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Putin’s Kyiv blitz sends message to G7 leaders: Russia does not want peace

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 17 Jun 2025 20:52:00 +0000

As G7 leaders attended a summit in Canada on Monday, Russia unleashed one of the largest bombardments of the Ukrainian capital since the start of Moscow’s invasion more than three years ago. The overnight Russian attack on Kyiv involved hundreds of drones and missiles targeting residential districts across the city. At least fifteen Ukrainian civilians were killed with many more injured.

While this latest Kyiv blitz was by no means unprecedented in a war that has been marked by frequent Russian attacks on Ukraine’s civilian population, the timing is unlikely to have been coincidental. Like a mafia boss ordering elaborate killings to send coded messages, Putin has repeatedly scheduled major bombardments of Ukraine to coincide with international summits and gatherings of Western leaders. For example, Russia bombed Kyiv, Odesa, and other Ukrainian cities on the eve of NATO’s 2023 summit, and conducted a targeted missile strike on Ukraine’s biggest children’s hospital as NATO leaders prepared to meet in Washington DC last summer.

Bombing raids have also taken place during high-profile visits of international dignitaries. In spring 2022, Russia launched an airstrike on Kyiv while UN Secretary General António Guterres was in the Ukrainian capital. At the time, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the attack was a deliberate attempt by the Kremlin to “humiliate” the United Nations. Two years later, Russia subjected Ukrainian Black Sea port Odesa to intense bombardment as Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis visited the city.

The massive bombardment of Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities during this week’s G7 summit is the latest example of Putin’s penchant for sending messages with missiles. On this occasion his message could hardly have been clearer: Russia does not want peace. On the contrary, Moscow feels increasingly emboldened by growing signs of Western weakness and is more confident than ever of securing victory in Ukraine.

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Russia’s rejection of US-led peace efforts is equally evident in the diplomatic arena. While Ukraine agreed to US President Donald Trump’s call for an unconditional ceasefire more than three months ago, Russia still refuses to follow suit. Instead, the Kremlin has engaged in obvious stalling tactics while creating a series of obstacles aimed at derailing any meaningful progress toward peace. At one point, Putin even claimed the Ukrainian authorities lacked the legitimacy to negotiate a settlement and suggested the country be placed under temporary UN administration.

The recent resumption of bilateral talks between Moscow and Kyiv has provided further confirmation of Russia’s commitment to continuing the war. Putin personally initiated these talks but then chose not to attend and sent a low-level delegation instead. In the two meetings that have since taken place, Russian officials have presented a list of ceasefire conditions that read like a call for Kyiv’s complete capitulation.

The Kremlin’s demands include Ukraine’s withdrawal from four partially occupied Ukrainian regions that the Russian army has so far been unable to fully occupy. This would mean handing over dozens and towns and cities while condemning millions of Ukrainians to the horrors of indefinite Russian occupation.

Moscow also wants to ban Ukraine from any international alliances or bilateral security partnerships, while imposing strict limits on the size of the Ukrainian army and the categories of weapons the country is allowed to possess. In recent days, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko has underlined Moscow’s insistence on Ukraine’s total disarmament by calling on the country to destroy all Western weaponry provided since 2022.

Putin’s punitive peace terms are not limited to sweeping territorial concessions and harsh military restrictions. The Kremlin also expects Ukraine to grant the Russian language official status, reinstate the Russian Orthodox Church’s legal privileges, rewrite Ukrainian history in line with Russian imperial propaganda, and ban any Ukrainian political parties that Moscow deems to be “nationalist.”

The Kremlin’s negotiating position envisions a postwar Ukraine that is partitioned, disarmed, internationally isolated, and heavily russified. If imposed, these terms would allow Russia to reestablish its dominance over Ukraine and would deal a fatal blow to Ukrainian statehood. In other words, Putin wants a Ukraine without Ukrainians.

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Donald Trump’s talk of peace through strength succeeded in generating considerable optimism during the early months of 2025, but it is now time to acknowledge that this was largely based on wishful thinking. Since Trump returned to the White House, the Russians have significantly escalated their air war against Ukraine’s civilian population. On the battlefield, Putin’s troops are now engaged in the early stages of what promises to be a major summer offensive. Meanwhile, Kremlin officials continue make maximalist demands at the negotiating table that no Ukrainian government could accept. These are not the actions of a country seeking a pathway to peace.

In both words and deeds, Putin is sending unambiguous signals that he has no interest whatsoever in ending his invasion and remains determined to achieve the complete subjugation of Ukraine. This uncompromising stance will not change unless Western leaders can convince Putin that the most likely alternative to a negotiated peace is not an historic Russian triumph but a disastrous Russian defeat.

The steps needed to bring about this change and create the conditions to end the war are no secret. Sanctions measures against Russia must be tightened and expanded to starve the Kremlin war machine of funding and weaken the domestic foundations of Putin’s regime. Countries that currently help Moscow bypass international sanctions must be targeted with far greater vigor. In parallel, Western military aid to Ukraine must be dramatically increased, with an emphasis on providing long-range weapons and financing Ukraine’s rapidly growing domestic defense industry.

All this will require a degree of political will that is currently lacking. It would also be expensive. Indeed, during this week’s G7 summit, Trump balked at the idea of imposing new sanctions, saying they would “cost us a lot of money.” This is dangerously shortsighted. Trump and other G7 leaders need to urgently recognize that if Putin is allowed to succeed in Ukraine, the cost of stopping him will skyrocket.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

About the podcast

Guns for Hire podcast is a production of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative. Taking Libya as its starting point, it explores the causes and implications of the growing use of mercenaries in armed conflict.

The podcast features guests from many walks of life, from ethicists and historians to former mercenary fighters. It seeks to understand what the normalization of contract warfare tells us about the world we currently live in, the future of the international system, and what war could look like in the coming decades.

New presidents and new nuclear developments test the United States–Republic of Korea alliance

Heather Kearney, Amanda Mortwedt Oh — Fri, 30 May 2025 22:26:48 +0000

Key takeaways

South Korea’s new President, who will be elected on June 3, will have to grapple with many South Koreans’ unease with relying on the United States’ nuclear arsenal for deterring North Korea.
The first and most important test the US-South Korea alliance under Trump and the incoming new South Korean president faces is the continuing growth of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities.
South Korea’s establishment of a new strategic command outside of the combined US-ROK military structure highlights Seoul’s willingness and capability to take greater responsibility for deterring North Korea, but careful coordination will be required to ensure this strengthens rather than strains the alliance.

In the coming years, the US-South Korea (Republic of Korea, or ROK) alliance is likely to be tested in at least three fundamental ways: by a concerning growth in North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile weapons program; by changes to ROK defense capabilities and structures, including the establishment of ROK Strategic Command (ROKSTRATCOM); and by potential strategy and policy changes under new US and ROK political administrations.

Though the alliance may rise to the challenges of these tests to emerge stronger, these factors could potentially prevent the United States and the Republic of Korea from leveraging the mutual benefits that come from being integrated into a unified wartime command system and the long-standing ideal of a US-ROK bilateral agreement that emphasizes mutual defense. The United States will need to continue to adapt its approach, account for its ally’s perspectives, and plan for the inevitable change to the status quo on the Korean Peninsula.

A second North Korean enrichment facility heightens security concerns in Seoul

The first test for the alliance is the continuing growth of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Current estimates suggest Pyongyang has enough fissile material to build up to 90 nuclear warheads, which generates compelling security concerns that could create tension among two longtime and staunch allies—the United States and the Republic of Korea. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has placed increasing importance on the regime’s nuclear weapons development in the last decade, portraying nuclear weapons as not only defensive but providing the means to win in conflict. In September 2022, North Korea promulgated a new law that laid out a much broader approach to the use of nuclear weapons, including their employment in various conditions.

In 2023, Kim updated Article 58 of the state’s constitution to “ensure the country’s right to existence and development, deter war and protect regional and global peace by rapidly developing nuclear weapons to a higher level.” In September 2024, North Korean state media released photos for the first time of a suspected second uranium enrichment facility and Kim called for a higher number of more capable centrifuges to boost his plans to “exponentially” increase nuclear warhead production. Further, 2025 marks the final year for Kim to achieve the military capability development goals laid out in his five-year plan.

Kim Jong Un touring a uranium enrichment facility at an undisclosed location. Photo released by Korean Central News Agency, September 2024.

North Korea has a nuclear dyad with land- and sea-based nuclear weapons, and it is developing new technologies, including hypersonic gliding flight warheads and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, consistent with Kim’s drive to rapidly develop nuclear weapons and the five-year plan. North Korea’s Strategic Forces have short-range, medium-range, intermediate-range, and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), along with 200 road-mobile launchers. North Korea’s continued development of its rail-based ballistic system shows the regime’s efforts to diversify launch platforms, including various vehicles and ground launch pads and potentially submarines, and increase the survivability of its force. While Kim’s ability to strike the US homeland with North Korean ICBMs only grows with additional testing and the introduction and testing of its solid-fuel ICBM in 2023, the regime is also hard at work improving the efficacy of its precision-guided tactical nuclear weapons, which are designed to significantly damage South Korea and US forces on the peninsula, as well as create response challenges for the alliance.

In addition, North Korea is moving forward on its sea-based deterrent. It has ballistic missiles and what it terms ”strategic” (alluding to long range and nuclear capability) cruise missiles for both developmental, missile-firing submarines and underwater platforms. Its tactical nuclear attack submarine, the Hero Kim Kun Ok, is designed to launch tactical nuclear weapons from underwater. In January 2024, the regime tested its underwater unmanned nuclear weapon system, the Haeil-5-23, as a purported response to the trilateral US-ROK-Japan maritime exercise. In January 2025, the regime tested an underwater-to-surface strategic guided cruise missile while also vowing to respond to the United States with the “toughest counteraction.”

Ultimately, North Korea wants to halt US-ROK joint (and multinational) military exercises and to splinter an alliance of seventy-plus-years between the two nations. Its determined and bellicose approach has the potential to highlight the asymmetry of what’s at stake between the United States and the ROK and, if unchecked, sow fear and doubt into the fabric of the alliance.

Would South Korea go nuclear? A shift in ROK defense architecture

The second test of the alliance follows changes in the ROK’s defense architecture and capabilities, including the advent of the ROK Strategic Command (ROKSTRATCOM), which may increase potential areas for divergence among allies even as the changes show the ROK’s increasing capability and willingness to take greater responsibility for its own defense. ROKSTRATCOM’s establishment may be an opportunity rather than just a challenge and it is perhaps more a response to an increasingly serious threat from North Korea than a shortfall in the US-ROK alliance. It nevertheless highlights that South Koreans may not feel US extended deterrence guarantees are sufficient given the growing North Korean threat.

Plans to establish ROKSTRATCOM were underway for over two years by the time of the command’s official establishment on October 1, 2024, yet many Americans either did not pay attention or believe there was a need for such a command on the Korean Peninsula. After all, the United States, South Korea’s strongest ally, has been with the ROK since the Korean War began in 1950. The two countries also have a long-standing Mutual Defense Treaty, signed shortly after the Korean War Armistice. So, for some observers, South Korea’s need for such a command was questionable. The United States already commits to defending South Korea, most visibly with 28,500 military personnel present on the peninsula and contributing to the Combined Forces Command, US Forces Korea, and the United Nations Command. Regular joint exercises and strategic activities, such as a port visit of the USS Kentucky ballistic missile submarine to Busan, also bolster this presence.

The ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC) marks its forty-sixth anniversary with a ceremony at Camp Humphreys, Pyeongtaek, November 7, 2024. Photo provided by United States Forces Korea.

Importantly, though, ROKSTRATCOM does not clearly fall under the combined alliance wartime command construct under a bi-national Combined Forces Command that has been in place since 1978. ROKSTRATCOM is instead an independent ROK-controlled command, currently led by ROK Air Force Lieutenant General Jin Young Seung, and it is still under development exactly how this new command will align and coordinate with CFC and other alliance constructs like the bilateral Military Committee.

Markus Garlauskas, Indo-Pacific Security Initiative director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, with Lt. Gen. Jin Young Seung, ROKSTRATCOM commander, at the ROKSTRATCOM headquarters in February 2025. Photo provided by the Atlantic Council

Operationally, ROKSTRATCOM resides under the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, serving as an integrator of ROK armed forces’ strategic weapons systems from each military branch. In July 2024, a former ROK minister of defense expressed the administration’s vision of the command:

The strategic command will be a unit that leads the development of nuclear and conventional integrated operational concepts and plans and combat development in new areas such as space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum in conjunction with the operation of the ROK-US Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG).

According to a news report citing the South Korean Ministry of National Defense, the command “would also give the orders to subordinate military assets to strike enemy targets or intercept hostile missiles as part of the Kill Chain strategy and the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation [KMPR] plan.” (See the ministry’s 2022 white paper for more information about the kill chain strategy and the KMPR plan.)

It is more than just command and control that is changing, however. South Korea’s independent strike capabilities are increasing. South Korea unveiled its most powerful conventional weapon, the Hyunmoo-5, referring to it as an “ultra-high-power ballistic missile.” The high-yield Hyunmoo-5 appears to be intended as a ROKSTRATCOM capability, integral to reinforcing ROK messages of an “overwhelming response” to any North Korea nuclear attack. It remains to be seen, however, how the command will contribute these forces to a conflict on the Korean Peninsula—and this calls into question the previously relied upon unified command system.

The establishment of ROKSTRATCOM is a historic event and time will tell if capabilities breed intentions. It appears South Korea is not willing to take the option of having nuclear weapons off the table despite the US nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence commitments. As the ROK continues to grapple with its current and future defense challenges, the United States should take care to be an integral part of this ROK process, thereby ensuring a better understanding of the intentions of allies, enhancing the alliance, and deterring North Korea from strategic attack.

New presidents in Washington and Seoul portend policy changes

The third test involves expected changes by the new Trump administration to US policies and strategies affecting the alliance, along with potential adjustments by the imminent new South Korean administration to its approach toward the alliance and to defense issues more broadly. Coupled with divisive domestic politics in both the United States and South Korea, these developments could potentially open old wounds and create new points of contention within the alliance. As the new US administration begins to set its tone for foreign policy for the rest of its term, many South Koreans seem hopeful, but uncertain. Meanwhile, South Korean media reports and commentaries are examining the implications of rumored US force reductions in Korea and other potential changes to US policy and strategy affecting the alliance as either challenges or opportunities.

South Korea will soon have its own new president, after the martial law declaration by Yoon and his removal from office resulted in elections set for June 3. A new ROK president may well inject more uncertainty into the state of South Korean affairs, which could affect the alliance, as the country works to self-heal from Yoon’s surprising martial law announcement and the subsequent fallout.

Meanwhile, there are lingering questions about whether South Korea will eventually develop its own nuclear weapons. While many Americans empathize with South Korea’s undesirable position, its creation of ROKSTRATCOM and varied calls by ROK officials for nuclear weapons are concerning for US assurance efforts and, potentially, its nonproliferation policy. Would South Korea really go nuclear? Given the tense nuclear-armed neighborhood that surrounds the small country, and North Korea’s continued refusal to give up its nuclear weapons, many ask, “Why not?” Others, however, argue South Korea “cannot” or would “never” do so because it is a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). However, the NPT has a get-out-of-jail free card in Article X. According to a 2005 Arms Control Today article by the late arms control experts George Bunn and John B. Rhinelander:

Article X of the NPT provides a “right” to withdraw from the treaty if the withdrawing party “decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this [t]reaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.” It also requires that a withdrawing state-party give three months’ notice.

South Korean public discussion of a nuclear latency capability and indigenous nuclear weapons has been growing, with some officials publicly expressing the desire to keep the option open or to actually build nuclear weapons. Most recently, the People Power Party presidential candidate, Kim Moon Soo, announced that, if elected, he would pursue a nuclear latency capability—meaning that South Korea would be much closer to being able to build nuclear weapons on short notice. This indicates South Korea’s unease with relying on the United States as the only nuclear weapons responder to a growing North Korean nuclear arsenal.

Conclusion

These new hurdles—a more capable and threatening nuclear North Korea; a shift in South Korea’s defense architecture, including a unilateral strategic command; and presidential-level political changes—will inevitably strain the alliance, but may also present opportunities. The US-ROK alliance has remained ironclad, with more than seven decades of experience and adaptation, underpinned by a commitment to each other’s mutual defense. Now it is up to both countries to learn from their past while developing new approaches to the changing status quo. No matter who wins the ROK presidential election, the continued strength of the US-ROK alliance matters in the face of threats confronting both the United States and South Korea. Early and in-depth engagement by Washington with the new South Korean president to begin charting a new course for the alliance will ensure the US-ROK alliance emerges even stronger and more equipped to enhance each country’s interests, as well as underpin stability in the region.

About the authors

Heather Kearney is a nonresident fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She is also a senior Indo-Pacific analyst in the Joint Exercise, Training, and Assessments Directorate at United States Strategic Command. As a senior analyst for risk of strategic deterrence failure, she leads a team dedicated to assessing trends in the environment in order to inform strategic risk assessments.

Amanda Mortwedt Oh is a USSTRATCOM liaison officer in the Office of Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Policy, Strategic Stability, in the Joint Staff J-5 Directorate. She focuses her research on Northeast Asia and strategic deterrence and was most recently a Fall 2024 Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Policy Fellow. She is the previous director of international outreach and development at the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) and has published several articles and reports on North Korea’s prison camps and human rights issues. She is also a lawyer in the US Army Reserve Judge Advocate General’s Corps.

Disclaimer: The views presented in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of US Strategic Command, the US Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US government.

The Tiger Project, an Atlantic Council effort, develops new insights and actionable recommendations for the United States, as well as its allies and partners, to deter and counter aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Explore our collection of work, including expert commentary, multimedia content, and in-depth analysis, on strategic defense and deterrence issues in the region.

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The Indo-Pacific Security Initiative (IPSI) informs and shapes the strategies, plans, and policies of the United States and its allies and partners to address the most important rising security challenges in the Indo-Pacific, including China’s growing threat to the international order and North Korea’s destabilizing nuclear weapons advancements. IPSI produces innovative analysis, conducts tabletop exercises, hosts public and private convenings, and engages with US, allied, and partner governments, militaries, media, other key private and public-sector stakeholders, and publics.

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Fiber optic drones could play decisive role in Russia’s summer offensive

David Kirichenko — Thu, 29 May 2025 18:48:59 +0000

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than three years ago, the war in Ukraine has been shaped by a technological arms race as both countries have struggled to achieve an innovative edge on the battlefield. While Ukraine’s dynamic tech sector and less cumbersome bureaucracy initially gave it the advantage, Russia may now be gaining the upper hand.

The weapon that is turning the tide in Russia’s favor is the rather humble-looking fiber optic drone. This variation on the first-person view (FPV) drones that have dominated the skies above the battlefield since 2022 may appear inconspicuous at first glance, but it is having a major impact on the front lines of the war and is expected to play a crucial role in Russia’s unfolding summer offensive.

As the name suggests, fiber optic drones are controlled by wire-thin cables linked to operators. Crucially, this makes them immune to the jamming systems that have become near-ubiquitous in the Russian and Ukrainian armies due to the rapid evolution of drone warfare. Thanks to their data-transporting cables, fiber optic drones benefit from improved video quality and can also operate at lower altitudes than their wireless counterparts, but it is their invulnerability to electronic jamming that makes them such a potentially game-changing weapon.

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There are some drawbacks to this kind of drone. Key problems include limited range and a tendency to become entangled in obstacles such as trees and pylons. Nevertheless, there is mounting recognition on both sides of the front lines and among international military observers that fiber optic drones are now indispensable. In a recent report, the BBC called these drones “the terrifying new weapon changing the war in Ukraine.” Meanwhile, the Washington Post noted that Moscow’s focus on fiber optic drones represents “the first time Russia has surpassed Ukraine in front-line drone technology since the full-scale invasion in 2022.”

The combat effectiveness of fiber optic drones became increasingly apparent amid heavy fighting in Russia’s Kursk region during the early months of 2025. Russia’s campaign to push Ukrainian forces out of the Kursk region used large numbers of fiber optic drones to attack Ukraine’s flanks, cut supply lines, and cripple Ukrainian logistics. This eventually forced Ukrainian troops to retreat, ending an extended incursion into Russian territory that had been hugely embarrassing for Vladimir Putin. Ukrainian troops who fought in Kursk later reported that the only thing capable of stopping fiber optic drones was bad weather.

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The technology behind fiber optic drones is no secret and is available to Ukraine as well as Russia. However, as is so often the case, Moscow benefits from weight of numbers and is looking to exploit its strengths. While Ukraine has experimented with a wide variety of drones produced by hundreds of different startup-style defense companies, Russia has concentrated its vast resources on the mass production of a relatively small number of specific weapons categories including fiber optic drones and shahed kamikaze drones. Moscow’s strategy is to focus on volume with the goal of overwhelming Ukraine’s defenses. Russia has also benefited from close ties with China, which is a key drone producer and ranks among the world’s leading suppliers of fiber optic cables.

Ukraine’s front line military commanders and the country’s tech sector developers recognize the growing importance of fiber optic drones and are now rapidly increasing production. However, they are currently lagging far behind Russia and have much work to do before they can catch up. It is a race Ukraine cannot afford to lose. One of the country’s largest drone manufacturers recently warned that if the current trajectory continues, Kyiv will soon be unable to defend against the sheer scale of Russia’s mass production.

Increased foreign investment in Ukraine’s defense industry could help close the gap. By financing the development and production of fiber optic drones, Ukraine’s international partners can put the country’s defenses on a firmer footing and enable the Ukrainian military to address the threat posed by Russia’s cable-connected drones. This trend has already been underway for some time, with more and more partner countries allocating funds for Ukrainian defense sector production. The challenge now is to channel this financing specifically toward fiber optic drones.

Time may not be on Ukraine’s side. The Russian army is currently in the early stages of a summer offensive that promises to be one of the largest and most ambitious of the entire war, with fighting already intensifying at various points along the front lines. If Putin’s commanders can implement the fiber optic drone tactics that proved so successful in the Kursk region, they may be able to finally overcome Ukraine’s dogged defenses and achieve a long-awaited breakthrough. In a war defined by attrition and innovation, Ukraine must now come up with urgent solutions to counter Russia’s fiber optic drone fleet.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

The new agreement between Kyiv and Washington differs greatly from classic concession deals as Ukraine retains full ownership of national natural resources while the Reconstruction Investment Fund will be under joint management. Unlike more traditional trade deals or resource acquisitions, this is a strategic agreement that combines commercial objectives with geopolitical interests, making it a textbook example of economic statecraft. By establishing military aid as a form of capital investment, the United States is securing a long-term stake in Ukraine’s security and the management of the country’s resources.

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The minerals deal with Ukraine offers a number of obvious potential advantages for the United States. Crucially, it ensures preferential access to rare and highly valued natural resources like lithium and titanium, thereby reducing dependency on China. This is a strategic win for Washington with the possibility of significant long-term geopolitical implications. The deal also creates a framework for further US military aid to be treated as an investment via the Reconstruction Investment Fund, providing opportunities for the United States to benefit economically from continued support for Ukraine.

By signing a long-term resource-sharing agreement, the United States is also sending an important signal to Moscow about its commitment to Ukraine. Any US investments in line with the minerals deal will involve a significant American financial and physical presence in Ukraine, including in areas that are close to the current front lines of the war. Advocates of the deal believe this could help deter further Russian aggression. Kremlin officials are also doubtless aware that around forty percent of Ukraine’s critical mineral reserves are located in regions currently under Russian occupation.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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There are fears that the mineral deal makes Ukraine too dependent on the United States and leaves the country unable to manage its own resources independently. Some critics have even argued that it is a form of dependency theory in action, with Ukraine’s mineral wealth set to primarily fuel the needs of US industry rather than building up the country’s domestic economy. However, advocates argue that Ukraine was able to negotiate favorable terms that create a credible partnership, while also potentially securing valuable geopolitical benefits.

The agreement provides the US with a form of priority access but not exclusivity. Specifically, the US is granted the right to be informed about investment opportunities in critical minerals and to negotiate purchase rights under market conditions. However, the framework of the agreement explicitly respects Ukraine’s commitments to the EU, ensuring that European companies can still compete for resource access.

In terms of implementation, it is important to keep practical challenges in mind. The identification, mining, and processing of mineral resources is not a short-term business with immediate payoffs. On the contrary, it could take between one and two decades to fully develop many of Ukraine’s most potentially profitable mines. Without a sustainable peace, it will be very difficult to secure the investment necessary to access Ukraine’s resources. Without investment, the Reconstruction Investment Fund risks becoming an empty gesture rather than an economic powerhouse.

The minerals deal has the potential to shift the dynamics of the war while shaping the US-Ukrainian relationship for years to come. The United States is not only investing in resources, it is also investing in influence. Viewed from Washington, the agreement is less about producing quick payoffs and more about allowing President Trump to make a statement to US citizens and to the Russians. For Ukraine, the minerals deal provides a boost to bilateral relations and creates opportunities for a new economic partnership. America’s strategic rivals will be watching closely to see how this partnership now develops.

Svitlana Kovalchuk is Executive Director at Yalta European Strategy (YES).

The US counterterrorism role in South Asia

For over two decades, US counterterrorism policy in South Asia has combined growing alignment with India and strategic privileges for Pakistan. This contradiction has normalized a repetitive cycle of terror attacks on India, targeted retaliation, and a US desire to be part of the solution but no institutional changes that could meaningfully shift the landscape.

To his credit, US President Donald Trump has worked toward effecting change—which was visible after India’s 2019 revocation of Article 370, which removed the Jammu and Kashmir region’s special constitutional status. The Trump administration refrained from public criticism of this move, framing it as a bilateral matter. Similarly, after the 2019 Pulwama attack, the United States condemned the terrorist act and urged Pakistan to dismantle terror infrastructure on its soil. The first Trump administration also played a pivotal role in maintaining Pakistan on the Financial Action Task Force grey list, pressuring Islamabad to act against terrorist financing networks.

The Trump administration’s endorsement of India’s strategic autonomy, especially in counterterrorism operations, marked a shift toward recognizing India’s capability to address its security challenges independently. India’s less formal and less codified designation as a Major Defense Partner (but not a MNNA) further underscored this approach. It resonates with Trump’s broader foreign policy doctrine, which favors burden-sharing and encourages allies to take greater responsibility for their defense. Ensuring a strategically autonomous India is not just a US interest, but a potential milestone achievement for Trump.

However, the most immediate obstacle is a US security policy that continues to privilege Pakistan’s military establishment. The Pahalgam attack occurred in close proximity to Vice President JD Vance’s visit to India, drawing historical parallels to the 2000 Chittisinghpura massacre, which took place hours before President Bill Clinton’s arrival. While causality is debatable, the recurrence of such timing highlights how extremist violence in the region can intersect with high-visibility diplomatic moments, complicating crisis management and signaling.

While confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan—such as the 1991 Agreement on Advance Notice of Military Exercises and the 2005 nuclear confidence-building measure framework—remain in place, they have proven insufficient during episodes of heightened tension. In recent crises, including in 2019 and 2025, India has kept key partners, including the United States, informed ahead of taking action to manage signaling risks and minimize escalation. Pakistan has also engaged international stakeholders, though typically only in the context of post-escalation outreach. These differing approaches to crisis communication carry implications for how third-party actors interpret intent and calibrate their response.

The contrasting diplomatic practices of India and Pakistan directly influence how external actors, particularly the United States, interpret each country’s intent and determine their diplomatic responses during crises. Given these differences in crisis management behavior, Washington’s continued extension of MNNA status to Pakistan without clear criteria related to counterterrorism or escalation management creates ambiguity. But US strategic designations like MNNA should periodically be reassessed and clearly linked to behaviors—such as transparency, proactive communication, and restraint—that concretely support regional stability.

Besides, Pakistan’s designation as an MNNA in 2004 was intended to anchor counterterrorism logistics during the US war in Afghanistan. With the war over and US dependence on Pakistani transit routes effectively ended, the core justification for Islamabad’s MNNA status has eroded. At the same time, China now accounts for over 70 percent of Pakistan’s arms imports, while US lawmakers—citing both strategic drift and insufficient counterterrorism compliance—have repeatedly questioned the designation’s utility. Rebalancing US priorities does not require substituting Pakistan with India but rather ensuring that strategic privileges reflect Washington’s current alignment—not legacy entitlements.

How the US can use its economic leverage

As a frequently used quip goes, “Most states have armies. In Pakistan, the army has a state.” That inversion isn’t rhetorical—it defines a structural barrier to Pakistan’s economic recovery. Through business entities such as the Fauji Foundation, Bahria Foundation, and Army Welfare Trust, the military retains a significant commercial presence across the banking, real estate, fertilizer, and logistics industries. While not unique among developing states, the scale and opacity of this role pose obstacles to reform. Repeated International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs have flagged structural issues—such as privatization bottlenecks, tax distortions, and subsidy burdens—as impediments to stabilization.

In fiscal year 2023, Pakistan’s debt servicing obligations absorbed over 80 percent of federal revenue, foreign exchange reserves fell below four billion dollars, and inflation peaked near 30 percent, though it has now eased to around 5 percent. These economic pressures sharply limit the policy options available to civilian leaders. The United States could more effectively support structural economic reforms in Pakistan by explicitly linking privileges—such as MNNA status—to concrete progress on economic governance and institutional accountability.

In this context, revoking MNNA would not rupture relations but reframe them around contemporary realities. The United States remains a key voice in international financial institutions and investment forums that shape Pakistan’s recovery path. From IMF conditionality to multilateral development flows, economic leverage is now the primary channel of influence. Rather than permanently revoking MNNA, Washington should set clear, achievable economic and governance benchmarks, creating a credible pathway for Islamabad to regain or enhance strategic privileges upon meeting certain standards.

Stability through strategic restraint and recalibration

The May 10 pause in fighting reflected a recalibration in South Asia’s strategic balance. Pakistan entered negotiations under mounting pressure: its military had sustained visible losses and continued escalation—while a one-billion-dollar tranche of IMF funding remained pending—threatened deeper fiscal and political instability.

India, in contrast, had secured a clear tactical upper hand through Operation Sindoor. Yet its swift endorsement of the cease-fire reflected strategic restraint. The decision allowed India to reinforce deterrence, bring the Indus Water Treaty to the renegotiation table, and redraw red lines. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s statements that India “will not tolerate any nuclear blackmail” and “will not differentiate between the government sponsoring terrorism and the masterminds of terrorism” signals a new red line—in the instance of a repeat attack, India could target the Pakistani military in addition to terrorist camps.

To prevent similar escalations with these new red lines having been drawn, Washington must reassess the strategic benefits it extends in the region. Conditionally revoking Pakistan’s MNNA status would clarify that US defense privileges are tied to demonstrated counterterrorism cooperation and economic reform, rather than past strategic alignment. While some warn that this move could drive Pakistan closer to China, retaining MNNA status without accountability has already reduced US leverage. If the goal is influence, the United States should anchor its partnerships with conditionality—not ambiguity.

Srujan Palkar is the global India fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Mrittika Guha Sarkar is the India policy consultant at Horizon Engage.

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Drone superpower: Ukrainian wartime innovation offers lessons for NATO

David Kirichenko — Tue, 13 May 2025 21:10:46 +0000

Ever since the onset of Russian aggression against Ukraine eleven years ago, military training has been a core element of Western support for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. As Moscow’s invasion has escalated into the largest European war since World War II, the relationship between Ukraine and the country’s partners has become much more of a two-way street. While Ukrainian troops continue to train with Western instructors, it is now increasingly apparent that NATO also has a lot to learn from Ukraine.

The Ukrainian military has evolved dramatically during the past three years of full-scale war against Russia to become the largest and most effective fighting force in Europe. Innovation has played a key role in this process, with Ukraine relying on the country’s vibrant tech sector and traditionally strong defense industry to counter Russia’s overwhelming advantages in terms of both manpower and firepower. This has resulted in an army capable of developing and implementing the latest military technologies at speeds that are unmatched by any Western countries with their far more bureaucratic procurement cycles.

Ukraine’s innovative approach to defense is most immediately obvious in the country’s ability to produce and deploy a wide variety of drones. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, the experience of the Ukrainian army has underlined the growing dominance of drones on the modern battlefield, and has redefined our understanding of drone warfare in ways that will shape military doctrines around the world for many years to come.

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The most important tools in Ukraine’s unmanned arsenal are the country’s growing fleet of First Person View (FPV) drones. These drones in many ways function as the infantry of drone warfare. They have become a central pillar of Ukraine’s war effort, inflicting up to 80 percent of Russian battlefield casualties and making it possible to hold the line even when Ukrainian troops have found themselves starved of artillery shells.

Ukrainian production of FPV drones has mushroomed in recent years, with domestic companies also gradually moving away from an initial reliance on imported components. By early 2025, Ukraine was reportedly producing 200,000 FPV drones per month. Cheap to manufacture, they are capable of destroying tanks and other military equipment worth millions of dollars.

Russia is also relentlessly adapting to technological changes on the battlefield, creating a daily race to innovate that runs in parallel to the actual fighting on the front lines of the war. The dominance of FPV drones has led to a variety of countermeasures, ranging from the widespread use of netting and so-called “cope cages,” to increasingly sophisticated electronic blocking and the jamming of signals. In response, both Russia and Ukraine are turning to fiber optic drones that are not susceptible to jamming technologies.

As the full-scale war approaches a fourth summer, the evolution of drone tactics continues. Over the past year, Ukraine has sought to establish a 15-kilometer kill zone patrolled by drones along the front lines of the conflict, making it extremely challenging to concentrate troops for major offensive operations. The strength of Ukraine’s so-called “drone wall” defenses will be severely tested in the coming few months by Russia’s ongoing offensive. Building on Ukraine’s experience, NATO is reportedly exploring the idea of creating a “drone wall” of its own on the alliance’s eastern flank.

Beyond the front lines, Ukraine has developed an expanding fleet of long-range drones capable of striking targets deep inside Russia. This has made it possible to carry out a wide range of attacks on Russian military bases, ammunition storage facilities, air defenses, and Putin’s economically vital but vulnerable oil and gas industry. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has called the country’s growing long range capabilities “a clear and effective guarantee of Ukraine’s security.”

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Ukrainian drone innovations are also transforming naval warfare. During the first two years of the war, Ukraine used marine drones to target Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, sinking or damaging multiple warships and forcing the remainder to retreat from Russian-occupied Crimea. This remarkable success made it possible to lift the naval blockade on Ukrainian ports and reopen commercial maritime routes, providing Kyiv with a vital economic lifeline.

More recently, Ukraine has begun using naval drones as launch platforms for missiles and smaller unmanned systems. The results have been spectacular. In January 2025, missile-armed Ukrainian naval drones reportedly destroyed several Russian helicopters over the Black Sea. In another world first, Ukrainian officials announced in early May that they had shot down two Russian fighter jets using marine drones equipped with anti-aircraft missile systems.

Ukrainian military planners are now working on a range of unmanned ground systems as they look to take drone warfare to the next level. With support from the country’s government-backed defense tech cluster Brave1, work is underway to develop dozens of robotic models capable of performing a variety of combat and logistical tasks. In December 2024, Ukrainian forces claimed to have made history by conducting the world’s first fully unmanned assault on Russian positions using ground-based robotic systems and FPV drones.

Speaking in April 2025, Ukraine’s former commander in chief Valeriy Zaluzhniy underlined how his country’s use of new technologies was transforming the battlefield. “The Russian-Ukrainian War has completely changed the nature of warfare,” he commented. Zaluzhniy predicted that the wars of the future would be won by countries that focus their resources on the development of drones, electronic warfare, and artificial intelligence. “It is obvious that victory on the battlefield now depends entirely on the ability to outpace the enemy in technological development,” he noted.

Western leaders and military commanders are clearly taking note of the remarkable progress made by the Ukrainian Armed Forces since 2022. Many are now incorporating Ukraine’s unique battlefield experience into their own programs, while NATO members including Britain and Denmark are reportedly already receiving training in drone warfare from Ukrainian military instructors. This is likely to be just the beginning, as more countries seek to benefit from Ukrainian expertise.

For many years, it has been customary to view Ukraine as being almost entirely dependent on Western aid and know-how for its survival. This was always an oversimplification; it is now hopelessly outdated. In reality, today’s Ukraine is a drone superpower with an innovative domestic defense industry that can provide its NATO allies with important lessons in the realities of twenty-first century warfare.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

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Ukraine’s defensive strategy is focused primarily on attrition. This includes remote mining to channel advancing Russian troops into kill zones, along with the extensive use of traditional artillery. Ukraine’s expanding drone army is also playing a crucial role, making it possible to target Russian units at depths of up to 15 kilometers behind the line of contact.

By increasing drone coverage along the front lines, Ukrainian commanders aim to hamper the logistics of Putin’s invasion force and significantly reduce the potential for future Russian advances. This approach is being dubbed the “drone wall,” and may well come to play a far biggest role in efforts to freeze the front lines. However, Russia is also rapidly innovating to address Ukraine’s growing drone capabilities, leading to a relentless technological contest that runs in parallel to the fighting on the battlefield.

As the Russian army currently holds the initiative and is advancing at various points along the front lines of the war, Putin’s commanders can choose from a range of potential locations as they look to identify geographical priorities for their summer offensive.

At present, Russia is expanding a foothold in northeastern Ukraine’s Sumy region after largely pushing Ukrainian formations out of Russia’s Kursk region. There have also been recent localized Russian advances in the Kharkiv region. However, the main thrust over the next few months is expected to come in eastern Ukraine, where Russia has concentrated forces in the Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka sectors. Success in these sectors could create the conditions for the occupation of the entire Donetsk region, which remains Russia’s most immediate political objective.

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While Putin is under no pressure on the home front, he will be keen to achieve some kind of meaningful breakthrough in the coming months in order to demonstrate to domestic and international audiences that the Russian army is capable to achieving victory in Ukraine. He recently stated that Russia has “sufficient strength and resources to take the war in Ukraine to its logical conclusion,” but the fact remains that his army has failed to capture and hold a single Ukrainian regional capital in more than three years of brutal warfare.

For war-weary Ukraine, the coming summer campaign will be a major test of endurance. If Ukrainian forces are able to prevent any significant Russian advances despite dwindling supplies of US military aid, it would serve as a powerful argument for pro-Ukrainian politicians in Europe and the United States. This would likely lead to strengthened support for the Ukrainian war effort, and could help convince skeptics in the Trump White House to adopt a firmer stance toward Russia.

The Ukrainian authorities have already accepted a US proposal for an unconditional 30-day ceasefire and remain ready to pursue a sustainable peace settlement. But with Russia showing little sign of following suit, Ukraine faces another long summer of brutal fighting.

The Kremlin’s current negotiating position would leave postwar Ukraine partitioned, isolated, and defenseless. Any peace on such terms would almost certainly mean the end of Ukrainian statehood. Instead, Ukraine must continue to defend itself while hoping that Russia’s ability to sustain heavy losses declines faster than the West’s collective commitment to stopping Putin.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

Time to adjust the US approach to the South Caucasus

Ali Mammadov — Wed, 07 May 2025 14:57:14 +0000

The South Caucasus region is undergoing a period of strategic transition, shaped by shifting regional dynamics and the realignment of global powers.

In the region, the interests of key actors—including Russia, Iran, Turkey, and European powers—are converging.

The United States may need to reassess its regional strategy, as Russia’s sustained focus on the conflict in Ukraine presents a potential window of opportunity, during which regional powers, including Iran, are seeking to expand their influence. US engagement in the South Caucasus can help foster stability, enhance connectivity, and promote long-term strategic balance. And in doing so, the second Trump administration would support Washington’s strategic interests to contribute to a multipolar and balanced regional environment.

An entirely new landscape

Historically, the South Caucasus has not been a priority in US foreign policy calculations. Previous US approaches to the region reflected broader priorities, such as reducing overseas commitments and focusing on more transactional partnerships. Yet over the past several years, events that have played out in the region—including the 2020 war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the shifting strategic policies of South Caucasus states, and broader geopolitical changes—have created a new landscape.

Following the 2020 conflict, Azerbaijan regained control over the Karabakh region and surrounding territories. Turkey supported Azerbaijan during the conflict and has since deepened its strategic alignment with Baku. In contrast, Russia—despite, at the time, being a formal ally to Armenia through the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization—opted not to intervene directly. These shifts disrupted existing regional equilibriums and prompted each of the South Caucasus states to reassess their foreign policy orientations.

Iran’s engagement in the region has become more visible. Iran appears to view the developments with concern, especially as Azerbaijan has been strengthening ties with Turkey and Israel, particularly given the countries’ shared border and the strategic implications for Iran’s northwestern frontier. Armenia, by contrast, has traditionally served as a critical corridor for Iranian trade and outreach into the South Caucasus. As such, Tehran has sought to reinforce its economic and diplomatic ties with Yerevan while expressing skepticism toward regional initiatives that could bypass Iran. At the same time, Iran’s coordination with Russia has grown, particularly through military technology transfers and joint initiatives during Russia’s war in Ukraine. These linkages have implications for the broader security environment across the Caucasus and beyond.

As international efforts are being made to settle the war, Moscow’s regional posture has changed, though the changes are probably temporary. The diversion of military resources from the South Caucasus to the Ukrainian front, combined with the pressures of sanctions and domestic fatigue, has temporarily reduced Russia’s influence in the region. The possibility of the return of Russian engagement in the region, however, should not be discounted. While Russia may be constrained in the short term, its long-term strategic interests in the South Caucasus are unlikely to diminish. As such, regional actors appear to be seeking to diversify their partnerships while preparing for a potential reassertion of Russian influence.

In March, Armenia and Azerbaijan announced the finalization of a peace agreement—an important milestone that could bring a measure of stability to the region. Though significant hurdles remain, and the implementation process may be gradual and complex, the agreement signals a readiness by both sides to pursue a more predictable regional order. This development opens the door to potential collaboration in areas such as trade, connectivity, and cross-border coordination. It also offers an opening for external actors, including the United States, to support initiatives that reinforce long-term peace.

Peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan could also contribute to a recalibration of the two countries’ foreign policy trajectories. Armenia, with its expectations from traditional security partners unmet, is increasingly open to diplomatic and economic diversification. Azerbaijan continues to build on its partnership with Turkey while remaining attentive to regional sensitivities and the need to balance its strategic autonomy. Recently, it was reported that Azerbaijan has been acting as a mediator between Turkey and Israel, which might also serve US interests in stabilizing the Middle East and preventing potential clashes.

How Washington should engage

Looking ahead, a key objective for US engagement should be to contribute to a multipolar and balanced regional environment—one in which no single outside power holds disproportionate influence. Such an approach aligns with the interests of all three South Caucasus states, each of which has sought to maintain strategic flexibility in a complex neighborhood. Rather than favoring one actor over another, US policy can support cooperative initiatives that reduce dependencies and encourage regional self-reliance.

In the long term, this can be achieved by promoting trilateral cooperation between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia in areas such as transportation, energy infrastructure, and economic development. A web of shared interests can serve as a foundation for resilience against external pressures while also reducing the likelihood of future conflict. Such efforts do not necessarily require formal alliances or institutions but can emerge through sustained dialogue, confidence-building, and coordinated investment. Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia held their first-ever trilateral meeting, which could be a sign that the region is going in this direction. The United States should not miss this opportunity to engage in a more unified South Caucasus.

Turkey’s expanding role in the South Caucasus, alliance with Azerbaijan, growing diplomatic engagement with Armenia, and longstanding connections with Georgia position Ankara as a central actor in the region. Turkey has also demonstrated renewed cooperation with European powers, as illustrated by recent trilateral military discussions involving the United Kingdom and France. These developments point toward a greater integration between Turkey and Europe, which may extend into the South Caucasus.

The United States can coordinate with Turkey on infrastructure, energy, and security issues in the region while encouraging constructive regional relationships. Facilitating such progress will not require a direct US presence, but rather calibrated engagement and support for regionally led initiatives.

Engaging the South Caucasus and ensuring regional stability is important for US interests, particularly for its interests in nearby Central Asia. The United States and also the European Union are looking to certain countries, such as those in Central Asia, for partnership as a way to diversify energy sources and supply chains, for example for critical minerals. That interest has been demonstrated by developments including an announcement by Uzbekistan’s trade ministry that the country signed critical-mineral agreements with US companies and recent European visits to and partnerships with countries in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Energy and supply-chain diversification will require enhancing east-west corridors, which itself will require cooperation from South Caucasus states and Turkey. The recent agreement between Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan on exporting renewable energy to Europe could be an important development in that regard. Europe is becoming more interested in energy deals with the South Caucasus as well, as shown by European Commissioner for Energy and Housing Dan Jørgensen’s visit to Baku in April. US engagement can complement European initiatives by ensuring that strategic infrastructure projects, such as Azerbaijan’s Zangezur transport corridor, contribute to regional stability and openness.

The corridor, in particular, holds strategic potential. If implemented effectively, it could connect Azerbaijan and its exclave Nakhchivan more closely and strengthen Turkey’s (and, in turn, Europe’s) access to Central Asia. The corridor is viewed with skepticism by Iran, which sees it as reducing its role in regional trade. However, from the standpoint of regional economic diversification, the project could contribute to a more competitive and resilient logistical network.

The Trump administration’s emerging policy approach—which so far appears to favor bilateral agreements, infrastructure-driven engagement, and a focus on energy security—resonates with these emerging trends. By emphasizing pragmatic cooperation and avoiding entanglement in regional disputes, the administration can help shape a more open and strategically aligned South Caucasus.

Practical steps that could be taken include supporting the signing of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, facilitating energy and transit cooperation involving all three South Caucasus states, backing Turkish and European initiatives that enhance connectivity, and engaging in quiet diplomacy to support regional de-escalation.

The United States should engage in the South Caucasus; doing so can help the region become a model of multipolar engagement, where external powers converge constructively, while reducing the risk of disproportionate sway from one or two neighboring actors.

Ali Mammadov is a PhD researcher at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government focusing on global stability, alliance formation, and rising powers. You can find him on X.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Warrick joins Al-Hura TV to discuss why the Popular Mobilization Forces should be put under the control of the Iraqi government

Atlantic Council — Tue, 06 May 2025 14:37:19 +0000

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Putin confirms North Korean troops are fighting for Russia against Ukraine

Olivia Yanchik — Thu, 01 May 2025 20:43:55 +0000

More than six months after the story was first reported, Russian President Vladimir Putin has officially confirmed the presence of North Korean troops in Russia’s war against Ukraine. “We will always honor the Korean heroes who gave their lives for Russia, for our common freedom, on an equal basis with their Russian brothers in arms,” he commented on April 27.

Putin’s announcement was mirrored by similar official confirmation from the North Korean side. Pyongyang praised the “heroic feats” of North Korean troops fighting alongside the Russian army in a front page article published by the state-run Rodong Sinmun newspaper last weekend.

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Claims of North Korean troops participating in Russia’s war against Ukraine first began to circulate in October 2024. However, the Kremlin initially denied the North Korean presence, with Russian officials remaining tight-lipped on the subject until late April.

Moscow and Pyongyang appear to have coordinated their recent statements, indicating that both partners felt the time was now right to confirm the involvement of North Korean forces in Russia’s war. Official confirmation came as Putin proclaimed the defeat of Ukrainian forces in Russia’s Kursk region, where the bulk of North Korean soldiers are believed to have been deployed.

Moscow’s decision to confirm the presence of North Korean soldiers after months of denials could prove damaging to the Kremlin’s credibility at a time when questions are already being asked over Russia’s commitment to US-led peace talks to end the war in Ukraine. In recent days, US President Donald Trump has signaled his mounting frustration with Putin’s apparent stalling tactics, and has suggested that the Russian leader may be “tapping” him along.

The appearance of North Korean troops alongside their Russian counterparts on the front lines of the war against Ukraine represents the latest stage in a deepening military alliance between the two countries. North Korea has been supplying Russia with significant quantities of military aid since the early stages of the war in 2022. Deliveries have included millions of artillery shells as well as ballistic missiles, which have been used to devastating effect against Ukrainian cities.

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North Korea’s direct participation in the war against Ukraine is a watershed moment in modern European history. It is also widely seen an indication of the Russian army’s mounting recruitment issues.

While the Kremlin still has vast untapped reserves of available manpower to call upon, Putin is thought to be deeply reluctant to conduct a new mobilization due to fears of a possible domestic backlash inside Russia. This is making it increasingly challenging to replenish the depleted ranks of his invading army amid continued heavy losses.

For much of the war, Putin has relied on a combination of recruits drawn from Russia’s prison population and volunteer soldiers attracted by generous financial incentives that are typically many times higher than average Russian salaries. However, with the Russian army now reportedly averaging over a thousand casualties per day, it is becoming more difficult to find sufficient manpower to maintain the momentum of offensive operations in Ukraine.

So far, the North Korean contingent has seen action inside the Russian Federation itself amid fierce battles to push Ukrainian forces out of Russia’s Kursk region. However, with their participation now publicly confirmed by both Moscow and Pyongyang, officials in Kyiv are voicing concerns that North Korean troops could soon be redeployed to Ukrainian territory. This would represent a dangerous international escalation with unpredictable consequences for the wider region.

North Korea has now firmly established itself as one of the Kremlin’s most important allies in the invasion of Ukraine. Pyongyang’s involvement began with the supply of artillery shells and has expanded to include ballistic missiles and large numbers of combat troops. This comprehensive military support is enabling Russia to sustain the current war effort.

Ukraine’s allies are still searching for a suitable reaction to the expanding North Korean military presence on Europe’s eastern frontier. Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has called for the strengthening of sanctions against Russia and North Korea, while also warning that the Koreans are gaining valuable experience of modern warfare in Ukraine that could have grave implications for international security. In the absence of an overwhelming Western response, it seems safe to assume that North Korea’s involvement in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will continue to deepen.

Olivia Yanchik is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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Ukraine’s Minister of Economy Yulia Svyrydenko, who traveled to the US to sign the minerals deal on Wednesday evening following intense last-minute discussions over the fine print of the agreement, emphasized that Ukraine would retain ownership and control over its natural resources. She noted that the final wording “provides mutually beneficial conditions” for both countries, and praised the deal as “an agreement that reaffirms the United States commitment to Ukraine’s security, recovery, and reconstruction.”

Back in Kyiv, many saw the signing primarily as an opportunity to improve relations with the Trump White House following a turbulent few months that has seen the US President employ harsh rhetoric toward Ukraine while repeatedly blaming the country for Russia’s invasion. “Ukraine held the line. Despite enormous pressure, every overreaching demand from the other side was dropped. The final deal looks fair,” commented Kyiv School of Economics president Tymofiy Mylovanov. “It’s a major political and diplomatic win for Ukraine and the US that gives Trump a domestic political boost. That will translate, I expect, into a more positive attitude toward Ukraine.”

There was also much praise for the Ukrainian negotiating team and their ability to accommodate US interests while addressing Kyiv’s concerns. “This final version is significantly fairer and more mutually beneficial than earlier drafts,” stated Olena Tregub, who serves as executive director of Ukraine’s Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (NAKO). “To me, the minerals agreement is a clear win-win. It’s a well-negotiated, balanced deal that reflects both strategic vision and professionalism.”

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Many members of the Ukrainian parliament adopted a pragmatic view of the landmark minerals deal. “It seems like Trump was putting pressure on us in an attempt to get a victory during his first hundred days in office,” commented Oleksandr Merezhko, a lawmaker representing President Zelenskyy’s Servant of the People party who chairs the Ukrainian parliament’s foreign affairs committee. “The devil is in the details. But politically there are upsides. We have improved relations with Trump, for whom the deal is a win.”

Fellow Ukrainian member of parliament Inna Sovsun, who represents the opposition Golos party, underlined the unprecedented challenges Ukraine faced during negotiations as the country sought to broker a fair deal with a crucial ally while fighting for national survival. “We weren’t choosing between good and bad, we were choosing between bad and worse. What we got is better than the initial offer,” she noted.

While the general mood in Kyiv was relatively upbeat following the news from Washington, Sovsun stressed that the new natural resources agreement with the United States falls far short of the security guarantees that Ukraine is seeking in order to safeguard the country’s future and prevent further Russian aggression. “A true end to the war can only happen if the US provides significantly more weapons to Ukraine, is willing to apply greater sanctions pressure on Russia, or ideally both. If neither happens, it’s hard to expect the war to end.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Kyiv accuses China of deepening involvement in Russia’s Ukraine war

Katherine Spencer — Tue, 29 Apr 2025 20:43:29 +0000

As US-led efforts continue to broker a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine, Kyiv has recently accused China of deepening its involvement in Moscow’s invasion. The claims leveled at Beijing are not the first of their kind since the start of the full-scale invasion and add an extra dimension of geopolitical complexity to the ongoing negotiations.

In early April, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that two Chinese nationals had been captured while fighting alongside the Russian military in eastern Ukraine. Although the presence of foreign fighters within the ranks of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invading army is not new, officials in Kyiv claim that more than 150 Chinese mercenaries have been recruited by Russia. China has called the allegations “totally unfounded.”

While there is no evidence linking Russia’s Chinese troops to Beijing, many have suggested the Chinese authorities must be aware that their nationals are participating in a foreign war. Some have pointed to widespread Russian military recruitment adverts circulating across China’s heavily censored social media space, and have suggested that the presence of these videos indicates a degree of tacit official approval, at the very least.

US officials do not believe the recently captured fighters have direct ties to the Chinese government, Reuters reports. However, there are mounting concerns in Washington and other Western capitals over reports that Beijing is sending army officers to observe the Russian invasion of Ukraine in a bid to learn tactical lessons from the war. This could provide the Chinese military with important insights into drone warfare and the rapidly changing nature of the modern battlefield.

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In a further indication of growing frustration in Kyiv over China’s alleged support for Russia’s invasion, Zelenskyy recently accused Chinese citizens of working at a Russian manufacturing plant producing drones for the war in Ukraine. In the past month, the Ukrainian authorities have also imposed sanctions on three Chinese companies for alleged involvement in the production of Iskander ballistic missiles, which Russia often uses in the war against Ukraine.

The most serious Ukrainian allegations came in the middle of April, when Zelenskyy claimed that China was now supplying weapons and gunpowder to Russia. This was the first time the Ukrainian leader had openly accused Beijing of providing Moscow with direct military assistance. Although, last fall US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell had also suggested that China was providing Russia with technology that was “not dual-use capabilities,” contributing directly to Russia’s war production.

Claims of expanding Chinese involvement in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine do not come as a complete surprise. After all, China has long been seen as one of the Kremlin’s key allies and has emerged over the past decade as Moscow’s most important economic partner.

On the eve of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, China and Russia declared a “no limits” partnership. Over the past three years, the two countries have repeatedly underlined their shared geopolitical vision, which includes a commitment to ending the era of US dominance and ushering in a new multipolar world order. These strengthening ties have been further highlighted by a number of bilateral summit meetings between the Russian and Chinese leaders.

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Despite its close relations with Moscow, China has officially adopted a neutral stance toward Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This has included refraining from any overt gestures of support and publicly backing calls for peace. Nevertheless, Beijing has faced accusations of enabling the Russian war effort in important ways through the provision of restricted items including sanctioned components and dual-use technologies used in the production of missiles, tanks, and aircraft. By providing the vast majority of these exports to Russia, US officials believe that China has helped Russia greatly boost its arsenal and ramp up military production.

US officials have also alleged that China is providing Russia with geospatial intelligence to aid the invasion of Ukraine.

Claims of growing Chinese involvement are fueling speculation that this could lead to a possible international escalation in Russia’s war against Ukraine. There is also alarm over what Russia may be providing in exchange for Chinese support. US officials have alleged that China is receiving unprecedented access to highly sophisticated Russian defense technologies. The US Congress has also suggested that the Kremlin could be providing China with critical knowledge about the vulnerabilities of Western weapons systems based on combat experience acquired in Ukraine.

While Beijing has denied providing any material support for Moscow’s war, there is no question that the geopolitical partnership between China and Russia has reached new levels against the backdrop of the conflict.

With the United States now looking to reduce its involvement in European security, opportunities may soon emerge for China to play a greater role in peace efforts to end the war. However, Beijing would first need to align its actions with its words to convince Kyiv that it is a plausible peacemaker rather than a Russian ally.

Katherine Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Editor’s note: This article was updated on April 30, 2025, to clarify that reports of Chinese support for Russia’s war effort have been persistent before Kyiv’s recent accusations.

Ukraine’s innovative army can help Europe defend itself against Russia

David Kirichenko — Thu, 24 Apr 2025 21:39:48 +0000

When Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he cited Ukraine’s “demilitarization” as one of his two key war aims. He has not yet succeeded in achieving this goal, to put it mildly. Rather than disarming Ukraine, Putin’s invasion has actually transformed the country into one of Europe’s most formidable military powers.

The emergence of the Ukrainian army as a serious international fighting force can be traced back to the beginning of Russia’s invasion in 2014. At the time, decades of neglect and corruption had left Ukraine virtually defenseless. With the country’s existence under threat, a program of military modernization was rapidly adopted. During the following years, the Ukrainian Armed Forces expanded dramatically and implemented a series of far-reaching reforms in line with NATO standards.

Following the full-scale Russian invasion of February 2022, the transformation of the Ukrainian military entered a new phase. The number of men and women in uniform swelled to around one million, making the Ukrainian army by far the largest in Europe. They have been backed by a domestic defense industry that has grown by orders of magnitude over the past three years and now accounts for around 40 percent of Ukraine’s military needs.

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For today’s Ukraine, a strong domestic defense sector is now a matter of national survival. During the initial stages of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian authorities relied heavily on military aid from the country’s partners. This support helped enable Ukraine’s early victories but was also often subject to prolonged delays that left Kyiv vulnerable to changing political priorities in various Western capitals.

The need for greater military self-sufficiency has been underlined in recent months by the return of US President Donald Trump to the White House. The new US leader has made clear that he does not intend to maintain United States military support for Ukraine, and plans instead to downgrade the overall American commitment to European security. This shift in US policy has confirmed the wisdom of Ukraine’s earlier decision to prioritize the expansion of the country’s domestic defense industry.

Ukraine’s growing military capabilities owe much to a defense tech revolution that has been underway in the country since 2022. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion, hundreds of Ukrainian companies have begun producing innovative new technologies for the military ranging from software to combat drones. By focusing on relatively simple and affordable defense tech solutions, Ukraine has been able to close the gap on Russia despite Moscow’s often overwhelming advantages in terms of manpower, firepower, and resources.

