Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding - Atlantic Council

Putin’s Kyiv blitz sends message to G7 leaders: Russia does not want peace

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 17 Jun 2025 20:52:00 +0000

As G7 leaders attended a summit in Canada on Monday, Russia unleashed one of the largest bombardments of the Ukrainian capital since the start of Moscow’s invasion more than three years ago. The overnight Russian attack on Kyiv involved hundreds of drones and missiles targeting residential districts across the city. At least fifteen Ukrainian civilians were killed with many more injured.

While this latest Kyiv blitz was by no means unprecedented in a war that has been marked by frequent Russian attacks on Ukraine’s civilian population, the timing is unlikely to have been coincidental. Like a mafia boss ordering elaborate killings to send coded messages, Putin has repeatedly scheduled major bombardments of Ukraine to coincide with international summits and gatherings of Western leaders. For example, Russia bombed Kyiv, Odesa, and other Ukrainian cities on the eve of NATO’s 2023 summit, and conducted a targeted missile strike on Ukraine’s biggest children’s hospital as NATO leaders prepared to meet in Washington DC last summer.

Bombing raids have also taken place during high-profile visits of international dignitaries. In spring 2022, Russia launched an airstrike on Kyiv while UN Secretary General António Guterres was in the Ukrainian capital. At the time, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the attack was a deliberate attempt by the Kremlin to “humiliate” the United Nations. Two years later, Russia subjected Ukrainian Black Sea port Odesa to intense bombardment as Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis visited the city.

The massive bombardment of Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities during this week’s G7 summit is the latest example of Putin’s penchant for sending messages with missiles. On this occasion his message could hardly have been clearer: Russia does not want peace. On the contrary, Moscow feels increasingly emboldened by growing signs of Western weakness and is more confident than ever of securing victory in Ukraine.

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Russia’s rejection of US-led peace efforts is equally evident in the diplomatic arena. While Ukraine agreed to US President Donald Trump’s call for an unconditional ceasefire more than three months ago, Russia still refuses to follow suit. Instead, the Kremlin has engaged in obvious stalling tactics while creating a series of obstacles aimed at derailing any meaningful progress toward peace. At one point, Putin even claimed the Ukrainian authorities lacked the legitimacy to negotiate a settlement and suggested the country be placed under temporary UN administration.

The recent resumption of bilateral talks between Moscow and Kyiv has provided further confirmation of Russia’s commitment to continuing the war. Putin personally initiated these talks but then chose not to attend and sent a low-level delegation instead. In the two meetings that have since taken place, Russian officials have presented a list of ceasefire conditions that read like a call for Kyiv’s complete capitulation.

The Kremlin’s demands include Ukraine’s withdrawal from four partially occupied Ukrainian regions that the Russian army has so far been unable to fully occupy. This would mean handing over dozens and towns and cities while condemning millions of Ukrainians to the horrors of indefinite Russian occupation.

Moscow also wants to ban Ukraine from any international alliances or bilateral security partnerships, while imposing strict limits on the size of the Ukrainian army and the categories of weapons the country is allowed to possess. In recent days, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko has underlined Moscow’s insistence on Ukraine’s total disarmament by calling on the country to destroy all Western weaponry provided since 2022.

Putin’s punitive peace terms are not limited to sweeping territorial concessions and harsh military restrictions. The Kremlin also expects Ukraine to grant the Russian language official status, reinstate the Russian Orthodox Church’s legal privileges, rewrite Ukrainian history in line with Russian imperial propaganda, and ban any Ukrainian political parties that Moscow deems to be “nationalist.”

The Kremlin’s negotiating position envisions a postwar Ukraine that is partitioned, disarmed, internationally isolated, and heavily russified. If imposed, these terms would allow Russia to reestablish its dominance over Ukraine and would deal a fatal blow to Ukrainian statehood. In other words, Putin wants a Ukraine without Ukrainians.

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Donald Trump’s talk of peace through strength succeeded in generating considerable optimism during the early months of 2025, but it is now time to acknowledge that this was largely based on wishful thinking. Since Trump returned to the White House, the Russians have significantly escalated their air war against Ukraine’s civilian population. On the battlefield, Putin’s troops are now engaged in the early stages of what promises to be a major summer offensive. Meanwhile, Kremlin officials continue make maximalist demands at the negotiating table that no Ukrainian government could accept. These are not the actions of a country seeking a pathway to peace.

In both words and deeds, Putin is sending unambiguous signals that he has no interest whatsoever in ending his invasion and remains determined to achieve the complete subjugation of Ukraine. This uncompromising stance will not change unless Western leaders can convince Putin that the most likely alternative to a negotiated peace is not an historic Russian triumph but a disastrous Russian defeat.

The steps needed to bring about this change and create the conditions to end the war are no secret. Sanctions measures against Russia must be tightened and expanded to starve the Kremlin war machine of funding and weaken the domestic foundations of Putin’s regime. Countries that currently help Moscow bypass international sanctions must be targeted with far greater vigor. In parallel, Western military aid to Ukraine must be dramatically increased, with an emphasis on providing long-range weapons and financing Ukraine’s rapidly growing domestic defense industry.

All this will require a degree of political will that is currently lacking. It would also be expensive. Indeed, during this week’s G7 summit, Trump balked at the idea of imposing new sanctions, saying they would “cost us a lot of money.” This is dangerously shortsighted. Trump and other G7 leaders need to urgently recognize that if Putin is allowed to succeed in Ukraine, the cost of stopping him will skyrocket.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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Territorial concessions are only one part of Russia’s comprehensive plan to undermine Ukrainian statehood. The memorandum presented in Istanbul calls for strict limits to be imposed on the size of Ukraine’s military along with restrictions on the categories of weapons the country is allowed to possess. Ukraine would also be banned from joining any military alliances or concluding bilateral security agreements with other nations. This would transform Ukraine into a disarmed and internationally isolated buffer state with no means to defend itself, leaving it entirely at Putin’s mercy.

Beyond the battlefield, Russia’s memorandum proposes a series of sweeping changes to Ukraine’s internal political and cultural landscape that would allow Moscow to reestablish its dominance over the country. Key demands include official status for the Russian language, the reinstatement of the Russian Orthodox Church’s legal privileges, and a wholesale rewriting of Ukrainian history in line with Kremlin narratives.

One of the most sinister aspects of the Russian peace proposal is the call for a complete ban on all so-called “nationalist” Ukrainian political parties. This rather vague wording is open to interpretation and could easily be used to silence Ukrainian politicians opposed to Russian influence. Given the Kremlin’s long record of labeling anything that contracts Russian imperial orthodoxies as “extremist” or “fascist,” the idea of outlawing “nationalist” political parties represents an obvious threat to Ukraine’s sovereignty and the country’s democratic political system.

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Moscow’s memorandum was presented at a time when Russia is escalating its invasion of Ukraine. In recent months, Russian drone and missile attacks on Ukrainian cities have increased significantly, leading to a sharp rise in the number of killed and wounded civilians. Along the front lines of the war, the Russian military is currently engaged in what most analysts believe are the early stages of a major summer offensive that seeks to break Ukrainian resistance. Russian troops are advancing in the east and have recently crossed the border in northern Ukraine to open a new front in the Sumy region.

The Ukrainian authorities cannot accept the punishing terms being proposed by Russia. Indeed, no sovereign state could do so and expect to survive. The real question is how the international community will respond. Russia’s memorandum is a blueprint for the end of Ukrainian statehood and the return of the country to Kremlin control. It makes a complete mockery of recent US-led calls for a compromise peace, and demonstrates beyond any reasonable doubt that Russia has no interest in ending the invasion.

This should be enough to persuade Western leaders that progress toward peace will only be possible if they increase the pressure on Putin. At present, the Russian leader clearly believes he is winning and is confident of outlasting the West in Ukraine. In order to change this calculus and force a rethink in Moscow, Kyiv’s partners must impose tougher sanctions on Russia while boosting military support for Ukraine. In other words, they must speak to Putin in the language of strength, which remains the only language he truly understands.

Russia’s recent memorandum sends an unambiguous signal that Moscow is undeterred by the current Western stance and remains fully committed to its maximalist goal of erasing Ukraine as a state and as a nation. If Western leaders wish to avoid this catastrophic outcome, they must convince Putin that the alternative to a negotiated peace is a Russian defeat.

Tetiana Kotelnykova is a graduate student at Yale University specializing in European and Russian Studies with a focus on conflict, postwar recovery, and regional geopolitics. She is the founder of Brave Generation, a New York-based nonprofit organization that supports young Ukrainians affected by war and invests in the next generation of Ukrainian leadership. She also leads the Ukrainian Recovery Youth Global Initiative.

Alawites: From army to militia

The Alawite community—the Syrian minority group to which the Assad family belonged— formed the backbone of the military and security apparatus under the former regime. With its collapse, hundreds of thousands of soldiers—most of them Alawite—were demobilized without being offered alternative pathways, particularly amid a deteriorating economic situation and the near-total absence of employment opportunities.

The transitional government limited its response to conducting settlement processes and disarming light and medium weapons, leaving the heavy ones on the battlefields, without establishing a comprehensive institutional framework capable of absorbing the large number of demobilized personnel, or providing them with viable alternatives to prevent their descent into armed violence—an undertaking that, even if politically desired, currently lies beyond the government’s capacity.

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Moreover, some former Alawite officers and commanders established armed militias that launched violent operations in early March 2025. These actions triggered retaliatory violence, resulting in the deaths of numerous civilians—including Alawites, Sunnis, and others from Syria’s coastal communities—as well as hundreds of security and military personnel. The clashes have entrenched a persistent state of insecurity that continues to this day.

While the regime’s remnant leaders may be driven by their own motives—such as evading transitional justice and exploiting sectarian rhetoric to portray themselves as protectors of the Alawite community against the transitional government—the absence of DDR programs continues to fuel these militias with new recruits. This dynamic has turned the situation into a pattern of intermittent rebellion and has opened the door for regional actors like Iran to intervene and exacerbate instability. Lasting stability in Alawite-majority areas—and elsewhere—will remain out of reach unless sustainable solutions are introduced to economically and socially reintegrate these individuals into the fabric of the new state.

DDR programs as a pathway to stability

Amid growing international openness and willingness to support Syria’s stabilization, DDR programs stand out as essential pillars for building lasting peace. Their value lies in their capacity to curb the proliferation of weapons and reduce the risk of internal conflict, particularly in areas that have experienced sectarian or tribal tensions. They help address the root causes of conflict by offering former combatants viable alternative pathways.

Similar programs were backed by the UN’s Development Program (UNDP) in Liberia and Colombia based on United Nations (UN)- integrated DDR standards (IDDRS). Implemented in parallel with a transitional justice process, these programs serve as a foundational mechanism. For example, in Colombia and Liberia, DDR served as a structured mechanism to transition combatants to civilian life. Comparable DDR programs in Liberia, Colombia, and South Sudan have demonstrated the importance of linking disarmament with social reintegration in reducing long-term conflict risks.

In line with these existing international standards, DDR programs follow a clear sequence: voluntary or mandatory disarmament, vocational and social rehabilitation, and eventual reintegration into civilian life or institutional structures. Their importance lies in their ability to reduce the likelihood of renewed violence, particularly in areas that have experienced sectarian tensions, such as Syria’s coastal region.

In the Syrian context, the issue of demobilized fighters from the Alawite community and others within a unified national framework helps foster trust among Syria’s diverse components, ensuring that no group feels targeted based on its political or sectarian background. These programs would also demonstrate the transitional government’s seriousness in addressing security and humanitarian concerns, laying the groundwork for attracting international support and securing the funding necessary to implement development and reconstruction plans.

The impact of DDR extends beyond internal stabilization; it also serves as a gateway to creating a secure environment that can rebuild refugee confidence in the safety of return. In doing so, it helps reposition Syria as a safe country, capable of reintegrating its citizens, both inside and abroad, under dignified and voluntary conditions.

A new opportunity, and and an urgent task

With the end of Western sanctions on Syria and the return of external support to the state-building process, the transitional government now faces a rare opportunity to address the imbalances of the post-conflict period. However, this international opening does not automatically guarantee stability unless accompanied by serious domestic measures, chief among them, the launch of DDR programs.

The current challenge is not only the lack of funding but also the absence of operational structures capable of absorbing such programs, weak institutional coordination, and growing security risks posed by uncontrollable local forces from the remnants of the regime or civil groups with a revolutionary background. In this context, DDR programs become a central tool not only for restoring security but also for rebuilding trust between the state and society and paving the way for genuine national reintegration.

Although the Western-led international community continues to stress the importance of protecting minority communities in Syria, particularly the Alawites, the core challenge now lies not only in the lifting of international restrictions but in the transitional government’s ability to translate that commitment into effective policy. Without creating institutional and economic environments capable of absorbing demobilized fighters and reintegrating them into society, protection efforts will remain vulnerable to failure, and stability will remain fragile, regardless of available resources or declared intentions. In this space, the government’s seriousness about rebuilding the state will be truly tested.

A “collaborative fund” as a practical solution

With international willingness to support Syria’s stabilization now in place, the need arises for establishing a “Collaborative Support Fund” dedicated to financing DDR programs, similar to models implemented in Iraq, Sudan, Gaza, and others. This fund would operate under the direct supervision of the Syrian government and in partnership with neutral third parties. It would aim to manage financial resources for DDR programs transparently and efficiently, ensuring their use in the rehabilitation and economic and social reintegration of former combatants, including marginalized groups such as demobilized Alawite fighters who may fall outside the scope of transitional justice mechanisms.

A portion of the fund could also be allocated to support other conflict-affected groups, such as wounded opposition fighters, thereby promoting balanced justice and contributing to repairing Syria’s social fabric. This mechanism would also create a broader space for partnership, allowing both Arab and Western countries to contribute within an integrated framework subject to international oversight, thus minimizing the risk of political manipulation or misuse of funds.

In this context, Arab states—particularly those in the Gulf—could be crucial in filling key funding and technical gaps, especially as many have adopted more open positions toward the new Syrian administration. The Gulf states have previously contributed to stabilization funds in Yemen and Iraq, offering a precedent for such involvement in Syria’s DDR efforts. With their considerable financial capabilities and accumulated experience, Arab countries are well-positioned to serve as active partners in funding DDR programs. However, the success of this role will remain contingent on close coordination with the wider international community.

Stability hanging in the balance

Syria cannot fully turn the page on its conflict unless realistic guarantees are put in place to prevent the resurgence of violence or the drift of demobilized fighters toward rebellion. As such, the post-Assad reconstruction process cannot be completed without fundamentally addressing a set of sensitive issues, chief among them the sanctions regime and the critical role of DDR programs in laying the foundations for stability and ensuring the protection of minority groups, both as a domestic imperative and an international responsibility.

However, DDR programs are not a silver bullet despite their strategic importance. Their success depends on a supportive political, economic, and social environment, ensuring sustainability. This requires an integrated framework of transitional justice, economic revitalization, and inclusive participation by all societal components in shaping the country’s future. Without such coherence, DDR initiatives risk failure, co-optation, or losing their intended role as tools for building trust and long-term stability.

The current opportunity—bolstered by broad international support—must not be wasted. Failure to activate these pathways would represent a serious setback for Syria’s future, potentially reopening the door to renewed conflict and the resurgence of extremism. Conversely, if the transitional government succeeds in operationalizing DDR programs and mobilizing international support to rehabilitate society and kickstart development, it could mark a pivotal turning point in Syria’s modern history. In doing so, the country would be able to protect and advance minority rights within a new state that exercises its authority fairly and equitably under the principles of citizenship, just like for all other Syrians. This would pave the way for a renewed social contract through which Syrians can once again believe in their homeland and a shared, hopeful future.

Muhsen al-Mustafa is a researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies. He can be found on X @MuhsenAlmustafa.

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Armenia’s ‘crossroads’ offers the US and Israel a rare opportunity

Sheila Paylan — Mon, 09 Jun 2025 12:00:00 +0000

For decades, Armenia and Azerbaijan’s conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh has kept the South Caucasus in a gridlock of historic animosities, closed borders, and economic stagnation. But with the conflict now effectively over, Armenia has launched its “Crossroads of Peace” initiative, envisioning itself as a central Eurasian transit hub.

The project aims to revive long-defunct transport routes—once important arteries of Soviet-era trade—that were severed after Azerbaijan and Turkey closed their borders with Armenia in 1991 and 1993, respectively, thereby isolating it. Restoring these routes would reconnect Armenia with its neighbors and link broader corridors from the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea and from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean, facilitating trade between major economies in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. For both the United States and Israel, supporting this initiative offers a strategic opportunity to enhance regional stability, expand economic influence, and counterbalance adversarial powers like Iran, Russia, and China.

Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev attend a meeting of heads of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, on October 11, 2019. Sputnik/Alexei Druzhinin/Kremlin via REUTERS

This vision, however, ultimately depends on the successful conclusion of the peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which remains stalled largely due to Azerbaijan’s shifting and escalating demands—including calls for constitutional amendments and the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group—despite diplomatic consensus over the treaty text and Armenia’s expressed readiness to sign it. Another major underlying issue is Azerbaijan’s insistence on an extraterritorial so-called “Zangezur Corridor”, which would connect it to its exclave Nakhchivan through southern Armenia, but bypassing all Armenian oversight, customs, and security. Armenia, while supportive of connectivity, unequivocally rejects any surrender of sovereignty over its territory.

Nevertheless, Crossroads of Peace still offers Baku significant economic and geopolitical benefits. By reconnecting regional transport networks, including access to Turkey through Armenian territory under Armenian jurisdiction, Azerbaijan could achieve many of its logistical objectives without the contentious demand for a sovereign corridor. This cooperative model would provide Baku with more trade routes to Nakhchivan and beyond, while also gaining international legitimacy and investment through a mutually beneficial and multilateral framework.

Why engagement serves US interests

The entry of US President Donald Trump’s second administration offers an opportune moment for the United States, and potentially Israel, to play an active role in securing a high-profile peace agreement by pushing Azerbaijan to sign the treaty with Armenia. While brokering such a deal would be a diplomatic win in itself, its real payoff lies in unlocking the Crossroads of Peace and thereby delivering meaningful strategic and commercial gains.

By facilitating new trade routes through a Western-friendly, post-conflict South Caucasus, the United States could establish a firmer presence in a region it has long neglected, challenge the dominance of rival powers, and generate economic returns through infrastructure partnerships and transit revenue.

For Washington, the Eurasian transport network represents a unique opportunity to establish a foothold in a region vital to global trade and geopolitics. It offers a Western-aligned alternative to transport networks increasingly dominated by Russia and China while opening the door to US commercial participation in logistics, infrastructure, and technology.

The Eurasian transport network, comprising mainly the Northern Corridor, Middle Corridor, and International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), moves millions of tons of freight worth billions of dollars each year. These corridors, which cut across Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Eastern Europe, are economic battlegrounds where Moscow and Beijing seek to maintain influence, and the West attempts to create alternatives to Russian and Chinese-controlled infrastructure. In this fiercely contested region, controlling trade routes means shaping the future balance of economic and geopolitical power.

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Despite the strategic importance of these corridors, the United States currently has a very limited regional presence and lacks an integrated strategy or infrastructure footprint, offering only modest support limited to diplomatic engagement and technical assistance for the Middle Corridor, led by Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. However, this corridor faces significant challenges, including limited infrastructure capacity, high costs, and a lack of integration, which undermine its efficiency and deter large-scale, reliable trade flows. It is also partially aligned with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with parts of the Middle Corridor physically overlapping with and increasingly integrated into the BRI, drawing it into Beijing’s sphere of influence.

China’s growing interest and investment in the Middle Corridor thus further complicates its appeal for Western stakeholders. Chinese influence is now poised to grow even further with the Anaklia Port—a deep-sea project in Georgia—having been awarded to a Chinese-led consortium. Meanwhile, most freight still flows through Russia via the Northern Corridor, maintaining Moscow’s dominance over Eurasian transport. The INSTC—connecting India, Iran, Russia, and Europe—offers some diversification, but it presents “double trouble” for Washington’s involvement by relying heavily on both Iranian and Russian networks, two countries under sweeping US sanctions.

From a purely economic standpoint, the potential of Crossroads of Peace is substantial. Much of Eurasia’s overland trade currently bypasses Armenia, relying instead on Georgia’s politically sensitive routes and the broader Middle Corridor. Diversifying transit through Armenia would strengthen regional connectivity and unlock new channels for investment, trade, and employment. By investing early in Crossroads of Peace, the United States can counterbalance Moscow and Beijing’s regional footprints while creating entry points for American firms in sectors such as construction, energy, digital infrastructure, and logistics. While comprehensive feasibility studies have yet to be publicly released, the Armenian government has indicated that the project could generate significant economic returns by restoring dormant transit infrastructure and linking key regional corridors. Institutions like the Asian Development Bank have expressed support, and the US-Armenia Strategic Partnership Charter highlights the initiative as a priority area for cooperation.

Moreover, given the Trump administration’s emphasis on economic partnerships and tangible returns, Armenia’s proposal aligns well as a concrete opportunity to advance US financial interests. Infrastructure projects, particularly railways and highways, could generate significant returns through tolls, tariffs, and transit fees, benefiting US investors, US-backed development institutions, and potentially the US federal government if linked to initiatives like an External Revenue Service.

However, the precise mechanisms through which the United States would realize these returns—such as specific investment structures, revenue-sharing agreements, or operational roles—require further elaboration. Detailed financial modeling and bilateral agreements would be necessary to quantify and actualize these benefits. The US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) could help drive this effort by providing early-stage support and risk mitigation for targeted investments in Crossroads of Peace that lay the groundwork for a sustainable US economic footprint across the South Caucasus. This approach would also dovetail with Trump’s broader ambitions to fund government expenditures through foreign-derived revenue rather than domestic taxation. Investing in Crossroads of Peace could therefore fit neatly into this vision, turning geopolitics into a profitable enterprise benefiting the American taxpayer.

The potential for this initiative to succeed under US sponsorship could redefine Washington’s legacy in the South Caucasus and position the Trump administration as the indispensable peace broker in a region historically dominated by rival powers. Given Trump’s record of bold diplomatic efforts, from Ukraine-Russia negotiations to mediation between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo—conflicts still far from resolution—brokering peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan would be a comparatively easy win. It would take little more than a decisive push from Trump to “close the deal” and get Azerbaijan to sign onto terms it has already effectively agreed to, delivering a swift and tangible diplomatic victory.

Why engagement serves Israeli interests

Israel, too, has strong incentives to support the finalization of peace and the development of Armenia’s transit ambitions. Azerbaijan is a close Israeli ally, particularly in terms of energy and security cooperation. Helping to solidify peace with Armenia could deepen these ties while promoting broader regional stability. With trade between Israel and Gulf states, particularly the United Arab Emirates, growing rapidly under the Abraham Accords, Israel could benefit from overland corridors like Crossroads of Peace that improve access to Persian Gulf markets, bypass Iran, and create new logistics, infrastructure, and technology cooperation opportunities. This would enhance Israel’s economic outreach and reduce its exposure to Tehran’s influence in regional supply chains.

Additionally, Israel has historic and cultural ties with Armenia, notably through the Armenian Quarter in Jerusalem, home to one of the oldest continuous Armenian diasporas in the world. A peaceful, economically integrated South Caucasus could open new avenues for Israeli trade, diplomacy, and investment across the region.

Furthermore, a secure peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan would significantly reduce Armenia’s dependence on Iran, which has become one of its few trade and energy lifelines due to closed borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Armenia’s pragmatic relationship with Iran stems more from necessity than ideological alignment. Opening new trade routes through Azerbaijan and Turkey would enable Armenia to break this dependence and accelerate its Westward pivot.

This shift would directly serve Israel’s interests by further isolating Iran economically while allowing Israel to maintain its foothold in Azerbaijan as a counterweight to Iranian threats. Armenia remains one of Iran’s few accessible and expanding trade partners, with Iranian exports to Armenia reaching nearly 600 million dollars in 2023, including petroleum gas, iron, and other industrial goods. The two countries also maintain strategic energy exchanges—notably under a “Gas for Electricity” agreement—and Armenia is Iran’s only direct link to the Eurasian Economic Union. Reducing Armenia’s dependence on Iran through regional normalization would therefore help close a critical commercial and geopolitical corridor for Tehran. At the same time, a more connected and less Iran-dependent Armenia—at peace with its neighbors and increasingly aligned on common regional security concerns—could adopt a more collaborative stance toward Israel’s interests. Turkish officials have made clear, however, that normalization with Azerbaijan is a necessary precondition for reopening the Turkey-Armenia border.

To this end, leveraging Azerbaijan’s growing interest in joining the Abraham Accords could be instrumental. Although Baku has long maintained strong security and energy relations with Israel, formalizing those relations within the Abraham Accords would significantly elevate its international standing. US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff recently indicated that Armenia, too, could be a candidate for future accession—a development that would further reinforce a regional climate of normalization, mutual recognition, and cooperation. Building on this momentum, US-Israeli joint mediation could help encourage Azerbaijan to soften its stance toward Armenia, facilitating the conclusion of a peace agreement that respects Armenia’s sovereignty while satisfying Azerbaijan’s strategic objectives.

Seizing the opportunity

Finalizing peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan offers Washington and Jerusalem a rare chance to tilt the balance of power in one of the world’s most critical yet contested regions. Investing in this moment and helping to overcome the last obstacles to a peace deal—through targeted diplomacy, infrastructure support, and principled mediation—can help secure new trade corridors, weaken adversaries, and build lasting influence at the crossroads of Europe and Asia. Armenia’s Crossroads of Peace is not merely a reconstruction project but a strategic gateway to a more stable, prosperous, and Western-aligned South Caucasus.

That said, a Westward pivot is not without geopolitical risks. Armenia’s deep historical ties with Russia and Iran could make this realignment contentious, especially if viewed as a zero-sum loss by Moscow or Tehran. To mitigate this, the United States and its allies should pair their investment and mediation efforts with clear security and economic guarantees to Armenia, ranging from energy diversification and trade facilitation to defense cooperation and institutional integration. Framing Crossroads of Peace as a shared regional gain, rather than a Western encroachment, will be essential to ensuring its sustainability.

But this opportunity will not remain open for long. It must be seized now.

Sheila Paylan is a human rights lawyer and senior legal consultant with the United Nations.

* The views expressed herein are her own and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations.

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Trump’s Russia policy must be rooted in realism

Agnia Grigas — Thu, 05 Jun 2025 20:50:06 +0000

US President Donald Trump has recently changed his tone toward Russian president Vladimir Putin, suggesting that he has “gone crazy” and is “playing with fire.” This highlights the ongoing difficulties of negotiating with the Kremlin. While the Trump administration broadly favors a realist approach to international relations, a more pragmatic assessment of Russia’s capabilities and objectives could better equip the US to achieve its stated goal of bringing the war in Ukraine to an end.

Almost three months ago, Ukraine accepted a US proposal for a thirty-day unconditional ceasefire. So far, Russia has refused to do likewise. Instead, the Kremlin continues to demand a series of preconditions. Meanwhile, Russia has intensified its missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian civilian targets. When Trump recently backed Putin’s proposal for direct negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, the Russian leader then boycotted the subsequent Istanbul talks, sending only a lower-level delegation.

Within the Trump administration, key figures such as Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth have all articulated their support for a realist view of international relations. This implies sidestepping abstract ideological objectives and focusing on tangible power factors such as economic size, population, geography, and military strength.

The realist viewpoint is reflected in Hegseth’s assertion that Ukraine returning to its pre-2014 borders is “unrealistic.” It can also be seen in Trump’s statements that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy “does not have the cards” in negotiations with Russia, an assertion that seems far less certain in the wake of Ukraine’s successful recent strikes on Russia’s long-distance bombers.

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Some advocates of foreign policy realism argue that the US should seek to accommodate Russia, even at Ukraine’s expense. However, this approach tends to exaggerate Russia’s strengths, while underestimating the importance of the Kremlin’s imperial objectives and the relevant fact that Russian national security doctrine identifies the US as its principal adversary. A more comprehensive realist analysis of Russia reveals that, despite its assertiveness, Moscow’s power is in fact often overstated, while its appetite for compromise is limited.

Compared to the United States, Europe, and NATO, Russia simply does not “hold the cards,” to use Trump’s phrase. Its $2 trillion economy ranks outside the world’s top ten, trailing behind the US, China, Germany, Japan, India, and others. Although Russia has weathered sanctions, the prolonged war since 2022 has left its economy overextended and vulnerable.

The Russian population of 145 million is shrinking and ranks ninth globally, far behind the US and the collective European Union. Militarily, Russia’s large conventional forces have under-performed during the invasion of Ukraine while sustaining heavy losses. Russia’s $146 billion military budget, though substantial relative to neighboring states, pales in comparison to the $968 billion US budget in 2023, or even the collective defense spending of EU member states.

Russia remains a formidable nuclear power and frequently reminds the international community of this fact. Since the very first days of the Ukraine invasion in February 2022, Putin and other Kremlin officials have engaged in regular nuclear saber-rattling. But while Russia is the only nuclear power to make such threats, Putin has repeatedly failed to act when his red lines have been crossed by the Ukrainians, and has been publicly warned by his Chinese allies not to cross the nuclear threshold.

Since 2022, Russia has lost much of its energy leverage and is no longer Europe’s key energy supplier. Meanwhile, the United States has consolidated its position as a leading global energy exporter, particularly in liquefied natural gas (LNG). This is enabling Europe to diversify away from Russia while starving the Kremlin of vital revenue and geopolitical influence.

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In realist terms, Russia’s power surpasses that of its immediate smaller neighbors but falls well short of the US or the European Union as a whole. Countries in Northern, Central, and Eastern Europe view Putin’s ambitions through a realist lens based on centuries of painful experience with Russian imperialism. They understand that Putin’s current goal of reasserting Moscow’s dominance over the territories of the former Soviet Union and Russian Empire is deeply rooted in the Kremlin’s perception of Russian national interests.

President Trump should not fall into the same trap as his predecessors. Past US administrations, from George W. Bush onward, have sought to normalize relations with Moscow but have consistently underestimated Russia’s enduring imperialist objectives. In 2001, Bush famously called Putin “trustworthy” and said he has been able to “get a sense of his soul.” And yet before the end of Bush’s second term, Putin had become increasingly hostile to the West and had invaded Georgia. US President Barack Obama then pursued a “reset” in relations with Russia, only for Putin to invade Ukraine in 2014.

US President Joe Biden initially adopted a similarly optimistic stance toward Moscow, emphasizing the importance of predictable relations with Russia. In May 2021, Biden canceled sanctions on the Kremlin’s Nord Stream II gas pipeline. The following month, he met Putin in Geneva for a bilateral summit that was widely viewed as a further concession to the Russian leader. Less than a year later, Putin launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Looking back, it is clear that US policy toward Russia has often been shaped by the optimism of incoming administrations rather than a sober, realist understanding of Moscow’s longstanding ambitions. A deeper grasp of Russia’s objectives and capabilities could help the Trump administration, alongside European leaders, to negotiate a ceasefire in Ukraine and achieve a durable peace. Approaching the Kremlin from a position of strength, through the implementation of new sanctions on Russia and sustained military support for Ukraine, would be essential tools in securing that peace.

Agnia Grigas is senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and author of “Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire.”

Putin’s punitive peace terms are a call for Ukraine’s complete capitulation

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 03 Jun 2025 21:42:17 +0000

Russian and Ukrainian delegations failed to achieve any meaningful breakthroughs when they met for peace talks in Istanbul on Monday. The event was not a complete waste of time, however. Aside from agreeing on another welcome round of prisoner swaps, the two sides also exchanged peace proposals that confirmed the complete lack of middle ground for any kind of meaningful compromise to end the fighting.

While Ukraine’s proposal laid out a fairly pragmatic vision based on battlefield realities and security concerns, Russia presented punitive peace terms that would reestablish Kremlin control over Kyiv and doom the postwar Ukrainian state to a slow but inevitable death. This uncompromising Russian position should serve as a wake-call for anyone who still believes Putin is negotiating in good faith. In reality, the Russian dictator is more determined than ever to destroy Ukraine, and is merely exploiting US-led peace talks in order to strengthen his hand and divide the West.

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The demands unveiled by the Russian delegation this week in Istanbul came as no surprise and closely mirrored the conditions outlined on numerous prior occasions by Putin and other Kremlin leaders. Nevertheless, at a time when US President Donald Trump is publicly pressing for progress toward peace, the Russian decision to deliver such a maximalist memorandum sent a clear message of defiance to Washington DC.

As expected, Moscow reiterated its call for Ukraine to withdraw completely from four Ukrainian provinces that Russia currently claims as its own but has been unable to fully occupy. This would oblige the Ukrainian authorities to hand over a number of major cities and condemn millions of their compatriots to indefinite Russian occupation. Kyiv would also be expected to officially cede these regions together with Crimea, paving the way for international recognition of Russia’s conquests.

This crushing territorial settlement is only one aspect of Russia’s vision for the comprehensive dismantling of Ukrainian statehood. In line with Putin’s peace terms, Ukraine would be forced to accept limitations on the size of its army and on the categories of weapons it is allowed to possess. The country would be also be barred from joining any military blocs or concluding alliances with foreign nations. It does not take much imagination to guess what Putin has in mind for Ukraine once it has been successfully disarmed and internationally isolated.

Nor is that all. The Kremlin’s conditions actually go much further and aim to transform Ukraine from within in ways that would erase Ukrainian identity along with the country’s political independence. Moscow’s memorandum called on Ukraine to grant Russian the status of official state language, reinstate the privileges of the Russian Orthodox Church, and adopt a Kremlin-friendly version of Ukrainian history. Meanwhile, all so-called “nationalist” Ukrainian political parties would be banned, paving the way for the installation of a puppet regime in Kyiv.

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On the morning after this week’s bilateral meeting, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev confirmed the true objective of Russia’s participation in peace talks. “The Istanbul talks are not for striking a compromise peace on someone else’s delusional terms,” commented Medvedev, who currently serves as deputy chairman of Russia’s powerful National Security Council. Instead, Medvedev stated that Russia’s goal was to secure victory and ensure “the complete destruction of the neo-Nazi regime,” which is widely recognized as Kremlin code for the Ukrainian state. “That’s what the Russian memorandum published yesterday is about,” he noted.

Medvedev’s frank appraisal of the Russian position won him sarcastic praise from US Senator Lindsey Graham. “Congratulations to Mr. Medvedev for a rare moment of honesty coming from the Russian propaganda machine,” commented Trump ally Graham. “I appreciate you making it clear to the world that Putin and Russia are not remotely interested in peace.”

It is hard to argue with Graham’s assessment. For the past few months, Putin has gone out of his way to demonstrate that he has absolutely no intention of ending the war. While Ukraine has accepted a US proposal for an unconditional ceasefire, Putin has repeatedly refused to do so. Instead, he has engaged in transparent stalling tactics that make a mockery of the entire peace process.

Away from the negotiating table, Putin has dramatically increased drone and missile attacks on Ukrainian cities, killing and wounding hundreds of civilians. On the battlefield, his armies are currently engaged in the early stages what is shaping up to be one of the biggest Russian offensives of the entire war. These are not the actions of a man who seeks peace.

After this week’s fresh confirmation of Moscow’s undiminished imperial ambitions in Ukraine, it is now surely time to abandon any lingering delusions and accept that the Russian dictator will not stop until he is stopped. Putin believes he is on a messianic mission to extinguish Ukrainian statehood and revive the Russian Empire. He currently thinks he is winning this historic struggle and will not be swayed by Trump’s comparatively trivial talk of tariffs and trade deals.

The only thing that can change Putin’s mind is Western strength. As long as Putin is confident of eventual victory, he will continue. But if the alternative to a peace deal is a potentially crushing defeat, he may reconsider. To achieve this change, Western leaders must demonstrate a degree of collective resolve that has often been absent over the past three years. They must sanction Russia to the max and arm Ukraine to the teeth. This will require considerable political will and good old-fashioned courage in Western capitals. Ukraine will do the rest.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Welcome to the long war: Why a Ukraine deal was never realistic

Brian Whitmore — Thu, 29 May 2025 19:10:44 +0000

This war will be decided on the battlefield.

Four months of chaotic shuttle diplomacy aimed at reaching a cease-fire in Ukraine, multiple phone calls between US President Donald Trump and Kremlin leader Vladimir Putin, repeated US attempts to pressure, browbeat, and bully Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy into concessions, have all yielded exactly nothing.

Which is not in the least bit surprising. Because there is no deal to be had with Russia on Ukraine. There never has been, and there never will be.

There is simply no magic formula, no concession, and no grand bargain that would satisfy the Kremlin’s maximalist and eliminationist goals. Moscow wants to end Ukraine’s sovereignty, nationhood, and statehood. Ukraine wants to continue to exist as an independent sovereign state. Given this, no compromise is possible. Any Kabuki negotiations or Potemkin cease-fire would be meaningless and treated by the Kremlin as nothing more than a strategic pause and an opportunity for sanctions relief.

“Russian imperialism will not be neutralized by negotiations, compromises, or concessions,” Andreas Umland, an analyst at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies and an associate professor at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, wrote on May 22.

Following his latest call with Trump, Putin said he wanted any settlement to address what he called the “root causes of the crisis.” That choice of phrase was no accident. The Kremlin leader used a similar formulation when addressing the issue of ending the war during a joint press conference with Belarusian strongman Alyaksandr Lukashenka in March.

Putin’s repeated use of the term “root cause” is a tell. For the Kremlin leader, the root cause of the war is the very existence of Ukraine as a sovereign state, which he has long seen as anathema. At the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest, Putin made this clear when he told then US President George W. Bush that “Ukraine is not even a state.” Putin has also repeatedly referred to Ukraine as “little Russia,” a Tsarist-era term to describe Ukrainian lands.

For Putin and the Kremlin elite, Russian colonial dominance of Ukraine is an ideological issue that is not subject to negotiation. The Kremlin cannot be persuaded, it can only be defeated.

Russia’s game: decouple the war from relations with Washington

If anyone doubts Russia’s intentions, then recent remarks by Vladimir Medinsky, one of Putin’s court ideologists and the Kremlin’s chief representative at recent talks in Istanbul, should put them to rest. “Russia,” Medinsky told the Ukrainian delegation, “is prepared to fight forever.” He added, in reference to the Northern War of 1700-1721, which elevated Russia to the status of an empire, “we fought Sweden for twenty-one years. How long are you ready to fight?”

But with the front line largely static and Russia making miniscule gains with high casualties, forever may turn out to be a very long time and have a very steep cost.

According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), in the first four months of 2025, Russia advanced just 1,627 square kilometers on the front in eastern Ukraine while suffering 160,600 casualties. That’s a staggeringly high ninety-nine casualties for every square kilometer of territory. ISW also estimates that “at this rate of advance, it would take Russian forces approximately 3.9 years to seize the remainder of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts,” the four regions Putin has claimed to have annexed. Moreover, according to ISW, it would take nearly a century to seize all of Ukraine save its Western border regions at a cost of nearly fifty million casualties—which is roughly one third Russia’s current population.

The economics of the war are also not trending in Moscow’s favor. As Charles Lichfield, deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center wrote in February, “while Moscow has found ways to mitigate the impact of [Western sanctions], growing deficits, unsustainable subsidies, and the rising cost of debt servicing” are putting severe strain on the Russian economy.

Additionally, a widely circulated report by Craig Kennedy of Harvard University’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies suggests that the “surprising resilience” that the media and analysts have been seeing in the Russian economy is largely a mirage. According to Kennedy’s research, published earlier this year, the war is largely being financed by concessionary off-the-books loans to defense contractors at well below market interest rates. Simply put, this is not sustainable over the long term.

Given this, the Kremlin’s goal vis-à-vis the United States is to decouple the war from Russia-US relations, normalize relations between Moscow and Washington, and get sanctions relief. In a speech in late February, Putin said that Moscow “would be happy to cooperate with any foreign partners, including American companies” to secure rare-earth-minerals deals. Putin added that lifting sanctions could lead to a profitable new economic relationship between the United States and Russia, particularly in the energy sector.

Putin, of course, wants an economic rapprochement without ending his quest to conquer Ukraine. Russia has continued to pound Ukrainian cities with aerial assaults, resulting in mass civilian casualties even as he seeks to entice Washington economically.

And for his part, Trump appears open to the idea. Following his most recent call with Putin, the US president indicated a desire to establish normal economic relations with Moscow. This would be a grave error, as it would throw Putin a lifeline to continue his war of aggression.

Fortunately, there does appear to be pushback in Washington. The Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025, which would expand existing penalties on Russia, was introduced in the US Senate by South Carolina Republican Lindsey Graham and Connecticut Democrat Richard Blumenthal and has more than eighty cosponsors.

Europe’s moment and Ukraine’s resolve

For its part, the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom have already moved ahead with their own new package of sanctions enacted on May 20, a day after the latest Trump-Putin call. Brussels and London are also pledging to increase military assistance to Ukraine to make up for any shortfall resulting from a US cutoff.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and the EU’s top diplomat, Kaja Kallas, all seem to understand that this could be Europe’s moment. But one of the biggest wildcards going forward is whether Europe can overcome its internal divisions—mainly opposition from Hungary and Slovakia—and surge arms to Ukraine.

Which brings us to Ukraine itself—and here the calculations are simple. As the Ukrainian political scientist Anton Shekhovtsov wrote earlier this week, “Ukraine’s choices are to fight back and risk being killed, or to surrender and be killed. By fighting back, Ukraine has a chance; by surrendering, it has none—making surrender not a viable option.”

And for Ukraine, as always, necessity has become the mother of invention. Faced with a potential shortfall in weapons, Kyiv has created a vibrant domestic arms industry focusing on drone warfare.

“In just three years, Ukraine’s military has evolved from defending itself with leftover Soviet weapons to pioneering a new kind of warfare,” the Ukrainian war correspondent Nataliya Gumenyuk writes in the Atlantic.

“Fortunately for Ukraine, American weapons are not the only factor that has rebalanced the battlefield in the past three years. Starting in 2024, Ukrainian-made drones definitively changed the way both sides waged war. For Ukraine, the adjustment was not just tactical, but a broader, doctrinal evolution in how its military fights.”

Gumenyuk concludes by noting that “as Ukraine’s partners speak of peace deals and security guarantees, Ukraine’s armed forces are adapting in every way they can to continue carrying out their mission . . . They cannot afford the luxury of counting on American commitments or Russian concessions, because for most Ukrainians, what matters above all is physical safety. And the only force protecting human lives in Ukraine is the Ukrainian military.”

So here we are, after three years of war and four months of failed diplomacy to end it. This war will be decided on the battlefield. It is for the United States and Europe to decide whether they are prepared to help Ukraine win it.

Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Eurasia Center, an assistant professor of practice at the University of Texas-Arlington, and host of The Power Vertical Podcast.

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Dispatch from Dayton: What Trump can learn about ending war

Frederick Kempe — Wed, 28 May 2025 22:30:00 +0000

DAYTON, Ohio—US President Donald Trump could learn a lot about how to best end Russia’s murderous war on Ukraine, now into its fourth year, from the US experience here thirty years ago in negotiating what became known as the Dayton Peace Accords.

If Trump wants to stop Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war, and he has made that an administration priority, then he should reflect on what it took to finally stop Serbian President Slobodan Milošević in 1995—after nearly four years of killing and more than 100,000 dead, including the massacre at Srebrenica, Europe’s worst genocide since the Holocaust.

A deal required relentless US diplomatic engagement backed by a demonstrated military threat and carried out alongside unified European allies. It also took twenty-one days of intensive negotiations in Dayton—not involving then US President Bill Clinton until the end—while all parties were cloistered from media and outside influences at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base.

Marking the Dayton anniversary, Ohio Congressman Mike Turner brought the NATO Parliamentary Assembly here last week, gathering delegates from the thirty-two allies as well as from partner countries. They joined leaders from the Western Balkans, assorted experts, and even the Sarajevo Philharmonic, which performed for participants in a giant hangar stocked with presidential aircraft in the National Museum of the US Air Force.

Though I came to commemorate history, I left having interrogated its architects. My aim was to gain clues that might help the Trump administration in its still-fruitless quest for an end to Russia’s war on Ukraine.

It would be easy to discount the lessons for Ukraine and Russia now, where the stakes are so much higher, from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia then. Nuclear-armed Russia has two hundred times the land mass of Serbia and more than twenty times its population. And Ukraine, with its pre-war population of forty million and France-sized territory, is more than ten times larger in geographic size and population than Bosnia-Herzegovina. In my view, that makes the lessons only more compelling.

The first lesson? “Peace agreements are extremely rare,” former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt, the European Union’s special representative at the talks thirty years ago, said in a session of former officials that I moderated. “In modern European history, there are only two really: Dayton and the Good Friday Agreement,” which in 1998 ended a thirty-year conflict in Northern Ireland known as “the Troubles.”

Both were forged in the aftermath of horrific violence, which is also the case in Ukraine. Yet both also required something that is still lacking today: determined, focused, and creative US leadership in lockstep with European partners. Both also succeeded through disciplined diplomacy, military leverage, and the unglamorous work of compromise.

Beyond that, winning peace in Dayton demanded US credibility but not neutrality. At Dayton, the United States was not an impartial mediator but rather a focused powerbroker, using whatever muscle was necessary to shape the outcome. No lasting deal can reward Putin’s aggression, just as Dayton didn’t knuckle under to reward Milošević.

Another lesson is that building peace is as crucial as ending war. Dayton and Belfast were both followed by years of international engagement, economic aid, and security commitments. Peace might have collapsed had those efforts not continued.

Most importantly, the United States led but did not go it alone. Peace that endures requires multilateral support. Dayton hasn’t worked perfectly, but without the European Union and NATO it wouldn’t have worked at all. “Only when the international actors can get together with a uniform message and policy can results be achieved,” said Bildt, who is also an Atlantic Council International Advisory Board member. “There was success in Dayton, yes. But it should also be said that there was massive failure prior to Dayton due to disagreements across the Atlantic, disagreements in Europe, and disagreements in the United States.”

US General Wesley Clark, who at the time was the military right hand to Richard Holbrooke, the chief US negotiator, took away a different lesson: “Don’t be timid,” Clark, a member of the Atlantic Council Board of Directors, said to the NATO parliamentarians. “We are going to have to be unified. And we are going to have to be forceful enough to convince Putin he will not win. Right now, he thinks he’s winning.”

In a slap across the face of Trump’s efforts to broker peace, Putin from last Friday to Sunday launched what Ukrainian officials called the largest combined aerial assault of the conflict, including some nine hundred drones and dozens of missiles of various types. That prompted a frustrated Trump to write on Truth Social about Putin that “something has happened to him. He has gone absolutely CRAZY!” The US president added that “missiles and drones are being shot into Cities in Ukraine, for no reason whatsoever.”

The problem is that there’s nothing crazy about Putin’s calculations, and his reasons are obvious. He’s trying to wear down Ukraine and its partners, and he’s betting that he has more staying power. He sees US military and diplomatic support in retreat, European efforts as insufficient, and Ukraine as weary. Trump has belatedly acknowledged that Putin has been “tapping” him along.

With all that in mind, Washington will have to try far harder now than it did then to change a murderous despot’s mind—or resign itself to accepting Putin’s ongoing war and its ambition to redraw the European map.

Until Washington stood up to Milošević in 1995, Clark said, the Serb leader thought he could pull the wool over Europe’s eyes with his small army overrunning Bosnia. When he bid farewell to Milošević at the end of the talks, Clark remembers the Balkan leader saying, “We Serbs never had a chance against your NATO, your airplanes, your missiles.”

Speaking with me at the same NATO session, Christopher R. Hill, who was part of the Holbrooke delegation in Dayton, added another important lesson—that the parties must be ready to end the war. “I am not sure Russia is ready for peace,” he said. “They should be, but they don’t seem to be. I think until they are, we have got to help Ukraine because a hundred years from now . . . our grandchildren, our great-grandchildren, will be thinking about what we did to deal with this crisis.”

The Dayton Accords were not perfect, but they were proof of what US leadership can achieve when properly applied. Speaking in Bosnia-Herzegovina shortly after the agreement was finalized, the then US president explained why the United States had chosen to lead, rather than cut and run from the European conflict.

“Around the world, people look to America not just because of our size and strength but because of what we stand for and what we’re willing to stand against,” Clinton said. “And though it imposes extra burdens on us, people trust us to help them share in the blessings of peace. We can’t be everywhere . . . But where we can make a difference, where our values and our interests are at stake, we must act.”

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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A remarkable week for a rising Turkey

Frederick Kempe — Sat, 17 May 2025 12:00:00 +0000

Geography is destiny.

The quote is sometimes attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte, but it might as well also be the working motto of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

This past week, Erdoğan strung together a trio of geopolitical wins that underscored his success in leveraging his country’s size, military capability, and—perhaps most of all—geographic position to achieve outsize influence.

Erdoğan did this despite facing some of the biggest political protests he has weathered in years following the imprisonment of his political rival, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu. It’s no wonder Erdoğan is harnessing international gains to shore up his domestic position.

The first victory was US President Donald Trump’s decision to lift sanctions on Syria’s new government. Turkey played a catalytic role in the December ouster of Bashar al-Assad, Erdoğan’s nemesis who had ruled Syria since 2000, when he succeeded his father. It was fitting that Trump included Erdoğan by phone in his meeting this week in Riyadh with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa.

Second, the Kurdish militant group known as the PKK announced this week that it will disband and end its armed struggle after months of Turkish backchannel diplomacy. There’s still a risk that the PKK could fragment into smaller groups that attack Turkey, but for now, the development is a win for the country’s security.

Third, Istanbul played host to the first direct peace talks between Ukrainian and Russian officials since March 2022, with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio also flying in from a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in the Turkish town of Antalya. Russian President Vladimir Putin was a no-show, which kept Trump from traveling to Turkey as well, and the two-hour meeting appears to have been fruitless. Yet it underscored Erdoğan’s ability to navigate both Moscow and Kyiv even while providing Ukraine with armed drones.

For years, some Western officials and analysts have dismissed Erdoğan as a populist authoritarian whose inflation-ridden economy was troubled and whose geopolitical ambitions were fantasy. But it now rings truer when Erdoğan says, as he did in December, “Turkey is bigger than Turkey. As a nation, we cannot limit our horizon to 782,000 square kilometers.”

None of this week’s wins are permanent. The jury is out on whether Syria’s new leadership can hold the country together. The PKK peace is fragile. Ukraine-Russia talks still don’t seem to be going anywhere. And other pressing questions remain unresolved, such as whether Erdoğan will be able to successfully manage relations with Israel given Israeli security concerns about the expanded Turkish military presence in Syria. However all that turns out, Erdoğan’s focus remains on protecting both his legacy and longevity after more than twenty years as prime minister and then president.

We might be a long way from a Pax Turcica. For now, however, Erdoğan and Turkey have gained relevance as an indispensable player from the Black Sea to the Levant, and from Central Asia to Europe, where the Turkish military will play a crucial role if Europe is to have the wherewithal to provide for Ukraine’s security—and its own.

What I’m reading

With doubts growing within NATO about the US nuclear umbrella, French President Emmanuel Macron specified three conditions for extending the protection of France’s nuclear weapons to European allies. We’ll keep monitoring the Trump transatlantic fallout.

“How do you know the day that you become old?” legendary investor Warren Buffett this week asked the Wall Street Journal as he announced he was stepping back at age ninety-four (for him, it was at age ninety).

We interrupt this report for an inflection point in US baseball, my non-geopolitical passion. Call me old-fashioned, but I hope the Hall of Fame won’t ever induct baseball’s all-time hits leader Pete Rose, who passed away last September, given his gambling on baseball. That said, I wish he’d lived to see Major League Baseball lift its banishment of “Charlie Hustle” from the game.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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To achieve his goal of a durable peace, Trump must turn up the pressure on Putin

John E. Herbst — Fri, 16 May 2025 22:29:48 +0000

This is the first in a series of regular assessments of the efforts, spearheaded by the Trump administration, to achieve a negotiated end to Russia’s war on Ukraine.

The results are now in from the first direct talks between Russia and Ukraine since the revelations of Russian atrocities in the Ukrainian cities of Bucha and Irpin three years ago. And one thing is clear: It remains Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aim to seize more territory so that he can achieve effective political control over Ukraine.

The talks were productive in the important but limited sense that the sides agreed to each exchange one thousand prisoners of war. But the parties took no steps toward an eventual end to the hostilities, as the Kremlin negotiators insisted that Ukrainian troops withdraw from areas of Ukraine that Moscow has “annexed.”

This is just the latest twist on the roller coaster that is the negotiating process to end Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The Trump administration’s approach to a negotiated peace has required compromise from both Ukraine and Russia. Ukraine was asked to accept de facto Kremlin control of Ukrainian territory that Russia currently occupies and to put its aspirations for NATO membership on hold. Washington has asked Russia to accept the presence of European troops in Ukraine as a peacekeeping force and ongoing Western arms supplies to Kyiv to deter future Russian aggression. Ukraine has largely accepted these terms; Russia has not. Ukraine agreed without objection to the mid-March general cease-fire that the United States proposed, as well as the naval cease-fire in late March. Russia rejected both. Each side agreed to a cease-fire involving energy installations that same month, but Moscow violated it within hours.

The Trump administration’s approach through late April was hobbled by its unwillingness to put pressure on Moscow for rejecting the general and naval cease-fires, which contrasted with the severe pressure the US administration put on Ukraine after the difficult Oval Office meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on February 28. When Moscow refused the United States’ proposal for a naval cease-fire, the White House’s approach was to offer Russia more carrots, which prompted substantial criticism from Trump-friendly newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal and the New York Post, as well as from some Republicans on Capitol Hill. This tendency continued in late April as the White House proposed the truly damaging concession of recognizing Russian control of Crimea.

All of this changed—at least for the moment—when the United States and Ukraine inked the critical minerals deal on April 30. The deal included a paragraph in which, for the first time, the Trump administration mentioned the possibility of new US weapons going to Ukraine. It was no coincidence that at the same time, the White House separately approved two modest shipments of weapons to Ukraine. While the Trump administration did not stress this point publicly, the approval of the weapons shipments clearly complicated Putin’s efforts to take more Ukrainian land. It is worth noting that in response to criticism of its weak approach toward the Kremlin, the Trump administration has been talking for weeks about putting new sanctions on Russia. So far, however, it has not acted on these threats.

At the same time, Zelenskyy has been continuing to leverage his relationships with key European allies. He hit paydirt last weekend when the leaders of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Poland joined him in Kyiv to demand that Russia agree to a general cease-fire by May 12, threatening new sanctions if the Kremlin did not agree. Those leaders also called US President Donald Trump during their meeting and sought his support. He did not discourage them.

As circumstances grew unfavorable for him, Putin parried with a proposal for direct talks between Russia and Ukraine in Istanbul—a bid to delay progress on a cease-fire, avoid sanctions, and split Trump from the Europeans. At first, the gamble seemed to pay off. Zelenskyy immediately denounced the idea as a Russian stalling tactic and said Ukraine would not participate. But Trump reacted quickly as well; while skeptical that Russia wanted peace, he called on Zelenskyy to engage. Demonstrating his diplomatic nimbleness, Zelenskyy swiftly changed his mind and announced his intention to got to Istanbul.

This prompted a change of position in Moscow, with Putin announcing that he would not participate in the talks and Russian media criticizing the very concept of these talks—without mentioning that they were Putin’s idea. While Putin did not split off the Trump administration from Europe, his gambit did block the plans of Ukraine, Poland, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany to impose sanctions against Russia this week. And the instincts of the Trump team made that possible. After encouraging Zelenskyy to go to Turkey to negotiate, Trump provided cover for Putin’s cynical decision not to attend the talks. Trump said it was natural for Putin not to attend since, he, Trump, would not be there.

On Thursday, Trump declared that there will be no real progress toward peace until he and Putin sit down together. Trump may well be right about that—but only if he makes clear that if the Kremlin continues to reject reasonable compromises, the United States will send major new arms supplies to Ukraine and levy additional economic sanctions against Russia.

John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

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How much longer will Putin be allowed to continue stalling for time?

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 13 May 2025 21:59:27 +0000

The leaders of Britain, France, Germany, and Poland arrived in Kyiv last weekend amid much fanfare to deliver an unprecedented ultimatum to the Kremlin. The time for talk was over, they announced. If Russian President Vladimir Putin did not agree to an unconditional 30-day ceasefire by Monday, he would face tough new sanctions and increased weapons transfers to Ukraine. “All of us here, together with the US, are calling Putin out. If he’s serious about peace, then he has a chance to show it now,” declared British Prime Minister Keir Starmer.

For a brief moment, it seemed possible that this bold move could revive faltering peace efforts. After all, if Putin agreed to a ceasefire, the way would be open for more substantive negotiations. If he refused, the West would now be obliged to turn up the pressure on Moscow and force Russia to rethink its position. Putin, however, had other ideas. At a hastily arranged midnight press conference in the Kremlin, he chose not to directly address the West’s ultimatum, and instead proposed bilateral talks with Ukraine.

Putin’s announcement that he was ready to resume negotiations with the Ukrainian authorities for the first time since the initial months of the war succeeded in overshadowing Saturday’s ultimatum. It also undermined any fleeting sense of Western unity and decisiveness. Predictably, US President Donald Trump was the first to break ranks, posting a statement urging Ukraine to “immediately” accept Putin’s offer in order to determine whether a peace deal is actually possible.

Elsewhere, confusion reigned. Was the original ultimatum still in place? There seemed to be no clear answer. In Berlin, German officials stated on Monday that “the clock is ticking,” but then took no action when their subsequent midnight deadline came and went. Meanwhile, according to Bloomberg, the Kyiv quartet quietly decided to wait until after a potential Russia-Ukraine meeting on Thursday in Istanbul before taking any action. This was the exact opposite of US President Theodore Roosevelt’s famous foreign policy advice to “speak softly and carry a big stick.” European leaders had instead opted to speak very loudly while carrying no stick at all.

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Putin’s evasive response to last weekend’s ceasefire ultimatum was wholly in line with his elusive approach to the entire US-led peace process. Since tentative talks first began in February, Putin has consistently voiced his support for peace. At the same time, he has offered endless excuses and presented a long list of additional demands that make genuine progress toward a peaceful settlement of the war virtually impossible. At one point, he even questioned the legitimacy of the Ukrainian authorities and suggested the country should be placed under United Nations administration.

In contrast, Ukraine has demonstrated a readiness to make compromises in the interests of peace. Kyiv has acknowledged that any negotiated settlement will likely leave Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine under de facto Kremlin control, and has backed a US proposal for a 30-day unconditional ceasefire. It came as no surprise on Sunday when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy promptly agreed with Trump’s call to accept the Russian offer of bilateral talks. In the current climate, even the most obtuse of observers cannot help but conclude that Putin is now the main obstacle to peace.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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It remains theoretically possible that this week’s proposed bilateral talks will lead to some kind of breakthrough, but past experience suggests there is very little prospect of any real progress. On the contrary, negotiations are far more likely to end inconclusively, with the Russian delegation offering up just enough false hope to justify yet another round of time-consuming meetings. The real question is how long Putin will be allowed to continue engaging in stalling tactics before Western patience finally runs out.

It should be obvious by now that Putin has no genuine interest in ending the war. He refuses to offer any meaningful concessions and continues to insist on maximalist peace terms that would leave postwar Ukraine partitioned, disarmed, isolated, and defenseless in the face of future Russian aggression. It does not require much imagination to anticipate exactly what Putin has planned for Ukraine if his conditions are met.

Anyone who thinks Putin is willing to compromise over Ukraine clearly does not understand his profoundly revisionist worldview or his imperial ambitions. While Western leaders speak about the need for diplomatic dialogue and mutual concessions, Putin himself views the current invasion in far more existential terms as an historic mission to reverse the Soviet collapse and revive the Russian Empire.

The Russian leader is perfectly happy to entertain the idea of negotiations in order to buy time and weaken Western resolve, but in reality he has no intention of stopping until Ukrainian statehood has been extinguished. Trump has made a legitimate effort to broker a generous peace, but the time has now come to acknowledge that Putin is not negotiating in good faith and will only respond to the language of strength.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

This rapid shift from Vance’s isolationist rhetoric to high-stakes diplomacy demonstrates the global stakes of nuclear crises and the impossibility of dismissing them as regional concerns. A nuclear exchange would devastate any region, disrupt trade routes, spike energy prices, and generate millions of refugees, overwhelming international systems. Radioactive fallout would pose environmental risks far beyond the countries involved, directly impacting US economic and security interests.

Those stakes are why the United States must prevent Iran’s regime from retaining the technological capability to develop nuclear weapons. Allowing Tehran such capabilities risks replicating the perilous dynamics of the South Asian nuclear standoff, with profound global consequences.

Vance’s initial claim that the conflict was “none of our business” ignored these consequences, but the crisis’s rapid escalation forced US action. The Iran nuclear negotiations must internalize this lesson.

Tehran’s regime, with its history of supporting proxy groups such as Hezbollah and the Houthis, has demonstrated a propensity for destabilization, as seen in the 2019 Aramco attack. If Iran retains the technological infrastructure for nuclear weapons, it could leverage the threat of weaponization to escalate regional aggression or actively work clandestinely to develop a weapon, creating a crisis that, like India and Pakistan’s, becomes a global liability.

The South Asian crisis also illustrates how nuclear technology can embolden provocative behavior under the guise of deterrence. India’s retaliation for the April 22 attack, which it blamed on Pakistan, and Pakistan’s counterstrikes reflect a cycle of escalation enabled by mutual nuclear capabilities. Despite Vance’s hope that the conflict would not “spiral into a broader regional war or, God forbid, a nuclear conflict,” the rapid deterioration necessitated US intervention.

Iran poses an even greater risk. With nuclear technology, Tehran could intensify proxy operations—Hezbollah targeting Israel or the Houthis disrupting Red Sea shipping—confident that its potential nuclear arsenal deters retaliation. This could spark a regional arms race, with Saudi Arabia and others pursuing nuclear capabilities, heightening the risk of miscalculation.

The India-Pakistan experience highlights the challenges of managing nuclear-armed states. Decades of diplomacy have failed to resolve their tensions, as mutual distrust and nuclear arsenals perpetuate a fragile stalemate. Iran’s history of evading International Atomic Energy Agency oversight and prolonging negotiations, as seen with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, suggests similar challenges. The United States must pursue a stringent approach in the negotiations that lie ahead, demanding that Iran dismantle its nuclear weaponization infrastructure, backed by robust verification, sustained sanctions, and a credible military deterrent.

The latest India-Pakistan crisis, triggered by a terrorist attack and propelled to the brink of nuclear conflict, forced Vance to abandon his “none of our business” posture and engage urgently to avert catastrophe. Like it or not, Washington carries a heavy burden in these crises, and that’s why it must ensure Iran cannot develop nuclear weapons—before it’s too late.

Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. He leads the initiative’s Counterterrorism Project. He is currently a principal and industry director at Providence Consulting Group for aerospace, defense, and high-tech electronics.

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Russia’s coming summer offensive could be deadliest of the entire war

Mykola Bielieskov — Thu, 08 May 2025 15:08:20 +0000

As the US-led peace initiative continues to falter, the unfolding summer campaigning season in Ukraine promises to be among the bloodiest of the entire war. In the coming months, Russia is hoping to build on more than a year of gradual advances to achieve breakthroughs on the eastern front, while Ukraine aims to demonstrate to the country’s partners that it is capable of stopping Putin’s war machine and holding the line.

While the Kremlin insists it is ready for peace, developments on the battlefield tell a different story. According to Britain’s Ministry of Defense, Russia is intensifying its offensive operations and sustained approximately 160,000 casualties during the first four months of the current year, the highest total for this period since the start of the full-scale invasion. If this trend continues during the coming fighting season, 2025 will be the deadliest year of the war in terms of Russian losses.

Russia’s strategy continues to rely on costly frontal assaults, but the nature of these attacks is steadily evolving. Russian troops now increasingly employ motorbikes and other improvised vehicles to advance in small groups and infiltrate Ukraine’s defensive lines. These assaults are backed by strike drones, glide bombs, and artillery, making it difficult for Ukraine to direct reinforcements to hot spots or provide medical and engineering support. The end goal is to force Ukrainian tactical withdrawals and inch further forward.

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Ukraine’s defensive strategy is focused primarily on attrition. This includes remote mining to channel advancing Russian troops into kill zones, along with the extensive use of traditional artillery. Ukraine’s expanding drone army is also playing a crucial role, making it possible to target Russian units at depths of up to 15 kilometers behind the line of contact.

By increasing drone coverage along the front lines, Ukrainian commanders aim to hamper the logistics of Putin’s invasion force and significantly reduce the potential for future Russian advances. This approach is being dubbed the “drone wall,” and may well come to play a far biggest role in efforts to freeze the front lines. However, Russia is also rapidly innovating to address Ukraine’s growing drone capabilities, leading to a relentless technological contest that runs in parallel to the fighting on the battlefield.

