Non-Traditional Threats - Atlantic Council

Keeping China at bay and critical minerals stocked: The case for US-Africa defense collaboration

Aleksandra Gadzala Tirziu — Fri, 06 Jun 2025 15:02:47 +0000

The United States is ill prepared to confront the challenges of an increasingly hostile global strategic environment. A coordinated coalition of adversarial states is working to dismantle the US-led global order, seeking to replace it with one defined by their ambitions and autocratic principles. At the forefront of this effort is China, which is rapidly accelerating its military capabilities and expanding its defense industrial base (DIB) to field sophisticated weapons systems designed to deter the United States globally and secure its goal of national rejuvenation. Aligned with China are Russia, Iran, and North Korea—forming an increasingly unified axis of authoritarians steadily advancing toward this objective. Compounding these challenges are increasingly frayed traditional US security alliances, notably in Europe, that leave the United States further exposed.

The most effective strategy to contend with this evolving threat landscape is through robust preparedness—both immediate and long term. Against this background, US and allied attention has increasingly turned to Africa. Africa holds one-third of the world’s known mineral reserves, including 80 percent of platinum and chromium, 47 percent of cobalt, and 21 percent of graphite.

Of the fifty minerals identified as critical by the US Geological Survey (USGS), thirty-two are found in Africa. US policymakers have therefore begun to explore partnerships with African countries to secure these resources. Yet, despite several promising initiatives, the United States still lacks a coherent and comprehensive policy for engagement—particularly one that can compete with the entrenched influence of the axis of authoritarian states, notably Russia and China, in the continent’s mining industry.

By supporting African nations in the development of their domestic mineral processing capabilities, the United States could enable them to retain a greater share of their mineral wealth and build self-sufficiency in defense. Such efforts could also diminish China’s influence across the continent. For the United States, developing these capabilities could secure a reliable source of critical minerals.

This report begins to lay the groundwork for such an effort by:

Identifying the defense capabilities the United States should prioritize to remain competitive in the evolving global strategic environment and the critical minerals necessary to support them.
Charting Africa’s critical mineral resources relevant to US defense needs and assessing the shifting defense postures of African nations, particularly where the development of their weapons systems and security objectives aligns with US interests.
Underscoring the importance of US support for building Africa’s mineral processing infrastructure, while addressing the structural barriers that have hindered progress so far.
Advancing targeted recommendations for US policymakers to operationalize such efforts and redefine US-Africa relations for today’s global challenges.

View the full report

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The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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Russian hybrid warfare: Ukraine’s success offers lessons for Europe

Maksym Beznosiuk — Thu, 05 Jun 2025 21:39:11 +0000

As Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine continues, the Kremlin is also rapidly escalating its hybrid war against Europe. Intelligence officials from a number of European countries are now raising the alarm and warning that Russian operations are growing in number and becoming bolder, with potential targets including transport hubs and critical infrastructure.

The Kremlin employs hybrid warfare tactics to remain below the threshold that would trigger a unified and potentially overwhelming European response. This has led to a surge in sabotage, cyberattacks, political interference, and disinformation campaigns across Europe, with a particular emphasis on countries closer to Russia.

Moscow’s hybrid war against Europe mirrors the tactics used by the Kremlin in Ukraine following the start of Russia’s invasion in 2014. Ukraine’s response to the often unprecedented challenges posed by Russian hybrid warfare offers important lessons for Kyiv’s European partners.

The Ukrainian experience highlights the gravity of the hybrid threat and the importance of an integrated response. The overall message to Western policymakers is clear: Moscow views hybrid warfare as an important Russian foreign policy tool and will continue expanding its campaign. Europe cannot afford to wait for Russian hybrid attacks to escalate further before building the advanced capabilities required to counter this threat.

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There have been growing reports of Russian hybrid war-style attacks across the EU since the onset of Russian aggression against Ukraine eleven years ago. This trend gained significant additional momentum following the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Typical incidents include cyberattacks targeting infrastructure, sabotage including arson attacks, and attempts to disrupt military aid destined for Ukraine. Moscow is also accused of investing billions of dollars in sophisticated social media campaigns to influence the outcome of elections across Europe. The Kremlin’s hybrid operations are concentrated in central and eastern Europe, with Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states among the primary targets.

None of this is new to Ukraine. For more than a decade, Ukrainians have been learning to cope with the full range of Russia’s hybrid warfare toolbox. Russia’s attack on Ukraine began in February 2014 when Russian soldiers without insignias took control of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula in a lightning operation that was accompanied by a massive wave of targeted disinformation.

Russia’s subsequent efforts to destabilize and subjugate the rest of Ukraine have involved a combination of conventional military aggression, sabotage, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and support for pro-Russian actors in Ukraine. Thanks to this prolonged exposure to Russian hybrid warfare, Ukraine has been able to develop countermeasures that have helped build resilience and reduce the impact of Russia’s hybrid operations.

Ukraine’s response has been a collaborative effort involving the Ukrainian government, civil society, and the private sector. In the cyber sphere, efforts to improve Ukraine’s digital security have played a key role, with the launch of the country’s popular Diia platform and the establishment of the Ministry of Digital Transformation helping to drive important digital governance reforms.

This has enhanced Ukraine’s ability to maintain public services amid acts of cyber aggression and has improved engagement with the population. Ukraine’s progress in the digital sphere has been recognized internationally, with the country climbing from the 102 spot to fifth position in the UN’s annual Online Services Index in the seven years between 2018 and 2025.

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Ukraine’s coordination structures, such as the Center for Strategic Communications and the Ministry of Digital Transformation, enable swift and well-coordinated responses across government, media, and digital channels. This offers a number of advantages in a hybrid war setting. For example, it allows the Ukrainian government to synchronize positions with proactive narrative-setting when countering the Kremlin’s disinformation campaigns.

Ukraine has also benefited from a decentralized approach involving digital volunteers, civil society, and public-private partnerships. A wide range of civic tech groups and open-source investigators are active in Ukraine detecting and countering Russian disinformation. These measures have made it possible to expose Russian narratives efficiently, coordinate messaging across government and civil society, and maintain coherence during military operations.

Since 2014, Ukraine has been able to reduce Russia’s overwhelming initial advantages on the information front of the hybrid war. While Russian disinformation tactics continue to evolve and remain a major aspect of the ongoing invasion, Ukraine has managed to increasingly leverage information to shape international opinion and influence diplomatic outcomes.

At present, the European response to Russia’s hybrid war lacks the institutional agility and coordination between public sector and civil society that is evident in Ukraine. Instead, the EU and NATO have developed a number of parallel structures such as NATO’s Joint Intelligence and Security Division and the EU’s East StratCom Task Force. While these agencies continue to make meaningful contributions to the fight back against Russian hybrid warfare, they have yet to demonstrate the kind of real-time operational coordination that has served Ukraine so well.

Ukraine’s model for combating Russian hybrid warfare can’t be replicated in full, but it could serve as a practical reference point for building more adaptive and integrated responses across the West. Given Ukraine’s unique experience, it might make sense to establish a trilateral consultative framework together with the EU and NATO to enable rapid hybrid threat evaluations and coordinate responses.

Ukraine’s long record of countering Russian hybrid warfare has also highlighted the role of civil society. Kyiv’s European partners should consider increasing support for initiatives such as investigative journalism, fact-checking platforms, and technical watchdogs that can serve as support elements in a broader European defense ecosystem. In an environment where information is increasingly weaponized, Ukraine’s experience has also underlined the need to embed media literacy into the education system to ensure European citizens are able to consume information critically and are less vulnerable to Russian propaganda.

Maksym Beznosiuk is a strategic policy specialist and director of UAinFocus, an independent platform connecting Ukrainian and international experts around key Ukrainian issues.

As the Putin regime’s illegal war unfolded, however, it quickly belied these hypotheses and collapsed many Western assumptions about Russia’s cyber power. Russia didn’t deliver the expected cyber “kill strike” (instantly plummeting Ukraine into darkness). Ukrainian and NATO defenses (insofar as NATO has spent considerable time and energy to support Ukraine on cyber defense over the years) were sufficient to (mainly) withstand the most disruptive Russian cyber operations, compared at least to pre-February 2022 expectations. And Moscow showed serious incompetencies in coordinating cyber activities with battlefield kinetic operations. Flurries of operational activity, nonetheless, continue to this day from all parties involved in the war—as Russia remains a persistent and serious cyber threat to the United States, Ukraine, and the West. Russia’s continued cyber activity and major gaps between wartime cyber expectations and reality demand a Western rethink of years-old assumptions about Russia and cyber power—and of outdated ways of confronting the threats ahead.

Russia is still very much a cyber threat. Patriotic hackers and state security agencies, cybercriminals and private military companies, and so on blend together with deliberate state decisions, Kremlin permissiveness, entrepreneurialism, competition, petty corruption, and incompetence to create the Russian cyber web that exists today. The multidirectional, murky, and dynamic nature of Russia’s cyber ecosystem—relying on a range of actors, with different incentives, with shifting relationships with the state and one another—is part of the reason that the Russian cyber threat is so complex.

Policymakers in the United States as well as allied and partner countries should take at least five steps to size up and confront Russia’s cyber threat in the years to come:

When assessing the expectations-versus-reality of Russia’s wartime cyber operations, distinguish between capabilities and wartime execution.
Widen the circle of analysis to include not just Russian state hackers but the broader Russian cyber web, including patriotic hackers and state-coerced criminals.
Avoid the trap of assuming Russia can separate out cyber and information issues from other bilateral, multilateral, and security-related topics—maintaining its hostility toward Ukraine while, say, softening up on cyber operations against the United States.
Continue cyber information sharing about Russia with allies and partners around the world.
Invest in cyber defense and in cyber offense where appropriate.

Russia’s cyber ecosystem

Russia is home to a complex ecosystem of cyber actors. These include military forces, security agencies, state-recruited cybercriminals, state-coerced technology developers, state-encouraged patriotic hackers, self-identified patriotic hackers acting of their own volition, and more. Even Russian private military companies offer cyber operations, signals intelligence (SIGINT), and other digital capabilities to their clients. Together, these actors form a large, complex, often opaque, and dynamic ecosystem. The Kremlin has substantial power over this ecosystem, both guiding its overall shape (such as permitting large amounts of cybercrime to be perpetuated from within Russia) and leveraging particular actors as needed (discussed more below). Simultaneously, decisions aren’t always top-down, as entrepreneurial cybercriminals and hackers—much like “violent entrepreneurs” in Russian business and crime, or the “adhocrats” vying for Putin’s ear to pitch ideas—take initiative, build their own capabilities, and sell them to the state as well.

The relationships that different security agencies, at different levels, in different parts of the country and world, have with Russian hackers also vary over time. A local security service office might provide legal cover to a group of criminal hackers one day (after the necessary payoffs change hands, of course), only for a Moscow-based team to recruit them for a state operation the next. While the Kremlin has a sort of “social contract” with hackers—focus mainly on foreign targets; don’t undermine the Kremlin’s geopolitical objectives; be responsive to Russian government requests—its tolerance for a specific cybercriminal group can change on a whim, too. Security officials might take a bribe from a cybercriminal, much as their colleagues do on the regular, and still find their patrons in prison and their own wrists in handcuffs.

On the Russian government side, the principal units involved in offensive cyber operations are the Federal Security Service (FSB), the military intelligence agency (GRU), and the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). Russia does not have a proper, centrally coordinating cyber command; it was never launched despite attempts in the 2010s. The Ministry of Defense’s initial efforts to make one happen by circa 2014 were, it came to be understood later, overtaken by the subsequent establishment of Information Operations Troops with seemingly some coordinating functions—though experts still debate its analogousness to a “cyber command” and its level of shot-calling compared to bodies like the Presidential Administration. So while it is possible for the Russian security agencies to coordinate their (cyber) operations with one another, their engagements are marked more by competition than cooperation.

The most prominent example of this potential overlap or inefficiency is when GRU-linked APT28 and SVR-linked APT29 both hacked the Democratic National Committee in 2016, making it unclear whether each knew the other was carrying out a similar campaign. This operational friction is exacerbated by the fact that the agencies’ general remits—SVR on human intelligence, for instance, and FSB mostly domestic—do not translate to the digital and online world. All three agencies hack military and civilian targets and, for example, the FSB actively targets and hacks organizations outside of Russia’s borders. Each agency approaches cyber operations differently, too, often in line with their overall institutional cultures—such as the GRU, known for its brazen kinetic operations including sabotage and assassination, carrying out the boldest and most destructive cyber operations, contrasted with the SVR, and its emphasis on secrecy, focusing on quiet cyber intelligence gathering like in the SolarWinds campaign. Still, the Russian state agencies with cyber operations remain active threats to the United States, Ukraine, the West, and plenty of others through intelligence-gathering efforts, disruptive operations, and efforts that meld both, such as hack-and-leak campaigns.

Beyond government units themselves, the state encourages patriotic hackers—sometimes just young, technically proficient Russians—to go after foreign targets through televised and online statements (such as disinformation about Ukraine). Different security organizations, such as the FSB, may hire cybercriminals for specific intelligence operations and pay them based on the targets they penetrate. Other private-sector companies pitch their own services to the state of their own volition, bid on government contracts, and support a range of offensive capability development, research and development, and talent cultivation efforts (including defensive activities and benign or even globally cybersecurity-positive activities beyond the scope of this paper). Russian private military companies increasingly offer capabilities related to cyber and SIGINT to their private and government clients around the world, too. All the while, the state retains the capability to target specific people and companies in Russia that otherwise have nothing to do with the state, apply the relevant pressure, and compel them to assist with state cyber objectives, which it can wield to extraordinary effect.

As the historian Stephen Kotkin notes, “The Russian state can confound analysts who truck in binaries.” While there are several core themes to this ecosystem—complexity; state corruption; overwhelming tolerance for and even tacit support of cybercrime; myriad offensive cyber actors in play—Russia’s cyber ecosystem neither fits into a neat box nor is a neatly run one at that.

For all the threats these actors pose to Ukraine and the West, assuming that the Putin regime controls all cyber activity emanating from within Russia’s borders is not just inaccurate (e.g., the country’s too big; there are too many players; it’s not all top down), but is the kind of assumption that serves as a “useful fiction” for the Kremlin. It makes the system appear ruthlessly efficient and coordinated, gives disconnected or tactically myopic actions a veneer of larger strategy, and puts Putin at the center of all cyber operation decision-making. Thinking as much can, intentionally or not, further feed into the idea that the Kremlin’s motives are clear and fixed or driven by some kind of “hybrid war” strategy. It also obscures the fact that—unlike many Western countries that do, in fact, publish official “cyber strategies”—Russia does not have a defined cyber strategy document, instead drawing on a range of documents and sweeping “information security” concepts to frame information, the internet, and cyber power.

On the contrary, it is the multidirectional, murky, and dynamic nature of Russia’s cyber ecosystem that makes cyber activity subject to sudden change, feeds opportunities for interagency rivalries, contributes to effects-corroding corruption and competition, and provides the Kremlin with a spectrum of talent, capabilities, and resources to tap, direct, and deny (plausibly or implausibly) as it needs. It is in part this dynamism and multidirectional nature that makes Russia’s cyber threat so complex—as mixes of deliberate state decisions, Kremlin permissiveness, entrepreneurialism, competition, petty corruption, and incompetence blend together to create the Russian cyber web that exists today. Relationships between the state proper, at different levels, in different organizations, with nonstate cyber affiliates are often shifting; ransomware groups persistently targeting Western critical infrastructure, for example, may be prolific for months before collapsing under internal conflict and reconstituting into new groups, with new combinations of the old tactics and talent. It is also the reason that what is known to date about cyber operations during Russia’s full-out war on Ukraine provides such a valuable case study in assessing the status quo of this ecosystem—and, coupled with lessons from past incidents (like Russian cyberattacks on Estonia in 2007, Georgia in 2008, and Ukraine in 2014), helps to better weigh the future threat.

What happened to Russia’s cyber might?

Cyber operations have played a substantial role in Russia’s full-on invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the ensuing war. These activities range from distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks knocking Ukrainian websites offline and Ukrainian patriotic hackers’ attacks on Russian government sites (what Kyiv calls its “IT Army”) to Russia using countless malware variants to exfiltrate data and targeting Ukrainian Telegram chats and Android mobile devices. Without getting into a timeline of every major operation—neither this paper’s focus nor possible given limits on public information—it is clear that Russian and Ukrainian forces and their allies, partners, and proxies have made cyber operations part of the war’s military, intelligence, and information dimensions.

There are many ways to define cyber power, which is by no means limited to offensive capabilities. In Russia’s case, analysts could focus on anything from Russia’s national cyber threat defense system—the Monitoring and Administration Center for General Use Information Networks (GosSOPKA), which effectively brings together intrusion detection, vulnerability management, and other technologies for entities handling sensitive information—to the enormous IT brain drain problems the country suffered immediately following the full-on invasion of Ukraine. As explored in a study last year for the Atlantic Council, Russia’s growing digital tech isolationism—both a long-standing goal and increasing reality for the Kremlin—has driven more independence in some areas, like software, while heightening dependence and strategic vulnerability in others, such as dependence on Chinese hardware. This paper’s focus, though, will remain on Russia’s offensive capabilities.

Pre-February 2022 expectations in the United States and the West, as highlighted above, were dominated by those predicting extensive Russian disruptive and destructive cyber operations. In these scenarios, Russia would leverage its state, state-affiliated, state-encouraged, and other capabilities to cause serious damage to Ukrainian critical infrastructure (telecommunications, water systems, energy grids, and so forth) and cleanly augment its kinetic onslaught. Russia would “employ massive cyber and electronic warfare tools” to collapse Ukraine’s will to fight through digital means.

To be sure, some predictions were more measured. Some pointed to the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, as an illustration of Russian forces effectively using DDoS attacks (Moscow’s shatter-communications approach) in concert with disinformation and kinetic action to prepare the battlefield, and conjectured that Moscow would do the same if it moved troops further into Ukraine. Others highlighted Russia turning off Ukrainian power grids as a possible menu option for Moscow as it escalated. Cybersecurity scholars Lennart Maschmeyer and Nadiya Kostyuk, contrary to widely held positions, argued two weeks before Russia’s full-scale invasion that “cyber operations will remain of secondary importance and at best provide marginal gains to Russia,” incisively noting that press headlines talking of “cyber war” rest on “the implicit assumption that with the change in strategic context, the role of cyber operations will change as well.” The overwhelming sentiment, though, was worry and anticipation of what some considered true, cyber-enabled, twenty-first century warfare.

But the cyber operations that unfolded immediately before and after the February 2022 invasion defied what many Western (including American) commentators were predicting. Russia didn’t deliver the cyber kill strike expected (instantly plummeting Ukraine into darkness). Ukrainian and NATO defenses were sufficient to (mainly) withstand the most disruptive FSB and GRU cyber operations, compared at least to pre-February 2022 expectations. And Moscow showed serious incompetencies in coordinating cyber activities with battlefield kinetic operations. Many experts who did not expect cyber-Armageddon per se have still been surprised by the limited impact of Russian attacks, the focus on wiper attacks (that delete a system’s data via malware) and data gathering over critical infrastructure disruptions, and apparent poor coordination between cyber and kinetic moves made by the Russian Armed Forces and intelligence services.

What, then, explains the gulf between expectations—decisive moves, cleanly executed operations, and visible results—and reality, with some operations, certainly, but the overwhelming focus on kinetic activity and far less on destructive cyber movement than anticipated? Scholars and analysts have, since February 2022, put forward several buckets of hypotheses.

Various commentators argue, as National Defense University scholar Jackie Kerr compiles and breaks down, that Russia’s weak integration of cyber into offensive campaigns was symptomatic of broader problems with Russian military preparations for full-on war; that Western observers simply overestimated Russia’s cyber capabilities; that poor coordination and competition between Russian security agencies impeded operational success; or that Ukraine’s cyber defenses have been extraordinarily robust. Some have gone so far as to attribute Ukrainian cyber defenses, backed up by Western allies and partners, as the primary reason for Russian offensive failures. Russia cyber and information expert Gavin Wilde argues that Russia focused on countervalue operations (against civilian infrastructure, to demoralize political leaders and the public) more than counterforce operations (against Ukrainian military capabilities), to little effect, “a sign of highly sophisticated intelligence tradecraft being squandered in service of a deeply flawed military strategy.”

Professors Nadiya Kostyuk and Erik Gartzke write that Russia’s full-on war on Ukraine is about territory and physical control, making physical military activity far more important than cyber operations themselves. Cyber scholar Jon Bateman argues that traditional signals jamming and Russia’s cyberattack against the Viasat satellite communications system, coupled with a chaotic slew of data-deletion attacks, may have helped Russia initially—but that cyber operations from there had diminishing novelty and impact. Russia’s poor strategy, insufficient intelligence preparation, and interagency mistrust have been presented as causes for undermining Russia’s cyber-kinetic strike coordination, too. Others argue that Russians wanted to gather intelligence from Ukrainian systems more than disrupt them, that Russia’s information-focused troops have been more optimized for propaganda than cyber operations, and that cyber scholars’ and pundits’ expectations were plain wrong given that Russia wanted to inflict physical violence on Ukraine more than achieve cyber-related effects—necessitating bombs, missiles, and guns over malware, zero days, and DDoS attacks.

In reality, of course, many factors are likely in play at once. Plenty of the above scholars and commentators recognize this multifactorial situation and say it outright (although a few do push a single prevailing explanation for the war’s cyber outcomes). However, it’s worth explicitly stressing that many factors coexist, in light of occasional efforts to provide reductive explanations for complex wartime activities and effects. Concluding that Russia is no longer a cyber threat, for instance, is wrong. While Ukraine as a country has demonstrated extraordinary will and resilience, and while Ukrainian cyber defenses have been more than commendable, explanations that place the rationale solely on formidable Ukrainian cyber defenses are likewise reductive. Taking such explanations as fact simplifies the many factors involved and can veer analysis and debates away from the policy actions that are still needed, such as continued cyber threat information sharing between the United States and Ukraine.

The above, plausible, evidence-grounded explanations are not mutually exclusive. FSB officers, rife with paranoia, conspiratorialism, and a Putin-pleasing orientation, did indeed grossly misinterpret the situation on the ground in Ukraine in 2022 and fed that bad information to the Kremlin, potentially skewing assessments of cyber options as well.

Interagency competition may very well have undermined, once again, the ability of the FSB, GRU, and SVR to coordinate activities with one another, let alone with the Ministry of Defense and Russian proxies in Belarus, and therefore hampered more effective planning, coordination, and execution of cyber operations. For example, during the war’s initial stages, elements of the SVR may very well have sought to technically gather intelligence from targets that GRU- or FSB-tied criminal groups were indiscriminately trying to knock offline or wipe with malware, thrusting uncoordinated activities into tension.

Like in every other country on earth, Russian cyber operators are additionally subject to resource constraints: A hacker spending a day on breaking into a Ukrainian energy company is a hacker not spending time on spying on expats in Germany or setting up a collaboration with a ransomware group. Competition, therefore, not just between agencies—turf wars, budget fights, who gets the primary jurisdiction over Ukraine, and so forth—but within them, over who gets to spend what time and resources targeting which entities, sit within broader Russian government calculi over cyber, military, and intelligence operations. And, among others, Russia’s overall strategy did lead to bad moves, as Wilde and others have noted, with limited effect and burning away Russian capabilities (like exploits) in the process. Recognizing these many likely factors will facilitate better analysis of where Russia stands.

The gap between the imagined, all-out “cyber war” and the past three years’ reality also begs the question of whether the right metrics were considered in the first place. As much as cyber capabilities are inextricable from modern intelligence operations, and as much as cyber and information capabilities are embedded throughout militaries around the world, war is obviously about far more than cyber as a domain. But experts studying cyber all day, every day, may fall into the unintentional trap (as anyone can) of having their area of study become the focal point of analysis in a war with many moving pieces and considerations—hence, some of the commentary anticipated Russian destruction of Ukraine to happen through code, compared to a range of military weaponry. Academic theories, moreover, of how cyber conflict will unfold in political science-modeled simulations or think tank war games may similarly fail to map to battlefield realities, such as generalizing how cyber fits into warfare without adequately considering unique contexts in a country like Russia. Layered on top of all this—in the academies, in the media, in the data and artificial intelligence (AI) era—is a frequent desire to quantify everything, too, obscuring the fact that not everything can be effectively, quantifiably measured and that counting up the number of observed Russian cyber operations and scoring them may still not get to the heart of their inefficacy. Clearly, as US and Western perspectives on Russian cyber power shift with more information and time, it is worth rethinking Russia’s future cyber power—not just for how the West can recalibrate its assumptions and size up the threats, but in how the West can prepare to act and respond in the future.

Unpacking the (cyber) nesting doll

The takeaway from comparing predictions and reality shouldn’t be that pundits are always wrong or that Russia’s cyber operations are considerably less threatening in 2025. Nor should it be that Ukraine is propped up solely by Western government and private-sector cyber defenses, and that Russia is simply waiting to unleash a devastating cyber operation to end it all.

Russia remains a sophisticated, persistent, and well-resourced cyber threat to the United States, Ukraine, and the West generally. This is not going to change anytime soon. Kremlin-spun “crackdowns” on cybercrime (arrests that were little more than public relations stunts), frenetic talk of US-Russia rapprochement, and wishful thinking about Putin’s willingness to cease subversive activity against Ukraine do not portend, as some might suggest, that the United States can sideline Russia as a central cyber problem—and focus instead on China.

The Russian government views cyber and information capabilities as key to its military and intelligence operations, and the Kremlin still has one top enemy in its national security sights: the United States. Outside the Russian state per se, a range of ransomware gangs and other hackers in Russia will continue targeting companies, critical infrastructure, and other entities in the United States, Ukraine, and the West, too. There are at least five steps US policymakers and their allies and partners should take to size up this threat—against the full scope of Russia’s cyber web and integrating lessons learned so far from Russia’s full-out war on Ukraine—and confront it head-on in the coming years.

When assessing the expectations-versus-reality of Russia’s wartime cyber operations, distinguish between capabilities and wartime execution. Clearly, Russian offensive cyber activity during its full-on war against Ukraine has not matched up against Western assumptions that envisioned a cyber onslaught that turned off power grids, disrupted water treatment facilities, and blacked out communications. Evaluating how and why Russia did not make this happen is critical to understanding Russia’s operational motives, play-by-play planning and coordination between security agencies, targeting interests, and much more. But analysts and media must be careful to avoid thinking that Russia’s cyber capabilities themselves are weak. Clearly, when Russian hackers put the pedal to the metal, so to speak—ransomware gangs targeting American hospitals, or the GRU going after Ukrainian phones—they can deliver serious results. A better approach is policymakers and analysts in the United States, as well as in allied and partner countries, breaking out Russia’s continued cyber threats across ransomware, critical infrastructure targeting, mobile-device hacking, and so on while pairing the capabilities against where execution could fall short in practice. Doing so will give a better sense of Russia’s cyber strengths and weaknesses—and distinguish between the different components of carrying out a cyber operation.

Widen the circle of analysis to include not just Russian state hackers but the broader Russian cyber web, including patriotic hackers and state-coerced criminals. Focusing Western intelligence priorities, academic studies, and industry analysis mainly on Russian government agencies as the primary vector of Russian cyber power loses the importance of the overall Russian cyber web. Putting the focus mostly on Russian government agencies also loses, as my colleague Emma Schroeder has unpacked in detail, the role that public-private partnerships have played in cyber operations and defenses in the conflict, and the opportunity to assess similar public-private dynamics on the Russian side. Conversely, making sure to consider the roles of government contractors, military universities, patriotic hackers, state-tapped cybercriminals, and other actors as described above should help to fight the temptation to treat all Russian cyber operations as top-down—and illuminate the many ways in which Russia can build capabilities, source talent, and carry out operations against the West. Understanding these actors will allow for better tracking, threat preparation, defense, and, where needed, disruption.

Avoid the trap of assuming Russia can separate out cyber and information issues from other bilateral, multilateral, and security-related topics—maintaining its hostility toward Ukraine while, say, softening up on cyber operations against the United States. Whether the US government can or cannot separate out cyber issues vis-à-vis Russia from other elements of the US-Russia relationship (e.g., trade, nuclear security), Western policymakers should avoid the trap of assuming the Russian government is currently capable, let alone willing, of genuinely and seriously doing the same: separating out its cyber activities from other policy and security issues.

The Russian government has come to view the internet and digital technologies as both weapons that can be wielded against the state and weapons to use against Russia’s enemies. In this sense, cyber operations (as well as information operations) are core not just to Moscow’s approach to modern security, military activity, and intelligence operations but, perhaps more importantly, to the Kremlin’s conceptualization of regime security as well. Paranoia and propaganda about fifth columnists (with, sometimes, one feeding the other), persistent efforts to crack down on the internet in Russia, and a continued belief that Western tech companies and civil society groups are weaponizing the internet to undermine the Kremlin, mean that the regime will not truly believe it can put “information security” on the sidelines—and that includes not just internet control but cyber operations. Policymakers must go into diplomatic and other engagements with Russia with their eyes wide open.

Continue cyber information sharing about Russia with allies and partners around the world. For years, military and intelligence scholars and analysts have referred to Russia’s actions in Georgia, Ukraine, and other former Soviet republics as a “test bed” or “sandbox” for what Russia might do in other countries. It would be a strategic, operational, and tactical mistake to think that Russian cyber operations against Ukraine are just confined to Ukraine and that two-way information sharing with Ukraine about cyber threats is a waste of time and resources. Quite the opposite: Russia’s cyber and information activities against Ukraine today can give the United States and its allies and partners critical insights into the types of capabilities and operations that could, and very well might be, carried out against them at the same time or days or months later. Whether hack-and-leak operations designed to embarrass political figures, wiper attacks designed to destroy government databases, espionage operations, or anything in between, having real-time information about Russian cyber threats will only help the United States and its allies and partners better defend their own networks and systems against hacks and attacks.

Invest in cyber defense and in cyber offense where appropriate. Persistent, sophisticated Russian cyber threats to a range of key US and allied and partner systems—military networks, hospitals, financial institutions, critical infrastructure, advanced tech companies, civil society groups—demand continued investments in cyber defense. In addition to information-sharing, the United States and its allies and partners need to continue prioritizing market incentives for companies to enhance cyber defenses along with baseline requirements for essential measures such as multifactor authentication, detailed access controls, robust encryption, continuous monitoring, network segmentation, resourced and empowered cybersecurity decision-makers, and much more. Just as the Russians clearly possess a range of advanced cyber capabilities, any number of recent operations, including against Ukraine, show that Russian operations (like those carried out by many other powers) continue to succeed with basic moves such as phishing emails. The United States and its allies and partners need to continually increase cyber defenses. And, where appropriate, the United States and its allies and partners should ensure the right capabilities and posture to carry out cyber offensive operations—including to preemptively disrupt Russian attacks (the “defend forward” euphemism). As the Kremlin is more paranoid and conspiratorial, the notion of diplomatic talks and establishing cyber redlines is less and less realistic. Active mitigation and disruption of threats, rather than relying too heavily on diplomatic meetings or endless criminal indictments, are together a more feasible approach to protecting US and allied and partner interests against Russian cyber threats in the years to come.

Conclusion

Lessons from cyber operations—and about cyber operations and capabilities—from the Russian full-on war against Ukraine will continue to emerge in the coming years. This trickle of information may slowly dissipate some of the “fog of war” surrounding the back-and-forth hacks and shed much-needed light on issues such as coordination and conflict between Russian security agencies in cyberspace.

For now, however, the issue for the United States is clear: Russia remains a persistent, sophisticated, and well-resourced cyber threat to the United States and its allies and partners around the world. The threat stems from a range of Russian actors, and it stands to continue impacting a wide range of American government organizations, businesses, civil society groups, individuals, and national interests across the globe. As wonderful as the idea of cyber détente might be, Putin’s paranoia about Western technology, Russian officials’ insistence that the internet is a “CIA project” and Meta is a terrorist organization, and military and intelligence interest in conflict and subversion against the West will not evaporate with a wartime ceasefire or a newfound agreement with the United States. These are hardened beliefs and fairly cemented institutional postures that are not going to shift under the current regime.

Rather than dismissing Russia’s cyber prowess because of unmet expectations since February 2022, American and Western policymakers must size up the threat, unpack the complexity of Russia’s cyber web, and invest in the right proactive measures to enhance their security and resilience into the future.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Brian Whitmore and Andrew D’Anieri for the invitation to write this paper and for their comments on an earlier draft. He also thanks Gavin Wilde, Trey Herr, Aleksander Cwalina, Ambassador John Herbst, and Nikita Shah for their comments on the draft.

About the author

Justin Sherman is a nonresident senior fellow with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative, part of the Atlantic Council Technology Programs. He is also the founder and CEO of Global Cyber Strategies, a Washington, DC-based research and advisory firm; an incoming adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service; a contributing editor at Lawfare; and a columnist at Barron’s. He writes, researches, consults, and advises on Russia security and technology issues and is sanctioned by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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The Eurasia Center’s mission is to promote policies that strengthen stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

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The Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, part of the Atlantic Council Technology Programs, works at the nexus of geopolitics and cybersecurity to craft strategies to help shape the conduct of statecraft and to better inform and secure users of technology.

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Budginaite-Froehly in Wall Street Journal discussing Rail Baltica

Justina Budginaite-Froehly — Tue, 13 May 2025 13:52:01 +0000

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Transatlantic Security Initiative and Europe Center nonresident senior fellow, Justina Budginaite-Froehly, appeared in the Wall Street Journal to discuss how Europe’s strategic $27 billion railway project is addressing NATO concerns about Russian aggression in Europe.

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New Atlanticist Feb 20, 2025

What Europeans think of Trump’s approach to Ukraine (and what they might do next)

By Atlantic Council experts

European leaders are waking up to calls from the Trump administration to take the lead on security for Ukraine. Atlantic Council experts share what that might look like from Berlin to Vilnius.

Conflict Europe & Eurasia

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Europe needs a seat at the table in Ukraine negotiations

By Jörn Fleck, James Batchik

European leaders must quickly make the case to the Trump administration for collaboration in negotiations—and show their willingness to step up.

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New Atlanticist Feb 10, 2025

Now is Europe’s moment for decisive action on Ukraine

By Léonie Allard, Ian Brzezinski

Make Trump an offer he can’t refuse: European allies should propose deploying troops in Ukraine.

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Ajumobi in Globalization and Health: “Safeguarding global health security amidst a scramble for Africa’s minerals for the clean energy transition”

snyaoga — Sun, 27 Apr 2025 13:00:00 +0000

Original Source

On April 27, 2025, Africa Center nonresident senior fellow Oluwayemisi Ajumobi published an article in Globalization and Health, “Safeguarding global health security amidst a scramble for Africa’s minerals for the clean energy transition.”

“The global transition to renewable energy is increasing the demand for critical minerals mining in Africa. Without appropriate safeguards, expansion of mining operations on the continent increases the risk of mining-associated infectious disease outbreaks with epidemic and pandemic potential,” Ajumobi writes.

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China is militarizing its coast guard against Taiwan. Here’s how Taipei and its allies can respond.

Kitsch Liao — Wed, 16 Apr 2025 10:00:00 +0000

On April 1, China launched a two-day military exercise against Taiwan. Taiwanese national security officials suggested it was timed to coincide with US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s first trip to the Indo-Pacific since taking office. While the exercise was accompanied by the usual inflammatory and sometimes crude public messaging against Taiwan, it yielded a critical insight about China’s military operations. In describing the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) movements they observed, Taiwan’s Coast Guard disclosed that the Eastern Theater Command exercised operational control over the China Coast Guard (CCG) along with PLA military forces in theater.

This is a ground-breaking revelation. Beijing generally aims to portray the CCG as a nonmilitary actor despite its legally mandated dual role as both law enforcement and a component of China’s armed forces. This is also significant considering a previous incident in February 2024 in which Taiwan confronted the CCG when the latter was caught executing war-fighting functions against Taiwan under the guise of law enforcement activities. At the time, it was unclear whether this was merely a one-off experimental arrangement or the act of an overzealous CCG officer. It is now clear that the PLA exercises operational control over the CCG and uses the cover of law enforcement to gain military advantage over the United States, Taiwan, and their allies and partners without drawing much public attention.

China’s use of its coast guard for military purposes under the guise of law enforcement poses a threat to Taiwan that requires a strong response from Taipei, as well as the United States and its allies and partners in the region. Countering the CCG’s gray zone activities will require an active response from Taiwan and public messaging that makes clear that certain CCG law enforcement activity is a cover for military activities. It will also require a coordinated response from the US Coast Guard and Washington’s allies to provide deterrence and impose costs on China for using the CCG’s law enforcement cover to threaten Taiwan’s security.

‘White hulls’ in the gray zone

Taiwanese media reported in February 2024 that CCG vessels were identifying Taiwanese vessels and targets and providing real-time precise locations to the PLA for subsequent missile strikes while acting in a law enforcement capacity. Three CCG cutters entered the Western Pacific through the southern tip of the Miyako Strait and turned south until parallel to Taiwan’s east coast before speeding at eighteen to twenty knots eastward directly toward Taiwan. The cutters maintained radio silence, turned off their automatic identification system, and exercised emission control, an unusual precaution generally taken by military vessels, civilian vessels going through conflict zones, or vessels conducting illegal activities. The CCG cutters entered Taiwan’s twenty-four-nautical-mile contiguous zone, a buffer area internationally recognized for identification and interception of unknown vessels, and streaked past Taiwanese military and coast guard vessels sent to intercept them.

Intelligence provided to Taiwan by an undisclosed allied country indicated that these CCG vessels were validating functionalities of China’s Guo Wang, or “state network,” satellite constellation. Guo Wang designates targets for DF-21/DF-26 ballistic missiles supporting future PLA rocket force strikes against both Taiwan and US allied forces operating in the Western Pacific. The vessels only activated their automatic identification system and identified as belonging to the China Coast Guard after they passed the Taiwan Coast Guard’s TCG Nantou and came perilously close to Taiwan’s territorial waters.

Most countries’ coast guards, including those of the United States, China, and the Philippines, identify as both law enforcement and military, thus sailing in gray waters under international law. However, there is still a widely accepted norm that “white hull” vessels conducting law enforcement activities and promoting stability at sea are treated differently than “gray hull” warships safeguarding individual countries’ national interests. White hull activities near another country’s territorial waters are generally received with more goodwill and elicit less provocative reactions. China understands this and has been actively exploiting this divide since at least 2016.

The type-818 CCG vessels in the 2024 incident were 3,800-ton cutters built on People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 054A-class frigate hulls, equipped with 76 mm guns and the standard PLAN communication suite—essentially a “gray hull” in all but name. Through operational control over CCG, the PLA can use the cover of a “white hull” law enforcement facade to conduct exclusively “gray hull” military activities that would otherwise receive much stronger pushback.

How China has militarized its coast guard

Beijing reorganized the CCG in 2018, moving it from China’s State Oceanic Administration to the People’s Armed Police. The People’s Armed Police is a paramilitary that reports directly to the Central Military Commission, China’s highest military authority. The CCG’s placement under the Central Military Commission’s authority is an unusual arrangement. In the United States, for example, although the US Coast Guard is a branch of the armed forces, its chain of command runs through the Department of Homeland Security, not the Department of Defense, unless it is otherwise directed by the president or Congress during wartime. Taiwan’s Coast Guard administration also follows a similar logic.

Since the 2018 reorganization, the CCG has used its law enforcement facade to great effect in gray zone operations against Taiwan, the Philippines, and other US regional allies and partners. In the South China Sea, the CCG has been using its vessels, which include the largest coast guard cutters in the world, to “shoulder,” or attempt to ram, other countries’ coast guard vessels and force them to divert course. All the while, these vessels use their white hull cover to justify these incidents as law enforcement actions.

To protect this useful subterfuge, Beijing has been careful to disaggregate exercises conducted by the PLA and those conducted by the CCG against Taiwan since the Chinese military exercises around Taiwan that came in response to then US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island in 2022. This means careful messaging from the official Weibo accounts of both the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command and the CCG. While exercises from the two entities seemed to take place within similar and sometimes overlapping timeframes, the Eastern Theater Command and CCG have different names for their respective exercises and take care to deconflict areas of operation.

Observers have long suspected operational coordination between the PLA and the CCG, but to date, only circumstantial evidence has linked the organizations. It is known that the PLA coordinates some of China’s gray zone operations through the Eastern Theater Command’s Joint Operations Command Center (JOCC). Previous concurrent CCG exercises with PLA in the Taiwan Strait have not provided sufficient direct evidence of operational coordination by observing PLAN and CCG movements alone, though international reporting sometimes characterizes the two entities’ actions as a combined exercise.

The revelation came from Taiwan’s Coast Guard administration, which stated on April 1 that the CCG, while ostensibly law enforcement, operates under the control of military theater commands. In the case of exercises against Taiwan, this would mean the Eastern Theater Command’s JOCC. Additionally, for the first time since the exercises in response to Pelosi’s visit in 2022, the CCG conducted joint operations with the PLA east of Taiwan, confirming its role in exercises for a potential joint quarantine/blockade against Taiwan.

Consequently, the April exercise indicates that the CCG is operationally controlled by PLA. And the 2024 incident provided an example of China unilaterally escalating cross-strait tension by conducting military operations with ostensibly law enforcement white hull vessels against Taiwan during peacetime, without even the facade of declaring a military exercise. These developments have far-reaching implications beyond garden-variety gray zone operations. These practices are highly provocative and require strong but measured responses from the United States and Taiwan, as well as their partners and allies in the region.

How the US and Taiwan should respond

To stop Beijing from gaining additional military advantage under the guise of law enforcement activities, Taiwan must combine a proper active response with strong public messaging. Taipei’s active responses must be commensurate with the nature of each incident—dispatching military assets to intercept and guard against the CCG’s military activities against Taiwan while leaving law enforcement issues for Taiwan’s Coast Guard. This will create significant challenges for the Taiwan Navy and Coast Guard’s existing command-and-control, but it is essential to counter China’s use of the CCG as cover to gain military advantage over Taiwan. Taiwan’s public messaging must adequately establish this. Taiwan should present the public with credible evidence, including intercepted signals intelligence, electro-optical recordings, and the exact courses and speeds of offending CCG vessels.

Meanwhile, the United States and its allies and partners must impose additional costs for the CCG’s clandestine activity. Joint patrols led by the US Coast Guard and the coast guards of other allied nations can form a credible deterrent against China’s militarization of law enforcement activities. The US Coast Guard already extensively collaborates with the Taiwan Coast Guard. A joint patrol within Taiwan’s exclusive economic zone or even within the twenty-four nautical mile contiguous zone, modeled after the US Coast Guard’s agreement with Taiwan’s diplomatic ally Palau, can impose significant costs for the CCG should it decide to engage in provocative behaviors like the February 2024 missile targeting incident. Additional support from Japan or even the Philippine Coast Guard, such as joint patrols, could lend further legitimacy to counter the militarization of the CCG. Taken together, these measures can send a strong message to Beijing and mark clear redlines against the CCG’s participation in the PLA’s gray zone activities.

Kitsch Liao is an associate director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Previously, he worked in the US Congress, in diplomatic postings, and as a cyber intelligence analyst for the private sector.

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As Chinese EVs threaten to overrun Europe, Germany should ramp up supply-chain investment

Joseph Webster — Wed, 19 Mar 2025 17:34:54 +0000

Chinese electric vehicle (EV) exports pose a dilemma for Germany and the rest of Europe. On the one hand, EVs are increasingly technologically superior to traditional internal combustion engine vehicles, and they reduce pollution and carbon emissions. On the other hand, China’s current dominance of EV production poses large commercial and security risks.

European auto companies are being undercut by Chinese-made EVs. In the summer of 2024, for instance, before the European Union (EU) imposed tariffs on Chinese imports, Chinese-owned BYD Dolphin models sold in Europe for about €32,400, while a comparable Volkswagen ID.4 cost around €37,000. Moreover, there is a potential security risk of an influx of Chinese-made EVs on European roads, as the United States has recently argued about these cars on its own roads and highways. In its waning days, the Biden administration warned that Chinese or Russian access to connected vehicle software or hardware “could allow our foreign adversaries to extract sensitive data, including personal information about vehicle drivers or owners, and remotely manipulate vehicles.” In the United States, the Trump administration is unlikely to adopt a softer approach to Chinese EVs than the Biden administration did—nor should it.

What Europe will do is still up in the air. It must balance economic needs, climate goals, commercial and security risks from Chinese-made and internet-connected vehicles, and increasingly unpredictable ties with the United States. To resolve this EV dilemma, one option is for Germany, Europe’s largest economy, to tap its considerable fiscal space and undertake transformational investments in defense, EV supply chains, and other infrastructure. It wouldn’t take this leap alone; several northern European countries could join in this effort.

Taking stock of Chinese electric vehicle exports

Chinese EVs continue to take the world by storm. Chinese shipments of battery electric vehicles (BEVs), plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs), and hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs) reached $44 billion in 2024, up 10 percent from the prior year.

The EU is the largest market for Chinese BEV exports, as measured by value. Additionally, China is rapidly increasing shipments to geostrategically significant markets in Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

While the value of Chinese BEV exports rose only slightly in 2024, the number of units shipped globally rose 7 percent. In 2024, shipments to the EU decreased, in large part due to tariffs and disruptions from Red Sea attacks. At the same time, China’s BEV exports to countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, its second-largest export market, increased significantly in both value and volume terms. This massive-scale export is made possible by Chinese BEV exporters benefitting from synergy with China’s heavily subsidized shipbuilding and steel complexes. This results in new-build transoceanic car carriers, such as BYD’s new dual-fuel car carrier, to ship the vehicles abroad.

Finally, Chinese BEV prices differ significantly across markets. Per-unit prices suggest that most Chinese BEV exports to emerging markets, such as those in Southeast Asia, are disproportionately of low-cost two- and three-wheelers rather than larger and more expensive frames, though Chinese customs data do not specifically go into this level of detail.

How should Europe respond to its EV dilemmas?

Consider the case of Israel, which was the destination for 4.5 percent of all Chinese BEV exports by value in 2024 (a large share given its smaller population relative to other markets). Acknowledging potential risks that Chinese intelligence could gather sensitive data on military activities, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) disabled media systems in leased Chinese Chery vehicles in October 2024. The IDF taking this step should give pause to Europe, especially given the close coordination between China and Russia.

But there is a way to resolve the dilemma between the decarbonization gains and security risks posed by Chinese EVs: Berlin must step up.

Germany should lead other European countries in investing heavily in EV supply chains while shielding the EU market from subsidized competition. More than many other European countries, Germany has the fiscal space for transformational investments. Germany’s general government debt-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio stands at a relatively comfortable 63 percent, versus 111 percent in France, 101 percent in the United Kingdom, and 123 percent in the United States. Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden all enjoy even lower general government debt-to-GDP ratios than Germany, although their collective GDP is only about 60 percent of Germany’s. Berlin is the key player, but other countries should play a supporting role.

Germany’s investment needs are also dire. It was the only Group of Seven (G7) economy to shrink in 2023; last year its GDP declined again. Economists—including the European economy commissioner—agree that Germany’s debt brake is a main culprit for persistent underinvestment. The constitutionally mandated brake limits the federal government’s annual deficit to approximately 0.35 percent of GDP and essentially blocks its sixteen federal states from borrowing. Fortunately, Germany’s likely next chancellor, Friedrich Merz, is moving ahead with reforms of the debt brake to allow for more investment in defense and infrastructure. This was an important step for the famously frugal nation, but it should quickly be followed by another.

German politicians are right now making strides to lift their country’s debt brake. It is important that they are successful. Military aggression from Russia, systemic rivalry with China, and increasing uncertainty about the trajectory of US-Europe relations mean that Germany and Europe face profound and immediate challenges that require action.

If Germany and northern European countries tap credit markets for investment, there are several worthy initiatives. The defense sector, particularly vis-à-vis Ukraine, must be the highest priority.

But EVs are another worthy security-related investment for Germany and other European powers. By reducing reliance on Chinese EVs, Europe can mitigate a security risk while stabilizing employment, as the automotive sector’s direct and indirect jobs comprise 6.1 percent of total EU employment.

Critically, the development of EVs—and their underlying batteries—will complement European defense capabilities. As the war in Ukraine has demonstrated, batteries are a dual-use technology, used in items such as first-person-view drones, lithium-ion powered submarines, and more. Building battery—and drone—supply chains would enhance Europe’s military capabilities. Of course, these supply chains will require the construction of not only manufacturing facilities but also the mining and processing of key materials such as lithium and rare earth elements.

In short, this would amount to a German-led overhaul of European competitiveness, and it would require substantial—though not excessive—investments. Chinese EV subsidies over a fourteen-year period are estimated to exceed $230 billion, or under 5 percent of Germany’s GDP; Berlin would also not need to commit funds at that level. Moreover, Germany could accelerate technological catch-up and limit costs by forcing technology transfer from Chinese firms—a tactic that Beijing has repeatedly embraced, including vis-à-vis German firms. It will not be easy to secure tech transfers, but it’s worth noting that European nations take in roughly half of all Chinese BEV exports by value. Europe is not without leverage.

In addition to investing in domestic EV supply chains and securing technology transfers from China, Germany and other European countries, including the United Kingdom, may need to undertake sensible risk-mitigation measures. It may make sense, for example, to bar Chinese-connected vehicles near NATO facilities in Europe, and to bar NATO personnel from purchasing or operating these vehicles. This will be difficult, but it is an approach that must be considered to ensure security. Europe should comprehensively study the security risks of Chinese connected vehicles and adjust policy as appropriate.

For better and for worse, Europe must increasingly learn to rely on itself. Accordingly, it’s time to remove self-imposed limitations, such as Germany’s debt brake and unnecessary internal European trade barriers. By undertaking critical investments in sectors such as defense, EVs, and other infrastructure, Germany and other European countries can ensure the continent has the means to overcome the threats and challenges it faces from multiple directions.

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and Indo-Pacific Security Initiative and editor of the independent China-Russia Report. This article reflects his own personal opinions.

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How US military action against drug cartels in Mexico could unfold

James Fowler and Alicia Nieves — Wed, 05 Mar 2025 17:36:34 +0000

During his address to Congress on March 4, US President Donald Trump did not mince words about the threat drug cartels pose: “The cartels are waging war on America, and it’s time for America to wage war on the cartels.” His statement marks the clearest indication so far that the new administration is serious about confronting the cartels and follows a series of escalating actions.

Two weeks earlier, on February 20, the Trump administration officially designated eight Latin American cartels, including six from Mexico, as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) for their major roles in drug smuggling and human trafficking into the United States. The move marks a major escalation in the administration’s efforts to cripple the cartels, as an FTO designation grants the administration access to enhanced counterterrorism authorities, such as the ability to launch covert operations authorized by the president. The FTO designation came only days after the Mexican Senate approved the presence of the US Army’s 7th Special Forces Group to conduct joint training with Mexico’s elite Naval Marine Corps.

The Trump administration’s FTO designation and US Special Forces presence in Mexico comes as the administration is taking other notable steps. The United States has imposed new tariffs on Canada and Mexico to pressure them into greater cooperation against cartels and trafficking. On orders from the president, US Northern Command launched new deployments at the US southern border. And Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) surveillance drone flights, approved by Mexico, have reportedly gathered intelligence on cartel operations within the country. The rapid speed and scale of these apparent foreign counteroffensive preparations, arguably not seen since the early stages of the War on Terror, may indicate that the United States is on the verge of direct military action, either unilaterally or with the Mexican military, against cartels on Mexican soil.

While it remains unclear what the US administration will decide next, a scenario outlining what such an engagement might entail can be constructed by examining recent developments in the US-Mexico relationship and US counterterrorism efforts.

The following outlines a potential four-part sequence of events that could unfold if the United States conducts a direct military action against the cartels.

Step 1: Build relationships and training

US-Mexico cooperation is the best method of addressing the cartel problem. Therefore, at the start of this scenario, the new administration will likely work to establish operational partnerships with its Mexican counterparts. However, fostering reliable relationships may be challenging due to the country’s alleged entanglement with cartels.

Two recent criminal cases brought by the US Department of Justice against two of Mexico’s highest-ranking former law enforcement and military officials highlight the problem. In 2020, former Defense Minister Gen. Salvador Cienfuegos Zepeda was accused of using his position to aid the H-2 Cartel in drug smuggling. In 2024, former Mexican Secretary of Public Security Genaro García Luna was sentenced to thirty-eight years in prison for taking bribes from the Sinaloa Cartel in exchange for assisting the cartel. Moreover, a US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) report found evidence that cartels had funneled millions into the 2006 presidential campaign of Andrés Manuel López Obrador, known as AMLO.

In a move that perhaps anticipates the difficulty of engaging a government compromised by cartel influence, Trump appointed Ron Johnson as US ambassador to Mexico. Johnson is a former US ambassador to El Salvador, retired Green Beret, and veteran CIA officer with more than twenty years of experience leading sensitive paramilitary operations. He is uniquely equipped to secure cooperation from civilian officials while mitigating counterintelligence risks from cartel-affiliated public officials.

The US-Mexico military relationship presents a different set of challenges. During his term as president of Mexico (2018-2024), ALMO increased the funding and authority of the Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA) in order to expand the main military branch’s role beyond military operations into civilian functions, such as law enforcement and infrastructure projects. However, this expansion occurred during a three-year absence (2019-2021) of a formal US-Mexico counternarcotics agreement, after AMLO pulled out of the Merida Initiative agreement in his first months in office. During this time, cartels extended their territorial control and fueled the rise of fentanyl-related overdose deaths in United States. The Mexican military’s expanding role in civil society and private business in recent years, coupled with allegations of corruption and cartel collusion, particularly around intelligence leaks, may complicate the US relationship with Mexico’s primary military branch. However, given its dominant role in Mexico’s national security, the US will continue to engage with SEDENA on conventional military cooperation, particularly in curbing migration and drug smuggling on the US-Mexico border.

By contrast, the smaller Secretariat of the Navy (SEMAR), a separate federal executive cabinet member, has built a strong record in conducting successful specialized counter-narcotics operations and has maintained a long-standing partnership with US forces and the DEA. Given its specialized capabilities and established US relationships, SEMAR is well-positioned to be a key partner in any potential US-led joint operations with Mexico against cartel leadership. The fact that the first joint training under the Trump administration was conducted by Green Berets and SEMAR further suggests this likelihood.

Step 2: Identifying first targets

What cartels might the United States target first? Among the candidates, the Sinaloa Cartel, one of two cartels reportedly responsible for the majority of drug trafficking into the United States, is likely high on the list. As the most powerful drug-trafficking organization in the Western Hemisphere, its influence extends beyond narcotics and human smuggling. The cartel has been involved in business extortion, illegal mining, and oil theft, as well as infiltrating formal businesses to launder money.

But what sets the Sinaloa Cartel apart is its deep ties to China in the fentanyl trade. The cartel has reportedly relied on Chinese suppliers for precursor chemicals, and it uses Chinese money-laundering networks to clean its illegal profits. The Sinaloa Cartel’s danger to US interests is so significant that it has been the primary target of congressional investigations and aggressive US law enforcement actions in recent years, with the most notable recent step against the group being the arrest of Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada, the co-founder and leader of the group, in 2024 by the Biden administration.

The Sinaloa Cartel’s willingness to partner with a major state adversary to flood the United States with deadly drugs underscores its growing brazenness in violating US sovereignty and undermining national security. Targeting the Sinaloa Cartel first would not only disrupt one of the largest fentanyl producers in the Western Hemisphere but also send a clear message to other cartels to refrain from engaging with China and other states hostile to the United States.

Step 3: Covert action and “shock and awe” strategy

Once training operations conclude and intelligence assets finalize target selection, the United States will need to consider its next steps. In the past, countercartel efforts have been managed primarily by US law enforcement agencies, such as the DEA and Federal Bureau of Investigation. These agencies conduct criminal investigations and collaborate with their Mexican counterparts to arrest cartel operatives for prosecution in Mexico or extradition to the United States for trial.

However, the new US administration’s decision to allocate significant resources from the Department of Defense and the CIA to dismantle the cartels suggests that more aggressive measures are also being considered, potentially including the launch of a military campaign. Such a step would require the administration to initiate a formal procedure for authorization.

The first option the Trump administration can pursue is a formal Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) approved by Congress. This would allow the administration to deploy military assets in an open and continuous manner under Title 10 of the US Code. However, given the political sensitivity of US troops operating on Mexican soil, the administration may instead opt for a second option: a CIA-directed covert action conducted in secrecy and under Title 50. In this scenario, Trump would issue a presidential finding that authorizes the CIA to conduct covert actions against the cartels. From there, CIA paramilitary officers or special forces units, typically under Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), would be used to carry out the secret operations. Trump has historically favored covert operations in counterterrorism efforts against al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), making this a more likely scenario.

Regardless of which option the administration chooses, it is likely to launch robust kinetic operations during the initial phase of the conflict. The Trump administration’s designation of the eight cartels as FTOs strongly supports this expectation. This is because the first Trump administration may have set a precedent when it placed Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force on the FTO list just eight months prior to the assassination of its leader Qasem Soleimani. Importantly, the Department of Defense announcement of his killing references his leadership in the FTO-designated group in the opening sentence.

Specifically, in the cartel context, the United States may employ a “shock and awe” strategy that is similar to the first Trump administration’s rapid-strike military campaigns against ISIS. The goal of this approach would be to overwhelm the cartels’ forces through raids and to eliminate high-value cartel targets, particularly sicarios and mid-level commanders coordinating logistics and enforcement operations. In such a scenario, the United States would likely provide heavy air support in order to prevent cartel counteroffensives and ensure that targeted cells cannot regroup or retaliate. This may include US forces embedding with the Mexican navy’s special forces. Drone warfare may also be used to eliminate high-value cartel command centers, fentanyl production labs, and weapons depots.

Finally, it’s important to note that such direct actions against cartel factions will likely complement, not replace, ongoing bilateral operations between the United States and Mexico to extradite senior cartel leaders for prosecution. Instead, lethal actions can be expected to focus on cartel security forces and professional sicarios responsible for enforcing the cartel’s rule through violence in Mexico, including the assassination of elected officials, journalists, and innocent civilians.

Step 4: Concession and enforcement

Military force will be central in the early phases of the conflict, but the Trump administration has historically followed extreme pressure with engagement. Accordingly, after an initial shock-and-awe campaign, the administration is likely to push for the Mexican government to lead discussions with the cartels to compel them to end their drug smuggling, particularly synthetic drugs, and human trafficking operations in the United States, while also demanding that they sever business ties with state adversaries such as China.

Early signs of this strategy may already be emerging. In February, open-source intelligence indicated a ceasefire was brokered between the Grupo Escorpion and Metros cartels in the northern state of Tamaulipas that called for the end of fighting between the groups and an end to fentanyl trafficking into south Texas. This event, credited to pressure from the Mexican government, could serve as the recipe for future US efforts. This model of applying overwhelming force to compel cartels into submission, followed by behind-the-scenes discussions, will likely define the long-term course of the conflict. Continuous monitoring and enforcement will be essential to ensure compliance with the concessions.

After “shock and awe”

How would cartels respond to a “shock and awe” military campaign similar to that which destroyed the ISIS caliphate? While cartels control territory, command militia-style forces, and possess military-grade weaponry, they lack a standing army, which makes it more difficult for them to survive a sustained military campaign. Additionally, their tactics are limited to lightweight ambushes and terroristic actions, primarily targeting civilians and rival groups.

Unlike ideological terrorist organizations, cartels operate as businesses. When their funding streams and resources are severely threatened, they are more likely to adapt, negotiate, and shift operations rather than engage in prolonged conventional warfare. Therefore, targeted military attacks on cartels could potentially lead to successful cartel concessions. Furthermore, while direct narco-terrorist attacks on US soil from Mexican cartels are unlikely, US military actions against them could create an opportunity for other state-sponsored groups to conduct counteroffensive attacks, such as targeting US law enforcement officials and terrorizing civilians.

