran’s military and security apparatus. He is on X @JasonMBrodsky.

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The cease-fire announcement comes after Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the PKK (which is designated a terrorist group by the United States, European Union, and others), issued a long-awaited statement on Thursday telling the group to lay down its arms and dissolve. His message touched upon the themes of respecting national borders, renouncing armed struggle in favor of political engagement, and shifting from an ethnonationalist agenda to a broader push for democratic reforms.

Many are questioning whether this is truly the beginning of a historic resolution, seeing as it would depend on PKK-linked groups to follow through with disarming dissolving. But, as the Kurdish question has become a regional one, the significance of the cease-fire and Öcalan’s call will also depend on how regional alliances and power balances unfold.

The backdrop

The statement wasn’t unexpected. It comes after a political development in October 2024—one that caught everyone off guard.

Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli, known not only as a staunch defender of Turkish nationalism but also as a pillar of the state tradition, signaled a potential shift in policy when he shook hands with pro-Kurdish political party representatives in the Turkish parliament. He later stated that Öcalan could see his prison conditions eased if he called on the group to lay down its arms. This moment marked a profound shift in the Turkish state’s approach to the Kurdish issue, signaling a potential departure from its long-standing policies.

For those observing the issue from within Turkey, this turning point was deeply perplexing. Key leaders of the Kurdish political movement, including its most popular political figure Selahattin Demirtaş, remained behind bars. In 2024 and 2025, the Turkish government appointed trustees to replace elected mayors from the pro-Kurdish People’s Democracy and Equality Party (DEM Party) and the Republican People’s Party (CHP) following arrests on terrorism charges. This practice impacted Kurdish-populated municipalities including Hakkari, Mardin, Batman, and Istanbul’s Esenyurt district. The Kurdish opposition also faced a large-scale crackdown. Concerns over Turkey’s democracy had reached their peak as discussions on the Kurdish issue were gaining momentum.

Analysts argued that Erdoğan’s efforts were aimed at amending the constitution to extend his presidency as, after being elected three times, he would be constitutionally banned from running in the 2028 elections. In this context, securing new coalition partners—particularly Kurdish support—became crucial for obtaining the backing needed to pass constitutional changes that would enable him to seek another term.

But throughout discussions on the Kurdish issue, Erdoğan refrained from taking a direct role and largely delegated communication of the process to Bahçeli, in what seems to be a deliberate effort to separate his political future from the negotiations. This choice reinforces the notion that the “opening” was not merely a political maneuver but a broader state-driven initiative. In fact, the first statement from the government side came from Justice and Development Party Deputy Chairman Efkan Ala, who said, “The essence of the call is for the laying down of arms and the dissolution of the terrorist organization. We focus on the outcome.”

Ala’s response not only seeks to frame the issue primarily as one of disarmament but also underscores the uncertainty surrounding its feasibility. This uncertainty is compounded by the fact that a call from an imprisoned leader does not guarantee compliance, especially given the internal divisions, conflicting interests, and shifting power dynamics that often characterize armed movements such as the PKK. Over time, factions may develop autonomy from their original leadership, further complicating the prospects of a unified response. Given these complexities, the likelihood of a definitive outcome remains uncertain.

All this raises a critical question: Why would the PKK be willing to lay down arms?

The Syrian dimension

These events appear to be part of a broader strategic realignment with far-reaching geopolitical implications, particularly concerning Syria. It is a realignment not only for Ankara—which is shifting its approach to the war in Syria—but also for the PKK, whose regional strategy is evolving. Both actors are recalibrating their positions in response to changing regional dynamics, international pressures, and the balance of power in Syria.

The PKK’s regional strategy is closely intertwined with the trajectory of Syrian Kurds. First, while the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Syria is formally distinct from the PKK, its connection to the PKK is rooted in recruitment patterns and strong sociological ties. Historically, Syria has been a crucial source of PKK fighters, with fluid movement between the two organizations. Additionally, the PKK’s leadership and ideological influence have played a significant role in shaping the PYD’s political vision, resulting in continuity between their strategies and objectives. But while the PKK is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union, the PYD is not classified in the same manner, leading to differing international approaches toward the two groups.

Second, when the Ba’athist regime withdrew from Kurdish-majority areas at the beginning of the civil war, Syrian Kurds established a quasi-state with military, administrative, and judicial structures. For the first time, they governed autonomously, consolidating territorial control and legitimizing their authority through legal and institutional mechanisms. This transformation not only solidified the PYD’s position as a key regional actor but also secured the party international support; notably, the group’s participation in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) attracted the support of the United States. Consequently, Syrian Kurds’ self-governance and efforts to strike international alliances demonstrated the strategic advantages of state-building and diplomacy, making the goal of securing the PYD’s future appear both more feasible and strategically sound for the PKK.

Following the ousting of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, Syrian Kurds find themselves at a pivotal moment. Beyond maintaining their autonomous enclave, they seek formal recognition and legal integration into Syria’s evolving political structure. Öcalan’s call aligns with this broader geopolitical shift as it implicitly advocates for Kurdish groups in Syria to be recognized as legitimate legal entities within the state framework. Like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS’s) transition from an insurgent group to a governing force, the PYD is undergoing a parallel transformation, seeking to establish itself as a legally recognized political actor in the region.

Turkey’s calculations

Whether this transformation materializes depends on Turkey’s readiness to soften its stance toward the PYD in Syria and willingness to reconsider its perception of Syrian Kurdish governance as an existential threat. However, for Turkey to shift its position, two key conditions must be met: first, a clear decoupling of the PYD from the PKK, and second, the neutralization of the PKK threat through disarmament and credible guarantees that current borders will remain unchanged. In essence, while Öcalan’s call for disarmament does not directly pertain to the PYD (as Mazloum Abdi, commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces, immediately clarified), it remains a sine qua non for Turkey to reconsider its stance and open the door for political negotiations with the PYD.

If Turkey were to soften its stance, it would not only ease US policy concerns and reduce US-Turkey tensions but also contribute to a more stable security framework in Syria. The Kurdish-led administration acts as a counterbalance to HTS, maintains close cooperation with the United States, and is widely regarded as a secular alternative to Islamist factions. Moreover, the inclusion or exclusion of Kurds in Syria’s governance structure is a crucial factor in shaping the regional power balance, particularly in influencing dynamics between Turkey, the United States, Israel, and Arab states (many of these Arab states remain cautious of Ankara’s expanding influence in the region). The political integration of Kurdish actors into Syria’s future governance is thus a crucial step in, specifically, the United States’ efforts to ensure long-term stability in the region. This significance was underscored when the White House publicly welcomed Öcalan’s statement.

From ethnopolitics to geopolitics

While the Kurdish question has always had a geopolitical dimension, groups over the past decade have shifted from using ethnopolitical tools—such as cultural rights and political representation—to geopolitical strategies focused on regional security and strategic realignment. No longer confined to matters of identity and minority rights, the Kurdish question has become a regional issue, both shaping the broader power dynamics of the Middle East and being influenced by them.

As this shift blurs the distinction between internal and international politics, the nature of any potential resolution also changes. The terms of negotiation are no longer about cultural recognition or political inclusion but about strategic positioning and regional security. As Middle East academic Arzu Yılmaz points out, this is why the current process cannot be seen as a traditional peace initiative aimed at resolving historical grievances; rather, it is a process of alliance-building, in which regional alliances and power balances dictate the framework of engagement.

Whether the cease-fire and Öcalan’s statement mark the beginning of a lasting resolution or merely another phase in an ongoing regional power struggle remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that it can no longer be understood—let alone resolved—within the borders of a single state.

Evren Balta is a professor of political science at Özyeğin University and a visiting scholar at the Harvard University Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. Follow her on X at @Evreki.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Despite the significant weakening of Hamas’s military capabilities after fifteen months of conflict, the group’s political control over Gaza remains intact, complicating any roadmap for postwar recovery. This deadlock largely stems from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s extended military campaign in Gaza and his government’s lack of any clear strategy for the strip’s day after. Netanyahu has failed to pursue a sustainable political path that could bring stability to Gaza and ensure Israel’s long-term security. Instead, recent rhetoric from Netanyahu’s government seems to have doubled down on the Trump administration’s proposal of displacing the entire Palestinian population of Gaza as a potential avenue to address the crisis. Any Israeli move in this direction would escalate the conflict, not resolve it.

Moving forward with the forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza would only fuel support for Hamas’s extremist ideology and exacerbate tensions throughout the region. For a sustainable peace, the Israeli government must agree to a postwar governance framework for Gaza that provides an alternative to Hamas and allows Palestinians to govern themselves.

The absence of a postwar plan for Gaza

Since the war began, Israel’s primary objective has been to dismantle Hamas and secure the return of the hostages taken on October 7, 2023. While Israel has successfully degraded Hamas’s military infrastructure and eliminated some of its top leaders, the group continues to wield control over Gaza, raising questions about the effectiveness of Israel’s approach.

The main Israeli failure lies in the absence of a credible governance alternative for Gaza. Netanyahu’s rejection of any role for the Palestinian Authority in postwar Gaza has created a power vacuum that Hamas continues to exploit. Without a clear plan for Gaza’s postwar governance, the Israeli military effort alone cannot achieve long-term stability for the enclave or for Israel. US, Israeli, and regional leaders have all made clear that they view Hamas rule over Gaza in the war’s aftermath as unacceptable. This month, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called Hamas “pure evil” and said it must never govern Gaza again. Last year, former Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry described Hamas as “a faction outside the Palestinian consensus.” Yet despite this rhetoric, the failure to establish a viable alternative governing structure for Gaza risks prolonging Hamas’s control by default.

New Atlanticist

Feb 14, 2025

A plan for postwar Gaza: Instead of removing Palestinian civilians, remove Hamas

By Daniel B. Shapiro

Drawing inspiration from an approach that worked in 1982, US President Donald Trump should put forward a landmark plan to rid Gaza of the terrorist organization.

Conflict Israel

Netanyahu’s political calculations

With the fragile cease-fire hanging by a thread and mounting pressure from the families of Israeli hostages, Netanyahu appears to be prioritizing his own political survival over a sustainable peace settlement. Indeed, at various points during the current phase of the cease-fire, he has both threatened a renewed military offensive—despite the Israeli military’s claims in September that Hamas’s military wing had been defeated—and embraced Trump’s proposal for the mass displacement of Gaza’s population.

Further, Netanyahu appointed his close political ally, Ron Dermer, as the lead negotiator for phase two of the Gaza cease-fire, replacing Mossad head David Barnea. This decision centralized authority over the cease-fire talks within Netanyahu’s inner circle, giving him greater oversight and influence over the negotiation process and the flexibility to shape the narrative and outcomes of the cease-fire in a way that aligns with his political agenda.

Netanyahu’s direct involvement is particularly significant given his track record of altering cease-fire terms to serve his political interests, which has repeatedly led to the breakdown of prior rounds of negotiations. Prolonging the war in this manner has jeopardized the hostages, whose lives are further endangered every additional day they spend in Hamas captivity. This was made painfully evident by tragic incidents such as Hamas’s execution of six hostages, including American-Israeli Hersh Goldberg-Polin, in September, just days before Israeli forces arrived and discovered the victims’ remains.

Moving ahead with the plan for the mass displacement of Gazans would align with the hardline stance of prominent members of Israel’s far-right, including Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, a member of the Knesset who resigned as national security minister in protest of the January cease-fire agreement. Both figures hold significant sway over the stability of Netanyahu’s fragile governing coalition.  

However, forcing civilians out of Gaza would neither weaken Hamas nor bring security to Israel. On the contrary, it risks intensifying radicalization and reinforcing extremist narratives, potentially destabilizing the broader region. By intertwining his own political survival with a dubious military strategy, Netanyahu’s approach threatens to further escalate regional tensions, making a sustainable resolution even more elusive.

New Atlanticist

Feb 14, 2025

A plan for postwar Gaza: Reconstruction will fail unless these two challenges are addressed

By Ahmed F. Alkhatib

Gaza’s reconstruction will require creativity and an understanding that there is no simple US real-estate solution for the strip.

Israel Middle East

How mass displacement would fuel radicalization

The argument for mass displacement is fundamentally flawed because it blames Palestinian civilians for Hamas’s actions. In reality, Gazans have suffered under Hamas’s authoritarian rule, where dissent is crushed and civilians are used as human shields.

The idea that Palestinians are a homogeneous block that supports Hamas is simply not accurate. The only Palestinian legislative election in which Hamas participated, in 2006, showed a divided electorate, with Hamas winning 44.45 percent of the vote and Fatah garnering 41.43 percent. Since then, Hamas has ruled Gaza by brute force and coercion after taking over the enclave militarily in 2007. More recently, an Arab Barometer poll that was conducted just before the October 7 terrorist attacks indicated that 72 percent of Gazans believed Hamas was corrupt while 44 percent expressed no trust in the group. Considering how brutally Hamas suppresses dissent, one can only imagine how low support for the group in Gaza really is. Further, nearly half of Gaza’s population is under eighteen, meaning Hamas is the only government many Palestinians have ever known.

Therefore, blaming the whole population of Gaza for Hamas’s actions is not just a moral failure. It is also a strategic mistake. It shifts the focus away from the real issue: Hamas’s reign of terror. Treating civilians as perpetrators rather than victims feeds extremist narratives, fueling radicalization and hatred. If the goal is to eradicate extremism, foster stability, and achieve long-term security for Israel, then the focus should be on freeing Gazans from Hamas’s oppression, not displacing them.

Displacement would spread Hamas’s influence across the region, solidifying its image as a “resistance movement” rather than exposing it as a failed terrorist entity. This move would inflame tensions across the Middle East, destabilize neighboring countries, and fuel anti-Israel sentiment around the world.

History shows that forced displacement breeds extremism. The Nakba of 1948 created generations of refugees who would became the backbone of militant movements. This includes the late high-ranking Hamas officials Ismail Haniyeh and Yahya Sinwar, both of whom were born in refugee camps in Gaza after their families were displaced during the Nakba. A similar mass expulsion today would reinforce the idea that violence is the only way to reclaim lost land, further entrenching cycles of radicalization.

Breaking Hamas’s grip

Defeating Hamas militarily is not enough. To truly end its control over Gaza, Hamas must be defeated strategically by degrading its legitimacy and freeing Gazans from Islamist authoritarianism. This cannot be achieved by weakening the so-called “Axis of Resistance” alone, but only by breaking Hamas’s grip on power.

Gaza’s reconstruction is impossible as long as Hamas controls the strip. The group has repeatedly manipulated international aid to build its military capabilities, fueling radicalization and extremism. Without a postwar governance framework liberating Gaza from Hamas’s influence, Gazans will continue to suffer under a humanitarian catastrophe.

This cannot be achieved through forced displacement or by obstructing efforts to establish a legitimate and credible alternative to Hamas. For long-term stability to be achieved, international actors must support the development of Palestinian institutions capable of effective governance. This requires fostering an Arab-led, Palestinian-owned transitional process with a nonpartisan, technocratic government that can implement the rule of law and carry out structural reforms in education, law enforcement, and media. Economic development initiatives must also be prioritized to reduce extremism by creating real employment opportunities.

Gaza’s reconstruction must be designed to empower civilians, not Hamas or its backers. The only way to defeat extremism is by offering Gazans hope, opportunity, and the means to govern themselves responsibly.

Netanyahu’s failure to agree on a clear day after plan for Gaza has prolonged Hamas’s rule and exacerbated the suffering of both Israelis and Palestinians. By embracing mass displacement, he is not solving the crisis but escalating it. This strategy threatens to radicalize a new generation of Palestinians, solidifying Hamas’s narrative of resistance and fueling long-term instability.

Achieving security and stability requires a strategic shift from military dominance and displacement to cooperation with Arab countries, empowering Gazans through governance reform and economic opportunity. A credible political alternative to Hamas is essential for lasting peace.

Ignoring this will only perpetuate cycles of violence, deepen regional instability, and ultimately undermine Israel’s security. The future of Gaza lies not in forced migration but in breaking Hamas’s grip on power and creating opportunities for Gazans to build a better future.

Mohamed Farid is a member of the Egyptian Senate.

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1. Who is Abdullah Öcalan, and why is his statement such a big deal?

Öcalan is the imprisoned symbolic leader and driving co-founder of the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK), a US-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization rooted in radical leftist ideology and revolutionary violence. It has fought the Turkish state in Turkey since 1984 and spawned affiliates in Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Tensions stemming from the PKK conflict have roiled Turkey, the region, and US-Turkish relations for decades, and thwarted the search for stability, prosperity, and security for Turks, Kurds, and other peoples of the region. The statement marks the first serious attempt in over a decade to end the PKK’s armed campaign and normalize politics in Kurdish-majority areas affected by the conflict. 

—Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Turkey Programs, with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian.

Since the PKK’s establishment in 1984, Turkey’s conflict with the group has resulted in at least forty thousand deaths. Some unofficial estimates put this number as high as one hundred thousand. And that’s just the human toll. It is hard to quantify the economic losses from a war that has lasted over forty years.

Öcalan is the founder of the PKK, and he has been imprisoned in Turkey since 1999. His call to end the PKK, even though he is still in jail, is a big deal. But Öcalan left the final decision to the PKK’s current leadership, and we still need to wait for the PKK party congress for the final word. The timeline of this congress is not yet known. If Öcalan’s call is ratified there and then is followed by all Kurdish militias in Syria, Iraq, and Iran, as well as in Europe, then this will be a big win for all parties. 

—Defne Arslan is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Turkey Programs.

2. What are his possible motivations for making this statement?

If we can read between the lines of Öcalan’s statements today, he sounds like he has lost his hope to win against the Turkish military and is looking for a more official and political ground to continue their battle. He also called the PKK an outdated organization rooted in Marxist/Leninist ideals that do not exist anymore. 

—Defne Arslan

Öcalan presumably wants to cement his legacy as something more than a militant or terror detainee and to be remembered as a peacemaker who translated violence, or “resistance,” into political gains. He has previously espoused partnership between Turks and Kurds and in his new statement embraced the Turkish Republic as the vehicle to do so—another step in a long evolution from anti-state, separatist dimensions of PKK ideology. He likely sees the writing on the wall regarding his movement’s Syrian branch (the People’s Protection Units, or YPG) given the new post-Assad reality, and he knows the time is now for political developments to remove the motive for new Turkish military operations to eradicate it.

—Rich Outzen

3. What does this mean for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s agenda?

Erdoğan pursued a peace process with the PKK from 2011 to 2014, which was interrupted by events in Syria and domestic political struggles. He intends to be the Turkish leader who ended PKK terrorism while improving the conditions of Kurds in Turkey and the region. A resumed peace process will help Turkey’s economy and relations with the United States, and it will remove an obstacle to reintegration of Syria (and Iraq) into a Turkey-driven regional economy. Moreover, it may strengthen his hand in terms of domestic politics as he re-attracts liberal Turks and leftist Kurds who rejected his more hardline stance on the PKK over the past decade. 

—Rich Outzen

If all PKK-linked Kurdish groups follow Öcalan’s call to disarm and dissolve, then this will be a big win for all sides, ending a conflict that has persisted for more than forty years. Such an outcome could also help Erdoğan receive the support of most of the Kurdish population for the amendment to the Turkish constitution he needs to stand for reelection.  

—Defne Arslan

4. What can we expect next from PKK affiliates throughout Turkey and the wider region?

The PKK seems likely to heed Öcalan’s call for a congress of leadership and affiliates to act on his statement. I expect there will be caution and conditionality—a process of phased implementation rather than an immediate transformation. The Syrian affiliate is most exposed and probably will comply most readily. There may be dissident factions that refuse to disarm or stop fighting. (Think, for instance, of the “Real IRA,” the version of the Irish Republican Army that broke away from the IRA and Provisional IRA in 1997.) The aging cadres in the Qandil Mountains may be looking for an honorable way to come down off the mountain, and the organization is highly centralized in ideological terms despite its regional distribution. Within Turkey, the organization has in any case lost most of its capacity to sustain armed attacks, so the question there is political process, while across the border in Iraq and Syria, the question is compliance. 

—Rich Outzen

5. What does this mean for US cooperation with PKK affiliates in Syria?

The United States has already developed plans to withdraw its forces from Syria, and I suspect indirectly has been advising its partner force that the best strategy moving forward is political reconciliation with Damascus and Ankara. Prudence dictates a gradual approach by which the United States signals, coordinates, and executes the withdrawal in a way that avoids a sudden vacuum or provides incentives not to comply with the peace process. There is a continuing need for coordination among the United States, Turkey, Damascus, and the YPG to prevent any resurgence of the Islamic State. That said, if the PKK disarms and disbands as an armed force, there will be no basis for a continued US affiliation.

The commander of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) said this call doesn’t apply to the group, because it sees itself as something other than the PKK. But the SDF would likely abide by a cease-fire, and it is in separate talks on integration into the new Syrian security structure, in any case.

—Rich Outzen

6. Could this help pave the way to the establishment of an independent Kurdish state?

That is highly unlikely, because Öcalan essentially committed with his statement to Turkish-Kurdish solidarity within the existing Turkish Republic. Trends in the region—dictator Bashar al-Assad’s fall and the advent of a new Syrian government, the weakening of Iran’s proxy network, Washington’s inclination to end wars and avoid imperial projects in the region, the likely resumption of a peace process in Turkey—all point to Kurdish communities pursuing their interests within the existing states. 

—Rich Outzen

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These choices signal that the United States is focused on countering the Houthis’ weapon supply chains, while also suggesting that the White House is keeping the political door open for a possible stronger military engagement against the Iran-backed group. For the United States, a stronger maritime partnership with Yemen’s government and allied forces in southern Yemen can be the first step to curb armed groups’ rising offensive capabilities in the Red Sea region. This would support Yemeni institutions to restore a degree of sovereignty in the country; weaken the emerging, weapons-driven cooperation among the Houthis, al-Shabaab, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); and would make it more difficult for Russia to develop game-changing military relations with the Houthis. 

In a break from the past, the main international and regional stakeholders (the United States, the European Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council states, Israel) now share converging perspectives on the global threat emanating from Houthi-controlled areas. Degrading their offensive capabilities is widely perceived as the only viable option left, as the Yemeni government is calling for international support to regain Houthi-held territories, starting from the coastal Red Sea area. 

Supporting the Yemeni Coast Guard 

When empowered through equipment and training, which increased in the final months of the Biden administration, and also with regular payment of their salaries, the YCG can tackle the arrival of smuggled weapons to the Houthis. Task forces of the US-led Combined Maritime Forces have often seized dhows carrying Houthi-destined weapons in international waters, while the YCG could effectively complement the effort within Yemeni territorial waters. 

As part of the US-endorsed Yemen Maritime Security Partnership, the United Kingdom will provide boats, training, and assistance to the YCG to protect Yemen’s coasts and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea; the United Kingdom will also fund training programs for the Coast Guard via the Technical Assistance Fund for Yemen. In December, then-US ambassador to the United Nations (UN) Linda Thomas-Greenfield stated that Washington “will continue to work” with the YCG “to control illicit activity along the country’s coastline.” In early February, a senior Yemeni official visited US Central Command to discuss how to counter Houthi threats and propaganda.

In recent months, the YCG has increased the interception of Iranian-provided weapons bound to the Houthis. For instance, on February 13, the YCG intercepted a cargo vessel carrying a substantial number of weapons that had departed from Djibouti towards the Houthi-controlled port of Al-Salif in Hodeida. The interception occurred in coordination with the National Resistance Forces, the armed group led by Tareq Saleh, whose fiefdom is in Mocha, close to the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, and whose forces control the Red Sea division of the YCG. The nephew of the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, the younger Saleh isn’t part of the government but one of eight members of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC).  

According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, most of the Coast Guard’s vessels operate in the Red Sea, not in the Arabian Sea. This is the case even though much of the Houthis’ smuggled weapons enter Yemeni territory through the Arabian Sea (Hadhramaut and Mahra) and the Gulf of Aden because of transhipment off the Somali coast. 

However, routes have partly changed since Yemen’s 2022 national truce. Although the truce is no longer technically in place, the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM) continues to inspect ships arriving at Hodeida to prevent weapons and munitions from being transferred to the Houthis, in compliance with the UN arms embargo. But the UNVIM now has to deal with more vessels than before, in particular container ships that previously couldn’t dock at the Hodeida port, increasing the risk that inspections are not accurate. Therefore, a stronger and better-organized presence of the YCG in the Arabian Sea would help Yemen to be more effective against weapons smuggling in territorial waters. 

Preventing the expansion of a smuggling network

In the Red Sea region, the smuggling of weapons goes beyond the Houthis, but the Houthis—with Iran’s backing—increasingly are the actor driving this trade. The rise of instability on both shores of the Red Sea (Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia), with non-state armed groups developing growing offensive capabilities, makes the task of curbing arms smuggling even more urgent for the United States and regional allies. It starts with going after the financing.

Since late 2023, the Houthis’ attacks against shipping and Israel have allowed the group to increase its visibility and influence and to shape new alliances in the Red Sea. While weapons provided by Iran are key to these tactical alliances, the Houthis are using these alliances to carve out a network of financing, supply, and support that is autonomous from Tehran. 

According to the UN, the Houthis established an “opportunistic alliance” with AQAP in Yemen, providing drones to the Sunni terrorist group. Furthermore, what the UN described as “increased smuggling activities” between the Houthis and al-Shabaab (the Somali terrorist group affiliated with AQAP) are taking place via Somalia’s Puntland State, as previously warned by US intelligence. 

A more proactive stance by the United States against weapons smuggling off the coast of Yemen would also reduce risks of strengthened military ties between the Houthis and Russia. According to several media reports, the Iranian-backed group has been in talks with Moscow for the provision of weapons, a development facilitated by the Russian-Iranian strategic partnership. Russia’s military intelligence personnel have reportedly been spotted in Houthi-held areas of the country, and Moscow reportedly recruited Yemenis through Houthi intermediaries to join the battlefield in Ukraine. However, a de-escalation between the United States and Russia on Ukraine likely would limit—at least in the short term—Moscow’s appetite for stronger military cooperation with the Houthis aimed at damaging Western interests. 

Strengthening Yemen’s government and institutions 

The more the United States supports Yemeni forces to curb the Houthis’ smuggling activities, the more Yemen’s government and allied forces in the southern and southwestern regions can try to restore a degree of institutional presence in the country. Since the Houthis started attacks against maritime vessels, the Yemeni government and allied forces have increasingly called for US and international support to regain Houthi-held territories. 

Speaking at this month’s Munich Security Conference, PLC Chairman Rashad al-Alimi stated that the Yemeni government “must be empowered to exert full control over its territory” and this can be achieved only with “international support,” enforcing measures to prevent the flow of Iranian weapons to Yemen. 

Previously, at the Rome MED Dialogues in November, Yemeni Foreign Minister Shaya Mohsin al-Zindani explicitly asked the United States and international partners to enhance the capabilities of Yemen’s security and military forces, especially the Coast Guard.

As the Trump administration’s Yemen policy takes shape, it is clear that choking off the Houthis’ weapons routes is a central part of the president’s strategy, and US partners in Yemen are eager to play an active role. The benefits of a strong, holistic strategy to disrupt these networks would reverberate across the region—and on global maritime traffic. 

Eleonora Ardemagni is an expert on Yemen and the GCC states, a senior associate research fellow at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies, and an adjunct professor at ASERI (Graduate School of Economics and International Relations, Milan).

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What stand out most are the potential of cross-border attacks, the lower technological barriers to causing major damage, the escalatory risks arising from coordination among terrorist groups, and the power of psychological warfare to shape a conflict.

Securing the border

The inciting attack of October 7 was not a “typical” terrorist act; it was meticulously planned and executed as both an invasion and a declaration of war on Israel. While the attack included elements traditionally associated with terrorism—such as the mass murder of civilians, including women and children; heinous acts like rape; and the abduction of hostages, mostly civilians, taken to Gaza—it went far beyond the conventional scope of terrorism.

The attack underscored for Israel, and probably for other nations, the urgent need to reevaluate its approach to border security, as the threat of terror-attack-as-invasion has become a tangible reality. In the aftermath of October 7, there is a growing possibility that other terrorist organizations, or even some established armies, may attempt to replicate such operations, combining invasion tactics with acts of terror.

Israel learned this lesson the hardest way. But other nations—particularly those with adversaries along their borders—should now consider preparing for similar scenarios to ensure the security of their borders and the safety of their civilian populations, thereby minimizing the risk of similar attacks. This includes actively protecting borders, even when an immediate threat is not expected. Israel’s experience has shown that technological measures alone are not always sufficient. In defending against terrorist organizations, the best approach is to prepare based on their capabilities rather than their often difficult-to-predict motivations. Also, we can expect a rise in investments in anti-missile armor, as capabilities such as Israel’s Iron Dome can play a crucial role in maintaining and protecting civilian lives.

Low-tech terror

Another important lesson learned from the tactics and capabilities used by Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and even Iran is that low-cost technology is now transforming the nature of armed conflicts around the world—from the Middle East to Ukraine. Tools such as drones and unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as low-cost rockets and outdated and primitive missile launchers, are enhancing the precision and effectiveness of attacks, demonstrating that terrorist organizations do not require advanced, high-tech capabilities to achieve strategic goals and inflict significant damage on their adversaries. Terrorist organizations, as well as sovereign countries and established armies, can use simple tools, some of which are purchased online, and adapt them to their needs without necessarily relying on arms industries to challenge their enemies. These methods can prove effective against Western militaries that have chosen to defend against attacks by investing in capabilities such as fighter jets, sophisticated radar systems, naval vessels, and high-end ammunition. 

This should serve as a wake-up call for countries to adapt to the evolving threats posed by inexpensive and accessible technologies. For example, countries should develop solutions to counter drones and other precision capabilities in areas where the Iron Dome system has only partial success. Most importantly, countries must closely monitor developments in their enemies’ capabilities as threats will continue to evolve. This understanding is crucial, as low-tech attacks can persist for extended periods and cause significant damage to both civilian and military targets.

The risk of escalation

The October 7 attack and subsequent active involvement of other terror groups and countries demonstrated how attacks of this nature can quickly escalate into full-scale wars with multiple participants. Besides Israel and Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, the Houthis, and Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria also became involved in the wide-scale war, although they were not initially part of the attack and could have chosen to remain uninvolved. These groups’ involvement also drew in the United States, the United Kingdom, and others who hit back against them.

This expansion of the conflict had profound consequences for the civilian populations and governments of the countries where these groups operate. More than one million civilians fled their homes in Lebanon during the armed conflict with Israel, following counterattacks by the Israel Defense Forces. This is not to mention the tremendous damage and suffering to the people in the Gaza Strip.

It is now clear that Hamas’s attack not only dramatically damaged Hamas itself, but also weakened the broader Axis of Resistance, as the region’s Iran-backed armed groups are known. This dynamic may lead some terrorist groups to reconsider their actions in the future. These groups likely will seek prior confirmation and support from their allies—meaning Iran, in the case of Hamas and Hezbollah—before any future large-scale operations. 

The important lesson, once again learned from Israel’s harsh experience, is that large-scale, multi-arena wars can erupt unexpectedly, even when the parties’ interests do not fully align. Initially, it was not clear that the October 7 attack would draw Hezbollah into the conflict given that it had not been strong allies with Hamas, but the two groups took greater risks for one another than Western analysts expected. Their initial motivation was driven by hatred toward Israel, a commitment to their terrorist agenda, and a desire to avoid standing idle while another terrorist organization waged a large-scale fight against Israel. Additionally, they sought to avoid appearing less committed to terrorism or less opposed to Israel. 

Therefore, countries must take this into account and understand that previously unconnected terrorist organizations may cooperate toward the same goal—requiring preparation for war scenarios involving multiple fronts. It is likely that their cooperation will be based on a shared ideology, such as resistance to Western influence. It is difficult to determine if external intervention can eliminate such collaborations between terrorist organizations, but terrorist groups must be made to understand that becoming involved in a full-scale war will come at a significant cost to them and their host countries. 

In addition, the United States and Israel, with the support of Western allies, should focus on disrupting cooperation, however limited, between terrorist organizations during peacetime. These efforts should complement other steps aimed at reducing the empowerment of terrorist organizations in the future. This includes capitalizing on the vulnerabilities of the Axis of Resistance to disrupt its empowerment and arms transfers, and strengthen alternatives within their home countries to provide the civilian services previously offered by these organizations—ensuring that, unlike in recent decades, these groups do not take over their countries. 

Additionally, the United States and Israel, along with Western allies, should apply pressure to the countries where these terrorist organizations originate to prevent them from using civilian areas for operations, including by threatening to withhold financial backing. Furthermore, those allies should take action against terror facilities in civilian areas as soon as they are identified. This could come in the form of military action, exposing these facilities so the terrorist organizations would be reluctant to use them, and pressuring countries to take action against these facilities themselves. The goal should always be to minimize civilian harm, reduce the threat posed by such facilities, and deter terrorist groups from operating in these areas due to the risk of destruction and loss of resources.

The psychological war

Following the catastrophe of October 7, Israel quickly regained its military effectiveness and succeeded in inflicting substantial damage on its enemies. This recovery was further strengthened by the remarkable support of its allies, which enhanced both its capabilities and strategic position. This model could also apply to other countries that may be attacked in the future. 

Although Israel managed to recover from the shock of the October 7 attack, the broader perspective of the Gaza war highlighted the significant impact of psychological terror on both the civilian population and government decision-making. This represents a new type of warfare, one that involves not only mainstream media and news reports but also underground sources. Actions by Hamas, such as releasing hostage videos, spreading rumors, and leaking information, profoundly influenced public sentiment, contributing to the chaos seen in Israel, particularly in the war’s early months.

This is another shared lesson from both the Middle East conflict and the Russia-Ukraine war. It’s hard to predict whether future conflicts with terrorist organizations will necessarily involve these kinds of psychological threats and tactics. However, it is clear that the flow of information today—via social media, messaging apps, and other platforms—not only shapes public opinion but also influences the battlefield.

The conflicts across the Middle East that erupted in late 2023 will carry a lasting legacy for the entire region. As policymakers turn to the future of Gaza and other political negotiations, they should also take note of the lessons learned over the past sixteen months as they seek to reshape the region and reduce the impact of terrorism. This particular series of conflicts may be coming to a close, but the threat is not going away.

Maayan Dagan is a visiting research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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On February 1, Elliot Ackerman, a nonresident senior fellow at Forward Defense, published a piece in the New York Times that discussed the hundreds of remaining Afghan refugees, especially those who assisted US and allied forces, still struggling to find a new home abroad. In the opinion piece, Ackerman argued that accepting the “stranded” Afghans into the US would serve as not only a moral imperative to the US, but a strategic one as well.

Fellow

Elliot Ackerman

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Defense Policy

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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Trump’s pre-presidency was frenetic. Never a disciple of the “one president at a time” school, he injected himself aggressively into the spotlight, dispatching Steve Witkoff, his new Middle East envoy, to that region within weeks of the November election and threatening (amorphously) that there would be “ALL HELL TO PAY” unless hostages in Hamas custody were released by the time of his inauguration. Mike Waltz, Trump’s national security advisor, was quick to attribute Israel’s ceasefires with both Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza to the advent of a new administration.

Palpable apprehension in world capitals about what courses of action Trump might—or might not—pursue has been a powerful driver of events. However, the significance of January 20 as an inflection point cannot be overexaggerated. With Trump now ensconced firmly in the Oval Office, rhetoric alone will prove insufficient to induce tangible cooperation from the United States’ counterparts, who will be monitoring the pulse of his intentions rigorously.

Washington watchers in Jerusalem have been, unsurprisingly, surveying the appointments topography for clues to decipher Trumpland, but they have found its landscape equivocal. Israeli officials are encouraged by the nominations of friendlies Mike Huckabee and Elise Stefanik—as ambassadors to Israel and the United Nations, respectively—but diplomats are not policymakers, and the perspective of Trump’s executive cadre is by no means monolithic. The president himself has toggled in recent months between pledging to “stop all wars” and, on the other hand, telling Netanyahu to “do what you have to do” when it comes to Israel’s enemies. (Relations between the two leaders have known highs and lows.)

Soon after his victory, Trump unceremoniously disinvited Mike Pompeo and Nikki Haley, two trusted interlocutors of Israel during his previous tenure, from returning to his leadership team. That vacuum has been filled apparently by Waltz and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who both advocated on Capitol Hill for a strong US-Israel bond, but few other principals share their level of prior, high-level engagement with the intricate dynamics of that alliance. Meanwhile, senior bureaucratic echelons at the Pentagon—which has been an essential partner in enhancing Israel’s national security—are being populated by staffers who favor greater detachment from the Middle East.