As the Russian army currently holds the initiative and is advancing at various points along the front lines of the war, Putin’s commanders can choose from a range of potential locations as they look to identify geographical priorities for their summer offensive.

At present, Russia is expanding a foothold in northeastern Ukraine’s Sumy region after largely pushing Ukrainian formations out of Russia’s Kursk region. There have also been recent localized Russian advances in the Kharkiv region. However, the main thrust over the next few months is expected to come in eastern Ukraine, where Russia has concentrated forces in the Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka sectors. Success in these sectors could create the conditions for the occupation of the entire Donetsk region, which remains Russia’s most immediate political objective.

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While Putin is under no pressure on the home front, he will be keen to achieve some kind of meaningful breakthrough in the coming months in order to demonstrate to domestic and international audiences that the Russian army is capable to achieving victory in Ukraine. He recently stated that Russia has “sufficient strength and resources to take the war in Ukraine to its logical conclusion,” but the fact remains that his army has failed to capture and hold a single Ukrainian regional capital in more than three years of brutal warfare.

For war-weary Ukraine, the coming summer campaign will be a major test of endurance. If Ukrainian forces are able to prevent any significant Russian advances despite dwindling supplies of US military aid, it would serve as a powerful argument for pro-Ukrainian politicians in Europe and the United States. This would likely lead to strengthened support for the Ukrainian war effort, and could help convince skeptics in the Trump White House to adopt a firmer stance toward Russia.

The Ukrainian authorities have already accepted a US proposal for an unconditional 30-day ceasefire and remain ready to pursue a sustainable peace settlement. But with Russia showing little sign of following suit, Ukraine faces another long summer of brutal fighting.

The Kremlin’s current negotiating position would leave postwar Ukraine partitioned, isolated, and defenseless. Any peace on such terms would almost certainly mean the end of Ukrainian statehood. Instead, Ukraine must continue to defend itself while hoping that Russia’s ability to sustain heavy losses declines faster than the West’s collective commitment to stopping Putin.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

Putin is escalating the war in Ukraine. He will not stop until he is stopped.

Alyona Nevmerzhytska — Tue, 06 May 2025 14:37:12 +0000

Almost two months ago, Ukraine agreed to a United States proposal for an unconditional 30-day ceasefire. Russia still refuses to do likewise. Instead, Putin continues to engage in stalling tactics while escalating the war.

Since US-led peace talks began in February, Russia has carried out some of the deadliest attacks of the entire invasion targeting Ukrainian civilians. These have included a ballistic missile strike on a playground in Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s hometown, Kryvyi Rih, that killed 18 people including 9 children. On Palm Sunday, Russia launched targeted strike on Sumy city center as civilians made their way to church, leaving 35 dead.

Some of these attacks have made international headlines. Many more have not. Every single day, the population in front line Ukrainian cities like Kharkiv in the east and Kherson in the south face relentless Russian bombardment. At night, millions of Ukrainians are forced to seek shelter as Russia launches wave after wave of missiles and drones at targets across the country.

As Russia intensifies its air offensive against Ukraine’s civilian population, the death toll is rising. According to UN officials, the number of Ukrainian casualties has spiked recently. During the first 24 days of April, 848 civilians were killed or wounded, representing a 46 percent increase on the same period one year ago.

Meanwhile, Russia is also escalating its offensive operations on the battlefield as Putin’s commanders seek to wear down Ukrainian resistance and achieve a breakthrough. This is leading to mounting Russian losses. The UK Ministry of Defense reports that in the first four months of 2025, Russia suffered approximately 160,000 casualties. If the current rate of attrition persists, this will become the costliest year of the war for Putin’s invading army.

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Despite extensive evidence of Russia’s intention to escalate the invasion, the United States continues to pursue a vision of peace through compromise. Since talks began, the Trump administration has offered the Kremlin a range of concessions while pressuring Ukraine to back down on key issues such as the country’s NATO ambitions. A recent US peace proposal indicated that President Trump may even be prepared to officially recognize Russia’s 2014 seizure of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula.

The tone of American diplomacy has shifted noticeably since Trump returned to the White House, with US officials now seeking to avoid any direct condemnation of Russia. In line with this new strategy, the United States has sided with Moscow on a number of occasions to vote against UN resolutions critical of the Kremlin. The US has also stepped back from international efforts to hold Russia accountable for alleged war crimes committed in Ukraine, defunding one flagship program and exiting another.

The Trump administration’s conciliatory approach toward Russia does not appear to be working. Far from offering concessions of his own, Putin has responded to the new US administration’s peace initiative by doubling down on his maximalist war aims. The Kremlin dictator insists on international recognition for Russia’s claims to Ukrainian territory, and demands that any peace deal must leave Ukraine disarmed and internationally isolated.

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The current lack of progress toward peace should come as no surprise. After all, the experience of the past two decades has demonstrated that there is nothing more likely to provoke Putin than weakness. When the West chose not to punish Russia for the 2008 invasion of Georgia, this paved the way for the 2014 invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. The underwhelming Western response to Putin’s initial assault on Ukrainian sovereignty then set the stage for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Russian’s sense of impunity is now a crucial factor fueling the largest European invasion since World War II. While Putin is always ready to engage in diplomatic maneuvers, his evasive actions in recent months confirm that he has no real interest in a compromise peace. Instead, he is more confident than ever that he can outlast the West in Ukraine and achieve his objectives.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a watershed event in world history that will define the future of international security for decades to come. If Western leaders allow Russia to continue bombing civilians and destroying the foundations of international law without consequence, a ruthless new world order will emerge and will be defined by the principle that might makes right. Putin and his authoritarian colleagues in China, Iran, and North Korea will dominate the global stage and will rewrite the rules to suit their expansionist agendas. No country will be secure.

Today, Ukrainians are paying the price for the West’s reluctance to confront Russia. If Putin is not stopped in Ukraine, many other countries will also count the cost of this failure.

Alyona Nevmerzhytska is CEO of hromadske.ua.

Putin’s demands include the comprehensive disarmament of the Ukrainian military and the reestablishment of Russian dominance in all spheres of Ukrainian public life (euphemistically called “denazification” by the Kremlin), along with official international recognition for Russia’s territorial gains and an end to all military support for Kyiv. If implemented, Putin’s terms would leave Ukraine partitioned, isolated, and defenseless. This is not a negotiating position; it is a call for Kyiv’s capitulation.

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While Russia’s ultimate objectives remain unchanged, there is a very real danger that Putin may seek to exploit Trump’s evident ambition to settle the Ukraine issue as soon as possible. He could do so by agreeing to a temporary ceasefire that would lead to a pause in hostilities, while creating the conditions to complete the conquest of Ukraine following the end of Trump’s presidency. This would allow Putin to lift sanctions, rebuild the Russian army, and destabilize Ukraine from within.

In order to secure Kremlin backing, a ceasefire deal would need to hand Putin the semblance of victory while denying Ukraine any genuine and reliable security guarantees. Alarmingly, reports indicate that current US peace proposals go a long way toward meeting these conditions.

Crucially, the United States is reportedly prepared to officially recognize the Russian seizure of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula. This has led to inevitable comparisons with the 1938 Munich Agreement, which saw Britain and France hand Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland over to Nazi Germany in the hope that this would satisfy Adolf Hitler. Instead, the shameful deal struck in Munich encouraged the Nazi dictator to escalate his territorial demands. Less than a year later, World War II began.

The appeasement policies of the 1930s have long been condemned for enabling the rise of Hitler. Attempts to appease Putin have produced strikingly similar results. After Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, Western efforts to downplay the war and resume “business as usual” only served to embolden the Kremlin. When Russia’s 2014 invasions of Crimea and eastern Ukraine again failed to produce a resolute Western response, Putin interpreted this as a tactic green light to go further. This paved the way for the full-scale invasion of 2022.

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It should now be obvious to any objective observer that the continued appeasement of Putin will further fuel his imperial ambitions. This would be potentially fatal for Ukraine itself. It would also be disastrous for the future of international security.

Putin’s revisionist agenda is not limited to Ukraine. He openly speaks of establishing a new world order and frequently laments the fall of the Russian Empire, which at its peak included more than a dozen currently independent nations beyond Ukraine, from Finland and Poland in the west to the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. If Putin is allowed to succeed in Ukraine, it is delusional to think he will simply stop. On the contrary, abandoning Ukraine to Russia would dramatically increase the chances of a far larger conflict in the coming years.

In order to prevent this nightmare scenario from materializing, the West must demonstrate maximum unity and an uncompromising commitment to Ukraine’s survival as an independent state. Putin interprets any talk of compromise as a sign of weakness. The only language he truly understands is the language of strength.

The most effective deterrent remains Ukrainian membership of NATO. Unsurprisingly, Putin has worked hard to prevent this from happening. He has employed nuclear blackmail to intimidate the West, and has spent years spreading false narratives about an alleged NATO security threat to Russia itself.

Putin’s objections to Ukrainian NATO membership do not stand up to scrutiny. Notably, he has been unable to explain why he went to war over Ukraine’s distant hopes of joining NATO but did nothing to oppose Finland’s recent NATO accession, despite the fact that Finnish membership of the alliance more than doubled Russia’s NATO borders overnight. Indeed, Russia already shares borders with six NATO member states and leaves these frontiers largely unguarded. Putin’s real problem is evidently with Ukrainian independence and not NATO enlargement.

Bringing Ukraine into NATO would serve as a powerful barrier to future Russian invasions and would dramatically reduce the likelihood of a major European war without undermining Russian national security. However, this would require a degree of political will on the part of the United States and major European powers including Britain, France, and Germany that is currently absent. Unless that changes, Western leaders must come up with a credible alternative to NATO membership that will guarantee Ukraine’s long-term security.

Nobody wants peace more than the Ukrainian people. But Ukrainians also recognize that well-meaning efforts to compromise with the Putin regime will only encourage further Russian aggression. Similar policies aiming to accommodate and appease Hitler led directly to World War II. If Western leaders wish to prevent a repeat of this catastrophic outcome, they must stop offering the Kremlin concessions and demonstrate the kind of resolve that Russia respects.

Oleksandr Merezhko is a member of the Ukrainian Parliament for the Servant of the People Party and Chair of the Ukrainian Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee.

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Ukraine’s Minister of Economy Yulia Svyrydenko, who traveled to the US to sign the minerals deal on Wednesday evening following intense last-minute discussions over the fine print of the agreement, emphasized that Ukraine would retain ownership and control over its natural resources. She noted that the final wording “provides mutually beneficial conditions” for both countries, and praised the deal as “an agreement that reaffirms the United States commitment to Ukraine’s security, recovery, and reconstruction.”

Back in Kyiv, many saw the signing primarily as an opportunity to improve relations with the Trump White House following a turbulent few months that has seen the US President employ harsh rhetoric toward Ukraine while repeatedly blaming the country for Russia’s invasion. “Ukraine held the line. Despite enormous pressure, every overreaching demand from the other side was dropped. The final deal looks fair,” commented Kyiv School of Economics president Tymofiy Mylovanov. “It’s a major political and diplomatic win for Ukraine and the US that gives Trump a domestic political boost. That will translate, I expect, into a more positive attitude toward Ukraine.”

There was also much praise for the Ukrainian negotiating team and their ability to accommodate US interests while addressing Kyiv’s concerns. “This final version is significantly fairer and more mutually beneficial than earlier drafts,” stated Olena Tregub, who serves as executive director of Ukraine’s Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (NAKO). “To me, the minerals agreement is a clear win-win. It’s a well-negotiated, balanced deal that reflects both strategic vision and professionalism.”

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Many members of the Ukrainian parliament adopted a pragmatic view of the landmark minerals deal. “It seems like Trump was putting pressure on us in an attempt to get a victory during his first hundred days in office,” commented Oleksandr Merezhko, a lawmaker representing President Zelenskyy’s Servant of the People party who chairs the Ukrainian parliament’s foreign affairs committee. “The devil is in the details. But politically there are upsides. We have improved relations with Trump, for whom the deal is a win.”

Fellow Ukrainian member of parliament Inna Sovsun, who represents the opposition Golos party, underlined the unprecedented challenges Ukraine faced during negotiations as the country sought to broker a fair deal with a crucial ally while fighting for national survival. “We weren’t choosing between good and bad, we were choosing between bad and worse. What we got is better than the initial offer,” she noted.

While the general mood in Kyiv was relatively upbeat following the news from Washington, Sovsun stressed that the new natural resources agreement with the United States falls far short of the security guarantees that Ukraine is seeking in order to safeguard the country’s future and prevent further Russian aggression. “A true end to the war can only happen if the US provides significantly more weapons to Ukraine, is willing to apply greater sanctions pressure on Russia, or ideally both. If neither happens, it’s hard to expect the war to end.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Putin announces ceasefire to protect Moscow parade from Ukrainian attack

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 29 Apr 2025 21:26:01 +0000

Russian President Vladimir Putin has just announced his second unilateral ceasefire in a matter of days, but this emerging trend does not reflect any sincere desire for peace. On the contrary, Putin’s brazen new ceasefire gambit suggests a man emboldened by Western weakness who is now more confident than ever that he can continue to game the US-led peace process without seriously disrupting his invasion of Ukraine.

In early March, Ukraine agreed to an American proposal for an unconditional ceasefire. Almost two months later, Russia still refuses to follow suit. As a result, many observers are drawing the obvious conclusion that Russia rather than Ukraine is the primary obstacle to peace. In an apparent bid to counter this growing consensus and distract attention from Russia’s reluctance to end the war, Putin has recently begun declaring his own brief ceasefires. His first step was to announce a surprise 30-hour Easter truce during traditional Orthodox religious festivities in Russia and Ukraine. Putin is now proposing a three-day break in hostilities to mark Victory Day on May 9.

The timing of Putin’s latest truce is particularly interesting. Critics note that his Victory Day ceasefire coincides with a major military parade in Moscow to mark the eightieth anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. Putin is expected to host a number of high-ranking foreign dignitaries at the event, including the leaders of China, Brazil, and India. Needless to say, it would be hugely embarrassing for the Kremlin dictator if his propaganda parade was overshadowed by Ukrainian airstrikes in Moscow or elsewhere in Russia.

Many have already noted the cynicism of Putin’s proposal. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reacted by reaffirming his commitment to an unconditional 30-day ceasefire while accusing the Kremlin of trying to “manipulate the world” and “deceive the United States” with empty ceasefire stunts. “We value human lives, not parades,” he stated. Officials in Brussels were similarly critical of the Kremlin. “Russia could stop the killing and the bombing at any time, so there’s absolutely no need to wait until May 8,” commented European Commission spokesperson Anita Hipper. Meanwhile, the Trump White House responded by emphasizing the need for a “permanent ceasefire.”

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Putin’s shamelessly self-serving call for a Victory Day ceasefire says much about his opportunistic approach toward the faltering peace process initiated by the United States in early 2025. Much like the 30-hour lull in fighting initiated by Putin over the Easter holiday, the three-day truce proposed this week is far too short to have any meaningful impact on negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. However, it does allow the Russian ruler to pose as peacemaker while continuing his invasion.

Putin’s headline-grabbing truces are also an important part of his stalling tactics as he seeks to drag out peace talks indefinitely without exhausting US President Donald Trump’s patience or closing the door on a potential broader thaw in bilateral relations with the United States. It is no coincidence that both of Putin’s recent ceasefire announcements have come in the immediate aftermath of critical comments from Trump indicating that the US leader is growing tired of Russian excuses. Indeed, news of the Victory Day truce emerged just hours after Trump had questioned Russia’s willingness to end the war and commented that he feared Putin was “tapping me along.”

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While Putin engages in dubious peace gestures, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has recently provided a far more realistic view of the Kremlin’s war aims and continued commitment to the conquest Ukraine. In an interview with Brazilian newspaper O Globo that was published on the same day as Putin’s Victory Day ceasefire announcement, Lavrov listed Russia’s conditions ahead of possible negotiations with Ukraine. These included international recognition of Russia’s right to five partially occupied Ukrainian provinces, the removal of all sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014, guarantees over Ukrainian neutrality, and the reduction of Ukraine’s army to a skeleton force.

Crucially, Moscow also insists on Ukraine’s “denazification,” which is recognized as Kremlin code for the comprehensive “de-Ukrainianization” of the country and the reestablishment of Russian dominance in all spheres of public life. If implemented, these punishing Russian terms would not lead to a sustainable peace. Instead, they would serve as an act of capitulation, setting the stage for the final destruction of Ukraine as a state and as a nation.

All this is a very long way from the Trump administration’s frequent assertions that both sides must be willing to compromise if they wish to achieve a viable settlement. While Ukraine has repeatedly backed calls for an unconditional ceasefire and has accepted the need for temporary territorial concessions, Russia continues to pursue maximalist goals that no Ukrainian government could possibly accept.

During the first hundred days of his presidency, Trump has sought to advance the peace process by pressuring Ukraine while offering Russia a wide range of incentives to engage. It should now be abundantly clear that this uneven approach has backfired. Far from persuading Putin to offer concessions of his own, Trump’s appeasement policies have convinced the Kremlin to escalate its demands further. We have now reached the point where Putin believes he can personally pause the war to host a military parade on Red Square before resuming his invasion three days later. This absurd situation makes a complete mockery of Trump’s peace efforts and threatens to leave him looking foolish.

If Trump is serious about bringing Russia to the negotiating table, he must first demonstrate a readiness to impose crippling costs on the Kremlin. The current US strategy toward Russia can be characterized as all carrots and no sticks. This is useless against a regime that only understands the language of strength and regards any attempts at compromise as signs of weakness. It also gravely underestimates the high stakes underpinning Russia’s invasion. Putin views the war in Ukraine as an historic mission to reverse the imperial collapse of 1991 and return Russia to its rightful place as a global superpower. He will not abandon this mission unless the alternative is defeat.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

A pro-Putin peace deal in Ukraine would destabilize the entire world

Elena Davlikanova, Lesia Ogryzko — Thu, 24 Apr 2025 20:41:09 +0000

US President Donald Trump launched a fresh attack against Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on April 23, accusing him of obstructing peace negotiations and prolonging the war with Russia. Trump’s comments came after Zelenskyy rejected the idea of ceding Crimea to Russia as part of a US-brokered plan that some skeptics say would reward the Kremlin and grant Moscow most of its objectives while offering Ukraine little in return.

Ending the war between Russia and Ukraine has been Donald Trump’s top foreign policy priority throughout the first hundred days of his new administration. This has led to mixed results. The US leader has won praise for initiating the first meaningful talks since the early months of the Russian invasion, but he has also been accused of adopting an overly Kremlin-friendly approach to negotiations that has seen the US consistently pressure Ukraine while offering Russia a series of concessions.

The eagerness of the new US administration to reach some kind of settlement comes as no surprise. During the 2024 presidential election campaign, Trump vowed to broker a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine as soon as possible. Since returning to the White House in January, he has sought to distance himself from the current confrontation with the Kremlin, and has repeatedly expressed enthusiasm for normalizing relations with Moscow.

This dramatic shift in US foreign policy is sparking considerable alarm in Kyiv and other European capitals. Concerns are now mounting that if Ukraine is forced to accept a pro-Putin peace deal, the country would be unlikely to survive much longer as an independent state. This would represent an historic victory for Putin’s Russia, with profound geopolitical repercussions that would be felt far beyond the borders of Ukraine.

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In Russia itself, a successful peace deal would vindicate the entire invasion of Ukraine and further consolidate the country’s ongoing transition toward a fully totalitarian model of government. Today’s militarization of Russian society would intensify, with imperial propaganda dominating the national information space and defense spending rising to unprecedented levels. Unpopular aspects of the current war such as heavy battlefield losses and sanctions-related shortages would soon be forgotten as triumphant Russians embraced a new era of imperial expansionism.

Others would draw very different conclusions from a Russian victory in Ukraine. The failure of the existing international order to prevent the invasion and occupation of a major European country would send shock waves around the world and mark the dawn of a dangerous new era defined by the principle that might is right. This would soon lead to sharp increases in defense budgets as nations rushed to rearm in order to avoid suffering the same fate as Ukraine.

Russia’s frequent use of nuclear blackmail during the invasion of Ukraine would be particularly consequential. The Kremlin’s readiness to engage in nuclear saber-rattling would convince many countries that in order to be truly safe, they must acquire nukes of their own. In such a scenario, the existing nuclear nonproliferation architecture would collapse and be replaced by a nuclear arms race that would significantly increase the potential for a future nuclear war.

For Putin, a successful outcome in Ukraine would be a stepping stone toward even more ambitious foreign policy adventures. He would almost certainly seek to continue reasserting Russian dominance across the former USSR, with his next targets likely to include Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and the countries of Central Asia. He may also seek to go further into Central Europe. Confronted by a demoralized and weakened West, Putin would surely be tempted to escalate his campaign of aggression against front line nations like Finland or the Baltic states in order to expose the emptiness of NATO’s collective security guarantees and discredit the alliance.

An emboldened Russia would also seek to increase its military and economic presence in other regions of the world including the Arctic, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. With sanctions no longer in place and Russia increasingly viewed as a geopolitical winner, potential allies would flock to Moscow. In this new reality, Putin’s current authoritarian alliance with China, Iran, and North Korea would serve as the basis for a far larger anti-Western grouping.

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Any settlement that leaves Ukraine partitioned, isolated, and disarmed will not bring peace. On the contrary, it would signal the start of a new stage in the country’s agony marked by the slow bleeding of territory, population, and sovereignty. Step by step, an abandoned Ukraine would gradually be absorbed into Putin’s new Russian Empire. This would place Europe’s second-largest army under Russian control, while also providing the Kremlin with vast additional industrial and agricultural wealth to fuel Putin’s expansionist agenda.

Meanwhile, Europe would lose its Ukrainian shield at a time when the continent is already facing up to the reality of a drastically reduced US commitment to transatlantic security. While European leaders are now urgently addressing the need to rearm, few would currently be confident in their ability to withstand a determined Russian offensive. Without Ukraine’s battle-hardened million-strong army to protect them, the countries of Europe would represent an extremely inviting target that Putin may be unable to resist.

After more than three years of relentless horror and destruction, nobody wants peace more than the Ukrainians themselves. But most Ukrainians also recognize that a bad peace will mean no peace at all. Handing Russia victory in Ukraine may temporarily create the illusion of peace, but in fact it would merely set the stage for a dangerous new era of international insecurity marked by militarization, authoritarianism, nuclear proliferation, and wars of aggression.

Elena Davlikanova is a fellow at CEPA. Lesia Ogryzko is director of the Sahaidachny Security Center.

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If the goal of Putin’s Easter ceasefire gambit was to position Ukraine as the main obstacle to peace, it appears to have backfired. Far from rejecting Russia’s last minute ceasefire proposal, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy quickly agreed. “If Russia is now suddenly ready to truly engage in a format of full and unconditional silence, Ukraine will act accordingly, mirroring Russia’s actions,” he commented in a social media post outlining Ukraine’s position.

Crucially, Zelenskyy also called Putin’s bluff by issuing his own counter-proposal to significantly extend the ceasefire. “If a complete ceasefire truly takes hold, Ukraine proposes extending it beyond Easter Day. This will reveal Russia’s true intentions, because 30 hours is enough to make headlines, but not for genuine confidence-building measures. Thirty days could give peace a chance,” the Ukrainian leader commented.

Zelenskyy has since expanded on his call for a more comprehensive ceasefire agreement. On Easter Day, he said Russia and Ukraine should both implement a month-long pause on all missile and drone attacks against civilian infrastructure. Putin has not yet provided a definite answer to Zelenskyy’s proposal, but he has suggested that he may be open to bilateral talks with Ukraine on the issue. It is far from certain whether this dialogue will lead to any meaningful action, but the Ukrainian leader has already succeeded in demonstrating his constructive approach to the peace process.

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These recent developments come at a key moment in the Trump administration’s efforts to broker a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine and bring Europe’s largest invasion since World War II to an end. Ukraine agreed to a US proposal for an unconditional ceasefire on March 11, but Russia has yet to do likewise. Instead, Moscow has sought to secure multiple further concessions and has been accused of attempting to drag out talks indefinitely.

Putin’s efforts to obstruct negotiations have placed Trump in an uncomfortable position and have led to widespread suggestions that the US leader is being played by the Kremlin dictator. Matters first came to a head in late March when Putin publicly questioned Zelenskyy’s political legitimacy and said Ukraine should be placed under temporary United Nations administration in order to elect what the Russian ruler called a more “competent” government. Trump responded by saying he was “pissed off” and “very angry” about Putin’s comments.

Throughout April, the chorus of international criticism over Russia’s bad faith approach to negotiations has grown steadily louder, as have demands for Trump to respond accordingly. The US leader is now evidently running out of patience and is threatening to walk away from peace talks altogether. With American officials demanding progress in a matter of days rather than weeks, we should soon have a better picture of the prospects for a breakthrough toward a sustainable settlement. For now, there is little indication that Russia has any interest in ending the invasion of Ukraine.

Vladimir Putin’s surprise Easter ceasefire announcement was clearly a cynical stunt, but it did inadvertently serve an important purpose by underlining the simple fact that Russia can end the war whenever it chooses. With faltering peace talks now approaching a critical juncture, the significance of this basic point cannot be overstated. As many people have observed over the past three years, if Russia stops fighting, there will be no more war. If Ukraine stops fighting, there will be no more Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

US-led peace talks hampered by Trump’s reluctance to pressure Putin

Olivia Yanchik — Tue, 22 Apr 2025 21:20:14 +0000

During the 2024 election campaign, US President Donald Trump famously vowed to end the Russian war on Ukraine “in 24 hours.” Three months into his presidency, the US leader now appears to be rapidly losing patience with a faltering peace process that is showing few signs of progress. Trump stated on April 18 that he wanted a ceasefire agreement in place quickly and would “take a pass” if Moscow or Kyiv “make it very difficult” to reach a peace deal.

Trump’s latest comments reflect mounting US frustration. Speaking on the same day in Paris, United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned that the US may soon “move on” from efforts to broker a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine if there is no progress in the coming days. “We are now reaching a point where we need to decide whether this is even possible or not,” Rubio told reporters.

It is not difficult to see why the Trump White House is feeling discouraged. While Ukraine agreed to a US proposal for an unconditional 30-day ceasefire on March 11, Russia has so far refused to follow suit. Instead, the Kremlin has offered a long list of excuses and additional conditions. This has led to accusations that Russian President Vladimir Putin has no real interest in peace and is deliberately engaging in stalling tactics in a bid to drag out negotiations and continue the war until he has political control of Ukraine.

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Critics of Trump say he has been too reluctant to pressure Putin and has done little to convince the Kremlin dictator that the time has come to abandon his invasion. They claim Trump has consistently signaled his readiness to offer Russia concessions while adopting a noticeably tougher stance toward Ukraine. This has included multiple statements blaming Ukraine for Russia’s invasion.

Since the very early stages of Trump’s peace initiative, the US has ruled out the prospect of Ukraine joining NATO. This was recently underlined by US envoy General Keith Kellogg, who confirmed that NATO membership for Ukraine was “off the table.” Kellogg’s comments were welcomed by the Kremlin. “Of course, this is something that causes us satisfaction and coincides with our position,” noted Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov.

The US has also made clear that it expects Europe to play a leading role in any peace settlement, including the provision of security guarantees for Ukraine to prevent any future repeat of Russia’s current invasion. This is part of a broader foreign policy transition that looks set to see the United States reduce its historic commitment to European security in order to focus more on Asia.

After taking office in January, Trump threatened to target Putin’s energy sector and extended some existing sanctions, but he has so far chosen not to impose any additional economic measures against Moscow. When Trump unveiled landmark new tariffs in early April, Russia was one of the few major economies not on the list.

US officials said the decision not to impose tariffs was because bilateral trade had already effectively stopped due to sanctions imposed following Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, trade with Russia is greater than trade with a number of countries subject to the new tariffs. Meanwhile, Trump and other US officials have frequently talked up the prospect for greater economic cooperation between Russia and the United States.

In the diplomatic arena, the Trump White House has sought to avoid direct criticism of Russia in favor of more neutral messaging that prioritizes the need for peace. This approach has seen the United States siding with Moscow at the United Nations and voting against UN resolutions condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine. US officials also reportedly refused to back a statement by the G7 group of nations condemning Russia’s recent Palm Sunday attack on the Ukrainian city of Sumy, which killed dozens of civilians.

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The Kremlin has responded approvingly to the dramatic recent shift in the United States approach toward Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In early March, Russian officials noted that US foreign policy now “largely coincides with our vision.” However, while Putin has good reason to welcome the Trump administration’s stance on Ukraine, he has so far shown little interest in reciprocating by offering any concessions of his own. Far from it, in fact. Since the start of bilateral talks with the United States in February, the Russian military has significantly increased its bombing campaign against Ukrainian cities. In recent weeks, Russian forces have launched a major new spring offensive in Ukraine.

The Kremlin’s negotiating position in ongoing US-led talks is similarly hard line and reflects Russia’s continued commitment to ending Ukrainian independence. Moscow’s demands include official recognition of Russian control over four partially occupied Ukrainian provinces, a complete end to all Western military support for Kyiv, and the drastic reduction of the Ukrainian army to a mere skeleton force, apparently with the intention of leaving Ukraine defenseless against a future phase of Russia’s invasion.

Russia’s uncompromising current approach reflects Putin’s conviction that he can eventually outlast the West in Ukraine, and that by saying no, he will push Trump to offer more concessions. So far, Putin’s logic appears to be working. Trump’s efforts to win over the Kremlin seem to have convinced many in Moscow that they are now firmly on track to secure an historic victory and have no reason to offer any meaningful concessions. If Trump is serious about achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine, he must demonstrate that he is prepared to turn up the pressure on Putin and increase the costs of continuing the invasion.

Olivia Yanchik is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Russian missile strikes on Ukrainian civilians cast shadow over peace talks

Mercedes Sapuppo — Tue, 15 Apr 2025 20:36:03 +0000

As Ukrainians made their way to church on the morning of April 13 to attend Palm Sunday services, two Russian ballistic missiles struck the city center in Sumy, killing at least 35 people and wounding more than 100. This Palm Sunday bombardment was the deadliest Russian attack so far this year. It was part of an escalating recent trend of Russian airstrikes targeting Ukrainian civilians that is casting doubt over the viability of US-led peace talks initiated by President Trump.

The attack in Sumy came just over a week after a similarly devastating strike on a residential district in the southern Ukrainian city of Kryvyi Rih that killed 19 people including nine children. The missile struck close to a playground in the early evening when the area was busy with children and families. According to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the attack was “the deadliest single strike harming children which the Office has verified since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022.”

The Russian missile strikes on Kryvyi Rih and Sumy share a number of characteristics. Both attacks targeted civilian areas of major Ukrainian cities and took place at times when large numbers of people were likely to be present. Both reportedly involved the use of cluster ammunition designed to maximize casualties. “The use of an explosive weapon with wide area effects by the Russian Federation in a densely populated area, and without any apparent military presence, demonstrates a reckless disregard for civilian life,” commented UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk following the Kryvyi Rih attack.

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In addition to these ballistic missile strikes on heavily populated civilian areas, Russia has also recently escalated drone attacks across Ukraine. In the month following the first meeting between Kremlin and White House officials in Saudi Arabia, the number of Russian drones targeting Ukraine surged by more than 50 percent. Analysis by Britain’s Telegraph newspaper found that Russia launched an average of 101 drones per day in the period prior to the initial February talks in Riyadh, compared to 154 afterward.

Russia’s increased bombardment of Ukraine and deadly missile attacks on Ukrainian cities are casting a long shadow over the Trump administration’s efforts to broker a peace deal and end the largest European invasion since World War II. Many view Russia’s actions as an indirect but unmistakable snub to Trump’s peacemaker efforts. Others have also suggested that Kryvyi Rih may have been selected as a target due to the city’s status as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s hometown, in order to send a chilling message of Russian impunity and underline Ukraine’s vulnerability to further such attacks.

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Trump has so far refused to criticize Russia directly for the recent spate of bombing attacks that have left dozens of Ukrainian civilians dead. Instead, he somehow concluded that the recent Palm Sunday strike in Sumy may have been a “mistake.”

Elsewhere in the US and across Europe, there has been widespread condemnation. “Putin’s Russia keeps bombing cities and murdering citizens. It is their strategy to wear down Ukraine. We shouldn’t agree to reward these war crimes with any Ukraine territory,” commented GOP Representative Don Bacon. Fellow Republican Michael McCaul said the Palm Sunday attack was “beyond the pale” and served as further confirmation that Russia has no intention of ending the war. “While Ukraine has accepted President Trump’s ceasefire proposal, Putin continues to show he is more interested in bloodshed than in peace,” stated McCaul.

Across the Atlantic, French President Emmanuel Macron responded to the Palm Sunday attack by emphasizing the “blatant disregard for human lives, international law, and the diplomatic efforts of President Trump.” Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni echoed Macron, condemning “this unacceptable violence, which goes against all real engagement in favor of peace.” British Prime Minister Keir Starmer slammed Russia’s “horrific attacks” and noted that while Zelenskyy had shown his commitment to peace by backing an unconditional ceasefire, “Putin must now also agree to a full and immediate ceasefire without conditions.”

Such calls are unlikely to resonate in Moscow unless the entire US approach to the peace process changes significantly. During the first few months of Trump’s peace initiative, the US has offered Russia a series of concessions, for instance the Black Sea ceasefire proposal, while very publicly applying pressure to Ukraine. So far, this appears to have hardened Putin’s conviction that he can ultimately outlast the West in Ukraine. With existing US aid commitments to Ukraine set to run out in the coming months and no indication that the Trump administration will sanction further support, it is easy to understand why Putin is in no hurry to seek peace.

While Trump remains reluctant to condemn Putin, there are indications that he may finally be growing tired of the Kremlin dictator’s stalling tactics and will soon run out of patience. Trump has recently said he is “very angry” and “pissed off” with Putin over the lack of progress toward peace, and has called on him to “get moving” toward a ceasefire agreement. If Trump is serious about getting Putin’s attention, he will need to follow through on earlier threats and increase the economic pressure on Russia via sanctions and tariffs measures against Putin’s energy industry. Anything less will be interpreted by the Kremlin as a tacit green light to continue escalating attacks on Ukraine’s civilian population as Putin seeks to break the country’s resistance.

Mercedes Sapuppo is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

A pragmatic peace plan for Ukraine

Mykola Bielieskov — Thu, 10 Apr 2025 21:36:32 +0000

Almost two months since the start of negotiations between the United States and Russia over the war in Ukraine, it is clear that Russian President Vladimir Putin is in no hurry to end his invasion. While Ukraine has agreed to an unconditional ceasefire, Russia refuses to do likewise. Instead, the Kremlin continues to make excuses and employ a range of stalling tactics in an apparent bid to drag out the negotiating process indefinitely.

This failure to achieve a breakthrough is a significant setback for US President Donald Trump, who famously claimed during the 2024 election campaign that he would end the war in twenty-four hours. Since returning to the White House in January, Trump’s approach to peace talks has been based on the need for a compromise settlement. He has sought to persuade Moscow and Kyiv by pointing to the devastating cost of continued hostilities, while arguing that neither side can realistically hope to achieve their goals via military means.

So far, Putin remains unconvinced. This is in part due to Trump’s own actions. The US leader’s foreign policy turn away from Europe, together with his frequent Kremlin-friendly statements and hostile treatment of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during their notorious Oval Office meeting, have encouraged Putin to believe that he can outlast the West in Ukraine.

With the Western coalition in support of Ukraine looking increasingly fragile, Putin is now more than confident than ever of succeeding in his historic mission to extinguish Ukrainian statehood. This is reflected in his current negotiating position, which includes a series of maximalist demands that would deny postwar Ukraine any meaningful sovereignty or security, leaving the country at Russia’s mercy.

Needless to say, Putin’s insistence on an internationally isolated, disarmed, and defenseless Ukraine is a non-starter for Kyiv. Ukrainians have learned the bitter lessons from previous international agreements with Russia such as the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which did not deter Moscow from attacking Ukraine in 2014 and failed to prevent the full-scale invasion of 2022. Understandably, Ukrainian officials are now emphatic that security guarantees for their country must be at the heart of any future peace deal.

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With Putin unwilling to make concessions and seemingly determined to fight on, the United States will soon be forced to reassess its approach to ending the Russia-Ukraine War. In order to deliver on his promise of peace, Trump must seek to change Russia’s strategic calculus and convince the Kremlin that its present goals in Ukraine are unattainable.

Any settlement seems certain to involve Russia’s continued occupation of the almost 20 percent of Ukraine that is currently under Kremlin control. This has led some commentators to draw parallels with the partition of the Korean peninsula following the Korean War in the early 1950s. In order for such comparisons to be relevant, the front lines of the current war in Ukraine must be stabilized to the extent that neither side has any realistic chance of achieving a decisive military victory. That is not yet the case.

If a ceasefire proves possible, the next challenge will be moving toward a more permanent peace. Trump has made it clear that he does not support Ukrainian membership of NATO and will not deploy US troops to Ukraine in order to enforce any peace deal. Instead, responsibility for safeguarding Ukraine’s security will fall primarily on the country’s own armed forces and Kyiv’s European partners. This cannot be compared to the kind of watertight security guarantees that many Ukrainians had hoped for, but it is not entirely unrealistic.

The Ukrainian military has evolved dramatically since 2022 and already represents a formidable obstacle to Putin’s imperial ambitions. Crucially, Ukraine has emerged over the past three years as one of the world leaders in drone warfare. In 2024, Ukraine became the first country to establish a separate branch of its military dedicated to drones. Hundreds of Ukrainian companies are now producing millions of drones per year, and are using wartime conditions to test their products on the battlefield. This is leading to new innovations on a virtually daily basis. Ukraine’s drone revolution is already transforming the way wars are waged and can serve as a key pillar of the country’s future security.

The broader Ukrainian defense industry is undergoing rapid expansion but needs additional investment in order to make the most of excess production capacity. With this in mind, Kyiv is calling on the country’s partners to place orders with Ukrainian defense companies and support joint ventures. If sufficient international investment is forthcoming, Ukraine’s defense sector can become a key component in Europe’s future security architecture. This would greatly improve the country’s ability to defend itself and help contain the threat posed by an expansionist Russia.

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With continued United States security support no longer assured, European countries are now embarking on an unprecedented rearmament drive. This will have huge implications for any peace settlement in Ukraine. Indeed, Ukraine’s survival may well hinge on Europe’s ability to match the current rhetoric about the need to rearm with concrete steps to boost weapons production.

The EU is preparing to unveil a major package of measures to support defense sector spending in the coming weeks, while individual countries including Germany are set to radically increase national defense budgets. A significant portion of Europe’s expanding arms industry output will likely go to Ukraine. After all, European leaders are acutely aware that if Ukrainian resistance should falter, they will be next in line.

Some European countries are also expected to play a more direct role in enforcing a peace deal in Ukraine. A “coalition of the willing” led by Britain and France is already taking shape, with practical discussions between military chiefs over possible troop deployments now well underway. However, it is still far from clear whether European troops in postwar Ukraine would have a mandate to engage in combat operations, leading to doubts over their effectiveness as a deterrent force.

While details remain vague, Ukrainian commanders and their European partners are currently discussing a military presence “on land, in the sky, and at sea.” The most practical contribution may be in the air, with coalition forces potentially capable of supplying fighter jet squadrons and air defense systems. This could allow them to close the skies over large parts of Ukraine, minimizing the threat posed by Russian missiles and drones without risking direct clashes between coalition and Russian forces.

Officials in Kyiv and across Europe are also still counting on some degree of continued US support. First and foremost, this means leading the diplomatic push for a ceasefire and the start of serious peace talks.

While it is thought to be highly unlikely that the Trump administration will be willing maintain earlier levels of military aid, the US can still make a critical contribution to Ukraine’s security in terms of intelligence sharing, sanctions enforcement, and the supply of specific munitions such as missiles and air defense interceptors. In a bid to win Trump’s approval, Ukraine has recently expressed a willingness to pay for future US weapons packages, possibly with support from European partners.

After two months of false dawns and failed ceasefires, it is evident that the road toward a sustainable settlement in Ukraine remains long and uncertain. The radical recent shift in US foreign policy under Trump has transformed perceptions of what a possible peace deal in Ukraine could look like, but a plausible picture is now slowly beginning to emerge.

Naturally, the first step is to stop the fighting. If US-led talks do lead to a ceasefire, preparations are in place that should allow Ukraine and the country’s European partners to make any temporary pause in hostilities more permanent. Participating European countries will be expected to close Ukrainian skies and provide a reassurance force of troops on the ground, creating the conditions for a Ukrainian national recovery. In parallel, they must also significantly increase the flow of military aid to Kyiv and strengthen Ukraine’s domestic defense industry.

Ultimately, Ukraine’s main security guarantee will remain the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The country’s military has already proven itself during the past three years of full-scale war. If Kyiv’s European partners can now rise to the challenge and provide sufficient support, Ukraine looks destined to continue guarding Europe’s eastern frontier and defending against the Russian threat for many years to come.

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In addition to invoking imaginary Ukrainian Nazis, the Kremlin has also sought to stall negotiations over a possible ceasefire by questioning the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government. Ukraine was scheduled to hold presidential and parliamentary elections in 2024, but the Ukrainian Constitution stipulates that elections cannot take place during martial law. Despite this constitutional barrier and numerous logistical obstacles to wartime elections in Ukraine, officials in Moscow have repeatedly called for a new national ballot while arguing that President Zelenskyy lacks the authority to conclude a peace deal.

Most recently, Putin went one step further by suggesting that Ukraine should be placed under some kind of external administration, with United Nations officials overseeing elections. This obvious attempt to derail peace talks proved too much even for US President Donald Trump, who reportedly responded by stating that he was “pissed off” with Putin. Trump then threatened to impose secondary tariffs on Russian oil exports if the Kremlin dictator refuses to make a deal ending the war in Ukraine.

Putin’s inflexible negotiating position further underlines his intention to continue the invasion of Ukraine. Kyiv has made a number of major concessions in recent months, including expressing its readiness to accept the temporary occupation of Ukrainian regions currently under Kremlin control. Rather than offering compromises of his own, Putin has insisted on the surrender of additional Ukrainian land that the invading Russian army has so far been unable to seize. He also demands an end to all foreign aid and the dramatic reduction of the Ukrainian army to a mere skeleton force. This would leave Ukraine partitioned, isolated, disarmed, and defenseless against further Russian aggression. No Ukrainian government could expect to remain in power for long if they accepted Putin’s maximalist terms. Indeed, it is unlikely that Ukraine itself would survive such a suicidal settlement.

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By now, it should be abundantly clear that Putin does not want peace. For more than two months, the Trump administration has tried to entice Moscow by pressuring Ukraine into concessions while offering the prospect of lucrative future cooperation between Russia and the United States, only to be met with endless excuses and stalling tactics. Although Putin remains reluctant to openly reject Trump’s peace overtures, his goal evidently remains the complete subjugation of Ukraine and the effective end of Ukrainian statehood.

Many Western leaders are now publicly criticizing Putin’s refusal to engage in meaningful peace talks. “It is urgent that Russia stops with the pretenses and stalling tactics and accepts an unconditional ceasefire,” French President Emmanuel Macron commented recently. The Trump White House is also apparently now finally running out of patience. While US officials have been keen to talk up progress in talks with their Russian counterparts, Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated last week that Trump was not “going to fall into the trap of endless negotiations” with Moscow.

Trump’s initial attempt to broker a Ukraine peace deal by offering Putin an attractive off-ramp has failed. He must now decide whether he is prepared to employ sticks as well as carrots. At present, Putin has little interest in limited territorial concessions and remains committed to the destruction of Ukraine as a state and as a nation. Crucially, he has been encouraged by Trump’s reluctance to maintain US support for the Ukrainian war effort. This has strengthened the Russian ruler’s conviction that he can ultimately outlast the West in Ukraine.

In order to force a change of mood in Moscow, the United States must increase the costs of the invasion while undermining Russian hopes of military victory. This can be achieved by tougher sanctions measures targeting the Russian energy sector along with increased military aid that will allow the Ukrainian army to regain the battlefield initiative. Anything less will be interpreted by the Kremlin as a tacit green light to continue the invasion. If Trump is serious about persuading Putin to seek peace, he must first convince him that the alternative is defeat.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The West must stop seeking Putin’s permission for peace in Ukraine

Alyona Getmanchuk — Thu, 03 Apr 2025 13:25:32 +0000

Recent efforts to establish a “coalition of the willing” to help enforce a potential peace deal in Ukraine are very welcome, even if it still remains unclear exactly what participating countries are actually “willing” to do. The good news is that talks on the issue appear to be advancing steadily from the purely theoretical level toward more practical military matters. In particular, it is encouraging to see recognition among Ukraine’s European partners of the need for genuine deterrence rather than a toothless United Nations peacekeeping mission.

The bad news is that the entire discussion over the possible deployment of Western troops to Ukraine continues to be overshadowed by concerns over Russia’s inevitably negative reaction. While British and French officials insist that they do not require the green light from Moscow, a significant number of their European colleagues disagree. Furthermore, many of those who appear supportive of Western troops in Ukraine seem ready to grant Putin a veto on other critical issues relating to Ukraine’s long-term security, such as the country’s NATO aspirations.

Efforts to seek some kind of consensus with the Kremlin over the future security of Ukraine are futile and fundamentally misjudge the expansionist goals underpinning Russia’s invasion. After more than three years of full-scale war, it should be painfully obvious to any objective observer that Putin is not pursuing legitimate security concerns, and is instead obsessed with the idea of erasing Ukraine as a state and as a nation.

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Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Putin has demonstrated time and again that he has no intention of seeking a sustainable solution that could lead to peaceful coexistence between the Russian Federation and an independent Ukraine. On the contrary, he remains committed to wiping the Ukrainian state off the map. This is most immediately apparent in the systematic eradication of Ukrainian national identity throughout areas of the country currently under Kremlin control.

Putin’s current negotiating position is similarly revealing. The Kremlin dictator continues to insist on a demilitarized and neutral Ukraine, with Kyiv prevented from receiving any further Western aid and forced to cede large tracts of additional Ukrainian territory that the Russian army has so far been unable to occupy. If implemented, these so-called peace terms would amount to a complete capitulation that would leave Ukraine partitioned, isolated, and virtually defenseless against further Russian aggression. It would then only be a matter of time before Putin completed his conquest.

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Given what we now know about Russia’s war aims in Ukraine, it makes little sense to let Putin set the agenda for peace negotiations or dominate the debate over future security guarantees. His imperial ambitions clearly leave no room for any meaningful compromise that would guarantee Ukraine’s national survival or serve as the basis for a lasting peace in the wider region.

Instead, Ukrainians should be focused on convincing the country’s European partners that they do not need Russia’s consent before acting to defend Ukrainian sovereignty and safeguard their own security. One of the most compelling arguments in this respect has been provided by Putin himself. After all, the Russian ruler did not ask Western leaders for their opinion when he invited North Korean soldiers to join his war against Ukraine, or when he deployed Russian nuclear weapons to neighboring Belarus.

It is delusional to think that offering Putin concessions will persuade him to abandon his expansionist agenda. In reality, as long as Ukraine’s Western partners continue to seek Putin’s permission before taking steps to protect themselves, they will never be secure. If the leaders of the democratic world are serious about achieving a lasting peace in Europe, they must move decisively to provide Ukraine with credible security guarantees without worrying whether Putin will agree or not.

Alyona Getmanchuk is director of the New Europe Center and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Eurasia’s Center.

Russian advance slows in March as Putin’s invasion loses momentum

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 01 Apr 2025 21:16:38 +0000

Russia’s Ukraine invasion continued to lose momentum in March 2025, with the Kremlin’s territorial gains reportedly falling for a fourth consecutive month. According to new data from the Institute for the Study of War, Russian forces captured 240 square kilometers of Ukrainian land throughout March, representing the smallest monthly total since the current wave of offensive operations began in summer 2024.

News of Russia’s slowing advance comes as Russian President Vladimir Putin claims that his invading army currently holds the “strategic initiative” along the entire front line of the war in Ukraine. “There are now reasons to believe we can finish off” the Ukrainian military, he told submarine crews last week during a visit to the north Russian port city of Murmansk.

While Putin predicts impending Russian victory, the evidence on the ground in Ukraine would seem to suggest otherwise. Far from being on the verge of crumbling, Ukraine’s defensive lines have strengthened significantly in recent months. As a result, advancing Russian forces continue to suffer heavy losses without achieving any meaningful breakthroughs.

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Ukrainian commanders are well aware that the recent lull in Russian battlefield gains may only be a temporary phenomenon as Putin’s army regroups following months of intense fighting. Officials and analysts in Kyiv are now warning that preparations are likely well underway for a major new Russian offensive that is expected to begin in the coming weeks and last until late in 2025.

Putin hopes this new campaign can help strengthen his position as negotiations intensify over a possible compromise settlement to end the war. Speaking last week in Paris, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy accused the Kremlin dictator of “dragging out talks and trying to get the United States stuck in endless and pointless discussions about fake conditions just to buy time and then try to grab more land.”

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Russia’s modest battlefield gains since the start of the current year provide important perspective at a time when international media coverage and Western commentaries often create the misleading impression that Ukraine’s position is hopeless. In reality, the Ukrainian army has stood up to the full might of the Russian military for more than three years and represents a formidable obstacle to Putin’s plans for the complete subjugation of the country.

Today’s Ukrainian army is by far the largest and most experienced force in Europe, and is backed by a rapidly expanding domestic defense industry that already accounts for around forty percent of Ukraine’s military needs. Since early 2022, Ukrainian troops have succeeded in liberating around half of all the territory occupied by Russia, and have won a string of famous victories in the Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson regions.

Over the past three years, Ukraine has also emerged as a technologically advanced drone warfare superpower. Ukrainian drone manufacturers now produce millions of drones each year and continue to innovate on a daily basis. This is having a huge impact on the battlefield, where drones now account for well over half of all Russian casualties.

At sea, marine drones have enabled Ukraine to sink or damage around one-third of Russia’s entire Black Sea Fleet. This has transformed the Battle of the Black Sea and forced the remainder of Russia’s warships to retreat from Crimea. Meanwhile, Ukrainian commanders are using the country’s expanding arsenal of long-range drones and domestically produced cruise missiles to bring Putin’s invasion home by striking military and energy industry infrastructure deep inside Russia.

The remarkable evolution of the Ukrainian Armed Forces since February 2022 should give pause to all those who insist that Ukraine “has no cards” to play in future negotiations. While Kyiv cannot realistically hope to match Russia’s overwhelming advantages in terms of manpower, firepower, funding, and industrial capacity, Ukraine is now a major military power in its own right and will not agree to any peace deal that leaves the continued existence of the country in doubt.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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Putin has repeatedly signalled that he views the complete subjugation of Ukraine as only the first step toward reasserting Russian hegemony over the wider region. He has placed his entire country on a war footing, openly claims to be returning “historically Russian lands,” and declares his intention to establish a new multipolar world order. If Putin is allowed to succeed in Ukraine, his position will become far stronger, while Europe will be more vulnerable than ever. There will then be little to prevent him from achieving his wider objectives.

Trump’s obvious haste to exit Ukraine is now encouraging the Russian dictator to pursue his most maximalist war aims. These include the outright annexation of five Ukrainian regions representating around twenty percent of the entire country, and the international isolation of the remaining Ukrainian state, which would be left neutral, disarmed, and defenseless. In such circumstances, it would only be a matter of time before Putin completed his conquest.

The destruction of Ukraine would set a disastrous precedent that would undo many decades of progress in international relations and mark a return to the diplomatic standards of the nineteenth century, complete with empires, invasions, and annexations. Putin himself would be emboldened to acquire more “historically Russian lands,” while his fellow autocrats in Beijing, Tehran, and beyond would draw the obvious conclusions and follow suit. Failure to confront one aggressive dictatorship would give rise to many more.

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Some in Washington believe that by appeasing Putin in Ukraine, they can convince Russia to ally with the United States against China. This is dangerously naive and fails to appreciate the strength of the current strategic partnership between Moscow and Beijing. China has played an important supporting role in the invasion of Ukraine and sees the current war as an opportunity to undermine the West. As long as Russia can deliver geopolitical success, cooperation between the two countries will continue to deepen.

In contrast, Russian defeat in Ukraine would set off alarm bells in Moscow and Beijing, causing both countries to reassess the nature of their partnership. Many Russian leaders in particular would become increasingly concerned over their growing dependence on China. With this in mind, it would probably make more sense for US officials to maintain or even increase their support for Ukraine if they are serious about creating the long-term conditions for closer cooperation with Russia in the coming confrontation with China.

Perhaps the gravest and most far-reaching geopolitical consequence of a Putin-friendly peace in Ukraine would be the spread of nuclear weapons. In 1994, Ukraine gave up the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal in exchange for security assurances from Russia, the US, and the UK. These assurances have since proved worthless. To make matters worse, Russia has repeatedly used nuclear blackmail during the past three years to intimidate Ukraine’s Western allies and enable the invasion.

The lessons from Ukraine’s unilateral nuclear disarmament and Russia’s subsequent nuclear bullying are painfully clear: Any country that wishes to avoid a similar fate must acquire nuclear weapons of their own. This grim reality is likely to spark a new nuclear arms race, with governments from Berlin and Warsaw to Seoul and Tokyo already reportedly exploring their options. If the US backs a pro-Russian peace deal in Ukraine, unprecedented nuclear proliferation will become virtually inevitable.

It is still far too early to pass judgment on Donald Trump’s efforts to end the war in Ukraine, but the potentially disastrous consequences of a bad deal are already clear. Any peace on Putin’s terms would discredit the entire Western world and signal the dawn of a dangerous new era in global affairs marked by mounting instability, international aggression, and the looming threat of nuclear war.

This calamitous outcome can be avoided by backing Ukraine militarily and providing the country with the kind of NATO-style security guarantees that can prevent further Russian aggression and secure peace in Europe. Anything less will merely serve as a pause before the next stage in Russia’s war against the West and the unraveling of the current world order.

Oleksandr Merezhko is a member of the Ukrainian Parliament for the Servant of the People Party and Chair of the Ukrainian Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee.

Sanctions will remain an essential tool to deter future Russian aggression

Ilona Khmeleva — Thu, 27 Mar 2025 14:14:54 +0000

Nobody wants peace in Ukraine more than the Ukrainians themselves. But having experienced the horrors of modern warfare, Ukrainians also desperately seek assurances that the current nightmare will never be repeated. This is why Ukrainian officials continue to insist that any peace agreement must include credible security guarantees for their country. These guarantees must be multifaceted, encompassing a range of components to ensure their effectiveness.

At present, the international discussion over security guarantees for Ukraine is focused primarily on potential military alliances, peacekeeping missions, and the strengthening of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. This makes perfect sense as Western leaders seek to address the largest European invasion since World War II. However, the ongoing role of sanctions to help maintain peace in the years to come should also be explored in greater detail.

Sanctions have long been viewed as a tool to pressure Russia and force Putin to rethink the invasion of Ukraine. They can also play a part in longer term efforts to limit the potential for further Russian aggression. Sanctions can be used in a practical sense to limit Moscow’s ability to wage war, and can also serve as part of broader policies designed to deter the Kremlin and provide Europe as a whole with a greater sense of security.

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The issue of removing existing sanctions in exchange for Russian compliance with peace-building steps is already under discussion. Even at this early stage in the US-led peace process, there are signs of diverging opinions on opposite sides of the Atlantic with regard to the use of sanctions as a tool to bring Russia to the negotiating table. Moving forward, unity on sanctions policy will be crucial.

Many if not most of the current sanctions measures imposed on Russia since 2022 in response to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine are likely to remain in place until a peace agreement can be implemented. In the postwar period, it will be important to maintain or impose targeted sanctions that can restrict Kremlin access to cutting edge military technologies. This will help limit Russia’s ability to rearm.

Countries across Europe are already debating significant increases in defense spending, with many governments planning to invest in expensive air defense systems in order to guard against the kind of Russian bombing campaigns they have witnessed in Ukraine. While these air defense upgrades are clearly necessary, it would also make sense to take steps that could potentially prevent Russia from replenishing its missile and drone arsenals by denying Moscow the ability to acquire key components in large quantities.

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In addition to baseline sanctions on military technologies, Western leaders should also explore the possibility of agreeing on comprehensive sanctions packages to be triggered in the event of renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine or elsewhere. A credible rapid response mechanism would send an unambiguous message to Moscow regarding the inevitable and severe economic consequences of further invasions.

This approach could build on the sanctions experience of the past three years. Western policymakers could increase collaboration to better identify Russia’s vulnerabilities and address potential loopholes, such as the role of third party intermediaries in bypassing sanctions measures. Much would depend on the readiness of participating countries to work together in order to present the Kremlin with a united front.

No sanctions measures, whether imposed or implied, can ever hope to fully replace the hard power of military deterrence. Russian expansionism and the isolationism of the current US administration mean that a high degree of European rearmament is already inevitable. This also means that the Ukrainian military will likely remain at the heart of Europe’s new security architecture for many years to come, and will be a major focus for defense sector investment. At the same time, tools such as sanctions can help further deter the Kremlin.

There is currently no consensus over the impact of sanctions on efforts to end Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Nevertheless, with sufficient political will and Western unity, sanctions can become an important component in postwar efforts to safeguard Ukraine’s security and provide Europe with a degree of stability. This approach is economically appealing. While expanding defense budgets will significantly increase the burden on European taxpayers, sanctions are the single most cost-effective way of containing Russia and enhancing international security. As such, they should be utilized to their maximum potential.

Dr. Ilona Khmeleva is the Secretary General of the Economic Security Council of Ukraine (ESCU).

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Crucially, Russia may have much more to gain than Ukraine from a temporary energy sector ceasefire. While both countries have sought to target energy infrastructure, the timing of the proposed pause in attacks would appear to favor the Kremlin.

Since the first winter of the war, Russia has conducted a series of air offensives targeting Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure in a bid to break the country’s will to resist by leaving millions of Ukrainians without access to electricity and heating. These attacks have succeeded in destroying around half of Ukraine’s prewar power-generating capacity, and have resulted in periods of rolling blackouts across the country.

Faced with the unprecedented challenges presented by Russia’s ongoing bombardment, Ukraine has managed to adapt. The country has dramatically enhanced its air defenses since 2022, while the Ukrainian power grid has proved remarkably resilient. Kyiv has also received extensive financial and technical support from international partners, which has proved instrumental in the struggle to keep the lights on.

Seasonal changes are an additional factor shaping Russia’s bombing campaign. Despite multiple large-scale missile and drone attacks in recent months, Ukraine avoided a much feared energy collapse during the winter season. The arrival of spring is now expected to further undermine the effectiveness of Moscow’s energy sector offensive, with higher temperatures in Ukraine reducing demand for electricity, and longer days minimizing the psychological impact of blackouts.

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As the Kremlin struggles to destroy the Ukrainian power grid, Ukraine’s own campaign of airstrikes against Russia’s oil and gas industry has steadily accelerated. Ukrainian officials say these attacks are designed to weaken Russia’s wartime economy while also creating logistical headaches for Putin’s army in Ukraine.

The first attacks on Russian refineries took place during the early months of the war. However, Ukraine initially lacked the long-range firepower to mount a sustained air offensive, and was further hamstrung when the country’s international partners imposed restrictions on the use of Western weapons inside Russia.

The Ukrainian authorities responded to these limitations by prioritizing the development and domestic production of long-range drones and missiles. As Ukraine’s air arsenal has expanded, so have attacks on Russia’s vast energy industry. Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries first began making headlines in spring 2024. There has been a further escalation in attacks during the first three months of the current year, reflecting Ukraine’s increased long-range capabilities and growing drone production.

Assessing the scale of the damage caused by these Ukrainian strikes is challenging. Amid tightening wartime censorship, Russia no longer publishes refining figures or other key industry data. Meanwhile, Kremlin officials remain tight-lipped and typically claim that any blazes captured on video are the result of falling debris from intercepted drones. However, according to Reuters data published in early February, Ukrainian drone attacks since the start of 2025 had succeeded in knocking out around ten percent of Russia’s total refining capacity.

The recent uptick in attacks may only be the beginning. Ukraine has ambitious plans for dramatically increased drone production, and is also developing a number of long-range weapons including missile-drone hybrids capable of striking targets deep inside Russia.

On March 15, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the latest breakthrough for the country’s missile program with the successful deployment of a domestically produced cruise missile. Called the Long Neptune, this Ukrainian cruise missile is adapted from the earlier Neptune model, which was designed for use against warships and was famously responsible for the sinking of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet flagship, the Moskva, in April 2022. With a reported range of around one thousand kilometers, the Long Neptune has the potential to wreak havoc throughout Russia’s energy sector.

This is bad news for Putin, who is heavily dependent on the Russian oil and gas sector to fund and supply his war machine. With Russia’s air defenses already stretched thin in order to cover the front lines of the invasion in Ukraine, Putin now finds himself unable to adequately protect his energy industry from aerial assault. It is therefore hardly surprising that he has now agreed to a mutual pause in attacks that will keep his refineries, pipelines, and export hubs safe for at least a month. Any progress toward peace is certainly welcome, but Putin’s support for Trump’s partial ceasefire should be seen as a pragmatic move rather than an indication of his readiness to end the invasion of Ukraine.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

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Putin insistence on an end to all Western military support for Ukraine is not new. Since the very first days of the invasion, he has been warning the West not to arm Ukraine. He has also consistently identified the complete demilitarization of Ukraine as one of his primary war aims.

During failed peace talks in spring 2022, Russian negotiators demanded an approximately 95 percent reduction in the size of Ukraine’s army, which was to become a skeleton force of just fifty thousand troops. For the past three years, the Kremlin has repeated these calls for a drastic reduction in the size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, including severe restrictions on the categories of weapons Ukraine can possess.

Russian officials have also frequently pressed Ukraine’s Western allies to end all military assistance, while boasting to domestic audiences that this would soon force Kyiv to capitulate. Speaking in October 2023 at the annual Valdai Discussion Club in Sochi, Putin predicted that Ukraine would have “a week left to live” if the country’s Western partners ended weapons deliveries. “Imagine if supplies stopped tomorrow. They would have a week left to live until ammunition was exhausted,” he stated.

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The Kremlin has been similarly insistent on the need to isolate Ukraine internationally and deprive the country of potential allies. In addition to a ban on all Western arms supplies, Moscow demands that Ukraine must voluntarily abandon its NATO ambitions and accept enforced neutrality. Putin claims this is necessary as NATO expansion poses a military threat to Russia. However, he himself said Russia had “no problem” when neighboring Finland announced plans to join the alliance in 2022.

Most recently, Russia has firmly rejected the idea of deploying peacekeepers from NATO member countries to Ukraine in order to monitor any future ceasefire agreement. This rejection is particularly revealing, given the fact that the same NATO troops are already present in six countries bordering Russia without sparking World War III. It would certainly seem that Putin’s real problem is with Ukraine rather than NATO.

Putin told Trump today that he wants a lasting peace, but his negotiating position suggests otherwise. The Kremlin dictator’s preferred peace terms envision a disarmed and defenseless Ukraine with virtually no army of its own and no chance of receiving any meaningful military aid from the international community. If he achieves this goal, it is surely only a matter of time before Putin renews his invasion and completes the conquest of Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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Since the onset of Russia’s invasion in early 2022, the UK has been among Ukraine’s biggest backers. According to data from the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, British military aid up to the end of 2024 totaled $10.4 billion, putting the country in third place behind the United States and Germany among Ukraine’s international partners. Crucially, the UK has also often led by example in providing Ukraine with new categories of weapons including modern battle tanks and cruise missiles, paving the way for others to do likewise.

In addition to direct military aid, British support for Ukraine also extends to cooperation in areas including cybersecurity, intelligence, and countering hybrid threats. The UK continues to assist in the reform of the Ukrainian defense sector and provides training for Ukrainian military personnel. In the diplomatic arena, Britain advocates for tough sanctions measures against Russia and draws international attention to the Kremlin’s crimes in Ukraine.

This strategic support for Ukraine has enabled Britain to reassert its leadership position on the global stage following the country’s exit from the European Union. By supporting Ukraine, post-Brexit Britain has demonstrated that it remains a force in international affairs and a major contributor to European security. British support for the Ukrainian war effort has also made it possible to overcome Brexit-related tensions and build new partnerships with key European countries such as Germany, France, and Italy.

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British backing for Ukraine is about much more than mere power projection, of course. There is a broad cross-party consensus in Westminster that Europe’s collective security is inextricably linked to the outcome of the war in Ukraine. The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine has coincided with a particularly turbulent period in British politics, with four different prime ministers and a change in government since February 2022. Throughout all this, the country’s position on Ukraine has remained largely unchanged.

Ties between London and Kyiv are now poised to strengthen further. The exact nature and objectives of a potential international peacekeeping force for Ukraine are not yet clear, but if current plans proceed as anticipated, it seems all but certain that British troops will feature prominently in any deployment. This would deepen a bilateral relationship that looks set to be at the heart of Europe’s new security architecture in the coming years.