While it remains to be seen whether the United States will conduct direct military action, one thing is clear: the Trump administration’s efforts to combat drug smuggling and human trafficking into the United States is not likely to be a short-term political goal. Instead, these efforts represent a significant step in redefining US grand strategy away from maintaining the country’s post–World War II global primacy toward securing concrete national interests closer to home. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth articulated this shifting policy during a recent Pentagon town hall, stating, “Chaos happens when the perception of American strength is not complete. And so, we aim to reestablish that deterrence, and it starts with our own southern border. It starts with the defense of our homeland.”

James Fowler is a counterterrorism expert who specializes in leveraging technology to support democratic governance and institutional resilience. A retired Special Operations Command (SOCOM) operator, he brings extensive experience in counterterrorism operations and security strategy. Fowler is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project, where he contributes to policy discussions and strategic initiatives aimed at enhancing global security.

Alicia Nieves is a legal expert in immigration and refugee law, specializing in humanitarian assistance and conflict rescue. She is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project and co-founder of the Gaza Family Project, an initiative of the Arab-American Civil Rights League (ACRL) dedicated to helping American families impacted by the Israel-Hamas war.

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Nasrallah’s funeral was Hezbollah’s desperately needed lifeline

David Daoud — Wed, 05 Mar 2025 16:02:34 +0000

Hezbollah is in a crisis. The group suffered an unprecedented drubbing by Israel, which decimated most of its arsenal, eliminated a substantial number of its fighters, and killed its iconic Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. Hezbollah faces near-total Israeli freedom of action in Lebanon, growing skepticism about its utility at home, and the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime, which has severed its supply line through Syria. Within Hezbollah’s core constituency—Lebanese Shiites—these developments have left the group vulnerable to criticism. Many can now plausibly accuse Hezbollah of compounding five years of severe economic hardship, beginning with Lebanon’s 2019 financial collapse, with an unnecessary war that has left their homes in ruin and reconstruction uncertain.

Hezbollah desperately needed a lifeline to secure its future in Lebanon. The massive turnout to Nasrallah’s funeral on February 23 may have provided one, deterring Beirut from either seizing its arms or undermining its domestic standing.

Hezbollah derives its domestic strength—and its longstanding immunity from disarmament or restraint by the Lebanese government—not through force of arms alone but through widespread popularity among Lebanese Shiites, Lebanon’s likely largest and fastest-growing sect. In Lebanon’s May 2022 parliamentary elections, the group garnered 356,000 of the 1.8 million votes cast—the most of any party by approximately 150,000 votes. Polls from January and September of 2024 showed that between 89 percent and 93 percent of Lebanese Shiites support Hezbollah.

This extensive support reflects the group’s “Nation of Hezbollah” model of membership, first articulated in its foundational 1985 Open Letter, which prioritized a party’s “responsiveness with the masses” over territorial control. As a result, Hezbollah developed a broad, flexible concept of membership to attract as much support as possible.

This served a pragmatic purpose. Gaining Shiite support at all granted Hezbollah domestic legitimacy and secured its place in Lebanon’s sectarian-power sharing system. The larger that support, the more influence Hezbollah had within that sectarian system—and therefore adopting a membership model designed to maximize support was vital.

Road to reconstruction

Popular support will also prove critical to Hezbollah achieving its post-war priorities, the first of which is retaining its arms. In his December 5 speech, the group’s new Secretary-General Naim Qassem bowed to reality and the Lebanon-Israel ceasefire agreement, agreeing that “the presence of armed individuals and the resistance’s weapons” would be “banned south of the Litani River”—amounting to a tactical withdrawal from most of south Lebanon. However, Qassem and the rest of Hezbollah have insisted that the agreement does not apply north of the Litani, meaning that the question of Hezbollah’s arms in the rest of Lebanon must be resolved through Lebanese consensus and dialogue on a national defense strategy.

Hezbollah’s other, equally important priority is ensuring that post-war reconstruction funds reach its battered community. Qassem insisted that this must also be the Lebanese government’s priority, after ensuring Israel’s complete withdrawal from southern Lebanon. Seeking to shifting the onus of reconstruction—and the potential backlash if aid does not materialize—from Hezbollah squarely to the Lebanese state, Qassem stated that Beirut had a “responsibility” to “attract donations or call for [aid] conferences or rely on [help] from [foreign] countries” for reconstruction.

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Securing these two priorities is of existential importance for Hezbollah as they are essential to regain whatever trust Shiites lost in the group for inviting the recent war with Israel. Without its arms, the group could no longer claim to be “The Resistance.” After all, that image is the basis of much of Hezbollah’s appeal, and it also serves as its justification for retaining the figurative stick it uses—often as a last resort—to deter hostile action within Lebanon and, more vitally, dissent from within the Shiite community.

As for reconstruction, Iran has allegedly been channeling funds to its main regional instrument—one billion dollars the day after the ceasefire went into effect. However, that’s a pittance compared to the estimated eight billion to eleven billion dollars in war damage. Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s access to Iranian coffers has been complicated by a combination of Assad’s downfall and Israeli threats, which led Beirut to temporarily clamp down on Hezbollah’s alternate funding route through Hariri International Airport by, for example, seizing cash shipments. If reconstruction aid does not materialize, Hezbollah will likely face an unprecedented eruption of anger from within its own support base.

Numbers game

Enter Nasrallah’s funeral, the purpose of which, as Qassem stated, was not only an outpouring of grief but also a domestic show of force. Vast attendance was therefore necessary.

Turnout numbers varied. Citing event organizers, Al-Jadeed and the Lebanese National News Agency offered a slightly implausible preliminary estimate of 1.4 million people, while Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International reported “hundreds of thousands” both in Camille Chamoun Stadium, Lebanon’s largest sports arena where the funeral began, “and surrounding areas.” Meanwhile, Reuters estimated one million attendees based on an unnamed “Lebanese security source,” anonymous Hezbollah sources told AFP that the event drew “around 800,000” participants, and a Lebanese official speaking on condition of anonymity to the Associated Press put the number at 450,000. The newspaper Al-Joumhouria claimed that 200,000 people from the Beqaa valley alone had headed to Beirut to participate in the funeral.

The final say on turnout, however, goes to the Beirut-based research and consultancy firm Information International. It dismissed both the inflated 1.4 million figure provided by the funeral organizers and the minimal estimate of a 200,000-person turnout, calling the latter “very low” and illogical, “given nearly 40 percent of attendees were in the stadium.” Instead, they estimated that 700,000 to 900,000 people attended Nasrallah’s funeral, with “no more than 15,000” of them coming from abroad, “based on [Hariri International Airport’s] daily activities.”

For comparison, the February 16, 2005, funeral of slain former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri attracted around 150,000 people.

Arms control

Hezbollah’s gambit, it would therefore appear, paid off—seemingly rebutting claims that the war and its effects had drained the group of a critical mass of supporters and left it domestically vulnerable. But that turnout now also serves to forestall any potential action by Lebanese authorities, who are already wavering on reining in the group. Both the ostensibly sovereigntist President Joseph Aoun and longtime ally, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, have accepted Hezbollah’s position on resolving the question of its arms.

This is also likely to critically impact Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, who has already made concessions to Hezbollah while forming his cabinet—Lebanon’s real executive authority—in recognition of the country’s political realities. Salam, if his government and its policy statement win a parliamentary vote of confidence, will hold the premiership until Lebanon’s May 2026 parliamentary elections, when his government will dissolve by operation of law. Meanwhile, Salam has a long list of vital tasks to accomplish during his short term in office, including steering Lebanon through economic recovery, repairing and upgrading the country’s dilapidated infrastructure, enacting political and judicial reforms, and overseeing post-war reconstruction. These would be monumental tasks in a functioning state. In Lebanon, accomplishing them will require all hands on deck and avoiding political infighting.

With the numbers it brought out on February 23, Hezbollah can threaten the premier with—at a minimum—obstructionism if the group senses his government is moving against its arms or withholding or conditioning reconstruction aid to areas under its control. At worst, clashing with a Hezbollah that has retained pre-war levels of Shiite support could risk igniting a civil war.

Most Shiites who support Hezbollah are not unwavering Khomeinists. They back the group for practical reasons: its extensive social-clientelist network, the protection from external threats they believe Hezbollah’s private arsenal provides, and the domestic dignity and equality the traditionally disenfranchised sect derives from the group’s domestic political weight. But the relationship between party and population isn’t entirely transactional. Hezbollah has spent decades building an emotional symbiosis between the two—one that has remained relatively unchallenged by Shiite opposition alternatives, whose already small numbers are disunited and lack resources.

By bringing the community out to Nasrallah’s funeral in the hundreds of thousands, Hezbollah sent a message to its domestic opponents and the government: An attack on Hezbollah is an attack on the Shiites writ large. That doesn’t mean Hezbollah’s survival is absolutely guaranteed. But it has now, to Lebanon’s and the region’s misfortune, created a bridgehead that it can widen—over years, perhaps decades, and quite likely in fits and starts—to ensure it remains a fixture in Lebanon’s future.

David Daoud is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, focusing on Hezbollah, Israel, and Lebanon issues. Follow him on X: @DavidADaoud.

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Global Foresight 2025

Andrea Ratiu — Wed, 12 Feb 2025 11:00:00 +0000

Global Foresight 2025

The authoritative forecast for the decade ahead

Welcome to the fourth edition of Global Foresight from the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, home for the last decade to one of the world’s premier strategic foresight shops.

In this year’s installment, which is part of the Atlantic Council Strategy Papers series, our experts present exclusive findings from our survey of leading strategists and experts around the world on how human affairs could unfold over the next ten years across geopolitics, the global economy, climate change, technological disruption, and more. Our next-generation foresight team spots six “snow leopards”—under-the-radar phenomena that could have major unexpected impacts, for better or worse, in 2025 and beyond. And our foresight practitioners imagine three scenarios for how the world could transform over the next decade as a result of China’s ascendance, worsening climate change, and an evolving international order.

Welcome to 2035

What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts

To survey the future, we polled global strategists and foresight gurus on our most burning questions about the biggest drivers of change over the next decade. Check out their forecasts on everything from the likelihood of another world war to the outcome of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Six snow leopards to watch in 2025

The underappreciated phenomena that could have outsize global impact

Because it receives relatively little attention in the press, the “snow leopard” does not appear significant enough to warrant much scrutiny as a driver of change and shaper of the future. Yet just like the real cat in the wild, the figurative snow leopard is something that could sneak up and vividly remind us of its power.

Three worlds in 2035

Imagining scenarios for how global affairs could be transformed over the next decade

The Atlantic Council’s foresight team brought their globe-spanning expertise to the task of envisioning three potential future paths for humanity.

Full survey results

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series

Feb 12, 2025

The Global Foresight 2025 survey: Full results

In the fall of 2024 after the outcome of the US presidential election, the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security surveyed the future, asking leading global strategists and foresight practitioners around the world to answer our most burning questions about the biggest drivers of change over the next ten years. Here are the full results.

Africa China

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Strategy Paper Editorial board

Executive editors

Frederick Kempe
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Editor-in-chief

Matthew Kroenig

Editorial board members

James L. Jones
Odeh Aburdene
Paula Dobriansky
Stephen J. Hadley
Jane Holl Lute
Ginny Mulberger
Stephanie Murphy
Dan Poneman
Arnold Punaro

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Jan 17, 2024

Global Foresight 2024

In this year’s Global Foresight edition, our experts identify the top risks and opportunities for 2024. Our foresight team spots “snow leopards” that could have major unexpected impacts in 2024 and beyond. And we share findings from our survey of global strategists and foresight practitioners on how human affairs could unfold over the next decade.

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Dec 21, 2022

Global Foresight 2023

In this year’s Global Foresight edition, our experts identify the top risks and opportunities for 2023. Our foresight team spots “snow leopards” that could have major unexpected impacts in 2023 and beyond. And we share findings from our survey of global strategists and foresight practitioners on how human affairs could unfold over the next decade.

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Dec 21, 2021

Global Foresight 2022

The inaugural edition of a new annual report from the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, home for the last decade to one of the world’s premier strategic foresight shops.

The post Global Foresight 2025 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Global Foresight 2025 survey: Full results

Andrea Ratiu — Wed, 12 Feb 2025 11:00:00 +0000

The Global Foresight 2025 survey

Full results

This survey was conducted from November 15, 2024 through December 2, 2024.

Demographic data

Survey questions

Global Foresight 2025

In this year’s Global Foresight edition, our experts share findings from our survey of global strategists on how human affairs could unfold over the next decade. Our team of next-generation scholars spot “snow leopards” that could have major unexpected impacts in 2025 and beyond. And our foresight practitioners imagine three different scenarios for the next decade.

Learn More Full Survey

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Welcome to 2035: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2025

By Emily Milliken, Imran Bayoumi, Ginger Matchett, Srujan Palkar, Sydney Sherry

Atlantic Council foresight experts spot the underappreciated phenomena that could have outsized impact on the world, driving global change and shaping the future.

Civil Society Climate Change & Climate Action

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Three worlds in 2035: Imagining scenarios for how the world could be transformed over the next decade

2024 was marked by increased climate shocks and collaboration of autocratic adversaries. What will the world look like in the next decade? The Atlantic Council’s top experts brought their globe-spanning expertise to the task of forecasting three different scenarios for the future.

Africa China

The post The Global Foresight 2025 survey: Full results appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2025

Emily Milliken, Imran Bayoumi, Ginger Matchett, Srujan Palkar, Sydney Sherry — Wed, 12 Feb 2025 11:00:00 +0000

Six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2025

Consider the snow leopard. Panthera uncia sports some of the most effective camouflage in the animal kingdom, its white coat with gray and black spots blending in perfectly with the rocky, snowy Himalayan landscape it inhabits. It’s known as “the ghost of the mountains,” seeming to appear out of thin air on the rare occasions it is seen in the wild.

There’s an equivalent phenomenon in global affairs: under-the-radar trends and events that elude even the most seasoned observer. When their effect on world affairs eventually becomes apparent, they may seem to have come out of nowhere. But these “snow leopards” were there all along. Trends slowly gathering momentum while the crisis du jour dominates headlines, technological developments whose real-world application is still theoretical, known but underrated risks—all of these phenomena have the power to reshape the future. Some already are.

Any forecast of the future needs to account for these snow leopards. As we brought together experts across the Atlantic Council for our annual look into the future, our next-generation staff took on the challenge of spotting the hard to spot. They surveyed the world around them for overlooked risks, trawled scientific journals and the websites of obscure government departments, and came up with a list of potentially world-changing trends and developments.

In the year to come and beyond, keep an eye on these six snow leopards.

The terrorist threat that could sever global connections

When you send a message on WhatsApp to a friend in Colombia or share a video call with family in India, the data—images, text, and video—gets broken down into packets and travels along undersea cables that connect continents in fractions of a second. Nearly 99 percent of international data passes through these cables, including terabytes of sensitive data sent by the US military to command posts overseas as well as an estimated ten trillion dollars transferred every day through the global financial system. In an increasingly interconnected world, nonstate actors pose a serious threat to this critical digital infrastructure, which often lies in shallow waters where it is vulnerable to everything from cyber threats to explosive devices to dragging anchors.

It doesn’t take advanced equipment like submarines to damage these undersea cables. In 2013, for instance, Egyptian authorities arrested three divers who had used underwater explosives to slice through the South East Asia-Middle East-West Europe 4 internet cable, which runs for 12,500 miles and connects three continents. This incident came five years after a similar attack on the same cables and three years after terrorists in the Philippines successfully cut cable lines near the Filipino city of Cagayan de Oro. While the possible involvement of China and Russia in recent cord-cutting incidents has drawn international scrutiny, these prior incidents indicate that nonstate actors also perceive these cables as an opportune target.

In late 2023, a Telegram channel affiliated with Yemen’s Houthi rebels threatened this vital underwater infrastructure by posting a map showing the subsea communications cables in the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, and the Persian Gulf. An ominous message accompanied the map: “There are maps of international cables connecting all regions of the world through the sea. It seems that Yemen is in a strategic location, as internet lines that connect entire continents—not only countries—pass near it.” Of note, the Houthis possess an arsenal of underwater mines, and Houthi militants have reportedly undergone combat diver training in the Red Sea.

The Houthis’ bold assertion could inspire other nonstate actors to put undersea cables in their crosshairs, expanding the threat to this vital infrastructure beyond the region. The same day the Telegram post appeared, a Hezbollah-affiliated Telegram channel shared a similar message and questioned whether the Houthi statement was a “veiled message to the Western coalition.”

Since these cables facilitate financial transactions and are the only hardware capable of accommodating the huge volumes of military sensor data that inform ongoing operations, terrorist groups may see them as high-value targets that can be attacked at a relatively low cost. Furthermore, non-state actors with growing cyber capabilities could exploit vulnerabilities in these networks, potentially disrupting services or stealing sensitive data. This confluence of high-tech and low-tech threats should sound alarms about the future security of global communication networks.

Emily Milliken is an analyst focusing on Gulf security issues, and the associate director of media and communications for the N7 Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

The low-carbon energy source that could power nearly half of US homes

In 2023, the United States produced more oil in a single year than any other country in history—largely due to fracking, which injects fluid under high pressure into rocks, cracking them open to access oil stored within them. The same technique can be used to draw cleaner sources of energy—such as the heat trapped in the earth’s crust—to the surface and send it out to homes across the United States. Geothermal energy harnesses that heat and constitutes a low-carbon energy source. With new technology on the horizon that could make it easier to utilize geothermal energy in more parts of the country, the United States is poised to unlock a major source of energy.

Geothermal-power extraction is currently confined to traditional hydrothermal regions, mostly in the western continental United States plus Hawaii and Alaska. In these regions, conventional geothermal systems tap into the naturally occurring hot water or steam from the earth to drive turbines that generate electricity.

Through enhanced geothermal systems (EGS), geothermal-energy production could be expanded far beyond traditional hydrothermal regions. According to the US Department of Energy, by replicating the physical dynamics present in these regions, EGS has the potential to power more than 65 million homes—a little under half of all American homes. EGS is similar to fracking in that it involves injecting fluid into the ground to create new fractures or reopen old ones, resulting in increased permeability. The hot fluid is then pumped to the surface, where it is used to generate electricity. This method works in areas where the ground is hot enough but there may not be enough naturally occurring fluid or permeability to make geothermal power viable without the addition of EGS.

Currently, the United States has utilized less than 0.7 percent of its geothermal-electricity resources, with the remaining potential expected to become available via EGS. The Department of Energy has started to recognize the potential of EGS, funding projects in Nevada, California, and Utah. The department’s Enhanced Geothermal Shot initiative seeks to reduce the cost of EGS by 90 percent by 2035 to $45 per megawatt hour. It’s an ambitious goal, but one that, if successful, would dramatically increase access to this low- or no-carbon energy source across the United States.

That could help address an urgent need. One analysis estimates that power demand in the United States will grow 4.7 percent over the next five years, outpacing the 0.5 percent growth in annual demand over the last decade. Though not a silver bullet, expanding access to geothermal power could help meet this demand in a clean, predictable, and relatively cheap way.

Imran Bayoumi is an associate director at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The yellow powder that cleans carbon dioxide out of the air

Given the political and technical difficulties of getting countries to reduce the amount of greenhouse gases they pump into the air, the quest for technologies that can remove these gases has grown ever more important. One such technology, direct air capture (DAC), involves pulling carbon dioxide (CO2) out of the air and permanently storing it somewhere else, usually deep underground in rock formations. Because current methods of direct air capture are costly and energy-intensive, they have made only a marginal contribution to meeting global climate goals.

Yet carbon capture might be poised for a transformation thanks to a yellow powder. DAC technologies are expensive to scale because they use substantial amounts of water and energy and are designed to capture concentrated sources of carbon such as the exhaust from a power plant. A new CO2-absorbing material called COF-999, created by a University of California at Berkeley-led team of scientists, could collect CO2 far more cheaply, using substantially less water and energy, than current DAC processes. Utilizing a covalent organic framework—involving the strongest chemical bonds in nature—the material promises to be dependable and sustainable. The powder is less likely to be damaged by humidity, reaches half its capacity in only eighteen minutes, is reusable (it can be used through one hundred cycles of the carbon-removal process, with minimal capacity loss), and might effectively pull CO2 out of the air around us, which has far lower concentrations of carbon than, for example, power-plant exhaust.

Current carbon-capture technology, according to some estimates, could account for 14 percent of the global-emissions reductions needed to meet climate targets by 2050. The market is already expected to rapidly expand, with a projected compound annual growth rate of 6.2 percent over the next five years and estimated value of four trillion dollars by 2050. The invention of COF-999 could supercharge these numbers. It could be easily implemented in existing carbon-capture systems, or scientists could experiment with ways to take advantage of its ability to clean ambient air. “We took a powder of this material, put it in a tube, and we passed Berkeley air—just outdoor air—into the material to see how it would perform … It cleaned the air entirely of CO2,” said Omar Yaghi, a Berkeley chemistry professor who worked on the study. As atmospheric CO2 levels hit record highs, and extreme heat waves, wildfires, floods, and hurricanes increase in frequency, the yellow-powder breakthrough is one example of the creative science needed to counter inaction on rising global emissions.

Ginger Matchett is a program assistant with the GeoStrategy Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The return of wild land

If you have fifteen million dollars to spare, an unused ancestral estate, or even a small plot of land in need of transformation, you too can get in on the hot new trend of rewilding—or the process of rebuilding natural ecosystems on landscapes disrupted by humans. The concept represents a fundamental shift in the way governments, ecologists, and ordinary people view conservation. It focuses on restoring to health native environments—including their balance of plants and animals—rather than on trying to protect scarce undisturbed areas such as wilderness (only 3 percent of the Earth’s land surface is ecologically intact). The idea first took off in North America and has spread like kudzu, including to the estates of the ultra-wealthy. Although rewilding remains a niche solution to various conservation problems, it may be on the verge of an explosion, with major consequences for the global climate.

Some estimates already put the global total of land available for rewilding at a billion acres, which is roughly half the area of the Australian landmass—and even more is set to become available over the course of this century as a combination of factors reduce pressure for the intensive use of land. Some two-thirds of humanity is projected to live in cities by 2050, and the world’s total population (urban and rural) is expected to peak by the mid-2080s. At the same time, agricultural productivity is increasing, technology and innovation are decoupling food output from land input, and alternative proteins, which are far less land- and carbon-intensive than animal-based proteins, are becoming increasingly popular.

A 2024 study found that a quarter of land in Europe is suitable for rewilding, with Scandinavian countries, Scotland, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal at the top of the list. A lot of land is viable for rewilding beyond Europe, too, including in Japan and North America. In the United States alone, around thirty million acres of cropland has been abandoned since the 1980s.

Rewilding may help the environment by absorbing carbon and reversing biodiversity loss. Recent declines in biodiversity around the world, including a 73 percent decrease in wildlife populations over the last fifty years and one million species on the verge of extinction, are linked to accelerated climate change and the spread of infectious diseases. There could be economic benefits as well. Nature tourism is responsible for $600 billion in revenue globally and twenty-two million jobs; revitalized natural spaces and the reintroduction of large animals into them can help raise those numbers. Restoration and rewilding can also increase farming yields, the availability of water, and global fish populations, while also reducing the degradation of agricultural land. Mangroves, coastal wetlands, and coral reefs can lessen flood risk. Putting large herbivores back into their native areas can lower wildfire risk.

Just as the potential benefits of rewilding are becoming clearer, so too are its possible costs. Some experts fear that rewilding efforts may, like some net-zero carbon pledges, allow governments and industry to sidestep decarbonization efforts in favor of carbon offsets, which are unregulated and can be reversed. The reintroduction of animals and plants, particularly large predators, can also induce a public backlash, which may harm rewilding and restoration. Restoration of ecosystems might increase the risks of tick- and other vector-borne diseases as well. As the world grows hotter, it could prove difficult to reintroduce some desired species.

Nevertheless, if the land resources and financial incentives for ecological restoration combine with messaging and public sentiment in favor of individual and community action, rewilding may become a movement capable of restoring wide swathes of land to their original states. In so doing, it might open a new route to address the effects of a changing climate.

John Cookson is the editor of the Atlantic Council’s New Atlanticist.

Sydney Sherry is an assistant director with the GeoStrategy Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The coming quantum leap in energy storage

In 2019, scientists Akira Yoshino, M. Stanley Whittingham, and John B. Goodenough won the Nobel Prize in chemistry for their development of the rechargeable, renewable lithium-ion battery. The committee commended the trio for having “laid the foundation of a wireless, fossil fuel-free society.” Since their debut in the 1990s, batteries have become ubiquitous in all kinds of electronics. But there’s something even better on the horizon, and not a moment too soon: quantum batteries.

These novel batteries store energy by drawing on quantum mechanics (the study of physics on a microscopic scale) and particularly quantum chemistry, which is crucial to battery research and allows scientists to understand the chemical structure and reaction of atoms at significantly quicker speeds than current models. It’s a promising emerging technology to watch amid a broader exploration of alternative battery chemistries that could offer the energy density and stability to perform better than lithium-ion batteries for certain functions.

One application is medical devices. About 26 percent of the US adult population has some type of disability that requires a medical device—such as cochlear implants or a pacemaker—and these devices rely on lithium-ion, lithium, or lithium-iodine batteries for energy. Supply of such batteries isn’t guaranteed; beginning in 2022, for instance, a lithium-ion battery shortage upended electric-vehicle and medical-device supply chains in the United States. These batteries also often require recharging or a replacement, which can necessitate additional surgeries if the medical device that uses them is implanted.

Since quantum batteries could have higher energy density, quantum devices could provide more efficient and long-lasting performance than lithium-based options, reducing the number of battery exchanges that put patients at risk. The energy stored in quantum batteries also could power medical facilities and electric vehicles, improving emergency services in vulnerable and remote areas—a crucial concern worldwide, as climate change brings stronger storms along with longer and more intense heat waves, which not only raise health risks but also strain power grids. During power outages, most hospitals today rely on fossil-fuel and battery-system generators, which often experience complications. In the future, quantum batteries could power these facilities instead. Additionally, since quantum batteries could accelerate charging times for electric vehicles from the current thirty minutes to seconds at high-speed stations (and from about ten hours to a few minutes at home), electrically powered ambulances and medical devices could be charged and ready to go in seconds—a unit of time that can make all the difference for first responders.

Tatevik Khachatryan is an assistant director for events at the Atlantic Council.

The very online generation’s susceptibility to misinformation

Picture someone falling for an online hoax. If an elderly internet user came to mind, think again. A recent study from Cambridge University revealed that the generation that grew up with the internet—and that reported in the study spending the most time online—had a hard time telling real headlines from fake ones.

Though they tend to be tech savvy and certainly are not the only generation vulnerable to inaccurate information, members of Generation Z (those born in the late 1990s and early 2000s) are more susceptible to mis- and disinformation than widely assumed. Often relying on social media as a primary news source, digital natives are vulnerable to manipulation. In the Cambridge study, as well as in research conducted by the Center for Countering Digital Hate, they demonstrated a propensity to believe in conspiracy theories. Gen Z might be conscious of the threat posed by biased feeds and manipulated media, but its members continue to scroll and share—and their amplification of mis- and disinformation will be a serious challenge in the future.

Social media is a central fact of life for the vast majority of Gen Zers in the developed world, and it has become an indispensable informational tool for those in developing countries as well. In 2024, a report surveying nearly 4,500 individuals across the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Australia found that 91 percent of Gen Z social media users are on Instagram and 86 percent are on TikTok. Gen Z is forming judgments based on the content appearing on their social media feeds—often curated by algorithms that privilege content with higher engagement levels regardless of whether it is true or false—and circulating it to their digital communities. Their decisions about who to follow on social media are not necessarily rooted in the authenticity or credibility of those figures. Instead their social media consumption is often parasocial: They tend to follow media streams and engage with the causes of individuals who they don’t know personally, be they influencers or politicians.

A generation growing up with seemingly unlimited access to information and extensive knowledge about what digital technologies like algorithms do, but with limited ability to verify that information, represents a significant sociological change. As members of Gen Z proceed in their careers and assume more powerful positions, there is a real risk that they have been left ill-prepared to navigate the overwhelming scale of online information ecosystems. The mis- and disinformation surrounding global challenges ranging from war to migration to climate change may also make Gen Zers more mistrustful of both institutions and other individuals, rendering them less capable of addressing these challenges. Collaborative efforts between Gen Z and older generations—engaging private companies, governments, and individuals—are needed to manage a transformed information landscape and prevent subsequent generations from growing up in an era of misinformation or falling for online hoaxes.

Ginger Matchett is a program assistant with the GeoStrategy Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Srujan Palkar is a Global India fellow and assistant director with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Global Foresight 2025

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Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

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Six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2025

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From Russia’s shadow fleet to China’s maritime claims: The freedom of the seas is under threat

Elisabeth Braw — Thu, 23 Jan 2025 23:04:21 +0000

Executive summary
Introduction
Treaties and other agreements governing the seas
Recent violations of the global maritime order
Harassment of civilian vessels
China’s construction of artificial islands to claim more sea territory
Manipulation of navigational tools
Gradual maritime border alteration
Sabotage of sea-based infrastructure
Illegal fishing
Challenging UNCLOS
Compliance with maritime rules
Implications of systematic and state-linked violations of the global maritime order
Potential measures to strengthen the global maritime order
Conclusion

Executive summary

The maritime order, which ensures the freedom of the seas, is under intense and growing threat from rule violations in areas including maritime borders and the right of innocent passage. As the Atlantic Council has documented in the first two reports within its Threats to the Global Maritime Order: Securing Freedom of the Seas initiative, continuing attacks on merchant shipping in the Red Sea and beyond pose a serious threat to the freedom of the seas. So does the shadow fleet, whose size has ballooned since Russia began relying on it. This report analyzes the deterioration of the global maritime order, focusing on rule violations in areas including maritime border alteration, harassment of civilian vessels, and disturbance of navigational tools. It also provides recommendations for measures that can help halt this deterioration of the global maritime order.¹

Introduction

“Our purpose is shortly and clearly to demonstrate that it is lawful for the Hollanders, that is the subjects of the confederate states of the Low Countries, to sail to the Indians as they do and entertain traffic with them. We will lay this certain rule of the law of nations (which they call primary) as the foundation, the reason whereof is clear and immutable: that it is lawful for any nation to go to any other and to trade with it.”

Thus wrote Hugo Grotius in Mare Liberum (The Free Sea), his seminal work that laid the foundation for the maritime rules that collectively form today’s global maritime order.² In the brief treatise, the Dutch legal scholar presented a “Disputation Concerning the Right Which the Hollanders Ought to Have to the Indian Trade.” When he wrote it, the world’s oceans were an anarchic collection of waters ruled by nothing more sophisticated than brute force. Dutch traders seeking to sail to India lacked protection in law, just as other traders did.

It took a long time for Grotius’s concept of the free sea to develop into a set of rules and treaties that truly made the seas free, but such a patchwork was in place by the early twenty-first century. Though they were certainly not without loopholes, controversies, and differences in interpretation, these agreements made it possible for global trade to take place without merchant vessels needing to worry about being attacked by forces representing nation states, without coastal states needing to worry about harm to their waters and coastlines caused by merchant vessels, and, indeed, without states needing to worry about neighbors changing maritime borders in violation of international agreements. When there were disagreements, countries could reasonably expect to have their case heard by one of the institutions set up as part of this global maritime order. Indeed, the understanding that global trade, and thus increased prosperity, is only possible if oceans—a global commons—are safe for civilian activities meant that it was in countries’ interests to adhere to global maritime rules.

It worked. In 2021, nearly 2 billion metric tons of cargo were shipped globally, an increase from some 100 million metric tons in 1980.³ The expansion of undersea oil and gas pipelines would not have been possible without the global maritime order, nor would the explosive growth of undersea data cables that power modern economies. In September 2024, the world had 532 active undersea data cables and another seventy-seven planned.⁴

Treaties and other agreements governing the seas

“To the Phoenicians, who were called Canaanites by the sacred writers, who inhabited the coast of the Mediterranean from the Island of Aerad to Mount Carmel, to which country they had been driven by the Hebrews, and whose chief city was Tyre, has been ascribed the distinction of being the inventors of a marine and the originators of maritime commerce,” legal scholar George S. Potter noted in the Yale Law Journal in 1902.⁵ But, he added, “[it] is not known whether the Phoenicians, the Carthaginians or other ancient nations, their contemporaries, possessed or published any maritime laws or regulations.” Indeed, although the Phoenician traders commanded the maritime environment around them and conceived the first known Law of the Sea, they did not write it down. Codified maritime rules were instead introduced by the Roman Empire, another maritime superpower. It based its maritime rules, which were introduced in the sixth century and mostly concerned collisions and lost or damaged cargo, on the Rhodian Sea Law, which is thought to have been drafted in the fourth century BCE.⁶ “As sea commerce under the Byzantine Empire flourished, the seaport cities along the coasts of Spain and France grew in importance. Each port contributed its own local ordinances to the basic Rhodian Law,” Edward Oliver noted in the 1950s.⁷ Other cities and provinces added their own rules, including the Rolls of Oléron in the French duchy of Guyenne in 1175 and the Code of Visby on the Baltic Sea island of Gotland in 1505.⁸

But by the time Hugo Grotius was born in 1583 in the Dutch city of Delft, the Rhodian Sea Law had declined in importance and the oceans were an unruly domain—as they were to remain, for the most part, until nations became serious about creating order in the nineteenth century. Indeed, the Dutch scholar remains a pillar of the global maritime order because he was the first to set out the concept of the free sea (or the freedom of the seas, as the concept is also known). This went far beyond the regulation of collisions and lost or damaged cargo; it is the basis on which civilian maritime activities can take place.

Since the late 1800s, and especially since the end of World War II, the community of nations concluded that the freedom of the seas is only possible if a significant number of nations—ideally all nations—commit to it. While a smaller group of countries began to sign agreements on maritime and naval rules at the turn of the century, after the end of World War II a larger group—which eventually included virtually every nation on the planet—negotiated and agreed on an impressive collection of treaties, rules, and conventions that still govern the oceans and, thus, guarantee the freedom of the seas.

The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), which governs the safety of merchant ships, was adopted in 1914 in response to the Titanic disaster. A second version followed in 1929, a third in 1948, and a fourth in 1960.⁹ SOLAS has been adopted by 121 nations, which collectively represent 98 percent of global shipping tonnage.¹⁰

The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC), which compensates those affected by oil spills from oil-carrying ships, was passed in 1969, entered into force in 1975, and was succeeded by a new protocol in 1992.¹¹ The convention requires all seagoing vessels carrying more than two thousand tons of oil as cargo to maintain insurance covering oil spills.¹²

On the basis of the CLC, a large majority of the world’s nations agreed on the 1971 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution, whose purpose was to compensate those affected by spills from oil tankers. In 1992, a successor convention was passed, which has been signed and adopted by 122 nations.¹³ Thirty-three mostly Western nations have also adopted a supplementary convention.¹⁴ On the basis of the two conventions, countries receiving oil pay into two so-called IOPC Funds, which administer payouts to those affected by oil spills. The funds are financed by contributions by recipients of oil; thus, IOPC countries that import oil pay into the funds. (The fund based on the supplementary convention involves additional contributions and compensation in case of oil spills.) To date, the 1992 fund has settled 158 incidents.¹⁵

The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) was passed in 1973, was amended in 1978, and came into force in 1983. It has been adopted by 158 nations, which collectively represent 99 percent of global shipping tonnage.¹⁶

The International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) was passed in 1979 and has been adopted by 113 countries, which collectively represent 80 percent of global shipping tonnage.¹⁷

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the pillar of the global maritime order. This constitution of the oceans “lays down a comprehensive regime of law and order in the world’s oceans and seas establishing rules governing all uses of the oceans and their resources,” and constitutes the world’s most ambitious attempt at maritime governance to date.¹⁸ The need for such a treaty became obvious during the twentieth century, when “the situation called for the codification of the customary law of the sea for the benefit of all nations.”¹⁹ UNCLOS puts in writing what constitute territorial waters and exclusive economic zones, which rights coastal states and vessels have in specific waters, coastal states’ rights to continental shelves, and other fundamental matters of maritime governance. The convention, which incorporates existing customary law, was signed in 1982, entered into force in 1994, and has been adopted by 170 countries. Violations notwithstanding, it has been a success.²⁰ While United States has not signed the convention, it complies with it.

The International Maritime Organization (IMO), the global maritime order’s most important organization, was established as the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) in 1948, came into force in 1958, and was renamed in 1982.²¹ The agency, which is part of the United Nations system, is “responsible for measures to improve the safety and security of international shipping and to prevent pollution from ships” and is also “involved in legal matters, including liability and compensation issues and the facilitation of international maritime traffic.”²² One hundred and seventy-six countries, which collectively represent virtually all global shipping tonnage, are members of the organization; they are also represented in the IMO Assembly, the organization’s governing body.²³

Together with lower-profile conventions and agreements, these agreements ensure that the world’s oceans are safe for civilian activities and that such activities don’t harm other maritime practitioners or coastal states. Over the decades, the maritime industry and national governments have also added rules and legislation of their own, all of which have helped make civilian maritime activities safer. “Shipping is the first global business,” noted Neil Roberts, secretary of the maritime insurance industry’s Joint War Committee, which classifies waters according to risks posed to merchant vessels. He added the following.

The big thing in the early and mid-1980s was bulkers breaking up. That was because of structural deficiencies, and sometimes it was down to where they were built, how they were built, whether the welds were any good, whether the designs were right. That resulted in lots of international legislation to minimize the risk of further such incidents. And from the late 1960s onwards, there were a number of increasingly large oil spills, which brought in double bottom tankers to try to minimize such incidents. The incidents that took place by accident, not design. Apart from the Tanker War, there was no intent to cause harm. The incidents that occurred were the result of some parties wanting to save costs and maximize profit.²⁴

This general adherence to global maritime rules allowed trade to increase as globalization intensified, which created a need for larger and larger ships. “The global maritime system is very reliable,” Roberts noted. “There are accidents. It’s not completely safe, but it’s really, really efficient. It costs almost nothing to ship a television from East Asia to Europe. Today the largest container ships are 24,000 TEU, having started off at around 1,000 in the ’60s.”²⁵ TEU, twenty-foot equivalent unit, is the size of the standard shipping container.

UNCLOS defines ships’ and coastal states’ rights and defines the free sea’s fundamental right: the right of innocent passage. “Subject to this Convention, ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea,” UNCLOS’s Article 17 states.²⁶ The convention also defines territorial waters (“territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles”) and exclusive economic zones (EEZs, which “shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured”).²⁷ The convention defines innocent passage as continuous and expeditious journeys that don’t prejudice the “peace, good order, or security of the coastal State.”²⁸ This means vessels using the right of innocent passage are barred from threatening or using force, conducting surveillance, fishing, and several other activities.

The convention gives coastal states the right to suspend innocent passage through their territorial waters under certain circumstances, but they cannot suspend innocent passage in their EEZs. In international straits—such as Denmark’s Great Belt and the Strait of Malacca between Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore—vessels have the right to transit passage, which the adjoining coastal states don’t have the right to suspend.²⁹ Transit passage is “the freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.”³⁰ Under UNCLOS, coastal states are also entitled to continental shelves. An island that doesn’t form the main part of a country lacks the right to territorial waters but has the right to an EEZ and a continental shelf. A rock does not.³¹

Svein Ringbakken, managing director of the maritime war-risk insurer DNK, observed the following.

A couple of decades ago, we still had the build-up of the international maritime regime through the IMO, with various conventions being agreed. For example, the IMO responded to pollution issues or the need for regulation of tankers. When things happened that demonstrated a new need for action, countries would negotiate new international conventions regulating these matters or amend existing ones. Countries were doing a lot. That activity goes back to the seventies and eighties and really to the start of the IMCO and then the IMO. You’ve got the oil-spill regimes that came in place from the late sixties and were adjusted several times. After the tanker incidents of the late eighties, there was a major clean-up in terms of quality of tankers. Then you had the Exxon Valdez in the United States that prompted the US to pass the US Oil Pollution Act of 1990, and after that followed an international regulatory period within the UN-based system. Then you had a challenge after some tanker accidents and similar incidents like that in the early 2000s where the EU [European Union] got active, and the Europeans definitely built on the international system. And we had port state control regimes where Paris MoU [memorandum of understanding] and other regimes were developed to enforce the international system.³²

In 2023, in what was perhaps the last hurrah of post-Cold War multilateralism, 193 countries passed the High Seas Treaty, whose purpose is to protect the marine environment of the high seas. At the time of writing, however, only sixteen countries have ratified the treaty.³³

Recent violations of the global maritime order

At the time of writing, the Houthis, armed with weapons supplied by Iran, have been waging a campaign against Western-linked shipping in the Red Sea for more than a year. By June 2024, traffic through the Suez Canal, and thus the Red Sea, had declined by 64.3 percent from May 2023.³⁴ Attacks on shipping are analyzed in the Atlantic Council’s Maritime Threats project’s report “What Attacks on Shipping Mean for the Global Maritime Order.”³⁵ Since the report’s publication, it has emerged that Russia appears to be providing the Houthis with targeting data and that the two sides are in talks regarding Russian arms deliveries.³⁶ Marco Rubio, the new Donald Trump administration’s nominee for secretary of state, has been vocal about China’s indirect support of the campaign: “Next time China talks about being a ‘responsible’ global leader that promotes a ‘community of common destiny for mankind’ remind them how they are doing nothing to stop Houthis from attacking ships in Red Sea carrying medicine, food & fuel for countries all over the world,” he wrote on X in March 2024.³⁷

The fast-growing shadow fleet, which poses an acute risk to coastal states, legally operating ships, the marine environment, and its own crews, has joined attacks on shipping as a pervasive threat that has ballooned since 2022.³⁸

Yet the shadow fleet and state-linked attacks on merchant shipping are not the only violations of global maritime rules. On the contrary, the global maritime rules, treaties, and conventions nations and companies have so painstakingly built since Roman times and, more collectively, since the end of World War II, are being systematically violated by companies, governments, and groups operating in coordination with such governments.

Ringbakken observed, “What we’re seeing now is totally different from the past decades. The dark fleet, for example, demonstrates that there’s a very strong political will to challenge the global maritime system, and it’s in fact much wider than the maritime system. The magnitude of the challenge to the system, both in practice and in the fact that major maritime nations are quite overtly challenging the system, is totally different today than it ever was in the past.”³⁹

Roberts noted, “The global maritime order has undoubtedly deteriorated. For sixty years or so, we’ve had cooperation. Harmonious trades have been allowed because the countries in the world have observed the system, the rules, the IMO legislation. And now fractures are appearing. The question is, how far can it fracture before people start reacting and changing what they do?”⁴⁰

Retired Vice Admiral Duncan Potts, who began his career in the Royal Navy in 1979, observed the following.

In the Cold War years, where I spent the first eleven years of my service, the world was clearly very polarized and we all grew up knowing that the Soviet Union was a potential enemy and everything we did in the military was focused on that. But even during that time, there were accepted practices at sea. The respect for the high seas as a global common where both sides could sail and trade freely . . . issues such as innocent passage and transit passage were respected. We even had agreements between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, protocols for if you met at sea and wished to communicate and understand what the other side was doing. We then, of course, transitioned after 1990 into a period of thirty years where, from a Western point of view, the freedom of navigation on the high seas was not just assured, but the West really had control of the high seas and could use the high seas for whatever it wanted to do within the framework of UNCLOS. Now that seems to have unraveled or be unraveling quite quickly.⁴¹

Navy Captain Niels Markussen, the director of the NATO Shipping Center, added the following.

The maritime order has been developed over time both by nations but also by the industry because it served an agreed and common purpose. The Western world has dominated the development of the rules and regulations, but it has worked, down to the most basic things. We all know when to turn starboard, and it goes on from there. In the nineties, when we saw a rise in globalization, goods really started moving around the world, and most of the goods were carried on ships. Global maritime traffic was a clear manifestation of globalization, and the existing global maritime rules and regulations formed a good legal basis. In the nineties, we didn’t see China that much, but later we did, as a big market but also as the big producer of cheap goods with an expanding need for raw material and energy. They seriously started getting out in the world, interacting and playing a role on the global scene, in the new millennium. More recently, we started seeing China seriously challenging the United States as world leader also in the maritime domain with both a huge navy and coast guard but also with soft and commercial power, buying influence around the world. We are now seeing the maritime domain being much more politicized, also related to the race for resources. China is challenging the West in our dominance of the rules and they also started proactively using them to their own advantage.⁴²

The following pages highlight examples of state-linked maritime rule violations. This is not an exhaustive list. Instead, it is intended to illustrate the breadth of such violations.

Harassment of civilian vessels

Taiwan Strait

Since 2020, harassment of civilian vessels has involved a range of actions.⁴³ These include China’s 2023 deployment of what it labeled an inspection flotilla in the Taiwan Strait. The flotilla had a mandate to inspect all commercial shipping going through the strait on both sides of the median line. In the end, it did not conduct these inspections. But had it done so, it would have caused considerable disruption and delays to commercial shipping in the Taiwan Strait, through which some 240 merchant ships sail on an average day.⁴⁴ Merchant ships sail through the strait on the condition that the median line will be respected and that they won’t be subjected to unwarranted inspections. Taiwan considers the strait international waters, while China considers it Chinese territorial waters. Either way, UNCLOS only allows inspections in territorial waters “[w]here there are clear grounds for believing that a vessel navigating in the territorial sea of a State has, during its passage therein, violated laws and regulations of that State adopted in accordance with this Convention,” and in international waters a coastal state has minimal inspection rights.⁴⁵

Chinese excavators also regularly appear in the waters around Taiwan’s Matsu Islands and dig up sand without permission. Because the Matsu Islands are not Taiwan’s main island, they don’t have territorial waters, but excavation without permission is still a violation of innocent passage because it is prejudicial to the good order of Taiwan. The excavators’ regular appearances mean the Taiwan Coast Guard Administration needs to sail to the excavators’ location and force them to leave. This involves considerable use of vessels and crew time.⁴⁶ In 2020, Taiwan expelled nearly four thousand Chinese sand dredgers and sand-transporting vessels from its waters, a 560-percent increase from 2019.⁴⁷ This forced Taiwan to buy twelve more patrol vessels, at a cost of $400 million—an otherwise unnecessary expense, but one required for Taiwan to uphold the rules around innocent passage.⁴⁸ The excavators, however, continued to arrive.

Black Sea

International treaties ban attacks on merchant vessels carrying civilians and/or civilian goods.⁴⁹ Even so, Russia has regularly struck merchant vessels in the Black Sea since its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. As it became clear that war was imminent, insurers raised the Russian and Ukrainian parts of the Black Sea to their highest risk level, a status that requires shipping lines to obtain special permission from their insurers before sailing into the affected waters.⁵⁰ The resulting slump in shipping from the world’s breadbasket led the United Nations, aided by Turkey, to negotiate with Russia for a “grain corridor” that allowed vessels carrying commercial food and fertilizer to leave three Ukrainian ports and sail through the Black Sea to the Bosphorus and on to their destinations in middle- and low-income countries. The corridor, agreed to in July 2022, was initially successful. But by July 2023, Russia was no longer complying with it and called merchant vessels legitimate targets.⁵¹

Since then, Russia has directly or indirectly (through attacks on Ukrainian ports) attacked merchant vessels in the Black Sea. For example, in September 2024, Ukraine reported that Russia had struck a merchant vessel carrying Ukrainian grain to Egypt just after it left Ukrainian territorial waters.“⁵²

“The acceleration in attacks coincides with harvest season in Ukraine, a country which remains a major supplier of agricultural produce, crucial for global food security,” the UK government reported in October 2024.⁵³

South China Sea

In the South China Sea, vessels belonging to the China Coast Guard (CCG) and the Chinese Maritime Militia have, together with the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), long marked China’s presence in waters legally belonging to the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Taiwan. Beijing claims these waters belong to China under its “nine-dash line,” which it first proclaimed in 1947 and which covers 90 percent of the South China Sea.⁵⁴ Because the nine-dash line could give China rights to fishing and natural resources in these waters, it is perhaps unsurprising that Beijing has tried to unilaterally change established maritime borders in the South China Sea.

For the past fifteen years or so, China has asserted its unilateral interpretation of these maritime boundaries by alternately sending PLAN, CCG, and Maritime Militia vessels to patrol them in what is known as the cabbage-leaf strategy. It has done so not just through harassment of civilian vessels in waters officially belonging to the Philippines, Vietnam, or other countries over whose waters Beijing claims jurisdiction, but also through the construction of artificial islands to solidify its claims there. (See the section on construction of artificial islands below.) As Rebecca Strating, a scholar focusing on the maritime domain in Southeast Asia, notes, this has “raised concerns that as it grows more powerful and confident, China will be able to access maritime resources that it is has no legitimate right to under international law by using economic coercion or stand-over tactics.” In 2016, an UNCLOS tribunal ruled against China in a case brought by the Philippines.⁵⁵

For several years, the Philippines refrained from enforcing the tribunal’s ruling; since 2022, by contrast, it has attempted to enforce it. These efforts have included delivering regular supplies to the skeleton crew manning a naval ship deliberately grounded in 1997 to mark Philippine waters.⁵⁶ Vietnam also tries to enforce its jurisdiction over parts of the South China Sea, as does Indonesia. Companies conducting surveys for potential oil and gas exploration in Indonesia’s EEZ, which is partly within the nine-dash line, must do so escorted by Indonesian law-enforcement and naval vessels due to the risk of harassment by China.⁵⁷

Indeed, vessels from the PLAN, the CCG, and the Chinese Maritime Militia regularly harass ships in the EEZs of the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, and other countries. They have, among other actions, directed military-grade lasers against Philippine supply boats and deliberated rammed them.⁵⁸ It is no surprise that the harassment is escalating, as China’s 2021 Coast Guard Law gives agencies the right to board, inspect, and detain foreign vessels and individuals in waters China considers to be under its jurisdiction.⁵⁹ On June 15, 2024, China’s Coast Guard Order #3, an addition to the 2021 Coast Guard Law, came into effect. Under it, Chinese authorities “can detain any foreign vessel or individual suspected of violating Chinese law in waters within ‘Chinese jurisdiction’ for up to 60 days without trial.”⁶⁰ In August 2024, there were two separate collisions involving Chinese and Philippine vessels in the Philippines’ EEZ. In December, following an incident during which Chinese ships fired water cannons and sideswiped a Philippine fisheries bureau vessel, Beijing accused Manila of having “provoked trouble” in the South China Sea with US backing.⁶¹ CCG vessels also regularly patrol gas projects in the EEZs of Malaysia, Vietnam, and Indonesia to demonstrate China’s claim on the waters, frighten companies from doing business there, or both.⁶²

The CCG, already the world’s largest maritime law-enforcement body, has also been expanding its fleet. In 2023, it began receiving twenty-two corvettes from the PLAN, which gives it a fleet of more than 150 patrol vessels with a displacement of one thousand tons.⁶³ Corvettes are warships extremely rare in coast guard fleets; the US Coast Guard’s fleet includes no corvettes.“⁶⁴ The CCG also operates 350 smaller vessels with displacements between 100–999 tons.⁶⁵ Warships would not be necessary for standard maritime law enforcement; instead, China uses its coast guard fleet to enforce its unilateral claims in the South China Sea. The large fleet also allows the CCG to patrol waters far from China’s territorial waters, its EEZ, and the South China Sea. In October 2024, CCG cutters were sighted in the Arctic Bering Sea together with Russian Border Guard vessels.⁶⁶

The maritime harassment signals China’s rejection of UNCLOS and other parts of the global maritime order. “It’s getting more aggressive, they’re getting more bold and it’s getting more dangerous,” Admiral John Aquilino, then commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, said in April 2024.⁶⁷ He explained that China was increasing its aggressive conduct through a “boiling the frog” strategy, adding that “there needs to be a continual description of China’s bad behavior that is outside legal international norms.”⁶⁸ In July 2024, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian made the following accusation at a press conference.

The US and the EU disregard the history and facts on the South China Sea issue, act against the UN Charter, and misinterpret UNCLOS and other international law [and] the US has gone back on its public commitments of not taking a position on sovereignty issues in the South China Sea. It encouraged the Philippines to launch the arbitration on the South China Sea, and blatantly released a statement to endorse the award. This is political manipulation aimed at using allies to destabilize the South China Sea and the region and advance the nefarious agenda of going after China.⁶⁹

(There is no evidence that the United States prompted the Philippines to submit its case to the tribunal.)

The maritime harassment is already causing anxiety among shipping lines and even manufacturers, because many manufacturers are looking to friendshore to Vietnam and the Philippines and away from China. “The situation in the South China Sea hasn’t really affected the shipping industry in itself, but where the rules-based order is being challenged, it will affect the shipping industry in a much bigger sense,” said Line Falkenberg Ollestad, an adviser at the Norwegian Shipowners’ Association.⁷⁰

China’s construction of artificial islands to claim more sea territory

In 2013, China began constructing artificial islands on undersea rock formations—that is, reefs—in waters also claimed by one or more of the South China Sea coastal nations of the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Taiwan. On these reefs, collectively known as the Paracel Islands and the Spratlys, China has created more than 3,200 acres of new land.⁷¹ The country now possesses islands that already host military equipment and infrastructure, and could also host troops and further equipment. As noted earlier, an UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal unanimously ruled against China in a 2016 case brought by the Philippines involving China’s artificial islands and other UNCLOS violations in its waters. It found that “Beijing’s claims to ‘historic rights’ within the nine-dash line were inconsistent with international law,” “none of the features subject to the arbitration could be legally classified as islands,” and “the features had no entitlements to an EEZ or continental shelf.”⁷² The marine features within the nine-dash line that China considers islands (Chinese islands, to be specific) are, the tribunal explained, “rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own [. . .] and generate no entitlement to an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.”⁷³

Had the tribunal sided with China, it “would have resulted in extensive sovereign rights to living and non-living resources within the EEZs of these features,” including the South China Sea’s “estimated 11 billion barrels of untapped oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.”⁷⁴ Instead, the tribunal sided with the Philippines, also providing definitions of a rock and an island. As Strating notes, the “UNCLOS arbitral award is only final and binding on China and the Philippines, yet it nevertheless has the potential to set a high legal standard on what constitutes an island as opposed to a rock, which may have implications for the maritime claims of other regional states that may be considered ‘excessive.’”⁷⁵ (China has also challenged a recognized island that belongs to Japan, and thus generates an EEZ belonging to Japan, on the basis that the island should be considered a rock.⁷⁶)

Had the maritime order worked as intended by UNCLOS and other treaties, China would have abided by the tribunal’s decision, dismantled its artificial islands—especially because these are located in waters also claimed by other countries—and ceased its maritime harassment around the islands. Instead, Beijing rejected the tribunal’s jurisdiction, kept the artificial islands, continued to construct and equip them, and has increased its harassment of civilian vessels there. In December 2024, the Philippines announced it is gathering evidence of Chinese UNCLOS violations with the intention of filing a “foolproof, solid case” against China with the UNCLOS tribunal.⁷⁷

The fact that China systematically violates UNCLOS in the South China Sea doesn’t mean that all other countries fully uphold it. Though less severe, such violations—which result from different interpretations of UNCLOS—also undermine the global maritime order. They are discussed in the section on compliance with maritime rules.

Manipulation of navigational tools

SOLAS requires all vessels that conduct international voyages and have a gross tonnage of three hundred and above, as well as all passenger ships, to have and use an automatic identification system (AIS).⁷⁸ This rule, which was created in response to collisions between vessels, is another example of how the maritime order’s components have been established to increase the safety of maritime activities.

AIS benefits all vessels and is “is the mariner’s most significant development in navigation safety since the introduction of radar.”⁷⁹ Much like the Global Positioning System (GPS), it “is a digital positional awareness system operating in the Very High Frequency (VHF) maritime band. Its purpose is to help identify ships, assist in target tracking, assist in search and rescue operation, simplify information exchange and provide additional information to assist situational awareness.”⁸⁰ The US Coast Guard describes AIS as “a shipboard radar or an electronic chart display that includes a symbol for every significant ship within radio range, each with a velocity vector (indicating speed and heading). [. . .] With this information, you can call any ship over VHF radiotelephone by name, rather than by ‘ship off my port bow’ or some other imprecise means. Or you can dial it up directly using [Global Maritime Distress and Safety System] equipment. Or you can send to the ship, or receive from it, short safety-related email messages.”⁸¹

In recent years, however, Russia has occasionally and deliberately jammed AIS, initially in the Black Sea. In June 2017, for example, the US Maritime Administration sent out an alert informing recipients that a “maritime incident has been reported in the Black Sea in the vicinity of position 44-15.7N, 037-32.9E on June 22, 2017 at 0710 GMT. This incident has not been confirmed. The nature of the incident is reported as GPS interference. Exercise caution when transiting this area.”⁸² Since then, AIS incidents linked to Russia have increased and spread to other bodies of water, including the Baltic Sea. Between 2016 and 2022, the think tank C4ADS identified 9,883 suspected instances of interference in AIS and GPS across ten locations, affecting 1,311 civilian-vessel navigation systems.⁸³ In October 2024, Finnish officials said navigational interference had increased in the Gulf of Finland, the Baltic Sea’s easternmost part.⁸⁴

The Gulf of Finland is home to Russia’s large ports of Ust-Luga and St. Petersburg, which a large share of Russia’s shadow fleet uses. This might explain why Russia would want to disguise the vessels’ journeys, though the increase in navigational disturbance could also be an attempt to disrupt traffic in the Baltic Sea. Either way, such navigational interference violates SOLAS’s maritime safety provisions. For vessels sailing in the affected waters, the interference means that crews cannot be sure which navigational information to trust. Although ships also have Electronic Chart Display and Information Systems (ECDIS)—another SOLAS requirement—as well as paper charts, navigational interference causes delays and could also cause accidents.

“During that time, it was not very common that the Russians or anybody else entered the wrong AIS symbols into their computers or the like,” retired Rear Admiral Anders Grenstad, chief of the Swedish Navy between 2005 and 2011, said. “That came after 2012 and 2013, and especially 2014, when they started to disguise their military ships, and some of the cargo ships also stopped using AIS system or spoofed it. Now it’s getting more and more common. Of course that changes the security situation in the Baltic Sea.”⁸⁵

In the South China Sea, the Philippines has accused China of engaging in manipulation of navigational tools. After residents in the Philippine province of Zambales reported seeing Chinese vessels near a local dredging site in early December 2024, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) investigated and found the dredgers elsewhere. Presenting a sixty-day AIS analysis of one of the ships, PCG spokesman Commodore Jay Tarriela said the vessel “could not realistically navigate those routes.”⁸⁶

Gradual maritime border alteration

China’s construction of artificial islands on undersea rocks in waters that belong to other countries under international law is a clear case of maritime border alteration. However, such acts are difficult for the wronged country to stop because they are conducted gradually. Even if the affected country notices the activity, it’s not clear at what stage it should intervene, especially if the country engaging in the construction is much more powerful.

In the case of China’s artificial islands, it was difficult for the Philippines and other states with rights to the waters to prove China’s intentions in the Spratlys and the Paracel Islands, even though they suspected China was planning to build artificial islands. When it was undeniable that China was building islands, the Philippines brought its case to the UNCLOS tribunal—but when China rejected the tribunal’s ruling, it was unclear what else could be done. The islands are now a fait accompli.