It is against this backdrop that Netanyahu arrives in Washington to plead his case. His wish list from Trump will include US acquiescence for Israel to continue its campaign to dislodge Hamas rule from Gaza; normalization with Saudi Arabia; and a kinetic effort—or, at least, US backing for a potential solo Israeli endeavor—to terminate the threat of a nuclear Iran. The paradox of Netanyahu’s predicament is that Trump’s favorable disposition toward that agenda does not mean their approaches will be similarly aligned.

Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich—a stalwart critic of the current truce—is touting assurances from the prime minister to intensify the Gaza war and initiate “a gradual takeover” that ensures “humanitarian aid will not reach Hamas as it has been until now.” Smotrich, a proponent of exercising Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza, has also vowed repeatedly to scuttle any diplomatic breakthrough with Riyadh that would entail territorial concessions to the Palestinians. On the Iranian front, Israeli military planners are training their sights increasingly on the near term, before Tehran can recover from the blows that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has inflicted on its defenses and on its Hamas and Hezbollah proxies.

Those parameters are almost certain to conflict with the president’s thinking. By all accounts, Trump, as evidenced through Witkoff’s interventions, is interested actually in extending the suspension of combat in Gaza, for the sake of securing the release of all captives and stabilizing the area. The track would then be cleared for Israeli-Saudi rapprochement—along lines that would likely be anathema to Smotrich—and a coveted Nobel Peace Prize for Trump. As for Iran, indications suggest that the president might prefer initially to try and settle that standoff through negotiations.

The ball is very much in Trump’s court now. Witkoff met on January 30 with Smotrich and Shas chairman Aryeh Deri, two key stakeholders of Netanyahu’s government, in an attempt to enlist their support for his mission, but their consent will hinge ultimately on the specifics involved. (Right-wing Israelis, who are hoping anxiously that Trump will adopt their cause, have latched tightly onto his manifest enthusiasm for transferring Gaza’s residents to neighboring Egypt and Jordan, although the wisdom and feasibility of that program—opposed stridently by those countries and by Palestinians themselves—are dubious.) The time for command decisions is close at hand.

Cessations of hostilities in Lebanon and Gaza are both fragile. Netanyahu’s coalition is also in crisis, with saber-rattling between its various members—who are at loggerheads over controversial legislation to exempt Ultra-Orthodox Jews from military service—jeopardizing the passage of a national budget before a March 31 deadline. Separately, Smotrich has committed to bolt unless the IDF resumes its Gaza incursion, in parallel with expanding counter-terrorism operations in the West Bank. Not only the prime minister’s political fate, but also the future of the entire Middle East is hanging in the balance, waiting for Trump to decide how much slack he is prepared to grant Netanyahu.

Much will depend on the president’s definition of friendship for Israel: Will it entail space for the IDF to keep fighting Hamas until the achievement of “total victory”—as Netanyahu has promised and many Israelis are still demanding—at the possible cost of derailing progress with Saudi Arabia? Will it, rather, obligate Israel to wind down its offensive and satisfy Saudi requirements for a pathway to Palestinian statehood, thus, in all likelihood, precipitating the collapse of Netanyahu’s majority in the Knesset? Or might it entertain tradeoffs such as greater Israeli flexibility vis-à-vis the Palestinians in exchange for an augmented US role in confronting Iran?

There will be inherent risks in any strategy that Trump chooses to embrace. The only certain thing is that now, as commander in chief, he controls an arsenal of formidable carrots and sticks to deploy in the service of his administration’s objectives. On February 4, the world will be watching to see whether he offers Netanyahu a deal that he can’t refuse.

Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow for Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. From 1990 to 2016, he served seven consecutive premiers at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem. Follow him on X: @ShalomLipner.

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In Season 2, Episode 9 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi chats with modern warfare expert Andreas Krieg about the sudden deployment of three private military companies to the Netzarim corridor in the Gaza Strip. Andreas examines the risks and opportunities in outsourcing a key task of stabilization to the market and depending on low-profile companies for a high-profile job.

He argues that the Israeli Defence Forces have a poor track record when it comes to stabilizing any of the territories they have controlled and that Gaza might be a case where the profit motive of PMCs is preferable to the motivations driving two deeply traumatized societies. Still, Andreas outlines how the deployment of PMCs deepens the “gray zone” because we now have contractors operating on the ground whose status in international law is not well-defined.

Find the Guns For Hire podcast on the app of your choice

Guns for Hire podcast is a production of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative. Taking Libya as its starting point, it explores the causes and implications of the growing use of mercenaries in armed conflict.

The podcast features guests from many walks of life, from ethicists and historians to former mercenary fighters. It seeks to understand what the normalization of contract warfare tells us about the world we currently live in, the future of the international system, and what war could look like in the coming decades.

Podcast Jan 10, 2024

Mercenaries and Gaza

By Alia Brahimi

Host and Nonresident Senior Fellow Alia Brahimi speaks with Iraq expert Renad Mansour about what motivates the non-state actors who are leading the bid to avenge Gazans.

Conflict Crisis Management

Podcast Apr 24, 2024

American Hit Squad in Yemen

By Alia Brahimi

Host and Nonresident Senior Fellow Alia Brahimi speaks with BBC investigative journalist Nawal Al-Maghafi about her film on American mercenaries in Yemen.

Conflict Defense Industry

Podcast Jul 30, 2024

‘I was a Blackwater mercenary in Iraq’

By Alia Brahimi

Host Alia Brahimi is joined by former Blackwater contractor Morgan Lerette to reflect on Loretta’s experience a private military contractor in Iraq.

Conflict Defense Industry

Through our Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, the Atlantic Council works with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region.

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The post “No, really”: American PMCs in Gaza appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On January 2, Marc Polymeropoulos, a nonresident senior fellow at Forward Defense, was invited to give his expert analysis on MSNBC about the role of foreign terror groups in the New Year’s Day attack in New Orleans. In his words, the attack was “very concerning” due to the ‘lone wolf’ nature, and was “straight out of the ISIS playbook.”

Fellow

Marc Polymeropoulos

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Europe & Eurasia

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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Modern statehood has eluded Lebanon since its independence in 1943. As a result, Lebanon—which Michael Hudson termed “the precarious republic”—has seen a surge of disasters, leaving the country a battlefield for the wars of others and inflicting economic ruin on an enterprising, innovative populace.

Between 1958 and 1964, then President Fouad Chehab—Lebanon’s first army commander-in-chief, who was elevated to the presidency to end the low-grade civil war of 1958—tried his best to overcome the Ottoman legacy of sectarianism and feudalism and replace that legacy with a state. He instituted a series of administrative reforms designed to increase the effectiveness and reach of Lebanon’s central government and, by virtue of his personal modesty and incorruptibility, provided a model of selfless public service to his countrymen, a model rarely replicated by his successors. Indeed, Lebanon’s political class blocked him in the end. In 1970, the sectarian feudalists elected, by a single vote margin, one of their own to the presidency: Suleiman Frangieh. Lebanon’s trajectory has been straight downhill ever since.

Over a half-century later, Franjieh’s grandson—another Suleiman—was the presidential candidate of choice of Iran’s Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah. Hezbollah, at the behest of Iran, has for decades supported a ravenously corrupt and ruinously incompetent Lebanese political class. In return, the politicians have recognized the group as “The Lebanese Resistance,” a designation elevating it above the status of armed militia and permitting it to bear arms. Twice, in 2006 and 2023, Hezbollah initiated hostilities with Israel, causing massive destruction falling mainly on its Shia Lebanese constituents. Finally, in late 2024, much of that kinetic destruction fell on Hezbollah itself.

Unlike several of his predecessors, Aoun neither mentioned nor paid obeisance to “The Lebanese Resistance” in his inaugural speech. Instead, he pledged “to carry out my duties as the supreme commander of the armed forces and as the chairman of the Higher Defense Council, working to ensure the state’s right to hold a monopoly on weapons, and to invest in the army to monitor the borders, maintain their security in the south, define the boundaries in the east, north and at sea, prevent smuggling, fight terrorism and preserve the unity of the Lebanese territory.” Indeed, much of the analysis following Aoun’s accession to the presidency has, quite understandably, mined his speech for references to Hezbollah, but Aoun did not mention the group by name. 

Aoun’s first task will be to ensure that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) implements Lebanon’s role in the ceasefire with Israel by removing and replacing Hezbollah as the armed Lebanese presence south of the Litani River. He will, to be sure, require the cooperation of Iran’s proxy, which retains considerable military capabilities notwithstanding the pounding it has absorbed from Israel. To succeed, Aoun must perform a diplomatic high-wire act: He must, in effect, mediate between Hezbollah and Israel.

The mediation tool most readily at his disposal is the 1949 Israel-Lebanon General Armistice Agreement. The ongoing validity of the armistice, unilaterally (and unjustifiably) renounced by Israel in 1967, is cited by the 1989 Taif Agreement and is, therefore, a tenet of post-civil war Lebanon’s constitutionalism. 

Aoun could signal to Israel his interest in implementing and consolidating the current ceasefire by offering Israel the opportunity to update and fully implement the armistice, a critical first step toward eventual peace and diplomatic normalization. Israel could, in turn, assure Lebanon of its own commitment to making the ceasefire work by revoking its 1967 renunciation, completing its withdrawal behind the Blue Line (demarcated by the United Nations in 2000), and declaring its readiness to resolve diplomatically all territorial disputes with Lebanon. It could even suspend its overflights of Lebanese airspace, perhaps as part of a third-party arrangement providing ceasefire-related aerial reconnaissance services. Given that the armistice is anchored in Lebanese constitutionalism, Hezbollah—which acknowledges the need to focus on reconstruction, for the sake of its constituents—might be hard-pressed to object and obstruct. Ideally, Hezbollah’s constituents will urge the organization’s leadership cadre to put Lebanon first by becoming part of a Lebanese political party instead of a proxy for Iran.

Aoun knows what must be done to stabilize the Lebanon-Israel frontier. But the long game he wishes to contest and win centers on Lebanese statehood. This is how he put it in his inaugural speech: “if we want to build a nation, we must all be under the roof of law and justice, where there will be no more mafias or security islands, no more leaks or money laundering, no more drug trafficking, no more interference in the judicial system, in police stations, no more protections or clientelism, no more immunity for criminals and the corrupt. Justice is the bulwark, it is the only guarantee that every citizen has. This is my commitment!” This will be a tall order because the collaboration between Hezbollah—meaning Iran—and Lebanon’s abysmal political class (which still dominates parliament) has left the country awash in all the depravities cited by Aoun.

The Lebanese presidency in 2025 is not endowed with the same powers it enjoyed before the 1989 Taif Accord, and in any event, such powers were insufficient for Chehab to build a state. Aoun will not be able administratively to compel governmental decency, honesty, and competence, even if he proves able to broker a respectable cabinet of ministers and even if he retains the full, enthusiastic support of the LAF. If he wishes to succeed, he must build a mass political movement from the ground up, one dedicated not to him personally but to the idea that it is time, at long last, for Lebanon to graduate from Ottomanism, and that it is time for citizenship-based statehood to emerge. As Aoun put it in his acceptance speech, “No sect should be favored over another, and no citizen should have privilege over another. This is the time for respecting the Constitution, building the state and applying the laws. This is the oath of Lebanon!” 

Aoun must, in short, use his office to build the political infrastructure needed to win elections, to ultimately replace the parliamentarians who have used that which has passed for the “government of Lebanon” as a feeding trough. Only with the support of enough Lebanese people willing to abandon political sectarianism and localism can he build a foundation for a nation-state willing and able to meet the needs of all Lebanese citizens, especially the poorest and most vulnerable.

As Aoun embarks on a journey to complete the work of Chehab, he will need both external support and internal protection. Lebanon’s reconstruction needs are enormous, as are the operational challenges faced by the LAF. And there are, to be sure, those in Lebanon who correctly see Aoun as a threat to their ability to steal the fruits of Lebanese diligence, ingenuity, and enterprise. 

It is only the gratuitous and often unspeakable suffering and impoverishment of most Lebanese and their consequent desperation that makes Aoun’s quest something other than mission impossible. Some three-quarters of all Lebanese people are now experiencing poverty, and they know that business as usual by a dysfunctional political class is no longer tolerable. The people of Lebanon now have a president willing to say the following: “My commitment is your commitment, honorable members of parliament, and that of every Lebanese person who wants to build a strong state, a productive economy, stable security, a united nation and a promising future.” 

The duty of all Lebanese people and all friends of Lebanon is to give Aoun the support he needs to build the “strong” state that the people of Lebanon require to thrive and to live in peace.

Frederic C. Hof is a senior fellow at Bard College’s Center for Civic Engagement. Hof served as a military attaché during Lebanon’s civil war and mediated both maritime and land disputes between Israel and Lebanon from 2009 to 2012 as a State Department official. He is the author of Reaching for the Heights: The Inside Story of a Secret Attempt to Reach a Syrian-Israeli Peace (2022).

The post The quest ahead for Lebanon’s new president: Secure a modern statehood appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The deal, mediated by US, Qatari, and Egyptian officials, will take place over three phases, each slated to last six weeks. During the first phase, Hamas will release thirty-three hostages—women, children, and those over fifty years of age—and Israel will release hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, begin to withdraw from some areas, and facilitate a significant increase in humanitarian aid into Gaza. In the second phase, Hamas is slated to free the remaining male hostages while Israel withdraws from Gaza. The third phase would include the return of deceased hostages and the beginning of reconstruction.

Does this deal, which now heads to the Israeli cabinet for approval, really mark the end of the war? What’s next for Gaza’s reconstruction, Israel’s security, and wider regional efforts such as Israeli-Saudi normalization? Below, Atlantic Council experts share their answers to these and other pressing questions.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Jonathan Panikoff: The war has widened the gap over the prospect of a two-state solution

Shalom Lipner: The “Trump effect” will help Netanyahu sell this deal to his hard-liners

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: The deal risks freezing the conflict with no political horizon

Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley: Israel’s military victory has come at immeasurable cost to its global standing

Carmiel Arbit: Is this the end of the “bromance” between Trump, Netanyahu, and the Israeli far right?

Liz Cathcart: The disparities are striking, but there is never an “equal” hostage deal

Danny Citrinowicz: Now Israel needs to aim for normalization with Saudi Arabia

Thomas S. Warrick: Who governs postwar Gaza when the shooting stops?

Marc Polymeropoulos: The human cost of the war in Gaza is about to become clear—with repercussions for the region

Alex Plitsas: Now for the hard part—a long-term solution for Gaza

The war has widened the gap over the prospect of a two-state solution

The cease-fire between Israel and Hamas is likely to end this long and painful chapter for both Israelis and Gazans. Gaza is completely destroyed, with tens of thousands of innocent lives lost over the past fifteen months. Israel is safer today than it was on October 6, but at a painful cost of more than four hundred Israel Defense Forces (IDF) members killed and hundreds more injured. 

In addition to the deaths and devastation in both Gaza and Israel, the war will be remembered for widening the gap over the prospect of a two-state solution. For many Arab states and European nations, the conflict was a turning point to reprioritize or declare their support for a sovereign and independent state of Palestine. At the same time, Israelis across the political spectrum remain fundamentally horrified and gobsmacked by the idea that after the suffering they’ve experienced—October 7 was the greatest single-day loss for the Jewish people since the Holocaust—anyone would think that now is the time to create an independent state of Palestine. Many in Israel would view such an outcome as increasing the odds of more October 7–type attacks happening. Moreover, the war may also be remembered as leading to a rise in global anti-Semitism, with a recent study finding a worldwide surge of such views among adults, especially younger ones.

But the war has also reshaped the Middle East in more unexpected ways. After months of tit-for-tat attacks between Hezbollah and Israel—prompted by the Lebanon-based group attacking Israel on October 8 and originally vowing not to stop until there was a cease-fire in Gaza—Hezbollah today is utterly diminished. Most of its military capabilities have been destroyed, and its leadership has been eliminated. That result is reshaping Lebanon, where a new president and prime minister are taking power, giving hope to many in the country that, for the first time in decades, Hezbollah will not be controlling the strings. The war has also helped lead to the end of the Assad regime in Syria, and it has put Iran in its weakest position in the region since the 1979 Revolution. 

What comes next for Israel, Gaza, and the region is less clear. The ceasefire has multiple stages that if broken could result in a resumption of fighting. But the reality is that Hamas is battered and much of the group’s leadership has long sought an end to the conflict. In Israel, the Netanyahu government is also unlikely to break the ceasefire. President-elect Donald Trump has made clear that he wants a sustainable ceasefire in place by the time he gets into office. Breaking the deal could endanger Israel’s relationship with the new Trump administration and it could potentially jeopardize coordination and Israeli policy preferences being given due consideration when it comes to Iran. Iran is, after all, the issue that Netanyahu views as the most important in the relationship. Longer term, the reconstruction of Gaza, the security of Israel, and the future of normalization all remain unclear.

But those will all be the next set of challenges to address. Today, most people in Gaza will simply rejoice at not having to fear explosions from Israeli missiles and gunfire; and in Israel, most will rejoice in the knowledge that the hostages, at long last, will come home.

—Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council.

The “Trump effect” will help Netanyahu sell this deal to his hard-liners

The hopeful moment of an imminent cease-fire between Israel and Hamas comes with the subtext of circumstances that have facilitated the signing of this agreement—which has been on the table since last May—only now. US President Joe Biden has attributed apparent changes of heart to “extreme pressure” on Hamas, a transformed “regional equation” that has put Iran and Hezbollah on the defensive, and also “dogged and painstaking American diplomacy.” Israel’s calculus has been impacted similarly by mounting IDF casualties, vociferous calls to liberate the hostages and, in a different vein, Netanyahu’s improved prospects to garner political support for the controversial bargain.

But the real game-changer has been, to quote incoming National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, “the Trump effect.” The president-elect’s ominous (if amorphous) threat that “all hell will break out in the Middle East” unless the captives are released before his inauguration energized the parties to reach a compromise before that deadline, lest they suffer those consequences. Additionally, from the perspective of Israel’s government, expectations that the incoming administration will offer strong support for Jerusalem on a host of issues—e.g. confronting Iran, cementing relations with Saudi Arabia, and supporting Jewish settlement in the West Bank—provided extra impetus to placate Trump.

Those aspirations will also play a pivotal role in Netanyahu’s struggle to keep his parliamentary majority intact. Although he should have enough votes to approve the deal, many of his core allies are vehemently opposed to any framework that would suspend the pursuit of “total victory” over Hamas, as he has promised repeatedly to achieve. Their objections will feature prominently when the cabinet convenes to consider the package on Thursday. The prime minister, who has assured these critics that Israel will not relent in its campaign to dismantle Hamas, will be encouraging their instincts to remain in the coalition and wait to advance their policy priorities under Trump—however dubious that opportunity may prove to be.

Meanwhile, this latest halt in the fighting will be no less tentative. Under the terms of the arrangement, Hamas will be securing freedom for about one thousand convicted terrorists, doubling the quantity of humanitarian aid coming into Gaza, and benefiting from extensive IDF pullbacks. The pledge of Waltz that “Hamas has to be destroyed to the point that it cannot reconstitute” notwithstanding, the possibility of the group’s resurgence—in the absence of any other authority—cannot be discounted.

—Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative who previously worked in foreign policy and public diplomacy during his time at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem, where he served in the administration of seven consecutive Israeli premiers.

The deal risks freezing the conflict with no political horizon

The declaration of a ceasefire and hostage deal between Hamas and Israel is a welcome respite for the more than two million Palestinian civilians trapped in a vicious war they didn’t start and were powerless to stop. Though much can go wrong between now and the time of the implementation of the deal on January 19, not to mention the potential impasse once the first phase is over, the absence of war may indeed provide space for a more optimistic pathway forward. Gazans will experience relief from the horrors of the relentless Israeli bombardment and attacks that have killed and maimed so many in the coastal enclave. However, Palestinians in Gaza will emerge out of this deal with the greatest humanitarian, political, and strategic losses. Not a dollar of reconstruction money will go into Gaza as long as Hamas controls the coastal enclave and in the absence of a political horizon.

The most significant risk ahead is that there will be a potential freezing of the conflict, in which Gaza remains destroyed and in ruins, entirely dependent on a few hundred trucks per day to sustain the population and stabilize the humanitarian catastrophe. This, of course, would allow Hamas the best of two worlds: It would not be responsible for actual governance or providing for its populace, but it would benefit from a steady stream of goods and items it can siphon and tax. Once again, such a scenario would be horrendously painful for the civilian population in Gaza, many of whom have no homes to return to and are unable to sustain themselves beyond the scope attainable through basic humanitarian and commercial aid and supplies. 

It’s tempting for analysts to examine alternatives to Hamas’s rule now that there is an impending cease-fire. Such discussions are not only premature but also have ultimately proven irrelevant to the intractably static nature of Gaza’s governance landscape, which has hardly changed for almost two decades. This remains true even though Hamas is financially, politically, and militarily severely weakened, with little to no prospect for replenishing the material resources and geopolitical ballast that have enabled it to remain afloat for so many years in Gaza.

Most painful of all, many in Gaza are asking why their loved ones are dead or maimed, their homes destroyed, their businesses shattered, and their lives in shambles. These sacrifices were imposed upon them and feel utterly useless to the Palestinian national project for freedom and independence. The incoming US administration’s regional priorities, coupled with the possibility of a rejuvenated push for a peace process, may be the only hope for Gaza’s recovery, reconstruction, renaissance, and evolution.

—Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib is a resident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Israel’s military victory has come at immeasurable cost to its global standing

The forty-two-day cease-fire just agreed to by Israeli and Hamas negotiators is a whimpering close to a conflict that began with shock and awe. It started, of course, with a heinous attack that left more than one thousand people dead in Israel and humiliated the vaunted IDF. More than a year of bombing and fighting followed, which left tens of thousands of Palestinians dead and injured and destroyed the basic infrastructure that supports health, education, housing, and more. The very futures of Palestinian survivors and those coming into the world soon have been blighted by a deliberate strategy. The full extent of the impact of that strategy will be known soon.

The cost for the release of even one thousand prisoners is one Palestinians likely count as far too dear. Hamas, in the short term, is the clear loser.

Israel won. But it may be a Pyrrhic victory.

The conflict gave Israel the opportunity to strike crippling blows against its most dangerous foes: Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. But the brutality of its conduct has undoubtedly cost Israel in terms of economic strength, global reputation, and international standing. The latter two will not be revived soon. Israel is more isolated from the region and beyond than anyone could have imagined on October 8, 2023.

In the long term, however, Hamas’s actions reminded the world of Occupied Palestine. This war reminded the world that Palestinians are not a “non-people,” as acknowledged by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Tuesday at the Atlantic Council. And Hamas’s provocation led the Israeli government to show just how ruthless its treatment of Palestinians can be. The unrelenting response to the October 7 attack stripped away Israel’s reasonable, humane, peace-loving, good guy image for millions of people around the world, including in the United States.

That image will take a long time to restore.

Hamas is likely to abide by the cease-fire. Palestinians have everything to lose if it doesn’t. As we saw during the war, the driver of what happens next—whether the cease-fire lasts past the first phase—is Israel.

—Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Abercrombie-Winstanley served as the US ambassador to the Republic of Malta and as special assistant for the Middle East and Africa to the secretary of state. Her Middle East assignments included election monitoring in the Gaza Strip and an assignment where she supported gender equality in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as the first woman to lead a diplomatic mission there.

Is this the end of the “bromance” between Trump, Netanyahu, and the Israeli far right?

Wednesday’s announcement of a cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas was met with a feeling of elation around the world and agony for many in Israel. In its first phase, the agreement would ensure the release of at least thirty of Israel’s hostages and would be accompanied by much-needed relief in Gaza. The agreement marks a clear victory for both Trump and Biden, Biden who had worked tirelessly to secure a cease-fire for the past fifteen months and whose terms were largely adopted, and Trump for his ability to push it over the finish line through threats alone. That the incoming and outgoing administrations were able to work together hand in glove to push this over the finish line is not only a powerful demonstration of the United States’ bipartisan approach to the region; it also signifies a decorum in the transition of power that many in the United States crave.  

However welcome by many, the agreement and its timing also expose Netanyahu for his deluge of failures in handling the war, thus explaining his continued reticence to accept it. Netanyahu had promised to secure the release of all hostages–and to the devastation of so many Israelis, too many will come home in body bags. Hamas has not been decisively defeated in the ways that he had promised his people—to the contrary, Netanyahu’s failure to support a meaningful pathway to new governance in Gaza has only created a power vacuum in the Strip where extremism will fester and Hamas—either in name or ideology—could reemerge in time. And while details of the agreement are still unfolding, it would appear that Netanyahu’s maximalist positions demanding Israeli control over both the Philadelphi and Netzarim corridors through the final stages of a cease-fire have both been largely abandoned, at least in practice.   

If the agreement proceeds, the beginning of Trump’s term could mark an end to Netanyahu as chief negotiator in this conflict and, more strikingly, an end to the “bromance” between the two leaders before Trump even moves into the Oval Office. Members of the Israeli far-right—once proudly donning their MAGA hats—are faced with the reality that their ambitions for a continued conflict and possible resettlement of Gaza are not shared by the United States’ new president.  

Netanyahu’s woes in managing his far-right flank will worsen and yet their power in Israel will diminish as Trump, who has made clear that he wants the conflict to be over and to move on to a long sought-after regional deal with the Saudis, will exert only greater influence in determining whether a second or third phase of the cease-fire is achieved. Perhaps this will give Netanyahu the political cover he will need to survive, but it will also only bring him closer to a moment of reckoning in which he must face his public for his responsibility in allowing October 7 to happen—and his failure to deliver a decisive victory in response.

—Carmiel Arbit is a nonresident senior fellow for Middle East Programs and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

The disparities are striking, but there is never an “equal” hostage deal

As part of a deal reached between Israel and Hamas, thirty-three living and deceased Israeli hostages held by Hamas in Gaza are set to be released. In exchange, Israel will reportedly release thirty Palestinian prisoners for every Israeli civilian and fifty for every Israeli female soldier released.

Does this disproportionate exchange make for a bad deal? On the surface it may seem so, making it difficult to remember the core of the problem of hostage taking—the hostages that Hamas took and held for nearly fifteen months were innocent individuals: civilians, soldiers, parents, and children. There would be no “equal” deal for these hostages when talking about humans being held as pawns. Countries negotiating for hostage releases must do what is needed to get their people home. And, in this case, Hamas effectively used the hostages they are holding to get to this point.

These releases only represent a third of the approximately one hundred hostages Hamas continues to hold. It was expected that this deal would not include the release of all hostages held, as the agonizing and lengthy negotiations to reach a deal involve not only the exchange of people held but also a cease-fire and options for increased aid. While the release of thirty-three hostages held by Hamas in Gaza is not the perfect outcome, it is a good one. It means thirty-three fewer individuals suffering the horrific conditions of being held hostage and thirty-three families who can have closure, in addition to the other positive outcomes for civilians in Gaza.

This deal will reportedly last forty-two days. Looking past those forty-two days for the hostages and Gaza alike, there is little clarity. Though the deal could allow for more hostage releases in subsequent phases, the work continues as there is no certain path for the release of the remaining hostages, prolonging their suffering and that of their families, communities, and countries fighting for their freedom.

—Liz Cathcart is a member of the Atlantic Council Counterterrorism Project and the executive director of Hostage US.

Now Israel needs to aim for normalization with Saudi Arabia

The prisoner-of-war deal concluded between Israel and Hamas is a bad deal for Israel, but one that it had no choice but to implement. Israel has a moral obligation to return its abductees even at the heavy price of releasing terrorists and accepting Hamas remaining in the Gaza Strip. 

But in order for this deal to serve Israel’s strategic interests, there must be political continuity in the form of Israeli consent to the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza, and the utilization of this move to promote diplomatic normalization with Saudi Arabia.

Because 2025 appears to be a decisive year regarding the Iranian nuclear issue, the deal in Gaza will make it possible to focus international attention on Iran. Together with an Israeli-Saudi normalization, greater focus on Iran will strengthen the Israeli posture in the Middle East.

If Israel seeks to return to the war in Gaza, then it will find the Trump administration and the whole international community against it. Israel must complete the cease-fire agreement in Gaza and Lebanon. It must also work with the new US administration and with Arab neighbors to strengthen the Palestinian Authority in Gaza and the West Bank, and offer a political horizon based on what US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called the “deal of the century” during Trump’s first term.

“Absolute victory” for Israel will only come from normalization with Saudi Arabia, not any other military move.

—Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and a member of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project working group. He previously served for twenty-five years in a variety of command positions units in Israel Defense Intelligence.

Who governs postwar Gaza when the shooting stops?

Despite the talk about the sticking points in the negotiations, the real sticking point underlying everything still has not been resolved: Who will control postwar Gaza? Hamas wants to ensure it has the ability to rebuild and re-arm, and Israel is equally determined to prevent this. The agreement calls for postwar arrangements to be discussed during phase two, but make no mistake, no one is ready for what this will really require.

Both the outgoing Biden administration and the incoming Trump administration, as well as the Netanyahu government, understand that the essential requirement for a lasting peace is that Hamas has no role in postwar Gaza. Even Hamas surrogates are signaling that Hamas knows it will have to step back from governing Gaza—for now. What is needed is a workable postwar plan that puts Gaza under international administration for a transitional period. But how that is set up, and who participates in it, will make the difference between success and failure. The bare-bones plan outgoing US Secretary of State Antony Blinken described on Tuesday at the Atlantic Council would not succeed as is in preventing Hamas’s eventual return. 

Given the tensions in Israeli politics—Netanyahu reportedly agreeing to the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank carries real dangers—prospects for a negotiated outcome in the next twelve weeks are extremely slim. Fighting could resume. Trump’s presidency will toughen Netanyahu’s position, and the Palestinians really need to take to heart what incoming Trump National Security Advisor Mike Waltz said on January 15: “There is nothing but downside” to holding out. The Trump administration will likely step back for a while and wait to see what the Israelis and Palestinians are able to do on their own. 

The tensions in Palestinian politics also create a different danger. Just as Israel has failed to come up with a viable postwar plan, the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah is in even worse shape. The voices that dominate Palestinian civil society want international recognition of the justice of the Palestinian cause, apparently failing to recognize that the people they are talking to are not able to deliver what they want. Ramallah and Palestinian civil society need to broaden who they talk to about the future of Palestine.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security.

The human cost of the war in Gaza is about to become clear—with repercussions for the region

The human cost of the war will become even more evident as a cease-fire takes effect. The visuals over the next several days and weeks will not only be jarring, but also may have political repercussions.

The Israeli hostages, who have likely endured unspeakable suffering, including rape and torture, will now be seen up close and personal by the Israeli public, who will then relive the trauma of October 7. This may reignite anger against Hamas and the Palestinians as a whole and further harden Israeli views toward a future two-state solution. 

At the same time, this outcome may cause a backlash against Netanyahu, who essentially accepted an agreement that was on the table for many months. It was a delay that increased suffering and likely led to the death of some of the hostages. Let’s not forget that a tenet of Israel’s social compact with its citizen soldiers is that it will go to any lengths to bring them home if they are captured. There is a legitimate question as to whether Netanyahu adhered to this sacrosanct compact. 

In addition, as Gaza opens up to the international press and to aid organizations, and as reconstruction efforts begin, the world is going to see devastation and death at every corner, on a truly dramatic scale. There are likely hundreds of bodies (or more) still buried in Gaza under tons of rubble. Entire neighborhoods are flattened. The humanitarian situation is dire. While some countries in the region may now see an opportunity for further normalization with Israel, many in the Arab world will get even more of a sense of the immense horror in Gaza as it opens up, and they could then question any rapid pace of change with Israel. 

—Marc Polymeropoulos is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He worked for twenty-six years at the Central Intelligence Agency before retiring in July 2019 at the senior intelligence service level.

Now for the hard part—a long-term solution for Gaza

Despite the length of time and difficulty of the negotiations, this interim deal is actually the easier part. The difficult part is the long-term solution to the conflict and release of the remaining hostages. There is still no clear picture of the long-term governance and security in Gaza that would be required to facilitate reconstruction at the end of the conflict.

Hamas wants complete and total withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and a permanent end to hostilities. Israel still sees Gaza as a security issue that will require a military presence, and there is currently no partner for peace or stability who can be relied upon to administer Gaza. 

If Hamas and the Palestinian people in Gaza reject a security force and governing authority, then it could lead to a protracted insurgency in Gaza. As previously noted, Israel and Hamas had reached an interim security deal a year ago that failed to advance a broader peace. So, while the deal should be celebrated, there is still a lot of difficult work ahead to define Gaza’s future and Israel’s security.

 —Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the head of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project, and a former chief of sensitive activities for special operations and combating terrorism in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

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After US forces in Iraq toppled Saddam Hussein in 2003, the Assad regime effectively turned Syria into a training ground, with terrorist groups entering Iraq to commit heinous acts. That played a major role in destabilizing Iraq, and the Assad regime ultimately contributed to the killing of thousands of Iraqis. The Iraqi government worked diligently to cast a light on the Assad regime’s practices, including by referring these violations to the United Nations when, in 2009, former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki appeared to accuse the Assad regime of being behind two bombings on government buildings in Baghdad and asked the United Nations envoy to form a fact-finding commission to investigate these terrorist acts. 

But the Iraqi government’s position changed after the Syrian uprising in 2011 and the rise of an assortment of terrorist organizations (many active in Iraq) that were vying to replace the Assad regime. The Iraqi government pragmatically preferred Assad as the lesser evil and refused to contribute to his downfall. While Assad was not able to cause Iraq any harm, as he was preoccupied with the existential threat he faced in the civil war, threats from Syria have not subsided. Then in June 2014, the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) began an offensive from Syria, overrunning the Nineveh province and proceeding to occupy one-third of Iraq’s territory. It took Iraq and an international coalition three years of brutal fighting to defeat ISIS and liberate the areas the terrorist group controlled.  

With Assad out of Syria, Iraq once again is in a vulnerable position. As a matter of principle, it is untenable for the Iraqi government to accept the new Syrian leader Ahmed al-Sharaa who, under the nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, ran atrocious terrorist operations in Iraq for many years and was responsible for the killing of numerous innocent Iraqi civilians. While almost all relevant governments in the region (and many beyond) seem to be looking past the new Syrian leadership’s terrorist affiliations and are opening lines of communication with them, Iraq cannot ignore the security risks arising along its 372-mile border with Syria. Such dangers may come as a result of direct hostility by the new regime, but they also may come from the ungoverned territories of northeastern Syria, where the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are on the verge of collapse under threats from Turkey and the new Syrian government, a collapse that could be avoided if the United States expresses a strong commitment to the Kurdish group. The SDF currently keeps several detention camps, and the most concerning among them is al-Hol, which hosts some forty thousand detainees, including alleged ISIS affiliates, families, and sympathizers. The majority of them are Iraqis.

In recognition of these dangers, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani sent the newly appointed director of national intelligence, Hamid al-Shatri, to meet the new Syrian government in December last year to discuss Iraqi security concerns. The Iraqi government also sent Minister of Foreign Affairs Fuad Hussein to represent Iraq at January 12 meetings in Saudi Arabia, which gathered partner and neighboring countries in a conversation about supporting Syria. By engaging in this way, the Iraqi government has shifted the burden of establishing good-faith security cooperation to the new Syrian leadership.

The challenge for Iraq in the coming months will be twofold: On the one hand, there is the long border with Syria, where several hostile armed groups operate without any opposition from the Syrian side. The Iraqi security forces will have to multiply their resources and vigilance to maintain border security. The scale of this threat will depend on whether Syria is heading toward stability or disintegration into conflict. On the other hand, Iraq will face serious internal pressure from changing geopolitical conditions. For example, Assad’s fall marks the beginning of a new era, one in which Turkey could see its influence spreading across what used to be an Iranian sphere of influence. The Iraqi leadership will be under great pressure from Iran, which seeks compensation for its recent loss of influence, including by having a better political, economic, and security posture in Iraq. At the same time, Iraq will also be under pressure to recalibrate its bilateral relations with the United States. The new reality in Syria will push Iraq and the United States to revisit the recently reached troop-withdrawal agreement, with the Iraqi government simultaneously navigating its need to ensure its territorial security and the scrutiny of rival groups who call for the timely adherence to troop withdrawal.

To test the new geopolitical reality, Sudani made an important visit to Iran on January 8 where he met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The visit resulted in a lot of analysis and speculation about a possible Iraqi effort to persuade the Iranians to agree to a deferment of the US troop withdrawal and the demilitarization of the Iraqi armed groups that identify primarily with Iran. The speculation was put to rest by the X account of the Iranian supreme leader, which put out several concise statements. On the first issue, the ayatollah said the presence of US forces in Iraq is “illegal and contrary to the interests of the people and the government.” On the question of the Iraqi fighting forces, he said that the Popular Mobilization Forces represent “a crucial component of power in Iraq, and more efforts should be made to preserve and strengthen it”—adding that Sudani “emphasized” this as well. The supreme leader argued, in a third statement, that “the more developed and secure Iraq is, the more it will also benefit the Islamic Republic of Iran.” Whatever the bilateral talks may have accomplished, it all has been overshadowed by these three short statements. 