As Europe adjusts to the dramatic shifts in US foreign policy initiated by the Trump administration, Britain is playing an important role as a transatlantic intermediary, while also leading European efforts to bolster Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression. Almost ten years after the country voted to leave the EU, Britain is now once again proving itself indispensable to European security.

Alina Hrytsenko is co-founder of the Kyiv-based Research Solutions analytical network. She was previously a senior consultant at the National Institute for Strategic Studies.

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There was more positive news for Ukraine from Saudi Arabia, with the US delegation announcing the immediate lifting of a freeze on military assistance and intelligence sharing. This decision to renew US support reflects a thaw in bilateral ties following weeks of increased tension including a disastrous Oval Office meeting in late February that saw US President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance clash publicly with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

Trump responded to his White House confrontation with Zelenskyy by claiming that the Ukrainian leader was “not ready for peace.” The change in tone from US officials following today’s meeting was palpable. “The Ukrainian delegation today made something very clear, that they share President Trump’s vision for peace, they share his determination to end the fighting, to end the killing, to end the tragic meat grinder of people,” commented White House national security adviser Michael Waltz.

With Ukraine now clearly backing the US peace initiative, the world will be watching closely to see Russia’s reaction. Trump has stated that he may speak directly with Russian President Vladimir Putin later this week. If Putin decides not to support the push for a temporary ceasefire, it will dramatically alter the optics of the war and position Russia as the main obstacle to peace.

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Developments in the coming few days will reveal much about Trump’s personal relationship with Putin. The US leader has long claimed to be on good terms with the Russian dictator and has talked up the progress being made during initial negotiations with the Kremlin over a potential peace deal to end the war in Ukraine. If his efforts are now rebuffed, Trump will face mounting pressure to adopt a far tougher stance toward Moscow.

This places Putin in something of a quandary. Despite suffering heavy battlefield losses, his armies continue to advance slowly but steadily in Ukraine. Meanwhile, dramatic recent changes in US foreign policy have increased his sense of confidence that the international coalition supporting the Ukrainian war effort is finally fracturing. Putin will therefore be understandably reluctant to embrace US calls for an immediate ceasefire. At the same time, he knows that if he rejects Trump’s peace overtures, this will likely derail the broad reset in US-Russian relations that the new United States administration has been signaling since January.

The United States has been pushing for a ceasefire as the first step toward comprehensive negotiations between Ukraine and Russia to reach a peace agreement. While a peace deal is still a long way off, this initial step from the Ukrainian side could create much-needed momentum. If Russia chooses not to reciprocate, calls will grow for the United States and Europe to strengthen Ukraine’s position militarily while increasing sanctions pressure on Russia.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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Trump should embrace the Egyptian Gaza plan. It’s his best chance to secure peace.

Ahmed Nabil — Mon, 10 Mar 2025 21:14:04 +0000

Only hours after Egypt unveiled its plan for Gaza’s reconstruction last week, US National Security Council spokesman Brian Hughes rejected it, saying it does not “address the reality that Gaza is currently uninhabitable.” But days later, US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff seemed to walk back that rejection, saying that the new plan is a “good faith first step from the Egyptians.”

Trump indeed should take a close look at the Arab plan as a starting point for negotiations, as there is no other realistic plan on the table. Trump’s proposal for forced displacement is counterproductive; a group of 144 Democrats in the US House of Representatives pointed out that Trump’s plan undermines the United States’ principled moral position. Trump’s plan also threatens the long-standing peace between Egypt and Israel, according to Egyptian officials. But beyond the fact that the Egyptian plan is the only realistic one on the table, it is still in the United States’ interest to embrace a version of this plan, because it is politically and financially affordable for Washington.

The Egyptian plan, swiftly endorsed by Arab leaders last week, allows Palestinians to remain in the Gaza Strip while reconstruction takes place. Such reconstruction includes three phases: interim measures (six months), which would include the clearing of damage and initial construction overseen by a group of Palestinian technocrats paving the way for the Palestinian Authority to return to Gaza; reconstruction (two years), which would involve building additional housing and restoring services such as water and electricity; and governance (three years), which would see industrial zones built and would ensure that the technocratic committee has oversight over aid and governance.

The plan’s $53 billion price tag would be sourced from international organizations and investments. In calling for a group of Palestinian technocrats to manage the reconstruction, and for the Palestinian Authority to eventually lead Gaza, the plan stresses Palestinian ownership of the process. The Arab leaders who have backed the plan have committed to making their case for this plan internationally and for hosting an international conference in Cairo in April dedicated to Gaza’s recovery and reconstruction, in cooperation with Palestinians and the United Nations.

On the other hand, Trump’s plan neglects the Palestinians, echoing policies and plans he released during his first term. But the Palestinian question remains pivotal in the Middle East and can’t be disregarded in favor of broader regional peace that doesn’t include the Palestinians. Trump’s Gaza plan also fails to answer many questions about the logistics of moving two million Palestinians out of the Gaza Strip (likely against their will) and about strategies for the countries that will receive them and how to secure Arab cooperation. Meanwhile, the Egyptian plan answers critical questions, specifically ones about Gaza’s political future (one without Hamas in power).

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The Trump administration would benefit from supporting the Egyptian plan. Throughout his campaign and initial months in office, Trump has vowed to bring peace to the Middle East; backing the Egyptian plan would enable him to keep his word. Any attempted forced removal of Palestinians from Gaza, as implied by the Trump plan, would likely lead to armed resistance—and a return to war. That war would be costly for the United States, at a time when the Trump administration has prioritized reducing the government’s expenditures. The resumption of war would likely lead to more US aid to Israel: Since the start of the Israel-Hamas war, Israel received at least twelve billion dollars in military aid from the United States. This estimation doesn’t include the cost of the US military operations in the wider Middle East (including around the Red Sea) or any economic assistance to Israel. Trump’s plan would be costly morally, politically, and financially, not only for the United States, but any other party that would cooperate to implement this plan. Given that the White House has said that the United States won’t pay for this plan, it will be challenging to find partners to fund it.

Witkoff’s comments on the Egyptian plan last week reflected two main sticking points for the Trump administration. The first is the timeline. While the Egyptian plan outlined reconstruction that would take place over five years without displacing Gazans, Witkoff suggested a longer period between ten and fifteen years and reiterated the administration’s concerns that the Strip would be uninhabitable during that time. A joint technical committee of engineers from Gaza and other parties could help resolve this issue by recommending what is possible in terms of the reconstruction timeline and process. The second point is the future of Hamas. Witkoff has concerns about the future of Hamas as a militant group. The Egyptian plan did not deal with this point, but it did suggest a political process in Gaza that results in the return of the Palestinian Authority. US officials should engage with different Palestinian groups, including the Palestinian Authority, as they did with Hamas. This may carry the promise of a long-term security arrangement in parallel with a political horizon to settle this conflict.

Israel also dismissed the plan last week, arguing that it “fails to address the realities of the situation,” in a statement that focused on the political and security future of Gaza. Although the Egyptian plan emphasizes the Palestinian ownership of this process, it does overlap with Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid’s vision for Egypt to assume responsibility of Gaza for eight to fifteen years. That echoes an Israeli request from 2005—when Israel said it disengaged from Gaza—to no longer bear responsibility for the Gaza Strip. With the Egyptian plan, Arab countries have taken a leadership role that will likely amount to taking de facto responsibility of Gaza, even if the Palestinian Authority is in power.

The Egyptian plan offers a base to secure many parties’ interests and create the required regional stability to buy time for diplomacy. US backing would help in the implementation of the plan and in addressing threats to the plan such as the resumption of war in Gaza, tensions resulting from the Israeli military operations in the West Bank, Israeli rejection of Palestinian power in Gaza after the war ends, and Israeli refusal of a Palestinian state. Trump should support the Egyptian plan or at least engage with it, both for the plan’s political and financial benefits and also for regional peace.

Ahmed Nabil is an adjunct lecturer at the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies at Wayne State University.

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Syria’s women face a new chapter. Here’s how to amplify their voices.

Diana Rayes , Hind Kabawat — Mon, 10 Mar 2025 15:41:44 +0000

This International Women’s Day, groups worldwide issued a call to accelerate action for gender equality. As post-Assad Syria takes shape, the country has a rare opportunity to achieve major gains in gender equality. But time is limited: The stakeholders involved in mapping Syria’s future must harness this opportunity early, while the country is freshly emerging from the conflict.

What women have faced in Syria

Women’s rights in Syria have been neglected for decades. Before the Syrian revolution in 2011, any legal frameworks that offered women rights, privileges, and titles were symbolic and did not translate into meaningful social or political empowerment. These laws and policies were largely superficial, serving more as “window dressing” to give the appearance of progress while women’s actual roles and opportunities were limited in practice. Bashar al-Assad rose to power and led a regime that excluded and discriminated against women.

As the conflict ensued, women in Syria faced increasingly dire conditions. Over 90 percent of Syrians are estimated to be living under the poverty line, and women bear the brunt of this economic crisis. Mariam Jalabi, one of the founders of the Syrian Women’s Political Movement (which advocates for the participation of women in decision-making bodies) told us: “We cannot talk about women’s rights without first talking about human rights . . . A Syrian woman does not have food on her table, her children are not in school, she doesn’t have access to proper healthcare.” These issues are compounded by Syria’s economic collapse, which has increased gender-based violence, child marriage, child labor, and sexual exploitation.

The conflict’s gendered impact is evident in the experiences of female heads of households—the widows and wives of the hundreds of thousands killed, disappeared, or missing in Syria—many of whom are still seeking justice. The patriarchal nature of Syrian society and the Assad regime’s failure to make meaningful legal reforms (specifically regarding citizenship, personal status, property, and the penal code) put women at a disadvantage in providing for their families or making key decisions.

The window of opportunity is limited

Post-conflict contexts provide a unique opportunity for women to take on greater roles in political, economic, and social spheres as existing gender hierarchies get upended. As one study notes, peace processes pave the way for institutional reform and new strategies that promote gender equality. However, as this study also points out, these opportunities for meaningful advancements in women’s empowerment are often time-limited, and substantial effort may be needed to maintain commitment to furthering these advancements.

Syria’s civil society, both inside the country and in the diaspora, has grown stronger and has collected wisdom over years of operating under oppressive, authoritarian rule. Despite hardship, this resilient civil society has continued to adapt, organize, and advocate for a better future and has the potential to steer Syria, including its new leadership, toward a more inclusive, democratic future. This has set a foundation for swift action to promote gender equality during this pivotal but fleeting period.

But still, if matters related to gender parity are continuously postponed—whether until a constitution is solidified or lasting peace is secured—opportunities for equality may be lost.

The women shaping Syria’s future

The Syrian interim government has made some progress. It appointed several women to high-level positions, including Maysaa Sabreen, head of Syria’s Central Bank (the first woman to ever serve the role); Aisha al-Dibs, head of the newly established Women’s Affairs Office; and Muhsina al-Mahithawi, the first female governor of Suwaida.

These women have an opportunity to assert the legitimacy of women as valuable actors in social and political spaces. Their appointments also serve as key indicators of progress, which is being monitored closely by international governments and organizations, including the United States, European Union, and United Nations (UN), in advance of fully lifting sanctions, among other steps towards stabilization in Syria.

While these appointments are significant, questions remain about whether they are genuine efforts or symbolic gestures. For example, statements from officials (including al-Dibs and government spokesperson Obaida Arnaout) and the appointment of Minister of Justice Shadi al-Waisi, who has a controversial track record with respect to women, have been perceived as dismissive of the demands of Syrian women across the country. Syrians were quick to condemn these statements and say they did not reflect priorities for Syria’s future.

But in another sign of progress, ahead of the February Syrian National Dialogue Conference on the country’s political future, the interim government appointed a preparatory committee to set standards for the talks. The committee of seven included two women: Hind Kabawat (one of the authors of this piece) and Houda Attasi.

Kabawat and Attasi led the mediation team and organized thematic sessions within the broader dialogue, with a clear focus on securing the participation of women from across Syrian society, including professionals such as judges, lawyers, and politicians; artists such as writers and actresses; civil-society leaders; women living in displacement camps; mothers of detainees; and others. This included efforts to ensure that there were minimum quotas for women’s participation, set at 30 percent, for each defined category of participant (i.e. politicians, civil society representatives, human-rights activists, and intellectuals). In reality, this quota was not met (it was closer to 25 percent), in part because various religious groups and tribes have little to no female representation in their leadership.

Some attendees expressed concerns about the conference’s inclusivity, particularly of minority women. While invitations were sent out to members of the Yazidi and Kurdish minorities ahead of the conference—and Druze, Kurdish, and Christian men and women participated—there was indeed not a lot of time for Syrians, particularly those in the diaspora, to travel to Damascus to attend in person. In addition, some women participants also expressed concern about a lack of clarity from the interim government on how it would guarantee that the conference’s recommendations would be carried out after the talks; these women called for the implementation of an accountability mechanism.

Nevertheless, the Syrian National Dialogue Conference still marked a significant moment, seeing as over two hundred women participated in the National Dialogue Conference following decades of low women’s participation in Syrian governance and politics. In addition, over ten thousand Syrians from around the world contributed through an online questionnaire, 40 percent of whom were women. The conference’s final statement, which was presented by Attasi, included calls for transitional justice, peace, and respecting women’s rights and role in Syria’s future. These calls were inspired by the requests of women attendees and organizations such as the Syrian Women’s Advisory Board, the Syrian Feminist Lobby, and TASTAKEL, who participated in the dialogue.

Jalabi, who was formerly the Syrian Opposition Coalition’s representative to the UN, reflected on some of the criticisms currently facing the interim government: “Part of our job as active citizens is engaging actively with the current government. As Syrians, we can always expect better from our government. Syrian women . . . we want to be a part of high-level decision making, and not just in the abstract.”

What to do now

It is critical for women to be involved in transitional justice and constitutional reform processes in Syria. This can be enabled by several actors, including the interim government, international stakeholders, and, primarily, Syrian women themselves.

The international community, particularly the United States and the European Union, should accelerate sanctions relief for Syria. Doing so will help the Syrian government improve women’s rights and revitalize the country’s ailing economy, which has been greatly affected by sanctions imposed on the Assad regime. Sanctions relief would allow women and their families to achieve a “normal” life and secure the resources needed to rebuild the country. Bottom line: If the international community wants to support the women of Syria, the priority should be sanctions relief.

Additionally, the international community should firmly call for Syria to shape a system of governance that includes women. There is precedent for this: For example, UN Resolutions 1325 (2000) and 2467 (2019) call on countries to prioritize the participation of women and the incorporation of gender perspectives in peace and justice processes.

The Syrian interim government must take proactive measures to ensure that women, particularly from minority communities, are represented in future National Dialogue Conferences and all high-level political dialogues. The interim government must ensure that at least 30 percent of representatives in decision-making bodies are women, as was achieved by the UN-facilitated Syrian Constitutional Committee in 2019. Establishing a new Women’s Affairs Office, while important, should not allow the isolation of women’s issues from broader governance. Instead, the office should ensure that such issues are considered in national policies. In essence, Syrian women need to be represented in all levels of government.

Syrian organizations that advocate for women’s participation in decision making should continue to cultivate strategic alliances and broad coalitions, including with regional and international actors, to promote gender equality and peacebuilding.

Furthermore, these organizations should work to further establish solidarity among women. That is essential for the long-term success of any effort to build a more inclusive and democratic Syria. Women working collectively, and without competition, with close alignment in visions and values, can drive efforts to bridge divides (across classes, locations, and sects) that have previously hindered Syria’s sociopolitical progress.

Syrian women’s organizations must work to reframe the debate on gender equality, highlighting that it is not just a fundamental right but also a critical component of a more inclusive and just society. In appealing to the interim government, Syrian women can show how progress in achieving gender equality can enhance the government’s image and reputation. This approach can help mitigate the backlash that has been seen in other post-conflict transitions.

Both women’s organizations and the interim government should together incentivize higher levels of representation by women in Syria’s decision-making bodies and processes. They should work together to ensure the quality and effectiveness of women’s roles, not just the quantity of those roles, in order to ultimately erase deeply ingrained gender stereotypes that undermine the legitimacy of women’s political participation.

While some progress has been made, the Syrian interim government, with support from the international community, must follow with concrete actions to advance women’s rights in Syria. Empowering women will not only benefit Syria in the short term but also set the country on a trajectory toward an inclusive and sustainable future.

Diana Rayes is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and a postdoctoral associate at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.

Hind Kabawat is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the director of interfaith peacebuilding at the Center for World Religions, Diplomacy, and Conflict Resolution at the George Mason University Carter School for Peace and Conflict Resolution.

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Is Trump’s Russia reset overshadowing the Ukraine peace process?

Katherine Spencer — Thu, 06 Mar 2025 22:36:40 +0000

US President Donald Trump campaigned last year on a promise to end the Russia-Ukraine War. His efforts to achieve this goal are now rapidly transforming the geopolitical landscape.

Trump’s commitment to securing a peace deal clearly resonated with American voters, many of whom have long since grown tired of financing a brutal conflict that is now in its fourth year. Nevertheless, his apparent emphasis on rebuilding ties with Russia while pressuring Ukraine is sparking mounting alarm, both internationally and among domestic US audiences.

In the first days of his presidency, Trump’s initial diplomatic overtures seemed very much in line with his campaign trail talk of “peace through strength,” and included suggestions of tougher sanctions on Moscow. However, in recent weeks there has been a striking change in tone that has been accompanied by landmark news that the United States intends to dramatically reduce its role in European security.

The first sign of a major shift in US policy toward the war in Eastern Europe was the decision to embark on bilateral talks with Russia without Ukrainian or European participation. Then came a series of verbal attacks on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who Trump branded a “dictator,” along with suggestions that Ukraine was to blame for Russia’s invasion.

This culminated on February 28, when Zelenskyy’s White House visit descended into a bitter and very public Oval Office spat that sent shock waves around the world. Although both sides have since indicated their readiness to reengage, the United States has underlined its displeasure by pausing all military assistance to Ukraine.

While Trump has adopted an increasingly uncompromising stance toward Ukraine, his Russian outreach has so far been marked by complimentary language, expressions of trust, and talk of new economic opportunities. Unsurprisingly, the signals coming from the new US administration have been warmly welcomed by the Kremlin. Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov noted on March 2 that Trump’s rapidly changing foreign policy configurations now “largely coincide with our own.”

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Across Europe, Trump’s pursuit of a radical Russian reset has seriously undermined faith in the transatlantic alliance and led to a flurry of summits calling for urgent European rearmament. Closer to home, there are growing signs of disquiet in the United States over what many see as the new administration’s unprecedented turn toward Moscow.

It is not difficult to imagine why some in the US may be feeling uneasy about Trump’s approach to reviving relations with Russia. While polls have shown gradually declining public support for Ukraine, most data indicates that a majority still back the country in its fight against Russia’s ongoing invasion. Meanwhile, there is very little evidence of any American enthusiasm for Putin’s Russia.

In a fairly typical February 2025 Gallup poll, 63 percent of Americans viewed Ukraine favorably, while the figure for Russia was just 17 percent. Another recent survey found that 69 percent of Republican voters believe Russia is the aggressor and 83 percent disapprove of Putin. In a Reuters poll conducted in early March, Republican respondents were similarly dismissive of attempts to shift responsibility for Putin’s invasion onto Ukraine, with just 11 percent agreeing that the country was more to blame for the war.

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In recent weeks, there have been some rumblings of discontent from within the Republican Party itself. While Republicans largely remained quiet during the initial stages of Trump’s Russia policy shift, that may now be changing. When the United States sided with Moscow at the United Nations in late February to vote against a resolution condemning Russia for the invasion of Ukraine, Senate Appropriations Committee Chair Susan Collins described the move as “shameful.”

Fellow Republican senator John Curtis said he was “deeply troubled” to see the US aligning with Russia and the likes of North Korea at the UN. “These are not our friends,” he commented. “This posture is a dramatic shift from American ideals of freedom and democracy. We all want an end to the war, but it must be achieved on terms that ensure Ukraine’s sovereignty and security and that deter Putin from pursuing further territorial ambitions.”

Some of the most pointed criticism of Trump’s efforts to broker negotiations between Russia and Ukraine has come from Republican congressman Don Bacon, who said the US leader should not have called Zelenskyy a dictator and also suggested he was far from alone in thinking so. “Many Republicans know what the president said was wrong,” Bacon commented. “Putin started this invasion. He is the dictator. He has killed all of his opponents. Zelenskyy was rightfully elected.”

There has also been push back from prominent Trump backers within the US media. As the president’s attacks on Ukraine’s Zelenskyy escalated in late February, Fox News host and longtime Trump loyalist Mark Levin responded by stating, “MAGA doesn’t support Putin.” Meanwhile, the normally pro-Trump New York Post ran a front page story featuring a giant portrait of Vladimir Putin alongside the banner headline: “President Trump: This is a dictator.”

The US Senate’s second most senior Republican woman, Lisa Murkowski, was one of the few party members to directly voice her concern following the disastrous recent Oval Office meeting. “I know foreign policy is not for the faint of heart, but right now, I am sick to my stomach,” she commented. “The administration appears to be walking away from our allies and embracing Putin, a threat to democracy and US values around the world.”

It is still far too early to talk about serious domestic opposition to Trump’s Russia strategy. After more than three years of relentless bloodshed in Ukraine, many welcome his efforts to break the diplomatic deadlock and will applaud loudly if he is able to broker some kind of deal. However, recent expressions of dissatisfaction from Trump’s Republican Party colleagues and his own support base should serve as a warning against any attempt to abandon Ukraine entirely or impose a Kremlin-friendly peace.

Katherine Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

The Egyptian plan for postwar Gaza is a good starting point—but it needs changes

Thomas S. Warrick — Wed, 05 Mar 2025 20:59:40 +0000

Who will govern Gaza? This has always been the most difficult question that must be answered to end the fighting between Israel and Hamas and see the return of the hostages taken on October 7, 2023. At a March 4 summit in Cairo, Arab leaders endorsed an Egyptian plan, which is more detailed than any previous Arab plan for Gaza, that aims to answer this important question. While Israel will not accept some key elements and the Trump administration immediately criticized it, Egypt’s proposal is useful as the basis for further negotiations that will lead to a plan that Israel, Palestinians, and other governments—including the United States and Arab partners—could make work. The Trump administration should take the lead and build on what the Egyptians have proposed in order to move negotiations forward.

The Egyptian plan fulfills two central requirements: it excludes Hamas from governing Gaza and it takes off the table any thought that Gaza’s residents could be relocated. Instead, Gaza would be governed for six months by a technocratic council of Palestinians under the auspices, but presumably not the control, of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in Ramallah. United Nations (UN) peacekeepers would be invited in by the PA to both Gaza and the West Bank. An international contact group would oversee the effort. Arab governments would contribute to Gaza’s physical reconstruction.

There are many reasons why Israel will not accept this plan in its present form. Israel has reason to be wary of putting unnamed Palestinians in charge of Gaza—though Arab capitals and Jerusalem could reach an agreement in secret negotiations over who would be on the council.

Israel will also never accept UN peacekeepers, given the UN’s disastrous experience in Lebanon and the risk that Israel’s security could be jeopardized by big-power gridlock or pro-Palestinian sentiment at the UN. Even apart from the UN’s debacle in Lebanon in failing to enforce Security Council resolution 1701, adopted in 2006, UN peacekeeping has a spotty record of success. The Trump administration and many Democrats will back up Israel’s refusal to entrust its security to a UN force.

There are other ways to square this circle. The United States has more experience than any other country in the world in organizing effective military coalitions. This includes the effort to liberate Kuwait in 1991, in which many Arab states participated, as well as peacekeeping coalitions in Bosnia and elsewhere. In the case of Gaza, this could take the form of US involvement that does not entail US boots on the ground, at no net financial cost to the United States. That means the United States could provide logistical support, airlift, intelligence, and command and staff functions to a force of Arab and European units, funded by financial contributions from Arab countries or others. (For example, seizing frozen Iranian assets to reimburse the United States and its allies for rebuilding Gaza would be appealing to US President Donald Trump.) Trump hinted at openness to some US role in his February 4 press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, even as the White House closed the door the next day by saying Trump had not committed to putting US boots on the ground in Gaza. There are indications that a plan that threads this needle exists in a safe somewhere in the Pentagon. Trump political appointees at the Department of Defense probably abhor the idea, but if this is the only way to secure a lasting Israeli peace with Gaza and Trump’s Nobel Peace Prize, there is a way to organize a peacekeeping force for Gaza without involving the UN.

But the central problem for the Netanyahu government is that it is not willing to commit to turning Gaza over to the PA and to setting up a Palestinian state. This gap can be bridged, but it will be the first serious test of the second Trump administration’s Middle East diplomacy and of the leaders in Arab capitals and Israel. Israel’s concerns over “de-radicalization” should not be dismissed. Egypt and other Arab states harbor their own grave concerns about Hamas and its Muslim Brotherhood roots. Talk of Palestinian unity cannot overlook the problem of Israeli concerns over the prospect of empowering Hamas and other advocates of a “one-state” Muslim Brotherhood solution, which makes Israelis do everything in their power to block a two-state solution.

Moreover, PA “reform” seems necessary but elusive. Israelis should not be asked to gamble their security on a reformed PA when Arab states have not been successful, so far, in forcing much-needed reforms on Ramallah. These are all serious problems, but the pressing need to begin Gaza’s physical and social reconstruction cannot wait for all these problems to be solved. An internationally led interim governance authority in charge of both security and reconstruction that brings in non-Hamas Palestinians is the only way to start this process.

The Egyptian proposal, like other proposals, is not going to be accepted immediately. But after years of Hamas’s disastrous rule, the Egyptian proposal could form the starting point for negotiations over a workable plan for postwar Gaza that will end both the security threat to Israel and the suffering of the people of Gaza.

Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council. He previously served in the US Department of State on Middle East and international justice issues.

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Nasrallah’s funeral was Hezbollah’s desperately needed lifeline

David Daoud — Wed, 05 Mar 2025 16:02:34 +0000

Hezbollah is in a crisis. The group suffered an unprecedented drubbing by Israel, which decimated most of its arsenal, eliminated a substantial number of its fighters, and killed its iconic Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. Hezbollah faces near-total Israeli freedom of action in Lebanon, growing skepticism about its utility at home, and the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime, which has severed its supply line through Syria. Within Hezbollah’s core constituency—Lebanese Shiites—these developments have left the group vulnerable to criticism. Many can now plausibly accuse Hezbollah of compounding five years of severe economic hardship, beginning with Lebanon’s 2019 financial collapse, with an unnecessary war that has left their homes in ruin and reconstruction uncertain.

Hezbollah desperately needed a lifeline to secure its future in Lebanon. The massive turnout to Nasrallah’s funeral on February 23 may have provided one, deterring Beirut from either seizing its arms or undermining its domestic standing.

Hezbollah derives its domestic strength—and its longstanding immunity from disarmament or restraint by the Lebanese government—not through force of arms alone but through widespread popularity among Lebanese Shiites, Lebanon’s likely largest and fastest-growing sect. In Lebanon’s May 2022 parliamentary elections, the group garnered 356,000 of the 1.8 million votes cast—the most of any party by approximately 150,000 votes. Polls from January and September of 2024 showed that between 89 percent and 93 percent of Lebanese Shiites support Hezbollah.

This extensive support reflects the group’s “Nation of Hezbollah” model of membership, first articulated in its foundational 1985 Open Letter, which prioritized a party’s “responsiveness with the masses” over territorial control. As a result, Hezbollah developed a broad, flexible concept of membership to attract as much support as possible.

This served a pragmatic purpose. Gaining Shiite support at all granted Hezbollah domestic legitimacy and secured its place in Lebanon’s sectarian-power sharing system. The larger that support, the more influence Hezbollah had within that sectarian system—and therefore adopting a membership model designed to maximize support was vital.

Road to reconstruction

Popular support will also prove critical to Hezbollah achieving its post-war priorities, the first of which is retaining its arms. In his December 5 speech, the group’s new Secretary-General Naim Qassem bowed to reality and the Lebanon-Israel ceasefire agreement, agreeing that “the presence of armed individuals and the resistance’s weapons” would be “banned south of the Litani River”—amounting to a tactical withdrawal from most of south Lebanon. However, Qassem and the rest of Hezbollah have insisted that the agreement does not apply north of the Litani, meaning that the question of Hezbollah’s arms in the rest of Lebanon must be resolved through Lebanese consensus and dialogue on a national defense strategy.

Hezbollah’s other, equally important priority is ensuring that post-war reconstruction funds reach its battered community. Qassem insisted that this must also be the Lebanese government’s priority, after ensuring Israel’s complete withdrawal from southern Lebanon. Seeking to shifting the onus of reconstruction—and the potential backlash if aid does not materialize—from Hezbollah squarely to the Lebanese state, Qassem stated that Beirut had a “responsibility” to “attract donations or call for [aid] conferences or rely on [help] from [foreign] countries” for reconstruction.

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Securing these two priorities is of existential importance for Hezbollah as they are essential to regain whatever trust Shiites lost in the group for inviting the recent war with Israel. Without its arms, the group could no longer claim to be “The Resistance.” After all, that image is the basis of much of Hezbollah’s appeal, and it also serves as its justification for retaining the figurative stick it uses—often as a last resort—to deter hostile action within Lebanon and, more vitally, dissent from within the Shiite community.

As for reconstruction, Iran has allegedly been channeling funds to its main regional instrument—one billion dollars the day after the ceasefire went into effect. However, that’s a pittance compared to the estimated eight billion to eleven billion dollars in war damage. Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s access to Iranian coffers has been complicated by a combination of Assad’s downfall and Israeli threats, which led Beirut to temporarily clamp down on Hezbollah’s alternate funding route through Hariri International Airport by, for example, seizing cash shipments. If reconstruction aid does not materialize, Hezbollah will likely face an unprecedented eruption of anger from within its own support base.

Numbers game

Enter Nasrallah’s funeral, the purpose of which, as Qassem stated, was not only an outpouring of grief but also a domestic show of force. Vast attendance was therefore necessary.

Turnout numbers varied. Citing event organizers, Al-Jadeed and the Lebanese National News Agency offered a slightly implausible preliminary estimate of 1.4 million people, while Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International reported “hundreds of thousands” both in Camille Chamoun Stadium, Lebanon’s largest sports arena where the funeral began, “and surrounding areas.” Meanwhile, Reuters estimated one million attendees based on an unnamed “Lebanese security source,” anonymous Hezbollah sources told AFP that the event drew “around 800,000” participants, and a Lebanese official speaking on condition of anonymity to the Associated Press put the number at 450,000. The newspaper Al-Joumhouria claimed that 200,000 people from the Beqaa valley alone had headed to Beirut to participate in the funeral.

The final say on turnout, however, goes to the Beirut-based research and consultancy firm Information International. It dismissed both the inflated 1.4 million figure provided by the funeral organizers and the minimal estimate of a 200,000-person turnout, calling the latter “very low” and illogical, “given nearly 40 percent of attendees were in the stadium.” Instead, they estimated that 700,000 to 900,000 people attended Nasrallah’s funeral, with “no more than 15,000” of them coming from abroad, “based on [Hariri International Airport’s] daily activities.”

For comparison, the February 16, 2005, funeral of slain former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri attracted around 150,000 people.

Arms control

Hezbollah’s gambit, it would therefore appear, paid off—seemingly rebutting claims that the war and its effects had drained the group of a critical mass of supporters and left it domestically vulnerable. But that turnout now also serves to forestall any potential action by Lebanese authorities, who are already wavering on reining in the group. Both the ostensibly sovereigntist President Joseph Aoun and longtime ally, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, have accepted Hezbollah’s position on resolving the question of its arms.

This is also likely to critically impact Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, who has already made concessions to Hezbollah while forming his cabinet—Lebanon’s real executive authority—in recognition of the country’s political realities. Salam, if his government and its policy statement win a parliamentary vote of confidence, will hold the premiership until Lebanon’s May 2026 parliamentary elections, when his government will dissolve by operation of law. Meanwhile, Salam has a long list of vital tasks to accomplish during his short term in office, including steering Lebanon through economic recovery, repairing and upgrading the country’s dilapidated infrastructure, enacting political and judicial reforms, and overseeing post-war reconstruction. These would be monumental tasks in a functioning state. In Lebanon, accomplishing them will require all hands on deck and avoiding political infighting.

With the numbers it brought out on February 23, Hezbollah can threaten the premier with—at a minimum—obstructionism if the group senses his government is moving against its arms or withholding or conditioning reconstruction aid to areas under its control. At worst, clashing with a Hezbollah that has retained pre-war levels of Shiite support could risk igniting a civil war.

Most Shiites who support Hezbollah are not unwavering Khomeinists. They back the group for practical reasons: its extensive social-clientelist network, the protection from external threats they believe Hezbollah’s private arsenal provides, and the domestic dignity and equality the traditionally disenfranchised sect derives from the group’s domestic political weight. But the relationship between party and population isn’t entirely transactional. Hezbollah has spent decades building an emotional symbiosis between the two—one that has remained relatively unchallenged by Shiite opposition alternatives, whose already small numbers are disunited and lack resources.

By bringing the community out to Nasrallah’s funeral in the hundreds of thousands, Hezbollah sent a message to its domestic opponents and the government: An attack on Hezbollah is an attack on the Shiites writ large. That doesn’t mean Hezbollah’s survival is absolutely guaranteed. But it has now, to Lebanon’s and the region’s misfortune, created a bridgehead that it can widen—over years, perhaps decades, and quite likely in fits and starts—to ensure it remains a fixture in Lebanon’s future.

David Daoud is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, focusing on Hezbollah, Israel, and Lebanon issues. Follow him on X: @DavidADaoud.

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Ukrainians unite behind Zelenskyy after disastrous Oval Office meeting

Peter Dickinson — Mon, 03 Mar 2025 15:48:34 +0000

Ukraine’s roller coaster relationship with the Trump administration entered a new downward spiral on February 28 when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s White House visit ended abruptly after a televised meeting escalated into a very public spat with US President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance.

Trump and Zelenskyy had been due to sign off on a landmark minerals partnership agreement that was intended to strengthen ties between Kyiv and Washington, DC, but the two leaders instead became embroiled in an increasingly angry exchange in front of the cameras over the terms of a potential peace deal with Russia. The Ukrainian delegation left the White House with the document still unsigned, leaving the future direction of bilateral relations in question.

The shocking scenes in the Oval Office rapidly went viral, sparking considerable international unease. The sense of disquiet was strongest in Europe, with numerous officials and commentators across the continent concluding that the rift confirmed their worst fears over Trump’s shifting foreign policy priorities and his commitment to European security.

In Ukraine, millions watched video footage of the White House argument in disbelief. Ukrainians were hoping the meeting would mark a welcome change in tone following weeks of mounting tensions that had seen their president branded a “dictator” by Trump and excluded from talks between the United States and Russia. Instead, they were faced with what appeared to be a complete breakdown in communication with their country’s most important ally and main supplier of critical military assistance.

Many Ukrainians were angered and dismayed by what they saw as Trump and Vance’s confrontational stance toward Zelenskyy. At various points in the heated exchange, the two US leaders appeared to question Ukraine’s war effort and suggest the country was in no position to be making demands, while also accusing Zelenskyy of being insufficiently grateful for US support.

Strikingly, neither man voiced any criticism of Russian ruler Vladimir Putin for launching the largest European invasion since World War II. On the contrary, Trump indicated that he did not welcome Zelenskyy’s hostility toward the Kremlin dictator. “You see the hatred he’s got for Putin,” Trump told the assembled press during the Zelenskyy meeting. “It’s very tough for me to make a deal with that kind of hate. He’s got tremendous hatred. And I understand that. But I can tell you the other side’s not exactly in love with him either.”

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As news of the disastrous Oval Office meeting spread across Ukraine, there was a clear effort to demonstrate a united front and rally around the flag. This response was hardly surprising. After all, Ukrainians have been fighting for national survival ever since Russia’s attack began eleven years ago with the seizure of Crimea and the invasion of eastern Ukraine. Since 2014, they have become familiar with the significant challenges their country faces as Ukrainian officials seek to maintain support in Washington and other Western capitals.

Zelenskyy’s main political rival Petro Poroshenko led the way, vowing to refrain from any criticism and saying that Ukraine needed to respond to events in the US by demonstrating unity. Other politicians followed suit. “Under no circumstances should we agree to calls for the president to resign, and I’m saying that as an opposition Member of Parliament. That defies the very idea of democracy,” said Inna Sovsun.

Many Ukrainians expressed their pride in Zelenskyy for what they saw as his refusal to be intimidated and his insistence on pressing the issue of security guarantees. “If we are for real, we haven’t spoken with such dignity since writing to the sultan,” commented Ukrainian political activist Anastasiya Paraskevova, referencing a celebrated but likely apocryphal series of seventeenth century letters sent by the Ukrainian Cossacks to the Ottoman Sultan and immortalized in a painting by Ilya Repin. “This is the sentiment right now. Trump has actually made Zelenskyy even more popular in Ukraine.”

There were also widespread suggestions that the White House had deliberately provoked a confrontation in order to discredit Zelenskyy and undermine US support for Ukraine. “Zelenskyy could have just sat there in silence for 40 minutes without saying a word. The problem is, they would have found a reason to get offended and start a brawl anyway,” argued Ukrainian journalist and commentator Ilia Ponomorenko. “You simply can’t win with people who don’t actually want a standard, successful meeting.”

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While the overall mood in Ukraine was one of defiance, Zelenskyy’s handling of the Oval Office clash also came in for significant criticism. Ukrainian Member of Parliament Oleksiy Goncharenko, a member of the opposition European Solidarity Party, called the meeting “catastrophic for Ukraine” and noted that the only winner was Putin. Commenting on Zelenskyy’s role in Friday’s confrontation, Goncharenko told CNN that the Ukrainian leader needed to be “much more diplomatic” and “constructive” in his future dealings with the country’s US partners. “Mr. Trump will be president of the United States for the next four years. We need to work with him, not argue with him,” Goncharenko commented.

A common complaint among Ukrainians was that while they are being asked by the Trump administration to make concession after concession, Russia faces no such pressure. The tone of the White House meeting certainly seemed to underline Ukraine’s limited leverage as it attempts to secure the backing of the United States for a sustainable peace settlement that can prevent further Russian aggression. “You’re either going to make a deal or we’re out, and if we’re out, you’ll fight it out,” Trump told Zelenskyy at one point as tempers frayed.

Mariia Zolkina of Ukraine’s Democratic Initiatives Foundation think tank commented to the BBC that the war of words in Washington would add to a growing sense of injustice within Ukrainian society over the Trump administration’s strategy for ending Russia’s war in Ukraine. She accused the US leader of seeking to grant Putin almost all of the objectives he has sought but failed to achieve on the battlefield during three years of full-scale war, and warned that this one-sided approach would only strengthen Ukraine’s will to resist. “Trump does not understand that millions of Ukrainians are united by a shared sense of zero tolerance toward injustice. This is what led to the revolutions of 2004 and 2014,” she noted, referencing independent Ukraine’s two pro-democracy revolutions.

While most Ukrainians were clearly shaken by the spectacle of their president arguing so publicly with Trump and Vance, the sense of shock was not shared by everyone. Some viewed the Oval Office clash as yet another reality check in a long and painful national journey that has seen Ukraine navigate more than a decade of Russian aggression while adjusting to the limitations of international assistance. “Zelenskyy was brave, but we are supplicants now,” wrote Ukrainian author Andrey Kurkov in Britain’s Guardian newspaper. “Trump and the Kremlin have made it abundantly clear that Ukraine’s participation in these negotiations between the US and Russia is not necessary or desirable.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The absence of a postwar plan for Gaza

Since the war began, Israel’s primary objective has been to dismantle Hamas and secure the return of the hostages taken on October 7, 2023. While Israel has successfully degraded Hamas’s military infrastructure and eliminated some of its top leaders, the group continues to wield control over Gaza, raising questions about the effectiveness of Israel’s approach.

The main Israeli failure lies in the absence of a credible governance alternative for Gaza. Netanyahu’s rejection of any role for the Palestinian Authority in postwar Gaza has created a power vacuum that Hamas continues to exploit. Without a clear plan for Gaza’s postwar governance, the Israeli military effort alone cannot achieve long-term stability for the enclave or for Israel. US, Israeli, and regional leaders have all made clear that they view Hamas rule over Gaza in the war’s aftermath as unacceptable. This month, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called Hamas “pure evil” and said it must never govern Gaza again. Last year, former Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry described Hamas as “a faction outside the Palestinian consensus.” Yet despite this rhetoric, the failure to establish a viable alternative governing structure for Gaza risks prolonging Hamas’s control by default.

New Atlanticist

Feb 14, 2025

A plan for postwar Gaza: Instead of removing Palestinian civilians, remove Hamas

By Daniel B. Shapiro

Drawing inspiration from an approach that worked in 1982, US President Donald Trump should put forward a landmark plan to rid Gaza of the terrorist organization.

Conflict Israel

Netanyahu’s political calculations

With the fragile cease-fire hanging by a thread and mounting pressure from the families of Israeli hostages, Netanyahu appears to be prioritizing his own political survival over a sustainable peace settlement. Indeed, at various points during the current phase of the cease-fire, he has both threatened a renewed military offensive—despite the Israeli military’s claims in September that Hamas’s military wing had been defeated—and embraced Trump’s proposal for the mass displacement of Gaza’s population.

Further, Netanyahu appointed his close political ally, Ron Dermer, as the lead negotiator for phase two of the Gaza cease-fire, replacing Mossad head David Barnea. This decision centralized authority over the cease-fire talks within Netanyahu’s inner circle, giving him greater oversight and influence over the negotiation process and the flexibility to shape the narrative and outcomes of the cease-fire in a way that aligns with his political agenda.

Netanyahu’s direct involvement is particularly significant given his track record of altering cease-fire terms to serve his political interests, which has repeatedly led to the breakdown of prior rounds of negotiations. Prolonging the war in this manner has jeopardized the hostages, whose lives are further endangered every additional day they spend in Hamas captivity. This was made painfully evident by tragic incidents such as Hamas’s execution of six hostages, including American-Israeli Hersh Goldberg-Polin, in September, just days before Israeli forces arrived and discovered the victims’ remains.

Moving ahead with the plan for the mass displacement of Gazans would align with the hardline stance of prominent members of Israel’s far-right, including Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, a member of the Knesset who resigned as national security minister in protest of the January cease-fire agreement. Both figures hold significant sway over the stability of Netanyahu’s fragile governing coalition.

However, forcing civilians out of Gaza would neither weaken Hamas nor bring security to Israel. On the contrary, it risks intensifying radicalization and reinforcing extremist narratives, potentially destabilizing the broader region. By intertwining his own political survival with a dubious military strategy, Netanyahu’s approach threatens to further escalate regional tensions, making a sustainable resolution even more elusive.

New Atlanticist

Feb 14, 2025

A plan for postwar Gaza: Reconstruction will fail unless these two challenges are addressed

By Ahmed F. Alkhatib

Gaza’s reconstruction will require creativity and an understanding that there is no simple US real-estate solution for the strip.

Israel Middle East

How mass displacement would fuel radicalization

The argument for mass displacement is fundamentally flawed because it blames Palestinian civilians for Hamas’s actions. In reality, Gazans have suffered under Hamas’s authoritarian rule, where dissent is crushed and civilians are used as human shields.

The idea that Palestinians are a homogeneous block that supports Hamas is simply not accurate. The only Palestinian legislative election in which Hamas participated, in 2006, showed a divided electorate, with Hamas winning 44.45 percent of the vote and Fatah garnering 41.43 percent. Since then, Hamas has ruled Gaza by brute force and coercion after taking over the enclave militarily in 2007. More recently, an Arab Barometer poll that was conducted just before the October 7 terrorist attacks indicated that 72 percent of Gazans believed Hamas was corrupt while 44 percent expressed no trust in the group. Considering how brutally Hamas suppresses dissent, one can only imagine how low support for the group in Gaza really is. Further, nearly half of Gaza’s population is under eighteen, meaning Hamas is the only government many Palestinians have ever known.

Therefore, blaming the whole population of Gaza for Hamas’s actions is not just a moral failure. It is also a strategic mistake. It shifts the focus away from the real issue: Hamas’s reign of terror. Treating civilians as perpetrators rather than victims feeds extremist narratives, fueling radicalization and hatred. If the goal is to eradicate extremism, foster stability, and achieve long-term security for Israel, then the focus should be on freeing Gazans from Hamas’s oppression, not displacing them.

Displacement would spread Hamas’s influence across the region, solidifying its image as a “resistance movement” rather than exposing it as a failed terrorist entity. This move would inflame tensions across the Middle East, destabilize neighboring countries, and fuel anti-Israel sentiment around the world.

History shows that forced displacement breeds extremism. The Nakba of 1948 created generations of refugees who would became the backbone of militant movements. This includes the late high-ranking Hamas officials Ismail Haniyeh and Yahya Sinwar, both of whom were born in refugee camps in Gaza after their families were displaced during the Nakba. A similar mass expulsion today would reinforce the idea that violence is the only way to reclaim lost land, further entrenching cycles of radicalization.

Breaking Hamas’s grip

Defeating Hamas militarily is not enough. To truly end its control over Gaza, Hamas must be defeated strategically by degrading its legitimacy and freeing Gazans from Islamist authoritarianism. This cannot be achieved by weakening the so-called “Axis of Resistance” alone, but only by breaking Hamas’s grip on power.

Gaza’s reconstruction is impossible as long as Hamas controls the strip. The group has repeatedly manipulated international aid to build its military capabilities, fueling radicalization and extremism. Without a postwar governance framework liberating Gaza from Hamas’s influence, Gazans will continue to suffer under a humanitarian catastrophe.

This cannot be achieved through forced displacement or by obstructing efforts to establish a legitimate and credible alternative to Hamas. For long-term stability to be achieved, international actors must support the development of Palestinian institutions capable of effective governance. This requires fostering an Arab-led, Palestinian-owned transitional process with a nonpartisan, technocratic government that can implement the rule of law and carry out structural reforms in education, law enforcement, and media. Economic development initiatives must also be prioritized to reduce extremism by creating real employment opportunities.

Gaza’s reconstruction must be designed to empower civilians, not Hamas or its backers. The only way to defeat extremism is by offering Gazans hope, opportunity, and the means to govern themselves responsibly.

Netanyahu’s failure to agree on a clear day after plan for Gaza has prolonged Hamas’s rule and exacerbated the suffering of both Israelis and Palestinians. By embracing mass displacement, he is not solving the crisis but escalating it. This strategy threatens to radicalize a new generation of Palestinians, solidifying Hamas’s narrative of resistance and fueling long-term instability.

Achieving security and stability requires a strategic shift from military dominance and displacement to cooperation with Arab countries, empowering Gazans through governance reform and economic opportunity. A credible political alternative to Hamas is essential for lasting peace.

Ignoring this will only perpetuate cycles of violence, deepen regional instability, and ultimately undermine Israel’s security. The future of Gaza lies not in forced migration but in breaking Hamas’s grip on power and creating opportunities for Gazans to build a better future.

Mohamed Farid is a member of the Egyptian Senate.

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The Finlandization fallacy: Ukrainian neutrality will not stop Putin’s Russia

Brian Mefford — Thu, 27 Feb 2025 18:26:13 +0000

In the month since Donald Trump’s inauguration, the foreign policy of the new US administration has focused on efforts to broker a peace deal between Ukraine and Russia. This admirable initiative is in its infancy as daily trial balloons are floated. Currently, the Trump White House appears to favor a compromise peace that would establish a neutral Ukraine without clear security guarantees from the country’s Western partners. This formula is sometimes called “Finlandization,” in reference to Finland’s experience as a neutral front line nation during the Cold War.

The Cold War status of Finland reflects the realities of the country’s relationship with the USSR. In the aftermath of the August 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact and the outbreak of World War II, the Soviet authorities began demanding territory from the Finns. The Kremlin accompanied this with a disinformation campaign referring to Finland’s leaders as a “reactionary fascist clique.”

In November 1939, the Red Army attacked Finland. The Finns fought bravely in a three-month winter war, inflicting over 300,000 Soviet casualties while suffering around 70,000 themselves. Nonetheless, the USSR eventually prevailed and annexed more than ten percent of Finnish territory. This history will sound eerily familiar to today’s Ukrainians.

In the decades after World War II, Finland was handcuffed to neutrality via a treaty with Moscow, but remained an independent state with a market economy. The constraints placed on Finland during this period prevented the country’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic community and came to be known as Finlandization. In essence, Finland was forced to cede land and accept a Kremlin-friendly form of geopolitical neutrality in exchange for nominal independence.

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Some in Washington DC and elsewhere now see the Finlandization format of neutrality as a suitable model for Ukraine. This includes influential members of the Trump administration. However, supporters of this approach ignore the obvious differences between Soviet policy toward Finland and the Putin regime’s objectives in Ukraine. While the USSR had limited territorial ambitions in Finland and was far more focused on the Cold War competition with the United States and Western Europe, today’s Russia is fully committed to erasing Ukrainian statehood and national identity.

The most powerful indictment of Finlandization has come from Finland itself. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the Finns moved quickly to end decades of neutrality, joining the European Union in 1995. When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the Finnish authorities went even further and applied for NATO membership. Finland’s accession to the alliance in 2023 marked the final stage in the country’s rejection of Finlandization.

Instead of imposing neutrality on Ukraine, the country’s partners should seek to create a security environment that will prevent further Russian aggression and allow Ukrainians to define their own future. After eleven years of Russian military aggression and three years of full-scale invasion, pressuring Ukraine to accept Finlandization on the Kremlin’s terms would be the equivalent of forcing a victim of abuse to live with their abuser. Such an unjust settlement would be doomed to fail and could also significantly undermine the international standing of the United States for years to come.

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Despite the evident problems with a peace deal that imposes neutrality on Ukraine, the new US administration has begun the negotiating process with Russia by proactively offering a series of concessions to the Kremlin such as ruling out Ukrainian NATO membership. US officials appear intent on avoiding anything that might offend the Russians as they seek to provide Putin with a face-saving off ramp. This approach is unlikely to result in a viable long-term peace deal. On the contrary, it risks emboldening Putin and encouraging him to increase his demands.

The alternative to Kremlin-friendly neutrality is clear. Ukraine seeks binding security guarantees from its Western partners and an invitation to join NATO. Kyiv’s vision for a sustainable peace offers obvious advantages for the West. At a time when the US is calling on Europeans to take greater responsibility for their own security, closer defense ties with Ukraine would be a major asset. With more than a million soldiers and unique combat experience on the twenty first century battlefield, the inclusion of Ukraine would dramatically increase the size and effectiveness of NATO forces in Europe while enabling the US to potentially withdraw troops.

Integrating Ukraine into the Western security architecture would bring lasting peace to Europe because it would project strength to Russia, which is the only language Vladimir Putin understands. Striking a temporary peace deal by appeasing aggression is easy, as Neville Chamberlain demonstrated at Munich in 1938. However, the long-term consequences are likely to be disastrous. The Trump administration appears well aware of this and says it is committed to achieving peace through strength. The question is whether this principle will now be applied to negotiations with Russia over the fate of Ukraine.

Brian Mefford is a senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. He has lived and worked in Ukraine since 1999.

US sides with Russia against Ukraine and Europe at the United Nations

Shelby Magid — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 21:59:17 +0000

As the world marked the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a diplomatic clash at the United Nations illustrated the dramatic divide that has emerged between the United States and Europe since the inauguration of US President Donald Trump just over one month ago.

The cause of the clash was a disagreement over the wording of rival UN resolutions marking the anniversary of the Russian invasion. The resolution initiated by Ukraine and supported by most Western nations explicitly identified Russia as the aggressor, while a version promoted by the United States adopted a more neutral tone and emphasized the need for peace.

The United States voted against the UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russian aggression in Ukraine, siding with a handful of states including Russia, Belarus, and North Korea. The resolution passed thanks to backing from 93 nations including Ukraine and America’s traditional European allies.

The significance of this US realignment was widely noted. “If you want a measure of the scale of the transatlantic rift, consider this: I am told that yesterday was the first time since 1945 that the US voted with Russia and against Europe at the UN on an issue of European security,” commented BBC News diplomatic correspondent James Landale.

Hours later, the US successfully spearheaded a resolution at the UN Security Council calling for a “swift end” to the conflict and urging a “lasting peace between Ukraine and the Russian Federation.” Notably, Russia was not named as the aggressor. This marked the first adoption of a Security Council resolution on Ukraine since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Russia holds veto power in the Security Council and has effectively prevented the body from passing any resolutions on the invasion of Ukraine until now. Clearly, the Kremlin approved of the change in tone from US diplomats.

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While only United Nations Security Council resolutions are binding, the UN General Assembly is widely seen as a key diplomatic battleground. Ukrainian diplomats duly celebrated the adoption of their resolution. “Sometimes it is not easy to fight for the truth. But in the end, it is the truth that makes history,” wrote Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha. Meanwhile, the US-led Security Council resolution earned praise from the Kremlin, with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov welcoming it as an indication that the causes of the war were being better understood in the West.

Speaking after the United Nations votes, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio explained that the United States position on the resolutions reflected President Trump’s emphasis on ending the war. “We didn’t feel it was conducive, frankly, to have something out there at the UN that’s antagonistic to either side,” he commented.

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While many Americans back Trump’s push for peace in Ukraine, the decision to vote alongside Russia and other authoritarian powers has sparked concern and some bipartisan condemnation. “I was deeply troubled by the vote at the UN today which put us on the same side as Russia and North Korea. These are not our friends. This posture is a dramatic shift from American ideals of freedom and democracy,” commented Republican senator John Curtis. “Siding with Russia and North Korea over freedom and democracy? Unconscionable. Dangerous. Weak,” offered Democratic senator Amy Klobuchar.

Trump has repeatedly stated that his goal is peace in Ukraine. His team insists the recent UN maneuvers were aimed at creating a less confrontational climate and setting the stage for meaningful negotiations. Critics counter that any serious peace process must recognize the root causes of the war and acknowledge the central role played by Russia’s imperial ambitions. Refusing to name Russia as the aggressor may prove popular in Moscow, but this does not change the reality of Russia’s actions. On the contrary, it risks fueling the Kremlin’s sense of impunity.

This week’s efforts to avoid offending Russia at the United Nations will add to existing concerns that the Trump White House is siding with the Kremlin against Ukraine and the rest of the collective West. While a strong case can be made for seeking to engage Russia, it is unclear why an administration eager to project strength appears so willing to make concessions to an authoritarian dictator while pressuring the victim of Russian aggression. Few UN votes go down in history, but the intense interest in this week’s resolutions reflects a far deeper sense of international alarm over what many see as the transformation of US foreign policy under Donald Trump.

Shelby Magid is deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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In addition to often conflicting foreign policy agendas, the leaders of the United States and Russia also operate in very different political realities. When US presidents are elected to office and their party controls Congress, they only have two surefire years to forge new policy, positively impact American lives, and set the course for their re-election. During that short time frame, US policymakers often face difficult decisions under extreme pressure from their constituents. Unfortunately, success through innovation requires a willingness to fail.

In comparison, Russian politicians do not compete against the clock in the same manner. They seldom face hard deadlines or constraints from public opinion when implementing their policies. Just as most Soviet leaders ruled until death, today’s Russian leaders like Vladimir Putin and Sergei Lavrov have remained in their roles for decades. Russia’s security apparatus, the true source of political power in the country, has been loyal to Putin since the very beginning of his reign.

Developing a holistic strategy toward Putin’s Russia has been more complicated than dealing with other regions because traditional playbooks do not apply. The United States has not been willing to pursue a Cold War-style policy of containment, as Russia is now a global power with an internationally integrated economy. Washington has also been reluctant to pursue strategic security cooperation as it did in the 1990s because Russia has proven to be an unreliable partner, has violated the international rules-based order, and has placed American lives directly at risk.

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Despite the need to address the security challenges posed by Russia, a coordinated United States strategy to deal with the Kremlin remains elusive. Successive attempts to reset relations have failed and bilateral ties have deteriorated. It is true that the US has had a policy on Ukraine and a policy on Russia as it relates to Ukraine. However, a strategic plan to counter Russian actions globally through traditional soft and hard power tools has become politically toxic for successive US administrations.

This applies throughout US politics. While Congress maintains country-specific caucuses like the Ukraine Caucus or the Friends of Democratic Belarus Caucus, it has long been considered politically impossible to create a Friends of Democratic Russia Caucus. Until recently, no member of Congress has wanted to appear as though they were extending even a metaphorical hand toward Russia. However, that may now be changing.

Why is there such an apparent sense of urgency? Like US presidents before him, Trump is working against time. He ran for the presidency on a campaign of ending foreign wars. He also has an ambitious domestic agenda to both cut the federal workforce and drastically increase its output. Crucially, Congress must pass a budget by March 14 or the federal government will shut down, a scenario that would create explosive pressure on the Trump administration.

Trump needs a deal with Russia more than he fears the political fallout that a Russia reset could bring to his presidency. In an era where having a Russia policy has long been politically elusive, now may be the time for a dramatic shift in US-Russia relations. As the Trump administration reviews the US approach to international aid and diplomacy, all eyes will be on how they navigate relations with America’s long-time geopolitical rival and the potential consequences for the future of Ukraine.

Leah Nodvin is a national security specialist with extensive experience covering issues related to foreign affairs, defense, trade, and geopolitical risk.

The inciting attack of October 7 was not a “typical” terrorist act; it was meticulously planned and executed as both an invasion and a declaration of war on Israel. While the attack included elements traditionally associated with terrorism—such as the mass murder of civilians, including women and children; heinous acts like rape; and the abduction of hostages, mostly civilians, taken to Gaza—it went far beyond the conventional scope of terrorism.

The attack underscored for Israel, and probably for other nations, the urgent need to reevaluate its approach to border security, as the threat of terror-attack-as-invasion has become a tangible reality. In the aftermath of October 7, there is a growing possibility that other terrorist organizations, or even some established armies, may attempt to replicate such operations, combining invasion tactics with acts of terror.

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Israel learned this lesson the hardest way. But other nations—particularly those with adversaries along their borders—should now consider preparing for similar scenarios to ensure the security of their borders and the safety of their civilian populations, thereby minimizing the risk of similar attacks. This includes actively protecting borders, even when an immediate threat is not expected. Israel’s experience has shown that technological measures alone are not always sufficient. In defending against terrorist organizations, the best approach is to prepare based on their capabilities rather than their often difficult-to-predict motivations. Also, we can expect a rise in investments in anti-missile armor, as capabilities such as Israel’s Iron Dome can play a crucial role in maintaining and protecting civilian lives.

Low-tech terror

Another important lesson learned from the tactics and capabilities used by Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and even Iran is that low-cost technology is now transforming the nature of armed conflicts around the world—from the Middle East to Ukraine. Tools such as drones and unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as low-cost rockets and outdated and primitive missile launchers, are enhancing the precision and effectiveness of attacks, demonstrating that terrorist organizations do not require advanced, high-tech capabilities to achieve strategic goals and inflict significant damage on their adversaries. Terrorist organizations, as well as sovereign countries and established armies, can use simple tools, some of which are purchased online, and adapt them to their needs without necessarily relying on arms industries to challenge their enemies. These methods can prove effective against Western militaries that have chosen to defend against attacks by investing in capabilities such as fighter jets, sophisticated radar systems, naval vessels, and high-end ammunition.

This should serve as a wake-up call for countries to adapt to the evolving threats posed by inexpensive and accessible technologies. For example, countries should develop solutions to counter drones and other precision capabilities in areas where the Iron Dome system has only partial success. Most importantly, countries must closely monitor developments in their enemies’ capabilities as threats will continue to evolve. This understanding is crucial, as low-tech attacks can persist for extended periods and cause significant damage to both civilian and military targets.

The risk of escalation

The October 7 attackand subsequent active involvement of other terror groups and countries demonstrated how attacks of this nature can quickly escalate into full-scale wars with multiple participants. Besides Israel and Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, the Houthis, and Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria also became involved in the wide-scale war, although they were not initially part of the attack and could have chosen to remain uninvolved. These groups’ involvement also drew in the United States, the United Kingdom, and others who hit back against them.

This expansion of the conflict had profound consequences for the civilian populations and governments of the countries where these groups operate. More than one million civilians fled their homes in Lebanon during the armed conflict with Israel, following counterattacks by the Israel Defense Forces. This is not to mention the tremendous damage and suffering to the people in the Gaza Strip.

It is now clear that Hamas’s attack not only dramatically damaged Hamas itself, but also weakened the broader Axis of Resistance, as the region’s Iran-backed armed groups are known. This dynamic may lead some terrorist groups to reconsider their actions in the future. These groups likely will seek prior confirmation and support from their allies—meaning Iran, in the case of Hamas and Hezbollah—before any future large-scale operations.

The important lesson, once again learned from Israel’s harsh experience, is that large-scale, multi-arena wars can erupt unexpectedly, even when the parties’ interests do not fully align. Initially, it was not clear that the October 7 attack would draw Hezbollah into the conflict given that it had not been strong allies with Hamas, but the two groups took greater risks for one another than Western analysts expected. Their initial motivation was driven by hatred toward Israel, a commitment to their terrorist agenda, and a desire to avoid standing idle while another terrorist organization waged a large-scale fight against Israel. Additionally, they sought to avoid appearing less committed to terrorism or less opposed to Israel.

Therefore, countries must take this into account and understand that previously unconnected terrorist organizations may cooperate toward the same goal—requiring preparation for war scenarios involving multiple fronts. It is likely that their cooperation will be based on a shared ideology, such as resistance to Western influence. It is difficult to determine if external intervention can eliminate such collaborations between terrorist organizations, but terrorist groups must be made to understand that becoming involved in a full-scale war will come at a significant cost to them and their host countries.

In addition, the United States and Israel, with the support of Western allies, should focus on disrupting cooperation, however limited, between terrorist organizations during peacetime. These efforts should complement other steps aimed at reducing the empowerment of terrorist organizations in the future. This includes capitalizing on the vulnerabilities of the Axis of Resistance to disrupt its empowerment and arms transfers, and strengthen alternatives within their home countries to provide the civilian services previously offered by these organizations—ensuring that, unlike in recent decades, these groups do not take over their countries.

Additionally, the United States and Israel, along with Western allies, should apply pressure to the countries where these terrorist organizations originate to prevent them from using civilian areas for operations, including by threatening to withhold financial backing. Furthermore, those allies should take action against terror facilities in civilian areas as soon as they are identified. This could come in the form of military action, exposing these facilities so the terrorist organizations would be reluctant to use them, and pressuring countries to take action against these facilities themselves. The goal should always be to minimize civilian harm, reduce the threat posed by such facilities, and deter terrorist groups from operating in these areas due to the risk of destruction and loss of resources.

The psychological war

Following the catastrophe of October 7, Israel quickly regained its military effectiveness and succeeded in inflicting substantial damage on its enemies. This recovery was further strengthened by the remarkable support of its allies, which enhanced both its capabilities and strategic position. This model could also apply to other countries that may be attacked in the future.

Although Israel managed to recover from the shock of the October 7 attack, the broader perspective of the Gaza war highlighted the significant impact of psychological terror on both the civilian population and government decision-making. This represents a new type of warfare, one that involves not only mainstream media and news reports but also underground sources. Actions by Hamas, such as releasing hostage videos, spreading rumors, and leaking information, profoundly influenced public sentiment, contributing to the chaos seen in Israel, particularly in the war’s early months.

This is another shared lesson from both the Middle East conflict and the Russia-Ukraine war. It’s hard to predict whether future conflicts with terrorist organizations will necessarily involve these kinds of psychological threats and tactics. However, it is clear that the flow of information today—via social media, messaging apps, and other platforms—not only shapes public opinion but also influences the battlefield.

The conflicts across the Middle East that erupted in late 2023 will carry a lasting legacy for the entire region. As policymakers turn to the future of Gaza and other political negotiations, they should also take note of the lessons learned over the past sixteen months as they seek to reshape the region and reduce the impact of terrorism. This particular series of conflicts may be coming to a close, but the threat is not going away.

Maayan Dagan is a visiting research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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Civil war, debt, and Ethiopia’s road to recovery

Abbi Kedir — Tue, 18 Feb 2025 23:52:23 +0000

Evolution of freedom

Evolution of prosperity

The path forward

Explore the ethiopia country scorecard

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Evolution of freedom

Since 2000, Ethiopia has achieved remarkable economic growth, driven by public investment in infrastructure and industrial expansion, positioning itself as one of Africa’s fastest-growing economies. Coupled with extensive construction projects, the service and agricultural sectors also made modest contributions. However, since 2020, the country has faced significant setbacks, including internal conflicts that disrupted production and trade, alongside the global COVID-19 pandemic, which exacerbated supply chain disruptions and weakened demand for exports. These challenges were further compounded by rising inflation, which strained household incomes and increased the cost of living, and a severe shortage of international reserves, making it difficult to stabilize its currency. The recent decision to float the Ethiopian birr has added to the volatility, causing currency fluctuations that have increased uncertainty in trade and investment flows. These converging shocks have placed immense pressure on Ethiopia’s economic stability, underscoring the need for carefully managed reforms and international support to restore macroeconomic balance.