Maritime border alterations can be gradual not just in a temporal sense but in a spatial one. In May 2024, Russia removed the buoys in the Narva River that demark the maritime border between Russia and Estonia.⁸⁷ Had Russia tried to alter the land border in a similar fashion, that action would likely have been considered an attack under NATO’s Article 5, but unilateral alterations of maritime borders are less dramatic and less likely to trigger a decisive response. Still, such unilateral alterations violate UNCLOS and contribute to the deterioration of the global maritime order. “Since Russia has already removed buoys in the Narva River, one must ask what might happen in the Black Sea,” Markussen observed. “And when countries undertake such unilateral border alterations, in each case we’ll have a fight over control. They will use such means to challenge us in every way they can.”⁸⁸

Sabotage of sea-based infrastructure

In September 2022, unknown perpetrators blew up the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines in the Baltic Sea EEZs of Sweden and Denmark.⁸⁹ Five months later, a Chinese fishing boat and a Chinese freighter severed the two pipelines connecting the Matsu Islands with Taiwan proper.⁹⁰ In October 2023, two undersea cables and one pipeline in the Baltic Sea EEZs of Sweden, Finland, and Estonia were sabotaged; Finnish and Estonian investigators later identified the Chinese-owned, Hong Kong-flagged boxship Newnew Polar Bear as the likely perpetrator.⁹¹

Then, in November 2024, two other undersea cables in the Baltic Sea—one connecting Sweden and Lithuania and one connecting Finland and Germany—were severely damaged within the course of twenty-four hours. Investigators quickly zeroed in on the Yi Peng 3, a Chinese-owned bulk carrier flagged and owned in China that had just left Russia’s Baltic port of Ust-Luga. After the ship sailed out of the Baltic Sea toward the Atlantic, Danish naval vessels followed it through the Danish Straits. After leaving the Great Belt, the Yi Peng 3 stopped just outside Denmark’s territorial waters, which gave Danish authorities far fewer rights to detain it and its crew than if it had halted within Danish territorial waters.⁹² “If you focus on the sabotage, you’re missing the picture,” Wang said. “The real objective for Russia is to show the China-Russian cohesion to the entire world. They didn’t even try to conceal the sabotage. What they did, however, was that the Yi Peng 3 stopped just outside territorial waters in order to expose our impotence.”⁹³

Harming undersea infrastructure violates Article 113 of UNCLOS, which stipulates that “[e]very State shall adopt the laws and regulations necessary to provide that the breaking or injury by a ship flying its flag or by a person subject to its jurisdiction of a submarine cable beneath the high seas done willfully or through culpable negligence, in such a manner as to be liable to interrupt or obstruct telegraphic or telephonic communications, and similarly the breaking or injury of a submarine pipeline or high-voltage power cable, shall be a punishable offence. This provision shall apply also to conduct calculated or likely to result in such breaking or injury.”⁹⁴

Punishing those involved, however, has been difficult for the countries in whose waters these and similar incidents have occurred. In the case of the 2023 sabotage of the undersea cables and the pipeline in the Baltic Sea, the Newnew Polar Bear immediately left the scene, and China and Hong Kong SAR have not cooperated with the investigation despite their obligations under UNCLOS.⁹⁵ In the case of Nord Stream, Swedish and Danish investigators have closed the cases after being unable to file criminal charges.⁹⁶ This was hardly surprising, given coastal states’ limited law-enforcement powers in their EEZs, and it also illustrates the limitations of criminal justice when it comes to suspected maritime gray-zone aggression.

The UN Security Council has also been unable to reach a resolution on the matter. Sweden, Denmark, or both could file a case with the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea—the body that typically adjudicates UNCLOS matters—against the country they suspect of instigating the sabotage. Given that China has set a precedent for ignoring the tribunal’s rulings, such a ruling would, however, be unlikely to have a significant effect.⁹⁷

Although (and because) it’s often impossible to prove state involvement, sea-based infrastructure remains highly vulnerable to state-linked harm. While Taiwan did not identify Chinese state involvement in the severing of the two cables connecting the Matsu Islands with Taiwan proper, the fact that the cables were severed rendered the islands disconnected from the rest of the world. The post-Cold War world’s expansion of sea-based infrastructure, especially the internet communications cables that power modern economies, has been based on the assumption that nations and companies will abide by maritime rules. This is no longer the case, and the current expansion of offshore windfarms creates another large category of sea-based infrastructure that will be vulnerable to harm.

Although NATO launched a Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network in May 2024, it’s unclear what the network can do apart from monitoring threats to this infrastructure.⁹⁸ The same is true for governments, which can monitor sea-based infrastructure in their territorial waters and EEZs but would be hard pressed to find a suitable response if they detected sabotage in progress. They could arrest perpetrators in their territorial waters, but this would be difficult in an EEZ and virtually impossible on the high seas. A military or other forceful response to sabotage would be escalatory and, therefore, highly unlikely. For their part, the owners and operators of sea-based infrastructure have increased monitoring of their installations but don’t have the legal power to punish saboteurs, though they can alert authorities to suspicious behavior.

Illegal fishing

Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUUF) has taken place for decades. Such fishing is a violation of national laws, international treaties, and UNCLOS’s Article 61, which stipulates that “[s]uch measures shall also be designed to maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors, including the economic needs of coastal fishing communities.”⁹⁹

China engages in such fishing on a larger scale than any other country through its distant-water fishing fleet. The fleet, which is not government owned but whose activities are tolerated or even encouraged by the Chinese government, is estimated to encompass nearly seventeen thousand vessels.¹⁰⁰ The vast majority of these vessels fish outside Chinese waters, especially in low-income countries’ territorial waters. Fishing in other countries’ territorial waters does not in itself violate international maritime rules, but IUUF does. A small but significant number of the Chinese distant-water fishing fleet—eighty-three vessels, according to a comprehensive study published in 2018—engages in IUU. That’s more than twice as many vessels as those coming from the second-worst offender, Fiji, which was found to have forty vessels engaged in the practice.¹⁰¹ The other offenders among the top five—Senegal, Panama, and Kiribati—had thirteen, eight, and eight vessels, respectively, engaged in the practice.

IUUF is a considerable concern for the affected coastal states because it doesn’t just involve the fishing itself. “It’s a web of criminal activity,” said Captain Matthew Michaelis of the US Coast Guard, who serves as division chief at US Africa Command’s Counternarcotics and Transnational Threats Program. “It may involve forced labor on these fishing vessels, and the methods of payment may go into other illicit means and cross multiple countries.”¹⁰²

Challenging UNCLOS

Ordinarily, disputing the validity of a treaty or a piece of legislation would not count as a violation of it. However, in addition to violating UNCLOS and ignoring an UNCLOS tribunal’s ruling against it, China regularly disputes the validity of the convention itself. In 2022, for example, Foreign Minister Wang Yi explained that “it is important to stay open-minded and move forward. UNCLOS is not isolated or insulated, but rather inclusive and adjustable. It should keep pace with the times to better adapt to international maritime practices.” The world should, Foreign Minister Wang said, “join hands to usher in a new journey of maritime governance.”¹⁰³ China is not the only country to have publicly challenged the purpose of treaties it has signed. For example, the United States left the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia (previously the Soviet Union) during the George W. Bush administration and left the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal) during the Donald Trump administration.¹⁰⁴

Compliance with maritime rules

The global maritime order has never enjoyed complete compliance from all the nations of the world, and complete compliance is unlikely.

Nations’ differing approaches to maritime rules and regulations begin with their differing interpretations of the treaties and agreements that constitute the maritime order. One issue on which countries’ interpretations differ concerns naval vessels’ right of innocent passage. Referring to countries in and around the South China Sea, Strating notes that “across the region, states—even like-minded states—have different interpretations of the activities that international law permits, including the rights of warships to innocent passage or to conduct military activities such as surveys.”¹⁰⁵ For example, some countries differentiate between innocent passage for commercial vessels and naval ships, while others—including the United States—argue that all categories of ships have the right of innocent passage. Some nations—including China and South Korea—demand that naval vessels provide notification before any journeys through their waters and require such vessels to await permission before transiting. (China insists on notification by foreign military vessels in its own waters, but typically does not notify other countries when its own military vessels sail through their waters.¹⁰⁶) Other nations—including the United States—maintain that innocent passage is truly innocent and should not be curtailed by demands for notification. China’s unilateral declaration of the nine-dash line turns high seas and other countries’ EEZs into a Chinese EEZ, while China’s insistence that Taiwan is part of China gives Beijing significant rights over the Taiwan Strait.

Differing interpretations are the reason why the United States conducts freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) through both waters that are indisputably at risk of blockade or other hostile action and those of friendly nations. In 2023, the United States conducted FONOPs through the waters of fellow NATO member states Croatia and Latvia to signal opposition to these countries’ demands for notification prior to passage. It conducted FONOPs in Taiwanese waters for the same reason, and conducted FONOPs in Japanese waters to highlight that Japan’s use of baselines does not conform with UNCLOs. Further FONOPs took place in the waters of Cambodia, Colombia, China, the Dominican Republic, Iran, the Maldives, Malta, Oman, Russia, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Vietnam, and Yemen.¹⁰⁷ This laudable and resource-intensive effort in support of the global maritime order is, however, undercut by the fact that, while it adheres to the convention’s obligations, the United States itself has not signed UNCLOS.

“UNCLOS does not explicitly address which, if any, military activities are permissible within coastal states’ EEZs and which ‘high sea freedoms’ may be exercised in EEZs,” Strating notes. “Under Article 87, UNCLOS provides that high sea freedoms ‘shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard for the rights under this Convention with respect to activities in the Area.’”¹⁰⁸ Most countries take this wording to mean that only peaceful exercises may be conducted in other countries’ EEZs, and many request permission to conduct such exercises. UNCLOS, however, does not expressly ban naval exercises in EEZs.

Russia has exploited this legal ambiguity by, inter alia, holding naval exercises in the EEZs of Ireland and Norway. In January 2022, the Russian government informed the government of Ireland that it intended to hold a naval exercise in Ireland’s EEZ off the country’s southern coast, an area traversed by most undersea communications cables connecting northern Europe and the US east coast. Although Dublin declared the exercise “not welcome and not wanted,” Russia proceeded with its plans.¹⁰⁹ It only called off the exercise after Irish fishermen announced they would stage the fishing equivalent of a sit-in, swarming the waters with their fishing boats and preventing the Russian Navy from conducting the exercise.¹¹⁰ In August 2023, Russia similarly informed Norway that it would hold a major naval exercise in Norway’s EEZ in the Arctic Barents Sea.¹¹¹ This time, too, local fishermen announced they would remain in the waters to contest the exercise. In both cases, however, Russian military vessels had the right to be in the waters under UNCLOS, and the convention is unclear regarding the nature of military activities that are acceptable in another country’s waters.

Nor has compliance ever been perfect. China has conducted nine-dash-line activities since the 1940s and, as Wang observed, “the Cuban missile crisis is a very visible example of how you can interpret the law of the sea to your benefit in order to blockade, in this case, Russian armaments bound for Cuba.”¹¹²

Indeed, the officials and leaders who negotiated and signed UNCLOS and other maritime treaties and agreements were not so naïve as to believe the agreements were perfect. “UNCLOS is simply the least bad compromise available, and it has allowed a huge number of nations to benefit from some degree of maritime order,” Wang noted. “With UNCLOS, you have the advantage that it is generally accepted. But UNCLOS does not take care of all eventualities and some of the ambiguities that might be in the convention can then be interpreted and pushed to your own advantage.”¹¹³

Implications of systematic and state-linked violations of the global maritime order

Although the global maritime order has never been perfect, the intensity of rule violations has increased and has now reached an alarming level. Potts noted the following.

Wherever you look at the world, we’re seeing problems in the maritime domain. It starts in the Red Sea where we now see proxies armed with complex weapons and supported by states. It’s absolutely threatening, and it’s taking place in one of the world’s great trading routes. In the South China Sea we’re seeing China, a signatory of the UN Convention of Laws of the Sea, asserting territorial claims, expanding what they consider they can claim by artificial fabrication, challenging all those innocent-passage rights. And then we start to see other things coming up, like Russia and China cooperating launching patrols in the High North. It feels as though that fundamental freedom that enables global trade is under more pressure today than it has been since the end of the Second World War.¹¹⁴

Ringbakken also noted the challenge of countries violating the maritime order.

It’s not just an issue of those directly breaking the rules; it’s also an issue of the governments that engage with those breaking the rules. If, for example, the governments where shadow vessels load or discharge their cargo wanted to do something about it, they certainly have the international framework of regulation to do so [by refusing to let the vessels dock], but they don’t. That’s because it’s probably both politically and economically advantageous for them not to. They have a double incentive. Certainly for some of the states that are receiving the cargo it’s economically beneficial to do it that way. But I think it’s also deeper than that. These violations are also part of a wider challenge to the international maritime regime.¹¹⁵

Because the global maritime order relies on its participants voluntarily following the rules, the fact that key participants now openly violate them makes further deterioration likely, or even inevitable. This is beginning to create a split in the global maritime order. On one side are the countries that adhere to virtually all the obligations laid down in treaties, rules, and conventions; on the other side are countries that openly violate one or more of these rules and even challenge the validity of the rules altogether. “The balance of power and influence is undoubtedly changing in the world,” Potts observed. “Those building blocks that we have taken as a given for the last fifty years are definitely at the point of being challenged. And for a lot of people, it has thrown the light on how important the high seas are.”¹¹⁶ Simon Lockwood, head of shipowners at Willis Towers Watson, noted, “We’ve almost got a bifurcated model now: there are those countries that sit within the norm, and then we have the creation of a parallel system—the shadow system, the dark system.”¹¹⁷

One often-floated potential measure dramatically illustrates the dilemma facing nations committed to the maritime order. A blanket ban on suspected shadow vessels in Western waters would violate vessels’ right of innocent passage and would give the impression that Western countries only adhere to the maritime rules that suit them.

Indeed, the state of the global maritime system is a harbinger of the state of the rules-based international order, and its deterioration is taking place at a time when the oceans are becoming even more important. “I don’t think it’s the case that China doesn’t want a rule-based world,” Markussen noted. “They just want to write the rules themselves. The global maritime order is definitely under pressure. I can’t see where it will end, but challenging the global maritime order seems to part of a bigger strategy.”¹¹⁸

Referring to the impact of rules violations on the shipping industry, Falkenberg Ollestad said the following.

Accidents caused by rules violations are the short-term perspective. All of this is happening as the shipping industry is trying to execute a big green transition. Owners are making huge investments in a whole new technology. And if the green transition is to be successful, we need to commit by common rules or else there’s going to be a loophole for some to continue to use fuels that harm the environment but are much less expensive. We need to have a pricing mechanism decided at the IMO. But if not everybody abides by what’s decided at the IMO, we’re going to see two different playing fields. That will also ultimately make it more difficult to green the industry, which desperately needs to become greener. The whole industry is based on common international rules and orders.¹¹⁹

Commenting on the shadow fleet, she added, “The structural problems created by rules violations are what we’re seeing when 25 percent of the tanker fleet has left adequate insurance schemes.”¹²⁰

This increasing divide will affect not just rule-abiding shipping lines but the entire maritime sector. “It will create a two-tier market where the compliant companies are attracting costs,” Ringbakken observed. “It’s never free to comply with rules and regulations, and compliant companies are now attracting compliance costs that some of these other actors don’t have. And when you have a two-tier market, it’s going to be less effective.”¹²¹ He added, “Commercially, it means that some of the cargoes, let’s say in the liquid oil trades, will no longer be available [because they are being shipped by noncompliant, lower-cost companies]. This reduces the volume of cargoes that is available to compliant companies and increases, of course, the volume of cargo available to the dark fleet and other noncompliant actors.”¹²²

Roberts made similar observations.

Seaborne trade is critical, it is vulnerable, and it depends on peace. If you don’t have peace, it cannot function as it has been functioning, and if it doesn’t function as it has, then there will be an increased cost of some kind. Over time, supply chains have been honed to maximum efficiency. Shipping is incredibly efficient and there are obviously economic anomalies where you transport prawns from South America to Europe and back, which is just pointless, but that’s been allowed because it’s so efficient. If that efficiency is impaired, then perhaps some things won’t happen anymore.¹²³

He continued.

Ships navigate from one port to another and deliver the goods and then carry on. They are independent of foreign policy. But if they can’t count on peace in the waters, they have to go another way. And the question is what happens if their alternative way is also blocked. There’d be big delays, more delays, more cost. If it becomes impossible to do trans-oceanic trade, then the world will look very different very quickly because countries depend on this trade, and they don’t have the resources in their own countries for most of the goods being transported by sea.¹²⁴

In addition to the economic impact, such bifurcation will also have an impact on safety beyond the harms already being caused by the shadow fleet. “Almost all the rules that govern maritime activities are experience based; they are safety rules,” Ringbakken said. “If you have a large portion of the global merchant fleet not operating to the standards that have been developed over the years based on experiences from previous accidents, they will be more prone to accidents. Incidents risk going uncompensated or having to be compensated by those that adhere to the regimes, namely the compliant countries and companies. That threatens the viability of the rules-based maritime system in the longer term.”¹²⁵

Indeed, the rule violations are likely to cause a split in the painstakingly built global maritime order, with one side represented by countries and companies complying with virtually all rules and the other side by countries and companies that frequently violate them. “There’s been a massive growth in undersea communications cables over the last few years,” Potts noted. “If we start looking at minerals, especially the rare-earth minerals that are essential for a transition to an electric economy, China has already secured almost exclusive access to many of those, but the main reserves on land are insufficient and the reserves that are known about are in the high seas. At a time when the world needs a consensus about what we do with 70 percent of the Earth’s surface, it seems that the world is fracturing into blocs that are going to be in competition for this space.”¹²⁶

The US military, especially the US Navy, remains the default protector of the global maritime order. But even under normal circumstances, the US Navy is already stretched. “The US Navy is emphatically not big enough to combat all these rules violations. Never has been, never will be,” noted retired Vice Admiral Andrew Lewis, a former commander of the US Second Fleet and the NATO Joint Force Command for the Atlantic.¹²⁷ Indeed, some of the rule violations, such as the Houthis’ campaign against Western shipping, seem designed to tie down the US Navy. That, of course, limits its ability to provide constabulary duties in other parts of the world. “All the resources we use to protect shipping in the Red Sea are in effect used to protect Russian and Chinese merchant vessels there, because most Western-linked merchant vessels are rerouting to the Cape of Good Hope,” Markussen noted. “That means that we use American warships to protect Chinese shipping in the Black Sea.”¹²⁸

Commenting on the shipping sector, Falkenberg Ollestad added, “We’re seeing increased polarization within an industry that is so reliant on global unity, and it’s only the beginning. This polarization seems likely to continue to increase because it has become apparent to some that it’s in their interest and that it can create new markets and opportunities.”

Another challenge facing countries and companies wanting to uphold the maritime order is that they have few tools with which to enforce the rules under the current set of rules, treaties, and conventions. Falkenberg Ollestad noted the following.

Those violating the rules are outside of the jurisdiction of the ones wanting to fix the system. We have freedom of navigation and the right of innocent passage. When it comes to the shadow fleet, this is a real dilemma. The West has helped create the shadow fleet by imposing the oil price cap, and you can’t curtail the shadow fleet by undermining UNCLOS [by preventing all suspected shadow vessels from traversing Western EEZs], because then you’re just doing the same as them: violate maritime rules. We have to find solutions in a different way, and that’s where we are now.¹²⁹

That is, indeed, where the world is now. The freedom of the seas, toward which the world’s nations (and companies) had been making progress for generations, is at risk of dangerous deterioration. The following section outlines measures countries committed to the global maritime order can take to shore up the system.

Potential measures to strengthen the global maritime order

Expanded freedom-of-navigation operations

Freedom-of-navigation operations have long been a pillar of constabulary efforts in support of the global maritime order, with the US Navy as the lead practitioner. The US Freedom of Navigation Program, of which FONOPs are just one part, is “a US-specific program with legal, diplomatic, and operational stages that challenge different types of excessive maritime claims and demonstrate a commitment to protecting its maritime freedoms” and “targets excessive maritime claims from allies and foes alike and includes the use of bilateral diplomacy, diplomatic protests, and operational assertions known as FONOPs.” The program contests “restrictions on innocent passage that do not accord with UNCLOS; impermissible EEZ and airspace use limitations; improperly drawn baselines or archipelagic claims; and excessive historic waters claims.”¹³⁰ The United Kingdom’s Royal Navy also conducts FONOPs, though they are fewer in number and typically only challenge rival states. In 2020, for example, it conducted a FONOP in the Barents Sea, and it has long conducted FONOPs in the Red Sea.¹³¹ “All Government ships, including naval ships, enjoy the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea and freedom of navigation in the contiguous zone and the exclusive economic zone under UNCLOS,” Minister for Asia Nigel Adams told the UK Parliament in March 2020. “As part of the Royal Navy’s persistent presence in the region, five ships have transited the South China sea since April 2018, most recently HMS Enterprise in February.”¹³²

In September 2024, the German Navy performed a rare freedom-of-navigation journey when two of its ships—the frigate Baden-Württemberg and a supply ship—sailed through the Taiwan Strait on a journey from South Korea to the Philippines. “International waters are international waters, it is the shortest route, it is the safest route given the weather conditions, and it is international waters, so we are going through,” explained Boris Pistorius, Germany’s defense minister.¹³³ In accordance with the right of innocent passage, Germany also did not provide the Chinese government with prior notification. (Beijing, which considers the entire Taiwan Strait to be Chinese waters, and which demands notification prior to any passages by foreign military vessels, took umbrage.) A few weeks later, a Canadian frigate also sailed through the Taiwan Strait together with a US Navy ship. A few days after that, a French frigate made the same journey.¹³⁴

Germany publicized its journey, explicitly making the case for freedom of navigation.

These freedom-of-navigation journeys, including by countries that were until recently reluctant to irritate Beijing, send an unmistakable signal that Western countries are willing to support the global maritime order. Western countries and other partners could expand such navigations, including through journeys involving more than one country. This would allow smaller countries, and countries with smaller navies, to participate, and the signal could be amplified through public messaging about the journeys. Freedom-of-navigation journeys would also allow Western countries to team up with countries outside the Western family of nations in support of the global maritime order. This is in the interest of many countries, such as Vietnam, that otherwise disagree with the West on numerous policy issues.

Further involvement by navies and other armed services

Enforcement of UNCLOS’s rules governing territorial waters and EEZs are typically the responsibility of coast guards, except in cases involving naval assaults. Yet with maritime rule violations becoming a tool with which some states stake out geopolitical claims, undermine the global maritime order, or both, countries committed to the protection of the global maritime order could consider using their navies collectively and in functions beyond freedom-of-navigations operations.

Doing so as a matter of policy would signal that these countries are willing to enforce the global maritime order. It would be the maritime equivalent of beat cops or neighborhood watch patrols. Like freedom-of-navigation operations, such tasks would also allow Western countries—the default protectors of the rules-based international system—to team up with non-Western countries committed to protecting the global maritime order. These countries could include a range of countries in different regions, from the UAE to Indonesia.

Some countries, which could range from Finland and Denmark to Malaysia, would have an interest in participating in “neighborhood patrols” to discourage shadow vessels. (Of course, under UNCLOS it is impossible to ban all suspected shadow vessels.) Other countries, primarily those in the South China Sea, would likely be interested in neighborhood patrols there. Like freedom-of-navigation operations, maritime neighborhood patrols would allow the United States and other Western nations to cooperate with countries that are not part of the Western camp and that disagree with many Western policy positions, but which are committed to the global maritime order. This commitment would not always be ideological. In most cases, it would likely be based on enlightened self-interest: the majority of the world’s countries, and nearly all smaller and coastal states, depend on a functioning maritime order for imports, exports, or both, as well as for the safety of their seafarers. (The world has some 1.9 million seafarers, most of whom are nationals of developing and emerging countries.¹³⁵) Indeed, the protection of maritime rules could allow regional neighbors that otherwise rarely collaborate in a systematic fashion to join forces. Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore have the potential to form a strong group.

Naval force-structure innovation

In 2005, then Chief of US Naval Operations Mike Mullen introduced a bold idea: a “thousand-ship navy.” As Dan Uhls notes, this force would not be a fleet exclusively serving US interests, “but rather a global maritime security arrangement, designed to synergize the collective maritime capabilities of our allies to further security in the maritime domain. Admiral Mullen’s initiative was born partly out of the globalization driven need ensure free, and unfettered access to the global commons by legitimate merchant traffic, and the realities of an ever shrinking American fleet’s inability to conduct global sea-control unilaterally.”¹³⁶ Though little came out of the idea at the time, the thousand-ship navy remains a desirable arrangement, especially in light of the world’s growing geopolitical tensions. It’s a rare opportunity for the US Navy and other Western navies to collaborate with countries that are not part of the Western family of nations, as described below in the section on further involvement by navies and other armed services. “The goal of the thousand-ship navy was to be able to operate with a unified intent of keeping the maritime commons free and open for trade, which is ultimately what we have navies for,” Lewis noted.¹³⁷

The potential combined fleet would, of course, need a command-and-control structure for its designated duties. It would also need the right combination of vessels, which would involve a great degree of collaborative planning, and even acquisition, among participating countries. Lewis explained the logistics.

We would need a combination of types of ships. There’s a way to leverage artificial intelligence and autonomous vessels to expand the global fleet. But that’s only one aspect of it. You have to have small combatants. You have to have medium-sized combatants and large combatants and depending upon where you’re operating, how far you are from land. We would need to include aviation assets and space assets to support such a fleet, and we’d also need vessels of different propulsion where you can stay at sea for long periods of time, i.e., nuclear powered or ones that have capabilities with battery power and so on, where we can keep the fleet at sea longer for longer periods of time.¹³⁸

But simply having one thousand vessels dedicated to the protection of the global maritime order will in no way guarantee maritime order, as Lewis noted.

Patrolling the oceans involves vast areas, and the oceans also get busier all the time, especially at choke points and in critical areas and where there’s friction, whether it be in the South China Sea and First Island Chain, Second Island Chain, or in the Atlantic and the Strait of Gibraltar and the Mediterranean down into the Middle East or up into the Arctic and in the Barents. There are all sorts of choke points and vital areas that need to be patrolled regularly to maintain that order. And the globe is a big place. If you’re operating in the Pacific, it’s vast, and there are not many countries around there. Even the Atlantic is vast. And even a thousand ships, is it big enough to have what I would call a man on man-type force? Not really. It’s difficult to be everywhere, even with a vast naval capability.¹³⁹

Indeed, the threats to the global maritime order may have reached such an extent that no amount of multilateral innovation will create a naval force large and powerful enough to dependably protect the maritime order.

Collaboration with the private sector

Governments and companies active in different parts of the maritime domain, including as part of NATO’s Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network, informally exchange information on an unclassified basis. Requirements around fair competition and security clearance make it difficult for Western governments to maintain a formal information-exchange system with private-sector executives and companies, but more governments could invite private-sector representatives to informal conversations. This would be a mutually beneficial arrangement, as many companies in the maritime domain maintain highly sophisticated monitoring of maritime activities and can alert governments to anomalies.

In the first instance, governments would do well to create such informal information-exchange channels with the shipping and maritime insurance sectors. The exchange that already takes place among certain officials and executives has proven useful for both sides. Governments and companies should also consider collaboration with the space-based imagery sector. Space-based imagery is essential to many crucial activities, and such imagery is especially useful in areas—such as oceans—that neither navies nor commercial fleets can fully cover. Cooperation with space-imagery firms would naturally need to be based on contracts rather than informal conversations. But with such collaboration in place, those involved could also provide the respective other side with occasional and informal updates.

AFRICOM’s maritime collaboration with African coastal states

As a unified combatant command, the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) covers far more than maritime issues. But because the African continent has a vast coastline with thirty-eight littoral states, maritime-order cooperation with these states is an AFRICOM priority. Ambassador Robert Scott, deputy to the commander for civil-military engagement, noted that “a lot of the countries have a lot of interest in issues such as IUUF and maritime domain awareness securing their natural resources, whether they’ve got current existing gas or oil strikes out there, or they’re anticipating gas or oil strikes. So there’s a lot of interest in talking to us about what we can provide to assist them in their goals. On IUUF, we do a lot of work through exercises and capacity building. We provide small boats and training for troops to be able to board ships.”¹⁴⁰

It’s a multi-US agency effort led by AFRICOM, involving a total of twenty-one agencies ranging from the US armed forces to the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and it involves African countries including Kenya on the east coast and Senegal on the west coast. Components include both maritime and land-based exercises—for example, moot courts that allow judges and other court staff to exercise maritime violation cases. US Naval Forces Africa (NAVAF) and USAID have also teamed up to provide some navies in the region with SeaVision, a maritime situational-awareness tool.¹⁴¹ Having such situational awareness, Scott said, is essential for these countries, whose navies are often small and function more like coast guards. “How do I analyze what is happening in my waters? And how do I determine when I should go out and expend my scarce resources to do something about it? Having this additional information may let you know we need to go check out this boat, or you may need to go check out this area because something’s happening there.”¹⁴²

He added, “That’s something we’re incorporating more and more into our exercises. How do you board a ship? If a trawler is brought in, how do they arrest the crew? How do they take that to their judiciary? And how does the judiciary evaluate its own laws in order to come up with the correct penalties? What we’re trying to do is work with our partners so that they can go after those who are paying no attention to their sovereignty and resources.”¹⁴³

AFRICOM’s collaboration with African coastal states demonstrates the potential for Western maritime collaboration with countries that don’t belong to the immediate Western community of nations but want to protect the maritime order in their own waters and beyond.

Updating the definition of war

Article 51 of the United Nations Charter states that “[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”¹⁴⁴ NATO’s Article 5, in turn, states that “[t]he Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.”¹⁴⁵

With gray-zone aggression increasing, including in the maritime domain, treaties’ lack of definition for what constitutes an armed attack presents a loophole for gray-zone aggression to continue with impunity. In the same vein, international humanitarian law—often called the law of war—only defines armed military violence as acts of war, and only military combatants as perpetrators of acts of war. This strict divide, too, provides loopholes for acts of gray-zone aggression.

It is extremely unlikely that the member states of the United Nations would be able to agree on a definition in the near future, but NATO could strive for such clarification. Individual countries that are not members of NATO could do the same. A definition of armed attack more expansive than the traditionally understood kinetic attack by another country’s armed forces would, however, force the targeted country to respond with force, which would bring the risk of escalation.

Conclusion

Compliance with global maritime rules has never been perfect, but rules violations are increasing quickly. The violators include different countries and proxies, and the rules they violate cover a wide range, from China’s construction of artificial islands and harassment of civilian vessels (which violates UNCLOS) to the Russian-led shadow fleet (which violates rules regarding safe shipping) to the Houthis’ campaign against Western-linked shipping (which violates UNCLOS’s fundamental right of innocent passage).

Past violations, primarily piracy, were manageable because the perpetrators faced the community of nations, which teamed up to protect the maritime order. Today, however, the perpetrators include two of the world’s most important governments, those of Russia and China. They violate maritime rules for what appear to be dual reasons: for economic advantage and to communicate their opposition to the global maritime order as it has been built over generations, especially since World War II. Because Russia and China consider this order a Western-led construct, they appear determined to undermine it. Indeed, China has said it supports the scrapping of UNCLOS and its replacement with a new constitution of the oceans.

This reality presents enormous challenges to the freedom of the seas. If the Western-based shipping industry can’t count on innocent passage—and if officially sailing vessels face the risk of colliding with ghost vessels and being attacked for geopolitical reasons—shipping lines and insurers will no longer be able or willing to operate in certain part of the world. The same is true for owners and operators of sea-based infrastructure, while China’s enforcement of its unilaterally declared maritime borders makes these waters unsafe for the countries to which the waters officially belong. The freedom of the seas is at risk of fatal deterioration—that is, of the freedom only being applicable to part of the world’s oceans.

The Atlantic Council is grateful to the Smith Richardson Foundation for its support of this report.

About the author

Elisabeth Braw is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, focusing on geopolitics and the globalized economy as well as gray-zone and hybrid threats. She’s also a columnist with Foreign Policy and Politico Europe and the author of the award-winning Goodbye Globalization: The Return of a Divided World (Yale University Press, 2024) and the upcoming Undersea War (2026). At the Atlantic Council, Elisabeth leads the Threats to the Global Maritime Order initiative. She was previously a senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London. She’s the author of God’s Spies, about the Stasi’s church division (2019), and The Defender’s Dilemma: Identifying and Deterring Gray-Zone Aggression (2022). Elisabeth is a member of the UK National Preparedness Commission and a member of the Krach Institute for Tech Diplomacy’s advisory council. Before joining academia, she worked in the private sector following a career as a journalist. She is a regular op-ed contributor to the Financial Times, The Wall Street Journal, and The Times (of London).

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1 The Atlantic Council is grateful to the Maritime Threat initiative’s partners, DNK and the Norwegian Shipowners’ Association.

2 Hugo Grotius, Mare Liberum, Richard Hakluyt with William Welwod’s Critique and Grotius’s Reply Edited and with an Introduction by David Armitage, Liberty Fund, 2004, 10, https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/armitage/files/free_sea_ebook.pdf.

3 “Container Shipping—Statistics & Facts,” Statista, January 10, 2024, https://www.statista.com/topics/1367/container-shipping/#topicOverview.

4 Lane Burdette, “How Many Submarine Cables Are There, Anyway?” Telegeography, September 9, 2024, https://blog.telegeography.com/how-many-submarine-cables-are-there-anyway.

5 George S. Potter, “The Sources, Growth and Development of the Law Maritime,” Yale Law Journal 11, 3 (1902), 147, https://www.jstor.org/stable/782993.

6 Lieutenant Edward F. Oliver, “Twenty-Five Hundred Years of the Rules of the Road,” US Naval Institute Proceedings 81, 11 (1955), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1955/november/twenty-five-hundred-years-rules-road#:~:text=The%20birth%20of%20the%20Law,after%20the%20island%20of%20Rhodes

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 “International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS),” International Maritime Organization, 1974, https://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-the-Safety-of-Life-at-Sea-(SOLAS),-1974.aspx.

10 “Status of Treaties,” International Maritime Organization, last visited December 6, 2024, https://web.archive.org/web/20200528090136/http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Documents/StatusOfTreaties.pdf.

11 “International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC),” International Maritime Organization, last visited December 6, 2024, https://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/International-Convention-on-Civil-Liability-for-Oil-Pollution-Damage-(CLC).aspx.

12 Ibid.

13 “Parties to the International Liability and Compensation Conventions,” IOPC Funds, last visited December 6, 2024, https://iopcfunds.org/about-us/membership/a-z-listing/.

14 Ibid. This report uses “Western” to mean liberal democracies; that is, it also includes countries in the geographical east such as Japan and Australia.

15 “Funds Overview,” IOPC Funds, last visited December 6, 2024, https://iopcfunds.org/about-us/.

16 “Status of Treaties.”

17 Ibid.

18 “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” International Maritime Organization, last visited January 6, 2025, https://www.imo.org/en/ourwork/legal/pages/unitednationsconventiononthelawofthesea.aspx#:~:text=The%20United%20Nations%20Convention%20on,the%20oceans%20and%20their%20resources.

19 “The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea at 40,” International Seabed Authority, last visited January 6, 2025, https://www.isa.org.jm/unclos-at-40/#:~:text=As%20of%20July%202021%20it,are%20automatically%20members%20of%20ISA.

20 “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.”

21 “International Maritime Organization (IMO),” United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library, last visited December 6, 2024, https://research.un.org/en/docs/unsystem/imo#:~:text=International%20Maritime%20Organization%20(IMO)&text=Established%20as%20the%20Inter%2DGovernmental,International%20Maritime%20Organization%20in%201982

22 “Frequently Asked Questions,” International Maritime Organization, last visited December 20, 2024, https://www.imo.org/en/About/Pages/FAQs.aspx.

23 “Member States,” International Maritime Organization, last visited December 6, 2024, https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/ERO/Pages/MemberStates.aspx.

24 Interview with the author, November 1, 2024.

25 Ibid.

26 “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” Article 17.

27 Ibid., Articles 3 and 57.

28 Ibid., Article 19.

29 Ibid., Part III.

30 Ibid., Article 38.

31 Steven Geoffrey Keating, “Rock or Island? It Was an UNCLOS Call: The Legal Consequence of Geospatial Intelligence to the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration and the Law of the Sea,” Journal of National Security and Law Policy 9, 509 (2018), 512, https://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Rock_or_Island_It_Was_an_UNCLOS_Call_3.pdf.

32 Interview with the author, November 18, 2024.

33 “High Seas Treaty Ratification Tracker,” High Seas Alliance, last visited December 6, 2024, https://highseasalliance.org/treaty-ratification/.

34 “Suez Canal Authority Extends Discounts as Traffic and Revenues Plummet,” Maritime Executive, June 16, 2024, https://maritime-executive.com/article/suez-canal-authority-extends-discounts-as-traffic-and-revenues-plummet.

35 Elisabeth Braw, “What Attacks on Shipping Mean for the Global Maritime Order,” Atlantic Council, August 9, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/what-attacks-on-shipping-mean-for-the-global-maritime-order/

36 Elisabeth Braw, “Russia Is Running an Undeclared War on Western Shipping,” Foreign Policy, November 7, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/11/07/russia-houthis-targeting-data-war-western-shipping-gaza/.

37 Marco Rubio (@marcorubio), “Next time China talks about being a ‘responsible’ global leader that promotes a ‘community of common destiny for mankind’ remind them how they are doing nothing to stop Houthis from attacking ships in Red Sea carrying medicine, food & fuel for countries all over the world,” X, March 13, 2024, 8:41 a.m., https://x.com/marcorubio/status/1767908957593444713.

38 The shadow fleet is analyzed in: Elisabeth Braw, “The Threats Posed by the Global Shadow Fleet—and How to Stop It,” Atlantic Council, December 6, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-threats-posed-by-the-global-shadow-fleet-and-how-to-stop-it/.

39 Interview with the author, November 18, 2024.

40 Interview with the author, November 1, 2024.

41 Interview with the author, November 3, 2024.

42 Interview with the author, November 3, 2024.

43 For more detail, see: Braw, “What Attacks on Shipping Mean for the Global Maritime Order.”

44 Elisabeth Braw, “China Eyes Commercial Ships in a Move to Intimidate Taiwan,” Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-eyes-commercial-ships-in-a-move-to-intimidate-taiwan-inspection-xi-jinping-strait-cargo-a5d0d067.

45 “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” Article 220.

46 Due to its unusual legal status, and the fact that it’s not a member of the United Nations, Taiwan has not signed UNCLOS, but it adheres to it.

47 Yimou Lee, Ann Wang, and Marco Hernandez, “China’s Latest Weapon against Taiwan: the Sand Dredger,” Reuters, July 5, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/graphics/TAIWAN-CHINA/SECURITY/jbyvrnzerve/.

48 Elisabeth Braw, “China is Stealing Taiwan’s Sand,” Foreign Policy, July 11, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/11/china-stealing-taiwan-sand/; Wen Lii, “From Taiwan to the Philippines, Chinese Illegal Dredging Ships Wreak Environmental Havoc,” Diplomat, August 12, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/from-taiwan-to-the-philippines-chinese-illegal-dredging-ships-wreak-environmental-havoc/.

49 Charles Cheney Hyde, “Attacks on Unarmed Enemy Merchant Vessels,” US Naval Institute Proceedings 44, 4, 182 (1918), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1918/april/attacks-unarmed-enemy-merchant-vessels#:~:text=In%20accordance%20with%20the%20general,attempt%20to%20escape%20or%20offer.

50 Elisabeth Braw, “The Last Thing Ukraine Needs Is a Shipping Crisis. But It’s About to Have One,” Prospect, February 17, 2022, https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/world/the-last-thing-ukraine-needs-is-a-shipping-crisis-but-its-about-to-have-one-russia-conflict.

51 Patrick Wintour, “What Was the Black Sea Grain Deal and Why Did It Collapse?” Guardian, July 20, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/20/what-was-the-black-sea-grain-deal-and-why-did-it-collapse.

52 Ukraine War Briefing: Russia Accused of Unprecedented Missile Attack on Grain Ship in Black Sea,”
Guardian, September 13, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/sep/13/ukraine-daily-briefing-russia-accused-of-unprecedented-missile-attack-on-grain-ship-in-black-sea.

53 “Prime Minister Warns Russian Threat to Global Stability Is Accelerating as Putin Ramps Up Attacks on Black Sea,” UK Prime Minister’s Office, October 22, 2024,
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-warns-russian-threat-to-global-stability-is-accelerating-as-putin-ramps-up-attacks-on-black-sea.

54 Rebecca Strating, “Defending the Maritime Rules-Based Order: Regional Responses to the South China Sea Disputes,” East-West Center, January 1, 2020, 5, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep25045.

55 Ibid., 8.

56 Jon Hoppe, “The Measure of the Sierra Madre, Originally the USS LST-821,” US Naval Institute Proceedings 36, 1 (2022), https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2022/february/measure-sierra-madre.

57 “Seismic Strife: China and Indonesia Clash over Natuna Survey,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, October 28, 2024, https://amti.csis.org/seismic-strife-china-and-indonesia-clash-over-natuna-survey/.

58 “Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea,” Council on Foreign Relations, last updated September 17, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea.

59 “Coast Guard Law of the People’s Republic of China,” 25th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 13th National People’s Congress, January 22, 2021, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Translations/2021-02-11%20China_Coast_Guard_Law_FINAL_English_Changes%20from%20draft.pdf.

60 Chloe Yeung and Karen Hui, “China’s New Coast Guard Regulations Up the Ante in Tense South China Sea,” Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada, July 4, 2024, https://www.asiapacific.ca/publication/chinas-new-coast-guard-regulations-in-south-china-seas.

61 “China Says Philippines Has ‘Provoked Trouble’ in South China Sea with US Backing,” Reuters, December 13, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-says-philippines-has-provoked-trouble-south-china-sea-with-us-backing-2024-12-13.

62 “Seismic Strife.”

63 Alex Wilson, “China Adds 22 Ships to World’s Largest Coast Guard Fleet, Japanese News Agency Says,” Stars and Stripes, February 2, 2023, https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/2023-02-02/china-coast-guard-rapid-expansion-9015285.html.

64 Coast Guard Operational Assets,” US Coast Guard, last visited December 6, 2024, https://www.uscg.mil/About/Assets/.

65 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” US Department of Defense, 2023, 80, https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

66 John Grady, “China Coast Guard Now Operating in the Bering Sea,” USNI News, October 3, 2024, https://news.usni.org/2024/10/03/china-coast-guard-now-operating-in-the-bering-sea.

67 Demetri Sevastopulo, “US Pacific Commander Says China Is Pursuing ‘Boiling Frog’ Strategy,” Financial Times, April 28, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/f926f540-d5c2-43f2-bd8f-c83c0d52bcda.

68 Ibid.

69 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian’s Regular Press Conference on July 12, 2024,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, July 12, 2024, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/lxjzh/202407/t20240730_11463258.html.

70 Interview with the author, November 13, 2024.

71 “China Island Tracker,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, last visited December 6, 2024, https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/china/#Spratly%20Islands.

72 Strating, “Defending the Maritime Rules-Based Order,” 35.

73 “PCA Case Nº 2013-19, In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration, Before an Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China,” Permanent Court of Arbitration, July 12, 2016, 496,
https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Award.pdf; “Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea.”

74 Keating, “Rock or Island?” 513.

75 Strating, “Defending the Maritime Rules-Based Order,” 39.

76 Ibid., 9.

77 Kathrin Hille, “Philippines Considers New UN Case against Beijing over South China Sea Activity,” Financial Times, December 12, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/d16f314b-a602-44ce-a304-83f850a50d81.

78 “AIS (Automatic Identification System) Overview,” NATO Shipping Center, last visited December 6, 2024, https://shipping.nato.int/nsc/operations/news/2021/ais-automatic-identification-system-overview#:~:text=SOLAS%20requirements%3A%20The%20IMO%20Convention,size%20to%20carry%20AIS%20onboard.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid.

81 “Automatic Identification System (AIS) Overview,” Navigation Center, United States Coast Guard and US Department of Homeland Security, last visited December 6, 2024, https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/automatic-identification-system-overview.

82 “2017-005A-Black Sea-GPS Interference,” US Department of Transportation Maritime Administration, last visited December 6, 2024, https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci/2017-005a-black-sea-gps-interference.

83 “Above Us Only Stars: Exposing GPS Spoofing in Russia and Syria,” C4ADS, 2022, https://c4ads.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/AboveUsOnlyStars-Report.pdf. The report focuses on four geographic areas.

84 Anne Kauranen, “Finland Detects Satellite Navigation Jamming and Spoofing in Baltic Sea,” Reuters, October 31, 2024, https://uk.news.yahoo.com/finland-detects-satellite-navigation-jamming-101744355.html.

85 Interview with the author, November 20, 2024.

86 “Philippines Accuses Chinese Coast Guard of Using Dredgers for AIS Spoofing,” Maritime Executive, December 13, 2024, https://maritime-executive.com/article/philippines-accuses-chinese-coast-guard-of-using-dredgers-for-ais-spoofing.

87 “Statement of the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regarding the Border Incident on the Estonian-Russian Border in the Narva River,” Republic of Estonia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 23, 2024, https://www.vm.ee/en/news/statement-estonian-ministry-foreign-affairs-regarding-border-incident-estonian-russian-border.

88 Interview with the author, November 1, 2024.

89 Laura Gozzi, “Nord Stream: Denmark Closes Investigation into Pipeline Blast,” BBC, February 26, 2024,
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68401870.

90 Elisabeth Braw, “China Is Practicing How to Sever Taiwan’s Internet,” Foreign Policy, February 21, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/21/matsu-islands-internet-cables-china-taiwan/.

91 “National Bureau of Investigation Has Clarified Technically the Cause of Gas Pipeline Damage,” Polisen, October 24, 2023, https://poliisi.fi/sv/-/centralkriminalpolisen-har-tekniskt-klarlagt-vad-gasrorets-skada-orsakats-av?languageId=en_US; Elisabeth Braw, “Finland Identifies Pipeline Sabotage Ship,” AEIdeas, American Enterprise Institute, October 25, 2023, https://www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense-policy/finland-identifies-pipeline-sabotage-ship/

92 Johan Ahlander, “Danish Military Says It’s Staying Close to Chinese Ship After Data Cable Breaches,” Reuters, November 20, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kremlin-says-absurd-suggest-russia-involved-baltic-sea-cable-damage-2024-11-20/

93 Interview with the author, November 22, 2024.

94 “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” Article 113.

95 “Foreign Minister Meets with PRC Counterpart, Urges Newnew Polar Bear Cooperation,” ERR, September 27, 2024, https://news.err.ee/1609472497/foreign-minister-meets-with-prc-counterpart-urges-newnew-polar-bear-cooperation.

96 Gozzi, “Nord Stream.”

97 “At Security Council Meeting on Sabotage of Nord Stream Pipeline, Many Speakers Condemn Attacks on Critical Infrastructure, Stress Need for Accountability,” United Nations, press release, October 4, 2024, https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15844.doc.htm.

98 “NATO Holds First Meeting of Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network,” NATO, May 23, 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_225582.htm

99 “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” Article 61.

100 Miren Gutiérrez, et al., “China’s Distantwater Fishing Fleet Scale, Impact and Governance,” Overseas Development Institute, June 2020, 8, https://odi.cdn.ngo/media/documents/chinesedistantwaterfishing_web.pdf.

101 Ibid., 27.

102 Interview with the author, November 26, 2024.

103 “Wang Yi Attends ‘UNCLOS at 40: Retrospect and Prospect,’” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Great Britain and Northern Ireland, September 2, 2022, http://gb.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zgyw/202209/t20220904_10761900.htm.

104 “The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, last updated December 2020, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/anti-ballistic-missile-abm-treaty-glance; Kali Robinson, “What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal?” Council on Foreign Relations, last updated October 27, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal.

105 Strating, “Defending the Maritime Rules-Based Order,” 9.

106 Ibid., 17.

107 “Report to Congress: Annual Freedom of Navigation Report, Fiscal Year 2023,” US Department of Defense, 2023, https://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/Documents/FON/DoD%20FON%20Report%20for%20FY23%20(Corrected).pdf.

108 Strating, “Defending the Maritime Rules-Based Order,” 17.

109 Molly Killeen, “Irish Fishing Industry Meets Russian Ambassador over Planned Naval Exercises,” Euractiv, January 28, 2022, https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/irish-fishing-industry-meets-russian-ambassador-over-planned-naval-exercises/.

110 Elisabeth Braw, “How Irish Fishermen Took on the Russian Fleet and Won,” Defense One, January 31, 2022, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/01/how-irish-fishermen-took-russian-fleet-and-won/361377.

111 Eskil Johansen, “Norske Fiskefartøy Trosser Russiske Missiltester: Vi Blir Værende,” NRK, August 12, 2024, https://www.nrk.no/tromsogfinnmark/norske-fiskefartoy-trosser-nordflaten-_-nekter-a-flytte-ut-av-missil-testomrader-1.16514160.

112 Interview with the author, November 1, 2024.

113 Ibid.

114 Interview with the author, November 3, 2024.

115 Interview with the author, November 18, 2024.

116 Interview with the author, November 3, 2024.

117 Interview with the author, November 1, 2024.

118 Ibid.

119 Interview with the author, November 13, 2024.

120 Interview with the author, November 12, 2024.

121 Interview with the author, November 18, 2024.

122 Ibid.

123 Interview with the author, November 1, 2024.

124 Interview with the author, November 1, 2024.

125 Interview with the author, November 18, 2024.

126 Interview with the author, November 3, 2024.

127 Interview with the author, November 18, 2024.

128 Interview with the author, November 1, 2024.

129 Interview with the author, November 13, 2024.

130 Starting, “Defending the Maritime Rules-Based Order,” 24.

131 “UK and Allies Uphold Freedom of Navigation above Arctic Circle,” Royal Navy, September 7, 2020, https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news/2020/september/07/200907-sutherland-north-atlantic.

132 “South China Sea: Freedom of Navigation, Volume 679: Debated on Thursday 3 September 2020,” UK Parliament Hansard, September 3, 2020, https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2020-09-03/debates/99D50BD9-8C8A-4835-9C70-6E9A38585BC4/SouthChinaSeaFreedomOfNavigation.

133 Sven Lemkemeyer, “China Sieht ‘Falsche Signale’: Deutsche Marine Passiert Erstmals Seit 22 Jahren die Taiwanstraße,” Tagesspiegel, September 13, 2024, https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/es-sind-internationale-gewasser-pistorius-bestatigt-passage-von-taiwanstrasse-durch-deutsche-marine-12367745.html.

134 Jonathan Chin, “French Navy Sails Frigate through Taiwan Strait,” Taipei Times, October 30, 2024,
https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2024/10/30/2003826102.

135 “Seafarer Supply, Quinquennial, 2015 and 2021,” United Nations Trade and Development, last updated 18 July 2023, https://unctadstat.unctad.org/datacentre/dataviewer/US.Seafarers

136 Dan Uhls, “Realizing The 1000-Ship Navy,” Naval War College, 2006, 2, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA463750.pdf.

137 Interview with the author, November 18, 2024.

138 Interview with the author, November 18, 2024.

139 Ibid.

140 Interview with the author, November 26, 2024.

141 “SeaVision,” US Department of Trade, last visited December 6, 2024, https://info.seavision.volpe.dot.gov/#overview.

142 Interview with the author, November 26, 2024.

143 Interview with the author, November 26, 2024.

144 “Charter of the United Nations,” United Nations, last visited December 6, 2024, https://legal.un.org/repertory/art51.shtml.

145 “The North Atlantic Treaty,” NATO, last visited December 6, 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.

The post From Russia’s shadow fleet to China’s maritime claims: The freedom of the seas is under threat appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Braw in Trade Winds on How to Counter Violations in the Global Maritime Order

Elisabeth Braw — Sat, 28 Dec 2024 22:31:00 +0000

Original source

On January 3rd, Transatlantic Security Initiative senior fellow Elisabeth Braw authored an article in Trade Winds where she discussed rule violations of the global maritime order in the Baltic Sea. Braw also provided recommendations on how to counter actors who seek to upend this order.

Fellow

Elisabeth Braw

Senior Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

NATO Resilience & Society

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The post Braw in Trade Winds on How to Counter Violations in the Global Maritime Order appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The threats posed by the global shadow fleet—and how to stop it

Elisabeth Braw — Fri, 06 Dec 2024 20:36:51 +0000

Defining the shadow fleet
Russia joins the shadow fleet
Tracking shadow vessels
Collisions, fire, disorder: The immediate harms caused by the shadow fleet
Risks posed by shadow vessels’ bunkering and refusal to use pilotage
Incidents involving shadow vessels
How flag states, port states, and coastal states contribute to the problem
Sanctions and other measures by Western governments
Environmental damage and systemic breakdown: Longer-term harm likely to be caused by the shadow fleet
Potential measures that could limit the shadow fleet’s size and activities
Conclusion

On March 2, 2024, the crude-oil carrier Andromeda Star collided with the Bulgarian-flagged cargo ship Peace in the treacherous waters between Denmark and Sweden. More precisely, the two ships collided between the Danish coastal town of Amager and the small island of Saltholm, which is located in the Øresund (the Sound) between Sweden and Denmark.¹ Because the tanker was en route to the Russian port of Primorsk to load Russian Urals crude, she wasn’t carrying the cargo of oil she would have been carrying had she been traveling in the other direction.² Had the collision occurred then, the oil would likely have leaked, causing considerable environmental harm in Danish waters. This meant that the Andromeda Star merely had to be brought to a Danish shipyard for repairs. Twenty-four days later, she was on her way again.³ At the time of writing, the Peace remains out of commission.

The Andromeda Star sails under the flag of Panama, a flag of convenience that is also the world’s second-largest flag registry (after Liberia).⁴ But she has an ambiguous identity. International maritime databases list her owner as “reported sold undisclosed interest,” meaning her owner isn’t known. Other databases list her as having been acquired in November 2023 by Seychelles-based Algae Marine Inc., a firm that, according to public records, owns no other vessels.⁵ Databases list as her manager Margao Marine Solutions OPC, a company listed at an address in the Indian state of Goa that only manages two other vessels.⁶ “Public records, however, show no such company operating at the address.

Until November 2022, the Andromeda Star was a normal oil tanker, covered by standard insurance and undergoing regular port-control inspections in Western ports. In November 2022, she passed an inspection in the Port of Houston in Texas without any problems.⁷ A year later, her ownership and management changed to Margao Marine Solutions and Algae Marine, after which she underwent no more port-control inspections until she collided with the Peace in Danish waters and had to be repaired at a local shipyard. The repairs in Denmark meant she also had to be inspected at a Danish port before being able to leave the country’s waters.⁸

The inspection completed, the Andromeda Star traveled to Primorsk, Russia’s second-largest Baltic port. Having received her cargo there, she traveled through the Baltic Sea to the Suez Canal, which she traversed on April 22.⁹ But when she reached the Red Sea, Yemen’s Houthi rebels, mistaking her for a British-owned ship, fired anti-ballistic missiles at her.¹⁰ The damage, however, was limited and the tanker could continue her journey to the Indian port of Mundra.¹¹

At the time of the collision in Danish waters, the Andromeda Star provided Danish authorities with documentation showing she was insured by Gard AS, a Norwegian firm. But when the authorities examined the documentation, it emerged that the insurance had lapsed. The Andromeda Star also provided documentation showing she was insured by the state-backed Russian underwriter Ingosstrakh. Ingosstrakh, however, reserves for itself the right not to pay out if a vessel involved in an accident has been transporting Russian oil above the price cap.¹²

The Andromeda Star turned out to belong to Russia’s shadow fleet, a collection of mostly aging ships that transport sanctioned cargo, especially crude oil. They have obscure ownership, are poorly maintained, and obfuscate the details of their identity. Many frequently obfuscate their movements by manipulating their automatic identification systems (AIS), and many also frequently change their flag registrations. This has made previously tiny ship registries including Gabon, Eswatini, the Comoro Islands, and Guinea-Bissau suddenly significant participants in global shipping: They are so permissive that virtually any vessel can register, even ones turned down by other “flag-of-convenience” states. Yet due to their insufficient maritime expertise and infrastructure, these countries will not or cannot take the action required of flag states if one of their vessels causes an accident or incident.

Summary

Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the shadow fleet—which previously mostly transported goods to and from Iran and Venezuela—has exploded in size. Today, around 17 percent of all oil tankers are estimated to belong to the shadow fleet, which also comprises other merchant vessels.

When the shadow fleet was much smaller, the global maritime community could manage the risks posed by it. Today, by contrast, the fleet’s size means it poses immediate risks to a large number of crews, coastal states, vessels, and to the maritime environment.

The fleet’s size also means it poses a threat to global maritime rules. The global maritime system only functions when the vast majority of its participants voluntarily follow the rules.

Western governments’ efforts to reduce the shadow fleet through sanctions on individual vessels have only been marginally effective. There are, however, other strategies they could pursue, including engagement with the nations that flag the shadow vessels and investigations to identify and sanction shadow vessels’ ultimate beneficial owners.¹³

Defining the shadow fleet

The shadow fleet—often also referred to as the dark fleet—is not an official fleet. Instead, it is a collection of vessels that exhibit most or all the below characteristics.¹⁴ The vessels:

Have opaque ownership and management. Many companies involved are registered at post-box addresses in countries including India, the Seychelles, and the United Arab Emirates, or in extremely obscure locations in these countries. The majority of companies are only linked to one, two, or three vessels. In many cases, that may be because these are shell companies, not proper businesses. The use of shell companies means the ultimate beneficial owner (and carrier of liability) is almost impossible to identify, let alone locate. According to investigations by Pole Star, a maritime research company, in 44 percent of cases a shadow vessel, or the majority of its sister ships, “has changed its owners, operators, or managers at least three times in the past year.”¹⁵ The owners or operators of 36 percent of shadow vessels were set up after February 2022.¹⁶
Sail without the industry’s standard Western insurance (so-called P&I clubs; see fact box How P&I clubs cover contingencies).
Are old compared to other ships of the same size. Almost 70 percent of dark-fleet tankers are fifteen years or older.“¹⁷.
Tankers are typically scrapped when reaching twenty years of age, which is another reason the shadow fleet, with its large number of vessels aged over twenty, stands out. On average, very large crude carriers (VLCCs) operating as part of the shadow fleet between February 2022 and February 2023 were 18.1 years old, while officially operating VLCCs had an average age of 10.4 years.¹⁸
Often change flag registrations and almost always sail under flags of convenience. The Andromeda Star, for example, switched flag registrations in 2019 and 2023, when she was reflagged from the Marshall Islands to Panama.
Don’t undergo regular maintenance.
Often manipulate their AIS, the navigation system required on all commercial vessels for the safety of maritime traffic.

Since shadow vessels by definition operate in the shadows, it’s difficult to fully establish key aspects including how and when the fleet emerged and how fast it has grown since. What is clear, however, is that in addition to Latin American drug cartels, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) is a long-standing practitioner of surreptitious shipping techniques. These techniques have been prompted by North Korea’s desire to evade United Nations Security Council sanctions imposed on it since 2006 as a result of its development of nuclear weapons. Even though these sanctions only cover the export of weapons and weapons technologies, and the import of certain food and luxury products, North Korea has systematically thwarted new sanctions with comprehensive efforts to export the sanctioned goods.