It is now up to the government of Iraq to balance its regional policies with full consideration of the opportunities and the challenges the fall of Assad has put forward. At the same time, it will have to be mindful not only of the new Syrian political order but also the change of posture that major regional and international actors will make in the post-Assad era.

Abbas Kadhim is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative. Follow him on X: @DrAbbasKadhim.  

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Strategic competition is likely to intensify over the next decade, increasing the demands on the United States to deter and defend against wide-ranging and simultaneous security challenges across multiple domains and regions worldwide. In that time frame, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Joint Force should more effectively leverage the competencies of US Special Operations Forces (USSOF) to compete with US strategic adversaries.

Three realities facing the DOD over the next decade lend themselves toward leveraging USSOF more in strategic competition. First, the growing need to counter globally active and increasingly cooperative aggressors, while the broader Joint Force remains focused on the Indo-Pacific and Europe, underscores the value of leveraging USSOF to manage competition in other regions. Second, the desire to avoid war and manage competition below the threshold of conflict aligns with USSOF’s expertise in the irregular aspects of competition. Third, unless defense spending and recruitment dramatically increase over the next decade, the Joint Force will likely have to manage more security challenges without a commensurate increase in force size and capabilities, which underscores the need for the DOD to maximize every tool at its disposal, including the use of USSOF to help manage strategic competition.

The US government must harness all instruments of national power, alongside its network of allies and partners, to uphold international security, deter attacks, and counter efforts to undermine US security interests. Achieving this requires effectively integrating and leveraging the distinct roles of the DOD, interagency partners, the intelligence community (IC), and the Joint Force, including components like USSOF that have not been traditionally prioritized in strategic competition. For the past two decades, USSOF achieved critical operational successes during the Global War on Terror, primarily through counterterrorism and direct-action missions. However, peer and near-peer competition now demands a broader application of USSOF’s twelve core activities, with emphasis on seven: special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, security force assistance, civil affairs operations, military information support operations, unconventional warfare, and direct action.

Over the next decade, the DOD should emphasize USSOF’s return to its roots—the core competencies USSOF conducted and refined during the Cold War. USSOF’s unconventional warfare support of resistance groups in Europe; its support of covert intelligence operations in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America; its evacuation missions of civilians in Africa; and its guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations helped combat Soviet influence operations worldwide. During that era, special operations became one of the US military’s key enablers to counter coercion below the threshold of armed conflict, and that is how USSOF should be applied in the next decade to help manage strategic competition.

This report outlines five ways the Department of Defense should use Special Operations Forces over the next decade to support US efforts in strategic competition. USSOF should be leveraged to:

1. Enhance the US government’s situational awareness of strategic competition dynamics globally.
2. Entangle adversaries in competition to prevent escalation.
3. Strengthen allied and partner resilience to support the US strategy of deterrence by denial.
4. Support integration across domains for greater effect at the tactical edge
5. Contribute to US information and decision advantage by leveraging USSOF’s role as a technological pathfinder.

This report seeks to clarify USSOF’s role in strategic competition over the next decade, address gaps in understanding within the DOD and the broader national security community about USSOF’s competencies, and guide future resource and force development decisions. By prioritizing the above five functions, USSOF can bolster the US competitive edge and support the DOD’s management of challenges across diverse theaters and domains.

Staff

Clementine G. Starling-Daniels

Director, Forward Defense

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense NATO

Staff

Theresa Luetkefend

Assistant Director

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy German

Report Mar 7, 2024

Stealth, speed, and adaptability: The role of special operations forces in strategic competition

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Clementine G. Starling and Alyxandra Marine discuss how special operations forces enhance US readiness in an era of strategic competition.

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Great power competition is back. What does that mean for US special operations forces?

By Alyxandra Marine

With their wide array of capabilities, US special operations forces can play a central role in strategic competition.

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By Richard Angle, Leo Blanken, and Philip Swintek

General Richard Angle, Leo Blanken, and Lieutenant Colonel Philip Swintek argue that building and maintaining relationships is the true competitive advantage of Army Special Forces (ARSOF).

Defense Policy National Security

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

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Central to this strategy is Turkey’s proclivity to leverage military interventions, political agreements, and economic tools to advance its objectives. In Libya, Turkey’s 2019 intervention secured it a critical foothold through the deployment of drones, Syrian mercenaries, and direct military support. This allowed Ankara to negotiate an EEZ agreement that, from its vantage point, redefined maritime boundaries and challenged the claims of Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel. The agreement was not merely an economic gambit; it was a strategic move to confront Mediterranean rivals over territorial waters and energy resources. Five years later, Ankara is seeking to establish an EEZ agreement with Syria’s new government that would extend its maritime claims further into the Eastern Mediterranean. While Turkey frames these actions as legitimate assertions of its rights, regional powers are likely to view them as provocations that deepen tensions in an already volatile environment.

Balancing Russia in Libya 

Libya occupies a central role in Turkey’s Mediterranean strategy, serving as a gateway for Ankara’s regional ambitions and a platform for projecting influence. The 2019 Memorandum of Understanding with the GNA, which established a long-contested maritime boundary, has been criticized for raising unresolved sovereignty issues and its questionable legality under international law. Beyond these legal challenges, Turkey’s position in Libya is further complicated by Russia’s entrenched involvement. Through the Wagner Group—recently rebranded as the Africa Corps—Moscow has bolstered Libyan National Army Commander Khalifa Haftar’s forces, securing itself its own foothold in Haftar’s areas of control. Reports of Russian arms transfers over Turkish-controlled airspace from Syria’s Hmeimim airbase to eastern Libya after the fall of Damascus exemplify the paradoxical nature of the Turkey-Russia rivalry. On the surface, such developments may appear transactional, but they reflect Ankara’s broader strategy: maintaining escalation dominance by setting boundaries on Russian operations while leveraging its role as a regional balancer to extract strategic advantages.

This balancing act underscores Turkey’s calculated pragmatism in Libya, where collaboration with Russia acts as both a counterweight to regional adversaries and a measured gamble. By permitting Moscow’s logistical transfers, Ankara has transformed a potential liability into a tool of strategic leverage, subtly positioning itself to influence Russian ambitions in Africa while reaffirming its indispensability to NATO and fortifying its regional clout. However, this strategy is not without vulnerabilities. The delicate balancing required to manage Moscow’s activities leaves Ankara exposed to the risks of miscalculation, overreach, and dependency. Disruptions in its arrangement with Russia—or fractures in its relationships with NATO allies, regional powers, or Libyan factions—could unravel Ankara’s hard-won gains, imperiling its broader Mediterranean ambitions and leaving its geopolitical foothold exposed.

Flexing muscle in Syria

In Syria, Turkey’s intervention was initially driven by the need to address immediate security threats, primarily removing the self-proclaimed Islamic State and containing Kurdish forces seeking to expand territorial control in northern Syria. However, with the fall of dictator Bashar al-Assad, Ankara recalibrated its approach, merging economic and geopolitical ambitions with its security objectives. The prospect of an EEZ agreement with Syria mirrors the dynamics of the 2019 Libya pact. While such a pact could offer maritime gains and deepen Turkey’s influence in the region, it is fraught with risks. Greece, Cyprus, and other European powers are likely to view such an agreement as an illegal and destabilizing move, further polarizing regional dynamics and intensifying disputes over energy and sovereignty.

Turkey’s approach in Syria also reflects its broader ambitions to integrate its strategies across theaters, enhancing its influence through interconnected policies. The country’s pursuit of maritime gains in Syria builds on the successes of its Libya agreement while highlighting the risks inherent in replicating this strategy in a different geopolitical context. The overlapping tensions in Libya and Syria demand constant recalibration, as Ankara navigates volatile rivalries and shifting alliances. The integration of its strategies underscores Turkey’s vision of the Mediterranean as a unified arena for projecting power.

However, significant challenges loom in Syria, the most salient of which stem from Israel. Following the collapse of the Assad regime, Israeli airstrikes have escalated, targeting countless military installations and destroying aircraft, radar systems, and missile sites. Simultaneously, Israeli forces have conducted incursions and expanded their presence beyond the occupied Golan Heights, particularly in the Quneitra province of southern Syria. These actions reflect dissatisfaction with Syria’s current trajectory. There is a widespread perception within Israel that Syria risks becoming a Turkish protectorate, a scenario that would severely constrain Israel’s military latitude in the region. This concern is compounded by the belief that Iran will continue to maneuver for influence, viewing Syria’s strategic assets as too valuable to relinquish. In this context, a Syria rebuilt under the leadership of Arab states is seen as a far more desirable outcome, curbing the influence of both Turkey and Iran while pre-emptively neutralizing their resurgence.

Should this vision prove unattainable, Israel may resort to curbing Turkish influence by undermining Syria’s unity, channeling support to ethnic and religious minorities to fragment the country and weaken Ankara’s position. This could set the stage for a potential collision course between the two. The interplay of this rivalry highlights the fragile nature of Ankara’s ambitions, with Israel emerging as perhaps its most formidable challenge. Tel Aviv’s ability to operate beyond traditional international norms, as starkly demonstrated in Gaza, and to secure the unwavering support of Ankara’s traditional Western allies—regardless of its methods—exposes the looming asymmetry Turkey faces in this geopolitical contest.

Strengthening influence in the Mediterranean

Anticipating the challenges to its broader Mediterranean aspirations, Turkey is building synergies between its strategies in Libya and Syria to maximize its leverage, reflecting its broader ambition to reshape the Mediterranean’s geopolitical map and strengthen its negotiating position. In Libya, Ankara has adapted to the shifting political landscape, engaging with Eastern Libyan factions and the Haftar family to expand its influence. This outreach signals a pragmatic shift from confrontation to cautious diplomacy, as Turkey seeks to transform former adversaries into cooperative stakeholders while navigating the crowded Libyan geopolitical arena. In Syria, Turkey’s political influence has positioned it as a linchpin for regional engagement with the Syrian government, mediating between Damascus and key external actors, including Arab states, European Union countries, and potentially Russia. Ankara’s subtle gatekeeper role sharpens its leverage, turning regional rivalries into stepping stones for its own ascent.

By aligning its strategies in Libya and Syria, Turkey seeks to consolidate influence and amplify its leverage across both theaters. This calculated approach underscores Ankara’s effort to position itself as an indispensable actor in the Mediterranean, translating tactical maneuvers into broader geopolitical gains while pre-empting challenges that threaten its ambitions. Yet, this high-stakes strategy leaves Turkey exposed. The overlapping tensions in Libya and Syria demand constant recalibration, as advances in one arena could rapidly unravel in another. 

The return of US President-elect Donald Trump to the White House this month looms as perhaps the most significant determinant shaping the region’s dynamics. Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy could offer Ankara opportunities to assert itself more aggressively, particularly as it leverages its strategic position in the Mediterranean. However, this same approach raises the specter of greater US disengagement from regional conflicts, leaving Turkey to face escalating challenges from Moscow, Israel, and other regional powers without the backing of its traditional Western allies. The uncertainty of this geopolitical environment underscores the precariousness of Turkey’s gains, where advances in one theater could rapidly unravel in another, placing its broader Mediterranean strategy on a knife’s edge.

Ultimately, Turkey’s Mediterranean strategy reflects both ambition and vulnerability, a delicate dance on shifting sands where every advance risks triggering a cascade of challenges. Much like Ankara views Libya and Syria as interconnected theaters, Western actors should embrace this moment of change to recalibrate their bilateral relations with Turkey, recognizing shared interests in maritime stability and regional development. 

In Libya, this means supporting a political process that moderates a Turko-Russian oligopolistic arrangement while promoting stability and inclusivity to align with shared Turko-Western priorities. In Syria, targeted sanctions relief and reconstruction efforts tied to an inclusive political framework can support stabilization efforts and address immediate needs. By anchoring their engagement with Turkey in mutual interests and shared goals, Western actors can transform competition into cooperation. This recalibration will be pivotal in shaping whether Turkey’s Mediterranean gambit becomes a cornerstone of regional stability or a foundation of enduring fragility.

Emadeddin Badi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

Abdullah al-Jabassini is an adjunct professor at the Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Europe.

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The Israeli military has designated the two access points to the Netzarim Corridor as no-go zones to provide force protection for troops inside the zone, threatening to shoot those “trespassing” the area around the Salah al-Din Road in central Gaza and the Al-Rashid coastal highway, where most of the civilian population has been moving out of the north and heading south. 

The corridor has become significant because those seeking to leave northern Gaza have been forced to pass through it on their journey south. Meanwhile, those facing cramped and unbearable humanitarian conditions in the crowded central and southern Gaza seeking to take their chances on returning to what’s left of Gaza’s north attempt to traverse the deadly corridor. As ceasefire negotiations appear to be making progress, the incoming Trump administration must ensure that any deal, regardless of its phased implementation, includes mechanisms for protecting Palestinian civilians traversing the corridor to return to their homes and monitoring the IDF’s compliance with the terms of the agreement.

A sobering investigation

The Haaretz investigation describes in harrowing detail how civilians were repeatedly targeted by careless, reckless, and, in a few instances, even joyous soldiers who applied overwhelming firepower against civilian targets who were clearly visible through drones and cameras as nonthreatening people, only to be mercilessly and ruthlessly gunned down without any apparent military necessity. 

Time and again, the officers, soldiers, and commanders interviewed describe how arbitrarily designated kill zones were regularly littered with dead Palestinian bodies who were counted as “terrorists” without any confirmation of their identities, affiliations, crimes, or wrongdoing. Israeli officials regularly assert that IDF attacks and operations only strike military targets based on intelligence, battlefield assessments, and reactions to incidents and threats. Though this claim has been repeatedly challenged by evidence, footage, and even the IDF’s own admission at times, the Israeli government maintains that it vigorously investigates incidents and takes appropriate action against soldiers who violate established codes of conduct and rules of engagement.

However, the report details how the excessive use of helicopters, drones, tanks, and hundreds of bullets was regularly deployed against targets that did not pose an imminent threat and likely could have been spared with simple warning shots instead of being obliterated. Even when those killed were confirmed not to be militants based on IDF intelligence databases, murdered civilians were added to a daily count of eliminated combatants, left to be eaten by packs of stray dogs, as some officers congratulated their soldiers on a supposed job well done. 

Despite the details being difficult and depressing to read, perhaps the silver lining throughout was that there are still IDF soldiers with consciousness, awareness, and recognition of the horrors that they are technically part of who are speaking out. They wanted to defend their people after the October 7 massacre but feel that the Israeli public deserves to know the full picture of the brutality that some of their soldiers and commanders are committing. They questioned their orders and the necessity of what they were doing, knowing that they would have to live with the consequences of what they were witnessing for the rest of their lives. 

If Israel doesn’t trust any external mechanism for legal accountability for its conduct in Gaza, then the only way that its internal checks and balances can work is for brave soldiers to speak out against war crimes and for courageous journalists to expose these stories so that there can at least be a record of what took place.

What’s next for the corridor?

There are intensive rounds of negotiations to reach a new ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, though it remains unclear whether this could occur in the final days of the Biden administration or in the early days of the incoming Trump administration. Regardless of when such an agreement may be struck, serious questions will have to be answered about the Netzarim Corridor and Palestinian civilians’ ability to return to northern Gaza. Some reports suggest that as part of pending negotiations, Palestinian civilians would be able to return north without conditions, but vehicles would be inspected in accordance with a new mechanism. This would necessitate a partial or complete withdrawal of IDF troops from the corridor, something that is difficult to envision after the Israeli military expanded the corridor last month to vast areas and built more than a dozen bases throughout the space, which encompasses over twenty-one square miles of the coastal enclave’s territory. 

The incoming Trump administration will have to wrestle with tactical-level details—especially what happens with the Netzarim Corridor and civilians’ return to the north—if it wants to play a role in mediating a ceasefire and ending the war. The carnage associated with the forced deportation of Palestinian civilians from the north and the prevention of their return has been an exceptionally bloody chapter in this war; the road to Gaza’s recovery and the prospects for lasting peace will require addressing this issue. 

President-elect Donald Trump’s incoming secretary of state, working with special envoys and the National Security Council, should ensure the inclusion of specific guidelines for how the corridor—and indeed, all territories held by Israel during a ceasefire—would be administered and secured. This would entail pushing for stricter rules of engagement that involve higher-ups in the chain of command, higher thresholds for engaging suspects, mechanisms for issuing warnings before opening fire, and a clear strategy for how to discriminate targets based on a tangible threat matrix, not hunches or an overzealous field officer and commander. 

Additionally, if the IDF maintains a presence in the corridor or other parts of Gaza that would be traversed by civilians seeking to return to their neighborhoods, there should be a mechanism for an independent observer, including regional players with US support, who could assess the behavior and compliance of Israeli soldiers with the ceasefire agreement, much like what the United States is doing in southern Lebanon. 

The incoming Trump administration can play a positive role in dialing back some of the battlefield excesses that have caused immense, unnecessary loss of life to Palestinian civilians. The testimonies of IDF soldiers should give serious pause to policymakers, who must register the irreparable geopolitical damage that these stories inflict on regional stability and the hope for lasting peace between Palestinians and Israelis.

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib is a resident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Marc Polymeropoulos: A lone wolf is far more dangerous than a terrorist cell

Danielle Cosgrove: The attack shows the evolving threat of ISIS’s Digital Caliphate

Morgan Tadych: The attack indicates a troubling pattern of online radicalization

Doug Livermore: ISIS is diminished in the Middle East, but is persisting elsewhere

Mike Nelson: The US must remain vigilant against the appeal of ‘leaderless jihad’

A lone wolf is far more dangerous than a terrorist cell

As the investigation unfolds in New Orleans, I get a sense that some in the media and law enforcement are a bit relieved that this may “just” be the work of a lone wolf attacker. It may be counterintuitive, but I’d argue that a lone wolf is far more worrisome and dangerous for US counterterrorism officials, as it is so much harder for both law enforcement and the intelligence community to penetrate the operation itself. This is exacerbated further if the attacker self-radicalized, receiving inspiration and guidance virtually from ISIS propaganda, for example.

Officials in the counterterrorism world actually prefer to investigate terrorist cells, as this provides significant opportunities to uncover and recruit the cell members, and also potentially intercept communications between cell members and the terrorist mothership. The more individuals involved in a terrorist plot, the larger chance that one makes a mistake. While of course it would be a relief to know that there are not ISIS adherents running around New Orleans posing a direct public safety threat, we should not rest easy, as this modus operandi of a lone wolf conducting a vehicle attack poses immense challenges to the traditional detect/disrupt/deter counterterrorism model that has worked so effectively in the past.  

—Marc Polymeropoulos is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a member of the Council’s Counterterrorism Project. He worked for twenty-six years at the CIA in a variety of field and headquarters operational assignments focusing on counterterrorism, the Middle East, and South Asia.

The attack shows the evolving threat of ISIS’s Digital Caliphate

Following their formal defeat by coalition forces in 2019, the Islamic State leveraged its technological expertise to establish a Virtual Caliphate—a digital refuge where disaffected individuals seeking community and purpose converge around the vision of a state governed by sharia law under a caliph. The Virtual Caliphate has expanded rapidly, driven by shifting refugee populations, unresolved border disputes, decentralized planning needs, the use of generative AI as a knowledge hub, and the role of protests.

The Digital Caliphate signifies a new chapter in ISIS’s technological evolution, building on the Virtual Caliphate by advancing from the dissemination of ideas to the orchestration of action and violence through digital and technological means. In essence, the Digital Caliphate bridges the proliferation of ideas with the execution of actions through digital tools.

The New Year’s attack in New Orleans highlights the evolving threat of the Digital Caliphate. The attacker’s actions reflect its hallmarks, including likely radicalization via unregulated platforms. The shift from physical territories to digital domains has made it harder to detect and disrupt lone actors operating independently but aligned with extremist ideologies.

This attack serves as a stark reminder that extremism has fully adapted to the digital age. The United States’ counter-strategies must evolve at scale and speed. Policymakers must act decisively to disrupt the Digital Caliphate’s ability to weaponize commercial technology and protect communities from future attacks.

—Danielle Cosgrove is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project as well as a technology executive and distinguished lecturer at Stanford University who previously led high-impact conflict zone operations and strategic stability initiatives.

The attack indicates a troubling pattern of online radicalization

The terror attack on our homeland on New Year’s Day shares several horrifying characteristics with other recent terror arrests made in the United States and Canada. In all three cases, men disaffected with their lives started to interact online with ISIS-linked influencers and sites. While the specifics of Jabbar’s online interactions are not yet clear, the presence of an ISIS flag in his rental truck in addition to early reports of videos that he posted promoting extremist content indicate that he was radicalized online. Prior to the last few years, Jabbar appeared to lead a relatively normal life; as his personal life fell apart, he became further radicalized. 

In particular, Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K, the Central Asia/Afghanistan-based branch of ISIS) has demonstrated a particular social media savvy to expand its Digital Caliphate. In several foiled attack plots in 2024, IS-K leveraged online contact with men seeking an Islamic community to radicalize and encourage them to commit attacks against symbolic Western targets. The New Orleans attack follows a similar pattern, with a recently radicalized US citizen terrorizing a symbolic soft target that is in opposition to IS-K’s perception of morality. The United States must monitor online spaces to attempt to detect and deter radicalization before it happens—in cases such as this, it is critical to stay “left of boom.”

—Morgan Tadych is an open-source intelligence (OSINT) professional, Army veteran, and member of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project. She spent much of her military career researching strategic Russia/Eurasia issues and deployed to conduct counterterrorism missions.

ISIS is diminished in the Middle East, but is persisting elsewhere

ISIS’s territorial caliphate in the heart of the Middle East has largely crumbled and the group’s continued influence now relies on various “provinces” across the globe, from the Sahel to Afghanistan. These affiliates continue to pose notable challenges, surviving in regions marked by instability, weak governance, and other active insurgencies.

Throughout 2022, I served as the deputy commander of the NATO Special Operations Advisory Group in Iraq, a role in which I worked closely with the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service and Federal Intelligence and Investigations Agency to root out the few legitimate ISIS fighters hiding out in caves in the mountainous north. Despite the group’s increasingly diminished capacity in Iraq and Syria, it continues to exploit the fragmented security environments there and elsewhere to persist despite international pressure. In the Sahel, ISIS affiliates compete with other larger terrorist groups for influence, while IS-K, operating in Afghanistan, remains a small but persistent threat to regional security—as was seen in the Moscow attack of March 2024.

Iran has strategically used ISIS as a bogeyman to justify its malign activities in the region, particularly its influence in Iraq and, until recently, Syria. By portraying itself as a bulwark against the return of ISIS, Iran aims to maintain its presence and control over strategic territories, consolidating its influence among local militias and proxy groups. This dangerous narrative obscures Iran’s broader regional ambitions and its role in exacerbating the very conditions that foster extremism. This ongoing dynamic allows Iran to continue using proxies to smuggle weapons and launch attacks against Israel and threaten other interests from within Iraqi territory. 

Even though ISIS is a diminishing shell of its former self, it still bears continued attention given both the exploitation of its existence by strategic competitors and potential for resurgence.

—Doug Livermore is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Group, national vice president for the Special Operations Association of America, senior vice president for solution engineering at the CenCore Group, and the deputy commander for Special Operations Detachment—Joint Special Operations Command in the North Carolina Army National Guard.

The US must remain vigilant against the appeal of ‘leaderless jihad’

The New Orleans attack represents the latest in a series of attacks and threats that have plagued the United States and its allies for decades. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, there was speculation that this was an act of a larger cell or potentially a complex attack with improvised explosive devices placed as a second wave. Perhaps this was part of a multicity simultaneous attack connected to the bizarre events in Las Vegas. However, while details are still emerging, it appears that this was a tragic but unsophisticated attack by a solo actor who had recently become more radicalized by digital messaging and content against a soft target. In many ways, it was reminiscent of attacks like those in San Bernardino in 2015 and Orlando in 2016, in that the perpetrators were individually radicalized and inspired by Islamist jihadism as opposed to being directed by larger organizations or conducting attacks that required specialized training. Jabbar’s status as a veteran is reminiscent of the attacks of Sergeant Hasan Akbar and Major Nidal Hasan, in that those who had volunteered to serve the United States became influenced to attack it. 

These kinds of attacks are the manifestation of al-Qaeda strategist Abu Musab al-Suri’s concept of “leaderless jihad,” that mujahideen distributed throughout the world would take it upon themselves to conduct attacks against enemies near and far. They are potentially the hardest to anticipate in that there are no cells to infiltrate, no specialty items or explosives to trigger attention, and, given that Jabbar was a native-born US citizen, no immigration screening to have blocked the threat at the border. 

The attack should not be taken as an indication of re-emerging ISIS strength, rather as what appears to be the radicalization of an imbalanced malcontent. The danger, however, is that there are many more who are susceptible to this kind of extremism. As such, the United States must remain vigilant against all forms of radical Islamism—both the armed formations and the online influence operations.

—Mike Nelson is a retired Army special forces officer and a member of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project.

The post Experts react: What the New Orleans attack tells us about terrorism in 2025 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

At this moment, HTS is eager to build goodwill inside Syria and internationally. The United States should act swiftly and strategically to help ensure the country’s transition toward a more stable and democratic system. The United States can leverage its diplomatic, economic, and political tools to influence the post-Assad landscape in Syria. Here are several critical steps the United States should consider.

1. Provide diplomatic recognition to the new government

The political situation in Syria is fluid, and the future government will likely be a coalition of opposition groups, civil society organizations, and representatives from various ethnic and sectarian groups, including HTS. One of the most significant actions that Washington could take is to provide early diplomatic recognition to this emerging government—contingent on commitments to a peaceful transition, democratic reforms, and the protection of human rights. Recognition may be contingent upon specific steps, including:

• Formation of a transitional government: This government should be representative of Syria’s diverse political and ethnic groups, and include women, youth, political structures currently in exile, and opposition military factions.
• Commitment to a democratic process: The interim government should agree to hold free and fair elections with international oversight and establish a justice and accountability mechanism to address past atrocities.
• Constitutional reform: A new, inclusive constitution should be developed with input from all Syrian stakeholders to lay the foundation for a democratic governance system.
• International oversight: The United Nations should be allowed to oversee the transition, including monitoring justice and accountability processes and ensuring the dismantling of Syria’s chemical weapons program. Encouragingly, HTS has indicated its readiness to cooperate with the international community to monitor Assad regime military sites.  

2. Provide humanitarian aid and reconstruction assistance

Syria faces an enormous humanitarian crisis. Millions of Syrians are displaced, and much of the country’s infrastructure is in ruins. The United States should work with international organizations to ensure that aid is distributed effectively. Given the opposition’s experience in governance, existing structures on the ground can be leveraged to channel aid, minimizing the risks that would come from trying to create entirely new systems from scratch. However, this aid should be conditional on:

• Political inclusivity: The transitional government must equitably provide aid to all regions of Syria.
• Anti-corruption measures: Donors must insist on transparency and accountability mechanisms to prevent misuse of funds.

3. Begin the process of removing sanctions on HTS and the new Syrian government

HTS is currently designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). The group’s evolving stances, including its recent public commitments to protect religious minorities and refrain from retributive violence, suggests that HTS may be open to political accommodation. The United States should initiate a gradual, good-faith process for removing sanctions and designations on HTS and the new Syrian government. Additionally, the United States has designated the government of Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism since the 1970s and has since added additional sanctions beginning in 2011 in response to the Assad regime’s exercise of violence and repression. This process could include:

• Phased sanctions relief on HTS: The United States should start by removing sanctions on individuals who demonstrate a willingness to engage in a political transition, particularly HTS leaders. Over time, as HTS shows concrete steps toward reconciliation, further sanctions can be lifted. 
• Quick sanctions relief on Syria: Removing broader sanctions on Syria can be done swiftly, as the new Syrian government will likely be hostile to US-designated terror groups like Lebanese Hezbollah or Iraq’s Asaib Ahl al-Haq, which were instrumental in bolstering the previous Syrian regime. As for the second batch of sanctions on Syria related to the regime’s exercise of violence on civilians, if HTS follows through on its promises to refrain from retributive violence against civilians, the United States should lift this second set of sanctions as well.
• Diplomatic engagement: Engaging with HTS and other opposition groups is critical. Past US policy on similar groups, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), shows that delisting a group from the FTO list is possible if the organization demonstrates a genuine commitment to peace.

4. Cooperation on counter-terror measures

HTS has a law enforcement body that has since 2017 conducted dozens of operations against Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) cells operating in northwestern Syria, including arresting many members of its leadership. HTS has also arrested members of the al-Qaeda branch in Syria, Hurras al-Din, largely dismantling the organization. HTS will have an interest in preventing more extremist actors from trying to reform in Syria as the rest of the state rebuilds. The United States may thus find HTS willing to cooperate on counterterror measures. 

• Intelligence sharing: Intelligence sharing on counterterrorism measures can build good faith on both sides and prevent extremist groups from proliferating.  

5. Encourage SDF participation in the political process

Syria’s Kurdish population, particularly those in the northeast, will play a crucial role in the country’s future. The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have been key allies in the fight against ISIS, but tensions with other opposition groups remain. The United States should encourage dialogue between the SDF and HTS, as well as other opposition factions. This dialogue could include:

• Inclusion of Kurdish leaders in the political process: A future Syria should represent the interests of all Syrians, including Kurds, Arabs, and other minorities. The United States can mediate discussions between the SDF and HTS to ensure Kurdish representation in the future government.

Seizing the moment

Failure for the United States to engage with Syria’s new leadership can lead to several negative outcomes. HTS could radicalize further if it does not have international checks or relies on other actors for diplomacy, trade, and support. Russia and Iran could fill the vacuum and partner with the new Syrian government to sideline the United States in the region. A new Syrian government without international support could fall into chaos and sow instability, leading to further mass displacement throughout the rest of the region. The United States must seize this moment to help influence the future of Syria, rather than waiting to see what happens. No potential path forward for Syria or HTS is inevitable. The sooner the United States takes concrete action, the more likely it can positively impact Syria’s future.  

HTS leader Ahmed al-Shara, formerly known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, entered the political scene in Syria over ten years ago. He has long been mindful of the lessons learned from the failures of al-Qaeda to win the support of the Iraqi people. HTS was formed by military officials who wanted to work within the contexts of the societies they lived in. HTS has continuously moderated since its inception and break from Jabhat al-Nusra—al-Qaeda’s Syria branch—in 2017. Of course, part of its strategy may be for optics, but much of the group’s rhetoric about moderation has taken the form of concrete actions. HTS has a Directorate of Minority Affairs that has guaranteed the safety of Christians and Alawites under its control. HTS has ordered its fighters not to disturb public institutions. And the larger and more diverse the population that comes under its governance, the more HTS will need to evolve and the less power it will have to determine what governance looks like on the ground. 

It is important not to overstate the current moderation of HTS. The group is not a bastion of liberal democracy, and its political evolution is still ongoing. However, HTS is actively seeking diplomatic recognition and has expressed a willingness to engage with the international community. The United States should not expect perfection but should recognize that political entities are capable of evolving, especially when faced with the realities of governance and international expectations. Shara has already reached out to regional countries, including Lebanon, Iraq, and Russia, reassuring them that he intends to have good relations despite past support their past support for Assad. If HTS proves genuinely open to dialogue and reform, the United States should pursue engagement rather than exclusion.

As long as HTS is willing to evolve and accept constructive criticism, the United States should engage with the group. Ignoring Syria’s new leaders will not make them go away. US outreach to HTS is not just engagement for the sake of engagement. A post-Assad Syria, especially one with leaders willing to engage with Washington, presents an opportunity for the United States to promote stability and democracy in the Middle East, curb Iranian and Russian influence in the region, and provide a safe and secure home for Syrians both inside and outside Syria. 

Sana Sekkarie is a digital threat analyst focusing on the Middle East. She was previously a researcher focused on Syrian opposition groups at the Institue for the Study of War and the University of Virginia.  

The post A US blueprint for Syria’s fragile transition appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Wall Street Journal’s Yaroslav Trofimov writes that now those two US allies, whose relations have grown far worse since the war in Gaza began last year, are set on “a collision course” in Syria and beyond.   

Assessing what Israel hopes to get out of the dramatic geopolitical realignment of the Middle East isn’t hard, as its national interests are well known and existential in nature. Its decisions are driven by its need for security, by its desire to maintain military and technological superiority, and by its enduring need to deter, contain, and counter Iran and its proxies.

Events of the past few weeks, which have so deeply weakened Iran and the armed groups that it supports across the region, have put Israel in its strongest security position in recent memory. In a powerful interview with the Wall Street Journal, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recounts the key decision points that produced that outcome. “Power isn’t merely guns, missiles, tanks, and aircraft,” Netanyahu says. “It’s the will to fight and seize the initiative.” Now, Israel’s leaders are reflecting on how best to leverage and extend their gains.

Until now, the world hasn’t focused as much on Turkey’s own aspirations, but President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan isn’t shy about discussing them. “Every event in our region, and especially Syria, reminds us that Turkey is bigger than Turkey itself,” Erdoğan said this week. “The Turkish nation cannot escape from its destiny.”

Erdoğan frames that “destiny” in civilizational terms, positioning the “new Turkey” as a continuation of its Ottoman legacy and an Islamic world leader. This notion is sparking concern not only in Israel, but among Gulf monarchies and the United States, too.

“For Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel, the shift in Damascus is a gamechanger that could pit them against a regional rival,” Hassan Hassan, the founder and editor-in-chief of New Lines Magazine, writes in the Guardian. “For western policymakers, views of Ankara’s growing assertiveness range from concerns over its Islamist ties to recognition of its centrality to Middle Eastern politics. This plays into Ankara’s hands, as it is a marked difference to Iran’s power projection that was unanimously challenged in the west and the region.”

Turkey’s rise, writes Hassan, disrupts Riyadh’s narrative depicting itself as the undisputed leader of the Sunni Muslim world, countering Shia Iran. “Ankara’s Islamist-leaning policies resonate with a broad swath of Sunni Muslims and political Islamists, offering an alternative to the Gulf monarchies,” he writes.

At a time when Israelis can sigh in relief at the diminished threat from Shia Iran, they are expressing new worries about a Turkish-led group of Sunni Islamists. Meanwhile, European and US diplomats are meeting in Damascus with Ahmed al-Shara, the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which led the recent push that ousted the Assad regime.

On Friday, US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf met with Shara and announced that the United States will drop a ten million dollar bounty it had offered for his capture. Leaf also said that the HTS leader agreed on the need to prevent terrorist groups from operating in Syria.

Shara says that he wants to build his country and not start new fights, but he’s still designated by the United States as a terrorist bearing the nom de guerre Muhammad al-Jawlani. 

Where will all of this land? With so much in motion, one can’t be sure.

What’s clear is Turkey will have the most important voice in Damascus in the period ahead, and an increasingly large voice far beyond. Writes Trofimov: “This brings Erdoğan closer than ever to reaching his ambition for a sphere of influence that stretches across former Ottoman lands, all the way to Libya and Somalia.”

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

The post The Middle East’s shifting balance of power favors Turkey and Israel appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the immediate aftermath of the US-led departure from Afghanistan, US officials reassured the public that over-the-horizon intelligence would be sufficient to track and take needed action against the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and IS-K. There was an expectation that this approach would be sufficient to prevent a reemergence of terrorist groups that pose a threat outside of Afghanistan. The opposite has occurred. Afghanistan is once again a hub of extremist leadership, training, and plotting of attacks against Western interests.

Now a new challenge is emerging. Despite early optimism, the new leadership in Syria poses serious concerns to US and third-country officials who are moving more cautiously than in Afghanistan. The toppling of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in recent days is a major win for the people of Syria, but Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS’s) origin as a consortium of al-Qaeda-aligned groups, including the Nusra Front, strongly suggests that the group’s domestic and foreign policies are unlikely to be moderate by regional standards. An already fragile situation in the Levant with on-going Israeli operations, a fragile Jordanian economy with concerns about domestic stability, and the imminent mass return of Syrian refugees could result in global leaders taking HTS leader and new Syrian Prime Minister Mohammed al-Bashir at his word when a skeptical and measured approach is needed.

All these regional developments speak to a need for the United States to stay vigilant—and present—in the fight against terrorism.

They are back

In the chaos of the coalition departure from Afghanistan, prisons were emptied of extremists and known al-Qaeda fighters, the Taliban was unable to establish governance across the country, and an already established IS-K in the eastern provinces of Nangarhar and Kunar saw an opportunity to expand its recruitment from mostly Afghan and Pakistani Pashtuns to third-country nationals. At the same time, terrorist organizations around the world took note that the United States and its allies moved on from terrorism. The US resources required to keep groups in check were no longer available. 

In short, over-the-horizon intelligence was not interfering with the day-to-day operations or leadership of Afghanistan-based groups, and it was only marginally impacting operations in Syria, the Sahel, Yemen, and Somalia.