The Freedom Index portrays a realistic picture of the politico-economic development of Ethiopia in the past three decades. The rapid improvement on the economic subindex around the turn of the century illustrates the country’s sustained strong economic growth in that period. More recently, this subindex reflects the euphoric momentum that came with a new administration in 2018, promising additional economic liberalization in trade and investment. I think the rise observed in the property rights component starting in the early 2000s is also a product of an effort to better protect foreign investment.

Unfortunately, these improvements were not very long-lived, with scores on the investment freedom component dropping first, followed by declines in the trade and property rights components a few years later. 2020 appears to be a clear inflection point, with the expansion of internal conflicts in the country—starting with war in Tigray—that have been devastating for the economic climate. Along with the war, the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown and supply chain disruption exacerbated the economic development challenges. Some of the industrial zones in areas of conflict are now difficult to access, and the lack of stability makes it harder to retain and attract foreign investors. A dramatic example of the effects of these protracted conflicts since November 2020 is the fact that Ethiopia lost its beneficiary status under the African Growth and Opportunity Act in 2022. This dented the country’s ability to propel its economic development via export growth.

The women’s economic freedom component shows an optimistic view of the situation for women in Ethiopia. In terms of legislation, especially at a federal level, it is true that the economic rights of women have come closer to that of males since 1995. Raising the legal marriage age to eighteen since 2000 has helped reduce child marriage rates, ensuring that young people have more time to complete their education and achieve better economic outcomes. The strict enforcement of the legal marriage age legislation is essential to tackle child marriage problems in some regions, such as Amhara, where the incidence of child marriage was persistently high in the past. Enforcement across all regions in the country contributes to improved health, educational attainment, labor market outcomes, and well-being for young women by allowing them to marry at a more mature age, thereby decreasing the risks and complications associated with early pregnancies. So, the improvement in the legal framework for women, particularly around economic issues, is probably what is being captured in this component, and it is also true that we now see a larger share of women in top government positions, including ministerial posts.

Nonetheless, the implementation of gender equality more generally and at all levels of society is probably a much harder task. There is still significant cultural resistance in some regions and ethnic groups; for example, some impose informal limits on the assets that women can inherit. My own research on the topic shows that the school-to-work transition remains very challenging for many women, especially when they turn eighteen and the pressure to marry is intense, particularly in rural and remote areas.

The political subindex clearly captures the excitement of the country when the current administration came to power. However, the regressive nature of the new government—responding both to internal and external factors—became immediately clear, in terms of civil liberties and political rights. In recent years, the country has been going through civil conflicts, a cost-of-living crisis, high levels of indebtedness, and tight monetary policy. These, combined with global factors such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine-Russia war, have been detrimental for Ethiopia and the welfare of its population. If the current trajectory continues, the near future is worrisome.

The unexpectedly high score on the election component may stem from a limited interpretation of this variable. While elections do take place, the system does not yet fully embody a completely democratic political structure with guaranteed political and civil liberties and a robust system of checks and balances on the executive. Ethiopia has no history of a meaningful political opposition. The legislative constraints on the government are very low, which explains, in part, the developments of the past thirty years.

The low level of the legal subindex components accurately shows the poor state of the rule of law in Ethiopia—a common problem in many African countries. I am somewhat surprised by the relatively good and rising performance of informality, which is probably due to the obvious difficulties in measuring the size of the informal economy and the share of the informal sector in employment. My own research, using the harmonized World Bank Enterprise Surveys, shows a persistently high level of informality in the enterprise sector. Another potential problem with this component is that informality is not a binary phenomenon, but a continuum, as firms navigate the formal and informal sectors simultaneously, making the actual share of the informal economy—and the number of individuals engaged in it—even harder to measure.

The sharp drop in security starting from 2020 is explained by the proliferation of internal conflicts and fighting between the federal government and various groups in regions such as Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia. The Pretoria Agreement of November 2022 may have slightly improved the situation by stopping the war in Tigray, but the ongoing conflicts in Amhara, Oromia, and elsewhere could jeopardize those security improvements, and the overall future stability of the country.

Evolution of prosperity

The significant rise in the Prosperity Index since 1995 is noteworthy, but it is important to consider the very low initial levels in areas like income, education, and health. While the country remains one of the least prosperous globally and has yet to reach the average level for Sub-Saharan Africa, the substantial progress, especially since 2000, is undeniable.

The rise in income starting around the turn of the century is substantial. When initial conditions are at a very low level of economic development, any form of growth and stability favors the reallocation of resources to more productive uses and rapidly shows up in gross domestic product (GDP) measures. Sectors like construction and infrastructure clearly benefit from a more stable macroeconomic framework, boosting income growth. For the first two decades of the twenty-first century, growth was propelled mainly by strong public investment. However, the most important question is whether the increase in GDP has been adequately and fairly distributed. The inequality component for Ethiopia, based on the Gini coefficient, is in line with other aggregate measures of inequality. Nonetheless, when you focus on the lower end of the income distribution, the bottom 20 percent, the situation is not so optimistic, and is probably worsening, pointing to the lack of inclusion and progressive redistribution. There are also important disparities across Ethiopia’s regions that are usually not well captured by data, as these are mainly collected in the larger cities.

The extraordinary increase in Ethiopia’s health component can be attributed to the extensive work of grassroots service providers, expanding healthcare and coverage in line with policies since 2000 (e.g., the use of health extension workers). Broadly speaking, the country focused on improving primary and preventive healthcare, which produced a sharp drop in child mortality and adult morbidity over the past three decades, though maternal mortality remains a significant problem. The small dip on this component since 2019 is not only due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which was not so severe in health terms as in Europe, but also to the deaths related to armed conflicts.

In any case, while Ethiopia has been meeting the Millennium Development Goals and is even ahead of schedule for indicators such as child mortality, there is a long way to go if the country is to achieve the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. Despite progress in terms of GDP growth, Ethiopia still faces complex economic challenges including the prevalence of poverty, inequality, malnutrition, and destitution.

Regarding education, the graph clearly captures the significant improvement in schooling rates, which have increased in all levels of the educational system, for both males and females. However, quality has been an issue, and our graduates are not as well prepared as these data suggest. As an example, think of the investments carried out by the Chinese government in the last two decades. The Chinese investors came to Ethiopia because labor is relatively cheap, but they have realized that the skills and human capital of many of the workers they hired are very poor, to the extent that they have even needed to send them to Beijing to train. To make headway in education, the country needs to “invest in learning” and development of cognitive and other skills for better employability of graduates. This necessitates a paradigm shift away from the usual culture of “spending on schooling” which simply focuses on completing a given schooling cycle, with little attention paid to acquiring employable skills and other practical outcomes for learners.

The very low level of the minorities component reflects a recurrent problem of the Ethiopian institutional environment: the close alignment of political power and access to services and opportunities. That is, economic growth has failed to be inclusive of all societal groups. The current administration must reverse this tendency so that the proceeds of economic growth reach the wider population. Children, youth, women, the disabled, and the elderly should not be neglected, and the economic management should give utmost priority to have a social protection angle in the ongoing reforms and policy measures.

The path forward

The current and future challenges for Ethiopia are enormous. First and foremost, the various armed conflicts around the country are the biggest impediment to movement of labor, traded goods, and execution of productive activities. If peace and security are not restored in all regions of the country, there will be further deterioration of the socioeconomic situation nationwide. Agricultural and industrial production, and other employment-generating economic activities such as trade and investment, continue to suffer.

It will be difficult to attract domestic and foreign investors, who are critical to revive the ailing economy in a situation of insecurity and uncertainty. Economic growth will not be able to maintain the pace of the first two decades of the twenty-first century. The debt problem in the country dented the confidence of investors and the country’s credit rating and/or worthiness suffer consequently. Macroeconomic management will be a major challenge in the context of very limited international reserves, devalued currency, and high levels of debt repayments with high cost of capital. The relatively easy access Ethiopia has enjoyed to international capital markets and bilateral lending from countries like China can suddenly become a problem. China, with its aid (e.g., lending for road and other infrastructure projects), might offer benefits in the present but at a very high cost in the future. But the debt problem Ethiopia faces is not only the making of China; it has been a problem for several years and borrowing from other sources such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank contribute to current debt levels.

Another big challenge that Ethiopia faces is the alarming demographic trend. Even if there has not been a census in the country since 2007, some global estimates put the population at around 120 million and growing. This demographic situation poses a major challenge for attaining food security and creating enough jobs for the growing young and educated population. Each year, two to three million young Ethiopians enter the labor force, and it is clear that the labor market cannot absorb such a huge number of workers. Any hope of transforming the economy—or even of gaining a meaningful grip on it—is an elusive dream in a country where there are high levels of unemployment, poverty, inequality, destitution, internal conflicts, food insecurity, and an ever-growing and underskilled youth population.

Addressing the challenges facing Ethiopia requires more than just external assistance; it demands the implementation of robust public policies that focus on aiding the poor, youth, and women, all within a framework that fosters inclusive economic growth. While Ethiopia’s strategic importance to global powers, including the United States, might influence the flow of foreign aid from organizations like the International Monetary Fund, the impact of such aid (in the form of grants and/or loans) will depend heavily on the conditions attached to it and how Ethiopia uses the aid for growth enhancing, productive, and poverty-reducing activities. If strict fiscal consolidation is enforced, it could exacerbate inequality and worsen conditions for the most vulnerable populations, potentially leading to increased poverty and destitution. My concern for Ethiopia is profound, and I hope that an end to conflicts will soon allow the country to return to the better economic path it was on before 2020.

Abbi Kedir is the director of research at the African Economic Research Consortium based in Nairobi, Kenya. Kedir was an associate professor in international business at the University of Sheffield, UK, from 2016 to 2023. Kedir has authored more than fifty journal articles and is an editorial board member of the Journal of Development Studies, International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour & Research, Economies, and Frontiers in Environmental Science.

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A Putin-friendly peace deal would be disastrous for global security

Ihor Smeshko — Thu, 13 Feb 2025 21:39:06 +0000

Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea was a watershed moment in modern European history. The Kremlin’s subsequent full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 brought the world to the brink of World War III. With negotiations over a possible peace deal now reportedly set to begin in earnest, we are approaching a critical juncture that will shape the future of international relations for decades to come.

In hindsight, it is now clear that the threat posed by Russian aggression in Ukraine could have been eliminated almost immediately. As soon as Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the illegal annexation of Crimea in early 2014, Ukraine could have declared war and ordered its military to defend the peninsula. Putting NATO forces on alert would have further cooled the heads of the more hawkish Russian officials in the Kremlin.

This did not happen. Instead, the international community stood by and watched the Russian invasion unfold, while Ukraine’s Western partners advocated passivity and cautioned Kyiv against doing anything that might risk provoking Putin. The opportunity to end Russia’s invasion in the early stages was therefore missed, paving the way for a series of further Kremlin escalations that ultimately led to the full-scale invasion of 2022.

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Over the past eleven years, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has done serious damage to the foundations of the international security system. It has undermined the inviolability of international borders that was first established in the aftermath of World War II. Russia’s invasion has also seriously discredited the cause of nuclear disarmament, with Ukraine’s 1994 decision to surrender its vast nuclear arsenal now widely recognized as one of the costliest mistakes in modern history.

Given the global implications of any negotiated settlement reached over Russia’s war in Ukraine, it is vital that the entire peace process focus on Russia’s existing international commitments. These include the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and Moscow’s recognition of Ukraine’s 1991 borders. After all, what is the point of signing any new treaties with Russia if Moscow refuses to acknowledge or adhere to the terms of the many agreements and documents it has previously signed?

At stake is the credibility of the entire treaty system governing international relations, such as the 1969 Vienna Convention. Known as the “treaty on treaties,” the Vienna Convention sets out clear guidelines for how international treaties should be drafted, defined, amended, and interpreted. Russia’s invasion poses a similarly grave threat to the 1975 Helsinki Accords, which confirmed the principle of territorial integrity.

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It is also important that the peace process specifically address the issue of nuclear non-proliferation. By giving up the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal in the 1990s, Ukraine rendered an unparalleled service to the cause of global security. Over the past three decades, this unilateral Ukrainian step in support of nuclear non-proliferation has translated into savings worth trillions of dollars for countries around the world.

Unfortunately, however, the security commitments that Ukraine believed it had received in the Budapest Memorandum have proved worthless. Instead, Russia has launched the largest European invasion since World War II, bringing untold death and devastation to Ukraine.

Adding insult to injury, the Kremlin has used nuclear blackmail against non-nuclear Ukraine as a tool to enable the invasion and deter the West from providing Kyiv with desperately needed military aid. Understandably, many in Ukraine now feel they have every right to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty unless the country is able to obtain genuine security guarantees.

A bad peace deal will compound the damage that Russia’s invasion has already done to the current international security architecture. It would legitimize international aggression and set a dangerous precedent that could have catastrophic consequences for global stability. In order to avoid this, Western leaders should return to Russia’s existing international treaty obligations with regard to the sanctity of borders and the use of force.

Crucially, Ukraine must also receive credible long-term security guarantees that can prevent any repeat of the current Russian invasion in the years to come. Failure to do so will set the stage for a new era of geopolitical lawlessness that will be felt far beyond the violated borders of Ukraine.

Ihor Smeshko is a Ukrainian politician and former head of Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence and Security Service.

Meanwhile, Jordanians of Palestinian origin (who constitute a majority of Jordan’s population) are weary of the kingdom transforming into an alternative Palestinian homeland, fearing it would result in a denial of Palestinians’ “right of return” to the areas they have fled in 1948 and 1967.

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Last week, the Jordanian parliament introduced a bill to ban the resettlement of Palestinians in the kingdom. The draft law, according to the text, “reaffirms Jordan’s official and popular rejection of any plan to displace Palestinians to Jordan as an alternative homeland. Jordan is for Jordanians, and Palestine is for Palestinians.”

During his visit, King Abdullah will likely warn Trump that his resettlement idea will destabilize the Middle East, jeopardize Jordan’s peace with Israel, and even threaten the kingdom’s stability.

Israel, which shares its longest border with the Hashemite Kingdom, should be concerned that Trump’s plan could destabilize Jordan. Since October 2023, Amman has witnessed an increase in protests against Israel’s war in Gaza and in support of Hamas. Such support has been voiced primarily by Jordanians of Palestinian descent and the Islamic Action Front (the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood). An influx of Palestinians sympathetic to Hamas could further inflame tensions, especially amid protests pressing for the annulment of the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty and calls from Hamas urging the population to take up arms against Israel. The threat became evident in October 2024 when two terrorists, disguised as Jordanian troops, traveled from Jordan to Israel and attacked Israeli soldiers. The perpetrators were linked to the Islamic Action Front.

On the agenda

The two leaders are expected to discuss the resettlement issue, but that isn’t the only topic likely to be on the agenda.

One other topic is the security partnership between Jordan and Israel in countering Iran’s regional ambitions. In 2023 alone, over four hundred firearms were intercepted while being smuggled into the West Bank through Jordan. However, these figures only account for confiscated shipments—many weapons still make it across the border, with hundreds believed to reach the West Bank and Israel.

Jordanian authorities have made significant efforts to curb these smuggling attempts, but their resources have been stretched due to ongoing instability in Syria and the captagon trade. Despite the diplomatic tensions that have arisen since October 7, 2023, security cooperation between Jordan and Israel remains crucial and should be strengthened.

As Iran’s influence in Syria declines, Tehran may shift its focus toward intensifying its support for terrorist organizations in the West Bank including Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Anticipating this, Trump may push Jordan to minimize its anti-Israel rhetoric and prioritize its security coordination with Israel to help maintain stability along the border.

Another topic likely to be discussed is US foreign aid to Jordan. Such assistance remains frozen following Trump’s Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid executive order and is under review to determine whether the aid aligns with US interests.

US assistance is vital for Jordan’s stability, military operations, and efforts to address domestic challenges. Jordan is one of the top three recipients of US aid, and the ninety-day freeze will significantly impact the country economically and in terms of security. In September 2022, the United States and Jordan signed a seven-year memorandum of understanding, in which the United States committed to provide $1.45 billion in annual foreign assistance. Jordan also hosts US troops at multiple bases. Given the stakes, Abdullah and Trump’s discussions will likely focus on expediting the review process and minimizing the freeze’s impact to ensure Jordan can continue its security role and support US interests in the region, as well as maintain domestic stability.

It’s plausible that Trump could use Jordan’s foreign aid as leverage to influence its stance on the Gazan resettlement issue. There is precedent for this. During Trump’s first term, some members of his administration pushed for reducing foreign assistance. In 2020, US Ambassador to Jordan Henry Wooster, during his nomination process, did not rule out the possibility of using assistance as leverage to coax Jordan to extradite Ahlam Aref Ahmad al-Tamimi, a Jordanian involved in the 2001 Jerusalem Sbarro bombings that killed two Americans. Despite such proposals, Trump continued to provide aid to Jordan. It is likely that Abdullah will work to ensure no new conditions are placed on Jordan’s aid from the United States.

The February 11 meeting is crucial for Abdullah and Trump to share their requests and concerns. Despite potential challenges and tensions in the backdrop to the visit, Abdullah will continue to prioritize Jordan’s strong relationship with the United States, recognizing the importance of this partnership for the kingdom’s stability.

Ahmad Sharawi is a research analyst at The Foundation for Defense of Democracies, focusing on Middle East affairs. Follow him on X: @AhmadA_Sharawi.

Note: Some Atlantic Council work funded by the US government has been paused as a result of the Trump administration’s Stop Work Orders issued under the Executive Order “Reevaluating and Realigning US Foreign Aid.”

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Is Israel laying the groundwork to stay in Lebanon and defy a second withdrawal deadline?

Nicholas Blanford — Fri, 07 Feb 2025 17:44:38 +0000

The Israeli military has already missed one deadline to pull its forces out of south Lebanon at the end of a sixty-day ceasefire that fell on January 27, and now there are concerns that the Israelis may extend their presence beyond a second withdrawal date set for February 18.

Fueling such speculation are reports that the Israelis are constructing what sources with the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission in south Lebanon, known by the acronym UNIFIL, say are “semi-permanent Forward Operating Bases” (FOBs) on hilltops close to the Blue Line, the UN name for Lebanon’s southern border.

Israel has provided no indication of whether it will continue to stay beyond February 18, but it has repeatedly accused the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) of failing to disarm Hezbollah in the southern border district and fully deploy across the area in accordance with the ceasefire agreement that commenced on November 27. Lebanon has said that the LAF cannot deploy in all villages and towns until the Israeli military has left. Since the ceasefire began, the LAF has significantly increased its presence in the area south of the Litani River (which lies between three and twenty-eight kilometers from the Blue Line) in what the UN has described as a demonstration of “resolve.” The LAF also has taken control of some former Hezbollah facilities in the southern border district, including a massive underground tunnel network, named Imad 4, that was showcased in a Hezbollah video last August.

During the sixty-day ceasefire and since then, the Israeli military has continued operations to uncover and destroy Hezbollah infrastructure and seize weapons and ammunition along a narrow strip adjacent to the border. The Israelis also destroyed hundreds of houses, places of worship, roads, and electricity and water infrastructure in what many Lebanese interpret as a deliberate policy to create a belt of territory adjacent to the border that is all but uninhabitable.

Nevertheless, on the day the ceasefire ended, tens of thousands of Lebanese flocked back to their homes, despite warnings from the Israeli military to stay away. On that day, twenty-two Lebanese were killed and 124 wounded by Israeli fire as they marched toward their homes. While the desire to return to their homes was genuine, there was a degree of organization behind the mass march, with residents brandishing new Hezbollah flags and portraits of “martyrs” killed during the recent conflict.

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Not only have the Israelis been dynamiting villages, uprooting olive trees, and building semi-permanent outposts on the loftier reaches of the southern border district, but they also have launched a program of defoliation to destroy ground cover along the Lebanese side of the Blue Line. Three separate UNIFIL sources told me that the Israelis have engaged in unusual aerial activity since the weekend of January 25-26. A small prop plane has been spotted flying at low altitude and disseminating a defoliant agent along a swathe of Lebanese territory immediately adjacent to the Blue Line. A UNIFIL spokesman confirmed the flights and said that the peacekeepers had been able to identify with their “limited capabilities” that the substance was a chemical herbicide.

“It’s something to stop the vegetation growing in the near future. It gives the Israelis a better view across the area,” the spokesman said.

There is a precedent for such actions by the Israeli military. Since 2014, Israel has been spraying herbicides on the Palestinian side of the Gaza border to destroy ground cover that could be used by militants to approach the security fence. According to Israeli researchers, the flights have also caused damage to Palestinian farmers’ crops. The low-level flights along the Blue Line appear to have the same goal as in Gaza, destroying all vegetation that could be used by Hezbollah to cover movement along the border. In the past, Hezbollah fighters have used the dense undergrowth of bushes and Mediterranean oak to mask tunnelling activities and to observe Israeli troop movements on the other side of the border. However, Lebanese farmers have crops, mainly tobacco and olive trees, close to the Blue Line where the flights have occurred that could be affected by the chemical agent.

If the Israeli army does remain in Lebanon after February 18, it will pose a significant dilemma for Hezbollah. The thirteen-month war with Israel has shattered Hezbollah’s deterrence against its long-standing enemy. Israel, frankly, is no longer scared of Hezbollah, and the mutual deterrence that maintained a tense calm along the Blue Line from their 2006 war until the outbreak of hostilities in October 2023 is well and truly over. On January 30, Israel shot down an alleged Hezbollah drone flying over south Lebanon in the first such incident since the November 27 ceasefire began. In retaliation, Israel staged that night a series of air strikes against Hezbollah targets in the Bekaa Valley. Such a response would have been unthinkable before October 2023 when Israel confined its anti-Hezbollah operations to Syrian territory rather than Lebanon to reduce the risk of escalation and possible war.

UNIFIL sources told me that the Israelis are building the semi-permanent FOBs in at least five locations: one on the Blue Line at Labboune south of Naqoura where UNIFIL’s headquarters are located, a second on Jabal Blat opposite the Israeli settlement of Zarit and the location of a prominent Israeli compound during the years of occupation, two more positions on the adjacent hills of Tallet Ezziyeh and Jabal Aweida near the Lebanese border village of Kfar Kila, and a fifth on Tallet Hamames facing the Israeli town of Metulla.

The outposts include cement structures, contain technological equipment, and are protected by Hesco blast barriers, according to UNIFIL sources. Israel appears to be signaling that the outposts are necessary to allow the Israeli military to dominate the high ground along the Blue Line and to prevent Hezbollah from returning to the border. However, such an argument would be somewhat specious, and the decision to construct and man the outposts is clearly provocative. Israel enjoys saturation air coverage over south Lebanon and does not require a footprint on the ground for observation purposes over a relatively limited stretch of the border. It also has shown no hesitation in the past two months to launch attacks against any suspected Hezbollah movements it detects both north and south of the Litani. Furthermore, the Israeli army is also planning to build a string of new military compounds on the Israeli side of the border between the fence and towns and settlements to provide better protection for residents.

Nevertheless, if Israel stations troops in the outposts beyond the February 18 deadline, Hezbollah will have to decide whether or not to launch attacks against them. If Hezbollah attacks, Israel is likely to respond disproportionately, possibly by resuming air strikes against targets in the southern suburbs of Beirut or assassinations of senior cadres. If Hezbollah does nothing, it will inevitably undermine the party’s resistance credentials and provide ammunition to the group’s opponents in Lebanon who want it disarmed. After all, if Hezbollah refrains from confronting Israeli occupation, what is the point of it continuing to carry weapons?

One possibility apparently under consideration, according to sources close to Hezbollah, is to mount deniable operations in which attacks are claimed by previously unknown groups to convey the impression they are acts of grassroots resistance by residents of south Lebanon. However, given Israel’s bullish mood, it is unlikely to turn the other cheek to such attacks even if they go unclaimed by Hezbollah.

Nicholas Blanford is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, a Beirut-based consultant, and a defense and security correspondent for IHS/Jane’s.

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Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan outlines his vision for peace in the region

Katherine Golden — Thu, 06 Feb 2025 01:24:05 +0000

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A conversation with Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan

The Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center hosts a discussion featuring Nikol Pashinyan, prime minister of the Republic of Armenia, to discuss the path forward for Armenia amid geopolitical developments in the South Caucasus and the broader region.

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For Armenia’s independence, sovereignty, and democracy, “peace is crucial,” said Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.

Pashinyan spoke at an Atlantic Council event on Tuesday hosted by the Eurasia Center.

In pursuit of improved independence and sovereignty, the prime minister said, Armenia is “concentrating on our regional affairs first,” meaning Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia, and Iran.

“It isn’t possible to have real and thriving independence, prosperity, and security without peace,” Pashinyan argued.

“We have deep relations with our neighbors Georgia and Iran,” he said, “but we want to open a new era in our relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan.” Armenia and Azerbaijan had been locked in a conflict over the Karabakh region for decades, which was also one contributing factor to the historically tense Armenia-Turkey relationship.

Below are more highlights from the conversation, moderated by Eurasia Center Senior Director John E. Herbst, during which the prime minister also outlined how he envisions Armenia’s relations with the United States and the European Union.

Peace ahead?

According to Pashinyan, peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan is “more than reachable” today.
Pashinyan said that of the seventeen articles that comprise a draft peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, fifteen are agreed upon, including provisions on the territorial integrity of the two countries; two additional articles, according to the prime minister, remain topics of discussion.
One such article regards the deployment of third-party forces along the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, a proposal seen as unnecessary by Azerbaijan. The measure is supported by Armenia in part because of Yerevan’s concern about the future operations of the European Union Mission in Armenia, whose mandate to report and observe the situation on the ground was recently extended for two years.
The prime minister said that his country has proposed applying the provision only to delimited sections of the border. “We are waiting for a reaction from Azerbaijan,” Pashinyan said.
The other article, Pashinyan said, regards a proposal for Armenia and Azerbaijan to withdraw complaints about each other in legal institutions. The prime minister argued that such a drawback should include removing those issues from bilateral discussions as well. “Our proposal is to . . . open a new era in bilateral relations starting from [a] new and empty and clear page.”

The big picture

“The attention and support of [the] international community will be very useful to create a proper atmosphere for having a lasting and sustainable peace,” he said.
“The potential beneficiaries of peace [are] not only people living in Armenia. All the region and even [the] international community will benefit from that peace,” he added. “We perceive this process as our investment into global peace.”

Looking west

The prime minister spoke at the Atlantic Council during his working visit to Washington, a few weeks after the United States and Armenia signed a strategic partnership. In addition, Pashinyan noted, Armenia is “deepening” its cooperation with the EU—as shown not only by the mission in Armenia but also by EU-Armenia visa liberalization dialogues and the EU’s decision to include Armenia in the bloc’s peace facility.
“We are in the process of diversifying our foreign relations in all fields, from economy to security,” Pashinyan said.
“Armenia is [a] thriving democracy,” Pashinyan argued. That democracy is having a “very concrete impact” on Armenia’s foreign policy, he said. “When a country is democratic, obviously it will try to deepen cooperation and partnership with all other democratic countries.”

Katherine Golden is an associate director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

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How Armenia’s ‘Crossroads for Peace’ plan could transform the South Caucasus

By Sheila Paylan

The initiative could economically benefit the region, reduce Armenia’s dependence on Russia, and promote peace throughout the South Caucasus.

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Experts react: Is the US really going to ‘take over’ the Gaza Strip?

Atlantic Council experts — Wed, 05 Feb 2025 19:34:58 +0000

“The US will take over the Gaza Strip, and we will do a job with it too.” During a press conference on Tuesday with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, US President Donald Trump proposed that the United States take control of the Palestinian territory and rebuild it. While the real-estate mogul-turned-president said that he envisions Gaza becoming “the Riviera of the Middle East,” Arab states and other countries quickly rejected the idea of direct US intervention, arguing that it would in effect force out Palestinians from the land and abandon the long-standing US commitment to a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Below, Atlantic Council experts share their insights on how to decode Trump’s comments and how the remarks are already impacting the region.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: If Trump is trying to pressure Hamas, it’s unlikely to work

Jonathan Panikoff: Trump is serious about shaking up the Middle East, even if his Gaza plan isn’t

Thomas Warrick: Trump has pushed the US further ahead on Gaza in a month than Biden ever did

Jennifer Gavito: It’s a concept without a plan—made all the more difficult by dismantling USAID

Arwa Damon: The way to avoid “history repeating itself” is not to repeat the core cause

Alex Plitsas: The reality of “owning” Gaza would carry large costs and risks—including an armed insurgency

If Trump is trying to pressure Hamas, it’s unlikely to work

Though many were extremely taken aback by Trump’s remarks alongside Netanyahu, a few rushed to view them through the prism of Trump’s hardball negotiation style. By setting the goalpost in such an extreme territory, Trump might then gradually negotiate down and obtain favorable conditions for whatever policy he hopes to implement between Israel and Gaza.

However, what remains puzzling in this equation is who the president might be trying to influence with such outlandish and extreme declarations that violate decades of established US policy toward the Middle East, international humanitarian law, and diplomatic norms.

It is well understood that Jordan and Egypt are in no position to help facilitate the forced or even voluntary removal of more than two million Gazans out of the coastal enclave and into their respective territories. Even if those countries wanted to acquiesce to the president’s blackmail, the US foreign aid that they receive is insufficient to justify the geopolitical, economic, security, and social risks and implications such a move would entail. Clearly, the president is not trying to pressure Israel or its leadership, represented by Netanyahu, who received a hero’s welcome in Washington as the first foreign leader to visit the White House in Trump’s second term. That leaves the Palestinians, and Hamas in particular, as the likely party that Trump was trying to pressure with his unprecedented declarations on Tuesday.

Contextually, Netanyahu’s visit comes on the heels of the impending negotiations to begin the second phase of the cease-fire between Hamas and Israel. Netanyahu is involving his close confidant, Ron Dermer, instead of Mossad’s head, David Barnea, as the negotiations are expected to be political and less technical. The expected goal is to tie the implementation of the second phase with a political horizon that displaces Hamas as the sole authority in Gaza and prevents the terror group from remaining in power after the withdrawal of all Israeli troops from the decimated Palestinian strip.

It is unclear how these threats can credibly force Hamas to moderate and shift its position vis-à-vis the negotiations. It’s also unclear whether the group is susceptible to threats of US military action against the territory as a way to induce behavioral change. Hamas has unleashed the most destructive chapter in Palestinian contemporary history upon the people of Gaza, and it is still ruthlessly acting as if it will enjoy the spoils of war, including the full reconstruction of the territory. Although the entire world, including Arab and Muslim nations, has made it clear that there will be no reconstruction of Gaza while Hamas remains in complete control (and for good reason), Hamas has yet to signal that it is willing to give up anything in order to facilitate Gaza’s recovery.

Trump’s comments are extraordinarily harmful to the prospects of regional stability, to moderate Arab Sunni states, and to the prospects of Israeli-Saudi normalization, with the kingdom releasing a statement on Wednesday saying that it will not join the Abraham Accords if there isn’t a Palestinian state. The comments also reek of an incoherent foreign policy that is defined by threats, not compelling US leadership. Indeed, these remarks are fuel for the United States’ enemies, especially the likes of China, Iran, and Russia, the last of which will now likely point to US actions to justify its illegal and ruthless invasion of Ukraine.

The rules-based world order that the United States has led for decades must not be sacrificed for neo-imperialism that breeds chaos and instability while eroding trust in US leadership among its allies and emboldening its foes.

—Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib is a resident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and an analyst who grew up in Gaza City.

Trump is serious about shaking up the Middle East, even if his Gaza plan isn’t

Many Americans and allies in Europe and the Middle East woke up this morning confused and shocked to learn of US President Donald Trump’s declaration that the United States will “take over” the Gaza Strip, and its approximately two million inhabitants should be moved elsewhere. They shouldn’t be.

Trump’s plans and goals to end many of the traditional domestic and global norms we’ve experienced in the post-World War II period were never a secret. And Tuesday night’s policy declaration is not part of a strategic master plan to get Hamas to agree to a deal with better terms for Israel and the United States. Nor is it a strategy to cajole Egypt or Jordan to be more accommodating to US preferences in the region, as some commentators have assessed.

The plan the president announced is about remaking the world and US interests in it in a fundamental way. Does the president truly believe his plan can ultimately be executed? Maybe, maybe not. If it cannot, then it could indeed serve as a starting point for negotiations over Gaza with Arab states, making the result the same regardless of whether he intended the plan to be a serious proposal or not.

But even if his plan is a nonstarter, which it almost certainly is, it’s not because that was the intent all along. Rather, it is because he doesn’t fully understand, or perhaps care, about the history of the region, the complexities of intra-Palestinian relationships, the potential implications for US allies, or, most importantly, the emotional connection most people have to their home. …

Read more from Jonathan Panikoff, the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council:

New Atlanticist

Feb 5, 2025

Trump is serious about shaking up the Middle East, even if his Gaza plan isn’t

By Jonathan Panikoff

It’s almost impossible to imagine Trump’s plan for Gaza coming to fruition. But it would be a mistake to think that he was anything but serious with the proposal he laid out Tuesday night.

Human Rights International Norms

Trump has pushed the US further ahead on Gaza in a month than Biden ever did

Since his election win on November 5, I have told colleagues that Trump would eventually realize that only the United States can organize a lasting solution to the problem of who will govern postwar Gaza. I thought this would happen in June, given the start of the new US presidential administration and the seasonal rhythms of Middle East diplomacy. I never would have guessed that the realization would hit Trump during a press conference on February 4.

Those criticizing Trump for calling for the displacement of more than two million Gazans are fundamentally misunderstanding how Trump sees Gaza: Trump is a longtime billionaire property developer who has recently come to understand the extent of Gaza’s devastation. He is right that it will likely take more than a decade to rebuild Gaza—and that the only way Gaza will be rebuilt even in that amount of time is if Hamas plays no role in Gaza’s governance going forward. Trump is also right on this point: No Arab government is going to donate billions of dollars to rebuild Gaza if Hamas is able to attack Israel in three or four years, turning all that reconstruction back into rubble.

Trump, as a developer used to buying and selling properties, does not understand the depth of Gazans’ attachment to the land and their absolute unwillingness to be further dispossessed after what happened to so many of them in 1948. The obvious precedent is their next-door neighbors, who were steadfast after almost 1,900 years of dispossession. The people of Gaza are never going to leave.

Trump also underestimates Egyptian and Jordanian unwillingness to accept Palestinians from Gaza or the West Bank under any circumstances, even if it were to mean the cutoff of US assistance to those countries. There is quite literally no tool in the US toolbox that could persuade the leaders of Egypt or Jordan to change their minds on this point. Trump’s advisors know this, but they would likely rather have Trump hear this directly from Jordanian King Abdullah on February 11, and from Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi, who reportedly will visit the following week, rather than from them. Fair enough. Abdullah and Sisi need to tell Trump plainly, directly, and undiplomatically that they will not do this, so that discussions will move in a more productive direction.

What Palestinians and Arab leaders need to praise is the idea that the United States will directly involve itself, in a limited way, in organizing international efforts for Gaza’s transition. Trump is not serious about wanting to “own” Gaza. What the United States can usefully do needs to be negotiated with Israelis, Palestinians, and Arab governments, along with other major donors, such as European states and Japan. But the United States contributing to disarming unexploded bombs and rubble-clearing efforts, as Trump said the United States would do, is something that the Biden administration steadfastly refused to even consider. The Biden administration refused even when pressed by former US officials (I was one) who urged it to recognize that the only way this could turn out well for the United States, Israel, and the Palestinians would be for the United States to take a leadership role in organizing the efforts of others.

Much of what Trump suggested in the past twenty-four hours will need to be dialed back to what is workable. But no one predicted that Trump would push the United States to engage more on what postwar Gaza should look like in one month than the Biden team did in fifteen months.

—Thomas S. Warrick is the director of the Future of DHS project at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense program and former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security.

It’s a concept without a plan—made all the more difficult by dismantling USAID

Tuesday’s comments by Trump sent shock waves not only through the Middle East, but also through his circles of supporters. The president campaigned on a platform of international disentanglement, not taking on new nation-building responsibilities like the one he is proposing in Gaza.

Not since the Marshall Plan, which saw massive investments in postwar Europe that continue to pay dividends today, has the United States successfully undertaken such a project. Indeed, most of its attempts have ended in abject failure (think Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya). Why? Because the American people ultimately weren’t prepared for the massive, all-in, long-term investment in both dollars and troops that is needed to transform a warzone into a flourishing economy. And the United States now lacks the institutional infrastructure to conceive of such a project, thanks to the ongoing dismantling of the only US government organization with nation-building expertise: the United States Agency for International Development.

Ultimately, though, this is a concept without a plan, as it is predicated on the willingness of Israel’s neighbors—especially Egypt and Jordan—to take in massive numbers of Gazans at the expense of their already shaky political and economic stability. Other Arab foreign ministers joined them earlier this week in roundly rejecting any effort to displace Palestinians, setting the stage for a difficult conversation when Jordan’s King Abdullah becomes the first Arab leader to visit Trump in the White House next week.

—Jennifer Gavito is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and a former US acting principal deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs.

The way to avoid “history repeating itself” is not to repeat the core cause

We just heard the US president endorse the idea of committing ethnic cleansing and forcibly resettling a population. We just heard a US president lay out the potential intent to draw the United States into a war crime. That is stunning in itself. However, it’s highly likely that Trump will be given a “pass” given how accustomed the world has grown to his history of irresponsible rhetoric. Many analysts are already predicting that his sweeping commentary will need to be dialed down into an actual executable plan.

The speed of the Saudi response, reaffirming Riyadh’s commitment to a Palestinian state as a precondition to establishing diplomatic ties, is an indication of how unpalatable Trump’s plan is. It could also give Egypt and Jordan the courage they need to stand firm against the United States’ not-so-subtle threats of consequences if they refuse to take in more than two million Gazans.

“It’s terrifying. But what we fear is not the rhetoric of one man,” a Palestinian friend of mine in Gaza messaged me. “We fear forced displacement and losing the right to return like our grandparents and great-grandparents did. What we fear is losing our home, our right to our home, to see our families, to have roots.”

Gaza is a demolition zone. Trump is 100 percent correct on that, even if he did neglect the fact that US bombs dropped by Israel are the culprit. Gaza does need a massive effort to clear it of explosives and rubble and then to start reconstruction. But the clarity of his comments end there. The rest of this haphazardly laid out “plan”—if it can be called that—is little more than psychological torture for a population that is already on the edge of a mental abyss.

To somehow think that the solution, as Trump stated, to avoid “history repeating itself” is to repeat the core cause—stealing of land, illegal occupation, the forced displacement of Palestinians, denying the right of return—is rather ludicrous.

The sad irony is that it would be among the best outcomes for Palestinians to have Gaza rebuilt and transformed into the “Riviera of the Middle East.” But there is nothing in Trump’s comments or in Netanyahu’s apparent glee at them that suggest that this will be a Riviera for those whose land it is: the Palestinians.

—Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs; the president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA); and a former international correspondent for CNN.

The reality of “owning” Gaza would carry large costs and risks—including an armed insurgency

Trump’s suggestion that the United States could clear and rebuild Gaza presupposes a significant level of US military and economic involvement. In his comments, Trump was ambiguous about the deployment of US troops to secure Gaza and oversee its reconstruction, saying “We’ll do what needs to be done.” This would require a long-term commitment, with estimates of up to fifteen years for full reconstruction. The question of who would pay for such an enormous endeavor remains unanswered. Given the immense cost and the political sensitivity of the region, it is unclear if the United States would foot the bill entirely or if there would be international partners involved.

Trump’s recent statements that he can get Egypt and Jordan to host Gazans, combined with his statement about “owning Gaza,” suggest a bargain: The United States could take on Gaza’s reconstruction but, in exchange, Jordan and Egypt would host displaced Palestinians. Neither country wants to administer or secure Gaza. But they also do not want to be seen as complicit in Israel’s actions and have historically been reluctant to host more Palestinians, fearing that it would lead to the permanent displacement of the Palestinian people and thus the end of Palestinian statehood.

While this could be seen as a diplomatic move, it raises several significant concerns, not least of which is the formation of an armed insurgency. US troops or contractors in Gaza could come under fire from militant groups, particularly Hamas, which has not been fully dismantled despite efforts by Israel and others. Recent reports of Hamas recruiting more than ten thousand new members, along with the public presence of large groups of Hamas fighters at recent hostage handover events, show that the group remains an operational force. The president could have been thinking that if Egypt and Jordan take responsibility for the Gazan people, then there wouldn’t be an insurgency as there would be no one to fight. However, that would mean Gazans would have to leave Gaza altogether, which is a tall order given their desire for statehood and fears that a temporary displacement for reconstruction would actually lead to a permanent displacement and not being able to return.

Additionally, Trump’s proposal seems to overlook the deep animosity many Gazan Palestinians have toward the United States regarding US military support for Israel. The United States is often viewed as a partial actor in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which could fuel armed resistance to any perceived US-led efforts in Gaza. There is also the issue of who would take responsibility for the security of Gaza during the rebuilding process. Arab states have shown no interest in stepping into this role, fearing the political ramifications of being seen as complicit in the displacement of Palestinians or Israel’s actions.

The logistics of this plan remain unclear. Would Palestinians be willing to leave Gaza voluntarily or would they be forcibly relocated? This question is crucial, as any attempt to remove or displace a population would likely face resistance and could lead to further violence. Trump’s idea might therefore be seen as a negotiating tactic, similar to his approach with trade deals, but its success would hinge on navigating complex regional dynamics and the realities of a volatile and heavily armed Gaza.

—Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the head of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project, and a former chief of sensitive activities for special operations and combating terrorism in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

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Waiting on a friend: Will Netanyahu get a sweet deal—or a raw deal—from Trump?

Shalom Lipner — Mon, 03 Feb 2025 15:40:56 +0000

Monty Hall, the legendary host of television’s Let’s Make a Deal game show, was a patron of the Jewish state. But it’s US President Donald Trump—the co-author of Trump: The Art of the Deal, and a person not to be upstaged—who claims unabashedly to be the “best friend that Israel has ever had.” That title will be put to the test on February 4, when he hosts Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House.

Trump’s pre-presidency was frenetic. Never a disciple of the “one president at a time” school, he injected himself aggressively into the spotlight, dispatching Steve Witkoff, his new Middle East envoy, to that region within weeks of the November election and threatening (amorphously) that there would be “ALL HELL TO PAY” unless hostages in Hamas custody were released by the time of his inauguration. Mike Waltz, Trump’s national security advisor, was quick to attribute Israel’s ceasefires with both Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza to the advent of a new administration.

Palpable apprehension in world capitals about what courses of action Trump might—or might not—pursue has been a powerful driver of events. However, the significance of January 20 as an inflection point cannot be overexaggerated. With Trump now ensconced firmly in the Oval Office, rhetoric alone will prove insufficient to induce tangible cooperation from the United States’ counterparts, who will be monitoring the pulse of his intentions rigorously.

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Washington watchers in Jerusalem have been, unsurprisingly, surveying the appointments topography for clues to decipher Trumpland, but they have found its landscape equivocal. Israeli officials are encouraged by the nominations of friendlies Mike Huckabee and Elise Stefanik—as ambassadors to Israel and the United Nations, respectively—but diplomats are not policymakers, and the perspective of Trump’s executive cadre is by no means monolithic. The president himself has toggled in recent months between pledging to “stop all wars” and, on the other hand, telling Netanyahu to “do what you have to do” when it comes to Israel’s enemies. (Relations between the two leaders have known highs and lows.)

Soon after his victory, Trump unceremoniously disinvited Mike Pompeo and Nikki Haley, two trusted interlocutors of Israel during his previous tenure, from returning to his leadership team. That vacuum has been filled apparently by Waltz and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who both advocated on Capitol Hill for a strong US-Israel bond, but few other principals share their level of prior, high-level engagement with the intricate dynamics of that alliance. Meanwhile, senior bureaucratic echelons at the Pentagon—which has been an essential partner in enhancing Israel’s national security—are being populated by staffers who favor greater detachment from the Middle East.

It is against this backdrop that Netanyahu arrives in Washington to plead his case. His wish list from Trump will include US acquiescence for Israel to continue its campaign to dislodge Hamas rule from Gaza; normalization with Saudi Arabia; and a kinetic effort—or, at least, US backing for a potential solo Israeli endeavor—to terminate the threat of a nuclear Iran. The paradox of Netanyahu’s predicament is that Trump’s favorable disposition toward that agenda does not mean their approaches will be similarly aligned.

Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich—a stalwart critic of the current truce—is touting assurances from the prime minister to intensify the Gaza war and initiate “a gradual takeover” that ensures “humanitarian aid will not reach Hamas as it has been until now.” Smotrich, a proponent of exercising Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza, has also vowed repeatedly to scuttle any diplomatic breakthrough with Riyadh that would entail territorial concessions to the Palestinians. On the Iranian front, Israeli military planners are training their sights increasingly on the near term, before Tehran can recover from the blows that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has inflicted on its defenses and on its Hamas and Hezbollah proxies.

Those parameters are almost certain to conflict with the president’s thinking. By all accounts, Trump, as evidenced through Witkoff’s interventions, is interested actually in extending the suspension of combat in Gaza, for the sake of securing the release of all captives and stabilizing the area. The track would then be cleared for Israeli-Saudi rapprochement—along lines that would likely be anathema to Smotrich—and a coveted Nobel Peace Prize for Trump. As for Iran, indications suggest that the president might prefer initially to try and settle that standoff through negotiations.

The ball is very much in Trump’s court now. Witkoff met on January 30 with Smotrich and Shas chairman Aryeh Deri, two key stakeholders of Netanyahu’s government, in an attempt to enlist their support for his mission, but their consent will hinge ultimately on the specifics involved. (Right-wing Israelis, who are hoping anxiously that Trump will adopt their cause, have latched tightly onto his manifest enthusiasm for transferring Gaza’s residents to neighboring Egypt and Jordan, although the wisdom and feasibility of that program—opposed stridently by those countries and by Palestinians themselves—are dubious.) The time for command decisions is close at hand.

Cessations of hostilities in Lebanon and Gaza are both fragile. Netanyahu’s coalition is also in crisis, with saber-rattling between its various members—who are at loggerheads over controversial legislation to exempt Ultra-Orthodox Jews from military service—jeopardizing the passage of a national budget before a March 31 deadline. Separately, Smotrich has committed to bolt unless the IDF resumes its Gaza incursion, in parallel with expanding counter-terrorism operations in the West Bank. Not only the prime minister’s political fate, but also the future of the entire Middle East is hanging in the balance, waiting for Trump to decide how much slack he is prepared to grant Netanyahu.

Much will depend on the president’s definition of friendship for Israel: Will it entail space for the IDF to keep fighting Hamas until the achievement of “total victory”—as Netanyahu has promised and many Israelis are still demanding—at the possible cost of derailing progress with Saudi Arabia? Will it, rather, obligate Israel to wind down its offensive and satisfy Saudi requirements for a pathway to Palestinian statehood, thus, in all likelihood, precipitating the collapse of Netanyahu’s majority in the Knesset? Or might it entertain tradeoffs such as greater Israeli flexibility vis-à-vis the Palestinians in exchange for an augmented US role in confronting Iran?

There will be inherent risks in any strategy that Trump chooses to embrace. The only certain thing is that now, as commander in chief, he controls an arsenal of formidable carrots and sticks to deploy in the service of his administration’s objectives. On February 4, the world will be watching to see whether he offers Netanyahu a deal that he can’t refuse.

Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow for Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. From 1990 to 2016, he served seven consecutive premiers at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem. Follow him on X: @ShalomLipner.

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“No, really”: American PMCs in Gaza

Alia Brahimi — Thu, 30 Jan 2025 14:22:59 +0000

In Season 2, Episode 9 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi chats with modern warfare expert Andreas Krieg about the sudden deployment of three private military companies to the Netzarim corridor in the Gaza Strip. Andreas examines the risks and opportunities in outsourcing a key task of stabilization to the market and depending on low-profile companies for a high-profile job.

He argues that the Israeli Defence Forces have a poor track record when it comes to stabilizing any of the territories they have controlled and that Gaza might be a case where the profit motive of PMCs is preferable to the motivations driving two deeply traumatized societies. Still, Andreas outlines how the deployment of PMCs deepens the “gray zone” because we now have contractors operating on the ground whose status in international law is not well-defined.

“This is an entirely novel approach of basically outsourcing… an essential task of stabilization to the market.”

Andreas Krieg, modern warfare expert

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About the podcast

Guns for Hire podcast is a production of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative. Taking Libya as its starting point, it explores the causes and implications of the growing use of mercenaries in armed conflict.

The podcast features guests from many walks of life, from ethicists and historians to former mercenary fighters. It seeks to understand what the normalization of contract warfare tells us about the world we currently live in, the future of the international system, and what war could look like in the coming decades.

Syria’s post-Assad honeymoon is over. Now the hard work of state-building begins.

Sinan Hatahet — Thu, 23 Jan 2025 14:24:22 +0000

DAMASCUS—On December 8, 2024, after years of brutal conflict, the Assad regime finally fell. For over a decade, the Syrian people endured relentless violence, widespread torture, and the worst economic crisis in their modern history. Every sector of the economy was destroyed, incomes shrank dramatically, and savings were wiped out. The state’s ability to provide even basic services like electricity, water, and infrastructure deteriorated to unprecedented levels. Assad’s regime had held on through a combination of coercion and international brinkmanship, extracting what it could from a weary population.

Unlike the dramatic collapses of the Iraqi and Libyan states following the fall of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi, Syria’s state institutions crumbled gradually. The fall of Bashar al-Assad was not the cause of state collapse; rather, it was a result of it. Years of economic mismanagement, corruption, and war hollowed out the foundations of governance, leaving behind a country fractured and exhausted.

The fall of the Assad regime was met with relief and hope by Syrians of all backgrounds, including even some former loyalists disillusioned with Assad’s inability to address Syria’s worsening crises. However, Syrians are now faced with a new government whose leadership remains largely unfamiliar. While some have praised the governance and economic management model developed in Idlib under Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), many others question whether such a system can be scaled to govern the entirety of Syria. The disparity between localized governance successes and national-scale governance requirements has become a focal point of concern, particularly given Syria’s fragmented political landscape and the competing interests of various factions.

The initial euphoria has now given way to a sober realization of the monumental task ahead. As the Syrian saying goes, “The intoxication is over, and now comes the reckoning.” Syrians, while politically diverse, share a common urgency for solutions to their daily struggles: securing electricity, rebuilding shattered infrastructure, creating jobs, and ensuring access to basic necessities. These immediate needs are non-negotiable and form the cornerstone of any trust that the transitional government hopes to build. Without addressing these, the government risks losing its fragile legitimacy, and the window for public patience may close far sooner than anticipated.

The scars of conflict have not only created physical destruction but also eroded trust among different communities.

Ahmad al-Sharaa, Syria’s new de facto leader, finds himself at the center of this fragile transition. For now, he enjoys considerable popular support and faces limited competition from rivals unwilling to shoulder the immense responsibility of rebuilding. Yet, his mandate comes with an expiration date. Syrians are watching closely, expecting swift and meaningful action to restore stability and improve livelihoods. The stakes for Sharaa are extraordinarily high: Failure to demonstrate effective leadership could not only undermine his position but also open the door to renewed fragmentation or even chaos.

The challenges are daunting. HTS, which holds significant influence in the new government, lacks sufficient technocratic expertise to manage a nation as complex as Syria. The group’s governance in Idlib relied heavily on improvisation and local alliances, but governing an entire country requires a far greater degree of institutional capacity and expertise. HTS leadership must now tackle the immense challenge of bridging its localized governance methods with the demands of a unified national administration. Its ability to navigate Syria’s volatile political landscape will be critical.

Throughout the conflict, Syrians have demonstrated extraordinary resilience and ingenuity in developing local solutions. Self-reliance has become a hallmark of survival. In cities such as Damascus and Aleppo, basic services are often managed locally, with minimal involvement from the state. Communities have turned to solar energy, grassroots initiatives, and small-scale enterprises to sustain themselves. This self-reliance has extended to governance as well. For example, in major cities, traffic management and security are often overseen by just a handful of individuals. Syrians have shown a willingness to adapt to and support change, provided it brings tangible improvements.

However, the success of these localized solutions is not guaranteed. The scale of Syria’s national challenges requires coordination and resources that local efforts alone cannot provide. There is also a growing concern that, in the absence of progress, the government may revert to centralized security measures as a way to maintain control. Should this happen, it would replicate the authoritarian methods of the Assad regime, which alienated the population and produced no meaningful results. The risk of adopting such solutions is compounded by the international community’s reluctance to support a strong centralized authority in Syria, leaving the government with limited options and resources.

A further complication is the deeply fractured nature of Syrian society after years of war. The scars of conflict have not only created physical destruction but also eroded trust among different communities. To address these divisions, the government must ensure that governance is inclusive and representative of Syria’s diverse political factions. Without meaningful participation across the spectrum, there is a real risk of alienating key groups, further destabilizing the fragile transition.

Syrians are yearning for change, but they cannot carry the burden alone.

The international community, particularly the United States, has a vital role to play in supporting Syria’s recovery. To date, US policy has focused on allowing other states—mainly regional countries—to provide financial assistance to the transitional government. This was made possible through US Treasury this month issuing General License 24, which allowed for the provision of energy supplies and wage subsidies but failed to extend similar support to Syria’s private and civil sectors. The policy, while useful in keeping the government afloat, has been a huge letdown for Syria’s private sector.

Throughout the conflict, the private sector, supported by local communities, financed livelihoods and provided essential services in the absence of state support. To truly foster stability and rebuild the Syrian economy, the international community must lift sanctions on critical financial institutions, such as the central bank, as well as facilitate foreign investment and empower private enterprises. Without such measures, the economic pressures on Syrians will only intensify, jeopardizing the fragile progress achieved so far.

Syria’s transitional government faces a pivotal moment. To build a sustainable and inclusive political future, it must focus on enabling the private and civil sectors. Empowering them would not only reduce pressure on the government but also build trust with the population, which is critical for long-term stability.

Delays in lifting sanctions and providing targeted support risk undermining these efforts, potentially dealing a fatal blow to Syria’s prospects for recovery. The coming months will determine whether Syria’s post-Assad era will be a story of renewal or yet another missed opportunity. Syrians are yearning for change, but they cannot carry the burden alone. The stakes could not be higher—not just for Syria but for a region desperate for hope and stability.

Sinan Hatahet is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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Donald Trump’s promise of strong US leadership should begin with Ukraine

Arseniy Yatsenyuk — Tue, 21 Jan 2025 15:03:27 +0000

I wholeheartedly congratulate the people of the United States on the inauguration of their new president Donald Trump. At this historic moment, it is worth pausing to reflect on what truly makes America great, and how it can be greater still.

Throughout its history, the United States has fought for freedom. From the War of Independence to the fight against Nazism, this commitment to freedom has defined the United States at home and abroad.

This resonates deeply with Ukrainians, who also have a long history of fighting for our freedom. Generations of Ukrainians have resisted Russian imperialism, Nazism, and Soviet terror in a struggle that goes back centuries. With the help of the United States and the entire free world, Ukraine is now defending itself against the resurgent Russian imperialism of the twenty-first century.

As the largest European invasion since World War II approaches the three-year mark, this shared dedication to liberty has brought the United States and Ukraine closer than ever. There are also a number of very practical reasons why continued support for Ukraine is beneficial for the United States and for President Trump.

While the United States is not at war with Russia, the Russians firmly believe they are at war with the United States. Russian President Vladimir Putin is determined to outsmart Trump and views the invasion of Ukraine as an opportunity to humiliate the United States on the global stage.

Putin’s immediate objective is to erase Ukrainian independence, but his ultimate goal is to reverse the verdict of 1991 and dismantle the entire US-led rules-based international order. Unless he is stopped in Ukraine, Putin will seek to subjugate other countries of the former Russian Empire, from Moldova and Belarus in Eastern Europe to Kazakhstan and the nations of Central Asia.

If the West allows the current invasion of Ukraine to succeed, the main beneficiaries will be Russia and fellow authoritarian regimes including China, Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela, along with an assortment of rogue actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah. This Axis of Autocrats is already taking shape against the backdrop of Russia’s war in Ukraine.

The emergence of an autocratic new world order would be disastrous for US interests. NATO would be deeply discredited, while authoritarian dictators everywhere would be emboldened. The US dollar would give way to the Chinese yuan as the global currency of choice, while many current partners of the United States throughout the Global South would begin leaning increasingly toward Beijing. The impact on international security and the US economy would be severe.

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Crucially, Russia victory in Ukraine would cause irreparable damage to the prestige that underpins US power globally. In 2021, Putin watched the botched United States withdrawal from Afghanistan with glee. He is now eager to repeat the process in Ukraine. The Kremlin dictator is convinced this would shatter the credibility of the United States, while dramatically enhancing Russian influence across Europe and beyond.

Putin’s fellow autocrats would also draw the logical conclusions from Russian success in Ukraine, and would be encouraged to embark on more aggressive foreign policies of their own. Before long, this would undermine the security of United States allies including Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea.

Trump has the opportunity to prevent all this. By resolutely backing Ukraine, he can stop the slide toward World War III and reestablish US leadership at a time when international stability is increasingly threatened by Putin’s Axis of Autocrats.

It is important to acknowledge the role played by US President Joe Biden and the bipartisan backing of the Democratic and Republican parties, which have been instrumental in strengthening Ukraine since 2022. At the same time, it is clear that much more could have been done. As a Ukrainian, I sincerely hope the Trump administration will now go further.

As many commentators have pointed out, military aid to Ukraine is arguably one of the best foreign policy investments in United States history, significantly undermining the military capabilities of a key adversary without requiring any boots on the ground. Supporting Ukraine is also good for the economy. After all, most of the aid allocated to Ukraine is actually spent in the United States, creating jobs in the defense industry.

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Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the key foreign policy issue facing the Trump administration. The outcome of the war unleashed by Putin almost three years ago will define the international security climate for decades to come. By now, it should be obvious that this is not a minor dispute that can be resolved by appeasement and compromise. It should be equally apparent that Western weakness only encourages Russian aggression.

While some Western leaders continue to hesitate, Putin is growing more confident and has bet everything on victory in Ukraine. He has placed the whole of Russian society on a wartime footing and is openly preparing his country for the rigors of a long war. It is delusional to believe he will stop unless he is forced to do so.

Military collaboration between Moscow and its authoritarian allies is also deepening at an alarming rate. Iran is arming Russia with drones and is one step away from acquiring nuclear weapons. Thousands of North Korean troops are fighting on the front lines against Ukraine, while China is accused of providing “very substantial” help to the Russian war machine. All of these countries are united in their desire to humble the United States and bring down the current international order.

Stopping Russia will require bold actions. This means introducing and strictly enforcing new sanctions that will deprive Moscow of funding from the energy exports that finance the invasion. It means putting pressure on all those who directly or indirectly help the Russian war effort. In parallel, military support to Ukraine must increase significantly, while restrictions on Ukraine’s ability to defend itself must be lifted.

The war will only end when Ukrainian security is assured. To achieve this, Ukraine needs ironclad security guarantees that will keep the country safe from further Russian aggression until it is able to join NATO. A Trump Plan modeled on the post-World War II Marshall Plan and funded by confiscated Russian sovereign assets can fuel Ukraine’s postwar recovery.

I am convinced that a just and sustainable peace can be achieved through negotiations. These talks should take place in a four-way format involving Ukraine, the United States, the European Union, and Russia. In 2014, I was one of the initiators of this format, which was established in Geneva. The alternative, with Ukraine alone against Russia, would mean the capitulation of the United States and the entire Western world.

While adherents of realpolitik call for concessions, in reality the future of international security depends on a steadfast defense of the rules-based order against Russia’s onslaught. The West has the requisite strength and resources to do this. All that is needed is strong leadership from the United States.

Arseniy Yatsenyuk is Chairman of the Kyiv Security Forum and former Prime Minister of Ukraine (2014-2016).

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Over a half-century later, Franjieh’s grandson—another Suleiman—was the presidential candidate of choice of Iran’s Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah. Hezbollah, at the behest of Iran, has for decades supported a ravenously corrupt and ruinously incompetent Lebanese political class. In return, the politicians have recognized the group as “The Lebanese Resistance,” a designation elevating it above the status of armed militia and permitting it to bear arms. Twice, in 2006 and 2023, Hezbollah initiated hostilities with Israel, causing massive destruction falling mainly on its Shia Lebanese constituents. Finally, in late 2024, much of that kinetic destruction fell on Hezbollah itself.

Unlike several of his predecessors, Aoun neither mentioned nor paid obeisance to “The Lebanese Resistance” in his inaugural speech. Instead, he pledged “to carry out my duties as the supreme commander of the armed forces and as the chairman of the Higher Defense Council, working to ensure the state’s right to hold a monopoly on weapons, and to invest in the army to monitor the borders, maintain their security in the south, define the boundaries in the east, north and at sea, prevent smuggling, fight terrorism and preserve the unity of the Lebanese territory.” Indeed, much of the analysis following Aoun’s accession to the presidency has, quite understandably, mined his speech for references to Hezbollah, but Aoun did not mention the group by name.

Aoun’s first task will be to ensure that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) implements Lebanon’s role in the ceasefire with Israel by removing and replacing Hezbollah as the armed Lebanese presence south of the Litani River. He will, to be sure, require the cooperation of Iran’s proxy, which retains considerable military capabilities notwithstanding the pounding it has absorbed from Israel. To succeed, Aoun must perform a diplomatic high-wire act: He must, in effect, mediate between Hezbollah and Israel.

The mediation tool most readily at his disposal is the 1949 Israel-Lebanon General Armistice Agreement. The ongoing validity of the armistice, unilaterally (and unjustifiably) renounced by Israel in 1967, is cited by the 1989 Taif Agreement and is, therefore, a tenet of post-civil war Lebanon’s constitutionalism.

Aoun could signal to Israel his interest in implementing and consolidating the current ceasefire by offering Israel the opportunity to update and fully implement the armistice, a critical first step toward eventual peace and diplomatic normalization. Israel could, in turn, assure Lebanon of its own commitment to making the ceasefire work by revoking its 1967 renunciation, completing its withdrawal behind the Blue Line (demarcated by the United Nations in 2000), and declaring its readiness to resolve diplomatically all territorial disputes with Lebanon. It could even suspend its overflights of Lebanese airspace, perhaps as part of a third-party arrangement providing ceasefire-related aerial reconnaissance services. Given that the armistice is anchored in Lebanese constitutionalism, Hezbollah—which acknowledges the need to focus on reconstruction, for the sake of its constituents—might be hard-pressed to object and obstruct. Ideally, Hezbollah’s constituents will urge the organization’s leadership cadre to put Lebanon first by becoming part of a Lebanese political party instead of a proxy for Iran.

Aoun knows what must be done to stabilize the Lebanon-Israel frontier. But the long game he wishes to contest and win centers on Lebanese statehood. This is how he put it in his inaugural speech: “if we want to build a nation, we must all be under the roof of law and justice, where there will be no more mafias or security islands, no more leaks or money laundering, no more drug trafficking, no more interference in the judicial system, in police stations, no more protections or clientelism, no more immunity for criminals and the corrupt. Justice is the bulwark, it is the only guarantee that every citizen has. This is my commitment!” This will be a tall order because the collaboration between Hezbollah—meaning Iran—and Lebanon’s abysmal political class (which still dominates parliament) has left the country awash in all the depravities cited by Aoun.

The Lebanese presidency in 2025 is not endowed with the same powers it enjoyed before the 1989 Taif Accord, and in any event, such powers were insufficient for Chehab to build a state. Aoun will not be able administratively to compel governmental decency, honesty, and competence, even if he proves able to broker a respectable cabinet of ministers and even if he retains the full, enthusiastic support of the LAF. If he wishes to succeed, he must build a mass political movement from the ground up, one dedicated not to him personally but to the idea that it is time, at long last, for Lebanon to graduate from Ottomanism, and that it is time for citizenship-based statehood to emerge. As Aoun put it in his acceptance speech, “No sect should be favored over another, and no citizen should have privilege over another. This is the time for respecting the Constitution, building the state and applying the laws. This is the oath of Lebanon!”

Aoun must, in short, use his office to build the political infrastructure needed to win elections, to ultimately replace the parliamentarians who have used that which has passed for the “government of Lebanon” as a feeding trough. Only with the support of enough Lebanese people willing to abandon political sectarianism and localism can he build a foundation for a nation-state willing and able to meet the needs of all Lebanese citizens, especially the poorest and most vulnerable.

As Aoun embarks on a journey to complete the work of Chehab, he will need both external support and internal protection. Lebanon’s reconstruction needs are enormous, as are the operational challenges faced by the LAF. And there are, to be sure, those in Lebanon who correctly see Aoun as a threat to their ability to steal the fruits of Lebanese diligence, ingenuity, and enterprise.