Western insurers, who dominate the market, don’t underwrite the shipment of cargo sanctioned by Western governments, and UN member states are obliged to inspect and report suspected North Korean shipments. Pyongyang, working with actors in the shipping industry willing to violate the sanctions, began to systematically disguise the identity of vessels carrying sanctioned North Korean goods. The case of the MV Light is instructive. According to a note published in 2012 by the panel of experts established pursuant to UN Resolution 1874 (2009) and monitoring the implementation of that resolution,¹⁹ the United States reported:

It had reasonable grounds to believe that the MV Light, which departed the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in May 2011, was transporting items prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). With permission from Belize, the flag State, on 26 May, a United States Navy ship hailed the MV Light and informed the shipmaster of its intention to inspect. The shipmaster responded that it was a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea ship and that it refused to be boarded and inspected. The United States therefore requested the assistance of several other Member States in the region, including inspecting the vessel should it enter one of their ports. However, on 29 May, the MV Light changed course and returned to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

How P&I clubs cover contingencies

Merchant vessels are covered by hull-and-machinery insurance for the vessel itself, and by cargo insurance for the shipment. Shipowners are responsible for the hull-and-machinery insurance, while cargo owners sign insurance for their shipments. Protection and indemnity insurance (commonly referred to as P&I insurance) exists alongside cargo and hull-and-machinery insurance. It covers additional risks relating to the entire vessel, mostly ones relating to serious contingencies including oil leaks and attacks on the vessel. Because the damage from such contingencies can incur enormous costs, coverage is provided by mutual insurance associations known as P&I clubs. There are twelve P&I clubs, which in turn form an International Group of P&I Clubs. Each insured party pays into the club to which they belong. Incidents requiring payouts are paid by the club on an annual basis; if there are not enough funds available, the members make another payment into the pool.²⁰

Ever since, vessels that have been sold into the opaque market and disguise their identity while traveling have been transporting sanctioned North Korean goods to countries willing to buy these goods.²¹ The export destinations for sanctioned weapons include Russia. As a sanctioned importer of luxury goods and technology, North Korea simply pays a massive premium to the companies and individuals willing to smuggle these goods.²² The US government in particular has imposed sanctions on vessels carrying sanctioned goods to and from North Korea, but Pyongyang and its collaborators have found ways of maintaining this shadow trade.²³

Iran, too, has developed sophisticated strategies to get around sanctions imposed by the West in response to Iran’s attempts to develop nuclear weapons. The sanctions were eased as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the agreement signed by Iran, the UN Security Council’s five permanent members, Germany, and the European Union in 2015. Under President Donald Trump, however, the US withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018 and reimposed its sanctions; the agreement’s other Western partners found themselves unable to sustain the agreement’s provisions.²⁴ Since US economic sanctions include transactions in US dollars, Iran once again found itself unable to legally trade key goods, especially petroleum, on which it depends for export revenues. It increasingly did so using vessels that frequently flag-hopped and manipulated their AIS, and typically lacked P&I club insurance.

This is when monitoring of shadow vessels (or dark vessels), as they were to be unofficially labeled, began in earnest. The monitoring was conducted by companies in the shipping industry, by navies and coast guards, and by nongovernmental organizations like United Against a Nuclear Iran. For different purposes and using different formats, each entity observed vessels that appeared to be flag-hopping and turning off their AIS. Retired Vice Admiral Duncan Potts of the Royal Navy, who commanded the EU’s counterpiracy force, ATALANTA, off the Horn of Africa in the late 2010s, described his experience running counterpiracy operations:

We used to call shadow vessels “bottom feeders,” like those murky creatures. They caused us massive problems because as a force, we were flag-blind to piracy, so if anyone got into trouble, we would go and assist. That included bottom feeders, who could change flag states at the drop of a hat and had dubious insurance. I remember one such ship we had coming through. We knew it was carrying lots of arms, and it kept on breaking down and was ripe for piracy. If it had been seized by those pirates, that would have kept al-Shabaab and every jihadi in the Middle East region going for a long time. So we put ships around it to make sure that it couldn’t be seized and almost escorted it around, although we never really knew who owned it.²⁵

In September 2019, thirty-six of the seventy-five Iran-linked oil tankers tracked by United Against a Nuclear Iran were not using their AIS.²⁶ That year, the US government widened its sanctions against Venezuela, because the 2018 Venezuelan presidential election in 2018 was widely considered not to have been free and fair.. Most importantly, it sanctioned PdVSA, Venezuela’s state-owned oil and gas company.²⁷ Because Venezuela relies on energy exports for nearly two-thirds of its national budget, the country has made massive efforts to keep up exports, including through the use of shadow vessels. (The US partially eased the sanctions in 2023 but reimposed them in April 2024.²⁸)

In 2020, United Against a Nuclear Iran identified seventy shadow tankers transporting Iranian oil.²⁹ While nongovernmental organizations and companies in the shipping industry kept monitoring the growing number of shadow vessels, including ones linked to North Korea, there was no central entity collecting the information. Indeed, there seemed to be no need for one, as the unofficial fleet was still so small it didn’t seem to pose significant risks to vessels, coastal states, or marine life. Simon Lockwood, head of shipowners at WTW, the global insurance broker, put it this way:

The shadow fleet is simply a collection of vessels that operate when countries experience challenges like sanctions regimes and insurance restrictions that preclude them from operating under normal conditions. It became obvious with Iranian cargoes in the late 2010s, but it existed before that too, just in smaller volumes.³⁰

Russia joins the shadow fleet

After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, it was clear that the West would attempt to punish Russia— and even force it to withdraw from Ukraine—by imposing sanctions including some type of ban on Russian crude oil. P&I clubs anticipated this move and began withdrawing coverage from vessels transporting Russian crude. This meant that many vessels transporting Russian oil no longer had Western insurance, which forced them to turn to second-rate or untested insurers. This rendered many such vessels effectively uninsured. Noted Lockwood: “Insurers started to look at their own position and, in some cases, preempt what was going to happen with regard to sanctions. They ended their contracts with Russian cargo ahead of that time so that they wouldn’t be caught trying to implement cancellations after the cap had been introduced.”³¹

The calculations can be complicated when companies operating on the basis of long-standing rules and regulations try to assess how geopolitics might change those conditions. Lockwood noted:

One of the biggest challenges for insurers and brokers, and also for shipowners, is having to interpret a shifting landscape of sanctions and sanctions regimes, and then having to guess what comes next. Nobody wants to put up in a situation where they unwittingly are in breach of a sanctions regime or one that’s very close to being imposed. A challenge for lots of insurers is that they operate in a number of jurisdictions, many of which may have different sanctions regimes. And shipping exists in the world of US dollars. As a result, companies take a cautionary approach rather than risking a [sanctions] breach.³²

Underwriters’ early actions were also prompted by the complex nature of insurance, which can rarely be canceled from one day to the next and typically involves several insurers underwriting the same policy for any given vessel. “Typically for a hull-machinery policy or hull-machinery war policy, there may be ten-plus different insurers that are involved, and it could be one or several brokers. Each one of those stakeholders will have to do due diligence, run sanctions checks, and achieve approval on any action, which adds layers and layers,” Lockwood noted.³³ By November 2022, Lloyd’s List calculated that the shadow fleet had grown to some 200 vessels.³⁴

At the same time, shipowners anticipating the price cap left the Russian oil trade. This opened an opportunity for completely new actors to establish themselves, which they did. Within a very short period, a significant number of tiny outfits were formed, primarily in India, the United Arab Emirates, and Hong Kong.³⁵ The formation of such companies, which typically operate out of obscure industry-park or brass-plate addresses, continues, with most of the firms owning only a few vessels.

The Group of Seven countries, joined by the EU and Australia, imposed the cap of $60 per barrel in December 2022.³⁶ Western shipping companies and maritime insurers were allowed involvement in the shipment of crude oil below the cap, while shipment above the cap to the participating countries was banned. The insurance cancellations unsurprisingly accelerated once the oil price cap was introduced and, in tandem, so did the number of vessels sailing without P&I club insurance. The shadow fleet’s explosive growth had begun. In 2022, there were over 600 second-hand tanker sales—a record—and the tankers were often sold at unusually high prices, the US Congressional Research Service reports.³⁷ By the summer of 2023, prices for fifteen-year-old Aframax tankers—a type often used in the shadow fleet—in the second-hand market had more than doubled.³⁸ That year, only seven tankers were retired from service and sold for their scrap value, an extremely low number compared to the annual average of twenty-five to 140 tankers.³⁹

In February 2023, the commodity trader Trafigura estimated that the dark fleet had grown to some 400 crude oil vessels and 200 oil-product tankers.⁴⁰ By November 2023, the energy intelligence firm Vortexa estimated that 1,649 unique tankers had operated in the “opaque market” (i.e., fulfilling at least some of the shadow fleet criteria) since January 2021. Tankers exclusively transporting Russian oil products accounted for a staggering 66 percent of this fleet, while Iran and Venezuela together accounted for 20 percent: But 75 percent of the vessels transported oil products for Russia and also for Iran, Venezuela, or both.⁴¹ The firm’s analysts also noted that in the second quarter of 2023, Russian crude-oil and oil-product carriers “accounted for 80 percent of all opaque market tanker activity.”⁴²

In December 2023, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) attempted to at least partially stall the shadow fleet’s explosive growth. In a meeting that month, the IMO Assembly (the organization’s governing body of member states) passed a resolution that called on member states to prohibit or regulate ship-to-ship transfers. The Assembly also recommended that port states, as soon as becoming aware of vessels trying to conceal their identity or activities, “should subject such ships to enhanced inspections.”⁴³

Yet the shadow fleet continued to flourish. In May 2024, shipbroker BRS documented 787 oil tankers operating as shadow vessels—8.5 percent of the world’s total fleet. Among large ocean-going vessels (i.e., 34,000 deadweight tonnage and larger),⁴⁴ the shadow fleet represented 13 percent of the total fleet, BRS found.⁴⁵ Venezuela, where the fleet of state-owned ships has shrunk due to lack of maintenance, has even turned to dark tankers for oil exports to its maritime neighbor Cuba.⁴⁶

In September, maritime AI firm Windward estimates that a quarter of wet-cargo vessels, a total of 2,300 ships, operate outside the official shipping system.⁴⁷ A new form of shadow vessels has also appeared: so-called zombie vessels that steal the identities of legitimately operating vessels that have gone out of service.⁴⁸ Two months later, S&P Global estimated that 889 oil tankers of medium size and upwards had been used to transport sanctioned oil: 17% of the global oil tanker fleet.⁴⁹ (Since shadow vessels don’t re-enter the official sector, the departure of hundreds of vessels from the shadow fleet indicates that these aging ships have reached a point at which it’s no longer feasible to operate them.)

What are flags of extreme convenience?

Flags of convenience (FOCs)—those from shipping registries open to all vessels regardless of where their owners are based—have been a part of global shipping for decades. The practice became popular in the 1930s, when US shipping companies got around US restrictions by registering their vessels in Panama. In the late 1940s, a US businessman teamed up with the government of Liberia to establish an open registry there too.⁵⁰ Though the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) stipulates that there be a genuine link between a ship and the flag she flies, it doesn’t specify what constitutes such a link.⁵¹ Today Liberia, Panama, and the Marshall Islands (another open registry) dominate global flag registrations, while Greece, China, and Japan are the top three ship-owning nations.⁵² The United States is the world’s fourth-largest ship-owning nation, but ranks nineteenth in flag registrations.⁵³

As the shadow fleet has grown, nations that until recently had minimal or no maritime experience have emerged as destinations for dark vessels seeking flag registrations. The registries of Antigua and Barbuda, Cameroon, the Cook Islands, Eswatini, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Palau, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, and Togo have all grown unexpectedly (and in some cases have only recently been set up).

This has occurred even though such registries are not equipped to properly assist in the contingencies shadow vessels have already begun to cause.⁵⁴ Indeed, virtually all of these registries are operated by private companies, which in turn are often based in other countries, and are run as profit-making operations, not government agencies. Gabon’s and the Comoros Islands’ registries are, for example, operated out of offices in India and elsewhere.⁵⁵ (Some older, more established, flag-of-convenience ship registries are also based overseas. Liberia’s registry, for example, is based in Virginia.⁵⁶)

Such registries constitute flags of extreme convenience (the author’s term). Most of them, including Sierra Leone, Cameroon, Comoros, Palau, and Tanzania, are included in the Paris MoU on Port State Control’s gray or black lists of high-risk flag states as well as the FOC list of the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF).⁵⁷ Some of these growing flags of extreme convenience are so new or small that they are not even listed by the Paris MoU, an intergovernmental body monitoring maritime safety. Well-governed flag states are included in the Paris MoU’s white list.

Indeed, flag states of extreme convenience only partially adhere to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), or don’t adhere to it at all. SOLAS, the world’s most important treaty governing the construction, equipment, and operation of merchant vessels, states that “flag States are responsible for ensuring that ships under their flag comply with its requirements, and a number of certificates are prescribed in the Convention as proof that this has been done.”⁵⁸

Between January and July 2024, the Cook Islands added more tanker tonnage to its previously tiny registry than did Panama and Liberia. Indeed, tankers accounted for almost the entire Cook Islands registry.⁵⁹ This doesn’t mean all the tankers are shadow vessels, but it does illustrate the problem posed by flags of extreme convenience. In June 2024, Panama and Gabon accounted for 42 percent of the shadow vessel registrations.⁶⁰ At least 36 percent of vessels registered in Gabon have definitive links via group owners to Russia, and 47 percent of vessels registered there have missing or perfunctory ownership details.⁶¹ Between January and September 2024, more than one hundred tankers joined the registries of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana, Honduras, land-locked San Marino, and Sierra Leone after leaving traditional flag states of convenience.⁶²

The flags of extreme convenience are dominated by older vessels, another feature of the shadow fleet. Of the twenty tankers registered in São Tomé and Príncipe as of November 2024, none were built after 2006, and most were built in the 1990s.⁶³ The 186 tankers registered in Sierra Leone similarly feature a strikingly high average age.⁶⁴

The Norwegian Coastal Administration, in an internal report, noted an increase in vessels flagged in Gabon, Antigua and Barbuda, and Vietnam in Norwegian waters in 2023 and the first months of 2024. Liquefied national gas (LNG) tankers sailing through Norwegian waters were flagged in Gabon and Panama. “It is notable that we are observing an increase in ships flagged in Gabon. This increase began at the end of 2023 and looks likely to continue in 2024,” the report noted.⁶⁵ Between January and May 2024, three Gabon-flagged crude-oil tankers passed through Norwegian waters, as did three flagged in Antigua and Barbuda, three flagged in Vietnam, and one flagged in Cameroon. In 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023, no crude-oil tankers flagged in these countries sailed through Norwegian waters.⁶⁶

In July 2024, it emerged that some flag states (thought to be flags of extreme convenience) had been approaching port state inspectors, who can detain ships that don’t fulfil safety requirements. Repeated such detentions cause flag states to be listed on the Paris MoU’s gray and black lists.⁶⁷

An internal report of the Norwegian Coastal Administration—which has been at the forefront of documenting suspected shadow vessels—notes the rapidly increasing age of crude-oil tankers sailing through Norwegian waters, a strong indication of shadow-vessel traffic. In 2020, crude-oil tankers passing through Norwegian waters had an average age of eight-and-a-half years. In 2023, their average age was twelve years; in April 2024, their average age had increased to fifteen years.⁶⁸ Between April and May, the Norwegian Coastal Administration registered eight tankers that had previously never sailed along the Norwegian coast. Of these tankers, five were twenty years or older.⁶⁹ By October, nearly two-thirds of all tankers of intermediate size or larger built before 2010 were trading sanctioned Iranian, Venezuelan, or Russian oil.⁷⁰

Different data points deliver a good picture of what Russia’s dark-fleet activity looks like. In March 2024, 223 loaded tankers lacking Western insurance left Russian ports; of these, 85 percent were fifteen years or older.⁷¹ Tankers that previously transported oil and oil products on behalf of Iran also appear to have switched to primarily servicing Russian clients. Since February 2022, “more than 92 vessels previously involved in helping Tehran export Iranian oil are now helping Moscow transport Russian oil or petroleum products,” United Against Nuclear Iran reported in May 2024.⁷² Between May and August 2024, 600 tankers carrying Russian oil traversed the Bay of Finland on their way from Russia’s Baltic ports; of these, 283 were shadow vessels.⁷³

In a September 2024 report on shadow fleet activity in the Baltic Sea, Greenpeace found that since 2021, the number of tankers departing from Russia carrying crude oil had increased by 70 percent, and during the same period the vessels’ average age had nearly doubled.⁷⁴ In 2023, nearly 1,000 Russian oil tankers sailed along the Baltic coast in a westerly direction, the highest number of Russian oil tankers ever recorded off the German coast.⁷⁵ Two-thirds of the tankers lacked P&I coverage.⁷⁶ Unsurprisingly, many of the tankers were in poor repair. The Antigua and Barbuda-flagged Chilli, for example, “has [a] history of inspection issues, with Indian authorities noting significant corrosion on its hull in July 2023,” Greenpeace notes. “In March 2024, six more defects were reported, including problems with the engine and the Inert Gas System—a safety system designed to prevent explosions caused by volatile oil vapours on tankers.”⁷⁷

But shadow tankers transporting Russian oil are only one part of the dark fleet: other shadow vessels transport chemicals or dry goods, while yet others continue to transport cargo on behalf of Iran, Venezuela, or drug cartels.

Tracking shadow vessels

Another challenge in ascertaining the size and activities of the shadow fleet is that no entity is responsible for collecting such global data. Crews on legally operating vessels (which sail alongside the shadow vessels and may collide with them because the shadow vessels disguise their movements), coast guards, marine protection organizations, nongovernmental organizations, maritime underwriters, and research organizations all collect some data, but no international body gathers all the data available. Peter Broadhurst, senior vice president of safety and security at Inmarsat Maritime, noted:

It would be possible to collect a lot more data about the shadow fleet. There are not that many ships in the world, and even if the vessels have got everything switched off, there are ways of seeing that signature. There are satellites that will take the thermal picture of a vessel and pick up the actual profile of the vessel from the reflection because the steel reflects better than the sea. The data is available.⁷⁸

Today, however, the world has no single entity in charge of gathering details about shadow vessels and collecting details gathered by others. Indeed, not even the US government has an entity in charge of gathering details about the shadow fleet. Or as The New York Times reported in February 2024:

It is unclear who the US government considers primarily responsible for identifying suspicious tankers. The Treasury is tasked with administering sanctions by investigating and blacklisting individuals or companies participating in illicit activities. But it places some of the burden on insurers to monitor for suspicious behavior through the regular release of advisories and alerts.⁷⁹

Despite the obstacles involved with identifying and monitoring shadow vessels, let alone curtailing their activities, Western governments have made increasingly energetic attempts, primarily by sanctioning individual vessels and vessel owners. They also have made more sweeping political pronouncements, such as a July 2024 “call to action” by forty-five governments, which included a plea to flag states to “adhere to the highest possible safety and pollution prevention requirements and best practices” and a plea to port states “to ensure the enforcement of the safety and liability conventions on these ships, including those that relate to ship-to-ship transfer operations and the requirement to have on board valid State certificates of insurance.”⁸⁰

In the 1990s and early 2000s, and even in the late 2010s, countries involved in violations of international rules would have been embarrassed to be called out and would have been likely to at least curtail some of their activities if called out on them. By 2024, however, the countries involved in the shadow fleet—Russia, the flag states, and the oil’s recipients—showed virtually no reaction to being called out over their shadow fleet involvement.⁸¹

Indeed, states buying sanctioned oil could rightly argue that they have no legal obligation to enforce Western sanctions such as the oil price cap. By May 2024, the top importers of Russian crude oil since the introduction of the price cap were China, India, the EU (the latter buying under the price cap), and Turkey.⁸² Neither China and India nor Turkey have expressed any regret over their imports of Russian oil.

In a further development, by the summer of 2024 Russia appeared to be expanding its shadow fleet to liquefied national gas (LNG) tankers.⁸³ This was an apparent reaction to an EU sanctions package introduced in June 2024, which among other things targets Russian LNG.⁸⁴ To date, the number of suspected shadow LNG vessel is very small, also because the global LNG-tanker fleet is much smaller than the crude-oil fleet.

Nevertheless, this development demonstrates Russia’s intention to keep operating shadow vessels despite efforts by Western governments to reduce the fleet’s size and operations through sanctions.⁸⁵ In early August, for example, the Palau-flagged LNG tanker Pioneer, which has no known insurer and was disguising its location, docked at a Russian gas facility and was later sighted off the coast of Norway.“⁸⁶ The Pioneer is managed by an obscure Indian company, Ocean Speedstar Solutions, that manages only three vessels, all Palau-flagged LNG tankers that it has been managing since May 2024.⁸⁷ Like the Pioneer, the other two vessels managed by Ocean Speedstar Solutions are suspected shadow vessels. The owner of the Pioneer is also an obscure Indian firm, Zara Shipholding Co, whose address is c/o Ocean Speedstar Solutions. Zara Shipholding owns no other vessels.⁸⁸

Collisions, fire, disorder: The immediate dangers caused by shadow vessels

On May 1, 2023, the Gabon-flagged shadow vessel Pablo exploded in busy waters off the coast of Malaysia, just outside Singapore’s crowded waters. The Aframax tanker,⁸⁹ which had switched flag registration to Gabon just six days before the incident, was traveling with a nearly empty hull after having delivered crude oil in China.⁹⁰ This prevented an environmental disaster from unfolding when the tanker caught fire. However, Malaysian authorities had to extinguish the fire, rescue the ship’s crew, and search for three missing crew members, who were eventually declared dead, and organize the salvage and cleanup, as well as the care of the surviving crew members.⁹¹

In the early hours of July 19, 2024, the Singapore-flagged product tanker Hafnia Nile and the São Tomé and Príncipe-flagged tanker Ceres I collided in nearby waters, off the coast of Malaysia. The collision caused both vessels to catch fire. As is typical for shadow vessels, the Ceres I is aging, having been built in 2001, while the Hafnia Nile is only seven years old.⁹²

Eleven days later, Malaysian authorities announced that at the time of the accident the Ceres I had been anchored due to technical problems, and despite trying to evade the tanker, “the Hafnia Nile vessel could not avoid colliding with it.”⁹³ Photos shared by the Malaysian authorities show the fire-ravaged hull of the Ceres I. The Hafnia Nile, too, was damaged by the fire and left an oil sheen at the site of the crash. Both the Pablo and the Ceres I lacked a contactable owner and manager, and neither tanker had functioning P&I insurance. (The shipping publication TradeWinds has identified the Ceres I owner as a Singapore-based brass-plate company that owns no other vessels.⁹⁴)

These collisions dramatically illustrate the immediate dangers caused by the shadow fleet, and these dangers go far beyond the harm to vessels and seafarers that experience collisions with shadow vessels. Line Falkenberg Ollestad, an adviser at the Norwegian Shipowners’ Association, highlighted one of the many details stemming from the shadow fleet causing considerable problems for other maritime participants:

If a shadow has an accident and you need a tugboat or another type of vessel to assist the shadow vessel, we’d need clearances from the government to make sure they can go in and do an operation involving a sanctions-breaking vessel. We’d need such clearances to ensure that the shipowner that does that operation does not get blacklisted or otherwise penalized. And getting a payout then from the shadow vessels’ insurance company is also very unsure.⁹⁵

Indeed, as Svein Ringbakken, managing director of the maritime war-risk insurer DNK, noted, “there are a number of avenues where a legitimate shipping company can lose out. If, for example, you’re a legally operating shipowner and your vessel is harmed in a collision with a shadow vessel, and you’ve done your due diligence and maybe have missed a point or two, or if a new company has come up and you’re caught dealing with them, you might be subject to sanctions yourself.”⁹⁶

The disorder the shadow fleet causes, and the uncertainty about who should act and pay for damages caused by shadow vessels, also illustrate the longer-term harm the fleet causes to the global maritime order.

Dangers for crews

The fact that the shadow vessels operate without serviceable insurance, are poorly maintained, and transport dangerous cargo makes working on them decidedly dangerous for seafarers. Indeed, the most immediate harm shadow vessels pose is to their crews. The Pablo’s explosion left the Malaysian authorities having to attend not just to the tanker but also to her crew, yet the Malaysians’ efforts could not undo the fact that twenty-five of the crew members had suffered physical or mental harm, or both, and three crew members had lost their lives.⁹⁷

In addition, it’s unclear how well-trained seafarers employed on shadow vessels are. Precisely because they evade regulations and don’t make stops at ports in countries that fully enforce maritime rules, shadow vessels can de facto operate as they wish. While maritime regulations require that seafarers undergo a certain amount of training, it’s not known what training and vetting seafarers working on shadow vessels undergo.

What is clear, however, is that any journey involving a shadow vessel poses more risks to seafarers than journeys on most legally operating ones (though plenty of legally operating fishing boats and other vessels are so poorly managed that they do pose considerable risks to their crews). Noted Falkenberg Ollestad:

IG insurance [the traditional insurance provided by P&I clubs] ensures that the seafarers have their salaries according to the ITF’s [International Transport Workers Federation] tariffs, and it also ensures that shipowners adhere to the MLC [Maritime Labour Convention]. One can say that P&I insurance functions as social insurance for seafarers. That means that with P&I insurance, crew members have a number of rights if something were to happen to them. The shadow fleet poses a risk for its crews, also as a result of its subpar insurance.⁹⁸

Indeed, if a shadow vessel has an accident or incident, the crew risks being abandoned by the vessel owner. Seafarer abandonment is already a serious and growing problem in the shipping industry. The crews of several dozen vessels are currently onboard abandoned vessels, which means they remain with the ship despite the owner having abandoned it. As of November 2024, many dozen vessels crewed by many hundred nationals of India, the Philippines, Syria, Bangladesh, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Croatia, Vietnam, and other countries are abandoned in ports around the world.⁹⁹ By November 2024, ninety-nine vessels have been abandoned since January 1, 2024, alone.

And, as Falkenberg Ollestad pointed out, shadow vessels’ de facto unregulated use of crews risks harming the reputation of the global shipping industry, which in recent decades has improved its treatment of seafarers. The Maritime Labour Convention, which was passed by members of the United International Labour Organization in 2006, “sets out, in a single instrument, the right of the world’s 1.5 million seafarers to decent conditions of work in almost every aspect of their working and living conditions.”¹⁰⁰ Overall, 108 nations, including Russia, China, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Western world have signed and ratified the convention.¹⁰¹

In the case of the Hafnia Nile, the tanker’s insurer is likely to cover a large part of the costs associated with the evacuation and care for the crew. Crews working on shadow vessels, by contrast, operate under completely different conditions. Even though the vessels do present insurance coverage to port authorities, as insurance is mandatory, the insurance covers little. As previously mentioned, Russia’s state-backed underwriter Ingosstrakh, which insures a large number of shadow vessels, has in its insurance policies a sanctions clause that means vessels transporting oil above the price cap are not covered by the policy.¹⁰² Ingosstrakh itself was among the companies sanctioned by the UK government in June 2024, though this is unlikely to reduce the shadow fleet, as it already operates outside Western and many international rules.¹⁰³

The risk to the marine environment

The risk shadow vessels pose to the environment is immediate, as this armada comprises aging vessels that are not undergoing regular maintenance and, in addition, carry environmentally harmful cargo. The US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) lists the following environmental harm caused by oil spills:

Injuries to animals
Loss of habitat
Impacts to local economies and recreation.¹⁰⁴

It takes marine habitats nearly a decade or more to recover from oil spills, and the large number of animals killed in such accidents are, of course, gone forever. When the Andromeda Star collided with the Peace, only the lucky circumstance that the Andromeda Star was not carrying any oil prevented harm to Danish waters. Because shadow vessels are aging and poorly maintained, they’re also likely to experience leaks of oil and other hazardous substances in their cargo. In collision between the Hafnia Nile and the Ceres I, a serious oil spill was averted by the fact that the Ceres I was on her way to collect cargo and sailing with an empty hull.

Shadow vessels’ age and poor maintenance record thus present a significant risk to the environment. In its September 2024 report, Greenpeace notes that shadow tankers sailing from Russia’s Baltic ports along the German coast pass several bird sanctuaries and nature reserves.¹⁰⁵

Noted Broadhurst: “There are legally operating tankers that are twenty-six, twenty-seven, twenty-eight years old, with recognized companies. That’s okay if you’re maintaining them, but that’s a long time for a ship. Shady practices were already happening years ago, but the shadow fleet means they’ve become much more common. In some cases, for example, aging vessels are sold for scrap and don’t actually go for scrap but are instead used as shadow vessels. Plus, maintenance of the vessels is poor and maintenance of their safety equipment is poor.”¹⁰⁶

Under international maritime rules, ports act as ships’ primary inspectors. This system, however, depends on port authorities complying with rules. If they’re sloppy or look the other way when poorly maintained vessels enter their ports, there’s no international authority that can force them into compliance. “The shadow vessels are getting through port state controls: This is also the case because these vessels don’t travel to highly regulated ports in countries like the United States and Europe,” Broadhurst noted.¹⁰⁷ Indeed, Chinese port authorities have been found to accept fraudulent documentation from shadow vessels.¹⁰⁸

The risks posed by the shadow fleet to the marine environment and surrounding communities is compounded by shadow vessels’ habit of turning off or manipulating their AIS, which means other vessels can only know their location when it becomes visible to the naked eye, at which point efforts to avoid a collision may be inevitable. This appears to have been what happened when the Hafnia Nile collided with the Ceres I. A further risk is the weather, as poorly maintained shadow vessels struggle to cope with icy waters. “This is not a pleasant environment for our members and nor for Finland as a major catastrophe is expected sooner or later. If something happens in the winter with ice, it is impossible to clear the ice,” said Carolus Ramsay of the Finnish Shipowners’ Association.¹⁰⁹ A wintry oil spill in the Baltic Sea or other icy waters would significantly exacerbate the harm to the environment.

Costs for coastal states

The costs facing coastal states from shadow-fleet incidents are enormous. Cleaning up after just one accident involving an Aframax tanker could cost $859 million in Europe and $1.6 billion in Southeast Asia.¹¹⁰

Coastal states are naturally exposed to accidents and incidents involving merchant vessels, even when these operate legally. The International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR), adopted in 1979 and entered into force in 1985, ensures that all parts of the high seas have access to search and rescue. Under SAR, the world’s waters are divided into thirteen search-and-rescue zones, and all coastal state signatories are obliged to participate in search and rescue within their zones.¹¹¹

Spills are, in turn, handled through a public-private partnership. Under the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, “the owner of any oil tanker carrying more than 2,000 tonnes of oil cargo in bulk is liable for damages caused by any leaked or discharged oil, regardless of whether it was intentional or not.”¹¹² Such shipowners must obtain a so-called Blue Card from their flag states for each of their tankers in this category: The Blue Card serves as proof that a tanker has insurance covering potential oil leaks. The Blue Card allows vessels carrying oil to travel unencumbered through different coastal states’ waters, and the coastal states have reassurance that the cleanup and expense for any spills will be handled by the vessels’ insurers.

The environmental and financial harm caused to coastal states by legally operating oil tankers is also covered by the International Oil Protection Compensation Funds (IOPC), which were established in 1992 after several large oil spills had placed severe strain on the affected coastal states. The IOPC Funds are “financed by contributions paid by entities that receive certain types of oil by sea transport. These contributions are based on the amount of oil received in the relevant calendar year, and cover expected claims, together with the costs of administering the Funds.”¹¹³ This means that oil importers pay a fee into the funds, which then administer any claims by coastal states. To date, the IOPC Funds have handled compensation for 158 oil spills.¹¹⁴

In addition, maritime rules and regulations cover the salvage of vessels that are unable to move or have been damaged beyond repair in fires or other accidents. In the case of the Hafnia Nile-Celes I collision, the owners of the former appointed a nearby salvage firm, Straits Salvage Engineers, to carry out the salvage work.¹¹⁵

For the most part, shadow vessels often have P&I insurance, but according to Insurance Journal, these are often “Russian providers backstopped by a heavily sanctioned, state-backed reinsurer. In some cases, there are insurers in locations including Cameroon and Kyrgyzstan.”¹¹⁶ That makes the insurance questionable and often unusable, and because shadow vessels lack P&I club-provided insurance, they also lack Blue Cards. In addition, the recipients of their oil don’t pay into the IOPC Funds. Even if they wanted to do so, the IOPC Funds would not be able to receive the contributions, as the oil transported by shadow vessels is typically above the price cap and the IOPC Funds – being based in London – adheres to UK laws.

The growth of the shadow fleet thus means that coastal states must contend with regular traffic involving oil tankers that lack Blue Cards. DNK’s Ringbakken recounted how much things have changed since he testified before the European Parliament on behalf of the tanker industry in 2003:

There was a discussion about whether Norway should introduce exclusion zones to keep substandard ships away from our shores. And in the hearing, I told the MEPs that all the ships that were transporting oil along the Norwegian coastline were only modern tonnage with double hulls, and with experienced operating companies. If I were to testify in a similar way now today, I would not be able to say the same thing. Today coastal states are in a difficult position.¹¹⁷

P&I club insurance and Blue Cards are a maritime custom that has worked well because the vast majority of shipping companies participated in it. The fact that the now sizable shadow fleet exists outside this system places coastal states and their marine environments at considerable risk. While coastal states could, in theory, introduce requirements for all merchant vessels to possess Blue Cards and block vessels lacking such protection, countries involved in the shadow fleet would be likely to consider such a measure hostile and escalatory.

It also poses a substantial risk to the IOPC Funds. Since the funds compensate coastal states for oil spills not covered by insurance, oil spills caused by the shadow fleet would force the funds to cover the entire amount. That would quickly empty the funds’ coffers.

Risks posed by shadow vessels’ bunkering and refusal to use pilotage

The inherent threats shadow vessels pose to the environment are exacerbated by their crews’ behavior. This includes not just AIS manipulation but also refusal to use pilotage in treacherous waters and their use of bunkering, also known as ship-to-ship transfers (STS). The Danish Straits, which are narrow, busy, and difficult to navigate, are already seeing such refusals. (Shadow vessels now transport 65 percent of Russian oil shipments going through the Baltic Sea. Since early 2022, 230 shadow tankers have transported Russian crude through the Danish Straits on 741 occasions, Bloomberg reports.¹¹⁸) At the time of writing, more than one in five of the shadow vessels decline the use of pilots while passing through the Danish Straits.¹¹⁹ Though international maritime regulations don’t oblige vessels to use pilotage, it’s standard practice to do so in dangerous waters (including the Danish Straits and parts of the Suez Canal). Shadow vessels’ refusals of pilotage accentuate the norm violations institutionalized by the shadow fleet. When the shadow fleet began its rapid growth in 2022, this author considered pilotage an opportunity to rein it in: If Denmark were to refuse pilotage to suspected shadow vessels, such vessels would not travel through the Danish Straits. Instead, shadow vessels deliberately turn down pilotage to signal their ability to harm Denmark and to violate norms with impunity.

Retired Rear Admiral Nils Christian Wang, a former chief of the Danish Navy (which also has coast guard duties) said:

The risk with not using pilotage through Danish waters is that you are traveling through quite narrow straits. And if you are deep-drafted, it becomes even more narrow. Having a skilled pilot on board when you go through Danish waters significantly enhances safety. We have from time to time also had experienced ships from the Russian merchant fleet colliding with [the island of] Bornholm because the helmsman or the officer on watch was drunk and the autopilot just let the ship go right into the cliffs of Bornholm. That’s to say that shadow vessels are not the only vessels that can have accidents in the Danish Straits. But today, shadow vessels combine poor-quality shipping with not having a pilot on board, which doubles the risk of potential disaster. It’s obvious that you enhance navigational safety if you use pilotage. You could even say that good seamanship and courtesy towards a coastal nation that has hardly navigable waters requires you to use pilotage. And that’s what quality shipping companies do.¹²⁰

Should a Russian shadow vessel cause an accident in the Danish Straits by not using pilotage, there would be immediate damage to Danish waters and marine life. But because pilotage is merely good practice, not mandatory under international maritime rules, Denmark can’t ban shadow vessels that refuse pilotage. Noted Wang:

Normally a private shipping company gets proper insurance, which means it won’t go bankrupt in case of an accident. That insurance means you have to live up to the proper international insurance standards, and you also pay attention to how people view you as a shipping company when it comes to quality. That means you have a private business interest in being a good choice for transport. But the state-supported shadow fleet doesn’t operate according to normal business rules but as a state instrument and even has the purpose of not living up to international standards because that’s a way of making a statement.¹²¹

Off the eastern coast of Gotland, Russian shadow vessels have been signaling that they can harm other countries’ maritime environment in a similar manner.¹²² Several vessels have been conducting bunkering oil there, as well as in several locations in the Mediterranean including the Laconian Gulf (near Greece), Hurd’s Bank (near Malta), Ceuta (a North African enclave belonging to Spain), and the waters off the Romanian port of Constanta.¹²³ STS is a common practice among shadow vessels and involves ships transferring suspicious oil to other ships, which makes it harder to trace the oil’s origins. STS also allows importers of sanctioned oil to receive the oil without their ports having to come into contact with the shadow vessels, as the shadow vessel can transfer its oil to a legitimately operating vessel that then transports it to the recipient. But because bunkering involves the transfer of large amounts of oil between two ships, it’s also prone to leaks. On September 30, 2024, for example, two dark tankers transferring oil in the Persian Gulf spilled some 5,400 barrels of it.¹²⁴

Pole Star research shows that on any given date, more than thirty tankers carrying Russian crude travel to the Laconian Gulf to conduct bunkering.¹²⁵ The waters off the coast of Malaysia are another popular area for shadow-fleet bunkering. While STS is not illegal, any transfer of oil on the open sea poses a considerable risk of leaks.

In many cases, the vessels conduct the STS so openly as to appear deliberately provocative, but again, neither Sweden nor other coastal states can ban shadow vessels as a category, nor can they ban vessels simply because they’re linked to Russia. Off the coast of Gotland, Greenpeace has tried to shame the shadow vessels into departing by painting “Oil Fuels War” on one of them, but so far without success.¹²⁶ Nor has reporting by international media prompted vessels involved in STS to leave the waters off the coasts of Gotland, Malaysia, or in the Laconian Gulf. On the contrary, by the late summer of 2024, the activity off the coast of Gotland had increased somewhat compared to a few months earlier.¹²⁷

Vessels’ rights under UNCLOS

Article 17 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea states that “ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.”¹²⁸ This right to innocent passage means that countries can’t ban merchant vessels, not even vessels they suspect will engage in STS. All vessels also have the right to traverse coastal states’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs), which extend for up to 200 miles beyond the territorial waters.¹²⁹

In territorial waters, UNCLOS stipulates that “passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.”¹³⁰ The treaty then lists the activities considered impermissible: threats or use of force, military exercises, and other activities, espionage, criminal activities, fishing, wilful and serious pollution, research and surveying, and communications interference. In EEZs, coastal states have little such protection. Their rights are limited to sovereignty over natural resources, jurisdiction regarding the establishment of “artificial islands, installations and structures” as well as marine scientific research. Moreover, coastal states are responsible for the protection of the marine environment in their EEZs.¹³¹

Incidents involving shadow vessels

The accidents involving the Ceres I and the Andromeda Star dramatically demonstrate the dangers shadow vessels pose to coastal states, the marine environment, and legally operating vessels. The two ships are far from the only shadow vessels involved in incidents and accidents since early 2022. In total, by the summer of 2024 there had been some fifty incidents including fires, engine failures, collisions, loss of steerage, and oil spills.¹³²

In early December 2023, the Liberty, a twenty-three-year-old tanker flagged in Cameroon, went aground in the Strait of Malacca. She is thought to have been carrying some one million barrels of Venezuelan oil.¹³³ The Liberty “called at the Russian tank farm complex at Ust-Luga in June [2023], then spent August, September and October driving in geometric circles off the Angolan coast,” the Maritime Executive reported: “The location has been previously identified with the Venezuelan ‘dark fleet’ trade, in which tankers fake their location in Angola in order to hide their true operations in Latin America.”¹³⁴ She then traveled to the Indian Ocean via the Cape of Good Hope, arriving in Singapore in late November. Then, on December 2, she ran aground, forcing Singaporean authorities to dispatch five tugboats to the scene. The authorities also had to make preparations for an oil spill.¹³⁵ At the beginning of 2024, the Liberty’s name was changed to Vernal, and days later her management changed from a company in Kazakhstan to one in the Seychelles.¹³⁶ The latter, Enchanted Echo Corp, manages no other vessels.¹³⁷

Around the same time as the Liberty went aground, the Turba, a twenty-six-year-old tanker carrying Russian oil, lost steering in a busy shipping lane in the Indian Ocean. For two days, the Cameroon-flagged vessel drifted from the waters off Indonesia toward Singapore.“¹³⁸ Around a year earlier, the Young Yong, a vessel sanctioned by the United States, had run aground in the same vicinity, forcing the Indonesian Navy to conduct a difficult (but successful) refloating mission.¹³⁹

In May 2024, a Comoros Islands-flagged shadow tanker bringing crude oil from Novorossiysk to India via the Suez Canal had an engine failure in the Dardanelles, which forced the southbound lane to close for three hours.¹⁴⁰

How flag states, port states, and coastal states contribute to the problem

Without flag registries willing to allow shadow vessels to fly their flags, and states willing to let shadow vessels dock in their ports, the shadow fleet would not exist. Conversely, the shadow fleet exists because countries are willing to trade with Russia and other sanctioned nations that avail themselves of shadow vessels, and because flag-of-convenience countries are willing to let shadow vessels fly their flags. Since the beginning of 2022, China, India, Turkey, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates have been the main recipients of Russian crude.¹⁴¹ (Price-cap coalition countries are allowed to import oil below the cap, but countries outside the coalition are under no obligations to observe it, and none of these countries have adopted the cap.) Since shadow vessels engage in ship-to-ship transfers on the high seas, not all vessels bringing sanctioned oil to the final destinations are shadow vessels, but many do. What percentage is unclear, as buyer nations’ port authorities don’t release statistics on the number of suspected shadow vessels that call at their ports. Either way, the importer countries’ port authorities let shadow vessels depart without the significant improvements needed to reach the standards set for merchant vessels.

Port states’ silence

This insufficient adherence to maritime standards makes such port states complicit in the shadow fleet’s operations, and these countries thus contribute to the harm caused by the shadow vessels. The shadow fleet will ultimately also harm the recipient nations themselves, as shadow vessels can experience accidents and incidents anywhere. As of September 2024, however, no port states that have been receiving suspected shadow vessels have announced they will cease doing so.

Flag states’ complicity

States flagging suspected shadow vessels are similarly complicit in the risks posed by the fleet. Windward lists Panama, Liberia, and the Marshall Islands as the top three, with Russia and EU member Malta rounding out the five nations flagging the most Russian shadow vessels, while S&P Global lists Panama and Gabon as the two top flag nations.¹⁴² As previously noted, the two nations flag 42 percent of Russia’s shadow fleet (according to S&P Global’s statistics), and 36 percent of Gabon-flagged vessels have definitive links to Russia.¹⁴³ Flags of extreme convenience, and in some cases traditional flag states of convenience, have taken minimal action to reduce the risks posed by Russian and other shadow vessels, as evidenced by the fact that they keep flagging suspected shadow fleets even though the risks posed by the vessels are well-documented. One partial exception is Liberia’s ship registry, which in June 2024 announced that the Russian insurer Ingosstrakh would no longer be allowed to insure vessels flagged in Liberia.¹⁴⁴ And in September, Palau suspended the flag registrations of the Pioneer, the Asya Energy, and the Everest Energy, while investigating their reported use of AIS manipulation.¹⁴⁵ Around the same time, the government of Eswatini announced it had discovered the registry run in its name, which it had reportedly been unaware of.¹⁴⁶ In September, it wrote to the IMO saying that 377 vessels flying its flag were doing so without permission.¹⁴⁷ A couple of weeks later, the Panama Maritime Authority announced that it would automatically deflag vessels involved in illegal activities.¹⁴⁸

Coastal states’ struggles

Coastal states have struggled to find measures that will protect them against the shadow fleet. In August 2024, the UAE banned Eswatini-flagged vessels from its ports; earlier in the year, it had banned vessels flagged in Cameroon.¹⁴⁹ That is, however, the extent of the UAE’s efforts to tackle the shadow fleet. Even though it’s well-known that numerous shadow fleet managers and owners have set themselves up in the UAE, the government has not cracked down on this activity.

Greece, meanwhile, has taken an innovative approach to try to deter the STS: In the late spring and early summer, it conducted a lengthy series of naval exercises in the Laconian Gulf, a popular area among ships conducting ship-to-ship transfers of Russian oil. Greek authorities issued the first traffic restriction on account of the naval exercise on April 30. The restriction, and the exercise going with it, were then gradually extended until July 15.¹⁵⁰

Sanctions and other measures by Western governments

The globalized economy has afforded Western governments enormous opportunities to punish Russia for its aggression against Ukraine. Sanctions are, of course, designed to force the offending country to end the policies for which it’s being punished. However, like Venezuela, Iran, and North Korea before it, Russia has shown no intention of doing so. Instead, its invasion of Ukraine continues. Since shipping is by nature more international than almost any other business sector, the continued war and Russia’s blatant use of shadow vessels have prompted Western governments to start sanctioning individual vessels and owners.

Sanctions

The United States has taken the lead. In October 2023, for example, it sanctioned a Liberia-flagged tanker and one flagged in the Marshall Islands.¹⁵¹ The following month, it sanctioned three shadow vessels and their owners, all UAE-based entities.¹⁵² By the end of May 2024, the US government had sanctioned forty-one shadow vessels.¹⁵³ The following month, the UK imposed its first sanctions on shadow vessels: four tankers flagged in the Cook Islands, Cameroon, and Barbados. The EU also imposed its first sanctions on vessels, a combination of twenty-seven shadow vessels and ships owned by Sovcomflot.¹⁵⁴ The Andromeda Star, discussed on the first pages of this report, was among the shadow vessels included.

By early July 2024, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the EU had together sanctioned fifty-three tankers transporting Russian oil. The sanctions were successful: That July, Bloomberg found that almost none of the ships were collecting cargo anymore.¹⁵⁵ Later that month, the UK sanctioned three more shadow tankers along with eight tankers owned by Sovcomflot, and in September it sanctioned another ten.¹⁵⁶ That meant it had sanctioned twenty-five shadow vessels, along with fifty individuals and entities.¹⁵⁷ Given the painstaking work involved in identifying the vessels and their owners, and the fact that any vessels exiting the business are easily replaced by new (though aging) arrivals in the fleet, sanctions of vessels are unlikely to make a significant dent in shadow fleet activity. The UK also sanctioned Ingosstrakh.¹⁵⁸ In response to Iran’s October 2024 missile attack on Israel, the United States sanctioned sixteen companies and twenty-three vessels, most of which are part of the shadow fleet.¹⁵⁹

Other measures

Behind closed doors, Western governments have also been pressuring flag states to refrain from flagging shadow vessels. Given that the registrations continue, this has not been a successful effort, but there are signs that such flag states may deflag shadow vessels when having them on their books turns out to be too cumbersome. On August 23, the United States sanctioned the Pioneer and her two fellow LNG tankers-cum-suspected shadow vessels managed by Ocean Speedstar Solutions. As we have seen, days later Palau temporarily suspended the vessels’ flag registrations.¹⁶⁰

Results to date

Even though sanctioned shadow vessels have mostly been rendered idle, the number of sanctioned vessels pales in comparison with the shadow fleet’s estimated total size. Indeed, the time and effort involved in establishing beyond reasonable doubt the details around every suspected shadow vessel vastly surpasses the effort involved in adding a vessel to the shadow fleet. As a result, the fleet has kept growing (although, as previously noted, its exact size is unknowable). Certain owners of tankers that are reaching retirement are decidedly open to selling their vessels to shady entities, and thus the shadow fleet, rather than paying to have them scrapped, as is standard practice when a vessel reaches retirement age.

Such is the lack of fear among shadow fleet operators that shadow vessels continue to blatantly engage in ship-to-ship transfers off the coasts of Western countries. Between April 2023 and April 2024, more than 3,100 STS operations took place off the coasts of EU member states, Norway, and the UK, according to S&P Global Commodities at Sea.¹⁶¹ Meanwhile, an estimated 124 shadow tankers in the VLCC and (smaller, midsize) Suezmax categories continue to transport Iranian oil and bunker off the coast of Malaysia.¹⁶²

Other plans and proposals by Western governments

It is obvious to Western governments that sanctions alone won’t curtail, let alone cripple, the shadow fleet. What is far less clear is what other measures they can take that would both be legal and have a decisive impact.

In June 2024, Denmark announced that it was planning “measures” together with allies.“¹⁶³ “And even though the Danish government didn’t specify the measures, immediately there was a response from Russia saying that Russia would make an appropriate response,” Wang said. “It was so obvious that this was something that was picked up immediately by Russia as a very, very serious offense to the right of innocent passage.”¹⁶⁴ Indeed, any measure by coastal states to curtail shadow vessels’ passage is likely to trigger angry responses and potentially escalation from Russia, which could accuse such nations of violating the right of innocent passage. At the end of August, Denmark said it would begin refusing entry to nearly thirty Russian vessels, including shadow vessels, though at the time of writing no ships have been refused entry.¹⁶⁵

Finland, for its part, has proposed that the EU acquire an oil-spill response vessel designated for use in the northern parts of the Baltic Sea.¹⁶⁶

Greece’s protracted naval exercise in the spring and summer of 2024 was an inspired and successful effort to keep shadow vessels engaged in bunkering out of Greek waters. However, the vessels merely moved their bunkering elsewhere. During the Greek exercise, the number of tankers conducting STS in Maltese waters quadrupled.¹⁶⁷ Moreover, it’s not possible to conduct lengthy naval exercises for the mere purpose of keeping shadow vessels away, and naval exercises would themselves present new perils. “You risk that the answer would be to have a Russian warship being in the same area to make sure the shadow vessels are not harassed. And then you suddenly have warships from each side close to each other,” Wang noted.¹⁶⁸

At the time of writing, the EU is (according to information provided to the author) considering a sanctions package that would allow its Baltic Sea member states to inspect the cargo and documentation of vessels in their waters, so as to ascertain the cargo’s origins and destinations. The planned measure is intended to deter shadow vessels from traveling through the Baltic Sea. In July 2024, the Netherlands’ Human Environment and Transport Inspectorate (ILT) inspected two suspected shadow vessels and banned them from Dutch waters.“¹⁶⁹ There’s some evidence that the Netherlands’ inspection and banning of two shadow vessels caused other shadow vessels to stay away from Dutch waters.¹⁷⁰ Such inspections, however, remain relatively rare, not least because shadow vessels rarely sail through Western nations’ territorial waters. Coastal states have far more rights to conduct inspections in their territorial waters than they do in their EEZs. (The Danish Straits are considered international passageways, not Danish territorial waters.)

In November 2024, the European Parliament passed a resolution calling for tougher actions against the shadow fleet in future EU sanctions packages. The MEPs want the EU to sanctions owners, operators, managers, accounts, banks, and insurance companies involved with the shadow fleet, and demand “the systematic sanctioning of vessels sailing through EU waters without known insurance and urges the EU to enhance its surveillance capabilities, especially drone and satellite monitoring, and to conduct targeted inspections at sea.”¹⁷¹ Such systematic sanctioning would, however, be likely to clash with the right to innocent passage.

Since shadow vessels don’t usually sail through Western countries’ territorial waters, and EEZs afford coastal states fewer rights, Western nations would have a limited basis on which to conduct inspections. They could, however, do so on the basis that the vessels pose a risk to marine life. If coastal states were to conduct large-scale inspections, however, they would face the prospect of having to detain a significant number of vessels or order them to undergo repairs. Especially because shadow vessels’ owners and insurers are so elusive, such measures would become a significant administrative and financial burden. Indeed, because shadow vessels’ owners are so obscure as to often be unreachable, and because they would at any rate be content to let go of aging shadow vessels rather than paying for repairs, coastal states face the prospect of having to indefinitely store and maintain seized shadow vessels.

A blanket ban on Russian-linked vessels from Baltic Sea countries’ waters—a proposal regularly floated in the public-policy community—may seem like an enticing idea. Banning vessels on account of their affiliation with Russia would, however, violate the right to innocent passage. Barring access to Russian-linked vessels would also expose such governments to retaliatory bans by Russia. Indeed, it would be the maritime equivalent of a no-fly zone, to which Russia could respond not just with a retaliatory ban but also with military action. Falkenberg Ollestad noted: “What we’re seeing in the Red Sea is a politicization of the shipping industry, and we’ve been seeing that for a while. If we start coming up with measures against the shadow fleet, that that can be retaliated against us in a different way.”¹⁷²

And, Wang noted, the very purpose of UNCLOS is safety, and the putting of restrictions on shipping:

And as soon as you start to put restrictions on one country, then you are basically eroding the whole construct. If Russia can’t STS twelve nautical miles off Gotland, what about a Latvian-registered merchant ship needing oil outside Australia? Every time you start to address one problem, you are creating multiple problems.¹⁷³

In addition, countries introducing such a ban would lose their standing as protectors of the rule of law. This is a not inconsiderable consideration, as their ironclad adherence to the rule of law is one of the platforms Western countries use in trying to convince other countries to do the same.

Environmental damage and systemic breakdown: Longer-term harm likely to be caused by the shadow fleet

The shadow fleet poses a challenge not just in the short term but in the longer term too. Ringbakken underscores the international nature of the shipping industry, which means that regulation, too, needs to be international:

The IMO and its predecessor the IMCO have been promoting international regulation of the shipping industry. It’s not an easy task, but they have been pretty good at it, and we have come quite far with the international regulation of shipping, with the liability conventions for oil spills, compulsory insurance for tankers carrying persistent oil. And all of this is threatened by the advent of the shadow fleet. A fleet of 10 to 20 percent of the world’s tankers operating outside this framework of regulation, compensation agreements, and setups: It definitely has the potential of undermining the system itself.¹⁷⁴

The most obvious risk is to maritime health. Oceans and marine wildlife may be able to withstand an occasional oil spill, and even then the recovery lasts years, if it’s ever complete. Even today, some animal communities affected by the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989 have not recovered.¹⁷⁵ Repeated spills, especially in small, shadow vessel-intense waters like the Baltic Sea, would place the ocean and marine life under enormous strain.

The shadow fleet also poses considerable risks to the global shipping system. This system is based on treaties, rules, and regulations built over several generations and especially since the end of World War II. Thanks to this patchwork of rules, global shipping has gone from being a chaotic, not to say anarchic, and extremely dangerous enterprise, to a mostly stable system that allows companies (ranging from shipowners and managers to underwriters) and governments to operate without constant fear of catastrophes or financial distress. The system works because the companies involved mostly obey rules governing matters from crews to insurance and maintenance.

With the shadow fleet, however, the global shipping system is faced with rule breaking not just by a few actors and on an occasional basis but rule breaking of a systematic kind. “We’re already seeing a fragmentation of the system and the shipping market,” Ringbakken noted. “If you’re engaged in shadow-fleet activities, I have a hard time seeing how you as a company at the same time can lift oil cargoes for the oil majors.”¹⁷⁶

That fragmentation also poses legal jeopardy for officially operating companies. “What happens if you’re in collision with a vessel that may have inadequate insurance?” Lockwood asked. “The other big thing is if the ship itself is a sanctioned entity: That could make it impossible to transfer funds in case of an incident.”¹⁷⁷ In other words, if a legally operating vessel is harmed by a shadow vessel, it may not be possible for the former to receive an insurance payout from the latter, even in the unlikely event that that vessel has functioning insurance. The fact that shadow vessels in reality lack insurance has put the shipping industry’s insurance system, painstakingly established over decades, under enormous stress. Ringbakken noted: “The liability insurers have lost more than a thousand ships—ships that were previously operating in well-regulated P&I clubs—to some fly-by-nights somewhere, if there’s insurance at all.”¹⁷⁸

The public-private system that compensates coastal states for oil spills in their waters is under similar stress. This system, managed by the IOPC Funds, was set up in 1978 to collect and administer funds for payouts to coastal states affected by oil spills. The contributions to the fund are paid by recipients of oil shipments, with the amount to be paid based on the volume received and the anticipated payouts needed in any given calendar year.¹⁷⁹ Today the IOPC operates two funds, which any country can join. However, the system only works if the number of oil spills is small, and following the Exxon Valdez and similar incidents, the oil-shipping industry’s standards have improved. As of November 2024, the IOPC Funds are administering fourteen cases, some of which date back more than two decades. In 2002, for example, the Bahamas-flagged Prestige broke in two and sank off the coasts of Spain, France, and Portugal. To date, these countries have received compensation of €147.9 million ($159.7 million) from the IOPC Funds and €22.8 million paid by the London Club, the ship’s insurer. The final compensation is estimated to reach €573 million.¹⁸⁰

The shadow fleet poses a fundamental challenge to this system. It’s unclear how the IOPC Funds, which are located in London, can enforce payments from buyers of Russian oil above the price cap, as the Funds are governed by UK legislation. At the same time, any state that is a member of the IOPC Funds—as Russia is—is entitled to compensation for spills in its waters. That means Russia can continue to operate its shadow fleet, which naturally sails extensively in Russian waters, knowing that leaks would be compensated by the IOPC Funds. Even more troublingly, the shadow fleet’s operations and its risk of regular spills could bankrupt the IOPC Funds altogether, especially since the funds can’t enforce payments from shadow vessels’ customers.

Indeed, by virtue of its size, the shadow fleet has enabled rule breaking on a systemic scale. The violators are most obviously the shadow vessels and their owners and managers, but also their flag states. In the past, flags of convenience have mostly tried to perform the duties that flag states are obliged to perform, but today there are states offering flags of extreme convenience to shadow vessels despite being unable to perform a flag state’s duties. Broadhurst noted:

The most common rule violations you’re seeing is flag states not performing the functions, all the functions that the flag state is supposed to perform: Vessels are being undermaintained, they engage in flag-hopping, and we don’t know who their true owners are. As a result, we don’t even know who is accountable when something goes wrong.¹⁸¹

This makes the shadow fleet the maritime equivalent of neighborhood gangs. As long as a neighborhood is only home to individual criminals, it can absorb these criminals’ rule breaking. When, however, neighborhood criminals organize themselves into gangs, the volume of malfeasance overpowers the rule-abiding majority. Especially since there is no global maritime policing authority, global shipping depends on participants from flag states to ship managers to obey the rules, and the shadow fleet has led to such an increase in rule breaking that it’s uncertain how the global maritime system will be able to absorb it.

Potential measures that could limit the shadow fleet’s size and activities

Systematically identifying owners, ultimate beneficial owners, and managers

As part of the effort to track vessels, Western governments should also increase their focus on identifying the individuals involved in the vessels’ management and ownership. Because the owners take pains to hide behind brass-plate companies, this would require investigative effort, but relevant expertise exists. Western governments could turn in particular to Italy’s Carabinieri and Guardia di Finanza, which have unique expertise investigating organized crime and identifying the individuals involved in it. This would serve as a deterrent to those individuals, as their involvement in the shadow fleet is based on the assumption that that they will not be identified, let alone penalized. Western governments could also make shadow fleet owners’ and managers’ names publicly available, for example on government websites, which would act as a further deterrent against involvement with the shadow fleet.

Revoking visas of those involved in shadow fleet-linked rule breaking

It’s not illegal for people and entities living outside the oil price-cap coalition countries to trade in Russian crude above the price cap. Shadow vessels’ rules violations, however, may be punishable under criminal or civil law (see above). It would also be within Western countries’ right to deny visas to persons involved in the shadow fleet and even to their family members. Western countries have long been loath to revoke the visas of hostile operators’ family members, but denying or revoking visas is within any country’s purview and can’t be considered or construed as an act of aggression.

Designating an EU agency to track the fleet

The European Defence Agency’s Maritime Surveillance project (MARSUR) or another EU agency could be selected as the agency in charge of tracking shadow vessels. It could invite tech companies to become partners in identification and tracking. The groups involved in this effort could also make wider use of existing technologies to comprehensively track shadow vessels including satellite technology. “If we’re going to tighten up and collect data,” Broadhurst said, “then it’s a move toward a digital kind of environment where there is a lot more tracking of vessels, a lot more recording of vessels; then maybe we can get on top of this situation because at the moment it’s so easy to sail under the radar and not have to comply.”¹⁸² This would also be an opportunity for tech start-ups to prove their capabilities within the area of growing emerging national-security risks.