IS-K quickly expanded its operational activity and recruitment in Afghanistan. As a result, it has built a hub of strongholds or camps in thirteen provinces with an estimated four to six thousand fighters as of July 2023, according to the United Nations (UN). More and more Islamic State fighters from different parts of the world now travel to Afghanistan because they find this territory safer in the absence of a capable force to effectively counter them. Though US officials dispute the UN’s figures, few dispute that IS-K is present in the country and can direct and coordinate attacks around the world. Such attacks include the March 2024 mass shooing at a concert hall in Moscow that killed 139 people, as well as several thwarted efforts to disrupt the 2024 Paris Olympics. 

In the United States, an Afghan on a special immigrant visa was arrested in early October after his plans to conduct an Islamic State-inspired attack on Election Day surfaced. Contrary to the Taliban’s claims that it has reduced the capacity of IS-K, all the major leaders of the group are alive and active in Afghanistan; these individuals have direct external operations as well as internal operations experience.

It’s a small world after all

Today, despite Taliban rule and the numerous sanctions and restrictions put on the government, as well as on many al-Qaeda- and IS-K-affiliated leaders, Afghanistan is more connected to the outside world than at any previous time. It has access to the internet and a budding 4G mobile phone network. It has regular direct flights to international hubs such as Dubai, Doha, and Istanbul available several times per week, and some daily. And its largely open borders with neighboring countries enable Afghanistan-based terrorist groups to act as a command-and-control center for operational planning both inside Afghanistan and abroad. The problem becomes compounded by the fact that more than six thousand Afghan passports were distributed to some known foreign terrorist operatives, including al-Qaeda, under fake names, per reports from sources allied with the former Afghan Directorate of National Security (NDS) to its former leadership. 

More broadly, no single terrorist group operates in a silo. Communication between groups, be it voice or digital, through social media or chat apps, is common. Several investigations by the NDS supported the conclusion that, despite various names and goals, terrorist groups extensively shared expertise and new tactics with each other, as noted in lectures and presentations given by former NDS senior leaders. The movement of fighters from one group to another is also a common practice. A successful attack or operation is often viewed as a shared win across groups and a means to recruit, fundraise, or validate a group’s credibility. Moreover, the ongoing fighting between Israel and the consortium of Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and various Sunni groups such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad inspires and mobilizes previously dormant or undermanned groups globally, providing a rallying call against Western interests.

What the West can do

The Taliban seems to have neither the intention nor the ability to counter the growth of terrorist groups in Afghanistan. While the Taliban rolls out new rules to restrict the behaviors and movement of women, IS-K and al-Qaeda are actively recruiting new fighters, indoctrinating future fighters and supporters around the world, and planning attacks abroad. As a result, Afghanistan has once again become a hub of transnational terrorist activity under a Taliban regime. At the same time, the resilience of Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic State, and African-based al-Qaeda affiliates highlights that the terrorism problem is far from under control.

The West must be willing once again to view the terrorism fight as worthy of time and resources, starting with an admission that countering terrorism cannot be done well from a great distance. There are three ways to put that change of mindset into practice.

1. Reestablishing relationships and programs with third-country political leaders and intelligence services can provide the frontline information, insights, and trip wires needed to better forecast terrorist operations and attacks. For Afghanistan, many former NDS and Afghan military leaders remain in close contact with former colleagues, sources, and family and friends on the ground who are able to provide information and insights that cannot be gathered through technical means. In other nations, funding and on-the-ground partnerships with operational units in intelligence services, security and policing services, and some military units which were common in the 2000s and early 2010s can once again build vital source networks and capabilities for nations to reduce or eliminate terrorist groups on their soil.
2. Devoting resources to grassroots and opposition organizations can help to prevent new recruitment and reduce community support for existing resident terrorist groups. Applying direct political pressure on the Taliban and other governments that provide a safe haven for terror is necessary to hold these governments accountable for the terrorist activity happening on their turf.
3. Outside of the normal sanctions or withholding of aid, pressuring countries to cease allowing the Taliban’s or other terrorist groups’ leadership to visit, send their children or family members for education or medical care, and invest in businesses outside of Afghanistan or their home country could be easy wins that negatively impact Taliban members’ daily lives. For nations that support or permit terrorist activities, naming and shaming, reducing or eliminating financial aid and support, and actively supporting opposition political actors would all garner attention and encourage substantive changes. 
4. Maintaining a robust US and coalition military presence in Syria may not be politically popular, but it would be a constant reminder to HTS that a highly capable global power is watching. On-going support to Israel to take this opportunity to further degrade the Islamic State in partnership with the United States will help to reduce the threat the group poses in the region, and would send clear signals to Bashir, the new prime minister, that threats with ties back to Syria will be dealt with quickly and severely. 
   

Despite the robust attention currently being paid to conflicts like Ukraine, the upcoming change in US presidential administrations, and the global economy, the threat of terrorism continues to once again gain steam, often quietly, in the background of our daily lives. As was learned previously, turning a blind eye to or wishing the problem away is not a viable policy or political position, and prevention is far more impactful than relying on responses after the fact.

Ahmad Zia Saraj is on the faculty of the King’s Centre for the Study of Intelligence at King’s College London and was the director general of the Afghan National Directorate of Security from 2019 to 2021. 

Jennifer Counter is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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While Hamas initially demonstrated sincere interest in a negotiated ceasefire and potential diplomatic resolution to the conflict Israel in the Gaza Strip, the last month has seen it largely withdraw from and refuse to participate in these efforts. In early November, the Qatari government ceased its mediation efforts, citing a lack of good-faith negotiations and stating that the “Hamas political office no longer serves its purpose.” It is likely that Israel’s successful operations to degrade both Lebanese Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Quds Force (IRGC-QF) have severely reshaped the strategic calculus of the remaining Hamas senior leadership.

Sinwar’s fatalism was often interpreted as a willingness to accept heavy losses in exchange for long-term ideological goals. He embraced a narrative of martyrdom that resonates with the base of Hamas’s support, with death in conflict against Israel seen as a worthy end. Under Sinwar’s leadership, Hamas has shown little hesitation in confronting Israel even when it appears militarily disadvantageous, highlighting Sinwar’s focus on ideological rather than pragmatic calculations. This approach aligns with the long-standing Hamas principle of resistance (muqawama) but adds an intensity that escalates the risk of broader and more destructive conflicts.

However, beyond fatalism, there was a strategic component to Sinwar’s leadership. He had previously overseen periods of tactical ceasefires and negotiations, showing that—despite the group’s extreme rhetoric—he was not opposed to temporary pauses in fighting if it meant regrouping and fortifying Hamas’s position. This pattern has been particularly evident when Hamas faces significant setbacks or needs time to reorganize its military and political structures. This makes Hamas’s current recalcitrance to negotiate for a ceasefire all the more vexing.

It is likely that Hamas’s current approach to negotiations with Israel stems from an acceptance of the IRGC-QF’s clear prioritization of restoring Hezbollah. Recent Israeli military successes against Hezbollah, particularly through targeted strikes and intelligence operations, have severely weakened Hezbollah’s operational capacity and severely undermined Tehran’s regional capabilities. 

Hezbollah’s losses have not only reduced its military capabilities but also eliminated a number of senior leaders and key intermediaries between the group and its Iranian patrons. The pressure on Hezbollah to rebuild will limit Iran’s ability to support Hamas in the short term. This shift could also relieve some of the Israeli pressure on Hamas, allowing Hamas a window to reorganize without being drawn into the broader conflict dynamics with Hezbollah and Israel. Sinwar’s death will further undermine any efforts by Iran to bolster Hamas as the IRGC-QF struggles to reestablish effective relations with the replacement leadership.

The IRGC-QF likely finds it easier—and ideologically prefers—to focus on restoring Hezbollah, given the physical proximity of Hezbollah to Iranian bases of operation in Syria and Iraq and its shared Shia religious ideology. As a Sunni-majority group, Hamas has historically enjoyed less support from Iran in comparison Hezbollah and other Shia-dominated groups, leading to Hamas accusing Tehran of “betrayal” last year. By comparison, to reconstitute Hamas in Gaza, the IRGC-QF must smuggle munitions and other supplies along a far more circuitous route through Oman, Yemen, the Red Sea, Sudan, and Egypt. 

The situation is complex for Hamas. On one hand, it loses a powerful ally with Hezbollah’s weakened state, particularly one that has provided significant complementary military and logistical support in the past. On the other hand, Israel’s clear shift to focusing on destroying Hezbollah might afford Hamas breathing room to consolidate its resources and reorganize.

With Hamas being further down on Iran’s priority list, the group’s leadership likely sees less advantage in negotiating a ceasefire right now, as Iran would be less likely to send assistance for reconstituting. Iran’s backing, although critical, is not as reliable or consistent as it once was. With Iran’s economic limitations, exacerbated by sanctions and its own need to focus resources on rebuilding Hezbollah, Hamas will likely face reductions in Iranian financial and military support in the near future. In response, Hamas has already shown signs of diversifying its revenue and supply streams, a necessity for sustaining its operations. 

One avenue for diversification involves forging new alliances with regional actors that are sympathetic to the Palestinian cause but not directly aligned with Iran. Since 2007, Qatar has provided Hamas nearly $2 billion in financial support, focusing on humanitarian aid that bolsters Gaza’s infrastructure. Turkey has also extended significant diplomatic and fundraising support, though Qatar and Turkey need to balance these actions with broader geopolitical calculations and relationships with other regional powers, including Israel.

Moreover, Hamas could deepen its covert ties with actors in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, where smuggling networks provide a critical lifeline for weapons and other supplies. While Egyptian authorities have cracked down on these networks, Hamas has shown a capacity to adapt and work around such challenges. The ongoing civil wars in Egypt’s neighbors Libya and Sudan also help ensure the region is awash in weapons available to the highest bidder, providing another potential source of arms.

Hamas has significantly ramped up its domestic production of rockets and other munitions. Leveraging locally sourced materials, Hamas’s engineers have managed to build a substantial stockpile of crude, but effective, projectiles. This shift toward self-reliance has been a critical factor in sustaining the group’s military capabilities, especially as external support fluctuates. Hamas will likely continue this trend, focusing on upgrading its weapons programs to maintain operational readiness, even in the face of tightened sanctions and supply shortages. What remains to be seen is the impact that Israel’s sustained combat operations against Hamas in Gaza will have on Hamas’s effort to become more self-reliant.

Over several years, Hamas has been increasingly using cryptocurrencies as a means of circumventing international banking restrictions and sanctions (although, as a proportion, cryptocurrency remains small in comparison to other sources of funding). Bitcoin and other digital currencies offer Hamas a relatively anonymous and decentralized means of transferring funds, making it difficult for international authorities to track or block these financial flows. This method of financing has seen increased use in recent years, with reports of Hamas soliciting cryptocurrency donations via online platforms.

In parallel, Hamas is likely to increase its reliance on black-market activities and other forms of illicit financing, such as smuggling and money laundering through front companies and charities in sympathetic states. Hamas has used sham charities to exploit sympathy for Palestinians in the West, raising funds through donation campaigns with pro-Palestinian messages. While these avenues of raising funds come with risks for Hamas, particularly as international counterterrorism financing efforts intensify, they offer alternative revenue streams for Hamas to supplement reduced Iranian support.

Predictive paths for the Israel-Hamas conflict

Given these dynamics, several potential scenarios could unfold in the Israel-Hamas conflict, each shaped by regional shifts, international interventions, and Hamas’s ability to adapt to its changing environment.

One likely scenario is the continuation of the current pattern of sporadic escalations followed by periods of relative calm, punctuated by rocket attacks and retaliatory Israeli strikes. The current Israeli focus on Hezbollah and Iran could create time and space for Hamas to reestablish this pattern. Hamas might opt to engage in periodic confrontations to maintain its image of resistance, without pushing for a full-scale conflict that would strain its resources. 

This would allow the group to reconsolidate its position in Gaza and focus on rebuilding its military capabilities while avoiding the kind of overwhelming Israeli response that could decimate its leadership and infrastructure. Despite, or perhaps because of, the devastation Israel has wreaked in Gaza, it is unlikely that Hamas will have significant issues attracting new recruits to its cause.

Alternatively, a full-scale conflict could erupt if internal pressures within Gaza, such as economic collapse or political unrest, push Hamas to escalate as a means of redirecting public anger toward Israel. In such a suicidal assault, Hamas might throw all its remaining combat power into last-ditch offensive operations against Israel using tactics similar to those of its October 7 attack. Additionally, external factors—such as conflict between Israel and Hezbollah—could trigger broader regional instability that draws Hamas into a larger confrontation.

Given Israel’s military superiority, Hamas would likely face significant losses in this scenario. However, echoes of Sinwar’s confrontational approach suggest that Hamas might be willing to accept such losses if it believes that it could emerge with its ideological legitimacy intact, or even enhanced, in the eyes of its supporters. Absent strong commitments from Iran and Hezbollah to support Hamas far better than they have in the current conflict, it is unlikely that Hamas will instigate a full-scale conflict.

A third scenario involves increased international mediation efforts, particularly efforts led by regional powers such as Egypt and Qatar, which have a vested interest in preventing Gaza from descending into chaos. While Qatar recently ceased its own mediation, its long history with Israel and Hamas makes it a preferred interlocutor. This could lead to temporary ceasefires or agreements that would provide Gaza with much-needed humanitarian aid and economic relief in exchange for de-escalation.

In this case, Hamas would likely use the lull to regroup and focus on internal governance, balancing its need for legitimacy as a resistance movement with the practical demands of governing Gaza’s population. Given Israel’s clear understanding of this pattern, by which Hamas has sustained its resistance over several decades, it is unlikely that Israeli leadership would acquiesce to a mediation that allows Hamas to retain political and military power in Gaza.

Policy recommendations for the next US administration

As the Israel-Hamas conflict continues to evolve, the incoming Donald Trump administration will need to adopt a nuanced and forward-looking approach that builds upon prior efforts to avoid further destabilization while maintaining US interests in the region. It should consider the following actions.

1. Support for regional mediation efforts: The United States should continue to support regional mediation efforts, particularly those led by Egypt and Qatar, aimed at maintaining temporary ceasefires and providing humanitarian aid to Gaza. Such efforts can help prevent full-scale conflict while allowing time for more sustainable solutions to be explored. 
2. Countering illicit financing and smuggling networks: The United States should work with international partners to enhance counterterrorism financing efforts, particularly in targeting the cryptocurrencies and smuggling networks on which Hamas relies for funding. This will require closer coordination with financial institutions and governments in the region to monitor and block illicit financial flows.
3. Humanitarian aid and infrastructure development: Providing humanitarian aid to Gaza through carefully monitored channels will be essential for reducing the suffering of the civilian population and preventing Hamas from capitalizing on economic desperation. However, this aid must be closely tied to ceasefire agreements and efforts to reduce Hamas’s ability to divert resources for military purposes.
4. Supporting Israeli defense and regional security: The United States must continue to support Israel’s right to defend itself against Hamas attacks, while encouraging Israel to take measured responses that minimize civilian casualties and avoid the war spiraling into broader regional conflict. At the same time, the United States should enhance regional security cooperation to counteract Iran’s influence and reduce the potential for escalation involving Hezbollah and other actors.

The current leadership of Hamas reflects a blend of confrontational ideology and pragmatic adaptability. While recent regional dynamics might offer Hamas some breathing room, its long-term survival will depend on its ability to diversify revenue streams, maintain military capabilities, and navigate a complex geopolitical landscape. For the United States, balancing support for Israel with efforts to mitigate humanitarian suffering and prevent full-scale conflict will be critical to ensuring stability in the region.

Doug Livermore is the national vice president for the Special Operations Association of America, senior vice president for solution engineering at the CenCore Group, and the deputy commander for Special Operations Detachment–Joint Special Operations Command in the North Carolina Army National Guard. 

Disclaimer: The views expressed are the author’s and do not represent official US government, Department of Defense, or Department of the Army positions.

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The capture of Hama is a significant strategic victory for the rebels, but Damascus remains the biggest prize. Here’s what to watch as the rebel offensive continues to unfold.

Why Hama matters

The rebels’ operation, named “Deterrence of Aggression,” was a response to increased shelling of civilian areas by government forces since the 2020 ceasefire agreement. With the control of strategic heights surrounding rebel-controlled northwest Syria, the regime and Iranian proxies utilized artillery, rockets, and first-person view drones to attack civilian infrastructure across Idlib province. Just a day before the operation launched, Assad regime forces attacked an elementary school in Ariha, killing three children and injuring fourteen. The rebels’ success so far has been attributed both to external factors, such as diminished Iranian and Hezbollah support for the regime, and to internal coordination among opposition forces in Idlib and neighboring Aleppo.

As the rebels advance in Hama province, the power dynamics are dramatically shifting in their favor. The collapse of government defenses suggests a tactical failure and a broader strategic disarray within the Assad regime.

Taking Aleppo is a major feat by the rebels, but securing Hama holds a special political and strategic importance. Hama is the city from which Syria’s early uprising in the 1960s and 1970s started. In 1982, it was subjected to a brutal military campaign, during which tens of thousands of its residents were killed and displaced. The event remains alive in the collective memory of Syrians as a demonstration of the willingness of the regime, then under Hafez al-Assad and now under his son Bashar, to exercise violence to remain in power. Hama also played a prominent role in the 2011 uprising as a site of large-scale popular protests.

Hama is also strategically positioned in central Syria between major cities, making it a critical node for controlling supply lines and transportation routes across the country. The province hosts a significant military airbase used by the SAA and its allies, including Russian forces. The airbase has been critical for launching airstrikes, reconnaissance, and logistical operations throughout the conflict. The city and its surroundings, which the rebels are currently taking over, also house several military barracks and artillery positions, making it a vital operational center. 

In all, the rebels’ advance in and around Hama will seriously weaken the Assad regime’s ability to counter rebels’ attacks, reverse its losses from the past week, and defend its remaining strongholds in central Syria.

What’s next for the rebels?

Next, the opposition forces will likely advance southward and push toward the capital, Damascus. But after successfully capturing Aleppo and Hama, the rebel forces will face military, social, and governance challenges as they move south.

The rebels will need to cement their gains in Hama province. The area will be important to maintain military and strategic leverage against Assad, and it is likely to be the first target for any attempt by Assad to the reverse the course of the rebel offensive. The rebels may also face logistical and operational challenges, including the need for supplies. Open-source intelligence indicates that as the SAA withdraws from different military bases, it is leaving enough military equipment and ammunition to power the rebel advances. However, the area captured in Hama province may stretch the rebel forces and expose them to counterattacks.

As the rebels head south toward Homs, they will be faced with new challenges. Homs is Syria’s third-largest city and serves as a critical transit hub connecting Damascus to the northern and western provinces, including the coastal strongholds of Latakia and Tartus, where the Russian military has bases. Entering Homs province requires going through large Alawite communities, many of which strongly support Assad. This poses a challenge for rebels to establish local support. A decade of fighting between Assad-allied militias and rebels within the province has resulted in more fortifications being build there. Homs is also home to a significant concentration of Syrian government forces, bolstered by allied militias and a large Hezbollah presence. 

More importantly, the rebels advancing toward Homs will test Russia’s redlines in Syria. So far, Russia has been absent from providing serious military support to uphold Assad’s defenses across areas he’s losing to the rebels. While Russia has conducted some airstrikes in Idlib and Aleppo to counter rebel advances, it has not engaged directly in Hama. This restraint reflects Moscow’s strategic calculations to avoid overextension.

However, Russia appears committed to preserving the Assad regime, its primary foothold in the Middle East, and it has reportedly promised additional military aid to Damascus. If the rebels now advance toward Homs, Russia will have to decide where it draws the line, whether that is in preventing an advance toward Assad in Damascus or the protection of its major naval and air hub in western Syria.

The evolution of HTS

Syria’s rebels also face challenges in Hama and other areas under their control. Rebel factions in Syria have long had differing ideologies, and over the past decade they have often struggled to present a unified governance structure. This lack of cohesion led to internal conflicts and weakened their overall ability to govern. So far in Hama, however, the rebels appear to be taking a different approach. Led by HTS, the rebels participating in Deterrence of Aggression have shown discipline in their military conduct, their control of civilian infrastructure, and their outreach to minority communities. Statements from rebel leadership emphasize the protection of civilians and Syria’s cultural heritage, reflecting efforts to gain local and possibly international legitimacy. This approach draws on HTS’s experience in Idlib province, where it has maintained control through a combination of military dominance, localized governance structures, and a focus on community relations, including outreach to minority groups.

While previously associated with al-Qaeda, HTS has evolved into a locally focused group, abandoned al-Qaeda’s cross-national jihadism ideology, and become the main force to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and al-Qaeda in northwest Syria. Yet the group remains controversial due to its past militant and extremist activities. HTS also remains a designated terrorist organization by the United States and the United Nations, which presents challenges for foreign governments to deal with it. HTS has announced its willingness to dissolve itself, again, and work with partners on the ground to develop a more representative governing structure, in what seems to be a signal of its pragmatism toward the European Union (EU) and the United States. Diplomats have also indicated that HTS has communicated with different EU capitals its willingness to work with them to facilitate a safe return for Syrian refugees in Europe.

The control of Syria’s second- and fourth-largest cities and their advances toward Homs present Syria’s rebels with challenges and opportunities. Aleppo is one of only two metropolitan centers in Syria with a population of more than four million. Hama is home to more than a million Syrians. In contrast to long-held Idlib, the rebels will be dealing with diverse religious, cultural, and ethnic communities, and they will have to adapt relatively quickly to the challenges ahead. If the rebels are successful in providing good governance in Aleppo and Hama, then it bodes well for their ability to successfully govern Damascus, and ultimately the whole of Syria. The world is watching.

Qutaiba Idlbi is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs, where he leads the Council’s work on Syria.

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IS-K was formed in 2015 and operates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia. Initially, the group seemed to focus on recruitment and on conducting attacks within Afghanistan. The group experienced a slowdown between 2018 and 2021 because of US and Afghan military operations targeting the group in Afghanistan. The Taliban, too, fought against IS-K during this period. However, after the US troop withdrawal in 2021, the Taliban became the only force combating the group on the ground, which allowed the terrorist organization to regroup and build operations in Afghanistan and beyond. With this resurgence, IS-K seems to have pivoted its strategy away from attacks within Afghanistan to a more global agenda.

In the first half of 2024, IS-K carried out three successful attacks abroad that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of civilians in Iran, Turkey, and Russia. The attack in Moscow on Crocus City Hall, which claimed the lives of more than 140 people, made headlines and stoked fears of a resurgent and coordinated global IS-K threat. The success of the attack might also provide motivation for the group to attempt similar mass casualty attacks elsewhere. 

In addition to these attacks, there have been a number of publicly disclosed foiled plots and arrests connected to IS-K across the globe. Authorities reportedly disrupted IS-K plots to attack the Olympic Games in Paris and Taylor Swift concerts in Austria this past summer. In August, a United Nations official called IS-K the “greatest” terror threat to Europe. And the threat is not only in Europe; eight Tajik nationals suspected of connections to ISIS were arrested this year after entering the United States. 

IS-K is simultaneously increasing its online propaganda output and tailoring it to a wider audience. Last summer, IS-K began releasing more multilingual content, with an uptick in Uzbek- and Tajik-language materials in particular. Shortly after the Crocus City Hall attack, a media group connected with IS-K created a new Tajik-language magazine, a change from its infrequent and low-profile usage of Tajik in previous materials. 

US officials have reported that the group has rolled out a “sophisticated propaganda campaign” targeting disaffected individuals in the Muslim diaspora to carry out attacks in Western countries, including in the United States. This represents an expansion from previous recruitment efforts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia. On top of the group’s new efforts, Israel’s war in Gaza has also likely contributed to radicalizing a new generation.

There is another change that further complicates US and European counterterrorism efforts: Russia is making the IS-K threat worse. 

Two weeks before the Crocus City Hall attack, the United States alerted Russia about the possibility of an impending terrorist strike on large gatherings in Moscow. The public warnings and private communication on the matter with Russian authorities in the lead-up to the attack proved futile. Only three days before the tragic attack, Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged the warning, citing it as “propaganda” meant to “intimidate and destabilize” Russian society.

Intelligence sharing has been an integral part of counterterrorism efforts since 9/11, and the United States and Russia have successfully cooperated on the issue in the past. But the deterioration of US-Russian relations amid the Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has resulted in a greater blind spot in the US response to the global threat of IS-K. It remains unclear whether Russia simply didn’t trust the Western tip or failed to react effectively to it, although both constitute a faulty policy with deadly consequences.

In addition, most Central Asians recruited to IS-K have been radicalized in Russia. For decades, Russia has been a major destination for Central Asian migrants seeking work, but the harsh living conditions, economic struggles, and widespread hostility they face there make this population more vulnerable to extremist ideologies. Central Asians, particularly Tajiks, have been involved in much of IS-K’s recent activities, with some experts estimating that they may make up as much as half of the group’s recruits. With Russia a fertile recruiting ground for Central Asians, who make up much of IS-K’s ranks, Moscow’s counterterrorism policy would play a key role in mitigating the threat. 

In response to the March attack, Russia has tightened restrictions on Central Asian migrants. In the summer, the State Duma passed a new batch of laws that curb the rights of migrants, while raids against migrant communities have become more frequent. These official actions, accompanied by increased instances of xenophobia on the street, contribute to a growing hostile environment for Central Asians in Russia. These hardships, which have pushed some to extremism already, will likely worsen as Putin’s crackdown continues, leaving an already vulnerable population even more exposed to IS-K’s recruitment pitch. 

Russia has shown no clear intention to effectively tackle the growing threat of IS-K. The Kremlin has blamed the Crocus City Hall attack and others on the West or Kyiv, likely as an attempt to deflect responsibility for failing to stop the attacks. Moscow remains an unreliable partner with a diminishing willingness to engage in counterterrorism cooperation while pursuing ineffective policies to mitigate this threat. Indeed, its policies likely created more fertile ground for recruitment in the country. 

US policymakers should expect a growing blind spot coming out of Russia resulting from Moscow’s ineffective counterterrorism measures and increasingly hostile policy to a population already vulnerable to extremist recruitment. Russia cannot be relied on to deal with this threat, which makes the attention of the United States and its allies on this issue all the more urgent.

Katherine Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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While working with foreign liaison services, it is essential to note that the CIA also partners closely with other US intelligence community agencies and/or US Special Operations Forces in supporting them. This brings a far more holistic and comprehensive approach to foreign partnerships and typically occurs with the US’ most valued intelligence relationships. Such efforts result in some of the US government’s highest-impact intelligence successes, often against its most critical adversaries. According to a 2022 Politico article, the CIA, National Security Agency (NSA), Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI), British counterparts, and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) all reportedly worked together in 2006 to disrupt an al-Qaeda airliner plot where UK-based operatives, directed by al-Qaeda leadership hiding in Pakistan, were attempting to smuggle peroxide-based liquid explosives onto multiple planes simultaneously, and then planning to detonate them mid-flight. The disruption of this plot, through arrests in Pakistan and the United Kingdom, prevented a catastrophic attack. Separately, though not specifically related to counterterrorism, a 2012 New York Times article reported that the CIA, NSA, US Cyber Command, and Israeli intelligence agency Mossad all collaborated to sabotage Iran’s nuclear enrichment program, reportedly delaying the country’s nuclear ambitions while avoiding the direct consequences of military strikes, which could have risked a regional war. While reportedly a successful joint effort, it was also reported that the targeted malware used in the operation accidentally spread beyond the intended target, infecting systems worldwide.

As these examples demonstrate, robust investment in foreign liaison relationships enables the fundamental conditions required for an effective global counterterrorism strategy, and not just within the countries where these partnerships are enabled. Here, “robust investment” includes an array of opportunities. First, the forward deployment of a sufficient number of subject matter operational and analytic counterterrorism experts in every country with a terrorist presence, with language fluency where required. Second, using every inch of US authority to share critical intelligence with liaison partners, with an emphasis on transparency given the compatibility of the underlying content, while encouraging liaison to share back with the same bias in favor of robust sharing. Third, aggressively resourcing training courses for liaison to continuously improve their capabilities against an evolving threat landscape, with the opportunity to learn from local experts as well on the latest enemy tactics observed. Finally, funding and/or acquisition of the appropriate equipment for partner units to be as effective as possible for the threats they face.

These investments enable a range of fundamental conditions that are required for an effective global counterterrorism strategy and also provide several secondary and even intangible critical benefits that would otherwise be unavailable in their absence. First and foremost, these investments provide a consistent seat at the foreign liaison decision table. There is simply no substitute for this in counterterrorism work, as this seat is “skin in the game” and the genesis of every other opportunity that follows. It is here where robust two-way intelligence sharing is made possible, as well as exchanges of threat assessments and terrorist order of battle assessments, and training/capacity-building measures. These actions move relationships from “nice to have” status to “essential” for both sides. Through these investments and the partnerships themselves, the US is also able to maintain the closest proximity to terrorist strongholds. In whatever form this takes within a country, there is no substitute for having all forms of intelligence collection as close as possible to the problem and, where possible, always reducing the enemy’s safe haven. 

Additionally, when these investments are maximized, it allows the US to plug this foreign liaison relationship into a more effective transnational counterterrorism network community of interest to better go after ongoing transnational threats. Furthermore, through close partnership with foreign liaison services as described above, the US is also in the best possible position to monitor behaviors, both those observed and those learned about by other means, to ensure these behaviors are in line with the US and its partners’ laws, policies, and values. Such crucial insights allow the US to ensure proper accountability and continuous improvement for its partners’ culture and practices. Finally, in those rare instances requiring a unilateral US action to solve a problem, all of the parameters above, when enabled to the fullest, put policymakers in the best possible position to know when to make such a call.

When these investments are made through intelligence channels, they build valuable goodwill with the partner country outside the public eye. This is particularly important in countries where the United States is not viewed favorably. Counterterrorism work is perhaps the most compatible subject across virtually all of the countries of the world. And while that is a sad reality owing to the ubiquitous state of the global terrorist threat, it is also an opportunity. In limited places, it is the US’ only channel for engagement, which can be used for other critical needs in limited instances. Relatedly, great power competition adversaries would rather not see the United States be successful in many countries with the most entrenched terrorist threats and will actively work to undermine the US in these regions. Robust, productive, successful, and indeed necessary foreign liaison relationships are much harder to disrupt. And those partners are much more likely to share intelligence regarding attempts at such disruption, thereby improving the US’ overall counterintelligence posture when done right.

The United States must embrace this challenge of counterterrorism foreign liaison relationships as it manages national security priorities in a resource-constrained environment. Withdrawing from commitments is the wrong message to send, and adversaries will fill the gaps if the US leaves. If anything, in an age of great power competition, the United States needs to double down on liaison relationships that focus on counterterrorism. And doubling down here means being there, in appropriate numbers, cultivating deep counterterrorism and foreign liaison expertise, with language skills as needed, as the US is positioning itself against great power competition adversaries. In fact, such efforts will be mutually enabling.

What can history teach the United States? For one, foreign liaison partners are not perfect, and there are a wide range of categories of effectiveness. There are crown jewel liaison partnerships that have consistently mattered. Some relationships are messy, with human rights issues complicating valuable cooperative efforts. Some relationships show wildly mixed results over time. Some attempts fail, while others can be highly controversial. George Tenet said about the CIA, “We do hard stuff.” In this context, that means working with sometimes capable and willing but often imperfect partners who periodically cause policy and legal challenges for the United States. The reality is that these challenges are also, in part, derivative of imperfect US policies, derivative from the US’ past policy failures, and derivative from times when it failed to live up to its promises. Despite episodic policy and legal challenges, the legal framework for leveraging foreign liaison, of course, matters. The United States does not necessarily need any new authorities in 2024, as it can and must use the existing ones that have remained in place since September 11 to meet its needs. Partnerships can be messy to include in both directions, but they absolutely are required to keep the American people safe. That should be what drives the United States beyond 2024.

Marc Polymeropoulos is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. He worked for twenty-six years at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) before retiring in 2019 at the senior intelligence service level.

Edward Bogan is a retired CIA Operations Officer with twenty-four years of experience in national security and intelligence operations and policy.

James Petrila is an adjunct professor of law at George Washington University School of Law. He previously had a thirty-year career as a lawyer at the National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency.

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On October 1 of this year, Israeli troops returned to south Lebanon for the first time in eighteen years—the latest phase in a year-long conflict that has escalated steadily over this past month. This time, however, the Israeli army appears to have absorbed some of the lessons of its troubled 2006 experience fighting against Hezbollah.

Four divisions have been mobilized for what the Israeli military says are “limited, localized, and targeted ground raids” in south Lebanon. The first troops across the border were drawn from the Ninety-First Galilee Division’s elite units, the Golani Reconnaissance Brigade and the Egoz commandos, which were established in 1995 specifically to fight Hezbollah. The intention appears to be to locate and destroy Hezbollah’s military infrastructure close to the Blue Line, the United Nations’ term for the boundary running along Lebanon’s southern border. Israel says Hezbollah could use these positions to attack vulnerable Israeli communities in the north. Israel hopes that the operation will allow for the return of the more than 60,000 residents of northern Israel who evacuated their homes months ago because of the threat posed by Hezbollah rocket fire. So far, Israeli troops have uncovered several bunkers and tunnels, captured at least four Hezbollah fighters, and dynamited civilian structures in border villages, including an entire neighborhood in the village of Mohaibib. Nevertheless, it does not appear that the Israelis are physically occupying any of the incursion points for any length of time. The ground operations more closely resemble in-and-out raids rather than an invasion and occupation and, so far, are limited to a depth of around three kilometers.

As of this writing, the Israelis appear to be operating at six locations in Lebanon close to the border:

• Labboune is an unpopulated, brush-covered hillside that lies just southeast of Naqoura, a coastal village where the headquarters of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) are located. Hezbollah had a visible military presence on the hillside before the outbreak of hostilities in October 2023, including several observation posts linked to Hezbollah’s environmental non-governmental organization, Green Without Borders. The Blue Line follows an escarpment at Labboune that offers sweeping southward views to the coastal town of Nahariyeh and, beyond that, to Haifa, Israel’s third-largest city.
• Ramieh-Aitta Shaab-Qawzah is a triangle of villages that reportedly saw fierce clashes on October 13, October 14, and again on October 16. Five Israeli soldiers from the Golani Reconnaissance Brigade were killed in this sector during a Hezbollah ambush on October 17.
• Yaroun-Maroun er Ras-Aitteroun is a three-kilometer axis a few hundred meters from the Blue Line. Hezbollah also had a military presence in the area, particularly on a hill overlooking the border south of Aitteroun.
• Blida-Mohaibib-Meiss al Jabal-Markaba is a stretch of the border that runs north to south for about ten kilometers, some of which overlooks the flat plain of northern Galilee to the east. Israeli troops have made several probes toward these villages and have been attacked by Hezbollah fighters armed with rockets, anti-tank missiles, and mortar rounds.
• Addaisseh-Kfar Kila is a narrow chokepoint where the Blue Line lies only three kilometers from the Litani River. The main road hugs the Blue Line between these two villages.
• Kfar Shuba is a Sunni-populated village on the edge of the Shebaa Farms, a rugged mountainside claimed by Lebanon that has been occupied by Israel since 1967. Israeli soldiers from the Mountain Brigade have reportedly carried out raids against Hezbollah infrastructure in this area.

Hezbollah has suffered a series of powerful blows in the past month, including the September 27 assassination of its veteran secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, in a massive air strike on what Israel said was the group’s underground command headquarters in the southern suburbs of Beirut. Several other senior leaders and top commanders have been killed and wounded since mid-September, demonstrating that Israeli intelligence seems to have thoroughly penetrated Hezbollah, an organization once known for its tight internal security. On September 23, Israel launched a widescale aerial bombing campaign against what the Israeli military said were Hezbollah infrastructure sites, claiming to have struck 1,600 targets in the first day. Nearly 500 people in Lebanon were killed in the first twenty-four hours of the raids.

Israel has warned the residents of dozens of villages and towns in southern Lebanon to leave their homes and move north of the Awali River, which lies some fifty-five kilometers from the border. UNIFIL sources say that the airstrikes against Hezbollah’s rocket launchers in the south appear to have been effective. One officer said that the peacekeepers have seen numerous destroyed launchers, some loaded with unfired rockets and others soaked in blood, presumably from the operators.

Despite its leadership having been badly mauled, Hezbollah’s surviving officials remain defiant. Naim Qassem, now Hezbollah’s acting secretary-general, said in a televised speech on October 7 that “the longer the war continues, the more difficult impasse Israel will face.”

He added, “We are striking the enemy and expanding the range of fire. We will reach any place at the time we decide according to our plan. We are steadfast, and we will emerge victorious.”  Reports have claimed that Qassem has since left Lebanon for Iran to avoid being assassinated.