It is only the gratuitous and often unspeakable suffering and impoverishment of most Lebanese and their consequent desperation that makes Aoun’s quest something other than mission impossible. Some three-quarters of all Lebanese people are now experiencing poverty, and they know that business as usual by a dysfunctional political class is no longer tolerable. The people of Lebanon now have a president willing to say the following: “My commitment is your commitment, honorable members of parliament, and that of every Lebanese person who wants to build a strong state, a productive economy, stable security, a united nation and a promising future.”

The duty of all Lebanese people and all friends of Lebanon is to give Aoun the support he needs to build the “strong” state that the people of Lebanon require to thrive and to live in peace.

Frederic C. Hof is a senior fellow at Bard College’s Center for Civic Engagement. Hof served as a military attaché during Lebanon’s civil war and mediated both maritime and land disputes between Israel and Lebanon from 2009 to 2012 as a State Department official. He is the author of Reaching for the Heights: The Inside Story of a Secret Attempt to Reach a Syrian-Israeli Peace (2022).

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Appeasement will only fuel Vladimir Putin’s imperial ambitions in Ukraine

Anastasiia Marushevska — Thu, 16 Jan 2025 01:20:01 +0000

When US President-elect Donald Trump returns to the White House next week, his foreign policy priority will be ending the war in Ukraine. As he seeks to engage with the Kremlin, however, Trump is likely to discover that Moscow’s war aims extend far beyond limited territorial gains and leave little room for any meaningful compromise.

If Trump’s peace initiative fails to make progress, it should come as no surprise. After all, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is not a simple land grab that can be resolved with some kind of compromise deal. Instead, it is an old-fashioned war of colonial conquest that forms the latest chapter in an historic campaign of Russian imperial aggression against Ukraine stretching back hundreds of years.

Russian rulers have been attempting to suppress Ukraine’s statehood aspirations and subjugate the country ever since the seventeenth century and the days of the Ukrainian Cossack Hetmanate. Throughout the Tsarist and Soviet eras, successive generations of Russian rulers sought to dominate Ukraine and extinguish the very idea of a separate Ukrainian nation. This led to a vast array of crimes and atrocities including as the Holodomor, an artificial famine engineered by the Stalin regime in the 1930s that killed millions of Ukrainians in their own homes.

From the very beginning of his reign, Putin has enthusiastically embraced this Russian imperial tradition. When his initial efforts to reestablish control over Ukraine via political subversion were thwarted by the country’s 2004 and 2014 Maidan revolutions, Putin opted to use force and ordered the Russian military to seize Crimea. This watershed moment in modern European history set the stage for the full-scale invasion of 2022. Putin himself has since underlined his imperial ambitions, comparing his own ongoing invasion to the eighteenth century conquests of Russian Emperor Peter the Great.

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International audiences often struggle to understand the true nature of Russian imperialism because they have been encouraged to view Russia as a nation rather than an empire. While academics and historians have always made clear distinctions between Great Britain or France and their colonial possessions, for example, this has not usually been the case when dealing with Russia. Instead, occupied countries within the Tsarist and Soviet empires such as Ukraine and Georgia have often been treated as ethnic minorities rather than captive nations.

As a result, modern Russia’s expansionist policies typically escape the ire of those who identify as opponents of imperialism. This also helps to explain why everyday cultural practices such as the use of the Ukrainian language in Ukraine are still sometimes perceived by outside audiences as evidence of dangerous nationalism.

The ultimate objective of Russian imperialism in Ukraine could hardly be more extreme. Putin and his predecessors have consistently aimed to erase any sense of Ukrainian national identity and replace it with a Russian imperial identity. In other words, Russia’s historic goal has always been a Ukraine without Ukrainians.

For generations, Ukrainian community leaders were systematically silenced and all evidence of Ukrainian national memory eradicated. Meanwhile, many of Ukraine’s most prominent intellectuals and cultural figures were appropriated by the empire and rebranded as Russians.

Over the centuries, Russia’s long war on Ukrainian identity has been most immediately apparent in the many legislative initiatives introduced to restrict or ban the use the Ukrainian language. This often extended to outright denials. “A separate Ukrainian language never existed, does not exist, and shall not exist,” stated one particularly notorious Russian imperial decree in the mid-nineteenth century.

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Efforts to remove all traces of Ukrainian identity continue in regions of the country currently under Russian occupation. In areas of Ukraine where the Kremlin has been able to establish control since 2022, anyone deemed pro-Ukrainian is at risk of arrest. Thousands have reportedly disappeared into a vast network of prison camps.

Those who remain are being forced to accept Russian citizenship. Dissenters face being stripped of their property rights, denied access to basic services such as healthcare, and deported. They must also subject their children to indoctrination via Kremlin-approved school curriculums that glorify the Russian invasion and demonize the idea of a Ukrainian state. Needless to say, the Ukrainian language is no longer taught or tolerated.

The grim realities of life for the millions of people living in Russian-occupied Ukraine make a complete mockery of suggestions that the war can be stopped simply by handing over more land to Russia. In reality, the current occupation regime is not peace; it is a continuation of Russia’s long war against the Ukrainian nation.

Any attempt to end the war in Ukraine must take Russia’s imperial agenda into account. The future existence of Ukraine is at stake, including everything it represents from language and culture to national memory and ancient traditions. For Ukrainians, this is a fight for national survival against an enemy that makes no secret of its ambition to wipe the country off the map. For Europe as a whole, this is a turning point that will shape the continent’s security climate for many years to come.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is not a war for land or resources. It is therefore wishful thinking to suggest that Putin can be appeased with the promise of relatively minor territorial concessions. Like so many Russian rulers who came before him, Putin is determined to destroy Ukraine. The war will continue until he is forced to abandon his imperial ambitions entirely.

Anastasiia Marushevska is a co-founder of Ukrainian NGO PR Army, editor in chief at Ukraїner International, and host of the Decolonisation podcast.

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With Assad out of Syria, Iraq once again is in a vulnerable position. As a matter of principle, it is untenable for the Iraqi government to accept the new Syrian leader Ahmed al-Sharaa who, under the nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, ran atrocious terrorist operations in Iraq for many years and was responsible for the killing of numerous innocent Iraqi civilians. While almost all relevant governments in the region (and many beyond) seem to be looking past the new Syrian leadership’s terrorist affiliations and are opening lines of communication with them, Iraq cannot ignore the security risks arising along its 372-mile border with Syria. Such dangers may come as a result of direct hostility by the new regime, but they also may come from the ungoverned territories of northeastern Syria, where the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are on the verge of collapse under threats from Turkey and the new Syrian government, a collapse that could be avoided if the United States expresses a strong commitment to the Kurdish group. The SDF currently keeps several detention camps, and the most concerning among them is al-Hol, which hosts some forty thousand detainees, including alleged ISIS affiliates, families, and sympathizers. The majority of them are Iraqis.

In recognition of these dangers, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani sent the newly appointed director of national intelligence, Hamid al-Shatri, to meet the new Syrian government in December last year to discuss Iraqi security concerns. The Iraqi government also sent Minister of Foreign Affairs Fuad Hussein to represent Iraq at January 12 meetings in Saudi Arabia, which gathered partner and neighboring countries in a conversation about supporting Syria. By engaging in this way, the Iraqi government has shifted the burden of establishing good-faith security cooperation to the new Syrian leadership.

The challenge for Iraq in the coming months will be twofold: On the one hand, there is the long border with Syria, where several hostile armed groups operate without any opposition from the Syrian side. The Iraqi security forces will have to multiply their resources and vigilance to maintain border security. The scale of this threat will depend on whether Syria is heading toward stability or disintegration into conflict. On the other hand, Iraq will face serious internal pressure from changing geopolitical conditions. For example, Assad’s fall marks the beginning of a new era, one in which Turkey could see its influence spreading across what used to be an Iranian sphere of influence. The Iraqi leadership will be under great pressure from Iran, which seeks compensation for its recent loss of influence, including by having a better political, economic, and security posture in Iraq. At the same time, Iraq will also be under pressure to recalibrate its bilateral relations with the United States. The new reality in Syria will push Iraq and the United States to revisit the recently reached troop-withdrawal agreement, with the Iraqi government simultaneously navigating its need to ensure its territorial security and the scrutiny of rival groups who call for the timely adherence to troop withdrawal.

To test the new geopolitical reality, Sudani made an important visit to Iran on January 8 where he met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The visit resulted in a lot of analysis and speculation about a possible Iraqi effort to persuade the Iranians to agree to a deferment of the US troop withdrawal and the demilitarization of the Iraqi armed groups that identify primarily with Iran. The speculation was put to rest by the X account of the Iranian supreme leader, which put out several concise statements. On the first issue, the ayatollah said the presence of US forces in Iraq is “illegal and contrary to the interests of the people and the government.” On the question of the Iraqi fighting forces, he said that the Popular Mobilization Forces represent “a crucial component of power in Iraq, and more efforts should be made to preserve and strengthen it”—adding that Sudani “emphasized” this as well. The supreme leader argued, in a third statement, that “the more developed and secure Iraq is, the more it will also benefit the Islamic Republic of Iran.” Whatever the bilateral talks may have accomplished, it all has been overshadowed by these three short statements.

It is now up to the government of Iraq to balance its regional policies with full consideration of the opportunities and the challenges the fall of Assad has put forward. At the same time, it will have to be mindful not only of the new Syrian political order but also the change of posture that major regional and international actors will make in the post-Assad era.

Abbas Kadhim is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative. Follow him on X: @DrAbbasKadhim.

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No peace without security: Ukraine needs guarantees against new Russian invasion

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 14 Jan 2025 21:55:14 +0000

Donald Trump’s impending return to the White House has raised expectations of a fresh push for peace in 2025, with the US leader committed to seeking some kind of deal to end Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While the exact nature of Trump’s peace plan is still unknown, it is expected to involve significant Ukrainian territorial concessions.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s negotiating position is already coming into focus. While Ukrainian officials continue to rule out officially ceding land to Moscow, there appears to be growing recognition in Kyiv that the complete liberation of the country is no longer militarily feasible. Instead, Ukraine has begun indicating a readiness to temporarily compromise on territorial issues, while at the same time underlining the critical importance of security guarantees.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy used his first meeting with Trump since the US presidential election to emphasize the need for credible security commitments in any negotiated settlement. During a three-way chat together with French President Emmanuel Macron in December 2024, the Ukrainian leader reportedly stressed to Trump that a ceasefire alone “would not be enough” to end the war with Russia.

Zelenskyy and other senior Ukrainian officials have reiterated this position on multiple occasions in recent weeks, expressing their readiness to seek a diplomatic solution while insisting that it must be accompanied by credible long-term security guarantees that will prevent any repeat of the present Russian invasion. In essence, Ukraine’s position can be summed up as “no peace without security.”

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It is not yet clear what kind of security guarantees Ukraine can realistically expect to receive. Ukrainian officials continue to push for NATO membership, which is seen in Kyiv as being by far the most credible deterrent against future Russian aggression. However, leading NATO members including the US and Germany remain reluctant to extend an invitation to Ukraine amid concerns over the possibility of a direct clash between the alliance and Russia.

Bilateral security pacts could potentially serve as a solution to this impasse, but any agreements would need to include firm commitments to defend Ukraine against a renewed Russian invasion. Zelenskyy stated in early 2025 that security guarantees of this kind would only be effective if provided by the US. As yet, there is no indication that the United States or other key allies are prepared to undertake such a major step.

Preliminary discussions are also believed to be underway exploring the possible deployment of a multi-national peacekeeping force to monitor a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine, with a number of European nations potentially providing troops. This approach could temporarily reduce the likelihood of a return to full-scale hostilities, but skeptics argue that such a force would be challenging to maintain and would not serve as a long-term solution to the Russian threat.

In the absence of a plausible peacekeeping operation, some have suggested that Ukraine’s Western partners could ensure a viable peace by vowing to dramatically increase military support and provide the country with sufficient arms to deter Moscow. However, given the regular delays and consistent shortfalls in the delivery of Western military aid during the current war, this option would be unlikely to satisfy Kyiv or convince the Kremlin to abandon its plans for the complete conquest of Ukraine.

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With all sides now increasingly acknowledging the necessity of territorial concessions, solving the long-term security conundrum looks set to be the main obstacle to ending the largest European war since World War II. Indeed, unless Ukraine’s security concerns can be satisfactorily addressed, there is unlikely to be any peace agreement at all.

Ukrainians are acutely aware that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains fully committed to his ultimate goal of ending Ukrainian independence and erasing Ukrainian national identity entirely. Putin’s insistence on a neutral and disarmed Ukraine is seen in Kyiv as a clear indication that he has no interest in a viable peace agreement and intends to renew his invasion as soon as he has had an opportunity to rearm.

They also understand that any ceasefire without credible security guarantees would leave their country in a militarily, economically, and geopolitically unsustainable position. In such circumstances, Ukraine would be unable to attract the international investment needed to rebuild the country, while the millions of Ukrainians who fled the Russian invasion in 2022 would be unlikely to return. A weakened, demoralized, depopulated, and internationally isolated Ukraine would be in no shape to resist a fresh Russian onslaught.

Unless Ukraine is offered long-term security commitments, many Ukrainians may reluctantly conclude that it would make more sense to continue the fight now rather than accept terms that would amount to a national death sentence. If their Western partners respond by reducing military support, Ukraine’s prospects would be extremely dim. This would be equally dangerous for Europe, which would be confronted by the prospect of a collapsing Ukraine and a resurgent Russia.

All this can be avoided if Western leaders provide Ukraine with watertight security guarantees capable of deterring Putin and preventing further Russian aggression. However, that will require the kind of bold leadership and political courage that have been in strikingly short supply in Western capitals since the onset of Russia’s invasion almost three years ago.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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The spirit of the 1938 Munich Agreement looms large over prospective US-brokered peace talks between Russia and Ukraine. With pressure mounting on Ukraine to make concessions to the aggressor, it is hardly surprising that many are comparing the current situation to the ugly deal between Western leaders and Nazi Germany that sealed the fate of Czechoslovakia and paved the war for World War II. Just as British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain returned from Munich brandishing Hitler’s worthless signature and declaring “peace for our time,” critics now fear that similar efforts to appease Putin will set the stage for further Russian aggression.

Ukraine’s demise as an independent state would confirm the failure of the existing international security architecture. In its place, we would enter a new era of international affairs dominated by a handful of Great Powers seeking to establish their own spheres of influence, with smaller countries reduced to the role of buffer states. A climate of insecurity would initially take root from the Baltic to the Balkans, and would soon spread to the wider world.

The collapse of the rules-based international order would inevitably undermine the credibility of the West. Meanwhile, authoritarian regimes such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea would be significantly strengthened. Moscow would almost certainly escalate its ongoing hybrid war against the democratic world, and may seek further territorial gains in Central Asia, the Caucasus, or Eastern Europe. Autocrats in Beijing, Tehran, and beyond would draw the logical conclusions from Putin’s victory in Ukraine and embrace expansionist foreign policies of their own.

With the sanctity of international borders no longer assured, countries around the world would scramble to rearm. Crucially, Russia’s successful use of nuclear blackmail against Ukraine would convince many nations to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. This would lead to a nuclear arms race that would rapidly escalate, undoing decades of non-proliferation efforts. With dozens of countries aspiring to nuclear status, the chances of a nuclear war would rise dramatically, as would the potential for nukes to fall into the hands of rogue actors.

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Today’s international security crisis did not arise overnight. The security climate has been steadily deteriorating since 2014, when Russia first seized the Crimean peninsula and invaded eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. The inadequate international response to these watershed acts of Russian aggression was interpreted in Moscow as a green light to go further, creating the conditions for the full-scale invasion of 2022 and setting the stage for what has become the largest European war since World War II.

If Western leaders now choose to sacrifice Ukraine in a misguided bid to placate Putin, the shift from a rules-based international order to the law of the geopolitical jungle will be complete. This transition will be extremely expensive, with countries around the world forced to dramatically increase defense budgets to levels that dwarf the current cost of military support for Ukraine.

None of this is inevitable, of course. It is still entirely possible to secure a just peace for Ukraine that would deter the Russia-led axis of autocrats and revive faith in a rules-based system of international relations. However, this would require a degree of resolve and political will that few Western leaders have been prepared to demonstrate since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. For almost three years, the Western response has been marked by excessive caution and a crippling fear of escalation that have only served to embolden the Kremlin.

Putin is clearly counting on continued Western weakness as he looks to break Ukrainian resistance in a grinding war of attrition. He is now more confident than ever of victory and has little interest in negotiating anything other than the terms of Ukraine’s surrender. This is the unfavorable reality that will confront Donald Trump when he returns to the White House later this month. Unless he and other Western leaders insist on pursuing peace through strength, Ukraine will have little chance of survival and the wider world will face a Hobbesian future of instability and aggression.

Victor Liakh is the CEO of the East Europe Foundation.

Putin begins 2025 confident of victory as war of attrition takes toll on Ukraine

Mykola Bielieskov — Tue, 07 Jan 2025 22:02:12 +0000

While many commentators are already speculating over the possibility of Ukraine peace talks in the coming months, there is actually very little to indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin is interested in a negotiated settlement. Ukrainian military commanders are certainly not counting on any pause in hostilities, and are instead preparing for a fourth year of Europe’s largest war since World War II.

Russia held the battlefield initiative throughout 2024, and managed to make gains at various points along the approximately one thousand kilometer front lines of the war. While Moscow was unable to secure any landmark successes, the relatively minor advances of the past year marked a shift from the largely static front lines in 2023. If the underlying causes of this Russian progress are not addressed, Putin’s invading army may be able to achieve a more decisive breakthrough in the coming year.

Russia’s gains in 2024 owed much to tactical and technological adaptations implemented since the early stages of the war. At the same time, Moscow also clearly benefited from a range of problems bedeviling the Ukrainian military, with troop shortages, ineffective leadership, and supply uncertainties at the very top of the list. Ukraine’s survival as a state may now depend on the country’s ability to resolve these issues in the coming months.

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Ukraine began the war in February 2022 with a large number of highly capable soldiers who had gained valuable experience during the previous eight years of sporadic fighting against Kremlin forces in eastern Ukraine. These seasoned troops played a key role in Ukraine’s early successes, adopting an often innovative approach to the war that helped cancel out Russia’s overwhelming advantages in terms of firepower.

Russia has countered Ukraine’s greater battlefield creativity by relying increasingly on strength in numbers. In September 2022, Putin announced Russia’s first mobilization since World War II. This dramatically increased the number of Russian troops in Ukraine and set the stage for the human wave tactics that have made Moscow’s subsequent advances possible.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s heavy losses since 2022 have robbed multiple army units of their most seasoned members. In many cases, this has led to a sharp decline in battlefield performance. Large numbers of promising young Ukrainian officers who should have risen through the ranks to senior command positions have instead been killed, wounded, or simply exhausted by almost three years of relentless combat.

The Ukrainian military is now facing growing challenges recruiting fresh troops to replenish its depleted ranks. This is due in part to the demoralizing impact of consistently high casualty rates and the lack of demobilization prospects while hostilities continue. It also reflects declining confidence in the quality of Ukraine’s military leaders and concerns over consistent shortages in both weapons and ammunition.

Revisions to Ukraine’s mobilization regulations introduced in spring 2024 failed to adequately address the underlying causes of this mounting manpower shortage. Instead, the past year witnessed record levels of desertion that have further undermined Ukraine’s already weakening defenses. Unless measures can be taken to reverse this trend, the consequences for Ukraine could be disastrous.

The increasingly acute challenges facing the Ukrainian army in terms of both quantity and quality demand a combined response from Ukraine and its allies. This must include improved training for infantry and officers, measures to root our ineffective commanders and enhance coordination between units, and greatly increased flows of military supplies from the international coalition backing the Ukrainian war effort.

This will require greater cooperation and an end to the current finger-pointing between Ukraine and the country’s partners. In recent months, officials in Kyiv have sought pin their problems on a lack of sufficient international military aid, while allies including the US have begun questioning Ukraine’s mobilization strategy and calling for a reduction in the age of military recruits. This blame game does little to address the mounting crisis within the Ukrainian military.

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With Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine set to pass the three-year mark next month, it is clear that the policies adopted in Kyiv and other Western capitals since 2022 are no longer working. Ukraine’s manpower problems cannot be overcome via reliance on patriotic sentiment and superior combat experience alone. A more systematic approach to training and equipping new troops is clearly necessary, and must be accompanied by measures to improve leadership and accountability within the Ukrainian military.

Likewise, piecemeal deliveries of weapons will not convince Russia to end the invasion. The extended debates and regular delays that have characterized international military support for Ukraine since 2022 have done much to persuade Putin that he can ultimately outlast the West.

The Kremlin dictator is facing his own manpower issues amid catastrophic Russian losses. However, he can call upon a population more than four times the size of Ukraine’s and can also afford to attract volunteers with large cash incentives. The recent addition of more than ten thousand North Korean troops has further eased the pressure on Russia’s army recruiters.

If Ukraine’s partners really wish to change the mood in Moscow, they must make a far more long-term commitment to providing Kyiv with military support and demonstrate their resolve to defeating Russia on the battlefield. Wars of attrition like the current Russo-Ukrainian War are won and lost through the deployment of superior resources. On paper, the West has the collective wealth and technological capabilities to completely overwhelm Russia. However, almost three years since the start of the full-scale invasion, Western support for Ukraine remains hampered by talk of compromise and fear of escalation. Putin interprets this as weakness and is emboldened.

Ukraine is currently in a race against time to address a number of key issues that threaten to undermine the country’s war effort and hand Putin an historic victory in 2025. Supporting Kyiv’s efforts is a matter of urgency for European leaders and should also be high on the list of priorities for the incoming Trump administration. Donald Trump has vowed to end the war, but he will likely find that Putin is unwilling to enter into talks unless the United States can undermine his confidence in victory and dramatically strengthen Ukraine’s negotiating position.

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A sobering investigation

A combination of satellite images shows farmland, buildings and roads in central Gaza before Israel’s invasion of the Palestinian enclave and before the Israeli military cleared an area known as the Netzarim Corridor dividing north and south Gaza, October 6, 2023 (TOP) and the same area cleared by the Israeli military after invading the Palestinian enclave August 20, 2024. Planet Labs Inc./Handout via REUTERS THIS IMAGE HAS BEEN SUPPLIED BY A THIRD PARTY. MANDATORY CREDIT.

The Haaretz investigation describes in harrowing detail how civilians were repeatedly targeted by careless, reckless, and, in a few instances, even joyous soldiers who applied overwhelming firepower against civilian targets who were clearly visible through drones and cameras as nonthreatening people, only to be mercilessly and ruthlessly gunned down without any apparent military necessity.

Time and again, the officers, soldiers, and commanders interviewed describe how arbitrarily designated kill zones were regularly littered with dead Palestinian bodies who were counted as “terrorists” without any confirmation of their identities, affiliations, crimes, or wrongdoing. Israeli officials regularly assert that IDF attacks and operations only strike military targets based on intelligence, battlefield assessments, and reactions to incidents and threats. Though this claim has been repeatedly challenged by evidence, footage, and even the IDF’s own admission at times, the Israeli government maintains that it vigorously investigates incidents and takes appropriate action against soldiers who violate established codes of conduct and rules of engagement.

However, the report details how the excessive use of helicopters, drones, tanks, and hundreds of bullets was regularly deployed against targets that did not pose an imminent threat and likely could have been spared with simple warning shots instead of being obliterated. Even when those killed were confirmed not to be militants based on IDF intelligence databases, murdered civilians were added to a daily count of eliminated combatants, left to be eaten by packs of stray dogs, as some officers congratulated their soldiers on a supposed job well done.

Despite the details being difficult and depressing to read, perhaps the silver lining throughout was that there are still IDF soldiers with consciousness, awareness, and recognition of the horrors that they are technically part of who are speaking out. They wanted to defend their people after the October 7 massacre but feel that the Israeli public deserves to know the full picture of the brutality that some of their soldiers and commanders are committing. They questioned their orders and the necessity of what they were doing, knowing that they would have to live with the consequences of what they were witnessing for the rest of their lives.

If Israel doesn’t trust any external mechanism for legal accountability for its conduct in Gaza, then the only way that its internal checks and balances can work is for brave soldiers to speak out against war crimes and for courageous journalists to expose these stories so that there can at least be a record of what took place.

What’s next for the corridor?

There are intensive rounds of negotiations to reach a new ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, though it remains unclear whether this could occur in the final days of the Biden administration or in the early days of the incoming Trump administration. Regardless of when such an agreement may be struck, serious questions will have to be answered about the Netzarim Corridor and Palestinian civilians’ ability to return to northern Gaza. Some reports suggest that as part of pending negotiations, Palestinian civilians would be able to return north without conditions, but vehicles would be inspected in accordance with a new mechanism. This would necessitate a partial or complete withdrawal of IDF troops from the corridor, something that is difficult to envision after the Israeli military expanded the corridor last month to vast areas and built more than a dozen bases throughout the space, which encompasses over twenty-one square miles of the coastal enclave’s territory.

The incoming Trump administration will have to wrestle with tactical-level details—especially what happens with the Netzarim Corridor and civilians’ return to the north—if it wants to play a role in mediating a ceasefire and ending the war. The carnage associated with the forced deportation of Palestinian civilians from the north and the prevention of their return has been an exceptionally bloody chapter in this war; the road to Gaza’s recovery and the prospects for lasting peace will require addressing this issue.

President-elect Donald Trump’s incoming secretary of state, working with special envoys and the National Security Council, should ensure the inclusion of specific guidelines for how the corridor—and indeed, all territories held by Israel during a ceasefire—would be administered and secured. This would entail pushing for stricter rules of engagement that involve higher-ups in the chain of command, higher thresholds for engaging suspects, mechanisms for issuing warnings before opening fire, and a clear strategy for how to discriminate targets based on a tangible threat matrix, not hunches or an overzealous field officer and commander.

Additionally, if the IDF maintains a presence in the corridor or other parts of Gaza that would be traversed by civilians seeking to return to their neighborhoods, there should be a mechanism for an independent observer, including regional players with US support, who could assess the behavior and compliance of Israeli soldiers with the ceasefire agreement, much like what the United States is doing in southern Lebanon.

The incoming Trump administration can play a positive role in dialing back some of the battlefield excesses that have caused immense, unnecessary loss of life to Palestinian civilians. The testimonies of IDF soldiers should give serious pause to policymakers, who must register the irreparable geopolitical damage that these stories inflict on regional stability and the hope for lasting peace between Palestinians and Israelis.

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib is a resident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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Europe needs a coalition of the resolute

Léonie Allard and Elie Tenenbaum — Fri, 20 Dec 2024 21:10:26 +0000

The December 7 trilateral meeting between French President Emmanuel Macron, US President-elect Donald Trump, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on the sidelines of the reopening of Notre-Dame Cathedral signaled a possible convergence of views regarding a way forward in Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine. The meeting might have helped dissipate the widespread fear among Europeans that the president-elect would settle for a deal throwing Ukraine to the wolves. It also alleviated some US perceptions that Ukrainians were too demanding in their approach to a deal and that Europeans were unwilling to commit.

Several European nations have been clear that their end goal is a strategic victory for a Ukraine integrated in the Western security order. Beyond its general support for this goal, France has repeatedly engaged with other European leaders on future legal, political, military, and operational guarantees for Ukraine. France should step up and lead this European effort, along with the United Kingdom and Poland, especially as the latter will chair the rotating presidency of the European Council in the first half of 2025. Only about a month out from the inauguration of Donald Trump, the most urgent move for Europe is to develop a framework for an open-ended “coalition of the resolute,” a kernel of a dozen countries—distinct from NATO—to provide security guarantees to Ukraine. This coalition should serve as the baseline for a European presence in any negotiation round driven by the United States with Russia. Along with Ukraine itself, this coalition should serve European states’ efforts to take more responsibility for their own security.

France can lead the way in supporting Ukraine

France, among other European nations, has much to offer to both respond to the US demand that Europe assume more responsibility and make sure Ukraine and Europe’s security interests are well understood by the new US administration. At first glance, France might not appear ideally positioned to lead a European effort, given its track record concerning Ukraine and Russia. Its response to date has been marred by moments of hesitation, perceived naivety, and occasional double dealing. Some critics believe France lags other European nations—such as the United Kingdom, Poland, and the Nordic and Baltic states—in their support of Ukraine.

Since February 2022, however, Macron has clarified France’s stance and significantly increased its support for Ukraine. France now backs Ukraine’s NATO membership application, as formalized during the 2023 Vilnius Summit. France has shown its willingness to avoid setting red lines, including by lifting restrictions on providing Ukraine deep-strike capabilities before the United States and the United Kingdom did so. Macron now ranks among the five foreign leaders most trusted by Ukrainians (58 percent of Ukrainians trust him, an increase of three points in a year). He is also one of the only European leaders still in office who has a long-standing relationship with Trump, which makes him well positioned to take a leadership role on Ukraine while keeping the US administration engaged.

Although France has long faced criticism for lagging other nations in providing financial and military assistance to Ukraine, it has made notable progress. While it is still behind its 2024 goal of providing military aid worth “up to” 3 billion euros this year, it now ranks fourth—behind the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom—in total aid to Ukraine, according to the Kiel Institute. Since 2022, its total contributions (bilaterally and through the EU) have exceeded 13 billion euros. France supports Ukraine in key areas with advanced capabilities. In the beginning of the conflict, it responded to Ukraine’s most urgent needs by focusing on equipment for individual soldiers. As the war progressed, France shifted to providing crucial capabilities such as artillery and surface-to-air weapons. In January 2024, France and the United Kingdom initiated the first delivery of the air-launched long-range cruise missile SCALP/Storm Shadow, and lifted restrictions on strikes on Russian territory as early as May. The start of 2025 will see France delivering the first air-superiority Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets, while the full training and equipment for a Ukrainian “Anna of Kyiv” brigade (named in honor of a Kyiv princess who became queen of France in 1051) was completed in late 2024. This brigade will include over two thousand soldiers in combined arms combat—that is, covering all fields including infantry combat, anti-air defense, anti-tank warfare, drone operations, and artillery. As of September 15, 2024, France had trained nearly fifteen thousand Ukrainians in France and Poland as part of the European Union Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM) in support of Ukraine.

At the political level, Macron’s international standing is weakened by setbacks at home in June, July, and December, which certainly diverted much of his political focus toward domestic issues. This precarious situation makes foreign policy and military initiatives more appealing to Macron, as they represent areas in which he retains more freedom of action. Under France’s constitution, the president has substantial operational autonomy in military affairs, acting as Commander in Chief with direct control over the armed forces. Deploying troops only requires informing Parliament within three days of the start of an operation and securing approval only after three months. Unlike in any other European state, sending troops to Ukraine might prove easier for the French president than increasing financial aid or passing a budget bill for social security.

What will security guarantees for Ukraine look like?

Despite these possibilities, the exact nature of European security guarantees remains unclear. Options vary in size and scope, must be understood as part of a wider scheme to impact Russia’s calculus in potential negotiations, and act in combination with both cross-domain pressures on Moscow and increased multidimensional support to Ukraine.

As far as security guarantee models go, NATO remains the preferred conduit for Zelenskyy as well as for Macron, who has clearly reassessed his 2019 comment about the Alliance experiencing “brain death.” However, envisaging Ukrainian accession to NATO seems to be a nonstarter for a new Trump administration at present, leaving only the option of an ad hoc guarantor force. The option of a European Union (EU) framework has been floated, but is unlikely given the proverbial hassles of its internal process. Conversely, an ad hoc guarantor force should not be seen as an alternative to NATO or an invitation, but as a first step setting the stage for both future EU and possible NATO accession.

In that context, an open-ended coalition of the resolute could be proposed, in coordination with Ukraine, ahead of negotiations. This would ensure that European security interests are factored into potential talks, while securing a European seat in a negotiation round with Russia. Such a coalition could also ensure Europeans contribute more directly to measures to prevent renewed Russian aggression.

France and other potential contributors must clarify what they would be willing to commit and how they could sustain such a force over several years. Since November 2024, Macron has proposed putting European forces on the ground in Ukraine to several European leaders, without revealing the exact timing or contour of such forces. Zelenskyy referenced Macron’s idea in his recent meeting with German opposition leader Friedrich Merz and in discussions with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk. Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Dutch Foreign Minister Caspar Veldkamp also publicly referenced the idea while cautioning against quick action. Macron’s proposal now needs to be made explicit. Questions regarding such a guarantor force’s strategic and military credibility should be discussed, and the answer lies mostly in the composition of the force.

Such a coalition could take several forms and involve various nations, starting with those European states that have signed the most binding and complete bilateral agreements with Ukraine. In that respect, the United Kingdom and France stand out. They have the most seasoned militaries and are probably the only nations with command-and-control capabilities to lead such an operation. Their status as independent nuclear powers adds a unique dimension to their strategic posture. While it would be unrealistic to claim escalation dominance over Russia, their leadership would send a strong signal that would force Moscow to reconsider any reckless action.

Poland, the Nordic countries, and the Baltic states—all of which have gained considerable political leverage in shaping European security—might play along, especially as their collective contribution can provide significant mass to the coalition. Combined, the four Nordic states’ air forces taken together are at least as large as the UK Royal Air Force. Given its fast-expanding military, especially in the land domain, Poland would be a key addition and possibly a third lead nation along with the United Kingdom and France. But Warsaw remains cautious and might prioritize territorial defense over forward deterrence in Ukraine. Still, it is hard to think of a more credible contributor.

While Germany is Ukraine’s main financial supporter, it is hard to see its government making any bold moves before the snap elections in February 2025. Nevertheless, it is essential that Berlin at least politically agrees to such a project, provides security guarantees to Ukraine, and avoids another public Olaf Scholz-Macron fight over the proposal, which would only benefit Russia. Along with its European members, the coalition should include partners such as Canada, which is leading the NATO land forces in Latvia and ranks fifth in total military aid to Ukraine according to the Kiel Institute.

All of this remains uncertain pending the United States’ position during its presidential transition. Not much is possible against Washington’s will, but a lot can be achieved without the United States bearing the bulk of the effort. France understands that boots on the ground might be a nonstarter for the United States, favoring bilateral guarantees that would keep US troops out of Ukraine physically. If the United States supports the European proposal in one form or another, other nations might be encouraged to take part. Beyond a possible endorsement of guarantees, the coalition will need US critical enablers in Europe. These critical enablers include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), airborne early warning (AEW), long-range strikes, and missile defense entail neither a NATO security guarantee nor US boots on the ground but would make a significant difference.

What leverage exists for a robust strategic framework?

The notion of security guarantees to Ukraine is related to—but should not be confused with— either the longer-term strategy on Russian containment, or the increased efforts to bring the war to a stalemate by enhancing NATO’s role. This includes ideas to expand the Security Assistance and Training (NSATU) mission and the proposal to supply military trainers and maintenance support activities to increase Ukrainian capacity, possibly linked with some air-defense zone over a portion of Ukrainian airspace. The EU accession process might have a bigger role to play in making sure aid is anchored in the long term. In the economic domain, beyond the latest plan to make the fifty-billion-dollar loan to Ukraine that uses the interest from the frozen Russian assets, there needs to be increased pressure on Russian revenues by lowering oil prices and a mix of secondary sanctions.

The territorial scope for application of security guarantees could be defined by the post-negotiation establishment of a line of contact between Ukraine and Russia. While a guarantor force has been presented in various media comments as comprising “peacekeepers,” it could not be a Blue Helmet-style force close to the line of contact or—even worse—a renewed Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) observers’ force that would have no deterring strategic effect on Russia should it decide to resume its large-scale offensive.

What is needed is an actual guarantor force that would demonstrate European strategic solidarity with Ukraine’s security and deter any significant Russian advance. As previously discussed in a Foreign Affairs article, the guarantor force could comprise an air-control component (both land-based and airborne), as well as a ground component made up of several brigade combat teams deployed in the eastern part of Ukraine. While not posted on the line of contact, these forces should be ready to intervene in the case of Russian breakthrough.

There are varying options in terms of footprints, depending on the number of countries involved. A lighter option would include a smaller “tripwire” force inside Ukraine modeled after NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence, with additional forces standing by. But this approach risks inviting more Russian testing and provocation. Another lighter approach might bet on an air component only, reviving the old idea of a no-fly zone over Ukraine enforced by combat air patrol on alert and deployment of ground-based air defenses.

Timing is also a key variable. While it is generally assumed that the guarantor force would be a post-deal instrument, a bolder approach might be to think of it as a pre-deal tool—as a fait accompli imposed on Russia to influence talks, sending a message that European forces are going to be deployed either way. While this option supposes an even lower aversion to risk than a post-deal force, it might prove more relevant strategically.

France’s military is seasoned and versatile. However, it is not yet equipped for the type of protracted territorial warfare Ukraine has faced. The current French force structure needs to speed up its adaptations to high-intensity operations to deliver credible conventional deterrence. Changes are under way, thanks to lessons learned from training with Ukrainian armed forces and other deployments on the eastern flank. Moreover, France has a proven track record of sustaining long-term overseas operations. France was able to maintain a force of five thousand troops in the Sahel for nearly a decade while simultaneously deploying a dozen fighter aircraft, making it the second-largest contributor to the US-led air campaign in Operation Inherent Resolve over Iraq and Syria. While these campaigns have recently ended or wound down, freeing up some room for maneuver, French armed forces have rapidly expanded their presence on NATO’s eastern flank, from just a few hundred personnel in 2022 to around three thousand today—some of whom could be used as part of a European coalition in Ukraine.

Any deployment of a guarantor force needs to be coupled with a long-term European vision for dealing with the inevitable Russian attempts to intimidate such a coalition and to test its consistency and risk aversion. France has tried to take a leading role in forging new response options for escalation management, in both the short and long terms. On air defense, deep strikes, or long-range missile production for the battlefield, select capability coalitions have emerged with some creative answers. The European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA)—which includes France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and Poland—aims to build new long-range strike weapons with a range exceeding five hundred kilometers, as a way to fill gaps in European defenses highlighted by the conflict in Ukraine. Also, the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI), while incomplete, is a starting point to develop a comprehensive European defensive shield.

Another implication to consider of deploying a guarantor force in Ukraine is how it will affect NATO’s New Force Model and operational planning. Indeed, deploying a multi-brigade joint force from some of NATO’s most capable European contributors would impact the ability of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) to go on with its current regional and strategic plans. But this would not necessarily be a bad thing. As often noted, there is no other major military contingency for NATO planning other than one involving Russian aggression. Establishing a guarantor force in Ukraine also means pinning Russian power to this southeast corner while safeguarding a mighty six hundred thousand-strong Ukrainian military. This is certainly more advantageous strategically than losing Ukraine and saving European forces for a battle west of the Article 5 border.

Finally, Europe needs a global outlook to strengthen its leverage in future negotiations and preempt possible formats beyond the transatlantic family. Here again, France can offer value. A possible format reuniting the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Ukraine would have direct implications on transatlantic policy regarding China. Given its support for Russia’s war, including China in a discussion critical to the future of the European security order could be unprecedented and warrants careful consideration. Macron’s political leadership regarding Ukraine is credible only if he also takes a strong stance against China’s support for Russia, while continuing to invest in existing communication channels with Beijing. A future negotiation might also implicate North Korea-Russia ties, given that North Korean soldiers are deployed in Ukraine. France’s steadfast position on the North Korean nuclear issue can contribute to making sure European and US interests align in curbing North Korean involvement in Ukraine, as a possible second summit between Trump and Kim Jong-Un could have direct implications for the situation there.

As January 20 looms, Europe must act swiftly

Timing will be crucial in the coming weeks. The foremost priorities are increasing Western support for Ukraine and intensifying pressure on Russia. All the discussions about security guarantees between Europeans and Americans will amount to no more than wishful thinking if the Ukrainian armed forces collapse in the coming months or if Russia feels confident enough to reject negotiations. The envisioned guarantor force must be part of a wider strategy to prevent a Ukrainian collapse and compel Russia to negotiate.

As Trump’s January 20 inauguration approaches, Europeans must act swiftly to consolidate a unified position on future security guarantees for Ukraine. The coalition option should be proposed ahead of negotiations, ensuring Europeans are at the table from the outset in shaping the future European security order. A European coalition or guarantor force would have significant deterrent value, reinforcing strategic solidarity between Europe and Ukraine, strengthening their shared security even further.

As policymakers in Washington see Europeans taking greater responsibility for their own security, they should support the nations already committed, incentivize others to join the endeavor, and bring their ambitions to a practical conclusion. A revitalized transatlantic relationship hinges on Europe shouldering a larger share of the burden, as well as further integrating Ukraine into the European security framework.

About the authors

Léonie Allard is a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, previously serving at the French Ministry of Armed Forces.

Elie Tenenbaum is a research fellow at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) and director of its Security Studies Center.

The fall of the Assad regime is just the beginning of Syria’s quest for stability

Amir Asmar — Wed, 18 Dec 2024 21:11:53 +0000

After the sudden exit of ousted Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad, the only certainty is that both the former Islamist opposition, led by al-Qaeda offshoot Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and the Syrian people face a monumental transition. This is not so much the beginning of the end of the bloody civil war. Rather, it is the end of the beginning of the conflict, as Syria—freed from Assad—attempts to find its way despite significant social and religious divisions and the presence of many armed groups.

After gaining its independence from restrictive and authoritarian French rule, Syria suffered through a series of short-lived and unstable regimes, endured more than fifty years of brutal Assad family rule, and finally devolved into civil war. Syria is divided by competing ethnic and sectarian communities, creating barriers to the coalition building that could foster greater stability outside authoritarian rule. If, however, an Islamist coalition led by HTS can consolidate power in this environment, it would represent a massive transformation in a nation that has long been cursed with instability and portend significant implications for the region.

Broken promises and a divided nation

The Syrian Arab Republic, as it exists today, is largely based on territorial boundaries established during the French mandate, which lasted from 1920 to 1946. The British and French—anticipating an Ottoman defeat in World War I and eager to absorb the spoils into their respective colonial empires—divided Syria between them: a French northern Syria and a British southern Syria, breaking wartime promises to the Arabs to promote their independence if they revolted against Ottoman rule during the war. France further subdivided its area, managing Lebanon—with much of northern Syria’s Mediterranean coastline—as a separate mandate and ceding another portion of the coast around the city of Iskenderun to the newly independent Republic of Turkey.

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The borders drawn by the European powers before and during the Syria mandate not only divided ethnic and sectarian communities but also institutionalized and exacerbated existing divisions. The Sunni majority, which makes up more than two-thirds of the state’s population, was composed of multiple ethnicities including Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, and others. A third of the country’s population was composed of Christians, Shia, and Alawi Muslims, as well as smaller Druze and Jewish communities, among others.

Further, the Arab centers of culture, learning, and nationalist ferment—cities such as Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad—all ended up in different countries. The artificial boundaries ignored historical, cultural, and social ties, setting the stage for many of the conflicts and identity struggles that have continued to shape the region in the present era.

France did little to build the state institutions necessary for the constricted Syrian republic to manage its affairs after gaining independence in 1946. The new state went on to have twenty-one governments in the following twenty-four years, when Hafez al-Assad assumed power in an intra-regime coup in 1970.

Decades of suppression

Although Hafez introduced a level of stability previously unknown in Syria, he established one of the most authoritarian states in the region. His minority regime—dominated by the schismatic Alawi sect of Islam—severely circumscribed the role of Sunni Muslims, which comprised most of Syria’s population, in politics and the security services. A 1982 challenge by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was met with brutal crackdowns, which resulted in an estimated tens of thousands killed and forced the organization into exile.

The elder Assad’s suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood set the script for his son Bashar al-Assad’s later effort to quash the demonstrations that began the 2011 Syrian uprising: declaring all opposition elements to be Islamic extremists and mobilizing state security resources to destroy them. Although radical Islamists, including al-Qaeda elements and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) would ultimately conduct their own struggles against the regime, the initial popular uprising was not ideological, and it was Assad’s overreaction that turned it into a civil conflict that would engulf the entire country.

It was Hafez’s effort to protect the Alawis from a vengeful communal reorganization after his death that led him to install his son in the presidency. Notably, Bashar was not Hafez’s first choice for succession. Years of preparing his oldest son Basil came to naught when he was killed in a car accident, putting the ophthalmologist Bashar in line to assume the presidency upon Hafez’s death in 2000. Despite talk of political and economic liberalization, the younger Assad’s regime was ruthless and kleptocratic. It was that ruthlessness that would ultimately lead to demonstrations, civil war, and the regime’s undoing. The Assad government’s brutal crackdown against children who had painted anti-regime graffiti in 2011 in the southern city of Daraa, who were subjected to torture and abuse, was one of the incidents of oppression that sparked the almost fourteen-year civil war that would ultimately result in Assad’s ouster.

Russia, Iran, and the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah had fought on behalf of the regime earlier in the war. But when HTS launched its offensive in November, each of these allies couldn’t respond fast enough, as they had all been weakened by other conflicts and had fewer resources to dedicate to the Assad regime. Bashar and his family are now living in asylum in Russia, as Moscow negotiates with HTS to retain its military bases in Syria.

International implications

Whether the Islamist coalition led by HTS can consolidate power over the country has significant regional implications. If it does, Tehran will have lost a stalwart ally and a link in its land bridge to Lebanon’s Shia community. The elder Assad, contemptuous of former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, had gone so far as to support Iran in the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq war, and Syria could always be relied upon to support Iranian regional policies. With a Syrian government no longer friendly toward Iran, Tehran’s ability to support Hezbollah would become far more complicated.

Israel, which has attacked Syria for being a conduit of Iranian support to Hezbollah in Lebanon, may find that radical Sunni Islamists are just as dangerous and just as committed to Israel’s destruction as Hezbollah’s Shia. Both Israel’s respective borders with Lebanon and Syria are each approximately fifty miles long, but there is no United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution, however poorly executed, mandating a buffer zone along the border area in Syria as UN Security Council Resolution 1701 does in Lebanon. Finally, it is worth remembering that only the United States recognizes Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, which is internationally recognized as Syrian territory captured in the Arab-Israeli war in 1967. In fact, UN Security Council Resolution 497 explicitly states that Israel’s “decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction, and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights is null and void and without international legal effect.”

Turkey, under the regime of the Islamist Justice and Development Party of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, known to have close ties to global Islamist establishments, would presumably benefit from a relationship with the new regime, as it has long supported elements of the Syrian opposition and demonstrated long-standing disquiet about Assad remaining in power. Ankara will seek to remain involved in Syria to repatriate the millions of Syrian refugees it currently hosts and to combat the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), an organization it considers a dangerous terrorist group because of its links to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is designated as a terrorist organization by both Turkey and the United States.

The United States’ principal Arab partners—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—have all taken hostile stands against Islamists since the Arab Spring uprisings of 2010-11, and the new Syrian regime may struggle to gain acceptance or support from other Arab states. Qatar, however, has often been accused of supporting Islamist groups considered beyond the pale by its Arab neighbors, and Doha may see an opportunity to make its mark on the region by buttressing the new HTS-led regime.

Minority rights

While it would be inaccurate to assert that the Syrian Arab Republic, as carved by European colonial powers, never had a chance at stability, both European rulers and Syrian leaders share great responsibility for the mess in which the country finds itself. Neither contributed to the evolution of functioning institutions that are essential for stability. Without a new national identity in the constricted Syrian republic, ineffectual Sunni Arab-dominated governments and communal tensions combined to promote instability and, ultimately, a strongman dictatorship in the form of Alawi minority rule.

Now, in the aftermath of Assad’s ouster, both internal divisions among Syrians and external interests in shaping the country’s future threaten to render the current moment a lull in the civil war rather than its conclusion. Although the emerging HTS-dominated government has yet to consolidate its authority, it would be highly unexpected if—as a Sunni Islamist government—it were to guarantee the civil rights of Twelver Shias, Alawis, Druze, and other groups generally considered schismatic and which are often discriminated against among Sunni-majority communities.

There are many flavors of Islamists in Syria, both within and outside the HTS coalition, including pockets of ISIS. Elements of the Syrian military may yet reinvent themselves into an insurgency, as happened next door in Iraq after the fall of Hussein’s Baathist regime in 2003. Minorities, particularly Alawis, may elect to fight to protect their future from perceived Sunni animus. Syrian Kurds, long disenfranchised by the outgoing regime, are armed and have demonstrated resilience against other armed groups.

Finally, although the United States is mostly steering clear of direct involvement in Syria’s transition, Russia, Iran, and Turkey all have major interests in attempting to shape the country’s trajectory in their favor.

Given Syria’s long history of sectarian divisions, the presence of multiple armed factions in the country, and external powers’ competing interests in shaping the aftermath of the Assad regime’s downfall, the swift triumph of HTS and its allies may prove to be merely the end of a phase of the Syrian civil war rather than the end of the conflict.

Amir Asmar is an adjunct professor of Middle East issues at the National Intelligence University. He was previously a senior executive and Middle East and terrorism analyst in the US Department of Defense.

The views expressed are the author’s and do not imply endorsement from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or any other US Government agency.

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To advance Saudi-Israeli relations, let the private sector lead

Mark Donig and Tally Zingher — Fri, 13 Dec 2024 15:47:47 +0000

It is conventional wisdom that the second Donald Trump administration will seek to finalize a defense treaty with Saudi Arabia as part of a broader deal to normalize relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Achieving such a deal, whose general parameters have been promoted and developed under the Joe Biden administration, would accomplish at least three significant objectives: it would firmly orient Saudi Arabia toward the West—and, ideally for the United States, away from China—under a security umbrella that would support Saudi regional leadership; it would pave the way for a regional defense alliance that includes Israel and moderate Arab states to maintain stability in the face of a bellicose and radical Iran; and it would facilitate Israel’s economic integration in the region.

However, the Middle East of 2024 is not the one that the first Trump administration left behind, as demonstrated by the dramatic ouster of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad earlier this week. As war grips Israel, Gaza, and, until recently, Lebanon following Hamas’s heinous terror attack on October 7, 2023, Riyadh has responded to domestic pressure and sentiments in the broader Muslim world by returning to the Arab Peace Initiative’s stated price that normalization with Israel includes the establishment of a Palestinian state. Such a demand appears difficult to reconcile with the current Israeli government’s positions, especially as 101 hostages—including seven Americans—languish in Gaza. In short, absent a meaningful political shift in Saudi Arabia or Israel, the US-brokered Saudi-Israeli “mega-deal” faces hurdles in the immediate future.

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Given the current reality, policymakers seeking to advance Saudi-Israeli ties in the near term would be wise to focus on incentivizing private-sector cooperation alongside traditional diplomacy. With the right policies in place, the US private sector can play a critical role in advancing US-Saudi-Israeli economic relations, creating a reality that will make normalization more achievable, attractive, and palpable to both Saudi and Israeli leadership in the coming years.

To understand how the United States can serve as a catalyst for enhanced Saudi-Israeli economic integration, it is crucial to appreciate Saudi economic and geopolitical interests. For Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), modernizing the Saudi economy and realizing his ambitious Vision 2030 are priorities on par with ensuring Saudi Arabia’s security. To diversify the Saudi economy and reduce dependence on oil, MBS has shifted Saudi’s centralized economy away from investments overseas, focused on job creation, increased human capital, and secured foreign direct investment and cutting-edge technologies from the United States, Europe, China, and other advanced economies.

To that end, MBS has significantly reformed intellectual property (IP) protections, corporate governance, regulatory frameworks, and investment protocols to introduce greater transparency and predictability into the Saudi economy and attract international investors. For example, Saudi Arabia recently revised its corporate code, transitioning from a traditional Sharia-based legal system to one that more closely resembles international legal standards. This legal transformation includes a law requiring companies to locate their regional headquarters within Saudi Arabia in order to be eligible for Saudi government contracts. (According to Saudi Investment Minister Khalid al-Falih, more than 550 firms, including Citibank and Morgan Stanley, have established regional headquarters in Saudi.)

All of these developments, combined with its projected gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 4.9 percent in 2025, have positioned Saudi Arabia as one of the most attractive target markets for US companies and investors across multiple sectors to expand their Middle East reach. The challenge for the incoming Trump administration will be translating these opportunities into geopolitical achievements, including enhancing the Saudi-Israeli relationship. It can do so by positioning the United States as a vital conduit for furthering the Saudi-Israeli private-sector partnership.

Prior to October 7, Saudi-Israeli commercial activity and interest had ticked upward as normalization appeared ever more imminent, highlighted by MBS’ appearance on Fox News in September 2023. Since the Israel-Hamas war, however, direct private-sector collaboration between Saudi Arabia and Israel has slowed, with a rough indicator being the lower-profile presence of Israeli businesspeople at the recent Future Investment Initiative Summit in Riyadh, the Middle East’s leading annual business conference.

US involvement can help push forward the Saudi-Israeli economic collaboration in at least three ways. First, the United States can build upon existing US-Israeli economic collaboration to incentivize US companies to integrate Israeli technology within Saudi Arabia. Specifically, leading US and Israeli companies that already collaborate in sectors such as cyber, agricultural technology, and renewable energy are well-aligned with Saudi’s Vision 2030 goals and Saudi Arabia’s national economic interests. For instance, the Binational Industrial Research and Development (BIRD) Foundation, a US-Israeli initiative that funds technologies developed by US and Israeli companies, or the US-Israel Binational Agricultural Research and Development (BARD) Fund, could provide additional grants or reduce repayment requirements for US participants who deploy the technologies in Saudi Arabia or across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). These incentives would entice US companies to ensure that Israeli technology and the Saudi economy are intertwined, while demonstrating to each country the benefits of an enhanced relationship. Given the strong alignment between Israel’s economic strength and the needs of Vision 2030, this approach could help accelerate the success of ambitious projects in Saudi Arabia.

Additionally, the United States can facilitate the introduction of Israeli technologies and human capital into Saudi Arabia via the more than two hundred US multinational corporations that currently have a research-and-development (R&D) presence or subsidiaries in Israel. These companies can leverage their expertise and established teams on the ground in Israel to contribute to the economic growth of the GCC and align with Saudi national economic priorities. By instituting policies that induce collaboration, Washington can harness the innovative capabilities and talent pool of these Israeli companies to support their integration into the GCC.

Second, the United States can help coordinate with regional parties to overcome existing infrastructure challenges and advance regional trade. The United States can facilitate regional infrastructure projects, such as the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEEC) initiative announced by the Biden administration, which would advance the ability of Saudi Arabia and the GCC to export goods to Israel, the Mediterranean basin, and Europe via Jordan. Simultaneously, the United States should encourage Israel to increase its import capacity at border crossings with Egypt and Jordan, as they would be stretched to handle the full volume of goods that would become available for trade if regional opening occurs. By simultaneously advancing these policies, the United States will incentivize Saudi Arabia and the GCC to take advantage of export opportunities to the Mediterranean and access to Israel’s small but consumer-heavy market.

Finally, by leveraging its convening power, Washington can assemble the economic building blocks to support a future deal, while evading the political barriers preventing GCC business leaders from non-Abraham Accords countries from openly meeting with their Israeli counterparts. For instance, the incoming administration can leverage existing cybersecurity, defense, energy, and water conferences and summits in Washington and Silicon Valley—which leading GCC and Israeli figures already attend regularly—to convene sideline meetings with business leaders from Israel and the region. Even if not the express purpose, the clear subtext and agenda should focus on areas of actionable collaboration that the United States can midwife. Such off-the-record convenings will allow GCC and Israeli business counterparts to learn about one another, exchange ideas, and lay the groundwork for what partnering across the region will look like.

The United States faces structural and geopolitical barriers to advancing private-sector relations among itself, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Riyadh’s overtures to China and Iran highlight its hedging strategy against a polarized US political system that has yielded unpredictable economic and foreign policy. Additionally, the advanced technologies best suited to support Vision 2030 are unlikely to be shared freely due to US concerns about their potential acquisition by its global rivals. Moreover, given the relative novelty of reforms in Saudi Arabia, certain Saudi markets and corporate jurisprudence remain untested and unpredictable. Finally, the ongoing Israel-Hamas war, coupled with some Israeli government coalition members’ rhetorical flirtation with West Bank annexation, might delay Saudi Arabia’s willingness to explore a regional deal.

While these risks remain, it is for these precise reasons that Washington should pursue a business-first approach while signaling its commitment to Saudi-Israeli normalization. By deepening Israel and Saudi Arabia’s economic integration across a wide variety of sectors, the United States will increase the price of deviating from peaceful relations. That is to say if either the Israeli or Saudi government pursues policies that undercut the possibility of normalization, they will pay an economic cost as well as a diplomatic one. In addition to prioritizing the release of the hostages and ending the war in Gaza, the incoming administration would be wise to build upon the first Trump administration’s “Peace to Prosperity” roadmap to underscore this point, encouraging the parties to include a Palestinian private-sector component in joint endeavors so that regional prosperity is shared by all. In any case, the incoming administration should indicate, in no uncertain terms, that the United States remains committed to pursuing Saudi-Israeli normalization in parallel to signaling to US businesses that Washington intends to expand its economic relationship with Saudi Arabia.

While both the Trump and the Biden administrations deserve praise for vigorously pursuing long-term regional stabilization based on peace agreements between GCC countries and Israel, a formal change in the status of the Saudi-Israeli relationship remains elusive. By leaning on the robust US private sector, the new administration can enhance Saudi and Israeli prosperity and, ultimately, increase the odds of regional stability.

Mark Donig is a Millennium fellow at the Atlantic Council, an attorney, and a senior adviser at Blue Laurel Advisors, which advises public-and private-sector actors on advancing business opportunities in the GCC.

Tally Zingher is the founding director of Blue Laurel Advisors.

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Where Syria goes next after the fall of Assad

Frederic C. Hof — Tue, 10 Dec 2024 14:57:08 +0000

The departure of Bashar al-Assad from Syria and the implosion of his regime is, for me, easily the most pleasant geopolitical surprise of the twenty-first century. Twenty million Syrians face continued tough times as men with weapons try to sort out what is next in terms of governance. But there is but one absolute certainty: With Assad gone, Syrians now have a chance to live lives of decency, dignity, and opportunity.

It seems like ages ago when I sat with President Assad on February 28, 2011, in a palace high above Damascus, informing him of what specifically would be required of Syria to recover all land—mainly the Golan Heights—lost to Israel in 1967. That fifty-minute conversation and subsequent much longer talks with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and others would be the high points of a backchannel peace mediation that had gathered momentum in the fall of 2010. A White House colleague and I were so encouraged by our progress that we planned to bring Syrian and Israeli officials together in an Eastern European capital in April 2011. But it never happened.

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The prospect of Syria-Israel peace died in mid-March 2011 when Assad ordered his security apparatus to use deadly force against Syrians peacefully protesting police violence and the mass, illegal detention of pro-democracy advocates. By shooting demonstrators and filling prisons, Assad did much more than effectively cede the Golan Heights to Israel. He destroyed what was left in Syria in the hope that a well-educated young president might reform the brutally authoritarian system he inherited from his father, Hafez. And as Assad doubled and tripled down on violence for much of 2011, he set the stage for internal warfare that would all but destroy the country and, on December 8, send him packing.

So how did it happen?

Syrian rebels, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), seem to have decided last month to take advantage of the recent defeats suffered by Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah by trying to expand their rule in northwestern Syria to Aleppo. They did so almost effortlessly. Indeed, as they entered Aleppo and pushed beyond, they found regime military forces dissolving in front of them. A Syrian army degraded by inactivity and hollowed out by criminality, corruption, and amphetamine production—Captagon—was simply in no condition to fight. The door to Hama, Homs, and Damascus was wide open, and HTS, led by Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, did not hesitate to enter.

The Assad regime’s greatest supporters—Iran and Russia—were at first strongly inclined to prop up their client, as they have done for a dozen years. For Iran, Syria is the land bridge to what is left of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Hezbollah has—at least until recently—been the jewel in the crown of foreign policy accomplishments by Iran’s clerics. For Russian President Vladimir Putin, Syria was much more than a country offering naval and air facilities. Rescuing Assad in the past was Putin’s top domestic political talking point about the supposed return of Russia to great power status. Tehran and Moscow wanted desperately to shore up the regime. But they could find nothing to support. All they found, in the words of Percy Bysshe Shelley’s Ozymandias, was “boundless and bare. The lone and level sands stretch far away.”

No one, except perhaps Assad himself, knew that the regime over which he had presided for nearly a quarter century, one built by his father, was, in fact, a “colossal wreck,” in the words of Shelley. That the regime had fragmented into criminal cliques, with the Assad family and entourage looting what they could from the country they had wrecked, was widely known. Still, it was widely assumed by many, including me, that the regime’s appetites for mass homicide, torture, rape, starvation, terror, and theft remained strong, and the means required to convert appetites to actions remained intact. In the end, however, the acidic evil of a crime family and its enablers dissolved everything.

What, then, is next? Jolani, the head of HTS, appears to be the big winner, although it is far from clear in the opening hours of the post-Assad era exactly what he commands. While Jolani claims to have severed his connection to al-Qaeda in 2016, HTS remains a Turkish– and US-designated terror organization.

The Joe Biden administration seems pleased that the mass-murdering client of Iran and Russia has fled. Yet Washington’s ambivalence concerning HTS is understandable. On the one hand, HTS is deeply committed to liquidating the presence and influence in Syria of the Iran-Hezbollah combination and perhaps that of Russia as well. On the other hand, however, its Islamist orientation poses potential dangers to Syrian minorities—especially Alawites and Christians—as well as the prospect of Syrian governance falling into the hands of a fundamentalist group containing foreign fighters and perhaps even still harboring global terrorist sentiments.

These well-founded reservations about HTS mandate close coordination and cooperation between Washington and Ankara, notwithstanding severe bilateral differences over the US military relationship with the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Defense Forces in northeastern Syria.

Indeed, Turkey sees no advantage in Syria being “governed” by anyone whose blatant sectarianism is likely to send refugees surging in its direction. Turkey has already had this experience thanks to Assad’s campaign of mass homicide directed at Syrian Sunni Muslims in rebel areas. Indeed, Ankara’s support for the current rebel offensive probably has its roots in Assad’s failure to provide guarantees for the safe and protected return of Syrian refugees from Turkey, a major domestic political priority of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. One hopes Ankara can exert some influence over what comes next.

Jolani is publicly speaking about his dedication to minority rights, governing through institutions, and rebuilding Syria after thirteen years of internal warfare. This is all to the good if it indicates his conversion from al-Qaeda is complete and if he is truly interested in promoting the kind of Syria of which he speaks. Yet, HTS’ human rights record in Syria’s northwest has been abysmal. Perhaps Turkey, with input from Washington, can persuade Jolani to take the following steps now that Assad is finished:

Offer to form a national unity, transitional government with the current Baathist Syrian Arab Republic Government, headed by Prime Minister Mohammed Ghazi al-Jalali. Priorities of such a government would include establishing law and order with justice for all, releasing all political prisoners, ensuring the departure of foreign forces from Syrian territory, providing for the safe return of Syrian refugees, securing the lifting of sanctions and initiating reconstruction, and setting the conditions for eventual parliamentary elections and even constitutional reform.
Pledge that HTS armed forces will not enter Latakia province or any other places where Alawite Syrians reside. Syrian authorities could, if necessary, ask for Turkish assistance if help is needed, defending civilians from anyone motivated by feelings of vengeance.
Identify, in conjunction with other Syrian opposition elements, senior professional Syrian military officers who have defected over the years and place them in command of what remains of the Syrian armed forces. To the maximum extent possible, use existing Syrian Army units under new, decent, and professional leadership to provide security in populated areas. Permit HTS personnel to join the Syrian military and set a deadline of six months to do so or disarm.
Clarify to the people of Syria that the rule of law in the post-Assad era would convey neither advantage nor disadvantage to any Syrian based on sect. Begin work on a new, inclusive Syrian Constitution.

The United States should move quickly, as soon as security conditions permit, to dispatch a special envoy to Syria and to reopen the US Embassy in Damascus. Direct contact with Jolani is essential; granting him the benefit of the doubt up-front would preserve the possibility of influencing him. Sanctions on the Assad family and entourage should be maintained, and Assad’s transport to The Hague to be prosecuted for crimes against humanity should be pressed upon whoever ends up hosting him. All other economic sanctions on Syria should be suspended. The US should provide humanitarian assistance and organize a structure to advance Syria’s reconstruction in conjunction with allies and partners. There are reports that the regime kingpins emptied Syria’s Central Bank on the way to the Damascus airport. If true, the US should assist Syria’s new government in recovering stolen assets.

Although Turkey may be the most important American interlocutor in the coming days and weeks, Washington should spare no effort to create a united front toward Syria among allies and partners. France will be important in this regard, as will the United Arab Emirates (UAE). According to press reports, Abu Dhabi, before the rebel offensive, attempted to ensnare Washington in a foolhardy scheme to lift US sanctions in return for Assad’s promise to halt arms flows to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Now the UAE is wringing its hands over Assad’s departure, warning—perhaps because of Abu Dhabi’s antipathy toward Turkey—that something akin to Libya or Afghanistan is very much in Syria’s future—as if Libyans and Afghans have suffered anything close to what Syrians have suffered for decades under the Assads.