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More than three years since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, it is now clear that wartime necessity has transformed Ukraine into perhaps the most agile and experimental military ecosystem in the world. Whereas Western arms procurement cycles typically span several years, Ukraine can translate ideas into operational weapons within the space of just a few months. This has helped establish Ukraine as a global leader in drone warfare. The country’s use of inexpensive FPV drones is increasingly defining the modern battlefield and now accounts for approximately 80 percent of all Russian casualties.

Ukraine’s domestic drone production capacity is growing at a remarkable rate. According to the country’s Deputy Defense Minister Ivan Havryliuk, Ukrainian forces are currently receiving approximately 200,000 drones per month, a tenfold increase on the figure from just one year ago. Kyiv is also making rapid progress in the development of numerous other cutting edge military technologies including robotic systems, marine drones, and cruise missiles.

Ukraine’s dramatically expanded armed forces and groundbreaking defense tech sector make the country an indispensable partner for Europe. After decades of reliance on US security support, European leaders currently find themselves confronted with the new political realities of an isolationist United States and an expansionist Russia. In this uncertain environment, it makes good sense for Europe to upgrade its support for the Ukrainian army while deepening collaboration with Ukrainian defense tech companies.

European investment in the Ukrainian defense industry is already on the rise, both in terms of government donor funds and private sector investment. This trend looks set to intensify in the coming months as Ukrainians and their European partners increasingly acknowledge that their collective future security depends on closer cooperation. Russia’s invasion has forced Ukraine to become a major military power and a leading defense tech innovator. This status looks set to guarantee the country a position at the heart of Europe’s security architecture for many years to come.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

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It is no surprise to see Russia engaged in yet more saber-rattling. After all, this approach has served the Kremlin well throughout the full-scale war in Ukraine. From the very first days of Russia’s invasion, Putin has attempted to exploit Western fears of escalation by threatening to retaliate if Kyiv’s partners dare to cross arbitrary red lines set by Moscow limiting the scale of international support for Ukraine.

Russia’s threats have proved remarkably effective. They have helped fuel prolonged debates in Western capitals over each and every aspect of military aid for Ukraine, and have made many of Kyiv’s partners reluctant to provide the kinds of weapons that could lead to a decisive Ukrainian victory. Indeed, while the Russian army has struggled to advance on the battlefield, Putin’s ability to intimidate the West has been arguably his most important achievement of the entire war.

This success is all the more remarkable given how many times Putin’s bluff has been called. He began the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 by issuing thinly-veiled threats indicating that any Western attempts to interfere would be met by a nuclear response. When Western leaders ignored this and proceeded to arm Kyiv, Putin did nothing.

In September 2022, as he prepared to illegally annex four partially occupied regions of Ukraine, Putin famously announced his readiness to use nuclear weapons to defend his Ukrainian conquests. “I’m not bluffing,” he declared. When Ukraine completely disregarded this bluster and proceeded to liberate the strategically vital southern city of Kherson days later, Putin did not reach for his nuclear button. On the contrary, he ordered his defeated army to quietly retreat across the Dnipro river.

The Kremlin’s many bloodcurdling threats regarding the sanctity of Russian-occupied Crimea have proved similarly hollow. Since 2022, Moscow has sought to position the occupied Ukrainian peninsula as being beyond the boundaries of the current war. This has not prevented Ukraine from sinking or damaging around one-third of the entire Russian Black Sea Fleet, which has traditionally been based in Crimea. Putin has responded to this very personal humiliation in typically understated fashion by withdrawing the rest of his warships to the safety of Russia.

Remarkably, Putin even failed to react when Ukraine crossed the reddest of all red lines and invaded Russia itself in August 2024. Rather than declaring World War III or attempting to rally his compatriots against the foreign invader, Putin actively sought to downplay the significance of Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk region.

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The Russian Foreign Ministry’s recent warnings regarding the potential delivery of German missiles to Ukraine are eerily similar to the empty threats made by Putin last September as the US weighed up the possibility of allowing Ukraine to conduct long-range strikes inside Russia using American weapons. At the time, Putin stated that any lifting of restrictions would mean that Russia was “at war” with NATO. However, when the US then duly granted Ukraine permission to begin attacking Russian targets, there was no discernible change in Putin’s stance.

Russia’s saber-rattling over Taurus missiles represents an important early test for Germany’s next leader. As Chancellor, Merz will inherit a major war on Europe’s eastern frontier that is now in its fourth year and could potentially expand further into the heart of the continent. He is also well aware that Europeans can no longer rely on US military support, as they have done for generations.

Germany is the obvious candidate to lead Europe’s rearmament, but Merz must first demonstrate that he has the political will to match his country’s undoubted industrial capabilities. US President Joe Biden consistently sought to avoid escalation with Russia, while his successor Donald Trump seems more interested in building bridges with Vladimir Putin than containing the Kremlin. If Merz wants to lead the Western resistance to Putin’s imperial agenda, he can begin by rejecting Russia’s threats and delivering Taurus missiles to Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The Ukrainian army is now Europe’s most credible security guarantee

Pavlo Verkhniatskyi — Thu, 17 Apr 2025 21:22:52 +0000

Ever since the first months of Russia’s full-scale invasion in spring 2022, Kyiv has played host to a steady stream of visiting European officials eager to demonstrate their support for Ukraine. With the war now in its fourth year, there are growing signs that this relationship is evolving and becoming more balanced. While Kyiv continues to rely on European aid, it is increasingly clear that Ukraine also has much to offer and can play a major part in the future security of Europe.

Following his return to the White House in January, US President Donald Trump has initiated a dramatic shift in United States foreign policy that has left many in Europe unsure of the transatlantic alliance and keen to ramp up their own defense capabilities. This geopolitical instability is also encouraging European policymakers to rethink Ukraine’s role in the defense of the continent. With unparalleled combat experience and proven ability to scale up arms production at relatively low cost, Ukraine is in many ways the ideal partner for European countries as they confront the twin challenges of an expansionist Russia and an isolationist US.

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Ukraine’s defense industry has grown at a remarkably rapid rate since 2022 and is now capable of meeting approximately 40 percent of the country’s military needs. The segment that has attracted the most international attention so far is drone production, with Ukraine widely recognized as a global leader in drone warfare. It requires a careful approach in order to identify the few true gems from among the hundreds of Ukrainian companies currently producing over a million of drones per year, but the potential for groundbreaking advances in drone technologies is obvious.

In order to make the most of this potential, Ukraine must first safeguard its survival as an independent nation. Looking ahead, a key challenge for the Ukrainian authorities will be creating the kind of business climate that can enable the country’s emerging defense industry to prosper in a postwar environment that is likely to feature declining defense budgets.

At present, many Ukrainian defense sector companies are moving production to locations outside Ukraine due to a combination of factors including export bans and a lack of financing options inside the country. The most elegant solution to this problem is to promote more defense sector partnerships with Ukraine’s European allies.

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During the first few years of Russia’s full-scale invasion, security cooperation between Ukraine and the country’s partners was generally a one-way street, with weapons and ammunition flowing to Kyiv. More recently, a new model has emerged involving Western countries funding production at Ukrainian defense companies. This approach is efficient and strategically sound. It boosts Ukraine militarily and economically, while also taking advantage of the country’s strengths as a cost-effective and innovative arms producer. However, it lacks long-term appeal for Ukraine’s partners.

Establishing joint ventures between Ukrainian and European defense companies may be a more attractive and sustainable format. This would be a financially attractive way of fueling Europe’s rearmament, and would allow participating companies to build on a wide range of potential research and development synergies. Setting up production facilities in wartime Ukraine would clearly involve an element of risk, but this need not necessarily be a deal breaker if sensible security measures are implemented.

The scope for such joint ventures is huge. Indeed, it would make good sense to invest in specialized business and science parks providing the full range of related services and industry expertise. Initially, jointly produced equipment could be fast-tracked to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Further down the line, output could also be exported to partner countries and global markets. The growth of joint ventures would significantly improve Ukraine’s defensive potential and enhance the country’s ability to shield Europe from the Russian threat.

An ambitious European rearmament plan is currently taking shape that could significantly accelerate the integration of Ukraine’s defense industry. For this to happen, a number of regulatory and operational issues must first be resolved in Kyiv, Brussels, and various European capitals. While Ukraine can undoubtedly make a meaningful contribution to European security, the continent’s political complexities are particularly pronounced when it comes to defense budgets and procurement policies. It will require a degree of pragmatism to dismantle bureaucratic hurdles and overcome narrow national interests.

As European leaders adapt to radical shifts in the geopolitical landscape, Kyiv is ideally positioned to help the continent address its most pressing security needs. Ukraine’s army is by far the largest in Europe and has unique experience of modern warfare. It is backed by a domestic arms industry that is growing at a phenomenal rate while benefiting from an innovative startup culture that is transforming the twenty-first century battlefield. With sufficient international funding and technological cooperation, the Ukrainian defense sector can serve as a cornerstone of Europe’s security architecture for decades to come.

Pavlo Verkhniatskyi is managing partner of COSA, co-founder of Fincord-Polytech Science Park, and advisor to the Defense Group at the Ukraine Facility Platform.

China is militarizing its coast guard against Taiwan. Here’s how Taipei and its allies can respond.

Kitsch Liao — Wed, 16 Apr 2025 10:00:00 +0000

On April 1, China launched a two-day military exercise against Taiwan. Taiwanese national security officials suggested it was timed to coincide with US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s first trip to the Indo-Pacific since taking office. While the exercise was accompanied by the usual inflammatory and sometimes crude public messaging against Taiwan, it yielded a critical insight about China’s military operations. In describing the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) movements they observed, Taiwan’s Coast Guard disclosed that the Eastern Theater Command exercised operational control over the China Coast Guard (CCG) along with PLA military forces in theater.

This is a ground-breaking revelation. Beijing generally aims to portray the CCG as a nonmilitary actor despite its legally mandated dual role as both law enforcement and a component of China’s armed forces. This is also significant considering a previous incident in February 2024 in which Taiwan confronted the CCG when the latter was caught executing war-fighting functions against Taiwan under the guise of law enforcement activities. At the time, it was unclear whether this was merely a one-off experimental arrangement or the act of an overzealous CCG officer. It is now clear that the PLA exercises operational control over the CCG and uses the cover of law enforcement to gain military advantage over the United States, Taiwan, and their allies and partners without drawing much public attention.

China’s use of its coast guard for military purposes under the guise of law enforcement poses a threat to Taiwan that requires a strong response from Taipei, as well as the United States and its allies and partners in the region. Countering the CCG’s gray zone activities will require an active response from Taiwan and public messaging that makes clear that certain CCG law enforcement activity is a cover for military activities. It will also require a coordinated response from the US Coast Guard and Washington’s allies to provide deterrence and impose costs on China for using the CCG’s law enforcement cover to threaten Taiwan’s security.

‘White hulls’ in the gray zone

Taiwanese media reported in February 2024 that CCG vessels were identifying Taiwanese vessels and targets and providing real-time precise locations to the PLA for subsequent missile strikes while acting in a law enforcement capacity. Three CCG cutters entered the Western Pacific through the southern tip of the Miyako Strait and turned south until parallel to Taiwan’s east coast before speeding at eighteen to twenty knots eastward directly toward Taiwan. The cutters maintained radio silence, turned off their automatic identification system, and exercised emission control, an unusual precaution generally taken by military vessels, civilian vessels going through conflict zones, or vessels conducting illegal activities. The CCG cutters entered Taiwan’s twenty-four-nautical-mile contiguous zone, a buffer area internationally recognized for identification and interception of unknown vessels, and streaked past Taiwanese military and coast guard vessels sent to intercept them.

Intelligence provided to Taiwan by an undisclosed allied country indicated that these CCG vessels were validating functionalities of China’s Guo Wang, or “state network,” satellite constellation. Guo Wang designates targets for DF-21/DF-26 ballistic missiles supporting future PLA rocket force strikes against both Taiwan and US allied forces operating in the Western Pacific. The vessels only activated their automatic identification system and identified as belonging to the China Coast Guard after they passed the Taiwan Coast Guard’s TCG Nantou and came perilously close to Taiwan’s territorial waters.

Most countries’ coast guards, including those of the United States, China, and the Philippines, identify as both law enforcement and military, thus sailing in gray waters under international law. However, there is still a widely accepted norm that “white hull” vessels conducting law enforcement activities and promoting stability at sea are treated differently than “gray hull” warships safeguarding individual countries’ national interests. White hull activities near another country’s territorial waters are generally received with more goodwill and elicit less provocative reactions. China understands this and has been actively exploiting this divide since at least 2016.

The type-818 CCG vessels in the 2024 incident were 3,800-ton cutters built on People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 054A-class frigate hulls, equipped with 76 mm guns and the standard PLAN communication suite—essentially a “gray hull” in all but name. Through operational control over CCG, the PLA can use the cover of a “white hull” law enforcement facade to conduct exclusively “gray hull” military activities that would otherwise receive much stronger pushback.

How China has militarized its coast guard

Beijing reorganized the CCG in 2018, moving it from China’s State Oceanic Administration to the People’s Armed Police. The People’s Armed Police is a paramilitary that reports directly to the Central Military Commission, China’s highest military authority. The CCG’s placement under the Central Military Commission’s authority is an unusual arrangement. In the United States, for example, although the US Coast Guard is a branch of the armed forces, its chain of command runs through the Department of Homeland Security, not the Department of Defense, unless it is otherwise directed by the president or Congress during wartime. Taiwan’s Coast Guard administration also follows a similar logic.

Since the 2018 reorganization, the CCG has used its law enforcement facade to great effect in gray zone operations against Taiwan, the Philippines, and other US regional allies and partners. In the South China Sea, the CCG has been using its vessels, which include the largest coast guard cutters in the world, to “shoulder,” or attempt to ram, other countries’ coast guard vessels and force them to divert course. All the while, these vessels use their white hull cover to justify these incidents as law enforcement actions.

To protect this useful subterfuge, Beijing has been careful to disaggregate exercises conducted by the PLA and those conducted by the CCG against Taiwan since the Chinese military exercises around Taiwan that came in response to then US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island in 2022. This means careful messaging from the official Weibo accounts of both the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command and the CCG. While exercises from the two entities seemed to take place within similar and sometimes overlapping timeframes, the Eastern Theater Command and CCG have different names for their respective exercises and take care to deconflict areas of operation.

Observers have long suspected operational coordination between the PLA and the CCG, but to date, only circumstantial evidence has linked the organizations. It is known that the PLA coordinates some of China’s gray zone operations through the Eastern Theater Command’s Joint Operations Command Center (JOCC). Previous concurrent CCG exercises with PLA in the Taiwan Strait have not provided sufficient direct evidence of operational coordination by observing PLAN and CCG movements alone, though international reporting sometimes characterizes the two entities’ actions as a combined exercise.

The revelation came from Taiwan’s Coast Guard administration, which stated on April 1 that the CCG, while ostensibly law enforcement, operates under the control of military theater commands. In the case of exercises against Taiwan, this would mean the Eastern Theater Command’s JOCC. Additionally, for the first time since the exercises in response to Pelosi’s visit in 2022, the CCG conducted joint operations with the PLA east of Taiwan, confirming its role in exercises for a potential joint quarantine/blockade against Taiwan.

Consequently, the April exercise indicates that the CCG is operationally controlled by PLA. And the 2024 incident provided an example of China unilaterally escalating cross-strait tension by conducting military operations with ostensibly law enforcement white hull vessels against Taiwan during peacetime, without even the facade of declaring a military exercise. These developments have far-reaching implications beyond garden-variety gray zone operations. These practices are highly provocative and require strong but measured responses from the United States and Taiwan, as well as their partners and allies in the region.

How the US and Taiwan should respond

To stop Beijing from gaining additional military advantage under the guise of law enforcement activities, Taiwan must combine a proper active response with strong public messaging. Taipei’s active responses must be commensurate with the nature of each incident—dispatching military assets to intercept and guard against the CCG’s military activities against Taiwan while leaving law enforcement issues for Taiwan’s Coast Guard. This will create significant challenges for the Taiwan Navy and Coast Guard’s existing command-and-control, but it is essential to counter China’s use of the CCG as cover to gain military advantage over Taiwan. Taiwan’s public messaging must adequately establish this. Taiwan should present the public with credible evidence, including intercepted signals intelligence, electro-optical recordings, and the exact courses and speeds of offending CCG vessels.

Meanwhile, the United States and its allies and partners must impose additional costs for the CCG’s clandestine activity. Joint patrols led by the US Coast Guard and the coast guards of other allied nations can form a credible deterrent against China’s militarization of law enforcement activities. The US Coast Guard already extensively collaborates with the Taiwan Coast Guard. A joint patrol within Taiwan’s exclusive economic zone or even within the twenty-four nautical mile contiguous zone, modeled after the US Coast Guard’s agreement with Taiwan’s diplomatic ally Palau, can impose significant costs for the CCG should it decide to engage in provocative behaviors like the February 2024 missile targeting incident. Additional support from Japan or even the Philippine Coast Guard, such as joint patrols, could lend further legitimacy to counter the militarization of the CCG. Taken together, these measures can send a strong message to Beijing and mark clear redlines against the CCG’s participation in the PLA’s gray zone activities.

Kitsch Liao is an associate director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Previously, he worked in the US Congress, in diplomatic postings, and as a cyber intelligence analyst for the private sector.

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Win fast or lose big against China

Bradley T. Gericke — Thu, 10 Apr 2025 13:00:00 +0000

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“For indecision brings its own delays,
And days are lost lamenting o’er lost days.”

– Johann Wolfgang von Goethe in Faust

It seems that “protraction” as a way of war is having a moment, especially through the lens of a future war against China. The Army is holding wargames and conferences addressing it. Even fresh scholarship is skeptical of short wars. All of which is somewhat bewildering because history is replete with long wars, and the record of long wars is one of much blood and great cost. Tinkering with notions of protracted war allows military decision-makers to be distracted and to make a poor bargain, like the trade made by the legendary Doctor Faust that comes with extraordinary cost.

Clearly, the cost of long wars is extraordinarily high. In every respect, long wars should be an unwelcome result, not an outcome to be acquiesced. The Army especially cannot afford to mischaracterize the inevitability of long war. Acceptance of protraction as an inevitability is to surrender the United States’ best way to win militarily against China, which is to fight and win the first battle of any war. Appearing to accept that the United States will not win the first battle in a US-China war could also fatally undermine deterrence by signaling a lack of confidence in US capabilities. Winning in a future contest and strengthening deterrence means making decisions now: real choices must be made regarding forward posture, organizational structure, training, and modernization to create a battlefield system that leverages US advantages.

Of course, wars become long when they aren’t concluded promptly. That seemingly tautological outcome is often due to a failure to identify war objectives and to align warfighting means properly. Or maybe, as game theory suggests, long wars are caused by information asymmetries. Whatever the reason, long wars are a recurring feature of the international state system, and not one to encourage. There isn’t space in this short essay to fully parse “long” war from “total” war, but it is a fair assumption in an era of all-domain contests that the longer a war protracts, the more total it will become, and the more awful the butcher’s bill. In every respect, the longer the war the more it becomes a widening conflagration and a losing hand for the United States. The present dalliance with protraction can only lead to expenses the United States cannot afford, and strategic ends it cannot determine. Because the United States doesn’t have many good ways to escape long wars once they become, well, long, the best approach is to plan and resource its armed forces to win at the onset of conflict.

Today neither the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) nor the United States is seeking the elimination of the other party. Hence, today’s immediate war-waging problem is not one of preparing for an existential fight between the United States and China. Whether the flashpoint is the South China Sea, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, or Taiwan, the military problem to solve is not how to eliminate China as a great power but to defeat its armed forces. In other words, the challenge is how to fight and win a regional, limited war against a nuclear-armed great power—that is, a short war. In the Pacific, such a war with China is the kind the United States is most likely to confront, and one that it can win.

There is no doubt that the historical record of war is not encouraging. In the Western military tradition, even the names of long-ago conflicts are suggestive of drawn-out carnage. The details of the Hundred Years’ War (1337–1453) between England and France and the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1634), which caused prolonged bloodshed between most of the powers of Europe, might be distant cultural memories, but their costs and consequences were felt for centuries thereafter.

Closer to home, the United States’ own military history features winning decisive battles, but America’s record of winning at the onset of conflict is inconsistent. In the Asia-Pacific theater, the US Army’s comprehensive defeat after Pearl Harbor and through the first half of 1942 as American forces were swept out of the Philippines is perhaps the twentieth century’s most noteworthy example of the costs of unpreparedness.

Of course, the United States’ adversaries face the same challenge regarding first battles. The Japanese failed to compel the United States in World War II despite their early victories. For instance, they won the battle of Pearl Harbor but not as decisively as they could have—as Admiral Chester Nimitz himself pointed out. The timing of the attack meant that the US carrier fleet escaped unscathed, while the narrowly focused and short raid also failed to destroy the submarine base and the vast stockpiles of fuel at Pearl Harbor. Carriers, submarines, and fuel proved critical to enabling the US counteroffensive in the months and years that followed. They attacked without enough force to deliver an irrevocable battlefield outcome. The same became true on the Korean Peninsula. The US Army’s performance in June 1950 in the form of Task Force Smith was a tragic defeat, yet North Korea’s invasion ultimately failed. Again, the opening blow was insufficient and long war ensued. All of which is to say that winning early is not a panacea. But readying armed forces to win early, and decisively, is still better than submitting to attritional wars of protraction.

The Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) is deserving of further consideration as a template for future conflict in the Pacific. While that war resulted in large numbers of casualties and demanded mass mobilization by each side to equip their armed forces, it also featured sustained campaigns of maneuver and military initiative, especially by Japan on both land and sea that led to the war’s termination in nineteen months. Longish wars admittedly happen frequently, but it is also true that decisive battles occur regularly. The fact remains that being ready to wage a decisive first battle is the best outcome.

Against China specifically, a short, regional, and limited war is how US armed forces avoid nuclear escalation and global, all-domain conflict that can be enormously damaging to each nation’s key infrastructure. It is in such damage to state cyber, space, and communication assets that real escalatory risk resides. Thus, the logic of each side’s objectives converges on a short, sharp war as the best way to settle a conflict if deterrence fails.

An opening campaign can be won by maneuver on and from the ground, enabled by on-time and on-target fires. Maneuver, which is simply the requirement to seize and hold ground, is the only way to obtain the battlefield ends that can lead to diplomacy and, ultimately, a return to civil order. The United States was swept out of the Pacific in 1942 because its garrisons could not maneuver and lacked strike capabilities that could destroy, or at least damage, invading Japanese forces. Even its largest concentration of forces in the Philippines lacked the depth to evict the Japanese. The result was three more years of savage killing and serious destruction to the Japanese homeland before the war ended. This is not the kind of future war the United States want to fight. While its adversaries in the Pacific have changed, the topography and the populations concentrated near and on mainland Asia remain. If war in the Pacific comes, this is where it will be waged.

It is important to highlight that it has become conventional wisdom in US policy and strategy circles that a future war in the Pacific will be primarily a naval and air conflict. That has not been the case historically, as demonstrated by the Boxer Rebellion, Philippine Insurrection, World War II (in which more than twenty US divisions deployed), Korean War, and Vietnam War. Nor will it be so in a future war. Ground forces in the Pacific create operational advantage by influencing or controlling a series of sustained and protected positions, as ground forces are more difficult to target than, for example, large naval surface combatants. This undermines the adversary’s decision space and morale. US Army forces can pursue positions of advantage primarily through offense, but positional advantage applies to both offense and defense. In terms of defense, positional advantage allows US land forces to defend key terrain over large areas. Against a peer adversary, mastery of positional advantage is essential.

Positions of advantage can be physical or non-physical. Physical or geographic positions of advantage in the Indo-Pacific include maritime chokepoints (such as the Sunda and Lombok straits), major political-economic centers (such as Seoul; Taipei; and Makati, Philippines), and major transportation hubs (such as Shinjuku City, Tokyo; and Makassar, Indonesia). Non-physical positions of advantage might include adversary leadership’s confidence in its information systems or the connectedness a population feels with its defense forces.

From these positions, Army forces provide the collection, command and control, protection, and sustainment to enable operational endurance. This is critical to maneuvering and attacking from multiple ranges and directions against the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which benefits from shorter lines of operation. When Army forces are integrated with the Joint Force, the PLA (or any adversary) will lose both time and space, which denies the enemy’s maneuver and also protects populations, land resources, and borders.

Likewise, land-based effects into other domains provide a suite of tools to integrate into the Joint Force’s kill chains from the onset of conflict. This includes short-, medium-, and long-range precision fires to strike adversary formations across the depth of the battlefield. Army forces provide tailorable, theater-level command posts for integrating and synchronizing joint and combined military actions across the battle space. A war in the Pacific cannot be conceived, nor will it be waged, in terms of a straight line penciled on a map from Hawaii to any part of the Pacific, whether that be North Korea, Taiwan, or the South China Sea.

The United States must train, equip, and posture both the Army and Joint Forces as an operational system that enables ground-gaining fires and maneuver. The PLA’s leadership certainly understands this. Mao Zedong spoke and wrote extensively about protracted war. In the years following Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931, Mao developed an extensive theory about China’s fight to expel Japan. It is worth noting that he considered a protracted conflict inevitable because of the disparities in China’s and Japan’s war-waging capabilities at the onset of the conflict. But the war-winning phase of the conflict was one of “quick-decision offensive warfare” characterized by “mobile warfare.” He recognized the key feature of how a war is won is the maneuver of friendly forces to compel an adversary so that it has no other choice, or only worse choices, and must yield to avoid obliteration.

Winning early and winning on land is the responsibility of the US Army, and it is the Army that must lead the Joint Force by building and sustaining a first-win operational warfighting system. It is time for Army leaders to make needed decisions. The key components of winning early from the land include the following:

Forward access and presence: The warfighting-campaigning-wargaming approach being undertaken by US Army Pacific (USARPAC) to build habitual land-power access and combined-arms proficiency is a template that is working. A robust experimentation program of testing and evaluation of both concepts and technologies adopted by the entire Army will improve interoperability with partners and allow the United States to expose gaps in its capabilities that it can then solve.
Highly trained forces: There is no substitute for tactical units that are ready to fight. Individual soldier skills and expert collective task performance are bedrocks of small-unit readiness. The US Army excels at this already. But integrating all arms both operationally and tactically remains problematic and merits further organizational solutions. More Army units should be trained in the Pacific theater under combat-like conditions, including with US Joint Forces as well as partner armies they will fight alongside.
Focused, dynamic sustainment: The Army must possess all kinds of supply in forward-stationed packages that can be distributed in greater quantities and more channels than they are today. Army Prepositioned Stocks must be thoroughly reformed. They must be tailored to the force packages that the Army and Joint Forces plan to deploy in the opening days of a conflict. Redundant and resilient ways and means of medical and personnel support must likewise be built and rehearsed.
Strategic deployment: Rapid deployment of land forces over long distances is remarkably challenging, and the throughput of Army forces that can move from home station is not sufficient today. It is therefore imperative that Mobilization Force Generation Installations be made much more ready. Present deployment timelines are too long, and the reserve components are not sufficiently aligned to overseas contingency missions. It should be a principle that every Army organization in a war plan must be able to deploy to its assigned position in a forward theater within six months of receiving its order. Any Army unit that cannot get out the door in that time frame should be considered for restructuring, assignment to a different Army component, or elimination from the force structure.
All-range fires convergence: The Army’s Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs) should become the template for future Army Corps and divisional designs. The MDTFs should no longer be viewed as experiments foremost. Instead, they point to how Multi-Domain Operations, the Army’s new doctrine, will be executed. Yet the Army is reluctant to change its structure. It must do so and do it aggressively and comprehensively.
Globally integrated plans: Major operational war plans against China and other state actors must be integrated across Combatant Commands (COCOMs) and services from inception. In 2018–2019, the Joint Staff led such planning, but indifference from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and COCOMs caused the plans to be abandoned. The Department of Defense’s Unified Command Plan leads to a regionally focused department whose subordinate echelons resist globally integrated US capabilities. Short of congressionally supported COCOM reform, globally integrated plans are the only way to fight and win.
Divesting: The Army’s Mobile Protected Firepower system (M10 Booker) is a head-scratcher. The Army’s attempt to brand it as a tank for the infantry is a clumsy attempt to obfuscate the fact that the Service is fielding an unneeded weapon. In real terms, the M10 is simply a “light” tank that is not light and sub-optimizes both protection and firepower. There is no requirement for a forty-plus-ton tank in any significant operational plan that the long-serving Abrams cannot perform. The Booker is simply an unnecessary and expensive platform. The Army must make choices to save both people and dollars; this is an easy trade. Eliminating outmoded unmanned aerial systems (UAS) is another obvious opportunity to harvest savings from legacy force structure.

It is imperative that military planners and decision-makers keep their eyes on building battlefield warfighting systems that can fight and win a short war, especially on the land, to achieve national policy ends in the shortest time possible. Fighting and winning a short war saves both lives and treasure. An Army and a Joint Force that are unready to fight and win tonight make a self-imposed long war nearly a fait accompli. Planners should not accept that only surrender or protracted war are the United States’ fate in the Pacific or anywhere else. They should build forward-postured, trained, ready, rehearsed, equipped, and dynamically sustained forces as the best way to win and deter at the lowest cost. Doing so is not easy, but the cost of failing to do so will be much higher. Ultimately, the best way to deter the start of what could become a long war could be to visibly improve the ability to fight a short one.

About the author

Major General Bradley Gericke, US Army (ret.), is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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Lithuanians pay tribute to US soldiers who died in training exercise tragedy

Agnia Grigas — Sat, 05 Apr 2025 00:24:44 +0000

Thousands of Lithuanians paid tribute this week to four United States soldiers who died during a training exercise while serving in the Baltic nation. Crowds lined the streets of Vilnius as hearses carrying the bodies of the deceased soldiers made their way to the Lithuanian capital city’s main cathedral for a memorial service before being flown to the United States.

The US servicemen had gone missing a week earlier during training exercises at a Lithuanian military facility close to the border with Belarus. This led to the largest search operation in modern Lithuanian history through the surrounding area of forests and swamps, with military and civilian teams being joined by colleagues from Poland, Germany, and Estonia. Tragically, the four missing United States soldiers were eventually found submerged in a peat bog together with their vehicle.

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Around one thousand US soldiers have been based at Camp Herkus in Lithuania since 2021. Their presence is part of NATO’s Operation Atlantic Resolve, which involves rotational deployments of troops from member states as part of the alliance’s deterrence strategy on its eastern flank.

The recent deaths of four US soldiers have shocked and saddened the Lithuanian public, underlining the bonds between the country and the United States. For days, the search operation for the missing soldiers gripped the nation of almost three million. “For us, it is more than a duty, it is an emotion. We have experienced trials in our history and therefore we understand well what loss is, what death is, what honorable duty is,” commented Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda during events in Vilnius honoring the deceased servicemen.

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The tragedy has served to highlight the importance of the NATO troop presence in Lithuania at a time when Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has heightened alarm in the region over the threat posed by a resurgent Russia. With the Trump administration now discussing plans to reduce the US commitment to European security and focus more of Asia, there are concerns in Lithuania and other front line NATO member states that Russia may seek to take advance of any weakening of resolve within the alliance.

In March, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kestutis Budrys traveled to Washington DC with his Estonian and Latvian colleagues to meet with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and seek assurances regarding the continued United States commitment to the security of the Baltic region. “The Baltic states are quite skeptical about Russia’s intentions. Our intel assessments clearly show that Russia and their instruments of power are all aligned toward war, not toward peace,” commented Latvian Foreign Minister Baiba Braze while in the US.

Lithuania is currently preparing for a dramatic increase in military spending as the country responds to Russia’s expansionist agenda and Kremlin dictator Vladimir Putin’s apparent imperial ambitions. Lithuanian officials unveiled plans in January 2025 to boost the defense budget from just over three percent to between five and six percent starting next year. This increase comes as the Trump White House calls on NATO members to move beyond current guidelines stipulating two percent of GDP and spend significantly more on national security.

Amid heightened geopolitical uncertainty, the recent tragic events involving US troops stationed in Lithuania have helped unite the two countries. “We cannot thank our allies and fellow service members enough, especially the Lithuanians, who spared no resource in support of this mission,” commented Major General Curtis Taylor, the commanding general of the United States 1st Armored Division, in the wake of the tragedy. “Together, we delivered on our promise to never leave a fallen comrade.”

Agnia Grigas is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and the author of Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire and other books.

Economic threats to Canada’s national security
An unexpected threat: Overdependence on trade with the United States
Lack of economic power consolidation by Canada’s federal government
Mapping Canada’s economic statecraft systems: Sanctions, export controls, tariffs, and investment screening

Economic threats to Canada’s national security

Cyberattacks on Canada’s critical infrastructure

Canada’s critical infrastructure has become a target of state-sponsored cyberattacks. In 2023, Canada’s Communications Security Establishment (CSE)—a signals intelligence agency—said that Russia-backed hackers were seeking to disrupt Canada’s energy sector. Apart from accounting for 5 percent of Canada’s gross domestic product (GDP), the energy sector also keeps the rest of Canada’s critical infrastructure functioning. CSE warned that the threat to Canada’s pipelines and physical infrastructure would persist until the end of the war in Ukraine and that the objective was to weaken Canada’s support for Ukraine.

Beyond critical infrastructure, Canadian companies lost about $4.3 billion due to ransomware attacks in 2021. More recently in February 2025, Russian hacking group Seashell Blizzard was reported to have targeted energy and defense sectors in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Russia and other adversarial states will likely continue targeting Canada’s critical infrastructure and extorting ransom payments from Canadian companies.

Theft of intellectual property

Canadian companies have become targets of Chinese state-sponsored intellectual theft operations. In 2014, a Chinese state-sponsored threat actor stole more than 40,000 files from the National Research Council’s private-sector partners. The National Research Council is a primary government agency dedicated to research and development in science and technology. Apart from undermining Canadian companies, theft of Canada’s intellectual property, especially research on sensitive technologies, poses a threat to Canada’s national security.

Chinese influence on Canada’s academic sector

Adversarial states have taken advantage of Canada’s academic sector to advance their own strategic and military capabilities. For example, from 2018 to 2023, Canada’s top universities published more than 240 joint papers on quantum cryptography, space science, and other advanced research topics along with Chinese scientists working for China’s top military institutions. In January 2024, Canada’s federal government named more than one hundred institutions in China, Russia, and Iran that pose a threat to Canada’s national security. Apart from calling out specific institutions, the federal government also identified “sensitive research areas.” Universities or researchers who decide to work with the listed institutions on listed sensitive topics will not be eligible for federal grants.

Trade weaponization by China

Trade weaponization by China has undermined the economic welfare of Canadians and posed a threat to the secure functioning of Canada’s critical infrastructure. For example, between 2019 and 2020, China targeted Canada’s canola sector with 100 percent tariffs, restricting these imports and costing Canadian farmers more than $2.35 billion in lost exports and price pressure. In Canada’s 2024 Fall Economic Statement, which outlined key measures to enhance Canadian economic security, the Ministry of Finance announced its plans to impose additional tariffs on Chinese imports to combat China’s unfair trade practices. These included tariffs on solar products and critical minerals in early 2025, and on permanent magnets, natural graphite, and semiconductors in 2026.

However, the imposition of 25 percent tariffs by Washington on both Canada and China could result in deepening trade ties between the two. Canada exported a record $2 billion in crude oil to China in 2024, accounting for half of all oil exports through the newly expanded Trans Mountain pipeline. Increased trade with China would increase Canada’s exposure to China’s coercive practices, and would be a direct consequence of US tariffs on Canada.

An unexpected threat: Overdependence on trade with the United States

A new and unexpected threat to Canada’s economic security emerged from the United States when the Trump administration threatened to impose 25 percent tariffs on all Canadian goods (except for the 10 percent tariffs on energy imports). The United States is Canada’s largest export market, receiving a staggering 76 percent of Canada’s exports in 2024. Canada relies on the United States particularly in the context of its crude oil trade, shipping 97.4 percent of its crude oil to the United States.

Canada had already started working on expansion to global markets through pipeline development even before Washington announced tariffs. It has succeeded in the expansion of the Trans Mountain pipeline in May 2024, which has enabled the export of Canadian oil to Asia. Canada is reviving talks on the canceled Energy East and Northern Gateway pipelines—the former would move oil from Alberta to Eastern Canada, and the latter would transport oil from Alberta to British Columbia for export to Asian markets.

In addition to oil trade, another area where Canada is highly dependent on the United States is in auto manufacturing. Behind oil exports, motor vehicles account for the largest share of Canadian exports to the United States, resulting in exports valued at $50.76 billion (C$72.7 billion Canadian dollars) in 2024. With 25 percent tariffs on all Canadian goods, the automotive industry is expected to take a hit, especially as components cross the border six to eight times before final assembly.

Figure 1

The United States invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to impose tariffs on Canada with the stated objective to curb fentanyl flows to the United States. The measure has plunged US-Canada relations into chaos and could result in a trade war between the two long-standing allies. In response, Canada might reroute oil shipments to China through existing pipelines and increase trade with China in general. Further economic integration with China would increase Canada’s exposure to economic threats emanating from China, including trade weaponization and anti-competitive practices.

Because of US tariffs, Canada could also face challenges in strengthening the resilience of its nuclear fuel and critical mineral supply chains. In the 2024 Fall Economic Statement, Canada outlined key measures for its economic security that heavily incorporated US cooperation. This included plans to strengthen nuclear fuel supply chain resiliency away from Russian influence, with up to $500 million set aside for enriched nuclear fuel purchase contracts from the United States. Canada also aims to strengthen supply chains for responsibly produced critical minerals, following a $3.8 billion investment in its Critical Minerals Strategy, which relies on the United States as a key partner. Given the tariffs, Canada will need to diversify its partners and supply sources quickly if it wishes to maintain these economic security goals.

Could the US-Canada trade war upend defense cooperation?

Recent tariff escalation between the United States and Canada has raised questions about the future of military cooperation between the two countries. Apart from being members of the North Atlantic Treasury Organization (NATO), the United States and Canada form a unique binational command called North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). NORAD’s mission is to defend North American aerospace by monitoring all aerial and maritime threats. NORAD is headquartered at Peterson Space Force Base in Colorado, has a US Commander and Canadian Deputy Commander, and has staff from both countries working side by side.

NORAD’s funding has been historically split between the United States (60 percent) and Canada (40 percent). However, the Department of Defense (DoD) does not allocate specific funding to NORAD and does not procure weapons or technology for NORAD, although NORAD uses DoD military systems once fielded. The US Congress recognized the need to allocate funding to modernize NORAD’s surveillance systems after the Chinese spy balloon incident in February 2023. While US fighter jets shot down the Chinese surveillance balloon after it was tracked above a US nuclear weapons site in Montana, the incident exposed weaknesses in NORAD’s capabilities. After the incident, former NORAD Commander Vice Admiral Mike Dumont stated that NORAD’s radar network is essentially 1970s technology and needs to be modernized.

A year before the incident, the Canadian government had committed to invest $3.6 billion in NORAD over six years from 2022 to 2028, and $28.4 billion over twenty years (2022-2042) to modernize surveillance and air weapons systems. However, Canada has fallen short on delivering on these commitments.

In March 2025, Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney announced that Canada made a $4.2 billion deal with Australia to develop a cutting-edge radar to detect threats to the Arctic. The radar is expected to be delivered by 2029 and will be deployed under NORAD. Canadian military officials have stated that the US military has supported the deal, signaling that the deterioration of economic relations has not (yet) had spillover effects for the defense cooperation.

However, Prime Minister Carney has also ordered the review of F-35 fighter jet purchases from US defense company Lockheed Martin, citing security overreliance on the United States. Under the $13.29 billion contract with Lockheed Martin, Canada was set to buy 88 fighter jets from the US company. While Canada’s defense ministry will purchase the first sixteen jets to meet the contract’s legal requirements, Canada is actively looking for alternative suppliers.

As the trade war continues, Canada will likely enhance defense cooperation with the European and other like-minded states, possibly to the detriment of the US defense industry and the US-Canada defense cooperation.

Figure 2: US-Canada overlapping memberships in security organizations and alliances

Source: Atlantic Council’s Economic Statecraft Initiative research

Lack of economic power consolidation by Canada’s federal government

Canada has a range of economic tools and sources of economic power to respond to emerging economic threats and mitigate vulnerabilities; however, it currently lacks economic power consolidation. Unlike the United States, where the federal government can regulate nearly all economic activity, Canada’s Constitution Act of 1867 grants provinces control over their “property and civil rights,” including natural resources. Section 92A, which was added to the constitution in 1982, further reinforced the provinces’ control over their natural resources. Meanwhile, the federal government has control over matters of international trade including trade controls. However, when international trade issues concern the natural resources of provinces, tensions and disagreements often arise between provinces and the federal government, and the lack of economic power consolidation by the federal government becomes obvious.

This issue manifested when the United States announced 25 percent tariffs on Canada in March 2025 as Canada’s federal government and the Alberta province had different reactions. Canada’s main leverage over the United States is oil exports. Refineries in the United States, particularly those in the Midwest, run exclusively on Canadian crude oil, having tailored their refineries to primarily process the heavy Canadian crude. Since 2010, Canadian oil accounted for virtually 100 percent of the oil imported by the Midwest. Threatening to hike levies on crude oil exports could have been Canada’s way of leveraging energy interdependence to respond to US tariffs. However, Alberta Premier Danielle Smith stated that Alberta, which is Canada’s largest oil producer and top exporter of crude oil to the United States, would not hike levies on oil and gas exports to the United States. Being unable to speak in one voice as a country even during a crisis is a direct consequence of Canada’s regional factionalism, characterized by each province looking out for their own interests.

The United States-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) trade agreement, which entered into force during the first Trump administration in July 2020, may have also contributed to diminishing the economic power of Canada’s federal government. Article 32.10 of USMCA requires each member of the agreement to notify other countries if it plans to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA) with a nonmarket economy. Thus, if Canada were to sign an FTA with China, the United States and Mexico could review the agreement and withdraw from USMCA with six months’ notice. After the USMCA was signed, Canadian scholars wrote that this clause would effectively turn Canada into a vassal state of the United States, with the authority to make decisions on internal affairs but having to rely on the larger power for foreign and security policy decisions. Five years later, it looks like the USMCA has put Canada in a difficult position, being targeted by US tariffs and not having advanced trading relations with other countries.

Figure 3: US-Canada overlapping memberships in economic organizations and alliances

Source: Atlantic Council’s Economic Statecraft Initiative Research

Mapping Canada’s economic statecraft systems

To secure Canada’s critical infrastructure and leverage its natural resources to shape favorable foreign policy outcomes, Canada’s federal government has a range of economic tools and the ability to design new ones when appropriate. Canada’s economic statecraft tool kit is similar to those of the United States and the European Union and includes sanctions, export controls, tariffs, and investment screening. Canada has imposed financial sanctions and export controls against Russia along with its Group of Seven (G7) allies. It has levied tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, in line with US policy, and recently created investment screening authorities to address concerns about adversarial capital.

Financial sanctions

Similar to the United States, Canada maintains sanctions programs covering specific countries such as Russia and Iran, as well as thematic sanctions regimes such as terrorism. Global Affairs Canada (GAC), which is Canada’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, administers sanctions and maintains the Consolidated Canadian Autonomous Sanctions List. Canada’s Finance Ministry, the Department of Finance, is not involved in sanctions designations, implementation, or enforcement, unlike in the United States, where the Department of the Treasury is the primary administrator of sanctions.

The Parliament of Canada has enacted legislation authorizing the imposition of sanctions through three acts: the United Nations Act; the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA); and the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (JVCFOA).

The United Nations Act enables GAC to implement sanctions against entities or individuals sanctioned by the UN Security Council. When an act of aggression or a grave breach of international peace occurs and the UN Security Council is unable to pass a resolution, Canada implements autonomous sanctions under SEMA; this act is Canada’s primary law for imposing autonomous sanctions and includes country-based sanctions programs. It is also used to align Canada’s sanctions with those of allies. For example, GAC derived its powers from SEMA to designate Russian entities and individuals in alignment with Canada’s Western allies in 2022. Meanwhile, the JVCFOA allows GAC to impose sanctions against individuals responsible for human rights violations and significant acts of corruption, similar to the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act in the United States, with sanctions administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control.

Once GAC adds entities and individuals to the lists of sanctions, Canadian financial institutions comply by freezing the designated party’s assets and suspending transactions. GAC coordinates with several government agencies to enforce and enable private-sector compliance with sanctions:

FINTRAC: Canada’s financial intelligence unit (FIU)—Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC)—is responsible for monitoring suspicious financial activities and collecting reporting from financial institutions on transactions that may be linked to sanctions evasion. FINTRAC is an independent agency that reports to the Minister of Finance. FINTRAC works closely with the US financial intelligence unit—Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)—on illicit finance investigations and when sanctions evasion includes the US financial system. For example, FinCEN and FINTRAC both monitor and share financial information related to Russian sanctions evasion and publish advisories and red flags for the financial sector in coordination with other like-minded partner FIUs.

OSFI: The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) is a banking regulator that issues directives to financial institutions regarding compliance and instructs banks to freeze assets belonging to sanctioned individuals and entities. FINTRAC also shares financial intelligence with OSFI on sanctions evasion activity under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA). OSFI shares intelligence with Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the national police service of Canada, if there is evidence of sanctions evasion or other financial crimes.

RCMP: Once OSFI notifies RCMP about suspicious activity, RCMP investigates whether the funds are linked to sanctions evasion or other financial crimes. If it finds evidence of a violation of sanctions or criminal activity, RCMP obtains a court order to seize assets under the Criminal Code and the PCMLTFA.

CBSA: Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) is responsible for blocking sanctioned individuals from entering Canada. CBSA also notifies OSFI if sanctioned individuals attempt to move cash or gold through border crossings.

All four agencies work with GAC and with one another on sanctions enforcement. GAC sets sanctions policy, FINTRAC analyzes financial intelligence and shares suspicious activity reports to inform law enforcement investigations, OSFI enforces compliance in banks, RCMP investigates crimes and seizes assets, and CBSA prevents sanctioned individuals from entering Canada and moving assets across borders.

While financial sanctions are part of Canada’s economic statecraft tool kit, Canadian sanctions power does not have the same reach as US sanctions. The preeminence of the US dollar and the omnipresence of major US banks allows the United States to effectively cut off sanctioned individuals and entities from the global financial system. Canadian sanctions are limited to Canadian jurisdiction and affect individuals and entities with financial ties to Canada, but they do not have the same reach as US financial sanctions.

Nevertheless, Canadian authorities have been able to leverage financial sanctions to support the G7 allies in sanctioning Russia. For example, in December 2022, under SEMA, Canadian authorities ordered Citco Bank Canada, a subsidiary of a global hedge fund headquartered in the Cayman Islands, to freeze $26 million owned directly or indirectly by Russian billionaire Roman Abramovich, who has been sanctioned by Canada and other G7 allies. In June 2023, Canadian authorities seized a Russian cargo jet at Toronto’s Pearson Airport pursuant to SEMA.

Figure 4

Export controls

Canada participates in several multilateral export control regimes, including the Wassenaar Arrangement, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, and Australia Group. When multilateral regimes fall short in addressing Canada’s foreign policy needs, Canada leverages its autonomous export control list, which is administered by GAC under the Export and Import Permits Act. The Trade Controls Bureau under GAC is responsible for issuing permits and certificates for the items included on the Export Control List (ECL).

Canada Border Services Agency plays a crucial role in the enforcement of export controls. CBSA verifies that shipments match the export permit issued by GAC. It can seize or refuse exports that violate GAC export permits through ports, airports, and land borders. CBSA refers cases to the Royal Canada Mounted Police (CRMP) for prosecution if exporters attempt to bypass regulations.

Separately, FINTRAC monitors financial transactions that might be connected to the exports of controlled goods and technologies. If FINTRAC detects suspicious transactions, it shares intelligence with GAC and other relevant authorities. Canada’s method of leveraging financial intelligence for enforcing export controls is similar to that of the United States, where FinCEN has teamed up with the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security to detect export control evasion through financial transactions.

While in the United States the export controls authority lies within the Commerce Department, Canada’s equivalent, Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED), does not participate in administering export controls. That responsibility is fully absorbed by GAC.

While Canada has mainly used its export control authority in the context of sensitive technologies, Canadian politiciansand experts have recently been calling on the federal government to impose restrictions on mineral exports to the United States in response to US tariffs. The United States highly depends on Canada’s minerals, including uranium, aluminum, and nickel. Canada was the United States’ top supplier of metals and minerals in 2023 ($46.97 billion in US imports), followed by China ($28.32 billion) and Mexico ($28.18 billion). Notably, President Trump’s recent executive order called Unleashing American Energy instructed the director of the US Geological Survey to add uranium to the critical minerals list. Canada provides 25 percent of uranium to the United States. If Canada were to impose export controls on uranium, the US objective of building a resilient enriched uranium supply chain would be jeopardized.

However, Canada could not impose export controls on the United States without experiencing significant blowback. Export control is a powerful tool. While US tariffs would increase the price of imported Canadian goods by at least 25 percent, Canada’s export controls would completely cut off the flow of certain Canadian goods to the United States. It would be destructive for both economies, so Canada will likely reserve this tool as a last resort and perhaps work on finding alternative export destinations before pulling such a trigger.

Canada employs restrictive economic measures against Russia

In response to Russia’s unjust invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Canada imposed financial sanctions and export controls against Russia in coordination with G7 allies. To date, Global Affairs Canada has added more than 3,000 entities and individuals to its Russia and Belarus sanctions lists under SEMA. Assets of designated individuals have been frozen and Canadian persons are prohibited from dealing with them. Apart from financial sanctions, Canada imposed export controls on technology and import restrictions on Russian oil and gold. Canada also joined the G7 in capping the price of Russian crude oil at $60 per barrel and barred Russian vessels from using Canadian ports.

To enforce financial sanctions against Russia, FINTRAC joined the financial intelligence units (FIUs) of Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States to create an FIU Working Group with the mission of enhancing intelligence sharing on sanctions evasion by Russian entities and individuals. Separately, Canada Border Services Agency’s export controls enforcement efforts included the review of more than 1,500 shipments bound to Russia (as of February 2024), resulting in six seizures and fourteen fines against exporters. CBSA continues to work closely with the Five Eyes intelligence alliance to share information about export control evasion.

To disrupt the operation of Russia’s shadow fleet, Canada proposed the creation of a task force to tackle the shadow fleet in March 2025. Such a task force could be useful in addressing the various environmental problems and enforcement challenges the shadow fleet has created for the sanctioning coalition. However, the United States vetoed Canada’s proposal.

Figure 5

Tariffs

Canada’s approach to tariffs is governed primarily by the Customs Act, which outlines the procedures for assessing and collecting tariffs on imported goods, as well as the Customs Tariff legislation that sets the duty rates for specific imports (generally based on the “Harmonized System,” an internationally standardized system for classifying traded products). The Canada Border Services Agency is responsible for administering these tariffs. Additionally, the Special Import Measures Act enables Canada to protect industries from harm caused by unfair trade practices like dumping or subsidizing of imported goods, with the Canadian International Trade Tribunal determining injury and the CBSA imposing necessary duties. The minister of finance, in consultation with the minister of foreign affairs, plays a key role in proposing tariff changes or retaliatory tariffs, ensuring Canada’s trade policies align with its broader economic and diplomatic objectives.

Canada has frequently aligned with its allies on tariff issues, as demonstrated in 2024 when, following the US and EU tariffs, it imposed a 100 percent tariff on Chinese electric vehicles to protect domestic industries. However, Canada has also been proactive in responding to US tariffs, employing a combination of diplomatic negotiations, retaliatory tariffs, and reliance on dispute resolution mechanisms such as the World Trade Organization and USMCA. In the past Canada was also quick to align itself with allies such as the EU and Mexico, seeking a coordinated international response, as was the case in 2018 when the United States imposed a broad tariff on steel and aluminum.

Similar to the United States, Canada offers remission allowances to help businesses adjust to tariffs by granting relief under specific circumstances, such as the inability to source goods from nontariffed countries or preexisting contractual obligations. The Department of Finance regularly seeks input from stakeholders before introducing new tariffs. In 2024, a thirty-day consultation was launched about possible tariffs on Chinese batteries, battery parts, semiconductors, critical minerals, metals, and solar panels, though it has yet to result in any new tariffs.

Canada’s primary weakness regarding tariffs is its lack of trade diversification. The United States accounts for half of Canada’s imports and 76 percent of its exports. This dependency severely limits Canada’s ability to impose tariffs on the United States without facing significant economic repercussions. Canada’s relatively limited economic leverage on the global stage also complicates efforts to coordinate multilateral tariff responses or to negotiate favorable trade agreements. Furthermore, Canada’s lengthy public consultations and regulatory processes for implementing tariffs hinder its ability to leverage tariffs as a swift response to changing geopolitical or economic circumstances.

Figure 6

Investment screening

Canada’s investment screening is governed by the Investment Canada Act (ICA), which ensures that foreign investments do not harm national security while promoting economic prosperity. The ICA includes net benefit reviews for large investments and national security reviews for any foreign investments which pose potential security risks, such as foreign control over critical sectors like technology or infrastructure.

The review process is administered by ISED, with the minister of innovation, science, and industry overseeing the reviews in consultation with Public Safety Canada. For national security concerns, multiple agencies assess potential risks, and the Governor-in-Council (GIC) has the authority to block investments or demand divestitures.

Criticism of the ICA includes lack of transparency and consistency, particularly in national security reviews, where decisions may be influenced by political or diplomatic considerations. To better mitigate risks to security, critical infrastructure, and the transfer of sensitive technologies, experts have argued that the ICA should more effectively target malicious foreign investments by incorporating into the review process the perspectives of Canadian companies on emerging national security threats. In response to these concerns, Bill C-34 introduced key updates in 2024, including preclosing filing requirements for sensitive sectors, the possibility of interim conditions during national security reviews, broader scope covering state-owned enterprises and asset sales, consideration for intellectual property and personal data protection, and increased penalties for noncompliance. In March 2025, further amendments were made to the ICA, expanding its scope to review “opportunistic or predatory” foreign investments. These changes were introduced in response to the United States’ imposition of blanket tariffs on Canadian goods.

Figure 7

Positive economic statecraft

Apart from coercive/protective tools, Canada maintains positive economic statecraft (PES) tools such as development assistance to build economic alliances beyond North America. For example, Canada is one of the largest providers of international development assistance to African countries. After Ukraine, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo were the top recipients of Canada’s international assistance. Canada’s PES tools lay the ground for the federal governments to have productive cooperation when needs arise. Canadian authorities should leverage PES tools to enhance the country’s international standing and increase economic connectivity with other regions of the world. This is especially important amid the US pause on nearly all US foreign assistance. Canada could step up to help fill the vacuum in the developing world created by the Trump administration’s radical departure from a long-standing US role in foreign aid.

Canadian authorities have already taken steps in this direction. On March 9, Canadian Minister of International Development Ahmed Hussen announced that Canada would be providing $272.1 million for foreign aid projects in Bangladesh and the Indo-Pacific region. The projects will focus on climate adaptation, empowering women in the nursing sector, advancing decent work and inclusive education and training. Earlier, on March 6, Global Affairs Canada launched its first Global Africa Strategy with the goal of deepening trade and investment relations with Africa, partnering on peace and security challenges, and advancing shared priorities on the international stage including climate change. Through this partnership, Canada plans to strengthen economic and national security by enhancing supply chain resilience and maintaining corridors for critical goods.

Conclusion

Canada’s federal government maintains a range of economic statecraft tools and authorities to address economic and national security threats. While regional factionalism and provincial equities can hinder the federal government’s ability to leverage the full force of Canada’s economic power, threats to Canada’s economic security, including tariffs from the United States, may prove to further unite and align the provinces. The federal government and provincial premiers should work together to meet this challenging moment, consolidating Canada’s sources of economic power and moving forward with a cohesive economic statecraft strategy to protect the country’s national security and economic security interests.

Canada’s leadership and engagement in international fora including the G7, NATO, Wassenaar Agreement, among others, as well as its bilateral relationships, make it well-placed to coordinate and collaborate with Western partners on economic statecraft. Information sharing, joint investigations, multilateral sanctions, and multilateral development and investment can extend the reach of Canada’s economic power while strengthening Western efforts to leverage economic statecraft to advance global security objectives and ensure the integrity of the global financial system. Canada also has a solid foundation for building economic partnerships beyond the West through development assistance and other positive economic statecraft tools.

About the authors

Staff

Kimberly Donovan

Director, Economic Statecraft Initiative

Economic Statecraft Initiative GeoEconomics Center

Digital Currencies Economic Sanctions

Staff

Maia Nikoladze

Associate Director, Economic Statecraft Initiative

Economic Statecraft Initiative GeoEconomics Center

Digital Currencies Eastern Europe

Staff

Lize de Kruijf

Program Assistant, Economic Statecraft Initiative

Economic Statecraft Initiative GeoEconomics Center

Dutch Economic Sanctions

The authors would like to thank Nazima Tursun, a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Economic Statecraft Initiative, for research support.

The report is part of a year-long series on economic statecraft across the G7 and China supported in part by a grant from MITRE.

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Housed within the GeoEconomics Center, the Economic Statecraft Initiative (ESI) publishes leading-edge research and analysis on sanctions and the use of economic power to achieve foreign policy objectives and protect national security interests.

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If Trump wants peace in Ukraine, he must increase the pressure on Putin

Doug Klain — Thu, 27 Mar 2025 01:52:25 +0000

For months, US President Donald Trump and allies such as Senator Lindsey Graham have stated that if Russian President Vladimir Putin rejects peace efforts, the United States will impose new sanctions to bring Russia to the negotiating table. So far, however, the Kremlin has refused to join Ukraine in accepting a US-proposed ceasefire. Instead, Putin has this week demanded sanctions relief in exchange for a limited maritime ceasefire that favors Russia. It may now be time to consider putting more pressure on Moscow.

Putin certainly does not appear to be very interested in ending the war. Since agreeing to a pause on energy infrastructure attacks during a March 18 call with Trump, he has launched multiple large-scale drone and missile bombardments of Ukrainian civilian and energy targets.

If the US uses sanctions alone to pressure Putin, the impact will not be felt immediately. In order to get the Russian leader’s attention, new sanctions must be paired with tougher enforcement of existing sanctions and expanded military assistance to put Ukraine in a better position on the battlefield. More than anything else, the military reality on the ground in Ukraine is the deciding factor in efforts to end the war. Luckily, this is the area where Trump has the greatest ability to shape perceptions.