Indeed, in the first twenty-four hours of ground operations, eight Israeli soldiers were killed and more than thirty wounded in separate clashes. Six of the soldiers died when an Egoz commando unit was ambushed by Hezbollah fighters, believed to be drawn from its elite Radwan Brigade, in the border village of Addaisseh.

Hezbollah has greatly increased the number of operations it carries out each day, according to the group’s statements. Most of the attacks use stand-off munitions such as mortar rounds and anti-tank missiles to target Israeli troop movements along the Blue Line. Some of the attacks hit what Hezbollah says are Israeli troop gatherings in towns set some distance from the Blue Line, which suggests that despite Israeli ground incursions, Hezbollah retains good reconnaissance capabilities, perhaps by employing drones or having a physical presence within eyeshot of the targets. Hezbollah has staged several ambushes against Israeli soldiers using improvised explosive devices and close-quarter small-arms fire.

So far, Hezbollah has relied mainly on its arsenal of relatively short-range, unguided surface-to-surface rockets to pound areas of northern Israel. However, Hezbollah announced on October 17 that it intended to “transition to a new and escalating phase in the confrontation with the Israeli enemy,” a possible indicator that it might employ precision-guided missiles on a more regular tactical basis. Indeed, before the announcement, Hezbollah sent warning shots to Israel by firing four precision-guided ballistic missiles in three separate sorties, a reminder that the group has the capacity to inflict far greater damage on Israel. Two missiles, Qader-1 and Qader-2, were fired on separate occasions toward the Tel Aviv area. A pair of Nasr-1 missiles were launched at an Israeli army barracks site east of Netanya on October 16. Since the announcement, Hezbollah has fired several volleys of what it calls “precision missiles” at targets in and around Haifa and Netanya. Nevertheless, Hezbollah’s increased use of precision-guided missiles over the past week falls well short of the mass barrages one might expect to see in a full-scale war. By the same token, Hezbollah has not used its arsenal of anti-ship missiles, and its air defense systems have been limited to challenging Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in Lebanese airspace. Hezbollah shot down three UAVs last week—two Hermes 450s and one Hermes 900—bringing the total to eight UAVs shot down since hostilities began a year ago. Some Israeli officials claim that half of Hezbollah’s precision-guided systems have been destroyed in multiple air strikes and that the wave of assassinations of top political and military leaders may have damaged Hezbollah’s command and control system. It is impossible to judge the accuracy of such claims.

Nevertheless, Hezbollah is a structured organization that should have the capacity to replace slain commanders with equally capable deputies relatively quickly. Israeli military intelligence has reportedly noted that Hezbollah forces on the front lines remain disciplined and maintain a “strict military hierarchy.” Hezbollah units on the ground are given a great deal of autonomy to confront Israeli forces. They know the mission and can proceed without having to remain in constant contact with the chain of command. The fighters tend to operate in the areas where they live, so they are intimately familiar with the terrain. There are probably only a few hundred fighters deployed along the six main axes of confrontation who have contact with Israeli ground forces. Other fighters will be deployed in villages and underground positions further north, awaiting the Israeli forces should they advance deeper into Lebanon.

For now, Hezbollah’s use of mainly unguided rockets is sufficient to prevent the Israeli government from sending Israeli evacuees back to their homes in the north, its primary war goal. Furthermore, Hezbollah and Israel are not yet engaged in a full-scale war, although it may look like it. Unlike the 2006 war, civilian state infrastructure has not been deliberately targeted to date. In 2006, Beirut’s airport was put out of action on the very first day, and bridges and roads were destroyed across Lebanon. Hezbollah may resort to more advanced missile systems in greater numbers and frequency if the war escalates to targeting infrastructure. It is in Hezbollah’s nature to act incrementally when confronting the Israeli military, reserving some of its more advanced weaponry for when it is needed and to retain the element of surprise. If Israel escalates, Hezbollah needs to be able to match that escalation. Hezbollah’s more advanced missiles could also form part of Iran’s counter-retaliation to the long-anticipated Israeli retaliation to Iran’s mass rocket barrage of Israel at the beginning of the month. The continued threat posed by Hezbollah’s existing arsenal was amply demonstrated when four Israeli soldiers were killed and more than sixty were wounded on October 13, following a Hezbollah drone strike on a dining hall in the Golani Brigade’s training base in Binyamina, midway between Haifa and Netanya and some fifty-five kilometers south of the Lebanese border. In another striking incident, a drone launched from Lebanon evaded air defense assets to strike the Caesarea home of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu was not at home at the time. Curiously, Hezbollah did not claim responsibility for the drone attack.

While Israel appears to have had some tactical on-the-ground success in south Lebanon, its strategic goal—beyond returning the displaced Israelis to their homes in the north—is still unclear. Israel reportedly intends to prevent Radwan fighters from entering villages and designate the area immediately adjacent to the border fence on the Lebanese side of the Blue Line as off-limits to all civilians. There have been several reports of Israeli troops dynamiting houses and even neighborhoods in border villages in a possible bid to make them uninhabitable for a long period of time. Israel reportedly demands the ability to enforce the no-entry zone to the extent of opening fire on anyone the army considers a combatant. It is hard to imagine Hezbollah, let alone the Lebanese government, agreeing to such terms, regardless of how heavily Israel bludgeons the group. Yielding to such terms would be tantamount to total defeat for Hezbollah, undermining the group’s self-stated raison d’être as a “resistance” force defending Lebanon and casting doubt about the future durability of the group.

From Hezbollah’s perspective, despite the pounding it receives, the group has the benefit of time. Assuming it can weather the blows from the daily torrent of air strikes, all Hezbollah needs to do is maintain the flow of rockets into northern Israel and confront Israeli troop movements on the ground. Doing so will deny Israel the ability to return the evacuees to their homes. At some point, Netanyahu may have to decide whether to move toward a negotiated solution or escalate the conflict even further, perhaps by going after Lebanese infrastructure. If he opts for the latter, the current conflict will worsen considerably.

Nicholas Blanford is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

The post Israel versus Hezbollah: Not a full-scale war—yet appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Jonathan Panikoff: Pressure will increase for a Gaza ceasefire, but the Lebanon campaign will continue

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: Sinwar’s death could provide an off-ramp for the war in Gaza

Shalom Lipner: An opportunity for Israel to ‘declare victory’ and shift focus

Carmiel Arbit: Sinwar’s death aside, Israel intends to operate in Gaza for many years

Emily Milliken: Hamas and Hezbollah leadership are diminished. Are the Houthis next? 

Danny Citrinowicz: Sinwar’s assassination won’t solve Israel’s strategic problems

Alia Brahimi: Israel’s guns are unlikely to fall silent soon

Thomas Warrick: Sinwar’s death opens the way to a resolution of the Gaza conflict

Mark N. Katz: Even Iran and Hezbollah might want a ceasefire after Sinwar’s death

Karim Mezran: What does Sinwar’s death mean for the remaining hostages?

Masoud Mostajabi: Hamas will now seek to frame Sinwar’s death as an act of martyrdom and heroism

Gissou Nia: With its Hamas targets dead, the ICC still must move forward its cases against Israeli leaders

Pressure will increase for a Gaza ceasefire, but the Lebanon campaign will continue

In July, when Israel killed Hamas’s previous leader, Haniyeh, at a government guest house in Tehran, the Hamas Shura council chose its Gaza-based leader and October 7 mastermind, Sinwar, to be the overall chief of the group. Today, the choice of a successor is likely to be more challenging. Much of Hamas has clamored for a respite from the conflict and favored a hostages-for-prisoners deal that would also mean at least a temporary cessation of hostilities. Sinwar was not nearly as inclined to have an end of hostilities, and for months Israeli leaders insisted that he was the true impediment to a ceasefire deal, having changed his demands. That culpability will quickly be put to the test. 

A new leader, especially one coming from outside Gaza, may be more inclined to finalize a deal than Sinwar was. At minimum, his death provides a renewed opening, the best that’s existed in months, for US President Joe Biden to again push for a ceasefire. For Israelis, Sinwar’s death will be viewed as a victory and as perhaps the best opportunity to convince their political leadership to make a deal for the hostages, ensuring that domestic political pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will be greater than at any point since the war began.

But even if Netanyahu is inclined to consider such a deal at this point—which is far from a sure thing—the interrelated challenges Israel is working through are unlikely to dissipate simply because Sinwar is no longer leading Hamas.

For more than a year, Hezbollah’s leaders have insisted on tying Hezbollah rocket attacks against Israel to Israel’s operations in Gaza. Israel’s operations in Lebanon have already begun and are not likely to stop, no matter the result in Gaza, unless the parties are able to strike a deal so broad that it also includes Hezbollah’s Radwan Force moving away from the border, allowing some 70,000 Israelis finally to return home. Even then, while the IDF was in conflict with Israeli political leaders about a hostage deal in Gaza, there is far more unity related to operations in Lebanon. With air and ground operations already under way, the IDF is likely to want to continue eliminating Hezbollah’s cache of its most lethal weapons, such as ballistic and cruise missiles. 

Sinwar’s death almost certainly won’t prompt Israel to reverse course and decline to strike Iran in retaliation for its ballistic missile attack on October 1, even if it comes as new negotiations are underway for a deal in Gaza. The necessity to ensure deterrence is reestablished has never been of greater importance to Israel.

Today marks an opportunity to begin to close one of the most painful chapters in Israel’s recent history, something that will only be completed once the hostages are released. But it is far from the end of the book. How Israel chooses to further leverage today’s success will determine whether the next chapters are better than this one. 

—Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He is a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council.

Sinwar’s death could provide an off-ramp for the war in Gaza

The death of Sinwar was inevitable the minute that he decided to launch the October 7 attack, which triggered a disastrous war that shattered the Gaza Strip’s people and infrastructure. 

Sinwar’s elimination could provide the Israeli government with several off-ramps and openings to start to end the war in Gaza. The chaos within Hamas following Sinwar’s death may provide a chance to exploit uncertainties and divisions to expedite the release of the remaining Israeli hostages and the implementation of a general stand-down and demobilization within Hamas. Israel, Arab nations, and the United States should now offer mass amnesty for remaining Hamas members who lay down their arms and stop fighting. They should also offer financial rewards to those who either turn in Israeli hostages or provide information leading to the whereabouts of remaining abductees. Israel should make clear its intention to pull out of Gaza and avoid the reoccupation of the Strip in the immediate future. And Gaza should be opened up for Arab, international, and Palestinian Authority figures and professionals to come in and begin stabilizing the war-torn Strip to initiate the “day after.”

But the “day after” is not here yet. And Sinwar’s death raises eight more pressing questions in the meantime:

1. Who can Israel and Arab nations negotiate with when it comes to Gaza and Hamas’s future role?
2. Who within Hamas in Gaza will control the issue of Israeli hostages, and who could command enough authority to make the group’s rank-and-file members release the hostages?
3. How much tactical and operational control did Sinwar have over Hamas’s day-to-day activities throughout the Gaza Strip?
4. Will Hamas splinter into small, disconnected cells inside Gaza, or can an interim leader emerge to keep the organization together?
5. Will elements of Hamas use Sinwar’s killing as an opportunity to step back and negotiate an end to the war that effectively amounts to a soft surrender?
6. Was Sinwar holding back more “moderate” elements within Hamas from making concessions to end the war, and could they emerge now to stop the war that he initiated?
7. Sinwar likely prepared contingencies for his eventual assassination. What could such scenarios entail? Do they include potential harm to remaining Israeli hostages? Did he intend for his killing to trigger a series of irrational and criminal actions? What sort of leadership transition did Sinwar envision for this eventuality?
8. How will Hamas’s leadership abroad react to this development? Can they credibly force Hamas in Gaza to make concessions or follow the commands of the group’s leadership in Qatar, Lebanon, and Turkey?

The answers to many of these important questions will be answered in the coming days and weeks.

—Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib is a resident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

An opportunity for Israel to ‘declare victory’ and shift focus

The now-confirmed death of Sinwar offers a potential off-ramp for Israel from its year-long Gaza offensive. Having decapitated Hamas’s leadership convincingly—remaining members of its hierarchy include Khaled Mashal and Musa Abu Marzook, both residing outside of Gaza—Israel could leverage this moment to “declare victory” and shift sharply toward a ceasefire/hostage deal with a severely downgraded Hamas. In that scenario, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would then shrink its Gaza deployment drastically, devoting more of its limited resources to inhibiting Hamas’s rejuvenation, and pivot to focusing almost exclusively on other theaters, most prominently Iran. Initial indications are that Netanyahu might be interested in precisely such an outcome, which could open the door to more practical discussions on the future of Gaza reconstruction involving international partners. It remains to be seen whether conditions on the ground, including his political circumstances, facilitate—or resist—that trajectory.

—Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative who previously worked in foreign policy and public diplomacy during his time at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem, where he served in the administration of seven consecutive Israeli premiers.

Sinwar’s death aside, Israel intends to operate in Gaza for many years

Eliminating Hamas leadership—and most importantly, killing Sinwar, the mastermind of the October 7 massacre—has been a central goal for Israel in its Gaza war. The achievement will mark yet another personal victory for Netanyahu, whose polling has been bolstered with each targeted assassination, and for Israel’s military.

But Sinwar’s death alone does not guarantee the circumstances necessary for Netanyahu to declare an end to the war as so many hope. The United States is likely to further increase its pressure on both sides to come to a ceasefire agreement, hoping that a weakened Hamas and an empowered Israel will be more ready to bring the conflict to its close. And while Hamas, for its part, has been thrown into disarray, it will need time to reestablish leadership and for that leadership—likely with Sinwar’s brother at the top—to solidify power. As Israel has made clear, in order for the war to end, the hostages must be released and Hamas must fully disarm. But it is not clear that any successor to Sinwar will take a new approach.

At the same time, Netanyahu now has an easy off-ramp from war in Gaza at a moment when Israel’s northern front now takes priority, but he is unlikely to take it. Israeli officials and opposition leaders have made it clear that Israel intends to operate in Gaza for years. Any official end to the war will require Netanyahu to reconcile both with the atrocity that took place under his watch and to articulate a strategy for a day after in Gaza. So far, he has not been prepared to do either—and Sinwar’s death alone is unlikely to change that.

—Carmiel Arbit is a nonresident senior fellow for Middle East Programs and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

Hamas and Hezbollah leadership are diminished. Are the Houthis next?

Israel’s elimination of Hamas’s Sinwar and Hezbollah’s Nasrallah has left both organizations diminished in the near term, but it has created an opportunity for Yemen’s Houthis and their leader, Abdul Malik al-Houthi, to step into a new and more prominent role within Iran’s “Axis of Resistance.” With greater importance placed on the Houthis, Tehran will likely prioritize providing the group with advanced weapons and weapon components to enable more accurate and devastating maritime operations and strikes on Israeli territory. One way Iran might do this is through brokering an agreement with Moscow to provide the group with anti-ship missiles. Continued Houthi threats to Israeli territory and international maritime traffic could lead the IDF to shift the focus of its operations in Yemen to targeting al-Houthi and other senior members, which could degrade the group’s ability to operate, spur a leadership crisis, and widen the leadership vacuum within Iran’s network of allies and proxies.

—Emily Milliken is the associate director of media and communications for the N7 Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Sinwar’s assassination won’t solve Israel’s strategic problems

Since the tragic events of October 7, Israeli leaders vowed to eliminate Sinwar, the man who was in charge of Hamas’s vicious attack against Israel. Today, it seems that this goal was achieved, as the IDF was able to kill Sinwar in the Gaza Strip.

But, as important as this event is, it won’t solve Israel’s strategic problems if the current policy of the Israeli government does not change. It is safe to say that even after Sinwar, the Hamas organization will not collapse. Thus the war will continue, with no political solution on the horizon.

In order to utilize Sinwar’s elimination, Israel will need to rethink its strategy in Gaza. First and foremost, that means reaching a ceasefire deal while allowing the Palestinian Authority to return to Gaza, taking control of all civilian activities. This move would allow the moderate Gulf states to increase their involvement in Gaza’s rehabilitation and would significantly improve Israel’s international legitimacy.

A ceasefire in Gaza will also lead to the end of hostilities with Hezbollah along the northern border of Israel and of course will lead to the release of hostages—a main goal of the current Swords of Iron War.

If Israel continues its current strategy of holding parts of Gaza and maybe building settlements there (like some ministers want), then despite the importance of Sinwar’s elimination, no dramatic change will occur in the near future. The war will continue with no end in sight. 

—Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and a member of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project working group. He previously served for twenty-five years in a variety of command positions units in Israel Defense Intelligence.

Israel’s guns are unlikely to fall silent soon

What began as a hunt for Sinwar and for vengeance for the October 7 attacks has transformed into an expansive quest by Israel to fundamentally reshape control over the West Bank and Gaza, to weaken Iran, and to violently remake the region. It’s therefore unlikely that Israel’s guns will fall silent soon, imperiling many thousands of civilian lives as well as any long-term prospects for normalcy or peace.

—Alia Brahimi is a nonresident senior fellow in the Middle East Programs and host of the Guns for Hire podcast.

Sinwar’s death opens the way to a resolution of the Gaza conflict

Yes, this is a big deal. To many Israelis, the death of Yahya Sinwar a year and ten days after October 7 will likely mean as much, if not more, than the fate meted out to Osama bin Laden did to Americans nine and a half years after 9/11. To Israelis, the death toll on October 7 was proportionately many times the death toll in the United States on 9/11. More importantly, by May 2011 bin Laden had ceased to be the driving operational force behind al-Qaeda, while until today Sinwar was very much both the military and political driving force behind Hamas’s unwillingness to agree to a ceasefire and the return of hostages on any terms that Israel could accept.

Those cautious voices claiming Hamas is an idea that cannot be defeated militarily are about to see their theory tested. While some terrorists and warlords make plans for after their deaths, many do not. It is widely believed that Sinwar accepted that he would be killed, and so he may have made plans for Hamas to carry on his brutal rule and unrealistic ambitions after his death. Other terrorist groups have fractured after the death of their leader, but Hamas is rare among terrorist groups in having been the de facto government of Gaza, which gives it more organizational depth and a bigger war chest than smaller terrorist groups.

There will probably be a short window for Hamas’s new leaders to work out a ceasefire-for-hostages deal through Egyptian, Qatari, and US mediators. If not, and depending on the US election on November 5, the United States and its Arab and European partners should push the Israelis and the Palestinians to authorize a temporary international administration for Gaza, overseen by an international contact group, backed by an international policing force, to ensure that Hamas does not return to power. Detailed plans for this exist, and the United Arab Emirates has been leading efforts to bring the United States and Israel around to what would be required to make something like this work. The Biden national security team has reportedly been considering this. Celebrations today in Israel and mixed emotions in Gaza and the West Bank need to give way to pragmatic decisions toward an end to the fighting and a lasting peace for both Israelis and Palestinians.

—Thomas Warrick, the former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security and senior advisor to the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs, is a nonresident senior fellow for the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Institute.

Even Iran and Hezbollah might want a ceasefire after Sinwar’s death

The death of Sinwar may provide the opportunity, if Netanyahu is looking for one, to bring about a ceasefire in Gaza. Sinwar was reportedly the mastermind behind the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel. It was always doubtful, in my view, that the Netanyahu government would agree to any ceasefire so long as Sinwar remained the leader of Hamas.

It is not clear, of course, whether either Sinwar’s successors or the Netanyahu government will now agree to a ceasefire. Western governments (including the United States) and most Arab governments would welcome a ceasefire. Even Iran and Hezbollah—both of whom have voiced support for Hamas—might welcome a ceasefire, if only to raise the possibility of tamping down their own conflicts with Israel. Russia and China, too, might breathe a sigh of relief about reducing the possibility of war in the Middle East expanding.

Whether a ceasefire occurs, though, will depend on whether Israel and Hamas can agree on the terms of one.

—Mark N. Katz is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and professor emeritus of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government.

What does Sinwar’s death mean for the remaining hostages?

The assassination of Sinwar, the leader of Hamas who was considered to be the mastermind of the October 7 massacres, was expected by most observers of the IDF operations in Gaza. Coming after the elimination of Haniyeh, the leader of the political wing of Hamas, and of Muhammad Deif, the head of the military wing, it sent a clear message from the Israeli security establishment that anyone who crosses Israel could be reached anywhere and dealt with effectively. This leaves one big open question: what does this mean for the hostages taken by Hamas?  

On the one hand, the hostages may have a better chance now that the whole leadership of Hamas has been wiped away, and thus no one within the organization would be willing to take the deadly risk of looking after them, meaning the hostages may be left to their own devices and able to escape. On the other hand, the hostages’ fate may now be sealed for the simple reason that there is no one left to negotiate their release. The fear is also that mid-level Hamas operatives may be tempted to eliminate the hostages to protect their own identities from the eventual retaliation of Israeli forces.  

Many other readings and predictions are circulating, but the truth is that nobody knows with any degree of certainty what will happen to the hostages. One thing is certain though: the decision of the then-elite of Hamas to unleash last year’s horrible attacks against the Israeli population in nearby settlements has only brought pain and suffering to everyone and not only to those directly involved. At the same time, the brutality of the IDF reaction, while it may be seen as advantageous in the short term, in the longer term will only cause the rise of another generation of terrorists imbued with a desire for revenge and hate for everyone in the world who didn’t stand by them. Israel has traded short-term gains for long-term losses.

—Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

Hamas will now seek to frame Sinwar’s death as an act of martyrdom and heroism

The assassination of Sinwar, Hamas’s leader and mastermind behind the October 7 attack on Israel, is seen by many as a pivotal moment for the Israeli government and its stated objective of dismantling Hamas in Gaza. The decapitation of Hamas’s leadership will hopefully move the conflict in a new direction toward a ceasefire. To that end, the Israeli government would be best off offering amnesty to those who lay down their arms, facilitating the release of Israeli hostages, and clarifying a postwar plan for Gaza that guarantees no future occupation of the Strip by Israel.

However, with many hostages still being held by Hamas and some Israeli leaders openly discussing the possibility of settling northern Gaza (in direct violation of international law) and “operating in the Strip for years to come,” the prospects for a peaceful resolution in the near term still seem remote.

On the ground, Sinwar’s death will likely be framed as an act of martyrdom and heroism, particularly amid reports that he was killed in combat garb alongside his soldiers. As Amos Yadlin, a former IDF intelligence chief, pointed out, every leader has a successor. The pressing question now is whether the new leadership, within Gaza’s deeply entrenched insurgency, will be willing to de-escalate and negotiate—and if there is anyone on the other side willing to reach out with an olive branch.

—Masoud Mostajabi is the deputy director of the Iraq Initiative at the Middle East Programs of the Atlantic Council.

With its Hamas targets dead, the ICC still must move forward its cases against Israeli leaders

The reported killing of the Hamas leader by Israeli forces has wide-ranging implications for an expanding regional conflict—and also necessitates a firm spine in The Hague. 

Karim A.A. Khan, the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), announced the filing of applications for arrest warrants against Hamas leaders and Israeli leaders back in May. Nearly five months and many reports of intimidation and public condemnations from Israel later, the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber has yet to issue those warrants. The delay has come under fire by many observers, since warrants in most cases at the ICC have been issued within one or two months of the initial application. While the arrest warrant application has been pending, the Hamas leaders named as perpetrators have been killed by Israel one by one, with Israel killing Haniyeh in Tehran at the end of July and Israel claiming that it killed Mohammed Deif in a strike in Gaza in mid-July. 

Israel has clearly committed to settling its disputes through kinetic means. Those brutalized in Gaza, however, are still waiting for justice. It will be incumbent on the court to move ahead with the issuance of arrest warrants against Netanyahu and Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, regardless of any pressure resulting from the Israeli state’s claims of false equivalency or imbalance. 

—Gissou Nia is a human rights lawyer and the director of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project.

The post Experts react: Yahya Sinwar is dead. Here’s what’s next for Hamas, Gaza, Israel, and the Middle East. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On September 30, Marc Polymeropoulos, nonresident senior fellow at at Forward Defense, was quoted by NBC in an article analyzing the future of Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’ after Israel’s significant blows to Hamas and Hezbollah. In his words, “The one concern we should have is a return to the old kind of terrorist game, soft targets such as embassies overseas, both Israeli and U.S.”

Fellow

Marc Polymeropoulos

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Europe & Eurasia

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Marc Polymeropoulos on NBC about the future of Iran’s ‘axis of resistence’ appeared first on Atlantic Council.

No Western partner is swooping in to assist Mali’s overburdened military, as France once did. Mali’s current approach, reliant on show-of-force air strikes and support from the Russian Wagner mercenary group, has failed to deliver a decisive victory. In late July, armed groups killed as many as forty-seven Malian soldiers and eighty-four Wagner mercenaries near the Algerian border, sparking a new round of fighting.

There is only one way to avert further loss of life and territorial contestation: mediation. Algiers, which has brokered multiple hostage releases and peace deals in northern Mali—including the 2015 Algiers Accord—is no longer a welcome interlocutor. Bamako has accused Algiers of meddling in its affairs by meeting rebel leaders. Mali’s neighbors to the east, Burkina Faso and Niger, are too consumed with their own domestic security challenges to play a meaningful role. But Mauritania, Mali’s neighbor to the west, is in a unique position to foster peace.

The case for Mauritania

Mauritania is a relatively stable country, whose historic neutrality in regional disputes has earned it generally positive foreign relationships. Previous attempts at mediation have failed to install an enduring peace in northern Mali, largely because they were not inclusive. But with its neutrality, Mauritania has the ability to talk to all conflict parties in northern Mali—nonterrorist armed groups, terrorists, and government-aligned forces. This offers distinct advantages.

Mauritania’s president, Mohamed Ould El Ghazouani, was recently inaugurated for a second and final term, which he is serving concurrently with the African Union (AU) chairmanship. The AU has substantial convening power, and Ghazouani is an ideal mediator because of Mauritania’s neutrality, making the timing optimal for a push for regional peace.

Peace would advance Mauritania’s interests, too. Mali’s widening conflict has destabilized its eastern border. More than 55,000 Malians fled to Mauritania last year, flooding refugee camps. Mauritania accused the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and Wagner of crossing the eastern border and killing Mauritanians. Mediation offers Ghazouani an opportunity to stem the refugee flow and permanently end the violent cross-border incursions that have killed his constituents.

It won’t be easy

The two primary parties in the conflict, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Malian transition government, have opposing goals. JNIM is an al-Qaeda affiliate and aims to displace the government, whereas Bamako aims to eradicate terrorism and assert control over its territory. At the same time, an anti-government, nonterrorist armed group coalition—the Permanent Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad (CSP-DPA)—is fighting for greater regional autonomy and economic opportunity. The CSP-DPA’s relationship with JNIM is unclear.

Regardless, none of the parties have given Mauritania consent to mediate, so Nouakchott will need to operate outside of a formal peace process, at least at the outset. This is risky but necessary. Bamako has gradually driven away French, European Union, and United Nations (UN) troops over the past few years, demonstrating its hostility to international stabilization efforts. The Malian transition government would probably reject a request to engage terrorist or nonterrorist armed group leaders.

The conflict still merits mediation. After months of fighting, no actor has achieved sustained momentum on the battlefield. There are clashes, of course, but the conflict is nowhere near over. The FAMa and Wagner have expended large amounts of munitions during offensive operations. These operations have displaced and killed northern civilians while failing to meaningfully degrade the capabilities of armed groups. Armed groups have withdrawn to more remote areas of the Sahara Desert, where they are expending scarce resources to survive. This cannot go on forever.

Ending the war

Here’s how Mauritania can bring all the parties to the negotiating table:

1. Open a direct line of communication with northern leaders

Mauritania is well-positioned to initiate contact with the leaders of terrorist and nonterrorist armed groups, given the historic relationship that its Beidane (White Moor) population has with Mali’s Tuareg population. The two ethnic groups have historically adopted similar migration patterns, and their personal, religious, and business connections persist to this day. Mauritanian citizens have maintained ties with populations in northern Mali by traversing age-old transhumance routes.

Mauritania should leverage these relationships and routes to initiate contact with leaders of terrorist and nonterrorist armed groups, many of whom are Malian Tuareg, without arousing suspicion. Once contact is made, Mauritania should arrange low-profile in-person meetings with select leaders of these armed groups to determine whether they are amenable to further engagement.

2. Persuade JNIM leaders to defect from al-Qaeda

Mauritania must clearly articulate the value of further engagement to leaders of terrorist and nonterrorist armed groups. JNIM is particularly important, as its members never reconciled with Bamako or laid down their arms. Their operations, as well as their continued recruitment of northern populations, made true peace impossible. JNIM’s leaders are thus critical to the installation of an enduring peace in northern Mali.

Mauritania can offer incentives for armed group leaders to engage in mediation. For example, it can offer to intercede with the Malian transition government on their behalf, push for pauses in military operations, and legitimize their bid for northern leadership.

JNIM’s Tuareg leaders may be receptive to the argument that, without this support, it will be impossible for them to evade persecution and exert true leadership over northern Mali, their homeland. Their ambition to secure leadership in their homeland predates JNIM’s establishment, after all. Ultimately, however, only engagement can reveal whether they are open to mediation.

Mauritania’s offer to mediate must come with conditions: JNIM’s Tuareg leaders must commit to disaffiliation with both al-Qaeda and JNIM. They must permanently cease all terrorist activity, and they must stop attacking civilians or permitting youth to serve as fighters. The leaders may choose not to accept these conditions; if that is the case, they must not be included in talks.

This step assumes that mass Tuareg defection from JNIM will not prompt conflict with one of its major factions, the Fulani-dominated Macina Liberation Front (MLF). Evidence suggests that the MLF will not instigate a violent conflict, as this would ultimately drain their resources. There is a strong incentive for the MLF to accept mass defection, and the risk of fratricidal conflict is thus low. It is far more likely that severing JNIM improves Mali’s long-term stability.

3. Solicit formal consent to mediate the conflict in northern Mali

Mauritania should make a formal bid to mediate this conflict. Ghazouani can arrange meetings with each conflict party and seek their consent to initiate multiparty talks. If the previous steps succeeded, leaders of terrorist and nonterrorist armed groups may have already agreed to talks. Ghazouani can thus “deliver” JNIM and the CSP-DPA to Malian officials. 

The Malian transition government will be difficult to persuade to enter multiparty talks. This year, the FAMa deployed and held territory in northern Mali. The recapture of Kidal in November 2023 was a major symbolic victory. Bamako may wish to continue fighting. If this is the case, the best strategy for engaging government officials would be to praise Mali’s strength.

Ghazouani should personally travel to Bamako to meet the interim president, Colonel Assimi Goïta. Ghazouani and Goïta are both military commanders who participated in coups d’état in their respective countries. Ghazouani is the elder of the two, and he has successfully navigated the transition from military to civilian leader. He can advise Goïta.

Ghazouani can praise Goïta’s leadership and make the argument that the Malian leader played a decisive role in bringing CSP-DPA and JNIM leaders to the table. He should also highlight the benefits of participating in multiparty talks. Settling the conflict in the north would allow the FAMa and Wagner to shift focus and dedicate more troops to the faltering counterterrorism campaign against the MLF in central Mali. The MLF recently launched a deadly attack against military facilities in Bamako. In light of this, Goïta may be receptive to this argument.

4. Seek international support for the peace process

After acquiring Goïta’s consent, Mauritania should seek backing from the international community and begin planning the first round of talks in Nouakchott. Ghazouani can capitalize on his position as AU chairman to form a Northern Mali Contact Group. The contact group would help coordinate, fund, and execute programming in support of negotiated outcomes of the multiparty talks.

It is very important that the group balance different perspectives and international alliances. Mali’s military junta swapped the country’s Western security partners for Wagner, and Bamako would object if the group contains a disproportionate number of Western states. Ghazouani’s initial efforts should focus on the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC). Two are not part of the West, and all are involved in regional initiatives.

Mauritania’s neutrality affords it positive relations with all the UNSC permanent members. Accordingly, it is well-equipped to navigate any tensions among them. It must emphasize that the permanent members have a common interest: improving stability. This is only achievable if they collaborate.

Within North and West Africa, Ghazouani should focus initial efforts on recruiting former members of the Algiers Accord Monitoring Committee: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, and Mauritania. Morocco should be included as well, to avoid upsetting the regional balance of power. These six states all stand to benefit from a peaceful and secure northern Mali.

Once the Northern Mali Contact Group is established, Ghazouani and the AU should focus on coordinating, funding, and executing programs in parallel to the multiparty talks. The parties to the conflict are extremely sensitive to external meddling. The Northern Mali Contact Group must keep the parties’ goals at the center of this deliberative process.

Parting shots

This is an ambitious concept, but it seizes upon the many advantages afforded by Mauritania’s current position. It generates momentum for multiparty talks by engaging terrorist and nonterrorist armed group leaders. It then uses their willingness to negotiate as a bargaining chip with which to compel the government to permit multiparty talks. It concludes by seeking external backing.

Considering and including representatives from all conflict parties in northern Mali is the pathway to a more durable, inclusive political settlement that brings peace to a region historically beset by violent conflict.

Jordanna Yochai is a defense analyst, whose portfolio includes the West African Sahel. She is currently on leave from the Department of Defense, pursuing a master’s degree at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA).

The positions expressed in this article do not reflect the official position of the US Department of Defense. The US Department of Defense does not endorse the views expressed in hyperlinked articles or websites, including any information, products, or services contained therein.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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ISIS-K seeks to establish a caliphate and expand beyond what it labels Khorasan, or Central and South Asia—and the group demonstrated its capability and intent to do so through a series of successful attacks in early 2024. In January and March of this year, ISIS-K conducted three separate mass-casualty attacks in Iran, Turkey, and Russia, killing hundreds of civilians. These attacks turned the spotlight on ISIS-K’s growing ability to conduct external operations, especially in Europe, and demonstrated the expanding threat that the group poses to the West. This summer, ISIS-K and individuals associated with and inspired by the group threatened to attack the Cricket World Cup, which took place in New York; the Paris Olympics; and the European Soccer Championship. Interestingly, each of these threats was phrased in such a way as to encourage an ISIS-inspired, lone-wolf actor to conduct the attack.

ISIS-K published the calls to action through its English-language magazine, Voice of Khorasan, which began publication in 2022. The English-language Voice of Khorasan is disseminated through various social media channels, particularly on Telegram, and is intended to spread ISIS propaganda to a Western audience. In the May edition of Voice of Khorasan, ISIS-K published a photo of a fighter standing in a German soccer arena, inviting its members to “score the last goal.” In June, following this call to action, German authorities arrested an ISIS-K-linked individual who intended to work at the Euro Cup soccer finals. That individual was likely a lone-wolf actor, but his pursuit of employment at the Euro Cup immediately following ISIS-K’s call to action underscores the realistic possibility of attacks against soft targets in the West.

To date, ISIS-K’s attacks against Western targets have involved suicide bombs and gunmen. Still, there are concerns that future attacks may be more sophisticated and conducted by dispersed cells, which are harder to deter. For example, one of ISIS’s recent English-language calls to action included a detailed manual explaining how to adapt commercially available drones to carry explosives—instructions that a sympathizer circulated in terrorist social media channels. This vignette encapsulates the use of new technologies in attack planning, which can result in an attack that could be carried out from a standoff distance. Furthermore, it demonstrates cyber-coaching, a term that describes ISIS-K’s strategy of providing guidance and support to cells of fighters from a distance. Cyber-coaching allows senior Afghanistan-based ISIS-K members to provide attack planning guidance and coordination from afar, potentially expanding ISIS’s reach and ability to plan and conduct attacks against Western targets. 

ISIS-K’s cyber-coaching has enabled the group’s Europe-based sympathizers to plan attacks locally, often using communication apps, like the walkie-talkie simulator Zello or the encrypted chat app Telegram, and cryptocurrency apps that are common in their areas. In 2020, for example, German officials disrupted a plot against US military facilities in Europe. For this attack, senior Afghanistan-based leadership provided “radical lectures” to a cell of Tajikistani nationals in Germany via a messaging app. The group’s ability to conduct and inspire attacks through cyber-coaching almost certainly enables its burgeoning capability to conduct external operations.

As with the 2020 plot in Germany, Tajiks frequently conduct ISIS-K attacks outside of Afghanistan and Central Asia. Tajiks were involved in all three of the group’s major 2024 attacks, and over a dozen have been arrested on terrorism charges in the United States and Europe this year alone. The quantity of terror-related arrests of Tajiks in the West indicates the emphasis ISIS-K has placed on recruiting from the tiny Central Asian country. This recruitment trend has become even more pronounced over the last year.

In March, ISIS’s media arm published the first edition of its Tajik-language online magazine, also titled Voice of Khorasan, which included topics such as the history of the caliphate and contact information for individuals seeking to join the jihad. The publication of Voice of Khorasan in Tajik highlights the expanding role Tajiks play in ISIS-K’s external operations and the importance to the group of recruiting these individuals. The group’s leader, Sanaullah Ghafari, is himself Tajik and seeks to expand recruitment through Central Asia by leveraging flashy, high-profile attacks.