Undoubtedly, twenty million Syrians now face a future with many challenges and more than a few errors. Yet the “devil they knew” surely was the devil. With the Assad family and entourage gone, Syria, at long last, has a chance to achieve the kind of political transition envisioned by the 2012 Geneva Final Communique and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254. They will now have an opportunity, where none previously existed, to live, work, and thrive in their country of birth instead of seeking refuge and opportunity abroad. After years of persecution by a brutal regime, imperial abuse at the hands of Iran and Russia, and betrayal by regional and international actors, Syrians have taken their liberation into their own hands. They merit the United States’ help and its willingness to listen. But the Syrian revolution, regardless of what happens next, is where it belongs: In the hands of the Syrian people.

Frederic C. Hof is a senior fellow at Bard College’s Center for Civic Engagement. He is the author of Reaching for the Heights: The Inside Story of a Secret Attempt to Reach a Syrian-Israeli Peace.

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A ceasefire happened in Lebanon, but Israel seems to have missed the memo

Nicholas Blanford — Thu, 05 Dec 2024 20:10:32 +0000

A fragile ceasefire took effect on November 27, ending the thirteen-month conflict between Hezbollah and Israel prompted by the October 7, 2023, attack, but the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) seems to have missed the memo. Within hours of the 4 a.m. ceasefire coming into force, Israeli troops inside Lebanon opened fire at vehicles as tens of thousands of Lebanese who had earlier fled the fighting attempted to return to their homes. In the town of Khiam, the scene of fierce fighting in October and November, three journalists were wounded by Israeli gunfire while covering the return of residents. The same day, the IDF slapped a ban on Lebanese returning to dozens of border villages, declaring them a “restricted area,” and imposed a curfew from 5 p.m. to 7 a.m. south of the Litani River, which runs anywhere between three and thirty kilometers north of the border.

The thirteen-point ceasefire plan brokered by the United States and France calls for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to deploy into the southern border district and for the IDF to withdraw from Lebanese territory within sixty days. However, instead of withdrawing, Israeli forces have advanced deeper into Lebanon in a number of locations.

Israel has also staged air strikes well north of the southern Lebanon border area. On November 28, Israeli jets struck what Israel said was a Hezbollah weapons storage facility near Sidon. On December 2, Israel aircraft bombed an LAF positionon Lebanon’s northern border with Syria, wounding an LAF soldier. Other air strikes have targeted villages in south Lebanon, killing and wounding several Lebanese.

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France reportedly accused Israel on December 1 of breaching the ceasefire fifty-two times. Even the United States has reportedly chided Israel and urged it to calm down.

On the afternoon of December 2, Hezbollah lobbed a pair of mortar rounds toward an Israeli army outpost in the Shebaa Farms area on the edge of southeast Lebanon, in what the group said was an “initial warning defensive response” to the repeated Israeli violations. Israel responded by staging a series of air strikes across south Lebanon.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz warned that, if the ceasefire broke down, the Lebanese state would no longer be immune from attack.

“If until now, we have distinguished between the state of Lebanon and Hezbollah . . . this will no longer be [the case if the ceasefire breaks down],” he said during a tour of northern Israel.

A week after the ceasefire began, it is evident that the security paradigm of mutual deterrence between Hezbollah and Israel, which led to a tense calm for seventeen years along the Lebanon-Israel border, is all but over. Where Israel was once hesitant to take action against Hezbollah in case it triggered an escalation of unwanted cross-border violence, the calculus has mostly swung the opposite way. Israel’s post-ceasefire shelling and air strikes indicate that it will police the agreement by fire, irrespective of any response by Hezbollah.

Although Hezbollah has claimed a victory against Israel, its decimated veteran leadership will need to do some serious soul searching going forward and mull the lessons from its serious miscalculation of opening a support front for Hamas in Gaza a year ago. Initially, the support front was a simmering low-intensity tit-for-tat conflict along the Blue Line—the United Nations term for Lebanon’s southern border—that saw Hezbollah targeting Israel border positions daily and Israel retaliating with drone strikes and shellfire.

Hezbollah expected that Israel would not overreact to the daily slew of attacks, even though they had led to the evacuation of more than twenty-eight communities, including the town of Kiryat Shemona in the Galilee panhandle. Hezbollah was so confident that it could control the conflict dynamics that it began linking the fate of the support front along the Blue Line to the war in Gaza. This was arguably the greatest strategic blunder Hezbollah has made in its forty-two-year history. By stating that it would only halt its attacks once the war in Gaza was over, Hezbollah had effectively handed over the decision-making process to Hamas and Israel. If neither Hamas nor Israel could strike a ceasefire deal, Hezbollah would be obliged to keep attacking Israeli troops along the border regardless of the cost.

By early 2024, it was becoming evident that Hezbollah was seeking a face-saving off-ramp to end the support front, which was increasingly imposing a cost on the organization. Tens of thousands of Lebanese civilians had fled the violence in south Lebanon and suffered the destruction of their properties and loss of livelihoods. Worryingly for Hezbollah, it was becoming clear that Israeli intelligence had penetrated deep within the party, allowing it to track and kill senior field commanders across south Lebanon and elsewhere.

One of the first to be killed, Wissam al-Tawil, a senior figure in the elite Radwan Brigade, died when an improvised explosive device detonated next to his car near his home in the southern village of Khirbet Silm on January 8. A friend of Tawil’s told me that the slain commander had not been home for six months, never carried a cell phone, and swapped cars multiple times a day—yet the Israelis were still able to locate and kill him. He was not the only one. Numerous commanders, whose names were not known publicly before they died, were killed in air strikes. One of them, Ali al-Debs, survived two attempted assassinations over a three-week period before being killed on February 15 in an air strike on the house in which he was recovering from wounds. In June and July, Israel assassinated the heads of the Nasr and Aziz units, two of Hezbollah’s top fighting formations deployed in south Lebanon.

Furthermore, as the losses mounted within Hezbollah and the destruction increased, there was a sense of frustration among the cadres and supporters that the organization was fighting with one hand tied behind its back. Although Hezbollah was using some advanced anti-tank missiles, such as the optically guided Almas and long-range Iranian versions of the Russian AT-14 Spriggan, most of the weapons employed were legacy systems. They included unguided rockets such as the 122-milimeter (mm) Grad, the 240mm Falaq-1, and the 333mm Falaq-2, which have limited ranges and impacts. Lying untouched in Hezbollah’s underground arsenals were larger and more accurate systems such as the Fateh-110 family of surface-to-surface missiles, which carry 500-kilogram warheads, can strike within meters of their targets, and have ranges of several hundred kilometers depending on the version. The source of this frustration was Iran, which refused to allow Hezbollah to use its more sophisticated systems in case such action led to further escalation and a possible major war. Iran had no problem with Hezbollah’s support front along the Blue Line, but this was supposed to be a sideshow, not the main event. These advanced weapons systems were a component of Iranian deterrence to stave off the possibility of Israel one day launching a major attack against the Islamic Republic’s nuclear facilities. They were not to be wasted on helping Hamas in Gaza.

Nevertheless, the Hezbollah leadership might have noticed the frustration within the ranks because, around mid-April, the group began to escalate its actions. It fired rockets in larger numbers and deeper into Israel. It expanded its target set to strike a broader number of Israeli army facilities, including military-industrial centers. Significantly, it greatly increased the use of suicide drones, which proved challenging for the Israelis to intercept because of their low altitude, speed, and unpredictable flight patterns.

Tensions steadily mounted during the summer months. On July 30, Israel assassinated Fuad Shukr, Hezbollah’s top military commander, in a drone strike in the southern suburbs of Beirut. His death was a response to the killings of twelveyoungsters when what was almost certainly an errant Hezbollah rocket struck a playing field in the Druze village of Majdal Shams in the Golan Heights. Hezbollah vowed revenge for Shukr’s death, but it took three weeks before the retaliation came in the form of more than three hundred rockets and suicide drones fired into Israel. Israel said that it shot down all the drones and that only minor damage had been inflicted. Even Hezbollah’s support base was less than impressed with the retaliatory attack.

In hindsight, it might have been this moment when Israel decided to call Hezbollah’s bluff. For the preceding ten months, it had been clear that Hezbollah had no taste for engaging in a large-scale war with Israel and sought to restrict its actions to low-level daily attrition along the Blue Line. But in the days after the Hezbollah retaliation for Shukr, Israel stepped up the number of daily air strikes, hitting multiple targets in single sorties. In mid-September, in a stunning intelligence coup, thousands of booby-trapped pagers and walkie-talkies carried by Hezbollah personnel exploded, killing more than thirty and wounding nearly 3,500.

In the following days, Israel assassinated a swath of Hezbollah’s top political and military leadership, including the veteran secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah. On September 23, Israel launched Operation Northern Arrow, a massive series of air strikes against Hezbollah targets across south Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley. Israel claimed that 1,600 targets were struck on the first day. Nearly 558 people were killed in the first twenty-four hours of the raids—the largest loss of life in Lebanon in a single day since the 1975–1990 civil war. On October 1, Israeli troops crossed into Lebanese territory to carry out a series of focused raids to locate and destroy Hezbollah’s military infrastructure adjacent to the Blue Line. Hezbollah fighters confronted Israeli troops on the ground. They began firing some of Hezbollah’s more advanced precision-guided missiles into Israel from October, but these were smaller-caliber systems and fired in too low of numbers to have much effect.

Now that a shaky ceasefire has taken hold, Iran and Hezbollah will need to assess if that shattered deterrence, which had proven effective in the seventeen years between 2006 and October 2023, can be—or even should be—restored. If Hezbollah had been allowed to fight the way its lower-ranking cadres had wanted, with recourse to the heavier systems, the war could have been much more damaging to the Israeli domestic front. But Iran’s reluctance to authorize a full use of force against Israel allowed the Israelis to call Hezbollah’s bluff and deliver a series of powerful blows. Even if Hezbollah embarks on a process of rearmament and recruitment, Israel’s intelligence penetration of the organization and its newfound confidence to act kinetically will make such a process challenging.

Perhaps Iran’s leadership will need to ponder whether the so-called “Axis of Resistance” —the loose coalition of Iran-backed Lebanese, Syrian, Iraqi, Palestinian, and Yemeni groups—has lost its utility as a means of defensive deterrence against Israel. And if Iran concludes that it has, what can replace it?

Nicholas Blanford is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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Trump’s Nobel Peace Prize opportunity in Ukraine

Frederick Kempe — Thu, 05 Dec 2024 12:02:00 +0000

It’s in the nature of President-elect Donald Trump’s hurry-up transition offense that he confronts the most significant decisions of his presidency long before he assumes office on January 20. They swirl around how he counters Russian President Vladimir Putin and supports Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty.

It’s hard to overestimate how great a difference his Ukraine-related decisions in the coming weeks will make to the trajectory of his second term. Beyond that, Trump can either assert or undermine US global leadership for an emerging era of great-power competition that will stretch far beyond his four years in office.

Done in the wrong way, Trump’s decisions will signal to Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran—the evolving “axis of aggressors”—that the United States is divided, distracted, and prepared to cede the global leadership that it has assumed since World War II, whether intentionally or by default.

Done in the right way, Trump’s decisions can confound his critics, who see some of his early nominations for cabinet positions as evidence that he’s more interested in disruption and retribution than in building a legacy equal to that of great US presidents of the past.

What could bring sweeter satisfaction for Trump than, for example, a Nobel Peace Prize? And history’s oddities present him with that opportunity right at the start of his new term in office.

The contours of such a deal are already apparent. Ukraine would give up for now most of the 20 percent of its territory currently occupied by Russia in exchange for iron-clad security guarantees, including a path certain (at best, immediate) to NATO membership and, separately, to European Union membership.

For that kind of deal, Trump will have to abandon his campaign rhetoric about bringing the war to an end in twenty-four hours, as Putin for the moment believes the military and political momentum is with him.

In so many words, that’s the message new NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte delivered to Trump when Rutte visited Mar-a-Lago, Trump’s Florida White House, as the first European leader to meet him following the election.

Credit Rutte, who as Dutch prime minister worked effectively with Trump during his first term, with understanding the president-elect’s proclivity for personal diplomacy, not to mention the value of being among the first in line.

“We have a strong relationship,” Rutte told the Financial Times this week. “We liked each other when I was in my previous role when he was president. And I sense that we can work from the same basis. And it helps that you find it’s genuinely a pleasure to work together.”

Speaking ahead of a NATO foreign ministers’ meeting on Tuesday, Rutte said he told Trump that he needs to consider how the outcome of the Ukraine conflict could be interpreted by the quartet of US adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. “They are all working together,” Rutte told reporters ahead of the meeting. This collaboration is something Trump has not yet publicly acknowledged as a reality or a problem.

Speaking to the Financial Times, Rutte put it in language that both appeals to Trump and captures the historic moment. “We cannot have a solution where we have Kim Jong Un and the Russian leader and Xi Jinping and Iran high-fiving because we came to a deal which is not good for Ukraine, because long-term that will be a dire security threat not only to Europe but also to the US.”

Someone else who understands the value of personal diplomacy with Trump is Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who met with Trump personally in September during the campaign and spoke with the president-elect just after the election. Zelenskyy also knows that 2025 will be a decisive year in the peace effort, and that Trump holds many of the cards necessary for his success, which Trump still might play in all the wrong ways.

Zelenskyy has changed his tune in recent days from demands that Ukraine keep fighting until it regains the territory that Moscow now controls or occupies. “Our army lacks the strength to do that,” he told Kyodo News of Japan. “We do have to find diplomatic solutions.”

Zelenskyy now says he could accept a ceasefire that would leave some Ukrainian territory in Putin’s hands if the rest of Ukraine’s territory gained NATO’s protection. It remains a long way from Trump’s campaign statements on Ukraine and the doubts he has previously expressed about NATO to a willingness to provide Kyiv with Alliance protection, much less membership.

Rutte, though not ready to discuss Ukraine’s NATO membership prospects with media this week, did discuss a path that would begin with greater Western military support now and a less immediate emphasis on the peace process.

“The main issue with Ukraine has to be, ‘How do we get more military aid into Ukraine?’ That’s priority number one, two, and three,” Rutte said. “In the meantime, that bridge to NATO membership is being built,” he added, through bilateral security deals with NATO member countries.

My last column, “Biden’s Ukraine moves are a gift to Trump,” focused on how President Joe Biden has provided the president-elect badly needed negotiating leverage. Biden did this by deciding to allow Ukraine to use longer-range US missile systems to hit targets inside Russia, by providing Kyiv with antipersonnel landmines to slow Moscow’s advance, and by applying new US sanctions on Gazprombank.

What’s entirely unclear thus far, however, is whether Trump, the author of The Art of the Deal, intends to build upon that leverage and use it for historic purposes—for example by arming Ukraine to the teeth if Putin is unwilling to negotiate.

Presidents rarely get to choose the crises that define their presidencies. Stopping Putin’s aggression in Ukraine will be Trump 2.0’s first test and opportunity, one that will have further-reaching consequences than the president-elect has yet recognized.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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With Trump back, King Abdullah is thinking about ‘Jordan First’

Aaron Magid — Tue, 03 Dec 2024 15:33:18 +0000

More than a decade before Donald Trump descended upon the golden escalator to announce his first presidential campaign, King Abdullah launched an initiative called “Jordan First,” or al-Urdun Awalan in Arabic. Billboards nationwide were plastered with the new slogan in an attempt to strengthen Jordanian nationalism. Citizens across the Hashemite Kingdom were outraged over the looming 2003 US invasion of Iraq and the high Palestinian death toll during the Second Intifada. Despite calls to expel US troops from the kingdom and annul the 1994 peace deal with Israel, Abdullah avoided such steps, insisting that Jordan needed to prioritize its national interests above pan-Arab concerns and not jeopardize ties with Washington.

Ahead of President-elect Donald Trump’s second term, the Hashemite king is again looking to adopt a “Jordan First” policy despite domestic outrage over US support for Israel’s war in Gaza. Hours after Trump’s electoral victory, Abdullah offered his “warmest” congratulations to the Republican leader and pledged to strengthen the US-Jordanian alliance. Even before the polls closed on November 5, the Hashemite ruler worked to maintain ties with the Trump family. After the July 13 assassination attempt against Trump, Abdullah condemned the shooting attack in Pennsylvania. Last year, the royal family invited Ivanka Trump and her husband, Jared Kushner, to Crown Prince Hussein’s wedding in Amman.

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Despite these government efforts, many in Amman are worried about Trump’s return to the White House as about half of Jordan’s population is of Palestinian descent. During his last presidential term, Trump relocated the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and cut US aid to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), both moves that the Hashemite Kingdom critiqued. Former Jordanian Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher argued that Trump’s hawkish nominations for US ambassador to Israel and national security advisor signal that Washington might not oppose Israel’s annexation of the West Bank, a long-standing fear of the Hashemite Kingdom. Abdullah has repeatedly rejected the creation of an alternative homeland for Palestinians in Jordan, a greater possibility should the Jewish state annex the West Bank. Muasher voiced alarm about the mass displacement of Palestinians from the West Bank into Jordan during the next administration. However, there is no evidence to show Trump’s support for such a significant change. (It’s worth noting that Trump refused to greenlight Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s 2020 plans to annex the West Bank, thwarting the initiative.)

Jordanian Senator Amer Hadidi also expressed concern that Trump viewed Amman in his first term as a less critical regional voice than those of the Arab Gulf states. While Saudi Arabia offered Trump multibillion-dollar arms agreements, Hadidi noted that, as a poorer country, Jordan could not provide the Republican leader with such economic victories.

Nonetheless, some Jordanians are less pessimistic about the bilateral relationship during the next administration. Jordanian government spokesman Mohammad al-Momani said, “Jordanian-American relations are strategic and institutionalized, regardless of the ruling party in the United States.” During his quarter century in power, Abdullah has worked tirelessly to boost cooperation with both Republican and Democratic members of Congress in frequent briefings with lawmakers. The countries’ security ties have remained strong as Jordan hosts thousands of US troops in the kingdom. In coordination with Washington, Amman also shot down dozens of Iranian drones and missiles fired at Israel in April and again in October despite domestic criticism. Such moves demonstrate that the Hashemite Kingdom is not freeloading off its US ties—a key Trump priority.

Former Jordanian Minister Mohammad Abu-Rumman explained that US aid to Jordan increased to then record levels under Trump, reaching $1.3 billion annually. Amid the Hashemite Kingdom’s ongoing fiscal woes, the Trump administration proved a reliable partner for Amman despite calls by some Americans to reduce foreign-assistance packages. Abdullah was also the first Arab leader to meet Trump as president in 2017, a practice repeated under President Joe Biden. Despite disagreeing at times about the Palestinian question, Abdullah ensured that Jordan’s bilateral relationship with the United States stayed on track during Trump’s first term, and billions of dollars of aid continued to flow.

In recent weeks, Jordan has worked to boost relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to ensure Amman’s interests are not harmed, even if Trump becomes closer to the Gulf states. On November 20, Abdullah visited Abu Dhabi for a meeting with President Mohammed bin Zayed and commended the “strong” ties between Jordan and the United Arab Emirates. A month earlier, Abdullah met Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to coordinate positions on the Gaza and Lebanon wars.

Finally, Abdullah even benefitted at times from Trump’s unorthodox decision-making. In 2017, Foreign Policy reported that Trump “dumped” US Ambassador to Amman Alice Wells after the Jordanian leader developed a grudge against the career foreign service officer. Abdullah had previously asked the Barack Obama administration to switch envoys, but the Democratic president declined to fire Wells, who won more than a dozen State Department awards during her tenure. Under a Trump presidency, the Hashemite Kingdom has little need to worry about US criticism on human rights issues, even as Freedom House recently downgraded Jordan to its lowest ranking of “not free.”

Although Amman will face challenges during Trump’s second term, Abdullah will likely continue prioritizing strong relations with the United States over all other foreign policy concerns. It’s been a remarkably consistent element of Abdullah’s twenty-five-year tenure as monarch and one of the reasons he has stayed in power for so long.

Aaron Magid is the host of the podcast On Jordan. A former Amman-based journalist, his articles on the Hashemite Kingdom have appeared in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, and al-Monitor. Follow him on X: @AaronMagid.

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What Congress has in mind for the future of the Abraham Accords

Adam Kozloski — Wed, 27 Nov 2024 21:39:53 +0000

Theoretically, Congress must pass two things every year. One is the set of appropriations bills—often a single omnibus—to fund the government, and the second is the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Congress has passed this defense bill without fail for sixty-three consecutive years, making its passage a near certainty. As a result, the NDAA has become one of the most potent legislative vehicles for policy related to national security.

In the last few years, this legislation has carried important authorizations and codifications for advancing regional Middle East defense integration and, through such integration, the Abraham Accords. As congressional leaders negotiate a final product between the House and Senate versions of the NDAA, which is due to be completed later this month, several vital provisions might soon be signed into law. Notably, these provisions have not been advanced by a single member or along partisan lines. The bipartisan nature of these efforts is a strong signal that Congress has remained committed to the future of the Abraham Accords despite the setbacks of October 7, 2023.

Key provisions in both versions of the NDAA

This year, congressional champions for the accords worked diligently to include several provisions in the House (H.R. 8070) and Senate (S. 4638) versions of the NDAA. These provisions will likely survive the current informal conference process and make it into the final passed NDAA.

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First, the Learning Integrated National Knowledge (LINK) for the Abraham Accords Act is included as Section 1211 of the Senate bill and Section 1216 of the House bill. This legislation is led in the Senate by Senators Joni Ernst (R-IA) and Jacky Rosen (D-NV) and in the House by Representative Jimmy Panetta (D-CA) and a broad bipartisan coalition of Abraham Accords champions. Unlike predecessor bills like the Deterring Enemy Forces and Enabling National Defenses (DEFEND) and Maritime Architecture and Response to International Terrorism in the Middle East (MARITIME) Acts, which primarily focused on authorizing new types of regional cooperation, the LINK the Abraham Accords Act seeks to enhance existing integration efforts by requiring the secretary of defense to design and implement a military subject-matter exchange program for US partners in the region. If passed, this provision will build on the foundation of existing authorizations to expand regional military-to-military relationships—an often overlooked, but important, asset that should strengthen the ability of US partners to respond to a security crisis. Importantly, it will also solidify the United States’ role as a host and convener of such exchanges, reducing the political costs to the United States’ Arab partners of having Israel at the table.

Second, the Space Technology and Regional Security (STARS) Act is included as Section 1288 of the Senate and Section 1607 of the House bill. This legislation is also led by Senators Rosen and Ernst in the Senate and Representative Panetta and others in the House. The STARS Act would expand defense cooperation by requiring the secretary of defense to develop an integrated regional space and satellite strategy, including a data-sharing agreement. If operationalized, such a strategy could improve the ability of US regional partners to detect threats and develop a common operating picture, building on the integrated air- and missile-defense efforts already authorized under the DEFEND Act in 2022. This effort would improve US partners’ ability to defend their sovereign airspace from Iranian and other attacks by operating under a US umbrella.

Key provisions only in the Senate NDAA

Due to differences in clearance policies between the House and Senate versions of the bill, the Senate version holds more provisions that would advance the Abraham Accords. These provisions would broadly expand congressional engagement and breadth on integration and indicate a positive trend in these efforts.

One provision included in the Senate version is the Artificial Intelligence Allied Cooperation for Crucial Operations, Research, and Deployment (AI ACCORD) Act, or Section 1615 of the Senate bill. This legislation is led by Senators Ernst and Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY) in the Senate. While a House companion led by Representative Jim Banks (R-IN) exists, it is not presently included within the House NDAA. This legislation directs the secretary of defense to develop a strategy to enhance defense information sharing among US regional partners. To execute the strategy, the Department of Defense will need to overcome the technical challenges of securely sharing data in real time between a multitude of different systems—and will also need to build trust between the countries sharing the data. Though the challenges are significant, tools like zero-trust networks and artificial intelligence, coupled with strong leadership by incoming President Donald Trump and Congress, could pave the way for a far more robust integrated defense architecture. The AI Accord Act—like the STARS Act—could be an important step in that direction.

The US-Jordan Defense Cooperation Act, or Section 1536 of the Senate bill, is another provision that enhances regional defense cooperation. This legislation is led by Senators Marco Rubio (R-FL) and Rosen. While there is a House companion, it is not included in the House NDAA. This legislation would, in part, direct the secretary of defense to work with Jordan to enhance its ability to counter air and missile threats from Iran and to participate in a regional integrated air- and missile-defense architecture, supporting the implementation of the DEFEND Act and providing important hardware for the software and information advances of the STARS and AI Accord Act. This legislation could greatly enhance Jordan’s defensive capabilities, thereby strengthening the regional defense architecture.

While some excellent legislative provisions currently appear only in the Senate version of the NDAA, there will still be an opportunity for leadership on the Senate Armed Services Committee to advocate for the inclusion of the AI ACCORD Act and the US-Jordan Defense Cooperation Act in the final version of the compromise text. In either case, this year’s NDAA will likely contain powerful legislative catalysts for deepening regional defense at the integration stage. Despite Iran’s increasingly belligerent role in the region and the uncertainty that Hamas’s October 7 attack on Israel has placed on regional integration, Congress has remained a champion and stabilizing influence for the Abraham Accords and the vision for a peaceful future for the region.

Adam Kozloski is a nonresident senior fellow in the N7 Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. In his former role as Senator Joni Ernst’s foreign policy adviser, he drafted or assisted in developing the DEFEND, MARITIME, LINK the Abraham Accords, AI ACCORD, and STARS Acts.

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War, peace, or a perpetual state of crisis—three possible paths for the Middle East’s future

Kristian Alexander — Wed, 27 Nov 2024 14:40:51 +0000

The Middle East remains a focal point of global security concerns and is marked by intricate alliances, ideological confrontation, and strategic rivalries that have kept the region in a near-constant state of tension. The ongoing debate between escalation and de-escalation reveals the complexity of the region’s geopolitics and the different perspectives on future conflicts.

While some analysts foresee an inevitable escalation that could lead to a larger regional war, others believe that the incentives for de-escalation are strong enough to prevent such a catastrophe. A third perspective, however, suggests that the region might persist in a protracted state of low-intensity conflict without a clear resolution.

The argument for escalation: the only way out is through

Proponents of escalation argue that a large-scale conflict in the Middle East is increasingly likely, given the current trajectory of regional tensions. These analysts point to the ongoing friction between Israel, Iran, and their respective allies, which has manifested in a series of targeted attacks, drone strikes, and missile exchanges across Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq—particularly since the October 7, 2023, Hamas assault on Israel.

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There is a persistent pattern of violence in the Middle East that can rapidly lead to multifront confrontations. This cyclical escalation often follows a pattern of provocation, retaliation, and further military mobilization, with each response heightening the risk of a broader conflict that could spiral out of control. Should these conflicts spread, the repercussions extend beyond immediate borders, potentially disrupting trade routes critical to the global economy, destabilizing financial markets, and creating conditions conducive to terrorism.

The escalation took on a new dimension after October 7, which resulted in significant Israeli casualties and triggered a powerful military reprisal. This escalation reignited concerns of a larger-scale conflict involving neighboring countries or proxy forces as Israel and Hamas engage in a brutal cycle of retaliation. Israel’s traditional approach toward its adversaries has long emphasized preemptive strikes and the targeted elimination of hostile leaders, a strategy designed to neutralize threats before they materialize into direct confrontations. Israel has increasingly resorted to heavy-handed military escalations, particularly in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon. These tactics include airstrikes and artillery barrages aimed at diminishing the capabilities of groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah.

Non-state actors such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, and the Houthis in Yemen add complexity to the already volatile regional environment. These groups, often supported by regional powers, hold significant autonomy and frequently act according to their interests, which might not always align with those of their state sponsors. The Houthis, for example, receive Iranian support but pursue objectives that align with their local grievances and aspirations for control in Yemen. These groups are often unpredictable, taking actions that provoke retaliation and draw in their sponsors, even when state actors prefer to avoid direct confrontation.

Escalation in the Middle East does not follow a step-by-step process but is marked by retaliatory actions. Each retaliation reflects strategic calculations to signal strength while avoiding outright war. The timing of a retaliation is also important. Immediate responses often signal urgency and resolve, while delayed responses indicate patience or a desire for more time to plan.

The cycle of escalation is also impacted by external actors, such as the United States and Russia, who influence the decisions of regional players. The United States has taken significant steps to influence the circumstances in the Middle East by pressuring Qatar to expel Hamas leaders based in Doha. This action follows failed attempts to negotiate a ceasefire and hostage release between Hamas and Israel, an outcome the United States has prioritized under President Joe Biden’s administration. US officials have urged Qatar to use the threat of expulsion as leverage in these negotiations, seeing expulsion as a way to limit Hamas’s operational freedom and international legitimacy.

Critics of the escalation argument note that predictions of full-scale war often represent worst-case scenarios shaped by pundits, journalists, and analysts. Media amplify these doom-and-gloom prognostications, which then fuel public anxiety and create the impression that war is inevitable. This focus on escalation obscures the behind-the-scenes de-escalatory diplomacy that often prevents crises from reaching their most extreme outcomes. The reality of a “full-scale” war in today’s Middle East is rarely presented. Most likely, such a war would not involve country fighting against country but would pit a complex web of state actors, paramilitary groups, ideological militias, and transnational organizations against each other in irregular warfare across multiple borders without a clear beginning or end.

Moving beyond zero-sum politics: de-escalation in motion

Recent diplomatic efforts illustrate the potential for regional stability as a viable alternative to military confrontation. The China-brokered normalization agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March 2023 underscored a shift toward mutual respect and resolving sectarian differences, helping to stabilize the Gulf region. The 2020 Abraham Accords similarly signaled a transformative approach to Middle Eastern diplomacy, promoting peace agreements between Israel and several Arab nations. These initiatives, however, required a high degree of commitment and cooperation from regional and global powers.

The United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) diplomatic engagement with Iran in 2022 and Turkey in July 2023 further exemplified how Gulf states are moving beyond zero-sum politics toward a more pragmatic approach to security and cooperation. Rather than treating Iran and Turkey solely as adversaries, the UAE has pursued dialogue and trade partnerships, seeking to address security concerns through diplomacy. This shift toward engagement over hostility aligns with other regional efforts, including the reintegration of Syria into the Arab League.

Economic pressures also serve as a powerful moderating influence, particularly for nations facing internal financial challenges that limit their capacity to sustain prolonged conflicts. For example, Iran’s economy has been severely weakened by years of sanctions, affecting its ability to fund proxy groups and invest in extended military operations. Full-scale conflict would exacerbate these economic pressures, with potential repercussions for domestic stability, as prolonged military spending could lead to further inflation, shortages, and public discontent.

Advocates of de-escalation emphasize that while tensions are undeniably high, the stakes for full-scale war are too costly. They argue that regional actors have economic, humanitarian, and political reasons to avoid an all-out conflict, as seen in past crises in which brinkmanship led to ceasefires rather than open war. Furthermore, proponents of de-escalation believe that military posturing often serves as a deterrent rather than an immediate prelude to war. For instance, although Iran continues to develop its missile capabilities, these moves could be intended to signal strength rather than to instigate conflict. Actors manage escalation by carefully selecting targets and limiting physical damage. This was seen in Iran’s warnings before a recent retaliatory missile attack, which allowed Israel to prepare its defenses and avoid significant casualties, thereby reducing escalation risks.

De-escalation in the Middle East is not simply the inverse of escalation; it is a complex process shaped by both intended and unintended factors. Efforts to de-escalate are frequently challenged by the involved parties, each of whom have distinct agendas and varying degrees of control over local factions.

Some skeptics point out that de-escalation is sometimes employed as a tactical measure rather than a long-term commitment to peace. Regional powers might reduce hostilities in one area to buy time or respond to diplomatic pressure while planning for future operations elsewhere. The US approach to Middle East diplomacy often involves encouraging de-escalation in specific areas while maintaining broader strategic interests. This dual approach, exemplified by the Biden administration’s push for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations while simultaneously strengthening military ties with Israel, allows for tactical de-escalation while maintaining influence in the region.

Arguments for de-escalation often fail to address the web of interrelated conflicts in the region. A framework that accounts for this complexity is needed to achieve lasting peace. De-escalation efforts tend to involve only a subset of the region’s actors, leaving the broader context of Middle Eastern conflicts unresolved. These initiatives, such as ceasefires and truces, provide short-term relief but can be swiftly undone by new provocations or shifting alliances, which can reignite tensions and return the region to a state of instability.

The same-as-it-ever-was perspective: regional conflict remains but doesn’t boil over

Beyond the binary perspectives of escalation and de-escalation lies a third perspective that argues that the political and ideological disputes that continue to fuel tensions in the Middle East are entrenched. Proponents of this view do not foresee a full-scale war in the region nor lasting peace but, rather, a continuation of proxy battles, sporadic clashes, and diplomatic brinkmanship without a decisive resolution.

This third perspective is supported by ongoing proxy conflicts, such as the intermittent skirmishes between Iranian-backed militias and US-aligned forces in Iraq. While these incidents have yet to lead to direct conflict between Iran and the United States, they reflect a pattern of sustained low-level violence, which keeps the conflict simmering without reaching a boiling point. Another example is the prolonged Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in which neither side has achieved a decisive victory, but escalations and ceasefires have become a recurring cycle.

This perspective also accounts for the possibility of unexpected factors that could either defuse or aggravate tensions, such as shifts in US foreign policy, domestic upheavals within Iran, or sudden changes in leadership. While these factors do not guarantee de-escalation, they create conditions in which traditional models of escalation or de-escalation may no longer apply, reinforcing the notion of a sustained, yet manageable, level of conflict.

Kristian Alexander is a senior fellow and lead researcher at the Rabdan Security and Defense Institute (RSDI) in the United Arab Emirates.

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Experts react: Israel and Lebanon have struck a ceasefire deal. Is the Israel-Hezbollah war really over?

Atlantic Council experts — Wed, 27 Nov 2024 02:25:55 +0000

Piece by piece, they’re working toward peace. On Tuesday, US President Joe Biden announced that Israel and Lebanon have agreed to a ceasefire, which is set to begin before dawn on Wednesday. It comes nearly fourteen months after Hezbollah followed Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attacks on Israel with its own rocket strikes the next day. Since then, Israel has steadily weakened the Iran-backed Lebanese terrorist group, including by killing its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, in September. Below, our experts share their insights on this ceasefire, which already faces questions about its durability, as well as its vulnerability to a maelstrom of other regional conflicts and antagonists, including Iran.

Nicholas Blanford: As a fragile ceasefire begins, Hezbollah has difficult choices to make

Jonathan Panikoff: A win for the Lebanese and Israeli peoples and governments; a loss for Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas

Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley: An enduring ceasefire hinges on how much Trump changes the atmosphere

Danny Citrinowicz: The deal is less important in its details, more in its enforcement

Gissou Nia: A ceasefire in Lebanon is necessary, and so is justice in Gaza

As a fragile ceasefire begins, Hezbollah has difficult choices to make

BEIRUT—A long-awaited ceasefire took effect at 4 a.m. local time Wednesday, bringing to a close—for now—a thirteen-month conflict between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah. However, the ceasefire remains inherently fragile, and there is a large dose of skepticism in Lebanon that it will hold. Even within hours of the ceasefire taking effect, Israeli soldiers were firing warning shots at a vehicle Israel said was carrying “suspects” in a “restricted zone.” There are not supposed to be any “restricted zones” under the agreement. Furthermore, tens of thousands of Lebanese who fled their villages and towns in south Lebanon earlier in the conflict headed back to their homes as soon as the ceasefire came into effect, despite warnings by the Israeli military that they should not yet return. Israeli troops are still deployed in some areas of the southern border district, which makes it almost inevitable that they will come into close proximity to angry Lebanese civilians in the days ahead.

The ceasefire agreement calls for a sixty-day cessation of hostilities during which time Hezbollah is supposed to withdraw its forces to north of the Litani river, which runs anywhere between twenty-seven and three kilometers from the Lebanon-Israel border. In effect, this will mean that Hezbollah will abandon what is left of its military infrastructure and positions, although its personnel who live and work in south Lebanon will remain in their homes. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are planning to deploy an initial five thousand troops to the southern border district as the Israeli military withdraws back into Israel.

Given the scale of damage to border villages and towns as well as the southern suburbs of Beirut, Hezbollah’s priority is likely to focus on the welfare needs of its Shia constituency rather than immediately rebuilding its military capabilities. Lebanese Shias have supported Hezbollah during the conflict, but that support could dwindle if they end up spending months in tents while waiting for their homes to be rebuilt.

Israel says it is retaining the right to undertake unilateral military action if it determines that Hezbollah is breaching the agreement and the LAF and the United Nations peacekeeping force are seen to be doing nothing about it. In the past year, Hezbollah has lost much of its deterrent factor that helped keep a tense calm along the Lebanon-Israel border between the last war in 2006 and the outbreak of hostilities in October 2023. Going forward, Israel probably will not hesitate to attack Hezbollah if it believes the group is working against the ceasefire agreement. The question is whether Hezbollah would retaliate to such actions or absorb any blows inflicted by Israel in order not to revive a war that has proven costly for the organization.

—Nicholas Blanford is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

A win for the Lebanese and Israeli peoples and governments; a loss for Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas

For Israel, in the best of circumstances, the deal provides an opportunity to have the security it has sought for much of the past two decades via United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1701 being meaningfully enforced. Its failure to have been so before directly led to the current situation, with Hezbollah receiving advanced weapons transfers from Iran and using the land south of the Litani river to stage and store the weapons being fired at and threatening Israel today.

But if Tuesday’s agreement is successful, having the Lebanese Armed Forces enforce provisions related to Hezbollah not being allowed in the south—and by implication dominating the security landscape there—would further weaken Hezbollah as Israeli kinetic attacks have done for the last four months. Doing so would strengthen the position of non-Hezbollah-aligned parts of the Lebanese government, all while enabling Israeli families to return to their homes in the north after more than a year of being displaced.

At the same time, the ceasefire would give a significant reprieve to those in Lebanon who have had to endure dozens of strikes with thousands of deaths and upwards of one million people displaced.

Of equal importance, the agreement breaks the kinetic link between Hezbollah and Hamas—as the former had previously committed to keep attacking Israel until there was a ceasefire in the Strip—and undermines Iran. Tehran has seen its deterrence decline following its direct attacks on Israel last month and Israel’s elimination of Iran’s air defense systems and purported attack on the Parchin nuclear facility.

Iran is probably quietly supportive of the deal, concerned that pushing Hezbollah and the Lebanese government to oppose it would risk continuing Israeli strikes that could decimate the group, which has long been the pointy end of Iran’s regional deterrence strategy, even further. But in acquiescing to the deal, Iran risks not being able to rebuild Hezbollah’s capabilities with the same ease it did after the 2006 war, thus undermining its own regional deterrence structure.

—Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council.

An enduring ceasefire hinges on how much Trump changes the atmosphere

A ceasefire has been reached in Lebanon. Finally.

What was supposed to be a short sharp incursion into Lebanon by the Israel Defense Forces to mop up Hezbollah’s capabilities had begun to drag. The killing of top leaders, wounding of thousands of fighters, and overwhelming air power up to the day the ceasefire was agreed could not stop Hezbollah rockets or Israeli soldiers dying. Though Israel fights to protect its land from attack, Lebanese Hezbollah was fighting for its very land.

Even so, the combination of Israel’s success and the increasing cost to Lebanese civilians and economy, Hezbollah’s will to fight, wisely, weakened.

New guarantees should strengthen the effectiveness and longevity of the ceasefire’s foundation, UN Security Council Resolution 1701. Even its imperfect implementation in 2006 brought over sixteen years of relative peace and stability. Both sides are ready for that.

The deal’s success may rest on two important changes in perspective: First, Iran may sense an opportunity to lessen its isolation with President-elect Donald Trump, the self-described “peace” president, and be motivated to help ensure Hezbollah abides by the truce for the time being. Second, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may sense he is on a shorter leash. After all, Trump takes no prisoners. He saw Netanyahu’s willingness to repeatedly, blatantly embarrass US leadership in spite of Biden’s commitment to Israel. It can be argued that Biden’s “no daylight” policy saved Netanyahu’s political longevity, even as it undermined his own. Trump’s record makes clear he’s unlikely to make a similar error. His stature and reputation for strength is his priority, and the prime minister would be wise to stay in his good graces. Support for Israel does not require support for Netanyahu.

There is now space for another look at Gaza. While mostly silent on the conflict, Trump has given no indication that he believes the continuing carnage is the best Israel can do. Like Richard Nixon opening China, there is reason to hope he will try another way.

—Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Abercrombie-Winstanley served as the US ambassador to the Republic of Malta and as special assistant for the Middle East and Africa to the secretary of state. Her Middle East assignments included election monitoring in the Gaza Strip and an assignment where she supported gender equality in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as the first woman to lead a diplomatic mission there.

The deal is less important in its details, more in its enforcement

After more than a year, Israel and Lebanon have reached a ceasefire agreement that effectively ends the war that Hezbollah began on October 8, 2023, in its attempt to force Israel to stop its campaign in Gaza.

Israel has made significant achievements in this war. Chief among them is the elimination of the organization’s leadership and the severing of the Gordian connection between Lebanon and Gaza in a way that dramatically weakens the ethos of the Iran-backed Axis of Resistance. But the truth must be told: Hezbollah has indeed been beaten, but it has not been dismantled, and it is still the strongest organization in Lebanon militarily and politically.

Both Israel and Hezbollah wanted the agreement in light of the understanding that the failure to reach it during the Biden administration may dramatically prolong the war, which is not in the interest of any of the parties.

But the future of the agreement will not be determined by its clauses or the side letter that the US administration will give to Israel. Instead, it will be decided by Israel’s willingness to go all the way in an attempt to prevent Iran from rebuilding Hezbollah’s capabilities. Rebuilding Hezbollah is a necessity for Tehran in light of the dramatic damage to Iran’s deterrence caused by Hezbollah’s weakness.

For Lebanon, the hope is that the weakness of Hezbollah and especially the death of Nasrallah will lead to a strengthening of the moderate forces in Lebanese politics. The first test of this prospect will be the appointment of a new president for the country. The military and political weakening of Hezbollah opens the door to significant changes in the Middle East, such as the potential weakening of the Syrian component of the Axis of Resistance and strengthening of the Lebanese Armed Forces into a dominant force.

And yet, the determining factor will be whether Israel is willing now—unlike its more relaxed approach after the 2006 war in Lebanon—not to allow Hezbollah to rebuild its forces. That is the biggest question mark regarding this agreement.

—Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and a member of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project working group. He previously served for twenty-five years in a variety of command positions units in Israel Defense Intelligence.

A ceasefire in Lebanon is necessary, and so is justice in Gaza

News of a ceasefire brokered between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon is certainly welcome news. However, an unfortunate feature may be France’s apparent bartering of justice in the process. Early reports indicated that Netanyahu was blocking French involvement in a potential ceasefire in Lebanon unless France promised to decline to act on International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrants against Israeli officials. This appeared to be confirmed when the French Foreign Ministry released a statement, curiously timed just hours after the announced ceasefire, that said France would consider what “immunities” apply to Netanyahu and Israeli ministers in evaluating France’s compliance with ICC arrest warrants. The quid pro quo was reportedly confirmed by an Israeli official.

France’s position is a stark about-face from its statements just days prior, affirming that it would comply with its obligations as an ICC member state. And those obligations are crystal clear: All ICC member states are required to cooperate fully with the Court, including in the arrest and surrender of individuals sought by the court where those individuals are on their territory. Article 27 of the Rome Statute addresses the “irrelevance of official capacity” and provides that head-of-state immunity does not apply at the ICC. A recent decision from an ICC Pre-Trial Chamber following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to ICC member state Mongolia and Mongolia’s failure to surrender him, puts a finer point on the matter. It expressly holds that Article 98 of the Rome Statute—which France invoked in its statement following the ceasefire—does not provide immunities for heads of state from non-ICC member states.

France’s position is made all the more incoherent given that its own national courts have held that Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad does not enjoy head-of-state immunity in France. To then balk at long-established principles of immunity before international courts when it comes to Netanyahu is a cynical example of political horse trading.

To be sure, history has seen moments of tension between the aims of international justice and peace processes, most notably in negotiations for amnesty of some officials. But to use justice for victims in Gaza as a bargaining chip for a stand-down of weapons in Lebanon, and to the detriment of France’s long-standing commitment to the international-justice project, is nothing to celebrate.

—Gissou Nia is a human rights lawyer and the director of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project.

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Panikoff, Fontenrose, Brahimi, and Dagres mentioned in Kurdistan 24 on high-level officials attending MEPS Forum 2024

Atlantic Council — Fri, 22 Nov 2024 19:56:55 +0000

Original Source

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Panikoff quoted in Kurdistan 24 on the role of military victory and diplomatic leverage in achieving peace

Atlantic Council — Fri, 22 Nov 2024 19:54:16 +0000

original source

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Panikoff mentioned in Kurdistan 24 on MEPS 2024 Forum kickoff in Duhok

Atlantic Council — Fri, 22 Nov 2024 19:50:00 +0000

original source

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Ukraine wary of Western disunity ahead of possible Russia peace talks

Katherine Spencer — Thu, 21 Nov 2024 21:19:15 +0000

In the wake of Donald Trump’s US presidential election victory, the discussion in Washington, European capitals, and Kyiv has sharply turned toward the possibility of a negotiated solution to end the war between Russia and Ukraine. At the same time, serious concerns remain over Trump’s long history of mixed messaging on Ukraine, leading to widespread fears that he could seek to broker a Kremlin-friendly peace deal.

Ukrainian officials understand that the current uncertainty about future international support could be seen by Moscow as a sign of weakening Western resolve. With this in mind, they are understandably eager to avoid any indications of growing divisions among Ukraine’s partners. There was therefore considerable disquiet in Kyiv last week over German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s controversial decision to hold a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin for the first time in around two years.

The call itself produced few real surprises. Putin took the opportunity to repeat the unchanged goals of his invasion and stress that the terms of any potential settlement must reflect the “new territorial realities” in Ukraine. From a Ukrainian perspective, however, the real story was the fact that the conversation between Scholz and Putin took place at all.

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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy led the chorus of criticism, accusing Scholz of opening a “Pandora’s box” and warning that the German leader’s actions risked undermining international efforts to isolate the Russian dictator. The call was “exactly what Putin had wanted for a long time,” stated Zelenskyy.

Other Western leaders echoed Zelenskyy’s concerns. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk noted that Putin launched a massive bombardment of cities across Ukraine soon after Scholz’s call. “No one will stop Putin with phone calls,” he commented. “The attack last night, one of the biggest in this war, has proved that telephone diplomacy cannot replace real support from the whole West for Ukraine.”

A host of European foreign ministers voiced similar skepticism. Dutch Foreign Minister Caspar Veldkamp questioned the value of the German initiative, noting that Putin “only listens to facts on the ground.” Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis branded the call “a really strange strategy.” Meanwhile, the EU’s top diplomat Josep Borrell confirmed that he had no plans to call Putin and said there was very little sign that the Russian leader was willing to negotiate.

Moscow’s openly enthusiastic response to Scholz’s call has done little to ease Western concerns. Kremlin officials confirmed that the telephone conversation had been initiated by the German side, and said the fact that the two leaders had spoken directly was “extremely positive.”

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The Kremlin’s obvious satisfaction over Scholz’s phone call came as no surprise. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine first began almost three years ago, Russian officials have worked hard to demonstrate that attempts to isolate Putin on the international stage are futile.

Putin rarely has any contact with Western leaders anymore, but he has compensated by strengthening ties with the Global South while promoting his vision of a “multipolar world order.” Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has spent a remarkable amount of time trying to win hearts and minds in Africa, while the leaders of China and India have both paid highly publicized visits to Moscow. This year’s BRICS summit, which Russia hosted in October, focused heavily on portraying Putin as anything but isolated.

With snap German elections looming, Scholz is likely to have had domestic politics very much in mind when he decided to call Putin. Nevertheless, critics say the timing of his telephone diplomacy initiative could hardly have been worse.

The German leader’s call to the Kremlin came as Russian troops continue to advance in eastern Ukraine, and amid mounting uncertainty across Europe over the potential policy implications of Trump’s return to the White House. In such circumstances, the West should be signaling its unwavering collective commitment to Ukraine. Instead, Putin’s conversation with Scholz will have strengthened the Russian ruler’s belief that he can ultimately outlast the West in Ukraine.

As the war enters what is likely to be a critical period, Ukrainians will be hoping that the backlash over Scholz’s call will discourage other Western leaders from following suit. In order to have any chance of achieving a viable peace settlement in the coming months, Ukraine must negotiate from a position of strength. That will only be possible if the country’s Western allies are able to convince the Kremlin that they remain as determined as ever to stand with Ukraine. If displays of disunity continue, Putin will have little incentive to compromise and every reason to fight on.

Katherine Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Russian and American obstruction of Turkish military operations

Since 2015, Turkey’s focus in Syria has been securing its borders from PKK-affiliated People’s Defense Units (YPG) forces within the US-allied SDF. Turkey’s 2016-2019 military operations aimed to establish a safe zone free of YPG influence.

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In 2019, when then-President Donald Trump announced a partial withdrawal from Syria, the SDF signed an agreement with Damascus, facilitated by Russia. Under this deal, Moscow and Damascus committed to deploying troops to protect the SDF from attacks by the Turkish Armed Forces and the Syrian National Army. Since then, Turkey has attempted several cross-border operations against the YPG-dominated SDF. However, Russia has effectively blocked these attempts by applying diplomatic and military pressure to deter Ankara.

In recent weeks, in response to rumors of a Turkish military operation, Russia bolstered its troops east of the eastern Euphrates River. The Russian-backed 25th Division, also known as the Tiger Forces, sent troops to YPG-controlled regions, along with Iranian-backed Shia militias. Additionally, Russian airplanes and helicopters have been patrolling regions with a Turkish military presence, demonstrating Russia’s air superiority in Syria. Similarly, Russia has reacted to rumors of military operations by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a designated terror organization.

Turkey’s situation is further complicated by the stance of the United States, which has consistently opposed Turkish military actions in Syria aimed at the SDF. The United States supports the SDF as a partner in counterterrorism efforts against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), putting Turkey at odds with American interests in the region. To deter Turkish operations, the United States has threatened economic sanctions against Turkey. Turkey’s strained economy heightens its aversion to US sanctions, adding pressure to avoid conflicts over the SDF.

Failed dialogue attempt with Bashar al-Assad

Turkey has been at a standstill, which, combined with domestic political considerations, led to a reevaluation of its strategy. In 2023, following negotiations between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin, Turkey and Syria’s defense and foreign ministers met with their Iranian and Russian counterparts. However, this meeting did not yield any significant progress.

After a year of silence, Erdogan reasserted his willingness to dialogue with Bashar al-Assad. This year, he publicly requested that Putin facilitate a meeting with the Syrian president, indicating Turkey’s acknowledgment that cooperation with Damascus might be necessary to achieve its goals in Syria. Despite several overtures from Erdogan, a meeting between Ankara and Damascus did not occur.

Turkey’s willingness to engage in dialogue with Assad signifies a significant shift from its previous approach. In theory, this cooperation could enable Ankara and Damascus to implement coordinated security measures against the YPG-dominated SDF, addressing one of Turkey’s primary security concerns. However, this path is fraught with challenges, as Assad’s policy objectives and priorities do not align with those of Turkey.

Turkey also fears a US-backed Kurdish state on its border, what Turkish officials refer to as “Terroristan.” Unlike the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, a PKK-led entity in Syria poses a direct threat to Turkey as it would have direct spillover effects on Turkey and could empower separatism and violence within the country.

Ankara’s concerns are heightened by the potential for a larger regional conflict involving Israel and Iran. As tensions rise, Turkey is acutely aware that an all-out war could spread into Syria, destabilizing the northern region and creating new security challenges at its borders. Ankara fears that Israel may collaborate with the YPG to counterbalance Iran in Syria, potentially providing political or covert support that would undermine Turkey’s position in the region.

A significant concern for Turkey is the potential for an Israeli ground invasion of Lebanon, which could lead to a humanitarian crisis and mass displacement. If hostilities escalate to this level, Syria is likely to see a surge of refugees fleeing the violence, many of whom would head toward the Turkish border. Turkey already hosts millions of Syrians.

A new strategy to address the Kurdish issue?

In a surprising development, on October 22, Devlet Bahceli, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and a key ally of President Erdogan, recently suggested that Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned leader of the PKK, could potentially address the Turkish parliament if he agreed to call for an end to the PKK’s armed struggle. This proposal represents an unconventional and possibly unprecedented approach to Turkey’s Kurdish issue, which Ankara might use as leverage in its efforts to resolve the ongoing situation in Syria.

Following Bahceli’s suggestion, Ocalan’s family visited him in prison the day after Bahceli’s call. During this visit, Ocalan conveyed that he has the “theoretical and practical power” to transition the Kurdish issue from an armed struggle to a political and judicial approach. Meanwhile, a PKK attack against a Turkish defense company triggered Turkish retaliations on PKK and YPG sites in Syria and Iraq.

Bahceli’s comments were met with silence from Erdogan for a week. This is noteworthy, especially since Turkish journalists accompanying him on his BRICS summit visit to Russia asked various questions but avoided the most important topic. Some figures within the Justice and Development Party claimed that Erdogan was unaware of the comments made by Bahceli. Eventually, on October 30, Erdogan thanked Bahceli, asked people to react to his suggestion “without prejudice,” and reaffirmed that there is no outreach for “terrorists in Iraq and northern Syria,” which was a reference to the PKK and its Syrian branch.

Nevertheless, this new initiative may lead nowhere, as exemplified after the BRICS summit when Erdogan renewed his call for cooperation with Damascus and requested that Putin mediate.

Even if the new process proceeds, it remains uncertain how any new process involving the PKK and its Syrian branch would be implemented. It’s unclear if such a process would be sustainable and how much influence Ocalan would have over them. The last attempt at a peace process between Turkey and the PKK ended disastrously and resulted in hundreds of deaths, along with an increase in violence and terror. The current geopolitical landscape is not supportive of a new process. Additionally, various potential obstacles could derail the process, even if there is a genuine willingness to achieve peace.

However, the United States has a strategic opening with Turkey as both nations search for a way out of Syria. With aligned interests, their cooperation could ease regional tensions. Considering the unknowns, uncertainties, and significant risks, the United States should ensure it is not seen as part of the process and should remain impartial. Even the sincerest US involvement could harm bilateral relations. The Turkish-American dialogue should be done in parallel without any links to what Turkey does with the PKK and Ocalan.

Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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Donald Trump’s election victory fuels hopes and fears in Ukraine

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 07 Nov 2024 22:33:29 +0000

Donald Trump’s election victory has sparked considerable disquiet in Ukraine, with many Ukrainians fearful that he may reduce or end US backing for the country once he takes office early next year. Trump provided Ukraine with significant military support during his first presidential term, but has also made a number of unfavorable statements that have led to questions over his commitment to the country’s struggle against Russian aggression.

At the same time, there are also hopes that Trump may prove more decisive than his predecessor in his approach to the war with Russia. This reflects growing frustration in Ukraine at what many see as the overly cautious policies adopted by President Biden, which have resulted in delayed weapons deliveries and restrictions on Ukraine’s ability to defend itself. With their country trapped in a bloody war of attrition against its far larger neighbor, many Ukrainians are desperate for a change in tactics and believe Trump may be able to provide it.

Ukrainian officials have been quick to congratulate Trump and demonstrate their readiness to work with him. “I appreciate President Trump’s commitment to the ‘peace through strength’ approach to global affairs,” commented Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in a congratulatory social media media post. “This is exactly the principle that can bring a just peace in Ukraine closer. I am hopeful that we will put it into action together.”

As the world continues to digest the implications of Donald Trump’s return to the White House, the Atlantic Council invited a selection of Ukrainian politicians, academics, and civil society representatives to share their thoughts on what a second Trump presidency may mean for their country.

Kira Rudik, Ukrainian MP, Golos Party leader: It is important to remember that Donald Trump is not president yet. There are still more than two months for President Biden to secure his place in history by taking decisive steps to support Ukraine. This could include lifting restrictions on missile strikes inside Russia, or inviting Ukraine to join NATO. Biden can still cement his political legacy as the leader of the democratic world by helping Ukraine in its fight for a free and democratic future.

By the time Trump returns to the White House in January 2025, Ukraine must prepare a truly pragmatic and efficient victory plan. We also need to work with supporters within the Republican Party and Trump’s team, especially those who have been urging Biden to switch from his policy of indefinite support toward a clearer strategy to win the war. It is true that many Ukrainians remain concerned over Trump’s earlier statements about ending the war in a single day, but we also hope that beyond the campaign trail, there is a clear understanding that wars cannot be stopped overnight without allowing dictators to have their way.

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Oleksiy Goncharenko, Ukrainian MP, European Solidarity Party: Despite what many people think, Trump’s election was not a particularly happy day for Putin. Trump said during the election campaign that he wants to pump oil, and again emphasized this following his win. Oil is Putin’s weak spot. As soon as prices begin to fall, the Russian economy follows. The Kremlin also benefits from instability in the United States and was hoping for some kind of civil unrest to emerge from the election. It is now apparent that this is not going to happen.

How should Ukraine react to Trump’s victory? We need to stop making emotional appeals and focus more on demonstrating what we have to offer the United States in practical terms as a partner. This includes one of the most experience armies in the world. Our soldiers have an unrivaled understanding of modern warfare and can share this with our American allies. We can play a vital role in global food security. We have vast natural resources that can be developed together with our partners. Ukraine has to work around the clock to promote these messages.

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Olena Tregub, Executive Director, Ukraine’s Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (NAKO): While there were signs of panic in many European capitals following news of Trump’s election victory, in Kyiv the dominant emotion was hope. Many Ukrainians have been encouraged by talk within the Trump camp of “peace through strength,” which they see as an indication that Ukraine may receive the kind of support and security guarantees that can prevent Russia from continuing to destroy their country. Nobody knows how peace through strength would work in practice, of course, but significant numbers of Ukrainians hope Donald Trump will now seek to showcase the United States as a global power and reestablish the rules broken by Russia and other rogue actors.

Frustration in Ukraine with the current United States administration stems from its tendency toward self-deterrence and its consistent deference to red lines set by Russia. Ukrainians believe these policies should be reversed, with the US leading instead of Russia. Many think that Trump’s personality may lead to a more resolute approach, which is fueling a degree of guarded optimism over his election. Of course, there are also widespread fears that Ukraine could be thrown under the bus by the Trump administration. However, Ukrainians are more accustomed to uncertainty than most and are desperate to see a change in US policy toward their country.

Volodymyr Dubovyk, Associate Professor, Odesa Mechnikov National University: I believe Trump’s return to the White House is probably bad news for Ukraine. I do not subscribe to the view that a change from the current administration is for the best, even though I recognize the many flaws in its policy toward Ukraine. I think it is extremely naive to hope that Trump’s unpredictability, impulsiveness, and ego will push him to stand up to Putin. Based on past experience, he is more likely to do the opposite.

Trump will try to end the war, but that is far easier said than done. He will find that it is impossible to alter Russia’s objectives in Ukraine, and will decide that it is much simpler to pressure Ukraine into concessions. Crucially, Trump does not appear convinced that supporting Ukraine is in US interests. He will be happy to focus his attention elsewhere, while delegating the Ukraine issue to Europe. The future of US aid to Ukraine is clearly now in question, both in terms of military supplies and humanitarian assistance.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The most detailed and revealing segment of the draft peace treaty dealt with Ukraine’s demilitarization. Russia called for the Ukrainian army to be drastically reduced to a skeleton force of just fifty thousand personnel. This was approximately one-fifth of the prewar total and a tiny fraction of Ukraine’s current military, which is believed to number around one million soldiers. Meanwhile, tight restrictions were to be imposed on the quantity of armor Ukraine could possess, the types of missiles the country could develop, and the size of the Ukrainian Air Force.

The Kremlin’s peace plan also obliged Ukraine to renounce its NATO membership ambitions and agree not to enter into bilateral alliances or seek military aid from Western countries. In later drafts dating from the final stages of the abortive peace process in April 2022, Russia also somewhat absurdly insisted on a veto over any international response to future attacks on Ukraine. If Ukraine’s leaders had accepted Moscow’s thinly veiled ultimatum, the country would have been disarmed and defenseless.

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While Russia’s demands were obviously unacceptable, this has not stopped Putin from repeatedly pointing to the failed negotiations of spring 2022 as proof that he seeks a peaceful settlement to the war. Furthermore, he has suggested on numerous occasions that the terms outlined in Belarus and Istanbul during the initial phase of Russia’s invasion should remain the basis for any negotiated peace agreement.

Far from representing a viable vision for a sustainable peace, Putin’s 2022 proposal actually underlines his commitment to extinguishing Ukrainian statehood and erasing Ukraine from the map entirely. Cut off from Western military aid and without an army of its own, an emasculated and demoralized rump Ukraine would be in no position to offer any serious resistance if Russia chose to renew the invasion.

There can be little doubt that this was Putin’s plan. Whether his end goal was the complete conquest of the country or the installation of a puppet government, it is virtually impossible to imagine an independent Ukrainian state surviving very long in such desperate circumstances. Instead, much of Ukraine would likely be annexed outright, with the remaining territory entrusted to Kremlin loyalists.

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The peace terms proposed by Russia in 2022 and subsequently reiterated by Putin himself make a mockery of suggestions that Ukraine could end the invasion by entering into some kind of land-for-peace compromise with the Kremlin. Putin’s war aims clearly extend far beyond the approximately twenty percent of Ukraine that is now under Russian occupation, and involve the takeover of the entire country along with the systematic suppression of Ukrainian identity.

This raises difficult questions for the growing chorus of voices calling for a negotiated settlement based on the current front lines of the war. Crucially, anyone who believes Putin would be satisfied with his present gains must explain why he remains so insistent on Ukraine’s disarmament. After all, this cannot possibly be justified on the grounds of Russian national security. Indeed, no serious analyst would argue that Ukraine poses a credible military threat to the far larger and infinitely mightier Russian Federation.

The only plausible reason to disarm Ukraine is to render the whole country defenseless and leave it at Putin’s mercy. This should tell you all you need to know about his true intentions and the scale of his imperial ambitions. From the very beginning, Putin has viewed the full-scale invasion of Ukraine as an historic mission that will define his personal place in Russian history and Russia’s place in the modern world. Attempting to appease him with limited territorial concessions would be both dishonorable and delusional, and would set the stage for further Russian aggression in Ukraine and beyond.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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Hours after Sisi declared his ceasefire plan, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed the Egyptian proposal as “non-existent.” During a meeting with members of his Likud Party on October 28, Netanyahu speculated that Hamas may accept the proposed truce deal because it would buy time for the militant group to get out of the tunnels and offer Hamas some respite. He added that if the Egyptian plan to free the four Israeli hostages were real, he would have accepted it right away.

Samir Farag, a senior strategist who sits on Egypt’s Security and Advisory Board, told me that Netanyahu rejected the Egyptian proposal because it advocates for a short-lived truce that would see only four of the remaining hostages released.

“The Israeli prime minister believes he has achieved major gains by annihilating senior Hamas and Hezbollah leaders in recent days; the only truce deal he would accept at this point is one that would see all of the remaining hostages released,” Farag explained. “Pressure has been piling on Netanyahu internally; the patience of the Israeli public and, in particular, the families of the hostages held by Hamas, is wearing thin at this stage.”

However, Netanyahu’s rejection of the Egyptian deal also comes at a time when relations between Egypt and Israel are on the rocks. Tensions between Cairo and Jerusalem spiked in 2023 after Israel seized control of the strategic Philadelphi Corridor running along the border with Gaza on the Egyptian side. The fourteen kilometer-long corridor was initially created as a buffer zone between Gaza and Egypt to prevent the smuggling of goods and weapons into Gaza. The corridor was under Israeli control under the 1979 peace treaty signed by Egypt and Israel. In 2005, when Israel unilaterally disengaged from Gaza, a deal was struck between the two countries, allowing Egypt to secure the thin strip of land on its side of the border. Under the 2005 agreement known as the Philadelphi Accord, Egypt was authorized to deploy a small contingent of 750 border guards along its side of the buffer zone.

The Israeli takeover of the Philadelphi Corridor in May enraged the Egyptian leadership, which had earlier warned that the corridor was “a red line” Cairo fears that Israeli assaults on Rafah in the south of the Gaza Strip may force Palestinian refugees to cross into the Sinai Peninsula to escape the violence. Salah Gomaa, deputy editor-in-chief of the state-owned Al-Sharq al-Awsat radio station told me he suspects the real motive behind Israel’s reoccupation of the Philadelphi Corridor is to allow a mass influx of Palestinian refugees into Egypt despite repeated warnings from Sisi that he categorically rejects the forced displacement of Palestinians to Egypt.