Republicans in Congress have shown an interest in expanding sanctions against Russia, particularly in going after Moscow’s energy revenues while boosting US energy exports to cut into Putin’s war chest. Any legislation to make good on these objectives should also include new appropriations for the Presidential Drawdown Authority so that Trump can send armored vehicles, long-range fires, air defenses, and more to Ukraine, while also backfilling US stocks with new replacements.

Legislative steps could also include funding for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative. This would allow the president to issue contracts for new weapons that will benefit Ukraine, while creating jobs for US manufacturers and revitalizing the domestic defense industrial base.

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Passing new military assistance would send a much-needed signal of resolve after two months of softball tactics from the Trump administration toward Russia. A record high number of Americans currently think Trump is doing too little to help Ukraine and believe he is siding with Russia. Trump’s Special Envoy Steve Witkoff recently added to these concerns by uncritically repeating a series of false narratives used by the Kremlin to justify the invasion of Ukraine during an interview with Tucker Carlson.

Members of Trump’s team have already outlined arguments in favor of more military aid to Ukraine. Last April, Special Envoy for Ukraine Keith Kellogg wrote that if Kyiv wouldn’t come to the table for talks, the US should withhold military assistance, while if Russia refused to negotiate, aid to Ukraine should be increased. Trump has since followed through on cutting aid to Ukraine, but resumed deliveries after Kyiv declared it was ready to accept Trump’s proposal for an unconditional ceasefire.

With Ukraine now backing Trump’s ceasefire proposal while Putin keeps finding new reasons to delay, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Russia is the main obstacle to peace. The recently announced ceasefire in the Black Sea is far from Trump’s original proposal, with the Russians requiring sanctions relief before implementing it. Putin has sought to introduce his own ceasefire conditions, while also demanding “the complete cessation of foreign military aid and the provision of intelligence information to Kyiv.” This would leave Ukraine isolated and disarmed in exchange for a pause in the fighting.

Trump should respond to Putin’s stalling tactics by following the recommendations of his own secretary of state, who said back in January that Ukraine needed greater leverage over Russia. That means changing Putin’s calculus on the battlefield and stopping the Russian military’s grinding advances.

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Strengthening Ukraine’s position on the battlefield could be politically advantageous for Trump. Former US President Joe Biden was long criticized for his flawed approach to providing Ukraine with military assistance. As a result of Biden’s cautious policies, Ukraine received enough to survive but not to win.

Trump could now correct Biden’s mistake by making an historic presidential drawdown and surging military assistance to Ukraine in order to bring Russia to the table. He could also use the REPO Act to make Russia’s own frozen assets pay for any new aid, an idea Speaker Mike Johnson has previously called “pure poetry.”

Russia is not yet ready to enter into serious peace talks, but Putin is in a vulnerable position. He is sacrificing huge numbers of soldiers for modest gains in Ukraine, and is struggling to replace the large quantities of military equipment being lost in costly frontal offensives. Domestically, the Russian economy is showing signs of strain, with high inflation and a shortage of workers.

Despite this deteriorating outlook, Putin is still betting that he can outlast the West in Ukraine. With continued US support for Ukraine in question and deep divisions emerging within the transatlantic alliance, he now has less reason than ever to compromise.

In Trump’s book, The Art of the Deal, he argues that the best way to negotiate is to “just keep pushing and pushing and pushing to get what I want.” So far, we’ve seen the president exert massive pressure on Ukraine by pausing aid, siding with Moscow at the UN, and even calling Zelenskyy a dictator. We’ve yet to see similar pressure on Russia.

Putin’s approach to negotiations currently resembles The Art of the Deal far more than Trump’s. The Russian dictator is pushing and pushing for further concessions, while offering very little in return. If Trump wants to achieve a genuine peace, he will need to put far more pressure on Moscow. Increased sanctions are a necessary step, but giving Ukraine the weapons it needs to push Russia back on the battlefield will likely prove far more effective.

Doug Klain is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a policy analyst for Razom for Ukraine, a US-based nonprofit humanitarian aid and advocacy organization.

Crucially, Ukraine’s army is backed by a highly innovative and rapidly expanding domestic military-industrial complex that is harnessing the excellence of Ukraine’s prewar tech sector and reviving long neglected Soviet era capabilities. Any discussion on the likely future course of the war against Russia and the terms of any peace deal must therefore take into account the fact that Ukraine is a now major military power in its own right.

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For the past year, international media coverage of Russia’s invasion has tended to create the impression that Putin’s army is slowly but surely grinding forward toward a costly but inevitable victory. The reality is less straightforward.

Russian troops reclaimed the battlefield initiative in early 2024 and have been advancing fairly steadily ever since, but they have only achieved relatively modest territorial gains while suffering record casualties. Analysts estimate that at the current pace, it would take Russia almost a century to complete the conquest of Ukraine.

Viewed from a broader perspective encompassing the entire full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s military performance becomes even more impressive. Since spring 2022, The Ukrainian Armed Forces have succeeded in liberating around half of all the territory seized by the Russian army, and have won a series of key battles in the Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson regions. Russia has been unable to capture and hold a single Ukrainian regional capital, and is still struggling to force Ukrainian troops out of Russia itself following Kyiv’s bold August 2024 cross-border incursion into the Kursk region.

Far beyond the battlefield, Ukraine has also overachieved. In the Black Sea, Ukrainian marine drones have revolutionized naval warfare and forced Putin to withdraw his fleet from Russian-occupied Crimea to the relative safety of Russian ports. Deep inside Russia, long-range Ukrainian drones strike at military assets, logistical hubs, and energy infrastructure with growing frequency.

Ukraine’s resilience owes much to the international military assistance the country has received. However, this support has often been subject to delays and has frequently fallen victim to political considerations that have cost Ukraine dearly. In order to minimize these vulnerabilities, the Ukrainian authorities have prioritized the development of the country’s domestic defense industry.

The results have been striking. In 2025, the overall capacity of Ukraine’s defense industry is expected to reach a new high of $35 billion, up from just $1 billion at the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion. While this capacity is not yet being fully utilized due to defense budget limitations, Ukraine now produces around one-third of all weapons, ammunition, and equipment used by the country’s armed forces. In critical areas such as drone production, the figure is now close to one hundred percent.

Meanwhile, Kyiv is encouraging international partners to invest in Ukrainian defense sector companies and finance weapons production in Ukraine. A number of countries have already responded by committing large sums and promoting joint projects within the Ukrainian defense industry. This trend is expected to gain pace during 2025 as the US pivot away from Europe fuels increased defense spending across the continent.

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Ukraine’s biggest defense industry success has been the development of the domestic drone manufacturing sector. On the eve of the full-scale invasion, the country boasted only a handful of drone producers. The sector has now mushroomed to include over 200 businesses producing millions of drones annually, with output expected to treble during the current year. In order to harness this rapidly growing strike potential and maximize battlefield impact, Ukraine last year established a special branch of the armed forces dedicated to drone warfare.

Ukraine’s emergence as a drone warfare superpower owes much to the country’s strong tech traditions and entrepreneurial spirit. Since 2022, Ukrainian drone developers have proved highly innovative and are now recognized internationally as world leaders in military drone technologies. “Foreign models are like Toyotas now, while Ukrainian drones are Mercedes. Ours are just leagues ahead,” one Ukrainian commander told Ukrainska Pravda recently.

Ukraine now has a formidable arsenal of drones for use on the battlefield, at sea, and for long-range attacks against targets across Russia. The country also has a growing collection of hybrid missile-drones and missiles. President Zelenskyy recently confirmed that Ukraine had carried out an attack with the domestically produced Long Neptune cruise missile for the first time, underlining the country’s growing potential to strike back at Russia. Further innovations are in the pipeline, with domestic missile production expected to increase in the coming months if Kyiv is able to secure the necessary additional funding.

The Ukrainian military still faces a range of major challenges. The biggest issue remains manpower shortages. So far, Kyiv has sought to address mobilization problems by updating training and offering recruits the opportunity to choose the unit they will serve in, but shortfalls persist. A new initiative aimed at potential recruits between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five was launched in February 2025, featuring attractive enlistment packages and one-year service contracts.

There is also no escaping the fact that Ukraine remains dependent on Western support in order to maintain the country’s war effort. While officials in Kyiv have spoken of increasing the share of domestically produced war materials to fifty percent, Ukraine cannot realistically expect to match Russia’s overwhelming advantages in manpower, firepower, industrial capacity, and financing without continued assistance from the West.

Despite these limitations, Ukraine’s growing military strength must be taken into consideration during coming negotiations over a potential compromise peace deal with Russia. While nobody in Kyiv would relish the grim prospect of fighting on without Western assistance, the country is far from defenseless and will not accept a bad peace that places Ukrainian statehood in jeopardy.

Russia made the mistake of underestimating Ukraine in 2022, and has since paid a terrible price. Three years on, there can be little doubt that the Ukrainian army is now the most powerful fighting force in Europe. This military reality will help shape the contours of any future peace deal. It should also guarantee Ukraine’s place at the heart of Europe’s changing security system as the continent adjusts to the new geopolitical realities of an isolationist United States and an expansionist Russia.

Serhii Kuzan is Chairman of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center (USCC). He formerly served as an adviser to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (2022-2023) and advisor to the Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council (2014).

The US needs to build a new Caribbean policy. Rubio’s trip to the region can be the first step.

Wazim Mowla — Tue, 25 Mar 2025 15:44:49 +0000

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio will make his first major trip to the Caribbean this week, starting in Jamaica on Wednesday before heading to Guyana and Suriname. In February, Rubio’s first trip abroad as secretary of state saw him stop in the Dominican Republic at the end of his tour through nearby Central America. But his visit this week, which is focused on the Caribbean, is a chance to see how the second Trump administration is approaching this important but too-often-overlooked region.

Rubio will find a region undergoing profound changes both negative and positive. Crime and violence are on the rise, which is hurting the private sector, especially tourism, a main lifeline for many economies in the region. At the same time, the Caribbean is poised to become an energy powerhouse by the end of the decade thanks to recent discoveries and energy development.

This week, Caribbean leaders will welcome Rubio’s visit, as they are eager to influence US policy toward the region over the next four years. On the US side, Rubio has an opportunity to come away from the trip with a new strategy for the region that can yield tangible benefits and protect US and Caribbean interests alike. This new strategy should have two priorities:

lowering barriers to US investment in Caribbean energy, which can bolster energy security for the wider region, including the United States, and
helping countries in the region reduce crime and violence, which can protect US citizens traveling abroad.

Untapped potential

The Caribbean’s proximity to US shores has earned it the nickname “the United States’ third border.” As with the countries on its land borders, the United States shares strong trade, commercial, and people-to-people ties with Caribbean nations. More than twenty million US citizens travel to the Caribbean each year for overnight stays, and the United States remains the Caribbean’s top trading partner. Five of Taiwan’s twelve remaining diplomatic allies are in the Caribbean. And Guyana, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago collectively house enough hydrocarbon resources to make them active players in global oil and gas markets.

Yet despite the importance of the Caribbean for US interests, the region has long suffered from inattention and inconsistent US foreign policy. The result is a relationship that relies on ad-hoc engagement and has forced countries to look elsewhere for assistance, from China to India to African nations. While in office, former US Vice President Kamala Harris sought to rectify this by launching the US-Caribbean Partnership to Address the Climate Crisis 2030, but it did not have enough time to take root and it failed to deliver long-lasting benefits. Now, early in the second Trump administration, Rubio can use this week’s trip as a starting point to design, build, and implement a Caribbean strategy that serves US and regional interests alike over the next four years and beyond.

What a US Caribbean strategy needs

Two points are critical to any successful US strategy in the Caribbean. First, it must be a whole-of-government effort that uses and amplifies existing diplomatic, economic, and security partnerships with the Caribbean. Fortunately, there are various forms of active US cooperation with Caribbean nations in all three of these areas. For example, US embassy officials across the region have built trust among locals and the private sector, making the United States a first-choice partner. US Southern Command’s defense partnerships with Caribbean militaries (except The Bahamas) has significantly enhanced capacity building and training for pre- and post-natural disaster events as part of its annual Tradewinds exercise.

The challenge will be to coordinate these various activities into one coherent strategy. In practice, this first means creating a new framework that can house current US policy initiatives in the Caribbean across different US agencies, identifying opportunities to scale engagement. Next, Washington will need to allocate the resources needed to in-region US embassies and other US policy instruments, such as US Southern Command and the State Department’s Caribbean office, to implement these measures.

Second, while Rubio’s trip is an important sign from administration that it takes the Caribbean seriously, US policy must go beyond high-level government-to-government engagement to succeed. There are five national elections set to take place in the Caribbean by the end of this year. Relying solely on interactions with the region’s national governments, some of which could change soon, limits the local private sector and regional institutions’ ability to help implement US-Caribbean policy decisions. Institutionalized partnerships with local business chambers and more engagement with development institutions, such as the Caribbean Development Bank, can offset any political uncertainty associated with upcoming general elections.

With these two principles in mind, where should the United States focus its attention? Reducing crime and violence should take precedence. In 2024, nine of the top ten countries in Latin America and the Caribbean with the highest homicide rates were in the Caribbean, primarily due to increasing gang proliferation and the illegal trafficking of small arms originating from the United States. The recent reintroduction of the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative Authorization Act by the US Congress—which allocates $88 million annually through 2029—is expected to help address the region’s security challenges, but the appropriated resources alone are insufficient given the scale of the problem. Caribbean countries also need increased technical assistance from the Pentagon and US Southern Command to increase police and military capacity to address the transit of illicit arms and drugs. Doing so would ensure greater stability for Caribbean countries and help protect the millions of US citizens traveling abroad to the region.

Next, Caribbean countries are uniquely positioned to welcome increased US investment in the region’s energy market. Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Suriname’s natural gas potential provide a hub for future investment. Each of those countries already has US and Western operators, but the derivatives from natural gas usage—such as ammonia, urea, plastics, and aluminum—also provide opportunities for US companies. For example, building and operating new ammonia and urea plants—which will have a ready-made market for export in the Caribbean—would enable US companies to invest at scale in a region where project size is on the smaller end. There are also energy investment opportunities in the eastern Caribbean, which houses significant geothermal reserves. New technological advances in geothermal exploration and financial backing from Wall Street could reduce costs and risks enough to entice US companies to consider making investments.

Since the power generation projects in the Caribbean are small relative to those in Latin America, Rubio should consider working with the US International Development Finance Corporation to subsidize pre-project costs for US companies willing to take the time to determine the viability of energy projects in the Caribbean. Moreover, given that potential geothermal projects reside in some of the countries with diplomatic ties to Taiwan, and the region’s future natural gas producers already have large-scale Chinese investments in the energy sector, increasing US competitiveness in this industry could go a long way toward counterbalancing potential Chinese engagement.

If the Caribbean truly is the United States’ “third border,” then it is important to US national security and economic interests to invest the resources and time in strengthening relations with the region. Rubio’s trip is the second Trump administration’s first real opportunity to do this. Resources, assistance, and institutionalized engagement will be needed—all of which can yield tangible benefits for the United States over the next four years and beyond.

Wazim Mowla is the fellow and lead of the Caribbean Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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Putin backs Trump’s partial ceasefire but insists Ukraine must be disarmed

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 18 Mar 2025 21:10:05 +0000

Russian President Vladimir Putin has accepted a US proposal for a partial ceasefire in the war against Ukraine following a lengthy phone call with US President Donald Trump. If Ukraine now agrees to the terms of the partial ceasefire, both countries will pause attacks on energy infrastructure for a thirty-day period. During the high stakes call, Putin also committed to begin negotiations over a possible maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea.

The White House readout following the Trump-Putin call was fairly upbeat, but in truth the outcomes fell far short of expectations. One week earlier, Ukraine had unconditionally backed a United States initiative for a complete thirty-day ceasefire in a move that was widely hailed as a breakthrough toward a potential peace deal. So far, Russia has refused to reciprocate. Instead, Putin has sought to insert a series of conditions that indicate an unwillingness to compromise on the key issues driving the Russia invasion of Ukraine.

Today’s telephone conversation appears to have been no different. While Putin offered some minor concessions, he also made clear that he has not abandoned his maximalist goal of subjugating Ukraine. Crucially, the Kremlin statement following the call stressed that Russia’s key condition for any progress toward peace is “the complete cessation of foreign military aid and sharing intelligence with Kyiv.” In other words, Putin continues to insist that peace will only be possible once Ukraine has been disarmed and left at his mercy. It does not require much imagination to anticipate the kind of peace Putin has in mind.

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Putin insistence on an end to all Western military support for Ukraine is not new. Since the very first days of the invasion, he has been warning the West not to arm Ukraine. He has also consistently identified the complete demilitarization of Ukraine as one of his primary war aims.

During failed peace talks in spring 2022, Russian negotiators demanded an approximately 95 percent reduction in the size of Ukraine’s army, which was to become a skeleton force of just fifty thousand troops. For the past three years, the Kremlin has repeated these calls for a drastic reduction in the size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, including severe restrictions on the categories of weapons Ukraine can possess.

Russian officials have also frequently pressed Ukraine’s Western allies to end all military assistance, while boasting to domestic audiences that this would soon force Kyiv to capitulate. Speaking in October 2023 at the annual Valdai Discussion Club in Sochi, Putin predicted that Ukraine would have “a week left to live” if the country’s Western partners ended weapons deliveries. “Imagine if supplies stopped tomorrow. They would have a week left to live until ammunition was exhausted,” he stated.

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The Kremlin has been similarly insistent on the need to isolate Ukraine internationally and deprive the country of potential allies. In addition to a ban on all Western arms supplies, Moscow demands that Ukraine must voluntarily abandon its NATO ambitions and accept enforced neutrality. Putin claims this is necessary as NATO expansion poses a military threat to Russia. However, he himself said Russia had “no problem” when neighboring Finland announced plans to join the alliance in 2022.

Most recently, Russia has firmly rejected the idea of deploying peacekeepers from NATO member countries to Ukraine in order to monitor any future ceasefire agreement. This rejection is particularly revealing, given the fact that the same NATO troops are already present in six countries bordering Russia without sparking World War III. It would certainly seem that Putin’s real problem is with Ukraine rather than NATO.

Putin told Trump today that he wants a lasting peace, but his negotiating position suggests otherwise. The Kremlin dictator’s preferred peace terms envision a disarmed and defenseless Ukraine with virtually no army of its own and no chance of receiving any meaningful military aid from the international community. If he achieves this goal, it is surely only a matter of time before Putin renews his invasion and completes the conquest of Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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Since the onset of Russia’s invasion in early 2022, the UK has been among Ukraine’s biggest backers. According to data from the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, British military aid up to the end of 2024 totaled $10.4 billion, putting the country in third place behind the United States and Germany among Ukraine’s international partners. Crucially, the UK has also often led by example in providing Ukraine with new categories of weapons including modern battle tanks and cruise missiles, paving the way for others to do likewise.

In addition to direct military aid, British support for Ukraine also extends to cooperation in areas including cybersecurity, intelligence, and countering hybrid threats. The UK continues to assist in the reform of the Ukrainian defense sector and provides training for Ukrainian military personnel. In the diplomatic arena, Britain advocates for tough sanctions measures against Russia and draws international attention to the Kremlin’s crimes in Ukraine.

This strategic support for Ukraine has enabled Britain to reassert its leadership position on the global stage following the country’s exit from the European Union. By supporting Ukraine, post-Brexit Britain has demonstrated that it remains a force in international affairs and a major contributor to European security. British support for the Ukrainian war effort has also made it possible to overcome Brexit-related tensions and build new partnerships with key European countries such as Germany, France, and Italy.

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British backing for Ukraine is about much more than mere power projection, of course. There is a broad cross-party consensus in Westminster that Europe’s collective security is inextricably linked to the outcome of the war in Ukraine. The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine has coincided with a particularly turbulent period in British politics, with four different prime ministers and a change in government since February 2022. Throughout all this, the country’s position on Ukraine has remained largely unchanged.

Ties between London and Kyiv are now poised to strengthen further. The exact nature and objectives of a potential international peacekeeping force for Ukraine are not yet clear, but if current plans proceed as anticipated, it seems all but certain that British troops will feature prominently in any deployment. This would deepen a bilateral relationship that looks set to be at the heart of Europe’s new security architecture in the coming years.

As Europe adjusts to the dramatic shifts in US foreign policy initiated by the Trump administration, Britain is playing an important role as a transatlantic intermediary, while also leading European efforts to bolster Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression. Almost ten years after the country voted to leave the EU, Britain is now once again proving itself indispensable to European security.

Alina Hrytsenko is co-founder of the Kyiv-based Research Solutions analytical network. She was previously a senior consultant at the National Institute for Strategic Studies.

The plan’s $53 billion price tag would be sourced from international organizations and investments. In calling for a group of Palestinian technocrats to manage the reconstruction, and for the Palestinian Authority to eventually lead Gaza, the plan stresses Palestinian ownership of the process. The Arab leaders who have backed the plan have committed to making their case for this plan internationally and for hosting an international conference in Cairo in April dedicated to Gaza’s recovery and reconstruction, in cooperation with Palestinians and the United Nations.

On the other hand, Trump’s plan neglects the Palestinians, echoing policies and plans he released during his first term. But the Palestinian question remains pivotal in the Middle East and can’t be disregarded in favor of broader regional peace that doesn’t include the Palestinians. Trump’s Gaza plan also fails to answer many questions about the logistics of moving two million Palestinians out of the Gaza Strip (likely against their will) and about strategies for the countries that will receive them and how to secure Arab cooperation. Meanwhile, the Egyptian plan answers critical questions, specifically ones about Gaza’s political future (one without Hamas in power).

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The Trump administration would benefit from supporting the Egyptian plan. Throughout his campaign and initial months in office, Trump has vowed to bring peace to the Middle East; backing the Egyptian plan would enable him to keep his word. Any attempted forced removal of Palestinians from Gaza, as implied by the Trump plan, would likely lead to armed resistance—and a return to war. That war would be costly for the United States, at a time when the Trump administration has prioritized reducing the government’s expenditures. The resumption of war would likely lead to more US aid to Israel: Since the start of the Israel-Hamas war, Israel received at least twelve billion dollars in military aid from the United States. This estimation doesn’t include the cost of the US military operations in the wider Middle East (including around the Red Sea) or any economic assistance to Israel. Trump’s plan would be costly morally, politically, and financially, not only for the United States, but any other party that would cooperate to implement this plan. Given that the White House has said that the United States won’t pay for this plan, it will be challenging to find partners to fund it.

Witkoff’s comments on the Egyptian plan last week reflected two main sticking points for the Trump administration. The first is the timeline. While the Egyptian plan outlined reconstruction that would take place over five years without displacing Gazans, Witkoff suggested a longer period between ten and fifteen years and reiterated the administration’s concerns that the Strip would be uninhabitable during that time. A joint technical committee of engineers from Gaza and other parties could help resolve this issue by recommending what is possible in terms of the reconstruction timeline and process. The second point is the future of Hamas. Witkoff has concerns about the future of Hamas as a militant group. The Egyptian plan did not deal with this point, but it did suggest a political process in Gaza that results in the return of the Palestinian Authority. US officials should engage with different Palestinian groups, including the Palestinian Authority, as they did with Hamas. This may carry the promise of a long-term security arrangement in parallel with a political horizon to settle this conflict.

Israel also dismissed the plan last week, arguing that it “fails to address the realities of the situation,” in a statement that focused on the political and security future of Gaza. Although the Egyptian plan emphasizes the Palestinian ownership of this process, it does overlap with Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid’s vision for Egypt to assume responsibility of Gaza for eight to fifteen years. That echoes an Israeli request from 2005—when Israel said it disengaged from Gaza—to no longer bear responsibility for the Gaza Strip. With the Egyptian plan, Arab countries have taken a leadership role that will likely amount to taking de facto responsibility of Gaza, even if the Palestinian Authority is in power.

The Egyptian plan offers a base to secure many parties’ interests and create the required regional stability to buy time for diplomacy. US backing would help in the implementation of the plan and in addressing threats to the plan such as the resumption of war in Gaza, tensions resulting from the Israeli military operations in the West Bank, Israeli rejection of Palestinian power in Gaza after the war ends, and Israeli refusal of a Palestinian state. Trump should support the Egyptian plan or at least engage with it, both for the plan’s political and financial benefits and also for regional peace.

Ahmed Nabil is an adjunct lecturer at the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies at Wayne State University.

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What Trump’s approach to Europe means for the Western Balkans

Agon Maliqi — Fri, 07 Mar 2025 19:52:26 +0000

Under President Donald Trump, the United States has rapidly shifted its approach toward Russia and the war in Ukraine. This has many pockets of Europe scrambling to understand the local implications of this change and to adjust their postures accordingly. The Western Balkans—a part of the continent outside the European Union (EU) where the United States has a significant security and development footprint—is already feeling the effects and is bracing for more.

The Trump administration is not expected to focus intently on the Western Balkans anytime soon. Yet it is reasonable to expect that a divergence between the United States and the EU on broader questions of security and trade will be reflected in the region. This could make the Western Balkans into an area of competition rather than complementarity for Washington and Brussels.

Western policy fragmentation could reshape regional dynamics that until recently had been anchored around EU and NATO accession—twin goals that the United States and the EU have pushed for together. Regional leaders who are angry with Brussels, whatever their reasons, may use the “Trump card” to agitate the EU, which could fuel instability and potentially even arms races and conflict.

For now, questions over the future of NATO, unsubstantiated reports that the US military will retreat from the Balkans, and speculation on how a settlement to end the war in Ukraine could change Europe’s borders are already fueling security dilemmas in the region. This is particularly the case in non-NATO countries, such as Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which have interethnic tensions, border disputes with neighbors, and a reliance on NATO and the United States as guarantors of peace settlements.

Can Europe fill the gaps created by US disengagement and play a credible deterrent role in the Balkans at a time when it may also have to significantly step up its support for Ukraine? What would happen if, as part of its broader rapprochement with Russia, the United States went over Europe’s head and tried to resolve the Kosovo-Serbia dispute, which Brussels—much to the dismay of Washington—has failed to do for fourteen years? These are questions European policymakers need to start asking themselves.

But the uncertainty the United States’ policy shifts have caused in Europe could also turn out to be a blessing in disguise. The United States’ disengagement from the region could put further productive pressure on Europe to take care of its own security, fill the gaps in democracy promotion that Washington is leaving behind, and jolt EU enlargement from its current limping state.

Backlash against Brussels

US-EU discord is already deepening regional fragmentation, mostly in an anti-EU direction. Early signs of this were visible in last week’s United Nations General Assembly vote on Ukraine, which pit the EU against Russia and the United States.

While Serbia, the region’s hedging power, did vote in favor of the EU-sponsored resolution backing Ukraine, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić later backtracked and suggested that it was a mistake. North Macedonia—a country whose membership in the EU has been blocked by its neighbors—notably abstained. With Hungary the only EU country to abstain, the contours of a regional Kremlin-friendly Budapest-Belgrade-Skopje axis—hostile toward Brussels and able to paralyze decision making in the EU—are forming.

Countries along this axis understand the transactional nature of the Trump administration and are actively courting strategic US investments for further leverage. In other cases, like in Bosnia and Herzegovina—where Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik is ramping up his secessionist agenda—troublemakers are feeling emboldened to test the limits of the new geopolitical environment.

On the other side of the spectrum is the region’s most pro-US country, Kosovo, which finds itself in a strategic pickle, as its statehood and security rely on transatlantic unity. What’s more, the country’s decision making has been paralyzed in the aftermath of an inconclusive election in February, which could drag out the formation of a new government for weeks, if not months.

Kosovo is highly dependent on the United States for its security and has many grievances with the EU. Its statehood is still not recognized by five EU member states, which blocks any advancement to candidate status, and Pristina remains under EU restrictive measures due to how the outgoing government handled affairs in its Serb-majority north. At least one major part of Kosovo’s political spectrum is also angry at the EU for its treatment of Kosovo’s former leaders who are on trial for war crimes at The Hague—a grievance that some members of the Trump administration apparently share.

Whether Kosovo uses its “Trump card” in the context of a US-EU split depends largely on who forms the next government and what the Trump administration has to offer. For instance, a breakthrough in international recognition would be a compelling prospect. Yet, Kosovo also remains somewhat anxious about Trump’s cordial relations with Belgrade, while acting Prime Minister Albin Kurti, whose party came in first in the recent elections, had an infamously difficult history with the first Trump administration.

Albania and Montenegro seem to be more aligned with Brussels at the moment, as they have positioned themselves as regional frontrunners in the EU accession path and have both set the ambitious goal of joining the bloc in the next few years. Yet, this EU path is affected by another major shift in Washington’s foreign policy. EU accession is heavily centered on rule of law and democratic reforms, areas in which the United States has invested in the past few decades. The Trump administration’s decision to halt foreign aid through the US Agency for International Development (USAID) has given such efforts a major hit. For example, in the past few years, Albania has made progress on tackling elite impunity through new rule of law bodies, which were built largely through US technical expertise and are now vulnerable.

The disruption in the operations of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED)—a key pillar of US democracy promotion—is also shrinking the space for regional civil society. The Serbian government is now persecuting some of the leading pro-democracy nongovernmental organizations under the convenient pretext of “abusing USAID funds.”

How Europe can fill the gap in the Western Balkans

To prevent the further deterioration of the security situation and an authoritarian descent throughout the Western Balkans, Europe needs to step up and claim its role as an anchor of regional security and democracy. On security, that would require not just the usual French-German leadership within the EU, but also an active role for European NATO powers such as the United Kingdom and Turkey, both of which are invested in preserving the regional order and have troops on the ground in the Western Balkans. The upcoming visit to the region by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte is a welcome sign and should be followed by firm guarantees of deterrence.

On democracy, the EU already has the instruments in place to fund institutional reforms or support civil society—such as the continent’s NED equivalent, the European Endowment for Democracy. Now, it needs to use those instruments to fill the financial gaps left by the United States.

However, the real litmus test of Europe’s power will be its ability to resolve the lingering bilateral disputes in the Western Balkans and to finally push the region forward toward EU accession. Yet, these goals would be best served by an approach that tries to work together with Washington, rather than against it.

Competition over Western Balkans policy between the EU and the United States over the next four years would deepen the region’s fragmentation, undermining any attempts for an agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. Europe also needs Washington engaged because there is a need to deter Russia from continuing to play a spoiler role in the Western Balkans through its regional allies, primarily Serbia. The current US-Russia dialogue seems broad in scope—Washington and Moscow recently discussed Middle East issues—and, with US-EU coordination, these talks could be used to serve joint Western interests in the Balkans.

At the same time, there are actions the EU could take on its own that could incentivize regional actors to anchor around its goals. It could start, for example, by eliminating decision-making obstacles to its enlargement process that have allowed individual member states to stall and veto candidate countries’ membership bids over petty disputes. Much like in the case of Ukraine, Washington cannot be blamed for, nor expected to solve, problems of the EU’s own making.

Agon Maliqi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is a political and foreign policy analyst from Pristina, Kosovo.

Note: Some Atlantic Council work funded by the US government has been halted as a result of the Trump administration’s Stop Work Orders issued under the executive order “Reevaluating and Realigning US Foreign Aid.”

***

The Western Balkans stands at the nexus of many of Europe’s critical challenges. Some, if not all, of the countries of the region may soon join the European Union and shape the bloc’s ability to become a more effective geopolitical player. At the same time, longstanding disputes in the region, coupled with institutional weaknesses, will continue to pose problems and present a security vulnerability for NATO that could be exploited by Russia or China. The region is also a transit route for westward migration, a source of critical raw materials, and an important node in energy and trade routes. The BalkansForward column will explore the key strategic dynamics in the region and how they intersect with broader European and transatlantic goals.

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Europe has the resources to defend itself and back Ukraine against Russia

Agnia Grigas — Tue, 04 Mar 2025 21:32:50 +0000

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen unveiled an unprecedented $840 billion plan to increase EU defense spending on March 4 as the continent continues to grapple with the dramatic changes taking place in the international security landscape amid US President Donald Trump’s new foreign policy agenda. “Europe is ready to massively boost its defense spending,” she stated in Brussels, noting that this was necessary to back Ukraine against ongoing Russian aggression and also “to address the long-term need to take on much more responsibility for our own European security.”

EU leaders are expected to discuss the proposed package at an emergency meeting later this week, marking the latest in a flurry of recent summits held to bolster European security and expand support for Ukraine. This sense of urgency reflects mounting alarm in European capitals as the Trump administration signals its intention to reduce the United States commitment to Europe and announces a pause in military assistance to Ukraine. With faith in transatlantic unity now rapidly evaporating, Europe is waking up to a new geopolitical reality and recognizing that it must now be prepared to defend itself.

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Throughout Europe, there is an acute awareness that the continent is not yet fully prepared to meet the threat posed by Vladimir Putin’s revanchist Russia. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the largest war in Europe since World War II, is currently in its fourth year. Meanwhile, the Kremlin continues to escalate its broader hybrid war against the West. There are now growing concerns that unless Russia can be stopped in Ukraine, Moscow will seek to exploit uncertainly over the US position in order to expand its campaign against a vulnerable Europe.

In this fast-evolving geopolitical environment, European leaders must find the political resolve to translate recent statements of intent into the kind of bold policies necessary to safeguard the continent’s security. This will also require considerable powers of persuasion in order to convince complacent European audiences that security is now a priority. The good news is that on paper at least, Europe possesses the resources to assert its strength and stand alone against Russia.

The economic disparity between the European Union and Russia is particularly striking. In 2024, the combined GDP of EU member states reached $19 trillion, dwarfing Russia’s approximately $2 trillion economy. According to IMF data from February 2025, Russia does not even rank among the world’s top ten economies, trailing behind the United States, China, Germany, Japan, India, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada, and Brazil. Although the Russian economy has withstood sanctions imposed in response to the invasion of Ukraine, the ongoing war has left it overextended.

In terms of population, the EU’s 449 million citizens significantly outnumber Russia’s 145 million. Moreover, Russia’s longstanding demographic crisis has worsened in recent years. Up to one million Russians are believed to have emigrated since 2022, representing the largest exodus since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Estimated Russian battlefield losses in Ukraine numbering hundreds of thousands are further undermining the country’s already deteriorating demographic outlook.

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Europe holds a significant edge over Russia in military spending. In 2024, EU nations collectively spent $457 billion on defense compared to Russia’s $146 billion defense budget. While Russia has moved its economy to a wartime footing and is set to continue increasing military spending, many European countries have recently committed to boosting their own defense budgets. There has long been reluctance among some NATO members to meet the alliance’s two percent target, but French President Emmanuel Macron and others are now calling on Europeans to dramatically increase annual defense spending to over three percent of GDP.

While Russia retains a strategic advantage in nuclear capabilities, the UK and France possess nuclear arsenals that can provide Europe with a credible deterrent. Europe has been steadily boosting military output since 2022, with share prices in European weapons producers surging to new highs in recent days in expectation of further investment in the continent’s defense industries. In terms of conventional military strength, the balance of power is more nuanced. Europe, including the UK, fields around 1.47 million active duty military personnel, according to Bruegel and SIPRI data from 2024. In comparison, Russia is reportedly working to expand its active duty force to 1.5 million troops.

In the realm of economic warfare, Russia faces significant constraints. Russian energy exports to Europe were once a key Kremlin tool but this leverage has significantly diminished since the onset of the Ukraine invasion. Instead, the United States has emerged as a key exporter of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), enabling European countries to diversify away from Russia. While Russian energy exports to Europe continue, the continent increasingly relies on US, Norwegian, and Algerian gas.

Given the overall balance of power between Europe and Russia, European leaders have ample reason to adopt a more resolute stance. By leveraging its economic strength, demographic advantage, and military potential, Europe can confidently counter Putin’s imperial ambitions and provide Ukraine with the support it needs to resist Russia’s invasion. The onus now is on European leaders to transform these strategic advantages into effective policies and actions. With sufficient political will, Europe can defend itself and back Ukraine against Russia.

Agnia Grigas is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and the author of The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas, Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire and other books.

The Islamic Republic has not yet softened its position on the nuclear file, even after being weakened by a series of killings of leaders across its proxy network and by the degrading of a chunk of its air defenses and missile capacities. While Iranian decisionmakers have recognized the reality that the 2015 text of the JCPOA is long dead, they have clung to the vision of resurrecting a new deal premised on the basic bargain of temporary nuclear constraints in exchange for sanctions relief, using the JCPOA as a reference point or framework.

Some Iranian officials have taken to the airwaves to hint that there may be willingness to discuss nonnuclear concerns, but those who are the real decisionmakers on these issues—the supreme leader and commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—have shunned talks over its missile and drone programs and other regional files. Their stances speak louder than the propagandists trying to give an impression to Western constituencies and others that such fundamental change is possible. History has shown that it is not.

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In February, the supreme leader himself delivered public remarks warning against negotiations with the Trump administration: “One shall not negotiate with a government like this,” he said. “Negotiating is unwise, unintelligent, not honorable.” Already this has triggered hardened rhetoric from Iranian officials, such as President Masoud Pezeshkian, who had previously made more conciliatory comments towards the Trump administration. Since Khamenei’s speech, the Pezeshkian administration has experienced further headwinds with the impeachment of Economy Minister Abdolnaser Hemmati as well as the resignation of Vice President for Strategic Affairs Javad Zarif, who has long been seen as the face of the Islamic Republic’s engagement with the United States.

But Khamenei’s warning last month was not the sweeping ban he laid down in September 2019, when he said, “the policy of maximum pressure on the Iranian nation is of little importance, and all the officials in the Islamic Republic unanimously believe that there will be no negotiations at any level with the United States.” The Islamic Republic under Khamenei will likely never truly walk away completely from the negotiating table, as its political weaponization is a valuable tool to buy time for the regime and divide the United States from within and from its allies. This does not necessarily mean there will be direct and public diplomacy with the Trump administration at this juncture. However, Khamenei’s latest comments seem to leave some room for diplomacy in that they do not necessarily rule out indirect discussions. Such discussions could take place through various channels of communication that Tehran has long maintained with Washington, including through Arab regional interlocutors and European governments. Russia has also reportedly agreed to serve as an intermediary. Still, the obstacles are significant.

For now, on substance, Iran and the United States are talking past each other about “deals.” Iran is still speaking in the language of the JCPOA. But US officials appear to have something different in mind. In a recent interview, Trump publicly disavowed the JCPOA formula, complaining about its short-term duration. This was followed by his national security advisor expressing a willingness to talk to Iran as long as Tehran wants to give up its entire nuclear program. The US secretary of state hinted at a similar demand, noting that in the past, “efforts that Iran has undertaken diplomatically have been only about how to extend the time frame” for its nuclear program and to continue to enrich, sponsor terrorism, build long-range weapons, and “sow instability throughout the region.”

Trump’s National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 (NSPM-2) included related pledges, vowing to “deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon and end the regime’s nuclear extortion racket.” NSPM-2 also employed mandatory language stating that the US ambassador to the United Nations will “work with key allies to complete the snapback”—or restoration—”of international sanctions and restrictions on Iran.” This language evokes past US demands for zero enrichment or reprocessing in Iran, which the first Trump administration endorsed. Triggering snapback would also restore previous UN Security Council resolutions, inked before the 2015 JCPOA, which included demands for Iran to suspend “all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities . . . and work on all heavy-water related projects.”

NSPM-2 likewise declared that it is US policy that “Iran be denied a nuclear weapon and intercontinental ballistic missiles,” among other measures to counter Iran’s malign behavior beyond its nuclear program. These US positions are reminiscent of the 2003 Libya disarmament deal, in which the country pledged to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction programs, including nuclear, and to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime. However, this is a fundamentally different paradigm from the JCPOA, which allowed Iran to enrich uranium up to 3.67 percent purity and did not touch its missile program.

In fact, Iran’s supreme leader has warned that US officials “intend to systematically reduce Iran’s nuclear facilities, similar to how they did with a North African country”—a hint at Libya—”ultimately leading to the shutdown of Iran’s nuclear industry.” In 2011, Khamenei (referring to Libyan dictator Muammar Ghaddafi) said that “this gentleman wrapped up all his nuclear facilities, packed them on a ship and delivered them to the West and said, ‘Take them!’” He added, “Look where we are, and in what position they are now.” In 2023, after talks about reviving the JCPOA stalled, Khamenei reiterated that “there is nothing wrong with the agreement [with the West], but the infrastructure of our nuclear industry should not be touched.”

Despite forty-six years of failed diplomacy, outside observers have been insisting Iran is ripe for a durable diplomatic arrangement with the United States. Some supporters of negotiations with Iran have also been wishcasting that Trump suddenly adopted the Obama administration’s Iran policy based on an overreading of the new president’s rhetoric and the absence of certain officials, such as former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo who took a hardline stance, from the policymaking process. But this is a false narrative, one that even some Islamic Republic officials like to promote while arguing that Trump was suckered into an Iran policy that was not his own, despite him expressing disapproval of the JCPOA during his first presidential campaign, well before his national security team was assembled.

There is no public evidence to date that the maximum Tehran is prepared to give—a JCPOA-style arrangement—will meet the minimum the Trump administration is prepared to accept. If current positions hold, this sets the stage for a showdown, not a deal, in the near term, necessitating the development of a robust pressure architecture to further sharpen Tehran’s choices.

Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI). His research focus includes Iranian leadership dynamics and Iran’s military and security apparatus. He is on X @JasonMBrodsky.

The post The stage is set for a US-Iran showdown—not a deal appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Mercenaries in DRC: “Do not come for adventure here”

Alia Brahimi — Mon, 03 Mar 2025 19:04:33 +0000

In Season 2, Episode 10 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi is joined by African politics and security expert Ben Shepherd. After 300 Romanian mercenaries were cornered by M23 rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in January, Ben reflects on the reasons behind the rebels’ advance and the perennial need for DRC’s government to look to external security providers for help managing threats.

Ben outlines how the Congolese military has been drawn into patterns of patronage that systematically undermine its effectiveness. They also discuss Rwanda’s support for M23, regional jockeying for access to DRC’s vast mineral wealth, and a recently thwarted coup involving three US nationals.

“The Mobutist system… is perversely stable in terms of maintaining itself, but it can’t do public goods and one of those public goods is territorial security. So that is perpetually outsourced.”

Ben Shepherd, specialist on African politics and conflict

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Putin uses NATO as an excuse for his war against Ukrainian statehood

Peter Dickinson — Fri, 28 Feb 2025 12:15:19 +0000

As speculation swirls over the possible terms of a US-brokered peace deal to end the Russo-Ukrainian War, the Kremlin is insisting that above all else, the future Ukraine must be neutral and demilitarized. This is nothing new. Vladimir Putin has been citing Ukraine’s demilitarization as his key war aim since the very first morning of the invasion. Demilitarization also featured prominently in abortive peace talks held during the initial weeks of the war, with Russian representatives demanding an approximately 95 percent reduction in the size of Ukraine’s army, which was to become a skeleton force of just fifty thousand troops.

Calls for a demilitarized Ukraine have remained a central feature of Russian rhetoric throughout the past three years of the invasion, and have been accompanied by demands that Kyiv accept permanent neutrality and rule out the prospect of joining NATO or concluding military alliances with any Western powers. Russian officials have also consistently stated that postwar Ukraine must be banned from receiving weapons or training from the West. Most recently, the Kremlin has rejected the idea of deploying Western troops in Ukraine as peacekeepers to monitor a potential ceasefire agreement. In other words, Putin’s preferred peace terms envision a disarmed and defenseless Ukraine with virtually no army of its own and no chance of receiving any meaningful military aid from the international community.

Putin may currently find it advantageous to entertain talk of peace, but his insistence on Ukraine’s unilateral disarmament reveals what he really has in mind for the country. The Russian dictator is obviously preparing the ground for the eventual resumption of his current invasion, which he fully intends to continue as soon as he has rearmed and circumstances allow. Why else would the demilitarization of Ukraine be seen in Moscow as such a priority?

No serious military analyst would argue that Ukraine poses a credible security threat to Russia itself. Likewise, no Ukrainian politician or public figure has ever harbored any territorial ambitions against their country’s far larger and wealthier neighbor. On the contrary, the sole purpose of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is to defend the country against Russian attack. The Kremlin’s emphasis on disarming Ukraine should therefore be seen as a massive red flag for the Trump White House and the wider international community that signals Putin’s determination to complete his conquest and extinguish Ukrainian statehood altogether.

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There are worrying signs that this is not yet fully understood in Western capitals. Instead, US President Donald Trump and senior members of his administration have recently begun shifting responsibility for the war away from Russia and echoing the Kremlin’s own longstanding efforts to blame the invasion on NATO expansion. Predictably, Russian officials including Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov have welcomed this dramatic change in the US position regarding the causes of the war. However, Russia’s whole NATO narrative suffers from a number of obvious flaws that should spark skepticism among even the most credulous consumers of Kremlin propaganda.

According to Putin, Ukraine’s deepening ties with NATO forced him to launch the full-scale invasion of February 2022. In reality, Ukraine’s prospects of joining the alliance were virtually nonexistent at the time, and had not significantly improved since Kyiv was first fobbed off with platitudes at a landmark NATO summit way back in 2008. Even the Russian seizure of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014 failed to produce any change of heart among alliance members, with key NATO countries including the United States and Germany openly expressing their opposition to Ukrainian accession. Indeed, on the eve of the full-scale invasion, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz assured Putin that Ukrainian NATO membership was out of the question for at least the next 30 years. This makes it difficult to accept Moscow’s claims that Ukraine’s NATO aspirations represented some kind of immediate danger to Russia.

There are also good reasons to question whether the Kremlin genuinely views NATO as a threat to Russian national security. Thanks to founding member Norway, the alliance has shared a border with Russia ever since its establishment in 1949. More recently, the accession of Poland and the Baltic states at the turn of the millennium dramatically expanded Russia’s shared border with NATO and placed the alliance a few hundred kilometers away from Moscow and Saint Petersburg. This close proximity to Russia’s two biggest cities did not lead to any discernible rise in border tensions.

The most revealing evidence of Russia’s true attitude toward NATO came in 2022 when Finland and Sweden reacted to the invasion of Ukraine by ending decades of neutrality and announcing plans to join the alliance. Putin responded to this landmark decision by declaring that Russia had “no problem” with the accession of the two Nordic nations, despite the fact that Finnish membership would more than double Russia’s border with NATO, while Swedish membership would turn the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake. Putin has since underlined his indifference to this expanded NATO presence on his doorstep by withdrawing most Russian troops from the Finnish frontier and leaving this supposedly vulnerable border zone largely undefended.

So far, nobody has been able to adequately explain the glaring inconsistency in Putin’s logic. He appears to be unfazed by the presence of NATO troops along the Russian border in Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. And yet at the same time, he expects us to believe that the faint prospect of Ukraine joining the alliance at some point in the distant future is sufficiently alarming to justify the largest European invasion since World War II. Militarily, this makes no sense. The only reasonable conclusion is that Putin’s objections relate specifically to Ukraine and not to NATO in general. He knows perfectly well that the alliance poses no security threat to Russia itself, but does not want to risk a growing NATO presence that might prevent him from achieving his expansionist objective of subjugating Ukraine.

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Online Event Tue, June 17, 2025 • 1:00 pm ET

Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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While Putin moans to foreign leaders about the inequities of NATO expansion, when speaking to domestic audiences he is typically far more candid about the imperial ambitions that shaped his decision to invade Ukraine. For much of his reign, Putin has insisted that Ukrainians are really Russians (“one people”), and has repeatedly accused modern Ukraine of being a invented nation occupying historically Russian lands. On the eve of the full-scale invasion, he published a rambling 5,000-word history essay that many likened to a declaration of war against Ukrainian statehood. During the first summer of the war, he compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great.

Putin’s frequent denials of Ukraine’s right to exist have set the tone throughout Russian society. Poisonous anti-Ukrainian rhetoric has become so commonplace in the Kremlin-controlled Russian media that UN investigators believe it may constitute “incitement to genocide.” Meanwhile, senior Kremlin officials have sought to demonstrate their loyalty to Putin by echoing his vicious attacks on Ukraine. Former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev has declared that “the existence of Ukraine is mortally dangerous for Ukrainians,” while top Putin aide Nikolai Patrushev recently suggested Ukraine may soon “cease to exist.” These are not the words of rational politicians addressing legitimate national security concerns.

This genocidal rhetoric is being more than matched by the actions of the Russian army in Ukraine. Wherever the Kremlin has been able to establish control, Russian troops have systematically detained local officials, military veterans, journalists, religious leaders, civic activists, Ukrainian patriots, and anyone else deemed to be a potential threat. Thousands have disappeared into a vast network of prisons amid a climate of fear that has been described by Britain’s The Economist as a “totalitarian hell.” Many more, including thousands of children, have been subjected to forced deportation and sent to Russia. Those who remain are being pressured to accept Russian citizenship, while all reminders of Ukrainian statehood, culture, and national identity are being methodically removed. Needless to say, anyone who dares speak the Ukrainian language risks severe punishment.

These horrors make a complete mockery of attempts to appease the Russians with limited territorial concessions. US negotiators need to recognize that Putin is not fighting for land. He views the current invasion in far broader terms as an historic mission to erase Ukraine from the map of Europe. In Putin’s chilling worldview, extinguishing Ukrainian statehood is a vital step toward the reversal of the Soviet collapse and the revival of the Russian Empire. He has pursued this messianic vision with increasing violence ever since Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, and is now closer than ever to realizing his goal.

This is why peace negotiations with Russia must focus primarily on establishing long-term security guarantees that are sufficiently credible to convince the Kremlin. Anything less will be viewed in Moscow as yet more proof of Western weakness and interpreted as a tacit invitation to go further. After all, that has been the pattern ever since the Russian invasion first began in 2014. Putin’s campaign to destroy Ukraine has been gradually unfolding in plain sight for over a decade and already ranks among the worst crimes of the twenty-first century. If Western leaders choose to ignore this and push ahead with a bad peace while leaving Ukraine without the support and security it needs to survive, they will be complicit in all that follows.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Bakir joins Strait Talk to discuss Syria’s interest in KAAN

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:15:43 +0000

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Bakir joins Syria TV to discuss Syria’s partnership with Qatar

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:15:23 +0000

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Katz in the Kyiv Post: Can Putin really keep Russia’s bases in Syria?

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:14:19 +0000

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How Trump can deliver on disrupting Red Sea weapons smuggling by the Houthis

Eleonora Ardemagni — Fri, 21 Feb 2025 22:08:31 +0000

The United States and its allies are stepping up efforts to curb the smuggling of Iranian weapons for the Houthis (aka Ansar Allah) in Yemen. US President Donald Trump’s redesignation of the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) on just the third day of his presidency, combined with the reinstated “maximum pressure” sanctions policy against Iran, aim to target pro-Iran financial and weapons’ networks. The FTO executive order states “it is now the policy of the United States to cooperate with its regional partners to eliminate the Houthis’ capabilities and operations, deprive them of resources, and thereby end their attacks on U.S. personnel and civilians, U.S. partners, and maritime shipping in the Red Sea.” These goals dovetail with the Yemen Maritime Security Partnership, launched in November by the United Kingdom with US backing, to support the Yemen Coast Guard (YCG).

These choices signal that the United States is focused on countering the Houthis’ weapon supply chains, while also suggesting that the White House is keeping the political door open for a possible stronger military engagement against the Iran-backed group. For the United States, a stronger maritime partnership with Yemen’s government and allied forces in southern Yemen can be the first step to curb armed groups’ rising offensive capabilities in the Red Sea region. This would support Yemeni institutions to restore a degree of sovereignty in the country; weaken the emerging, weapons-driven cooperation among the Houthis, al-Shabaab, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); and would make it more difficult for Russia to develop game-changing military relations with the Houthis.

In a break from the past, the main international and regional stakeholders (the United States, the European Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council states, Israel) now share converging perspectives on the global threat emanating from Houthi-controlled areas. Degrading their offensive capabilities is widely perceived as the only viable option left, as the Yemeni government is calling for international support to regain Houthi-held territories, starting from the coastal Red Sea area.

Supporting the Yemeni Coast Guard

When empowered through equipment and training, which increased in the final months of the Biden administration, and also with regular payment of their salaries, the YCG can tackle the arrival of smuggled weapons to the Houthis. Task forces of the US-led Combined Maritime Forces have often seized dhows carrying Houthi-destined weapons in international waters, while the YCG could effectively complement the effort within Yemeni territorial waters.

As part of the US-endorsed Yemen Maritime Security Partnership, the United Kingdom will provide boats, training, and assistance to the YCG to protect Yemen’s coasts and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea; the United Kingdom will also fund training programs for the Coast Guard via the Technical Assistance Fund for Yemen. In December, then-US ambassador to the United Nations (UN) Linda Thomas-Greenfield stated that Washington “will continue to work” with the YCG “to control illicit activity along the country’s coastline.” In early February, a senior Yemeni official visited US Central Command to discuss how to counter Houthi threats and propaganda.

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In recent months, the YCG has increased the interception of Iranian-provided weapons bound to the Houthis. For instance, on February 13, the YCG intercepted a cargo vessel carrying a substantial number of weapons that had departed from Djibouti towards the Houthi-controlled port of Al-Salif in Hodeida. The interception occurred in coordination with the National Resistance Forces, the armed group led by Tareq Saleh, whose fiefdom is in Mocha, close to the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, and whose forces control the Red Sea division of the YCG. The nephew of the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, the younger Saleh isn’t part of the government but one of eight members of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC).

According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, most of the Coast Guard’s vessels operate in the Red Sea, not in the Arabian Sea. This is the case even though much of the Houthis’ smuggled weapons enter Yemeni territory through the Arabian Sea (Hadhramaut and Mahra) and the Gulf of Aden because of transhipment off the Somali coast.

However, routes have partly changed since Yemen’s 2022 national truce. Although the truce is no longer technically in place, the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM) continues to inspect ships arriving at Hodeida to prevent weapons and munitions from being transferred to the Houthis, in compliance with the UN arms embargo. But the UNVIM now has to deal with more vessels than before, in particular container ships that previously couldn’t dock at the Hodeida port, increasing the risk that inspections are not accurate. Therefore, a stronger and better-organized presence of the YCG in the Arabian Sea would help Yemen to be more effective against weapons smuggling in territorial waters.

Preventing the expansion of a smuggling network

In the Red Sea region, the smuggling of weapons goes beyond the Houthis, but the Houthis—with Iran’s backing—increasingly are the actor driving this trade. The rise of instability on both shores of the Red Sea (Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia), with non-state armed groups developing growing offensive capabilities, makes the task of curbing arms smuggling even more urgent for the United States and regional allies. It starts with going after the financing.

Since late 2023, the Houthis’ attacks against shipping and Israel have allowed the group to increase its visibility and influence and to shape new alliances in the Red Sea. While weapons provided by Iran are key to these tactical alliances, the Houthis are using these alliances to carve out a network of financing, supply, and support that is autonomous from Tehran.

According to the UN, the Houthis established an “opportunistic alliance” with AQAP in Yemen, providing drones to the Sunni terrorist group. Furthermore, what the UN described as “increased smuggling activities” between the Houthis and al-Shabaab (the Somali terrorist group affiliated with AQAP) are taking place via Somalia’s Puntland State, as previously warned by US intelligence.

A more proactive stance by the United States against weapons smuggling off the coast of Yemen would also reduce risks of strengthened military ties between the Houthis and Russia. According to several media reports, the Iranian-backed group has been in talks with Moscow for the provision of weapons, a development facilitated by the Russian-Iranian strategic partnership. Russia’s military intelligence personnel have reportedly been spotted in Houthi-held areas of the country, and Moscow reportedly recruited Yemenis through Houthi intermediaries to join the battlefield in Ukraine. However, a de-escalation between the United States and Russia on Ukraine likely would limit—at least in the short term—Moscow’s appetite for stronger military cooperation with the Houthis aimed at damaging Western interests.

Strengthening Yemen’s government and institutions

The more the United States supports Yemeni forces to curb the Houthis’ smuggling activities, the more Yemen’s government and allied forces in the southern and southwestern regions can try to restore a degree of institutional presence in the country. Since the Houthis started attacks against maritime vessels, the Yemeni government and allied forces have increasingly called for US and international support to regain Houthi-held territories.

Speaking at this month’s Munich Security Conference, PLC Chairman Rashad al-Alimi stated that the Yemeni government “must be empowered to exert full control over its territory” and this can be achieved only with “international support,” enforcing measures to prevent the flow of Iranian weapons to Yemen.

Previously, at the Rome MED Dialogues in November, Yemeni Foreign Minister Shaya Mohsin al-Zindani explicitly asked the United States and international partners to enhance the capabilities of Yemen’s security and military forces, especially the Coast Guard.

As the Trump administration’s Yemen policy takes shape, it is clear that choking off the Houthis’ weapons routes is a central part of the president’s strategy, and US partners in Yemen are eager to play an active role. The benefits of a strong, holistic strategy to disrupt these networks would reverberate across the region—and on global maritime traffic.

Eleonora Ardemagni is an expert on Yemen and the GCC states, a senior associate research fellow at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies, and an adjunct professor at ASERI (Graduate School of Economics and International Relations, Milan).

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In strengthening its security architecture, Europe shouldn’t discount Türkiye’s role

Yavuz Türkgenci — Fri, 21 Feb 2025 18:38:25 +0000

With US President Donald Trump now back in the White House, there is new energy in discussions about the European security architecture—generated by the president’s comments about the war in Ukraine, NATO burden sharing, Greenland, and the growing importance of the Asia-Pacific.

Looking at the European security architecture—built for the most part by NATO, the EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)—there is much bolstering to be done. Türkiye,* as a country that is both a significant partner for the European Union and a major NATO ally, could help play a role.

Dents in the NATO armor

NATO has implemented several important measures to enhance European security, particularly following the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014. For example, it has enhanced its forward presence in Poland and the Baltic states, added new members (Sweden and Finland), increased its focus on the Arctic, and modernized its strategies and defense plans. Additionally, many NATO allies have made progress on reaching and even surpassing the goal of spending 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense.

NATO continues to adapt to the evolving European security situation. However, as shown by the war in Ukraine, NATO must do more to enhance its defense industrial base, modernize its command and force structure, and revise its NATO defense planning process.