It requires data collection, AI-assisted analysis, and exposure of offenders and facilitators, according to Broadhurst:

There’s a vessel in this position here that’s doing this or that, it’s the shadow fleet or it’s a good vessel. It’s out there. The structure around the bad boys, there is a structure for reporting that, which is what is done today when it comes to port detentions [which are the basis for the Paris MoU white, gray, and black lists]. If you’re identifying a vessel that seems suspicious, you could easily check it with the insurance companies. You could check it with a flag state, you could check it with a classification society, you could check it with the last port state control. And if you’ve got somebody who can analyze that data, effectively and by using AI, you’d have a very powerful platform that would identify offenders. If we can’t police, we can at least expose, because reputation is big in the maritime industry. We just need someone to own the process.¹⁸³

Inspecting and impounding deficient vessels

While coastal states can’t simply ban vessels linked to a particular country, they have the right to inspect vessels and impound ones that don’t meet maritime requirements. SOLAS, for example, gives government the right “to inspect ships of other Contracting States if there are clear grounds for believing that the ship and its equipment do not substantially comply with the requirements of the Convention.”¹⁸⁴ There have been regular suggestions that coastal states particularly exposed to the shadow fleet should conduct constant inspections (and resulting impoundments), thus making journeys through their waters unattractive for shadow vessels. UNCLOS, in turn, affords coastal states the right to protect themselves against “serious and wilful pollution.”¹⁸⁵ The two treaties thus give coastal states considerable rights that they could use more systematically.

This would, however, require an enormous personnel effort from the affected countries’ coast guards; indeed, they may lack the personnel needed for such an effort. In addition, as outlined above, such countries would almost certainly have to bear the costs for any impounded ships. Indeed, since shadow vessels’ owners are deliberately elusive and may be impossible to identify, coastal states impounding them would face maintaining them, providing care, repatriation, and some manner of wages to their crews, and then paying for the vessels’ scrapping.

If acting alone, coastal states would face both little success and considerable expense and risk. Wang is skeptical that a country like Denmark would act unilaterally to tackle this problem:

As a small cork in the Baltic bottle, we are always wary of taking unilateral steps toward Russia that are not backed up internationally. But we might try to get other countries onto the bandwagon in the IMO or some other organization to see if we can create an international protest against this.¹⁸⁶

Denmark and other coastal states could, for example, remind fellow IMO member states that preventing fast-growing oil spills, collisions, and other maritime accidents is in their interest. This is especially the case since they face the burden resulting from such incidents. If the IOPC Funds were to become nonoperational, they would of course face an extremely severe financial burden.

Verifying flag status

Countries trying to tackle the shadow fleet could also use flag-state verification as a reason to visit vessels. Potts noted that “flag-state verification has been used on the hash highway for drug runners as an excuse to get on board. You can request to board a vessel and say, ‘We think you’re Indian but you’re flying an Iranian flag, so we’re going to come over just to make sure because that flag is sacrosanct.”¹⁸⁷

Intervening against bunkering in the Baltic SeaThe EU could employ the Baltic Sea Action Plan, a “strategic programme of measures and actions for achieving good environmental status of the sea, ultimately leading to a Baltic Sea in a healthy state.¹⁸⁸ Russia is a signatory, as are EU nations. Since oil bunkering, with its considerable and unnecessary risks for the environment, violates the agreement, the plan’s other signatories would have the right to intervene against any STS activities.¹⁸⁹

Partnering with IndiaIndia presents another opportunity. Today, India is a protagonist in the shadow-fleet trade, both through its significant imports of Russian oil above the price cap and because a very significant number of shadow vessel owners operate from India. Indeed, Indian nationals own and operate a number of flag-of-extreme-convenience registries. Like other flag-of-convenience registries, these are privately operated, for-profit outfits.

Although no other country has the right to tell India what to do, political and maritime leaders could remind Indian leaders that it’s not in their country’s interest to so actively participate in the dismantling of the global maritime order the way it does by permitting larger numbers of shadow vessels to be owned and managed by shady outfits on its soil and by importing large amounts of oil arriving on shadow vessels. As examined in the previous report that is part of the Atlantic Council’s Maritime Threats initiative, the breakdown of the maritime order also includes the Houthi attacks on merchant shipping, which has seen countless Indian seafarers subjected to attacks. In March 2024, the Indian Navy rescued twenty seafarers from a tanker struck by the Yemeni militia¹⁹⁰Officials also could remind India that having some of the world’s worst flag registries based and operated in India, by Indian nationals, harms the country’s reputation. And they could remind Indian leaders that having shadow vessels in Indian waters presents a considerable risk to India itself.

Collaborating with nongovernmental organizations

Governments could initiate cooperation with environmental groups such as Greenpeace to bring attention to the massive risks posed by shadow vessels. Such collaboration would also bring opportunities to involve notable personalities who could bring further attention to the risk facing fish, birds, and waters. George Clooney, Leonardo DiCaprio, Bono, Lady Gaga, and Queen Mary of Denmark are among the large number of global celebrities involved in sustainability efforts. There are also celebrities in the Arabic-speaking world, India, and other non-Western countries who would be powerful voices in support of the environment and against the harm posed by the shadow fleet.

Encouraging shipowners not to sell vessels into the shadow fleet

Before entering the shadow fleet, dark vessels are owned by regular companies that operate in the official shipping sector. Though they clearly view the shadow fleet as a convenient source of income for ships they would otherwise have had to scrap (at their own expense), some would likely reconsider if helped to understand how the shadow fleet harms the official shipping sector and maritime order more widely.

Engaging with flag states of extreme convenience

International officials and maritime leaders could remind flag states of extreme convenience that making international headlines by flagging vessels so risky that no one else wants to flag them severely damages their reputation. Indeed, the reputational damage to flag states of extreme convenience far exceeds the limited revenues they receive from such flag registrations, as the registries are private companies. The Eswatini and Panama governments’ announcements of ship deflagging underlines this point.

If flag states of extreme convenience are, in fact, eager to establish themselves as flag states, Western countries could offer them assistance in developing the maritime expertise needed for them to be able to do anything other than shadow vessels. Especially since shadow vessels often flag-hop, this measure may result in some shadow vessels reflagging to another flag state of extreme convenience (indeed, more countries may allow companies to establish registries of extreme convenience). Deflagged vessels could also reflag to Russia. However, every country that stops flagging shadow vessels will help limit the shadow fleet.

Conclusion

The shadow fleet poses such a vexing challenge because it deliberately violates maritime rules and is so large that its violations pose a serious threat to the global maritime order. Each shadow vessel poses a risk to other vessels, to its crew, to the marine environment, and to coastal states; legally operating vessels’ insurers and especially coastal states face the prospect of significant expenses resulting from incidents and accidents involving shadow vessels. In the longer term, the shadow fleet poses another major risk: It threatens to undermine the global maritime order, which governments and the private sector have painstakingly built over several generations. The longer the shadow fleet continues to operate and grow, the more it establishes an alternative shipping sector that doesn’t just threaten individual vessels and coastal states but the functioning of the global maritime order.

One can argue that the West made a mistake in imposing a price cap on Russian oil, since the price cap has prompted the shadow fleet’s explosive growth, but the situation today is that the shadow fleet exists and keeps growing, and that it’s surrounded by an ecosystem of willing helpers ranging from flag states to port authorities to owners.

The shadow vessels’ participants involve not just vessels and their crews, owners, and insurers, but also nation-states. This state of affairs makes it impossible to agree on effective measures within multilateral organizations. The fact that the IMO, the global body primarily responsible for maritime matters, has been unable to stop the shadow fleet’s growth since early 2022 illustrates this dilemma. The private sector alone is not in a position to counter the shadow fleet, nor can individual coastal states throttle its activities by banning all suspected shadow vessels, as this could violate international maritime regulations and would also be denounced by Russia as illegal and escalatory. This, in turn, would further worsen the situation.

Governments committed to the global maritime order can, however, take actions that can gradually reduce the shadow fleet’s size and harm. These measures include establishing a shadow-fleet monitoring hub that can collaborate with tech start-ups to identify the best ways to identify and monitor shadow fleet participants, conducting regular inspections of suspected shadow vessels, engaging with flag states of extreme convenience to convince them not to flag shadow vessels, and engaging with India.

The Atlantic Council is grateful to the Smith Richardson Foundation for its support of this report.

About the author

Elisabeth Braw is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, focusing on geopolitics and the globalized economy as well as gray-zone and hybrid threats. She’s also a columnist with Foreign Policy and Politico Europe and the author of the award-winning Goodbye Globalization: The Return of a Divided World (Yale University Press, 2024) and the upcoming Undersea War (2026). At the Atlantic Council, Elisabeth leads the Threats to the Global Maritime Order initiative. She was previously a senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London. She’s the author of God’s Spies, about the Stasi’s church division (2019), and The Defender’s Dilemma: Identifying and Deterring Gray-Zone Aggression (2022). Elisabeth is a member of the UK National Preparedness Commission and a member of the Krach Institute for Tech Diplomacy’s advisory council. Before joining academia, she worked in the private sector following a career as a journalist. She is a regular op-ed contributor to the Financial Times, The Wall Street Journal, and The Times (of London).

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1 “Peace,” Electronic Quality Shipping Information System (EQUASIS) entry, last accessed November 13, 2024, https://www.equasis.org/EquasisWeb/restricted/ShipInfo?fs=Search.

2 Niklas Krigslund and Liv Almer, “Tanker with Unknown Owner Moored in Denmark after Collission [sic],” Shippingwatch, March 20, 2024, https://shippingwatch.com/carriers/Tanker/article16953853.ece.

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12 Alex Longley and Sanne Wass, “Shadow-Fleet Oil Tanker That Crashed Had Void Western Insurance,” Bloomberg, April 26, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-26/shadow-fleet-oil-tanker-that-crashed-had-void-western-insurance?sref=NeFsviTJ; and Cook and Sheppard, “Russian ‘Dark Fleet’ Lacks.”

13 This is the second report in the Atlantic Council’s Maritime Threats initiative. The author and the Atlantic Council are grateful to DNK and the Norwegian Shipowners’ Association, partners in the Maritime Threats initiative. More information is available at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/programs/scowcroft-center-for-strategy-and-security/transatlantic-security-initiative/threats-to-the-global-maritime-order

14 The characteristics are ones used by analysts, maritime companies, and governments to identify shadow vessels; there is no official internationally recognized set of characteristics.

15 Pole Star, confidential report, quoted with permission.

16 Pole Star, confidential report.

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19 United Nations Report S/2012/422, June 14, 2012, 23,
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20 Box 1 note: “Group Clubs: Full List of Principal Clubs and Affiliated Associations,” International Group of P&I Clubs, last accessed November 13, 2024, 2024, https://www.igpandi.org/group-clubs.

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24 Samuel M. Hickey, “A Worthless Withdrawal: Two Years Since President Trump Abandoned the JCPOA,” Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, May 11, 2020, https://armscontrolcenter.org/a-worthless-withdrawal-two-years-since-president-trump-abandoned-the-jcpoa/.

25 Duncan Potts (retired vice admiral, Royal Navy), in interview with the author, May 16, 2024.

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28 Matt Spetalnick, Daphne Psaledakis, and Marianna Parraga, “US to Reimpose Oil Sanctions on Venezuela Over Election Concerns,” Reuters, April 17, 2024,
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29 Claire Jungman and Daniel Roth “Stop the Hop,” United Against a Nuclear Iran, November 12, 2020, https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/blog/stop-hop.

30 Simon Lockwood (head of shipowners at WTW), in interview with the author, May 10, 2024.

31 Lockwood interview.

32 Lockwood interview.

33 Lockwood interview.

34 Elisabeth Braw, “How Greek Companies and Ghost Ships Are Helping Russia,” Foreign Policy, November 23, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/23/how-greek-companies-and-ghost-ships-are-helping-russia/.

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38 Frittelli, “The Global Oil Tanker Market.”

39 Frittelli, “The Global Oil Tanker Market,” 7.

40 Archie Hunter, Alix Steel, and Grant Smith, “Russia’s ‘Shadow Fleet’ of Tankers Swells to 600 Ships, Trafigura Says,” Bloomberg (reprinted by gCaptain), February 3, 2023, https://gcaptain.com/russias-shadow-fleet-of-tankers-swells-to-600-ships-trafigura-says/.

41 Armen Azizian et al., “The Fleet Operating in Opaque Markets: One Year Since the EU Import Ban,” Vortexa, uploaded December 2023, 6, https://marketinfo.vortexa.com/rs/837-MZE-578/images/Vortexa-Exclusive-Report-Opaque-Markets-Dec2023.pdf?version=0?utm_source=Website&utm_medium=Medium&utm_campaign=2000.EU-Ban-Anniversary–Report.

42 Azizian et al., “The Fleet Operating,” 7.

43 Sam Chambers, “IMO Adopts Shadow Fleet Resolution,” Splash 247, Asia Shipping Media, December 7, 2024, https://splash247.com/imo-adopts-shadow-fleet-resolution/.

44 Deadweight tonnage (dwt) refers to carrying capacity in metric tons.

45 Paul Peachey, “Targeting ‘Enormous’ Tanker Shadow Fleet with Fresh Sanctions Could Spark Global Economic Shock,” TradeWinds, DN Media Group, May 7, 2024, https://www.tradewindsnews.com/tankers/targeting-enormous-tanker-shadow-fleet-with-fresh-sanctions-could-spark-global-economic-shock/2-1-1639820

46 Rocío Magnani, “Venezuela Turns to Dark Fleet to Supply Oil to Ally Cuba,” Latin Times, June 28, 2024,
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47 “Updated: Illuminating,” Windward.

48 Weilun Soon, “Zombie Tanker Turns Up at Northern Chinese Port Laden With Oil,” Bloomberg, September 30, 2024, https://news.bloombergtax.com/international-trade/zombie-tanker-turns-up-at-northern-chinese-port-laden-with-oil.

49 Max Lin and Robert Perkins, “FACTBOX: Global shadow tanker fleet moves growing volumes of sanctioned oil,” S&P Global, November 12, 2024, https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/111124-factbox-global-shadow-tanker-fleet-moves-growing-volumes-of-sanctioned-oil

50 William R. Gregory, “Flags of Convenience: The Development of Open Registries in the Global Maritime Business and Implications for Modern Seafarers,” (master’s thesis, Georgetown University, 2012), 51, https://oceanfdn.org/sites/default/files/Gregory_georgetown.pdf; and Liberian Registry, last accessed November 13, 2024, https://www.liscr.com/#:~:text=The%20Liberian%20Registry%20was%20established,as%20their%20Flag%20of%20choice.

51 Robin R. Churchill with Christopher Hedley, “The Meaning of the ‘Genuine Link’ Requirement in Relation to the Nationality of Ships,” Study Prepared for International Transport Workers’ Federation, October 2000, https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/45062/1/itf-oct2000.pdf.

52 UN Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Maritime Transport 2023: Towards a Green and Just Transition, UNCTAD, 35, https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/rmt2023_en.pdf.

53 UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport 2023.

54 Paul Peachey, “UAE Crackdown Extends to Fresh Flag State Popular with Shadow Fleet Owners,” TradeWinds, January 9, 2024, https://www.tradewindsnews.com/tankers/uae-crackdown-extends-to-fresh-flag-state-popular-with-shadow-fleet-owners/2-1-1580655; Michelle Wiese Bockmann, “Iranian-linked Tanker Reflags to Europe’s San Marino Registry,” Lloyd’s List Intelligence, July 12, 2024, https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1149885/Iranian-linked-tanker-reflags-to-Europes-San-Marino-registry; and “Antigua and Barbuda Fresh Flag of Choice for Russia-calling Dark Fleet Tankers: Reports,” Antigua News Room, March 22, 2024,
https://antiguanewsroom.com/antigua-and-barbuda-fresh-flag-of-choice-for-russia-calling-dark-fleet-tankers-reports/.

55 Elisabeth Braw, “False Flags and Russian Oil,” Opinion, Wall Street Journal, September 6, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/opinion/false-flags-and-russian-oil-sanctions-evasion-shipping-b0c1cf5a

56 “About the Registry,” Liberian Corporate Registry, last accessed November 15, 2024, https://liberiancorporations.com/about-the-registry/contact-us/.

57 “Paris MoU Gray-Black List,” 07-2024-06-2025, Paris MoU, https://parismou.org/system/files/2023-06/Paris%20MOU%20Grey%20Black%20List%2007-2023–06-2024%20%2822%29.pdf; and
“Current Registries Listed as FOCs,” ITF Seafarers, last accessed November 13, 2024,
https://www.itfseafarers.org/en/focs/current-registries-listed-as-focs.

58 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), IMO, 1974, https://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-the-Safety-of-Life-at-Sea-(SOLAS),-1974.aspx#:~:text=The%20main%20objective%20of%20the,ships%2C%20compatible%20with%20their%20safety.

59 Michelle Wiese Bockman, “I’ve observed a huge influx of Russian-trading tanker tonnage to smaller flag registries in the past 2.5 years . . . But this week I decided to check the data to get some definitive answers . . . The Cook Islands registry has flagged more tanker tonnage so far in 2024 than registries 30 times larger, as it embraces the ‘dark fleet’ niche,” LinkedIn post, August 2024, https://www.linkedin.com/posts/michellebockmann_ive-observed-a-huge-influx-of-russian-trading-activity-7222534692472844289-Q2gg/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_desktop.

60 Byron McKinney et al., “Russia’s Shadow Fleet−Formation, Operation and Continued Risks for Sanctions Compliance Teams,” S&P Global blog, June 19, 2024, https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/blog/russia-s-shadow-fleet-formation-operation-and-continued-risks-for-sanctions-compliance-teams

61 McKinney et al., “Russia’s Shadow Fleet.”

62 Michelle Wiese Bockmann, “Small Registries Grow at Record Pace as Flag-hopping Tankers Play Regulatory Game of ‘Whack-a-mole,’ ” Lloyd’s List Intelligence, September 20, 2024, https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1150721/Small-registries-grow-at-record-pace-as-flag-hopping-tankers-play-regulatory-game-of-whack-a-mole.

63 “Vessels Database,” VesselFinder, last accessed November 13, 2024, https://www.vesselfinder.com/vessels?type=6&flag=ST.

64 “Vessels Database,” VesselFinder.

65 Norwegian Coastal Administration, internal report, May 2024, quoted with permission.

66 Norwegian Coastal Administration, internal report.

67 Paul Peachey, “Rogue Flag States Seek ‘Secret Deals to Avoid Ship Detentions,” TradeWinds, May 22, 2024, https://www.tradewindsnews.com/regulation/rogue-flag-states-seek-secret-deals-to-avoid-ship-detentions-/2-1-1647279.

68 Norwegian Coastal Administration, internal report, April 2024, referenced with permission.

69 Norwegian Coastal Administration, internal report, May 2024, referenced with permission.

70 Sam Chambers, “Majority of Ageing Tankers Now Engaged in Shadow Operations,” Splash 247, October 11, 2024, https://splash247.com/majority-of-ageing-tankers-now-engaged-in-shadow-operations/.

71 Borys Dodonov et al., “Russian Oil Revenues Rising, Tougher Sanctions Needed on Shadow Fleet,” Kyiv School of Economics, April 30, 2024, https://sanctions.kse.ua/en/russian-oil-revenues-rising-tougher-sanctions-needed-on-shadow-fleet-2/.

72 Claire Jungman and Daniel Roth, “The Switch List: Tankers Shift from Carrying Iranian Oil to Russian Oil,” United Against Nuclear Iran, May 1, 2024, https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/blog/switch-list-tankers-shift-from-carrying-iranian-oil-to-russian-oil.

73 Axel Rappe et al., “Svenska Yle avslöjar: Flera oljetankrar med rysk olja trafikerar Finska viken trots att de inte är sjödugliga,” Svenska Yle, https://svenska.yle.fi/a/7-10063668.

74 Wiebke Denkena and Oliver Worm, “Risk of Oil Disaster Off German Coast, Analysis of Russian Shadow Fleet Data Reveals,” Greenpeace, September 24, 2024, 3, https://www.greenpeace.de/publikationen/2409_Greenpeace_Investigation_Shadow_Fleet.pdf.

75 Denkena and Worm, “Risk of Oil Disaster Off German Coast,” 4.

76 Denkena and Worm, “Risk of Oil Disaster Off German Coast,” 5.

77 Denkena and Worm, “Risk of Oil Disaster Off German Coast,” 6.

78 Peter Broadhurst (senior vice president of safety and security, Inmarsat Maritime), in interview with the author, March 21, 2024.

79 Christiaan Triebert et al., “The $2.8 Billion Hole in U.S. Sanctions on Iran,” New York Times, February 16, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/02/16/world/middleeast/iran-oil-tankers-sanctions.html.

80 “The ‘Shadow Fleet’: A Call to Action,” Policy Paper, UK government, July 19, 2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-shadow-fleet-a-call-to-action.

81 The shadow fleet’s flag states and recipients are discussed in a subsequent section of this report.

82 Vaibhav Raghunandan, “May 2024 — Monthly Analysis of Russian Fossil Fuel Exports and Sanctions
20 June 2024,” Center for Energy and Clean Air, https://energyandcleanair.org/may-2024-monthly-analysis-of-russian-fossil-fuel-exports-and-sanctions/.

83 Anna Shiryaevskaya and Ruth Liao, “US Sanctions Seven ‘Dark Fleet’ Ships Linked to Russia LNG,” Bloomberg, August 23, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-08-23/us-sanctions-dark-fleet-of-seven-lng-ships-for-links-to-russia?sref=NeFsviTJ.

84 “14th EU Sanctions Package Targets Russian LNG and Political Donations, Expands Import and Export Bans and Closes Loopholes,” White & Case, July 12, 2024, https://www.whitecase.com/insight-alert/14th-eu-sanctions-package-targets-russian-lng-and-political-donations-expands-import.

85 For more on Western sanctions, see section Sanctions and other measures by Western governments.

86 A Gas Carrier Faking Its Location Helps Russia Avoid Sanctions,” Bloomberg (reprinted by gCaptain), August 5, 2024, https://gcaptain.com/a-gas-carrier-faking-its-location-helps-russia-avoid-sanctions/; and Malte Humpert, “‘Shadow Fleet’ LNG Carrier Reemerges Off Norway After Calling at Sanctioned Arctic LNG 2,” gCaptain (maritime industry blog), August 7, 2024,
https://gcaptain.com/shadow-fleet-lng-carrier-reemerges-off-norway-after-calling-at-sanctioned-arctic-lng-2/.

87 “Ocean Speedstar Solutions Inc.,” EQUASIS, https://www.equasis.org/EquasisWeb/restricted/FleetInfo?fs=CompanyInfo.

88 “Zara Shipholding Co.,” EQUASIS, https://www.equasis.org/EquasisWeb/restricted/FleetInfo?fs=CompanyInfo.

89 According to the US Energy Information Administration, “AFRAMAX vessels refer to ships between 80,000 and 120,000 deadweight tons;” See EIA, “Oil Tanker Sizes Range from General Purpose to Ultra-large Crude Carriers on AFRA scale,” Today in Energy, September 16, 2024, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=17991.

90 “An Oil Tanker Ablaze in the South China Sea Is a Global Problem,” Straits Times, May 7, 2023, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/an-oil-tanker-ablaze-in-the-south-china-sea-is-a-global-problem.

91 “Fire on ‘Shadow’ Tanker Off Malaysia Is Extinguished, Search Continues,” Maritime Executive, May 2, 2024, https://maritime-executive.com/article/fire-on-shadow-tanker-off-malaysia-is-extinguished-search-continues; and “Taking on the Dark Tanker Fleet, Part I: Flag State Responsibility Should Be Flag State Liability,” Column, Baird Maritime, August 19, 2024, https://www.bairdmaritime.com/security/incidents/piracy/column-taking-on-the-dark-tanker-fleet-part-i-flag-state-responsibility-should-be-flag-state-liability-offshore-accounts.

92 “Ceres I,” EQUASIS, https://www.equasis.org/EquasisWeb/restricted/ShipInfo?fs=Search.

93 Rashvinjeet S. Bedi, “Oil Tanker in Collision Near Pedra Branca Did Not Flee, but Had Drifted Away: Malaysian Authorities,” Channel News Asia, July 30, 2024, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/ship-tanker-collision-ceres-hafnia-nile-flee-drifted-4513651.

94 Jonathan Boonzaier, “Mystery Surrounds Shadowy Manager of Hit-and-Run VLCC,” TradeWinds, July 29, 2024, https://www.tradewindsnews.com/tankers/mystery-surrounds-shadowy-manager-of-hit-and-run-vlcc/2-1-1683925.

95 Line Falkenberg Ollestad (adviser, Norwegian Shipowners’ Association), in interview with the author, May 30, 2024.

96 Svein Ringbakken (managing director, DNK), in interview with the author, August 31, 2024.

97 Jasmina Ovcina Mandra, “Devastating Pablo Tanker Explosion Exposes Dangers of Growing Shadow Fleet,” Offshore Energy, May 8, 2023, https://www.offshore-energy.biz/pablo-tanker-explosion-exposes-dangers-of-growing-shadow-fleet/.

98 Falkenberg Ollestad interview, May 24, 2024.

99 “Seafarer Abandonment,” ITF Seafarers, last accessed November 13, 2024, https://www.itfseafarers.org/en/abandonment-list/seafarer-abandonment.

100 “Maritime Labour Convention, 2006,” IOL, https://www.ilo.org/international-labour-standards/maritime-labour-convention-2006.

101 “MLC, 2006, Maritime Labour Convention, 2006, (MLC, 2006),” NORMLEX Information System on International Labour Standards, last accessed November 15, 2024, https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:80001:0::NO.

102 Cook and Sheppard, “Russian ‘Dark Fleet’ Lacks.”

103 “Russia’s Ingosstrakh Says Weighing Legal Action After UK Sanctions,” Reuters, June 14, 2024,
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-ingosstrakh-says-weighing-legal-action-after-uk-sanctions-2024-06-14/.

104 “How Can a Spill Affect Your Community,” NOAA, US Commerce Department, https://darrp.noaa.gov/oil-spills/how-can-spill-affect-your-community#:~:text=Loss%20of%20habitat%3A%20Oil%20discharged,result%20in%20erosion%20of%20shorelines

105 Denkena and Worm, “Risk of Oil Disaster Off German Coast,” 6.

106 Broadhurst interview, May 12, 2024.

107 Broadhurst interview, May 12, 2024.

108 Claire Jungman (@claire_jungman), “SDGT-vessel ETERNAL FORTUNE, now MOONBAY, is offloading Iranian oil today at Dongjiakou under #Guyana’s fraudulent registry with fake documents. #China overlooks these forgeries, enabling the vessel to defy US sanctions. This not only continues funding #Iran’s terror but also sets a dangerous precedent for maritime safety,” X, May 29, 2024, https://x.com/claire_jungman/status/1795942728968106262.

109 Craig Eason, “Disaster Waiting to Happen: Finnish Owners Warn on Baltic Shadow Fleet Risk,” TradeWinds, September 19, 2024, https://www.tradewindsnews.com/casualties/disaster-waiting-to-happen-finnish-owners-warn-on-baltic-shadow-fleet-risk/2-1-1712263.

110 Paul Peachey, “Campaign Group Says Catastrophic Event Involving a Shadow Tanker Is Likely to Happen,” TradeWinds, October 11, 2024, https://www.tradewindsnews.com/tankers/shadow-tanker-catastrophe-fears-oil-spill-could-cost-asian-nations-1-6bn-new-report-warns/2-1-1722999.

111 “International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR),” IMO, https://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/International-Convention-on-Maritime-Search-and-Rescue-(SAR).aspx.

112 “Importance of Blue Cards and CLC in Marine Insurance: Guidance for Ship Owners,” GMCG, March 21, 2023, https://gmcg.global/importance-of-blue-cards-and-clc-in-marine-insurance-guidance-for-ship-owners/#:~:text=It%20is%20issued%20by%20the,operating%20in%20the%20maritime%20industry.

113 “Funds Overview,” IOPC Funds, n.d., https://iopcfunds.org/about-us/.

114 “Funds Overview,” IOPC Funds.

115 Carol Yang, “Malaysia Marine Department Detains Ceres I and Hafnia Nile for Further Investigation,” Lloyd’s List, July 30, 2024, https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1150065/Malaysia-Marine-Department-detains-Ceres-I-and-Hafnia-Nile-for-further-investigation.

116 Alex Longley, “The Secretive World of Russian Oil Tanker Insurance Revealed,” Insurance Journal, October 12, 2024, https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2024/10/22/798094.htm.

117 Ringbakken interview.

118 Sanne Wass et al., “A Warning from Onboard the ‘Old Piles of Junk’ Ferrying Russia’s Oil Across the Baltic Sea,” Bloomberg, August 22, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2024-russia-shadow-oil-fleet-denmark-baltic-environment/?sref=NeFsviTJ.

119 Wass et al., “A Warning from Onboard.”

120 Nils Christian Wang (retired rear admiral and former chief of the Danish Navy), in interview with author, May 15, 2024.

121 Wang interview, May 15, 2024.

122 “Här tankas ryska skuggflottan – från fartyg utanför Gotland,” Swedish Radio and Television (SVT), April 9, 2024, https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/har-tankas-ryska-skuggflottan-fran-fartyg-utanfor-gotland.

123 Alessio Armenzoni, Giangiuseppe Pili, and Gary C. Kessler, “Red Flags: Russian Oil Tradecraft in the Mediterranean Sea,” Proceedings of the US Naval Institute 150, no. 6 (2024): 1,456, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/june/red-flags-russian-oil-tradecraft-mediterranean-sea.

124 Malte Humpert, “Iranian ‘Shadow Fleet’ Oil Transfer Causes Large Spill in Persian Gulf,” gCaptain, October 2, 2024,
https://gcaptain.com/iranian-shadow-fleet-oil-transfer-causes-large-spill-in-persian-gulf/.

125 Pole Star, confidential report, n.d., referenced with permission.

126 “Greenpeace Protests Dark Fleet Tankers, Targeting Baltic Bunker Vessel,” Maritime Executive, April 12, 2024, https://maritime-executive.com/article/greenpeace-protests-shadow-fleet-tankers-targeting-baltic-bunker-vessel.

127 Information provided to the author by a senior Swedish official.

128 UNCLOS, Part II, Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Paragraph 17, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part2.htm.

129 UNCLOS, Article 57, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.

130 UNCLOS, Article 19, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.

131 UNCLOS, Article 56, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.

132 Safety and Shipping Review 2024, Allianz, 27, https://commercial.allianz.com/content/dam/onemarketing/commercial/commercial/reports/Commercial-Safety-Shipping-Review-2024.pdf.

133 “LIBERTY, IMO 9207027,” Ship Information, BalticShipping.com, last accessed November 15, 2024,
https://www.balticshipping.com/vessel/imo/9207027.

134 “Dark Fleet Tanker Runs Aground Near Singapore,” Maritime Executive, December 7, 2023, https://maritime-executive.com/article/dark-fleet-tanker-runs-aground-near-singapore#:~:text=The%20Liberty%20is%20a%20Cameroon%2Dflagged%20Suezmax%20of,is%20carrying%20a%20cargo%20of%20one%20million.

135 “Dark Fleet Tanker Runs Aground,” Maritime Executive.

136 VERNAL-IMO n° 9207027, EQUASIS, https://www.equasis.org/EquasisWeb/restricted/ShipInfo?fs=ShipHistory.

137 ENCHANTED ECHO CORP-IMO n° 6437925, EQUASIS, https://www.equasis.org/EquasisWeb/restricted/FleetInfo?fs=CompanyInfo.

138 Shadow Fleet Oil Tanker Drifted for Two Days in Indian Ocean,” Bloomberg, October 11, 2023,
https://gcaptain.com/shadow-fleet-oil-tanker-drifted-for-two-days-in-indian-ocean/.

139 “Indonesia Refloats Stranded Tanker Blacklisted by U.S.,” Maritime Executive, November 10, 2022, https://maritime-executive.com/article/indonesia-refloats-stranded-tanker-blacklisted-by-u-s.

140 “Russia Shadow-Fleet Oil Tanker Had Engine Fail at Turkish Strait,” Bloomberg, May 23, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-23/russia-shadow-fleet-oil-tanker-had-engine-fail-at-turkish-strait?sref=NeFsviTJ.

141 “Volume of Crude Oil Shipments from Russia from January 1, 2022 to January 1, 2024, by Declared Destination,” Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1350506/russia-crude-oil-shipments-by-destination/.

142 “UPDATED: Illuminating,” Windward; and McKinney et al., “Russia’s Shadow Fleet.”

143 “UPDATED: Illuminating,” Windward; and McKinney et al., “Russia’s Shadow Fleet.”

144 “Liberia Blocks Russian Insurer in Latest Move Against Shadow Fleet,” Maritime Executive, June 22, 2024, https://maritime-executive.com/article/liberia-blocks-russian-insurer-in-latest-move-against-shadow-fleet.

145 Malte Lumpert, Russia’s LNG ‘Shadow Fleet’ Grinds to Halt Following Suspension of Flag, gCaptain, September 3, 2024, https://gcaptain.com/russias-lng-shadow-fleet-grinds-to-halt-following-suspension-of-flag/.

146 Richard Meade, “How Eswatini Created a Shipping Register by Accident,” Lloyd’s List, September 3, 2024, https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1150511/How-Eswatini-created-a-shipping-register-by-accident.

147 IMO, Circular Letter 4917, last accessed November 13, 2024, https://docs.imo.org/Category.aspx?cid=5.

148 “Panama Registry to Automatically Expel Sanction Busters,” Maritime Executive, October 1, 2024, https://maritime-executive.com/index.php/article/panama-registry-to-automatically-expel-sanction-busters.

149 Alex Longley, “UAE Bans Eswatini-flagged Ships in Fresh Shadow-fleet Crackdown,” Bloomberg, August 8, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-08-08/uae-bans-eswatini-flagged-ships-in-fresh-shadow-fleet-crackdown?sref=NeFsviTJ.

150 Joshua Minchin, “Greek Navy Makes Anti-STS Measures More Permanent,” Lloyd’s List, June 5, 2024, https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1149374/Greek-Navy-makes-anti-STS-measures-more-permanent.

151 “Russia-related Designations; Publication of Maritime Oil Industry Advisory; Issuance of Russia-related General License,” Press Release, US Department of the Treasury, October 12, 2023,
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231012.

152 “Treasury Sanctions Additional Maritime Companies, Vessels Transporting Oil Sold Above the Coalition Price Cap,” US Department of the Treasury, November 16, 2023,
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1915.

153 “Rishi Sunak Cracks Down on Sanctions-busting Shadow Fleet Tankers with Pre-election Law Change,” TradeWinds, May 29, 2024, https://www.tradewindsnews.com/tankers/rishi-sunak-cracks-down-on-sanctions-busting-shadow-fleet-tankers-with-pre-election-law-change/2-1-1651508.

154 Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1744, Official Journal of the European Union, June 24, 2024, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202401744.

155 “Dozens of Tankers Sanctioned Over Russian Oil Are Sitting Idle Around the World,” Bloomberg (reprinted by gCaptain), July 10, 2024,
https://gcaptain.com/dozens-of-tankers-sanctioned-over-russian-oil-are-sitting-idle-around-the-world/.

156 Alex Longley and Julian Lee, “UK Piles More Sanctions on Fleet of Tankers Moving Russian Oil,” Bloomberg, July 18, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-07-18/uk-piles-more-sanctions-on-fleet-of-tankers-moving-russian-oil?srnd=commodities&sref=NeFsviTJ; and “UK Slaps Sanctions on 10 More Vessels from Russia’s ‘Shadow Fleet,’ ” Reuters, September 11, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/uk-sanctions-10-vessels-russias-shadow-fleet-2024-09-11/.

157 “UK Targets Shadow Fleet and Cargo Ships with First Vessel Sanctions,” Maritime Executive, June 13, 2024, https://maritime-executive.com/article/uk-targets-shadow-fleet-and-cargo-ships-with-first-vessel-sanctions.

158 “New UK Sanctions to Crack Down on Putin’s War Machine,” UK Prime Minister’s Office, June 13, 2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-uk-sanctions-to-crack-down-on-putins-war-machine.

159 Tomer Raanan, “US Broadens Iran Targeting as it Sanctions Dozens of ‘Ghost Fleet’ Tankers and Companies,” Lloyd’s List, October 12, 2024, https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1150955/US-broadens-Iran-targeting-as-it-sanctions-dozens-of-ghost-fleet-tankers-and-companies.

160 Ruth Liao and Stephen Stapczynski, “Palau Flag Suspends Russian LNG ‘Shadow’ Fleet Ships,” Bloomberg (reprinted by gCaptain), August 27, 2024,
https://gcaptain.com/palau-flag-suspends-russian-lng-shadow-fleet-ships/.

161 “Russia’s Stealth Tanker Fleet Refueling in European Waters as EU Mulls New Curbs,” Hellenic Shipping News, May 10, 2024, https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/russias-stealth-tanker-fleet-refueling-in-european-waters-as-eu-mulls-new-curbs/.

162 Leo Laikola, “Finland Wants EU Oil-Spill Vessel to Counter Shadow Fleet Risks,” Bloomberg, June 5, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-05/finland-wants-eu-oil-spill-vessel-to-counter-shadow-fleet-risks?sref=NeFsviTJ.

163 Denmark Seeks to Stop Shadow Tanker Fleet Carrying Russian Oil,” Reuters, June 17, 2024,
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/denmark-aims-limit-shadow-fleet-russian-oil-tankers-2024-06-17/.

164 Wang interview, May 15, 2024.

165 “Danmark nekter russiske skip adgang til havner,” Aftenposten, August 22, 2024, https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/mBKed4/siste-nytt-fra-norge-og-utlandet?pinnedEntry=108729.

166 Laikola, “Finland Wants.”

167 Michelle Wiese Bockmann, “Malta STS Transfers of Russian Oil Quadruple After Greece Shuts Down Laconia Bay,” Analysis, Lloyd’s List, June 18, 2024, https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1149569/Malta-STS-transfers-of-Russian-oil-quadruple-after-Greece-shuts-down-Laconia-Bay.

168 Wang interview, May 14, 2024.

169 Inspectors Step Up Checks on Russian Oil Tanker ‘Shadow Fleet,” DutchNews, July 17, 2024,
https://www.dutchnews.nl/2024/07/inspectors-step-up-checks-on-russian-oil-tanker-shadow-fleet/.

170 “Inspectors Step Up Checks,” DutchNews.

171 “Parliament calls for an EU crackdown on Russia’s ’shadow fleet’,” European Parliament, November 14, 2023, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20241111IPR25341/parliament-calls-for-an-eu-crackdown-on-russia-s-shadow-fleet.

172 Falkenberg Ollestad interview, May 30, 2024.

173 Wang interview, May 14, 2024.

174 Ringbakken interview.

175 “How Do We Recover After an Oil Spill?,” NOAA, https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/education/tutorial-coastal/oil-spills/os07.html.

176 Ringbakken interview.

177 Lockwood interview.

178 Ringbakken interview.

179 The current IOPC Funds follow a predecessor organization that was established in 1971.

180 “Incident Report: Prestige,” IOPC Funds, Presented to November 2023 Session of the 1992 Fund Executive Committee, https://iopcfunds.org/incidents/incident-map#1916-13-November-2002.

181 Broadhurst interview, April 2, 2024.

182 Broadhurst interview, May 14, 2024.

183 Broadhurst interview, May 14, 2024.

184 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, https://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-the-Safety-of-Life-at-Sea-(SOLAS),-1974.aspx#:~:text=The%20main%20objective%20of%20the,ships%2C%20compatible%20with%20their%20safety.

185 “Meaning of Innocent Passage,” Article 19 in United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 26, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.

186 Wang interview.

187 Potts interview, April 2, 2024.

188 ”Baltic Sea Action Plan, HELCOM,
https://helcom.fi/baltic-sea-action-plan/#:~:text=The%20Baltic%20Sea%20Action%20Plan,Sea%20in%20a%20healthy%20state.

189 Elisabeth Braw, “Russia’s Shadow Fleet Could Create Strange Allies,” Foreign Policy, April 22, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/04/22/russia-shadow-fleet-nato-greenpeace-oil-spills/.

190 .Jonathan Saul, “Ship Evacuated After First Civilian Fatalities in Houthis’ Red Sea Attacks,” Reuters, March 7, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/ship-evacuated-after-first-civilian-fatalities-houthis-red-sea-attacks-2024-03-07.

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Russia’s evolving information war poses a growing threat to the West

Kateryna Odarchenko, Elena Davlikanova — Tue, 26 Nov 2024 21:03:15 +0000

A number of Western officials and security agencies have recently warned of the growing challenges posed by Russian hybrid warfare. This threat is not new, of course. The Kremlin has long been engaged in acts of hybrid aggression against the West, with information warfare playing a central role in Moscow’s efforts to destabilize its democratic adversaries. With geopolitical tension now rising amid a jockeying for position ahead of anticipated Ukraine peace talks in early 2025, Russian information attacks look set to intensify.

It is important to acknowledge that Russian information warfare is highly innovative and continues to evolve at a rapid pace. Russia’s information offensives initially focused on the Kremlin’s own media platforms such as RT and Sputnik, but these outlets have proven relatively easy to identify, discredit, and restrict. In recent years, Russia has increasingly sought to promote its narratives via partners and proxies, as the recent scandal involving prominent US podcasters highlighted.

The pioneering use of social media troll farms to fuel divisions and distort public opinion remains a major component of Russian information warfare. In addition, the Kremlin engages in the large-scale creation of fake websites mimicking prominent news outlets, adding a veneer of credibility to Russian disinformation.

Russian narratives are also evolving. In 2022, the Kremlin’s attempts to depict Ukraine as a Nazi state largely failed to connect with international audiences, who struggled to understand how a country with a popularly elected Jewish president and no far-right presence in government could be in need of “de-Nazification.” Instead, Moscow has turned its attention to promoting the decline of the West and the need for a new multipolar world order.

Through a wide variety of traditional and digital media initiatives, the Kremlin has sought to highlight economic problems in Europe and North America, while pushing the idea of growing Western public dissatisfaction over issues such as identity politics and minority rights. Meanwhile, Russia positions itself as a bastion of traditional family values, social stability, and conservatism. This has struck a chord with alienated segments of society throughout the West.

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The Global South is currently a priority front in Russia’s information war. With the invasion of Ukraine leaving Russia isolated from the West, the Kremlin has reoriented its foreign policy toward the non-Western world. In its messaging to audiences across the Global South, Russia plays on historical resentment at centuries of Western colonialism and portrays itself as a fellow victim of the West. Despite Russia’s long history of imperial aggression and openly imperialistic ambitions in Ukraine, Putin has sought to win over audiences in Africa, Asia, and South America by posing as a defender against Western imperialism.

It would be foolish to dismiss Russia’s anti-imperial messaging as absurd. Older generations across the Global South are often aware of the role played by the Soviet Union in the decolonization movement that followed World War II. Others have little knowledge of the imperial ambitions underpinning the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and tend base their opinions on Putin primarily on his opposition to the West. This is helping to shape the geopolitical outlook throughout the Global South and is creating a range of foreign policy challenges for the West that expand far beyond the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

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Another key element of the Kremlin’s disinformation campaign is the claim that NATO enlargement represents a direct security threat to the Russian Federation and is the real cause of the war in Ukraine. This argument resonates loudly with international audiences suspicious of the West’s dominant role in world affairs. While other Russian attempts to justify the invasion of Ukraine have fallen flat, attempts to blame NATO have proved highly effective.

In reality, Putin seems well aware that NATO doesn’t pose a threat to Russia. Tellingly, he raised no serious objections in 2022 when neighboring Finland and Sweden announced their intention to join the alliance, despite the fact that this would more than double Russia’s NATO borders and transform the strategically crucial Baltic Sea into a NATO lake. Indeed, he has since withdrawn most Russian troops from the country’s Finnish frontier. Evidently, Putin’s expansionist foreign policy reflects his opposition to Ukrainian independence rather than any artificial fears over NATO expansion.

Putin’s NATO narrative may not stand up to scrutiny, but it is likely to play an important role in any upcoming peace talks, with Russia currently pushing for an end to NATO enlargement and a firm commitment to permanent Ukrainian neutrality. This would be potentially disastrous for international security. A neutral Ukraine would be highly vulnerable to further Russian aggression and eventual occupation. Meanwhile, rising anti-NATO sentiment in the US and elsewhere risks undermining transatlantic cooperation and fostering isolationism.

The West must trend carefully when attempting to confront Russian disinformation. Crucially, any efforts to moderate content on social media or impose restrictions on even the most openly propagandistic of platforms invites accusations of censorship. With this in mind, Western governments must walk a fine line as they seek to protect themselves against the Kremlin’s information warfare while safeguarding freedom of expression.

Given the transnational nature of the modern information landscape, international cooperation is essential when attempting to combat Russian disinformation. Looking ahead, the Western response should include the creation of collaborative task forces, real-time intelligence sharing, and coordinated efforts to sanction state and private actors. Western policymakers must also match the Kremlin in terms of versatility and innovation if they wish to keep their countries safe in an increasingly complex and interconnected information environment. Putin’s Russia has demonstrated the importance of the information front in modern warfare. It is time for the West to catch up.

Kateryna Odarchenko is a partner at SIC Group Ukraine. Elena Davlikanova is a fellow at CEPA.

Elliot Ackerman

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Defense Policy

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The West must respond to Russia’s rapidly escalating hybrid warfare

Doug Livermore — Thu, 07 Nov 2024 13:13:11 +0000

According to recent reports, Russia is currently stepping up its sabotage campaign across the EU as part of Moscow’s hybrid war against the West. “Russia is conducting an intensifying campaign of hybrid attacks across our allied territories, interfering directly in our democracies, sabotaging industry, and committing violence,” stated NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on November 4. “This shows that the front line in this war is no longer solely in Ukraine. Increasingly, the front line is moving beyond borders to the Baltic region, to Western Europe, and even to the high north.”

Rutte’s claims are not new. The Russian authorities have long faced accusations of everything from cyberattacks and political manipulation to the deliberate spread of disinformation to destabilize individual countries and sow discord among Western allies. Russian hybrid warfare operations are now often kinetic operations within Western countries. Incendiary devices that ignited in Germany and the United Kingdom in July 2024 were reportedly part of a covert Russian operation that aimed to start fires aboard cargo and passenger flights heading to the US and Canada.

With the Russian invasion of Ukraine now approaching the three-year mark, Moscow’s campaign of hybrid hostilities throughout the Western world appears to be escalating. As Russia’s tactics evolve, governments and security services throughout the West must work together to identify threats and counter the Kremlin.

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Information operations are a central feature of Russian efforts to weaken the West. Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the messaging emanating from Moscow has shifted from implausible accusations of a “Nazi regime” in Kyiv toward a greater focus on the inevitability of Russian military victory and the unreliability of Ukraine as a partner. These messages are being actively promoted throughout the West by Russian sources and by Moscow’s proxies.

For much of the past decade, Russia relied primarily on its own state-sponsored media outlets like RT and Sputnik to push narratives designed to undermine Western unity and polarize public opinion in democratic countries. However, in recent years there have been increasing efforts to co-opt non-traditional media and social media personalities throughout the West, such as US podcast hosts. This has made it possible for Russia to reach broader audiences, while also enhancing the credibility of its messaging by avoiding any overt links to the Kremlin.

Cyberattacks are another significant tactic used by Russia to undermine stability throughout the West. By disrupting communications, sowing chaos, and eroding public trust in institutions, Russian cyber warfare has the potential to disrupt and destabilize Western societies. One recent example was the December 2023 cyberattack on Ukraine’s largest telecommunications provider, which temporarily left millions of subscribers without mobile and internet access.

Russia has also sought to fuel political tensions by supporting populist movements and parties that align with the Kremlin’s own anti-NATO and anti-EU narratives. Throughout Europe and North America, the Kremlin is accused of empowering anti-establishment political parties and movements of all kinds. Moscow’s backing for far-right and far-left movements has been opportunistic rather than ideological, with an emphasis on support for any groups deemed capable of destabilizing domestic politics in Western countries. This approach has proved effective in amplifying the Kremlin’s narratives, while also making it harder to counter Russian influence and maintain support for Ukraine.

A further avenue of malign Russian influence is economic leverage, especially through the weaponized use of energy exports. While Europe’s overall dependence on Russian energy has declined significantly since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, A number of EU countries continue to rely heavily on Russian energy supplies. This makes them vulnerable to political pressure from Moscow.

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Western policymakers need to recognize that the hybrid security challenges currently coming from Russia are not going to go away soon. On the contrary, Putin is clearly preparing his country for a prolonged confrontation with the West. While open military conflict between Russia and NATO is still viewed as unlikely, Western nations must be better prepared to defend themselves against Russia’s escalating efforts to divide and destabilize them. This will require a multi-faceted approach that reflects the diverse nature of the hybrid threats posed by the Putin regime.

Addressing disinformation is vital. Western governments must intensify efforts to combat Russian information warfare by measures including support for fact-checking initiatives and improving media literary among the public. Before embarking on new steps of this nature in the information sphere, it is important to note that Russia has a record of successfully pushing back against countermeasures by framing them as attempts to suppress free speech.

Strengthening cyber defenses is another key task. NATO much invest in the recently announced Integrated Cyber Defence Centre to protect member states from Russian cyberattacks. The alliance should prioritize information sharing, joint cyber security exercises, and the development of rapid response teams to mitigate the impact of future attacks.

The Kremlin’s sophisticated brand of hybrid warfare poses a serious threat to Western unity and represents a critical front in the global confrontation that has emerged following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. By exploiting existing political, economic, and social vulnerabilities across Europe and North America, Russia aims to weaken the West from within. This requires a firm and coordinated response that includes efforts to counter disinformation, strengthen cyber defenses, and reduce energy dependence on Russia. Addressing these challenges is crucial for the future of transatlantic security in an increasingly complex and unpredictable geopolitical climate.

Doug Livermore is the National Vice President for the Special Operations Association of America, Senior Vice President for Solution Engineering at the CenCore Group, and the Deputy Commander for Special Operations Detachment – Joint Special Operations Command in the North Carolina Army National Guard. The views expressed are the author’s and do not represent official US Government, Department of Defense, or Department of the Army positions.

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Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Defense Policy

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How the US and Europe can counter Russian information manipulation about nonproliferation

Natasha Lander Finch, Ryan Arick — Fri, 04 Oct 2024 15:25:48 +0000

Russia has a long history of using false and unfounded narratives around chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons to undermine European security. These information influence activities (IIA) have intensified in recent years. Russia’s tactics, which include disinformation, misinformation, malinformation, and propaganda, consist of false claims that US cooperative nonproliferation efforts are a front for developing CBRN weapons. Through its IIA, Russia also has circulated false narratives that attack transatlantic cooperation meant to encourage nonproliferation efforts.

In this context, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative (TSI) in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security conducted a cooperative research project with the US Department of State’s Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) within the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) to better understand the extent of Russia’s nonproliferation-related IIA in three European countries: Slovenia, Slovakia, and Serbia. This project focused on how to identify Russian IIA and coordinate a multistakeholder response to counter these tactics, which can ultimately strengthen nonproliferation norms and regimes.

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I. Russian information influence activities against nonproliferation

II. Recognizing Russian information influence activities

III. Responding to Russian information influence activities

IV. Reinforcing a community of practice

V. Considerations for implementation and the way ahead

Russian information influence activities against nonproliferation

Russia relies on a range of malign tactics to complement its conventional warfare capabilities, including information manipulation. Throughout Europe, Russia creates or amplifies false narratives that support the Kremlin’s ultimate geopolitical goals: undermining unity and security in Europe and abroad.¹ These narratives attempt to evoke emotional and psychological responses from the public with the broader aim of amplifying polarization, undermining democracy, and weakening support for international norms and institutions.

Russia’s information manipulation networks—which consist of official spokespeople, state-run media, proxy websites, social media, and other entities—aim to exploit fears and sensationalize threats through a range of information influence activities (IIA), a term we use to capture the multifaceted nature of information manipulation. IIA includes disinformation, misinformation, malinformation, and propaganda (see definitions in Table 1 and a full list of key terms in Appendix I).

Sources: Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/issue/disinformation/; James Pammen, A Capability Definition and Assessment Framework for Countering Disinformation, Information Influence, and Foreign Interference, NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence, November 2022; Dean Jackson, “Distinguishing Disinformation From Propaganda, Misinformation, and ‘Fake News,’” National Endowment for Democracy and International Forum for Democratic Studies, n.d.; “How to Identify Misinformation, Disinformation, and Malinformation,” Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, ITSAP.00.300, February 2022; and “Understanding Propaganda and Disinformation,” European Parliament, November 2015.

Russia has perfected its use of information influence activities to achieve its geopolitical goals. Through its information networks, Russia attempts to inject narratives favorable to the Kremlin.² Russia’s tactics include saturating the information space, continuously sharing false and misleading information, and amplifying preexisting narratives.³ These narratives try to damage the credibility of political institutions and instill feelings of distrust, confusion, and fear.⁴

Historically, Russia has targeted states around the world with information warfare. In Europe, topics such as inflation, migration, and energy shortages are regular targets of Russian disinformation.⁵ To amplify its IIA, Russia uses a broad network of fake pages, social media accounts, and private messaging groups. However, authentic accounts—including many within the countries that Russia is targeting—are often just as involved in these campaigns, whether they know it or not.⁶ Media outlets within targeted countries frequently pick up, repackage, and amplify Russian narratives, furthering the impact and resonance of the Kremlin’s influence.⁷

Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine in 2022 featured IIA as a prominent Kremlin tactic to augment Putin’s conventional war. Russia’s methods included frequent narratives designed to target nonproliferation norms and regimes, which continues a pattern the Soviets followed during the Cold War. These tactics mirror previous Soviet patterns of employing “active measures,” or covert propaganda and influence operations to project control surrounding CBRN weapons and erode trust in democratic institutions.⁸ As part of its active measures campaign, the Soviet Union made false allegations that the United States had developed and used biological weapons.⁹ After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia targeted the activities of the US Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program by alleging the US government employed the CTR program as a cover to develop CBRN weapons throughout Europe and Eurasia, even though the CTR program was developed to curb the possible spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) throughout the region after the Soviet Union’s collapse and included Russian participation until 2014.¹⁰

Russia continues to spread unfounded allegations that ongoing partnerships between the United States and other countries are fronts for biological weapons development programs.¹¹ Russia intensified its use of propaganda and false claims that argued Ukraine was engaged in developing biological weapons to be used against Russian civilians.¹² These efforts damage the credibility of the work conducted in legitimate research facilities, undermine public trust in these institutions, and potentially jeopardize the safety of laboratory staff.

After the re-invasion of Ukraine, Russia intensified its influence operations across Europe to sway public opinion in its favor. Many of Russia’s claims included that Moscow is seeking peace, Ukraine is inherently aggressive, the West instigated the war, and the European Union (EU) and NATO are to blame for increased tensions in the region.¹³ Russia complements its conventional war in Ukraine with information warfare to fracture Western support for Ukraine, and shore up global support from nonaligned countries within multilateral organizations.¹⁴

Russia published false claims of “dirty bombs” being built in Ukraine on state-run media. In reality, the photo evidence was taken from a Slovenian reactor. Image: Deutsche Welle/Agency for Radwaste Management of Slovenia

Impact of Russian information influence activities on nonproliferation norms

Russia’s manipulation of the information space to erode support for nonproliferation includes continued support for the Assad regime in Syria through disinformation and misinformation, despite Assad’s well-documented history of using chemical weapons against civilian populations in Syria’s civil war in the mid-2010s.¹⁵ Russia has also used the information domain to spread false and misleading information related to the Kremlin’s targeted assassination attempts with chemical weapons. This included Moscow’s attack on Russian dissidents in the United Kingdom (UK), against a former KGB agent and his daughter, as well as on its own territory against prominent dissident Alexei Navalny.¹⁶

Russia combines information influence activities with disruptive behavior in multilateral institutions, such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to interrupt proceedings, derail procedures, and slow down investigations.¹⁷ Russian diplomats levy false accusations against nations Moscow deems hostile to stymie progress and undermine the authority of these organizations.¹⁸ These actions are not necessarily used to persuade others to accept Russia’s arguments, but instead to create doubt and confusion, undercut the unity and effectiveness of the organizations, and weaken protections of nonproliferation norms and regimes.¹⁹ Russia’s allegations include that Ukraine is concocting plans for a potential chemical attack (articulated at the OPCW in 2022),²⁰ preparing to deploy dirty bombs and nuclear weapons (UN, 2022),²¹ and using and developing biological weapons (BWC, 2022).²²

Russia’s false claims weaken accountability and verification measures established to monitor compliance with international treaties that ban CBRN weapons and regulate the legitimate use of technologies that have a dual-purpose capacity to create such weapons.²³ These claims also undermine efforts to strengthen and modernize nonproliferation norms and regimes, especially with respect to emerging technologies. Russia’s actions also distract from the Kremlin’s own harmful activities and noncompliance with nonproliferation obligations, especially Russia’s support for and use of chemical weapons, their sympathy for other regimes that have used CBRN weapons, and their escalatory rhetoric.

Figure 1: Russia published false claims of “dirty bombs” being built in Ukraine on state-run media. In reality, the photo evidence was taken from a Russian reactor. Image: Deutsche Welle, https://www.dw.com/en/fact-check-russias-false-case-for-a-dirty-bomb-inukraine/a-63590306.

Figure 2: Russia’s Foreign Ministry claimed the United States shipped chemicals to Ukraine to be used against Russian soldiers, while only providing a random assortment of graphics taken from other contexts as “evidence.” Image: Twitter/strana-rosatom.ru, http://twitter.com/mfa_russia/status/1630683781215526912.

In several posts on state-run media and on social platforms, the Kremlin shared so-called evidence that Ukraine was developing a “dirty bomb,” an explosive device that contains radioactive material. However, the photo—depicted in Figure 1—was taken from other websites. In this instance, the photo provided as “evidence” was taken from the Russian stateowned nuclear energy company Rosatom. In Figure 2, Russia claimed the United States was providing toxic chemicals and other CBRN-related materiel to Ukraine, which indicated a “large scale provocation.” These kinds of narratives could serve as false flag scenarios for Russia’s own potential use of CBRN weapons, which would have severe consequences for nonproliferation norms in Ukraine and more broadly in Europe.

Overall, these tactics serve as tools in Russia’s toolbox to discredit and weaken the multilateral institutions and regimes that govern nonproliferation. Russia’s persistent IIA erode trust and credibility in nonproliferation, which safeguards the international community from the development and use of CBRN weapons. The effects of Russian IIA are widespread, as evidenced by the experience of three European countries: Slovenia, Slovakia, and Serbia. The following sections provide an overview of each country’s recent experience with Russia’s false claims associated with nonproliferation and CBRN weapons.

Slovenia

Slovenia has been an active target of Russian disinformation and information influence activities. In 2016, Russia claimed NATO would harbor a secret arsenal of nuclear weapons throughout Eastern Europe,²⁴ including in Slovenia. Russian state media organizations invested millions of dollars in Central and Eastern European countries, such as Slovenia, to influence domestic politics and exacerbate political polarization through state-run media channels, government proxies, and other systems. Many of Slovenia’s top proliferators of disinformation and other falsehoods have significant inroads and connections to Russian state-media organizations.²⁵

Several websites that maintain strong linkages to Russia and the Kremlin—including RBTH Daily, NewsFront, and Katehon—operate or are available in Slovenia and consistently post dangerous rhetoric on the EU, NATO, and the United States. Russia launched RBTH Daily, a mobile app version of its Russia Beyond service operated by the Russian state news agency that regularly publishes content in Slovenian.²⁶

Figure 3: The Slovenian government’s response to Russian disinformation about radioactive weapons being used in Ukraine. ARAO stands for Agency for Radwaste Management, which is responsible for managing all radioactive waste in Slovenia. Image: Twitter/govslovenia, https://twitter.com/govSlovenia/status/1584936237806206976.