Sisi’s latest ceasefire plan isn’t Cairo’s first attempt to end the war, which has claimed more than 43,000 lives in the Gaza Strip, according to the latest toll released by the Palestinian Health Ministry. In December 2023, Hamas rejected an Egyptian proposal that would have seen the Islamist group cede power in the Gaza Strip in return for a permanent ceasefire. On May 6, another Egyptian ceasefire plan suggesting a phased truce that would gradually culminate into a permanent ceasefire and which had been endorsed by the Israeli side, again fell through. This happened after Qatari and American mediators discovered that Egyptian security officials had purportedly changed the terms of the deal agreed to by Israel before submitting the proposal to Hamas.

Despite the revelation causing embarrassment for the Egyptian leadership, Cairo appears adamant about continuing its mediation efforts to end the violence. For one, Egypt would like to regain its traditional role as a key mediator between Israel and Hamas. Secondly, Israel has widened the focus of its war to include Lebanon and Iran as new fronts—an escalation that threatens the stability and security of the entire region. More importantly, the war has also taken a heavy toll on Egypt’s already troubled economy.

Suez Canal revenues have dropped by 70 percent as a result of recurring Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea. A further escalation of the conflict may further impact tourism, another major source of income for the country. Additionally, there’s the looming risk of a massive influx of Palestinian refugees—a scenario that would pile additional pressure on the country’s already overstretched resources, causing water and electricity shortages, overcrowding in services such as health and education, and a further surge in inflation. Such a situation could very well trigger a new wave of unrest.

It could also be that the Egyptian leadership sees a window of opportunity right now to end the war, given the fact that Israel has accomplished its goals of wiping out the senior leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah in recent weeks. Moreover, internal pressure is rising in Israel to end the war; more than 3,000 Israelis have in recent days signed an open letter calling for international help to pressure Israel to end the war. Signatories blame the “lack of sanctions from other countries” and “the persecution of Palestinian citizens of Israel without real cost” for the continuation of the war. In early September, hundreds of thousands of Israelis staged rallies in Tel Aviv and other Israeli cities to protest the Netanyahu government’s handling of the war. This came after the bodies of six hostages were reportedly found in underground tunnels in Rafah, south of the Gaza Strip. An autopsy revealed that the hostages whom Hamas seized during the October 7, 2023 attacks, had been shot multiple times at close range by their captors a couple of days earlier

Hind al-Dawi, a journalist with the semi-official Al Ahram and researcher on regional and international affairs links the Egyptian proposal to the upcoming US elections.

“Israel has suffered heavy losses in south Lebanon in recent days and its recent assault on military sites in Iran has raised fears of a full-scale conflict in the region,” she said in an October 28 interview on the Al-Mayadeen satellite channel. She added that with the US elections set to be held on November 5, Democrats fear that a wider conflict in the Middle East could sway voters in favor of Donald Trump, the Republican presidential candidate.

“Cairo put forward the ceasefire proposal now because the Egyptian leadership believes the proposed deal will likely win the backing of the current US administration,” she noted.

However, with the US election results expected to be announced a few days after polling starts on November 5, time has already run out. The proposed Egyptian plan is too little, too late. Hopes of averting a full-fledged regional conflict are quickly dissipating. The next US administration must either use its leverage to enforce a ceasefire or work alongside Qatari and Egyptian mediators to craft a new deal that is acceptable to both Israel and Hamas.

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an independent journalist based in Cairo. A former contributor to CNN’s Inside Africa, Amin has been covering the development in post-revolution Egypt for several outlets, including Index on Censorship and Al-Monitor. Follow her on X: @sherryamin13.

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Western leaders offer underwhelming response to Zelenskyy’s victory plan

Aleksander Cwalina — Tue, 22 Oct 2024 21:34:30 +0000

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy finally presented his widely touted victory plan last week, but there is little indication that his ambitious proposal has captured the imagination of Ukraine’s Western partners. Instead, the somewhat muted reaction has underlined the current limitations of Western support for the Ukrainian war effort.

Western leaders had the perfect opportunity to back Zelenskyy’s victory plan on October 18 when they gathered in Berlin. However, the meeting between US President Joe Biden, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, French President Emmanuel Macron, and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer failed to produce any specific commitment to Ukraine’s recently unveiled blueprint for a sustainable peace.

This underwhelming response was particularly telling as Zelenskyy’s victory plan is essentially a concrete list of steps that Kyiv would like to see from the country’s allies to ensure a fair peace for Ukraine. The strategy Zelenskyy outlined last week also marked a pragmatic shift, with the emphasis on forcing Russia to the negotiating table while adopting measures that will ensure Moscow is unable to renew the war in the coming years and threaten Ukraine once again.

Kyiv’s victory plan priorities include more weapons, the lifting of restrictions on long-range strikes inside Russia, and a formal invitation to join NATO. According to Zelenskyy, Ukraine could potentially end the Russian invasion within a year if the country’s allies get behind his vision for victory.

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While Western leaders consistently voice their support for Zelenskyy’s goals, some remain preoccupied by fears of escalation and appear deeply reluctant to do anything that might risk provoking Putin. While Biden spoke of “total unanimity” in Berlin over continued support for Ukraine, the lack of public backing for Zelenskyy’s victory plan suggested that differences on key issues have yet to be resolved.

Crucially, there was no progress on Ukraine’s request to allow air strikes against Russian targets using Western weapons. The United States, France, and the United Kingdom have all provided Ukraine with long-range missiles, but Kyiv has yet to receive the green light for long-range attacks inside Russia. The extended debate over the possible lifting of restrictions has already allowed the Russian military to move many of its most valuable assets out of range.

Ukraine has sought to persuade its partners by providing detailed lists of potential targets inside Russia while explaining why strikes could have a significant impact on the future course of the war. However, this has so far proved insufficient to overcome escalation concerns in Western capitals.

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The Ukrainian authorities are not relying entirely on Zelenskyy’s victory plan to reinvigorate their country’s war effort. With little sign that Ukraine’s partners are ready to remove restrictions on long-range strikes, Kyiv is concentrating its limited resources on the development of domestic strike capabilities that will allow Ukraine to hit targets deep inside Russia without requiring Western approval.

Long-range Ukrainian drones have been attacking Russian military bases, armament production facilities, airfields, and energy industry infrastructure with increasing frequency throughout 2024. Recent successes have included a spectacular attack on a large Russian munitions storage site in the Tver region that sparked a blast large enough to register at earthquake monitoring stations.

While Ukraine’s Western partners hesitate, Russia’s authoritarian allies are escalating their involvement in the war. North Korea in particular has emerged as a key supplier of the Russian war machine, with Pyongyang reportedly providing Moscow with ballistic missiles as well as around half of all the artillery shells being used by the Russian military in Ukraine. In recent weeks, Ukraine has also accused North Korea of preparing to provide Russia with up to ten thousand soldiers.

The apparent lack of consensus over key points in Zelenskyy’s victory plan underlines the absence of a united vision among Ukraine’s partners over how best to end the war. While Western leaders remain determined to prevent Russia’s invasion from succeeding, they have yet to demonstrate a convincing commitment to Ukrainian victory and are still obviously constrained by escalation fears. This is exactly what Vladimir Putin is counting on as he looks to prolong the war and outlast the West in Ukraine.

Aleksander Cwalina is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—2022 Nobel Peace Prize winner Oleksandra Matviichuk discusses ongoing threats to democracy and the worldwide gathering of authoritarian forces—and how those topics converge in Ukraine.

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“People in Ukraine want peace, but peace doesn’t come when a country which was invaded [stops] fighting,” said human rights activist Oleksandra Matviichuk. “That’s not peace. That’s occupation.”

At an Atlantic Council Front Page event on Tuesday, Matviichuk—winner of the 2022 Nobel Peace Prize and head of the Center for Civil Liberties in Ukraine—detailed what countries endure under Russian occupation, based on what Ukraine has faced: “torture, rape and forced disappearances, denial of your identity, forcible adoption of your own children, filtration camps, and mass graves,” she said.

Matviichuk, as a coordinator of Euromaidan SOS, has joined activists and organizations across Ukraine in documenting Russian war crimes taking place during the war. She said the group has documented over eighty thousand thus far. “But that’s just the tip of the iceberg,” she said.

“There is no legitimate reason in doing such things; there is also no military necessity in it,” she added. “Russians have done these horrible things only because they could.”

Below are more highlights from the conversation, moderated by NBC News Congressional Correspondent Julie Tsirkin.

A new precedent

“Ukraine is just a tool” for Russian President Vladimir Putin to “break the world order” and to “change the rules of the game by force,” Matviichuk argued. She explained that through the war in Ukraine, Putin is trying to convince the world that human rights and freedom can’t “protect anyone” from war—and thus are “fake values.”

If he succeeds, she added, “it will encourage other authoritarian leaders . . . to do the same.” She pointed out how Ukraine is being hit by Iranian drones, how China has supported Russia’s defense industry, and how North Korea reportedly has sent both munitions and personnel to Russia.

That authoritarian alliance, coupled with Russia’s “total impunity” on the world stage—after having committed crimes from Ukraine to Mali to Syria and beyond without punishment—has global consequences, Matviichuk argued. The world order is “collapsing before our eyes,” and the international peace system is outdated, she warned. “We have to restart this system.”

Ukraine, she argued, could set a precedent similar to the post-World War II Nuremberg trials. “We have to establish a special tribunal on aggression now and hold Putin, [Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka], and other criminals accountable, and this precedent will be used for other parts of the globe in the future.”

On whether the United Nations or the International Criminal Court will offer the avenues to hold Putin accountable, Matviichuk said, “I have hope, but hope is not a strategy. We need a strategy, and we need decisive action.”

“Extraordinary” powered by “ordinary”

Matviichuk commended the work of “ordinary people” in Ukraine who are doing “extraordinary things,” surviving under artillery fire, conducting rescues, and providing humanitarian aid. In other countries, “ordinary people” are hosting refugees and urging their governments to provide Ukraine with weapons, she added.

Reflecting on that support, and on what she has seen in humanitarian law over the past twenty years, she argued that “when you can’t rely on the legal instruments or international guarantees or the UN system of peace and security, you can still rely on people. . . . Ordinary people can have a much greater impact than they can even imagine.”

But Matviichuk argued that those in charge in Western capitals have much more to do: granting Ukraine the ability to strike facilities in Russia with US-provided weapons, channeling immobilized Russian assets for Ukraine’s defense needs, and closing the “back door” that Russia has used to avoid sanctions. “We still find, in planes and drones, the elements from American companies, from [German] companies, from [Swiss] companies,” she said.

But above all that, “we need to set a common goal,” she argued, explaining that rather than to help Ukraine avoid failure, the goal should be “let’s help Ukraine to win.”

“The human dimension”

Matviichuk said that regardless of who wins the US presidential election, “Ukrainians will continue our fight for freedom.” She explained that as Putin has targeted all aspects of Ukraine, including its culture, “we have no choice. If we stop fighting, it will be no more us.”

“It’s very important . . . not to lose [the] human dimension,” she added. Throughout the conversation, she told harrowing stories about Ukrainian women and children who faced horrific circumstances, including a young girl who dug through rubble to try to save her mother.

Matviichuk praised the work of Ukrainian women, many of whom have assisted the war effort, doing everything from joining the armed forces to documenting war crimes. “Ukrainian women are in the forefront of this battle for freedom and for democracy, because bravery has no gender.”

“We are human beings, we are not gods,” she said. “But together we are [drops] in the ocean, and the ocean can change history.”

Katherine Walla is an associate director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

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It’s time Iran’s artists be considered as human rights defenders

Sanjay Sethi and Johanna Bankston — Wed, 02 Oct 2024 21:06:50 +0000

Two years after Mahsa Jina Amini’s tragic death in 2022 at the hands of the so-called morality police, Iran’s creative community has emerged as a formidable force in the ongoing struggle for human rights and fundamental freedoms. At the same time, Iranian artists’ influential work and high-profile activism have also made them vulnerable to political persecution at the hands of the clerical establishment ruling the country.

International recognition of the acute risk creatives face in Iran is necessary to ensure their vital role in advocating for human rights continues. Artists often struggle more than other human rights defenders (HRD)—such as activists, lawyers, and journalists—in receiving humanitarian protection, as art is not always recognized as a medium for dissent or political expression. If Iranian creatives receive due recognition as HRDs, they will be better situated to access support when their rights are threatened or violated, as they have been since the outbreak of the 2022 protests.

Tens of thousands of people joined the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising in response to Amini’s death, and from the earliest days of these protests, artists, musicians, authors, and creatives shaped the movement’s messaging. Their work transformed the raw emotions of the protestors into a powerful storm, clearly articulating the demands of those risking their lives on the streets of Iran’s cities and towns.

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The pivotal role of contemporary artists in Iran has been captured in a first-of-its-kind report by Artistic Freedom Initiative (AFI), “I Create, I Resist; Iranian Artists on the Frontline of Social Change.” The report documents how creative forces in Iran turned a nationwide protest into a cultural uprising that resonated across the globe and detailed the corresponding government’s effort to target fourteen of these artists with censorship, arbitrary arrests, and other forms of repression.

One of the most poignant examples of how art fueled the protests is Shervin Hajipour’s song “Baraye” (“For the sake of”). Composed of a series of Persian language posts on X (formerly Twitter) in which Iranians expressed their frustrations with the regime and their hopes for a different future, “Baraye” became the movement’s de facto anthem within a few days of its release. Its widespread popularity alarmed authorities, who promptly banned the song and sentenced Hajipour to three years in prison for “spreading propaganda against the regime,” though he has since been granted amnesty in a public “gesture of goodwill” by authorities. Though the regime took punitive action against the artist and censored his song, “Baraye” continued to have a strong effect, infiltrating the hearts of millions and giving a voice to the leaderless, decentralized demonstrations that captured global attention.

Visual artists, too, have played a crucial role in giving the movement a unique character. Graffiti, illustrations, paintings, and graphic designs, among others, have emerged as powerful tools of resistance, transforming public spaces into canvases of dissent. For example, a group of illustrators and designers known as the Iranian Women of Graphic Design created an open-access archive with hundreds of free posters for use in the Woman, Life, Freedom demonstrations. Their illustrations, particularly those depicting Amini or young Iranian women cutting their hair in defiance of the regime, have become iconic images associated with the protests. These artworks are not just acts of defiance but also symbols of the nationwide unwritten coalition of artists who, for the first time, have actively engaged in a protest movement with no singular leadership.

The situation for artists in Iran, however, has been perilous, as seen in the severe persecution of artists like musician Toomaj Salehi, artist Atena Farghadani, and director Mohammad Rasoulof. In 2022, Salehi, a rapper known for his politically charged lyrics, was arrested, tortured, and sentenced to death for his outspoken support of the protests, though his sentence was commuted in August. In 2023, Farghadani, a cartoonist, faced imprisonment for her satirical drawings that criticized the regime. Most recently, in June, Rasoulof was forced to flee Iran after the international release of his Cannes award-winning film, The Seed of the Sacred Fig, which uses actual footage of the 2022 protests and features several female characters without headscarves. While these are just three examples of higher profile artists who have suffered under the regime’s oppressive tactics, many lesser-known creatives continue to contend with a regime that is intent on controlling artistic production. Such artists include Daniel Moghadam and Vafa Ahmadpour, two dissident rappers arrested in May after releasing their music video “Amadeh Bash” (“Be Prepared”), highlighting the crises and challenges that Iranians are forced to confront under the country’s current leadership. The pair remain imprisoned as they await a final sentence.

Over the past several years, Iran’s law enforcement apparatus has increasingly been deployed to arbitrarily arrest and prosecute artists under the pretext of protecting national security and public morals. In 2022 alone, over a hundred artists were allegedly arrested and subjected to work bans for demonstrating their support of Woman, Life, Freedom. While it is difficult to ascertain the total number of artists targeted under these laws, at least twelve criminal cases have been brought against artists over the past two years as a direct result of their work or expressions of solidarity. Award-winning Iranian photojournalist Yalda Moaiery is among those. She was arrested and sentenced to six years on the charge of “spreading propaganda against the regime” in 2022 for photographing a Woman, Life, Freedom protest. Though Moaiery was later granted amnesty for this charge, she has been arbitrarily arrested several times throughout her career and still must serve a two year sentence for a previous case leveled against her. Today, Moaiery is one of fifty-three artists and activists represented by AFI who are in the process of relocating from Iran for fear of persecution in light of the escalating arrests of artists and dissidents in the country.

The Islamic Republic has also used bureaucratic offices to target artists. In particular, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance has been instrumental in silencing artists through online and physical surveillance, the issuance of work bans against artists, and the forced closure of publishing houses, theaters, and arts organizations. In October 2023, the ministry published a list of twenty actresses banned from working in Iran for appearing in public or on camera without headscarves. Among them was Taraneh Alidoosti, star of the 2016 Oscar-award-winning film The Salesman. This state-led persecution highlights the extent to which the regime fears the power of art as a tool for social and political change.

In the context of such severe repression, the international community should recognize Iranian artists as human rights defenders. Their work is not merely artistic expression but a form of political activism that champions freedom of speech and justice. There exists an urgent need for international support, including immigration relief and resettlement assistance, to protect these artists from the severe repercussions of their work in Iran and ensure their voices are not silenced by the oppressive forces of the Iranian regime.

Reflecting on the role of artists in Iran’s struggle, it is clear that their courage and creativity are vital to the movement for freedom and justice. As Moaiery poignantly states, “Art is the last sanctuary of free thought.” This sentiment encapsulates the resilience of Iran’s artistic community, who continue to create and resist, even in the face of unimaginable adversity.

Read the AFI report: “I Create, I Resist; Iranian Artists on the Frontline of Social Change”

Sanjay Sethi is an international human rights lawyer and the co-founder and co-executive director of Artistic Freedom Initiative (AFI).

Johanna Bankston is AFI’s senior officer of advocacy.

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Sudan has a famine. The gridlock on peace and security must end.

Maha Tambal — Wed, 25 Sep 2024 17:37:53 +0000

The Famine Review Committee (FRC) confirmed famine in Sudan’s Northern Darfur region due to ongoing war, setting a critical alert for the international community. It emphasizes the acuteness of the world’s largest hunger crisis, which affects more than 25.6 million people, approximately half Sudan’s population. Decades ago, even before the current conflict erupted, Sudan persistently struggled with a severe humanitarian situation, which added to the political instability and economic crisis and put 15.8 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. The ongoing conflict, which began on April 15, 2023, has worsened these challenges, necessitating immediate actions toward a ceasefire.

Since the fighting between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) erupted almost eighteen months ago after they allied in 2019 to topple President Omar al-Bashir and coordinated the 2021 military coup that removed the former transitional prime minister, thousands of civilians have been killed. The war has displaced almost 11 million people, with 2.1 million families either fleeing to neighboring countries or Gulf countries such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, where they face difficulties obtaining legal refuge or permanent residency. This has worsened their economic vulnerability, making it harder for them to feed their households. Others remain internally displaced, dealing with the rapidly deteriorating public services and the drastic shortage of essentials. Furthermore, the heavy rain season and flooding have destroyed displacement shelters, exacerbating the spread of transmittable diseases, damaging crops, and aggravating the humanitarian crisis.

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Since the conflict’s outbreak, joint mediation efforts by the United States and Saudi Arabia have been unsuccessful in reaching and enforcing the implementation of the May 2023 Jeddah Declaration, which aimed for a ceasefire, the establishment of humanitarian corridors, and civilian protection. Efforts that followed remained ineffective in reviving the stalled negotiations, including the most recent Geneva Talks in August, orchestrated by US Special Envoy for Sudan Tom Perriello. While RSF sent a delegation, SAF boycotted and refused to attend. The Geneva Talks, which continued with conflicting parties through a mediating team composed of representatives from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and others, concluded the establishment of the Aligned for Advancing Lifesaving and Peace in Sudan (ALPS) Group to establish immediate humanitarian corridors. Despite the boycott, the conflicting parties expressed their commitment to guarantee humanitarian access to relief famine in Darfur and Northern Sudan through the al-Dabbah and Adre routes.

By announcing permission to allow humanitarian access, the RSF and SAF might intend to intensify their rivalry to gain nonexistent international legitimacy, given the coinciding of the Geneva Talks with the convening of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly this month. Sudan’s critical humanitarian and civilian protection situation was strongly present at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which unanimously extended the renewal of sanctions against the country. Concurrently, the United Nations International Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) in Sudan called for the deployment of civilian protection forces in light of the outcomes of a visit to Sudan by Radhouane Nouicer, the designated expert on Sudan of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and amid continuing calls from Sudanese human rights defenders for the extension of the FFM mandate. Conceivably, the RSF and SAF strive to prolong their impunities despite UN accountability mechanisms.

International and regional geopolitical miscalculations led to conflict outbreak

The international community’s continued fumbles to establish a durable solution to the humanitarian crisis in Sudan mirror its long-standing miscalculations in addressing the complex entanglement of Sudan’s internal and regional geopolitics. The root cause of the current political impasse and humanitarian crises goes back to the period of Sudan’s civilian-led transitional government (2019–2021). At that time, the international community underestimated the support Sudan needed to survive the transitional period before it collapsed due to a military coup committed by the RSF and SAF, former allies that became conflicting parties, on October 25, 2021.

While the United States and its Western allies offered tremendous support for the transition government, such support primarily focused on the removal of Sudan from the States Sponsors of Terrorism List (SSTL), the establishment of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), and economic assistance through the International Monetary Fund’s debt relief and development funds. Nevertheless, the critical responsibilities of the political transition and the power-sharing agreement between civilians and the military allies the political transition internal arrangements were entirely delegated to and brokered by regional powers: the African Union (AU), which suspended Sudan’s membership in 2019; Ethiopia, which has a prolonged territorial dispute with Sudan; and US allies in the region such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Egypt, a longtime ally of the Sudanese Armed Forces led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, continues to benefit economically from the corrupt Islamic leaders linked to the former National Congress Party (NCP) and from SAF-affiliated kleptocratic businesses that smuggle Sudanese livestock and gum Arabic resources. Despite the hundreds of thousands of Sudanese refugees and displaced people stifling Egypt economically and raising security concerns, Cairo will only support a peace process that ensures the Sudanese people’s nonstop demands for a democratic system will not inspire Egyptian calls for anti-government protests. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia and the UAE maintain profound influence over the warring parties in Sudan, which were previously recruited to lead a proxy war in Yemen under the Saudi-led coalition. The UAE is taking advantage of RSF leaders’ internal and regional political ambitions to expand its hegemony in the Red Sea and Sub-Saharan Africa by providing RSF General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, aka Hemedti, with logistical support, using humanitarian aid as a cover to smuggle arms to fuel the war, and facilitating money laundering for RSF affiliates smuggling gold to the UAE in cooperation with the Wagner Group. Consequently, the UAE has a steadfast interest in prolonging Sudan’s political and security unrest.

As a result of the conflict, Russian hegemony in the Red Sea region is on the rise. Moscow hedges its bets by striking deals with the SAF and RSF, and by leveraging its geopolitical presence in the Red Sea through its military base in Port Sudan. Accordingly, Russia extends support for both conflicting parties in Sudan to preserve its strategic position in the region and support Iran and Houthis allies through the Red Sea in Yemen. This situation might pose a threat to the peace and security of the states previously allied under the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen.

A way forward to end deadlock for peace solution and humanitarian aid

It is time for the international community to reevaluate its approach to Sudan. Any future efforts to resolve the crisis must involve the United States and its regional allies and must be guided by a rigorous analysis of regional powers’ interest in Sudan. This would improve the international community’s desire for a durable solution in Sudan, leading to a ceasefire agreement that ensures the flow of humanitarian aid and the protection of civilians.

Moreover, it is crucial to assess the effectiveness of sanctions imposed by the United States and its Western allies against corporations and individuals affiliated with both conflicting factions. The fact that both sides continue financing the war through their networks underscores a significant gap in current accountability mechanisms. It is imperative to identify and implement more effective mechanisms to control and dismantle the SAF and RSF cartels in the region to pave the way for expediting the enforcement of regional and international accountability and ending corporations’ complicity in financing war and enabling human rights violations.

Prolonging the war in Sudan not only costs its people through famine and a humanitarian crisis but also threatens regional peace and security. To break this deadlock, coordinated international and regional efforts are needed, coupled with an unwavering willingness to take decisive actions to end the armed conflict in Sudan.

Maha Tambal is a senior program manager at DT Institute and a former fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).

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Compromising with the Kremlin in Ukraine will only embolden Putin

Kateryna Odarchenko, Elena Davlikanova — Thu, 19 Sep 2024 20:39:28 +0000

If Donald Trump wins the United States presidential election in November, he has pledged to bring the war in Ukraine to swift end by brokering an agreement between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Trump himself has yet to elaborate on the terms of any potential deal, but his vice presidential pick, Senator JD Vance, recently provided some insight into what a Trump peace proposal might involve.

In a September 11 interview with The Shawn Ryan Show, Vance outlined a settlement that would allow the Kremlin to retain control over all Ukrainian territory currently under Russian occupation. Meanwhile, Ukraine would be expected to reject NATO membership and commit to international neutrality.

It is important to underline that Vance’s interpretation has not been officially endorsed and may not match Trump’s personal vision for a future peace plan. Nevertheless, his comments have added to existing concerns in Kyiv, where many fear that Ukraine’s Western partners may eventually attempt to pressure the country into an unjust peace.

Vance is far from alone in indicating that any future negotiated settlement would include Ukraine ceding land to Russia. Numerous other foreign politicians and commentators have also suggested that some form of Ukrainian territorial concessions are inevitable. However, the idea of a land-for-peace deal remains deeply unpopular in Ukraine itself. Ukrainians believe an agreement of this nature would have disastrous consequences for their own country and would set a dangerous precedent for the future of international security.

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Russia currently occupies around 20 percent of Ukraine. Since February 2022, the millions of Ukrainians living under Russian occupation have been subjected to a litany of crimes including mass deportation, abduction, torture, and murder. All this has taken place against a backdrop of relentless russification and the complete suppression of Ukrainian identity.

Understandably, very few Ukrainians are prepared to permanently abandon their compatriots to such a fate. They also recognize that any handover of Ukrainian land would be perceived as a victory in Moscow. This would serve to justify and legitimize the current invasion, while setting the stage for the next phase of Russia’s war against Ukrainian statehood.

There is also widespread skepticism in Ukraine toward suggestions that the country should accept neutral status. Many Ukrainians believe neutrality would leave Ukraine internationally isolated and vulnerable to further Russian aggression. They point to Russia’s well-documented disregard for earlier agreements safeguarding Ukrainian sovereignty such as the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, and argue that any security guarantees signed by the Kremlin are essentially worthless.

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Calls for some kind of compromise peace with the Kremlin reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the motives driving Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Putin’s primary goal is not to add yet more land to the vastness of the Russian Federation or to secure his country’s borders against military attack. Instead, he sees the war in civilizational terms, and aims to prevent the consolidation of a democratic Ukrainian state on his doorstep that could inspire calls for similar change inside Russia itself.

Putin is haunted by the collapse of the USSR and has spent much of his political career trying to reverse the verdict of 1991. As a young KGB officer in East Germany, he personally witnessed the fall of the Soviet Empire as people power movements swept across Eastern Europe. Throughout his reign, Putin has been obsessed with the idea that Ukraine’s democratic transformation could spark a new chapter in Russia’s retreat from empire.

With this in mind, merely claiming twenty percent of Ukrainian land will not suffice. In order for Putin to view his invasion as a success, Ukraine must become either an obedient Russian region or a failed state. It cannot be allowed to continue in its present form or advance further toward Euro-Atlantic integration.

Nor is there any guarantee that Putin’s expansionist ambitions will end at the western borders of Ukraine. If the current invasion leads to a Kremlin-friendly settlement, Putin will inevitably be encouraged to go further. In such circumstances, his immediate objective would be to rearm and complete the conquest of Ukraine. Within a matter of years, NATO countries could find themselves confronted by a resurgent and combat-tested Russian military on their eastern flank.

Putin has often spoken of his regret at the breakup of the Soviet Union, which he has referred to as “the disintegration of historical Russia.” In similar fashion, he also claims to be returning “historically Russian lands” in Ukraine. If the present invasion does not end in defeat, who can guarantee that Putin’s revanchist claims will not expand to include the many other “historically Russian” countries in the neighborhood?

The idea that the West can disengage from Ukraine without undermining international security is a dangerous fantasy. Signs of Western weakness in Ukraine have already visibly emboldened Russia. Other authoritarian states including China, Iran, and North Korea are watching closely. Any attempt to push Kyiv into accepting Putin’s terms would shatter the West’s claim to global leadership, while greatly strengthening the position of Russia and its autocratic allies.

More than two and a half years after Moscow launched the largest European invasion since World War II, it should now be abundantly clear that Russia will not stop until it is stopped. Any shortsighted attempts to appease Putin with compromises that reward his invasion will inevitably backfire and fuel more Russian aggression. Instead, the West must recognize that the only way to achieve a sustainable peace is by committing fully to Ukrainian victory.

Kateryna Odarchenko is a partner at SIC Group Ukraine. Elena Davlikanova is a fellow at CEPA.

The seeds of the Abraham Accords were planted well before 2020. Longstanding hopes for peace began to become a reality publicly when the UAE named 2019 the “Year of Tolerance,” celebrating the diversity of religious life in the country. Among other milestones, the UAE invited Israel to participate in the Dubai 2020 World Expo, welcomed Pope Francis for a landmark visit to the Arab world, signed the Document of Human Fraternity with the Catholic Church, and announced the construction of the Abrahamic Family House—a mosque, church, and synagogue coexisting on the same campus in Abu Dhabi. For those paying attention, like I was, the ground was shifting—the UAE of 2019 that was building a synagogue was clearly a country that had greater ambitions with Israel.

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Then, on September 15, 2020, history was made as 700 guests gathered at the White House to witness the normalization of relations between Israel and two Arab nations: the UAE and Bahrain. Then-US President Donald Trump presided over the signing of the Abraham Accords, alongside Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan, and Bahraini Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid al-Zayani. Shortly after this milestone, Israel expanded its diplomatic ties by announcing agreements with Sudan on October 23, 2020, and Morocco on December 10, 2020.

In the immediate aftermath, the accords were well-received by the governments involved, who viewed them as opportunities to enhance economic ties, security cooperation, and diplomatic relations. The agreements were heralded by many as the “dawn of a new Middle East,” as Trump noted, marking the most significant transformation in regional geopolitics in a generation and the most important step toward peace and stability in the Middle East since the Israel-Jordan peace agreement twenty-five years earlier.

The early years

Between 2020 and 2023, diplomatic relationships flourished with the establishment of mutual embassies, air and trade corridors, political and cultural advocacy activities, strategic military agreements, and people-to-people ties. Groundbreaking bilateral and multilateral forums, like the Negev Summit in Israel, the Negev Forum Steering Committee in Bahrain, and the Atlantic Council’s N7 Initiative, were established, fostering unprecedented regional collaboration. High-level visits and joint initiatives that once seemed unimaginable brought together innovators, investors, experts, academics, and women leaders, further strengthening these new relationships. Economic ties flourished, with trade between the Abraham Accords countries surging from practically nothing in 2019 to an estimated $10 billion over the first three years.

Israel and the UAE saw the most significant trade, tourism, and innovation advancements following the Abraham Accords: Annual bilateral trade surged, reaching almost $3 billion by 2023, driven by a historic free-trade agreement and numerous business partnerships. Tourism flourished, with over one million Israelis visiting the UAE by 2023, facilitated by 106 weekly direct flights between the two countries. Both nations established embassies, engaged in security cooperation, and collaborated on innovation and technology projects. Cultural exchange programs further deepened these ties, promoting mutual understanding. Joint initiatives in areas like renewable energy and space exploration broadened the scope of their partnership.

Four years later

As their fourth anniversary arrives, the good news is that the Abraham Accords remain intact. Despite the Gaza war, none of the signatories have backtracked from their normalization agreements: No ties have been permanently broken, and no country has withdrawn from its commitments or closed its embassy—a powerful diplomatic signal that the relationships are enduring. Ambassadors from Israel, Bahrain, and the UAE continue to play active roles, maintaining diplomatic channels and fulfilling their duties to sustain these historic ties. Trade between the signatory nations continues, fostering economic prosperity, and security and airspace cooperation also remain largely in place.

However, the period between 2020 and 2023, characterized by hundreds of signed agreements, booming tourism, and vibrant public diplomacy, has given way to a more subdued phase. October 7, 2023, and its implications for all of the signatory countries have shifted the posture from very open and public to very private. People-to-people ties have been limited, public celebrations have been muted, and much of the once-public diplomacy now happens behind closed doors.

A look at the social media channels of the embassies reflects this shift. The Israeli Embassy in Bahrain is focused on the fate of hostages and advocating for their safe return. Israeli Ambassador to the UAE Amir Hayek emphasizes positive messages and sticks to sharing holiday wishes while recognizing milestones in the UAE. Emirati Ambassador to Israel Mohamed al-Khaja has been publicly quiet throughout 2024, albeit sharing Passover wishes in April. His most recent substantial post on X was issued on the third anniversary of the accords in September 2023.

Nevertheless, despite these challenges and the current state of the Middle East, there is still room for hope, and here are the reasons why:

A foundation of principles: The Abraham Accords declaration was more than just a political agreement. It was a statement of shared principles: a commitment to “strengthening peace in the Middle East and around the world based on mutual understanding and coexistence, as well as respect for human dignity and freedom.” The aspirations of the Abraham Accords represent universal values that resonate globally—and that are more relevant than ever today.
Shifting security alliances: Security alliances have shifted, enabling better responses, particularly from Israel and the UAE, to shared regional challenges ranging from the Red Sea attacks to Iran and from the Houthis in Yemen to Hamas.
People-to-people engagement: The Abraham Accords are a warm peace built not just on politics but also on people-to-people ties, offering a powerful counter to dehumanization, anti-Semitism, and Islamophobia. The Abrahamic Family House is a testimony to that enduring faith in shared humanity. The site recently ranked among Time Magazine’s “2024 Greatest Places in the World to Visit” and is just one example of the signatories’ ongoing commitment to coexistence and understanding.
Prosperity as a pathway to peace: Economic cooperation between Israel and the Abraham Accords countries continues, paving the way for peace by addressing key drivers of conflict like poverty, unemployment, and inequality and by shifting the focus to collaboration, innovation, and mutual benefit. In August, Israel Aerospace Industries announced plans to establish a presence in Abu Dhabi, where it will convert Emirati aircraft into freighters. This move highlights the UAE’s ongoing commitment to building ties with Israel, even as regional tensions rise.
The essential role of women: To ensure the long-term success of the Abraham Accords, integrating women equally in policy-making, decision-making, and programming will be crucial. Research shows that when women are actively engaged in peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding, negotiations are more effective, peace is more enduring, and broader segments of society benefit. Including women across all sectors—economy, education, environment, politics, and the legal system—will foster a more prosperous, sustainable, and peaceful future for the countries involved in the Abraham Accords and the entire region.

As the Abraham Accords turn four years old, they stand as a testament to the power of diplomacy and the pursuit of shared interests, even in a region as complex and historically fraught as the Middle East. However, the future of the accords cannot be fully realized without a sustainable and just resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

While the accords have faced criticism for sidelining the Palestinian issue, there is still potential for them to serve as a framework that encourages renewed dialogue. Additionally, the potential inclusion of Saudi Arabia—the most influential Arab nation—in the Abraham Accords would be a transformative development. While Riyadh has shown interest, any formal move toward normalization would likely hinge on meaningful progress toward resolving the Palestinian situation. Riyadh’s participation would not only bolster the accords but could also set the stage for even broader regional acceptance of Israel, further reshaping Middle Eastern geopolitics and potentially opening new avenues to address Palestinian concerns comprehensively.

Looking ahead, the survival and success of the Abraham Accords will depend on a continued commitment from all parties to maintain open dialogue, strengthen economic ties, and foster people-to-people connections capable of transcending political tensions. It is essential for signatory countries to reaffirm their dedication to these agreements, not only as a means of advancing their national interests but also as a broader contribution to regional stability. The Abraham Accords may not have solved all of the region’s problems, but they have undeniably shifted the geopolitical landscape in a positive direction: toward lasting peace and cooperation in the Middle East.

Marcy Grossman is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs and former Canadian ambassador to the United Arab Emirates.

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Indian PM Modi visits Ukraine to open new foreign policy horizons

Mridula Ghosh — Wed, 04 Sep 2024 12:41:58 +0000

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi paid an historic visit to Kyiv in late August, becoming the first Indian leader to travel to the country since Ukraine regained independence in 1991. Modi’s arrival in the Ukrainian capital was billed as part of ongoing international efforts to secure a peaceful resolution to the war between Ukraine and Russia. Many also saw his trip as further evidence of Delhi’s diplomatic balancing act, as India seeks to counter negative perceptions of its close economic and defense ties with Moscow while underlining its status as an emerging geopolitical power in its own right.

Prior to Modi’s visit, some analysts suggested he was heading to Kyiv with damage limitation in mind following a backlash over his July trip to Moscow and embrace of Russian President Vladimir Putin at a time when Russian missiles were raining down on targets in Kyiv, including the country’s largest children’s hospital. Modi’s high-profile hug with Putin brought a sharp rebuke from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that initially threatened to spark a diplomatic rift between Delhi and Kyiv. However, the two leaders appear to have opted for a more constructive response.

Speaking alongside Zelenskyy in Kyiv, Modi’s peace rhetoric was largely unchanged from the message he had delivered weeks earlier in Moscow. He stressed that only dialog and diplomacy could end the fighting, while also voicing his support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Significantly, Modi arrived in Ukraine amid the country’s surprise cross-border offensive into Kursk Oblast. While the Ukrainian invasion of Russia was not on the official agenda, Modi’s presence did suggest recognition that the operation falls within Ukraine’s right to self-defense.

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India is currently seeking to plot a geopolitical course that protects the country’s trade and energy interests, while reducing its reliance on Russia in the defense sector and increasing engagement with Ukraine and other countries in the region including Poland, which Modi visited on the eve of his arrival in Kyiv. Underscoring the importance of his Ukraine trip, the Indian Prime Minister was accompanied by a high-level delegation including Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval.

Although the landmark visit did not yield any major breakthroughs, Modi and Zelenskyy did reach a number of agreements that should allow the two countries to expand cooperation in the agrarian, healthcare, cultural, and humanitarian sectors. The terms of the humanitarian agreement signed in Kyiv could help pave the way for an Indian role in Ukraine’s reconstruction. The joint statement issued by both leaders following their summit also mentioned significant potential for deepening partnership in the defense sector, with India believed to be interested in Ukraine’s rapidly evolving drone technologies.

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India’s openness to greater engagement is an indication that attitudes toward Ukraine are evolving, with Delhi keen to counter perceptions that the country views Ukrainian affairs predominantly through a Russian lens. Today’s diplomatic language is certainly more nuanced than the position adopted at the onset of Russia’s attack on Ukraine a decade ago. In 2014, Indian officials initially responded to the seizure of Crimea by stating that Russia had “legitimate interests” in Ukraine. Such messaging is no longer seen as helpful in Delhi. As an aspiring economic superpower, India now seeks to project the image of a leading global player and cannot afford to be seen as too close to the Kremlin.

Another factor driving the strengthening of bilateral ties is people to people contacts. Zelenskyy stressed this point when he met with Indian journalists during Modi’s visit, expressing his own interest in getting to know more about India. Ukraine’s large community of Indian students and the country’s Indian diaspora are already playing an active role here, sharing personal stories of life in Ukraine that often run directly counter to Russian propaganda. The positive experiences of Indians in Ukraine contrast sharply with the fate of numerous Indian citizens who have been lured to Russia since 2022 to fight in Ukraine. Zelenskyy noted that Modi had specifically raised this issue during their talks in Kyiv.

Much homework still needs to be done by India and Ukraine in order to take bilateral cooperation to the next level. Delhi must also address the elephant in the room, namely how it can continue benefiting from cheap Russian energy supplies without enabling Putin’s war economy. At the same time, it is worth stressing that the visit of an Indian Prime Minister to Ukraine is a significant diplomatic event for both countries that few would have anticipated as recently as one year ago. As India seeks to consolidate its position on the world stage, the dynamic of relations with Ukraine is now on a positive trajectory and is beginning to look promising.

Dr. Mridula Ghosh is an associate professor of international relations at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and Board Chair of the East European Development Institute.

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But Arab countries’ support for Israel wasn’t straightforward. After months of its brutal assault on the Gaza Strip, which has killed thousands of Palestinians, there is much anger at Israel on the Arab street and in Arab capitals. Arab countries that helped Israel in April were reluctant to declare their support publicly. Saudi Arabia denied some Israeli reports about their collaboration, while Jordan asserted that it was merely protecting its airspace. The UAE was the first country to condemn Israel’s attack on Damascus, something that was also done by Saudi Arabia and all other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—with the exception of Bahrain, which doesn’t share ties with Tehran. In short, many Arab countries defended Israel against Iran, but not without reservations.

The April confrontation was limited. Iran’s showy attack was ably rebuffed by Israel and its allies and it only caused one serious injury (that of an Arab-Israeli child). Israel’s subsequent response on April 19 was a minor symbolic attack in Isfahan, the home of one of Iran’s key nuclear facilities, which appeared to have only destroyed a replaceable long-range air defense system. The outcome would be very different if a more serious conflict were to break out between Iran and Israel.

To start, Arab states are not interested in war. In recent years, these countries have prioritized winding down conflicts and disputes to focus on reconstruction and economic development, and they have made remarkable progress in this direction.

In 2020, a major rift inside the GCC was mended, with Qatar re-establishing ties with Riyadh and Manama. This, in turn, helped Turkey—an ally of Qatar—patch up relations with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. During that same year, the Abraham Accords led to Israel’s recognition by four Arab states—UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan—three of which now have significant diplomatic and military ties with Israel. Even the Syrian regime has been welcomed back into the fold of the Arab League, and President Bashar al-Assad now enjoys ties with the UAE. Egypt also recommenced ties with Turkey earlier this year and is now in regular contact with Iran, even though the two countries still lack full ties. More significantly, in 2023, Iran and Saudi Arabia re-established diplomatic relations with the help of China as mediator, ending a major row that started in 2016 and led to the downgrading of ties with several Arab states in the Persian Gulf. Since then, Iran has re-established ties with all GCC countries except Bahrain, which has recently expressed interest in renewed ties.

In short, Arab states have attempted to tone things down among each other and with other countries in the region. In the past few months, they have also pushed the United States and Israel to bring about a ceasefire and avoid a broader confrontation with Iran. This was clearly the message sent on August 4 when Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi visited Tehran, the highest-level visit in twenty years. “We want our region to live in security, peace, and stability, and we want the escalation to end,” Safadi said. He later affirmed, “We will not be a battlefield for Iran or Israel.” Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Arab states have issued similar calls for de-escalation.

Additionally, Arab states’ military posture is closely linked to the United States. This matters because any war between Iran and Israel will inevitably involve the United States, which has increased the number of its troops in the region to forty thousand and has given ironclad security commitments to Israel. US bases are present in all six GCC member states, as well as Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Israel, Turkey, and Djibouti. US operations in the area are covered by US Central Command, which, since 2021, has included Israel as well as the Arab countries, providing a background for Israeli-Arab collaboration. Diplomatic and trade deals also tie the United States and Israel closely with many of its Arab neighbors, including the I2U2 (the United States, India, UAE, and Israel) and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, which connects India and Europe via Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Any move by Iran or its allied militias has the potential to backfire. For starters, public opinion in these Sunni-majority countries—including in all Arab countries except Iraq, Bahrain, and perhaps Lebanon—isn’t necessarily favorable toward the Shia-majority Iran. But there are other factors at play.

In economically troubled Lebanon, Hezbollah enjoys some support even among the non-Shia population due to its anti-Israel posture and its being seen as opposing Israel’s attacks on Lebanon’s territory. But if the militia is seen as getting the country into a war it can’t afford, it could also face a backlash. In Iraq, Prime Minister Mohammed al-Sudani enjoys the support of Tehran-backed political parties and militias, but has also continued at least some of the attempts of his predecessor, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, to assert Iraqi sovereignty from Tehran and expand its ties with fellow Arab countries such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Back in April, Sudani sounded much like GCC leaders when he said the region couldn’t “stand tension” between Iran and Israel. On August 13, he spoke with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and affirmed the “importance of preventing escalation.” Even Iran’s most steadfast Arab ally, Syria, is considering growing its links to the Arab League and UAE—this was why Damascus stopped recognizing the Houthis and kicked out their diplomatic envoys last year. The Houthi rebels are among Iran’s most important allies and could use their strategic position by disrupting trade in the Red Sea and resuming attacks on Saudis. But they also maintain regular dialogue with Riyadh and might not wish to resume the Yemeni-Saudi war that has been mostly dormant since 2022.

In short, in the event of a broader war, Iran will find itself surrounded by Arab countries that host US bases and have many reasons not to want a conflict. The consequences of such a war will likely be catastrophic for all sides involved. Still, despite its years of patiently building a Resistance Axis of Arab militias, Iran will not enter with a good hand in any conflict that pulls in its Arab neighbors.

Arash Azizi is a writer and scholar. He is the author of The Shadow Commander: Soleimani, the US and Iran’s Global Ambitions and What Iranians Want. Follow him on X: @arash_tehran.

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Syrian elections ended. What have we learned from the results?

Vladimir Pran and Maroun Sfeir — Fri, 16 Aug 2024 18:20:51 +0000

With the presidential decree certifying the winners of the July 15 elections and calling for the Syrian People’s Assembly to convene on August 21, the 2024 election cycle has officially concluded. After President Bashar al-Assad called elections for the 250 seats of the Syrian People’s Assembly held in the areas controlled by his government, the key stages of the process were unpacked. This series also conducted a deep dive into the challenges of moving ahead with electoral reform in the United Nations (UN)-facilitated political process. The first article of the series discussed the outline of the election process and its significance, while the second article examined the system of representation, which determines the voting method and how many candidates will be elected from each of the districts. The third article presented the structure of the Syrian electorate, and the fourth article unpacked the role of various institutions in administering elections and the candidates. This concluding article makes sense of the election results.

Syrians voted in 8,151 polling stations that opened across the country, with the exception of areas not controlled by the Assad regime. To cater to residents displaced from opposition-held areas, the government established special polling stations scattered throughout the country. For example, stations were set up for Raqqa residents in the Hama, Damascus, Hasakah, Homs, Latakia, and Tartous governorates. For Quneitra residents, more than 111 out of 175 stations were located outside the governorate.

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In northeastern Syria, the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) prevented elections by establishing a security cordon around the Qamishli “government quarter,” in which the Assad regime provides administrative services to the residents of the area. SDF-affiliated social media and news outlets broadcasted warnings that the election sites might be subject to unspecified terrorist attacks. In Idlib and northern Aleppo, areas controlled by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Syrian National Army (SNA), there were no electoral activities.

Of all the areas under governmental control, the most disruptions were reported in the southern areas of Sweida. Before the polls, and continuing into Election Day, demonstrators protesting against the elections entered several polling centers, took away ballot boxes, and set election materials on fire. The anti-election protests were a continuation of the anti-regime protests that have been regularly occurring for the past year. On Election Day, demonstrators in Sweida’s al-Karama Square came under fire by security forces, and a civilian was injured. It’s worth noting that protests were not limited to Sweida—violence and demonstrations were reported across the governorate, as well as in the towns of Qarya and Mazraa and the villages of Melh, Slim, and Koraya. In Daraa governorate, protests and threats of violence forced the government to relocate twenty-five polling stations. For example, stations in the town of Mahja were moved to the city of Izraa, stations from al-Karak were moved to al-Musayfrah, and those in the city of Jasem were relocated to a safer part of the city.

Where the polls were conducted without disruption, the process unfolded identically to the 2020 election. Because the election authorities neither register voters nor compile the voters list in advance of elections, the first step at the polling station was to register a voter using the blank forms used to write in voters. This way, the voters list was compiled on Election Day rather than being available to the committees before the elections.

Voters would then be handed a ballot and needed to choose to either use ballots pre-filled with the Baath Party-sponsored candidates on the National Unity (NU) list or, if they dared, a blank ballot. Those who opted for a blank ballot had to write in the names of the candidates by hand, ranging from five names in al-Quentra to thirty-two names in rural Aleppo, which is a burdensome process. In some areas, the non-NU candidates would also distribute pre-printed ballots, such as the “Sham” list in Damascus, which features the incumbent Mohamed Hamsho (sanctioned by the European Union and the United States). The practice is fully permitted by law.

To ensure high turnout, public institutions, companies, committees, factories, banks, and unions were instructed by the government not to give employees a day off, which prevented them from ignoring the polls, and to compel them to vote en masse, likely under supervision. Many polling stations were set up in or near their workplaces—like factories and universities—to boost turnout. However, in contrast with the previous elections, there was no information on turnout either during the day or immediately after the close of the polls. According to our research, the Supreme Judicial Election Committee (SJEC), governors, and heads of polling committees used vague language to describe the turnout in the media, with statements like “turnout was good,” “nice,” “high,” “not bad,” and “it got better in the afternoon” being used throughout the day. During a live interview on state television with the polling station committee in rural Damascus, the reporter abruptly changed the subject and asked the polling station president not to share any information about the number of voters or the station’s results.

There is little to be said about the credibility of the polling process itself. As described in a previous article on electoral administration, the process did not meet fundamental standards for impartial management of elections nor the standards of transparency. There were no independent national or international observers, and there were no systematic, evidence-based reports of the polling process. For what it is worth, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence of mass proxy voting, underage voting, voting without secrecy, and voting in military barracks without a chance for supervision.

The same lack of transparency shrouds the process for resolving election disputes. The president of the Supreme Constitutional Court, Jihad Lahham, announced on July 28 that all forty-seven appeals were rejected for “not meeting the conditions stipulated in the laws” and “not supported by any document or evidence.” Nothing is known about the nature of the appeals or those filing them.

The Syrian opposition was campaigning against the legitimacy of the elections. These efforts were led by the Syrian Negotiation Committee, several Syrian nongovernmental organizations, and the media. The key slogan of the campaign was “No to Assad and his elections” alongside “Resolution 2254,” which also appeared as hashtags on X (formerly Twitter). The campaign messages were of a general anti-elections character, pointing out that they were against the framework set by the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC) 2254. The campaign was launched late and was effectively active only on Election Day. It does not appear to have gained any significant traction.

The Baath Party endorsed NU lists that included 185 candidates across the country. As expected, the electoral system ensured that all of them were elected, making the partisan composition of the assembly identical to the previous one: 67 percent for the Baathists (a total of 74 percent for all the NU candidates) and 26 percent for those elected to seats not contested by the NU. The number of seats not contested by the NU candidates, a maximum of sixty-five, is not random; it is by design. It avoids the perception of single-party rule and allows for a semblance of diversity, but protects the regime by securing a two-thirds majority needed to fend off legislative challenges, enact constitutional amendments, or accuse the president of treason. This golden ratio has been the formula in place since the 2016 legislative elections held in the aftermath of the 2012 constitutional reforms.

Are there any other conclusions besides the predictable 100 percent victory for all of the NU candidates? Detailed analysis is difficult because of the lack of transparency; there is simply not enough data published for a granular view of the results. If elections were ever to be held under the framework of the UNSC Resolution 2254 and within international standards, the authorities would be obliged to publish the complete election results, including turnout with gender breakdown, numbers of invalid ballots, registered voters, and votes for all the candidates. Currently, the results published by the SJEC present only the votes of the winning candidates, not all the candidates. This makes election analysis impossible, as by how much the election losers lost will never be known.

Because the voting data are missing, and because the competition was, in practice, resolved before Election Day through internal elections and the primaries, the analysis is reduced to levels of participation. The SJEC only announced an overall number of voters in elections: 7,325,844 out of 19,200,325 claimed by the government to be eligible, which results in a turnout of 38.16 percent, about a 5 percent increase since the 2020 elections. This overall number says nothing about regional differences.

Voting patterns are even harder to analyze because of elections used a block vote system with multiple candidates. The workaround is to consider the top candidate on the list as representative of the support received by the list. Employing this method reveals a pattern of some voting shifts between the governorates and between the 2020 and 2024 elections. Countrywide, the NU lists received 5 percent fewer votes than in 2024. Some drops in the votes were dramatic, such as in Damascus, where NU lost 49 percent of the votes, followed by Hasaka with 43 percent. On the other hand, votes for NU in rural Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor, and Hama dramatically increased (42 percent, 51 percent, and 71 percent, respectively.)

It will take some time to understand the cause of these changes. They could be simply the result of the redeployment of the military and the return of internally displaced persons, especially to Damascus. The only solid conclusion at this point is that the actual increase in the total number of those who voted by 1.1 million has not resulted in increased support for the NU lists, as they lost two hundred thousand votes compared to the 2020 elections. And, when compared with the 2016 elections, the increase in 2.2 million voters led to a decrease in support for the NU by 1.2 million votes.

Shifts in support for the NU lists do not seem to be related to whether the candidates on the lists were incumbents. As in the previous elections, the rates of turnover were high. Out of the 250 elected to the new parliament, ninety-three are incumbents, which is only 37.2 percent of the total—and almost exactly the same as in the 2020 elections, when 37.6 percent of incumbents were re-elected.

However, turnover is not uniform across the country. The variations between the regions are significant. In Idlib, Tartous, Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and Damascus, more than 80 percent of representatives were replaced. On the other side of the spectrum is Sweida with only 33 percent, followed by Daraa at 40 percent, and Hassaka at 42 percent.

Besides analysis of the turnout and the turnover in the parliament, what are the election results saying about the structure and political dynamics of the newly elected assembly? On an individual level, it might be of interest that six of the eight members serving in the governmental delegation to the UN-sponsored Constitutional Committee were not re-elected, including Ahmed Kuzbari, the co-chair. In Damascus, the “Sham” list led by Hamsho, a sanctioned businessman closely affiliated with Maher al-Assad, the president’s brother, won twelve seats that were not contested by the National Unity list. One of the new independent members of parliament from Aleppo, Mohammed al-Ruslan, is a former leader of a militia faction reportedly affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Madoul al-Aziz, a former leader of a militia affiliated to al-Nusra, was re-elected as an independent candidate for Deir ez-Zor.

But, as explained in the previous article on candidates, if there was any political competition, it played out in advance to general elections, in the intra-Baath Party elections and primaries. The conclusion from observing those processes is that the new parliament might be rejuvenated with significant turnover, but will likely remain in the service of the top Baath leadership.

Vladimir Pran advises electoral authorities, governments, and political leaders on transitional, electoral, and political processes.

Maroun Sfeir advises international and local civil society organizations, political groups, and electoral authorities on electoral and political processes.

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Ahmed Alkhatib quoted in Voice of America on Gaza ceasefire talks

Atlantic Council — Fri, 09 Aug 2024 16:53:40 +0000

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Hungarian PM Orban poses as unlikely peacemaker for Russia’s Ukraine war

Dmytro Tuzhanskyi — Thu, 18 Jul 2024 21:03:06 +0000

As perhaps the most pro-Kremlin and anti-Western leader of any EU or NATO member state, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban makes for an unlikely mediator in efforts to end Russia’s war in Ukraine. This did not prevent the Hungarian leader from embarking on an ambitious series of international visits in early July that he dubbed as a “peace mission.” In the first ten days of July, Orban visited four different countries on three continents, during which he claimed to have held twelve hours of talks with world leaders.

Orban’s intensive bout of shuttle diplomacy began with a visit to Kyiv on July 2, where he met with President Zelenskyy. This was the Hungarian leader’s first trip to neighboring Ukraine since 2015, and came just one day after his country took up the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. The presidency, a position which rotates through all EU member states, is designed to coordinate the agenda and chair meetings of EU member state officials. It is limited in power, and the presidency carries no responsibility for representing the EU abroad.

A few days later, Orban was in Moscow for talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who he then lavished with praise in an interview with Germany’s WELT Documentary. On July 8, the Hungarian PM was in Beijing to meet with Xi Jinping. He subsequently flew to the US for the annual NATO Summit, before rounding off his diplomatic mission by meeting with US presidential candidate Donald Trump in Florida.

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While Orban’s globetrotting itinerary was certainly impressive, there is little indication that this diplomatic initiative achieved much beyond generating media buzz and upsetting Hungary’s EU partners. Orban pushed the idea that a ceasefire in Ukraine could “speed up peace talks” and has tried to pitch his peace plan in a letter to European Union leaders, but so far he has faced little enthusiasm and a significant backlash. Crucially, both Zelenskyy and Putin have ruled out an immediate ceasefire.

This lack of progress toward peace might not be a major issue for Orban. Indeed, some believe his recent diplomatic efforts may actually have been designed primarily to strengthen his own position, both domestically and on the international stage. Crucially, it has allowed the Hungarian leader to balance his country between the key global centers of Washington, Beijing, Moscow, and Brussels. It has also served as a welcome backdrop for the creation of the new Patriots for Europe grouping within the European Parliament, as part of Orban’s self-styled effort to “change European politics.”

This international outreach allows Orban to maintain the stability of his own domestic position via continued NATO security, EU funding and market access, cheap Russian energy imports, and Chinese investments. He has been pursuing a similar model since 2010, and has consistently attempted to make himself useful to all key players. In the current geopolitical context, this means playing the role of potential peacemaker in the broader geopolitical confrontation that has emerged as a result of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

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Orban’s current peacemaker posturing could prove particularly timely if Donald Trump wins this year’s US presidential election and returns to the White House in January 2025. This would set the stage for a likely increase in tensions between Washington and Beijing, with the Hungarian PM potentially positioned to serve as an intermediary on key issues such as Ukraine peace initiatives.

Critics have accused the Hungarian leader of handing Putin a significant PR victory. At a time when the Russian dictator is eager to demonstrate that he is not internationally isolated, their Moscow meeting was particularly welcome. This explains why Orban was careful to begin his world tour in Kyiv, allowing him to deflect accusations from the West that he is doing the Kremlin’s bidding. Instead, Orban sought to portray his outreach efforts as an example of the “third way” that the current crop of populist European politicians often seek to champion.

There can be little doubt that Orban’s tour was also an attempt to troll the entire EU leadership. By seizing the initiative and unilaterally embarking on high-profile visits to Moscow and Beijing while holding the EU presidency, Orban was hoping to contrast his own dynamic leadership with the perceived indecisiveness of the European Union’s more cautious diplomacy. In doing so, he succeeded in boosting his international profile while causing significant embarrassment in Brussels.

Despite generating much media interest and favorable headlines, it would be wrong to portray Viktor Orban’s peace mission as an unqualified success. At this stage, his peace proposals appear to have little genuine substance, and have so far gained virtually no traction. Nevertheless, the Hungarian leader will likely continue to view the invasion of Ukraine as an opportunity to advance his own balancing act between Russia, China, and the West.

Dmytro Tuzhanskyi is director of the Institute for Central European Strategy. This article is published in his capacity as an analyst of the Institute for Central European Strategy and does not reflect any other institution’s position.

While recent events, such as an Israeli airstrike on July 3 that killed Mohammad Naameh Nasser, a senior Hezbollah commander in southern Lebanon, have exacerbated tensions, they are merely symptoms of a much deeper, long-standing conflict. The ongoing exchange of fire across the Israel-Lebanon border is part of a series of tit-for-tat attacks that have characterized the relationship between these adversaries for years.

The specter of a full-scale war between Israel and Hezbollah looms large. Hezbollah’s extensive rocket arsenal, which has significantly expanded since 2006, poses a grave threat to Israeli civilians. Israeli estimates put Hezbollah’s arsenal at roughly 150,000 rockets and missiles, while an IRGC Quds Force official boasted a stockpile of more than 1 million. Whatever the figure, these are not rudimentary missiles like Hamas’s Qassam rockets; Hezbollah’s arsenal is more sophisticated and dangerous—ranging from the smaller unguided Fajr-5, with a range of 75 kilometers, to powerful ballistic missiles such as the Fateh-110 and Scud variants, which can hit anywhere in Israel. So far, this has forced a mass evacuation of around sixty thousand Israeli residents from the north of the country.

The range and payload of these missiles have also allowed Hezbollah to threaten countries like Cyprus against providing any assistance to the IDF, meaning that the group has the ability to drag third parties into a wider conflict. Furthermore, an Israeli military offensive in Lebanon could potentially trigger responses from Hezbollah’s allies across the region, including Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. The situation is complicated by the potential for direct conflict between Israel and Iran, which is no longer merely an academic concept after the retaliatory responses between the foes in April.

On the domestic front, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces a multitude of challenges. Beyond the pressure to secure the northern border, he grapples with the ongoing hostage crisis, the lack of a clear “day after” plan for Gaza, and internal political strife. Corruption charges loom over Netanyahu but are currently held at bay by his immunity as prime minister. Political rivalries and domestic crises, such as that regarding the Supreme Court, have been put aside due to the unity government formed after October 7, 2023. However, these underlying issues are only delayed by the existential need to defeat Hamas. Once the threat subsides or the Israeli population tires of war, these issues will resurface.

The northern front with Hezbollah may serve as a distraction from these pressing issues, allowing Netanyahu to double down on security concerns. Hezbollah, too, faces domestic pressures. Lebanon has remained without a head of state for two years, and various political factions are pushing for accommodation in the presidency. The lack of a functioning and unified executive authority has led to political inaction over the country’s growing banking crisis, threatening to create one of the worst economic crises since 1857. Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth contracted by 6.7 percent in 2019, followed by another contraction of more than 20 percent in 2020. Unemployment currently stands at more than 11 percent. Hezbollah must balance its ideological commitment to resistance against Israel with the complex realities of Lebanese politics and the potential consequences of escalation.

The Joe Biden administration also finds itself in a precarious position, with some officials raising the alarm over the evolving crisis and worries that Israel and Hezbollah might be underestimating the risks associated with their actions. The administration must navigate a delicate balance: showing unwavering support for Israel while simultaneously attempting to prevent a wider regional conflict. Domestic political considerations further complicate this balancing act, with the November US presidential election looming and the potential for criticism from both sides of the aisle. The diplomatic efforts to resolve this crisis face significant challenges. Even if a Gaza ceasefire were negotiated and Hezbollah ceased its rocket attacks, Israel is unlikely to sit quietly with the knowledge of such a big threat to its north. This places US diplomacy in a difficult position of finding incentives for Hezbollah to pull back from a position of strength while accommodating Israel’s security concerns.

Questions have been raised about the efficacy of current diplomatic channels, particularly the role of Amos Hochstein as the primary envoy. While Hochstein has experience in energy-related diplomacy between Lebanon and Israel, his background as a former IDF soldier and his lack of extensive experience in high-stakes geopolitical negotiations raise concerns about his suitability for mediating this potentially explosive situation.

The consequences of a war between Israel and Hezbollah would be catastrophic. Such a conflict would likely draw in the United States in a far more substantive way, potentially marking a return to the “forever wars” that recent administrations have sought to avoid. The potential for Iranian-backed fighters from across the region joining Hezbollah in a conflict against Israel adds another layer of complexity and risk to the situation. As the current state of affairs is assessed, it is clear that the situation in the Middle East remains extremely volatile and dangerous. This is not a fragile peace, but a combustible situation that threatens to escalate into what could be characterized as “a forever war on steroids.” The ongoing exchange of fire and the high risk of miscalculation make the prospect of a broader regional conflict a looming threat.

The international community, led by the United States, must double down on its diplomatic efforts and continue to urge restraint on all sides. However, these efforts must be led by experienced professionals with a deep understanding of the region’s complexities. The stakes are extraordinarily high, and the consequences of a full-scale war would be dire for both the region and global stability.

Daniel Elkins is the founder and president of the Special Operations Association of America. A former Green Beret and Special Operations combat veteran, he is also an Atlantic Council Counter-Terrorism Project member.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the positions of the United States government or the Department of Defense.

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An Iranian war criminal’s freedom has a detonating impact on the universal jurisdiction project

Shadi Sadr — Tue, 09 Jul 2024 14:19:20 +0000

Universal jurisdiction, a principle granting a state jurisdiction over crimes against international law even when those crimes occur outside its territory, is rapidly flourishing in law and in practice. In recent weeks, a new law in Germany has precluded the invocation of functional immunity in proceedings for international crimes, regardless of the accused’s rank, while a French court sentenced three Syrian officials in absentia to life imprisonment for war crimes. However, the transfer of a convicted Iranian war criminal by Swedish authorities—under the welcoming gaze of European Union (EU) officials—has raised serious questions about political influence on international accountability and the effectiveness of justice mechanisms that involve substantial taxpayer funding.

On June 15, Hamid Noury, an Iranian national who Swedish courts sentenced to life in prison for war crimes and murder, was released and returned to Iran. This marked the first and only universal jurisdiction case related to atrocity crimes in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Noury was arrested in November 2019 at Arlanda Airport in Sweden, and was subsequently tried by the Stockholm District Court over ninety sessions held in 2021–2022. He was found guilty for his role in the massacre of thousands of political prisoners in Iran in the summer of 1988, in what became known as the 1988 massacre, and the appeals court confirmed his sentence in December 2023. Noury’s release was arranged as part of a prisoner swap, during which Iranian authorities freed two Swedish nationals who had been held hostage, according to the unofficial admission of Iranian authorities.