Additionally, NATO depends heavily on the United States. If the United States pulls back on its support for Ukraine, European countries would need to increase their support in order to maintain the level of aid committed by NATO. However, in such a scenario, European allies may be reluctant to fill the gap, feeling that they need to increase their own defense capabilities in the face of the Russian threat. This would be the case even if Russia’s war in Ukraine ends, particularly for Baltic and Scandinavian allies who feel the threat from Russia more often than other NATO members. Such a dynamic could negatively affect Europe’s collective defense efforts.

NATO has placed much focus on the threat Russia poses to Eastern Europe. However, Russia is also slated to cause new problems in the Arctic. Melting ice is unlocking new transportation routes and raw materials, making the region another hot spot for great-power competition. And even in the absence of conflict, Russia and other actors could deploy hybrid warfare tactics in the region, similar to approaches taken in the Baltic Sea. While NATO has taken some measures—such as Operation Baltic Sentry, which uses naval vessels and surveillance systems to protect undersea infrastructure—NATO may take up additional efforts to scale up its response.

A glaring hole in the CSDP

The CSDP was designed by the European Union to carry out non-Article 5 missions (such as crisis management and conflict prevention) in the post-Cold War era. Considering the new security situation and new missions geared toward fortifying collective defense, non-EU countries play an important role in what the CSDP strives to achieve. As former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has stated, security in Europe is “impossible to envisage,” without the work of non-EU NATO allies. Thus, it would be wise to establish an EU security mechanism that includes non-EU countries. It would also be cost effective to have a more integrated security and defense system with NATO.

The OSCE’s shrinking effectiveness

The OSCE, a security-oriented body with fifty-seven participating countries (including Russia), has played a part in several processes and agreements that have shaped European security, including the Helsinki Final Act, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the Vienna Document on Confidence and Security-Building Measures, and the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security. It has also led a monitoring mission in Ukraine and the Forum for Security Co-operation, which hosts dialogue between OSCE participating countries on military conduct and security building.

However, these agreements and processes have proven ineffective, and some (such as the Minsk agreements) have outright failed, as demonstrated by Russia’s war in Ukraine.

The OSCE should consider new agreements and processes based on the lessons learned from these ineffective or failed examples—and it should ensure that such agreements and processes adequately take new threats and technologies into account. The OSCE, in revisiting its old measures and pursuing new efforts, will need to consider how European security may be impacted by, for example, artificial intelligence, pandemics, cyber warfare, aggression in space, climate change, and migration.

For example, one of the OSCE’s strengths is its ability to conduct field missions and observations in crisis regions. Going forward, such missions and observations must take into account the needs of the digital age. To do so, the OSCE will need the support of its member countries. Yet, technology also has great potential in helping these missions and observations.

Türkiye’s potential

Beyond this framework for European security, Türkiye has the potential to help strengthen the European security architecture.

The country has many advantages: its geopolitical position, defense industry, role in the energy system, renewable energy opportunities, access to strategic transportation routes, infrastructure, and young population.

Türkiye has gained significant experience in resolving crises. Such experience has come from Türkiye’s efforts regarding crises in Ukraine, the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Horn of Africa. Backed by this experience, Türkiye has the ability and potential to contribute to global peace and stability efforts. This capability can be another important contribution to the European security architecture.

Additionally, Türkiye’s defense capabilities could help shore up the European security architecture. The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), which participates in efforts to address regional conflicts and continues to perform important tasks in the fight against terrorism, has significant combat experience and high operational readiness. As a NATO ally, Türkiye—via the TAF—continues to fortify NATO activities including air policing (over Bulgaria, Romania, and the Baltic states), maritime activities, missile defense, and peacekeeping operations. While most countries in the post-Cold War era focused on peacekeeping missions, the Turkish Armed Forces adeptly balanced between maintaining its regular warfare capabilities while contributing to counterterrorism and peacekeeping missions. This experience can be helpful not only to NATO but also to the CSDP (if widened to non-EU allies) as Russia poses a challenge for security in Europe.

In addition, the Turkish defense industry has managed to react quickly to TAF’s combat experiences. TAF has designed a defense planning system through which the force defines operational requirements and defense industry stakeholders define the technology needed. The TAF and defense industry work together to achieve Turkish defense and security goals. Such collaboration between the force and defense industry can help support European security needs.

Finally, seeing as warfare and defense will be shaped by emerging and disruptive technologies, Türkiye’s innovation, particularly in automated systems, can prove useful for Europe. The Turkish defense industry is currently developing unmanned aerial, naval, and ground vehicles. With such technologies, and the military concepts the TAF is developing for these new systems, the Turkish defense industry and TAF have together positioned the country to respond to the needs of the digital age. Europe could harness the advantages of this position.

There is now a new security situation in Europe. Thus, Europe will need to look outside of its current framework for security solutions that can realistically and effectively address today’s challenges amid increasing threats and the evolution of the digital age. Türkiye may be one source of much-needed solutions.

Yavuz Türkgenci is a recently retired three-star general in the Turkish Armed Forces whose career spanned several offices, including western European Union and NATO posts and as the commandant of the Turkish Third Field Army. He holds a doctorate in security strategy design and management.

*This article refers to “Türkiye,” the country name that the Turkish government and United Nations officially adopted in 2022.

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Ukrainian drones reportedly knock out 10 percent of Russian refining capacity

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 13 Feb 2025 22:17:50 +0000

Ukraine’s recent campaign of drone strikes on Russian energy infrastructure has succeeded in knocking out around one-tenth of Russia’s refining capacity, according to analysis by news agency Reuters.

Since the beginning of 2025, Ukraine has launched a wave of long-range drone attacks against military and industrial targets inside Russia. The Kremlin remains tight-lipped over the impact of these air strikes, but open source data and media reports point to significant damage to at least eight Russian refineries along with a number of oil depots and key logistical points such as pumping stations and ports used for oil and gas exports. The range of targets suggests a well-planned Ukrainian campaign to methodically dismantle Russia’s energy infrastructure.

Ukraine’s bombing offensive is proving effective. Calculations by Reuters analysts based on oil industry trading figures covering the period from January to early February 2025 indicate that Ukrainian drone attacks have disabled approximately 10 percent of Russia’s refining capacity. Coupled with the impact of recently imposed United States sanctions against the Kremlin’s shadow fleet of oil tankers, this is expected to leave Moscow with no choice but to slow oil production in the coming months.

Reports of significant disruption to Russia’s energy industry will be welcomed in Kyiv. Ukrainian officials have made no secret of their intention to target the Russian oil and gas sector, which serves as the economic engine of Vladimir Putin’s war machine. The first Ukrainian attacks took place during the initial months of the war, with a marked increase in frequency during 2024. Ukraine’s air offensive against Russia’s energy industry now appears to be entering a new phase of heightened intensity.

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Ukraine’s efforts to bring Putin’s invasion home to Russia have been hampered by restrictions imposed on the use of Western-supplied weapons amid a reluctance among Kyiv’s partners to risk escalating the conflict. The Kremlin has skillfully exploited these fears, with Putin warning explicitly in September 2024 that any attempt to lift restrictions on long-range strikes would mean NATO and Russia were “at war.”

In order to bypass Western restrictions, Ukraine has prioritized the domestic production of long-range drones and missiles capable of striking targets deep inside Russia. Thanks to Ukraine’s innovative defense tech sector and the country’s strong aerospace legacy from the Soviet era, progress has been rapid. In late 2024, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy showcased a number of new domestically produced drones and missiles with expanded ranges and payloads.

Ukrainian officials have stated that they intend to manufacture 30,000 long-range drones and 3000 missiles during the current year. Some of Kyiv’s Western partners also appear to recognize the strategic importance of Ukraine’s growing long-range arsenal, and are providing financing for production along with technical support. However, it will still be some time before Ukraine has sufficient long-range firepower to seriously threaten Russia’s ability to wage war.

At present, Ukraine’s air offensive is achieving the more limited goals of disrupting Russia’s energy industry, stretching the Kremlin’s limited air defenses, and undermining Moscow’s efforts to insulate ordinary Russians from the war. Since the onset of the full-scale invasion three years ago, Putin has been careful to cultivate a business-as-usual climate within Russia itself. Ukraine’s eye-catching daily strikes on oil refineries and storage depots are now sending a powerful message to the Russian public that the war unleashed by the Kremlin in February 2022 will not be fought exclusively on foreign soil.

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Ukraine’s expanding arsenal of domestically produced long-range weapons is particularly important at a time of growing uncertainty over the future of US military aid for the country. Throughout the war, the Ukrainian military has been heavily reliant on the United States and other Western partners for vital weapons supplies. However, there are now mounting concerns in Kyiv that US President Donald Trump’s efforts to reach a compromise peace deal with Putin could leave Ukraine isolated and vulnerable to further Russian aggression.

In the absence of credible NATO-style security guarantees, Ukrainian leaders believe one of the few reliable deterrents would be the proven ability to strike back powerfully at targets inside Russia. Zelenskyy’s “victory plan,” which he presented to Western partners in the final months of 2024, included a call for the supply of long-range missiles as part of a “non-nuclear deterrence package” designed to prevent a fresh Russian invasion. In his traditional New Year address, Zelenskyy spoke at length about Ukraine’s numerous new missile models, calling them “arguments for a just peace.”

There is currently very little to suggest that Putin is interested in any kind of peace with Ukraine, of course. On the contrary, he looks to be more confident of victory than ever, and appears unwilling to compromise on his original war aim of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood. However, if Ukraine can continue escalating its current wave of attacks on Russia’s economically vital but vulnerable energy industry, the Russian dictator may be forced to reassess the prospects of his invasion.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Ukraine is in an existential fight with Russia, resisting a murderous invasion through the resolve, courage, and endurance of the Ukrainian people. Ukrainian resistance is all the more impressive considering Russia’s significant advantages in resources and manpower, and the brutal disregard for human life that it transforms into tactical gains on the battlefield. Given this disparity in military advantage, sustaining Ukrainian resistance requires external support from a coalition of partners providing security assistance in the form of weapons, munitions, and materiel. The United States is, and remains, one of the key members of the coalition that supplies Ukraine.

At the same time, China continues its pressure campaign against Taiwan while increasing military preparedness for a cross-strait invasion. Whether China’s pressure campaign or a future military attack succeeds, the aim is the same: to destroy the sovereignty of a free and democratic Taiwan and subordinate it to communist China.

China is recognized as the premier threat to US national security interests, and the United States is committed to Taiwan’s defense. As such, US, allied, and partnered readiness for this contingency must be adequately resourced. This is essential to deterrence and, should deterrence fail, to fighting and winning.

Therein lies an apparent dilemma. Doesn’t the constant push of US military support to Ukraine drain the United States of critical resources needed to defend Taiwan? This supposed conflict led some commentators to speculate that supporting Ukraine undermines preparedness for a Taiwan fight.

Their case is simple, arguing that supporting Ukraine drains the finite US resources that should be husbanded and prioritized for deterring and fighting China. Every missile, tank, and artillery shell sent to Ukraine is one less round that could be fired in a China contingency. If preparing for a future war with China is the priority, they argue, the United States should deprioritize what they argue is a proxy war it is fighting against Russia.

The fates of Ukraine and Taiwan are entwined

But if this is so, why is Taiwan’s official position that the Russian invasion should be stopped? Why do its officials say the United States should maintain unwavering support to Ukraine, even at Taiwan’s expense? Joseph Wu, formerly the foreign minister of Taiwan under the Tsai Ing-Wen administration and now the secretary general of Taiwan’s National Security Council, argued compellingly that US aid to Ukraine is critical for deterring China, and that a Russian victory would embolden China to move against Taiwan.

While it is true that resources are finite, framing support to Ukraine or Taiwan as mutually exclusive is a false dilemma that is strategically unsound and unproductive to policymaking. More than that, it belies a lack of appreciation for strategic timing and sequencing, and for the connection between Russian aggression in Europe and Chinese aggression in the Pacific.

Ukraine isn’t preparing for a potential future war against Russia; it is fighting for its very survival against Russia right now. While Russia isn’t the premier threat to the United States, it remains an acute threat to US interests, one of which is a free Ukraine. With US support, Ukraine is bleeding Russia dry—in a financial bargain for the United States, with no cost of US lives, and without the political risk associated with the commitment of forces on the ground. Russian threats to interpret Western support as acts of war have proved to be mere saber rattling, as the United States has crossed each Russian red line with no significant consequence.

Russia’s inability to fight the war to a close has drained its military resources to such a degree that, despite its aspirations for great-power status, it must accept external support to continue its campaign. Much of this material and financial aid comes from China, indebting Vladimir Putin to Xi Jinping. A more shocking demonstration of Russia’s need for military support was its acceptance of North Korean troops into the theater of war.

Moreover, the protracted nature of the war continues to have deleterious effects on Russian national power. If this trend continues and Ukraine maintains its sovereignty at the war’s end, what was formerly an acute threat to US interests will be a mere shell of its former self. Russia, as a broken husk, will not reap the economic rewards of conquering Ukraine in its entirety and will be greatly hampered in terms of affecting US operations in a potential fight with China. In addition, US forces that might have needed to be husbanded to defend against Russian aggression and deployed to Europe to honor US treaty alliance commitments to NATO could instead reinforce military requirements for the Pacific in the defense of Taiwan. Finally, China will be further deterred from aggression in the face of sustained US resolve to support Ukraine. Despite the duration of the conflict, maintaining US support to Ukraine will be seen as a parallel for how stalwart US support would be to Taiwan if China threatened it.

The opposite is also true. Should US support to Ukraine fade and Russia emerge victorious, Russia will siphon economic power from the resources it takes from a conquered Ukraine, reconstitute its military power, and become emboldened toward greater aggression throughout Europe. China, too, will become emboldened by the faltering US resolve that led to Ukraine’s defeat, assured that the United States lacks the stomach to hold out against aims for which China is willing to fight. And in a future Taiwan contingency, Russia would be postured to support China in its time of need and reciprocate via material support, while also posing a significant threat to the rest of Europe. This would pin vital US forces and munitions to the European continent, where they will be of no assistance in a fight for the defense of Taiwan. Because of its strategic effects, the lost war against Russia will have proven to be the first phase in the eventual war against China. To defend Taiwan tomorrow, the United States must continue defending Ukraine today.

There is no zero-sum game between Ukraine and Taiwan

In addition, claims that US support to Ukraine prevents it from adequately supporting Taiwan’s defense overinflate the material cost to the United States and disregard the benefits to the industrial base surrounding US weapons production.

There is not a one-for-one tradeoff or a zero-sum game of munitions availability pitting Ukraine against Taiwan. Many of the systems optimal for use in the defense of Ukraine are not suited for a Taiwan defense scenario, and vice versa. US aid provided to Ukraine since the Russian invasion is suited to fighting a continental land war characterized by mass and attrition, incorporating modern technologies. Specifically, this has consisted largely of artillery and mortar rounds, tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, anti-armor systems, and short-range unmanned aerial systems. All of these would be ill-suited for the air, maritime, and littoral fighting that would dominate a Taiwan scenario. There is little direct competition between these systems and those optimized to defend Taiwan and fight China, which also characterizes the bulk of foreign military sales to Taiwan, which include sales of hundreds of Harpoons, Patriot assistance, Sidewinder missiles, and Switchblade loitering munitions, among others.

Finally, the provision of US arms to Ukraine has served as a test run for the US military industrial base, revealing challenges, stovepipes, and other hurdles to meeting timely production goals. This postured the United States to course correct, yielding congressional action to accelerate support to Taiwan, including the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act, which authorized Foreign Military Financing to Taiwan for the first time and amended Presidential Drawdown Authority to provision Taiwan directly with US Department of Defense stocks and services. As US support for Ukraine’s defense continues to stress test it, the US industrial base will only grow more capable and resilient, and will be better prepared to accelerate production for the defense of Taiwan. Rather than a zero-sum game, investing in Ukraine’s defense now creates more opportunity for Taiwan tomorrow.

To win in Taiwan tomorrow, the United States must win in Ukraine today

Under today’s conditions, the United States is supporting, by proxy, a single-front war against a decaying Russia. If this future holds and Russia fails to meet its wartime objectives, the United States can later focus the preponderance of its strength against China to deter its aggression against Taiwan and, if necessary, posture to win.

But deprioritizing Ukraine will lead to its defeat and set conditions for the United States to face a future two-front war against an emboldened China and a reconstituted Russia. This is a matter of strategic sequencing of the existential needs of the moment and how they will impact the existential needs of the future. If the United States is firmly committed to the defense of Taiwan against a future Chinese invasion, it should focus on defeating Russia in Ukraine today.

Lieutenant Colonel Brian Kerg is an active-duty US Marine Corps operational planner and a nonresident fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is also a 2025 nonresident fellow with the Irregular Warfare Initiative, a 501(c)3 partnered with Princeton’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project and the Modern War Institute at West Point.

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent the positions or opinions of the US Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or any part of the US government.

Europe must prepare to defend itself in an increasingly multipolar world

Mykola Bielieskov — Wed, 12 Feb 2025 19:27:41 +0000

US President Donald Trump’s peace plan for Ukraine has yet to be made public, but it is already abundantly clear that he expects Europe to play a far bigger role in the continent’s future security and the fight against Russian aggression. With the United States now looking to scale back its transatlantic commitments at a time when an openly revisionist Russia is embracing an expansionist agenda, European leaders must urgently adjust to the new geopolitical realities and prioritize security.

The Trump administration has moved rapidly to underline its expectations regarding an increased European role in the continent’s defense. Just days after his inauguration, Trump used an appearance at the World Economic Forum to reiterate his call for European NATO members to increase defense spending to five percent of GDP.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio then spoke at length on the return of a multipolar world and how this will shape future United States security policy toward Europe. “I do think, long term, there’s a conversation to be had about whether the United States needs to be at the front end of securing the continent or as a backstop to securing the continent,” he commented in a January 30 appearance on The Megyn Kelly Show.

Trump’s national security adviser Mike Waltz has also indicated that the United States expects Europe to take greater responsibility for preventing further Russian aggression against Ukraine and securing a viable peace. “An underlying principle here is that the Europeans have to own this conflict going forward,” he said on NBC’s Meet the Press. “President Trump is going to end it. And then in terms of security guarantees, that is squarely going to be with the Europeans.”

The starkest message so far has come from US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. “Safeguarding European security must be an imperative for European members of NATO,” he told a February 12 meeting of Ukraine’s Western allies in Brussels. “Europe must provide the overwhelming share of future lethal and non-lethal aid to Ukraine.”

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The new US administration is not the first to signal a strategic shift away from Europe. This process has actually been underway since the end of the Cold War, and has remained the long-term goal of policymakers in Washington DC despite Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. While Trump’s messaging on the issue of European security has been characteristically direct, his position is actually very much in line with longstanding trends in United States foreign policy.

As the new transatlantic security relationship takes shape, European countries will be expected to make a far bigger commitment to financing the security of the continent. This will include providing the majority of military support for Ukraine. Europe’s defense industry is not yet in a position to meet this challenge, with only limited progress in the production of critical arms and equipment in the three years since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Key deficits include essential items such as air defense systems, precision guided munitions, multiple launch rocket systems, and armored infantry fighting vehicles.

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One practical solution to current shortfalls would be for European countries to procure more weapons, ammunition, and equipment for the Ukrainian war effort directly from the United States. However, this would spark an intense debate across the continent, with advocates of Europe’s long-term economic and security interests likely to encounter opposition from those prioritizing the more immediate need to support Ukraine.

Purchasing greater quantities of US arms would certainly help strengthen transatlantic security ties. This would serve as a strong incentive for the United States to maintain a high level of defense sector engagement with European partners. In fact, European countries are already purchasing more from the United States defense sector. Increased European spending was a key factor driving record US arms sales of $318.7 billion in 2024, as countries sought to replenish stocks sent to Ukraine and prepare for the possibility of further international instability.

The changing rhetoric coming out of European capitals in recent months suggests that Europe’s leaders are well aware of the new security realities and the necessity of dedicating considerably more resources to the task of arming themselves. Nevertheless, mounting talk of the need for greater European defense sector autonomy has yet to be matched by increases in military spending and arms manufacturing output. Indeed, a new report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies indicates that Russian military expenditure is currently higher than all European countries combined when calculated in purchasing power parity terms.

As the transatlantic security relationship evolves in the coming months, Europe will face growing pressure to safeguard the continent’s fragile security in a much more decisive manner. The EU is already preparing plans to encourage increased defense spending among member countries as officials in Brussels adapt to changing geopolitical realities. However, the real test of Europe’s determination to defend itself will be in Ukraine. US officials are now unambiguously signalling that Russia’s invasion is primarily a European security issue. Europe’s response to this will reveal much about the future role of the continent in an increasingly multipolar world.

A conflict with either China or North Korea poses a grave and growing risk to the national security of the United States, particularly due to the potentials for simultaneous escalation involving both countries and for nuclear escalation.
In coordination with the United States’ allies and partners, US defense and military leaders should therefore expand efforts to ensure preparedness to fight and win a potential conflict in East Asia, even one involving limited nuclear attacks or multiple adversaries simultaneously.
The United States should also reduce escalation risks by prioritizing intra-conflict deterrence, fostering expanded multilateral military contributions, and influencing mid-level actors within adversaries’ military structures to enable sub-regime deterrence.

WORTH A THOUSAND WORDS

The geography of East Asia is a key potential variable increasing both the probability and impact of a US conflict with the PRC or North Korea expanding to simultaneous conflicts with both—particularly given the increasing ranges of modern sensors and weapons systems.

Northeast Asian geographic considerations in a US-PRC conflict

THE DIAGNOSIS

The risk of conflict with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or North Korea—especially the potential for simultaneous escalation involving both—poses a serious threat to the United States and its interests. This threat is heightened by the possibility of either adversary resorting to limited nuclear attacks.

A two-front war in Asia could unfold even without close cooperation between Beijing and Pyongyang. Dysfunctional coordination or misunderstandings could just as easily lead to conflict. Furthermore, with both China and North Korea developing greater incentives and capabilities for limited nuclear attacks, the risk of a nuclear war in East Asia is rising.

Deep-seated organizational and cognitive biases have been obstructing the ability of the United States and its allies to anticipate simultaneous conflicts with China and North Korea. Such biases also impede their preparations to manage such escalation and to counter limited nuclear attacks.

US and allied capabilities, command-and-control arrangements, and military posture are currently unsuited to provide a robust military response in the case of a two-front war and/or a limited nuclear war in East Asia. Simultaneous conflicts with both adversaries would impose severe operational and strategic challenges on the United States and its allies and/or their employment of nuclear weapons.

THE PRESCRIPTION

If a US conflict with one adversary in East Asia doesn’t end quickly, it is likely to widen.

The United States and its allies should reconceptualize planning for aggression by either the PRC or North Korea as marking the start of an Indo-Pacific campaign that also requires deterring—and potentially defeating—the other possible adversary.
The United States and South Korea should shift their focus to a broader priority of protecting South Korea from aggression—encompassing deterrence of PRC aggression in addition to North Korean aggression.
The US government and nongovernment institutions should sponsor studies and wargaming on the potential conditions and drivers that might cause a US-PRC conflict over Taiwan to escalate to the Korean Peninsula.

The risk that a war in East Asia would go nuclear is rising, as both China and North Korea have increasing incentives and capabilities for limited nuclear attacks.

The US defense community should direct and sponsor analysis and studies by the US intelligence community and outside analytic entities to track and identify signposts of North Korea’s increasing capabilities and potential for limited first nuclear use, as well as signposts of the PRC potentially moving down this path.
In collaboration with its allies, the United States should refine and amplify declaratory policies to emphasize that the United States and its allies will not be divided by a limited nuclear attack. This should include contextualizing the repeated US declaration that “there is no scenario in which the Kim [family] regime could employ nuclear weapons and survive.”
In coordination with the United States’ allies and partners, US military planners should expand efforts to ensure preparedness to fight and win even if faced with limited nuclear attacks, and to clearly communicate this preparedness to adversaries and allies alike. To preserve a range of military response options other than nuclear retaliation, the stage must also be set to avoid giving the impression that any response but an immediate nuclear counterattack would indicate weakness or hesitation.
The United States should lead international interagency efforts to explore and prepare options to respond to, mitigate risks of, and deter a limited nuclear attack by China or North Korea—which should include studies, workshops, and tabletop exercises/wargames, at both unclassified and classified levels. This analysis should include evaluation of the pros and cons of a range of potential options to increase and signal readiness to employ US tactical nuclear weapons in response to a limited nuclear attack, if the situation calls for it—up to and including the potential ramifications of the reintroduction of US tactical nuclear weapons to the region or the Korean Peninsula itself.

The United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific are not currently well-situated to fight a two-front war and/or a limited nuclear war in East Asia; the PRC’s capability and capacity to do so is growing and it might soon be better positioned to fight the United States and its allies on multiple fronts simultaneously in its neighborhood.

The United States should undertake a comprehensive reassessment of its command-and-control (C2) relationships and posture in East Asia in the context of evolving North Korean, Chinese, and nuclear threats, to identify the appropriate C2 relationships in the event of simultaneous conflicts with North Korea and China, as well as the best C2 arrangements and force posture for theater-level tactical nuclear responses, if needed.
US defense and military planners should ensure that the United States has effective, timely, and credible options for its own limited nuclear strikes in response to a limited nuclear attack, in addition to robust nonnuclear options. Relevant nuclear capabilities should be resourced, trained, staffed, equipped, and supported, while enabling messaging to dispel any perception among adversaries and friends that there is a gap in US capability that could be exploited through a limited nuclear attack.
The United States defense community should increase the forward presence of relevant experts to help operationally and intellectually prepare key US allies and partners (particularly South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan) for a conflict with the PRC and/or North Korea that involves a limited nuclear attack by either or both.

If conflict breaks out, however, the United States has options for managing escalation.

Relevant US military commands should apply and operationalize a greater focus on intra-conflict deterrence, rather than just deterrence of conflict in general.
The United States and its allies should seek more multilateral (e.g., Australian, Canadian, or UK) rotational contributions of aircraft and maritime patrols, and involvement in exercises to reinforce international commitment and contributions to deterrence of both North Korean and PRC aggression.
The US government should pursue study, development, and execution of approaches to pursue “sub-regime deterrence” within the PRC and North Korea as part of US deterrence strategy, including targeted influence of mid-level actors, to delay or prevent execution of escalatory moves, particularly limited nuclear attack.

Biases in US and allied institutions are impeding their understanding of how an East Asian conflict could escalate and their preparations to manage such escalation.

The United States and allied analysts should develop new assessments of the likelihood and potential indicators of simultaneous conflicts with the PRC and North Korea, as well as limited nuclear attack by Beijing or Pyongyang. These should use structured analytic techniques, like key assumptions checks, to identify and overcome biases.
US and allied leaders should establish guidance that the risks of simultaneous conflicts with the PRC and North Korea, and limited nuclear attack by either, have such key implications that military planning and exercises should consider and address these possibilities, even if they are not used as the baseline.
US and allied militaries should establish working groups that cut across a variety of military commands to address preparation for simultaneous conflicts and limited nuclear attacks.
US policymakers and analysts should lead efforts to ensure their allied counterparts engage with the potential for simultaneous conflicts and adversary limited nuclear attacks through repeated inclusion of these possibilities in scenarios for exercises and dialogue agendas.

A version of this report was originally written for the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), but it does not necessarily express the views of DTRA or any other US government organization. The principal investigator thanks DTRA, particularly the Strategic Trends team, for the sponsorship, guidance, support, and resources for this study.

Markus Garlauskas is the director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and former senior US government official. He also leads the Council’s Tiger Project on War and Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. He was appointed to the Senior National Intelligence Service from 2014 to 2020 as the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for North Korea—leading the US intelligence community’s strategic analysis on Korea. Garlauskas also served for nearly twelve years at the headquarters of United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command and US Forces Korea in Seoul, including as the chief of intelligence estimates and the director of strategy.

Russia’s war against the West will continue until Putin tastes defeat

Andriy Zagorodnyuk — Tue, 04 Feb 2025 22:23:34 +0000

As speculation mounts over possible negotiations to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it is important to understand the nature of the war unleashed by Vladimir Putin almost three years ago. Crucially, this is not a conventional war for land that can be resolved by offering limited territorial concessions. Putin’s goals are far more ambitious. He is waging the current war in order to undermine the existing international security architecture and replace it with a new world order where a handful of great powers are able to dominate their neighbors.

Since launching the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Putin has repeatedly outlined his vision for a “multipolar world order” that would reverse the verdict of the Cold War and create a world divided into spheres of influence. By challenging the sanctity of borders with his invasion of Ukraine, Putin aims to remove a central pillar of today’s global security system and normalize the use of military force in international affairs. If his efforts are perceived as successful, this will set a disastrous precedent that will embolden authoritarian regimes around the world.

Putin’s dream of establishing a new world order is reflected in his push for bilateral talks with the United States to discuss the fate of Ukraine and Europe without Ukrainian or European participation. He wants to demonstrate that sovereignty is negotiable and convey the message that some nations are more equal than others. The consequences of this approach could be catastrophic for both Ukraine and Europe as a whole.

The world order Putin hopes to usher in would be governed by the laws of the geopolitical jungle and defined by insecurity and aggression. Armed conflicts would proliferate around the world as previously accepted rules of international relations were replaced by the overriding principle that “might is right.” The unprecedented global economic prosperity of the past three decades would also be threatened amid mounting barriers to trade and record levels of defense spending. The only obvious beneficiaries would be nations like Russia that seek to embrace revisionist or expansionist agendas.

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The international security situation is now so grave and has escalated to such a level that it can no longer be resolved by appeasing Russia or seeking some kind of compromise peace. Instead, Russia must lose in Ukraine, and must be seen to lose.

At present, that is not the case. On the contrary, Putin is more confident than ever of victory and sees no reason to end the war. He is projecting strength around the world and is successfully building a coalition of fellow authoritarian powers including China, Iran, and North Korea, who all provide support for the war in Ukraine and share Moscow’s objective of overthrowing the current world order.

On the home front, Putin has succeeded in shifting the Russian economy onto a wartime footing, and has found new partners to compensate for the collapse in ties with the West. He is openly preparing for a long war and is counting on a lack of Western resolve to confront him.

In order to stop the war, Putin must be persuaded that continuing the invasion of Ukraine will lead to disaster for Russia. This requires a range of measures designed to weaken Russia’s position both economically and militarily.

Russia’s economic outlook is already worsening as a result of the war and could become far more serious if Western leaders take the necessary steps. There is an obvious need for greater coordination between the United States, UK, EU, and other countries engaged in sanctioning the Russian war effort. Implementation of existing sanctions remains inadequate, while tougher measures are needed to target intermediaries.

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Economic hardships alone will not bring Putin to the negotiating table. He must also be forced to confront the prospect of military defeat. This will require a major shift in thinking among Ukraine’s partners. At present, Ukraine finds itself forced to fight a defensive war of attrition with the aim of inflicting unacceptable losses on the invading Russians. However, Putin clearly has a very high tolerance for losses, and can also call upon huge untapped reserves of manpower to replenish the depleted ranks of his army. If the current war of attrition continues, Russia will eventually and inevitably win.

Instead, Ukraine must be equipped to defeat Russia on the battlefield. The Ukrainian military has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to beat Russia, but currently lacks the military capabilities to turn local victories into a war-winning position. This needs to change.

Western fears of escalation mean Kyiv is still being denied a wide range of weapons and faces restrictions on its ability to defend itself. As a result of this overly cautious approach, the Kremlin is able to wage a total war against Ukraine with little fear of major counterattacks inside Russia. Putin also enjoys overwhelming advantages in firepower, including a far larger and more advanced air force. No NATO member state would even consider fighting a war without adequate air power, but that is exactly what Ukraine is currently being expected to do.

So far, the West has been arming Ukraine to survive. Putin will not end the invasion until he becomes convinced that Western leaders are determined to arm Ukraine for victory. Ukraine’s military requirements are well known. All that is missing is the requisite political will to act. This means providing fighter jets, long-range missiles, armor, and artillery in large quantities along with dramatically enhanced drone and electronic warfare capabilities.

By supplying Ukraine with sufficient military aid, the West could finally oblige Putin to rethink the current war while also creating a powerful deterrence force capable of preventing further Russian aggression. Anything less will merely create a pause in hostilities that Putin will use to rearm and prepare for the next phase of his war against the West. The price of stopping Russia in Ukraine is high, but it will be dwarfed by the costs of a new authoritarian world order if Putin’s invasion is allowed to succeed.

Andriy Zagorodnyuk is chairman of the Center for Defence Strategies and an advisor to the Ukrainian Government. He previously served as Ukraine’s minister of defense (2019–2020).

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Washington watchers in Jerusalem have been, unsurprisingly, surveying the appointments topography for clues to decipher Trumpland, but they have found its landscape equivocal. Israeli officials are encouraged by the nominations of friendlies Mike Huckabee and Elise Stefanik—as ambassadors to Israel and the United Nations, respectively—but diplomats are not policymakers, and the perspective of Trump’s executive cadre is by no means monolithic. The president himself has toggled in recent months between pledging to “stop all wars” and, on the other hand, telling Netanyahu to “do what you have to do” when it comes to Israel’s enemies. (Relations between the two leaders have known highs and lows.)

Soon after his victory, Trump unceremoniously disinvited Mike Pompeo and Nikki Haley, two trusted interlocutors of Israel during his previous tenure, from returning to his leadership team. That vacuum has been filled apparently by Waltz and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who both advocated on Capitol Hill for a strong US-Israel bond, but few other principals share their level of prior, high-level engagement with the intricate dynamics of that alliance. Meanwhile, senior bureaucratic echelons at the Pentagon—which has been an essential partner in enhancing Israel’s national security—are being populated by staffers who favor greater detachment from the Middle East.

It is against this backdrop that Netanyahu arrives in Washington to plead his case. His wish list from Trump will include US acquiescence for Israel to continue its campaign to dislodge Hamas rule from Gaza; normalization with Saudi Arabia; and a kinetic effort—or, at least, US backing for a potential solo Israeli endeavor—to terminate the threat of a nuclear Iran. The paradox of Netanyahu’s predicament is that Trump’s favorable disposition toward that agenda does not mean their approaches will be similarly aligned.

Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich—a stalwart critic of the current truce—is touting assurances from the prime minister to intensify the Gaza war and initiate “a gradual takeover” that ensures “humanitarian aid will not reach Hamas as it has been until now.” Smotrich, a proponent of exercising Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza, has also vowed repeatedly to scuttle any diplomatic breakthrough with Riyadh that would entail territorial concessions to the Palestinians. On the Iranian front, Israeli military planners are training their sights increasingly on the near term, before Tehran can recover from the blows that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has inflicted on its defenses and on its Hamas and Hezbollah proxies.

Those parameters are almost certain to conflict with the president’s thinking. By all accounts, Trump, as evidenced through Witkoff’s interventions, is interested actually in extending the suspension of combat in Gaza, for the sake of securing the release of all captives and stabilizing the area. The track would then be cleared for Israeli-Saudi rapprochement—along lines that would likely be anathema to Smotrich—and a coveted Nobel Peace Prize for Trump. As for Iran, indications suggest that the president might prefer initially to try and settle that standoff through negotiations.

The ball is very much in Trump’s court now. Witkoff met on January 30 with Smotrich and Shas chairman Aryeh Deri, two key stakeholders of Netanyahu’s government, in an attempt to enlist their support for his mission, but their consent will hinge ultimately on the specifics involved. (Right-wing Israelis, who are hoping anxiously that Trump will adopt their cause, have latched tightly onto his manifest enthusiasm for transferring Gaza’s residents to neighboring Egypt and Jordan, although the wisdom and feasibility of that program—opposed stridently by those countries and by Palestinians themselves—are dubious.) The time for command decisions is close at hand.

Cessations of hostilities in Lebanon and Gaza are both fragile. Netanyahu’s coalition is also in crisis, with saber-rattling between its various members—who are at loggerheads over controversial legislation to exempt Ultra-Orthodox Jews from military service—jeopardizing the passage of a national budget before a March 31 deadline. Separately, Smotrich has committed to bolt unless the IDF resumes its Gaza incursion, in parallel with expanding counter-terrorism operations in the West Bank. Not only the prime minister’s political fate, but also the future of the entire Middle East is hanging in the balance, waiting for Trump to decide how much slack he is prepared to grant Netanyahu.

Much will depend on the president’s definition of friendship for Israel: Will it entail space for the IDF to keep fighting Hamas until the achievement of “total victory”—as Netanyahu has promised and many Israelis are still demanding—at the possible cost of derailing progress with Saudi Arabia? Will it, rather, obligate Israel to wind down its offensive and satisfy Saudi requirements for a pathway to Palestinian statehood, thus, in all likelihood, precipitating the collapse of Netanyahu’s majority in the Knesset? Or might it entertain tradeoffs such as greater Israeli flexibility vis-à-vis the Palestinians in exchange for an augmented US role in confronting Iran?

There will be inherent risks in any strategy that Trump chooses to embrace. The only certain thing is that now, as commander in chief, he controls an arsenal of formidable carrots and sticks to deploy in the service of his administration’s objectives. On February 4, the world will be watching to see whether he offers Netanyahu a deal that he can’t refuse.

Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow for Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. From 1990 to 2016, he served seven consecutive premiers at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem. Follow him on X: @ShalomLipner.

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Ukrainian Holocaust survivor: Russia is waging ‘war of extermination’

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 30 Jan 2025 22:33:03 +0000

Ukrainian Holocaust survivor Roman Schwarzman has implored Germany to increase support for Ukraine in the fight against Russia’s “war of extermination.” Addressing the Bundestag this week as part of events to mark 80 years since the liberation of Auschwitz, Schwarzman accused Russian President Vladimir Putin of attempting to “destroy” Ukraine as a nation. “Back then, Hitler wanted to kill me because I am Jewish. Now Putin wants to kill me because I am Ukrainian.”

Schwarzman, 88, is president of Ukraine’s association for concentration camp and ghetto survivors. Born in Ukraine’s Vinnytsia region in the 1930s when it was part of the Soviet Union, he told German lawmakers of the “humiliation, pain, lice, and constant hunger” he had experienced as a child while confined to the ghetto in the town of Bershad during the Nazi occupation of World War II. “I have already been able to escape extermination once,” he commented. “Now I am an old man and must once again live with the fear that my children and grandchildren could fall victim to a war of extermination.”

Germany ranks second behind the United States in terms of military aid for Ukraine, but Schwarzman called on the country to do more. Responding to German Chancellor Olaf Sholz’s reluctance to deliver long-range Taurus missiles, he argued that Ukraine needs the missiles “in order to disable Russian airfields and rocket depots which are used to attack us every day.” Failure to do so would have dire consequences for Ukraine and for European security, he warned. “Those who believe Putin will be happy with just Ukraine are wrong.”

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Schwarzman’s comments serve as a timely reminder of Russia’s extreme objectives in Ukraine. In recent months, there has been mounting international speculation over the potential territorial concessions Ukraine may be obliged to make in order to end the invasion of their country. In reality, however, the war unleashed by Putin in February 2022 was never about limited territorial gains. From the very beginning, it has been a war to extinguish Ukrainian independence entirely.

Putin’s Ukraine obsession has dominated his reign and can be traced all the way back to Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution. He has always viewed the emergence of an independent Ukraine as an historical injustice and a bitterly resented symbol of the Soviet collapse, which he has described as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century” and “the disintegration of historical Russia.” The Kremlin dictator’s desire to reverse this breakup of “historical Russia” has long focused on Ukraine, and has been given additional impetus by his fears that Ukraine’s fledgling democracy could serve as a catalyst for similar change within his own authoritarian state and spark a new phase in Russia’s retreat from empire.

Putin made his intentions obvious during the buildup to the invasion when he published a rambling 5,000-word history essay arguing against Ukraine’s right to exist and insisting that Ukrainians were in fact Russians (“one people”). As Russian troops massed along the Ukrainian border in February 2022, he described Ukraine as “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space.” He has since compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian ruler Peter the Great, and has declared occupied regions of Ukraine to be “Russian forever.”

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Putin’s contempt for Ukrainian statehood has set the tone throughout wartime Russian society. Vicious anti-Ukrainian rhetoric has become a daily feature of the Kremlin-controlled Russian media space, with Ukrainians routinely demonized and dehumanized. This has led United Nations investigators to note that some content “may constitute incitement to genocide.”

Following Putin’s lead, numerous senior Kremlin officials have also indicated that Russia’s ultimate goal is the complete disappearance of the Ukrainian state. Former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev in particular has become notorious for his unhinged rants. “The existence of Ukraine is mortally dangerous for Ukrainians,” he declared on one occasion in early 2024. More recently, close Putin aide Nikolai Patrushev has predicted that Ukraine “may cease to exist” in 2025.

This genocidal language has been matched by the actions of the invading Russian army. In areas of Ukraine currently under Kremlin control, Russia has systematically targeted anyone deemed a potential threat to the regime. Thousands have been detained and imprisoned, with victims including elected local officials, journalists, civil society activists, army veterans, cultural figures, and anyone regarded as a potential Ukrainian patriot. Those who remain are subjected to ruthless russification including the forced adoption of Russian citizenship. Meanwhile, all traces of Ukrainian national identity, statehood, and culture are being methodically erased.

Russia’s determination to destroy the Ukrainian state and nation is unprecedented in modern European history and makes a complete mockery of calls for a compromise peace. In words and deeds, Putin has made it abundantly clear that he will not tolerate the continued existence of an independent Ukraine, and regards the country’s destruction as an historic mission that will define his reign. Any efforts to broker a sustainable settlement must take this chilling vision into account.

Nobody wants the current war to end more than the Ukrainians themselves, but they are also painfully aware that the survival of their nation is at stake. Unless measures are put in place to prevent the resumption of Russian aggression once Putin has had an opportunity to rearm and regroup, a bad peace deal will merely set the stage for genocide in the heart of Europe.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

“No, really”: American PMCs in Gaza

Alia Brahimi — Thu, 30 Jan 2025 14:22:59 +0000

In Season 2, Episode 9 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi chats with modern warfare expert Andreas Krieg about the sudden deployment of three private military companies to the Netzarim corridor in the Gaza Strip. Andreas examines the risks and opportunities in outsourcing a key task of stabilization to the market and depending on low-profile companies for a high-profile job.

He argues that the Israeli Defence Forces have a poor track record when it comes to stabilizing any of the territories they have controlled and that Gaza might be a case where the profit motive of PMCs is preferable to the motivations driving two deeply traumatized societies. Still, Andreas outlines how the deployment of PMCs deepens the “gray zone” because we now have contractors operating on the ground whose status in international law is not well-defined.

“This is an entirely novel approach of basically outsourcing… an essential task of stabilization to the market.”

Andreas Krieg, modern warfare expert

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NATO chief: Cost of Russian victory in Ukraine would be ‘trillions not billions’

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 23 Jan 2025 22:14:45 +0000

NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte has warned alliance members that if the Russian invasion of Ukraine is allowed to succeed, the cost of reestablishing NATO’s international credibility would be measured in the trillions of dollars.

Speaking on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Rutte highlighted the economic argument for increased military spending in support of the Ukrainian war effort. “If Ukraine loses then to restore the deterrence of the rest of NATO again, it will be a much, much higher price than what we are contemplating at this moment in terms of ramping up our spending and ramping up our industrial production,” commented Rutte. “It will not be billions extra. It will be trillions extra.”

Underscoring his warning, the NATO chief conjured up images of Russian dictator Vladimir Putin and his authoritarian allies celebrating victory over the West. “If we get a bad deal, it would only mean that we will see the President of Russia high-fiving with the leaders from North Korea, Iran, and China. We cannot accept that. It would be a big, big geopolitical mistake.”

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Rutte’s alarming forecast comes as NATO leaders grapple with new US President Donald Trump’s calls for member states to increase defense spending from today’s two percent of GDP to five percent. Trump is also pushing for Europe to play a far more prominent role in the coalition of countries backing Ukraine. He argues that the Russian invasion is primarily a problem for European leaders to address, and has also long been critical of what he sees as the uneven security relationship between Europe and the United States.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has echoed Trump’s position on the need for dramatically increased European defense spending. In a strongly worded address to the World Economic Forum this week, he suggested that the continent was in danger of sliding into geopolitical irrelevance and must be able to defend itself. “All European countries must be willing to spend as much on security as is truly needed, not just as much as they’ve gotten used to during years of neglect. If it takes five percent of GDP to cover defense, then so be it,” the Ukrainian leader stated.

A number of senior European figures have already voiced their opposition to Trump’s vision for sharp rises in defense spending. While defense budgets across the continent have been growing in recent years against the backdrop of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, many NATO members are still struggling to meet the current two percent guidelines and see talk of a leap to five percent as wholly unrealistic.

European countries have also struggled to expand domestic military production in response to Russia’s invasion. During the initial stages of the war, existing stockpiles of weapons and equipment across Europe were sent to Ukraine. However, these reserves have now been largely exhausted. While Russia has managed to make the transition to a wartime economy, Europe’s defense sector is still unable to keep the Ukrainian military adequately supplied despite some progress.

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Critics of the Western response to Russia’s invasion say there is still no sense of urgency in many European capitals, despite the unprecedented security challenges presented by the continent’s largest armed conflict since World War II. Instead, decisions regarding weapons deliveries to Ukraine often remain subject to extended delays, while measures to boost Europe’s defense manufacturing capacity have frequently fallen victim to domestic politics or internal EU rivalries.

Europe’s hesitancy over defense spending is short-sighted, to say the least. As the NATO Secretary-General pointed out this week in Switzerland, the cost of supporting Ukraine’s defense will be dwarfed by the price of confronting a triumphant Russia if Putin is permitted to complete the conquest and subjugation of Ukraine.

Even if a victorious Russia did not immediately go further, Europe’s sense of security would be shattered and the balance of power on the continent transformed. Putin’s war machine would be greatly strengthened by the acquisition of Ukraine’s immense military strength, its vast industrial capacities, and the country’s natural resources. He would have Europe’s two largest armies under his control, and would be firmly established along the eastern borders of the European Union.

In such favorable circumstances, it is dangerously delusional to suggest that Putin might stop voluntarily or adopt a conciliatory approach toward the largely undefended nations of Europe. He has made no secret of his desire to reverse the verdict of 1991 and overturn the current world order. Victory in Ukraine would present Putin with a once in a lifetime opportunity to achieve these historic goals. Europe’s current levels of defense spending would be unlikely to deter him.

The debate over European defense budgets looks set to escalate during the coming months, with the new Trump administration and officials in Kyiv making the case for a radical rethink. Many across Europe will support them in principle, but past experience suggests that not all of these allies will have the requisite political will to act accordingly.

The importance of this debate cannot be overstated, with the outcome set to shape the course of the war in Ukraine and define the future of European security. For anyone who recognizes the threat posed by Putin’s Russia, the arguments for larger European defense budgets and expanded industrial production seem overwhelming. Supporting Ukraine today may be expensive, but it is a lot cheaper than facing an emboldened Russia tomorrow.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

North Korea is using Russia’s Ukraine invasion to upgrade its army

Alina Hrytsenko — Thu, 23 Jan 2025 19:09:38 +0000

The first North Korean soldiers were taken prisoner by Ukraine in early January, providing final confirmation of the Hermit Kingdom’s involvement in the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine following initial reports in late 2024. The participation of North Korean troops represents a dangerous escalation in what is already the largest European war since World War II, with potentially alarming implications for global security.

Pyongyang’s support for the Russian war effort began in late 2022 with the delivery of artillery shells. The list of armaments was subsequently expanded to include ballistic missiles. These supplies have helped Russia maintain the momentum of its invasion despite the country’s significantly depleted stores of munitions. With Moscow now also facing manpower shortages and reluctant to order a fresh round of mobilization, the arrival of North Korean troops helps relieve domestic pressure to recruit more Russians for the war.

While no official data is available, Ukrainian, US, and South Korean sources have estimated that North Korea has sent at least 11,000 soldiers to join Russia’s invasion. Some are believed to be drawn from highly trained elite units. Materials found on dead North Korean troops and battlefield accounts from Ukrainian forces indicate that the heavily indoctrinated North Koreans have been ordered to kill themselves if necessary to avoid being captured alive and taken prisoner.

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Pyongyang has a very specific interest in sending troops to fight against Ukraine. While the deployment is unlikely to dramatically alter the battlefield situation in the Kremlin’s favor, it allows the North Koreans to acquire priceless combat experience, test weapons systems, gain access to Russian military technologies, and secure Moscow’s further assistance in countering UN sanctions.

North Korea currently boasts one of the world’s largest armies with around 1.3 million active soldiers. However, unlike Russia, the Korean People’s Army (KPA) has not been directly involved in any major wars for many years. This lack of battlefield experience is a source of considerable concern for North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un, who is anxious to counter South Korea’s more technologically advanced military.

Sending thousands of troops to fight in the Russian invasion of Ukraine provides the KPA with valuable insights into what is widely recognized as the most technologically advanced battlefield environment in the history of warfare. North Korean soldiers are now learning the realities of modern drone warfare first-hand. As a result, North Korea will be “more capable of waging war against its neighbors,” senior US officials have warned.

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Ukrainians have been impressed by the skill and tenacity of the North Koreans they have encountered, including their ability to shoot down drones. “They are young, motivated, physically fit, brave, and good at using small arms. They are also disciplined. They have everything you need for a good infantryman,” Ukrainian army spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Yaroslav Chepurnyi told POLITICO.

North Korea is believed to receive significant financial and technological incentives for supplying Putin with soldiers. South Korean intelligence officials estimate that Moscow is paying Pyongyang $2000 per solder each month. While this money is no doubt welcome, the real prize is access to advanced Russian military tech. In exchange for troops, North Korea is believed to be receiving support from Moscow that will help upgrade its military, including the country’s anti-aircraft, submarine, and missile capabilities.

The Ukrainian front also serves as a valuable testing ground for North Korea, allowing the country to assess the effectiveness of the weapons it supplies to Russia. This will make it possible for Pyongyang to improve the quality of its own domestic arms industry and adapt future output to the realities of the modern battlefield. Meanwhile, the troops who survive their time on the Ukrainian front lines are expected to return home and become instructors, sharing their knowledge of modern warfare with colleagues.

At this point, North Korea’s participation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine looks to be less about supporting Putin’s imperial ambitions and more about upgrading Kim Jong Un’s war machine. In the short term, the presence of North Korean soldiers is allowing Russia to overcome mounting manpower shortages. But with Russia believed to be losing tens of thousands of troops each month, there is little chance that Pyongyang will be able to fully satisfy Moscow’s insatiable demand for additional manpower.

Looking ahead, the historically unprecedented appearance of North Korean soldiers on the battlefields of Europe could alter the security equation on the Korean peninsula and beyond. “For the first time in decades, the North Korean army is gaining real military experience,” commented Ukrainian military intelligence spokesman Andrii Yusov. “This is a global challenge. Not just for Ukraine and Europe, but for the entire world.”

Alina Hrytsenko is an analyst at Ukraine’s National Institute for Strategic Studies.

How the Gaza war brought Morocco and Israel closer

Sarah Zaaimi — Tue, 21 Jan 2025 18:48:32 +0000

Many analysts predicted the end of the Moroccan-Israeli rapprochement, which was initiated by the 2020 tripartite agreement brokered by the United States, because of pressure from pro-Palestinian sympathizers in Rabat amid the Gaza war. Instead, the raging conflict in the Middle East only brought the two countries closer as, on October 7, 2023, Rabat saw in action the potential menace of a pro-Iranian Polisario proxy in Western Sahara.

Like other Arab countries with existing diplomatic ties with Israel, Morocco needed to appease its local public opinion by reducing its public-facing appearances with its newly gained ally and raising the tone of its official speeches calling for a ceasefire and a two-state solution as the war continued to escalate. Yet, far from the crowded streets of Tangier or Casablanca, where pro-Palestinian demonstrators gather, another reality persists in the country’s security and intelligence spheres. In reality, security cooperation between Israel and Morocco is flourishing and has never been stronger, driven by a common Iranian threat and a shared vision for regional integration.

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Countering Iranian Neo-Sasanian imperialism

Since 2018, Morocco has warned about Iranian expansionist ambitions in Western Sahara following its severance of relations with Tehran over alleged military and financial support for the Polisario Front separatists through Lebanese Hezbollah. Reports have confirmed increased Iranian interference in the disputed territories of Western Sahara, which Morocco has claimed sovereignty over since its independence from Spain in 1975. This interference has involved Iran supplying lethal unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), surface-to-air missiles, and HM-16 mortar shells, along with training that has emboldened the separatist group. Consequently, Polisario forces began shelling towns within the Moroccan-administered areas of Western Sahara, specifically in Smara and Mahbes, alongside the Gaza war. This is a troubling development, as these actions violate the ceasefire established in September 1991.

The recent fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime may have uncovered the depth of relations between the Polisario Front and Iran, with Syria acting as the intermediary. Amid the chaos following the fall of Damascus, an unverified document emerged that revealed correspondence between the Syrian Ministry of Defense and the self-proclaimed Sahrawi Republic regarding the training of 120 Polisario soldiers in armed combat at Iran’s request. During the capture of Aleppo in Northern Syria, at least thirty Sahrawi mercenaries were apprehended by rebel forces, while Fahad Almasri, the head of Syria’s National Salvation Front, disclosed that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had dispatched about two hundred Polisario members to Thaala military airport, the Sweida army base, and rural Daraa over the past three years. Recently, Representative Joe Wilson of South Carolina (R-SC) also briefed the US House about the situation, stating that “war criminal Putin, Iran & Cuba are actively destabilizing West Africa by supporting Polisario Front, a threat to the Kingdom of Morocco—an essential US partner.”

The partnership between Morocco and Israel is inspired and reinforced by their shared interest in opposing Iran’s expansion and its anti-Western, Neo-Sasanian ideology, which traditionally saw Arabs as vassal kingdoms like the Lakhmids. Iran is looking to recreate this pattern through its regional proxies in countries like Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and—if the international community doesn’t address this pressing threat—in Western Sahara. However, the kingdom failed to persuade its own population that its alignment with Israel is not against the Palestinian cause but against Iranian malign expansionist ambitions in the region.

The Moroccan population has long-standing and established ties with the Palestinian people—with whom it shares culture, language, and religion—and a large portion has become increasingly vocal in demanding an end to normalization with Israel amid the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza. Recently, a Moroccan citizen who permanently resides in the US even carried out atrocious terrorist attacks, stabbing four people at the heart of Tel Aviv—an incident likely motivated by a deep discontent towards the events in Gaza. This stance, however, is not shared by the political and security apparatus in Rabat, which understands that countries can’t be ruled by sentimentalism, particularly after the collapse of the last of the pan-Arabist regimes in Damascus.

The annals of Morocco-Israel security cooperation

While the Moroccan government publicly attempts to appease the sentiments of its population and strike a balance between Morocco’s Arab-Islamic duties and its higher security interests, in private, security cooperation with Israel is thriving thanks to the intimate relationship between the two allies’ military and intelligence communities.

These institutions have a history of secret cooperation dating back to the 1960s and more formal relations since the late King Hassan II met Prime Minister Shimon Peres in Rabat in 1986. In 2020, the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces reportedly acquired three Israeli-made Heron drones, developed by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), for some $48 million. The systems, which were long-endurance models, were intended to be used in reconnaissance missions along the wall of sand in Western Sahara. Rabat’s appetite for Israeli weapons has grown since, with the purchase of the SkyLock Dome anti-drone systems in 2022 for $500 million and the Barak MX missile systems in 2023 for another $500 million, and the announcement in 2024 of the opening of a drone manufacturing facility by Israeli BlueBird Aero Systems in Morocco.

Business has continued to strengthen since the onset of the Gaza war. On the defense side, Morocco is poised to acquire a spy satellite from IAI in a $1-billion deal. Rabat recently faced backlash from local human rights groups when it extradited Nassim Khalibat, a Palestinian holding an Israeli passport who is suspected of being behind the 2021 bombing of the Nazareth Health Ministry. Trade cooperation has also increased, with bilateral exports reaching $53.2 million during the first six months of 2024, a 64-percent increase from the same period last year.

Beyond the practical benefits of cooperation, deeper historical and cultural ties are also at the foundation of this intimate relationship. Indeed, many Israeli security leaders have roots in the once-Jewish kingdom of Morocco. Meir Ben-Shabbat, the former Israeli national security advisor and a Moroccan Jew, once famously performed the allegiance bow before King Mohamed VI, repeating, “May God bless your age, my master” in Arabic. Another key figure is Amir Perez, the architect of the Israeli Iron Dome, who—like Yassine Manssouri, the head of the Moroccan intelligence services—was born in the small mountainous town of Boujad. One in ten Israelis today have Moroccan ancestry, including influential politicians like Speaker of the Knesset Amir Ohana, Aryeh Deri, and Yaakov Margi, to name only a few. Moroccan-Israeli relations have become stronger than ever since the recent events in the Middle East, and those relations are here to stay.

Though the United States brokered it, this critical alliance transcends Washington’s mediation and will be sustained by shared history and common geostrategic interests. Morocco has no intention of closing its liaison office in Tel Aviv like it did in 2000 during the Second Intifada, no matter how loud the popular opposition in Rabat becomes. Recently, a high-level Moroccan official told me it was “a regrettable decision that the kingdom is not prepared to repeat in light of a regional threat that may cost us half of our territories and the security of our children.” He added, “We share with the Israelis a common destiny and a vision for a peaceful and prosperous future.”

Sarah Zaaimi is a resident senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, where she also serves as the deputy director for communications.

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Why Saudi Arabia is so keen on the Turkish KAAN

Ali Bakir — Sat, 18 Jan 2025 12:54:59 +0000

Just before the turn of the year, Saudi and Turkish officials engaged in a flurry of talks on defense cooperation. In one such conversation—which included Turkish defense industry representatives—Saudi Arabia reportedly indicated it intends to buy one hundred Turkish KAAN fighter jets.

But with Saudi Arabia previously keen on acquiring F-35 fighter jets from the United States, what has steered Riyadh toward Turkish technology?

Securing an upgrade

The KAAN is a Turkish fifth-generation, multi-role, stealth fighter aircraft developed by the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) and BAE Systems, which is based in London.

The project to develop the aircraft began in 2010, with the aim of replacing Turkey’s aging F-16 fleet and boosting Turkey’s autonomy, self-dependency, and overall military and national power. The urgency to develop this aircraft increased after Turkey was removed from the F-35 program in 2019. The KAAN made its maiden flight in February 2024.