In early 2023, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed on Twitter that Ukraine was secretly building a dirty bomb and included a series of photos as evidence.²⁷ One of the photos was taken directly from a 2010 public education campaign on the Slovenian Agency for Radioactive Waste’s website. In response, the Slovenian government quickly published a statement on its official website and on social media that denied Russia’s claims and stressed that nuclear waste was stored safely in the country (see Figure 3).²⁸ Slovenian government authorities responded to these Russian campaigns and attempts to undermine its credibility with facts, data, and truthful information.²⁹

Slovakia

Russia also has frequently targeted Slovakia with IIA. Within Slovakia, pro-Russia propagandists are actively working to discredit Slovakia’s allies,³⁰ including the United States, the EU, and other NATO allies to downplay Russian aggression in Ukraine, deflect blame from historical conflicts, and denigrate responses from across the Alliance. These campaigns also attempt to erode trust in and the credibility of nonproliferation norms and regimes.

A general view of the “Foreign Ministers of Partners at Risk of Russian Disinformation and Destabilization” session at the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in Bucharest, Romania, November 2022. Source: Stoyan Nenov/REUTERS

For example, in May 2023, Russia spread disinformation in Slovakia regarding an alleged radiation leak as a result of an explosion of the ammunition warehouse in the Ukrainian city of Khmelnytskyi.³¹ Through its claims circulated on social media channels and with support from the Russian embassy in Slovakia, the Kremlin attempted to incite fear within targeted communities that there was a significant airborne risk of radiation spilling over into Slovakia from Ukraine.³²

In 2022, the Russian embassy in Bratislava issued several posts that claimed the United States and Ukraine were developing biological agents. The embassy—which was named by the International Republican Institute’s Beacon Project as the most virulent in circulating disinformation across Moscow’s network of diplomatic missions—alleged that the United States and Ukraine were developing biological weapons that could target specific ethnic groups, including Slavs.³³

Similar to Slovenia’s experience, the Kremlin injects pro-Russian messaging within Slovakia to amplify its geopolitical goals. One recurring target of Russian information manipulation is the bilateral defense cooperation agreement (DCA) that Slovakia signed with the United States in 2022.³⁴ After it was signed, Russian operatives began to inject falsified information that the DCA would include the deployment of nuclear weapons in Slovakia.³⁵

Slovakia’s elections in September 2023 were preceded by an influx of false and misleading messages, including those from Russia. The London-based nonprofit organization Reset recorded more than 365,000 election-related disinformation messages on Slovak social networks in the first two weeks of September, with estimates that the number would grow.³⁶

Their research found messages that violated social network terms of use and featured disinformation generated more than five times as much exposure as the average message. More than 15 percent of such content was posted by pro-Kremlin accounts.

Serbia

Serbia is one of Russia’s top targets in Eastern Europe for IIA. Serbia is deeply affected by Russian information operations that attempt to undermine perceptions of the EU, NATO, and other multilateral institutions in the region. With respect to CBRN weapons and nonproliferation, Russia has established a number of fake profiles, proxy pages, and state-run media (including Belgrade-based offices of Russia Today and Sputnik) in Serbia to share and amplify favorable stories on these issues.³⁷ Both Russia Today and Sputnik publish a constant flow of articles that relate to CBRN weapons and nonproliferation. Russia has invested resources and funds into ensuring that narratives gain a broader audience, especially in the Western Balkans, given Serbia’s relationship with Russia.³⁸ Several Russian state-sponsored or state-connected media organizations publish Serbian-language content in support of the Kremlin,³⁹ including News Front, SouthFront, Geopolitica.ru, and Katehon. For example, SouthFront has circulated several false claims, including that the OPCW neglected to share key details in their investigation on Syria’s chemical weapons program or that US accusations of Russia’s involvement in chemical attacks in Syria were an act of “whitewashing.”⁴⁰

Supporters of the opposition ‘Serbia Against Violence’ (SPN) coalition protest in front of the Radio Television of Serbia (RTS) building amid opposition claims of major election law violations in the Belgrade city and parliament races, which were the subject of frequent information influence campaigns, in Belgrade, Serbia. Source: REUTERS/Marko Djurica

However, even as Russian state-run media organizations maintain presences in Serbia, their most frequent tactic involves flooding the information space to see what resonates the most within local communities. Through these tactics, local media outlets in Serbia frequently repost and amplify Moscow’s claims laid out in state-run media, which has much more impact in reaching the public because many individuals in Serbia have greater trust in local media outlets. For example, on Serbian platforms, false claims include the story of the United States and Ukraine developing bats as biological weapons to attack Russians.⁴¹ These platforms include local media organizations, television broadcasters, radio stations, and others in Serbia that amplify, give credibility to, or create their own narratives that mirror the Kremlin’s priorities.

These narratives circulate beyond Serbia throughout the Western Balkans. Given the reach of Serbian media and historical connections with other nations in the region, many of the narratives related to CBRN weapons and nonproliferation that are shared in Serbia are picked up by other media organizations—including in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and North Macedonia—with great effect. Russia benefits significantly from destabilization in the Western Balkans, especially when Serbia and its neighbors do not condemn Russia’s actions within the international community. As part of its broader geopolitical strategy, Russia uses Serbian media organizations as proxies to create distrust in nonproliferation regimes while degrading broader support for global nonproliferation norms.⁴²

A strategic framework to counter Russian information influence activities

Given the scope and severity of Russian threats to nonproliferation norms in Slovenia, Slovakia, and Serbia, the project team developed a strategic framework for countering Russian IIA with the Department of State’s Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction. We convened private, small-group workshops with representatives from government, civil society, academia, media, think tanks, business groups, law enforcement, and other sectors in Ljubljana, Bratislava, and Belgrade in 2023.⁴³ The first series of workshops, conducted in all three cities, was designed to educate personnel who were familiar with the challenges of IIA but less knowledgeable about nonproliferation topics, especially as it relates to the risks IIA pose to the stability of nonproliferation norms and potential use of CBRN weapons. These workshops included a scenario-based exercise where attendees were asked to create a counter-messaging strategy to respond to a hypothetical disinformation campaign from an adversary that involved an anthrax leak at a secure government laboratory.⁴⁴

After these workshops were completed, the project team used the results of the discussions, our extensive research, and consultations with experts in the region to create a draft strategic framework for countering IIA. The framework is comprised of three critical elements, or pillars. As depicted in Figure 4, the three pillars are recognize, respond, and reinforce a community of practice. For the next series of workshops, the project team returned to Bratislava and Belgrade to present the draft strategic framework to similar groups of experts, both those who were present at the first workshops and new stakeholders. Participants shared their views related to the three pillars, as well as the threat of Russian IIA more generally in their countries. Their feedback was critical to finalize the strategic framework presented in this report.

Figure 4: The Atlantic Council’s strategic framework for countering Russian information influence activities.

These pillars reflect the central elements of establishing resilience against disinformation, misinformation, and other forms of IIA. As Figure 4 demonstrates, the pillars are mutually reinforcing. For example, members of a community of practice can help each other recognize possible Russian IIA and devise effective response strategies. Response options can be studied by the community of practice to understand strengths and identify areas for improvement. The next three chapters describe each pillar of the strategic framework in greater detail.

Recognizing information influence activities

Through its IIA, Russia attempts to distract from its own harmful actions and noncompliance with nonproliferation norms and regimes. These actions include Russia’s use of chemical agents as weapons, its support for other regimes who have deployed chemical weapons, and its threats of nuclear escalation in Ukraine. Russia’s long history of sowing doubt and confusion in public discourse by manipulating information goes beyond its borders. In Slovenia, Slovakia, and Serbia, Russia has perpetuated narratives designed to undermine nonproliferation norms, including those about the development and use of CBRN weapons. The first pillar in our strategic framework is recognize, which covers strategies, methods, and tools to identify IIA. This pillar is critical to promoting public awareness of—and resilience against—Russian influence.

Key principles of recognizing information influence activities

Effective tools and methods to recognize IIA are critical to fostering greater resilience and promoting critical thinking. Many governments and organizations have prepared guidelines for how to recognize disinformation, misinformation, and other types of IIA.⁴⁵ Several of these guidelines discuss the importance of verifying, authenticating, and scrutinizing information. Some tools are tailored for academic settings or for government and multilateral institution representatives.⁴⁶ However, the wider public can use many of the same tools. Common elements include the following principles:

Check the sources of the content and authenticate legitimacy

Understanding the source of a social media post or article is a critical first step in determining whether the information is reliable. Media consumers should assess whether a source is a reputable and well-established individual, organization, media outlet, or other legitimate entity. This is especially important when considering responses to nonproliferation-related information manipulation.

The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) produced a guide titled “Disinformation Stops with You,” which recommends several useful tactics to evaluate content, including investigating the issue with other reliable sources of information and thinking before sharing the content online.⁴⁷ CISA’s guide, built around the principles outlined in Figure 5, serves as an important tool for local communities to identify forms of foreign malign influence. Ensuring accuracy and conducting diligent fact-checking can help prevent the spread and impact of IIA.

Figure 5: CISA’s “Disinformation Stops With You” project, encouraging members of the community to recognize and combat disinformation and other forms of IIA. Image: CISA, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_1115_cisa_nrmc-Disinformation-Stops-With-You_0.pdf.

Verify information within the article or publication

Cross-checking information through multiple reputable sources is instrumental in confirming the accuracy of content. Fact-checking websites and other digital literacy tools provide a methodical approach to validating the claims presented in an article. Fact-checking and verifying information also can serve as an important educational tool for individuals to learn how to critically assess information. Digital and media literacy exercises allow the public to make better-informed judgments on the credibility of content before sharing.

Apart from fact-checking websites, trusted networks can serve as another way to corroborate information before publishing or sharing content. During each workshop, participants frequently pointed to how often they rely on their own trusted relationships to screen information. Verifying content is an important step in mitigating the spread of falsehoods and minimizing the impact of Russian IIA.

Prior to circulating any media online, audiences should inspect and identify the publication date of an article or post. A frequent Russian tactic includes circulating outdated information with eye-catching headlines that mislead audiences. First Draft News published a guide to corroborating false information online that recommends examining a webpage’s metadata to verify the date of the publication matches supporting sourcing elsewhere online and in print media.⁴⁸ Checking the publication date before sharing information can be a critical step in mitigating the spread of outdated, irrelevant, and sensationalized content.

Authenticate the authorship of content

Audiences should confirm the authorship of publications, especially as IIA can involve the impersonation of credible individuals or organizations.⁴⁹ Given that authors tend to publish within their area of responsibility and substantive focus, it is important to consider how the publication fits within the author’s broader expertise. Establishing the author’s identity by verifying their credentials contributes to the overall trustworthiness of the content.⁵⁰ Validating author identities is a necessary component to combat disinformation, while building trust and support for legitimate reporting.

Inspect multimedia and other content included within the post

With the development of new and emerging technologies, fabricated and doctored multimedia content appear more frequently on various publications, including social media posts and fringe website pages.⁵¹ To ensure manipulated content is properly verified, audiences should corroborate images and video to prevent manipulation through deepfakes, AI-generated photos and videos, deceptive editing, and other forms of online personalization.

Deepfake images in particular can mislead audiences to believe falsified content is real. For example, two seemingly authentic screenshots of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy speaking at a press conference appear in Figure 6.

Figure 6: A side-by-side comparison of screenshots that claim to be Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The photo on the right is real; the image on the left is a deepfake. Image comparison: Snopes, https://www.snopes.com/news/2022/03/16/zelenskyy-deepfake-shared/.

Both images appear to be authentic, but upon closer examination, there are indications that the image on the right was doctored. In this instance, the image on the right is an authentic photograph, while the image on the left is an AI-generated deepfake. However, for a user who is scrolling quickly on Facebook or X (formerly known as Twitter), the difference may not be easy to discern, creating an even more challenging information environment.

Similarly, IIA rely on visually compelling or sensational images and video to evoke extreme reactions from audiences. This holds especially true for CBRN-related disinformation, which can grab attention and spread rapidly online, in print and broadcast media, and through word of mouth.⁵² As new methods for misleading audiences are developed, it is imperative for the public to ensure content has not been altered, taken out of context, or misconstrued to serve ulterior interests.

Tools to detect information influence activities

In many cases, it can be difficult to detect and identify IIA as they arise, especially as Russia deploys several kinds of narratives. As local media outlets frequently parrot Russian IIA and communities battle the constant influx of propaganda, people can unintentionally share misinformation. Several tools and methods exist to help identify and verify the accuracy of information shared online.

Fact-checking and debunking websites

Fact-checking sites and debunking organizations play an important role in assessing the accuracy of information shared online. Fact-checkers often investigate and corroborate claims made in news articles, social media posts, and official government documents.

In Europe, EUvsDisinfo,⁵³ Snopes,⁵⁴ and PolitiFact are good examples of fact-checking and debunking websites.⁵⁵ In Slovenia, Oštro⁵⁶ and its fact-checking arm, Razkrinkavanje,⁵⁷ play an important role in vetting truthful information within the public domain. In Slovakia, fact-checking and debunking webpages—including Demagog.sk⁵⁸ and Infosecurity.sk⁵⁹—frequently fact-checked the statements of candidates during the September 2023 parliamentary elections. Similar organizations also exist in Serbia, including the Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA),⁶⁰ FakeNews Tragač,⁶¹ and the Crime and Corruption Reporting Network (KRIK).⁶² Finally, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty plays an important regional role throughout Central and Eastern Europe through its mission of sharing truthful information and independent analysis.⁶³

Reverse image search methods

Reverse image search tools are another important tactic in verifying online information. These platforms allow users to corroborate and verify the original uses and sources of images. Many reserve image search tools also provide tracing capabilities for audiences to track where the image has been circulated and whether the photos have previously been used in different contexts. In addition, reverse image search tools can determine whether questionable content has previously been used in other contexts. Similarly, in instances where images have been created and manipulated using deepfake technology, reverse image search tools are able to uncover the original sources of images and reveal inconsistencies, such as facial features, landscape backgrounds, and other details.

Figure 7: TinEye’s reverse image search platform can help users identify existing uses of images online. Image: https://tineye.com/.

Several platforms including Google Images,⁶⁴ TinEye,⁶⁵ and ImageRaider⁶⁶ are examples of systems that can help individuals confirm the authenticity of visual content online. TinEye, as displayed in Figure 7, uses a database of over sixty-four billion images for users to cross-reference when photos have been used in other contexts. Given how technical CBRN-related topics can be for audiences, these tools are important to support efforts in debunking and combating the spread of Russian IIA related to nonproliferation.

Web browser extensions

As search engines become more sophisticated, browser extensions can be useful tools to help identify false and misleading information, especially on webpages that tend to share disinformation. Many extensions can analyze links and sources in real time, which provides important details on the trustworthiness of information online.

One example of a browser extension is NewsGuard, which provides ratings and detailed information about the news sites that users visit as they read through various webpages.⁶⁷ SurfSafe is another example that can help identify disinformation and other forms of IIA through highlighting tools on content posts.⁶⁸ TinEye, the aforementioned reverse image search tool, also offers a browser extension for verifying visual content in real time when visiting webpages.

Digital forensics tools

Digital forensics tools are more specialized software that can investigate and analyze sophisticated IIA. Many of these tools can comb through the metadata of websites, which can reveal important details of webpages and their creation, modification, and origins, especially in tracing links to other pages. Other tools, such as social media forensics technologies, can assist investigators in tracking the spread of disinformation, identifying key actors within information influence networks, and analyzing the extent of Russian IIA’s reach and impact.

Figure 8: InVID is a useful digital forensics tool that can help analyze video footage that is spread online. Image: https://www.invid-project.eu/description/.

One sample tool is InVID, a browser extension that can verify the authenticity of videos and information shared on social media.⁶⁹ The tool, as seen in Figure 8, can be used in a variety of different formats, including a browser extension and mobile phone application. Forensically is another suite of digital tools for digital forensics, including image analysis and other forms of authenticating content.⁷⁰ Both forensics analysis systems are useful in identifying manipulated content and deepfake technology.

Augmenting methods to recognize information influence activities

Our discussions with representatives in Slovenia, Slovakia, and Serbia demonstrated that recognizing information influence activities is an important step to counter Russian influence efforts. However, these efforts need to be supported and complemented by effective responses to these campaigns. To counter Russian IIA, the recognize pillar of our strategic framework seeks to address some of the broader strategies that may be used in understanding the threat of disinformation and other forms of malign influence activity. In Chapter 3, we discuss our second pillar, responding to Russian information influence activities, which examines best practices and recent responses to Russian IIA.

Responding to information influence activities

Through our research, we identified several key principles to consider when crafting a response to Russian IIA. These principles are reinforced by examples from the United States, as well as the experiences of individuals in Slovenia, Slovakia, Serbia, and elsewhere. The second pillar in our strategic framework is respond, which covers strategies and narratives used to counter Russian IIA. Workshop participants demonstrated these principles when asked to create a response to the anthrax exposure posited in our hypothetical scenario-based exercise described in Appendix II. Several attendees also shared insights from their experiences creating responses to real-world Russian IIA, which we discuss in this chapter.

Key principles of responding to information influence activities

When crafting a response to Russian IIA, it is important to keep several key principles in mind: prioritize transparency and concise messaging, connect the ideas to the correct audience and platforms; and determine the best person to deliver the message.

Be transparent, clear, and concise

An effective response should be factual and clear, especially when addressing scientific and technical information that can be confusing to a non-specialist audience. By using clear and concise information, complex topics such as nonproliferation or chemical weapons can be distilled into digestible language that is easy to understand. Russia recognizes that CBRN-related issues and WMD threats are often not well understood among the general community, which makes them popular topics for false narratives.

Russia’s use of emotionally charged IIA has made the need for clear responses a priority. In Serbia, CRTA’s Istinomer project is at the forefront of debunking, fact-checking, and countering Russian IIA.⁷¹ Istinomer consistently monitors disinformation and misinformation on social media to determine which narratives are resonating the most within communities. Following their analysis, Istinomer staff publish short-form posts on their platform that debunk the various claims using facts. See Figure 9 for an example of how the Istinomer team debunked false and misleading claims that mischaracterized the work of US-supported research facilities in Ukraine. In each post, the Istinomer author refutes each false and misleading claim with citations, secondary sources, interviews, and further reading material, including US government reports.

Figure 9: Istinomer regularly fact-checks various forms of IIA on social media platforms using facts and transparency. Image: https://www.istinomer.rs/.

It is important for counter-messaging strategies to include these characteristics to resonate with audiences and ensure effectiveness, especially when it relates to nonproliferation-related information manipulation tactics.

Match the message to the audience and platforms

Different audiences might require tailored messaging strategies, including via different platforms. Younger audiences that receive much of their information from social media platforms may view TikTok before watching a local news broadcast. Those who spend more time driving might listen to radio news than those who commute via other means. Therefore, it is important to consider whether a counternarrative should include more visuals than text based on the intended audience and platform. Messages designed for television will require compelling audio and visual components, but messages designed for print media should focus on attention-grabbing graphics and text that clearly convey the main messages. However, all messages should include the same basic facts to promote consistency and accuracy.

Counter-messaging strategies must consider both the medium for sharing responses as well as the social media platforms themselves. For example, TikTok prioritizes short-form videos, while Instagram focuses more on photographs and other forms of visually appealing content. The combination of message and medium is especially important when considering which kinds of counter-messaging campaigns will resonate with different audiences. Two organizations in Slovenia—Danes je nov dan (Today is a new day) and Pod črto (The Bottom Line)—developed innovative methods of using storytelling to debunk false information in Slovenia using trusted voices and captivating forms of visual media. These efforts deepen the impact and reach of their organizations.⁷² One initiative, which Danes je nov dan termed Mislimetar (Figure 10), serves as an educational and entertainment mobile application that promotes media literacy and critical thinking in younger audiences.

Figure 10: A screenshot of the Danes je nov dan mobile application, Mislimetar, which serves as an important media literacy tool in Slovenia. Image: https://danesjenovdan.si/en/campaigns.

Regional differences also are important to consider. For example, in Slovakia, workshop participants said that Facebook and Telegram are more popular than Instagram or TikTok.⁷³ In Serbia, Telegram is the most frequently used social media platform, while Facebook remains a popular platform in Slovenia. Regardless of platform, it is essential to make sure credible information is available in regional dialects in addition to the main language spoken in a country to reach the broadest possible audience.

Consider who is best to deliver the message

The best person, organization, or outlet to deliver a counternarrative will depend on the country, city, or local area that the message is intended to reach as well as the specific target audience. When asked who the trusted messengers are within their communities, workshop participants in our three countries had varying answers. In Slovakia, the police and armed forces were cited as effective messengers, whereas in Slovenia, participants said a response led by the armed forces would not be well received.

The Slovak Police Force led a popular community-centered Facebook campaign titled “Hoaxy a Podvody” (“Hoaxes and Frauds”), which began in 2018. Through its platform, the Police Force led public engagement to debunk false narratives circulating online and develop an informed and resilient citizenry.⁷⁴ In 2023, the Police Force, part of the Department of Interior, kicked off a campaign called “Hoaxy Sa Na Mňa Nelepia” (“Hoaxes Don’t Stick to Me”). To move the campaign beyond the digital world, members of the community displayed buttons and stickers in public spaces in support of counter-disinformation efforts, as seen in Figure 11. The project’s community-centric focus could be a potential model to replicate in the future.⁷⁵

Figure 11: A photo from the Slovak Police Force Facebook page, which describes the “Hoaxes Don’t Stick to Me” campaign. Image: Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/hoaxPZ/.

Beyond responding: Proactive measures to prevent Russian information influence activities

Our discussions with representatives in all three countries demonstrated that responding alone is not enough to stop Russian IIA. Countries need to get ahead of possible Russian IIA campaigns, an observation shared by US government officials. For example, the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) established a dedicated information resilience office in 2022 to better understand the scope of information manipulation against its worldwide countering-WMD presence.⁷⁶ This includes prebunking,⁷⁷ a term that encompasses efforts to anticipate or identify IIA early and encourage resilience among citizens to inoculate them from IIA.⁷⁸ Additionally, the Department of State’s Global Engagement Center (GEC) has issued numerous reports about Russia’s attempts to spread disinformation about US and Ukrainian biosafety and biosecurity initiatives.⁷⁹ The GEC was established in 2017, but has more recently begun to explore whether sharing limited details about sensitive missions in advance can limit the effect of Russian attempts to twist facts after a mission has occurred.⁸⁰

To effectively counter Russian IIA, the respond pillar of our strategic framework takes a broad approach that incorporates elements of prebunking and early identification to promote a holistic view of response. In this way, response can be proactive or reactive, which is essential to limiting the effects of false narratives Russia spreads worldwide. In the next chapter, we describe our third pillar, reinforcing a community of practice, which encapsulates elements of the first two pillars to augment their importance to a broader audience.

Reinforcing a community of practice

A community of practice committed to identifying and countering Russian IIA is a critical component to limiting the effectiveness of Russia’s efforts to spread false messages in Slovenia, Slovakia, and Serbia. For our project, this community is defined broadly to ensure that all stakeholders are represented. Members of the public and private sectors, including government, military, law enforcement, academia, think tanks, nongovernmental organizations, and the media all have a role to play in recognizing and responding to Russian IIA. This third pillar in our strategic framework is reinforcing a community of practice, which covers opportunities to expand the multistakeholder community dedicated to responding to Russian IIA. In this chapter, we describe the general roles that a community of practice should serve in addition to country-specific considerations discussed throughout our workshops.

Community of practice roles

Members of the community play an important role in promoting resilience among the populations most frequently targeted by Russia’s false messages. These roles include reinforcing consistent communication, expanding social resilience, prioritizing multistakeholder engagement, and identifying methods to expand the overall community dedicated to countering Russian information influence activities.

Resource and reinforce

A vital role for the community of practice is to ensure that efforts to counter Russian IIA reach the broadest possible audience, both within a country and among its regional neighbors, when appropriate. Community members from academia and think tanks can amplify messages from government and law enforcement sources to add legitimacy to their campaigns. This cooperation requires consistent communication among the community to understand Russia’s IIA, how it affects the broader public, and what stakeholders can do to counter false narratives.

In March 2022, the Russian Defense Ministry circulated claims about US-backed Ukrainian bioweapons production efforts to justify Russia’s then-recent invasion of Ukraine.⁸¹ Officials from the People’s Republic of China and incendiary US media figures amplified these claims on a popular social media platform, Weibo.⁸² In response, prominent US officials testified before Congress about the legitimacy of US-backed research facilities in Ukraine—including those established with CTR resources—and organizations like DTRA and the GEC issued fact sheets and statements that bolstered the legitimacy of CTR’s work. Former US officials and private-sector experts wrote editorials, social media posts, and made media appearances decrying Russia’s claims, providing important alternative perspectives that bolstered official government messages. The reinforcement of the key message that the United States and Ukraine were not producing biological weapons was critical to reaching as broad an audience as possible.

Reinforcing capacity-building efforts focused on countering Russian influence efforts is a priority among stakeholders in Slovenia, Slovakia, and Serbia. However, interest in these issues must be matched by resources to maintain and create new counternarratives. Many of the workshop participants shoulder numerous work responsibilities in addition to tracking Russian IIA. One benefit of an engaged community of practice is the ability to cooperate on messaging strategies and share the resource burden, including the time it takes to craft engaging, informative narratives and discern the best platform(s) on which to disseminate these narratives. When new approaches are needed to respond to new or evolving Russian falsehoods, an active community can also ensure that key messages from past campaigns are carried over to promote consistency. Furthermore, a coordinated approach among stakeholders to amplify key messages and reduce duplication in messaging is important to reduce confusion and promote clarity.

The community of practice should also focus on enhancing social resilience through public messaging and public education campaigns. While it is more difficult to reach people who espouse aggressively favorable views of false claims, evidence-based messages can influence those who are more open-minded.⁸³ Though it might not be possible to stop Russia’s IIA, a resilient public might be less susceptible to believing or spreading false claims.

Enhancing social resilience emphasizes whole of society responses to counter Russian malign influence activities. This is a deliberately broad goal, but given the complexity of the media landscape, it is difficult to achieve.⁸⁴ A good starting point is by working through trusted messengers to understand whether false narratives have achieved support in specific parts of the community, and why those narratives were persuasive. Local journalists are especially critical because they are in closer contact with parts of the community that national outlets might not understand as well. In this way, local journalists can both contribute to an understanding of the pervasiveness of false messages and what could be effective in changing minds.

Media literacy is another critical component of enhancing resilience. Critical thinking skills that teach students to question everything they read can promote longer-term outcomes than identifying correct and incorrect statements.⁸⁵ Furthermore, engaging the public early and often can promote trust in the output of government data.⁸⁶ Such an approach has demonstrated benefits in countering public health-related disinformation and misinformation, and also applies to Russian IIA about biological and radiological weapons that prey on the health effects of exposure to toxic substances.

Employ multisectoral and multidisciplinary approaches

An important role of the community of practice is to promote effective methods to combat IIA through multisectoral and multidisciplinary approaches. For a complicated and technical subject such as biological weapons—a frequent target of Russia’s IIA efforts—it is critical to include scientists, public health experts, academics, and other experts in the development of responses. Communications experts should seek to translate scientific and technical information into digestible information suitable for a general audience. The Bioweapons Disinformation Monitor, a partnership between King’s College London and the Canadian government, publishes videos, fact sheets, and short reports that concisely explain false Russian narratives about biological weapons and the reasons why these claims are untrue.⁸⁷ In addition to producing concise, factual counternarratives, the website also promotes articles from other sources, such as the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and foreign news sites to amplify the work of like-minded organizations in multiple sectors.⁸⁸

Identify opportunities for expansion

When considering other elements of society to incorporate into a community of practice, it is important to cast a wide net. In international relations theory, the concept of latent power refers to the broad range of resources available to a state that could contribute to greater military power.⁸⁹ Russia calls this the correlation of forces and means, which explains how Russia views its military expansion potential, but also incorporates elements of alliance relations, social cohesion, and economic stability that involve broader parts of society.⁹⁰ Although these theories have primarily military implications, the principle that all elements of a society can bolster one critical function applies directly to the fight against Russian IIA.

For example, Estonia has used a multisectoral approach to countering disinformation and misinformation since 2007, when it was subject to destructive cyberattacks that continue to present day.⁹¹ Media literacy is a core component of the curriculum in Estonian schools, and leaders from across Europe visit Estonia to learn more about their broad approach to establishing resilience to IIA.⁹² The need to go beyond traditional organizations tasked with identifying and stopping IIA also is understood in Slovakia. Participants at our second workshop in Bratislava suggested that engaging religious leaders and local labor officials to amplify counternarratives against false Russian claims could be effective because these leaders maintain the trust of their members.

Expansion also applies to promoting resilience across countries, not just in large population centers. In Slovakia and Serbia, political polarization and distrust of institutions hamper counter-messaging strategies and keep people with disparate views siloed from one another. Geographic differences exacerbate these silos. Participants in both countries noted that going beyond the capital allows one to reach disadvantaged communities that might be more affected by Russian information warfare preying on their existing views that the state does not look after their interests.

As the third pillar of our strategic framework, the community of practice plays an important role in reinforcing the efforts of the first two pillars to recognize and respond to Russian IIA. The linkages between the three pillars are important to ensure thoughtful, effective responses to false narratives that damage government credibility and trust in institutions. In the next chapter, we discuss considerations for implementing the strategic framework, as well as areas for investment to continue the fight against Russian IIA that target nonproliferation.

Considerations for implementation and the way ahead

Our research and discussions with stakeholders in Slovenia, Slovakia, and Serbia illuminated several important considerations for implementing initiatives to counter Russian IIA as they relate to nonproliferation. In this chapter, we describe these considerations and include recommendations for investment, while discussing the way ahead for this project.

Implementation considerations

There are many opportunities for stakeholders within the region to design successful responses to Russian IIA. These include opportunities to strengthen transparency and access to information, expand cooperation within multistakeholder groups, and broaden existing networks to include international partners.

Maximize transparency and safeguard access to information

To improve trust in public institutions and political processes, government entities should strive to be as transparent as possible with information related to false Russian claims about CBRN weapons. Providing truthful and accurate information with proper citations and evidence can play an important role in prebunking Russian narratives. Maximizing transparency on social media platforms with respect to the activity of Russian information networks also can play an important role, especially as civil society and other organizations prioritize how to respond to Russian IIA.

Enhance cooperation with a multistakeholder community

Involving the private sector in government-led responses to Russian IIA can strengthen relationships and improve information sharing with partners outside of government. Members of the private sector can support a healthy information environment, including through their support for independent investigative journalism and objective reporting.

Another opportunity to strengthen responses to combat Russian IIA includes connecting civil society organizations and government entities with their counterparts in scientific and academic communities. Research-oriented professionals bring a wealth of expertise on technical topics, such as CBRN weapons and nonproliferation, which can augment countermessaging strategies with data-driven information.

Similarly, youth organizations can play an important role in mitigating disinformation. Dedicated engagement and educational initiatives with younger audiences can build broader resilience against Russian IIA. Youth organizations serve as an opportunity to reach unengaged youth who are not necessarily involved in countering Russian IIA more broadly. Increasing investment within younger generations also helps mitigate the brain drain phenomenon of young, highly educated people leaving Central and Eastern Europe.⁹³ This phenomenon leaves fewer in the next generation that are able to study disinformation and nonproliferation, resulting in a significant gap in substantive expertise on these issues. It will be critical to reinvest in the next generation of experts, which will allow for greater potential for locally driven development of policy solutions, especially around nonproliferation and information warfare.

Expand the community of practice to include international partners

Members of the community of practices within Slovenia, Slovakia, and Serbia should enforce stronger multistakeholder engagement with international partners, including neighboring countries, international organizations, and the United States. Maintaining consistent close cooperation with international partners provides opportunities to learn about other countries that might experience similar challenges with respect to Russian IIA and discuss best practices for response. These opportunities to learn from a broader range of stakeholders can build stronger alliances to coordinate responses against threats of information warfare on a larger scale.

Areas for investment

To expand societal resilience to counter Russian IIA, key stakeholders and organizations need to prioritize investing in programs to confront information manipulation in Europe. Several opportunities play an important role in building resilience and effectiveness in the long term, including: augmenting proactive measures, strengthening media literacy efforts and fact-checking programs, supporting independent media and community journalism, and prioritizing capacity building efforts.

Augment proactive measures

Attempts to more proactively counter malign influence campaigns are an important area for additional resourcing so counter-messaging strategies are not primarily reactive. The United States and NATO are exploring ways to be more proactive in sharing research and information, including exploration of prebunking initiatives, but continued cooperation will benefit NATO allies such as Slovenia and Slovakia.⁹⁴ For Serbia, cooperation with the EU, regional partners, or nongovernmental organizations could provide insights on how to incorporate proactive measures into their counter-messaging strategies.

Strengthen media literacy efforts and fact-checking programs

Greater cooperation between journalists and government representatives can improve public awareness about the threats of Russian IIA and enhance resilience. Instituting media literacy curriculum in education systems is also important to improve resilience among younger citizens, especially those who are more active on social media and exposed to a wider variety of messaging. Additionally, fact-checking programs to promote critical engagement with information from news, television broadcasts, and social media platforms can be expanded beyond education systems to workplaces, government offices, and other environments that would benefit from increased awareness.

Support independent media and community journalism initiatives

Independent media and community journalism can play important roles in combating IIA, especially through the prioritization of localized reporting, transparency, and accountability. Through strong connections to the communities around them, media and community journalism initiatives’ active engagement and collaboration with local organizations and trusted officials enhances the overall credibility of responses to Russian IIA. These organizations can highlight local solutions and positive stories that can play a role in bolstering broader support for institutions, minimizing polarization, and blunting the negative effects of disinformation.

Consider ways to measure success

Across the three countries considered for this project and in the United States, members of the communities of practice struggle with how to measure the success of responses to Russian IIA. It is impossible to isolate the effects of one message or campaign within the entire media landscape, given how much content is produced and how quickly it is distributed. It also is difficult to predict what could influence Russia to change its tactics. However, there are resources available to guide the development of attention-grabbing, impactful messages that can garner support, such as EUvsDisinfo and the Bioweapons Disinformation Monitor. Additionally, greater engagement with academia and journalism professionals can assist in developing messages backed by industry best practices and standards.

Review adequacy of cybersecurity infrastructure

In addition to concerns over false Russian narratives, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Serbia should consider whether existing cybersecurity measures are adequate to prevent cyberattacks. In the event prevention measures fail, each country should also review whether current defenses are up to date. For Slovenia and Slovakia, NATO’s Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence could be a good resource to support or inform these reviews.⁹⁵

Focus on capacity building efforts to increase effectiveness and viability across sectors

Leveraging programs to build capacity within organizations can sustain efforts, increase effectiveness, and build long-term resilience. For civil society organizations, think tanks, media entities, and others that are involved in countering Russian IIA, it is important to prioritize efforts that strengthen their overall ability to achieve success. To counter Russian IIA, educational programs—both within and outside of formal educational institutions—allow stakeholders to obtain important skills in digital literacy, cybersecurity, and critical thinking abilities. Professional development opportunities for analysts and journalists alike can strengthen the ability to use technologies and other tools to combat Russian IIA. For public diplomacy officials, training sessions that focus on strategic communications and crisis management provide important opportunities to implement standard operating procedures within their organizations. These kinds of programs play an important role in developing the necessary skills and experience to counter Russian IIA on nonproliferation.

Additionally, community engagement programs serve an important role in capacity building within the public. Organized workshops, outreach programs, and structured dialogues contribute to a broader sense of involvement among the community, which can increase buy-in and participation when combating Russian IIA. Community engagement programs can also empower local leaders and educators to play a role in disseminating truthful information and countering Russian IIA within the public.

Project next steps

For the next iteration of this project, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and the Department of State’s Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction will continue to examine the threat of Russian malign influence efforts that target nonproliferation norms in Eastern Europe and the responses to these threats. The Atlantic Council will monitor developments in Russia’s IIA for topics related to nonproliferation and CBRN weapons that might emerge in our focus countries to tailor the content of our private workshops accordingly. In addition, we will also support the organizations, experts, and entities on the frontlines of Russia’s information warfare to enable implementation and sustainment of the project’s overall goals.

In the next phase of our project, the Atlantic Council will continue to refine the three pillars of our strategic framework to ensure they capture the current challenges to recognizing and responding to IIA within Central and Eastern Europe, as well as any challenges to reinforcing a healthy community of practice committed to countering IIA in the region.

Finally, we will work closely with our partners at the Department of State to identify new countries that would benefit from engagement with our strategic framework.

The research team thanks the US Department of State Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation’s Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction for their strategic guidance and overall support throughout the project. Special thanks go to the wide range of stakeholders in Slovakia, Slovenia, and Serbia who contributed their invaluable insights to our workshops and participated in other contexts to enrich the analysis.

We would also like to acknowledge Sarah Jacobs Gamberini and Amanda Moodie of the National Defense University’s Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction for their critical contributions to our workshops in Slovakia and Serbia. Sarah Jacobs Gamberini and the Atlantic Council’s Eto Buziashvili from the Digital Forensic Research Laboratory also provided valuable peer reviews that improved our strategic framework. Within the Atlantic Council, we recognize the critical contributions of Leah Scheunemann, Zelma Sergejeva, and Kristen Taylor for their project management, research, and analytical support; Dr. Matthew Kroenig and Christopher Skaluba for their oversight of the project; and Gretchen Ehle, Nicholas O’Connell, Caroline Simpson, and Ursula Murdoch for their operational guidance and assistance.

This report is intended to live up to General Brent Scowcroft’s standard for rigorous, relevant, and nonpartisan analysis on national security issues. The Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to continue his nonpartisan commitment to the cause of security, support for US leadership in cooperation with allies and partners, and dedication to the mentorship of the next generation of leaders.

The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Atlantic Council, the Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction, the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, the US Department of State, or the US government.

About the authors

Fellow

Natasha Lander Finch

Senior Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Arms Control Europe & Eurasia

Staff

Ryan Arick

Associate Director

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

NATO Security & Defense

Natasha Lander Finch is a senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She previously worked as a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, where she led and conducted research on a range of issues, including chemical, biological, and nuclear policy; counterterrorism; European security; and military and civilian workforce policy. She also held positions as an adviser within the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and as the principal adviser for NATO’s Committee on Proliferation in the Defense Format.

Ryan Arick is an associate director with the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. In this capacity, he supports TSI’s work to strengthen the transatlantic alliance against emerging security threats from around the world. His research interests include NATO defense policy and transatlantic security; arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation; democratic resilience from foreign malign influence; and state fragility and conflict prevention.

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How do cyber-attacks threaten the Balkans? | A Debrief with Dan Ilazi and Filip Stojanovski

sjones — Tue, 01 Oct 2024 19:00:00 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

Cyber-attacks are on the rise in the Western Balkans, with 1.2 million personal records exposed to data breaches and a 200% surge in ransomware attacks over the past two years. Businesses across the region have paid millions of euros to recover compromised data, and 75% of companies report facing phishing attacks. Cyber-actors are exploiting internal ethnic tensions to target reconciliation efforts, while disinformation campaigns undermine democracy, destabilize institutions, and disrupt daily life.

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, sits down with Ramadan Ilazi from the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies and Filip Stojanovski, Director of Partnerships at Metamorphosis in North Macedonia. Together, they delve into the cybersecurity vulnerabilities threatening the region’s political and economic stability, examining the implications for critical infrastructure, businesses, and citizens.

The discussion tackles key questions, including how cyberattacks are being used to advance political agendas, the impact of emerging technologies like AI and the Internet of Things, and the gaps in regional cooperation. They also explore how the Western Balkans can strengthen its integration into the EU’s cybersecurity framework, including the role of ENISA in supporting regional efforts.

As cyber threats continue to evolve, this conversation highlights the urgent need for a resilient digital future in the Western Balkans, from workforce development to bolstering regional collaboration. Tune in for expert insights on navigating one of the region’s most critical challenges.

ABOUT #BALKANSDEBRIEF

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

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The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post How do cyber-attacks threaten the Balkans? | A Debrief with Dan Ilazi and Filip Stojanovski appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Webster quoted in VOA on US proposed ban on Chinese smart car software

Joseph Webster — Fri, 27 Sep 2024 18:45:00 +0000

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Tobin joins Radio Free Asia to discuss saturation of Chinese EV market

William Tobin — Wed, 25 Sep 2024 18:50:00 +0000

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Webster quoted in Recharge on Chinese dominance in wind power

Joseph Webster — Mon, 23 Sep 2024 18:40:56 +0000

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Webster quoted in Carbon Brief on US tariffs on Chinese EVs

Joseph Webster — Wed, 28 Aug 2024 17:36:00 +0000

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Samaan joins Channel News Asia to discuss Hezbollah’s strike on Israel

Atlantic Council — Mon, 26 Aug 2024 14:30:24 +0000

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What attacks on shipping mean for the global maritime order

Elisabeth Braw — Fri, 09 Aug 2024 14:00:00 +0000

Executive summary
History of attacks on shipping
Threats to commercial vessels in the Black Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea
Houthi attacks on merchant vessels: A new form of aggression
International response to the Houthis’ attacks
The shipping industry’s response
Improving strategies to counter attacks on shipping
Preemptive diversion of shipping
Intra-industry risk updates
Use of directed-energy weapons
Selective protection dependent on flag registration
Freedom-of-navigation operations
Disrupting the delivery of weapons
Armed guards on board
Conclusion

Executive summary

For as long as shipping has existed, merchant vessels have been vulnerable to attacks, especially in wartime. Starting in the beginning of the twentieth century, when international trade expanded rapidly, nations signed a string of treaties to protect merchant vessels from attacks by hostile states. With a few notable exceptions, most importantly the Iran-Iraq “Tanker War” in the 1980s, countries have complied with these rules.

Since the late 2010s, however, there has been a radical increase in state-linked attacks and harassment of merchant vessels. Around that time, Iran and, to a lesser extent, Israel began attacking vessels linked to the other side, primarily in the Strait of Hormuz, a situation that persists. China, for its part, has taken to harassing merchant vessels in the South China Sea in a strategy to enforce its unilateral territorial claims. The harm imposed on merchant vessels further increased in November 2023, when the Iran-linked Houthi rebels launched geopolitically linked attacks on shipping in the Red Sea. Eight months later—despite interventions by the US Navy, the United Kingdom’s (UK) Royal Navy, European Union (EU) navies, and other Western navies—the attacks continue and have caused large-scale rerouting to the Cape of Good Hope.

The increasing attacks on merchant vessels pose an acute threat not just to seafarers and shipping companies, but also to the global maritime order on which modern economies are based. This report discusses the history of attacks on shipping, the rules implemented to keep shipping safe, and the new and serious threats posed by the Houthis and other actors. It also discusses steps Western governments and the shipping industry can take to reduce the harm posed by such attacks. These steps include:

collective threats of rerouting away from risky waters;
directed-energy weapons on naval vessels protecting merchant shipping; and
increased focus on disrupting militias’ supply chains.

History of attacks on shipping

“Japan’s dependence on international economic ties for its survival is well recognized…In recent years, however, another source of vulnerability has assumed importance-the threat of international shipping disruptions in the Middle East.” Thus begins an article in the academic journal Pacific Affairs—not from 2023, but from 1986. In the Persian Gulf, Iraq had taken to attacking merchant ships linked to Iran as part of its war against the Islamic Republic.

The attacks began in 1981, the war’s second year, when Iraq attacked five merchant vessels, “largely to reduce Iran’s oil exports, which go entirely by sea and which help finance Iran’s war effort.”¹ The following year, Iraq attacked sixteen vessels carrying Iranian oil; the next year, it was twenty-two. In 1984, Iran began responding in kind. That year, Iraq attacked fifty-three tankers linked to Iran, while Iran attacked sixteen tankers linked to Iraq. By 1987, the numbers had risen to eighty-eight attacks by Iraq and ninety-one by Iran. The systematic attacks on the other side’s merchant vessels became known as the Tanker War, and it alarmed the outside world, which by that point was dependent on the supply of oil through the Persian Gulf. “Mizuo Kuroda, Japanese ambassador to the United Nations, in the Security Council debate on the gulf conflict in May 1984, made an appeal that Iran and Iraq and all other states exercise the utmost restraint, and asked that both countries respect the right of safe navigation. (However, attacks on neutral shipping have continued.),” the Pacific Affairs article noted. In the summer of 1987, after neutral Kuwait had concluded that Kuwaiti-flagged tankers could no longer travel through the Gulf and asked for permission to have them reflagged as American, the tankers were reflagged and the United States launched Operation Earnest Will, which saw US Navy vessels escort the US-flagged Kuwaiti vessels between the Gulf of Oman and their home ports.²

When the Iran-Iraq war ended the following year, more than 320 merchant mariners had been killed, injured, or were missing. Three hundred and forty merchant vessels had been damaged, some more than once. Some 30 million tons of cargo had been damaged, while eleven ships had been sunk and three dozen declared total losses.³

The Tanker War became infamous because it was a blatant case of aggression against merchant shipping as a tool of war, and it took place during a period in which countries’ economies were beginning to globalize. The Warsaw Pact countries largely operated in parallel with Western market economies and China was still a mostly closed economy, but Japan and South Korea were trading heavily with Western economies,Latin American economies had also begun opening up, and Middle Eastern oil fueled many countries’ growing economies. It was against this background that the Tanker War was such a shock. It demonstrated to increasingly commercially linked countries that global shipping—the most important tool of global trade—could easily be targeted by interested nations and that there was little other countries could do to stop the attacks.

However, geopolitically motivated attacks on shipping are nearly as old as shipping itself.⁴ Indeed, merchant vessels have been regularly attacked during wars. As H. B. Robertson, Jr. notes

During the Napoleonic era, both France and England utilized their differing strengths in an attempt to curtail the other’s logistic and commercial capabilities. In the American Civil War, the blockade of the Confederacy was a principal component of the Union’s war strategy. The indispensable condition for victory by Japan in its 1905 war with Russia was control of the seas. Without this advantage, Russia could have resupplied its superior land armies from the sea. During the progress of both WorId Wars, success of the maritime resupply effort of the Allied Powers, particularly Great Britain, was the sine qua non of victory.⁵

Until the nineteenth century, “privateers” also attacked merchant vessels on behalf of a country’s armed forces in exchange for bounties from the vessels.⁶

The reason merchant vessels have so systematically been attacked during wars is, of course, that they carry vital supplies to the adversary. “If it is true that merchant shipping can be critical to a nation’s ability to prosecute a war effort, it is equally true that the opposing power will seek to interdict that supply effort,” Robertson notes. “Tactics, weapons systems and geography are variables that will affect any interdiction effort but the interdiction effort fits nearly with the general principles of war.”⁷

Yet, by the time World War I erupted, nations realized that unrestricted warfare against merchant shipping was unsustainable and sought to restrict it. Traditional (or customary) international law had established a distinction between enemy naval ships and enemy merchant vessels, with the latter granted protection from attacks. The Hague Conventions, to which forty-four countries agreed in 1907, included an article on the status of merchant ships following the outbreak of hostilities. It stipulated that “the belligerent may only detain it, without payment of compensation, but subject to the obligation of restoring it after the war, or requisition it on payment of compensation” and that “enemy merchant ships which left their last port of departure before the commencement of the war, and are encountered on the high seas while still ignorant of the outbreak of hostilities cannot be confiscated.”⁸

The Hague Convention became international customary law, the de facto legal baseline governing merchant shipping during armed conflict. This meant that “merchant ships, even those sailing under the flag of the enemy, are considered as civilian objects and manned by civilian crews, and so long as they maintain their proper role, are subject only to seizure as prize and subsequent condemnation in prize courts of the capturing belligerent. Only in special circumstances is the capturing power allowed to destroy the prize, and then only after removing the passengers, crew and ship’s papers to a place of safety.”⁹ Germany had, however, developed a submarine fleet. During World War I, these submarines set about attacking merchant vessels supplying the Allies. In the first months of 1917, following German submarine attacks on several US merchant ships, the United States declared war on Germany.¹⁰

In the years after World War I, states sought to further codify merchant vessels’ rights, which resulted in the London Protocol of 1936. By 1939, all of World War I’s combatant countries except Romania had joined the protocol, which stipulated

A warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ship’s papers in a place of safety. For this purpose the ship’s boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board.¹¹

Even so, World War II saw regular attacks on merchant vessels. International customary law was simply ignored. As a result, some vessels sought to reduce the risk of attack by sailing under neutral countries’ flags (including the increasingly popular flag of Panama). As Robertson notes, both the Allies and the Axis powers attacked enemy merchant vessels—and sometimes even neutral merchant ships—and did so without ensuring the safety of the passengers, the crews, or the ships themselves, even though the protocol obliges warring parties to take such action.

Both sides justified these practices either on the basis of reprisal (which in itself is an admission that absent the first violation by the other side, the practice is illegal under international law) or on assertions that the other side had incorporated its merchant fleet into the combatant force by mounting offensive weapons on the ships, convoying them, requiring them to report enemy submarine sightings, and ordering them to take offensive action against surfaced submarines.¹²

Toward and after the end of World War II, the world’s nations attempted to create a global system of rules and institutions, with the United Nations (UN) at its center. In addition to the United Nations itself, nations created the International Civil Aviation Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization (WHO), and a string of other bodies. In 1948, they adopted the Convention on the International Maritime Organization and agreed to form the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO). The name was later changed to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and came into force ten years after its adoption. The organization’s statutes placed little emphasis on maritime security, focusing instead on promoting economic action in support of freedom and reducing discrimination in some countries.¹³ Article C, for example, states an IMCO aim “to provide for the consideration by the Organization of matters concerning unfair restrictive practices by shipping concerns.”¹⁴

Indeed, such was the desire for safe shipping among the world’s nations that a focus on security in the IMCO’s founding statute seemed unnecessary. Harm caused by pirates and criminals posed a problem, but even the most ideologically opposed governments agreed that shipping needed to be kept safe. Countries deliberately harming merchant vessels was no longer acceptable.

Even with the IMCO’s rules in place, ships continued to face considerable threats, but such threats came from criminals, terrorists, and malcontents. In 1961, a group led by Captain Henrique Galvao hijacked the Portuguese passenger ship Santa Maria in protest against the regime of Antonio de Salazar. In subsequent years, Cuban exile groups attacked Russian and Cuban merchant vessels, though they sometimes got the wrong ship, and the Palestinian terrorist group PLFP attacked vessels bound for Israeli ports. Groups with other causes similarly found shipping a convenient target. RAND researchers summarized the problem.

Besides guerrillas and terrorists, attacks have been carried out by modern day pirates, ordinary criminals, fanatic environmentalists, mutinous crews, hostile workers, and foreign agents. The spectrum of actions is equally broad: ships hijacked, destroyed by mines and bombs, attacks with bazookas, sunk under mysterious circumstances; cargos removed; crews taken hostage; extortion plots against ocean liners and offshore platforms; raids on port facilities; attempts to board oil rigs; sabotage at shipyards and terminal facilities; even a plot to steal a nuclear submarine.¹⁵

The Tanker War received such global attention because it was an extremely rare example of nation-states targeting merchant vessels. The attacks created considerable risks for vessels beyond those linked to the two respective countries. “Like the Houthis today, the Iraqi and Iranian armed forces at that time weren’t always that accurate in their targeting,” noted Svein Ringbakken, a maritime executive with several decades in the business who now serves as managing director of the Norway-based maritime war insurer DNK.¹⁶ Of the vessels attacked, sixty-one sailed under the Liberian flag, forty-one under the flag of Panama, thirty-nine under the flag of Cyprus, and twenty-six under the flag of Greece. A number of other Western countries similarly saw vessels sailing under their flag attacked. Forty-six were Iranian flagged. Ringbakken added that “the ships that were going back and forth to [in the Gulf] were often attacked several times each, so the number of attacks were much higher than the 340 ships that were listed as having been attacked.” Had the merchant vessels carrying oil and other supplies through the Gulf been less sturdy, the human and material losses caused by the Tanker War would have been even more dramatic.

But not even during the height of the Cold War, in the 1960s and 1970s, did NATO or Warsaw Pact member states systematically seek to harm merchant vessels linked to the other side. NATO and Warsaw Pact countries indisputably acted unethically in other ways, but in the maritime domain they respected rules, conventions, and the neutrality of merchant shipping. They did so not least because they also depended on ships carrying goods to and from their countries being able to travel safely.

Indeed, when the attacks by terrorists and other non-state entities continued, the world’s nations convened to negotiate and adopt the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), the fifth version of global shipping’s cornerstone safety treaty, which governs the safety of the vessels themselves. (Previous versions had been adopted in 1914—in response to the Titanic disaster—and then in 1929, 1948, and 1960.)¹⁷ Five years later, in 1979, nations adopted the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR), which entered into force in 1985. SAR governs the responsibilities of coastal states in maritime search and rescue; the 1979 version divided the world’s oceans into thirteen search-and-rescue regions and introduced the obligation for countries to operate rescue co-ordination centers on a twenty-four-hour basis with trained, English-speaking, staff.¹⁸

The crowning achievement of Cold War maritime agreements took place in 1982, when negotiators representing 160 nations adopted the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the “constitution of the oceans.”¹⁹ UNCLOS covers crucial areas including exploitation of ocean and seabed resources, as well as maritime transit rights. Crucially, coastal states are given territorial rights over waters extending twelve nautical miles from their coastlines; foreign vessels have the right to sail through these waters under UNCLOS’s “innocent passage” provision. Coastal states are also given limited rights in the Exclusive Economic Zones extending another two hundred nautical miles beyond their territorial waters.²⁰

A rare case of apparently state-linked attacks on merchant shipping took place in 1984, when nearly twenty vessels transiting the Red Sea were struck by mines. Egyptian and Western authorities subsequently identified the Ghat, a Libyan-flagged merchant vessel, as the culprit. Libya’s motivation for the attacks appears to have been ruler Muammar al-Qaddafi’s desire to demonstrate what he punish other Arab regimes’ misguided policy of maintaining close relations with the West.²¹

From the early 1990s, the end of the Cold War and the beginning of more harmonious relations between crucial groupings of countries decreased geopolitically linked risk everywhere, including in shipping. Crucially, the end of the Cold War delivered an extraordinary rise in commercial relations between previously hostile countries. In addition, China had begun opening up its closed economy in the 1980s and was quickly becoming a manufacturing hub for Western companies. The rapidly growing trade and resulting globalization were facilitated by global shipping. Between 1990 and 2019, global shipping grew nearly threefold, from 4,008 million tons loaded to 11,076 million tons loaded.²²

During the 1990s and 2000s, and until the late 2010s, shipping had to contend with spikes in piracy attacks, but geopolitically linked attacks remained minimal. The few attacks that took place, most prominently an explosion on the French-flagged oil tanker Limburg off the coast of Yemen, were carried out by terrorists.²³ In Nigeria in the early 2000s, the Movement for the Development of the Niger Delta—a local militant group—kidnapped oil workers and attacked oil facilities and pipelines, though this was done in protest against inequalities in Nigeria.

The mostly peaceful period ended around 2019, when a proxy war targeting merchant vessels unfolded in the Strait of Hormuz, an indispensable body of water through which more than 20 percent of global petroleum travels.²⁴ In 2018, Donald Trump’s administration took the United States out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the “Iran nuclear deal.” Soon after that, Iran began to regularly harass merchant vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. In a particularly high-profile incident, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) seized the Swedish-owned, UK-flagged oil tanker Stena Impero passing through the Strait of Hormuz on July 19, 2019, and took the crew hostage.²⁵ Though the IRGC alleged that the tanker had struck a fishing boat and failed to obey IRGC instructions, there was no evidence of this. Since then, attacks on merchant vessels have continued. Merchant vessels sailing under flags ranging from those of Norway to the United Arab Emirates have been struck by mines, magnetic mines, and torpedoes.²⁶ In August 2023, the United States dispatched a naval and Marine force to the strait to “support deterrence efforts.”²⁷ By that point, there had been twenty attacks on merchant shipping in the strait since the beginning of 2021, including two on July 5, 2023, when Iranian naval vessels attempted to seize two oil tankers.²⁸ The US Navy and Marine presence appears to have succeeded in deterring the aggression, which subsided after the force’s arrival. As with all deterrence measures, though, it’s impossible to know whether the attackers had already been planning to reduce their aggression or whether the deterrence measures changed their cost-benefit calculus.

Threats to commercial vessels in the Black Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea

In early 2022, another threat to global shipping emerged when Russia deployed close to two hundred thousand troops to its border with Ukraine. It was clear that any invasion by Russia would also involve attacks on Ukraine’s Black Sea ports and on shipping in the Black Sea. In the weeks immediately following the invasion, several merchant vessels in Ukrainian waters and ports were struck in suspected Russian attacks. On February 25, for example, a tanker was struck by missiles. Two crew members were injured, and the crew was forced to abandon ship.²⁹ On March 2, a Bangladeshi seafarer was killed when a shell hit his vessel in the Ukrainian port of Olvia.³⁰ In addition, when Russia invaded, ships crewed by some 800–1,000 seafarers were docked in seven Ukrainian ports and, in practice, unable to leave. Being stuck in Ukrainian ports, of course, made them an easy target for Russian attacks and also raised the risk of their becoming collateral damage of attacks against other targets.³¹ “There were more than 90 vessels [stuck in Ukrainian ports] to start with, and during the [UN-negotiated grain] Corridor [between Russia and Ukraine that allowed ships carrying grain to leave Ukrainian ports, traveling through a Black Sea corridor on to international destinations], about 30 got out. We ended up with around 65 claims for total loss,” said Neil Roberts, the secretary of the maritime insurance industry’s Joint War Committee, which lists international waters according to risk level.³²

Shipping in the Taiwan Strait has been similarly threatened, but has not yet been attacked. When, in April 2023, President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan met with US Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy in California, Beijing registered its displeasure by launching an offensive military exercise targeting Taiwan and sending a coast guard “inspection flotilla” to the Taiwan Strait. The strait is the main passage for cargo moving between Southeast Asia and Japan, South Korea, and northern China, which makes it one of the world’s busiest maritime thoroughfares; some 240–500 ships per day, including nearly nine in ten of the world’s largest container vessels, pass through the strait on an average day.³³ Beijing, which considers Taiwan a region of China, argues it has “sovereignty and jurisdiction” over the strait, while Taiwan and countries including the United States consider it international waters divided along the strait’s unofficial median line.