There have been other incidents in which the foreign accused were returned to where they committed crimes for trial purposes.

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Rwanda’s requests to European governments for the return of genocide suspects so they can be brought to justice are an example. There have also been numerous cases of foreign hostages being used as pawns to free individuals detained for or convicted of terrorism, narcotics, or other offenses. However, this was the first time someone convicted of core international crimes—genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression—in a case of universal jurisdiction was transferred back to the same country where they previously enjoyed absolute impunity, only to enjoy it again.

This troubling move was a reaction by the Swedish government to the Islamic Republic’s policy of detaining foreign or Iranian dual nationals and using them as pawns to gain leverage in its dealings with Western countries. Not only was it a slap in the face to the victims, but it also created dangerous precedents that will have a long-lasting, damaging impact on the core purpose of the universal jurisdiction principle—and, more importantly, on the expansion and frequency of its application.

Rooted in the post-World War II trials and recognized by multiple treaties—including the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1984 Convention against Torture—the principle of universal jurisdiction is increasingly codified in national legislation. Given the horrific nature of these crimes, humanity as a whole cannot tolerate their remaining unadjudicated. The principle of universal jurisdiction enables national courts in third countries to address atrocity crimes committed abroad, holding perpetrators criminally liable and helping to prevent impunity. One of the most essential purposes of applying the principle of universal jurisdiction is to prosecute those who enjoy impunity in countries where the crimes occurred.

It should be noted that international crimes are often committed by state actors under state policies or plans, meaning that victims cannot expect proper accountability as long as the state in question remains in power. In other words, if the state where the crimes were committed is able or willing to exercise its jurisdiction, other countries generally do not invoke universal jurisdiction to prosecute perpetrators. Similarly, if a person is convicted under universal jurisdiction, and the country where the crime occurred later undergoes a democratic transition, that person can be extradited to the country where the crime was committed to continue serving their sentence. Noury’s return to Tehran was met with a warm welcome by officials, featuring a red carpet, numerous flowers, and a press conference—nothing similar to the reception typically given to a convicted individual who is supposed to serve life in prison.

Setting aside the question of why Sweden pursued universal jurisdiction in the first place if there was no confidence that it would not retreat after facing backlash, it appears Sweden utilized an article (Chapter 12, Article 9) in its constitution that allows the government, “by exercising clemency, to remit or reduce a penal sanction.” Many other countries have similar laws or legislation permitting the transfer of foreign convicted criminals to serve their sentences in their home countries. The Swedish authorities’ decision to use this legislation after a long and costly criminal proceeding, which resulted in a conviction for atrocity crimes, could set a precedent for future cases concerning crimes committed not only in Iran, but in other countries. This approach could jeopardize the very essence of universal jurisdiction and significantly demotivate prosecutors from investigating crimes committed in countries such as Iran, Russia, and China, which have active hostage policies. What would be the point of initiating criminal proceedings and investing millions of taxpayer money if the outcome could potentially leave citizens in dreadful custody situations for months or even years, result in a diplomatic catastrophe, and ultimately deliver an international criminal back to a state that welcomes them warmly?

The international community has correctly identified immunity as a significant obstacle in the fight against impunity, and has moved toward prohibiting or limiting its application in cases involving atrocity crimes. In the same vein, amnesty provisions are considered to “be interpreted as contrary to states’ commitments under international law” in relation to core international crimes. The practice of transferring foreign convicted criminals who have committed atrocity crimes to their home countries, knowing they will be granted some form of clemency or otherwise released from the remainder of their sentences, should also be recognized as a major barrier to accountability.

There is a significant risk that the transfer of convicted war criminal Hamid Noury could lead to similar cases unless the international community addresses its detonating effects on the universal jurisdiction project. The only way to prevent such a paralyzing, contagious impact is to prohibit the transfer of those convicted of atrocity crimes to governments that have previously failed to prosecute them and are unlikely to enforce the sentences properly.

Shadi Sadr is a human rights lawyer and a member of the panel of judges at the International People’s Tribunals on Indonesia, Myanmar, and China. She co-founded and directed Justice for Iran, one of the organizers of the Iran Atrocities’ (Aban) Tribunal. Follow her on X: @shadisadr.

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With few options left, a limited peacekeeping force in Gaza could be the answer

Ahmed F. Alkhatib — Fri, 05 Jul 2024 17:55:58 +0000

Almost nine months after the horrific events of October 7, 2023, and the ensuing war against Hamas’s rule in Gaza by the Israeli military, the strategic picture has not changed in a way that Israel and its allies wanted. While Hamas is, in fact, weakened tactically and operationally, the group has not been strategically defeated and remains present throughout the strip—even in areas cleared by Israel Defense Forces (IDF) troops. The Islamist group’s total defeat, which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has long promised to deliver, remains elusive. So does the full release of all remaining hostages in Gaza, whether alive or dead.

The proposed ceasefire and hostage exchange deal, recently championed by the Joe Biden administration on May 31, has failed to move forward. It faces opposition from a hesitant Hamas that is dragging its feet, and from an intransigent Netanyahu who just declared he is backing away from the proposal, saying that he’s okay with exchanging some hostages but wants to resume the war after a pause. While some “day-after” scenarios have been proposed for what follows the war’s end, no progress has been made in establishing real and viable plans for who governs Gaza after the war or for a meaningful exit strategy for all parties involved.

There appears to be an unspoken alignment between Netanyahu and Hamas’s leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, to keep the war going in a manner that serves both parties’ divergent interests. Netanyahu is more likely to escape accountability for the shortcomings and grave miscalculations that resulted in the October 7, 2023 attack’s catastrophic success, arguably the worst single security failure on Israel’s territory. Furthermore, the chances of Netanyahu maintaining political power and avoiding early elections are greater with a protracted war in Gaza, a view that has become mainstream within Israeli society and politics. The Biden administration also seems to be aware of this reality, which is why the United States hosted opposition leader Benny Gantz and invited Defense Minister Yoav Gallant to Washington on June 23 to explore viable options beyond Netanyahu’s narrow interests.

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Sinwar and the hardline military commanders of Hamas, on the other hand, may have realized that a perpetual war in Gaza, even a low-intensity one, would ensure Hamas’s political and geo-strategic relevance and survival as a resistance movement. Should the war persist without an end in sight, the Israeli military is likely to maintain some presence in Gaza, allowing the Islamist group to engage in a protracted insurgency that would afford Hamas credibility and clout within Palestinian politics and the broader Arab and Muslim worlds. Should this happen, Sinwar might rid Hamas of the headache associated with governing Gaza, which proved difficult for the group amid perpetual blockades, financial sanctions, and limited resources for fulfilling the strip’s vast needs. This scenario would also outsource care for Gaza’s displaced and suffering civilians to the international community, which is currently the only source of humanitarian and medical support for the battered coastal enclave.

Netanyahu and Sinwar’s calculus would be disastrous for Israel and the Palestinians alike. The longer the war goes on, the more likely it is that a severe escalation with Hezbollah on Israel’s northern front will occur and trigger a broader war that could severely harm Israel militarily and weaken it strategically. Hezbollah’s capabilities are widely discussed as being vast and advanced, with the potential for wreaking extreme damage on Israeli cities and targets. In fact, Sinwar is likely hoping that a protracted war in Gaza increases the likelihood of a miscalculation in the north that could trigger a full-fledged war, which would consume Israel’s focus and attention—and increase regional instability in line with what Sinwar had hoped for in the first place when launching the October 7, 2023, attack. A wider conflict in the north also risks increased militancy targeting the Golan Heights through Iranian proxies in Syria and Iraq. Furthermore, scenes of destruction, widespread devastation, and loss of life in Lebanon will inflame tensions in the Arab and Muslim world, possibly destabilizing the fragile Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, which has struggled with Islamist political forces seeking to exploit the war in Gaza to undermine the monarchy’s rule. The Arab League’s decision to drop Hezbollah’s terror classification foreshadows the likely setbacks in Arab-Israeli relations should the Israeli military destroy Lebanon in a war the way that it did the Gaza Strip.

A perpetual low-intensity conflict in Gaza—which appears to be the upcoming new phase that Netanyahu has recently described—is effectively a form of stalemate that keeps the war going at a limited scale, which fails to achieve strategic results while preventing the reconstruction of Gaza or the introduction of alternatives to Hamas’s rule. A protracted stalemate would be extraordinarily painful and challenging for the families of Israeli hostages and Gaza’s battered Palestinian civilians alike. Hamas has made it crystal clear that it will not agree to any hostage exchange deal absent a complete cessation of the war—a deal that hostage families and their allies are demanding to ensure the safe release of their loved ones. As for Gazans who have faced nine months of bombardment, displacement, and humanitarian crises, the continuation of the war in the manner envisioned by Netanyahu or Sinwar would become a disastrous new chapter in their suffering and elevate their level of hopelessness, which could trigger new waves of radicalization and unpredictability.

In the near term, it is difficult to envision a serious shift in Netanyahu and Sinwar’s attitudes toward the Biden ceasefire and hostage deal. Nevertheless, the administration should push for small steps that could plant seeds for transformation and sustainable stability in the Gaza Strip, even amid a potential stalemate. The United States, its regional allies, moderate Palestinian players, and the international community need a secure beachhead in Gaza that could serve as a measure of stability in a deeply unstable territory.

This beachhead should start with a limited peacekeeping force that has an extremely narrow mandate: deploying along the Gaza Strip’s borders with Israel and Egypt. Critically, this would help separate the Palestinians from the Israelis, prevent the establishment of an Israeli-occupied buffer zone inside Gaza that would rob the Palestinians of precious territory, prevent infiltration and new cross-border attacks, and serve as an early-warning system to coordinate with Israeli authorities in case of future security incidents. Hamas’s incentives to agree to this mandate-limited force would stem from its serving as a separation shield that would cement the end of the war and prevent the permanent presence of Israeli occupation forces.

Additionally, this force would secure the Philadelphi Corridor to prevent future smuggling that would replenish Hamas’s stockpiles of munitions and illicit items. Limiting the force’s mandate to border security and protection would mean that participating troops, ideally from Arab and Muslim nations, would not need to carry out counterterrorism operations inside Gaza. The lower risks of harm to their soldiers would increase the likelihood that various nations would agree to be part of this effort.

On the Gaza side, a primary benefit of border security with such a limited force is that the area near the Rafah and Kerem Shalom crossings in Gaza’s southeastern territory could become a beachhead of stability. These two crossings, one of which is no longer functional, are critical for facilitating the entry and exit of humanitarian aid and people in the coastal enclave. The area by the Kerem Shalom crossing, where desperately needed aid comes in, is regularly targeted by bandits and looters who compromise the safety of aid delivery by seizing trucks immediately after they enter Gaza. The proposed peacekeeping force could stabilize the area, allowing for the establishment of makeshift medical, administrative, and other installations and facilities that could become headquarters for Gaza’s reconstruction and a new administrative entity.

Palestinians and Israelis would want separate assurances for such a limited force to work: Palestinians would need guarantees that it will not be a permanent “foreign occupation,” and Israelis would require assurance that this force will not become another version of the impotent United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) that hasn’t stopped Hezbollah from threatening Israeli territories in southern Lebanon.

Ending the war in Gaza—even through the Biden ceasefire and hostage deal and without introducing any executive foothold in Gaza that breaks Hamas’s monopoly on control—would risk a permanent stalemate with no progress toward political transformation in the coastal enclave. The limited scope, mandate, and deployment zone of this proposed peacekeeping force make it much more likely that an internationally binding agreement for its formation could be reached quickly.

Hamas remains present and relevant as a player in Gaza, and that cannot be changed anytime soon. While the group is significantly weakened and lacks the territorial and administrative control it once had, its continued existence in Gaza is all but assured. No viable immediate alternatives exist to challenge the group’s monopoly, due to both Israeli war-planning failures and the deep entrenchment of Hamas in Palestinian society.

Given the absence of ideal options and alternatives, the only way forward includes gradual political transformation, security arrangements that contain Hamas, and not giving Hamas an opportunity to engage in the kind of perpetual insurgency that a direct Israeli occupation would enable. The Biden administration and its regional allies are running out of time to insert a body other than Hamas, even in a limited capacity and scope, before the war in Gaza ends.

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. Follow him on X: @afalkhatib.

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Hamas’s resistance doctrine is making it harder to broker a deal

Amir Asmar — Tue, 02 Jul 2024 18:10:49 +0000

As the war in Gaza approaches its tenth month, there is palpable desperation on the part of the Joe Biden administration to end the conflict and its attendant political consequences. So far, the administration has struggled to justify its near-unconditional support of the Israeli government in light of the tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians dead and wounded—particularly to elements of the Democratic Party and to Arab-Americans who will play a critical role in several battleground states in the upcoming presidential election. On the flipside, the administration has angered staunch supporters of Israel by criticizing Israel’s conduct in the war, its restriction of humanitarian assistance to Gaza civilians, and its continued rejection of postwar planning. President Biden’s latest plan to end the war—attributed to the Israeli government and presented on May 31—drew Israeli equivocation and Hamas amendments that were deemed unacceptable by senior administration officials.

Apart from indifference to the US president’s political struggles, there are a number of reasons why Hamas is not jumping at Biden’s proposal. First and foremost, Hamas is an Islamist organization, and its resistance to Israel is riddled with rigid religious principles that permit no operational or strategic half-measures. Hamas’s 2017 charter characterizes Palestine—congruent with the mandate—as highly esteemed in Islam, probably due to its unique holy places. Hamas argues that Palestine is both the spirit and central cause of the ummah (Islamic community), and that Islam values standing up to aggression. In Hamas’s characterization, Israel is a colonial project imposed by force, and its settlement and Judaization of the country are illegitimate. Conversely, it sees all means to advance the struggle against Israel as legitimate. Escalating, de-escalating, or diversifying the means of the conflict are integral to the conduct of the fight. Much recent reporting reduces Hamas to its terrorist identity, rather than evaluating the group as a whole. Presenting an offer that Hamas would accept requires a full understanding of how the group perceives itself in the context of broader Islamic principles.

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Second, Hamas clearly intended to alter the sclerotic state of the Palestinian pursuit of independence, much as former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat did when he initiated a military assault and subsequent diplomatic initiative to reclaim the Sinai Peninsula from Israeli occupation on October 6, 1973. With regard to Palestinian statehood, prior to the October 7, 2023 attack, the Israelis were unreceptive, the corrupt Palestinian Authority was ineffectual, and the United States was disinterested. By conducting the brutal attack, displacing Israelis, highlighting Israel’s intelligence and military shortcomings, and promoting regional instability—both directly and via its allies Hezbollah and Iran—Hamas has gained the United States’ focus, if not Israel’s, on resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, although not on Hamas’s terms. As long as the Gaza war goes on, despite significant battlefield losses, Hamas is stoking Israeli anxiety by holding its hostages, displacing its civilians, engaging its troops in deadly battle—with more than three hundred Israeli troops killed in ground combat as of mid-June—and making the status quo ante more difficult to restore.

Third, Hamas leaders understood that Israel would, as it has countless other times, respond disproportionately to Hamas’s attack and inevitably lose the worldwide sympathy it gained on October 7, 2023. Apart from the latest Gaza Health Ministry numbers of some thirty-eight thousand killed and at least eighty-five thousand injured, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Health Organization, and the Palestinian government estimate that, as of June 30, Israeli attacks had damaged 80 percent of Gaza’s commercial facilities, 88 percent of school buildings, and 267 places of worship, while half of Gaza’s thirty-five hospitals were only partially functioning. Hamas’s use of civilian facilities for operational centers and weapons caches is bait to which Israel routinely rises with minimal regard for civilian casualties. So the longer the war continues, the more likely it is that Israel will continue to suffer worldwide approbation to Hamas’s and the Palestinians’ benefit, as was demonstrated by Norway, Ireland, and Spain recognizing Palestine as a state on May 22. As Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’s military leader in Gaza and the architect of the October 7 attack, recently said, “We have the Israelis right where we want them.” According to the Wall Street Journal, Sinwar also described Palestinian civilian deaths as “necessary sacrifices,” citing past high-casualty Arab independence conflicts like Algeria’s.

Fourth, Hamas understands that it has leverage over Israel due to the roughly 120 hostages it continues to hold, including those believed to be dead, and its readiness to continue the conflict. Conversely, the leverage Israel holds—its ability to kill Palestinians, both militants and civilians, and to destroy infrastructure—is a sacrifice Hamas and other groups are manifestly willing to accept. Though it desires an end to the war, Hamas is working to extract the maximum benefits it can, including denying Israel the “complete” victory Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu keeps vainly promising. Hamas leaders likely assess they can outlast the pressure on Israel’s government to secure the release of the hostages. They have set the price for the hostages’ release to be the complete end of the war, including Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and, by extension, Hamas’s continued involvement in Gazan affairs. On June 20, Israeli military spokesperson Daniel Hagari rejected the notion that completely eliminating Hamas was a realistic war aim, a statement that signaled growing tension between Netanyahu and Israel’s security establishment—a tension that Hamas has no doubt also noted. There was never a possibility of a Hamas military victory, but Sinwar and other leaders are fervently pursuing a political triumph that remains within reach.

For all these reasons, Hamas is unlikely to agree to any terms to end the Gaza conflict unless Sinwar assesses they represent the maximum “victory” he can extract. The recent Biden offer, designed to satisfy Israeli equities, continues to fall short. Sinwar spent decades in Israeli prison, learned Hebrew, studied Jewish history, and extensively examined Israeli media to better comprehend his adversary. Whether his decision-making regarding the conflict is sound or not, the Biden administration should not expect Sinwar’s acceptance of an offer Hamas assesses it can improve upon merely by holding out. Hamas views its resistance as religiously mandated, and nine months of military and political pressure have not altered its position.

Amir Asmar is an adjunct professor of Middle East issues at the National Intelligence University. He was previously a senior executive and Middle East and terrorism analyst in the US Department of Defense.

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Ending the war in Ukraine requires something for everyone to hate

Dan Reiter — Thu, 20 Jun 2024 14:06:22 +0000

The war in Ukraine seems as difficult to end as it is horrific to watch. It’s a bloody puzzle: Why have Ukraine and Russia continued fighting for so long, tearing each other to pieces? Why can’t they get to a peace deal and end the slaughter?

In a recent book, I examined why some wars are so difficult to end. I found that a fundamental problem causing wars to endure is belligerents’ deep distrust that the adversary will respect a war-ending peace deal. Even when a possible war-ending deal has acceptable terms, if a belligerent thinks that its adversary will break the deal the belligerent won’t take it, and the war will grind on.

This deep lack of trust has fueled many long and bloody wars. In 1940, UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill sloughed off Germany’s peace feelers, knowing that the Nazis could not be trusted. More recently, the Syrian civil war has dragged on for more than a decade because rebel groups have no faith in the word of the Assad government. The shadow of what might happen after a peace deal is struck affects whether parties will accept a peace deal in the first place.

Of course, there is an ocean of suspicion between Moscow and Kyiv. Ukraine deeply distrusts Russia, as Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea, support for the Donbas insurgency, and 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine violate the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Russia agreed to respect Ukraine’s borders and sovereignty.

Worse, some possible peace terms, such as granting Russia permanent control of the economically valuable and militarily important Donbas region, would shift the balance of power in Russia’s favor. Ukraine would be especially unlikely to accept this kind of deal, because it would expand a strengthened Russia’s incentives to break the deal down the line. This was one reason why Churchill refused to negotiate, as he feared that Nazi leader Adolf Hitler would demand British colonies and naval disarmament in any peace deal, leaving Britain helpless to resist eventual German demands for total British capitulation.

Russia, judging by its official statements, distrusts Ukraine and the West. It claims that post–Cold War NATO expansion eastward broke a commitment to respect Russia’s sphere of interest. “Thus, an absolutely unacceptable threat to us was steadily being created right on our borders,” Russian President Vladimir Putin said in May 2022.

The right kind of peace deal, agreed to by Russia, is the best means for Ukraine to recover important territory.

So, what options remain? How can the two sides find a way out, short of Russia grinding Ukraine to pieces, and leaving aside the unrealistic dream of Putin’s removal by a pro-peace faction in Russia?

History suggests what might and might not work. In conflicts between smaller belligerents, international peacekeepers can help ameliorate mistrust. But given Russia’s size and veto power on the United Nations Security Council, peacekeepers won’t be part of the solution. Russia cynically ignored monitors from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe when they were sent to eastern Ukraine in the late 2010s.

The “Korea option” may also be politically challenging. Though the United States still deeply distrusted North Korea and China in 1953, Washington agreed to a ceasefire effectively ending the Korean War because South Korean security could still rest on three stout legs: an alliance between the United States and South Korea, the long-term deployment of a substantial number of US troops to the peninsula, and the US nuclear deterrent.

The Korea option for Ukraine would come with political challenges, at least in the near term. At the upcoming NATO Summit in July, the Alliance will likely outline the terms of a “bridge” to Ukraine’s accession, expanding on its 2008 soft commitment to eventual Ukrainian membership. But the politics of Ukraine actually joining NATO appear uncertain. NATO membership for the country would require the unanimous consent of allies, and one could envision Turkey, Hungary, or isolationists in the US Senate blocking this move. Indeed, it appears that in the spring of 2022, an obstacle to a possible path to ending the war emerged in part because Washington indicated that it was unwilling to consider Ukraine’s condition for a NATO-like security guarantee from the United States.

But there is a possible way forward. Imagine that, after the war, the West were to agree not to NATO membership but rather to help Ukraine become sufficiently powerful on its own to deter future Russian attacks by providing military aid and training, as well as by helping Ukraine improve its arms industry. A recent RAND report described a variant of this approach as a “porcupine” strategy, making Ukraine a sufficiently prickly target that Russia would leave it alone.

This strategy would maintain the ability of NATO members to stay out of a future Russia-Ukraine war, making it politically palatable for the West. For Ukraine, it would represent a path to long-term security that does not rely on hopes of benign Russian intentions. And, if this promise was coupled with the sizeable carrot of Russian withdrawal from Ukrainian territory captured after the 2022 invasion, Ukraine could be brought on board.

For Russia, the principal attraction of this option would be a de facto, if not de jure, promise not to include Ukraine in NATO. Russia might be more likely to believe in an informal no-membership commitment if it received assurances that Turkey and Hungary would veto Ukrainian membership. Such a promise from Hungary is easy to imagine, given its recent efforts to block the European Union from even sending weapons to Ukraine.

This kind of no-membership concession might help end the war in another way: It would be a fig leaf for Putin. Recent work reveals that Putin understood that the war was a mistake as early as March 2022. Today, he might remain open to finding a way to end the war, especially given that Russia has already suffered perhaps 150,000 military deaths and may run out of tanks and combat vehicles by summer 2025. However, without a fig-leaf concession, Putin risks being turned out of power by disaffected nationalist elites or military officers. Other dictators have sometimes lost power this way, as when Pakistan’s strongman leader Yahya Khan was overthrown after his country was vivisected in the 1971 Bangladesh War. Fig leaves can help buy the support of pro-war militaries for peace deals. In 1945, the United States’ agreement to leave the emperor alone was critical in helping the Japanese military accept otherwise unconditional surrender.

Some might propose pursuing the porcupine strategy unilaterally, pouring aid into Ukraine without bothering to get Russian assent to a peace deal. However, the past year has shown that even if well-armed, Ukraine will find it difficult to recapture territory through offensive operations. The right kind of peace deal, agreed to by Russia, is the best means for Ukraine to recover important territory.

Critics would argue that this deal has something for everyone to hate: Ukraine gives up on its dream of NATO membership and perhaps de facto accepts the Russian occupation of Crimea, the West agrees to long-term military and economic aid to Ukraine, and Russia withdraws from post-2022 captured Ukrainian territory. But in politics and in business, parties are in the realm of a feasible deal when all of them find that deal to be painful.

Such a deal is becoming more possible because the war is a bloody stalemate for all sides. As the staggering costs of war continue to rise, all parties will become increasingly willing to strike a politically painful deal to end the war. Further, especially if Donald Trump does not win the November US presidential election and then withdraw US support for Ukraine, it is difficult for either Ukraine or Russia to imagine military victory anytime soon.

To reach peace, Ukraine and its Western partners must find a way to surmount mistrust. Doing so will not be easy. But to prevent tens if not hundreds of thousands more deaths, they must try.

Dan Reiter is the Samuel Candler Dobbs professor of political science at Emory University and author of the award-winning book, How Wars End (Princeton, 2009).

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Ukraine’s peace summit offers solidarity but no breakthroughs

Mercedes Sapuppo — Tue, 18 Jun 2024 19:06:16 +0000

Over the weekend of June 15-16, almost one hundred representatives of countries from around the globe and several international organizations gathered in Switzerland for a Summit on Peace in Ukraine. Described by some commentators as “the largest diplomatic effort” in Ukraine’s history, the summit was designed to rally international support for the Ukrainian vision of a peaceful, sustainable, and just settlement to the war sparked by Russia’s invasion.

While the event produced some encouraging signals and shone a light on how Russia’s invasion affects the broader international community, it did not produce any major diplomatic breakthroughs. Instead, the summit represented a small but significant step forward in what looks set to be a far longer peace process.

The absence of many leading nations from the Global South did much to weaken the summit’s potential impact, suggesting that Ukrainian diplomats still have much work to do at the bilateral level. Significantly, key participating countries including Brazil, India, South Africa, and Saudi Arabia chose not to sign the official summit communique supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Since 2022, these countries have all been hesitant to back Ukraine or openly condemn Russia’s invasion.

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The event in Switzerland came during a period of intense diplomatic activity for Ukraine. On the eve of the peace summit, G7 leaders agreed to provide Ukraine with a $50 billion loan financed by interest on Russian assets that remain frozen in Europe and the US. On the sidelines of the G7 meeting, the US and Ukraine signed a landmark ten-year bilateral security agreement. During the peace summit itself, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was also able to hold bilateral meetings with a number of leaders from Global South nations including Argentina, Chile, and Côte d’Ivoire.

Ukraine came to the summit hoping to galvanize international support for President Zelenskyy’s ten-point peace plan. In particular, Kyiv officials sought to emphasize the importance of advancing nuclear safety, protecting food security, releasing prisoners of war, and returning Ukrainian children abducted by Russia since the start of the full-scale invasion. In a broader sense, the event also aimed to keep ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine in the international spotlight.

Ultimately, seventy-eight countries signed the final communique recognizing that respect for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty must serve as the basis for any future peace agreement. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen sought to downplay expectations regarding the event, noting that peace could not be achieved in a single step. The summit was not a peace negotiation because Putin is not serious about ending the war, she commented. “He is insisting on capitulation. He is insisting on ceding Ukrainian territory, even territory that today is not occupied by him. He is insisting on disarming Ukraine, leaving it vulnerable to future aggression. No country would ever accept these outrageous terms,” stated von der Leyen in reference to a rival peace plan unveiled by Russian President Vladimir Putin on the eve of the Swiss summit.

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Russia did not receive an invitation to participate in the peace summit. Crucially, China also chose not to attend. US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan suggested Putin had asked China to turn down Ukraine’s invitation. In the build-up to the event, President Zelenskyy also accused Beijing of working to discourage others from attending Ukraine’s peace initiative. Meanwhile, a number of participating countries from the Global South spoke in Switzerland of the need to involve Russia in any future peace process.

While the Kremlin’s apparent spoiling tactics failed to derail Ukraine’s peace initiative entirely, Russian influence did nevertheless loom large over the Swiss summit and is clearly still a significant factor. China’s decision not to back the event was arguably even more important, with many observers arguing that Beijing’s stance succeeded in preventing the emergence of a more global consensus on the path toward peace in Ukraine.

Nevertheless, the participation of numerous countries regarded as being on good terms with the Kremlin underlined the potential of this peace initiative, with the likes of Qatar, Hungary, and Serbia all signing the final communique. While some had hoped for a more meaningful outcome, this modest progress should be enough to convince Kyiv officials and the country’s partners that additional diplomatic efforts in this direction are worthwhile and may yet produce results.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Charles Johnson — Mon, 13 May 2024 18:11:16 +0000

On Thursday, April 25, the Atlantic Council’s WIn Fellowship hosted a panel discussion on the vital role Arab women ambassadors play in shaping the field of diplomacy, both in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, and globally.

The conversation was moderated by Lynn Monzer, Deputy Director of the Atlantic Council’s WIn Fellowship and featured H.E. Sheikha Al-Zain Al-Sabah, Ambassador of the State of Kuwait to the United States of America; H.E. Hanene Tajouri Bessassi, Ambassador of the Republic of Tunisia to the United States of America; and H.E. Amal Mudallali, former Ambassador to the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations (UN).

Deciding on diplomacy

H.E. Sheikha Al-Zain Al-Sabah initiated the conversation by sharing insights from her background in journalism, where she encountered diverse mindsets through storytelling. This experience highlighted her natural diplomatic skills, as navigating complex systems and creating sustainable solutions in business mirrored key aspects of diplomacy. These experiences and insights logically paved the way for her career in diplomacy.

Similarly, H.E. Hanene Tajouri Bessassi transitioned from an initial aspiration to become a physician to recognizing the diplomatic field as another form of healing. In her view, diplomacy involves listening to those in distress, diagnosing societal issues, and crafting viable solutions, thus paralleling the healing processes in medicine.

Like Al-Sabah, H.E. Amal Mudallali started in journalism, with ambitions centered on reporting at the UN. After achieving this, she ventured deeper into politics, eventually serving under two Lebanese prime ministers and later as the Ambassador of Lebanon to the UN. She emphasized the critical role of male allies in politics, where men predominantly hold power but greatly benefit from women’s collaborative and problem-solving skills.

In addition to winding career paths, all three diplomats agreed on the importance of a robust support system for success in diplomacy. Bessassi thanked her parents and husband specifically for the strength, independence, and commitment necessary to work in the diplomatic field. Echoing the sentiment on support systems, Mudallali highlighted her grandmother’s empowering role during her upbringing. She also stressed the crucial need for political backing, citing the potential difficulties and injustices faced without such support. Al-Sabah, similarly, underscored the significance of a nurturing ecosystem for achieving success. For her, the focus is on contributing back to this ecosystem and the broader community, often through mentoring other women, providing support, advice, and honest guidance on their professional journeys.

Navigating the field’s challenges

Bessassi then turned to the challenges facing women in diplomacy. She noted that despite Tunisia’s rich history of influential women leaders, gender parity remains elusive. This disparity is underscored by prevailing gender stereotypes that still hinder women’s effectiveness in all fields, including diplomacy. Bessassi argued against the perception that empathy—a trait often associated with women—is a weakness. Instead, she illustrated how empathy enhances diplomatic efforts by fostering consensus and compromise, bringing more people into the fold while working toward peace and cooperation.

The underrepresentation of women in global diplomacy was further addressed by Al-Sabah, who pointed out that women make up only 21 percent of ambassadors worldwide. She emphasized the importance of improving representation and noted that the participation of women on the panel, along with other women ambassadors in the United States from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Mauritania, represents significant progress in altering public perceptions about women in diplomacy.

Mudallali echoed these concerns with specific examples from the United Nations, where women’s representation has been backsliding; the number of women UN representatives decreased from 52 in 2020 to 46 today. She linked this trend to a global phenomenon such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as countries have become more brazen in rejecting previously held norms such as equal gender representation. She also noted the decrease in women’s participation in peace negotiations. In 2020, women represented 23 percent of negotiators in active peace processes, dropping to 16 percent in 2023. Based on analysis of real-world peace processes, agreements between negotiators are much more likely to be reached when women have a strong influence on the negotiations.

Al-Sabah added that 2023 saw a 50 percent increase in war-induced violence against women, reinforcing the necessity for women’s voices in peace negotiations. This backslide in gender representation, Mudallali argued, demands urgent attention and action in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which focuses on women, peace, and security.

Bessassi acknowledged these recent challenges nut also emphasized the power of collective effort among women ambassadors, which has the potential to catalyze global change. Mudallali shared this sentiment,expressing her feeling of responsibility to do everything possible to elevate women, believing that these challenges require structured, codified solutions. Al-Sabah concluded by underscoring the importance of integrating advocacy into diplomacy to empower women effectively. In Kuwait, for instance, the government established the Department of Human Rights within the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in part to address women’s empowerment. Internationally, too, organizations with similar aims must work together to implement Resolution 1325 to ensure countries adhere to international principles of women’s empowerment. For young women in the MENA region and beyond, seeing women in these roles not only offers a glimpse of what is possible but also instills hope and inspiration.

The future of diplomacy

Building on the theme of hope, Al-Sabah discussed a significant shift toward civic diplomacy following Israel’s invasion of Gaza, with women taking on an increased role in this space. She highlighted the courageous efforts of journalists like Shireen Abu Akleh, Plestia Alaqad, and Hind Khoudary who have used their personal cameras and cellphones to broadcast their voices are around the world. Al-Sabah stressed the urgent need for greater protection of journalists in Gaza and around the world, who face harassment and life-threatening dangers in their line of work.

Continuing the conversation, Bessassi emphasized the increasing importance of multilateralism now more than ever in addressing global challenges. She called for consistency in the international community’s approach, as the international community’s engagement on issues like the war in Gaza must avoid “double standards” to effectively address challenges in diplomacy.

Mudallali echoed the sentiments of her colleagues, concluding the panel with a call for strong advocacy for peace. She pointed out that recent global tensions have shifted the focus from collaboration to competition. By supporting women in diplomatic roles, Mudallali argued, societies will not only lift but also enhance their prospects for achieving lasting peace.

The way forward

Over a century since the first appointment of a women ambassador in 1920, women remain severely underrepresented in the predominantly male diplomacy sector. As of 2023, women account for only 20.54 percent of ambassadors worldwide, a decrease from 23 percent in 2020. The disparity is even more pronounced in the MENA region, where women make up just 10 percent of ambassadors, the lowest regional rate globally, highlighting a significant challenge for women in MENA diplomacy.

Despite these daunting numbers in MENA, there have been some encouraging signs of progress. The United Arab Emirates, for instance, has increased its proportion of women ambassadors by 5.5 percent between 2018 and 2023, reaching 12.5 percent. Additionally, a recent Arab Barometer report has shown a marked decrease throughout the MENA region over the past decade in the belief that men are better political leaders than women, suggesting growing acceptance of women in political and diplomatic roles.

However, effectively capitalizing on these openings requires systematic and sustained support. Algeria serves as a cautionary tale where a 2011 gender quota led to increased opposition to women in political leadership due to the absence of systemic improvements or societal readiness for such changes. Conversely, Tunisia witnessed an increase in openness toward women political leadership after the implementation of a similar quota and was further bolstered by President Kais Saied’s appointment of Najla Bouden Romdhane as the first female prime minister in the MENA region. These moves demonstrate that political backing and continued support of women is a crucial component to increasing women’s representation at both the political and diplomatic levels.

In addition to national efforts, international initiatives are crucial. UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which calls for women’s equal participation in preventing violent conflicts, is particularly significant. Supporting this resolution could significantly legitimize women’s roles in conflict mediation. This is supported by data showing that peace negotiations involving women are 35 percent more likely to last for at least fifteen years. Therefore, in the midst of shifting attitudes, a global drive for greater women participation in diplomacy, and the myriad conflicts necessitating peace negotiations, reform toward gender parity in diplomacy is as pressing and timely as ever for the MENA region.

Charles Johnson is a Young Global professional in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs

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Jun 14, 2023

The WIn Fellowship 2023-2024 cohort

Building on the success of its inaugural cohort, the Women Innovators Fellowship (WIn) is expanding to Bahrain and the UAE, in addition to Saudi Arabia, as it continues to empower more women entrepreneurs from the Middle East. The program is thrilled to announce this year’s eighty-six recipients of its 2023 WIn Fellowship. The participants will receive a year-long program of executive education, mentoring, and networking opportunities in collaboration with Georgetown McDonough School of Business and with the support of the United States embassies in the three target countries and PepsiCo.

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2024 WIn Fellowship Roadshow

WIn Fellows participate in a fully sponsored trip to the United States for leadership training at Georgetown and meetings with US business and government leaders.

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2023 WIn Fellowship Roadshow

The WIn Fellowship roadshow is led by the Atlantic Council’s empowerME Initiative in cooperation with Georgetown University’s McDonough School of Business with support from US Embassy Riyadh, UPS, and PepsiCo. The WIn Fellowship Roadshow participants, chosen from a highly competitive cohort of more than thirty applicants, receive a fully sponsored trip to the United States for leadership training at Georgetown and meetings with US business and government leaders.

The nuclear fatwa that wasn’t—how Iran sold the world a false narrative

Khosro Sayeh Isfahani — Thu, 09 May 2024 19:14:54 +0000

“The idea struck me to introduce the concept of a fatwa [during the 2004 nuclear] negotiations. There was no coordination [in advance],” Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator at the time recounted eight years after the incident. This was nothing short of a stroke of genius in shaping a false narrative about the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program, which was delivered by a cleric who eventually rose in the ranks and became a two-term president (2013–2021): Hassan Rouhani.

In a 2012 interview with local magazine Mehrnameh, Rouhani recounted the 2004 talks with the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and claimed that he told them that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei “has issued a fatwa and declared it forbidden to acquire a bomb. This fatwa is more important for us than the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] and the additional protocol. It is more important to us than any law.”

Rouhani added that he was referencing comments made by the supreme leader ahead of Friday prayers in Tehran a week prior, when Khamenei said, “No, we aren’t thinking about nuclear weapons. I have said many times that our nuclear weapon is this nation. Our nuclear weapons are these youths. We don’t want nuclear weapons. A state that has so many young believers and this unified nation doesn’t need nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons, their production, storage, and use, each has a problem. We have also expressed our religious opinion, which is clear, and everyone knows it.”

However, Khamenei’s “religious opinion” about nuclear arms has always been a carefully crafted message concocted and repeated by him—never in writing but only in speeches—in which he has exclusively called the “use” of nuclear arms “haram” (forbidden).

The campaign of deceit was initiated when the Islamic Republic saw its survival at imminent risk. In a speech the day after the March 20, 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Khamenei said, “We don’t want a nuclear bomb. We are even opposed to having chemical weapons…These things don’t agree with our principles.”

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Over the years, Khamenei and other high-ranking officials have repeated this line while Iranian scientists were busy developing “all necessary components” for the development of a nuclear weapon— and the supreme leader has consistently celebrated these scientists.

Tracking Khamenei’s comments over the past two decades demonstrates that he never issued a fatwa against building a nuclear weapon, and only tentatively and revocably spoke against the use of weapons of mass destruction.

The “fatwa”

What eventually became a staple talking point of Iranian diplomats was sold to world powers as the supreme leader’s “fatwa” prohibiting nuclear arms. In reality, it was the last paragraph of his message to the first iteration of the International Conference on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, which Tehran hosted in 2010.

The segment of the message marketed by the Iranian diplomatic missions as a “fatwa” reads, “We believe that adding to nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical weapons and biological weapons, are a serious threat to humanity. The Iranian nation, which itself is a victim of the use of chemical weapons, feels more than other nations the danger of the production and accumulation of such weapons and is ready to put all its resources in the way of dealing with it. We consider the use of these weapons to be haram (forbidden), and the effort to protect mankind from this great disaster is everyone’s duty.”

The supreme leader’s official website includes several pages dedicated to explaining his stance on nuclear arms, with one listing all comments he has made about them. Among the eighty-five quotes, the word “haram” is used only three times and exclusively about the “use of nuclear weapons,” not their production or stockpiling. He has also twice called the “use” of weapons of mass destruction a “great sin.”

On the same page, the only quote that includes the term “fatwa” comes from a 2015 speech and reads, “We don’t want a nuclear weapon. Not because of what they say, but because of ourselves, because of our religion, because of our rational reasons. This is both our religious fatwa and our rational fatwa. Our rational fatwa is that we don’t need nuclear weapons today, tomorrow, or ever. Nuclear weapons are a source of trouble for a country like ours.”

In sharia law, all acts fall into five categories: wajib (obligatory), mustahab (recommended), mubah (neutral), makruh (disapproved), and haram (forbidden). In the case of nuclear weapons, the supreme leader clearly, and presumably intentionally, has avoided labeling the “production and storage” of nuclear arms with a religious label, leaving room for a nuclear weapons program.

In addition to beguiling world powers with a false narrative about the nonexistent fatwa, the double-speak commentary by the supreme leader gives powerful factions within the regime enough ammunition to pursue the development of a nuclear weapon.

Furthermore, a point of pride for Shia Muslims is that fatwas are not inherently permanent, and Islamic jurists can—and often do—reinterpret the scripture “in accord with the needs of time.” Throughout the history of political Islam, Shia ayatollahs have used fatwas as a political tool against adversaries. For example, in the 1890s, Ayatollah Mirza Shirazi issued a fatwa during nationwide protests after the ruling Qajar Dynasty granted a British merchant a monopoly on the growth, sale, and export of tobacco in Iran. This forced the king to revoke the monopoly; after it served its political purpose, the fatwa was also removed.

A “cornered cat”

Iranian officials have consistently warned that, if push comes to shove, they might openly seek nuclear weapons.

In 2021, then Intelligence Minister Mahmoud Alavi told state television, “The Supreme Leader has explicitly said in his fatwa that nuclear weapons are against sharia law and the Islamic Republic sees them as religiously forbidden and does not pursue them. But a cornered cat may behave differently from when the cat is free. And if [Western states] push Iran in that direction, then it’s no longer Iran’s fault.”

In June 2023, Khamenei warned world powers that they “cannot stop” his regime if it desires to build nuclear weapons—a threat echoed by Iran’s former nuclear chief, Ali Akbar Salehi. In February, Salehi boasted that the regime has “all components” necessary for building a bomb.

With heightened tensions in the Middle East, and amid the Islamic Republic’s four-decade war with Israel creeping out of the shadows and into the open, the clerical establishment has been testing the waters for openly announcing its nuclear aspirations.

In a March speech at a Quran exhibition, Hojatolislam Mohammad Fuker Meibodi said that the Muslim holy book orders believers to amass weapons that would “sow fear in the heart of the enemies.” He argued that weapons of the past—namely swords and cannons—will not achieve that aim and “therefore, maybe we should acquire nuclear weapons.”

Iranian nuclear scientist Mahmoud Reza Aghamiri—who has ties to the supreme leader’s office and currently serves as dean of Shahid Beheshti University—said on state television on April 7 that the supreme leader “can tomorrow change his stance” on building nuclear weapons and that his regime “has the capability” to make the leap because building the bomb is “not complicated.”

Aghamiri is among the top Iranian officials who have publicly endorsed the development of a nuclear bomb. In 2022, he said that Tehran can speed up uranium enrichment to 99 percent, build a nuclear warhead, and use it as both “deterrence” and a bargaining chip in interactions with the West “like North Korea,” which, according to him, gets away with “bullying” the world.

Such rhetoric has only intensified in Iran following the April 13 attack against Israel in retaliation for the April 1 killing of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders in Syria. Anticipating a response from Israel, which eventually arrived on April 19, Iranian officials warned against the targeting of nuclear facilities in the country.

On April 18, Ahmad Haghtalab, the IRGC commander in charge of nuclear security, said, “If the false Zionist regime decides to exploit the threat of attacking our country’s nuclear sites to pressure Iran, revision of Islamic Republic’s nuclear policies and doctrine and dropping of previously announced considerations in possible and perceivable.” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting reported his comments, sharing a video of him pronouncing the nuclear threat.

Javan, an influential daily close to the IRGC, wrote on the same day that it was the “first time a senior IRGC official” issued such a threat, and noted that state media were forcefully highlighting the comments, signaling “coordination with top decision-making bodies.”

The daily argued that every state’s primary goal is “survival no matter the cost” and that, before launching the April 13 attack against the “nuclear armed” Israel, Tehran had “prepared itself for engagement at highest level or at least is seeking to establish a new equilibrium.”

Javan warned “Israel to take the warning serious” because “all technical hurdles have been removed and with a wave of the hand from Imam Khamenei” and the regime “can” build a nuclear bomb.

Pro-reform daily Hammihan wrote on April 20 that the Islamic Republic’s attack against Israel from Iranian soil has “created a new norm of confrontation” between the two nations. According to the daily, in this new context, proxy forces “cannot provide the deterrence Iran needs.” The daily argued that if “Iran is pushed towards acquiring a nuclear weapon or adopting nuclear ambiguity, it would benefit from increased deterrence.”

On April 22, a member of the National Security Commission of the parliament, Javad Karimi Ghodousi, wrote on X (formerly Twitter), “If [supreme leader] issues permission, we would be a week away from testing the first [nuclear bomb].”

As an officer of the IRGC, Ghodousi has high security clearance. Through his key position in the parliament, he is privy to military decisions made at the top of the food chain. This attracted much attention when, ahead of the April 13 strike against Israel, he tweeted that the attack was happening “in a matter of hours.”

In an apparent effort to soften heightened rhetoric, on April 22, the spokesperson of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, Naser Kanani said, “Nuclear weapons have no place in Iran’s defense and military strategy.”

Iran-based security analyst Alireza Taghavinia, a frequent guest of state television, reacted to the mixed signals out of Tehran, writing on X, “General Haghtalab has fulfilled his assigned duty. [MP] Karimi Qudousi has sent the necessary pulse. The Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson has also fulfilled his inherent duty. Politics has complexities and subtleties that not everyone can understand.”

Ghodousi doubled down on the comments on April 23, in a video saying that the International Atomic Energy Agency is aware that the Islamic Republic “needs half a day or maximum a week to build a nuclear warhead.”

The nuclear threat has been echoed by people privy to the supreme leader’s thinking as well. On May 9, Khamenei’s top foreign policy advisor Kamal Kharrazi warned that if Israel threatens the existence of the Islamic Republic, Tehran will change its nuclear doctrine. “We have no decision to build a nuclear bomb but should Iran’s existence be threatened, there will have no choice but to change our military doctrine,” Kharrazi told Al Jazeera Mubasher.

A Persian proverb advises that, before shouting an insult, it is best to first murmur it to test the waters. The crescendoing chorus of Iranian officials, from IRGC generals to members of parliament to scientists advocating for the development of a nuclear weapon as “deterrent” is another sign of how a nuclear weapons program may emerge from the shadows. Unsurprisingly, all Iranian officials signaling this possible change in policy have pointed to the so-called “fatwa” and its impermanent nature—another sign of the move being orchestrated by the upper echelons of the clerical establishment.

Eyeing tectonic shifts in global power dynamics, the eighty-five-year-old Khamenei, who has unchecked powers and delusions about divine intervention on his behalf, is besieged by crises at every corner. In response, he appears to be shedding his decades-old habit of being a cautious gambler. Now a “cornered cat,” the ailing ayatollah, in a rush to solidify his legacy, is more likely than ever to embark on a path toward a nuclear weapon to ensure the survival of the Islamic Republic.

Khosro Sayeh Isfahani is an advocate, journalist, and Internet researcher with years of experience working in Iran, including work related to the LGBTQI community.

The post The nuclear fatwa that wasn’t—how Iran sold the world a false narrative appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Dispatch from Gaza: ‘My son, every night he screams and convulses’

Arwa Damon — Fri, 12 Apr 2024 21:11:19 +0000

It’s a crucible of human misery, this tented existence that spills out of shelters, blankets sidewalks, and covers any inch of empty space in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip.

“They’ve reduced us to the way the world wants to see us,” one of my Gazan companions comments to me. “Miserable, begging, and in tents.”

This is madness, I think to myself, staring out the car window. We’re barely moving every few minutes through this crush of people, donkey carts, and aid trucks. Ambulance sirens wail, drones buzz above head, and people yell and shout.

It’s the beginning of April, six months into the Gaza war. Rafah’s population has swelled from around 275,000 to, by some estimates, 1.4 million as Gazans were forced to flee their homes in other parts of the strip.

I lock eyes with those of a mother, her infant passed out on her shoulder. She gives me a weak smile. I see two teenage girls hanging off the back of a donkey cart, giggling at each other, and I am relieved—relieved that I caught that moment in the middle of this sea of human sorrow. People look like ghosts but are haunted by all those they have lost.

It’s nearing the end of the holy month of Ramadan, during which Muslims around the world fast from sunrise to sundown. Iftar meals traditionally bring families and friends together to break their fast.

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All I can think about is the impending Rafah invasion, which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said he has set a date for. The possible invasion has been the largest bone of contention between Israel and its long-standing ally, the United States, which has been “urging” Israel not to proceed. It’s an alliance that no one here can understand. How can the United States continue to support and fund this?

I imagine a bomb falling on these souls, and a part of me wonders in horror if I’m just staring at the already condemned. My heart starts pounding when we’re stuck behind an ambulance—as ambulances have been targeted by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

There are no proper toilets, showers, or sanitation, and there is no proper access to clean water. I drive past a cluster of people—young and old—surrounding a water truck, carrying beaten-up gallon bottles, pots, and whatever they have managed to scrounge to fill up with water.

Some stalls in the street sell produce from aid parcels. I’ve seen this in other war zones as well. A family that needs baby powder will barter the lentils and canned beans from their food parcel. They don’t have a choice because their babies need diapers, women need sanitary pads, and people will scrimp on any volume of food to be able to supplement a meal with a couple of wilted vegetables. They don’t have money, and there is no way to make money, so they barter what they are given for a more pressing need.

There is neither enough aid getting through nor enough commercial trucks, and as a result, what is available on the market is grossly overpriced. As of April 12, according to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), around 20,500 trucks have made it into Gaza during the last six months. Pre-October 7, 2023, Gaza saw around 500 trucks a day enter, which means that Gazans needed roughly 90,000 trucks over the past six months.

Addressing this level of desperation is about so much more than just counting trucks that have made it across the border. Aid must get to a warehouse and then move to the needy population.

Humanitarian aid moves through a warzone in what’s known as “deconfliction,” whereby warring parties are informed of and, in theory, agree to specific routes and locations. It’s a process that has never really worked in this wretched battlespace. Convoys are regularly denied movement requests by the Israeli side, and even when those requests are granted, any movement is fraught with dangers.

The starkest and most recent reminder of that is the April 1 Israeli airstrike on a convoy from the World Central Kitchen (WCK), an organization that I would argue had the best lines of communication to the Israeli side, the best “deconfliction.” WCK has since suspended its operations, as did a handful of other organizations.

Two days after the WCK hit, I arrived in the Gaza Strip on a humanitarian mission for my charity, the International Network for Aid, Relief & Assistance (INARA). Fellow humanitarian workers and volunteers I chatted with on the way in were all anxious—myself included. If WCK could lose people like this, what did it mean for the rest of us?

INARA works with thirteen informal shelters and has a Gazan team. We discussed pausing our work and whether the team felt safe enough to continue.

“We can be hit at any time. It’s always a risk,” Mona, one of our lead team members, whose full name is being withheld for safety reasons, explains to me. “If we don’t do this for our people, our people’s children, then who will? We have to stay strong. We have to keep going.”

Our team arrives at one of the shelters we work with north of Rafah. The children swarm around Mona; she’s a familiar face here, and they know that this Gazan woman in her thirties brings a break from their monotonous existence. They all clamor to help her set up the speakers, hula-hoops, balls, and other games. I play and dance with the children. I even smile and laugh, but my heart breaks into a million pieces.

Mona, one of INARA’s staff in Gaza, leads activities for children in one shelter. (Courtesy of Arwa Damon)

That evening, at the breaking of the fast meal known as iftar, we hand out hot meals INARA purchased from a local makeshift community kitchen set out of a former car repair shop. We splurged to provide Palestinian chicken mandi, a specially spiced dish that is cooked for hours in a pit underground. It’s a taste of the past, before October 7, a time when parents could afford to feed their children something like chicken. For months, one could rarely find chicken or meat on the market in Gaza. Over the last few weeks, supply has increased, but the vast majority of Gazans, with no income, still cannot afford it.

“Thank you. We used to get hot meals from WCK, but it’s been a few days, and nothing has arrived,” one of the older men says to me.

A few weeks ago, we managed to find solar panels locally and install them at one shelter. Now, children can play at night and go to the toilet—two for two hundred people—without being as afraid as they were before. There is no electricity in Gaza, and generator fuel is astronomically priced. Solar panels are a solid option, but trucks carrying them have been rejected entry since the war began.

A woman comes to plead with me, her daughter in tow: “We are thankful, but please, can you get her out? She had a scholarship to study in Turkey.”

Another mother begs, “Please help us! What has this government [Hamas] done for us? I don’t care; they just need to end this.”

But I can’t get them out, and I can’t end this. What I can do just feels so small, and my heart aches for every single one of them.

That night, I crashed at Mona’s place with her family. No one moves at night; it’s too risky, with Israel’s reported use of artificial intelligence to determine targets and the seeming randomness of what is being hit. Her elderly mother asks if I think the Rafah invasion will happen and where they are supposed to go. I don’t know how to answer that. She asks when I think it will end. I don’t know how to answer that, either.

“Stay with us,” Mona’s mother jokes. An explosion shakes the windows, drones buzz overhead, and she grips the armchair. I notice that her hands are trembling.

Mona and I “girl talk” in her room. I’m in a pair of borrowed sparkly pink pajamas, and she’s telling me about how, war or no war, she must be elegant when she goes out. Mona shows me some of her sister’s clothes that she wears all the time to feel closer to her.

Mona’s sister managed to get out to Egypt along with her young children early on in this war. She gave me a couple of bags of medicine, dried fruit, and other goodies to carry into Gaza for her family inside. The family wants to share what they have just received. I gently refuse, saying there is plenty for me when I go home, that I’m not hungry. But this level of generosity just hurts the soul.

If only the rest of the world could see this level of kindheartedness—could just be here in this moment, I think to myself. I wonder if I were subjected to such circumstances, would I be able to hold on to my humanity like this?

Just as I am about to fall asleep, another explosion jolts me off my mattress. I am here but don’t understand how anyone copes with this. This constant web of anxiety that settles in your chest.

The next morning, Mona and I head to Mawasi, the southernmost part of Gaza’s beachfront. Here, families used to picnic, and children screamed and played. We drive past Mona’s favorite fish restaurant, where she used to walk and work out with friends.

“I can’t believe what I am seeing,” she turns to me. “I just can’t believe this. This can’t be real.”

We meet up with two doctors to set up medical points and address some of the basic medical needs of the population. Gaza’s medical infrastructure has been decimated; hospitals cannot handle the influx of the injured, never mind the ill. There is a massive spread of communicable diseases, from diarrhea to hepatitis A, and there are infected wounds. There is someone who needs medical attention in just about every tent.

With each step in one tent, my foot sends a swarm of flies in the air. A mother shoves her listless baby at one of the doctors accompanying us. He’s severely malnourished.

Mothers are not getting enough food and nutrients to produce breast milk, there isn’t enough baby formula to supplement, and finding clean water to mix it with is yet another challenge.

United Nations agencies have warned of the risk of famine since December 2023. In northern Gaza, where the humanitarian situation is significantly more catastrophic, more than two dozen children are reported to have died from malnutrition and dehydration.

We talk about the need for hygiene kits and sanitary reusable underwear, and the need to distribute those items at Rafah and Mawasi. We try to plan around the unknowns: whether Rafah will be bombed, where everyone will go, what will happen to all the aid warehouses, and what access people will have to aid if Rafah is invaded.

It’s utterly overwhelming. The sort of overwhelming that twists your guts and sits in your chest. Later that day, a mother—hearing that we work on mental health with children—comes up, grabbing my arm.

“Please, my son, every night he screams and convulses,” she tells me. “It started when he saw his sister’s head blown off in an explosion that hit our house.”

My mouth dries. I stare at this mother talking about her son and her daughter’s awful death. Her voice is even-keeled as if it was just a story she was telling nonchalantly. I wonder if it’s because she’s been through so much that she’s lost all ability to process it. But then again, how does one process that?

“May she rest in peace, may God give you strength,” I say, my voice a whisper, barely able to form the words.

Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA), a nonprofit organization that focuses on building a network of logistical support and medical care to help children who need life-saving or life-altering medical treatment in war-torn nations.

The post Dispatch from Gaza: ‘My son, every night he screams and convulses’ appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Jordan was already walking a tightrope. Then the Gaza war happened.

Aaron Magid — Wed, 03 Apr 2024 15:09:05 +0000

Even before October 7, 2023, Jordanian authorities faced considerable pressure. Unemployment across the Hashemite Kingdom had climbed to approximately 22 percent. An Arab Barometer poll showed that 63 percent of Jordanians between the ages of 18–29 were considering emigrating due to economic woes, a higher percentage than nearly insolvent Lebanon and conflict-ridden Iraq. On the political front, King Abdullah accused his half-brother Prince Hamzah in 2021 of launching a “seditious” plot with former Royal Court Chief Bassem Awadallah. As punishment, Jordanian authorities placed Hamzah under house arrest. In a bid to quell popular discontent, the Jordanian monarch launched a political reform initiative that same year. Yet, activists saw few signs of democratic progress. In 2023, Freedom House labeled the Hashemite Kingdom “Not Free,” its lowest ranking, as Abdullah dominated Jordan’s political system with the power to appoint prime ministers, senators, and military leaders.

The Gaza war only added more stress on the Jordanian government. The Hashemite Kingdom witnessed a significant drop in tourism during the fall of 2023, further damaging a weak economy. Given that approximately 50–60 percent of the Hashemite Kingdom’s population—including Queen Rania—is of Palestinian origin, it is no surprise that Jordanians voiced their opposition to Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. A University of Jordan poll found that 66 percent of Jordanians supported the October 7, 2023, Hamas assault that killed about 1,200 Israelis. As the Gaza death toll spiked, Jordanians hit the streets to highlight their outrage. On October 20, 2023, Reuters reported that thousands of Jordanians chanted in Amman, “Oh Hamas, hit them with Qassam rockets…bring the suicide bombers to Tel Aviv.”

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Jordanian authorities were not pleased with the large protests. Amnesty International noted that at least one thousand people were arrested in Amman during pro-Palestinian demonstrations in October and November 2023. Jordanian security forces said some of those arrested during the protests engaged in arson. At the same time, activists cited public criticism of the Hashemite Kingdom’s stance on Gaza as the genuine reason for the detentions. After Jordanian authorities cracked down on 2020 demonstrations in support of teachers’ pay, it was no surprise that the government felt certain protests about Gaza were also threatening.

Public opinion pushes boundaries

Even as security forces detained activists in Amman, the royal family and Jordanian government understood the need to better align themselves with public opinion by intensifying their criticism of Israel. Queen Rania has given numerous interviews in which she assailed Western leaders for not condemning Israel’s killing of Palestinian civilians. Abdullah took the lead in voicing opposition to cutting funds for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). The king also participated in a February military airdrop of medical supplies to Gaza. Donning a military uniform, the Hashemite leader flew in a Jordanian Air Force helicopter and helped provide humanitarian goods for the besieged enclave. Jordan later collaborated with the US military to drop food packages to Gazans.

On November 1, 2023, Jordan withdrew its ambassador from Tel Aviv and instructed the Israeli ambassador to Amman not to return until the Gaza war ended. Then on November 16, 2023, after thousands of Palestinians had been killed in Gaza, Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi announced that the Hashemite Kingdom would not proceed with a water-for-energy deal with Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The country’s top diplomat insisted that Israel had no right to self-defense as an occupying power.

In response, the Israeli foreign ministry expressed regret for the Hashemite Kingdom’s “inflammatory” remarks but emphasized that the neighboring countries’ ties are of “strategic importance.” That very month, Jordanian Prime Minister Bisher Khasawneh also warned that any Israeli attempt to transfer Palestinians in the West Bank to Jordan would be considered a “declaration of war.” Yet, some six months later, Jordan has avoided military clashes with Israel, in contrast to neighboring Lebanon and Syria.

Still, it’s worth noting that Jordanian-Israeli ties were chilly even before the Gaza war.

In January 2023, the Jordanian foreign ministry repeatedly summoned Israel’s ambassador to Amman for reprimands over Benjamin Netanyahu’s government policy at the al-Aqsa Mosque compound. When Netanyahu was out of office, Amman still refused to participate in the “Negev Summit,” a 2022 meeting between Israel, Egypt, Bahrain, Morocco, and the UAE. From 2000–2005, Jordan also left its ambassador post in Tel Aviv empty to protest Israeli military operations during the Second Intifada. Despite numerous instances of pushback since October 7, 2023, this was not enough for the Jordanian public.

Protestors deplore Jordan’s balancing act

Around six months into the war, many Jordanians have not been satisfied with their government’s response to the Gaza war. During late March, thousands of Jordanians demonstrated in Amman on a nightly basis, with some trying to storm the Israeli embassy. “Our protests will continue until the war on Gaza comes to an end,” asserted Jordanian activist Mohammed al-Abssi. The large resurgence of protestors demonstrated the increased disconnect between the public and government officials. Activists in Amman held signs with pictures of Hamas military spokesman Abu Obaida, even as Abdullah expelled Hamas officials from the kingdom after assuming power, with authorities later accusing the Palestinian militant group of illegally smuggling weapons into Jordanian territory.

Despite this pressure, King Abdullah has declined to take more drastic steps. While activists have demanded that Jordan sever all ties with Israel, the Hashemite leader refused to cancel the landmark 1994 peace treaty and has proceeded with the multibillion-dollar gas deal with Israel signed in 2016. In March, Jerusalem-based Kan 11 television reported that the Hashemite Kingdom asked Israel to extend a water agreement for an additional year as Amman continues to suffer from severe water shortages. The kingdom has also forcibly dispersed hundreds of Jordanians trying to march along the country’s border with the West Bank.

The king’s measured stance on the Gaza conflict also extended into Amman’s ties with Washington. In a rare move, the Jordanian government canceled President Joe Biden’s planned October 18, 2023, meeting in Amman, with Safadi saying that such a summit would be ill-advised while the United States would not agree to end the Gaza war. Nonetheless, Abdullah proceeded with a February visit to Washington even as the Biden administration continued to support Israel’s military campaign. The Hashemite monarch was the first Arab leader to sit with Biden at the White House after the Gaza war erupted and press for an immediate ceasefire. Abdullah understood that refusing to meet the US president was not a sustainable policy, and instead felt it would be more effective to promote a pro-Palestinian viewpoint directly with Israel’s top ally. While Jordanian protestors criticized the United States for its support of Israel, Washington pushed to keep bilateral ties with Amman on track. Biden praised the Hashemite leader for his “critical leadership” in increasing Gaza aid and pledged “unwavering” US support for Jordan.

Jordan’s delicate balancing act in response to the Gaza war stems from its need to maintain cordial ties with the United States. As Washington provides the cash-strapped Jordan with about $1.5 billion in annual aid, the Biden administration remains the Hashemite Kingdom’s largest donor. If Abdullah were to annul his peace accord with Israel as some protestors demand, he would likely face congressional threats of a cut in the kingdom’s massive annual assistance package. Washington has already demonstrated its willingness to suspend aid to UNRWA and the Palestinian Authority. Therefore, Jordan would be unwise to ignore the precedent by pro-Israel US lawmakers and risk losing such critical bilateral assistance.

Abdullah’s relatively moderate response to the Gaza war has only reinforced his importance to Washington. Whether Jordan’s cooperation on airdrops of Gaza humanitarian aid or its participation in the anti-Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) coalition, US officials can count on Amman to be a reliable partner during regional crises. By rebuffing protestors’ calls to support Hamas, the king demonstrated his willingness to sacrifice domestic popularity to cement his alliance with the Biden administration. Such flexibility helps ensure that Abdullah will continue to be a regular White House visitor, far beyond the current Middle East conflict.

Aaron Magid is the host of the podcast, On Jordan. A former Amman-based journalist, his articles on the Hashemite Kingdom have appeared in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, and Al-Monitor. Follow him on X: @AaronMagid.

The post Jordan was already walking a tightrope. Then the Gaza war happened. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

#BalkansDebrief – Why is the UK focused on reconciliation in the Balkans? | A debrief with Lord Stuart Peach

jbatchik — Fri, 29 Mar 2024 23:29:10 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

With the Ukraine war underscoring security risks in the Western Balkans, the United Kingdom has doubled down on its commitment to the region’s stability. In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare speaks with Lord Stuart Peach, the UK’s Special Envoy for the region.

Tare asks Lord Peach about the reasons for optimism and pessimism in the region. How do the old issues such as nationalism, Russian influence, and a media landscape rife with misinformation impact the lives of citizens, particularly the younger generation? Why is the UK prioritizing reconciliation efforts in the Balkans?

What are the UK’s expectations for the ongoing dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia? What concrete steps should the President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić and Prime Minister of Kosovo Albin Kurti take to achieve progress? How concerned is the UK about calls for secession of the Republika Srpska by Milorad Dodik? Why are free and fair elections crucial for the EU aspirations of the Western Balkan countries?

Explore the #BalkansDEBRIEF series

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Ilva Tare

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Europe Center

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The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – Why is the UK focused on reconciliation in the Balkans? | A debrief with Lord Stuart Peach appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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