While it is not precisely clear why ISIS-K seeks to radicalize young men, specifically from Tajikistan, to conduct its external operations, a host of domestic problems—such as systemic poverty, limited religious freedom, and a lack of social mobility—plague that country. These factors can leave individuals feeling disenfranchised and push them towards radical beliefs, including terrorism, as an outlet for finding meaning in life. These conditions also drive thousands of Tajiks to become migrant workers abroad, where they often face discrimination, cramped living conditions, and low pay—all of which can further build an environment for radicalization to terrorism. There is evidence that these migrants have radicalized both inside and outside of Tajikistan, with some joining extremist Islamic groups in their new countries. Many Tajik migrants can legitimately claim economic refugee status to access Western nations, and these individuals can blend into immigration flows into Europe via Ukraine and into the United States via the Southern border and pose a terrorism threat to their new countries.

Addressing these issues within Tajikistan, especially by countering systemic poverty and the lack of economic opportunities, may present one vector for reducing recruitment for ISIS-K and potentially diminish the group’s ability to conduct external operations. Decreasing the number of Tajikistani economic migrants—and the associated opportunities for overseas recruitment—could ultimately decrease the number of potential terrorists from the region. Research from Nigeria demonstrates the impact of human rights fixes—including foreign assistance—on reducing the number of individuals joining Boko Haram, an ISIS affiliate. Although this research focused on attacks within Nigeria, the solutions and reductions in radicalization applied there may have strong parallels with the situation Central Asia. Additionally, diplomatic counterterrorism solutions, including US engagement and information sharing with regional governmental authorities, may present an avenue to increase pressure on ISIS-K.

Although US engagement with Dushanbe may help reduce ISIS-K’s ability to recruit, the situation is complicated by the fact that Tajikistan and Russia share a long history. Moscow considers Central Asia within its sphere of influence and has historically pressured Central Asia to curtail engagement with the West. (Moscow is also uneasy with China’s economic clout in the region.) Recently, however, Tajikistan has meaningfully engaged with Western nations on a wide variety of topics, including security, economic, and environmental issues. In the last several years, Tajikistan has pursued significant foreign engagement independently of Russia, and these emerging partnerships have proven beneficial for the country. For example, the US Agency for International Development recently introduced a substantial economic and environmental aid package for Tajikistan, and the Virginia National Guard held training exercises with the Tajikistani military—neither of which attracted Moscow’s attention. Building upon existing successful partnerships with Dushanbe presents the best framework for US efforts to reduce ISIS-K recruitment in Tajikistan.

ISIS-K’s recruitment focus on Central Asia, specifically in the impoverished nation of Tajikistan, underscores the group’s desire to expand its ability to conduct attacks in the West. While there is no reliable, timely data on the number of Central Asians the group has recruited, the recent arrests of Tajiks for overseas plots suggest a strategy of relying on these men, many of whom are economic migrants, to carry out attacks in the West. Furthermore, the group’s emphasis on attracting fighters from Tajikistan suggests that there are several pathways for reducing recruitment and deterring overseas attacks, including increased Western engagement to help lift Tajikistan from poverty and traditional counterterrorism measures like information-sharing with regional authorities. As these Tajik men continue to travel overseas, they are likely to increase ISIS-K’s ability to achieve its stated goal of expanding its caliphate and killing infidel Muslims, Christians, and Jews. This goal, combined with the group’s three successful attacks, multiple disrupted plots in 2024, and expanded recruitment attempts, highlights the potential for the group to develop into a major counterterrorism problem.

Morgan Tadych is an open-source intelligence (OSINT) professional and Army veteran. She spent much of her military career researching strategic Russia/Eurasia issues and deployed to conduct counterterrorism missions.

The post From Dushanbe to Berlin: The emerging ISIS-K threat appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On September 28, Elliot Ackerman, non-resident senior fellow at Forward Defense, published a piece in the Atlantic entitled “Hezbollah’s Long War Is With America Too.” Ackerman speaks on his experience as a US Marine Corps officer participating in the evacuation of American citizens during the Second Lebanon War. He explains how his experience informs his understanding of the current conflict between Israel and Hezbollah as well as the broader conflict between the United States and its adversaries in Iran, Russia, and China. He writes that “our leaders have proved reluctant to call enemies ‘enemies’ and friends ‘friends.’ If America wishes to remain at peace, or at least not find itself in an active war, we must speak clearly in defense of our friends.”

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Iran’s advanced missile capabilities pose a threat not only to Israel and the United States’ Arab allies, but to US and partner forces throughout the Middle East and beyond. Graphic courtesy of Design by Soapbox.

The wild swings in US policy toward Iran over the last decade have directly helped speed Iran’s malign influence in the Middle East and significant progress toward a nuclear weapon.

Iran is a deeply ideological regime unlikely to change its fundamental outlook on the world. But the geostrategic context has changed over the last two decades: Iran’s foreign ties are now so bolstered and buoyed, particularly by China, that isolating Tehran is far more difficult than ever before. These circumstances demand a bipartisan, long-term strategy that can span administrations.

The weapons, capabilities, and finances of Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran’s other proxies have benefited from sanctions evasion and weak enforcement, allowing Tehran to funnel probably hundreds of millions of dollars to its proxy militias. Illicit oil sales to China have earned the regime around eighty billion dollars.

Iran has advanced close to the nuclear-weapon threshold and has come to believe it can defy international warnings regarding its nuclear activities with impunity. Since the United States withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal (aka the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) in 2018, Tehran has advanced its nuclear program, stockpiling uranium enriched to 60 percent, installing more advanced centrifuges, experimenting with uranium metals that could be used in making a bomb, and restricting International Atomic Energy Agency access to nuclear sites.

Over the next two decades, the United States should pursue a long-term strategy with three main goals.

Reduce Iran’s influence in the region by strengthening weak states and countering Iran’s support to proxy militias.

• What to do: Tighten sanctions enforcement, crack down on sanctions evasion by China, and go after third-party brokers—but keep sanctions sensitive to qualitative change in Iranian behavior and the effect on ordinary Iranians.
• Shore up regional weak spots, pressing Middle Eastern and global allies to take the lead on diplomatic and economic efforts.
• Continue pursuing Israeli-Saudi normalization.
• Maintain an adequate US military presence in the region and be willing to respond with appropriate force to every attack by an Iranian proxy against US and allied interests.
• What to say: Use public diplomacy to draw attention to the destructive impact that Iran’s proxies are having on the region, including in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, the Palestinian territories, and Syria.

Prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.

• What to do: Recognize that attempting to revive the JCPOA is a dead end, and that “maximum pressure” cannot be the goal unto itself. Constantly relitigating both of them has impeded the development of new policy.
• Increased pressure on the regime needs to be an immediate focus of US policy—but that pressure must be connected to a strategic end, namely new negotiations aimed at placing restrictions on its nuclear program that would leave Iran at least several months from a breakout capability and would concurrently address its regional malign influence.
• Reimposing snapback sanctions and developing a credible military option against Iran’s nuclear program are important steps to increase pressure.
• What to say: The United States needs to maintain a declaratory policy, explicitly enunciated by the president, that it will not tolerate Iran getting a nuclear weapon and will use military force to prevent this development if all other measures fail.

Where possible, support the aspirations of the Iranian people to have the freedom to choose the direction of their country’s future—without pursuing regime change through military action.

• What to do: Choose policies that can be maintained for years, even though these might not have an immediately visible impact: increased funding for educational tools and access to independent media and voices, more Persian-language news.
• Use the United States’ support for the Polish Solidarity movement and other anti-communist movements during the Cold War as a model.
• On the human rights front, lead a multilateral effort to target regime officials and their family members who engage in or benefit from corruption, or who engage in human rights abuses. Work with international allies to oust Iran from United Nations institutions whose raison d’être Iran violates on a consistent basis.
• What not to say: Anything about regime change, which could push Iran in the wrong direction. It has to be up to the Iranian people to decide for themselves the future direction of their country.
• What to say: The United States and its allies need to publicize the corruption and behavior of regime officials in a way that highlights the disparity between leadership and common Iranians.

The Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project brought together a bipartisan, ideologically diverse group of experts and former senior officials to develop a holistic US policy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran for the next four years, regardless of who sits in the Oval Office. This report is the result of nearly two years of work by the project’s advisory committee, working group, contributors, and staff.

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After Nasrallah, three quandaries shape the future of the war—and the Middle East

By Jonathan Panikoff

Hassan Nasrallah’s death creates interrelated quandaries for Hezbollah, Iran, and Israel that will determine if the region erupts in conflict and shape what it looks like for years to come.

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IranSource Oct 2, 2024

Iran has a strategy for Israel. Now Israel needs one for Iran.

By Alan Pino

Israel needs a long-term plan that can secure regional cooperation, rehabilitate its international image, maintain the support of the United States, and give the Israeli people hope of a future without endless war.

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The Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative (SMESI) provides policymakers fresh insights into core US national security interests by leveraging its expertise, networks, and on-the-ground programs to develop unique and holistic assessments on the future of the most pressing strategic, political, and security challenges and opportunities in the Middle East. 

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1. How does this Lebanon campaign differ from past Israeli operations?

Context makes Israel’s latest offensive in Lebanon unique from previous forays in that theater of operations. One year into its Gaza campaign, the Israeli military is moving up the Iranian food chain, now focusing its energies on Hezbollah—a more intimate and ferocious client of Tehran than Hamas—while signaling, in Yemen and other places, that it expects to continue pushing back forcefully against all adversaries (and their sponsors). The methodical approach that Israel has employed thus far opposite Hezbollah, surgically decapitating its leadership before inserting Israel Defense Forces (IDF) boots into the battlefield, speaks to the fact that Hezbollah is an enemy that the IDF has long been preparing to face, and also stands in stark contrast to its undisciplined response after the rude surprise of October 7.

2. Will Israel be able to sustain the advantage it has had so far in its air campaign?

Israelis are hopeful that their tides may have turned finally, but their infantrymen should anticipate encountering more resistance than their pilots have. A positive outcome to this gamble is far from guaranteed. The “we’re not going to take it anymore” strategy of the Netanyahu government—which insists that it is “winning”—aspires to fundamentally shift the regional balance of power in Israel’s favor, but its obvious risk is the accompanying potential for a punishing, full-scale war in the Middle East.

3. What should the US government do now?

The Biden administration has remained broadly supportive of Israel’s objectives. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin acknowledged, as the formal IDF ground incursion into Lebanon commenced, the imperative of “dismantling attack infrastructure along the border to ensure that Lebanese Hizballah cannot conduct October 7-style attacks on Israel’s northern communities.” Given those sentiments, US principals should continue engaging with Israel to ensure that this task is accomplished clinically and swiftly, and with other actors to contain a possible escalation that would certainly undermine the administration’s goal of a ceasefire.

4. What does this ground campaign mean for regional normalization efforts?

Israel’s integration into the region was facilitated by, among other factors, its close friendship with the United States—which has been an enabler of Israeli security and prosperity—and the desire of other countries in the region to join that exclusive club. Accordingly, if Israel can emerge from its current predicament and restore itself to full military and economic health, and if it proves sufficiently adept at keeping its alliance with Washington intact, there is every reason to believe that the upward trajectory of normalization will resume.

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On September 30, Transatlantic Security Initiative nonresident senior fellow Beniamino Irdi was featured on RAI Radio 1’s Zapping discussing regional implications of Hassan Nasrallah’s death.

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It is no difficulty to find crises across the Sahel and its adjacent neighborhoods: Economic stagnation, extreme weather and climate degradation, multiple terrorist organizations and jihadist groups claiming territory, a series of military coups and democratic backsliding, various non-jihadist rebel and separatist alliances, a youth bulge and widespread unemployment, and a genocide all compete for sparse outside attention.

Yet, sailing from distant shores comes yet another crisis: An increase in drug trafficking, with flows originating in the Americas, crossing the Atlantic, and making their way into the markets of Europe.

This influx of drugs will have a marked impact, not only on the region itself, but also on the wider world should the worst happen.

The best-case scenario is merely the introduction of additional groups of well-funded armed criminal enterprises with international connections in an already volatile region. The worst-case scenario is the emergence of narco-terrorism on a scale hitherto unheard of and the entrenchment of partnerships between drug smugglers and increasingly well-funded terrorist groups, armed with cash and boasting access to international connections and smuggling routes.

In short, the worst-case scenario is one in which organizations such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) are fueled and financed by one of the largest drug markets in the world.

A bad situation getting worse

According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), between 2015 and 2020, an average of thirteen kilograms of cocaine was seized per year in the region. In 2021, the amount seized rose to forty-one kilograms. Then in 2022, it spiked to 1,466 kilograms.

In comparison to 2015 seizures, that is an increase of 11,176 percent.

Before complete data for 2023 became available, the UN cited that 2.3 tons (just over two thousand kilograms) of cocaine had been seized in Mauritania alone between January and June 2023. These statistics are alarming, and they don’t even show the full picture: Amounts seized are not amounts trafficked—that amount is likely far higher.  

While domestic drug use is rising across the Sahel, sparking public health crises that are ill-afforded in many countries, the region is becoming a drug trafficking corridor. The drugs are bound for outside markets, with the increase in activity attributed to Europe’s surging demand for illegal narcotics and trafficking groups searching for new routes to markets.

The region is a drug smuggler’s paradise.

Located on the doorstep of Europe and the Middle East, the region is vast and often sparsely populated. It is also riddled with economic deprivation, with an ever-increasing population of youth desperate for opportunity. The countries in the Sahel often have weak governance, widespread corruption, and ongoing battles with insurgents and fundamentalists.

On top of that, Sahelian officials and individuals are vulnerable to the influence of drug gangs—but they are not alone. There are numerous documented cases from across the world of drug gangs using officials to further their work, such as a premier of the British Virgin Islands. Following recent seizures and arrests in the Sahel, the UN expressed concerns about the range of individuals—including the political elite, community leaders, and armed groups—who appear to be involved in facilitating drug trafficking.

While the involvement of key individuals in facilitating drug trafficking is widespread, what makes the situation in the Sahel worrisome are the “armed groups” involved. In Latin America, armed groups facilitating drug trafficking are organizations such as FARC and in Southeast Asia they are militias tied to regional forces or even the drug traffickers themselves. In the Sahel, they are international jihadist organizations, ones with global ambitions and a willingness to export terror and war from their base of operations.

Worrying signs

An array of terrorist organizations operate in the Sahel region: Groups include al-Qaeda affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), and Boko Haram.

These groups control vast swaths of land in the Sahel, are expanding and entrenching their control, and are also competing with each other, propelling their searches for more resources. Because of this, they are among the groups that can most stand to financially benefit from the burgeoning drug trade.

While the drug smuggling flows are opaque, the UNODC highlights that the “limited evidence” of violent extremist armed groups involved in drug trafficking “does not mean that such groups are not involved.” These groups, the UNODC adds, are “likely to benefit indirectly” from drug trafficking, explaining that groups such as JNIM and ISGS demand taxes or fees from traffickers in areas where they operate.

Even if these organizations are not directly managing the drug trade, they stand to benefit from the routes and from facilitating drug smugglers’ operations in the territories they control. Such a partnership could be devastating for the region and beyond.

The UNODC notes that information about these groups’ involvement in the drug trade could still emerge. Historically, terrorist and jihadi organizations have embraced a more hands-on approach to the drug trade to fund their organizations and operations. The Taliban in Afghanistan has long been linked to the opium trade (and the drug trade has supported terrorism), ISIS in Syria has produced drugs for market in Europe and smuggles drugs across the Middle East, and Hezbollah has been tied to Columbian drug rings.

With the Sahel becoming an increasingly major drug trafficking corridor, terrorist groups could shift from merely facilitating the drug trade toward actively managing and participating in it, spreading narco-terrorism and expanding the funding for these groups. A war on drugs and narco-terrorism in the Sahel would be a devastating addition to the current war on terror across the region, where 43 percent of global terrorism deaths take place. A development such as this would not only be dangerous for the Sahel, but for the wider Middle East and Europe as well. Drug routes are known to facilitate other forms of international smuggling and for hiding activities from authorities—ever more dangerous when involving jihadist groups.

What the West can do

Unfortunately, the West can’t do much in the Sahel.

Both the United States and the European Union (EU) have retreated from the region, driven away by military juntas that do not share the West’s democratic values and concern for human rights. Various joint military efforts that had been underway to combat terror groups have fallen apart as the United States and EU left the region and lost partners. This is unlikely to change, and if the United States and EU lack the partners necessary to combat jihadist groups in the Sahel, they will likely also lack the ability to combat drug smuggling.

What they can do, however, is support and strengthen partnerships with the costal democracies in West Africa, preventing drugs from entering the Sahel in the first place.

West African democracies are on the frontlines of combating jihadists. Terrorists are attempting to expand operations and territory in countries including Senegal, Benin, Togo, and Ghana. These democracies are also on the frontlines of combating drug smuggling and are making waves with seizures. For example, last November, Senegal’s navy seized three tons of cocaine that was headed towards Europe. In April this year, the country made headlines for seizing 1,140 kilograms of cocaine (the most ever intercepted on land), which was headed toward Mali. More seizures followed in June. In Ghana, authorities have also clamped down on trafficking, making headlines after arresting a duo attempting to smuggle an amount of cocaine worth six million dollars through Accra’s airport and to London. On September 7 in Guinea-Bissau, authorities (with help from the US Drug Enforcement Administration and a European organization called the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre) seized 2.6 tons of cocaine that had arrived from Latin America.

As drugs continue to flow, and as the domestic use of drugs continues to rise, West African politicians and societies are just as interested in addressing drug trafficking as the United States and EU are. These West African democracies would be willing partners in combating the twin threats of expanding terrorist groups and a burgeoning drug trade.

Should the Sahel become home to narco-terrorism, the consequences would be catastrophic, not only for the Sahel but for the world. The international community must not ignore yet another crisis.

Alexander Tripp is the assistant director for the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

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These attacks have displaced tens of thousands of Israelis from their homes. Early Tuesday, Israel’s security cabinet voted to add their safe return to Israel’s official war aims. The vote came hours after Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant told US Special Envoy Amos Hochstein that he was not confident in a ceasefire deal and “the only way left to ensure the return of Israel’s northern communities to their homes will be via military action.”

This follows months of failed mediation attempts by Hochstein and Biden administration officials. Hochstein reportedly told Gallant and others on Tuesday that military action would not ensure the safety of Israeli civilians and would instead risk a wider regional war. However, since Hochstein’s many previous mediation attempts failed, and absent an alternative solution for the crisis on Israel’s northern border, Israeli leaders are signaling that they feel compelled to degrade this threat.

Hezbollah is getting stronger

The Biden administration’s pressuring of Israel to avoid a larger-scale conflict with Hezbollah has forced Israel into a series of low-intensity exchanges. Following the killing of twelve Israeli-Druze children, for example, White House spokesperson John Kirby stated that “there’s no reason, in our view, that this has to lead to some sort of dramatic escalation.” In line with the United States’ desire to avoid dramatic escalation, Israel responded with a targeted assassination against Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr in July that failed to reduce tensions. While the White House may believe that limited engagements are preferable to a larger military operation, this strategy prevents Israel from achieving its security goals. It also pushes the region closer to broader conflict as each side intensifies the scope of its attacks over time. This creates the exact scenario that the administration is desperate to avoid.

Additionally, delaying the conflict allows Hezbollah’s capabilities to grow as Iran pours resources in, increasingly jeopardizing US security interests. The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s 2024 Annual Threat Assessment states that Hezbollah “seeks to limit US influence in Lebanon and the broader Middle East,” goals it shares with the Iranian government. The stronger Hezbollah becomes, the more capable it will be in threatening US allies, personnel, and influence in the region. In addition to countering Hezbollah’s goals, US involvement and support would help to rein in and deter Iran, as well as signal to Russia, China, and other states that the United States supports its allies and wants to maintain its influence in the region.

With IDF capabilities stretched thin across multiple fronts since the Hamas attacks on October 7, 2023, Hezbollah has exploited the opportunity to test the limitations of Israel’s air defenses. It has also leveraged its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to develop a catalog of important military, civilian, and infrastructure targets within Israel. The full extent of Hezbollah’s military capabilities are unknown, but the group is estimated to have more than 150,000 ground-to-ground missiles, which is more than ten times what it possessed at the beginning of the Second Lebanon War in 2006. The group is also reported to have around 2,000 drones, 25,000-30,000 active personnel, and the same number of reservists. Critically, these forces now have combat experience, having fought on behalf of the Assad regime during the Syrian Civil War. Other fighters from Iraq and Syria are pouring into Lebanon to reinforce Hezbollah’s ranks, too, according to reports. Taken together, the data show an aggressive increase in Hezbollah’s capabilities over time. This threat is compounded by the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran in the near future, which could back Hezbollah with the ultimate deterrent. The longer Israel waits to deal with Hezbollah, the more time it allows Iran to arm and train its proxy and work toward creating a deliverable nuclear weapon, which would likely increase the difficulty and destructiveness of a future conflict.

What Israel needs from the United States

If Israel does conduct a military operation in southern Lebanon, Israel will need weapons sales and military aid without delay to ensure the IDF’s efficacy in southern Lebanon and the safety of the population. Israel’s Iron Dome and David’s Sling interceptor stores will be pushed to the brink with the likely overwhelming nature of the aerial attacks by Hezbollah. To keep the air defense systems fully operational, the United States should provide the military aid needed for Israel to continue to purchase crucial equipment.

To further support its ally, the United States should station the necessary naval forces in the region, increasing the two militaries’ interoperability and supporting Israel’s complex but still vulnerable air defense systems. US Central Command should coordinate regional efforts to defeat incoming projectiles from Iran and its proxies, similar to what the United States did during April’s Iranian attack. Israel’s strike on Hezbollah launch vehicles in August showed Israel’s intelligence capabilities in preempting a massive attack. To support this effort, the United States can provide passive support by augmenting sensing and targeting capabilities through Aegis systems and E-2 Hawkeyes, as well as with broader intelligence sharing. US sensing and targeting assistance in combination with regional efforts would allow Israel to focus its capabilities solely on Hezbollah, best positioning Israel to minimize the effectiveness of Hezbollah’s aerial attacks.

The final means by which the United States can aid Israel’s efforts is through vocal backing on the international stage. Following the October 7 attacks, Israel received broad support for its military campaign in Gaza. As the war has continued and the public is increasingly exposed to the horrors of urban combat and information warfare campaigns, this international support has diminished. Israel’s rationale for conducting an operation in Lebanon would be justified, as Hezbollah has been attacking Israel since October 8, 2023, launching more than 7,500 rockets, missiles, and drones since that date. Malign actors on the international stage would attempt to paint Israel’s actions as illegitimate. To support the rules-based international system, it is important for the United States to support military operations that defend a democratic and allied state’s sovereignty.

While many Americans are justifiably cautious about the country getting entangled in another war in the Middle East, Israeli officials have declared that, even though forces are stretched across multiple fronts, they are willing to do the heavy lifting. Israel will need US support through military aid, intelligence, missile defense support, and vocal support on the international stage. There are clear incentives for the United States to support this effort, as confronting Iran through the degradation of Hezbollah improves regional stability by weakening Iran’s strongest deterrent threat over Israel. Additionally, with Hezbollah further degraded, Israel can play a greater role in fighting against Iranian proxies, further advancing US security interests in the region.

In the same sense that supporting Ukraine has allowed the United States to degrade one of its near-peer adversaries without deploying US personnel on the battlefield, supporting Israel would allow the United States to degrade another revisionist actor in Iran without US troops on the ground. The growing links between the United States’ adversaries across the globe—mainly China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—must be addressed, and the most effective way to do so is by leveraging the United States’ robust alliance network. By supporting Israel’s efforts to secure its northern border, the United States can show its resolve and start to reestablish its regional deterrence, as well as signal to revisionist actors that it is still committed to the defense of its allies globally. This is especially relevant as China, Russia, and Iran continue to establish geopolitical footholds in the region, looking to upend the United States’ role as the region’s security guarantor.

The Lebanese government cannot control the actions of Hezbollah and, whether willingly or not, has allowed Hezbollah to turn the nation into a forward operating base for Iran’s terror activities. Given this and the direct attacks from Hezbollah, it is understandable why Israel feels compelled to conduct a military operation in southern Lebanon. While Israeli officials have made it abundantly clear that they will fight alone, if need be, it is in the United States’ strategic interest to support Israel as it seeks to remove the threat from Hezbollah. Supporting Israel in this campaign would be an important step in deterring and reining in Iran, and it would demonstrate that the United States can create credible security guarantees and prevent Russia and China from filling a US power vacuum in the region.

Jonathan Rosenstein is a program assistant in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Eliana Aiken is a former young global professional in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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NATO has established its place among the most successful political and military alliances in history—despite facing very challenging circumstances since its founding—by dint of solidarity, unity of purpose, and resolve.

Today, allies are presented with challenges such as increasing global systemic rivalry and a complex, interconnected, and unstable security landscape, which threaten Euro-Atlantic security. Russia, as the most significant and direct threat for NATO, has been undermining Euro-Atlantic security since its invasion of Georgia in 2008, and its aggression has since expanded in the form of its invasion of Ukraine. In addition, terrorism—in all forms and manifestations—persists. The topic has been on NATO’s agenda since the adoption of the Alliance’s 1991 Strategic Concept and it (specifically, the 9/11 terror attacks on the United States) was the reason the Alliance decided to invoke Article 5 for the first and only time in history. Since 2001, nonstate actors have continued to lodge a series of terror attacks on a number of allies such as the United Kingdom, Spain, France, and Belgium as well as Turkey, which still grapples with terror attacks from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), as well as the latter’s Syrian leg.

NATO allies must maintain their resolve and remain vigilant and ready to face challenges from any direction. Defense is not cheap, and it requires constant attention, care, and investment.

Since joining the Alliance seventy-two years ago, Turkey has contributed to NATO’s security in various theaters of instability and conflicts. Turkey was a bulwark against the Soviet threat in the Cold War period, and it continued to spend significantly on defense, sacrificing the opportunity to spend more elsewhere. For example, Turkey dedicated a level of forces and capabilities NATO in that period that was significant for the Alliance’s security and reduced pressure on allies in Central and Eastern Europe.

Turkey, because it continued to spend on defense, did not benefit from the post-Cold War “peace dividend” to the extent that European NATO allies enjoyed during the early 1990s when the unifying vision to establish a belt of security, stability, and prosperity that included Russia (extending from Vancouver to Vladivostok) was first launched by the United States. During this period, Turkey spent around or above 4 percent of its gross domestic product on defense, while most other allies saw their commitments wane over time.

In the immediate post-Cold War era, Turkey faced challenges from nearby regional conflicts in the Gulf, the Balkans, and the South Caucasus. Yet this conflictual period did not stop Turkey from contributing to NATO efforts designed to protect peace and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. Turkey actively took part in NATO operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, and it also made significant contributions to the International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan, which was followed by the Resolute Support Mission.

Today, Turkey has similarly consistently supported NATO efforts to enhance peace, stability, and prosperity in the Euro-Atlantic area, even despite divergent perceptions in allied capitals about Turkey’s approach to recent global challenges such as Russia’s war in Ukraine and the war in Gaza.

For example, Turkey did join its NATO allies in approving the most recent NATO Strategic Concept, adopted at Madrid in 2022, that identified Russia and terrorism (along with other regional and global challenges) as threats for the Alliance. Turkey is also set to play a pivotal role in the implementation of regional plans launched at the Vilnius summit last year which are dedicated to the defense of Southern Europe against the pervasive challenges in its immediate vicinity.

Turkey’s role in Washington summit outcomes

With the Russian threat looming over European security, it is high time to strengthen the European pillar of NATO. Allies at the NATO summit acknowledged the need to close the gaps between Europe’s defense needs and its capabilities. This includes, as highlighted at the Washington summit, expanding European allies’ defense manufacturing capacity in a coherent, complementary, and interoperable manner. To achieve interoperability will also require Turkey and NATO to find a lasting solution to the spat over the current Turkish administration’s decision in 2017 to procure the S-400 Russian missile system. While expanding capacity, the allies must take into account both the Alliance’s defense priorities and Ukraine’s needs as it continues to face up against Russian aggression.

Turkey can play a crucial role in helping expand the Alliance’s defense capacity through its contributions to collective deterrence and defense. Capabilities being produced by the growing Turkish defense industry cannot be sidelined in the Alliance’s endeavor to enhance deterrence and defense and maintain a technological edge against both state and nonstate adversaries. This will require result-oriented consultations within NATO and especially between European allies and Turkey, conducted with renewed vigor and mutual resolve. To this end, it is high time for the European Union (EU) to revisit its policies that engage only EU members in enhancing Europe’s defense capacity. Today’s challenges require collaboration with non-EU countries, such as Turkey, to the fullest extent.

With terrorism plaguing Turkey’s neighborhood, and with the issue remaining high on Turkey’s agenda, Ankara likely welcomed allies’ commitment (as outlined in the Washington Summit Declaration) to “counter, deter, defend, and respond to threats and challenges posed by terrorists and terrorist organizations based on a combination of prevention, protection, and denial measures with determination, resolve, and in solidarity.” If allies align their perceptions of the threat to Turkey posed by the PKK and its affiliates by including, for instance, deterrence and defensive measures against the threat in the regional defense plan for Southern Europe, this would help ease the friction on this major issue and help erase the Turkish society’s negative perceptions of NATO allies.

The Washington Summit Declaration also included a reference to the 1936 Montreux Convention. While some Turkish observers have oddly argued the reference is ill-intentioned, it is actually a major outcome for Turkey, as the allies reaffirmed their commitments to “regional efforts aimed at upholding security, safety, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Black Sea region.” The communiqué also welcomed the joint endeavor of three littoral allies (Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania) to launch the Black Sea Mine Countermeasures Task Group.

Finally, with the global order at stake—due to Russia’s aggression, China’s growing global influence, and threats to security including terrorism—it has become vitally important to maintain and increase cooperation with southern neighborhood countries. The Alliance recognized this importance at the Washington summit, when it committed to taking a new approach toward its “southern neighborhood.” As part of that approach, the NATO secretary general appointed a new special representative for the southern neighborhood to coordinate NATO’s efforts in that neighborhood. Turkey could play a positive role in improving ties between the Alliance and the southern neighborhood by leveraging the linguistic, kinship, religious, and cultural ties it has with other countries. Turkey could also mobilize opportunities that it has in being part of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and Organization of Turkic States, and in working with the Gulf Cooperation Council and African Union.

The Alliance has once again proven its relevance and value in protecting and defending the Euro-Atlantic area. As it continues to work to keep the Euro-Atlantic area safe, secure, and stable, Turkey has an important role to play.

Mehmet Fatih Ceylan is a retired career ambassador with forty years of experience in international security and defense affairs. Formerly, he served in the Turkish Foreign Ministry and served as Turkey’s ambassador to NATO from 2013 to 2018.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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In May, NATO published a thirty-three-page report by a group of experts on the Alliance’s “southern neighborhood,” which includes North Africa, the Sahel, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean Sea. The experts’ report highlights how instability from these regions has a direct impact on allies and suggests several important considerations as the Alliance finalizes its southern flank strategy in Washington. The report is a great start and should be read carefully, but NATO needs to take four additional measures if it genuinely wants to improve the situation on the Alliance’s southern flank.

Why look south?

Why should NATO spend time and energy on a southern flank strategy when it faces such a clear and present threat to the east? NATO’s 2022 strategic concept, adopted at the Madrid summit, outlines two fundamental threats the Alliance faces. The strategic concept declares that Russia is the “most significant and direct threat” to allies’ security and that terrorism is the “most direct asymmetric threat” to the security of citizens, international peace, and prosperity. As US Ambassador to NATO Julianne Smith recently noted, Russia and terrorist groups benefit from and contribute to instability in NATO’s southern neighborhoods and provide the central reason why the Alliance needs a southern flank strategy.

Russia’s Africa Corps (the successor to the Wagner Group in Africa) has taken advantage of instability in these neighborhoods, providing fighters, trainers, and materiel in Libya, Mali, Sudan, and Burkina Faso. Russia has a naval base in Tartus, Syria, and uses it to sail its vessels in the Mediterranean, posing a threat to naval security and maritime commerce. Instability in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Sahel has also provided an environment where radical Islamic terrorist groups expanded in recent decades. Instability in Iraq and Syria allowed the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) to establish a large territorial footprint across those countries. Recent research suggests that the Sahel region has become the global epicenter of Islamic radical terrorism. Left unchecked, instability in NATO’s southern neighborhood translates into opportunities for Russian intervention and metastasized terrorist groups. This instability also drives other important problems for NATO’s southern flank allies: irregular migration, drug smuggling, piracy, and organized crime, which, in turn, threaten energy security (especially as European countries have moved away from Russian oil and gas) and maritime commerce.

Getting concrete with the recommendations

At NATO’s 2023 Vilnius summit, the allies agreed to engage in a “comprehensive and deep reflection on existing and emerging threats and challenges” emanating from the southern neighborhoods. In October 2023, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg appointed a group of eleven experts to provide “concrete recommendations to shape NATO’s future approach.”

Released on May 7, the report includes recommendations that can be grouped in four basic categories.

First, it makes several overarching organizational suggestions. These include the appointment of a special envoy for the southern neighborhoods, periodic review of NATO’s relationship with the southern neighborhoods, and a better integration of NATO’s Strategic Direction-South Hub in Naples within the NATO structure to strengthen the link between the hub and the Alliance’s political leadership.

Second, the report suggests strengthening dialogue with and about the southern neighborhoods, as well as enhancing cooperation with relevant regional and international organizations. Specifically, it recommends a special summit of all NATO’s southern partners (members of the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative), the creation of a high-level regional security and stability dialogue, and improved consultation with the European Union and representation from the African Union.

Third, the report suggests several important strategic communications measures, recognizing that NATO’s image in the region—in part due to Russian misinformation campaigns—needs improvement. The report proposes a permanent “Facts for Peace” initiative to fight disinformation in the southern neighborhoods and the establishment of a center with the same mission.  

Fourth, the report discusses areas where NATO should expand its capacity to act. For example, NATO could set up a standing mission dedicated to training and capacity building for partners. NATO might also enhance cooperation with partners on resilience, which would include information and advice on resilience planning, including on disaster response. The report also suggests that NATO build on recent successes in counterpiracy and “identify further areas for maritime security cooperation” with partners.

This group of experts’ recommendations are detailed and thoughtful. Leaders of NATO’s member states would do well to implement most if not all of them. But four additional steps should be added to form an effective southern flank strategy.

Four steps forward

In releasing his fiscal 2024 budget, US President Joe Biden shared a quote that he attributed to his father. “Don’t tell me what you value,” he said. “Show me your budget—and I’ll tell you what you value.”

If NATO truly cares about addressing the challenges in its southern neighborhoods, then it should be willing to incur the costs to do so. If NATO adopts a southern flank strategy at the Washington summit that entails real increases in spending on the Alliance’s activities in the region, it will signal to Russia and to the leaders of terrorist groups that it cares enough about the southern neighborhoods to invest resources there. In agreeing to increased spending, NATO would also signal to southern flank member governments and their publics that the Alliance is willing to incur the costs for something other than defense of its eastern flank.

Moreover, the Alliance’s additional spending should focus on four specific areas:  

First, NATO members should commit significantly more resources to Operation Sea Guardian and its three tasks, which are to contribute to maritime capacity building with regional partners, maintain maritime situational awareness, and support maritime counterterrorism. All three tasks are means to directly address the threats from Russia and terrorism in the southern neighborhoods.

Second, NATO should commit to an amply resourced training and capacity-building mission for the southern neighborhoods, and it should look for local partners interested in receiving such assistance.

Third, NATO should commit the resources to stand up a multinational division for the southern flank, which would be available for deployment to a crisis in the region if necessary and appropriate.

Fourth, at the Washington summit, allies should commit to increase funding for the Defense Against Terrorism Programme of Work, which aims to protect against and prevent nonconventional attacks, such as attacks on critical infrastructure and terrorist attacks using emerging and disruptive technologies.

If allies agree to these four recommendations as well as to the group of experts’ recommendations, they will demonstrate to all parties that the southern neighborhoods are of great interest and they will be engaging in meaningful steps to improve stability there.

Jason Davidson is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is also professor of political science and international affairs and director of the Security and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Mary Washington in Fredericksburg, Virginia.

NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary is a milestone in a remarkable story of reinvention, adaptation, and unity. However, as the Alliance seeks to secure its future for the next seventy-five years, it faces the revanchism of old rivals, escalating strategic competition, and uncertainties over the future of the rules-based international order.