By threatening to inspect ships passing through the strait, on the basis of legal powers not recognized by Taiwan and large parts of the international community, China would be able to severely disrupt shipping in the strait and, thus, cause considerable problems for shipping globally. Yet, the deployment of an inspection flotilla—whether or not it carries out any inspections—hardly reaches the threshold where the US Navy or another navy would consider it necessary to intervene. In its law-enforcement scope of inspections of merchant vessels (albeit on Taiwan’s side of the median line), China’s inspection flotilla differs from the overtly aggressive actions China’s coast guard, maritime militia, long-distance fishing fleet, and other maritime entities take. All, though, constitute a risk to civilian vessels. Roberts noted

China has long been “leaning in” via its fishing fleet, and it’s been building all these little islands in the South China Sea. The Chinese government issues white papers to float their ideas, for example saying they’ll allow their Coast Guard to fire on all vessels in their territorial waters. And if nobody reacts, then they make it policy. Whilst the littoral states do not agree, they’re up against a huge nation and there’s no one in the area who’s in a position to react. That comparative disparity is what China has leveraged in deploying the inspection flotilla to the Taiwan Strait.³⁴

In addition, China’s maritime militia, coast guard, and long-distance fishing fleet habitually harass vessels, including civilian ones. These activities are of particular concern in the South China Sea, through which approximately one-third of global trade travels, as China claims some 90 percent of these waters under its “nine-dash line” policy.³⁵ These practices, which will be analyzed in a subsequent report as part of the Atlantic Council’s Maritime Threats project, are not specifically targeted against shipping but instead target a wide range of vessels, including civilian ones. Survey vessels sailing under the flags of Norway and Vietnam, for example, have been harassed by a combination of Chinese vessels.³⁶ Since the beginning of the 2020s, the harassment has increased significantly, creating an environment of heightened uncertainty and risk for merchant vessels. This uncertainty is heightened because it’s entirely unclear how coastal states and de facto protectors of the global maritime order, most notably the US Navy, can deter such activities. As Ringbakken noted

China has its Navy, it has its Coast Guard and it has the militia and the fishing boats and this kind of crossover between the fishing boats and the militia, which is a strange construct. And China has a long-term perspective. These small skirmishes and the small transgressions are not viewed as an attempt to undercut the global maritime regime, but that’s what they are. It’s what you might call the Chinese water torture method. Any kind of countermeasure from the Americans or others would seem disproportionate. The activity is just merely little bit out of normal and not like what the Houthis are doing in the Red Sea, and that makes responding even harder. You don’t send a naval group to try to stop this kind of behavior because it seems too minor. So it goes on.³⁷

The US military has come to much the same conclusion. “It’s getting more aggressive, they’re getting more bold and it’s getting more dangerous,” Admiral John Aquilino told media in late April 2024, shortly before handing over command of the US Indo-Pacific Command. He added that China was increasing its aggression through a “boiling the frog” strategy. “There needs to be a continual description of China’s bad behavior that is outside legal international norms,” he noted. “And that story has to be told by all the nations in the region.”³⁸

Indeed, China’s maritime harassment can easily be expanded to target many more cargo ships, in addition to the fishing vessels and supply vessels that have until now been the most frequently targeted categories. In the area of unilateral inspection flotillas , if the flotilla that was dispatched during Tsai’s visit to California were to be followed by similar measures, shipping companies and their insurers would need to assess whether it’s worth sending vessels through the Taiwan Strait. “Even if the US Navy wanted to intervene, it would be seen a gross intrusion, and it could spark something far worse. The merchant ships are on their own,” Roberts noted.³⁹ Ships don’t need to go through the strait to reach destinations other than Taiwan; they can simply travel along Taiwan’s eastern coast. That route, however, would render them unable to call at Taiwan’s main port—the massive Port of Kaohsiung—or the Port of Taipei. This is what makes a blockade of Taiwan, whether executed by the China Coast Guard, the People’s Liberation Army Navy, China’s maritime militia, or a combination of the three, possibly with other entities also involved, such a troubling scenario.⁴⁰ “What would happen to Taiwan if ships don’t call at its ports? Well, ultimately the people of Taiwan will starve ,” Roberts said. “But shipowners have to focus on crew welfare and they’d just go around [east of Taiwan] and take a bit more fuel. It’s really difficult.”⁴¹

Houthi attacks on merchant vessels: A new form of aggression

On November 19, 2023, armed commandos belonging to the Yemeni Houthi militia stormed the Galaxy Leader, a Bahamas-flagged roll-on, roll-off (RORO) carrier traveling through the Red Sea near the Yemeni port of Hodeida. The commandos, who filmed themselves arriving in a helicopter, took the twenty-five-strong crew hostage and directed the Galaxy Leader to Hodeida and then the port of Al Saleef, which is also controlled by the Houthis.⁴² The Galaxy Leader had apparently been targeted because it is part-owned by Israeli national Abraham “Rami” Ungar, though his firm is registered in the United Kingdom.

“The Yemeni Naval Forces managed to capture an Israeli ship in the depths of the Red Sea taking it to the Yemeni coast. The Yemeni armed forces deal with the ship’s crew in accordance with the principle and values of our Islamic religion,” Houthi spokesman Yahya Sare’e declared on X on the same day.

The Yemeni armed forces reiterate their warning to all ships belonging to or dealing with the Israeli enemy that they will become a legitimate target for armed forces. […] Yemeni armed forces confirm that they will continue to carry out military operations against the Israeli enemy until the aggression against Gaza stops and the heinous acts against our Palestinian brothers in Gaza and the West Bank stop…If the international community is concerned about regional security and stability, rather than expanding the conflict, it should put an end to Israel’s aggression against Gaza.⁴³

“All ships belonging to the Israeli enemy or that deal with it will become legitimate targets,” the Houthis added in a statement after the hijack.⁴⁴ The opportunistic labeling of the attacks as being an act of support for the people of Gaza was a clever move by the Houthis, gaining the attacks attention far beyond the global maritime community and gaining the Houthis sympathy for their actions among the public in countries troubled by Gazans’ plight. It also made any response by the United States and other Western countries geopolitically fraught. A few days later, assailants identified as Houthis attacked the Israel-linked tanker Central Park in the Gulf of Aden, the body of water that leads into the Red Sea.⁴⁵ On December 3, the Houthis attacked three additional vessels.⁴⁶

The attacks continued, though the targeted vessels’ alleged Israeli links were not always clear or even existent. On December 9, the militia expanded its scope, saying it would also target ships headed for Israeli ports. Two days later, it hit the Strinda, a tanker owned, managed, and flagged in Norway and crewed by Indians, which the Houthis said was headed for Israel, though the owner said the tanker was bound for Italy.⁴⁷

On December 15, a Houthi drone struck the Liberian-flagged Al Jasrah and two Houthi missiles struck the MSC Palatium III, which was also sailing under Liberian flag; both were thought to be headed for Israeli ports. On the same day, the Houthis threatened another Liberian-flagged vessel, the MSC Alanya, and told it to turn around.⁴⁸ “The Houthis’ targeting mechanism wasn’t that good, or their intelligence wasn’t entirely up to speed,” Ringbakken said. “And we don’t know for sure whether that was by chance or whether they didn’t mind a little bit of collateral damage because that got them more attention.”⁴⁹

Indeed, the Houthis appear to have decided to make necessity into an extraordinary virtue. Instead of having to conduct painstaking research into vessels’ complex ownership and management structure, and their cargo’s provenance and destination, the Houthis—while declaring that they were targeting Israeli-linked vessels—attacked a range of merchant vessels in the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of Aden. That, of course, has made the waters unsafe for vessels form all countries, though the Houthis appear to consistently have exempted vessels linked to Russia and China. Retired Rear Admiral Nils Wang, a former chief of the Danish Navy, noted the following.

It’s instructive to compare the Houthis’ attacks to the piracy of the Horn of Africa [that was particularly frequent in the early 2010s]. With the pirates off the Horn of Africa, the intimidation of international shipping was the same. That made launching a counter-piracy operation straightforward. Everybody, including China, Pakistan, Iran, everybody was of the opinion that this piracy had to be stopped. Indeed, the military operations against piracy at that time were probably the biggest multinational military operation that has ever taken place, if you count on how many countries, regions, and continents were involved. Everyone agreed that the piracy had to be stopped. If you then compare that to the situation now in the Red Sea, the Houthis only seem to be targeting ships linked to the West, not to Russia and China. And it’s only the Western world that is intervening to protect the ships there.⁵⁰

By pure coincidence, the IMO Assembly—the IMO’s governing body—was scheduled to hold its biannual meeting in late November and December 2023. Various items had been submitted for consideration by the assembly, including measures to prevent the growing dark fleet.⁵¹Unsurprisingly, the Houthis’ attacks received urgent attention. The Bahamas, the world’s eighth-largest flag state, criticized the Houthis’ attacks on merchant vessel as a “violation of all of the norms relating to innocent passage of ships.”⁵² And, referring to the Houthis, the country added, “Here we have non-state actors so who do you hold responsible?”

That is the dilemma posed by the Houthis’ novel campaign against shipping. The militia attacks ships ostensibly for geopolitical reasons, and it’s backed by a nation-state, but it’s not an official government. The militia is also linked to Iran but doesn’t officially represent this country either. “That makes it difficult to make this a matter between a hostile country and other countries, but at the same time, the Houthis are a completely different category from pirates and other opportunistic attackers without government links,” Wang said.⁵³

It should, therefore, come as no surprise that Western governments have struggled to formulate strategies to deter the attacks.

International response to the Houthis’ attacks

On December 18, the United States announced the establishment of Operation Prosperity Guardian, a naval task force comprising the United States, the United Kingdom, Bahrain, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, the Seychelles, Spain, and several other nations, amounting to a total of twenty countries.⁵⁴ Some opted not to divulge their participation out of concern that doing so could increase the risks for their countries. “The recent escalation in reckless Houthi attacks originating from Yemen threatens the free flow of commerce, endangers innocent mariners, and violates international law,” US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said in the press release announcing the task force. “The Red Sea is a critical waterway that has been essential to freedom of navigation and a major commercial corridor that facilitates international trade. Countries that seek to uphold the foundational principle of freedom of navigation must come together to tackle the challenge posed by this non-state actor launching ballistic missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) at merchant vessels from many nations lawfully transiting international waters.”⁵⁵

Operation Prosperity Guardian is set up as “highway patrol in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden” with the task of averting attacks on merchant vessels, not punishing the Houthis.⁵⁶ It will “respond to and assist as necessary commercial vessels that are transiting this vital international waterway,” Pentagon spokesman Major General Pat Ryder said in a briefing on December 21.⁵⁷ “It’s a defensive coalition meant to reassure global shipping and mariners that the international community is there to help with safe passage.”⁵⁸

Prosperity Guardian is a fitting name for a naval coalition tasked with thwarting the attacks on merchant vessels in the Red Sea and the adjacent Bab el-Mandeb Strait and Gulf of Aden. The water forms a crucial thoroughfare in the globalized economy; under normal circumstances, some 15 percent of global maritime trade passes through it.⁵⁹ Indeed, in deciding to attack shipping, the Houthis have opted for the form of aggression that would yield by far the most global disruption and attention.

Since December 19, Prosperity Guardian’s members have escorted merchant vessels with links to a wide range of countries (not just the countries involved in the operation). They have also regularly thwarted attacks. This is deterrence by denial: by denying the attackers the gain they seek, the defenders are changing the attackers’ cost-benefit calculus. “You always have the right to self-defense,” Wang noted. “So if you are shot at, you or your defenders can shoot back. That’s mandate for all the ships participating in Prosperity Guardian: they can shoot as soon as they see any threat emerging.”⁶⁰

Retired Vice Admiral Andrew Lewis, who until 2021 commanded the US Navy’s Second Fleet and in an earlier posting commanded the US Navy’s Carrier Strike Group 12, described the situation as follows.

The Houthis’ attacks are essentially a culmination of the threats we’ve seen over the past 15 years. At the beginning of that period, we broadly saw terrorist and piracy threats. As things progressed, we saw the Houthis become more active. As recently as nine years ago, when I was a carrier strike group commander, we were intercepting Iranian convoys of dhows that were transiting to either Oman or Yemen to go to Yemen with the weaponry the Houthis are now using to target vessels in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait. For a period of time, we intercepted these convoys and forced them to turn around, so the equipment wasn’t flowing through, but they continued to build up that capability, and that is the result we’re seeing now.⁶¹

The fact that there was no global body policing Iran’s shipments of weapons through the Red Sea thus became the source of the dramatic threats to shipping in the Red Sea once the Houthis acquired enough weaponry to launch their attacks.

Indeed, despite the launch of Prosperity Guardian, the Houthis’ attacks accelerated. On December 26, for example, US naval vessels and aircraft in the Red Sea shot down twelve one-way attack drones, three anti-ship ballistic missiles, and two land-attack cruise missiles within a period of ten hours.⁶² Such lack of success would convince a conventional adversary to give up. But the novel aspect of the Houthis’ campaign against shipping is not just their comparatively modern weaponry (including the fact that they’re the first non-state group to have fired anti-ship ballistic missiles) but also that the ability to harm merchant vessels is secondary in their cost-benefit calculus. “The difference between piracy and the Houthis is that piracy is criminality. It’s to make money,” said retired Vice Admiral Duncan Potts, who until 2018 was the UK armed forces’ director general of joint force development and previously commanded the EU’s ATALANTA counter-piracy mission. “And like any other business model, if the cost and the risk gets too high, you just move elsewhere. But for the Houthis the attacks are not about money.”⁶³ The Houthis’ priority is not even to sink vessels, which is what a traditional adversary attacking vessels would intend. Instead, their top priority has turned out to be to gain global attention and to cause fear among shipping companies, their insurers, and their customers, and thus to gain a global platform.

The Houthis’ cost-benefit calculus also differs from that of the West’s traditional adversaries, as they primarily use cheap drones and missiles. An often-quoted cost per Houthi missile is $2,000. Simon Lockwood, head of shipowners at Willis Towers Watson, noted that it is these weapons’ relative lack of sophistication that—together with the Houthis’ sloppy research—causes the most fear in the shipping industry. “How do you cause a massive amount of disruption? You just create that level of uncertainty that causes companies in the maritime industry to say, ‘we can’t go into the Red Sea,’” he said. “If I were that way inclined, I would laud the Houthis’ ability to create absolute mayhem with relatively unsophisticated weapons, just to scare off merchant vessels.”⁶⁴

However, the Houthis’ current weapons are a significant improvement from the weaponry used by militias in the early 2000s. The Limburg was attacked by a suicide bomber driving an explosive-laden small boat into the vessel’s hull. Today, by contrast, the Houthis have sophisticated missiles as well as relatively simple drones. “Improvements in technology are a key reason these attacks are happening,” Ringbakken noted. “When I started in this job and even ten years into the job, my experts were telling me that for groups of terrorists and others to hit a moving target like a vessel is extremely difficult. Now the Houthis have proved that it’s quite easy. There’s technological development in targeting technology that has made it possible for groups like the Houthis to drag their equipment around on a lorry and then target and hit a ship far away out in the sea. That was not possible a decade ago.”⁶⁵ Even the best of these missiles and drones don’t reach the technological sophistication of those used by first-rate armed forces, and the Houthis’ drones only hit ships randomly. But the combination is powerful. “The Houthis’ weapons are a mix of very, very advanced missiles and very, very cheap drones. It’s dangerous cocktail,” Wang said.⁶⁶ The fact that a non-state group that has signed no maritime conventions and feels bound by no maritime rules has access to this dangerous cocktail is a serious threat to global shipping.

Indeed, the drones and missiles cause fear among shipping companies, and thwarting them requires far more sophisticated—and far more expensive—technology. Offensive missiles don’t need to be very precise, at least if the attacker’s objective is not to harm specific targets. By contrast, defensive missiles—whose task is to shoot down the offensive missiles—must be extremely precise. US Navy defensive missiles cost, on average, between $1.5 million and $2.5 million each.⁶⁷ For the Houthis, $2,000-a-piece missiles supplied by Iran are a bargain, especially because the missiles spread fear in the shipping industry, regardless of whether they hit their intended target.

Despite Operation Prosperity Guardian’s efforts, the Red Sea has become too risky for many shipping lines and their insurers. By late December 2023, shipping traffic through the Red Sea had decreased by nearly 20 percent.⁶⁸ On January 3, the United States, UK, Germany, Italy, South Korea, and several other Western countries (and, again, Bahrain) issued a stern statement, warning the Houthis of consequences should the attacks continue:

Ongoing Houthi attacks in the Red Sea are illegal, unacceptable, and profoundly destabilizing. There is no lawful justification for intentionally targeting civilian shipping and naval vessels. Attacks on vessels, including commercial vessels, using unmanned aerial vehicles, small boats, and missiles, including the first use of anti-ship ballistic missiles against such vessels, are a direct threat to the freedom of navigation that serves as the bedrock of global trade in one of the world’s most critical waterways. These attacks threaten innocent lives from all over the world and constitute a significant international problem that demands collective action.⁶⁹

The Houthis—logically, according to their cost-benefit calculus—responded with a highly complex attack comprising Iranian-designed one-way attack drones, anti-ship cruise missiles, and an anti-ship ballistic missile.⁷⁰ Shooting them down required the efforts of F/A-18s from USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, USS Gravely (DDG 107), USS Laboon (DDG 58), USS Mason (DDG 87), and the Royal Navy’s HMS Diamond (D34).⁷¹ The fact that Iran supplies the drones and missiles and, in some cases, intelligence to the Houthis, is well-known both to maritime executives and to Western militaries. It would, however, be legally dubious and highly risky for Western armed forces to militarily punish Iran for the Houthis’ attacks. “The maritime domain is unfortunately a welcome arena for escalation without making it state to state,” Ringbakken said.⁷²

Indeed, the Houthis have demonstrated that they can keep escalating because the United States and other Western allies are loath to retaliate against Iran. On January 11, the United States and UK, supported by Australia, Bahrain, Canada, and the Netherlands—operating as part of a new coalition operating in parallel with Prosperity Guardian—launched strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen. “These strikes are in direct response to unprecedented Houthi attacks against international maritime vessels in the Red Sea—including the use of anti-ship ballistic missiles for the first time in history,” President Joe Biden said in a statement. “These attacks have endangered US personnel, civilian mariners, and our partners, jeopardized trade, and threatened freedom of navigation.”⁷³ Further strikes have followed; by the end of February, the United States and the UK had carried out strikes on an almost daily basis.⁷⁴

Not even this punishment has convinced the Houthis to end their attacks. In early 2024, they instead expanded the scope of their attacks, targeting vessels linked to the United States and the UK in addition to those linked to Israel. On January 18, for example, they launched two anti-ship ballistic missiles against a Marshall Islands-flagged, US-owned, Greek-operated tanker.⁷⁵ Since then, the United States and the Prosperity Guardian allies have thwarted Houthi drones, missiles, and anti-ship missile attacks on an almost daily basis, while the US- and UK-led strike coalition has continued its strikes against strategic installations in Houthi-held Yemeni territory.⁷⁶

As before, the Houthis decide what constitutes links to the countries concerned, which puts every vessel at risk of attack. “We can disagree with them and argue that a ship they’ve attacked is not linked to one of these three countries, but once the rocket has hit your ship, it’s too late,” Ringbakken noted.⁷⁷ Lockwood added, “US links, UK links, Israeli links: that’s rubbish. The attacks are about targeting shipping for effect, and it’s crippling shipping.”⁷⁸ By April 2024, sixty-five countries’ interests had been affected by the campaign, according to the US Defense Intelligence Agency.⁷⁹ Only ships linked to Russia and China have appeared safe. Indeed, in an effort to keep their vessels safe, by the beginning of 2024 some captains had adopted a strategy of incorrectly communicating to the Houthis that they had an all-Chinese crew. On February 19, the EU announced the formation of another naval mission in the Red Sea. Operation Aspides, comprising France, Germany, Italy, and Belgium, would protect merchant vessels alongside Prosperity Guardian and the strike coalition.⁸⁰ The Houthis, meanwhile, appeared to continue sparing any vessels linked to Russia and China.⁸¹

By March 2024, forty merchant vessels had been successfully attacked, thirty-four of which had sustained damage.⁸² A few weeks later, the rate of Houthi attacks appeared to have slowed. “Their pace of operations is not what it was,” US Air Force Lieutenant General Alexus Grynkewich, the top US Air Force commander for the Middle East, told a press conference.⁸³ Grynkewich attributed the slowdown to the effect of the US strikes, which had curtailed the Houthis’ arsenal of drones and missiles.⁸⁴ Crucially, despite a reduced arsenal, the Houthis appeared undeterred and kept up their missile and drone strikes. The US Central Command, communicating through its Twitter (X), reported Houthi attacks on a near-daily basis.⁸⁵ Yet the United States seemed to have little confidence the strikes would fundamentally improve security for Red Sea shipping. Grynkewich told reporters that Iran’s continued supply of weapons was a “complicating factor.”

Indeed, in the second half of April, the attacks increased again. On April 26, for example, the Houthis launched three anti-ship ballistic missiles from Yemen into the Red Sea, where they nearly hit one vessel and struck another, an apparently erroneously targeted suspected shadow vessel.⁸⁶ By the end of the month, the US Navy and allies had shot down Houthi drones and missiles or struck Houthi installations around 130 times, according to publicly known numbers.⁸⁷ An exact figure of how many vessels have been targeted by the Houthis is impossible to establish, precisely because the Houthi attacks are vague and may not always hit a vessel, though the attacks are always successful in spreading fear.⁸⁸ Without Prosperity Guardian’s defense of merchant vessels, the harm to vessels would, of course, be far more extensive. The number of vessels available to attack had also dropped significantly as Western-linked vessels’ owners were diverting them to the Cape of Good Hope route. By the end of February, traffic in the Suez Canal (and thus the Red Sea) had dropped by 50 percent.⁸⁹ By contrast, Red Sea traffic by Chinese merchant vessels rose by 73 percent between October 2023 and March 2024, compared to the same period one year earlier.⁹⁰ “The fact that you’ve got so many ships now avoiding the area tells you everything,” said Guy Platten, secretary general of the International Chamber of Shipping. “We absolutely welcome Operation Prosperity Guardian and the EU naval forces, because their presence does provide some sort of protection, but you can’t get every ship. But what does this mean for seafarers? These ships have crews, they’re not just inanimate objects. Nobody wants to risk their lives, and owners also have a responsibility and a duty of care for the seafarers on their ships.”⁹¹

The attacks have an effect on seafarers far beyond the ones working on vessels that have been struck by the Houthis—and, thus, on the globalized economy. “Shipping depends absolutely on its crew,” Roberts noted. “People have compared being a member of crew to being in prison, but with worse internet. It’s just not a great life. They don’t get many breaks, they get criminalized at the drop of a hat. It’s really not very attractive. And then on top of that, now you’ve got attacks on vessels. If you haven’t got crew and you haven’t got security, then the supply chain isn’t going to work for you. There’s got to be some serious thought given to this. If the crews don’t want to go, then nothing happens.”⁹²

Indeed, the global shortage of seafarers is becoming so severe that, if not enough of them are willing to crew ships having to pass through perilous waters, ships risk being unable to leave port. “There’s a limited number of people in our navies who could be drafted in to help on commercial ships,” Roberts said. “And would they be willing or able or allowed to do that? Governments would have to set priorities and start with the oil tankers and absolutely vital food. Luxury goods traveling on container ships, not so much. What is the appetite for consumer goods when you’ve got a threatened environment?”⁹³

The Houthis have continued their attacks despite paying a significantly higher price, measured in damaged or destroyed infrastructure in Houthi-held Yemeni territory. By April 2024, the militia appeared to have expanded its campaign into the Indian Ocean, to which the Gulf of Aden’s eastern end is connected but which is located several hundred nautical miles from the Red Sea. On April 26, the militia struck the MSC Orion, a container ship sailing under the flag of Madeira, off the coast of Somalia.⁹⁴

Then, on May 2, the militia announced it was expanding its attacks to the eastern Mediterranean. “We will target any ships heading to Israeli ports in the Mediterranean Sea in any area we are able to reach,” Houthi military spokesman General Yahya Saree said. He added that the decision would be implemented “immediately, and from the moment this statement is announced.”⁹⁵ By the end of June, no such attacks had occurred, but the Houthis kept up their attacks in the Red Sea and surrounding waters and expanded their arsenal. On May 13, EUNAVFOR Aspides reported that it had escorted 100 vessels since its inception less than three months earlier.⁹⁶ On May 28, the Marshall Islands-flagged bulk carrier Laax was hit—twice.⁹⁷ In June, the Antigua and Barbuda-flagged cargo ship Norderney was hit.⁹⁸ Five days later, a Liberia-flagged, Greek-owned coal carrier was hit so badly that its crew had to be evacuated, with one member unaccounted for.⁹⁹ Two days after that, another vessel reported two explosions nearby—apparent failed attempts to hit it.¹⁰⁰ As the attacks continued, the Houthis expanded their arsenal. On June 23, the militia reported having attacked a Liberia-flagged bulk carrier, this time using not flying drones or missiles but an uncrewed boat (which can also be referred to as a waterborne drone).¹⁰¹ Four days later, another Houthi uncrewed boat attacked a vessel, this time a Malta-flagged bunker.¹⁰² The Houthis’ use of uncrewed boats continued in July. On July 20, for example, an uncrewed boat appearing to be loaded with explosives approached a Liberian-flagged vessel the Houthis subsequently described as American. Armed guards onboard the merchant vessel managed to repel the attack.¹⁰³ In the subsequent 24 hours, US forces destroyed four such boats.¹⁰⁴ DNK and other maritime companies had been predicting this expansion, especially because the Houthis were already using airborne drones. The expansion also continued along the path of ever more sophistication. On June 26, the Houthis claimed to have struck another vessel with a hypersonic missile, a highly sophisticated weapon heretofore not used by militias.¹⁰⁵

Because modern merchant vessels are sturdy, even the successful attacks caused mostly minor material damage. They did, however, have a human toll. At the time of writing, the attacks have cost four seafarers their lives, and many seafarers whose ships were attacked have been left traumatized.¹⁰⁶ On June 25, the Philippines—the world’s leading provider of seafarers—announced it was considering banning its nationals from serving on vessels transiting the Red Sea.¹⁰⁷ While such plans are hardly surprising, they will further harm Western ships, as Philippine seafarers overwhelmingly crew Western-linked vessels, while Russian and Chinese vessels are primarily crewed by Russian and Chinese nationals.

The attacks have also continued to illustrate the Houthis’ inaccuracy in targeting (and their faulty due diligence). On April 26, for example, they struck the Andromeda Star, a vessel owned in the UK, flagged in Panama, and operated in the Seychelles.¹⁰⁸ On May 18, they struck the M/T Wind, a Greek-owned, Panamanian-flagged oil tanker. The two were, however, hardly Western vessels; they’re part of the dark fleet carrying Russian oil. In another illustrative turn of events, Western coalition ships in the Red Sea came to their aid.¹⁰⁹

Measured in the cost-benefit term of vessels hit by strikes compared to losses and damage to the attacker side, the Houthis’ campaign has, as we have seen, largely been a failure. Indeed, traditional armed forces would likely have ceased their attacks after such an increase on the cost side of the cost-benefit calculus. Yet the Houthis have not only kept up their campaign but expanded it. This again illustrates how the Yemeni militia reacts differently than traditional armed forces because it uses a different cost-benefit calculus. From the Houthis’ perspective, the benefit is not the number of vessels destroyed or severely damaged, but the inordinate global attention and power the attacks generate. The militia appears to measure cost purely in monetary expenses for its weaponry, and that cost is modest. In the Houthis’ calculus, the cost in number of targets missed, environmental damage in Yemeni waters, and infrastructure destroyed by US-UK airstrikes appears to be marginal. Attacks on shipping “are a great weapon that can be used, for want of a better expression, to prevent or effect change in a particular area or cause damage to other nations and to shift the order of the world,” Lockwood said. “That’s the real danger that we face with the Houthis.¹¹⁰” Captain (Navy) Niels Markussen, the director of NATO’s Shipping Center, added

The Houthis’ capability appears to have been reduced to around 50 percent as we speak [in March 2024], but they still have the will to continue as long as we’re not taking over their territory with land forces, which we’d have to do to prevent them from using their coastline to launch attacks. Western and allied navies can do what they’re doing right now, they can lie outside the coast and they can protect ships, they can shoot down the drones and the missiles that are coming out, but some of these drones and missiles will get through, meaning that the Red Sea is not safe for shipping. We cannot guarantee safe passage through the Red Sea. And it’s that uncertainty that they will keep using against us.¹¹¹

The Houthis are so illustrative because they’re not a one-off campaign but represent a triply new threat to shipping. The militia is not an officially recognized state and doesn’t operate according to the same calculus as traditional armed forces. At the same time, it’s linked to a government that supplies it with a range of weaponry, including highly sophisticated kinds. Because the Houthis’ objective is to wreak havoc on Western-linked merchant shipping, it matters little how successful their strikes are. What’s more, because global trade is so intense, they can wreak havoc on not just shipping, but on the globalized economy. Wang summarized the predicament facing Western nations, the default protectors of global shipping.

Is the Western defense against incoming missiles sustainable? When you’re using two-million-dollar missiles to shoot down a drone worth a few hundred dollars, there’s a long-term problem. Of course, if you are attacked by a ballistic missile, you need to engage it with a very advanced missile. That’s the only way you can counter it. But the combination of advanced missiles and very, very cheap weapons is basically drawing resources from the Western coalition at a pace that’s not sustainable in the long run. When it comes to drones, it takes a lot of courage to wait and to engage a drone when it comes into gun range, which would be the cheap way of doing it. But if you have a warship worth a billion dollars, you need to engage the drone or missile as soon as you can in order to cope with the threat as far out as possible. So you will have to waste expensive missiles on drones in order to be safe on board. And that raises, you could say, a technological challenge that you have on warships today because all warships are filled with advanced missiles. That has been the rule of the game because to engage a peer adversary you need advanced missiles and you also need to have precision deep strike capability to engage the enemy ashore from the sea. So that part is still valid. But you need another way of dealing with cheap drones that is coming towards you.¹¹²

Indeed, as Wang had predicted, the Biden administration appeared to conclude that the Houthis—with their fundamentally different cost-benefit calculus—could not be defeated militarily. In April, the US government appeared to be trying to find a diplomatic solution with the Houthis. One such solution involved removing the designation as a terrorist group, which the United States had imposed in January 2024, in a quid pro quo that would see the Houthis cease their attacks. “We would certainly study that but not assume it’s an automatic thing,” Tim Lenderking, President Biden’s special envoy for Yemen, told news media.¹¹³

The shipping industry’s response

The shipping industry (including shipping lines and insurers) possesses centuries-long experience assessing new and growing threats. Lloyd’s Market Association, a large marketplace for underwriters, traces its origins to Edward Lloyd’s coffeehouse in central London, where from 1688 seafarers, bankers, and underwriters met to discuss business. Today the insurance industry maintains bodies like the Joint War Committee (JWC), which operates a list of so-called listed areas. In regular meetings and emergency sessions, the JWC’s members assess risky waters. The most dangerous ones are “listed,” which means that shipping operators must clear passage with their insurers before sending their vessels through them. About a week before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the JWC listed Russia’s and Ukraine’s parts of the Black Sea, as well as the Sea of Azov. In mid-December, the JWC expanded its listed parts of the Red Sea.¹¹⁴

Red-flagging bodies of water is a logical measure for the shipping industry: it creates a common basis on which a critical mass of the industry can act. The JWC’s listing of Black Sea waters and the Sea of Azov was followed by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine , which left no doubt that sailing through these waters was inadvisable.¹¹⁵ In cases short of war, where the case for not sailing may be less obvious, the listed designation prompts shipping companies and insurers to approach perilous waters with caution, which creates a somewhat unified industry response.

This is what has taken place since the Houthis’ hijacking of the Galaxy Leader. Some shipping companies have diverted all their ships away from the Red Sea to the route around the Cape of Good Hope, which adds some 10–12 days to a vessel’s journey and added logistical complexity involving the reception and delivery of cargo and arrival and departure of crews. Other shipping lines have diverted some of their vessels. In late March 2023, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait had a seven-day moving average of thirty-one vessels; one year earlier, the seven-day moving average was seventy-six vessels.¹¹⁶ In early April 2023, the Cape of Good Hope had a seven-day moving average of forty-three vessels; by early March 2024, the seven-day moving average was seventy-eight vessels.¹¹⁷

Avoiding risky waters is a feasible strategy in the short term, but it doesn’t solve the problem of the Houthis and other state-linked outfits targeting shipping. “If you just look at these rebels, whether their actions are backed by Iran or not, the impact they’re having on not just shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, but on global trade generally, is substantial,” Lockwood said. “It will lead to shortages, and it will have an inflationary impact on trade. It will also lead to opportunism among people who see an opportunity to push prices.”¹¹⁸

Indeed, the attacks will create a contentious debate across the shipping sector (and its clients) about what added costs are acceptable—the alternative being to stop shipping goods altogether—and who should pay for them. “You have commercial pressures,” Ringbakken noted. “You have cars on the way from China to be launched in the European market and [the client] saying, ‘you have to get the cars to the market.’ But as insurers, we have to assess the risk, and if the risk increases we increase the premiums, which increases the costs.”¹¹⁹ The costs haven’t become prohibitive, meaning they are not so high that customers opt not to ship their goods.

It’s quite expensive to go around the Cape, and the Egyptians are pretty good at calculating what the cost is to go through the Suez Canal. As an example, if you have a 65-million-dollar tanker [a tanker insured for a value of $65 million], that’s our average ship going through [the Red Sea and the Suez Canal]. She will pay one million dollars to go through the canal and it would pay $650,000 in war risk premium to go through. That makes it slightly cheaper to go around the Cape, but it’s also 16 days more.¹²⁰

By contrast, Chinese-owned and Chinese-flagged vessels, which are under no threat of attack, don’t face additional premiums in the Red Sea.

Indeed, it may only be when the number of total losses—vessels sunk or rendered unusable—begins accumulating that the Western shipping industry and maritime insurers will collectively opt out of the Red Sea route. By May 2024, there had been two total losses resulting from the Houthis’ attacks. Had modern vessels not been so sturdy, the total losses would have been significantly higher. And, added Ringbakken, “there’s of course a duty of care for the crew, and at some point most operators will have realized that there is a chance if not of being targeted at least of being subject to collateral damage.”¹²¹ Rerouting to the Cape of Good Hope, however, also brings additional expense. By April 2024, ports along the cape route had also reached, and in many cases surpassed, capacity as a result of the sudden influx of ships. As a result, vessels calling at these ports frequently need to wait for a berth, and storage yards struggle to handle the cargo.¹²²

The Houthis’ campaign against shipping is, in fact, brilliantly executed gray zone aggression (sometimes referred to as hybrid aggression). It causes real harm to the entities, people, and countries targeted, but—because it’s not a military aggression by a government—the targeted countries struggle to respond. The peril posed by the Houthis is not just that shipping in the Red Sea will continue to be dangerous. Their campaign also sends the message that the global maritime order is crumbling and those violating its rules can do so with impunity.

The lesson other militias and hostile states are likely to draw from the Houthi campaign is that a militia or hostile state can cause immense and immediate harm to countries through similar campaigns by groups that are not officially or technically armed forces. Wang notes that

in global maritime strategy, there has always been a strong focus on choke points—a narrow strategic important strait, like the Malacca Strait, the Strait of Hormuz, the Great Belt in Denmark, the channel area between Europe the UK, the Strait of Gibraltar and so on. And you also have choke points in the Northern Sea route [the route that leads from the Barents Sea near Russia’s border with Norway, along Russia’s Arctic coast and on to the Bering Strait]. And those chokepoints will always potentially be subjects for aggression against global shipping because it’s so easy to inflict the sea waves from the shore thanks to the short distance from the shore.¹²³

In the early 2000s, the Strait of Malacca—a crucial shipping lane located between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand—experienced a spike in piracy, which subsided dramatically when Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand began jointly patrolling the strait.¹²⁴ It and similar narrow, strategic bodies of water may see the emergence of militias backed by a state in the region, perhaps even ad hoc militias created to attack shipping for geopolitical purposes. The Strait of Gibraltar, the English Channel, and the Great Belt, all located between nations that maintain friendly relations, are less at risk of geopolitically motivated attacks on shipping. The Great Belt, however, is a crucial thoroughfare for “shadow vessels” going to and from Russia.¹²⁵ Such vessels could be used to harm regular shipping in the Great Belt and the neighboring Baltic Sea.

In each case, the attackers’ objective would not be to sink merchant ships but to frighten the shipping industry for geopolitical reasons—for example, to gain global attention or, in the case of separatist groups, to gain some kind of legal recognition. The Baltic Sea could, for example, see the emergence of a maritime-style Wagner Group that might officially simply operate merchant vessels but unofficially frighten other merchant vessels by its mere presence.

As with the Houthis, such groups’ cost-benefit calculus is likely to fundamentally differ from that of traditional armed forces. Indeed, states with hostile intentions could create proxy groups to harm merchant vessels associated with other countries. Similarly, China could expand its use of maritime harassment by making it more frequent, using it in more areas, or both, and other countries could decide to similarly send geopolitical signals by dispatching inspection flotillas or initiate maritime harassment. Indeed, from China’s perspective, the Philippines engages in maritime harassment in parts of the South China Sea that Beijing considers Chinese waters, though the Philippines and other governments consider the waters Philippine.¹²⁶

As we have seen, the Houthis’ attacks are just the most dramatic example of geopolitically linked forms of aggression currently facing global shipping. If these forms of aggression are not deterred, they will continue to grow in quantity and will be joined by new forms. In the immediate term, such aggression will pose a threat to shipping operations in affected waters. In the longer term, it will also threaten functioning of the global maritime order, which depends on a critical mass of countries and other entities—whether they be militias or shipping companies—respecting maritime rules. If such compliance with maritime rules can’t be taken for granted, shipping lines and other companies involved in global shipping will be wary of sailing through certain bodies of water. This would harm not only countries located adjacent to such bodies of water but the entire conduct of global shipping.

Improving strategies to counter attacks on shipping

When the Houthis attacked the Central Park, it was clear that the countries trying to protect the global maritime order were facing a new type of adversary. This recognition among Western governments and maritime companies, though, was only marginally helpful, because it was entirely unclear what strategies Western governments could use against such an adversary. As we have seen, Western governments have struggled to establish an effective response to the Houthis’ attacks precisely because the Houthis are a new kind of adversary, whose logic differs from that of nation-states and traditional armed forces. Lewis notes:

If the Houthis were not an enemy, I would have an admiration for their strategy, but as it is I just have a distaste for their whole approach. They’re putting military forces, nation states, and industry at risk because they’re playing by different rules. How do you defend against this thing, how do you prepare to nullify it? It’s very costly for industry, and it’s very costly for militaries trying to enforce maritime rules. When it comes to the Houthis, we know who their backer is, Iran, so an extreme solution would be to hit it and all the military targets associated with it. But that would be too risky.¹²⁷

Indeed, hitting the state sponsor of every kind of aggression against merchant shipping would not only be highly risky, but would also quickly overextend the capacity of Western navies. The Russian and Chinese navies have not intervened against the Houthis’ attacks. This is regrettable from a maritime-order protection perspective but hardly surprising, given that both countries violate maritime rules in other ways.¹²⁸ They also seem to tolerate the Houthis’ attacks, which have—with the exception of a few cases of apparently misdirected attacks—spared vessels linked to Russia and China.

However, there are several steps Western governments and the shipping industry can take to at least partly blunt the impact of state-linked aggression against merchant vessels. They include the following.

Preemptive diversion of shipping

A yet-untried way to defang the Houthis and prospective similar attackers would be for a core group of governments and Western-based shipping companies and maritime insurers to declare that all merchant shipping linked (by flag, ship ownership, or cargo) to a core group of countries will be diverted. “As soon as you are away from the coasts, on the oceans, it’s much more difficult for paramilitary organizations to attack,” Wang noted. “The solution to the Red Sea attacks may be to collectively put everything on the southern route around the Cape of Good Hope.”¹²⁹

This kind of collective action would involve an extraordinary diplomatic effort to bring together enough countries—including flag-of-convenience states—as well as shipping companies and underwriters. But success in assembling such a coalition would produce significant power. The threat of shipping diverting to the Cape of Good Hope—not out of fear, but as part of a collective decision by a wide-ranging group of governments and companies in the shipping industry—would, in the case of the Houthis, turn the Yemeni militia from a self-proclaimed anti-Western fighting force into a force driving business away from the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the Gulf of Aden, and the Suez Canal. Such an undertaking would have to be led by the US State Department, the Egyptian government, or, given the number of EU-linked vessels affected, the European Commission. If the lead entity were to succeed in getting enough governments and companies to commit to the plan, it could present the plan as an ultimatum. In the case of the Houthis, given that the plan would leave the militia and its sponsor Iran isolated, Iran may well conclude that the Houthis’ campaign has achieved its objectives and force the Houthis to end it.

Intra-industry risk updates

Vessels would be helped by risk updates not just when sailing in waters such as the Red Sea that are known to be home to attacks, but also in waters where new attacks are being orchestrated. The International Chamber of Commerce operates a Kuala Lumpur-based organization called the ICC International Maritime Bureau (IMB), which is meant to function as a hub for maritime threat updates. But Peter Broadhurst, head of Inmarsat Maritime Safety, noted that updates logged with the IMB are often forwarded slowly and may not reach vessels at all.

The information is there. If you’ve got a ship that’s just been hit by a rocket, it’s got a crew on board, and they’ll want to abandon it. The nearest rescue is another vessel, either a military vessel that’s shadowing it or another commercial ship. Somebody needs to go and help these guys, and if you don’t tell them they’re not going to know.¹³⁰

Shipping companies and related firms could, he suggested, form an industry-funded outfit that would function as the hub for such updates.

Such a hub could be further aided by artificial intelligence (AI)-aided risk updates. Mature AI companies and AI startups could train artificial intelligence to detect anomalies in maritime thoroughfares and other strategic bodies of water and forward any anomalies—such as the accumulation of hardware or personnel in locations from which attacks could be launched—to the hub. After assessing whether the anomalies posed a risk to merchant vessels, the hub would alert shipping companies.

Use of directed-energy weapons

Directed-energy weapons use concentrated electromagnetic energy to “incapacitate, damage, disable, or destroy enemy equipment, facilities, and/or personnel.”¹³¹ The Congressional Research Service (CRS) notes that these weapons include high-energy lasers, which are used by “ground forces in short-range air defense, counter-unmanned aircraft systems, or counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar missions [and] could theoretically provide options for boost-phase missile intercept.”¹³² That makes these weapons—if they can easily be produced and used—an extremely cost-effective alternative to defensive missiles and, indeed, more cost-effective than missiles of the kind the Houthis use.¹³³ “If you can engage the enemy with laser weapons, you don’t have the logistics problem anymore because you can reload while you are at sea. It’s just a matter of having enough energy,” Wang said. “And that development of energy weapons is likely to be accelerated now as a result of the war in Ukraine, but definitely also as a result of the situation in the Red Sea.”¹³⁴ These defensive capabilities could also be developed as exportable, commercially procurable, standalone systems that commercial shipowners can procure and install on their fleets, which would enhance vessels’ defensive capability and, thus, lower risk and insurance premiums. For military customers, manufacturers could modify and enhance the weapons to meet military requirements such as increased power output and integration with other weapons.

For fiscal year 2024, the US Department of Defense has requested around $1 billion for unclassified directed-energy weapons. In a speech in January 2024, Vice Admiral Brendan McLane, the commander of the US Pacific Fleet’s Naval Surface Force, “called for a directed energy weapon to be deployed on every Navy ship.”¹³⁵ Such large-scale development, though, is likely to take some time. At the time of writing, only nineteen directed-energy weapons are installed on US naval vessels.¹³⁶

Selective protection dependent on flag registration

Countries sending naval forces to the Red Sea (and prospective future flashpoints) to defend merchant vessels could also announce that they will only protect vessels sailing under their flags. “To a certain extent, you can send naval vessels to the Red Sea in order to protect shipping,” Wang noted.” But it’s the same ships that are needed in the Indo-Pacific and in the North Atlantic and in the Baltic Sea and off the coast of Norway. When it comes to Western naval resources, it’s a zero-sum game.”¹³⁷ During the Tanker War, when the government of Kuwait asked the US government to allow Kuwaiti-flagged tankers—which were coming under attack—to be reflagged under US flag, Washington complied and provided the tankers with naval protection.¹³⁸

Western governments could declare that they will only seek to protect ships flagged in their countries, on the basis that shipowners that don’t commit to the rules of Western countries also can’t expect their protection. China and Russia, for example, have a history of only protecting merchant vessels sailing under their flags. Restricting protection would, however, do little for the general protection of the global maritime order, especially because the past several decades have seen the trend toward flags of convenience accelerate. In 2022, more than 70 percent of global ship capacity, as measured in deadweight tons, was registered under a foreign flag with beneficial owners and registries being in different countries, UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reports.¹³⁹ Only 0.9 percent of merchant vessels (measured in deadweight tons) sail under US flag, 0.5 percent sail under UK flag, and 0.3 percent sail under German flag. The three largest flag states are Panama and Liberia, with more than 16 percent each, and the Marshall Islands with 13.2 percent.¹⁴⁰

Indeed, trying to reverse the shipping industry’s pervasive use of flags of convenience while, at the same time, trying to protect shipping against state-linked attacks would likely be impossible. “If you look at all our economies in the West, irrespective of where the vessels are flagged, the goods they are transporting are fundamental to our economy,” said Potts, who has commanded the US-led Coalition Task Group in the northern Gulf and has also commanded NATO’s High Readiness Force (Maritime).¹⁴¹ He added:

In the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Strait of Hormuz region, historically we used to say we’re absolutely flag blind about who we’re protecting. Because the West, all our economies, rely on freedom of navigation for global trade and the well-being of our economy. Whether you’re Marshall Island-flagged or US-flagged or UK-flagged or Greek-flagged or anything else, we would treat them exactly the same because it’s only when the whole system works that the shipping works.¹⁴²

And, Potts noted, “Often the cargo is more valuable than the ship. Who owns the cargo? Where’s it going? Who’s insuring it? Who owns the ship? With many ships, you can identify several different countries who have a stake in the ship and should take responsibility.”¹⁴³

Freedom-of-navigation operations

In freedom-of-navigation operations (FONOPs, also known as FON operations or FON assertions), a country’s naval vessels underline the importance of innocent passage by sailing through waters over which another country wrongfully claims jurisdiction or otherwise tries to interfere with civilian traffic. FONOPs are regularly conducted by the Royal Navy, and especially the US Navy, as a constabulary measure to protect the global maritime order.

In the South China Sea, the US Navy now regularly undertakes FONOPs through waters that are internationally recognized as belonging to the Philippines or other countries but are claimed by China under its “nine-dash line” policy. Noted retired Rear Admiral David Manero, a former US defense attaché to Russia and the UK, respectively, said, “In order to be successful doing freedom and navigation operations, you have to be consistent, and your messaging has to be on, and it has to always be refined. Imagine taking that whole message among several nations and coordinate it. This is why we’re doing it, citing the law of the sea. But it involves a great deal of coordination.”¹⁴⁴

To date, FONOPs have rarely been conducted in response to state-linked attacks on merchant vessels, simply because such attacks have been so rare. The US Navy has, however, conducted FON-related operations in the Strait of Hormuz and in the Bab el-Mandeb. The latter challenge Yemen’s requirement for foreign warships and nuclear-powered vessels to obtain Yemen’s permission prior to transiting its territorial waters. The United States also regularly conducts FONOPs in the South China Sea.¹⁴⁵ There would be little point conducting FONOPs against attackers like the Houthis because they don’t represent nation-states and have such a different cost-benefit calculus. FONOPs would, however, be useful against inspection flotillas, should China or other countries begin to regularly deploy such flotillas in internationally disputed waters. In practice, such FONOPs would need to involve the US Navy or the Royal Navy, as other Western governments would be hesitant to lead such operations.

Yet it would be illusory to think that the US and UK navies could conduct simultaneous FONOPs around the world and, in essence, provide a global maritime constabulary. This would stretch the two navies’ resources beyond the breaking point. In the Taiwan Strait, FONOPs would also involve the risk of confrontation with the world’s largest navy, that of China, “with a battle force of over 370 platforms, including major surface combatants, submarines, ocean-going amphibious ships, mine warfare ships, aircraft carriers, and fleet auxiliaries.”¹⁴⁶

Indeed, the attacks against, and harassment of, merchant vessels have reached a quantity that key Western navies would struggle to tackle. The Royal Navy, for example, has some eighty vessels, but only twelve of them are frigates, while eight are offshore patrol vessels and six are destroyers.¹⁴⁷

Disrupting the delivery of weapons

As previously noted, the US Navy has long tried to interdict weapons supplies being shipped to the Houthis. Indeed, it began doing so long before it was evident that the militia would use the weapons to attack shipping. Now that it’s clear the weapons are being used not just in Yemen’s civil war but also to harm global shipping, the United States and its allies could ramp up these efforts. They could also announce they’re expanding such efforts to other weapons-smuggling operations. Until now, the smuggling has primarily harmed civilians in countries affected by civil war. But with the Houthis likely to inspire copycat attacks on shipping, disrupting the supplies of weapons and weapons components has gained additional urgency. “We need to really understand the Houthis’ supply chains and how the components for weapons that they then assemble get into the country,” Potts said. “It will be complex to map this, but it’s a practical step we can take.”¹⁴⁸ To map these supply chains, governments could also confer with the private sector, as some companies are likely to have information that could help governments establish a clearer picture.

They could also confer with AI companies that can track and trace movements of suspected arms components to Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen. Indeed, governments could establish cooperation with AI companies, especially with startups seeking to prove their technologies, to receive early indications of patterns suggesting potentially worrying developments involving other groups and states. Such collaboration would add to observations already provided by intelligence services.

Armed guards on board

When piracy increased heavily off the coast of Somalia in the early 2000s, many shipping companies responded by hiring armed guards. The Houthis’ seizure of the Galaxy Leader quickly prompted suggestions of armed guards onboard merchant vessels in the Red Sea. Guards on merchant vessels are, however, relatively lightly armed and would not be able to protect a vessel against trained militias like the Houthis. Indeed, because ship guards are not soldiers, they’re legally prevented from operating military equipment and would thus not be able to protect ships from missile and (most) drone attacks. They would likely also struggle to thwart a professionally executed hijacking of the kind the Houthis mounted against the Galaxy Leader. This is illustrated by the fact that, even though ships in the Red Sea have increased “armed guards on board” signals since the Houthis began their attacks, the attacks have continued.¹⁴⁹ In addition, armed resistance against a seizure attempt by a militia would risk escalating into a situation in which navies would feel compelled to intervene.

Western countries could, however, offer vessels protection by law-enforcement officers. Such officers’ task could be defined as defending the cargo rather than the ship. That would mean the exporting or importing country could offer embarked law enforcement that would be able to employ military or quasi-military defensive capabilities. The United States has tried this concept: the Navy and Marine task force that was deployed to the Strait of Hormuz in August 2023 included the offer of servicemembers embarking on merchant vessels if the vessels’ owners and managers requested such protection.

Conclusion

Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, the world’s nations have gradually built a set of rules and agreements that allows merchant shipping to operate without constant fear of attacks by hostile states. They have done so because nations’ economies—at least since the Industrial Revolution—rely on global shipping.

The Houthis’ attacks in the Red Sea, however, have introduced a new threat to merchant shipping: geopolitically connected attacks that are linked to a hostile state but not carried out by it. The Yemeni militia has, in fact, demonstrated that building up a capacity to act in the maritime domain is possible for a non-state actor with no maritime tradition. The fact that the Houthis are not the armed forces of an internationally recognized country and operate with a completely different cost-benefit calculus than traditional armed forces make them such a fierce threat to global shipping. So does the fact that they use more sophisticated weapons than previous generations’ militias have had at their disposal, and that the weapons are inexpensive and attractive to use. Other militias (including ones yet to be formed) will likely want to copy the Houthis’ successful concept in other maritime chokepoints and heavily trafficked waters.

For the global shipping industry (except vessels linked to Russia and China, which the Houthis exempt from their attacks), this means that a neutral sector can be severely harmed and disrupted, at great expense to the shipping industry. The Houthis’ different cost-benefit calculus means retaliating against their strikes has little effect on their motivation. The harm to seafarers as a result of the Houthi attacks now presents an additional problem for Western shipping companies and, thus, global supply chains. So far, the shipping industry has managed to recruit seafarers—these days, predominantly from India, the Philippines, and Indonesia.¹⁵⁰ If attacks continue, shipping’s already precarious recruitment situation will worsen significantly. “Who wants to work in a war zone?” Broadhurst asked. “Unless we can protect seafarers, how can global trade continue?”¹⁵¹ At the end of June 2024, the Philippine government banned Philippine seafarers from working on ships that had been attacked in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.¹⁵²

Instead, Western governments and the shipping industry will need to use means other than traditional military force to reduce the pain caused by the Houthis (and prospective future attackers of a similar kind). These efforts—including the preemptive threat of collective rerouting away from perilous waters and the use of direct-energy weapons—will require public-private collaboration. Western governments and shipping companies could start by announcing that they are increasing their collaboration beyond the immediate needs in the Red Sea. This would signal to prospective attackers that Western governments and companies are prepared for new maritime gray zone aggression and will have a better strategy to thwart it than has been the case in the Red Sea.

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1 Ronald O’Rourke, “The Tanker War,” Proceedings, US Naval Institute, May 1988, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1988/may/tanker-war.

2 Bradley Peniston, “Operation Earnest Will,” Navybook, last visited June 14, 2024, https://www.navybook.com/no-higher-honor/timeline/operation-earnest-will/.

3 O’Rourke, “The Tanker War.”

4 Piracy is not covered in this report, which exclusively analyzes state-linked aggression against shipping

5 H. B. Robertson, Jr., “U.S. Policy on Targeting Enemy Merchant Shipping: Bridging the Gap Between Conventional Law and State Practice,” in Richard J. Grunawalt, ed., International Law Studies 65 (1993), 338, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1744&context=ils#:~:text=The%20conundrum%20of%20this%20situation,legitimate%20targets%20of%20direct%20attack.

6 “Privateer,” Britannica, last visited June 14, 2024, https://www.britannica.com/technology/privateer.

7 Robertson, Jr., “U.S. Policy on Targeting Enemy Merchant Shipping,” 338.

8 “Hague Convention VI—Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities: 18 October 1907, 205 Consol. T.S. 305, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) 533, entered into force Jan. 26, 1910,” University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, last visited June 14, 2024, http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/1907e.htm.

9 Robertson, Jr., “U.S. Policy on Targeting Enemy Merchant Shipping,” 339

10 “American Entry into World War I, 1917,” US Department of State, last visited June 14, 2024, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwi/82205.htm.

11 Ibid., 342.

12 Robertson, Jr., “U.S. Policy on Targeting Enemy Merchant Shipping,” 342.

13 “Convention on the International Maritime Organization,” International Maritime Organization, 1948, https://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/Convention-on-the-International-Maritime-Organization.aspx.

14 Ibid.

15 Brian Michael Jenkins, et al., “A Chronology of Terrorist Attacks and Other Criminal Actions against Maritime Targets,” RAND, September 1983, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2006/P6906.pdf.

16 Interview with the author, March 14, 2024.

17 “International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974,” International Maritime Organization, 1974, https://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-the-Safety-of-Life-at-Sea-(SOLAS),-1974.aspx.

18 Ibid. International maritime rules, treaties, and conventions will be discussed at greater length in a later report.

19 Tullio Treves, “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” Audiovisual Library of International Law, December 10, 1982, https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/uncls/uncls.html. UNCLOS entered into force in 1994.

20 “United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982: Overview and Full Text,” United Nations, 1982, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm.

21 Richard A. Mobley, “Revisiting the 1984 Naval Mining of the Red Sea: Intelligence Challenges and Lessons,” Studies in Intelligence 66, 2 (June 2022), 22f, https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/RedSeaMiningMystery1984.pdf.

22 Felix Richter, “The Steep Rise in Global Seaborne Trade,” Statista, March 26, 2021, https://www.statista.com/chart/24527/total-volume-of-global-sea-trade/.

23 “U.S. Charges Saudi for 2002 Oil Tanker Bombing,” Maritime Executive, February 6, 2014, https://maritime-executive.com/article/US-Charges-Saudi-for-2002-Oil-Tanker-Bombing-2014-02-06.

24 “The Strait of Hormuz is the World’s Most Important Oil Transit Chokepoint,” US Energy Information Administration, November 21, 2023, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61002.

25 “Stena Impero: Seized British Tanker Leaves Iran’s Waters,” BBC, September 27, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-49849718.

26 Patrick Wintour, “A Visual Guide to the Gulf Tanker Attacks,” Guardian, June 14, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/13/a-visual-guide-to-the-gulf-tanker-attacks.

27 C. Todd Lopez, “U.S. Forces Arrive to Support Deterrence Efforts at Strait of Hormuz,” US Department of Defense, August 7, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3485733/us-forces-arrive-to-support-deterrence-efforts-at-strait-of-hormuz.

28 Heather Mongilio, “Video: Iranian Navy Warship Fires on Oil Tanker in the Strait of Hormuz,” USNI News, July 5, 2023, https://news.usni.org/2023/07/05/video-iranian-warship-fires-on-oil-tanker-in-the-strait-of-hormuz.

29 “Merchant Ships Attacked and on Fire off Ukraine,” Maritime Executive, March 25, 2022, https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/merchant-ships-attacked-and-on-fire-off-ukraine.

30 Matt Coyne and Gary Dixon, “Engineer Killed in Attack on Bangladeshi Bulker in Black Sea,” TradeWinds, March 2, 2022, https://www.tradewindsnews.com/casualties/engineer-killed-in-attack-on-bangladeshi-bulker-in-black-sea/2-1-1177847.

31 Elisabeth Braw, “Foreign Seafarers Are Stranded in Ukraine for Christmas,” Foreign Policy, December 27, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/27/seafarers-stranded-ukraine-christmas-russia-war/.

32 Interview with the author, April 5, 2024.

33 Alexander Lott, Hybrid Threats and the Law of the Sea (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2021),172, https://brill.com/display/book/9789004509368/BP000013.xml?language=en&body=pdf-60830; Katie Zeng Xiaojun, “East Asia: Impact of China and Taiwan Conflict on Shipping,” Maritime Intelligence, September 6, 2022, https://www.riskintelligence.eu/analyst-briefings/east-asia-impact-of-china-and-taiwan-conflict; “Taiwan Strait: Pray We’ll Always Be as Lucky,” Lloyd’s List, August 5, 2022, https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1141850/Taiwan-Strait-pray-well-always-be-as-lucky.

34 Interview with the author, April 5, 2024. China’s construction of artificial islands and its long-distance fishing fleet, whose estimated nearly seventeen thousand vessels fish other countries’ waters dry, will be examined in a subsequent report within the Atlantic Council’s Threats to the Global Maritime Order project.

35 Bec Strating, “China’s Nine-Dash Line Proves Stranger than Fiction,” Interpreter, April 12, 2022, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-s-nine-dash-line-proves-stranger-fiction; Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke, and Max Molot, “The Critical Role of Chinese Trade in the South China Sea,” in China and the U.S.: Cooperation, Competition and/or Conflict an Experimental Assessment, Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 1, 2019, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22586.30.

36 Gregory B. Poling, Tabitha Grace Mallory, and Harrison Prétat, “Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Maritime Militia,” Center for Strategic and International Studies and Center for Advanced Defense Studies, November 2021, 5, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/211118_Poling_Maritime_Militia.pdf?VersionId=Y5iaJ4NT8eITSlAKTr.TWxtDHuLIq7wR.

37 Interview with the author, March 14, 2024.

38 Demetri Sevastopulo, “US Pacific Commander Says China Is Pursuing ‘Boiling Frog’ Strategy,” Financial Times, April 28, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/f926f540-d5c2-43f2-bd8f-c83c0d52bcda.

39 Interview with the author, April 5, 2024.

40 Marek Jestrab, “A Maritime Blockade of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China: A Strategy to Defeat Fear and Coercion,” Atlantic Council, December 12, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/atlantic-council-strategy-paper-series/a-maritime-blockade-of-taiwan-by-the-peoples-republic-of-china-a-strategy-to-defeat-fear-and-coercion/.

41 Interview with the author, April 5, 2024.

42 “Hijacked Car Carrier’s Crew Treated ‘As Well As Can Be Expected,’” Maritime Executive, December 5, 2024, https://maritime-executive.com/article/hijacked-car-carrier-s-crew-treated-as-well-as-can-be-expected.

43 Yahya Sare’e (@Yahya_Saree), “The Yemeni Naval Forces managed to capture an Israeli ship in the depths of the Red Sea taking it to the Yemeni coast. The Yemeni armed forces deal with the ship’s crew in accordance with the principle and values of our Islamic religion,” Twitter, November 19, 2023, 11:23 a.m., https://twitter.com/Yahya_Saree/status/1726290072994296194.

44 Isabel Debre and Jon Gambrell, “Yemen’s Houthi Rebels Hijack an Israeli-Linked Ship in the Red Sea and Take 25 Crew Members Hostage,” Associated Press, November 20, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/israel-houthi-rebels-hijacked-ship-red-sea-dc9b6448690bcf5c70a0baf7c7c34b09.