Riyadh has expressed interest in acquiring F-35 fighter jets since 2017; however, the United States has not committed to the sale, and the situation has been prolonged. Riyadh is likely also feeling unsure about its ability to secure an F-35 deal considering the experiences of its neighbors. For example, while the Trump administration signed a multi-billion-dollar deal with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for F-35s in 2021 (as a reward for Abu Dhabi’s normalization with Israel in 2020), the UAE suspended talks over concerns with the Biden administration’s terms, citing “sovereign operational restrictions” and “technical requirements,” among other reasons. While some reports indicated that the UAE hopes to revive the deal with the incoming Trump administration, a UAE official said that Abu Dhabi does not expect to resume talks.

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Moreover, Saudi Arabia could be worried about its ability to secure the F-35 deal because the United States often prioritizes Israel, aiming to maintain its qualitative military edge over all regional powers. Additionally, such equipment typically comes with numerous strings attached to it, and the US Congress frequently impedes the sale of advanced military assets to other nations, including allies and partners. These factors have prompted some countries and regional powers to seek advanced weapons elsewhere, even though US military equipment is technologically superior.

As conveyed in Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 for the kingdom, Riyadh aims not only to purchase weapons but also to produce them, pursuing the necessary know-how and technology transfer to build its own defense industry. Regarding fighter jets, Saudi Arabia requested to join the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), a collaborative effort among Britain, Italy, and Japan to develop a sixth-generation stealth fighter jet to replace the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Mitsubishi F-2. The new jet is expected to be airborne by 2040.

While the United Kingdom and Italy support Saudi Arabia’s request to join GCAP, Japan has reportedly firmly opposed Riyadh’s membership in the project. Thus, the partnership has not yet been extended to Saudi Arabia. And on December 13—over a year after Saudi Arabia first submitted its request to join GCAP—BAE Systems, Italy’s Leonardo, and Japan Aircraft Industrial Enhancement reached an agreement on the venture, with each holding a 33.3 percent share in the new joint company developing the jet.

Riyadh’s extensive ties with China and amicable relations with Russia could explain why Japan would oppose Saudi Arabia’s inclusion. Accepting Saudi Arabia as a partner could raise questions regarding who has the authority to sell or block the sale of fighter jets to certain nations (including, for example, China and Russia). Furthermore, Japan’s opposition could be attributed to its concerns that incorporating Saudi Arabia would ultimately slow progress and delay timelines due to Riyadh’s need for technology transfers—especially given that Saudi Arabia currently lacks the necessary infrastructure and human resources for this project.

Although news about Saudi Arabia’s consideration of the Turkish KAAN first emerged last October, the finalization of the GCAP project may explain the resurgence of Saudi interest in the KAAN just a few days later. For the Saudis, timing is crucial. Unlike the GCAP, the Turkish jet has already taken to the air. Mass production is expected to begin in 2028, meaning that the KAAN project is likely at least ten years ahead of the GCAP. Even once the KAAN is operational, it is still possible to make updates to the jet incorporating sixth-generation technology, making it better aligned with Saudi Vision 2030 in terms of timelines and requirements.

Furthermore, the KAAN could appeal to Saudi Arabia because of uncertainty about Riyadh’s ability to acquire a GCAP jet should it remain excluded from the project. Japan’s opposition to Saudi Arabia’s involvement currently suggests that in the future, Tokyo could veto an attempt by Saudi Arabia to purchase the jet. Waiting over fifteen years to acquire new fighter jets only to face a potential veto would be an unwise move, especially considering two factors. First, Saudi Arabia’s ties with China are expected to strengthen if current trends persist, suggesting that a veto would become more likely. Second, it would be unwise because of Saudi Arabia’s desire to quickly establish a localized defense industry, diversify its military purchases, and acquire advanced fighter jets. In contrast to the GCAP countries, Turkey is already open to exporting the jet to allies and partners, including to Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Ukraine; the head of TAI predicts his company will deliver roughly 150 aircraft to such partner countries.

The thirty-thousand-foot view

By signaling its intention to acquire one hundred KAAN fighter jets, Saudi Arabia appears to be strengthening its strategic partnerships and elevating its geopolitical standing in the Middle East. This approach is particularly significant in light of shifting regional security dynamics, in which the need for a robust and independent defense posture has become increasingly critical. Through the diversification of its defense procurement strategies—and, ultimately, through enhancing its military capabilities, strengthening its deterrence, and fostering new strategic partnerships—Saudi Arabia is not only enhancing its military readiness but also asserting its influence in evolving regional geopolitics.

Moreover, by pursuing fighter jet acquisitions from Turkey, Saudi Arabia is strategically positioning itself to reduce its reliance on Western military hardware, including US military equipment. This shift is driven by complex political dynamics, especially with US restrictions on the sale of advanced fighters such as the F-35 and Washington’s prioritization of maintaining Israel’s qualitative military edge.

From 2015 to 2020, the Saudi Arabia-Turkey relationship experienced fluctuations due to unfavorable regional developments and differing ideological agendas. However, those factors began to shift after the normalization of ties following the Gulf Cooperation Council’s al-Ula declaration in 2021, marking the beginning of an unprecedented era of regional de-escalation and normalization efforts.

A notable indication of the evolving nature of defense cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Turkey is Riyadh’s procurement of the Turkish Akıncı unmanned combat aerial vehicle. While the exact value of the agreement has not been disclosed, it has been estimated at over three billion dollars. Baykar’s chief executive officer said it was “the biggest defense and aviation export contract” in Turkey’s history. If the KAAN deal is realized, it would represent a significant advancement that would cement the transformation of defense and security cooperation between Riyadh and Ankara.

Saudi Arabia is not only a global financial power but also one of the largest arms purchasers in the world. From the Turkish perspective, the Saudi purchase would provide a lucrative source of funding to expand the production line, helping expedite production and reduce the cost per unit (currently exceeding one hundred million dollars). This would be a double win for Riyadh because it would not only acquire the KAAN with no strings attached to the deal but also have an opportunity to request that parts of the production line be located in Saudi Arabia, expediting the expansion of its local defense industry.

For some time, Ankara has been seeking potential partners to join its flagship defense industry program. In July 2023, Azerbaijan became a partner in the development of the KAAN. Under the partnership, Baku’s financial resources from its oil and gas reserves help Turkey with the costs of production. Meanwhile, joint production creates job opportunities in Azerbaijan, facilitates technology transfer, and will help Baku replace its aging fighter jets with more modern ones.

Pakistan has also expressed interest in joining the KAAN program, and the two countries are reportedly in advanced discussions about such a possibility. On August 2, 2023, Turkish Deputy Defence Minister Celal Sami Tüfekçi revealed that nearly two hundred Pakistanis were already involved in the development of the KAAN. A nuclear power with a competent military, Pakistan boasts one of the largest air forces in the world. Like Turkey, Pakistan is seeking to replace its fourth-generation F-16 fighter jets with a fifth-generation alternative.

Additionally, there are reports that Russia and Ukraine have approached Turkey with joint production proposals. Malaysia has also been named as a potential partner for Turkey.

Ankara has created a trilateral mechanism that aims to elevate cooperation between Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan with a specific focus on political, economic, and defense and military ties. Similarly, Ankara has been working on cementing another trilateral mechanism—this one between Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia—for coordinating defense cooperation, boosting defense trade, facilitating technology transfer, and localizing the defense industry. The first meeting of the latter trilateral arrangement was held in Riyadh in August 2023, and several rounds of discussion have since taken place. In addition, there are various forms of bilateral defense cooperation shared between Turkey and Pakistan and also Saudi Arabia and Pakistan: For example, Pakistan has deployed troops to Saudi Arabia for various reasons, and the two countries conduct military exercises regularly.

For all these reasons, it makes sense that Saudi Arabia would have its eye on KAAN jets. But ultimately, whether the Saudis will acquire KAAN jets hinges on several factors, including the jet’s operational readiness and strategic value (gauged after its development is complete), the robustness of Saudi Arabia’s defense infrastructure, and evolving geopolitical dynamics within the region, which significantly influence defense collaborations. In addition, the Saudis typically take a long time to finalize such deals. Even if they do reach a decision, there is uncertainty regarding their commitment to it, especially if disagreements arise on other issues. In such cases, Riyadh tends to respond by halting or canceling all aspects of cooperation—political, economic, defense, and security—rather than engaging in dialogue to address the specific disagreement.

Thus, as regional powers navigate these complexities, they will likely need to take time before fully recalibrating their defense postures in response to a KAAN purchase. But this waiting period may provide opportunities for such regional powers and Saudi Arabia to work together to assess their strategic interests and align their defense strategies accordingly.

Ali Bakir is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

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Europe has a window of opportunity to shape Ukraine peace efforts

Doug Klain — Thu, 16 Jan 2025 02:58:36 +0000

Everyone wants to know what Donald Trump has planned for Ukraine. The US President-elect has pledged to secure a negotiated end to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but has yet to formally present his terms for any possible deal. At the same time, it is already clear that the new US administration will expect Europe to play a far more prominent role in the push for a sustainable peace. This creates opportunities for European leaders to seize the initiative.

In order to secure favorable terms in any future peace process, the West must approach negotiations from a position of strength. The only way Western leaders can achieve this is by dramatically expanding military assistance to Ukraine and intensifying economic pressure on Russia. Europe can show Trump that it’s ready to start leading on this without delay.

One major step would be using the more than €280 billion in Russian state assets currently frozen in European jurisdictions to support Ukraine economically and militarily, including by financing the production and purchase of US weapons. The case under international law for seizing these assets is strong. Both the US and Canada have already passed legislation to do so, while the British Parliament is moving forward with a report on how to use these assets to fund the war effort in Ukraine.

Using Russian assets to buy American weapons could certainly prove attractive to Trump, allowing him to claim a significant win for the US economy. Indeed, US House Speaker Mike Johnson has called the idea “pure poetry.”

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The energy sector is another opportunity for Europe to set the agenda in potential peace talks, while also creating further incentives for the incoming US administration. Trump has repeatedly underlined his intention to expand US energy exports. Meanwhile, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen commented in November that it would make economic and political sense for Europe to import LNG from the US instead of Russia.

Increased US energy exports to the EU, if combined with a lower price cap on Russian oil and further crackdowns on Russia’s shadow fleet of oil tankers, could substantially reduce Putin’s energy revenues. The Kremlin would find itself confronted with a further loss of global energy market share, while transatlantic economic ties would be strengthened.

With Russia already facing high inflation and an overheating economy, additional energy sector measures may help force Putin to the negotiating table under more favorable conditions for the West. But once talks begin, European governments must be ready to take serious steps to achieve a real peace in their neighborhood. Members of Trump’s team, including Vice President-elect JD Vance, have suggested that European troops should deploy to Ukraine to enforce a ceasefire. NATO and European leaders met in Brussels last month to discuss the issue. However, there is currently significant resistance in numerous European capitals to the idea of sending troops to Ukraine.

Regardless of whether peace talks result in a road map toward future Ukrainian NATO membership, any security guarantees offered to Ukraine are likely to require foreign troops to credibly enforce a ceasefire. European leaders should demonstrate their readiness to deploy forces on the condition that the United States backs them with the logistical, military, and political support necessary to make such an operation feasible. This would help win over the incoming Trump administration and send a powerful signal of transatlantic unity to the Kremlin. Critically, it would also increase the likelihood of European leaders being included as full partners in negotiations.

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Unless Ukraine receives credible security guarantees, any ceasefire negotiated in the coming months would almost certainly be violated by Moscow once Russia has had time to rearm. This should be at the forefront of European thinking ahead of possible peace talks.

Even without the resumption of full-scale hostilities, an insecure postwar Ukraine would be unable to recover economically and would be at risk of a major new exodus as millions sought to escape the uncertainty of a country on the brink of foreign conquest and collapse. Europe would face the prospect of a failed state on its doorstep, with Putin poised to renew his invasion under far more favorable circumstances.

With a new US policy toward Ukraine yet to take shape, now is the ideal time for European leaders to demonstrate the kind of decisiveness that has often been lacking since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Throughout the past three years, the West’s collective response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine has been consistently dogged by delays, with promised aid often taking many months to arrive. This has given Russia time to dig in, while also convincing Putin that he can ultimately outlast the West in Ukraine.

European leaders now have an historic window of opportunity to shape the future of European security. Over the next few months, Washington will look to engage Moscow in discussions to end Europe’s largest invasion since World War II. European governments cannot afford to be bystanders as the fate of their continent is decided. Instead of waiting to see how the incoming US administration approaches the war, they should work proactively to create leverage by dramatically boosting support for Ukraine, increasing the costs of Russian aggression, and taking on a greater leadership role.

Doug Klain is a policy analyst at Razom for Ukraine, a US-based nonprofit humanitarian aid and advocacy organization, and a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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With Assad out of Syria, Iraq once again is in a vulnerable position. As a matter of principle, it is untenable for the Iraqi government to accept the new Syrian leader Ahmed al-Sharaa who, under the nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, ran atrocious terrorist operations in Iraq for many years and was responsible for the killing of numerous innocent Iraqi civilians. While almost all relevant governments in the region (and many beyond) seem to be looking past the new Syrian leadership’s terrorist affiliations and are opening lines of communication with them, Iraq cannot ignore the security risks arising along its 372-mile border with Syria. Such dangers may come as a result of direct hostility by the new regime, but they also may come from the ungoverned territories of northeastern Syria, where the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are on the verge of collapse under threats from Turkey and the new Syrian government, a collapse that could be avoided if the United States expresses a strong commitment to the Kurdish group. The SDF currently keeps several detention camps, and the most concerning among them is al-Hol, which hosts some forty thousand detainees, including alleged ISIS affiliates, families, and sympathizers. The majority of them are Iraqis.

In recognition of these dangers, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani sent the newly appointed director of national intelligence, Hamid al-Shatri, to meet the new Syrian government in December last year to discuss Iraqi security concerns. The Iraqi government also sent Minister of Foreign Affairs Fuad Hussein to represent Iraq at January 12 meetings in Saudi Arabia, which gathered partner and neighboring countries in a conversation about supporting Syria. By engaging in this way, the Iraqi government has shifted the burden of establishing good-faith security cooperation to the new Syrian leadership.

The challenge for Iraq in the coming months will be twofold: On the one hand, there is the long border with Syria, where several hostile armed groups operate without any opposition from the Syrian side. The Iraqi security forces will have to multiply their resources and vigilance to maintain border security. The scale of this threat will depend on whether Syria is heading toward stability or disintegration into conflict. On the other hand, Iraq will face serious internal pressure from changing geopolitical conditions. For example, Assad’s fall marks the beginning of a new era, one in which Turkey could see its influence spreading across what used to be an Iranian sphere of influence. The Iraqi leadership will be under great pressure from Iran, which seeks compensation for its recent loss of influence, including by having a better political, economic, and security posture in Iraq. At the same time, Iraq will also be under pressure to recalibrate its bilateral relations with the United States. The new reality in Syria will push Iraq and the United States to revisit the recently reached troop-withdrawal agreement, with the Iraqi government simultaneously navigating its need to ensure its territorial security and the scrutiny of rival groups who call for the timely adherence to troop withdrawal.

To test the new geopolitical reality, Sudani made an important visit to Iran on January 8 where he met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The visit resulted in a lot of analysis and speculation about a possible Iraqi effort to persuade the Iranians to agree to a deferment of the US troop withdrawal and the demilitarization of the Iraqi armed groups that identify primarily with Iran. The speculation was put to rest by the X account of the Iranian supreme leader, which put out several concise statements. On the first issue, the ayatollah said the presence of US forces in Iraq is “illegal and contrary to the interests of the people and the government.” On the question of the Iraqi fighting forces, he said that the Popular Mobilization Forces represent “a crucial component of power in Iraq, and more efforts should be made to preserve and strengthen it”—adding that Sudani “emphasized” this as well. The supreme leader argued, in a third statement, that “the more developed and secure Iraq is, the more it will also benefit the Islamic Republic of Iran.” Whatever the bilateral talks may have accomplished, it all has been overshadowed by these three short statements.

It is now up to the government of Iraq to balance its regional policies with full consideration of the opportunities and the challenges the fall of Assad has put forward. At the same time, it will have to be mindful not only of the new Syrian political order but also the change of posture that major regional and international actors will make in the post-Assad era.

Abbas Kadhim is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative. Follow him on X: @DrAbbasKadhim.

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No peace without security: Ukraine needs guarantees against new Russian invasion

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 14 Jan 2025 21:55:14 +0000

Donald Trump’s impending return to the White House has raised expectations of a fresh push for peace in 2025, with the US leader committed to seeking some kind of deal to end Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While the exact nature of Trump’s peace plan is still unknown, it is expected to involve significant Ukrainian territorial concessions.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s negotiating position is already coming into focus. While Ukrainian officials continue to rule out officially ceding land to Moscow, there appears to be growing recognition in Kyiv that the complete liberation of the country is no longer militarily feasible. Instead, Ukraine has begun indicating a readiness to temporarily compromise on territorial issues, while at the same time underlining the critical importance of security guarantees.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy used his first meeting with Trump since the US presidential election to emphasize the need for credible security commitments in any negotiated settlement. During a three-way chat together with French President Emmanuel Macron in December 2024, the Ukrainian leader reportedly stressed to Trump that a ceasefire alone “would not be enough” to end the war with Russia.

Zelenskyy and other senior Ukrainian officials have reiterated this position on multiple occasions in recent weeks, expressing their readiness to seek a diplomatic solution while insisting that it must be accompanied by credible long-term security guarantees that will prevent any repeat of the present Russian invasion. In essence, Ukraine’s position can be summed up as “no peace without security.”

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It is not yet clear what kind of security guarantees Ukraine can realistically expect to receive. Ukrainian officials continue to push for NATO membership, which is seen in Kyiv as being by far the most credible deterrent against future Russian aggression. However, leading NATO members including the US and Germany remain reluctant to extend an invitation to Ukraine amid concerns over the possibility of a direct clash between the alliance and Russia.

Bilateral security pacts could potentially serve as a solution to this impasse, but any agreements would need to include firm commitments to defend Ukraine against a renewed Russian invasion. Zelenskyy stated in early 2025 that security guarantees of this kind would only be effective if provided by the US. As yet, there is no indication that the United States or other key allies are prepared to undertake such a major step.

Preliminary discussions are also believed to be underway exploring the possible deployment of a multi-national peacekeeping force to monitor a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine, with a number of European nations potentially providing troops. This approach could temporarily reduce the likelihood of a return to full-scale hostilities, but skeptics argue that such a force would be challenging to maintain and would not serve as a long-term solution to the Russian threat.

In the absence of a plausible peacekeeping operation, some have suggested that Ukraine’s Western partners could ensure a viable peace by vowing to dramatically increase military support and provide the country with sufficient arms to deter Moscow. However, given the regular delays and consistent shortfalls in the delivery of Western military aid during the current war, this option would be unlikely to satisfy Kyiv or convince the Kremlin to abandon its plans for the complete conquest of Ukraine.

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With all sides now increasingly acknowledging the necessity of territorial concessions, solving the long-term security conundrum looks set to be the main obstacle to ending the largest European war since World War II. Indeed, unless Ukraine’s security concerns can be satisfactorily addressed, there is unlikely to be any peace agreement at all.

Ukrainians are acutely aware that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains fully committed to his ultimate goal of ending Ukrainian independence and erasing Ukrainian national identity entirely. Putin’s insistence on a neutral and disarmed Ukraine is seen in Kyiv as a clear indication that he has no interest in a viable peace agreement and intends to renew his invasion as soon as he has had an opportunity to rearm.

They also understand that any ceasefire without credible security guarantees would leave their country in a militarily, economically, and geopolitically unsustainable position. In such circumstances, Ukraine would be unable to attract the international investment needed to rebuild the country, while the millions of Ukrainians who fled the Russian invasion in 2022 would be unlikely to return. A weakened, demoralized, depopulated, and internationally isolated Ukraine would be in no shape to resist a fresh Russian onslaught.

Unless Ukraine is offered long-term security commitments, many Ukrainians may reluctantly conclude that it would make more sense to continue the fight now rather than accept terms that would amount to a national death sentence. If their Western partners respond by reducing military support, Ukraine’s prospects would be extremely dim. This would be equally dangerous for Europe, which would be confronted by the prospect of a collapsing Ukraine and a resurgent Russia.

All this can be avoided if Western leaders provide Ukraine with watertight security guarantees capable of deterring Putin and preventing further Russian aggression. However, that will require the kind of bold leadership and political courage that have been in strikingly short supply in Western capitals since the onset of Russia’s invasion almost three years ago.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Libya occupies a central role in Turkey’s Mediterranean strategy, serving as a gateway for Ankara’s regional ambitions and a platform for projecting influence. The 2019 Memorandum of Understanding with the GNA, which established a long-contested maritime boundary, has been criticized for raising unresolved sovereignty issues and its questionable legality under international law. Beyond these legal challenges, Turkey’s position in Libya is further complicated by Russia’s entrenched involvement. Through the Wagner Group—recently rebranded as the Africa Corps—Moscow has bolstered Libyan National Army Commander Khalifa Haftar’s forces, securing itself its own foothold in Haftar’s areas of control. Reports of Russian arms transfers over Turkish-controlled airspace from Syria’s Hmeimim airbase to eastern Libya after the fall of Damascus exemplify the paradoxical nature of the Turkey-Russia rivalry. On the surface, such developments may appear transactional, but they reflect Ankara’s broader strategy: maintaining escalation dominance by setting boundaries on Russian operations while leveraging its role as a regional balancer to extract strategic advantages.

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This balancing act underscores Turkey’s calculated pragmatism in Libya, where collaboration with Russia acts as both a counterweight to regional adversaries and a measured gamble. By permitting Moscow’s logistical transfers, Ankara has transformed a potential liability into a tool of strategic leverage, subtly positioning itself to influence Russian ambitions in Africa while reaffirming its indispensability to NATO and fortifying its regional clout. However, this strategy is not without vulnerabilities. The delicate balancing required to manage Moscow’s activities leaves Ankara exposed to the risks of miscalculation, overreach, and dependency. Disruptions in its arrangement with Russia—or fractures in its relationships with NATO allies, regional powers, or Libyan factions—could unravel Ankara’s hard-won gains, imperiling its broader Mediterranean ambitions and leaving its geopolitical foothold exposed.

Flexing muscle in Syria

In Syria, Turkey’s intervention was initially driven by the need to address immediate security threats, primarily removing the self-proclaimed Islamic State and containing Kurdish forces seeking to expand territorial control in northern Syria. However, with the fall of dictator Bashar al-Assad, Ankara recalibrated its approach, merging economic and geopolitical ambitions with its security objectives. The prospect of an EEZ agreement with Syria mirrors the dynamics of the 2019 Libya pact. While such a pact could offer maritime gains and deepen Turkey’s influence in the region, it is fraught with risks. Greece, Cyprus, and other European powers are likely to view such an agreement as an illegal and destabilizing move, further polarizing regional dynamics and intensifying disputes over energy and sovereignty.

Turkey’s approach in Syria also reflects its broader ambitions to integrate its strategies across theaters, enhancing its influence through interconnected policies. The country’s pursuit of maritime gains in Syria builds on the successes of its Libya agreement while highlighting the risks inherent in replicating this strategy in a different geopolitical context. The overlapping tensions in Libya and Syria demand constant recalibration, as Ankara navigates volatile rivalries and shifting alliances. The integration of its strategies underscores Turkey’s vision of the Mediterranean as a unified arena for projecting power.

However, significant challenges loom in Syria, the most salient of which stem from Israel. Following the collapse of the Assad regime, Israeli airstrikes have escalated, targeting countless military installations and destroying aircraft, radar systems, and missile sites. Simultaneously, Israeli forces have conducted incursions and expanded their presence beyond the occupied Golan Heights, particularly in the Quneitra province of southern Syria. These actions reflect dissatisfaction with Syria’s current trajectory. There is a widespread perception within Israel that Syria risks becoming a Turkish protectorate, a scenario that would severely constrain Israel’s military latitude in the region. This concern is compounded by the belief that Iran will continue to maneuver for influence, viewing Syria’s strategic assets as too valuable to relinquish. In this context, a Syria rebuilt under the leadership of Arab states is seen as a far more desirable outcome, curbing the influence of both Turkey and Iran while pre-emptively neutralizing their resurgence.

Should this vision prove unattainable, Israel may resort to curbing Turkish influence by undermining Syria’s unity, channeling support to ethnic and religious minorities to fragment the country and weaken Ankara’s position. This could set the stage for a potential collision course between the two. The interplay of this rivalry highlights the fragile nature of Ankara’s ambitions, with Israel emerging as perhaps its most formidable challenge. Tel Aviv’s ability to operate beyond traditional international norms, as starkly demonstrated in Gaza, and to secure the unwavering support of Ankara’s traditional Western allies—regardless of its methods—exposes the looming asymmetry Turkey faces in this geopolitical contest.

Strengthening influence in the Mediterranean

Anticipating the challenges to its broader Mediterranean aspirations, Turkey is building synergies between its strategies in Libya and Syria to maximize its leverage, reflecting its broader ambition to reshape the Mediterranean’s geopolitical map and strengthen its negotiating position. In Libya, Ankara has adapted to the shifting political landscape, engaging with Eastern Libyan factions and the Haftar family to expand its influence. This outreach signals a pragmatic shift from confrontation to cautious diplomacy, as Turkey seeks to transform former adversaries into cooperative stakeholders while navigating the crowded Libyan geopolitical arena. In Syria, Turkey’s political influence has positioned it as a linchpin for regional engagement with the Syrian government, mediating between Damascus and key external actors, including Arab states, European Union countries, and potentially Russia. Ankara’s subtle gatekeeper role sharpens its leverage, turning regional rivalries into stepping stones for its own ascent.

By aligning its strategies in Libya and Syria, Turkey seeks to consolidate influence and amplify its leverage across both theaters. This calculated approach underscores Ankara’s effort to position itself as an indispensable actor in the Mediterranean, translating tactical maneuvers into broader geopolitical gains while pre-empting challenges that threaten its ambitions. Yet, this high-stakes strategy leaves Turkey exposed. The overlapping tensions in Libya and Syria demand constant recalibration, as advances in one arena could rapidly unravel in another.

The return of US President-elect Donald Trump to the White House this month looms as perhaps the most significant determinant shaping the region’s dynamics. Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy could offer Ankara opportunities to assert itself more aggressively, particularly as it leverages its strategic position in the Mediterranean. However, this same approach raises the specter of greater US disengagement from regional conflicts, leaving Turkey to face escalating challenges from Moscow, Israel, and other regional powers without the backing of its traditional Western allies. The uncertainty of this geopolitical environment underscores the precariousness of Turkey’s gains, where advances in one theater could rapidly unravel in another, placing its broader Mediterranean strategy on a knife’s edge.

Ultimately, Turkey’s Mediterranean strategy reflects both ambition and vulnerability, a delicate dance on shifting sands where every advance risks triggering a cascade of challenges. Much like Ankara views Libya and Syria as interconnected theaters, Western actors should embrace this moment of change to recalibrate their bilateral relations with Turkey, recognizing shared interests in maritime stability and regional development.

In Libya, this means supporting a political process that moderates a Turko-Russian oligopolistic arrangement while promoting stability and inclusivity to align with shared Turko-Western priorities. In Syria, targeted sanctions relief and reconstruction efforts tied to an inclusive political framework can support stabilization efforts and address immediate needs. By anchoring their engagement with Turkey in mutual interests and shared goals, Western actors can transform competition into cooperation. This recalibration will be pivotal in shaping whether Turkey’s Mediterranean gambit becomes a cornerstone of regional stability or a foundation of enduring fragility.

Emadeddin Badi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

Abdullah al-Jabassini is an adjunct professor at the Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Europe.

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Abandoning Ukraine would plunge the entire world into an era of instability

Victor Liakh — Thu, 09 Jan 2025 18:33:27 +0000

Ever since Donald Trump’s November 2024 election victory, speculation has been mounting over a potential peace deal to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine. With Russian forces currently enjoying the battlefield initiative and amid doubts over continued US support for Kyiv, many observers believe Ukraine may have little choice but to accept highly unfavorable peace terms dictated by the Kremlin. Russia’s conditions would likely include the loss of territory along with wholesale disarmament and the imposition of permanent neutral status.

The implications of such a shameful peace for Ukrainian statehood would be catastrophic. Nor would the damage be contained within Ukraine’s violated borders. On the contrary, the consequences of abandoning Ukraine would reverberate around the world for many years to come, undermining the foundations of international security.

If it happens, the fall of Ukraine may not be immediately apparent. Indeed, it could even be temporarily disguised by face-saving talk of pragmatism and compromise. However, a demilitarized, partitioned, and internationally isolated postwar Ukraine without credible security guarantees would have little chance of surviving for long. Behind the diplomatic platitudes, it would be painfully obvious that Ukraine was now completely at Putin’s mercy. In such circumstances, a new Russian invasion would be merely a matter of time.

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The spirit of the 1938 Munich Agreement looms large over prospective US-brokered peace talks between Russia and Ukraine. With pressure mounting on Ukraine to make concessions to the aggressor, it is hardly surprising that many are comparing the current situation to the ugly deal between Western leaders and Nazi Germany that sealed the fate of Czechoslovakia and paved the war for World War II. Just as British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain returned from Munich brandishing Hitler’s worthless signature and declaring “peace for our time,” critics now fear that similar efforts to appease Putin will set the stage for further Russian aggression.

Ukraine’s demise as an independent state would confirm the failure of the existing international security architecture. In its place, we would enter a new era of international affairs dominated by a handful of Great Powers seeking to establish their own spheres of influence, with smaller countries reduced to the role of buffer states. A climate of insecurity would initially take root from the Baltic to the Balkans, and would soon spread to the wider world.

The collapse of the rules-based international order would inevitably undermine the credibility of the West. Meanwhile, authoritarian regimes such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea would be significantly strengthened. Moscow would almost certainly escalate its ongoing hybrid war against the democratic world, and may seek further territorial gains in Central Asia, the Caucasus, or Eastern Europe. Autocrats in Beijing, Tehran, and beyond would draw the logical conclusions from Putin’s victory in Ukraine and embrace expansionist foreign policies of their own.

With the sanctity of international borders no longer assured, countries around the world would scramble to rearm. Crucially, Russia’s successful use of nuclear blackmail against Ukraine would convince many nations to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. This would lead to a nuclear arms race that would rapidly escalate, undoing decades of non-proliferation efforts. With dozens of countries aspiring to nuclear status, the chances of a nuclear war would rise dramatically, as would the potential for nukes to fall into the hands of rogue actors.

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Today’s international security crisis did not arise overnight. The security climate has been steadily deteriorating since 2014, when Russia first seized the Crimean peninsula and invaded eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. The inadequate international response to these watershed acts of Russian aggression was interpreted in Moscow as a green light to go further, creating the conditions for the full-scale invasion of 2022 and setting the stage for what has become the largest European war since World War II.

If Western leaders now choose to sacrifice Ukraine in a misguided bid to placate Putin, the shift from a rules-based international order to the law of the geopolitical jungle will be complete. This transition will be extremely expensive, with countries around the world forced to dramatically increase defense budgets to levels that dwarf the current cost of military support for Ukraine.

None of this is inevitable, of course. It is still entirely possible to secure a just peace for Ukraine that would deter the Russia-led axis of autocrats and revive faith in a rules-based system of international relations. However, this would require a degree of resolve and political will that few Western leaders have been prepared to demonstrate since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. For almost three years, the Western response has been marked by excessive caution and a crippling fear of escalation that have only served to embolden the Kremlin.

Putin is clearly counting on continued Western weakness as he looks to break Ukrainian resistance in a grinding war of attrition. He is now more confident than ever of victory and has little interest in negotiating anything other than the terms of Ukraine’s surrender. This is the unfavorable reality that will confront Donald Trump when he returns to the White House later this month. Unless he and other Western leaders insist on pursuing peace through strength, Ukraine will have little chance of survival and the wider world will face a Hobbesian future of instability and aggression.

Victor Liakh is the CEO of the East Europe Foundation.

Putin begins 2025 confident of victory as war of attrition takes toll on Ukraine

Mykola Bielieskov — Tue, 07 Jan 2025 22:02:12 +0000

While many commentators are already speculating over the possibility of Ukraine peace talks in the coming months, there is actually very little to indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin is interested in a negotiated settlement. Ukrainian military commanders are certainly not counting on any pause in hostilities, and are instead preparing for a fourth year of Europe’s largest war since World War II.

Russia held the battlefield initiative throughout 2024, and managed to make gains at various points along the approximately one thousand kilometer front lines of the war. While Moscow was unable to secure any landmark successes, the relatively minor advances of the past year marked a shift from the largely static front lines in 2023. If the underlying causes of this Russian progress are not addressed, Putin’s invading army may be able to achieve a more decisive breakthrough in the coming year.

Russia’s gains in 2024 owed much to tactical and technological adaptations implemented since the early stages of the war. At the same time, Moscow also clearly benefited from a range of problems bedeviling the Ukrainian military, with troop shortages, ineffective leadership, and supply uncertainties at the very top of the list. Ukraine’s survival as a state may now depend on the country’s ability to resolve these issues in the coming months.

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Ukraine began the war in February 2022 with a large number of highly capable soldiers who had gained valuable experience during the previous eight years of sporadic fighting against Kremlin forces in eastern Ukraine. These seasoned troops played a key role in Ukraine’s early successes, adopting an often innovative approach to the war that helped cancel out Russia’s overwhelming advantages in terms of firepower.

Russia has countered Ukraine’s greater battlefield creativity by relying increasingly on strength in numbers. In September 2022, Putin announced Russia’s first mobilization since World War II. This dramatically increased the number of Russian troops in Ukraine and set the stage for the human wave tactics that have made Moscow’s subsequent advances possible.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s heavy losses since 2022 have robbed multiple army units of their most seasoned members. In many cases, this has led to a sharp decline in battlefield performance. Large numbers of promising young Ukrainian officers who should have risen through the ranks to senior command positions have instead been killed, wounded, or simply exhausted by almost three years of relentless combat.

The Ukrainian military is now facing growing challenges recruiting fresh troops to replenish its depleted ranks. This is due in part to the demoralizing impact of consistently high casualty rates and the lack of demobilization prospects while hostilities continue. It also reflects declining confidence in the quality of Ukraine’s military leaders and concerns over consistent shortages in both weapons and ammunition.

Revisions to Ukraine’s mobilization regulations introduced in spring 2024 failed to adequately address the underlying causes of this mounting manpower shortage. Instead, the past year witnessed record levels of desertion that have further undermined Ukraine’s already weakening defenses. Unless measures can be taken to reverse this trend, the consequences for Ukraine could be disastrous.

The increasingly acute challenges facing the Ukrainian army in terms of both quantity and quality demand a combined response from Ukraine and its allies. This must include improved training for infantry and officers, measures to root our ineffective commanders and enhance coordination between units, and greatly increased flows of military supplies from the international coalition backing the Ukrainian war effort.

This will require greater cooperation and an end to the current finger-pointing between Ukraine and the country’s partners. In recent months, officials in Kyiv have sought pin their problems on a lack of sufficient international military aid, while allies including the US have begun questioning Ukraine’s mobilization strategy and calling for a reduction in the age of military recruits. This blame game does little to address the mounting crisis within the Ukrainian military.

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With Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine set to pass the three-year mark next month, it is clear that the policies adopted in Kyiv and other Western capitals since 2022 are no longer working. Ukraine’s manpower problems cannot be overcome via reliance on patriotic sentiment and superior combat experience alone. A more systematic approach to training and equipping new troops is clearly necessary, and must be accompanied by measures to improve leadership and accountability within the Ukrainian military.

Likewise, piecemeal deliveries of weapons will not convince Russia to end the invasion. The extended debates and regular delays that have characterized international military support for Ukraine since 2022 have done much to persuade Putin that he can ultimately outlast the West.

The Kremlin dictator is facing his own manpower issues amid catastrophic Russian losses. However, he can call upon a population more than four times the size of Ukraine’s and can also afford to attract volunteers with large cash incentives. The recent addition of more than ten thousand North Korean troops has further eased the pressure on Russia’s army recruiters.

If Ukraine’s partners really wish to change the mood in Moscow, they must make a far more long-term commitment to providing Kyiv with military support and demonstrate their resolve to defeating Russia on the battlefield. Wars of attrition like the current Russo-Ukrainian War are won and lost through the deployment of superior resources. On paper, the West has the collective wealth and technological capabilities to completely overwhelm Russia. However, almost three years since the start of the full-scale invasion, Western support for Ukraine remains hampered by talk of compromise and fear of escalation. Putin interprets this as weakness and is emboldened.

Ukraine is currently in a race against time to address a number of key issues that threaten to undermine the country’s war effort and hand Putin an historic victory in 2025. Supporting Kyiv’s efforts is a matter of urgency for European leaders and should also be high on the list of priorities for the incoming Trump administration. Donald Trump has vowed to end the war, but he will likely find that Putin is unwilling to enter into talks unless the United States can undermine his confidence in victory and dramatically strengthen Ukraine’s negotiating position.

These proposals are not a recipe for a sustainable settlement. On the contrary, Putin’s peace plan is in fact a call for Kyiv’s complete capitulation. Moscow’s demands are deliberately designed to leave Ukraine internationally isolated and unable to defend itself. If these terms are imposed on the Ukrainian authorities, there can be little doubt that Putin would use any subsequent pause in hostilities to rearm before renewing the war in the coming years.

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Russia’s true intentions can be seen in its insistence that Ukraine abandon efforts to join NATO and accept permanent geopolitical neutrality. Moscow claims this is essential in order to safeguard Russian national security, but Putin’s own actions suggest otherwise.

When neighboring Finland announced plans to join NATO in 2022, Putin made no effort to block the process and announced that Russia had “no problems” with Finnish accession. He then went even further, withdrawing most Russian troops from the border with Finland. Clearly, Putin does not view NATO as a security threat to Russia itself. Instead, he sees the alliance as a potential obstacle to his own expansionist ambitions in Ukraine.

Russian demands for a neutral and demilitarized Ukraine should be equally unacceptable in Kyiv and among Ukraine’s Western partners. Agreeing to the Kremlin’s conditions would mean leaving millions of Ukrainians at Putin’s mercy, while also emboldening Moscow and inviting more Russian aggression. From Chechnya and Georgia to Crimea and Syria, there is ample evidence from the past two decades that each successive failure to hold Russia accountable only encourages fresh escalations.

The West’s misguided efforts to appease Putin have already led to the largest and bloodiest European war since World War II. Any further attempts at appeasement will have similarly disastrous consequences for the future stability and security of Europe. Indeed, senior European officials are now warning that a military confrontation with Moscow is becoming more likely, with German spy chief Bruno Kahl recently predicting that Russia may seek to test NATO before the end of the current decade.

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While Russia is pushing for a disarmed and neutral Ukraine, Ukrainian officials are preparing for possible peace talks by prioritizing the need for credible security guarantees. In recent months, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has signaled the country’s readiness to temporarily compromise on territorial integrity in order to move forward toward a viable peace. At the same time, officials in Kyiv have underlined that there is no room for any similar compromises on the issue of security guarantees.

Ukraine’s objective remains NATO membership, which is seen in Kyiv as the only credible long-term guarantee of the country’s security and sovereignty. However, key members of the alliance including the United States and Germany remain deeply reluctant to embrace Ukraine’s NATO aspirations.

With their country’s pathway to NATO accession likely to be extremely politically challenging, Ukrainian officials are also exploring the possibility of bilateral security guarantees. In a recent interview with US podcaster Lex Fridman, Zelenskyy said security guarantees for Kyiv to end Russia’s war would only be effective if the United States provides them. He was also scathing of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which saw Ukraine surrender the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal in exchange for security assurances from Russia, the US, and the UK that ultimately proved worthless.

Given the diametrically opposed positions of Russia and Ukraine on the issue of NATO membership, it seems certain that security guarantees will be the most problematic point during any forthcoming negotiations to end the war. Can Western leaders come up with a credible security formula that will safeguard Ukrainian statehood and deter further Russian aggression? Unless they do so, Ukraine’s prospects will be grim and the rest of Europe will face years of costly confrontation with a resurgent Russia.

Serhii Kuzan is Chairman of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center (USCC). He formerly served as an adviser to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (2022-2023) and as an advisor to the Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council (2014).

Russia is making a fragile pivot from Syria to Libya. The West should beware falling into a new trap.

Emadeddin Badi — Thu, 02 Jan 2025 21:12:23 +0000

The fall of Damascus last month marks a shift of historic proportions. Once a centerpiece of Russia’s reassertion on the global stage, Syria now starkly illustrates the fragility of alliances built on coercion and convenience. Bashar al-Assad, propped up for years by Russian airpower, mercenaries, and propaganda, could not withstand the combined weight of internal dissent and external recalibration. For Moscow, this collapse is not merely a setback but an opportunity to adapt—an effort already underway as its forces and equipment pivot southward in the Mediterranean. Russia’s relocation of troops and hardware to eastern Libya signals a strategic recalibration, with Libyan National Army (LNA) Commander Khalifa Haftar waiting in Cyrenaica, hedging his bets. All eyes are on him as Western states court his family members to deter them from enabling a Russian naval pivot in the Mediterranean.

This shifting terrain—from the ruins of Assad’s Damascus to Haftar’s contested Libya—reveals a deeper logic in Russian foreign policy. It is not about replacing one proxy with another but about continuity. Moscow’s operations in Syria were as much about resisting Western encroachment as securing tangible gains. When Russian jets flew from Hmeimim airbase to Libya in 2019 to support Haftar’s Tripoli offensive, it was a quiet rehearsal for today’s broader strategic shift. This ambition in the Mediterranean is not new; it dates back to the eighteenth century, when Russia established its Mediterranean naval fleet to challenge Ottoman dominance and project power. While Moscow’s role in Syria may be evolving rather than disappearing, the shifting dynamics surrounding its use as a launchpad to Africa only underscore Libya’s importance—not as a fallback, but as part of a long-standing strategy to expand Moscow’s strategic foothold in the region and project power beyond it.

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Parallels between Assad and Haftar run deeper than their shared reliance on Russian patronage. Both are authoritarian figures willing to barter sovereignty for survival. Assad offered Moscow a foothold against NATO’s eastern flank and a stage to test military capabilities. Haftar presents a similar opportunity—a means to disrupt Western interests, exploit Libya’s fractured politics, and extend Moscow’s influence into Africa. Yet both men embody the risks of Russia’s transactional approach. They are less allies than instruments, their perceived strength masking deep vulnerabilities. In Damascus, Assad’s forces crumbled as Moscow’s support wavered. Haftar’s story, though not yet written, carries ominous echoes of the same trajectory.

The West’s neglect during Libya’s transition—marked by US disengagement and conflicting European agendas—enabled Russia (and Turkey) to assert dominance. Despite this, Washington is now playing catch-up, attempting to disentangle Haftar from Moscow’s grip. This strategy betrays a misunderstanding of the dynamics at play, as well as a misconception about Western stakeholders’ ability to replace what Moscow provides to Haftar—military, logistical, and financial support that the West is neither prepared nor equipped to offer. Haftar is no free agent capable of switching allegiances at will, least of all from Moscow, to which he is firmly tethered by his military and logistical dependence. From Wagner Group mercenaries acting as enforcers to counterfeit Libyan dinars printed in Russia financing his campaigns, Haftar’s power is not independent but borrowed, with terms dictated by the Kremlin.

Moscow’s tightening grip

The Kremlin’s view of Haftar as an unreliable paper tiger underscores the asymmetry in their relationship. While Haftar styles himself as Libya’s savior, Russia sees him as a tool for broader ambitions. During Haftar’s US-greenlit ill-fated assault on Tripoli launched in 2019, Wagner operatives eventually withdrew tactically, exposing his forces to chaotic retreats and humiliating losses. The mercenaries’ priority was not Haftar’s victory but securing strategic assets. By cementing a presence in key Libyan bases, Moscow deepened Haftar’s reliance on Russia while consolidating its long-term foothold.

Haftar’s dependence on Moscow reached new levels after his 2020 defeat in Tripoli. Cash-strapped and deprived of momentum, he turned to Wagner’s advanced military capabilities to maintain relevance. Wagner’s MiG fighter jets stationed in Jufra airbase and troops in Ghardabiyah airbase became lifelines for the LNA. The perception of retaining the support of a global power enabled Haftar to reconsolidate his forces, suppressing dissent and enforcing loyalty within its fractious ranks through purges and restructuring. This consolidation paved the way for hereditary succession plans within the Haftar family. Nevertheless, the dependence on Russian support at a period of vulnerability highlights the precarious nature of Haftar’s power, with reliance on foreign support masking fragility.

Haftar’s sons have since cultivated ties with several foreign capitals, including Moscow, leveraging these connections to bolster the family’s standing. This approach mirrors Assad’s dynastic governance and highlights the critical role of external support in sustaining such systems. Centralizing authority within the family aims to solidify power but also disrupts the delicate balance among tribal coalitions and militia alliances underpinning Haftar’s rule. While access to unfettered revenues has thus far preserved co-opted loyalty, the reliance on external backers mirrors the vulnerability that marked Assad’s later years, where growing insularity and dependence on Moscow eroded his broader alliances. The parallels extend to the late Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, whose inner-circle isolation and miscalculations led to mass defections at his regime’s peak. In both cases, perceptions of inevitability gave way to fragility—a cautionary tale for Libya’s current trajectory.

The Haftars’ strategy, while consolidating internal authority, has also deepened reliance on external backers such as Moscow. This dependency grew further in 2023 and 2024, as the Haftar family facilitated the evasion of Western sanctions on Russia by re-exporting Russian refined fuel products falsely labeled as Libyan. This scheme hinged on Haftar’s influence over Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC), a sovereign institution eroded by internal divisions and external interference. Working with the Tripoli-based government, the Haftars turned the NOC into a vehicle for factional control and illicit profit. A 2022 US-backed Emirati-mediated deal to replace the NOC’s chief reflected Washington’s flawed assumptions that sharing economic benefits between the Haftars and their counterparts in Tripoli could foster stability. Instead, the agreement enabled Haftar to exploit the NOC for Kremlin-aligned activities and private gain, deepening corruption and exacerbating Libya’s institutional fragility.

More broadly, Moscow’s rising influence over the Haftar family’s operations underscores its role as a key arbiter of its survival as a political dynasty. By controlling critical military assets and logistical networks, Russia wields significant leverage over the LNA’s future. This dependency highlights the paradox of Haftar’s ambitions: consolidating power through familial ties renders him more beholden to Moscow, which can recalibrate its support based on broader strategic interests. In pursuing dynastic continuity, the Haftars have tightened Russia’s grip on Libya, transforming a bid for autonomy into another layer of dependence.

Lessons for the West

The folly of Western engagement with Haftar lies in overestimating his leverage. Washington’s assumption that Haftar can counter Moscow ignores his fundamental reliance on external backers. Even his allies, such as the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, now view him more pragmatically, supporting him only as long as he serves their interests. For Russia, Haftar’s utility stems from dependence, not loyalty. His forces rely on Russian airlifts, the expertise of the rebranded Wagner Group (now operating as the Africa Corps), and Moscow’s soft power. Strip away Russia’s military support, and Haftar’s inflated power on the ground collapses—a mirage reminiscent of the misplaced certainty in Assad’s inevitability.

If the West is to counter Moscow effectively, it must abandon its reactive attempts to “peel away” influential figures from Russia and acknowledge the limits of its influence in a region where it has consistently been outmaneuvered. Instead of chasing fleeting alliances with figures like Haftar, the West should focus on addressing the structural weaknesses that make Libya susceptible to external exploitation. Equally, unconditional support for a weak and corrupt government in Tripoli undermines the country’s sovereignty, creating further voids for actors like Russia to exploit. Strengthening governance, fostering economic resilience, and supporting inclusive political solutions are paramount. In particular, the United States should work with international partners to bolster Libya’s judicial and financial oversight institutions, creating accountability and reducing opportunities for exploitation by foreign actors.

Whether or not Russia succeeds in its Mediterranean pivot, the lesson for the West is clear: playing catch-up in a game already lost serves no one. The failures in both Syria and Libya underscore the dangers of neglecting early intervention and coherent strategy. To avoid repeating these mistakes, the West must learn not only to act decisively but also to prioritize stability over opportunism. This is not merely a regional issue, but emblematic of a broader contest over the principles that will define the global order in the years to come.

Emadeddin Badi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

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A mercenary client collapses

Alia Brahimi — Thu, 02 Jan 2025 19:39:17 +0000

In Season 2, Episode 8 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi sits down with acclaimed author and former CIA analyst, David McCloskey, to discuss the spectacular collapse of a major mercenary client in Syria. They discuss why, despite their notorious brutality, Bashar Al-Assad’s security forces proved so brittle, and who the winners and losers are from the stunning rebel victory.

David describes the Assad security system as a hub-and-spoke model and conceives of the different military and security units as profit centres who had lost the incentive to defend the regime. David also talks us through CIA scenario planning around Syria and what spy services might be doing or thinking in relation to Syria right now.

“What I think was unknowable and therefore not predicted by the agency would have been the speed of the collapse… My guess is that was not anyone’s bingo card and so it was missed.”

David McCloskey, author and former CIA analyst

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How might Germany’s coming election shape future support for Ukraine?

Stuart Jones, Katherine Spencer — Tue, 24 Dec 2024 15:32:53 +0000

The collapse of the governing coalition in Germany, which was made official on December 16 when Chancellor Olaf Scholz lost a Bundestag no-confidence vote, has been followed closely in Kyiv. This interest is understandable; Germany is one of Ukraine’s most important supporters in Europe and has provided military aid valued at over 11 billion euros since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion almost three years ago. This is more than any other European country and second only to the United States.

The next government in Berlin will be confronted by a number of challenges as it addresses the future of German support for Ukraine. However, there are indications that Kyiv and the wider transatlantic community may have reason to welcome the early Bundestag elections slated for February 2025.

With the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) currently well ahead in nationwide polls, CDU leader Friedrich Merz is widely expected to be the next chancellor. This is potentially good news for Ukraine. Merz is more hawkish toward Russia than current German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. He is also poised to have a stronger majority in the Bundestag than Scholz, whose three-party coalition ultimately imploded amid internal feuds. For Ukraine, this would hopefully mean more predictability in bilateral relations with Berlin.

Before the election campaign officially began in Germany, Merz traveled to Kyiv in early December for meetings with the Ukrainian government. He is a vocal proponent of delivering German Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine, which Scholz has consistently refused to allow.

Scholz has also been criticized for a recent phone call to Vladimir Putin, which critics saw as indicating Western disunity at a critical point in diplomatic efforts to set the stage for possible peace talks. Meanwhile, Scholz’s party has been emphasizing “peace” rather than security in its campaign messaging, further widening the gap with the CDU, which is seen as being comparatively tougher on Russia.

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The outlook from Ukraine’s perspective is not entirely favorable. If he does secure election victory, Merz will face many of the same issues that confronted his predecessor. This includes Germany’s constitutional debt brake, which in effect limits the German government’s ability to spend more on defense without cutting expenditure elsewhere.

The CDU would have limited tools to safeguard funding for Ukraine. They could potentially reform the debt brake or seek to reduce state funding in other areas like welfare and transportation (which voters would be unlikely to appreciate). Alternatively, they may repeat the approach adopted by Scholz and attempt to pass another extra-budgetary “special fund.” While this is not a long-term solution for Germany’s defense spending, a new special fund specifically for Ukraine could potentially win enough political will in the Bundestag under the right stewardship.

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With Donald Trump’s election victory fueling uncertainty over the future of US military support for Ukraine, finding solutions to maintain German aid should be high on the agenda for the new government in Berlin in early 2025. In addition to Trump’s imminent return to the White House, France also remains stuck in a period of domestic political instability, which could disrupt French aid to Ukraine at a time when Europe’s Franco-German engine is more necessary than ever.

Officials in Kyiv will be keen to avoid any developments in Germany that raise questions over the country’s continued backing for Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin is widely believed to be counting on an eventual weakening of Western resolve as he looks to outlast the democratic world in Ukraine. Any signs of disunity or uncertainty in Berlin could help convince Putin that time is on his side, thereby further reducing the chances of meaningful peace negotiations.

Trump has vowed to end the war and is widely expected to push for the start of talks once he takes office in January. However, with the Russian army advancing in eastern Ukraine amid mounting signs of deteriorating Ukrainian morale and increasingly acute troop shortages, Putin will be in no hurry to compromise. Unless the battlefield dynamics change significantly in the coming weeks, it may prove difficult to persuade Putin to accept any peace terms that do not legitimize his invasion or represent a clear Russian victory.

There is a good chance that Germany’s snap elections will result in increased support for Ukraine in Berlin. However, the uncertainty of the next two months presents an unwelcome challenge, particularly as Kyiv seeks to convey a message of Western unity to Moscow. As they face another wartime winter, Ukrainians must wait to see who will lead the new German government and how they will articulate their plans.

Stuart Jones is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. Katherine Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Russia’s Syrian exploits were afforded blanket coverage throughout the country’s carefully curated information space. The Kremlin media spent much of the past decade trumpeting the war in Syria as a symbol of Russia’s return to Great Power status, with Moscow pundits routinely positioning the country’s military campaign as a righteous crusade against Western intrigues and Islamist forces of darkness. There have been endless documentaries, propaganda tours, and even a classical concert amid the rubble of a country devastated by Russian aerial bombardment. All this is now seemingly forgotten as the Kremlin seeks to ingratiate itself with the new powers that be in Damascus.

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Putin’s readiness to surrender his entire propaganda position in Syria and quietly accept new military realities should now help the West to overcome its crippling fear of Russian escalation in Ukraine. Ever since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began almost three years ago, the Western response has been hampered by concerns that support for Ukraine could provoke Russia into escalating its aggression and lead to a broadening of the conflict. Putin has skillfully exploited these fears, using a combination of nuclear threats and warnings of Russian red lines to limit the delivery of Western military aid to Kyiv and impose absurd restrictions on Ukraine’s ability to defend itself.

This excessive Western caution has infuriated many in Kyiv, not least because Ukraine has repeatedly exposed Russia’s threats as empty. When Putin threatened to defend his Ukrainian conquests with nuclear weapons in September 2022 and declared “I’m not bluffing,” Ukraine promptly called his bluff and liberated the strategically vital southern Ukrainian city of Kherson. Instead of reaching for his nuclear briefcase, Putin simply ordered his defeated troops to retreat across the Dnipro River. Likewise, when Ukraine disregarded Kremlin bluster and proceeded to sink or damage around one-third of the entire Russian Black Sea Fleet, Putin did not go nuclear. On the contrary, he instructed his remaining warships to withdraw from Russian-occupied Crimea to the relative safety of Russian ports.

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The biggest blow to the myth of inevitable Russian escalation came in summer 2024, when Ukraine crossed the reddest of all Russian red lines by invading Russia itself. As Ukrainian troops flooded across the border and began occupying swathes of Russia’s Kursk Oblast, Putin’s response was telling. He made no attempt to rally his compatriots against the foreign invader or warn of impending nuclear war. Quite the opposite, in fact. Rather than raising the stakes, Putin consciously chose to downplay the entire Ukrainian offensive, referring to it as a mere “provocation.”

Putin’s underwhelming response to the fall of his Syrian ally Bashar Assad serves as a timely reminder that Western fears of Russian escalation are wildly exaggerated. In reality, whenever Putin finds himself confronted by a resolute opponent, he is inclined to retreat. Like all bullies, he seeks to overwhelm his victims with intimidation. However, as we have seen repeatedly in Ukraine, his threats are almost always hollow.

This is good news for advocates of a “peace through strength” strategy, including those within the incoming Trump administration. Putin’s ability to intimidate the West has been his greatest success of the entire war in Ukraine, but it should now be abundantly clear that Russia’s saber-rattling is built on bluff.

The Kremlin’s inability to rescue its Syrian ally has revealed the humble reality behind Putin’s Great Power posturing. The Russian military is now obviously overextended by the ongoing invasion of Ukraine, while Putin is in a far weaker position than he would like us to believe. Crucially, he is also more than capable of completely rejecting his own propaganda and rewriting history when necessary. If confronted with the prospect of military defeat in Ukraine, there is every reason to believe he will retreat again, while ordering his media machine to save his blushes.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

—Sungmin Cho is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Impeachment is a rare occurrence in the United States, with only three presidents having faced the process in nearly two-and-a-half centuries. Conversely, South Korea has seen three presidents face impeachment in just twenty years, with several others leaving office in less-than-ideal circumstances.

Nor is martial law unknown in South Korea. The country experienced it under the control of Park Chung-hee in the 1970s. Then, the South Korean people fought with blood, sweat, and tears to institute a true democracy. It’s under this context, with martial law in the living memory of many in the country, that South Korea was galvanized to call for impeachment for an already massively unpopular Yoon. South Koreans are very protective of their democracy, and Yoon’s attempt at martial law drew comparisons to the authoritarian Park Chung-hee government, especially since Yoon’s first move after the martial law declaration was seemingly to block the National Assembly from voting to end it. This move was undoubtedly one step too far for the South Korean public and the calls for impeachment were a statement from the population that they will not take a threat to the democratic process lightly.

—Lauren D. Gilbert is a deputy director with the Atlantic Council’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative.

2. What is the potential removal process?

After the National Assembly impeached Yoon, his powers were immediately suspended, and the prime minister assumed the role of acting president. The impeachment case will now be reviewed by the Constitutional Court, which has up to 180 days to decide if Yoon violated the Constitution or laws to a degree warranting removal. In former President Park Geun-hye’s impeachment case that began in late 2016, the Constitutional Court took ninety-two days to reach a decision. Both Yoon and the National Assembly will present arguments, evidence, and witnesses in a trial-like process before the judges of the Constitutional Court. If upheld, Yoon will be formally removed from office, triggering a presidential election within sixty days; if rejected, he will be reinstated. Throughout this period, public opinion and political debates will intensify as the nation awaits the court’s final decision.

—Sungmin Cho

Now that Yoon is facing impeachment, the Constitutional Court has 180 days to decide, and the vote requires at least six of the full court’s nine judges to vote yes for impeachment. However, at present, the court only has six judges, with three seats on the court left vacant. This is leading to a debate over how and when the court should proceed. Some say that the vote should go through with the six current judges, while others say the vacant seats must be filled first.

There is also debate over whether the judges should be appointed by the National Assembly or whether Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, who has taken over the presidency during the impeachment process, has the right to appoint the three judges. Further complicating matters, the court has several other impeachment cases still awaiting its decision, adding to the oversaturation of the Constitutional Court. While we await the decision on how they will proceed with the appointment (or not) of the three vacant seats, there is still the possibility that Yoon’s impeachment will be overturned. There is a precedent for this. Former president Roh Moo-hyun’s impeachment was overturned in 2004, although unlike Yoon, Roh had the public’s support.