With partners and allies turning attention from celebrations to challenges, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative invited contributors to engage with the most pressing concerns ahead of the historic Washington summit and chart a path for the Alliance’s future. This series will feature seven essays focused on concrete issues that NATO must address at the Washington summit and five essays that examine longer-term challenges the Alliance must confront to ensure transatlantic security.

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These agreements have drawn attention to Ankara’s presence in the Horn of Africa and build upon a long history of Turkish engagement in the region. They hold great potential for expanding the security and economic benefits of Turkey-Somalia cooperation, but implementing them will not be easy. Great-power competition over influence in Mogadishu, regional rivalries, security challenges, and a fractured Somali government will all pose significant challenges to these agreements and Turkey’s bid for a greater role in the Horn of Africa.

What’s the big deal?

On February 22, Ankara and Mogadishu signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) establishing the Turkish Armed Forces as a partner in Somalia’s maritime security and law enforcement for the next ten years. Per reports about the MOU, Turkey will reconstruct, equip, and train the Somali Navy while receiving 30 percent of the revenue from Somalia’s exclusive economic zone. Proponents say that the stability and security brought to Somalia’s seas outweigh the costs. Somalia loses $500 million dollars annually to illegal fishing, for example to Iranian and Chinese fishermen, while Somalia’s oil and gas reserves of up to thirty billion barrels remain largely untapped since civil war broke out in 1991. A brief period of stability has led oil and gas companies to cautiously return to Somalia. In 2019, ExxonMobil and Shell indicated a potential return to the country, and in 2022, Coastline Exploration struck a seven-block exploration deal, though an increase in fighting once again prevented any major steps forward. Shortly following this agreement with Turkey, Liberty Petroleum announced that it had secured three offshore blocks for exploration.

Shortly after reaching the maritime defense and security deal, Ankara and Mogadishu announced another MOU, establishing Turkey as a partner in Somalia’s exploration, appraisal, and extraction of petroleum blocks, with the possibility of Turkey taking over sales and distribution. Though the first agreement of its kind for Turkey, Ankara is increasingly factoring hydrocarbons into its diplomatic efforts, including in Libya.

Guns and roses

Turkey’s reaching out to Somalia has been in the making for nearly two decades, though then Turkish Prime Minister (and current president) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Somalia during a devastating famine in 2011 was the watershed moment. The first non-African head of state to visit Somalia in twenty years, Erdoğan toured refugee camps and hospitals, pledging aid and drawing international attention to the crisis. His visit was warmly received by the Somali people, many of whom felt abandoned by the global community.

In the years since Erdoğan’s visit, Turkey has integrated deeply into Somali affairs, in everything from its security to its garbage collection and wastewater treatment to its management of seaports and airports. According to Erdoğan, Turkey provided more than one billion dollars in aid to Somalia between 2011 and 2022. Though Turkey’s presence has not been entirely without controversy, evidence of its popularity is widespread, whether through popular fundraising efforts for Turkish earthquake relief in 2023 or in day-to-day life—“Istanbul” is now a common girl’s name in Somalia.  

Turkey receives major attention for the aid it provides, especially considering that it is in the middle on the list of providers of official direct aid to Somalia. This is likely because of Turkey’s tendency to heavily brand its projects, its willingness to operate in dangerous areas of the country, and the close political ties between the two countries. The Turks often capitalize on shared cultural and religious ties to legitimize and optimize their operations, while the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (also known as the Diyanet) facilitates some projects.

At the heart of the Turkey-Somalia relationship is military cooperation, which began in 2015. In 2017, Turkey established its first African military base, Camp TURKSOM in Mogadishu, and it has reportedly trained up to sixteen thousand troops. Alongside the United States, Turkey has conducted drone strikes against the terrorist group al-Shabaab, with at least nineteen confirmed strikes since 2022. In April 2023, Ankara sold Bayraktar TB2 drones to Mogadishu as part of counterterrorism efforts (a sale for which the United Nations accused Ankara of violating an arms embargo). Turkey also plays an important role in training and arming the Haramcad paramilitary unit and Gorgor commando brigade— one of two major elite units in the Somali National Army (SNA), with the other being the Danab brigade, which is trained by the United States. In collaboration with the Danab brigade, the Gorgor has played an important role in combatting al-Shabaab, particularly in renewed fighting in 2021 and 2022.

Turkey turns southward

Ankara’s presence in Somalia is part of a Turkish push toward Africa that started in 1998, with the creation of the Africa Action Plan. By 2008, Turkey had been declared a strategic partner of the African Union and opened at least a dozen embassies across the continent. When Turkey made its successful bid to become a nonpermanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2009, it was supported by fifty-one of the fifty-three African states. In 2013, Turkey became a member of the African Development Bank Group. Turkey has varying interests in Africa, including ideological motivations, economic and trade priorities, and a desire to build up Ankara’s own defense industries and capabilities. Now, Turkey has a large presence in the region in the areas of humanitarian aid and military cooperation. As of 2022, some thirty African states had signed security cooperation agreements with Turkey, nineteen of which included troop training.

The Horn of Africa is critical for Turkish interests because of its its geographical position, rich mineral resources, and development potential. The region has seen increasing great-power competition involving a diverse cast of characters including Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Russia, China, and the United States. Since 2001, at least eighteen foreign military bases have been constructed in the region, primarily for counterterrorism and counterpiracy operations.

Over the past two decades, Ankara has developed a complex web of economic and military ties with the region, including by leasing the Sudanese island of Suakin, selling drones to Ethiopia, and participating in a decades-long anti-piracy mission off the Horn of Africa under NATO’s Combined Task Force 151. In 2017, Djiboutian officials invited Turkey to establish a military base near the critical Bab el-Mandeb Strait in an effort to promote freedom of navigation and regional stability. On February 20 this year, Djibouti and Turkey signed a military training cooperation agreement.

The Emirati angle

Turkey is far from the only power involved in Somalia. As recently as mid-February, Mogadishu signed an MOU with Washington to open five new military bases in the country and increase training for its Danab brigade. Qatar and the United Kingdom are also players in Somalia. Turkey’s primary competitor in Somalia, however, is the UAE, which has historically seen the region as critical to its strategic interests.

Flush with cash, the Emiratis have embarked on a campaign of infrastructure projects and security agreements across the region, including building major ports in Somaliland (an unrecognized republic in the north of Somalia that self-declared independence in 1991), Eritrea, and Djibouti. It also armed the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of Sudan and the Ethiopian government during conflicts in those countries. In November 2022, according to Middle East Eye, Somalia reportedly signed a secretive deal with the UAE to train ten thousand Somali troops and police officers in Egypt. However, frustration among officials with the terms of the agreement, as well as continued Emirati projects in Somaliland, have complicated the UAE-Somalia relationship. On January 1, Ethiopia (also close with the UAE) announced it had reached an MOU with Somaliland exchanging recognition for sea access and the lease of a military base. Following the two major Turkey-Somalia agreements of 2024, the Emiratis severely cut their support for the SNA, which included providing an additional $256 in monthly salary for the 14,400 soldiers trained by the UAE.

The Emirati factor carries two major risks for Turkish ambitions in Somalia. First, Abu Dhabi has played a critical role in the fight against al-Shabaab, including through air strikes. Manpower shortages have plagued the SNA for decades, an issue that Emirati coffers have helped alleviate. The withdrawal or reduction of Emirati support in the fight against terrorism will have a compounding effect as the African Union’s Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), abiding by a request from Somalia, plans to withdraw its forces by the end of 2024. The withdrawal of both ATMIS and the UAE risks Turkey becoming further burdened by the region’s fight against terrorist groups. Second, the UAE has faced several setbacks across the region as the number of players continues to grow, and its attempts to reinforce its position will create effects that will impact Turkey. The UAE is entering increasing competition with China in Djibouti, especially now that Djibouti’s government nationalized the Doraleh Deep Water Port, which was previously owned by an Emirati company; meanwhile, in Sudan, the Emirati-backed RSF has seen its first major setbacks in months with the loss of Omdurman to the Sudanese Armed Forces, who have purchased weapons from Iran. As the UAE seeks to reassert itself and reinforce its position in the region, it will likely double down on its already substantial investments in Puntland, Somaliland, and Ethiopia. Whether the emboldening of Somalia’s rivals and the geopolitical balancing in the Horn will have a stabilizing or destabilizing effect remains to be seen, but it will likely be closely watched by Turkey.

Known unknowns

Though Somali and Turkish officials maintain that the recent agreements are unrelated to the major deal between Somaliland and Ethiopia, the timing is difficult to ignore. The Somali cabinet labeled the Somaliland-Ethiopia MOU as a “blatant assault” on its sovereignty and said it was an example of Ethiopian “interference against the sovereignty of [Somalia].” Unsurprisingly, Somalilanders reacted similarly to the Turkey-Somalia agreements that followed. Though the regional backlash to the MOU may in part steer Ethiopia and Somalia to dissolve it, this is far from certain. It remains unknown if Turkey’s enforcement of Somali maritime security will extend to Somaliland waters, which Ankara recognizes as part of Somalia. In May, Somaliland’s foreign minister explicitly stated that Turkish naval vessels would not be welcome in its territorial waters. This issue will be particularly important if Ethiopia proceeds with its plans to build a naval facility in Somaliland. Despite a strong Turkish-Ethiopian relationship, the Turkish Navy supported joint Somalia-Egypt naval exercises days after the January 1 agreement was signed. It is also unclear how the Turkish Navy will interact with the Puntland Maritime Police Force, which has received funding support from the UAE. Though the semi-autonomous Somali region of Puntland does not claim total independence, it pulled recognition of the Somali federal government in March.

Equally uncertain is how Ankara will react should the Houthis attack a ship transiting through the Somali waters that it will be charged with protecting. Handcuffed by the group’s connection to the war in Gaza, Turkey has balanced a precarious relationship with the extremist group, quietly opposing them over the last seven years while refusing to label them a terrorist organization and shying away from joining the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian.

A winding path forward

It is uncertain how Turkey and Somalia will deliver on the major agreements and continue the upward trajectory in their bilateral relations. Turkey faces a complex and challenging Somali political landscape. Both MOUs were quickly ratified by the Somali parliament (members perhaps had little choice in the matter, according to one Somaliland-based researcher), though the deal is not without detractors. Beyond concerns over sovereignty, Mohamud is in need of an influential patron as he faces allegations of consolidating power. For Mohamud, Turkey may be the answer, as Turkey largely disregards Somalia’s domestic politics and offers near unconditional support for Villa Somalia, which has led some analysts to describe Turkey as an “all-weather friend.” Mohamud recently proposed a series of constitutional changes, including transitioning to a presidential system, arguing that it would combat clan politics and unite the country. The reforms have prompted protests and polarized the parliament. The Puntland region declared on March 31 that it would be withdrawing from the federal government until a new constitution was put in place. Days later, the Daily Somalia reported that Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni traveled to the UAE and Ethiopia.

Furthermore, Mohamud’s government lacks unity. The same day that the Liberty Petroleum deal was signed by Somali Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Abdirizak Omar Mohamed, Somali Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre expressed concerns and called for revoking the deal. Similarly, the Somali government lacks a clear strategy toward al-Shabaab. Following a successful first phase of “total war” in 2022, both battlefield and political gains have slowed, and al-Shabaab has struck back with a series of horrific attacks. Barre declared his support for peace talks with al-Shabaab in direct opposition to Mohamud, garnering public and private support from within a fractured cabinet.

Moreover, the recent battlefield gains by al-Shabaab undermine the legitimacy of Turkey’s military presence in the country. The concessions required for a peaceful settlement with the terrorist group may include ejecting Turkey’s military, the presence of which al-Shabaab has condemned harshly.

As Turkish officials and lawmakers consider ratification and implementation, they will no doubt look to the past decades of Turkish engagement with Somalia—but also the challenges that lay ahead. The difficulties posed by external influences, great-power competition, tumultuous domestic politics, widespread corruption, high costs, and continued conflict in Somalia will make Turkey’s enormous promises extremely difficult to fulfill. The future of these agreements and thus the future of Turkey’s relations with Somalia and position in the Horn of Africa, though built upon a strong foundation, remains to be seen.

Kiran Baez is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council Turkey program. Add him on LinkedIn.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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What does the UN secretary-general need to know? Our “memo to…” series has the answer with briefings on the world’s most pressing issues from our experts, drawing on their experience advising the highest levels of government.

Bottom line up front: The risk of interstate conflict between Afghanistan and its neighbors has been rising since the Taliban returned to power in 2021, and is now at a critical point. The Taliban’s rule has created new tensions and exacerbated longstanding problems, such as conflicts over water use across the semi-arid region. Existing efforts to prevent conflict in the war-torn neighborhood are ad hoc, reactive, and ineffectual. The United Nations should urgently establish a standing conflict-prevention mechanism for the Afghanistan region, led by a UN special envoy with a mandate to prevent cross-border and regional disputes from becoming violent, prevent escalation if violence breaks out, and re-establish stability.

Background

This memo describes the cross-border tensions and security threats in the Afghanistan region, discusses recent efforts to address these tensions, and makes proposals for a conflict prevention mechanism led by the UN.

When he took office in 2016, UN Secretary-General António Guterres declared that the international community’s “most serious shortcoming” is “our inability to prevent crises.”¹ In A New Agenda for Peace of 2023, the secretary-general recommended that preventive diplomacy in an “era of divisions” should be strengthened as follows:

Repair regional security architectures where they are in danger of collapsing; build them where they do not exist; and enhance them where they can be further developed. The UN can work to further such regional efforts in a convening and supporting role.”²

This memo proposes the formation of a standing UN conflict prevention mechanism for the Afghanistan region. The region is insecure and volatile and subject to cross-border violence. Experiences from other parts of the world suggest that standing conflict prevention mechanisms are more likely to be effective than ad-hoc and sporadic responses to regional crises.

More specifically, the conflict prevention mechanism for Afghanistan should comprise a UN special envoy, a UN Center for Preventive Diplomacy for the Afghanistan Region, and a regional consultative forum bringing together Afghanistan’s contiguous neighbors: Pakistan, Iran, China, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. An essential step towards the formation of the mechanism would entail consultation with these states.

These proposals build on the report of the Independent Assessment on Afghanistan, written at the behest of the Security Council, which mandated the assessment in UN Resolution 2679 as the first step toward a coherent approach to post-2021 Afghanistan. The assessment, drafted by Turkish diplomat Feridun Sinirlioğlu, was presented to the Security Council in November 2023.³ The report highlighted concerns about Afghanistan’s potential to generate destabilizing regional effects relating to illegal narcotics, transnational terrorism, and extremist ideologies. It recommended “international attention to and cooperation on issues that impact regional and global security and stability.” It also recommended the appointment of a UN special envoy whose mandate would include diplomacy between Afghanistan and international stakeholders. In December 2023 the Security Council requested that the secretary-general appoint a special envoy for Afghanistan to promote implementation of the recommendations.⁴

This memo proposes specific mechanisms to give effect to the Independent Assessment’s call for greater coordination and cooperation between international stakeholders and the de facto authorities in Afghanistan with respect to regional security issues.

A dangerous neighborhood

Since taking power in Afghanistan in 2021, the Taliban’s relations with several neighboring countries have reached a critical juncture. By way of illustration:

• According to a 2023 UN report, a range of terrorist groups have greater freedom of maneuver under the Taliban.⁵ There are indications that al-Qaeda is rebuilding operational capability, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is launching attacks into Pakistan with support from the Taliban, groups of foreign terrorist fighters are projecting threats across Afghanistan’s borders, and the operations of the Islamic State group’s local affiliate are becoming more sophisticated and lethal. Links between the Taliban and both al-Qaeda and TTP remain strong and symbiotic.⁶
• In April 2023 Pakistan warned the Taliban that it would strike terrorist hideouts inside Afghanistan if the Taliban was unable to rein in anti-Pakistan militants.⁷
• Russia has similarly said that the Taliban’s return to power has bolstered terrorist organizations operating in Afghanistan. Russia warned that increased terrorist risks from Afghanistan were threatening Central Asian neighbors where Russian troops were stationed.⁸
• In 2021 Tajikistan warned that “various terrorist groups are actively using the unstable military-political situation in Afghanistan in order to strengthen their positions.”⁹ Taliban officials responded by condemning the Tajik government for meddling in Afghan affairs.
• Militants from the Islamic State Khorasan Province group (ISIS-K) based in Afghanistan fired rockets at Uzbekistan in 2022. More broadly, ISIS-K and other Islamic State groups seek to destabilize Afghanistan and some of its neighbors, raising the risk of terror threats to Central Asia.¹⁰
• In April 2023 the Fourth Meeting of Foreign Ministers of Afghanistan’s Neighboring States listed the following terrorist groups as based in Afghanistan: the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, Al-Qaeda, the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, the Balochistan Liberation Army, Jundallah, Jaish al-Adl, Jamaat Ansarullah, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.¹¹ The ministerial meeting also highlighted the problem of drug production and trafficking.
• There are longstanding and growing water tensions in the region. In May 2023 tensions led to an exchange of fire between Afghanistan and Iran.¹²
• In November 2023 the report of the Independent Assessment on Afghanistan, requested by the UN Security Council, warned that the country “has the potential to generate destabilizing effects – as an origin country for illegal narcotics, as a base for transnational terrorism and extremist ideologies, and as a potential source of mass migration and displacement.”¹³ The report highlights “counterterrorism, counternarcotics and regional security” as priority issues for international attention.¹⁴

Previous efforts to address regional security

To date, there have been no effective international responses to the security problems of the Afghanistan region.

• The Moscow Format Consultations on Afghanistan, launched in 2017, is a regional platform on Afghanistan that has brought together representatives from Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The founding mandate was to ensure regional security and facilitate political reconciliation between the Taliban and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan under then-President Ashraf Ghani, whose government the international community backed. Moscow assumed the lead in this process because of its concerns about the regional spread of instability, violence, and extremism, as well as the growing inflow of Afghan heroin to the Russian market.¹⁵
• The Meeting of Foreign Ministers of Afghanistan’s Neighboring States, which focuses on regional security, held its fourth meeting in April 2023.¹⁶ It does not appear to have developed ongoing programs. This also appears to be true of the annual gathering of the national security advisers of Afghanistan’s neighbors.¹⁷
• The multilateral bodies that cover the Afghanistan region—the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—have proven to be ineffectual mechanisms for regional security because of the mistrust among their respective member states.¹⁸

Most of the regional meetings have been one-off events, failing to delve deeply into the underlying crises and tensions between Afghanistan and its neighbors and failing to develop concrete plans for collective problems such as the water crisis, territorial disputes, identity conflicts, and narcotics networks. Complicating matters further, some of the regional countries are economically and militarily weak, leading to dependence on stronger nations and to reduced autonomy to engage in meaningful regional cooperation. The complex web of insurgencies with cross-border affiliations has posed a severe challenge, with certain states covertly or overtly aligning with the nonstate armed actors.

The bottom line is that Afghanistan’s neighbors evidently believe there is a clear and strong need to address regional security issues relating to Afghanistan, but they have failed to meet this need.

Recommendations

Regional conflict prevention mechanisms (CPMs) take various forms and can be categorized as follows:

• Multilateral forums. In many regions, states have established multilateral bodies whose aims include the maintenance of regional peace, security, and stability. These bodies include the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the African Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Southern African Development Community, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Some of them have developed protocols for conflict prevention, management, and resolution. Their effectiveness varies greatly.¹⁹
• UN political missions. The UN has established over a dozen field-based political missions in regions wracked by destabilizing conflict, including regional offices in Central Africa, West Africa, and Central Asia. These missions serve as platforms for preventive diplomacy, support the work of peace envoys, and strengthen the capacity of states and regional actors to manage tensions peacefully.²⁰
• UN peacekeeping missions. Certain UN peacekeeping missions and special representatives of the UN secretary-general perform conflict early-warning and early-action functions intended to prevent escalation and stabilize the situation when there are violent incidents. These missions include the UN Interim Force in Lebanon and the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara.

On the basis of our research on these mechanisms,²¹ the following proposals should guide the establishment and design of a standing CPM for the Afghanistan region.

1. Why a CPM? Standing CPMs are preferable to ad hoc and sporadic responses to regional crises. This is because they encompass pre-established systems, procedures, and forums for conflict prevention. This leads to greater certainty and predictability regarding preventive diplomacy initiatives and methods. These methods can be fine-tuned over time and can respond quickly to crises because they are already in place. Consultations with regional states in setting up the mechanism make these states less resistant to prevention initiatives in tense situations, and even small achievements can build incremental regional confidence.

2. How should the CPM be structured? The CPM should include the following officials and structures:

• a UN special envoy;
• a UN Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for the Afghanistan Region, led by the special envoy; and
• a Regional Consultative Forum comprising Afghanistan’s contiguous neighbors, namely China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Other countries, as well as regional bodies and initiatives, could be invited to join the forum where this would be advantageous.

UN leadership and coordination would have the benefit of drawing on the UN’s extensive expertise in conflict early warning and preventive diplomacy. It would also mitigate and bridge mistrust between the members of the Consultative Forum.

The Consultative Forum would have the following benefits: It would ensure that the states in the region have direct participation in the CPM and view it as legitimate; it would facilitate interstate cooperation; and, over time, it could lead to confidence-building and collective problem-solving on security issues.

The member states of the Consultative Forum would be represented primarily by their ministries responsible for foreign affairs and security. The forum could comprise technical committees, ministerial committees, and a committee of permanent ambassadors. The UN Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for the Afghanistan Region would serve as the secretariat.

3. What should the CPM focus on? There is a distinction between structural prevention of conflict and operational prevention of conflict.²² 

The former seeks to address the underlying structural and systemic causes of conflict. It is a long-term endeavor that typically has political, security, economic, and social dimensions. Operational prevention, on the other hand, relies mainly on preventive diplomacy to prevent disputes from becoming violent, prevent escalation if violence breaks out, and re-establish stability.

The CPM for the Afghanistan region should prioritize operational prevention, which would include a major focus on the problems of cross-border terrorism and violence. It could also develop structural prevention programs around a limited number of issues (e.g., water use and alternatives to narcotics production).

4. Goal and functions. The goal of the CPM would be to promote regional peace, security, and stability in the Afghanistan region. To this end, the CPM would have the following functions:

• identify, analyze, and monitor threats to regional security;
• set up preventive systems and protocols;
• take preventive action, as and when required, to minimize threats and resolve interstate disputes;
• identify opportunities for collective action to address causes of tension; and
• collaborate as appropriate with other regional organizations and initiatives.

5. Next steps. If there is interest in pursuing these ideas further, the UN could undertake informal consultations, including with relevant member states. The secretary-general could also mandate the special envoy, once appointed in light of UN Security Council Resolution 2721 (2023), to undertake consultations.

In conclusion, there is widespread awareness of regional security problems and risks in the Afghanistan region. Efforts to address these problems and risks have thus far been ineffectual. The establishment of a standing CPM—headed by a UN special envoy and involving Afghanistan’s contiguous neighbors and other relevant actors—would be a more enduring, constructive and productive mechanism for conflict prevention and regional security.

Laurie Nathan is director of the Mediation Program of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame. He has participated in high-level peacemaking efforts in Africa and helped design the mediation units of the African Union. He has been a consultant on mediation and related issues to the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the European Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the United Nations, as well as with the governments of Germany, Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland, Switzerland, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

Nilofar Sakhi is a professorial lecturer of international affairs at the Elliott School of George Washington University and serves as the president of the Andiana Foundation, an organization focused on security and peace. Additionally, she holds the position of nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. With expertise in regional security and Afghanistan and its region, she has authored numerous publications covering traditional and nontraditional security, regional security complexity, and the geopolitics of peacemaking.

The South Asia Center is the hub for the Atlantic Council’s analysis of the political, social, geographical, and cultural diversity of the region. ​At the intersection of South Asia and its geopolitics, SAC cultivates dialogue to shape policy and forge ties between the region and the global community.

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In Season 2, Episode 1 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi is joined by the award-winning BBC investigative journalist Nawal Al-Maghafi to talk about her film on American mercenaries in Yemen. One of the few journalists to report from Yemen first-hand, Nawal discusses the Delaware-registered private military company (PMC) contracted by the UAE to kill “terrorists”, her meetings with two of the Americans involved, and the PMC’s training of Yemeni units to conduct targeted assassinations. She also describes how so many of those killed have been activists, teachers, and cultural figures, and the terror that has now gripped the population of southern Yemen. 

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The strike was in line with Israel’s efforts to kill Iranian officials whom it views as posing a direct threat to Israel because of their position and responsibilities. Since the Israel-Hamas conflict broke out six months ago, Israel is reported to have killed eighteen IRGC officials. But while Israel might view the strike on Zahedi as being consistent with its shadow war strategy, it comes amid the conflict in Gaza, hostilities on the Israel-Lebanon border, and threats from the Houthis and Shia militants in Iraq and Syria. Taken together, it creates a context in which Israeli adversaries almost certainly viewed the killing of Zahedi as escalatory.

Tehran’s policy of “strategic patience” might still sway Iranian officials, and ultimately Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamanei, to respond in a measured way. But some response—unlike with the deaths of previous IRGC officials—is almost certain to occur, or Tehran would be risking its credibility given how loudly it has been saber-rattling about retaliation. Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations said last Thursday that he would give interviews to US news outlets “after Iran’s response to Israel.”

The type of action will directly determine whether the response is the conclusion of this incident or just the prologue to something much bigger—like a broader regional war.

Four pathways of retaliation

The big question is: Does Iran want to retaliate in a manner that is equivalent to the loss of Zahedi? Or does Tehran want the appearance of retaliation, sufficient to claim it responded appropriately but with a goal of avoiding an Israeli counter-response that could lead to a regional war? 

The answer to that question will determine what happens next. Four broad scenarios are most realistic—with others, such as Iran using this episode as an excuse to race for a nuclear weapon, plausible but unlikely. Each scenario has value for Iran and risks associated with it. The decision will reveal whether Iran’s true priority is to create meaningful deterrence against Israel or to avoid regional escalation—because Tehran probably cannot do both. 

1. Iran’s response is asymmetric and not in the region. Iran has a history of seeking to organize terrorist attacks against Israeli interests throughout the world. Just last month, Peruvian police arrested a Quds Force officer alleged to have been plotting to kill an Israeli official during the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. In June 2022, then Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid urged Israelis to leave Turkey immediately, claiming they may be targets, weeks after IRGC Col. Sayyad Khodai was shot dead outside of his home in Tehran. Less than two weeks later, Turkey arrested members of an Iranian terror cell. This time, Iranian officials are already threatening Israeli embassies and consulates as a likely target.

• Value: A successful terrorist attack would probably provide Iranian leaders a sufficient basis to publicly claim that Tehran retaliated. But it would minimize the risks of escalating the current conflict into a regional war by keeping the response to an isolated event both in scope and geography. 

• Risk: Tehran may not be convinced that such an act will sufficiently deter Israel from continuing its efforts to kill senior Iranian officials and experts, and may therefore conclude that it is insufficient as a response to Zahedi’s death.

2. Iran leverages its partners or proxies, such as Hezbollah, to undertake an attack or strike targets inside Israel. Hezbollah has its own independent decision-making calculus when it comes to hostile engagement with Israel. But if Iran insists that Hezbollah take action to retaliate for the death of the Quds Force official closest to the group, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah might struggle to decline that request. If he carried it out, he would probably undertake a response that he could claim is a successful retaliation but that would not be seen by Israel as particularly escalatory or more threatening than the back-and-forth strikes of the last few months.

• Value: Iran would turn to its most trusted partner, optimistic that by not undertaking the attack itself it decreases the risk of an Israeli military response on the Iranian homeland. Avoiding a homeland attack is almost certainly an Iranian priority, as Tehran’s number one objective is always regime stability, and Iranian leaders might worry that the public will blame them for such an attack. 

• Risk: This scenario would risk the worst of all outcomes for Iran: It may be perceived as too weak to restore deterrence against Israel. And, at a time when tensions between Israel and Hezbollah are already high, Israel could use the retaliation as an excuse to undertake a broader war against the group, which could both degrade Iran’s most important ally in the region and quickly escalate into the regional war Iran doesn’t want. 

3. Iran leverages its Shia proxies in Iraq or Syria to strike US targets. Iranian proxies haven’t attacked US forces in Iraq or Syria since late January when three US soldiers in Jordan were killed and Iran immediately sought to distance itself from the attack to avoid risking a conflict with the United States and a broader regional war. Among those in Tehran last week for the annual Quds Day rally in support of the Palestinians was Abu Fadak al-Muhammadawi, the leader of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), the umbrella organization for various Iraqi Shia militia groups supported by Iran. PMF leaders are reported to be waiting for instructions from Tehran on responding to Zahedi’s death.

• Value: In Iran’s view, this option could increase deterrence by highlighting that the United States will not be absolved from Israel’s actions; this would be the inverse, perhaps, of Washington’s view that Iran was accountable for the 10/7 Hamas terrorist attack even if it did not specifically order the attack. Iran probably would believe that any US response would not be overly large, needing to be sufficiently calibrated to meet the consistent US priority of avoiding a broader regional war. 

• Risk: The United States went out of its way last week after the strike to publicly highlight that it had not played a role and wasn’t aware Israel was planning the strike. If Iranian proxies nevertheless attack US personnel and interests in the region, the Biden administration might, and should, view it necessary to respond swiftly in a manner that far exceeds what Iran thinks is likely and goes beyond Washington’s response in early February to the attack that killed three US service members.

4. Iran militarily attacks the Israeli homeland and/or kills senior Israeli officials. A kinetic attack using ballistic missiles or drones against Israeli homeland targets would be the most impactful, and risky, option available to Tehran. While Iran might seek to prevent escalation to a full-scale war—for example, by striking military or intelligence targets only, as opposed to civilian ones—this is still a risky step given that Iran has been trying to avoid a wider conflict for which it is likely ill-prepared.

• Value: Tehran is likely to view such an attack as having the best opportunity to restore its deterrence and demonstrate that Israel cannot strike Iranian leaders with impunity. Tehran might also believe such an attack could lead the United States to increase pressure on Israel not to retaliate again and risk sparking a broader war. Such a view, however, risks overestimating both the US ability to influence Israel in such a situation and President Joe Biden’s willingness to do so.
• Risk: Israel would almost certainly respond robustly to a loss of civilian or military personnel in Israel or to the assassination of senior officials. This option has a high potential to trigger a full-scale, region-wide war. 

Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He is a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council.

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On April 8, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Samantha Vinograd appeared on CBS discussing Iran’s vow to retaliate after an Israeli attack on the Iranian embassy in Syria and the implications for regional, global, and US national security.

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On April 2, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Marc Polymeropoulous coauthored “The Surprising Intelligence Community Outreach to Russia” for Politico about combatting the threat posed by transnational terrorist groups like ISIS-K.

He warns that the United States must be careful when engaging with other nations for intelligence sharing and basic counterterrorism exchanges, as such outreach can sometimes morph into more issues that intelligence professionals must face.

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This attack is a reminder that Ukraine is not the only entity Russia is at war against. Although Moscow’s war against the Muslim breakaway region of Chechnya officially ended in 2009, Russia has experienced a number of jihadist attacks. This one is just the latest.

The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), it should be recalled, was what al-Qaeda in Iraq was renamed when it broke away from al-Qaeda central over leadership quarrels and policy issues. Although ISIS quickly came to control a large amount of territory in both eastern Syria and western Iraq, it was largely crushed by several forces, including the US military, Syrian Kurdish forces, Iraqi government troops, Iran-backed Iraqi Shia militias, and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Although Iran and its allies did not do so in cooperation with the United States, the fact that Tehran and Washington both regarded ISIS as an opponent is indicative of the depth of the rivalry between Shia and Sunni Islamists. But while the activities of the original ISIS became severely constrained, those of its affiliates—including ISIS-K—have expanded.

This attack by ISIS-K, which operates primarily in Afghanistan and Pakistan, may have been motivated by several grievances, including retaliation for the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. With ISIS-K now fighting against the ruling Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which has relatively good relations with Russia, the Moscow attack may have been intended to draw a distinction between how ISIS-K fights against a Russia that oppresses Muslims while the Taliban cooperates with it. Assuming that the four Tajiks Moscow arrested and accused of perpetrating the attack actually did so, they may have launched it in response to what they see as the oppression of the Russian-backed Tajik government. ISIS-K’s grievances against Russia, as well as those of many other jihadist groups, include Russian support for the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, as well as Russian cooperation with Iran and other Middle Eastern governments that Sunni jihadists regard as enemies. What does not seem to have motivated ISIS-K’s attack in Russia is any particular concern about Ukraine.

ISIS-K and other ISIS affiliates, of course, have launched attacks not just against Western and pro-Western governments but also against anti-Western governments, including Iran (whose Shia regime ISIS-K and other Sunni jihadists consider anathema) and the Taliban. It is not surprising that ISIS-K has also attacked Russia. Indeed, it would have been more surprising if it did not do so.

This attack is a reminder that the Ukraine war is not the only conflict Moscow is fighting; its “war on terror” is not over and could even revive. In fact, ISIS-K and similar groups might see Moscow’s war against Ukraine as making Russia less vigilant against, and more vulnerable to, jihadist attacks.

Some might see this jihadist attack at the concert hall as raising the possibility of some degree of cooperation between Russia and the West against a common threat. Putin, however, seems to have put paid to this notion. He rejected US warnings beforehand that a jihadist attack might take place. And even after finally admitting that “radical Islamists” were behind the attack, he still linked it to Western-backed Ukraine. This suggests that Putin is in no mood to rein in his hostility to Kyiv and the West, much less cooperate with them.

Indeed, Putin’s reaction to the March ISIS-K attack in Moscow is eerily similar to his response to the September 2004 jihadist attack in Beslan. Even then, Putin claimed that the West supported—and even sought to benefit from—the attack.

This suggests that Putin may be a “worst case” thinker, believing that if the West and Ukraine are opposed to Russia, and if jihadists are opposed to Russia, then the West, Ukraine, and the jihadists must all be working together. On the other hand, Putin may not care so much whether this is true, but believes that linking ISIS-K to Ukraine and the West will resonate with the Russian public. Opposition to his war in Ukraine can then be equated not just to support for Russia’s Western enemies, but its Muslim ones as well.

Russia’s conflict with Ukraine and its conflict with jihadist groups like ISIS-K, though, are separate. And as horrific as it was, the ISIS-K attack on a Moscow theater is not nearly as much of a challenge to Putin as the war in Ukraine, in which hundreds of thousands of Russians have been killed or wounded. But the potential for an expanded Russian conflict with Sunni jihadists exists as long as Russia supports those such jihadists oppose—such as the Assad regime in Syria, oppressive rulers in the former Soviet Muslim republics and the Muslim “autonomous” regions inside Russia itself, Shia Iran, and the Taliban. Putin may have not just one war on his hands, but two.

Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

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This opportunistic attempt to blame Ukraine is fueling widespread speculation that the attack will lead to an escalation in Russia’s ongoing invasion. Based on past experience throughout Vladimir Putin’s 24-year reign, many also anticipate that the Russian dictator will use the atrocity to launch a further domestic crackdown.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Putin first emerged on Russia’s political stage against a backdrop of terrorist attacks. When he was appointed Prime Minister in August 1999, Putin was largely unknown to the wider Russian public. Weeks later, the country was rocked by a series of apartment bombings in Moscow and southern Russia.

Putin’s hard-line response to these attacks saw him rise to national prominence. This paved the way for his presidential election win in early 2000, while also serving as justification for the Second Chechen War. Putin’s use of macho street slang was welcomed by many, including his famous pledge to flush terrorists “down the toilet.”

In October 2002, armed militants seized a theater in the center of Moscow and held almost one thousand audience members hostage. The ensuing standoff ended in tragedy when a botched intervention by Russian security forces led to the deaths of more than 100 hostages. This incident was to become another key turning point in the Putin era.

In the wake of the theater siege, Putin passed a series of anti-terrorism laws restricting civil liberties. He also significantly strengthened Kremlin control over the Russian media, making it far more difficult for journalists to report critically on the authorities. Crucially, Putin sought to frame the theater attack as an act of “international terrorism.” This played an important role in transforming international perceptions of Russia’s fight against Chechen separatism by equating it with the US-led “War on Terror.”

The largest terrorist attack of the Putin era came in September 2004, when militants stormed a school in Beslan during traditional ceremonies to mark the first day of the new academic year. This high-profile crisis ended in carnage and the deaths of more than 300 hostages. The Beslan massacre transformed the political landscape in Russia. In the wake of the tragedy, Putin moved to end the direct election of regional governors and return to a system of appointment by the Kremlin. This reversed what was widely regarded as one of the main democratic achievements of the Yeltsin era.

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Throughout the 2010s, Russia experienced sporadic suicide bombings across the country. In 2017, an attack on the St. Petersburg metro system led to new restrictions imposed on the popular Telegram messaging app, after an investigation concluded that the platform had been used by terrorists to coordinate their activities.