—Lauren D. Gilbert

3. What does this mean for South Korea’s relations with Japan?

In the immediate term, Japan and South Korea will broadly continue to communicate and coordinate along the lines forged over the past two-and-a-half years. However, South Korea and also to some extent Japan will have limited political capital to undertake any new measures to strengthen the relationship. Instead, Tokyo and Seoul are focusing on making both their bilateral relations and the trilateral security framework with Washington resilient and long-lasting to minimize the effects of political revisions in the future.

Japan is concerned about who will take the presidency in South Korea if the impeachment is upheld. The political momentum gained by progressives in Seoul is raising concerns about a reversal of the progress made in Japan-South Korea relations in recent years. On the plus side, however, Japan and South Korea have rebuilt ties and worked on the strategic and operational mechanisms and procedures of close coordination, setting a strong precedent for the future.

—Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative.

4. What does this mean for relations with Washington and trilateral security cooperation with the US and Japan?

In the near term, the acting president, Han, is already moving to ensure continued alliance coordination between Seoul and Washington. Key meetings and working-level coordination are likely to return to some semblance of normalcy, as the institutional memory and mechanisms of the alliance are strong. However, in practical terms, the timing of this political crisis will make it challenging to have high-level strategic coordination or make progress on key alliance issues in 2025. South Korea will have only an acting president when US President-elect Donald Trump takes office in January. And depending on how long the Constitutional Court takes to decide the impeachment case, it could be as long as eight months from now before a new president is elected. We also cannot rule out a prolonged period of uncertainty followed by Yoon’s return to office, in a much-weakened and tenuous position, in the event the court does not uphold the impeachment.

—Markus Garlauskas is the director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative and a former national intelligence officer for North Korea.

5. What can we expect from North Korea right now?

North Korea appears to have been laying the groundwork for a renewed military confrontation with South Korea for some time now, and it could initiate that confrontation at a particularly inopportune moment for the alliance. Pyongyang’s silence so far suggests that North Korea will wait for the outcome of the Constitutional Court’s decision and the election of a new president in South Korea before moving to take advantage of the situation, however. North Korea likely recognizes that pursuing a confrontation with Han, the interim president, could simply strengthen the position of South Korean conservatives inclined to take a harder line against North Korea. Meanwhile, before pushing too far, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is likely to want some time to probe Trump’s new position.

A major thaw in relations is unlikely, even if South Koreans elect a progressive president inclined to engage Pyongyang, given Kim’s moves this year to reinforce the permanence of the division between North and South. Despite optimism in some quarters about the possibility of renewed Trump-Kim summitry in 2025, not much is likely to result. A lot has changed in the four years since Trump left office, and Kim’s position has solidified in ways that make it much less likely that he would be willing to offer major, meaningful concessions to Washington or Seoul.

—Markus Garlauskas

On the surface, North Korea’s response to the political crisis has been limited to domestic media commentary and has refrained from openly confronting South Korea so, perhaps to prove wrong Yoon’s claims about North Korean infiltration. At the same time, the political turmoil in South Korea is a prime situation for North Korea to carry out covert cognitive warfare—particularly through social media and other communication methods. In particular, Pyongyang would be piggybacking and boosting the criticisms in South Korea toward Yoon and the conservatives.

For North Korea, such measures are essentially about investing in the return of the progressives to power, which North Korea could exploit to make South-North relations and circumstances on the peninsula more advantageous for Pyongyang. North Korea’s new official policy of recognizing South Korea as an “adversary” rather than a “partner for unification” was not only to bolster its militarily confrontational stance, but a means of hybrid warfare to apply further pressure on Seoul—particularly vis-à-vis the progressives. Hence for now, North Korea will likely see how the situation in South Korea plays out while also ensuring that it has the upper hand in dictating the direction of inter-Korean relations.

—Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi

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Why Finland thinks Finlandization is a bad idea for Ukraine

Minna Ålander — Fri, 13 Dec 2024 00:38:02 +0000

As expectations mount over the prospect of fresh peace talks in 2025 to end Russia’s war in Ukraine, the idea of Ukraine’s possible Finlandization has once again resurfaced. Finnish officials have been quick to reject such suggestions, warning that forcing neutrality on Ukraine “will not bring about a peaceful solution to the crisis with Russia.”

The mood of skepticism in Helsinki is understandable. While there are some superficial similarities between the position Ukraine currently finds itself in and Finland’s predicament during the Cold War, any attempt to emulate the Finlandization policies of an earlier era would be disastrous for Ukraine.

Despite spending much of the past twenty years since the 2004 Orange Revolution pursuing Euro-Atlantic integration, Ukraine is still often incorrectly portrayed as a country occupying a geopolitical buffer zone between East and West. This is familiar to Finns, whose own country was condemned to similar geopolitical limbo during the Cold War.

Finland successfully defended its sovereignty during World War II and was not forced to become a Soviet republic. However, this was followed by the 1948 Friendship Treaty between Finland and the USSR, which established the framework for what has since come to be known as Finlandization.

For more than four decades, Finlandization served as a survival strategy for Finnish independence. In practice, this meant voluntarily taking the interests of the neighboring Soviet Union into account, both in terms of foreign and domestic policy. This approach enabled the Finns to avoid the experience of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, but the costs were nevertheless considerable. Indeed, Finlandization went far beyond mere neutrality and negatively impacted Finland for almost half a century.

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The postwar treaty that served as the basis for Finlandization stipulated that Finnish defense policy should focus exclusively on defending the country against possible attack from the west, despite the fact that a renewed Soviet invasion from the east was clearly far more likely. As a result, Finnish officials had to exercise extreme caution when addressing the security of the country’s eastern border.

Finland was also de facto obliged to seek Moscow’s consent before embarking on any efforts to increase political or economic cooperation with the West. This prevented Helsinki from participating in the initial stages of European integration. Instead, Finland was limited to membership of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). This was viewed by the Kremlin as being sufficiently apolitical, as long as it did not disrupt the so-called “eastern trade” with the USSR as a result.

Domestically, Finlandization meant a series of restrictions and compromises on core democratic standards. Self-censorship was imposed throughout the Finnish media and information space in order to avoid any open criticism of the USSR. Finns also accepted more than two decades without any changes in the country’s leadership, as Finnish President Urho Kekkonen was regarded as an irreplaceable figure for continued good relations with Moscow. In light of these realities, it is easy to understand why the term “Finlandization” is regarded as derogatory by many Finns, who see it as a reminder of an era remembered with bitterness.

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There are also solid geographical reasons why Finlandization is not a good fit for the modern Ukrainian context. Finland’s status during the Cold War was intertwined with the broader security climate across the Nordic region. Neighboring Sweden remained neutral in part due to the “Finnish question,” with Stockholm concerned that joining NATO would leave their Finnish neighbors in jeopardy as the lone buffer state. This could potentially have created the conditions for the Soviet Union to make another attempt at occupying Finland.

Until the end of the Cold War era, Swedish policies of neutrality and Norway’s self-imposed restrictions on the presence of NATO troops or nuclear weapons on their territory were directly linked to the fate of Finland. This Nordic balancing act created an environment where the USSR was incentivized to maintain the status quo rather than risk an escalation in regional tensions if it increased pressure on Finland. This very specific set of circumstances does not apply to Ukraine. Instead, enforced neutrality would leave Ukraine highly vulnerable to further Russian aggression.

The Finlandization of Ukraine would not guarantee Ukraine’s survival as it once safeguarded Finnish independence. Today’s Ukraine cannot be expected to accept any restrictions on its ability to guard its borders, form alliances, or defend itself against Russian aggression. Likewise, any attempt to impose the kind of domestic political compromises that were part of the Finnish model during the Cold War could prove fatal for Ukraine’s democracy and European aspirations.

Anyone who is genuinely interested in finding the right formula for Ukraine should look beyond the Cold War period and focus instead on Finland’s experience since 1991. During the past three decades, Finnish integration into the Western world has demonstrated that geopolitical perceptions can change over time. Finland has proved conclusively that geography alone does not determine a country’s fate.

Finland has now joined both the European Union and NATO, and is firmly anchored within the core institutions of the Euro-Atlantic community. This is the kind of Finnish model that could actually work for postwar Ukraine. As Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo commented in November, “Finland is a member of NATO and the EU. We support Ukraine in its fight against Russia’s aggression. This is the model the Ukrainians are fighting for.”

Minna Ålander is a Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

Foreign troops help Putin avoid pitfalls of another Russian mobilization

Katherine Spencer — Thu, 12 Dec 2024 16:37:21 +0000

Reports emerged in November of further efforts by the Kremlin to recruit foreign fighters for the Russian invasion of Ukraine. According to the Financial Times, a Houthi-linked company has provided Russia with hundreds of Yemeni mercenaries. Recruits traveled to Russia where they were promised high salaries and Russian citizenship before being sent to the front lines in Ukraine.

Such claims are not new. The Kremlin has reportedly been using foreign fighters since the early stages of the invasion in order to avoid the potential pitfalls of mobilizing fresh troops at home. Moscow is accused of conducting recruitment in a number of low income countries throughout the Global South. Russia’s efforts in Cuba and India have been slammed by critics as human trafficking operations. Nepal has proved particularly vulnerable to Russian recruitment, with estimates ranging from a few thousand to 15,000 men signing up to fight in Ukraine.

The Putin regime has also allegedly targeted vulnerable populations within its own borders. This summer, the Russian authorities rounded up more than 30,000 migrants with Russian citizenship who had failed to register for military service. Many were subsequently sent to Ukraine.

Recruitment efforts have been conducted at Russian immigration detention centers holding migrant workers mainly from Central Asian countries. An October 2024 report by RFE/RL claimed that Russian officials have made prison conditions unbearably harsh and inhumane in an effort to pressure inmates into joining the military. “They keep you in a cold cell, you sleep on the floor with just a pillow underneath you holding plastic bottles filled with hot water to keep warm,” according to one Kyrgyz inmate.

While many foreign fighters have reported being pressured or misled by Russian recruiters, others are enticed by the promise of relatively high salaries and the prospect of a Russian passport. As of November 2024, Russia had granted citizenship to more than 3,000 foreigners in exchange for military service.

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The issue of foreign troops fighting for Russia has hit the headlines in recent weeks following news that North Korea has sent approximately ten thousand soldiers to join the invasion of Ukraine. Many see this as a watershed moment in the war, due to the number of troops involved and the official nature of the deployment. Given the vast size of the North Korean armed forces, there is clearly considerable scope for Pyongyang to send many more men.

Moscow’s enthusiasm for foreign fighters is easy to understand. As the war grinds on and approaches the three-year mark, Russia appears to be facing mounting manpower challenges. While the Kremlin does not release official information on the scale of its losses in Ukraine, most estimates indicate hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers have been killed or seriously wounded during the invasion. According to the UK Ministry of Defense, November 2024 was the deadliest month of the war so far, with Russia suffering more than 45,000 casualties.

The grim prospects for Russian troops in Ukraine are making it harder to attract volunteers. In response, the Russian authorities have recently begun offering greater financial incentives for new recruits as well as generous compensation for the families of those killed in action.

Despite these efforts, there are indications that the Russian military is now dangerously overextended. When Ukraine launched a surprise cross-border incursion into Kursk Oblast in summer 2024, Russia initially had to rely on an improvised defense made up largely of young conscripts, many of whom were taken prisoner. More recently, Russia’s inability to save its Syrian client Bashar Assad underlined Moscow’s lack of reserves.

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With his own army fully committed in Ukraine and experiencing heavy losses, Putin is running out of options as he seeks to shield Russians from the consequences of his invasion. For much of the war, the Kremlin has focused its domestic recruitment efforts on lower income and ethnic minority regions of Russia, while also enlisting large numbers of prisoners. Such tactics avoided touching more prosperous regions to prevent protests or rallies. However, these sources of manpower are not infinite.

Putin remains determined to avoid a repeat of his September 2022 mobilization order, which proved highly unpopular and led to an exodus from Russia as hundreds of thousands fled military service. With the supply of prisoners drying up and fewer Russians prepared to volunteer for a war that many see as a meat grinder, his best option may now be to seek increasing numbers of foreign troops.

The implications of foreign soldiers fighting in Russia’s invasion extend far beyond the battlefields of Ukraine. Growing collaboration between the Houthis and Russia has raised alarm bells in recent weeks, with the US Special Envoy for Yemen reporting that Moscow could begin weapons transfers to the rebel group to allow it to more effectively carry out attacks on Western shipping in the Red Sea.

Meanwhile, the consequences of North Korea’s entry into the war are an even greater cause for concern. Fighting in Ukraine presents a rare opportunity for North Korean soldiers to gain valuable experience of modern warfare, including innovations such as the use of drones. Pyongyang is also expected to receive significant military support from Russia that could enhance its missile, nuclear, and naval capabilities. Unsurprisingly, South Korea is monitoring the situation with growing unease.

Russia’s use of foreign troops is a dangerous trend that promises to prolong the war and has the potential to fuel international instability. It is also a sign that while Putin is not yet running out of Russian recruits, he would prefer to seek manpower elsewhere to sustain the costly human wave tactics employed by the Russian army in Ukraine.

Katherine Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

The EU needs a Russia strategy

Ian Cameron, James Batchik — Tue, 03 Dec 2024 21:30:12 +0000

The European Union urgently needs a Russia strategy. A strategy document that articulates a strong vision and comes with the proper policy tools and financial commitments would serve as a signal to the United States that Europe understands the threat posed by Putin’s Russia at a critical moment in the relationship between Washington, Brussels, and Moscow.

The impending Trump presidency will shape EU foreign policy and redefine transatlantic ties. A second Trump administration will surely demand more from Europe, including on issues such as Europe’s defense spending and its support for Ukraine. Even as defense budgets across Europe rise and the EU takes a more forward-leaning role on support for Ukraine, the goalposts Washington sets will move. This challenge could create positive opportunities for the EU if it produces a European strategy on Russia.

Currently, the bloc does not have a formal strategy toward Russia. This is inconsistent, as the EU has adopted official strategies for relations with a range of countries and regions including China, the Indo-Pacific, and Central Asia, with a strategy for the Middle East under development. But it’s more than inconsistent. Failure to draft a Russia strategy suggests a lack of seriousness and undermines the credibility of the bloc’s geopolitical ambitions.

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The most serious obstacle to an EU Russia strategy has traditionally been the inability of member states to agree on interests and priorities. Countries closest to Russia and those with recent histories of oppression by Moscow have a more acute threat perception, whereas others in Europe often still see Russia as an essentially regional issue.

However, Russia’s challenge to Europe is clearly no longer regional. It quite literally surrounds and permeates the EU. Russia has unleashed the largest land war on the continent since World War II. To undercut sanctions, it has built up a “shadow fleet” of oil tankers that threaten to create a major environmental disaster in European waters. From the Western Balkans to the Sahel, Russia competes for influence, generates disinformation, and seeks to destabilize governments. Elsewhere in Africa, Moscow deploys mercenaries to support friendly governments and to secure access to resources.

Inside the EU, intelligence agencies say Putin is actively engaged in efforts to undermine the political stability of member states. Russia is accused of spreading disinformation, stirring up political conflict, and even resorting to acts of sabotage, such as the recent attempt to plant explosive devices on European airplanes flying to the United States.

Faced with increasing Russian threats and growing US demands, the EU needs a unified approach toward Moscow. In response, the new European Commission should prioritize the development of an EU Russia strategy aimed at creating a more forward-thinking, ambitious, and cohesive European approach.

This would have multiple benefits. First, it would provide a forum for EU members to jointly develop a vision for future policy toward Russia. Second, a strategy would allow the EU to draw a coherent picture of how Moscow’s various tactics are interlinked and threaten the entire bloc. Additionally, the EU would be better positioned for stronger enforcement. Articulating a longer-term Russia policy would lock in the hard-won gains of recent years, helping to ensure that countries like Germany do not return to problematic practices like relying on Russian energy.

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The EU now has the right personnel in place to lead this effort. The new High Representative for Foreign Policy Kaja Kallas, an ardent Russia hawk, could push for an ambitious and forward-leaning posture toward Russia. Other senior officials including defense commissioner Andreas Kubilius could lend credibility to the strategy, which would naturally be prepared in close coordination with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, herself a strong supporter of Ukraine.

Any would-be Russia strategy must start with Ukraine. Support for Kyiv is the central element of Europe’s policy toward Russia, so a successful strategy must plot a path forward on key Ukraine-related issues including financial support, defense industrial cooperation, reconstruction, and eventual Ukrainian EU membership. Similarly, any strategy should also keep in mind areas like the Western Balkans, Moldova, and the South Caucasus, with a view to helping counter Russian influence.

Economic statecraft should be a key focus. The EU has gradually adopted a more ambitious sanctions policy toward Moscow, but enforcement is lacking. For example, the EU will need to develop a realistic plan to deal with Russia’s shadow fleet and to ensure that Russian energy isn’t entering the EU via backdoor routes.

In order to be effective, an EU Russia strategy must not fall victim to the tendency to water down or take an overly narrow view of the task at hand. Previous EU foreign policy documents, for example the Strategic Compass, offered a raft of initiatives and legislative projects but struggled to project a grander vision.

Drafting a Russia strategy will be a politically difficult but worthwhile endeavor. It will be challenging to achieve an EU strategy that is sufficiently ambitious and necessarily forward-leaning while maintaining support from all member states, especially as certain countries have a record of obstructing EU support for Ukraine.

Nevertheless, it would represent a crucial step toward addressing today’s changing realities. In addition to boosting the EU’s capacity as a geopolitical actor, a comprehensive and practical Russia strategy would signal to the United States that Europe is stepping up and would help strengthen transatlantic ties.

The incoming US administration should support the EU in developing its Russia strategy. An EU that is ready to lead efforts to counter Russia, both inside Europe and throughout the wider region, is exactly what the transatlantic relationship needs.

Ian Cameron is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. James Batchik is an associate director with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Morocco is one of the United States’ oldest allies, having been among the first to recognize the independence of the young nation in 1777 when Sultan Mohammed III opened Morocco’s ports to US ships. In 1786, that implicit recognition became formal with the signing of a treaty of peace and friendship, which is still in force today. Designated a major non-NATO ally in 2004, Morocco also plays an important role in the United States’ activities, including in the international fight against terrorism.

Trump recalled these ties in December 2020 when, a few weeks before the end of his first term, he recognized Western Sahara as part of Morocco. A month later, the US ambassador to Morocco visited the Saharan city of Dakhla to begin the process of opening a consulate. But US President Joe Biden never made this project a reality. France’s new backing for Morocco’s claim (announced before the Moroccan Parliament during a historic visit to Rabat last month) could help Morocco accelerate this agenda.

Israel is among the countries that have recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara—it did so in 2023. A few years beforehand, in 2020, Morocco had joined the list of countries in the Arab world to normalize diplomatic relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords. However, Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attacks on Israel and the resulting Israeli bombing and invasion of Gaza have provoked massive demonstrations in Morocco in support of the Palestinian population. Morocco also quickly sent aid to Palestinians trapped in Gaza and, at the United Nations, reaffirmed the need to respect Palestinian rights—but did not break off relations with Israel.

Undoubtedly, whatever Trump’s strategy in the Middle East, Morocco will have a central role. But under King Mohammed VI, the kingdom has established a future role for itself well beyond the Middle East.

To its south, Morocco, which returned to the African Union in 2017, continues to deepen its African footprint. France, taking note of Morocco’s role across the continent, has considered how it could rely on Morocco as a way to regain lost ground in Africa, particularly in the Sahel; Washington may follow suit. In November 2023, Mohammed VI announced a new initiative to “enable the Sahel countries [Mali, Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso] to have access to the Atlantic Ocean” via large-scale development projects.

This plan has an ambitious Atlantic component that will undoubtedly require coordination with the United States. That can be accomplished through the Partnership for Atlantic Cooperation, which was launched in September 2023 and includes many African countries, including Morocco and Sahelian countries such as Senegal and Nigeria. There are other initiatives and challenges on which the United States and Morocco can collaborate, including addressing the drug trade that sweeps from South America and through the Sahel—and is becoming increasingly connected to the terrorist movements that have been sowing chaos in the Sahel for twenty years. How the Trump administration approaches these Atlantic projects will determine the direction of the United States’ relationship with Morocco because of Rabat’s central role in these initiatives.

What Trump does on the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) may also impact Morocco’s place on Washington’s map. The Moroccan economy has benefited from the IRA, which is based, among other things, on supplies from countries linked by free trade agreements with the United States. (Morocco has had a free trade agreement with the United States since January 2006.) With the IRA in place, Chinese companies have even turned toward Morocco, making investments there to maintain access to US markets. Meanwhile, for Morocco, it was a winning system that promoted job creation on its soil and technology transfers and strengthened its position as a key player in the green industry in Africa. Morocco is counting on its economy, one of the strongest in Africa, to achieve its regional ambitions and strengthen its impact—it is already the second-largest investor on the continent, after South Africa.

But Trump working with the Republican-controlled Congress to repeal the IRA or restrict the policy could make Morocco less tempting for China, and thus result in fewer investments. In the event of growing tensions between the United States and China, Morocco could review its strategy of equidistance between these two powers.

With China now Africa’s leading trading partner—China now has five times more trade volume with the continent than the United States does—how Trump approaches the Moroccan partnership will say a lot about his intentions for Africa.

The Africa that is awaiting Trump’s second administration is not the one his first administration left in 2021. The continent’s landscape has been profoundly changed by the pandemic, the energy crisis following the war in Ukraine, a series of coups in the Sahel, the civil war in Sudan, the strengthening of the BRICS group of emerging economies, and much more. On each of these issues, Morocco has a voice that will carry weight in Washington.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

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Ukraine wary of Western disunity ahead of possible Russia peace talks

Katherine Spencer — Thu, 21 Nov 2024 21:19:15 +0000

In the wake of Donald Trump’s US presidential election victory, the discussion in Washington, European capitals, and Kyiv has sharply turned toward the possibility of a negotiated solution to end the war between Russia and Ukraine. At the same time, serious concerns remain over Trump’s long history of mixed messaging on Ukraine, leading to widespread fears that he could seek to broker a Kremlin-friendly peace deal.

Ukrainian officials understand that the current uncertainty about future international support could be seen by Moscow as a sign of weakening Western resolve. With this in mind, they are understandably eager to avoid any indications of growing divisions among Ukraine’s partners. There was therefore considerable disquiet in Kyiv last week over German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s controversial decision to hold a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin for the first time in around two years.

The call itself produced few real surprises. Putin took the opportunity to repeat the unchanged goals of his invasion and stress that the terms of any potential settlement must reflect the “new territorial realities” in Ukraine. From a Ukrainian perspective, however, the real story was the fact that the conversation between Scholz and Putin took place at all.

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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy led the chorus of criticism, accusing Scholz of opening a “Pandora’s box” and warning that the German leader’s actions risked undermining international efforts to isolate the Russian dictator. The call was “exactly what Putin had wanted for a long time,” stated Zelenskyy.

Other Western leaders echoed Zelenskyy’s concerns. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk noted that Putin launched a massive bombardment of cities across Ukraine soon after Scholz’s call. “No one will stop Putin with phone calls,” he commented. “The attack last night, one of the biggest in this war, has proved that telephone diplomacy cannot replace real support from the whole West for Ukraine.”

A host of European foreign ministers voiced similar skepticism. Dutch Foreign Minister Caspar Veldkamp questioned the value of the German initiative, noting that Putin “only listens to facts on the ground.” Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis branded the call “a really strange strategy.” Meanwhile, the EU’s top diplomat Josep Borrell confirmed that he had no plans to call Putin and said there was very little sign that the Russian leader was willing to negotiate.

Moscow’s openly enthusiastic response to Scholz’s call has done little to ease Western concerns. Kremlin officials confirmed that the telephone conversation had been initiated by the German side, and said the fact that the two leaders had spoken directly was “extremely positive.”

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The Kremlin’s obvious satisfaction over Scholz’s phone call came as no surprise. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine first began almost three years ago, Russian officials have worked hard to demonstrate that attempts to isolate Putin on the international stage are futile.

Putin rarely has any contact with Western leaders anymore, but he has compensated by strengthening ties with the Global South while promoting his vision of a “multipolar world order.” Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has spent a remarkable amount of time trying to win hearts and minds in Africa, while the leaders of China and India have both paid highly publicized visits to Moscow. This year’s BRICS summit, which Russia hosted in October, focused heavily on portraying Putin as anything but isolated.

With snap German elections looming, Scholz is likely to have had domestic politics very much in mind when he decided to call Putin. Nevertheless, critics say the timing of his telephone diplomacy initiative could hardly have been worse.

The German leader’s call to the Kremlin came as Russian troops continue to advance in eastern Ukraine, and amid mounting uncertainty across Europe over the potential policy implications of Trump’s return to the White House. In such circumstances, the West should be signaling its unwavering collective commitment to Ukraine. Instead, Putin’s conversation with Scholz will have strengthened the Russian ruler’s belief that he can ultimately outlast the West in Ukraine.

As the war enters what is likely to be a critical period, Ukrainians will be hoping that the backlash over Scholz’s call will discourage other Western leaders from following suit. In order to have any chance of achieving a viable peace settlement in the coming months, Ukraine must negotiate from a position of strength. That will only be possible if the country’s Western allies are able to convince the Kremlin that they remain as determined as ever to stand with Ukraine. If displays of disunity continue, Putin will have little incentive to compromise and every reason to fight on.

Katherine Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Such thinking is likely to feature prominently as the debate continues to unfold in the coming months over the terms of a future peace deal. While Trump has yet to outline his plans for a possible settlement, unconfirmed reports suggest that a twenty-year freeze on Ukraine’s NATO membership aspirations is under consideration. This would be a costly blunder. Imposing neutrality on Ukraine will not bring about a durable peace in Europe. On the contrary, it would leave Ukraine at Putin’s mercy and set the stage for a new Russian invasion.

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Ukrainians have already learned the hard way that neutrality does not protect them against Russian aggression. The country officially embraced non-aligned status during the 2010-2014 presidency of Viktor Yanukovych, but this didn’t prevent Moscow from seeking to reassert full control over Ukraine. Initially, Russia’s efforts focused on orchestrating Ukraine’s economic reintegration through membership of the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union. When this sparked a popular backlash that led to the fall of the Yanukovych regime, Putin opted to use force and began the military invasion of Ukraine.

Ever since the start of Russia’s attack on Ukraine in spring 2014, Putin has sought to justify Russian aggression by pointing to the looming danger of Ukrainian NATO membership. In reality, however, Ukraine has never looked like progressing toward the distant goal of joining the alliance. For the past decade, NATO leaders have refused to provide Kyiv with an invitation and have instead limited themselves to vague talk of Ukraine’s “irreversible” path toward future membership. Putin is well aware of this, but has chosen to wildly exaggerate Ukraine’s NATO prospects in order to strengthen his own bogus justifications.

Putin’s complaints regarding NATO enlargement are equally dubious. Indeed, his own actions since early 2022 indicate that Putin himself does not actually believe that the alliance poses a genuine security threat to Russia. Instead, he merely exploits the NATO issue as a convenient smokescreen for Russia’s expansionist foreign policy.

Tellingly, when Finland and Sweden responded to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine by announcing plans to abandon decades of neutrality and join NATO, Putin was quick to declare that Russia had “no problem” with the move. This evident indifference was particularly striking, given that Finnish NATO membership has more than doubled Russia’s NATO border while Sweden’s accession has transformed the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake. Over the past two-and-a-half years, Putin has continued to demonstrate his almost complete lack of concern over NATO’s Nordic enlargement by withdrawing the vast majority of Russian troops from the Finnish border and leaving the area largely undefended.

Putin obviously understands perfectly well that NATO is not a threat to Russia itself, and sees no need to guard against a NATO invasion that he knows will never come. While Putin’s resentment over the expanding NATO presence on his borders is real enough, he only really objects when the alliance prevents Russia from bullying its neighbors. In other words, Putin’s opposition to Ukraine’s NATO aspirations has nothing to do with legitimate security concerns. Instead, it confirms that his ultimate goal is the destruction of Ukrainian statehood.

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For years, Putin has made no secret of his belief that the emergence of an independent Ukraine is an historical mistake and a symbol of modern Russia’s retreat from empire. He has repeatedly claimed that Ukraine is not a “real country,” and is fond of declaring that Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”). In July 2021, Putin even published an entire essay arguing against the legitimacy of an independent Ukrainian state.

Since the start of the full-scale invasion, it has become increasingly apparent that Putin’s ultimate goal is not Ukraine’s neutrality but Ukraine’s destruction. The Kremlin propaganda machine has portrayed Ukraine as an intolerable “anti-Russia,” and has promoted the idea that Ukraine’s continued existence is incompatible with Russian security. Meanwhile, Putin has compared his invasion to eighteenth century Russian ruler Peter the Great’s imperial conquests, and has repeatedly claimed to be “returning” historically Russian lands.

Putin’s imperialistic outbursts must be taken seriously. Throughout occupied Ukraine, his soldiers and administrators are already imposing a reign of terror that directly echoes the criminal logic of his imperial fantasies. Millions have been displaced, with thousands more simply vanishing into a vast network of camps and prisons. Those who remain face policies of relentless Russification and the suppression of all things Ukrainian. Adults must accept Russian citizenship in order to access basic services, while children are forced to undergo indoctrination in schools teaching a new Kremlin curriculum.

The crimes currently taking place in Russian-occupied Ukraine are a clear indication of what awaits the rest of the country if Putin succeeds. Despite suffering multiple military setbacks, he remains fully committed to his maximalist goals of ending Ukrainian independence and erasing Ukrainian identity.

Furthermore, since 2022 Putin has demonstrated that he is prepared to wait as long as it takes in order to overcome Ukrainian resistance, and is ready to pay almost any price to achieve his imperial ambitions. Imposing neutrality on Ukraine in such circumstances would be akin to condemning the country to a slow but certain death.

Any peace process that fails to provide Ukraine with credible long-term security guarantees is doomed to fail. Acquiescing to Putin’s demands for a neutral Ukraine may provide some short-term relief from the menace of an expansionist Russia, but this would ultimately lead to more war and the likely collapse of the current global security order. There is simply no plausible argument for insisting on Ukrainian neutrality other than a desire to leave the country defenseless and at Russia’s mercy.

Peace will only come once Putin has finally been forced to accept Ukraine’s right to exist as an independent country and as a member of the democratic world. Naturally, this includes the right to choose security alliances. It is absurd to prioritize Russia’s insincere security concerns over Ukraine’s very real fears of national annihilation. Instead, if serious negotiations do begin in the coming months, Ukrainian security must be the number one priority. Until Ukraine is secure, Europe will remain insecure and the threat of Russian imperialism will continue to loom over the continent.

Beyond the battlefield itself, the Russian invasion has plunged the entire Ukrainian population into a mental health crisis that will last for decades. Almost everyone has experienced some kind of personal loss or wartime trauma. In towns and cities across Ukraine, people have grown used to the daily routine of air raid alarms, bomb shelters, and electricity blackouts, all accompanied by gut-churning news of the latest Russian atrocities.

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Despite the many horrors and hardships, Ukrainians have remained broadly united by a shared sense of purpose. While most people are understandably desperate for peace, there is also widespread recognition that Ukraine is fighting for national survival and faces destruction if Russia’s invasion succeeds. This has been made abundantly clear by the actions of the Russian army in areas of Ukraine under Kremlin control, with thousands of potential dissenters abducted and children sent for indoctrination to rob them of their Ukrainian heritage.

Most Ukrainians acknowledge the need to fight on, but there are growing concerns over continued international support. During the initial months of the invasion, the watching world was awed by Ukrainian courage and tenacity as the country fought back against the might of the Russian military. This helped convince Western leaders that arming Ukraine was both morally right and worthwhile. However, as the war has dragged on, grumbles over the cost of supplying the Ukrainian military have grown louder, as has the chorus of voices calling for some form of compromise with the Kremlin.

Every time Western leaders delay the delivery of military aid, the cost can be measured in Ukrainian lives. These delays enable Russia to bomb Ukrainian cities and advance further along the front lines of the war. Shortfalls in military support are also making it significantly harder for Ukraine to mobilize new troops for the army, with many potential recruits left alarmed by the prospect of being sent into battle without adequate weapons or armor.

While Kyiv struggles to convince wavering Western leaders, Moscow is creating an axis of autocrats to bolster the Russian war effort. Since the start of the full-scale invasion almost three years ago, Putin has strengthened ties with China, Iran, and North Korea, receiving a range of support including sanctioned high-tech weapons components, attack drones, ballistic missiles, and vast quantities of artillery shells. This alliance is playing an increasingly direct role in the invasion of Ukraine, with North Korean soldiers recently appearing on the battlefield.

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Donald Trump’s election victory is now fueling anticipation that the war is about to enter a new phase, with the incoming US administration expected to push for a negotiated settlement. Nobody wants to end the war more than Ukrainians, of course. At the same time, there are mounting concerns that Western efforts to pursue peace from a position of weakness may lead to Kremlin-friendly terms that would end up emboldening Putin and setting the stage for further Russian aggression.

Ukrainians have particularly painful memories of the failed peace process that followed Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. For eight years, Russia refused to even acknowledge its direct involvement in hostilities, insisting instead on noncombatant status. This farcical situation made it virtually impossible to achieve any meaningful progress toward peace. It is now clear that while Moscow was pretending to engage in diplomatic efforts to end the war, Russia was busy preparing for the full-scale invasion of February 24, 2022.

Ahead of any peace talks, Ukrainians will be hoping their international allies have not lost sight of the huge costs they will face if they fail to stop Russia in Ukraine. The invasion launched by Putin one thousand days ago has already transformed the geopolitical landscape and led to the emergence of a formidable authoritarian alliance that shares a common commitment to ending the era of Western ascendancy. Russian success in Ukraine would dramatically strengthen this alliance, with alarming ramifications for the security situation everywhere from Central Europe to East Asia.

As the world reflects on one thousand days of Russia’s attack on Ukraine, the Ukrainian nation is exhausted but remains determined to end the war on terms that will allow the next generation to live in peace. This will not be possible without continued international support. Putin was wrong to assume that Ukraine would collapse in the wake of his invasion. Western leaders must now convince him that he is equally wrong to believe he can outlast them in Ukraine.

Kira Rudik is leader of the Golos party and a member of the Ukrainian parliament.

Samaan in The European Union as a Security Actor in the Indo-Pacific: The European Union and Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific—A Lamb in the Lion’s Den?

Atlantic Council — Sat, 09 Nov 2024 19:41:57 +0000

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Donald Trump’s election victory fuels hopes and fears in Ukraine

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 07 Nov 2024 22:33:29 +0000

Donald Trump’s election victory has sparked considerable disquiet in Ukraine, with many Ukrainians fearful that he may reduce or end US backing for the country once he takes office early next year. Trump provided Ukraine with significant military support during his first presidential term, but has also made a number of unfavorable statements that have led to questions over his commitment to the country’s struggle against Russian aggression.

At the same time, there are also hopes that Trump may prove more decisive than his predecessor in his approach to the war with Russia. This reflects growing frustration in Ukraine at what many see as the overly cautious policies adopted by President Biden, which have resulted in delayed weapons deliveries and restrictions on Ukraine’s ability to defend itself. With their country trapped in a bloody war of attrition against its far larger neighbor, many Ukrainians are desperate for a change in tactics and believe Trump may be able to provide it.

Ukrainian officials have been quick to congratulate Trump and demonstrate their readiness to work with him. “I appreciate President Trump’s commitment to the ‘peace through strength’ approach to global affairs,” commented Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in a congratulatory social media media post. “This is exactly the principle that can bring a just peace in Ukraine closer. I am hopeful that we will put it into action together.”

As the world continues to digest the implications of Donald Trump’s return to the White House, the Atlantic Council invited a selection of Ukrainian politicians, academics, and civil society representatives to share their thoughts on what a second Trump presidency may mean for their country.

Kira Rudik, Ukrainian MP, Golos Party leader: It is important to remember that Donald Trump is not president yet. There are still more than two months for President Biden to secure his place in history by taking decisive steps to support Ukraine. This could include lifting restrictions on missile strikes inside Russia, or inviting Ukraine to join NATO. Biden can still cement his political legacy as the leader of the democratic world by helping Ukraine in its fight for a free and democratic future.

By the time Trump returns to the White House in January 2025, Ukraine must prepare a truly pragmatic and efficient victory plan. We also need to work with supporters within the Republican Party and Trump’s team, especially those who have been urging Biden to switch from his policy of indefinite support toward a clearer strategy to win the war. It is true that many Ukrainians remain concerned over Trump’s earlier statements about ending the war in a single day, but we also hope that beyond the campaign trail, there is a clear understanding that wars cannot be stopped overnight without allowing dictators to have their way.

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Oleksiy Goncharenko, Ukrainian MP, European Solidarity Party: Despite what many people think, Trump’s election was not a particularly happy day for Putin. Trump said during the election campaign that he wants to pump oil, and again emphasized this following his win. Oil is Putin’s weak spot. As soon as prices begin to fall, the Russian economy follows. The Kremlin also benefits from instability in the United States and was hoping for some kind of civil unrest to emerge from the election. It is now apparent that this is not going to happen.

How should Ukraine react to Trump’s victory? We need to stop making emotional appeals and focus more on demonstrating what we have to offer the United States in practical terms as a partner. This includes one of the most experience armies in the world. Our soldiers have an unrivaled understanding of modern warfare and can share this with our American allies. We can play a vital role in global food security. We have vast natural resources that can be developed together with our partners. Ukraine has to work around the clock to promote these messages.

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Olena Tregub, Executive Director, Ukraine’s Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (NAKO): While there were signs of panic in many European capitals following news of Trump’s election victory, in Kyiv the dominant emotion was hope. Many Ukrainians have been encouraged by talk within the Trump camp of “peace through strength,” which they see as an indication that Ukraine may receive the kind of support and security guarantees that can prevent Russia from continuing to destroy their country. Nobody knows how peace through strength would work in practice, of course, but significant numbers of Ukrainians hope Donald Trump will now seek to showcase the United States as a global power and reestablish the rules broken by Russia and other rogue actors.

Frustration in Ukraine with the current United States administration stems from its tendency toward self-deterrence and its consistent deference to red lines set by Russia. Ukrainians believe these policies should be reversed, with the US leading instead of Russia. Many think that Trump’s personality may lead to a more resolute approach, which is fueling a degree of guarded optimism over his election. Of course, there are also widespread fears that Ukraine could be thrown under the bus by the Trump administration. However, Ukrainians are more accustomed to uncertainty than most and are desperate to see a change in US policy toward their country.

Volodymyr Dubovyk, Associate Professor, Odesa Mechnikov National University: I believe Trump’s return to the White House is probably bad news for Ukraine. I do not subscribe to the view that a change from the current administration is for the best, even though I recognize the many flaws in its policy toward Ukraine. I think it is extremely naive to hope that Trump’s unpredictability, impulsiveness, and ego will push him to stand up to Putin. Based on past experience, he is more likely to do the opposite.

Trump will try to end the war, but that is far easier said than done. He will find that it is impossible to alter Russia’s objectives in Ukraine, and will decide that it is much simpler to pressure Ukraine into concessions. Crucially, Trump does not appear convinced that supporting Ukraine is in US interests. He will be happy to focus his attention elsewhere, while delegating the Ukraine issue to Europe. The future of US aid to Ukraine is clearly now in question, both in terms of military supplies and humanitarian assistance.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 31 Oct 2024 21:22:03 +0000

Pentagon officials and NATO chief Mark Rutte have this week confirmed that thousands of North Korean troops are currently in the process of joining Russia’s war against Ukraine. The arrival of North Korean soldiers on the battlefields of Europe is an historically unprecedented event that represents a major escalation in the largest European invasion since World War II. Nevertheless, the Western reaction has so far been strikingly muted, with plenty of condemnation but little attempt to impose any actual costs on Moscow or Pyongyang. This lack of resolve is exactly what Vladimir Putin was counting on.

Ever since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine first began more than a decade ago with the 2014 seizure of Crimea, the West’s response to Russian aggression has been defined by a crippling fear of escalation that has only served to embolden Putin further. During the initial armed takeover of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula, Western leaders refused to intervene and urged Kyiv not to resist for fear of sparking a larger conflict. Instead, the international community limited itself to imposing a series of modest economic sanctions. Understandably, Moscow interpreted this as a tacit green light to go further. Weeks later, Kremlin forces started a separatist war in eastern Ukraine that would simmer and flare for the following eight years, setting the stage for the full-scale Russian invasion of February 2022.

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The West’s failure to hold Russia accountable for the 2014 invasion of Ukraine revealed a deep-seated desire to avoid direct confrontation with the Kremlin that continues to shape Western policy toward the war in Ukraine. Putin has skillfully exploited this fear of escalation, employing a combination of nuclear blackmail and talk of Russian red lines to intimidate Western leaders and convince them to limit their military support for Kyiv while imposing restrictions on Ukraine’s ability to defend itself. As a result, the Ukrainian army finds itself forced to wage war against a military superpower with one hand tied behind its back.

Persistent displays of Western weakness over the past ten years have encouraged Putin to believe he has little to fear from further escalation. On the first day of the full-scale invasion, he claimed that Russia had no intention of annexing any more Ukrainian lands. Within six months, however, he was comparing himself to Peter the Great and declaring that twenty percent of Ukraine was now “forever” Russian. As anticipated, Western leaders voiced their disapproval at this naked imperialism but stopped short of adopting any measures that might cause the Russian dictator to think twice before escalating again.

North Korea’s deepening involvement in the Russian invasion now confirms the folly of the West’s failed escalation management policies. When North Korea began supplying Russia with artillery shells in late 2022, the West took no action. A year later, the first reports started to emerge of Russia launching North Korean ballistic missiles at Ukrainian targets. By early October 2024, Western intelligence sources were claiming that North Korea was now providing half of all the shells being used by Russia in Ukraine. Sending troops to fight in Ukraine was the logical next step for the Hermit Kingdom.

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With the first ten thousand North Korean troops now reportedly heading to the front lines of the Russian invasion, Ukraine’s increasingly frustrated president Volodymyr Zelenskyy is desperately trying to instill a sense of urgency among his country’s Western partners. Speaking in Iceland on Wednesday, Zelenskyy said the response from Western capitals to North Korea’s participation in the invasion was “not strong enough.” Tellingly, he also took aim at Ukraine’s allies for their insistence on avoiding anything that might be used by Russia as an excuse to escalate. “I’m sorry, but I think that North Korean soldiers entering the war is an escalation,” he commented.

Zelenskyy is not alone. Many Ukrainians are now rapidly losing patience with the West’s excessive caution, especially as they believe their country has already exposed Russia’s red lines as bluffs that can be crossed with impunity. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine has ignored Putin’s vows to defend Russia’s gains with nuclear weapons and has liberated half of the territory seized by the Kremlin. Likewise, Kyiv has dismissed the Russian dictator’s warnings over the sanctity of the Crimean peninsula, and has proceeded to sink or damage one-third of the entire Black Sea Fleet, forcing Russia to withdraw its remaining warships to safety.

In August 2024, Ukraine crossed the reddest of all Russian red lines by invading Russia itself and occupying hundreds of square kilometers in the Kursk region. Despite these humiliating setbacks, Putin has yet to make good on his frequent nuclear threats. On the contrary, he has responded to each new embarrassment by attempting to downplay the significance of Ukraine’s success.

This seemingly overwhelming evidence has somehow failed to persuade Ukraine’s partners that Putin’s threats are hallow. Instead, they remain committed to misguided deescalation policies that risk turning the Russian invasion of Ukraine into a global conflict.

Putin is currently waiting to see the West’s collective response to his deployment of North Korean troops against Ukraine. If the reaction in Western capitals remains weak, he will go further and we may soon see a dramatic increase in the number of North Korean soldiers fighting in Europe. This could create the conditions for the far larger war that Western leaders are so eager to avoid.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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The success of Russia’s Donbas campaign owes much to Moscow’s traditional advantages in munitions and manpower, along with an apparent disregard for losses. Russia’s offensive has also benefitted from a number of tactical adaptations including the extremely effective use of glide bombs against Ukrainian defensive positions.

Over the past year, Russian commanders have been able to exploit a growing number of Ukrainian battlefield vulnerabilities. These Ukrainian weaknesses have included ineffective front-line fortifications, persistent troop shortages due to the mismanagement of Ukraine’s mobilization efforts, and extended delays in the delivery of military aid from the United States and Kyiv’s other Western partners.

Ukraine’s military setbacks have forced them to return to the tactics favored during much of the initial fighting in early 2022, which involved trading space for maximum enemy losses. This approach allows the Ukrainian military to impose heavy costs on the advancing Russians, but it also means abandoning any attempts to liberate occupied Ukrainian territories, for the time being at least.

While Russia’s recent offensive operations have not yet produced any decisive breakthroughs, the psychological impact of the advances achieved in recent months cannot be measured in kilometers alone. Crucially, Moscow’s localized successes in the Donbas are gradually undermining morale among the Ukrainian public. Regular reports of fresh Russian gains are also weakening the resolve of Kyiv’s Western partners and bolstering arguments against continued military support for Ukraine.

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The Russian invasion is not going entirely according to plan, of course. US, UK, and European officials have reported that September 2024 was the deadliest month of the entire war for Putin’s troops, with Russia suffering more than one thousand soldiers killed or injured every single day.

Russia has sought to address these catastrophic losses by enticing a steady stream of new recruits with ever larger bounty payments and inflated monthly salaries. The Kremlin is also scouring other branches of the Russian armed forces such as the navy and strategic rocket forces for troops who can be converted into infantry and sent to Ukraine. Most recently, Moscow has persuaded North Korea to provide thousands of additional troops.

The one thing Putin definitely does not want to do is announce another politically risky mobilization. So far, he looks to have found solutions that will allow Russia to maintain its offensive operations in Ukraine without mobilizing hundreds of thousands of Russian civilians.

As the Russian military gradually gains the upper hand in Ukraine, the Kremlin is also strengthening its position on the international stage by playing on the West’s fears of escalation. In recent months, Putin has openly intimidated Western leaders by threatening to revise Russia’s nuclear doctrine and significantly lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. This latest example of nuclear blackmail has succeeded in derailing Ukrainian efforts to end Western restrictions on deep strikes inside Russia.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is now at a critical juncture. Unless steps are taken in the coming few months to reverse today’s negative dynamics, Russia’s advantages will continue to grow until the military situation reaches the point of no return. Ukraine’s needs are well known, and include a significant increase in military aid along with the lifting of restrictions on the use of Western weapons. Above all, it is vital to maintain Ukraine’s fighting capability and impose increasing costs on the Kremlin while convincing Putin that Western support for Kyiv will not waver.

Much will depend on the outcome of the United States presidential election on November 5. Whoever wins the race for the White House, they will inherit a war in Ukraine that requires their urgent attention to prevent a Russian victory that would signal the decline of the West and transform the geopolitical landscape for decades to come.

Leslie Shedd: As an election monitor, I saw Georgian Dream’s intimidation tactics up close

Brian Whitmore: This flawed election was just the opening bell in the opposition’s fight against Russian influence

Maia Nikoladze: The international community must question the legitimacy of this election

Laura Linderman: The elections were marred by intimidation and surveillance. Zourabichvili is right not to recognize them.

Andrew D’Anieri: In the election’s aftermath, Georgians’ civil liberties are at stake

The US and EU need a plan for Georgian government repression

Georgia’s authoritarian-minded ruling party Georgian Dream, led by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, has dubiously claimed victory in the country’s October 26 parliamentary elections, while the pro-democracy opposition has asserted fraud and the election-monitoring mission of the respected Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has cited extensive efforts to intimidate voters and manipulate the results. Tensions in the country are high, as are the chances of government repression to retain power.

Credible exit polls published on October 26 (from Mtavari and Formula TV) gave Georgian Dream 41 percent and 42 percent percent of the vote, respectively. The official Georgian Central Election Commission announced on October 26 that Georgian Dream had won with about 54 percent, at odds with this credible exit polling.

The elections occurred against a background of mounting authoritarian threats and actions by the Georgian government, including threats to outlaw opposition parties and a law putting pressure on civil-society groups that receive foreign funding.

Georgians have consistently and over many years expressed their desire to integrate with Europe and NATO. Russia has for years sought to undermine this option, using economic pressure, disinformation, and, in 2008, war. Russian propagandists have boasted that the October 26 elections marked a defeat for Western efforts to engineer “regime change” in Georgia.

Georgia’s President Salome Zourabichvili, who has publicly supported the democratic opposition, condemned the elections on October 27, characterizing the official results as illegitimate and the product of Russian efforts to subordinate the country. She announced a public demonstration for the evening of October 28.

The Georgian government is likely to press ahead with its claims of victory. The opposition demonstration on Monday is likely to be huge. Violence, instigated by the authorities directly or through surrogates, could ensue.

The United States and Europe (not counting Hungary’s pro-Russian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who congratulated Georgian Dream even before the government announced the results and may visit Tbilisi on Monday) face a crucial set of decisions. The West must decide how to characterize these patently bad elections, how to respond to the ruling party’s repression (including the potential for a Belarus- or Venezuela-style scenario of retaining power through force), and how to support the Georgian people in both the immediate period ahead and the longer term.

The United States has reportedly prepared sanctions against Georgian leaders, including Ivanishvili, which it will probably employ in the event of government-instigated violence or the government remaining committed to election fraud. The key variable will be whether Georgian society has the determination to resist, on a sustained basis, the imposition of authoritarian rule.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US assistant secretary of state for Europe.

As an election monitor, I saw Georgian Dream’s intimidation tactics up close

I traveled to Georgia to serve as one of the International Republican Institute’s short-term observers for the country’s parliamentary elections. As I witnessed first-hand, fears that the ruling party, Georgian Dream, would use aggressive and illegal tactics to secure a victory were realized.

Leading up to the election, there was a systemic and pervasive intimidation campaign. One of the most common stories I heard was employers forcing employees to turn over their IDs to either prevent them from voting or so those IDs could be used to commit voter fraud.

On Election Day, rules limiting campaign materials and campaigning near polling stations were unabashedly ignored. The most glaring violation I saw was in the town of Tkibuli, where a large screen displayed a video of the Tbilisi mayor, a Georgian Dream member, giving a speech, his voice ringing out over the city’s loudspeaker system. In addition, at most of the polling stations I visited, groups of people hovered outside watching voters come and go, creating an air of surveillance. They were often large, intimidating-looking men, in groups of three or four, not talking but simply watching.

A video plays of the Tbilisi mayor, a prominent Georgian Dream politician, outside a polling place in Tkibuli, with sound playing over city speakers. Photo by Leslie Shedd.

We also witnessed the activities of what appeared to be fake observer organizations deployed to “monitor” the elections. In the small town of Satsire, I met a woman working for one roughly translated as the “Georgia Lawyers Barristers International Organization.” For an hour and a half, we observed her approaching voters and walking them to the side of an adjacent building where she couldn’t be seen. When we asked her what she was doing, she hurriedly walked away while a different man who had also been “monitoring” the station demanded we leave. Worse, inside every single station I visited I witnessed a small video camera pointed at the voting booths or at the ballot boxes. I was told they were set up by Georgian Dream or election officials, purportedly for security and to prevent ballot stuffing.

This all sent a very clear message: We are watching.

—Leslie Shedd is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and the president of Rising Communications.

This flawed election was just the opening bell in the opposition’s fight against Russian influence

The battle for Georgian democracy is now headed for the streets, which is exactly where most observers have long expected it to end up. After an election marred by what international observers called vote buying, double voting, and voter intimidation, the ruling Georgia Dream party’s claim to have won a parliamentary majority lacks any legitimacy. In fact, it is absurd. Moreover, Zourabichvili’s refusal to recognize the result, and her call for street protests, fully and firmly aligns the largely ceremonial presidency, the only institution of the Georgian state that has not been captured by Russia, with Georgia’s pro-Western opposition.

The battle lines are drawn. So what happens next? If Zourabichvili’s allegation that Georgia is the victim of a Russian special operation is correct—and few serious observers of the region doubt that this is the case—it stands to reason that the Kremlin and its Georgian proxies have a plan for the day after, as well.

Georgia’s 2024 parliamentary election has entered its “Maidan” phase. There are three possible outcomes: This could lead to a redux of Georgia’s 2003 peaceful Rose Revolution in which street protests ousted a corrupt and authoritarian government. It could lead to a violent crackdown and suppression of the democratic opposition, with covert Russian assistance, as was the case in Belarus in 2020. Or it could provide the pretext for direct Russian intervention, as in Ukraine in 2014. More than two decades after Georgian civil society came of age in the Rose Revolution, the country is headed for another decisive round. This weekend’s deeply flawed election was just the opening bell.

—Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, an assistant professor of practice at the University of Texas-Arlington, and a founder and host of the Power Vertical Podcast.

The international community must question the legitimacy of this election

Georgia’s Central Election Commission (CEC), a government agency, reported that the ruling Georgian Dream has received about 54 percent of the votes so far. Opposition leaders have expressed concerns that CEC could be under pressure from the ruling party during these pivotal elections. Now CEC is under scrutiny from the public because of the widespread violations that took place in voting districts outside of big cities in Georgia, which have cast doubt on the legitimacy of these elections.

It is indeed suspicious that in a country where 79 percent of the population supports EU membership, 54 percent would vote for a party that has been driving a wedge between Georgia and its Western partners, most recently by adopting the controversial foreign-agent law and offshore law.

Before accepting the highly contested election results, the international community should question the legitimacy of the elections.

Violations such as ballot stuffing and voter intimidation appear to have had what one watchdog group called “a significant impact on the election results.” Both Transparency International and the International Society for Fair Elections and Monitoring have reported that 10 percent or more of the votes were impacted by “systemic fraud” and “widespread rigging.”

As the Georgian public and international observers navigate the challenging process to ensure that the Georgian people’s votes are accurately counted, Western policymakers should keep two things in mind:

1. The Georgian people are doing all they can to keep the country on a Western course, including by voting and volunteering to observe the elections, but they are not on a level playing field.

2. Pushing Georgia away from the West will only benefit the Russia-China-Iran axis, which could turn Georgia into an economic black hole if the Georgian government supports the evasion of sanctions and export controls.

—Maia Nikoladze is an associate director at the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

The elections were marred by intimidation and surveillance. Zourabichvili is right not to recognize them.

The official CEC results of the Georgian parliamentary elections have raised significant concerns regarding the integrity of the electoral process.

As Georgian domestic observation organizations and international observers have noted, the elections were marred by manipulation of the results through the strategic use of intimidation, surveillance, and targeted interventions in vulnerable areas of the voting system. It strains credulity to believe that the Georgian Dream party would receive its highest numbers since the 2012 election after massive protests this spring over its foreign-agent law and amid high voter turnout.

Eoghan Murphy, head of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) ODIHR election-observation mission, concluded that the parliamentary elections were not “in line with international democratic principles.” Considering the typically restrained standards of the OSCE’s commentary on elections, the ODIHR statement was remarkably critical for a diplomatic organization and outlined evidence that supports many of the claims made by national organizations and international observers.

I echo Zourabichvili’s assertion that the elections were a “Russian special operation,” and she is right not to recognize the results. The people of Georgia deserve free and fair elections that are not marked by the kinds of irregularities that both national and international observers observed on Saturday.

—Laura Linderman is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a senior fellow and program manager at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at the American Foreign Policy Council.

In the election’s aftermath, Georgians’ civil liberties are at stake

This weekend’s parliamentary elections in Georgia went largely according to the grim forecasts of many experts. The ruling Georgian Dream party appears to have cheated, mainly through widespread voter intimidation, particularly in small cities and rural areas. The Georgian Dream-friendly electoral commission declared the ruling party the victor, opposition voters and parties credibly alleged electoral fraud, and Tbilisi looks set for mass street protests Monday evening. Things could get ugly if the government deploys the new crowd-control materiel it has bragged about or if it deploys thugs to beat up protesters as it did in May.

At stake in the aftermath of this disputed election is nothing less than Georgians’ civil liberties. Egged on by Ivanishvili, Georgian Dream has already passed laws to harass civil-society organizations and to largely criminalize homosexuality, both of which the party could use to stifle dissent and jail political opponents if it remains in power. Georgian Dream’s “foreign-agent law” and “LGBTQI+ propaganda law” are lifted directly from the Russian playbook. But the ruling party won’t stop there. Its leaders have pledged to pass legislation to ban opposition political parties and codify a Belarus-style one-party autocracy. Georgian Dream has so far made good on its goals of limiting the freedoms of its citizens. We should believe party leaders when they say this is just the beginning.

The United States should continue to support Georgians’ right to self-determination and free and fair elections. More importantly, the Biden administration should have a significant policy response ready should Georgian authorities resort to further violence against protesters or political opponents.

—Andrew D’Anieri is a resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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North Korean troops could help Putin avoid a risky Russian mobilization

Olivia Yanchik — Thu, 24 Oct 2024 20:53:19 +0000

North Korea has sent troops to Russia, United States Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin confirmed on October 23. Austin is the latest senior Western official to raise the alarm over the deployment of North Korean soldiers to Russia amid fears that the Hermit Kingdom is poised to participate directly in Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was the first to warn that Russia was about to be reinforced by large numbers of North Korean troops. South Korea has since confirmed Zelenskyy’s claims. In recent days, Britain’s ambassador to the UN said it was “highly likely” Pyongyang has agreed to send combat troops in support of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

If North Korean troops do appear on the Ukrainian battlefield in the coming weeks, it would be the latest in a series of milestones marking Pyongyang’s expanding support for Putin’s Ukraine invasion. North Korea has reportedly been supplying Russia with artillery shells since the first year of the war, and began delivering ballistic missiles to Moscow in late 2023. In October 2024, intelligence sources claimed that North Korea was now providing half of all shells being used by Russia in Ukraine.

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The presence of North Korean soldiers in Ukraine would risk transforming the largest European invasion since World War II into a truly global conflict. It would also serve to highlight the mounting manpower challenges Vladimir Putin faces as he looks to maintain a war of attrition amid staggering Russian losses.

When Putin first took the decision to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, he seems to have genuinely believed his troops would not encounter any serious resistance and would instead be welcomed as liberators. This proved to be a massive miscalculation.

Since the start of the invasion, the Russian army has sustained extremely heavy casualties in Ukraine, and has been forced to retreat from around half of the territories seized during the initial stage of the war. According to US officials, more than six hundred thousand Russian troops had been killed or wounded by October 2024, with September ranking as the deadliest month of the entire campaign.

Russia’s losses are in large part due to the Kremlin’s reliance on so-called “human wave” tactics. This extremely costly but effective approach involves successive waves of Russian troops gradually edging forward across the battlefield while relying on superior numbers to overwhelm Ukrainian defensive positions. This has allowed Russia to achieve small but visible front line advances in eastern Ukraine throughout 2024. At the same time, it has led to daily losses that regularly exceed one thousand dead or wounded soldiers.

In recent months, there have been growing signs that Russia is struggling to maintain the supply of fresh soldiers to the front lines. The most striking indication of Putin’s troop shortages came in early August, when Ukraine launched an offensive into Russia’s Kursk region and encountered threadbare border defenses manned by conscript troops. Almost three months on, the Ukrainian army continues to occupy hundreds of square kilometers of Russian territory.

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The Kremlin is exploring a range of different avenues as it seeks to replenish the depleted ranks of the Russian army. Initial steps included expanding the draft age and recruiting directly from Russia’s prison population. More recently, the Russian authorities have sought to attract new recruits with promises of generous monthly salaries and bumper one-time enlistment payments. These dramatically increased bounties point to growing difficulties in attracting enough volunteer fighters to replace combat losses suffered in Ukraine.

This does not mean that Russia is about to run out of potential soldiers, of course. In reality, Putin still has vast untapped reserves of manpower among the Russian population that he can potentially turn to if required. For now, though, he appears deeply reluctant to launch a second mobilization of the war for fear of destabilizing the home front inside Russia.

Putin announced Russia’s first partial mobilization since World War II in September 2022 at a time when his armies were retreating in Ukraine. The 2022 mobilization was an effective short-term solution, boosting the Russian military with an additional three hundred thousand troops. Crucially, however, it also proved deeply unpopular with the Russian public, sparking domestic protests and fueling a wave of migration as hundreds of thousands of military age men fled the country. With a record number of Russians already reportedly seeking asylum in the West in order to avoid military service, the Kremlin is understandably unwilling to gamble on a new mobilization unless absolutely necessary.

This may help to explain why we are now seeing reports of North Korean troops preparing to join the Russian attack on Ukraine. By turning to his North Korean partners for fresh soldiers, Putin hopes to plug the gaps in his decimated military without running the risk of mobilizing his own population.

In the coming weeks, Putin will be watching carefully to see how Western leaders react to the arrival of North Korean troops in Ukraine. If the West fails to impose appropriate costs for this first instance of direct foreign intervention in Russia’s invasion, a disastrous precedent will be set and far larger numbers of North Korean soldiers may soon be on their way to fight in Europe.

Olivia Yanchik is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Kyiv’s victory plan priorities include more weapons, the lifting of restrictions on long-range strikes inside Russia, and a formal invitation to join NATO. According to Zelenskyy, Ukraine could potentially end the Russian invasion within a year if the country’s allies get behind his vision for victory.

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While Western leaders consistently voice their support for Zelenskyy’s goals, some remain preoccupied by fears of escalation and appear deeply reluctant to do anything that might risk provoking Putin. While Biden spoke of “total unanimity” in Berlin over continued support for Ukraine, the lack of public backing for Zelenskyy’s victory plan suggested that differences on key issues have yet to be resolved.

Crucially, there was no progress on Ukraine’s request to allow air strikes against Russian targets using Western weapons. The United States, France, and the United Kingdom have all provided Ukraine with long-range missiles, but Kyiv has yet to receive the green light for long-range attacks inside Russia. The extended debate over the possible lifting of restrictions has already allowed the Russian military to move many of its most valuable assets out of range.

Ukraine has sought to persuade its partners by providing detailed lists of potential targets inside Russia while explaining why strikes could have a significant impact on the future course of the war. However, this has so far proved insufficient to overcome escalation concerns in Western capitals.

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The Ukrainian authorities are not relying entirely on Zelenskyy’s victory plan to reinvigorate their country’s war effort. With little sign that Ukraine’s partners are ready to remove restrictions on long-range strikes, Kyiv is concentrating its limited resources on the development of domestic strike capabilities that will allow Ukraine to hit targets deep inside Russia without requiring Western approval.

Long-range Ukrainian drones have been attacking Russian military bases, armament production facilities, airfields, and energy industry infrastructure with increasing frequency throughout 2024. Recent successes have included a spectacular attack on a large Russian munitions storage site in the Tver region that sparked a blast large enough to register at earthquake monitoring stations.

While Ukraine’s Western partners hesitate, Russia’s authoritarian allies are escalating their involvement in the war. North Korea in particular has emerged as a key supplier of the Russian war machine, with Pyongyang reportedly providing Moscow with ballistic missiles as well as around half of all the artillery shells being used by the Russian military in Ukraine. In recent weeks, Ukraine has also accused North Korea of preparing to provide Russia with up to ten thousand soldiers.

The apparent lack of consensus over key points in Zelenskyy’s victory plan underlines the absence of a united vision among Ukraine’s partners over how best to end the war. While Western leaders remain determined to prevent Russia’s invasion from succeeding, they have yet to demonstrate a convincing commitment to Ukrainian victory and are still obviously constrained by escalation fears. This is exactly what Vladimir Putin is counting on as he looks to prolong the war and outlast the West in Ukraine.

Aleksander Cwalina is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Axis of Autocrats: North Korea’s escalating role in Russia’s Ukraine War

Olena Tregub — Tue, 22 Oct 2024 20:48:05 +0000

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has accused North Korea of preparing to send thousands of soldiers to join the Russian invasion of his country, and is calling for a “strong response” from the international community. “In fact, another state is joining the war against Ukraine,” Zelenskyy commented during his traditional daily video address on Sunday evening.

Ukraine’s allegations have been backed up by South Korea, leading to calls for the immediate withdrawal of North Korean troops from Russia. Officials in Seoul summoned the Russian ambassador on Monday to condemn intensifying military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow. Meanwhile, Britain’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Barbara Woodward, informed the UN Security Council that it was “highly likely” North Korea had agreed to send combat troops in support of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

If confirmed, North Korea’s decision to provide Russian President Vladimir Putin with soldiers would further deepen the Hermit Kingdom’s involvement in an invasion that is already the largest European war since World War II. The United States first accused North Korea of supplying Russia with artillery shells in September 2022. Putin and his North Korean counterpart, Kim Jong-un, have since gone on to hold a number of high-profile meetings. In June 2024, the two dictators signed a mutual defense pact, underlining the strengthening security cooperation between their nations.

As the invasion of Ukraine has progressed, Russia’s reliance on North Korea has reportedly grown. In October 2024, Britain’s The Times newspaper cited Western intelligence estimates indicating that North Korea was now supplying half of all the artillery shells used by the Russian army in Ukraine. North Korea is also believed to be providing ballistic missiles for Russia’s campaign of aerial bombardment against Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure. The use of North Korean-supplied missiles by the Russian military in Ukraine was first confirmed in December 2023, according to US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby.

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The ballistic missiles reportedly being supplied by North Korea have a range of up to 690 kilometers and are extremely difficult to shoot down with Ukraine’s existing patchwork of air defense systems. This makes them a very significant addition to Putin’s arsenal. North Korea’s capacity to produce such weapons hinges on Pyongyang’s ability to bypass sanctions on key missile components produced in the West.

Research conducted by the Kyiv-based Independent Anti-Corruption Commission, which I chair, has recently identified a number of Western components in a North Korean missile that was shot down in central Ukraine’s Poltava region during early September 2024. Inspection of the missile confirmed the presence of microelectronics manufactured in the US, the UK, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. It was particularly striking to note that many of these components had been produced as recently as 2022 or 2023.

This is not a new problem, of course. Indeed, international audiences are no longer particularly shocked or even surprised by the latest revelations of Western components in Russian rockets and Iranian drones. Nevertheless, news that restricted Western technologies are making their way to one of the world’s most sanctioned and famously isolated countries should now strengthen calls for the introduction of far tighter export controls.

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More than two and a half years since the start of the invasion, Western tech is still playing an important part in Russia’s war effort. Moscow, Tehran, and Pyongyang are all heavily dependent on components produced by companies across Europe and North America, and have evidently found ways to keep illicit delivery channels open.

As policymakers in Western capitals search for an appropriate response to the anticipated appearance of North Korean soldiers in Europe, this technological dependency is one obvious vulnerability. If supplies of components could be dramatically reduced, Russia and its allies would soon find that they lacked the parts for the mass production of missiles and drones. This could significantly hamper the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.

In order to achieve this, Western governments should scrutinize their own sanctions policies, while looking to work more closely together to coordinate sanctions implementation. The export of militarily sensitive high-tech components should be subject to much stricter regulations and far tougher policing. For individual companies, this may involve accepting a greater degree of accountability for overseeing product movement and end delivery.

Far more attention must also be paid to the intermediary role being played by countries including China. There must be serious penalties for feeding the weapons component needs of sanctioned states such as Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Existing secondary sanctions measures are evidently not working and need to be significantly more comprehensive.

The arrival of North Korean troops in Ukraine would be an historically unprecedented event for all Europeans and a major wake-up call for the entire Western world. It is already abundantly clear that Putin and his authoritarian partners are working to establish an Axis of Autocrats. This alliance of tyrants is explicitly anti-Western in character and has global ambitions that extend far beyond the borders of Ukraine. Indeed, the entire Axis is bound together by a shared desire to destroy the existing world order.

Putin’s Axis of Autocrats may hate the West, but they remain heavily reliant on Western technologies. This is confirmed by physical evidence and intelligence findings from Ukraine. In other words, Russia has invaded a European country using weapons that would literally not exist without parts imported from companies across Europe and North America. If Western leaders want to undermine Putin’s war machine, one of the first steps should be to prevent Russia and its allies from acquiring the Western components they need to maintain their defense industries and supply their armies.

Olena Tregub is Executive Director of Ukraine’s Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (NAKO).

In the past, the United States has relied on its qualitative edge for its war-fighting systems. However, continued Chinese theft is eroding this advantage. As a result, near-peer Chinese capabilities now drastically outnumber US systems forcing a reckoning that requires strategic rebalancing to maintain credible deterrence. The United States can help mitigate these short- and medium-term challenges by taking advantage of its most significant strategic asset: the depth of its alliances and partnerships.

What is PIPIR?

Enter PIPIR—the Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience—a new multinational initiative launched in June to strengthen “defense industrial resilience to promote security, economic security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.” If it reaches its potential, PIPIR can enable the United States and its partners to mitigate the risk of a Pyrrhic victory. Though still in its early stages, PIPIR has already drawn comparisons to the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, which coordinates the pooling of resources for the multinational delivery of critical weapon systems to Ukraine. If a parallel effort is based in Asia, it could enable faster provisioning of resources to Taiwan, the Philippines, South Korea, or even the United States if a war breaks out. This effort, by providing credible benefits to sustainment helps restore deterrence as China continues to modernize its military forces to reach world-class status by 2049.

For the United States, PIPIR also provides a unique benefit, as many Indo-Pacific partners are US military hardware and software customers and regularly train with US forces, ensuring familiarity with variants of US systems. The effort could also be a valuable forum to coordinate the various bilateral co-production efforts emerging across the region. These include possible co-production of artillery pieces with South Korea; missile and rocket systems, including Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, with Australia; hypersonic missile interceptors with Japan; and drones with Taiwan.

On October 7, PIPIR took its next step forward with an inaugural meeting based on the thirteen-country signed statement of principles for Indo-Pacific Defense Industrial Base Collaboration, which includes European partners. The meeting resulted in the creation of four institutionalized work streams: sustainment, production, supply chain resilience, and policy and optimization. Now that these nations have decided to pursue these important issues, PIPIR should work to integrate the appropriate existing bilateral and multilateral efforts with these work streams. If done effectively, such integration could dramatically boost the sustainment and production capabilities of the United States and its partners.

Avoiding the tyranny of distance

In addition to providing the United States and its partners with more options for sustainment, PIPIR, as a regional initiative, can support Washington’s strategic goals of mitigating war-time risk through its distributed logistics and basing model—a key objective of the United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). In March, the then-INDOPACOM commander, Admiral John C. Aquilino, testified before the US Senate that “deterrence depends on the ability of the Joint Force to act quickly and decisively, which requires an increasingly flexible and distributed force posture and logistics network.” While pre-positioned stockpiles are a critical unilateral way of reducing the burden of resupply in a hot conflict, they are not a cure-all for INDOPACOM’s logistical challenges. Pre-positioned stockpiles are targetable by adversaries and cannot, in a truly distributed force posture, be of sufficient size for the duration of a hot conflict. Moreover, the larger the stockpiles and a force’s reliance on them, the more damage their destruction would cause to its readiness.

Here, co-production and the possible value of PIPIR to coordinate can genuinely shine by providing supplies that US forces could be capable of using beyond their existing regional stockpiles. Further, coproduction in the region could reduce the lag time from production to delivery from weeks to days. Such cooperation would significantly mitigate the United States’ tyranny of distance challenge in parts of the Indo-Pacific and offset China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) advantages.

Three steps to success

To be effective, PIPIR should next focus on three important objectives: account for current capabilities and shortfalls, standardize critical weapon systems among participants, and receive assurances or private commitments for using such produced systems in a crisis.

Resource and capability awareness: To begin, PIPIR should have each participant look hard at its defense production capacity and, importantly, the projected exportable capacity not already committed. This caveat is essential as, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, producers in Asia have already begun committing their resources to the fight. For example, in a two-part deal between the United States, South Korea, and Ukraine, Seoul agreed to provide 300,000 155 mm artillery shells to the United States to backfill its stockpiles with an equivalent amount supplied to Ukraine. However, with a current annual capacity of 200,000 155 mm shells, South Korea can’t provide any additional 155 mm capacity for partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific while also supporting Ukraine, which requires a whopping 75,000 shells a month. Indeed, public reports have found that South Korea may not have enough shells for more than a week of hot conflict with North Korea.

One must accept that the arms market is truly global, and with hot conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, Asian defense producers have not been idle. What was once excess capacity has already been dedicated to clients in these other regions. After completing an honest capability assessment of free capacity, PIPIR participants should consider leveraging funding to enhance the production of allies and partners for specific weapon systems. While such investments, if by the United States, would be made outside the US job market, the impacts on the sustainment of such production are well worth the investment. However, there remain strong political barriers to allocating taxpayer funds to defense industrial base investments abroad. Such a mechanism would have to be used sparingly and in cases where the benefit for sustainment outweighs the political backlash against the investment.

Champion standardization: PIPIR should emulate the commitments of the NATO industrial capacity expansion pledge toward standardization among key participants and systems. While NATO has the benefit of being an alliance-based effort, the long-term presence of the United States and the extensive foreign military sales to the region provide an opportunity to establish and expand the use of NATO standardization agreements to the Indo-Pacific. We have already seen examples of STANAGS with key regional allies such as the South Korea And Japan. Moreover, standardization does not have to be a monolithic effort. Instead, partner countries should identify critical systems that are most likely to require sustainment, such as missile and artillery capabilities, and focus on these systems first.

Ensure commitment to supply: PIPIR’s value is maximized in times of crisis when sustainment challenges add survivability and expenditure rates to the logistics equation. To ensure the effectiveness of PIPIR, the United States should work to develop security of supply agreements exclusive to PIPIR across partners that are willing to work on co-production and standardization. These agreements must come with clarity on the sequencing and preferential status of these agreements concerning other regional allies such as NATO. They should provide sufficient incentives to ensure participation. The United States should work with partners to identify situations in which partners are willing to support the US military’s sustainment and situations in which they will not accept the risks during a crisis.

Today, it’s still too early to tell if PIPIR has the potential to parallel or even surpass the efforts of the Ukraine Defense Contract Group. Apt diplomacy and consistent US leadership will be paramount to success. News that the Department of Defense’s most senior acquisition official, William A. LaPlante, chaired PIPIR’s inaugural meeting is a meaningful symbol that the United States is committed to seeing the initiative succeed.

At the same time, the opaque nature of which countries are participating in PIPIR points to China’s long shadow in the region. Regional partners will have to carefully balance economic interests with national security when working to expand defense industrial base cooperation. If the United States can prioritize the aforementioned recommendations and successfully navigate the discretion that PIPIR requires, then it can enable this new initiative to provide a strategic impact to improve allied deterrence and sustainment—ultimately saving American lives and treasure.

Adam Kozloski is a nonresident senior fellow at the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and at the N7 Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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As the US election nears, anxiety is mounting in Ukraine

Kate Spencer — Tue, 15 Oct 2024 20:20:25 +0000

The coming United States presidential election will have truly global ramifications. Few countries have more at stake than Ukraine, which is heavily reliant on continued US support to maintain the fight against Russia’s invasion. As the November 5 vote draws nearer, Ukrainians are anxiously observing the final weeks of the campaign.

Over the past two-and-a-half years of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukrainian officials, military personnel, and members of the public have gone to considerable lengths to express their gratitude for US support and acknowledge the critical role this has played in their country’s war effort. However, there is now a sense of disquiet over the future of US aid.

Ukrainian concerns are primarily focused on the potential consequences of a Donald Trump victory in the forthcoming election. While Ukrainian officials and commentators generally prefer not to make any public statements about the presidential race in order to avoid accusations of interfering in domestic US politics, many acknowledge a growing nervousness.

Uncertainty in Kyiv over the former president’s position is not a new phenomenon and can be traced back almost a decade to the 2016 US presidential race. “Trump’s view of Ukraine has been persistently negative for the last eight years at least,” Odesa National University Center for International Studies director Volodymyr Dubovyk commented in September 2024. “Much of this view was shaped by people antagonistic to Ukraine.”

Trump’s support for Ukraine while in the White House, which included the delivery of Javelin anti-tank missiles, did much to rebuild confidence in Kyiv. He also chose not to use his influence over Republican members of Congress to block aid for Ukraine earlier this year. Nevertheless, there is currently considerable unease over the former US president’s vague plans for peace with Russia, which many Ukrainians fear would involve unacceptable territorial concessions.

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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has sought to downplay concerns by referring to Trump’s more troubling campaign trail rhetoric on Ukraine as “election messages.” Despite these efforts, there remains significant uncertainty over what a Trump victory would mean for Ukraine, with some worried that he would be likely to adopt a softer approach toward Russia.

The sense of anxiety in Ukraine has been heightened by recent revelations in a new book by US journalist Bob Woodward, who claims Trump sent COVID-19 testing equipment to Russia in 2020 for President Vladimir Putin’s personal use. The book also alleges that Trump and Putin may have spoken up to seven times since Trump left the White House in 2021, according to an unnamed aide.

Trump campaign officials have denied these accusations. The Kremlin has confirmed that Russia did receive COVID tests from the United States, but has downplayed the significance of the gesture.

Throughout the current election campaign, Trump’s comments on Ukraine have centered on his commitment to ending the current war in one day, while also claiming that Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine would never have happened if he had remained in office. Speaking alongside Zelenskyy in New York in September, Trump highlighted his “very good relationships” with both Putin and Zelenskyy, while insisting that he could broker a settlement between the two leaders “very quickly.”

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Not everyone in Ukraine is convinced a Trump presidency would be bad news for the country. Some prefer to emphasize Trump’s important contribution in April 2024 when he chose not to come out against House Speaker Mike Johnson’s Ukraine aid bill, which likely would have prevented it from passing Congress. Allies of the former president have also said that he is receptive to advice from a number of officials who have cautioned him about the potentially dangerous repercussions of a Russian victory in Ukraine.

Perhaps the most detailed outline of possible future US policy toward Ukraine during a potential second Trump presidency has come from Trump’s vice presidential nominee, Senator JD Vance. In a September 2024 interview, Vance indicated that Trump’s peace plan for Ukraine would involve allowing Russia to remain in control of the Ukrainian regions it currently occupies, establishing a demilitarized zone, and obliging Ukraine to commit to neutrality.

If implemented, such a settlement would likely be seen as a significant victory in Moscow. Critics have warned that it would also jeopardize Ukraine’s future security and could set the stage for further Russian aggression. However, it is important to underline that Vance’s comments have not been endorsed by Trump and do not represent official policy.

Trump’s often evasive statements on Ukraine may suggest that he is keeping his options open for the future. While much of his rhetoric in relation to Ukraine has set off alarm bells in Kyiv, he has also been supportive of US aid to the country and is doubtless aware that many in his own party continue to favor a strong pro-Ukrainian position.

Recent allegations regarding the former US president’s personal relations with Putin will do little to ease existing concerns in Ukraine. If Trump does win a second term next month, his approach to the Russian invasion of Ukraine may ultimately depend on the advice he receives from those closest to him. Ukrainians will be hoping that bipartisan political backing for their country and continued indications of strong support for Ukraine among the US public will be enough to prevent any major shifts in United States policy.

Kate Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had initially hoped that by invading Russia, he could pressure Putin into transferring troops from Ukraine to the home front. So far, this has not happened. Instead, the Russian army has continued to advance steadily in eastern Ukraine and has captured a number of towns and villages since Ukraine’s cross-border incursion began. At the same time, the fact that Putin has had to choose between the invasion of Ukraine the defense of Russia is in itself telling.

Russia’s difficulties on the Kursk front are the latest indication that Moscow is experiencing mounting manpower issues. In recent months, the Russian military has reportedly been forced to dramatically increase the bounties on offer to new recruits. According to investigative Russian news outlet Vyorstka, those who do agree to sign up to fight in Ukraine are now often in very poor health, with the average age of volunteers rising from forty at the start of the invasion to around fifty.

Other signs that Putin is being forced to scrape the bottom of the barrel to replenish the depleted ranks of his army include recent reports that sailors from Russia’s only aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, have been withdrawn from naval service and deployed to Ukraine as infantry. Russia is also in the process of passing new legislation that will allow defendants to sign military contracts and avoid prosecution. Tens of thousands of Russian prisoners have already been released from jail to fight in Ukraine.

Meanwhile, as Ukrainian troops crossed the border into the Kursk region in early August, they found that most of the Russian defenses in the border zone were manned by young conscript troops who were soon surrendering in large numbers. This has allowed Ukraine to replenish its exchange fund and conduct a number of prisoner swaps, while also causing considerable disquiet within Russian society.

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Putin’s uncharacteristically restrained reaction to Ukraine’s Kursk incursion suggests that he is well aware of his army’s shortcomings. Far from threatening World War III or attempting to rally his country against the foreign invader, Putin has sought to downplay the entire invasion, and has had remarkably little to say about what is the first foreign occupation of Russian land since World War II.

This underwhelming response has been evident since the very first days of Ukraine’s offensive, which Putin initially dismissed as a mere “provocation.” The Russian media has reportedly been instructed by the Kremlin to minimize the significance of the Ukrainian invasion, and has been tasked with convincing domestic audiences that the presence of Ukrainian troops inside Russia is now the “new normal.”

This does not mean that the Russian military is on the brink of collapse, of course. On the contrary, Putin has recently unveiled ambitious plans to further expand the size of his army to one and a half million soldiers, a move that would make it the second largest in the world after China. He can also announce a further round of mobilization if necessary, but this could potentially fuel domestic unrest and convince thousands of young Russians to flee the country.

Putin will certainly need to find large numbers of additional troops as he looks to compensate for Russia’s staggering losses and achieve his objective of gradually bleeding Ukraine to death in a brutal war of attrition. According to US officials, September 2024 was the bloodiest month of the war for Russian troops in Ukraine, but it was also one of the most successful in terms of new territory seized. With Russia now comfortably outnumbering and outgunning Ukraine, Putin is clearly counting on his country’s far greater capacity to absorb battlefield casualties and keep fighting.

Ukraine’s leaders seem to understand this grim arithmetic perfectly well. Indeed, they appear to have taken the bold decision to invade Russia in large part because they recognized that remaining locked in a war of attrition with their much larger enemy would be an act of national suicide.

Not everyone is convinced by the arguments in favor of the Kursk operation, with some critics calling it a reckless gamble and a strategic blunder that has weakened Ukraine’s defenses at a critical moment. Nevertheless, there is no denying that the offensive has succeeded in challenging the previously prevailing narrative of inevitable Russian victory. Crucially, the Ukrainian invasion of Russia’s Kursk region has also demonstrated that Putin’s overextended army is far more vulnerable than the Kremlin would like us to believe.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

According to US military experts, the window between the first deployment of an improved drone design and the appearance of countermeasures is usually just over a month. Responses can range from electronic interference to copying drone designs and combat tactics. It is a lethal game of whack-a-drone that has led to the testing of, among other technologies, autonomous target acquisition and increasingly autonomous drone operations.

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International observers including opponents of the West are carefully studying how the defense tech innovations that are emerging in Ukraine will shape the future of warfare. Unsurprisingly, military cooperation among autocracies is already expanding as the Kremlin and its allies look to share knowledge and experience. For example, Iran has reportedly been providing training to Russian drone operators.

Western military planners are in turn learning from their Ukrainian partners about adapting commercially available platforms to military applications in an extremely challenging environment. Ukraine’s inventiveness and ability to establish mutually beneficial cooperation between tech startups and the state have amazed Western military experts, who are more accustomed to slow and highly bureaucratic processes.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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When it comes to learning the defense tech lessons of the Russia-Ukraine War, there is no substitute for being close to the battlefield. Observing Ukrainian drone operators at work, interacting closely with electronic warfare specialists, and participating in the deconstruction and analysis of recovered Russian drones are all vital to understanding how these technologies are evolving.

Many Western journalists and volunteers are already embedding themselves with Ukrainian units as they seek to learn more about the realities of modern warfare and the increasingly central role being played by defense tech innovations. This close proximity could be highly beneficial for military commanders and defense industry developers. However, that would require a far more comprehensive approach.

At present, Western efforts to learn from the war in Ukraine are being impeded by an extreme aversion to putting any personnel at risk. Fears over the possible consequences of injury or death to non-Ukrainian personnel in the war with Russia appear to be inhibiting Western governments and weapons manufacturers. These concerns are limiting their ability to study the remarkable developments currently taking place in Ukraine.

This is not necessarily the case elsewhere. For instance, US military personnel are currently deployed in a number of active conflict zones in the Middle East and Africa. In contrast, the movements of Western military personnel in Ukraine remain heavily restricted, even in a purely observational role.

While there is a strong case for allowing military personnel to get closer to the front lines in Ukraine, it is arguably even more important to provide weapons developers with direct access. Indeed, some smaller Western military equipment manufacturers have already sent experts to Ukraine. Mainstream manufacturers now need to overcome their reluctance and allow key staff greater access to the Ukrainian front lines.

Today’s self-imposed constraints are limiting the West’s opportunities to get a closer look at what the battlefield of the not-too-distant future will look like. This is making it harder to provide Ukraine with the support it needs to win the current war, while also preventing the development of new defense tech capabilities that can help keep Western societies safe in the coming decades.

Edward Verona is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center covering Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe.

Officials in Kyiv regard the current restrictions on attacks inside Russia as politically unjustified and militarily absurd. They argue that by preventing Ukraine from striking back, Western leaders are effectively protecting Putin’s war machine while forcing the Ukrainian military to fight with one hand tied behind its back.

With little indication that Ukraine’s major allies are ready to change tack and allow the use of Western-supplied missiles inside Russia, it may be time to explore other options. The most obvious solution would be to enhance Ukraine’s ability to launch attacks inside Russia using its own domestically-produced long-range weapons.

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Ukraine’s rapidly advancing domestic drone program already has considerable long-range capabilities, but requires extensive investment and technological cooperation in order to reach its full potential. Ukraine has also recently confirmed the successful testing of its first domestically-produced ballistic missile. With sufficient Western support, this expanding Ukrainian arsenal of long-range weapons could have a major impact on the future course of the war.

Since the beginning of 2024, Ukraine has been conducting an increasingly ambitious campaign of drone strikes against military targets and energy industry infrastructure deep inside Russia. Many of these attacks have taken place at distances more than one thousand kilometers from the Ukrainian border and have involved large numbers of drones that have succeeded in overwhelming Russia’s air defenses.

The potential of Ukraine’s long-range drones was underlined in September when a large-scale attack on a military storage facility in Russia’s Tver region produced an explosion that was large enough to be picked up by earthquake monitoring stations. According to Ukrainian sources, the blast destroyed vast quantities of Russian missiles, glide bombs, and artillery ammunition. Satellite imagery appeared to confirm that the targeted facility had been partially destroyed.

Some of Ukraine’s partners were initially reluctant to back this air offensive, with multiple US officials publicly questioning the wisdom of Kyiv’s strategy. However, these concerns appear to have eased in recent months. Western officials are now more publicly supportive of Ukraine’s right to strike back inside Russia, provided this is done using Ukrainian weapons.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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Over the past two and a half years, drones have emerged as a vital asset in Ukraine’s asymmetric warfare strategy as it fights to defend itself against a far larger and more powerful adversary. Outgunned and outnumbered by Russia, Ukraine has focused its resources on building up the country’s domestic drone industry. In the air, on land, and at sea, domestically-made drones have been instrumental in many of Ukraine’s most important military successes.

Ukrainian drone output has dramatically increased since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, with more than two hundred companies now producing millions of drones annually. The expansion of the sector has been so rapid that Ukraine is currently making more drones than the Ukrainian authorities can afford to purchase, leading to excess capacity. Unless this can be addressed, there is a danger that many Ukrainian drone companies could be forced out of business or obliged to move abroad.

Ukraine’s partners can bridge the gap between rising drone manufacturing capacity and the country’s limited state procurement budgets by placing orders directly with Ukrainian drone manufacturers themselves. Some countries including Denmark have already committed to do so. More comprehensive efforts in this direction could place Ukraine’s dynamically developing drone industry on a firmer footing and bolster the country’s ability to hit targets deep inside Russia.

In early October, Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov confirmed that increased production of long-range drones and missiles will be a key goal in 2025. Ukraine’s partners should follow suit and prioritize their support for the country’s long-range air strike capabilities. By expanding investment and technical cooperation in this area, they can help Ukraine regain the initiative and force Putin to rethink his invasion, while at the same time adhering to their own cautious doctrine of escalation management. Western policymakers may still believe in Putin’s red lines, but Ukrainians do not.

David Kirichenko is an Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

II. Learning from history

III. Analysis: Identifying and exploiting Russia’s vulnerabilities

IV. Policy recommendations

V. Conclusion

About the author

Whichever candidate takes the White House in November, the Russian war on Ukraine will be a major challenge. To handle it successfully, we must realize that Moscow is fighting not just for Ukraine but to shift the balance of power in Europe and, through it, in the world, as Vladimir Putin elucidated in his “ultimatum” of December 2021. Thwarting that ambition is imperative for US national security, the future of Europe, and the survival of democratic regimes the world over.

NATO leaders gathered in Washington, D.C., this past July to celebrate the Alliance’s seventy-fifth birthday as the war in Ukraine approached its 900-day mark. The war has been a slow and bloody slog, with Russia pitting its massive military industry and human resources against significant, albeit intermittent, Western support for Ukraine. Bolstered by North Korea, China, Iran, Belarus, Cuba, and Venezuela, and with the tacit cooperation of several nonaligned countries, the Kremlin is attempting to grind Ukraine down and open the door to further aggression in Europe.

As Russia has peaked in terms of its military production, finances, human resources, and information warfare, its limited successes can be reversed if the West commits to victory and consistent, ample, and intentional support for Ukrainian independence and sovereignty. A committed policy would put Russia on the back foot, possibly as early as 2025, forcing its elites to recognize the futility of the war. That, in turn, can bring about Russia’s strategic defeat and possibly the Putin regime transitioning to a more realistic administration by 2026/27.

Despite its aggressive stance, Russia also has clear weaknesses. While commentators called Russia’s military the second most powerful in the world before February 24, 2022, Russia has suffered several military defeats over the centuries and truly is not “nine feet tall.” This report aims to identify exploitable vulnerabilities in the current conflict. To achieve this, we briefly analyze the historical precedents of Russian/Soviet military engagements between the nineteenth and twenty-first centuries, examine Russia’s current domestic military production and exports, and probe the foreign relations of the Russian Federation for sources of both diplomatic support and military or dual-use import and export markets. We conclude that the Russian mobilization for war has peaked (except the use of weapons of mass destruction, particularly tactical nuclear weapons). In contrast, the Western coalition in support of Ukraine has barely started fighting. This is the chief Russian vulnerability and the most significant Western advantage. The report concludes with policy recommendations for Western decision-makers and other leaders as to how to exploit these vulnerabilities, win the war in Ukraine, and thus secure the peace not only in Europe but also in other “at risk” regions of the world by restoring deterrence.

Learning from history

The Crimean War was fought from 1853 to 1856 between the Russians and an alliance of the Ottoman Empire, Britain, France, and Sardinia-Piedmont. Europe advanced industrially and economically at the time while Russia lagged under Emperor Nicholas I’s military-feudal monarchy. In pursuit of strategic opportunities presented by the decomposing Ottoman Empire, Nicholas provoked the Ottomans by occupying the Danubian Principalities in 1853. Britain and France responded by sending their forces to the Black Sea.

The Russians suffered a crushing defeat, losing five hundred thousand troops, the naval base of Sevastopol, and naval rights in the Black Sea under the 1856 Treaty of Paris. Russia’s centralized and inefficient system contributed to the debacle: poor communications, clogged logistics, outdated technology, inferior weapons, a weak navy, corrupt military, incompetent administration, and low morale. Nicholas I’s failure to recognize European powers’ determination and to heed diplomatic warnings led to his downfall.

The Russo-Japanese War began in 1904 over St. Petersburg and Tokyo’s rival territorial ambitions in Manchuria and Korea. Reliant on the incomplete Trans-Siberian Railway to transport troops, Russia had fewer soldiers in Manchuria than Japan. Ultimately, a combination of poor planning, poor leadership, technological backwardness, and a tendency to underestimate the enemy prompted by racism against the Japanese led to a crushing defeat for the Romanov dynasty.

Russia fought to the bitter end, trying to avoid a “humiliating peace.” However, the Russian public came to view the conflict with anger and disgust. With the economy in disarray and food shortages, the war triggered severe socio-political conflict culminating in the 1905 Russian Revolution. Tsar Nicholas II promised a transition to a constitutional monarchy but repeatedly backtracked. The failure to meaningfully reform and modernize the government, the military, and the economy set the stage for the military defeats of World War I and the disastrous Russian Revolutions of 1917.

World War I came during an age of modernization and democratic advances in Europe, while semifeudal, authoritarian Russia continued to fall behind.

As it stumbled into the conflict, Russia struggled with military recruitment and the effort to produce sufficient weapons and munitions. With poorly trained troops, the country suffered 1.8 million killed in action and missing in action, and many more wounded. As retreats using a scorched earth policy led to millions of internal refugees, Russian social and political life broke down under the stress. The aristocracy-led army was hobbled by poor command, low morale, and fragging.

Nicholas II assumed supreme military command and left for the front, only to be blamed for the defeats and eventually overthrown. Russia descended from a dysfunctional monarchy to a short-lived democratic republic and proceeded off the cliff to a Soviet communist dictatorship within ten months.

The Winter War began when the Soviet Union attacked “Brave Little Finland” in November 1939. The war was fought in Finland’s brutal cold and snow. Around one million Soviet soldiers struck on several fronts but were ill-equipped and poorly led. Joseph Stalin’s purges of 1937–39 had devastated the Red Army command. Between 50 and 100 percent of officers of varying ranks had been eliminated and were not replaced until Russia entered World War II in June 1941. What Finland lacked in manpower and materiel, it made up for in knowledge of the terrain, speed, experience, economy of force, quality of command, motivation, and will. The Soviet command-and-control system was rigid, preventing the Red Army from adapting quickly to the shifting and difficult battlefield. While the Finns knew what they were fighting for, the Soviet soldiers did not.

The USSR gained territory despite Finland’s dogged defense at a heavy price. The Soviet Union also lost international influence due to its aggression and was booted out of the League of Nations. Moscow’s brutality later prompted Helsinki to side with the German Reich during World War II.

The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 in support of a communist client regime was limited by the Politburo to an initial invasion force of thirty thousand and an expeditionary corps of one hundred thousand. These proved insufficient to hold the country. The United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and others supported the mujahedeen resistance. After losing fifteen thousand troops, a collapsing USSR withdrew from Afghanistan in February 1989.

The First Chechen War began in December of 1994 when the Russian Fifth Congress of People’s Deputies determined that the election of Dzhokhar Dudayev as president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was illegal. After a coup attempt failed to unseat him, then Russian president Boris Yeltsin intervened militarily. The campaign failed. Russian forces were not strong enough to retain control. The war was massively unpopular, and Russia’s troops, who had not been paid for months, were demoralized. Chechen guerillas regrouped by 1996 and recaptured most territories occupied by Russia, while their leadership connected with global Islamists.

The Second Chechen War began when Chechen Islamists attempted to unite Dagestan with Chechnya. They were repelled by the Russian army, which had learned from the tactics used in the First Chechen War, and they retook control of Chechnya, ending the area’s independence. With billions of dollars worth of arms exports and increased oil prices, the Russian economy had by then improved tremendously. This war, with its massive civilian casualties, was fought by a better-trained, equipped, and economically bolstered Russian military.

The Russo-Georgian War was prompted by Russia’s interest in toppling the pro-US leadership in Georgia, securing Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and controlling the South Caucasus energy corridor. Russian-backed South Ossetian forces invaded Georgian villages on August 1, 2008. The brief conflict resulted in victory for Moscow. Careful planning by the Russians over two years, along with sheer numbers, allowed their army to overwhelm the well-trained Georgians. Georgia lost control of areas in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, allowing Russia to stage military bases in those locations.

The Russo-Ukrainian War began after Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych rejected a deal to integrate further with the European Union (EU). Yanukovych’s decision triggered the Maidan Uprising. He was run out of the country in February 2014 as his government, which had attempted to crack down on the Euromaidan protesters, was toppled. Later that month, Russia invaded and occupied Crimea, and irregular Russian troops took advantage of unrest in the Donbas to seize parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The Russian army invaded Ukraine in force when its proxies began losing their bid to shore up their partial control of the Donbas. The Minsk agreements nominally led to a ceasefire, though Russia repeatedly violated it in the years leading up to its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Analysis: Identifying and exploiting Russia’s vulnerabilities

Each conflict we have just briefly surveyed differs, yet we can discern patterns across Russian history and apply them to the current Russian war on Ukraine. First, the Russian leadership’s zero-sum mentality repeatedly leads it to a policy of imperialism and expansionism. While Western military tradition at times permits wartime rivals to save face to preserve blood and treasure, Russia’s military leaders believe in sparing no expense in casualties, armaments, or funds to utterly destroy the enemy and force total capitulation. Unconditional surrender is what the USSR achieved in 1945, and that is what the Kremlin wants today in Ukraine—and beyond.

With rare exceptions, whoever rules in the Kremlin pushes Russia to grab territory to augment power, prestige, and security. Often, authoritarian Russian leaders (like many others) tend to be surrounded by “yes-men” who provide poor intelligence, underestimate opponents, and overestimate their side’s capabilities. In most of the wars we briefly examined, Russia suffered significant losses due to incompetent leadership, insufficient training, technological backwardness, poor supply logistics, corruption, low troop morale, and poor discipline. Significantly, each conflict Russia unequivocally lost eventually led to domestic liberalization (1861 and 1904-1905), regime change, or outright collapse (1917 and 1991).

Recognizing these patterns may allow us to understand current Russian vulnerabilities better, beginning with poor battlefield performance.

Russian tactical battlefield performance in Ukraine was quite unimpressive from the beginning of the invasion in February 2022 until the fall of that year. Inadequately trained military units utilized equipment poorly. Instead of discipline, the Russian ground forces are motivated by intimidation. Individual commanders are unevenly prepared, the quality of tactical command demonstrably inadequate. At the initial stages of the invasion, Russian supply columns wound up being halted and destroyed, assault forces chaotically dispersed.

Despite reform attempts, the Russian military still has an overcentralized command, resulting in inflexible operations with numerous casualties and failures. The outdated nature of military higher education institutions cripples the quality of training and command.

Russia’s leadership consistently prioritizes political loyalty over battlefield effectiveness, resulting in some of the most competent military leaders being relieved of command. This became a common complaint even before the mutiny by Evgeny Prigozhin and his Wagner Group mercenaries against Putin in June 2023. Last but not least, officers and soldiers are often kept in the dark about operations until days or hours before they begin, leaving them unprepared to fight effectively.

Corruption is widespread in the Russian military, damaging morale and impacting supply chains. Troops today partially depend on donations and crowdfunding to obtain necessary supplies.

With the removal of veteran Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and the appointment of his successor, Andrei Belousov—a devout Orthodox Christian who is reportedly not corrupt and a trusted Putin’s étatist economic adviser—there may be plans to audit and restructure the military’s finances, including procurement. However, the appointment of Belousov’s deputies close to Putin, including Putin’s billionaire niece Anna Tsivileva, may suggest that the military will be used as a trough for Putin’s inner circle to feed from.

Russia’s strategy in Ukraine has yielded some successes in militarizing its economy, producing large stockpiles of ammunition and equipment, and recruiting massive numbers of soldiers. Leading analysts noted that the approach seems to be “small infantry groups with the support of a few armored vehicles … attack various spots on a frontline that stretches for over 1,000 miles.” While this stretches the Ukrainian battle lines and grinds Ukrainian units down, it has resulted in only minor territorial gains at the cost of major losses of troops and weapons for the Russians.

Another point of weakness is the failed integration of intelligence and strategic assessment. Russia’s own doctrine identifies NATO as the primary adversary and outlines how contemporary conflicts will play out. Russia came into the war believing “the Ukrainian government would retreat or be betrayed by its own population, that resistance would swiftly collapse, and that Russian troops would be welcomed as liberators.” In both Chechnya (1994) and Ukraine, Russian political leadership failed to understand their adversary or appreciate their own limitations. The Kremlin-initiated politicization of the Russian intelligence services has backfired, as agencies apparently provided Putin with the information he wanted to receive, preventing Russia’s High Command from making properly informed decisions.

Russian grand strategy performance in the international system has been somewhat more successful to date. The Kremlin views the war in Ukraine as a part of a global confrontation with the West, in which China, Iran, Syria, and North Korea are Russian allies, even if formal alliance treaties are absent. Moscow is receiving weapons, ammunition, dual-use, or military-industrial equipment from its comrades-in-arms. Putin’s visits to North Korea and Vietnam in June may have been a veiled signal of Moscow’s frustration with Beijing’s lukewarm support of its Ukraine war. The visits, which came after a Putin summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, suggest that Russia can provide geopolitical options to China’s neighbors.

Other nations have also supported Russia’s economy and war effort by circumventing sanctions or refusing to sign the final act of the peace summit in Switzerland in June 2024. These include Armenia, Belarus, India, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), to mention a few. While India buys Russian oil, the UAE helps with financial transactions and provides a hub for Russia’s parallel imports.

Some countries maintain a balance. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan criticized the Russian war in Ukraine, called for the restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty, and provided humanitarian relief to Ukraine and a refuge for the Russian refugees and migrants. Armenia also distanced itself from Russia after Moscow failed to come to its defense in the wars with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 and 2023. Although financial flows and trade between Russia, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus rose, a lot of this was sanction-busting capital flight.

China, the aspiring Eurasian hegemon, is key to Russia’s war effort. Relations between the two countries reflect the increasing dependence of Moscow on Beijing for diplomatic and economic support. Bilateral trade increased to around $240 billion in 2023, an increase of 23 percent over the prior year. China provides a key market for Russia’s exports and is a supplier of dual-use parts and technology and a reshipper of sanctioned Western goods and components.

Media reports state that Russia asked China to “snub” the June 2024 Ukraine peace summit, which Beijing did. Intelligence suggests, however, that there are some tensions between the two over economic disagreements, including the proposed Power of Siberia 2 pipeline. China wants to pay low prices equal or close to Russia’s subsidized domestic gas prices.

Russia has also used China to subvert Western sanctions. In July 2024, joint Russo-Chinese military flights were intercepted near Alaska. To counter US pressure, Moscow and Beijing can challenge Washington and its allies directly and simultaneously in Europe and the Pacific; through Iranian proxies Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis in the Middle East; and in the choke points of the Strait of Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb, the Red Sea, and the Suez Canal. Africa, Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and the Global South writ large are increasingly becoming a battleground for the East-West confrontation.

Putin visited North Korea in June 2024 to show a united front against “the imperialist policy of the United States and its satellites.” Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un signed a pact that provides for mutual assistance in the event of aggression against one of their countries. Along with Putin’s remarks, this publicly signals North Korea’s assistance in the war on Ukraine. Although both North Korea and Russia deny arms sales are occurring, the United States has accused North Korea of supplying ballistic missiles and munitions to Russia. Both nations may engage in joint military drills, further complicating the security situation in the North-East Pacific. The Moscow-Pyongyang cooperation demonstrates the Kremlin’s desperation, as suggested by the need to import obsolescent and often malfunctioning North Korean weapons. It signals Putin’s isolation on the international scene, distances Russia from the much more prosperous South Korea, and puts Putin squarely in the authoritarian/totalitarian camp together with China and Iran. Russian-North Korean cooperation may also expand nuclear proliferation risks, as Russia is likely to export modern nuclear and missile technologies to its partner.

Russia is expanding relations with Africa, increasing military, political, and economic cooperation with several African states, especially in North Africa and the Sahel. Moscow is particularly active in Chad, the Republic of Congo, Guinea, Libya, and Niger. Russia’s new partners are distancing themselves from their once prominent allies, France and the United States, causing significant security damage to the West.

In the Global South, many nations have remained neutral on Russia’s war against Ukraine. Only forty-five countries have imposed sanctions on Russia, while nearly ninety still allow Russians visa-free entry and do not sanction trade. That is not a feat of Russian diplomacy, however, but more the result of lingering anti-Western sentiment rooted in colonial histories.

Russia has mobilized its military-industrial complex for wartime. While Moscow has achieved limited success on the battlefield due to its superior firepower and manpower advantages, many Russian systems are outdated and ineffective against the Western military equipment provided to Ukraine. Russia’s artillery systems’ precision and long-range capabilities, as well as its multiple-launch rocket systems, tanks, and aviation equipment, do not compare favorably to the West’s.

While high in quantity, Russia’s military output is primarily refurbished or modernized previous stocks and models that are technologically obsolete. Although ammunition production is three times higher than the combined US-Europe output for Ukraine, it appears that Russia is still not producing enough to sustain its war effort. Chemical raw materials for explosives and precursor production are not growing. To compensate for shortages, Russia signed supply and production contracts with Belarus, Iran, North Korea, and Syria. If Western weapons and ammunition production rises proportionally to Western industrial capacity and GDP ratio versus Russia, Moscow will be severely outgunned. However, Belousov’s policies aimed at making Russia near-independent of the West and only partially reliant on “arsenals of autocracy” for its high tech supply chains may make Russia better equipped for a war of attrition.

Russia’s dependence on Western-sourced components such as computer chips for complex weapon production is a significant vulnerability. However, sanctions haven’t been severe enough to cut supply lines, only to increase costs by some 30 percent. In order to receive Western components, Russia depends on China and other sanction violators for assistance. This has resulted in complete dependence in some areas, such as the domestic drone industry. Although China does not provide Russia with weapons, it provides dual-use military/civilian precursors, components, and production equipment. These actions have resulted in components for almost all Russian unmanned aerial vehicles being imported from China or the West or having vital Chinese parts, at least as of October 2023 despite sanctions.

Russia’s wartime economy prioritizes quantity over quality. Directing civilian enterprises to transition to military output, Moscow whipped the defense industry into a 24/7 production schedule and directed around 30 percent of Russia’s federal budget toward the military in 2024 (almost 8 percent of GDP). This is in addition to receiving ammunit ion from Iran and North Korea.

In October 2023, Putin issued a temporary decree forcing Russian exporters to convert nearly all their foreign currency earnings into rubles. While this may have helped stabilize the ruble, which is currently trading around 88 Russian rubles to a US dollar, it risked capital outflows, devaluation, and a spike in inflation.

Russia is experiencing elevated inflation. As of May 2024, the official rate was at 8.3 percent. However, it is considerably higher, according to this author’s sources in Moscow in July 2024. To combat this, on July 26, 2024, the Central Bank of Russia raised interest rates to 18 percent.

Russian exports are a significant source of income for the state. These include arms sales, energy and raw materials exports, and nuclear reactors. Exports dropped 53 percent between 2012 and 2023, and the number of countries buying Russian weapons fell from thirty-one to twelve. However, with the need to increase arms and munitions production for the war, it is unlikely that Russia can fulfill even this reduced exports demand. This will likely cut revenue further and dampen Russian influence with client countries.

Russia’s energy sales income trumps arms exports by a wide margin, as its oil, petroleum products, and natural gas exports account for over 40 percent of budget revenues. To keep its economy afloat, Russia’s leaders must maintain these sales. Russian gas exports fell by 25 percent in 2022 and were expected to decline to almost 50 percent of the 2021 volume in 2024. Oil sales to countries that do not observe sanctions, led by China, India, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and the Global South, are still Putin’s cash cow. Some customers make use of Russia’s shadow tanker fleet in an attempt to conceal purchases and circumvent sanctions on Russian oil.

Russia is expanding its gas sales to China and Turkey as its exports of piped gas to Europe decline, yet China is in no hurry to sign a deal on a second gas pipeline from Russia. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports remain relatively stable, with plans for considerable expansion.

Russian oil exports had contracted slightly to around 9.5 million barrels per day as of July 2023, and revenues fell from a peak of $1.25 billion a day in January 2022 to less than $750 million a day in April 2024. As projected, Russia’s budget deficit will continue growing, with reliance on hydrocarbon sales as Russia’s greatest economic vulnerability.

Russia lacks the personnel to sustain the war effort. The forces that invaded Ukraine in February of 2022 have been mostly destroyed or demobilized. Throughout 2022 and 2023, Russian troops included contract soldiers, mobilized draftees, convicts, mercenaries, and some foreign fighters from Cuba, India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. North Korean trainees have reportedly visited Russia, possibly preparing for deployment.

To minimize unrest in the big cities, the Russian Ministry of Defense shipped ethnic minorities (Buryats, Chechens, Dagestanis, and Tatars) to the front. It also banned service members from leaving the military, damaging morale. Although the military can still amass vast numbers of personnel, these aren’t as trained or prepared as the pre-invasion forces. Russia’s resources aren’t infinite. It already faces manpower shortages that will likely translate to a smaller military force in the future. Despite this, Russia believes it can sustain this war of attrition through 2025–26, as Ukraine’s human reserves are also dwindling.

According to US intelligence assessments, by December 2023, approximately three hundred and fifteen thousand Russian soldiers had been killed or injured in the war in Ukraine. Based on Russia’s prewar ground troop strength of three hundred and sixty thousand, that amounts to about 87 percent of the nation’s prior capacity. In January 2024, Putin declared that he had six hundred thousand personnel in Ukraine—other observers estimated the number to be around four hundred and seventy thousand.

Avoiding mass mobilization to prevent local dissent and protests, Russia instead offers numerous benefits for joining the military. Military pay can be five times the average Russian monthly wage, with high bonuses should a soldier be wounded or killed. Volunteers receive the same benefits, with the ability to leave the service after their contracts expire. Prisoners are recruited with promises of amnesty. Payments to volunteers and to families of those killed in action are mushrooming. Russian economic analysts have stated that the high pay rates are unsustainable beyond 2026. This will be another pressure point for Moscow to wrap up the war.

A lone T-34 Soviet-era tank drives during a military parade on Victory Day, which marks the 79th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in World War Two, in Red Square in Moscow, Russia, May 9, 2024. (REUTERS/Maxim Shemetov)

The brain drain, along with numerous casualties during the COVID-19 pandemic and the war years, has resulted in labor force losses of around 1.9 to 2.8 million people. This includes approximately eight hundred and seventeen thousand to nine hundred and twenty-two thousand individuals who have left Russia specifically because of the war in Ukraine. The workforce deficit is becoming more apparent—it was reported in July 2023 that 42 percent of Russian industrial enterprises were experiencing shortages as over ten million migrant workers tried to fill the labor deficit.

Despite the long and bloody war, Russian society remains largely mum. Prominent opposition leaders have been eliminated—for example, Boris Nemtsov was assassinated while Alexei Navalny died in prison. Others, including recently released political prisoners Ilya Yashin and Vladimir Kara-Murza, have been jailed for very long terms, and even small protests are met with arrests. If the Putin regime goes broke, food supplies are disrupted, or the army is defeated on the battlefield, the chances of domestic protests grow. On its current course, if military setbacks continue and the economic situation deteriorates further, Russia may face political instability.

Policy recommendations

Regardless of which candidate wins the US presidential election in November, Russian aggression in Ukraine and beyond will remain a major challenge for US policy makers. It is imperative to understand that Russia views Ukraine not only as a battlefield to expand the empire and a country it believes it can and should control but also as an arena to shift the balance of power in Europe, as was proclaimed in Putin’s “ultimatum” of December 2021, and through Europe, the world. Effectively turning this latest round of Russian aggression into a clear defeat is imperative.

There are a number of ways that the war in Ukraine can end. These include:

Military victory for Ukraine, the liberation of all or nearly all Russian-occupied territories, including the Donbas and Crimea.

Military defeat of Ukraine, loss of territory, limitations on the military, and forced neutrality.

Armistice; freezing the conflict along current lines as in the Korean model, or more aptly, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria.
Continuous low-intensity fighting along a relatively static line of contact.

Anything but the first scenario will be a defeat of Western policy. Ideally, defeat for Russia will result in a radical power and foreign policy shift in Moscow. Russia would have to recognize Ukraine’s and its neighbors’ territorial integrity and sovereignty. It would also have to abandon its current role as China’s second fiddle and at least move toward a friendly and cooperative neutrality with the West, like India. In exchange, the West can start the process of lifting economic sanctions. While the likelihood of such a scenario is not high, it should not be ruled out.

Some analysts have offered ideas beyond a negotiated settlement with Putin in determining a strategy for Ukraine’s victory. This is not a preferred solution for Ukraine, the United States, or the West collectively. Not only does Ukraine need to expel Russian forces from all occupied territory, but the West needs to impose an unbearably high price on Russia to change its international behavior. The Russian threat may escalate in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere if undeterred.

The paramount goal is Ukrainian victory. While the Biden administration provided massive assistance to Ukraine and coordinated the Western response to the invasion, this effort has lacked a clear strategy for a full Ukrainian victory, possibly due to fear of much-threatened Russian nuclear escalation or in the hope that Russia may play a balancing role vis-à-vis a truculent China. This policy myopia is misplaced.

An all-of-government strategy that brings on board Western allies and friendly nonaligned states, utilizing Russian vulnerabilities and playing up Western strengths, is likely to be effective in forcing Russia to sue for peace and liberate Ukrainian territory. This outcome requires strong, preferably bipartisan, US leadership and clear vision, commitment, and resources, not the ad-lib, helter-skelter war management that the United States has often practiced since 2022.

Former US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo recently proposed a multipronged strategy that involves the United States increasing oil production to bring prices down and bankrupt Russia, increasing NATO member military budgets to 3 percent of GDP, a $500 billion lend-lease program for Ukraine, a $100 billion NATO fund for Ukraine, a massive US military build-up, and keeping Iran in check in the Middle East. If implemented, this would demonstrate the seriousness of the United States’ global role and go a long way to help Ukrainian victory.

A strategy proposed by former Minister of Defense of Ukraine Andriy Zagorodnyuk and former counselor at the US Department of State Eliot A. Cohen suggests increasing Ukraine’s military resources at a rate that forces Russia to become unable to keep up with the war demands. For example, “if Ukraine can increase precision strikes by long-range artillery, it can turn the war’s arithmetic against Russia and impose an unacceptable rate of attrition on Moscow,” they write. Other analysts have proposed targeting Russian military headquarters and depots and disrupting the operational command of large units.

Through the use of drones, enhanced air defenses, and Western long-range systems, Ukraine can paralyze Russian forces and compel Russia to focus on homeland defense. A massive increase in military aid, an aggressive sanctions strategy, and a much-needed information campaign from the United States and Europe could do much to defeat the Russian military effort, weaken Putin’s economy, and divide Russian public opinion over the conflict. This pressure could eventually split Putin’s inner circle. As has happened before in Russian history, a war defeat could lead to significant political and foreign policy changes for a sustained period.

The key to victory in Ukraine and restoring Western deterrence is a strategy of allied wartime mobilization led by the United States, which also encourages US allies in Europe and Asia to play key roles. Let’s call this a “standing tall strategy.”

This strategy requires cohesive wartime leadership and the rebuilding of the arsenals of democracy in Australia, Canada, EU countries, the United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea, and, of course, the United States. A higher allocation of GDP for military-industrial rebuilding, new weapons systems, and better and more numerous military units is vital.

It also requires a much broader training system for the Ukrainian military than the one that currently exists in Ukraine and Europe. As Russia has peaked in terms of its military production, finances, human resources, and information warfare, its limited successes can be reversed if the West commits to victory and consistent, ample, and intentional support for Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty. A committed policy would put Russia on the back foot, possibly as early as 2025, forcing its elites to recognize the futility of the war. That, in turn, can bring about Russia’s strategic defeat and possibly the Putin regime transitioning to a more realistic administration by 2026/27.

Information warfare is key, and, unfortunately, the West is doing very little to focus Russian public opinion on Putin’s strategic failures in starting and prosecuting this war. While the Russian elites are aware of—and indeed complicit in—the widespread corruption of the ruling inner circle, Putin’s illegitimate seizure of power in violation of a (rigged) constitution, the destruction of Russia’s ties to Europe and the United States, Russia’s increasing subservience to China, and the establishment of a deeply reactionary, chauvinistic, and xenophobic regime, the Russian opposition remains divided, weak, and without Western support.

Regardless of who wins the US presidential election in November, it is time to formulate, fund, and implement a broad strategy of information warfare aimed at bringing the truth to the peoples of Russia and the world, including the developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, similar to what the United States and its allies did during the Cold War. Today, this must be done through social media and with the full ownership and cooperation of activists in (and exiled from) Russia. Russia’s media censorship only goes so far in this age of technology. Emboldening younger audiences by declassifying and exposing information can strike at vulnerabilities in Russia’s cohesion.