With today’s Russia already an increasingly authoritarian state, it is not clear what measures remain available to the Kremlin in response to the recent Moscow attack. Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the last vestiges of an independent press and civil society have been largely extinguished, while draconian legislation has criminalized any criticism of the war.

Some fear that the Moscow attack may spark a backlash against Russia’s large community of labor migrants, many of whom are Muslims from Central Asia. Meanwhile, some officials are already calling for the reintroduction of the death penalty. Given the scale of the attack and the rhetoric currently coming out of the Kremlin, most expect the response to be severe.

The March 22 attack in Moscow has seriously damaged Putin’s carefully crafted public image as a strongman ruler who offers his subjects security in exchange for restrictions on their personal freedoms. In order to reestablish his credentials, Putin is likely to target his enemies in Ukraine and the West. In line with past practice, he will also look to tighten his grip inside Russia itself.

Olivia Yanchik is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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Putin fires navy chief as Ukrainians cheer success in Battle of Black Sea

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The chief of the Russian Navy has been dismissed by Vladimir Putin in the latest indication that Ukraine is winning the Battle of the Black Sea, writes Peter Dickinson.

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Peace is impossible until Ukraine is safe from future Russian aggression

By Mykola Bielieskov

With Russia openly committed to destroying the Ukrainian state and nation, a durable peace will only prove possible once Ukraine’s national security is guaranteed, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Putin has repeatedly used terror attacks to tighten his grip on Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Despite overwhelming evidence pointing to Islamic State terrorists, Vladimir Putin seems intent on blaming Ukraine. While the Russian dictator has acknowledged the atrocity was carried out by Islamist militants, he has repeatedly indicated that Ukraine and the country’s Western partners are the real culprits.

The first clear sign that Putin would seek to implicate Ukraine came on the day after the attack. In an official address to the nation, Putin announced that four suspects had been caught while attempting to reach Ukraine, before accusing the Ukrainian authorities of “preparing a window” for them to cross the border.

This version of events made little sense, given the massive military presence along Russia’s wartime border with Ukraine and the intense security spotlight on the wider region. Putin’s far-fetched story of a Ukrainian escape plan has subsequently been further undermined by his closest ally, Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who has stated that the terror suspects initially attempted to flee across the border into Belarus and not Ukraine.

None of this has deterred Putin. On the contrary, the campaign to blame Ukraine has continued to gain momentum in the wake of the Moscow massacre. The Kremlin-controlled Russian state media has openly questioned the claims of responsibility made by Islamic State, and has directly accused Ukraine of being behind the terror attack.

Russian officials have followed suit, with Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev stating that Ukraine was “of course” responsible for the attack and Russian Parliamentary Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin naming “the bloody regime of Ukraine” along with Washington and Brussels as the organizers of the atrocity. Meanwhile, Putin himself has doubled down on his earlier accusations, and has attempted to position the Moscow terrorist attack as part of a ten-year conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

Ukrainian officials have rejected Russia’s groundless accusations, suggesting instead that Putin is seeking to exploit the tragedy in order to provide further false justification for the invasion of Ukraine. “Do not let Putin and his henchmen dupe you,” commented Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba. “Their only goal is to motivate more Russians to die in their senseless and criminal war against Ukraine, as well as to instill even more hatred for other nations, not just Ukrainians, but the entire West.”

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Russia has yet to produce any credible evidence supporting its claims of a Ukrainian role in the Moscow terror attack. Instead, the Kremlin appears content to rely on a combination of unfounded allegations, conspiracy theories, and innuendo. This is entirely in keeping with the cynical information strategy that has accompanied the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has been based on deceit and distraction from the very beginning.

When Putin first launched the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2014, he did so with a lie so large and so transparent that in retrospect it is difficult to believe it actually happened. As his troops methodically seized control of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula, the Kremlin dictator appeared before global audiences and repeatedly denied any Russian military involvement whatsoever. Instead, he insisted that the thousands of well-armed and disciplined troops involved in the operation were actually local militias.

This astonishing duplicity set the tone for the following eight years as Putin expanded the war by occupying much of eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. Throughout this period, the Kremlin refused to acknowledge any direct role in hostilities and maintained an official policy of blanket denials, despite the fact that the presence of the Russian army in eastern Ukraine was the world’s worst kept secret. In addition to denying Russia’s obvious involvement, the Kremlin also waged an unprecedented information war to discredit and dehumanize Ukrainians.

For the past decade, the most consistent element of Russia’s anti-Ukrainian disinformation offensive has been the depiction of modern Ukraine as a “Nazi” state. This has been a Kremlin propaganda trope for many decades and was a prominent element of Soviet attempts to demonize Ukraine’s statehood ambitions during the Cold War. Putin has enthusiastically revived this tradition and has used it to justify his quest to extinguish Ukrainian independence. Few were surprised in February 2022 when he cited “de-Nazification” as the main goal of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Putin’s “Nazi Ukraine” propaganda resonates well with Russian audiences drenched in the Kremlin’s World War II mythology, but has been significantly less effective internationally. It is not hard to see why. After all, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is Jewish, while support for far-right political parties in Ukraine is lower than in most other European countries, with a coalition of Ukrainian nationalist parties receiving just 2% of the vote in the country’s most recent parliamentary election in 2019. Indeed, the entire “Nazi Ukraine” narrative is so ridiculous that even US media personality Tucker Carlson, who can usually be relied upon to echo Kremlin talking points, recently admitted it was “one of the dumbest things I’d ever heard.”

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The Kremlin’s attempts to blame the war on NATO expansion have proved far more persuasive among international audiences, but even this seemingly rational explanation has been undermined by Russia’s own recent actions. Putin has frequently stated that NATO enlargement since 1991 poses an intolerable security threat to Russia, but when neighboring Finland and nearby Sweden responded to the invasion of Ukraine by joining the alliance, he reacted with almost complete indifference and made no effort to obstruct the process.

The contrast between Putin’s evident lack of interest in NATO’s Nordic enlargement and his bellicose denunciations of Ukraine’s far flimsier ties to the alliance could hardly be starker. Far from threatening a military response, the Russian ruler actually downplayed the entire issue of Finnish and Swedish membership, and even withdrew the bulk of his troops from the border with Finland. Clearly, Putin understands perfectly well that NATO poses no security threat to Russia itself, and only objects to the alliance if it prevents Russia from bullying its neighbors.

In addition to imaginary NATO threats and phantom fascists, Putin has now added Islamist terrorism to the expanding list of absurd excuses for the invasion of Ukraine. This relentless flood of disinformation is designed to cloud perceptions and disguise the naked imperialism driving Russia’s war in Ukraine.

As the invasion has unfolded, Putin has become increasingly frank about his true motivations, especially when addressing domestic audiences. In summer 2022, he compared his invasion to the imperial conquests of eighteenth century Russian Czar Peter the Great. Months later, he announced the annexation of four partially occupied Ukrainian provinces while claiming they would now be part of Russia “forever.” With increasing frequency, Putin denies Ukraine’s right to exist and characterizes the war as a crusade to reclaim “historically Russian lands.”

Ukrainians are painfully aware of Russia’s genocidal goals and have long since grown used to the shameless disinformation being pushed by the Kremlin to justify the invasion of their country. In recent days, many Ukrainians have responded to allegations of their alleged involvement in the Moscow terror attack with typical gallows humor, quipping that according to Putin, “Ukraine is a Nazi Islamist state headed by a Jewish President.”

The Kremlin’s ludicrous conspiracy theories certainly deserve to be ridiculed, but the implications for millions of Ukrainians are no laughing matter. As Russian dissident Garry Kasparov noted this week, “mocking the absurdities of authoritarians is a worthy endeavor, as long as we never lose sight of how dictatorships like Russia use their laughable lies to justify oppression and murder.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Mar 26, 2024

Ukraine paves way for green energy future amid Russia’s escalating attacks

By Aura Sabadus

Ukraine has lifted restrictions on the export of biomethane in a move that could make the country one of Europe’s biggest green energy suppliers, writes Aura Sabadus.

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UkraineAlert Mar 25, 2024

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Ukrainians are war-weary but remain resolved to continue the fight despite growing exasperation with the country’s most important partner, the United States, write Steven Pifer and John Herbst.

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UkraineAlert Mar 21, 2024

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By Mykola Bielieskov

A Russian victory in Ukraine would reinvigorate Putin’s war machine and leave much of Europe at the mercy of the Kremlin, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Defense Industry

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Putin adds Islamist terror to the list of absurd excuses for Ukraine invasion appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 26, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Michael Groen coauthored an article for The Cipher Brief titled “Preparing for a Digital Battlefield: National Security and Cryptocurrency” about combatting illicit actors and nation states with blockchain intelligence. He emphasized that sanctions enforcement and counterterrorism success must include digital tools and techniques to investigate, seize, and disrupt transactions in evolving domains to protect national security.

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The post Groen writes in The Cipher Brief about cryptocurrency and national security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The second victimization, which started just as the fire was being put out, comes in how the Russian people will be denied the truth from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s government. The attack strikes at Putin’s claim to legitimacy as a strongman—so someone else has to be found to blame: Ukraine, which the Ukrainian government, the US government, and others have said was not involved. Even ISIS-K’s quick claim of responsibility was obscured from the Russian people. On Monday, Putin finally acknowledged that “radical Islamists” were responsible—but he still falsely claimed Ukraine was somehow ultimately responsible.

This deception has consequences, most notably in the road not taken by Russia after Friday’s terrorist attack. Consider what a truly responsible Russian government would have done: It would have taken better precautions after the early March warning from US intelligence that an attack was imminent. It appears senior Russian officials, including Putin, downplayed the intelligence warning, perhaps thinking it part of a US plot to disrupt Putin’s reelection. Even if the attack could not have been prevented, a responsible Russian government would now call for international solidarity and joint action against a deadly terrorist group responsible for thousands of deaths in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and elsewhere. A responsible Russian government would convene an honest accounting of its security failure to detect the plot and disrupt it.

And, of course, a responsible Russian government would not be embroiled in a destructive war in Ukraine that may have left Moscow distracted, overstretched, and therefore vulnerable. Nor would a responsible Russian government have embarked on the security crackdown (largely unnoticed in the Western media, with some exceptions) against Central Asian workers that fueled grievances that may have allowed ISIS-K to recruit terrorist killers among people already in Russia—though the details at this time remain unclear.

But Putin’s government is not a responsible government, and the Russian people are likely to be denied all these reasonable steps. This means the Russian people will continue to be vulnerable to future ISIS-K attacks, even after the security crackdown that is no doubt coming inside Russia. Nor is there likely to be a change of Russian support for the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Assad regime in Syria, or the regime in Iran—all of which factor into anti-Russian animus among Muslims in Central Asia and the Caucasus that ISIS-K uses for terrorist recruiting.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the return of great power competition to the world stage have not ended the threat of terrorism from ISIS-K and other terrorist groups. The fact that they get less attention in the Western press does not mean those threats have vanished. Terrorism is still a threat that deserves international cooperation, as the Biden administration showed by warning Russia of the threat in early March.

Russia’s intelligence failure that made March 22 possible shows that terrorism’s danger is not past, even while Russia’s irresponsibility makes the world and its own citizens less secure.

Thomas S. Warrick is a senior fellow and director of the Future of DHS Project at the Atlantic Council. He served in the Department of State from 1997-2007 and as deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security from 2008 to 2019.

The post The Russian people have been victimized twice—by ISIS-K terrorists, then by the Kremlin’s deception appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 25, Transatlantic Security Initiative senior fellow Elisabeth Braw was interviewed by Times Radio on the terrorist attack in Russia.

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The post Braw in Times Radio on the terrorist attack in Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 24, Transatlantic Security Initiative distinguished fellow Ambassador Alexander Vershbow was quoted in Radio Free Europe discussing the terrorist attack in Russia.

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Alexander Vershbow

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The post Vershbow in Radio Free Europe on the terrorist attack in Russia. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 24, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Samantha Vinograd appeared on CBS “Face the Nation” with Margaret Brennan discussing the recent terrorist attack carried out by ISIS-K in Moscow and southern US border security. She also spoke about the criticality of supplying resources for vetting architecture, intelligence sharing, and enhancing information arrangements with international partners.

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Samantha Vinograd

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Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Vinograd on CBS “Face the Nation” about the recent ISIS terrorist attack in Moscow, US border security, and more appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Lichfield quoted by Bloomberg on Russian reaction to Moscow theater attack appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Executive summary

Today, the US Joint Force grapples with an array of security challenges that transcend traditional boundaries and cut across theaters and domains. US competitors—China and Russia—conduct military, information, economic, cyber, and diplomatic activities across the globe, from the Indo-Pacific and Europe to Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, and the Arctic. Managing strategic competition necessitates the United States taking proactive measures to counter malign activities and advance US strategic objectives across multiple theaters and domains.

US Special Operations Forces (USSOF) possess distinct abilities and expertise that can greatly aid in addressing the complexities of strategic competition, yet these assets are often overlooked or misunderstood. USSOF is too often seen as the direct-action, finishing force of the Global War on Terror era. Yet, the special operator of 2024 is not just the physically imposing “trigger puller,” but also the young man or woman who is an expert at coding. USSOF has a unique position that allows it to elevate the Joint Force’s capacity to navigate the entire spectrum of competition. Its activities prior to conflict, such as operational preparation of the environment (OPE), can shape the strategic environment with US competitors. This report contends that, when leveraged effectively, USSOF has the potential to play a pivotal role in promoting US global interests, particularly in addressing vulnerabilities across the competition continuum.

To fully harness USSOF’s role in strategic competition, the authors of this report propose recommendations to United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)), the Joint Force, the Department of Defense (DOD), and policymakers within the defense ecosystem. The recommendations are aimed at enhancing USSOF’s capabilities that already have utility in strategic competition, while shifting USSOF’s mindset toward this role. By implementing these measures, USSOF can better support the US interagency and promote US global interests in strategic competition. The recommendations are summarized below.

First, USSOF must adapt its mindset to play a larger role in strategic competition, expanding its non-kinetic activities and irregular-warfare concepts to counter the sophisticated capabilities of near-peer US adversaries like China and Russia. To do this, USSOF must balance its traditional tasks like countering violent extremist organizations (VEO) and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) operations, which will remain critical, with new challenges posed by strategic competitors. The latter necessitates the global synchronization of Joint Force planning to fully leverage USSOF’s capabilities across seven geographic combatant commands. Effective communication between ASD(SO/LIC) and USSOCOM is essential for articulating SOF’s strategic role across the DOD enterprise, but USSOF must be empowered by the Joint Force to proactively support competition below the threshold of conflict.

Second, USSOF’s capacity to synchronize the efforts of interagency partners, allied and partner militaries, and the Joint Force serves as a linchpin in addressing the complexities of strategic competition. There is nevertheless a gap in understanding regarding USSOF’s pre-conflict role among decision-makers. Many of USSOF’s activities can be leveraged more strategically to shape the competition environment, such as its aptitudes in special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, civil-affairs operations, military information-support operations, unconventional warfare, security-force assistance, and foreign humanitarian assistance. By recognizing USSOF’s integral role in the competition continuum and integrating it more effectively into strategic planning, the DOD can leverage USSOF’s capabilities to their fullest extent, ensuring a proactive and comprehensive approach to strategic competition.

Third, USSOF can adapt its strengths to new challenges by enhancing capabilities in cyber, space, and undersea warfare, bolstering civil-affairs expertise for extreme environments like the Arctic, and investing in technological advancements like artificial intelligence (AI) to achieve cognitive overmatch in complex operating environments. Empowering USSOF to succeed in 2024 and beyond will require USSOF and the broader DOD enterprise to recognize that the special operator of the future includes a diverse cadre of cyber operators, culturally immersed experts, specialists in space, AI, engineering, or physics support operations, and gender-diverse teams.

Fourth, USSOF must find ways to measure its success in an unclassified setting by internally defining clear mission objectives for strategic competition and establishing tracking mechanisms to assess progress. Articulating success through deliberate campaigns to disrupt adversaries’ strategies can help communicate USSOF’s contributions and impact while safeguarding classified information.

Fifth, enhancing integration between USSOF and the US military services necessitates a better understanding of USSOF’s current capabilities and roles, improved communication, and synchronized global campaign planning to leverage USSOF’s strategic advantages effectively across multiple combatant commands and interagency partners. Clarifying USSOF’s presence and activities in regions pre-conflict, and facilitating collaboration between commands, can enhance intelligence sharing and support strategic-competition efforts.

Sixth, it is critical to leverage USSOF’s agility in identifying innovations from nontraditional defense-industrial partners. USSOF is a leader in identifying, testing, fielding, and evolving new, cutting-edge technologies that have utility across the Joint Force, DOD, and the Intelligence Community (IC). Enhancing USSOF and defense-industrial base relations involves improving collaboration between USSOF and leading-edge defense industries. Initiatives like SOFWERX and recommendations from the Atlantic Council’s Commission on Innovation Adoption can facilitate this collaboration, ensuring a culture of operational experimentation and incentivizing private-sector engagement to support USSOF’s mission success. Appropriately resourced, USSOF can continue to advance innovation adoption for the Joint Force at a time when doing so is essential for strategic competition.

Finally, USSOF must maintain effective cooperation with its allied counterparts while communicating its current and future plans, particularly regarding areas of focus, investments, and adaptations. The US interagency and DOD can learn from the experiences and models put forward by allies—such as the United Kingdom, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Norway—that have highly integrated special operations into their plans to compete with strategic challengers like Russia and China. In so doing, the United States should continue to recognize the importance of prioritizing special-forces capabilities, investing in small, specialized teams, and aligning with allies on shared priorities to facilitate multilateral operations.

These recommendations not only ensure USSOF’s relevance and effectiveness, but also reinforce its pivotal role in safeguarding US interests and promoting global stability. The US interagency and DOD should invest in USSOF’s many strengths for strategic competition. In so doing, USSOF will stand ready to navigate the complexities of the modern conflict and to serve as a formidable force in advancing US strategic objectives on the global stage.

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Introduction

The United States and its allies and partners face an increasingly complex security environment in the twenty-first century, with competitors China and Russia leveraging all elements of their national power—diplomatic, information, military, and economic—to undermine US and allied security and prosperity. Considering strategic competition, the US Joint Force must adapt how it operates, recognizing that today’s security threats stretch well beyond the physical battlefield, and that competition and deterrence must be shaped prior to conflict. Both China and Russia view competition with the United States as taking place on a continuum, while the United States too often draws a bright line between peace and war while underinvesting in the competitive space between, leaving the United States at a disadvantage. 

USSOF offers unique skills, competencies, capabilities, and experiences that can significantly support US goals and outcomes in strategic competition—but these tools are poorly understood. USSOF is often thought about through the lens of its past successes over the last two decades, notably in counterterrorism. But who special operators are today, where and how they operate, and the significant role they play in shaping the environment and creating successful outcomes for strategic competition remain underappreciated. 

The 2018 and 2022 National Defense Strategies—and the integrated deterrence concept—acknowledge that today’s security threats will only be deterred through “employing every tool at the Department [of Defense]’s disposal.” USSOF is uniquely positioned to model, support, and enhance the Joint Force’s ability to do this. This report argues that, if harnessed correctly, USSOF can play a central role in advancing global US interests—especially across the seams and gaps of national power and artificial geographic boundaries that US adversaries exploit. 

Some defense leaders are considering cuts to USSOF, which could dramatically alter its ability to contribute to strategic competition with China and leave an operational gap in current capabilities and future joint planning. How does USSOF support US and allied security imperatives, and how would a degradation of USSOF impact US competitive advantage in the 2020s and beyond? 

This paper examines how the US government can best employ USSOF and apply its past successes and unique and joint operational approach to the challenges present in today’s era of strategic competition. The authors examine USSOF’s background and history, how USSOF enhances the US ability to outcompete China, and areas in which USSOF can be more effectively employed. The paper benefited from consultations with and peer review from many experts and practitioners across the national security community. 

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Background: What makes special operations forces “special”?

Special operators are ubiquitous across the US military services and combatant commands, yet their organization, operations, and missions are distinct from their counterparts across the Joint Force. USSOF comprises the active, guard, and reserve elements of each service component of the US Armed Forces that are designed, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations—“activities or actions requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment, and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments.” USSOF is unique from other parts of the military in its light footprint, specialized and inherently joint operations, and stealth approach. SOF typically deploys as tailored units based on an operation’s requirements, risk, and capabilities to sensitive regions of the world—often to places that conventional forces otherwise cannot access—and, in doing so, it can generate outsized strategic effects. 

Globally positioned and readily deployed, USSOF provides decision-makers with low-visibility, small-footprint, and often low-cost options to secure US interests. It does this either by directly addressing threats or by indirectly engaging by, with, and through international allies and partners, thus allowing the United States to leverage partners’ capabilities and geographical familiarity and providing unique placement and access to partners that might be otherwise unavailable across the interagency. Accounting for just 3 percent of the US DOD’s budget, USSOF expands the response options available to the United States and its allies and partners, buying decision space for US and allied leaders. This is especially important in enabling US forces to shape the environment and conditions of competition well before conflict arises. 

How are US Special Operations Forces organized today?

The ASD(SO/LIC) “oversees and advocates for Special Operations and Irregular Warfare throughout the Department of Defense to ensure these capabilities are resourced, ready, and properly employed in accordance with the National Defense Strategy.” USSOF is consolidated under the United States Special Operations Command, the unified combatant command headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. USSOCOM oversees the US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), US Naval Special Warfare Command (WARCOM), US Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), and US Marine Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC). Within USSOCOM, the interoperability planning and equipment standardization of the various service SOF commands is overseen by the Joint Special Operations Commander (JSOC). To support the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs), SOCOM offers a sub-unified command per region aligned with the GCC in the form of Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs). 

The five SOF truths

USSOF is guided by its Five Truths—key tenets that define both USSOF and special operators. 

• Humans are more important than hardware.
• Quality is better than quantity.
• Special Operations Forces cannot be mass-produced.
• Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur.
• Most Special Operations require non-SOF assistance.

These truths echo the fact that a small number of SOF operators—carefully selected, well-trained, and exceptionally led—offer an unorthodox or specialized approach to security challenges that cannot be replicated at a larger scale across the conventional military force. 

The special operator’s experience is distinctive—marked by high levels of adaptability, cultural understanding, and exceptional physical prowess that reflect years of specialized training, as well as global and joint experience that other servicemembers may not obtain. Special operations are joint in nature and involve liaising across the Joint Force and US government interagency organizations. As such, special operators gain unique exposure and understanding of how to execute joint operations with interagency partners during competition, and in preparation for crisis and conflict. Special operators are highly educated and uniquely trained for different environments and locales, and they possess the capability to employ unconventional thinking to achieve success.¹ Furthermore, they are highly specialized, and their operational approach is characterized by cultural awareness, flexibility, and a tolerance for ambiguity, which allows them to function in complex and ever-changing conditions—a critical component when the presence of overt conventional forces may escalate tensions in any given region. These characteristics and capabilities mean that USSOF can be harnessed in creative ways to respond to strategic competitors whenever and wherever they are operating across the globe. 

USSOF’s twelve core activities

USSOF is known for its role in US counterterrorism missions of the past two decades. Special operators played a central role in the twenty-year Global War on Terror (GWOT) via counterterrorism and counterinsurgency missions. However, USSOF executes twelve core activities (both before and during conflicts or crises) that are lesser known and crucial to strategic competition. These activities often overlap and rarely take place in isolation. Many of these activities are highly relevant to combatting China’s and Russia’s malign activity or altering their decision calculus and popular perceptions across the globe.

1. Direct Action: Executing short-duration strikes and small-scale offensive actions to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets.
2. Special Reconnaissance: Actions conducted in sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance.
3. Unconventional Warfare: Executing actions to enable a resistance movement or insurgency that is aiming to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power.
4. Foreign Internal Defense (FID): Activities geared toward supporting the host nation’s internal defense and development, including safeguarding against subversion, terrorism, insurgency, or other threats to stability and internal security.
5. Civil Affairs Operations (CAO): Enhancing the relationship between US and allied and partner military forces and civilian authorities in areas where military forces are present.
6. Counterterrorism (CT): Actions taken directly against terrorist networks, as well as actions to influence or render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks.
7. Military Information Support Operations (MISO): Planned activities aimed at conveying specific, pre-selected information to foreign audiences. Such information is often aimed at influencing the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, or behavior of foreign audiences, groups, individuals, or sometimes governments in a manner favorable to US or host-nation objectives.
8. Counter-proliferation of WMD: Activities to support US government efforts to curtain the development, possession, proliferation, and use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons by governments and non-state actors.
9. Security Force Assistance: Organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, or advising various components of foreign security forces.
10. Counterinsurgency (COIN): The amalgamation of civilian and military efforts designed to end insurgent violence and facilitate a return to peaceful political processes.
11. Hostage Rescue and Recovery: Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to hostage incidents, which may include the recapture of US facilities, installations, sensitive materials, or personnel in areas hostile to the United States.
12. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance: A range of Department of Defense humanitarian activities conducted outside the United States and its territories, and alongside other humanitarian entities, to relieve and reduce human suffering.

These twelve activities form a robust, interconnected, and mutually supportive framework that allows USSOF to navigate different phases of competition and conflict across the competition continuum. Rarely does a special operation occur without involving or impacting one or more core activities. For instance, an unconventional-warfare campaign might seamlessly incorporate direct action and special reconnaissance elements, highlighting the fluidity and adaptability inherent in special operations. Some special operations are carried out by USSOF’s cross-functional teams (CFTs), which combine the unique capabilities of Civil Affairs, psychological operations (PSYOP) forces, special forces, and enablers. USSOF was the first to execute and operate multi-domain command and control, and helped define what is now doctrine in multi-domain operations.

Special operations are multifaceted by design, and each service may bring distinctive skills and missions.² Employing different specialties and tools, USSOF takes a holistic approach to threats across the competition continuum. Such an approach is critical to compete with US strategic rivals that operate in spaces beyond the military domain, including the information, diplomatic, economic, and legal realms. As such, USSOF has, and can continue to have, a tremendously valuable role in strategic competition.

USSOF’s role prior to and during conflict

Special operators are adept at shaping outcomes in response to evolving challenges, performing their core activities years before conflict breaks out and remaining on the ground in the aftermath of a crisis. For example, during pre-conflict phases, USSOF’s reconnaissance missions can provide information to the IC in key regions. USSOF can operate behind enemy lines and sometimes have access to sources and information that members of the IC do not, contributing vast amounts of intelligence to the United States.

Meanwhile, USSOF’s security cooperation programs are dedicated to enhancing partner capability and capacity while increasing US regional access and influence. Key aspects of this relationship include fostering partner resilience against subversion and coercion—and, when necessary, resistance to occupation. A prime example of this is the significant role that USSOF played in helping Ukraine build and train a professional and capable military force after the illegal Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. At that time, Ukrainian military forces lacked command and control and were not well-trained in operating key capabilities. Following 2014, US, United Kingdom (UK), and other allied SOF trained the Ukrainian military, supporting its evolution into the professional and capable military force we see today, which has been much better positioned to respond to and tenaciously fight Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine.

USSOF provides a critical leg of integrated deterrence, alongside conventional and nuclear military capabilities, by executing irregular aspects of competition that remain below the threshold of armed conflict. This includes undertaking specialized reconnaissance, irregular warfare, medical support, clandestine logistics, data collection, and human intelligence (HUMINT) analysis—or military information-support operations, known as MISO—against potential adversaries before a conflict arises. SOF also bolsters deterrence by denial and punishment, demonstrating to allies and partners how to stand up to coercion from Russia, China, and other adversaries.

In the event of a crisis, USSOF is strategically positioned at the forefront, offering support across the Joint Force and US government interagency organizations in critical areas. For example, USSOF supports the development of US Embassy Emergency Action Plans, provides humanitarian assistance, and generates intelligence to establish conditions for large-scale combat operations. In essence, USSOF’s role is proactive. Instead of waiting for the onset of conflict, special operators are engaged in a region for an extended period before such a conflict ever emerges, and they set the environment for future engagement and interoperability with other military forces.

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History of USSOF: SOF’s evolving purpose and how its history lends to competition today

The creation of USSOF and its role in the twentieth century

The inception of USSOF dates back to 1942. Born out of necessity during the Second World War (WWII), the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was created by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, establishing air, ground, and maritime SOF to meet the particular needs of warfighting theaters. These OSS forces, led by Bill Donovan, became critical to the global operations of the Allied forces in World War II, acting as elite raiding forces in Europe, enablers of Nazi- and fascist-resistance movements in the Mediterranean and Middle East, and the executors of an unconventional-warfare campaign in China and East Asia. The OSS forces were dissolved by President Harry Truman following the end of WWII, and all the special intelligence and warfare functions were then transferred to the War Department. By the time the Korean War began in 1953, there were no remaining official standing special-operations units, but their noticeable absence resulted in an accelerated effort to rebuild such capabilities during that decade.

During the Cold War, the Department of Defense recognized the value of irregular warfare to enable resistance groups in Warsaw Pact countries. This led to the 1952 establishment of the Army’s Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg—later renamed the Special Warfare Center. As their capability was rebuilt, USSOF forces deployed troops throughout the Cold War, supporting covert Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations in Tibet, Iran, Eastern Europe, and Cuba; supporting and training south Vietnamese troops; and evacuating missionaries and other personnel from unstable regions of the Congo, among other missions.

The true value of USSOF during the Cold War was realized when President John F. Kennedy stressed the need for the armed services to invest more heavily in guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations as an effort to combat Soviet influence operations worldwide. As it expanded to create new units and training centers across the services, USSOF emerged as “pioneers in interagency cooperation,” collaborating with entities such as the CIA by conducting long-range reconnaissance missions and medical support missions to Vietnam.³ During this time, special operations became one of the US military’s key enablers to counter coercion below the threshold of armed conflict.

In the aftermath of Vietnam, USSOF’s capabilities—like those of other services and commands—were reduced because of budget cuts and downsizing. The failed Iranian rescue mission of 1980, known as Operation Eagle Claw, led to a flurry of reorganization efforts in Congress, culminating in the permanent establishment of USSOCOM in 1987 and the creation of an office devoted to special operations and low-intensity conflict (SO/LIC) within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, all of which resulted in the current organization of USSOF.

USSOF in the GWOT and the twenty-first century

USSOF is perhaps best known for its work throughout the GWOT. USSOF carried out a diverse range of missions worldwide, serving as the primary tool in the US fight to counter VEOs. Beyond engaging in combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and the Philippines, USSOF played a crucial role in executing theater campaign plans and implementing national strategy on a global scale.

During this time, USSOF doubled in force size and more than tripled in budget to meet the growing threat environment; during some periods, its presence overseas more than quadrupled. SOF was vital in building partner capacity, providing low-cost, low-footprint options to understand and impose costs on malign adversary activity and expand US influence and access with key partners and allies. Importantly, USSOF established linkages to conceive and implement a true Joint Interagency Intergovernmental Multinational (JIIM) strategy in multiple locations—especially in areas in which the Department of Defense could not be the lead active player, such as in Africa. The value of SOF’s authorities and culture of moving quickly against a problem was clearly demonstrated during GWOT.  This entailed applying resources and focus against a challenge, but it also meant the research and development (R&D), experimentation, fielding, and application of novel—and potentially game-changing technology—tactics, techniques, and procedures.

While USSOF conducted a diverse range of operations during this time, the bulk of US public and policymaker attention was focused on the direct-action campaigns—such as the one that killed Osama Bin Laden, Operation Neptune Spear—that made USSOF better known. In some ways, USSOF suffers from its own success. USSOF faces the challenge of its media-molded image versus the reality of it being a highly expert and quiet force. As such, some still perceive USSOF’s role as confined to direct action despite the range of indirect action and other operations it conducts, ranging from training and equipping components of foreign security forces to enhancing relationships between US forces and foreign civilian authorities.

Public perceptions of USSOF

Perhaps due to its success in the GWOT, USSOF is too often viewed only as the finish force, closing the kill chain for its conventional service counterparts.⁴Instead, modern special operators should be understood as playing a role much earlier in the management of competition, prior to conflict. USSOF operates globally, across the entire competition continuum, and rapidly tests and employs novel or critical capabilities to enhance security operations.⁵ USSOF will continue to conduct CT and COIN operations, when necessary, but today’s security environment requires USSOF to prioritize its role in strategic competition—this may more closely mirror the role it played below active armed conflict in the Cold War era.⁶

USSOF has continued to play this role in some capacity over the past twenty years, albeit less visibly than some of its actions during the GWOT. Furthermore, if called upon, USSOF has the competencies and authorities to employ irregular-warfare concepts and gray-zone tactics in strategic competition. Nevertheless, few decision-makers think of it that way. It is time that policymakers update their understanding of USSOF and enhance the valuable role it can play in strategic competition.

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USSOF today in the context of strategic competition

USSOF’s strengths applied to strategic competition

Today, the US Joint Force confronts a pacing threat in China and an acute threat in Russia—far more sophisticated adversaries than it faced in VEOs throughout the GWOT.⁷ Prevailing in this era of strategic competition requires the Joint Force to shift its competitive mindset in order to effectively respond to threats spanning the competition continuum and cutting across theaters and domains. Within this three-dimensional approach to competition, USSOF is a critical operator, complementing conventional-force readiness and military dominance with a unique blend of competencies and capabilities that can be leveraged to deter, prepare for, and respond to armed conflict.

The 2023 Joint Concept for Competing defines strategic competition as “a persistent and long-term struggle that occurs between two or more adversaries seeking to pursue incompatible interests without necessarily engaging in armed conflict with each other.”⁸ In addition, the concept of the “competition continuum” was introduced as a Joint Concept in 2019, and describes a world of enduring competition conducted through a mixture of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict—a description that allows for simultaneous interaction with the same actor across different situations.⁹ These two concepts acknowledge that US adversaries have circumvented US conventional military dominance by competing below the threshold of armed conflict for some time. Following Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the United States celebrated a decisive battlefield win, while US competitors learned they must devise ways to compensate for unrivaled US conventional power and win without fighting through non-conventional means. USSOF is accustomed to operating across the competition continuum and cooperating with allies and partners to support US objectives, while simultaneously creating dilemmas for adversaries in an evolving threat environment. These factors make USSOF a versatile and critical instrument in strategic competition not only in the military domain, but also operating in support of diplomatic and economic objectives.

The following section outlines four key competencies USSOF brings to bear to support US strategic competition: its engagement with allies and partners, its global footprint, its ability to achieve effects across the competition continuum, and its cutting-edge use of technology.

I. Global and persistent engagement with allies and partners

The first major competency of USSOF is its proactive and sustained engagement of allies and adversaries globally.

USSOF is global by nature, confronting adversaries across every domain and every part of the world where China and Russia are undermining US and allied interests. Beijing leverages its influence, military, and predatory economic practices to bully its neighbors and project power far beyond the Indo-Pacific. Russia simultaneously wages a war of aggression against Ukraine, challenges national sovereignty across Europe, and undermines the security of nations globally through its cyberattacks, intimidation, and information operations. USSOF’s global role enables it to respond to China and Russia internationally.

USSOF builds and maintains authentic and multigenerational connections with allies and partners by training, advising, and assisting various countries in their security. This global presence and these relationships also enable USSOF to observe and counter Chinese and Russian influence in key regions while simultaneously engaging with and building trust with key partners. US partners may have greater access to observe Chinese or Russian activity. As such, USSOF engagement internationally not only supports partners but also creates greater options for the United States to counter adversarial influence.

USSOF approaches its relationships with allies and partners through persistent (rather than episodic) engagement, which generates a comprehensive understanding of host nations, threats to their security, and the second- and third-order effects of decisions and operations in those local contexts. USSOF’s enduring partnerships allow the United States to engage with nations in areas of strategic competition by assisting them with the problems they care about most. This is especially important for certain partners that may not view China or Russia as a threat, leaving USSOF as one of the only viable and trusted partners to discreetly engage on US foreign policy matters in certain areas.

USSOF spearheaded the by, with, and through approach for the US military, in which “operations are led by [US] partners, state or nonstate, with enabling support from the United States or US-led coalitions, and through US authorities and partner agreements.” USSOF’s approach centers allies and partners in the defense of their own nations, often leading to more successful results. This approach is better for the partner nation and also for the United States.

USSOCOM also has a USSOF Civil Affairs element, which works “by, with, and through unified action partners to shape conditions and influence indigenous populations and institutions” in support of DOD and US embassy strategies.¹⁰In this capacity, USSOF supports other parts of allied governments to leverage non-military instruments of power. In so doing, USSOF is able to gain “placement and access”—proximity to or the ability to approach an individual, facility, or information that enables one to carry out an intended mission—in geographic areas where US embassies otherwise do not have a presence. This expands the options available to US decision-makers to respond to activities by China and Russia in areas where the United States may not have much of a diplomatic or conventional military presence.