Exposing information through trusted and reliable third parties can bolster this initiative. Pointing out human rights abuses, waste, fraud, corruption, assassination of opposition figures, support for terrorist groups, amongst other subjects, are vulnerabilities that can be exploited if properly communicated. While the Global South may consider this war “none of their business,” a multilingual, multiyear campaign can help people in these regions recognize Russia’s actions for what they are and denounce them. Russia may provide security and business opportunities to leaderships within the Global South in exchange for diplomatic support, but when Moscow is spread thin in the war with Ukraine, it becomes a vulnerability to exploit. Addressing the history of colonialism instead of ignoring it may also help enforce trust in the information shared.

Exploit dependencies on Western technology and enhance sanctions to destabilize Russia’s arms production and overall economy. The Russian defense industry has had to adjust and pursue alternative supply sources. This has resulted in a further dependence on China and other countries for precision manufacturing machines and hi-tech components. Enhanced enforcement of the sanctions already in place and preventing third countries from reselling Western dual-use and military components to Russia could be incredibly effective. The United States and the EU need to design a comprehensive system of monitoring and sanctions that should be applied against violators, including in friendly and partner countries, such as Armenia, Georgia, India, Kyrgyzstan, the UAE, and Uzbekistan. Even stronger sanctions should be applied against Chinese companies supplying Russia with dual-use tech and goods. More—and more vigorous—sanctions, including secondary sanctions against companies doing business with Russia, can raise the cost of armaments, reduce the quality and effectiveness of weapons, and disrupt the rhythm of production.

Expand arms sales at the expense of Russia’s exports to further weaken Moscow’s income and influence. As Russian arms underperformed in Ukraine, many countries are refusing to expand purchases from Moscow or are terminating existing contracts. India is Exhibit One. The United States and its allies, including leading European suppliers, South Korea, Japan, and Israel, have an opportunity to expand their arms sales to Latin America, Asia, and Africa and enhance their political influence in these regions through expanding political-military cooperation.

Exploit Russia’s overdependence on energy revenues, which remains one of its greatest vulnerabilities. When it comes to oil and petroleum products, the price cap on Russian products should be lowered. Increased US oil and gas exports may lead to global prices declining, denying Russia energy export revenues. In addition, further financial sanctions could also limit how Russia can use funds from oil sales.

For natural gas, the EU could ban imports of Russian LNG and natural-gas-intensive fertilizer. This would mark the end of the EU-Russia energy relationship and stop additional revenues from reaching Russia.

Further sanctions on investments and technology transfer in new Russian oil and gas projects, including fracking, brownfields rehabilitation, offshore, and LNG, can also effectively limit war finances.

Incentivize and facilitate the brain drain, as many Russians, disenchanted with the war, would be happy to try their luck overseas. After an initial wave of emigration in 2022, many Russians returned. This is because the West, including the United States, is missing a unique opportunity to amplify Russia’s brain drain by providing visas to STEM and other qualified personnel, utilizing their knowledge and skill sets for the benefit of Western economies and societies, and denying Putin human resources needed for the military-industrial complex and the military. A comprehensive revision of this policy, demonstrating that the West’s doors are open to young and capable Russians (tightly vetted for security risks), could go a long way to defeat the bleak and malign image of the West painted by Russian propaganda.

Exploit Russia’s flagging influence over Central Asia and the South Caucasus, which has ebbed and flowed since Moscow’s increasing involvement in Ukraine. This is a great opportunity for the United States and other Western powers to facilitate better relations with countries in the region. US and EU support can go a long way toward shifting the geopolitical balance of power. Western powers can contribute to prosperity for Russia’s neighbors and turn the tide toward enhanced ties with the EU, the United States, and Asian powers other than China in Russia’s “soft underbelly.” The United States should apply a balanced policy of strategic cooperation with existing governments in Eurasia, support for the rule of law, trade and investment, development of market institutions, educational programs, and good governance to achieve these goals. The West can impose diplomatic sanctions when a pro-Russia shift occurs, such as recently in Georgia. This could be a win-win dynamic for Eurasia and the West.

Conclusion

The current battlefield stalemate cannot become a “new normal.” As Russia is fully mobilized, the question facing the West is how to compel change. A US-led strategy that focuses on military and economic aid to Ukraine denying Russia export revenue, unflinchingly enforcing technological embargos, and reaching out to the Russian population to change their view of the war and encourage emigration needs to be formulated, issued, and vigorously implemented.

Without a coherent strategy led by the United States and broadly adopted by its European and Asian allies, a victory in Ukraine is inconceivable. However, with bold leadership, coordination, and cooperation of the Western alliance, Russia cannot sustain a long-term war effort. An even greater level of grit and determination on the part of the West is needed to deter China from adventurism in the Asia-Pacific and elsewhere. No matter where the West turns its eyes, troubles abound. It will have to choose wisely, steer the course, and persevere. Nothing less than its Euro-Atlantic and democratic prosperity, survival, and future are at stake. Failure is not an option.

About the author

Ariel Cohen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a member of the Council of Foreign Relations. He is a recognized authority on international security and energy policy, and leading expert in Russia, Eurasia, and the Middle East.

Cohen is also a senior fellow at the International Tax and Investment Center (ITIC), where he is managing director of the Energy, Growth, and Security Program (EGS). Cohen is the founding principal
of International Market Analysis Ltd, a boutique political risk advisory.

For over twenty years, Cohen served as a senior research fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy at the Heritage Foundation. He directed Heritage’s energy war games and worked closely with members of Congress and Congressional staff members as well as cabinet-level and sub-cabinet domestic and foreign decision-makers.

Cohen is the author of six books, thirty book chapters, and over 1,000 articles. He regularly appears on CNN, NBC, CBS, FOX, C-SPAN, BBC-TV, Bloomberg, Al Jazeera, and all Russian and Ukrainian national television networks. He was a contributing editor for the National Interest and an energy analyst for the Wall Street Journal. Cohen is a regular commentator on Bloomberg, Newsweek, and The Hill, as well as a weekly Forbes energy columnist.

He earned his master’s degree and PhD from the Tuft’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to promote policies that strengthen stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

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Shaffer joins Maritime Nation to discuss intersection of naval strategy and energy politics

Brenda Shaffer — Fri, 27 Sep 2024 18:56:00 +0000

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Putin will keep escalating his nuclear blackmail until it stops working

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 26 Sep 2024 21:05:43 +0000

Vladimir Putin has this week proposed changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine that would significantly lower the threshold for the country’s use of nuclear weapons. Addressing a September 25 meeting of senior Kremlin officials, he presented a series of draft amendments aimed at expanding the scope for possible nuclear strikes. Putin emphasized that if these revisions are duly adopted, a conventional attack on Russia by any non-nuclear nation that is backed by a nuclear power would be perceived as a joint attack.

Putin’s televised comments were clearly timed to serve as a direct warning to Western leaders as they continue to debate lifting restrictions on long-range Ukrainian strikes inside Russia. Earlier this month, the Kremlin dictator declared that any attacks on Russian territory using Western-supplied missiles would mean that NATO is “at war” with Russia.

This week’s announcement of revisions to Russia’s nuclear doctrine is the latest in a long line of thinly-veiled nuclear threats made by Putin since he launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. As Russian tanks first rolled across the border in February 2022, Putin indicated that any attempts at Western interference would be met with a nuclear response. Three days later, he hammered home the point by placing Russia’s nuclear forces on high alert.

These early examples of nuclear saber-rattling have set the tone for the invasion, with Putin and other senior Russian officials regularly resorting to nuclear blackmail in an obvious bid to undermine Western support for Ukraine. During one particularly notorious incident in September 2022 as he prepared to “annex” four partially occupied regions of Ukraine, Putin directly referenced his country’s vast nuclear arsenal and vowed to use “all means at our disposal” to defend Russia’s conquests. “This is not a bluff,” he declared.

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So far, Russia’s nuclear intimidation tactics have had little discernible impact on decision-making processes in Kyiv. On the contrary, Ukraine’s leaders have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to call Putin’s bluff.

Since the start of the full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian military has liberated entire regions claimed by the Kremlin, sunk or damaged around one-third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and conducted a comprehensive bombing campaign of Russian military and energy infrastructure, all without provoking a nuclear response. In August 2024, Ukraine crossed the reddest of all Russian red lines by invading Russia itself. Rather than reaching for his nuclear briefcase, Putin chose to downplay the invasion.

Ukraine’s boldness is striking but not entirely surprising. After all, Russia has made no secret of its intention to extinguish Ukrainian statehood and erase Ukrainian identity. Faced with the existential challenge of Russia’s genocidal invasion, most Ukrainians see no real alternative to military victory and are committed to confronting the Kremlin.

The same cannot be said for all of Ukraine’s partners, however. While countries located closer to Russia such as the Nordic and Baltic nations, the Poles, and the Czechs, have been notably inclined to dismiss talk of red lines, many leading Western countries have allowed themselves to be intimidated by Putin’s relentless nuclear threats. This fear of escalation has enabled the Kremlin to reduce arms deliveries to Kyiv, and has led to the imposition of absurd restrictions on Ukraine’s ability to defend itself. As a result, the Ukrainians find themselves fighting for national survival against a military superpower with one hand tied behind their backs.

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It is easy enough to understand why so many in the West seem preoccupied by the idea of avoiding a potential nuclear war. Nevertheless, this readiness to fold when confronted by Russia’s nuclear ultimatums is shortsighted in the extreme and risks plunging the whole world into a dark new era of nuclear brinkmanship.

If Putin’s nuclear blackmail succeeds and enables him to achieve his imperial ambitions in Ukraine, this would set a disastrous precedent with the potential to completely transform the role of nuclear weapons in the international arena. A triumphant Putin would be sorely tempted to use the same tactics elsewhere, while other authoritarian regimes would draw the obvious conclusions for their own expansionist agendas.

Meanwhile, front line democracies from Finland and Poland in the west to South Korea and Japan in the east would be forced to urgently rethink their own non-nuclear status. Stunned by the West’s collective failure to stand up to Russia’s nuclear bullying in Ukraine, many governments would likely decide that the only way to safeguard their national security was by acquiring a nuclear arsenal of their own. The ensuing arms race would undo decades of nuclear nonproliferation progress and dramatically increase the chances of nuclear war.

The only way to avoid this nightmare scenario is by stopping Russia in Ukraine. But for that to happen, the West must first abandon its present zero tolerance approach to nuclear risk and adopt a much more resolute posture toward Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling. Among other things, this would require far firmer public and private messaging that spells out the catastrophic consequences for Russia if Moscow dares to follow through on its nuclear threats.

More than two and half years since the start of Russia’s invasion, it should now be abundantly clear that Vladimir Putin will continue escalating his nuclear blackmail until it stops working. So far, Putin’s ability to intimidate the West has been his greatest success of the entire war, allowing Russia to retain the initiative and set the boundaries of Western support for Ukraine. Unless this changes, nuclear bullying will be legitimized on the international stage and the world will become a far more dangerous place.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

This uncompromising push for Ukraine’s capitulation reflects Putin’s well-documented obsession with the country. For many years prior to the current full-scale invasion, Putin regularly demonstrated his contempt for Ukrainian independence while insisting Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”). Since 2022, he has openly compared his invasion to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great, and has argued that far from seizing Ukrainian territory, he is actually reclaiming “historically Russian lands.” If he is allowed to succeed in Ukraine, it is naive to imagine Putin will not target the many other countries in the neighborhood that also meet his definition of “historically Russian” due to their former status within the Russian Empire.

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The kind of land-for-peace deals favored by some Western politicians and pundits are equally unlikely to bring about a sustainable peace. Any attempt to freeze the conflict along the current front lines would reward Putin for his decision to launch the biggest European invasion since World War II, while also legitimizing the Russian occupation of almost one-fifth of Ukraine. Emboldened by this success, Moscow would use any ceasefire to rearm. The Kremlin would also work to destabilize the remainder of the Ukrainian state in preparation for the next stage of the invasion.

The first step toward any realistic settlement is convincing Russia that it cannot hope to prevail on the Ukrainian battlefield. At present, Russia is proceeding from the assumption that it will be able to continue establishing facts on the ground via overwhelming military force. Despite sustaining extremely heavy losses, the Russian army is currently advancing slowly but surely in eastern Ukraine. These gains allow Moscow to undermine morale in Ukraine itself and among the country’s partners, creating the conditions for ultimate political success. In order to stop Putin’s war machine, the West must dramatically increase military aid to Kyiv and lift restrictions on Ukraine’s ability to strike back inside Russia.

Unless this happens, Putin will have very little reason to consider ending his invasion. Russian military recruitment levels are currently sufficient to make up for the high casualty rates in Ukraine, with vast sums of money being offered to attract new volunteers. Despite unprecedented sanctions, the Russian economy shows no signs of collapse and has instead transitioned successfully to a wartime footing. With no serious anti-war movement in Russia, Putin is unlikely to face any domestic challenges. Moscow can also rely upon mounting weapons deliveries from its North Korean and Iranian allies. In such circumstances, why would Putin agree to peace on anything other than his own terms?

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Defeating Russia on the battlefield is only the first part of the challenge, of course. A durable peace will only be possible once Ukraine is no longer stranded in geopolitical no man’s land and becomes fully embedded into the security framework of the Western world. This means NATO membership, or the equivalent level of security commitment via binding bilateral agreements. Understandably, there is zero appetite in Ukraine for a repeat of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and its disastrous “security assurances.” Recent security pacts signed by Kyiv and dozens of partner countries are a welcome step, but fall far short of the commitment levels necessary to deter Moscow.

At present, Putin remains confident that he can achieve his goals in Ukraine by outlasting the West. In order to create the conditions for a sustainable peace, the Russian dictator must therefore be persuaded that the democratic world is committed to Ukraine for the long-term, and convinced that any future aggression would involve unacceptable costs for the Kremlin.

Western leaders can send an unambiguous message to Moscow without breaking the bank. Indeed, there is a strong economic argument for doing so, as supporting Ukraine today is far cheaper than the potential cost of rearming to face a victorious Russia tomorrow. Recent calculations suggest that a commitment of just 0.25 percent of GDP from each of Ukraine’s partners would make a major difference.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is now entering a critical stage. Decisions taken in Western capitals in the coming weeks will likely have a major impact on the future course of the war and the shape of any eventual peace agreement. At present, Ukrainians have little to gain from a ceasefire that would strengthen Russia and leave their own country more vulnerable than ever. Instead, they are looking to secure the kind of military aid and security commitments that can allow Ukraine to regain the upper hand on the battlefield and set the stage for a sustainable peace.

If Ukraine’s vision for victory receives sufficient support, there is still a good chance that a lasting peace in Europe can be achieved. However, if Western countries seek to appease Russia in order to achieve a temporary pause in hostilities, they will be condemning Ukraine to catastrophe and setting the stage for a much bigger war.

Ukraine’s expanding drone fleet is flying straight through Putin’s red lines

Giorgi Revishvili — Sat, 21 Sep 2024 14:34:39 +0000

Ukraine conducted one of the largest and most effective drone attacks of the entire war in the early hours of September 18, causing a blast at a weapons depot deep inside Russia that was large enough to be picked up by earthquake monitoring stations. According to Ukrainian sources, the attack involved more than one hundred domestically produced long-range Ukrainian drones and targeted a major Russian arms storage facility in Toropets, a town in Russia’s Tver region northwest of Moscow.

The Toropets raid was the latest Ukrainian success in an ambitious campaign of long-range drone strikes that has been steadily gaining momentum throughout the current year. Ukraine launched its air offensive in January 2024, and has since hit dozens of high-value targets in Russia including oil refineries, air bases, armament production facilities, and military sites.

The increasing frequency and effectiveness of these drone attacks would appear to vindicate Ukraine’s earlier decision to focus its limited resources on boosting the domestic development and production of long-range drones. Ukrainian attacks are now visibly expanding in scale as more drones are produced, and are also routinely reaching targets deep inside Russia over one thousand kilometers beyond the Ukrainian border.

In a sign of the rapidly advancing drone technologies that are now becoming available to the Ukrainian military, the country recently unveiled its first missile drone. Dubbed “Palyanytsia” in honor of a traditional Ukrainian bread that invading Russian troops find notoriously difficult to pronounce, this missile drone was welcomed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in August 2024 as “our new method of retaliation against the aggressor.”

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Ukraine’s long-range drone strike campaign has a number of goals. The most immediate objective is to undermine the Russian war machine by targeting military infrastructure and the country’s economically vital energy industry.

Strikes on Russian air fields have been credited with damaging a number of military planes used in the Kremlin’s bombing campaign of Ukraine’s cities and civilian infrastructure. Meanwhile, Ukrainian officials believe the recent attack in Tver region destroyed significant quantities of Russian munitions including artillery shells and missiles.

At this stage, Ukraine’s bombing raids on Russian oil refineries remain on an insufficient scale to plunge the Kremlin’s vast energy industry into crisis. However, Ukrainian drone attacks are frequently followed by media reports of decreased Russian refining capacity.

Russian officials have remained characteristically tight-lipped over the impact of Ukraine’s air offensive, but there are some indications that the Kremlin is concerned. In March 2024, Moscow imposed a six-month ban on gasoline exports that has since been extended to the end of 2024 in an apparent bid to prevent domestic shortages and price spikes. Russia’s Federal State Statistics Service has also reportedly stopped publishing oil production data.

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Kyiv’s drone strike strategy also has important political objectives. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s partners have imposed restrictions on the use of Western-supplied weapons inside Russia. This includes a ban on long-range missile strikes that is seen as particularly damaging by officials in Kyiv, who argue that it prevents them from targeting the air bases and military sites used by Russia to attack Ukraine.

The caution on display in Western capitals reflects widespread concerns among Ukraine’s partners over a possible escalation in the current war. Moscow has skillfully exploited these fears, using a combination of nuclear threats and talk of Russian red lines to scare Western leaders and ensure that current restrictions remain in place. Indeed, Putin recently warned that allowing long-range strikes against Russian targets would mean that NATO was “at war” with Russia.

By hitting targets deep inside Russia, Ukraine hopes to convince its allies that their fears of escalation are greatly exaggerated and expose Putin’s red lines as a bluff designed to intimidate the West. This argument is supported by numerous other examples of Russian red lines being crossed without consequence, such as the partial destruction of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and Ukraine’s recent invasion of Russia’s Kursk region.

While there has yet to be any breakthrough in Kyiv’s diplomatic push for an end to restrictions on long-range missile attacks, recent reports suggest that it may now be only a matter of time before Ukraine receives the green light for a least some categories of long-range strikes inside Russia. If permission is finally granted, this would dramatically increase the potential impact of Ukraine’s air offensive and create significant logistical headaches for the Russian military.

Russian commanders are currently struggling to provide sufficient air defense coverage to counter the existing threat posed by Ukraine’s increasingly sophisticated drone fleet. With the bulk of Russia’s available air defense systems currently deployed in Ukraine, the Kremlin lacks the additional resources to protect the country’s vast airspace. If Ukraine continues to expand drone production and also secures permission for strikes inside Russia with Western weapons, these air defense shortages will likely become even more apparent.

Ukraine’s drone campaign is already bringing the war home to the Russian public and undermining the Putin regime’s efforts to shield domestic audiences from the negative consequences of the invasion. While the Kremlin maintains tight control over the Russian information space and can easily suppress negative news coming from Ukraine, it is much more challenging to disguise regular air raid alarms and exploding military depots in towns and cities across western Russia.

Ukraine’s long-range drone campaign has been one of the key developments of the war in 2024. It has provided Kyiv with a partial solution to its own lack of domestically-produced missiles, and has helped Ukrainian commanders address the challenges created by the risk-averse West’s fear of escalation. Ukrainians are now hoping that by flying their long-range drones straight through Vladimir Putin’s red lines, they can convince Western leaders to abandon the failed doctrine of escalation management and lift restrictions that protect Russia while preventing Ukraine from defending itself.

Giorgi Revishvili is a political analyst and a former senior advisor to the Georgian National Security Council.

Ukraine has made particularly striking progress in the field of drone warfare. Over the past two and a half years, hundreds of Ukrainian companies have begun producing drones, with state-led and private initiatives helping to streamline cooperation between individual companies, government agencies, and the military. This has paved the way for the development of battlefield strike drones, maritime drones, and long-range drones capable of hitting targets deep inside Russia.

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Ukraine’s ability to stay one step ahead of Russia in the race for battlefield innovation offers valuable lessons for the country’s Western partners. It is therefore no surprise that defense companies and military planners throughout the West are already looking to learn from Ukraine’s experience as they prepare for the wars of the future.

Ukraine is also striving to establish itself as a leading defense industry player in its own right, drawing on its recently acquired know-how along the country’s past experience as a major contributor to the Soviet military-industrial complex. Ukrainian efforts are currently focused on a combination of public and private sector partnerships, together with integration into global supply chains and the defense programs of partner companies.

Recently, officials in Kyiv have begun encouraging allies to finance defense production in Ukraine. Supporters of this approach note that it saves time and is cost-effective, while also strengthening Ukraine economically and boosting the country’s long-term ability to defend itself. Ultimately, the goal is for the defense sector to become a major component of Ukraine’s postwar economy.

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Despite this broadly encouraging picture, many issues must be urgently addressed in order to make the most of Ukraine’s potential as a key defense tech partner for the West. These include imperfect intellectual property laws governing joint enterprises in Ukraine and in potential partner countries; excessive regulation of state-owned enterprises in Ukraine; and restrictions on defense companies in countries including the United States that create barriers to international cooperation.

In order to nurture the next generation of innovators and develop dual-use military technologies, Ukraine must ensure the right legal frameworks and operational mechanisms are in place. This is essential if the country hopes to attract manufacturers, engineers, and investors for joint research and development initiatives. Kyiv also needs to reform its export control systems and deepen cooperation with international partner agencies to counter industrial espionage.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s Western allies should be looking to relax or remove a range of existing barriers to joint research and development projects. In order to respect specific political and security sensitivities, this process could initially be limited to certain categories or separately approved projects.

Supporting the development of Ukraine’s defense sector brings a range of potential benefits. Most immediately, it enables Ukraine to more effectively resist Russia’s ongoing invasion. Looking ahead, it can also serve as an engine for Ukraine’s economic recovery, thereby reducing the need for external funding from Western partners. By harnessing Ukraine’s unique battlefield experience and strong record of defense tech innovation, the West can gain crucial advantages amid the growing security threat posed by Russia and other authoritarian powers.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said that Ukraine is building the arsenal of the free world. A number of individual Ukrainian defense companies have already demonstrated that they have much to offer and can compete internationally. In order to capitalize on this potential, Ukraine still needs to be fully embraced as an ally. This will require an imaginative understanding of the contribution the Ukrainian defense sector can make toward guaranteeing the security of the free world.

Pavlo Verkhniatskyi is the managing partner of COSA and co-chair of the Defense, Aerospace, and Security Working Group at the US-Ukraine Business Council. He is also a consortium member of the Ukraine Defense R&D Initiative, a contributor to the International Working Group on Russia Sanctions, and a member of the Public Council at the National Agency for Corruption Prevention of Ukraine.

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The evident inconsistency of Putin’s position provides a hint of the realities behind his imperialistic posturing during the invasion of Ukraine. When he first embarked on the invasion ten years ago, Putin began by pronouncing the annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula. In September 2022 he went even further, declaring that four partially occupied Ukrainian provinces were now part of the Russian Federation and would remain Russian “forever.” The Russian Constitution was duly updated to include Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions.

Putin has since doubled down on these territorial claims. He has boasted publicly of his Ukrainian “conquests,” and has compared his invasion to the imperial expansion of Russia under eighteenth century czar Peter the Great. In June 2024, Putin stated that in order to secure a ceasefire and begin peace talks, the Ukrainian military must completely withdraw from all four partially occupied provinces and hand them over to Russia. Meanwhile, Kremlin officials frequently claim that if Ukraine wishes to end the war, it must reconcile itself to the new “territorial realities” created by the invasion.

Judging by Putin’s latest red line, it would appear that he has also not yet fully adjusted to the new territorial realities championed by his own propaganda. While Putin publicly insists that the five unilaterally “annexed” regions of Ukraine have all been officially incorporated into the Russian Federation, he is evidently in no hurry to offer them the same level of protection afforded to other Russian regions. This reluctance detracts from his efforts to portray the occupation of Ukrainian lands as irreversible, and serves as tacit acknowledgment that in Putin’s new empire, some regions are more Russian than others.

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This is not the first time Russia has warned of impending war with NATO, of course. On the contrary, Kremlin officials and Russian propagandists regularly depict the invasion of Ukraine as a war against the West and often claim to be fighting NATO. Nor is it unusual for Putin’s red lines to be revealed as suspiciously flexible. Since the very first day of the invasion, the Russian dictator has frequently tried to impose arbitrary limits on the Ukrainian military and the country’s Western allies, only to take no action when these red lines are subsequently crossed.

Since February 2022, Ukraine’s partners have debunked red line after red line as they have expanded their military aid to Kyiv from helmets and hand-held anti-tank weapons to Patriot air defense systems, long-range missiles, and F-16 fighter jets. Ukraine has repeatedly called Putin’s bluff by liberating occupied regions claimed by the Kremlin and disabling or sinking around one-third of the entire Russian Black Sea Fleet. In August 2024, the Ukrainian army crossed the reddest of all red lines by invading Russia itself. Rather than making good on his many threats, Putin responded by downplaying Ukraine’s invasion and portraying the first occupation of Russian land since World War II as a mere “provocation.”

It should now be obvious that Putin’s red lines are just a bluff intended to scare the West and isolate Ukraine. Over the past two and a half years, his efforts to impose restrictions on his international adversaries have been repeatedly exposed and have grown increasingly detached from the realities of the war. We have now reached the point where Putin’s latest red lines directly contradict his own propaganda. The Russian ruler’s reliance on empty threats underscores the relative weakness of his position. If Western leaders can finally overcome their fear of escalation, they will find that Putin is far less formidable than he would like us to believe.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

This reactive approach places the West at a considerable disadvantage and hands the escalation initiative to Russia, enabling the Kremlin to set the terms of engagement for the entire war. For example, while Russia can attack civilian targets across Ukraine as it sees fit, the Russian Federation itself remains a safe haven for Putin’s forces due to restrictions imposed by the risk-averse West on Ukraine’s ability to defend itself.

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Western leaders have attempted to publicly impose their own red lines on just two occasions. The first instance was back in 2022 at a time when Vladimir Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling was heightening concerns over a potential apocalyptic escalation. In a series of high-profile TV appearances, President Biden’s national security advisor Jake Sullivan stated that the United States had warned Russia of “catastrophic consequences” if Moscow opted to deploy nukes in Ukraine.

More recently, French President Emmanuel Macron has raised the idea of sending troops to Ukraine if the military situation necessitates such a move. Crucially, Macron has framed this in terms of geographic red lines, speaking of the need to prevent Russia from occupying Ukraine’s main Black Sea port city Odesa.

Justifying his stance regarding the possible deployment of Western soldiers to Ukraine, the French leader has been critical of what he has characterized as the West’s overly cautious response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. “I’m not ruling anything out, because we are facing someone who is not ruling anything out,” he told The Economist in May 2024. “We have undoubtedly been too hesitant by defining the limits of our action to someone who no longer has any.”

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While Russia’s own red lines have been repeatedly debunked and widely mocked, it is clear that the Kremlin’s frequent threats have succeeded in shaping the Western response to the invasion of Ukraine. By setting boundaries on Western military aid to Ukraine, Moscow has sown uncertainty among Kyiv’s allies. This has undoubtedly slowed the flow of arms to Ukraine, while also limiting the Ukrainian military’s ability to use the weapons it does receive.

It remains far from clear where the West’s real red lines lie in relation to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, or whether Western leaders would be prepared to enforce them if Russia chose to call their bluff. Nevertheless, there may be significant advantages to be gained from keeping the Kremlin guessing. After all, as President Macron has pointed out, it makes little strategic sense to inform Russia in advance of what the West is and is not prepared to do.

Instead, Western leaders could aim to establish a series of red lines that would incur serious costs if crossed. These could include geographical red lines protecting Ukraine’s southern coastline and major cities, or more specific red lines designed to restrict attacks on civilian targets such as Ukraine’s energy grid or basic municipal services. Major war crimes such as the continued mass deportation of Ukrainian children could also be addressed.

Even talking about Western red lines will no doubt be seen as too provocative in some quarters, but it should be obvious by now that allowing Russia to enjoy uncontested escalation dominance has been a costly blunder. This approach has blunted the Western response to the largest European invasion since World War II, and has forced Ukraine to fight for national survival against a military superpower while having one hand tied behind its back.

By imposing red lines of their own, Western leaders could at least partially regain the initiative and create a degree of uncertainty for the Russians that would complicate Putin’s war effort. If Moscow is no longer able to count on the West’s fear of escalation, this would only be to Ukraine’s advantage.

On the third AUKUS anniversary, a toast to ITAR reform and a call to keep going

R. Clarke Cooper — Sun, 15 Sep 2024 10:00:00 +0000

On September 15, 2021, the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) trilateral security partnership embraced a new way of deeply integrating defense cooperation—in technology, workforce, industry, and beyond. Upon the partnership’s third anniversary, AUKUS nations continue to strive toward refined, integrated defense and reciprocal defense trade. However, the collective national institutions of the three countries still need to evolve from the Cold War–era model to meet ongoing shifts in global security.

In August, the US Congress received a timely determination from the Department of State officially recognizing Australian and UK export control systems as comparable to those of the United States. It noted that these allies have implemented a reciprocal export exemption for US entities. Effective September 1, the AUKUS-relevant exemptions (22 C.F.R. § 126.7) to the US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) mark a welcome and significant step toward a genuine defense industrial and technology alliance among the three partner nations.

Adjustments to the ITAR will allow Australia and the United Kingdom to be effectively granted the same privileged status as Canada within the US defense industrial base. In short, the US Department of State has certified that the export control systems in the United Kingdom and Australia are “comparable” to the export control systems in the United States. This is a significant step worthy of recognition. The ITAR exemption is a much-anticipated change from the regular processes for close US allies. It is a good start and should engender further reform.

However, as I shared at the Oxford AUKUS Dialogue this spring, challenges from US defense export controls remain the most significant barriers to the success of AUKUS. This is primarily due to the lack of a fundamental overhaul to US export control systems since their design in the Cold War. As such, there remain issues with Pillar II implementation of joint development of advanced military capabilities to enhance interoperability and technological integration among the three nations, particularly in electronic warfare, command and control, and artificial intelligence. Even with the latest ITAR reform exemptions, some could inadvertently omit AUKUS-relevant technologies, including those originating in the commercial and dual-use markets.

Current reform efforts will only reach their potential if additional regulatory adjustments are made and there are no lingering barriers to implementation. Indeed, stakeholders in all three nations worry that the enduring structural challenges posed by the ITAR and the exclusion of many AUKUS-relevant technologies from the new US licensing exemption will deadlock cooperation in AUKUS Pillar II and hinder alliance initiatives on precision-guided weapons. Further, present reforms could create an arrangement that omits many AUKUS-relevant technologies, including those originating in the commercial and dual-use markets, from the benefits of export control harmonization.

This is a critical moment for the three nations, and innovative and interoperable trilateral partnerships will be vital to advancing their shared mission. Moving forward, the three allies must collectively commit to tackling the complex issues that still need to be addressed to fulfill the vision of the AUKUS partnership.

For the United States, the focus needs to be on differentiating the applicability of the ITAR to existing US technologies, allied-developed technology, or jointly developed emerging technology through the creation of new exemptions or cooperative programs for AUKUS Pillar II workstreams. Specific areas that could benefit from further reform include, but are not limited to, the following:

Expansion of authorized users: Currently, the ITAR exemption applies to specific “authorized users” within the AUKUS countries. Expanding this list to include more entities could facilitate broader collaboration.

Simplification of licensing procedures: The new rules have expedited some processes, but further simplifying and automating licensing procedures could reduce administrative burdens and speed up approvals.

Inclusion of additional technologies: The current exemption includes a long list of excluded technologies that risks gutting the current ITAR reform. Periodic reviews and updates to this list could ensure that emerging technologies are appropriately covered.

Enhanced cybersecurity measures: As the AUKUS allies focus on advanced technologies, such as cyber capabilities and quantum technologies, implementing robust cybersecurity measures to protect sensitive information is crucial.

Training and compliance programs: Providing comprehensive training and compliance programs for entities involved in AUKUS-related activities can ensure adherence to the new regulations and prevent inadvertent violations.

Considering the critical importance of addressing the growing geopolitical uncertainties and potential conflicts punctuated on this anniversary of the AUKUS pact, it is imperative that policymakers thoroughly examine and harness the full potential of their trilateral security partnership. The United States, in particular, must act swiftly and with enthusiastic readiness to implement the necessary reforms to strengthen the partner nations’ collective security and stability.

R. Clarke Cooper is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and is the founder and president of Guard Hill House, LLC. He previously served as assistant secretary for political-military affairs at the US Department of State.

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Concerns grow over possible Russian sabotage of undersea cables

Aleksander Cwalina — Thu, 12 Sep 2024 21:15:03 +0000

The United States has recently detected indications of increased Russian military activity around key undersea cables, CNN reports. The news is adding to existing concerns over the vulnerability of critical undersea communications infrastructure at a time when the Kremlin is accused of waging an escalating hybrid war against the West in parallel to its ongoing invasion of Ukraine.

Undersea cables play a key role in many aspects of modern society, accounting for the vast majority of digital communication including internet traffic and more than $10 trillion in daily worldwide financial transactions. Hundreds of undersea cables run across the world’s seas and oceans, with cables in the Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea seen as being particularly at risk from potential Russian sabotage.

The world’s critical undersea infrastructure is largely unguarded and its exact positions are available in the public domain, creating a potentially tempting target for the Kremlin. Western intelligence officials believe Russia’s efforts to monitor and build up technical capability to access this vast undersea infrastructure are expanding and are currently spread among a number of different branches of the country’s military and security services, including the Russian Navy and the Main Directorate for Deep Sea Research (GUGI).

Though Russian officials have remained largely tight-lipped over the Kremlin’s alleged interest in undersea cables, former Russian President and close Putin ally Dmitry Medvedev stated in 2023 that there were no longer any constraints left “to prevent us from destroying the ocean floor cable communications of our enemies.”

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Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began just over two and a half years ago, reports of suspicious Russian activity close to undersea cables have been mounting. This threat to underwater infrastructure is viewed as one of the many tools in a far broader Kremlin toolbox of hybrid warfare methods against the West.

In September 2024, CIA and MI6 chiefs accused Russia of engaging in a “reckless campaign of sabotage” across Europe. Alleged recent Russian attacks on communications systems have included disruption to the Global Positioning System (GPS) that affected thousands of civilian passenger flights in the Baltic Sea, Black Sea, and eastern Mediterranean regions.

Attempts to disrupt vital digital infrastructure are all too familiar to Ukrainians. For example, just one month before the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Moscow launched a massive cyber attack that shut down more than sixty Ukrainian government sites. Russia was also linked to a major attack on one of Ukraine’s largest telecommunications companies in late 2023 that temporarily left approximately twenty four million users without connection to phone or internet services.

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Amid mounting alarm over the possibility of Russian attacks on undersea cables, security measures are currently being reviewed and beefed up. NATO has set up an undersea infrastructure coordination group that brings together a wide range of public sector, military, and business representatives to share information regarding potential threats. Late last year, the alliance also announced that it was stepping up naval patrols in the Baltic Sea in response to damage to underwater infrastructure in the region.

In spring 2024, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Norway, and Denmark signed an agreement to protect critical underwater infrastructure in the North Sea from potential Russian sabotage. The move came amid recognition that the North Sea now serves as a critical hub connecting European countries through power cables, gas pipelines, and telecommunications links.

Alarm over the security of the world’s vital undersea communications arteries comes as concern mounts over a possible further escalation in Russia’s hybrid war. The Kremlin is believed to be considering a variety of options as it looks to retaliate for Western military support provided to Ukraine. While direct military action is viewed as unlikely, attacks on critical infrastructure could cause chaos and impose significant costs.

With no end in sight to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the threat to undersea cables looks set to remain for some time to come. A range of measures are already being implemented to improve security, but much more needs to be done. As Western governments look to bolster protection for existing underwater infrastructure, it may also be wise to further expand backup capacity in order to minimize disruption and bolster Western resilience against potentially devastating attacks.

Aleksander Cwalina is assistant director for the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Why Ukraine will remain central to the future of European security

Silvester Nosenko — Thu, 12 Sep 2024 10:20:53 +0000

Although it is currently common to talk about the West as a unitary actor in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian War, the stakes actually differ significantly on the two opposite sides of the Atlantic. Most obviously, if Russia succeeds in Ukraine and goes further, Europe will become a battlefield. With this in mind, it makes sense in terms of security strategy to think of Europe individually as well as part of the broader Western world.

Russia’s war against Ukraine has thrown into stark relief what has long been obvious to many international relations scholars, namely that the Cold War ended more than three decades ago but left Europe with a security architecture that has gradually decayed in subsequent years and is now outdated. Mechanisms such as the OSCE and multiple arms treaties are clearly no longer effective. The sole exception here is NATO, but the alliance has been unable to put an end to Russian aggression in Ukraine.

It is therefore misleading to regard the invasion of Ukraine as an isolated problem within the framework of an otherwise stable European security environment. Instead, the current war is at least partially a consequence of the absence of effective alternative mechanisms for maintaining European security. These mechanisms are highly unlikely to emerge if Russia continues to achieve its goals in Ukraine.

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Some believe that the key to ending the current war lies not in overpowering Russia, but in reinstating just enough mutual trust to put institutional mechanisms back in place. It is worth keeping in mind, however, that multiple attempts over the past decade to turn Russia from a revisionist power into a supporter of the security status quo failed miserably. Although neither Russia nor Europe has any interest whatsoever in going to war with each other over Ukraine, it is also obvious that their security interests do not overlap. It would therefore be unreasonable to end or curb European support for Ukraine at this stage.

The European Union’s current focus on achieving greater strategic autonomy is not just an answer to Russian aggression in Ukraine. Instead, it is best understood as part of a broader trend that is likely to remain one of the driving forces shaping EU thinking for many years to come.

As US hegemony declines, becoming autonomous in the area of defense and managing relations with unreliable autocratic regimes are increasingly important goals for the EU. Such aspirations are bound to run contrary to Russia’s interest in keeping Europe inherently weak and disunited in the face of hard security threats. In other words, if the EU is to achieve strategic autonomy, having a security dilemma with Moscow is unavoidable, regardless of Europe’s approach to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

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Broader geopolitical considerations will also shape the future evolution of Europe’s security outlook. These considerations further underline the importance of continued European support for Ukraine.

While the EU is clearly concerned over possible changes in the US security commitment following the country’s presidential election in November, Europe’s own security rhetoric on the key long-term threat posed by China also has the potential to aggravate transatlantic ties. The wording on Beijing in Brussels is often conspicuously different from that of American hawks, with the European Union officially calling China “a partner for cooperation, an economic competitor, and a systemic rival.”

Meanwhile, as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues, China is using the war to expand its influence, either as a peace broker or as an aggression enabler. Despite the fact that Russian and Chinese foreign policy approaches may be different, both countries are geared toward undermining the Western-led international order. This kind of collective threat cannot be dealt with by making concessions in Ukraine, nor can it be contained by eclectic and rather soft “partner-competitor-rival” rhetoric.

Silvester Nosenko teaches international relations at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy.

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We have been here before, of course. In the 1930s, Western leaders responded to the challenge of an increasingly aggressive Nazi Germany by seeking to appease Adolf Hitler with a series of concessions. The architects of appeasement have come to be viewed as fools and cowards, but in fact they were mostly honorable men who believed it was their sacred duty to prevent another world war. The majority of today’s escalation managers are doubtless driven by similarly noble intentions. However, it should be painfully clear to them by now that escalation management is the appeasement of the modern era and is steadily creating the conditions for the global conflict they aim to avert.

Like Hitler before him, Putin makes no secret of his expansionist goals and imperial ambitions. Indeed, the Kremlin dictator likes nothing better than discussing his sense of historical mission. He is notorious for delivering rambling lectures on Russian history, and has often delved into the distant past to justify his contemporary geopolitical grievances. Ukraine is a favorite topic, with Putin frequently questioning the legitimacy of Ukrainian statehood and referring to entire regions of Ukraine as “historically Russian lands.” Few were surprised in summer 2022 when he compared the current invasion of Ukraine to the eighteenth century imperial conquests of Russian Czar Peter the Great.

Nor is Putin’s historical revisionism limited to the reconquest of Ukraine. He has often lamented modern Russia’s retreat from empire and has referred to the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union as the “disintegration of historical Russia.” At its greatest extent, the Russian Empire stretched far beyond today’s Ukrainian borders and featured a long list of additional countries including Finland, Poland, the Baltic states, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the whole of Central Asia. Many of these states could be at risk of suffering Ukraine’s fate if the current invasion is allowed to succeed.

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While there can be little doubt regarding the scale of Putin’s revisionist ambitions, some skeptics still question whether he possesses the military capabilities to achieve his goals. This is shortsighted. The invasion of Ukraine may have exposed the limitations of the Russian army, but it has also revealed the weakness of the West. This disastrous lack of Western resolve is visibly emboldening the Kremlin and may yet persuade Putin that he can risk going further without triggering an overwhelming Western response.

In recent months, Putin has begun testing NATO with occasional drone incursions across the border into Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states. So far, he has received minimal push back. This gray zone aggression is just one small part of an escalating Russian hybrid war being waged throughout the Western world that includes a dizzying array of disinformation operations, cyber attacks, weaponized corruption, sabotage, and support for extremist political movements of all kinds. Although many policymakers in Western capitals are still reluctant to admit it, Russia evidently believes it is already at war with the West and is acting accordingly.

Back in the Russian Federation itself, there are ample indications that Putin is preparing the domestic front for a long war. He has placed the entire Russian economy on a wartime footing, and has instructed his vast propaganda apparatus to preach holy war against the West. On the international stage, he is consolidating an authoritarian axis of like-minded nations such as China, Iran, and North Korea, all of whom share his stated goal of overturning the current world order. While it is impossible to anticipate exactly what Putin might do next if he succeeds in Ukraine, the idea that he will simply stop is dangerously delusional.

There was a time when such delusions regarding the revanchist nature of Putin’s Russia could be excused. Not anymore. Since 2022, the Kremlin has embarked on a path of open hostility toward the entire Western world, with each successive attempt to appease Putin merely serving to encourage bolder acts of aggression. In this climate of confrontation, compromising with the Kremlin will not bring peace. On the contrary, any territorial concessions in Ukraine would be viewed by Moscow as a victory and used to justify more war.

Before it is too late, the West must recognize the necessity of speaking to Putin in the only language he understands: The language of strength. This means committing fully and unambiguously to Ukrainian victory. More specifically, it means lifting the restrictions that currently protect Russia from attack, and supplying Ukraine with enough weapons to actually win. Putin sees international relations as a zero sum game and believes he has the upper hand over opponents who have revealed their fundamental weakness. By continuing to signal their fear of escalation, Western leaders now risk repeating the mistakes of the 1930s and provoking the wider war they so desperately seek to prevent.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The United States needs a long-term approach to Ukraine aid

Doug Klain — Mon, 02 Sep 2024 13:21:29 +0000

During their recent visit to Kyiv, United States Senators Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) and Lindsey Graham (R-SC) made news with pledges to bolster US support for Ukraine, including by telling Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that “we’re going to fight for another supplemental [aid package] before the end of the calendar year.”

After the last slog for supplemental assistance to Ukraine ended in April 2024, any new package is likely to face a far smoother path through Congress thanks to more political cover for congressional Republicans and increasing public support for aid. But having to debate whether the United States should help Ukraine each year isn’t sustainable. Instead, it’s time the United States matched its allies by passing meaningful long-term support for Ukraine. If executed properly, the Blumenthal-Graham proposal could soon make that a reality.

Talk of another supplemental aid package may seem surprising to some. A $61 billion package was passed just a few months ago, after all. But that package was never meant to last long. The Biden administration originally asked in August 2023 for a short-term supplemental to cover the rest of the year, with the expectation of more substantial aid coming in early 2024.

But the White House misjudged Capitol Hill, and the issue became subject to extended delays. The updated supplemental aid request that came from the White House in October 2023, almost identical to the package that eventually passed in April 2024, was instead designed to provide for military assistance to Ukraine until just after the November 2024 elections.

While the April 2024 supplemental is billed as a $61 billion package, the majority of that figure is comprised of long-term funding for defense production in the US and financial assistance to Ukraine. Only $7.8 billion was appropriated for Presidential Drawdown Authority, the primary mechanism used by the United States to send weapons to Ukraine. If the president doesn’t use it all, it could soon expire on September 30 without a notice of extension by the secretary of state.

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Despite challenges over the last tranche of Ukraine aid, key changes to the politics surrounding the issue and shifting power dynamics in Congress mean a new supplemental may not face the same obstacles. The April 2024 aid package was delayed for months by House Republicans, with Speaker Mike Johnson fearing that hardliners would strip him of his leadership position as they did with his predecessor. But Johnson was eventually convinced not just of the urgent need to help Ukraine win, but also that he had political cover to do so. Democrats pledged to save his position should it be at risk and, more importantly, former President Donald Trump came out publicly in support of the speaker’s efforts and backed him up after the package passed.

Many Republicans in Congress had feared that supporting Ukraine aid could mean losing their seats, as the supplemental fight came just as members of Congress faced their intra-party primary election. Some incumbents were accused of putting Ukraine’s interests over those of the United States and faced attack ads over their past votes for Ukraine aid.

Crucially, every single member of Congress who voted for the April 2024 supplemental aid package won their primary election. The importance of this cannot be overstated. These primary results will likely quell the fears among Republicans that supporting Ukraine could derail their political careers. On the contrary, given that polls show majority support for US aid to Ukraine, it could be an asset.

If a new supplemental aid package comes forward, it’s likely to find a Congress filled with Republicans who feel more empowered to vote for Ukraine. Just as important is a Republican speaker who is now enthusiastic to raise the alarm over Russia’s persecution of Ukraine’s Christians and the need to help Ukraine halt Russian President Vladimir Putin’s march on Europe.

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As long as the United States continues to debate Ukraine aid on an annual basis, it’s impossible for Kyiv to meaningfully plan long-term strategies. The reason that European commitments to aid Ukraine remain nearly double that of the United States is because many European governments have made multi-year commitments. To break the cycle of uncertainty, the United States needs to do the same.

Blumenthal and Graham’s idea to codify the US-Ukraine bilateral security agreement into law could be the solution. Because this agreement is not a binding treaty and focuses more on principles of support for Ukraine rather than specific commitments, it was viewed by many in Washington as a promising first step when US President Joe Biden and Zelenskyy signed it in June.

Fleshing that document out in legislation could lead to the most consequential security agreement in Ukraine’s history. The agreement lays out a road map for how to transform Ukraine’s military into a modern fighting force capable of deterring and defeating future Russian aggression, as well as substantial plans for economic support, governance reform, and meaningful military cooperation just shy of formal treaty commitments.

Timing will be key, and the smart move would be to wait until after the November presidential election. The recent supplemental passed only because Trump chose not to oppose it. There remain real risks that reintroducing Ukraine to the US political debate too soon could give Trump the incentive to sabotage any aid package in order to deny the Biden-Harris administration a political win.

US support will be the deciding factor in whether Ukraine is able to defeat Russia’s invasion and remain safe from any future attempts by Moscow to rearm and try again. Despite the wild swings of US politics in recent years, strong bipartisan support for Ukraine has been a rare constant. If there is any issue that could break the cycle of short-term planning in Washington, it is ensuring Ukraine’s ultimate victory.

Doug Klain is a policy analyst at Razom for Ukraine, a non-profit humanitarian aid organization that advocates for additional US support for Ukraine, and a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Despite Russia’s extensive list of crimes in Ukraine, many international voices continue to call for negotiations. These appeals are often accompanied by arguments claiming that the war is “unwinnable” for Ukraine, or suggestions that the West can promote peace simply by ending all military support to Kyiv. Such thinking is dangerously delusional.

Russian officials and Kremlin propagandists make no secret of their plans to destroy the Ukrainian state and nation. In fact, they often say so explicitly. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev spelled out Moscow’s intentions in July when he stated that Russia would seek to occupy any “remaining Ukrainian lands,” even if Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy agreed to a ceasefire deal.

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When Western commentators and politicians casually discuss ceding Ukrainian territory to Russia, they typically overlook the fact that the regions in question are home to millions of ordinary Ukrainians. Abandoning these people to indefinite Russian occupation means condemning them to the threat of kidnap, torture, disappearance, and death. Russians will continue erasing all aspects of Ukrainian identity wherever they can.

We have all seen the photos of the dead bodies in Bucha, the mass graves in the forests of Izyum, and the torture cells of Kupiansk. These are not isolated incidents or excesses. They are part of an horrific pattern that is being repeated throughout the areas of Ukraine under Kremlin control. It is grotesque to suggest that legitimizing this occupation will bring peace. And yet that is exactly what many international commentators advocate.

Ukrainians are under no illusions regarding Russia’s intentions. We have learned many hard lessons over the past decade, and have come to understand that modern Russia is fully committed to wiping Ukraine off the map.

In 2014, we lived through the occupation of Crimea and the Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine, and saw how the international community failed to punish Russia in any meaningful way. We witnessed the cynicism of the Minsk Accords, and watched as Russia openly prepared the ground for full-scale genocide.

It appears obvious to Ukrainians that Russia is now seeking breathing space to consolidate its territorial gains and rearm before completing the conquest of Ukraine. Why else would the Kremlin be so insistent that any peace deal must include Ukraine’s international isolation and comprehensive disarmament?

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It is vital to understand that the threat posed by Russia is evolving and extends far beyond Ukraine. Back in 2014, Russia was acting alone. Today, the Kremlin has managed to create a formidable coalition of authoritarian states that share Moscow’s goal of subverting the rules-based world order and replacing it with a lawless alternative governed by the schoolyard principle that “might is right.” The only way to prevent this axis of autocracies from becoming even more powerful is by defeating Russia in Ukraine.

Some say Russia cannot pose any real threat to Europe as the Russian army is fully engaged in the war against Ukraine. This gravely underestimates the scale of Russia’s ambitions. Putin genuinely believes he is on a sacred mission to correct the injustices of the Soviet collapse. He has repeatedly declared that he is reclaiming “historically Russian lands.” These territorial claims extend far beyond Ukraine.

Putin is now being emboldened by repeated signs of Western weakness and a lack of resolve among Ukraine’s partners. If Russia is handed victory in Ukraine, it is absurd to think they will simply stop.

Russia is already intensifying its hybrid war against the West. In recent months, details have emerged of a Russian plot to assassinate the CEO of a leading German defense manufacturer. There are also regular reports of sabotage campaigns, GPS jamming, attempted arson, cyber attacks, election meddling, and strategic corruption.

As Russia’s full-scale invasion passes the two-and-a-half year mark, it is time to acknowledge that supporting Ukraine is not an act of solidarity or charity. In reality, providing Ukraine with the military aid it requires to defeat Russia is the most effective way to prevent further escalation and avoid an even bigger war in the near future.

Kyiv’s wish list is well known. Ukraine needs more air defense systems, long-range missiles, and fighter jets. Crucially, Ukraine’s partners must lift all restructions on the use of Western weapons against military targets inside Russia and agree to shoot down Russian drones and missiles close to their airspace. Smart allies should be looking to boost Ukraine’s ability to defend itself by investing in the country’s rapidly expanding defense sector, while also bankrupting the Russian war machine by tightening sanctions on the country’s oil and gas industry.

Above all, we need to see a fundamental shift in international attitudes toward the war. The future of the world is being decided in Ukraine. It is not enough for countries to say they will stand with Ukraine “for as long as it takes.” Instead, Ukraine’s partners must define their position as “whatever it takes for victory,” and must act accordingly.

Olena Halushka is a board member at AntAC and co-founder of the International Center for Ukrainian Victory. This article is an adapted version of an opinion piece that was first published by the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten.

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Russia’s propagandists are taking their lead from Putin himself. The Kremlin dictator has remained remarkably tight-lipped over Ukraine’s invasion, and has limited himself to only a handful of public statements. Notably, there have been no attempts to rally the Russian people against the invader or engage in the kind of historical grandstanding that Putin normally favors. On the contrary, he has opted for a strikingly understated approach. Putin initially branded the invasion a “large-scale provocation,” and has since compared the advancing Ukrainian army to “terrorists.”

In recent days, Putin has sought to underline his apparent lack of concern over the invasion of Russia by embarking on a series of routine trips. First, he flew to Azerbaijan for a two-day visit that focused on strengthening bilateral trade ties. Next, he paid his first visit to Chechnya for thirteen years. Neither journey was urgent or in any way connected to Ukraine’s ongoing offensive.

Despite this very deliberate show of indifference, there have been numerous indications that Putin is in reality extremely rattled by the Ukrainian invasion. His evident disdain over the past fortnight while listening to Russian military commanders reporting fake battlefield victories has inspired multiple memes. In one particularly revealing exchange, Putin angrily interceded during a televised government meeting when the acting governor of Kursk region dared to disclose the scale of Ukraine’s territorial gains.

This behavior is nothing new. Indeed, Putin has long been notorious for going missing during times of national crisis, and has added to this unwanted reputation with numerous disappearing acts throughout the invasion of Ukraine. Nevertheless, the unprecedented nature of Ukraine’s own counter-invasion makes his recent posture particularly revealing.

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In the current circumstances, the Russian ruler may feel his best option is to downgrade Ukraine’s invasion to the level of border skirmish and pretend it is nothing to worry about. With the help of his formidable propaganda machine, this approach may indeed prevent panic from spreading inside Russia. Even so, there is no escaping the fact that by occupying more than one thousand square kilometers of Russian territory, Ukraine has dealt a serious blow to Putin’s strongman image and made a mockery of Russia’s claims to military superpower status. If this situation persists, it will also fatally undermine his ability to intimidate the international community.

Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Putin has skillfully employed nuclear blackmail together with frequent warnings of Russian red lines to deter the West from supporting Ukraine. His bully boy approach has proved highly effective, with Western leaders consistently delaying decisions on new categories of military aid for Kyiv and imposing absurd restrictions on Ukraine’s ability to use Western weapons inside Russia. However, this may be about to change. Ukraine’s invasion of Russia has demonstrated that it is possible to cross the reddest of all Russian red lines without sparking World War III. As a consequence, many are now concluding that Putin’s saber-rattling is mere bluster.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has seized on the Kremlin’s weak response to his counter-invasion. He is now arguing that the time has come to abandon the concept of escalation management entirely, and is calling on Kyiv’s allies to lift all restrictions on attacks inside Russia. “The whole naive, illusory concept of so-called red lines regarding Russia, which dominated the assessment of the war by some partners, has crumbled these days somewhere near Sudzha,” Zelenskyy commented on August 20, referencing the largest Russian town currently under Ukrainian occupation.

So far, the US and other key allies have yet to revise existing weapons restrictions or announce any upgrade in arms deliveries to Ukraine. But if Putin continues to downplay the invasion of Russia while failing to retaliate in a manner befitting his country’s superpower pretensions, it will be increasingly difficult to justify the excessive caution that has shaped the international response to Russia’s war. Putin succeeded in bluffing the world for almost two-and-a-half years, but Ukraine has now called his bluff in the most emphatic manner.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The attack clearly caught the unsuspecting Russians completely off-guard, despite the near ubiquity of surveillance drones on the modern battlefield. This represents a major achievement for Ukraine’s military commanders that has bolstered their already growing international reputation.

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Ukraine’s dramatic change in tactics comes after almost a year of slow but steady Russian gains in eastern and southern Ukraine. Since 2023, Russian commanders have been deploying their country’s overwhelming manpower and firepower advantages to gradually pummel Ukrainian forces into submission. The Kremlin’s reliance on brute force has proved costly but effective, leaving the Ukrainian military with little choice but to think outside the box.

It has long been obvious that fighting a war of attrition is a losing strategy for Ukraine. The country’s military leaders cannot hope to compete with Russia’s far larger resources and have no desire to match the Kremlin’s disregard for casualties. The Kursk offensive is an attempt to break out of this suffocating situation by returning to a war of mobility and maneuver that favors the more agile and innovative Ukrainian military. So far, it seems to be working.

While bringing Vladimir Putin’s invasion home to Russia has undeniable strategic and emotional appeal, many commentators have questioned why Ukraine would want to occupy Russian territory. The most obvious explanation is that Kyiv seeks bargaining chips to exchange for Russian-occupied Ukrainian lands during future negotiations.

The significant quantity of Russian POWs captured during the offensive also opens up possibilities to bring more imprisoned Ukrainian soldiers home. Meanwhile, control over swathes of Kursk Oblast could make it possible to disrupt the logistical chains supplying the Russian army in Ukraine.

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Beyond the military practicalities of the battlefield, the Kursk offensive is challenging some of the most fundamental assumptions about the war. Crucially, Ukraine’s invasion of Russia has demonstrated that Putin’s nuclear threats and his talk of red lines are in reality a big bluff designed to intimidate the West.

Ukrainians have long accused Western policymakers of being overly concerned about the dangers of provoking Putin. They argue that since 2022, the international response to Russian aggression has been hampered by a widespread fear of escalation that has led to regular delays in military aid and absurd restrictions on the use of Western weapons. Ukraine’s offensive has now made a mockery of this excessive caution. If the Kremlin does not view the actual invasion of Russia by a foreign army as worthy of a major escalation, it is hard to imagine what would qualify.

As the Kursk offensive unfolds, Ukraine is hoping the country’s allies will draw the logical conclusions. Initial indications are encouraging, with US and EU officials voicing their support for Ukraine’s cross-border incursion despite longstanding concerns over any military operations inside Russia. At the same time, restrictions on the use of certain categories of weapons remain in place. This is hindering the advance of Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast. It is also preventing Kyiv from striking back against the airbases used to bomb Ukrainian cities and the country’s civilian infrastructure.

Ukraine’s Kursk offensive represents a powerful signal to the country’s partners. It demonstrates that the Ukrainian military is a highly professional force capable of conducting complex offensive operations and worthy of greater international backing. It also confirms that Putin’s Russia is dangerously overstretched and is militarily far weaker than it pretends to be.

The muddled and unconvincing Russian response to Ukraine’s invasion speaks volumes about the relative powerlessness of the Putin regime. This should persuade Kyiv’s allies of the need for greater boldness and convince them that the time has come to commit to Ukrainian victory.

Oleksiy Goncharenko is a Ukrainian member of parliament with the European Solidarity party.

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