45 Ibid.

46 U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM), “Today, there were four attacks against three separate commercial vessels operating in international waters in the southern Red Sea. These three vessels are…” X post, December 3, 2023, https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1731424734829773090.

47 Nadine Awadalla, Terje Solsvik and Phil Stewart, “Yemen’s Houthis Claim Missile Attack on Norwegian Tanker in Tense Middle East,” Reuters, December 12, 2023,
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/cruise-missile-yemen-strikes-tanker-ship-us-officials-2023-12-12/.

48 John Gambrell, “2 Attacks Launched by Yemen’s Houthi Rebels Strike Container Ships in Vital Red Sea Corridor,” Associated Press, December 15, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/yemen-houthi-ship-attack-israel-hamas-69289146266b9042b5896aa4679605ef.

49 Interview with the author, March 14, 2024.

50 Interview with the author, March 28, 2024.

51 The dark fleet will be the subject of a subsequent report.

52 “Crew of Seized Galaxy Leader Allowed ‘Modest’ Contact with Families—Shipowner,” Reuters, December 5, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/crew-seized-galaxy-leader-allowed-modest-contact-with-families-shipowner-2023-12-05/.

53 Interview with the author, March 28, 2024.

54 Phil Stewart, “More than 20 Countries Now Part of US-led Red Sea Coalition, Pentagon Says,” Reuters, December 22, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/more-than-20-countries-now-part-us-led-red-sea-coalition-pentagon-2023-12-21/.

55 “Statement from Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on Ensuring Freedom of Navigation in the Red Sea,” US Department of Defense, press release, December 18, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3621110/statement-from-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-ensuring-freedom-of-n/.

56 Jim Garamone, “Ryder Gives More Detail on How Operation Prosperity Guardian Will Work,” US Department of Defense, December 21, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3624836/ryder-gives-more-detail-on-how-operation-prosperity-guardian-will-work/.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 Parisa Kamali, et al., “Red Sea Attacks Disrupt Global Trade,” International Monetary Fund, March 7, 2024, https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2024/03/07/Red-Sea-Attacks-Disrupt-Global-Trade.

60 Interview with the author, March 28, 2024.

61 Interview with the author, March 13, 2024.

62 U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM), “U.S. assets, to include the USS LABOON (DDG 58) and F/A-18 Super Hornets from the Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group, shot down twelve one-way attack drones, three anti-ship ballistic missiles, and two land attack cruise missiles in the Southern Red Sea that were fired by the Houthis over a 10 hour period which began at approximately 6:30 a.m. (Sanaa time) on December 26. There was no damage to ships in the area or reported injuries,” Twitter, December 26, 2023, 2:36 p.m., https://twitter.com/CENTCOM/status/1739746985652158755.

63 Interview with the author, April 10, 2024.

64 Interview with the author, March 14, 2024.

65 Interview with the author, March 14, 2024.

66 Interview with the author, March 28, 2024.

67 Wes Rumbaugh, “Cost and Value in Air and Missile Defense Intercepts,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 13, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/cost-and-value-air-and-missile-defense-intercepts.

68 Bridget Diakun, “Red Sea Activity Down Nearly 20% after Containership Exodus,” Lloyd’s List, January 4, 2024, https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1147824/Red-Sea-activity-down-nearly-20-after-containership-exodus.

69 “A Joint Statement from the Governments of the United States, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Singapore, and the United Kingdom,” White House, January 3, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/03/a-joint-statement-from-the-governments-of-the-united-states-australia-bahrain-belgium-canada-denmark-germany-italy-japan-netherlands-new-zealand-and-the-united-kingdom/.

70 “US CENTCOM Statement on 26th Houthi Attack on Commercial Shipping Lanes in the Red Sea,” US Central Command, January 9, 2024, https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/STATEMENTS/Statements-View/Article/3639970/us-centcom-statement-on-26th-houthi-attack-on-commercial-shipping-lanes-in-the/.

71 Ibid.

72 Interview with the author, March 14, 2024.

73 “Statement from President Joe Biden on Coalition Strikes in Houthi-Controlled Areas in Yemen,” White House, press release, January 11, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/11/statement-from-president-joe-biden-on-coalition-strikes-in-houthi-controlled-areas-in-yemen/.

74 Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali, “US, British Forces Carry out More Strikes against Houthis in Yemen,” Reuters, February 25, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-british-forces-carry-out-additional-strikes-against-houthis-yemen-2024-02-24/.

75 U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM), “Third Houthi Terrorists Attack on Commercial Shipping Vessel in Three Days: On Jan. 18 at approximately 9 p.m. (Sanaa time), Iranian-backed Houthi terrorists launched two anti-ship ballistic missiles at M/V Chem Ranger, a Marshall Island-flagged, U.S.-Owned, Greek-operated tanker ship. The crew observed the missiles impact the water near the ship. There were no reported injuries or damage to the ship. The ship has continued underway,” Twitter, January 18, 2024, 6:42 p.m., https://twitter.com/CENTCOM/status/1748143745567010833.

76 Ibid.

77 Interview with the author, March 14, 2024.

78 Interview with the author, March 14, 2024.

79 “Yemen: Houthi Attacks Placing Pressure on International Trade,” US Defense Intelligence Agency, 2024, 3, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Images/News/Military_Powers_Publications/YEM_Houthi-Attacks-Pressuring-International-Trade.pdf.

80 Mared Gwyn Jones, “EU Launches Mission Aspides to Protect Red Sea Vessels from Houthi Attacks,” Euronews, February 19, 2024, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/02/19/eu-launches-mission-aspides-to-protect-red-sea-vessels-from-houthi-attacks.

81 Sam Dagher and Mohammed Hatem, “Yemen’s Houthis Tell China, Russia Their Ships Won’t Be Targeted,” Bloomberg, March 21, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-21/china-russia-reach-agreement-with-yemen-s-houthis-on-red-sea-ships?sref=NeFsviTJ.

82 “Who Are the Houthis and Why Are They Attacking Red Sea Ships?” BBC, March 15, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67614911.

83 Sam Chambers, “Washington Seeks New Ways to Deescalate Red Sea Shipping Crisis,” Splash 247, April 4, 2024, https://splash247.com/washington-seeks-new-ways-to-deescalate-red-sea-shipping-crisis.

84 Ibid.

85 https://twitter.com/CENTCOM.

86 U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM), “April 26 CENTCOM Red Sea Update: At 5:49 p.m. (Sanna time) on April 26, Iranian-backed Houthi terrorists launched three anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen into the Red Sea in the vicinity of MV MAISHA, an Antigua/Barbados flagged, Liberia operated vessel and MV Andromeda Star, a UK owned and Panamanian flagged, Seychelles operated vessel. MV Andromeda Star reports minor damage, but is continuing its voyage,” Twitter, April 26, 2024, 7:46 p.m., https://twitter.com/CENTCOM/status/1784021287553135050.

87 Jonathan Lehrfeld, Diana Stancy and Geoff Ziezulewicz, “All the Houthi-US Navy Incidents in the Middle East (that We Know of),” Military Times, last updated April 30, 2024, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2024/02/12/all-the-houthi-us-navy-incidents-in-the-middle-east-that-we-know-of/.

88 Chambers, “Washington Seeks New Ways to Deescalate Red Sea Shipping Crisis.”

89 Kamali, et al., “Red Sea Attacks Disrupt Global Trade.”

90 Takeshi Kumon, “Chinese Cargo Ships Poised to Gain from Red Sea Tensions,” Nikkei Asia, April 27, 2024, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Middle-East-crisis/Chinese-cargo-ships-poised-to-gain-from-Red-Sea-tensions2.

91 Interview with the author, April 11, 2024.

92 Interview with the author, April 5, 2024.

93 Interview with the author, April 5, 2024.

94 Robert Wright, “Houthis Extend Attacks on Shipping to Wider Indian Ocean,” Financial Times, May 1, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/778a80a0-1f55-4ffc-ade0-857bd5bd9b92; “MSC Orion,” Vessel Finder, last visited June 14, 2024, https://www.vesselfinder.com/vessels/details/9857157.

95 “Houthis Say They Will Target Israel-Bound Ships Anywhere within Their Range,” Al Jazeera, May 3, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/3/yemens-houthis-say-they-will-target-ships-heading-for-israel-within-range.

96 EUNAVFOR Aspides (@EUNAVFORASPIDES), “EUNAVFOR ASPIDES: 100 close protections. In less than 3 months since its official launch, Operation ASPIDES completed 100 CP, providing safe transit of merchant vessels,” X, May 9 2024, 10:49 a.m., https://x.com/EUNAVFORASPIDES/status/1788597163435360334.

97 Jana Choukeir, Tala Ramadan and Adam Makary, “Bulker Damaged Near Yemen by Two Missile Attacks, Security Sources Say,” Reuters, May 28, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/vessel-tilts-off-yemens-coast-after-attack-by-missiles-ambrey-says-2024-05-28/.

98 “Yemen’s Houthi Rebels Claim Latest Attack on Cargo Ship in Gulf of Aden,” VOA, June 9, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/yemen-s-houthi-rebels-claim-latest-attack-on-cargo-ship-in-gulf-of-aden/7649384.html.

99 Neil Jerome Morales and Jonathan Saul, “Bulk Carrier ‘Tutor’ Abandoned After Houthi Attack,” Reuters, June 14, 2024, https://gcaptain.com/rescue-underway-for-bulk-carrier-missing-crew-member-after-houthi-attack/.

100 UKMTO Warning, June 16, 2024, https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/warnings/indian-ocean/2024/jun/20240616-ukmto-warning-incident-087-update-001.pdf?rev=46316c731be5415c8e6cc5587046f9c6.

101 “Houthis Claim Attacks on Two Ships in Red Sea and Indian Ocean,” Reuters, June 24, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/houthis-claim-attacks-two-ships-red-sea-indian-ocean-2024-06-23/.

102 “Houthis Hit Another Merchant Ship with a Bomb Boat,” Maritime Executive, June 27, 2024, https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/houthis-hit-another-merchant-ship-with-a-bomb-boat.

103 Mike Schuler, “Watch: Houthi Drone Boat Destroyed by Armed Guards,” gCaptain, July 23, 2024, https://gcaptain.com/watch-houthi-drone-boat-destroyed-by-armed-guards/.

104 https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1815178599151882616.

105 “Video: Houthis Claim First Launch of Hypersonic Missile Targeting MSC Ship,” Maritime Executive, June 26, 2024, https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/houthis-claim-first-launch-of-hypersonic-missile-targeting-distant-msc-ship.

106 “Surviving Crewmembers of Bulker Tutor Recount Ordeal of Houthi Attack,” Maritime Executive, June 17, 2024, https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/surviving-crewmembers-of-bulker-tutor-recount-ordeal-of-houthi-attack.

107 “Seafarer Supply, Quinquennial, 2015 and 2021,” United Nations Trade and Development, last visited July 22, 2024, https://unctadstat.unctad.org/datacentre/dataviewer/US.Seafarers; “Philippines Says 78 Crew Refused to Sail Red Sea as it Increases Ban,” Maritime Executive, June 26, 2024, https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/philippines-says-78-crew-refused-to-sail-red-sea-as-it-increases-ban.

108 “April 26 Red Sea Update,” US Central Command, press release, April 26, 2024, https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3758387/april-26-red-sea-update/.

109 TankerTrackers.com, Inc. (@TankerTrackers), “Ironically, WIND (9252967) is a Dark Fleet tanker that not only we know very well from Venezuela, but was carrying Russian oil last night in the Red Sea,” Twitter, May 18, 2024, 10:23 a.m., https://x.com/TankerTrackers/status/1791852091876528209; U.S. Central Command, (@CENTCOM), “Houthis strike M/T Wind in Red Sea: At approximately 1 a.m. (Sanaa time) May 18, Iranian-backed Houthis launched one anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) into the Red Sea and struck M/T Wind, a Panamanian-flagged, Greek owned and operated oil tanker…” Twitter, May 18, 2024, 10:20 a.m., https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1791851421152743816; “Houthi Attack Damages Shadow Fleet Tanker Carrying Russian Oil,” Maritime Executive, May 18, 2024, https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/houthi-attack-damages-shadow-fleet-tanker-carrying-russian-oil.

110 Interview with the author, March 14, 2024.

111 Interview with the author, March 18, 2024.

112 Ibid.

113 Sam Dagher, “US May Revoke Houthi Terrorist Label If They Stop Red Sea Ship Attacks,” Bloomberg, April 3, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-03/us-may-revoke-houthi-terrorist-label-if-they-stop-red-sea-ship-attacks?srnd=economics-v2&sref=NeFsviTJ.

114 Elisabeth Braw, “The Last Thing Ukraine Needs Is a Shipping Crisis. But It’s About to Have One,” Prospect Magazine, February 17, 2022, https://www.aei.org/op-eds/the-last-thing-ukraine-needs-is-a-shipping-crisis-but-its-about-to-have-one; Jonathan Saul, “London Marine Insurers Widen High Risk Zone in Red Sea as Attacks Surge,” Reuters, December 18, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/london-marine-insurers-widen-high-risk-zone-red-sea-attacks-surge-2023-12-18.

115 A UN-sponsored “grain corridor” was later created to allow the shipment of Ukrainian grain to world markets.

116 “Trade Disruptions in the Red Sea,” IMF Portwatch, last visited June 14, 2024, https://portwatch.imf.org/pages/573013af3b6545deaeb50ed1cbaf9444.

117 Ibid.

118 Interview with the author, March 14, 2024.

119 Interview with the author, March 14, 2024.

120 Interview with the author, May 9, 2024.

121 Interview with the author, March 14, 2024.

122 Robert Wright, “Mediterranean Ports Warn of Overflowing Storage Yards in Latest Threat to Supply Chain,” Financial Times, April 23, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/1f0a7add-1412-4b27-926f-cb99338fa520.

123 Interview with the author, March 28, 2024.

124 “Drastic Drop in Piracy in Malacca Straits,” Maritime Security Asia, April 21, 2011, https://web.archive.org/web/20171107012031/http://maritimesecurity.asia/free-2/piracy-2/drastic-drop-in-piracy-in-malacca-straits/.

125 For more about the shadow fleet, see: Elisabeth Braw, “Russia’s Growing Dark Fleet: Risks for the Global Maritime Order,” Atlantic Council, January 11, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/russias-growing-dark-fleet-risks-for-the-global-maritime-order. The dark fleet will also be analyzed in an extensive report as part of the Atlantic Council’s Threats to the Global Maritime Order initiative.

126 Again, these activities will be analyzed in a subsequent report as part of the Atlantic Council’s Maritime Threats project.

127 Interview with the author, March 14, 2024.

128 Russia’s use of the shadow fleet will be discussed in a subsequent report as part of the Atlantic Council’s Maritime Threats project, as will other maritime violations including China’s maritime harassment.

129 Interview with the author, March 28, 2024.

130 Interview with the author, March 21, 2024.

131 “Defense Primer: Directed-Energy Weapons,” Congressional Research Service, last updated February 1, 2024, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF11882.pdf.

132 Ibid.

133 Ibid.

134 Interview with the author, March 28, 2024.

135 Stew Magnuson, “Directed Energy Weapons: Here Now? Or 5 Years Off?” National Defense, February 29, 2024, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2024/2/29/editors-notes-directed-energy-weapons-here-now-or-5-years-off.

136 Ibid.

137 Interview with the author, March 28, 2024.

138 MG Wachenfeld, “Reflagging Kuwaiti Tankers,” Duke University, last visited June 14, 2024, https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3026&context=dlj.

139 “Review of Maritime Transport 2023,” United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2023, 32, https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/rmt2023_en.pdf.

140 Ibid., 33.

141 Interview with the author, April 10, 2024.

142 Ibid.

143 Ibid.

144 Interview with the author, March 21, 2024.

145 “IKE Strike Group Transits the Strait of Hormuz,” US Navy, November 27, 2023, https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/3598368/ike-strike-group-transits-the-strait-of-hormuz/.

146 “Report to Congress on Chinese Naval Modernization,” USNI News, February 1, 2024, https://news.usni.org/2024/02/01/report-to-congress-on-chinese-naval-modernization-20.

147 “Number of Vessels in the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom in 2023, by Type,” Statista, December 8, 2023, https://www.statista.com/statistics/603297/type-of-vessels-in-royal-navy/.

148 Interview with the author, April 10, 2024.

149 “Windward Trade Patterns & Risk Insights Report Q4/2023,” Windward, January 2, 2024, https://windward.ai/blog/windward-q4-risk-report/.

150 “Seafarer Supply, Quinquennial, 2015 and 2021,” UN Trade and Development, last updated July 18, 2023, https://unctadstat.unctad.org/datacentre/dataviewer/US.Seafarers.

151 Interview with the author, April 2, 2024.

152 Marita Moaje, “Pinoy seafarers no longer allowed on ships attacked in Red Sea,” Philippine News Agency, June 25, 2024, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1227677.

The post What attacks on shipping mean for the global maritime order appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Strengthening Taiwan’s resiliency

Franklin D. Kramer, Philip W. Yu, Joseph Webster, Elizabeth Sizeland — Tue, 02 Jul 2024 13:00:00 +0000

Introduction
Establish a comprehensive security strategy
Cybersecurity and critical infrastructure resilience
Energy
Food and water resiliency
Enhancing defense resilience
Conclusion
About the authors
Acknowledgments

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Introduction

This report recommends actions for the new leadership of Taiwan to take to enhance its societal resilience against Chinese aggression in the context of both “gray zone” conflict and wartime attacks. The report focuses on establishing a comprehensive security strategy and analyzes three key areas particularly important for effective resilience: enhancing cybersecurity for critical infrastructures; improving energy security; and accelerating defense transformation.

The new administration of Lai Ching-te faces both existing resilience challenges and the potential for significantly greater problems if the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pursues expanded gray zone activities or if actual conflict occurs.¹ The ongoing challenges include substantial disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, military incursions, and periodic economic coercion. Potential future challenges could involve expansion of one or more of these ongoing Chinese activities. In the context of a more contested environment such as a quarantine,² blockade, or a kinetic conflict, Chinese actions could seek to cause leadership failures and loss of social cohesion; undertake cyberattacks to target critical infrastructures; generate energy shortages; and seek to defeat Taiwan militarily before the United States could provide effective support. The potential for such harms substantially increases the importance of resilient responses by Taiwan.

The report recommends four major sets of actions to enhance Taiwan’s resilience:

Establish a comprehensive security strategy that engages government, the private sector, and individuals in cooperative efforts to ensure all facets of resilience including:
1. Risk analyses and priority requirements.
2. Organization of data relevant to responding to challenges from the PRC.
3. Development of expertise in key areas required for response.
4. Provision of governmental leadership and activation of the whole nation as part of a comprehensive approach.
Enhance cybersecurity by establishing:
1. Off-island, cloud-based capabilities to duplicate governmental and other critical functions.
2. Working arrangements with high-end, private-sector cybersecurity providers.
3. A surge capability of cybersecurity experts.
4. Regular engagement with US Cyber Command’s Hunt Forward program.
5. Alternatives to undersea cables through low-earth orbit (LEO) communications satellites.
Bolster energy security resilience by:
1. Rationalizing—that is, increasing—energy prices, especially for electricity.
2. Supporting indigenous supply, including nuclear energy.
3. Prioritizing energy needs.
4. Dispersing and hardening energy storage facilities.
5. Preparing comprehensive rationing plans for energy.
Enhance defense resilience by:
1. Continuing the trend of higher defense spending to at least 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).
2. Leveraging Taiwan’s strength in high tech manufacturing and shipbuilding to accelerate the development of a Ukraine-style, public-private “capability accelerator”³ for emerging technologies.
3. Fielding low-cost, high-effectiveness capabilities including unmanned surface vessels, unmanned aerial vehicles, and naval mines.
4. Incorporating training in emerging technologies and unconventional tactics for conscripts and reserves.
5. Investing in East Coast port infrastructure as counterblockade strongholds.
6. Raising the All-out Defense Mobilization Agency (ADMA) to the national level and implementing a larger civil defense force that fully integrates civilian agencies and local governments.

Establish a comprehensive security strategy

Resilience is not a new theme in Taiwan. Former President Tsai Ing-wen, who completed two terms in office on May 20, entitled her 2022 National Day Address “Island of Resilience,”⁴ and similarly identified resilience as a key factor for Taiwan in her two subsequent National Day addresses.⁵ “The work of making the Republic of China (Taiwan) a more resilient country is now our most important national development priority,” she stated in that 2022 speech, in which she articulated four key areas of resilience: economy and industry, social safety net, free and democratic government system, and national defense. What is left undone, however, is aligning these and other resilience elements into a comprehensive security strategy similar to those undertaken by Finland⁶ and Sweden,⁷ which utilize a whole-of society approach to enhance resilience.

Resilience is a nation’s ability to understand, address, respond to, and recover from any type of national security risk. Given the scale of risk Taiwan faces from China, domestic resilience should be front and center in Taiwan’s national security strategy.⁸ Comparable comprehensive national security approaches, such as the Finnish model, aim to foster and enable an engaged national ecosystem of partners, each with a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities. Finland’s model is instructive, underscoring the importance of engagement by the entire society:

The Security Strategy for Society lays out the general principles governing preparedness in Finnish society. The preparedness is based on the principle of comprehensive security in which the vital functions of society are jointly safeguarded by the authorities, business operators, organisations and citizens.⁹

Comprehensive security thus is far more than just government activities:

Comprehensive security has evolved into a cooperation model in which actors share and analyse security information, prepare joint plans, as well as train and work together. The cooperation model covers all relevant actors, from citizens to the authorities. The cooperation is based on statutory tasks, cooperation agreements and the Security Strategy for Society.¹⁰

The Finnish strategy identifies seven “vital functions” as key areas: leadership; international and European Union activities; defense capability; internal security; economy, infrastructure, and security of supply; functional capacity of the population and services; and psychological resilience.¹¹

Taiwan has taken a variety of actions to enhance resilience including the establishment in 2022 of the All-out Defense Mobilization Agency.¹² That agency has a useful but limited scope with its mandate of “comprehensive management of ‘planning for mobilization, management, service, civil defense, [and] building reserve capacity.’ ”¹³ But while defense is important (and further discussed below), as the Finnish and Swedish strategies underscore, Taiwan should expand its approach to resilience to include the full spectrum of governmental, private sector, and individual tasks—and the necessary cooperative efforts to make them most effective.

President Lai’s recent election ushered in an unprecedented third consecutive term for the Democratic Progressive Party.¹⁴ This outcome not only provides continuity in the agenda set by the island’s duly elected leader, but also presents an opportunity to sharpen the focus areas for resilience. As Taiwan transitions to a Lai presidency, the challenge of shoring up the island’s resilience should be at the forefront.

As a valuable starting point for establishing such an expanded resilience strategy, the Lai government should undertake extensive consultations with both Finland and Sweden—which could be facilitated as necessary by the United States. Taiwan should also seek to engage with the Hybrid Center of Excellence, based in Finland, which is an “autonomous, network-based international organization countering hybrid threats.”¹⁵

The discussion below describes several important elements of a comprehensive resilience strategy, and it will be a crucial task for the Lai administration to expand Taiwan’s current efforts to the full scope of such an approach. Resilience is a team game with the whole of society playing a role. But only Taiwan’s central government can act as the team captain, setting expectations, establishing priorities, formulating and communicating national strategy, and coordinating activities. Only leaders in national-level government can oversee the critical work of developing institutional effectiveness in key areas of risk management and resilience.

As a starting point, Taiwan should undertake a comprehensive audit now to uncover any gaps in the country’s ability to understand, respond to, and recover from both the chronic risks it currently faces and any more acute manifestations of PRC aggression in the future. Taiwan’s government should examine the following areas to pursue greater resilience:

Activating the whole nation: Working with the private sector and local government, and communicating to households are essential to develop a truly comprehensive approach to Taiwan’s resilience.
Understanding risk: Developing a set of scenarios that will help prioritize activities across government and beyond. Prioritizing is critical where resources are limited—as is identifying areas of cross-cutting work that can help to reduce risk in multiple scenarios.
Building data capacity: Laying a foundation for data exploitation needs will be critical for Taiwan, which will need this capacity both ahead of and during any crisis response. Preparing for and providing this capacity is not just the preserve of government, as commercially available and industry data sources will provide critical insights. Planning to access, receive, store, and process this data needs to start early, as the foundations for technical infrastructure, capabilities, data-sharing policies, and data expertise in government all require time and cannot just be activated on the cusp of crisis. Part of this work entails developing scenarios to help analysts map out gaps in information sources (intelligence, open source, commercial, and from allies) that Taiwan will likely need in each circumstance to build situational awareness. Ahead of and during crisis, risk assessment and effective decision-making will be highly dependent on the availability, quality, and usability of intelligence, information, and data.
Expanding its network of professional skills and resources: Assessing the range of skills and the levels of resourcing needed in government to manage a long-term crisis posture should start well ahead of any crisis. It would be helpful to look now at the gaps in key areas of professional expertise: analysts, data experts, crisis-response professionals, and operational planners will all be needed in larger numbers to sustain an effective response. Taiwan will also need professionally administered and well-exercised crisis facilities, resilient technical infrastructure, and business continuity approaches in place.
Preparedness and planning: Thinking through potential impacts of crisis scenarios in advance and working up potential policy and operational responses will bolster the quality of adaptability, which is an essential component of resilience. The process of exercising and refining plans is also helpful to build the professional connections and networks that will be activated during a live response.

Working with countries that are already developing vanguard resilience capabilities could help Taiwan quickly establish a workable model. For example, the United Kingdom’s National Situation Centre¹⁶—built in less than a year during the COVID-19 pandemic—is a model of developing access to critical data in peacetime and lessons learned from previous crisis scenarios about the practical challenges a nation could face in a variety of scenarios. Many commercial providers offer competent ways of displaying data insights on dashboards, and while this is helpful, it is only part of what can be achieved.

As a model for its broader resilience requirements, Taiwan will have the benefit of its existing efforts including in the counterdisinformation arena, where it has programs as effective as any in the world, despite the fact that Taiwan consistently faces the world’s highest volume of targeted disinformation campaigns.¹⁷ The saturation of PRC information manipulation across Taiwan’s traditional and social media platforms is strategically designed to undermine social cohesion, erode trust in government institutions, and soften resistance to Beijing’s forced unification agenda, while sowing doubts about America’s commitment to peace and stability in the region.

Taiwan has developed a multifaceted strategy to combat this onslaught, eschewing heavy-handed censorship in favor of promoting free speech and empowering civil society. This approach serves as a beacon for other democracies, demonstrating how to effectively counter disinformation through rapid-response mechanisms, independent fact-checking, along with widespread media literacy initiatives. Collaborative efforts such as the Taiwan FactCheck Center, Cofacts, and MyGoPen have proven instrumental in swiftly identifying and debunking false rumors, notably during the closely watched presidential election on January 13.¹⁸

Taiwan’s Minister of Digital Affairs (MoDA) attributes the island’s success in combating this “infodemic” to its sophisticated civil-sector efforts, which avoids reliance on reactive takedowns of malicious content akin to a game of whack-a-mole. Much like its handling of the pandemic—where Taiwan achieved one of the world’s lowest COVID-19 fatality rates without resorting to draconian lockdowns—it has demonstrated resilience and innovation in the digital sphere.¹⁹

Taiwan’s response to disinformation demonstrates that it is well-positioned to establish a comprehensive approach to societal resilience. The discussion below describes several important elements of a comprehensive resilience strategy, but it will be a crucial task for the Lai administration to expand Taiwan’s current efforts to the full scope of such an approach.

Cybersecurity and critical infrastructure resilience

Cyber risks to critical infrastructures

Like all advanced economies, Taiwan depends on its critical infrastructures. Critical infrastructures have been described as “sectors whose assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, are considered so vital . . . that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety.”²⁰ Since several critical infrastructures are interlinked, it is important in evaluating resilience to “capture cross-cutting risks and associated dependencies that may have cascading impacts within and across sectors.”²¹ Among those interlinked critical infrastructures are energy, communications, transportation, and water. Each of these are critical to society as a whole and each are dependent on digital technology for their operations.

In Taiwan, the Administration for Cyber Security has identified critical infrastructures “by their feature types into the following eight fields: energy, water resource, telecommunications, transportation, banking and finance, emergency aid and hospitals, central and local governments, and high-tech parks.”²² It is worth underscoring that several of Taiwan’s critical infrastructures, such as the electric grid²³ and the water system,²⁴ are significantly centralized or have other notable vulnerabilities such as the dependency on undersea cables for international communications²⁵ that increase the potential consequences from a successful cyberattack.

The Taiwan government has fully recognized the significant risks from cyberattacks. As described by Taiwan’s Administration for Cyber Security, “Due to Taiwan’s unique political and economic situation, the country faces not only a complex global cyber security environment but also severe cyber security threats, making the continuous implementation and improvement of cyber security measures a necessity.”²⁶

The number of cyberattacks against Taiwan is notable.²⁷ Published estimates range from five million cyberattacks per day against Taiwanese government agencies²⁸ to the detection of 15,000 cyberattacks per second, including attempted intrusions, in Taiwan during the first half of 2023.²⁹

The attacks often focus on key societal infrastructures. A recent Voice of America report noted that just prior to the January 2024 elections:

Most of the attacks appeared to focus on government offices, police departments, and financial institutions, with the attackers focused on internal communications, police reports, bank statements and insurance information.³⁰

Google researchers have likewise described the cyber threat to key critical infrastructures, revealing that it is “tracking close to 100 hacking groups out of China [and that these] malicious groups are attacking a wide spectrum of organizations, including the government, private industry players and defense organizations.”³¹

The attacks themselves are often relatively sophisticated. Trellix, a cybersecurity firm, described multiple techniques utilized by attackers that “focused on defense evasion, discovery, and command and control . . . to subvert system defenses to gather information about accounts, systems, and networks.” Among them are “living-off-the-land” techniques, which allow attackers to maintain their intrusions over time with smaller chances of detection.³²

While no one can say with certainty what actions the PRC would take in the context of a blockade of or outright conflict with Taiwan, the United States is clear-eyed about the potential for attacks on its own critical infrastructures if engaged in conflict with China. The February 2023 Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community notes the likelihood of such PRC cyberattacks in that context:

If Beijing feared that a major conflict with the United States were imminent, it almost certainly would consider undertaking aggressive cyber operations against U.S. homeland critical infrastructure and military assets worldwide . . . China almost certainly is capable of launching cyber attacks that could disrupt critical infrastructure services within the United States, including against oil and gas pipelines, and rail systems.³³

The ongoing Russian cyberattacks against Ukraine in the Russia-Ukraine war further underscore the reality of critical infrastructures as a target in a conflict. It seems reasonable to assume that comparable actions (and perhaps even more) would be undertaken against Taiwan in the event of a blockade or kinetic conflict. “Probable targets,” according to James A. Lewis, would include critical infrastructures such as electrical power facilities, information and communications systems, and pipelines.³⁴

Actions to enhance Taiwan’s cyber resilience

Taiwan can enhance its cyber resilience through its own actions and in collaborative activities with private-sector companies and with the United States. While cyberattacks can be highly disruptive, one of the important lessons of the Ukraine-Russia conflict is that the effects on operations can be mitigated, as described in a CyberScoop analysis that underscores a shift in expectations:

The war has inspired a defensive effort that government officials and technology executives describe as unprecedented—challenging the adage in cybersecurity that if you give a well-resourced attacker enough time, they will pretty much always succeed. The relative success of the defensive effort in Ukraine is beginning to change the calculation about what a robust cyber defense might look like going forward.³⁵

According to the analysis, the critical element for such success has been significant multinational and public-private collaboration:

This high level of defense capability is a consequence of a combination of Ukraine’s own effectiveness, significant support from other nations including the United States and the United Kingdom, and a key role for private sector companies.
The defensive cyber strategy in Ukraine has been an international effort, bringing together some of the biggest technology companies in the world such as Google and Microsoft, Western allies such as the U.S. and Britain and social media giants such as Meta who have worked together against Russia’s digital aggression.³⁶

Actions by Taiwan

Taiwan should utilize the Ukraine model of cyber resilience—backed in part by private-sector companies—and take comparable actions to enhance its cybersecurity. Taiwan has a substantial existing cybersecurity framework on which to build such mitigating actions. Since 2022, the Ministry of Digital Affairs, through its Administration for Cyber Security, is responsible for “implementing cyber security management and defense mechanisms for national critical infrastructures” including “evaluating and auditing cyber security works at government agencies and public entities.”³⁷ Utilizing that framework, Taiwan should undertake the following four actions that would significantly enhance the island’s cybersecurity resilience.

First, Taiwan should utilize cloud-based capabilities to establish a duplicative set of cyber-enabled governmental functions outside of Taiwan. Ukraine undertook such actions, thereby rendering Russian cyberattacks in Ukraine unable to disrupt ongoing governmental activities. Taiwan’s Ministry of Digital Affairs has been evaluating the use of public clouds including the possibility of “digital embassies” abroad to hold data.³⁸ Taiwan should organize such actions with key cloud providers such as Amazon Web Services, which provided support to Ukraine.³⁹ The United States should work with Taiwan and appropriate cloud providers to help effectuate such a result.

Second, Taiwan should establish arrangements with private-sector cybersecurity providers to undertake defensive operations against PRC cyberattacks in the context of a blockade or kinetic conflict. As noted above, such private-sector actions have been instrumental to Ukraine, and would similarly be invaluable for Taiwan. The United States should also help facilitate such private-sector defensive cyber operations for Taiwan.

Third, Taiwan should organize a surge capability of individual cybersecurity experts who can be called upon to complement governmental resources. Both Estonia and the United Kingdom have very effective cyber-reserve approaches, and Taiwan should engage with each country, seeking lessons learned as part of establishing its own reserve corps.

Fourth, Taiwan needs to accelerate its low-earth orbit satellite communications program. The Ministry of Digital Affairs’ two-year, US$18 million plan to strengthen the resilience of government communications entails building more than 700 satellite receiver stations. The impetus: ships from mainland China have repeatedly severed submarine internet cables in what Taiwan perceived as “a trial of methods” that the PRC could use to prepare for a military invasion.⁴⁰

The existing program involves satellites as well as ground-based receivers. The Taiwan Space Agency disclosed its plan for a “dedicated” LEO satellite communications project in late 2022,⁴¹ as a public-private partnership:

Distinct from traditional government programs, this groundbreaking project is structured as a privately operated venture, wherein the Taiwanese government would retain a substantial minority ownership. . . . This project intends to enhance the Taiwan Space Agency’s initial proposal for two government-built LEO satellites by evolving it into a “2+4” configuration. This will involve constructing four additional satellites through collaborative efforts between the public and private sectors.⁴²

Actions with the United States

In accord with the Taiwan Relations Act,⁴³ and as a matter of long-standing policy, the United States strongly supports Taiwan’s defensive capabilities including for cybersecurity. The Integrated Country Strategy of the American Institute in Taiwan (essentially the unofficial US embassy) specifically provides that “bolster[ing] Taiwan’s cybersecurity resilience” is one of the United States’ strategic priorities for the island.⁴⁴ To support that objective, the United States can enhance Taiwan cybersecurity through cooperative defensive activities.

First, US Cyber Command regularly supports the network resilience of allied countries and partners through its “Hunt Forward” operations, which are “strictly defensive” joint ventures, undertaken following an invitation from the ally or partner, to “observe and detect malicious cyber activity” on these networks, together searching out “vulnerabilities, malware, and adversary presence.”⁴⁵

While Taiwan has not been specifically identified as a Hunt Forward participant, Anne Neuberger, who is the US deputy national security advisor for cyber and emerging technology, said at a Politico Tech Summit in 2023 that in the event of a major cyberattack on Taiwan, the United States would “send its best teams to help hunt down the attackers, the same approach typically used to help global allies in cyberspace.”⁴⁶ She described the typical approach as:

Putting our best teams to hunt on their most sensitive networks to help identify any current intrusions and to help remediate and make those networks as strong as possible.”⁴⁷

Neuberger also highlighted US work with Taiwan to carry out military tabletop games and exercises to prepare for potential cyberattack.⁴⁸

More recently, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2024 explicitly authorized the Defense Department to cooperate on:

Defensive military cybersecurity activities with the military forces of Taiwan to (1) defend military networks, infrastructure, and systems; (2) counter malicious cyber activity that has compromised such military networks, infrastructure, and systems; (3) leverage United States commercial and military cybersecurity technology and services to harden and defend such military networks, infrastructure, and systems; and (4) conduct combined cybersecurity training activities and exercises.⁴⁹

Going forward, those authorities authorize not only Hunt Forward actions but also actions to leverage commercial and military technology to harden such networks (which would seem to resolve any export control issues) and to conduct combined training and exercises, all of which underscores clear congressional approval for enhanced cybersecurity activities with Taiwan.⁵⁰

Second, the United States should undertake to enhance Taiwan’s communications resilience by making available access to US commercial and military LEO networks. The important role of the commercial provider Starlink in assuring communications in the context of the Ukraine-Russia war is well-known.⁵¹ Starlink’s parent company, SpaceX, is, however, controlled by Elon Musk, whose Tesla company has major investments in China. That linkage has raised the question of whether Taiwan could rely on any commercial arrangements it might make on its own with Starlink—particularly since Starlink did impose some limitations on Ukraine’s use of the network.⁵² However, as previously described by one of the authors of this report, the US government has sway on such matters:

The Defense Production Act authorizes the [US] government to require the prioritized provision of services—which would include services from space companies—and exempts any company receiving such an order from liabilities such as inability to support other customers.⁵³

Accordingly, the US should rely on this authority to organize appropriate arrangements with Starlink—and other space companies that provide like capabilities—to ensure access that would support Taiwan communications. One way to do this would be to incorporate appropriate terms into the commercial augmentation space reserve (CASR) program arrangements that US Space Force is currently negotiating with civil space providers,⁵⁴ as part of the Department of Defense’s overall commercial space strategy.⁵⁵

Additionally, the DOD is developing its own LEO capability through a variety of constellations being put in place by Space Force.⁵⁶ Pursuant to the recent NDAA authorization noted above, DOD should work with the Taiwan military to ensure that those constellations will be available to support Taiwan as necessary.

Longer term, the United States should also undertake to enhance the resilience of Taiwan’s undersea cables. As previously proposed by one of the authors, the United States should lead in establishing an international undersea infrastructure protection corps. It should:

Combine governmental and private activities to support the resilience of undersea cables and pipelines. Membership should include the United States, allied nations with undersea maritime capabilities, and key private-sector cable and pipeline companies.⁵⁷

Such an activity would include focus on cybersecurity for undersea cable networks, hardening and other protection for cable landing points, and capabilities and resources to ensure expeditious repair of cables as needed.⁵⁸ To be sure, getting such an activity up and running will necessarily be a multiyear effort. However, Taiwan’s vulnerability underscores the importance of beginning promptly and working as expeditiously as possible.

Cybersecurity recommendations for Taiwan

Utilize cloud-based capabilities to establish a duplicative set of cyber-enabled governmental functions outside of Taiwan.
Establish arrangements with private-sector cybersecurity providers to undertake defensive operations against PRC cyberattacks.
Organize a surge capability of individual cybersecurity experts who can be called upon to complement governmental resources.
Accelerate the low-earth orbit satellite communications program.
Actively engage with Cyber Command’s Hunt Forward activities.
Enhance Taiwan’s communications resilience by making available access to US commercial and military LEO networks.
Undertake on a longer-term basis enhanced resilience of Taiwan’s undersea cables.

Energy

As part of its efforts to enhance resilience, Taiwan must mitigate its energy vulnerabilities, as its reliance on maritime imports for about 97 percent⁵⁹ of its energy needs creates acute risks. To lessen its dependency on maritime imports and strengthen its resiliency in the face of potential PRC coercion, Taiwan should curb energy and electricity demand, bolster indigenous supply, overhaul its inventory management, and prepare rationing plans. A resilient energy security approach would credibly signal to the PRC that Taiwan could hold out for long durations without maritime resupply.

Curbing demand by rationalizing prices

Taiwan’s ultra-low electricity prices are a security risk (and a black eye for its climate targets). Reliance on seaborne energy shipments presents straightforward security problems, and Taiwan’s low electricity prices subsidize consumption that is being met by imports of hydrocarbons, especially coal. The new Lai administration should make haste prudently, increasing electricity prices more frequently and significantly, without exceeding the limits of the politically possible.

Taiwan’s electricity price quandary is illustrated by Taipower, the state-owned monopoly utility. In 2022 and 2023, Taipower lost 227.2 billion New Taiwan dollars (NTD) and 198.5 billion NTD, respectively, as its per kilowatt hour cost of electricity sold substantially exceeded per unit prices.⁶⁰ Taipower’s prices failed to offset the steep rise in electricity input costs amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the post-COVID-19 unsnarling of supply chains.

Taiwan’s electricity costs remain too low, diminishing the island’s resiliency, although policymakers have now taken some steps in light of the problem. The Ministry of Economic Affairs’ latest electricity price review, in March 2024, raised average prices by about 11 percent, with the new tariff reaching about 3.4518 NTD, or approximately $0.11 USD/kWh.⁶¹ This rationalization of prices, while welcome, is insufficient. In the United States, the rolling twelve-month ending price in January 2024 for all sectors totaled $0.127/kWh.⁶² Taiwan’s heavily subsidized electricity consumers therefore enjoy a discount in excess of 13 percent compared to their US counterparts, despite US access to low-cost, abundant, and indigenously produced energy.

Taiwan’s heavily subsidized electricity prices incentivize maritime imports, especially coal. Astonishingly, Taiwan was the world’s largest per capita user of coal generation for electricity in 2022, higher than even Australia, a major coal exporter.

Taiwan’s low electricity prices and use of coal expose the island to PRC economic coercion. Taiwan’s dependency on imported coal heightens its vulnerability in the summer, when the island’s electricity-generation needs peak. Concerningly, Taiwan has already experienced electricity shortfalls in summer peacetime conditions, including a wave of outages⁶³ between July and August 2022. With the island’s future summer cooling needs set to rise even further due to climate change and hotter temperatures, Taiwan’s electricity needs pose a vulnerability that the PRC may attempt to exploit.

Curbing Taiwan’s electricity demand during summer months is critical, necessitating a rise in prices. While this reduction is a principal energy security challenge, the island must also do more to secure supply, especially for nuclear energy.

Supply: Support indigenous production

Taiwan’s resiliency will be strengthened by producing as much indigenous energy as possible, especially during the critical summer months. Taiwan, which has virtually no hydrocarbon resources, can therefore indigenously produce only four different forms of energy at scale: nuclear energy, offshore wind, onshore wind, and solar. Taiwan should pursue each of these indigenous energy sources. Taiwan should apply “carrots” by strengthening incentives and payments for indigenous production. At the same time, applying the “stick” of higher prices to energy consumption, especially for energy imports, would bolster the island’s resiliency.

Taiwan’s renewable resources are significant and often economically viable, but they cannot secure adequate levels of resiliency by themselves. Taiwan’s wind speeds slow in the summer,⁶⁴ limiting onshore and offshore wind’s effectiveness in bolstering energy security. Additionally, Taiwan’s stringent localization requirements for offshore appropriately minimize PRC components and sensors in Taiwan’s offshore wind turbines, but also raise the costs of this technology. Taiwan’s solar potential⁶⁵ is also limited⁶⁶ by cloudy skies, frequent rainfall, and land scarcity.

Accordingly, nuclear energy is the most viable way for Taiwan to address its summer electricity needs without turning to maritime imports. While Taiwan’s nuclear reactors must acquire fuel from abroad, this fuel can be used for approximately eighteen to twenty-four months.⁶⁷ Taiwan should maintain its existing nuclear energy capacity; restart retired capacity as soon as politically and technically feasible; and seek new, incremental capacity over time.⁶⁸

Unpacking Taiwan’s storage complexities: Dispersal and hardening is critical

To cope with various contingencies, including the possibility of a prolonged summertime blockade, Taiwan should increase its stockpiles of energy, disperse inventory around the island, and harden facilities.

While Taiwan’s ability to hold out against a blockade involves by many factors, energy inventories are a critical element. Taiwan’s electricity reserves are limited: it reported fifty-six days of supply of coal inventories in February 2023,⁶⁹ and aims to raise its natural gas inventories from eleven days to more than twenty days by 2030.⁷⁰ These inventory levels should be expanded, in part because “days of supply” fail to encapsulate uncertainty. Demand fluctuates depending on temperature and other variables, while Taiwan’s access to energy storage inventories faces the risk of sabotage and, in certain scenarios, kinetic strikes.

Taiwan’s management of petroleum reserves is a matter of great importance, given the use of these fuels, especially diesel, for military matters. Taiwan’s Energy Administration, in the Ministry of Economic Affairs, reported in April 2024 that its total oil inventories stood at 167 days of supply.⁷¹ This topline figure presents an overly optimistic portrait of Taiwan’s petroleum security, however. For instance, Taiwan’s government-controlled inventories in April 2024⁷² included 2.6 million kiloliters of crude oil and refined products; private stocks added another 6.5 million kiloliters. Accordingly, Taiwan reports forty-seven days of supply from government stockpiles, with an additional 120 days from private inventories.⁷³ Given that domestic sales and consumption equated to about 54,200 kiloliters per day from prior comparable periods,⁷⁴ Taiwan calculated it had about 167 days of supply.

There may, however, be insufficient monitoring of private inventories. Marek Jestrab observed:

A concerning—and possibly significant—loophole exists in these laws, where the criteria and computation formulas for the actual on-hand security stockpiles will be determined by the central competent authority, and are not required to be disclosed. This presents the opportunity for energy that is loaded onboard merchant shipping while in transit to Taiwan to count toward these figures.⁷⁵

While Taiwan should ensure that stockpiles are actually on the island, and not at sea, it also needs to carefully examine the inventory split between crude oil and crude products, such as diesel, gasoline, jet fuel, etc. Additionally, Taiwan’s policymakers should not expect to rely on its crude inventories, which only have a latent potential: crude oil cannot be used until it is refined into a crude product. Therefore, if the PRC disrupted Taiwan’s refineries via cyber or even kinetic means, Taiwan would not be able to access the totality of its crude oil reserves.

Taiwan’s military requirements for fuel would likely surge during a confrontation or conflict with the PRC, reducing the “days of supply.” Since Taiwan’s military vehicles largely run on diesel, the island should pay careful attention to this product.

Taiwan should disperse and harden its energy assets, especially diesel storage, as concentrated objects would present inviting targets for the PRC. Beijing is studying Russia’s invasion of Ukraine closely and will not fail to notice that Moscow attacked about 30 percent of Ukrainian infrastructure in a single day.⁷⁶ As one author witnessed during his recent visit to Kyiv, Ukraine’s dispersal of electricity assets is achieving a reasonable degree of success. Indeed, Russia’s more recent campaign⁷⁷ attacking large-scale thermal and hydroelectric power plants illustrates the utility of dispersed energy infrastructure. Like Ukraine, Taiwan should disperse and harden its energy storage inventories to the maximal feasible extent.

Rationing plans

While both Taiwan’s electricity supply and demand will be very hard to predict in a state of emergency, rationing plans must be considered—especially for the island’s manufacturing and semiconductor industries.

Taiwan’s economy is uniquely⁷⁸ tied to electricity-intensive manufacturing, as industrial consumers accounted for more than 55 percent of Taiwan’s electricity consumption in 2023.⁷⁹ Most of these industrial producers (such as chipmaker Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company) service export markets—not Taiwan. While the PRC might attempt to disrupt the island’s energy and electricity supply via cyber and kinetic means, Taiwan’s electricity consumption would fall dramatically during a crisis if Taiwan’s industries were forced to shut down. Although the closure of Taiwan’s industry would prove economically ruinous, it would also make the island’s electricity and energy issues much more manageable. Adding an additional layer of complication, many of Taiwan’s most valuable exports – such as chips – are shipped via civilian airliners, not on seaborne vessels, and would consequently be more difficult to interdict in circumstances short of war.⁸⁰ Taiwan should prepare rationing plans for a variety of contingencies, adapting to a range of scenarios, including a quarantine, siege, or even kinetic conflict. Taiwan must be ready.

Energy recommendations for Taiwan

Gradually raise electricity and energy prices, communicating that price hikes will persist and require significant adjustments over the medium term.
Expand the frequency of electricity price reviews from twice a year to a quarterly basis. More frequent price adjustments will allow smaller incremental increases while also enabling Taiwan to respond more quickly to potential contingencies.
Expand fiscal support for indigenous forms of energy. Demand-side management programs could include virtual power plants, building efficiency measures, two-way air conditioning units, and more. On the supply side, Taiwan should incentivize indigenous energy production, including nuclear energy, onshore wind, offshore wind, and solar.
Extend the life of Taiwan’s nuclear energy power plants and consider expanding capacity. Nuclear energy is not only Taiwan’s best option for meeting its summer generation needs but also extremely safe and reliable. In the event of a conflict, the PRC is extremely unlikely to launch highly escalatory and provocative attacks against nuclear facilities on territory it seeks to occupy.
Bolster domestic energy supplies and decarbonization objectives including by considering easing localization requirements for offshore wind projects—while ensuring that PRC components and sensors are not incorporated.
Disperse and, where possible, harden energy and electricity assets and volumes across the island for both military and civil defense needs.
Examine potential alternatives to diesel, as diesel inventories can begin to degrade after several weeks, including “long-duration diesel” solutions that, while more polluting, could extend the shelf life of its inventories, enhancing the durability of Taiwan’s military and civil defense efforts.
Deepen liquified natural gas (LNG) ties with the United States. Contracting with US LNG producers would moderately bolster Taiwan’s energy security, as the PRC would be more reluctant to interdict US cargoes than vessels from other nations.
Conduct comprehensive studies into energy contingency planning, examining how energy and electricity would be prioritized and rationed during various scenarios.

Food and water resiliency

Taiwan’s food supply needs will be significant in the event of a contingency, but pale in comparison to its energy and water requirements. Taiwan’s water security is a serious concern, as it is already suffering from water access issues in noncrisis periods. Taiwan should prioritize scarce land for electricity generation, especially onshore wind and solar, which are much less water-intensive than coal and natural gas generation. Repurposing farmland for renewables would ease Taiwan’s electricity and water needs in peacetime and during any crisis.

Taiwan’s food security challenges are serious, but manageable. The island’s self-sufficiency ratio for food stands at about 40 percent, after rising somewhat in recent years. Unlike energy, however, Taiwan can both store food, especially rice, and replenish these inventories. Meals ready to eat (MREs) can store for more than eighteen months.

Additionally, the island would likely be able to resupply itself aerially in all situations short of conflict. The PRC might well be extremely reluctant to shoot down a civilian aircraft resupplying Taiwan with food. The PRC’s shootdown of a civilian aircraft would damage external perceptions of the PRC, and strengthen global support for sanctions. While there can be no certainty, the PRC’s self-interest in managing perceptions of a confrontation would increase the likelihood of the safe transit of aerial and perhaps even maritime food deliveries to the island.

Taiwan’s water access problems are serious. Water shortages have manifested even in peacetime, as Taiwan experienced a severe drought in 2021. During a contingency with the PRC, Beijing might attempt to exploit this vulnerability.

Luckily, Taiwan’s water resiliency can be strengthened by tackling agricultural consumption and, wherever politically and technically feasible, repurposing farmland for energy generation. From 2013 to 2022, 71 percent of Taiwan’s water consumption was attributable to agriculture. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s industries comprised only 10 percent of demand during that period, with domestic (i.e., residential and commercial) consumption accounting for the remainder. Taiwan’s water needs are growing, due to “thirsty” industrial customers, but the agricultural sector is primarily responsible for the majority of the island’s consumption, although consumption and supply sources vary across the island.

Taiwan’s policymakers recognize its water problems and have begun raising water prices, especially for heavy users. Taiwan should continue to encourage efficiency by gradually but perceptibly increasing water prices. Concomitantly, it should further reduce demand by repurposing water-intensive farmland for electricity generation, when feasible. Repurposing farmland will undoubtedly prove politically difficult, but it will also improve Taiwan’s water and electricity resiliency.

Food and water security recommendations

Prioritize energy and water security needs over food production.
Secure and disperse inventories of foodstuffs, such as MREs, medicines, and water, along with water purification tablets.
Bolster the island’s cold storage supply chains and overall foodstuff inventories.
Plan and work with partners to stage food supply if a Berlin airlift-style operation becomes necessary.
Continue to encourage water conservation by increasing water prices gradually but steadily.
Ensure redundancy of water supplies and systems, especially in the more populous northern part of the island.
Ensure that drinking water and sanitation systems can operate continuously, after accounting for any electricity needs.

SOURCES

Gustavo F. Ferreira and J. A. Critelli, “Taiwan’s Food Resiliency—or Not—in a Conflict with China,” US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters 53, no. 2 (2023), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.3222; Joseph Webster, “Does Taiwan’s Massive Reliance on Energy Imports Put Its Security at Risk?,” New Atlanticist, Atlantic Council blog, July 7, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/does-taiwans-massive-reliance-on-energy-imports-put-its-security-at-risk/; Amy Chang Chien, Mike Ives, and Billy H. C. Kwok, “Taiwan Prays for Rain and Scrambles to Save Water,” New York Times, May 28, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/28/world/asia/taiwan-drought.html; “Water Resources Utilization,” Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), Water Resources Agency, 2022, https://eng.wra.gov.tw/cp.aspx?n=5154&dn=5155; Meng-hsuan Yang, “Why Did Formosa Plastics Build Its Own Desalination Facility?,” CommonWealth Magazine, May 31, 2023, https://english.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=3440; and Chao Li-yen and Ko Lin, “Taiwan State-Owned Utility Evaluates Water Price Adjustments,” Focus Taiwan, January 26, 2024, https://focustaiwan.tw/society/202401260017#:~:text=As%20of%20Aug.

NOTE

The Berlin airlift of 1948 and 1949 demonstrates the power of aerial food replenishment logistics in an uncontested environment. From June 26, 1948, to September 30, 1949, Allied forces delivered more than 2.3 million tons of food, fuel, and supplies to West Berlin in over 278,000 airdrops. While Taiwan’s population of more than twenty-three million is significantly larger than West Berlin’s population of 2.5 million, the world civilian air cargo fleet has expanded dramatically over the past seventy-five years. In all situations short of conflict, Taiwan would be able to restock food from the air. For more on the Berlin airlift, see Katie Lange, “The Berlin Airlift: What It Was, Its Importance in the Cold War,” DOD News, June 24, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Feature-Stories/Story/Article/3072635/the-berlin-airlift-what-it-was-its-importance-in-the-cold-war/.

Enhancing defense resilience

Ever since Beijing leveraged then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan as an excuse to launch large-scale joint blockade military exercises, pundits have labeled the residual military situation around Taiwan as a “new normal.” Yet there is really nothing normal about a permanent presence of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy warships menacingly surrounding the island along its twenty-four nautical mile contiguous zone, and nothing usual about increasing numbers of manned and unmanned military aircraft crossing the tacit median line in the Taiwan Strait—a line that held significance for seven decades as a symbol of cross-strait stability. Nor should it be viewed as normal that a steady stream of high-altitude surveillance balloons—which are suspected of collecting military intelligence—violate Taiwan’s airspace.⁸¹ Some have better described this “new normal” as a strategy akin to an anaconda noticeably tightening its grip around the island, drawing close enough to reduce warning time and provocative enough to raise the risk of inadvertent clashes. In other words, the PRC has unilaterally dialed up a military cost-imposition campaign meant to chip away at peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, wear down Taiwan’s military, and erode confidence and social cohesion in Taiwan society.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was an additional wake-up call for the citizens of Taiwan, following mainland China’s 2019 crackdown on Hong Kong freedoms, heightening recognition of the risks presented by the PRC and, in particular, that the long-standing status quo in cross-strait relations is no longer acceptable to Beijing. Taiwan thus finds itself in the unenviable position of simultaneously countering PLA gray zone intrusions and cognitive warfare—what NATO calls affecting attitudes and behaviors to gain advantage⁸²—while beefing itself up militarily to deter the growing threat of a blockade or assault.

With this backdrop, Taipei authorities have since embarked on long-overdue reforms in defense affairs, marked by several developments aimed at bolstering the island democracy’s military capabilities and readiness in the face of growing threats from Beijing.

First, Taiwan’s overall defense spending has undergone seven consecutive year-on-year increases, reaching 2.5 percent of gross domestic product.⁸³ While this is commendable, Taiwan’s defense requirements are very substantial, and its budget in US dollars is only $19.1 billion.⁸⁴ Accordingly, it will be important for Taiwan to continue the trend of higher defense spending to at least 3 percent of GDP both to bolster Taiwan’s military capabilities and as a deterrent signal to Beijing—and also to garner international community recognition that Taiwan is serious about its own defense. A key element will be to ensure that Taiwan has sufficient stocks of ammunition and other weapons capabilities to fight effectively until the United States could fully engage and in the event of a longer war. One area that deserves a high degree of attention is defense against ballistic and cruise missiles and unmanned vehicles. Especially in light of the recent coalition success in defeating such Iranian attacks against Israel, planning should be undertaken to assure comparable success for Taiwan against PRC attacks. Adding mobile, short-range air defenses to the high-priority list of military investments for Taiwan—such as the highly mobile National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS)⁸⁵—will make it harder for the PLA to find and destroy Taiwan defenses, especially if combined with passive means for target detection and missile guidance.

Second, the new president can kick-start an enhanced approach to defense by embracing full integration of public-private innovation and adopting Ukraine’s model of grass-roots innovation for defense, which has served it well through a decade of war against a much larger Russia. Recognizing that innovation is itself a form of resilience, Taiwan can draw valuable lessons from Ukraine, particularly in leveraging private-sector expertise. By implementing what some Ukrainian defense experts term a “capability accelerator” to integrate emerging technologies into mission-focused capabilities, Taiwan can enhance its resilience and swiftly adapt to evolving security challenges, including rapidly fielding a high volume of unmanned systems to achieve distributed surveillance, redundant command and control, and higher survivability.⁸⁶ This comprehensive approach, which recognizes the private sector as the greatest source of innovation in today’s complex security environment, holds significant potential for enhancing Taiwan’s defense capabilities through the utilization of disruptive technologies. The island’s overall resilience would significantly benefit by drawing the private sector in as a direct stakeholder in national defense matters.

Ukraine’s grass-roots model of defense innovation, spearheaded by volunteers, nongovernment organizations, and international partners, is a worthy and timely model for Taiwan. Ukraine’s approach has yielded significant advancements in drone warfare, as well as sophisticated capabilities like the Delta battlefield management system—a user-friendly cloud-based situational awareness tool that provides real-time information on enemy and friendly forces through the integration of data from sources such as drones, satellites, and even civilian reports.⁸⁷ This collaborative model, reliant on cooperation between civilian developers and military end users, has propelled Ukraine’s military technological revolution by integrating intelligence and surveillance tasks, while enhancing decision-making and kill-chain target acquisition. Taiwan will benefit from a comparable approach.

Third, as suggested above, Taiwan should focus a large portion of its defense budget on low-cost, highly effective systems. In terms of force structure, it appears that Taiwan has settled on a design that blends large legacy platforms of a twentieth-century military with the introduction of more survivable and distributable low-end asymmetric capabilities. The latter are best exemplified by Taiwan’s indigenously produced Ta Chiang-class of high-speed, guided-missile corvettes (PGG) and Min Jiang-class fast mine laying boats (FMLB).⁸⁸ But much more must be done to bolster Taiwan’s overall defense capabilities by focusing on less expensive, but nonetheless highly effective systems.

In Ukraine’s battle against Russian Federation invaders, drones have provided Ukrainian forces with important tactical capabilities by enabling them to gather intelligence, monitor enemy movements, and conduct precision strikes on high-value targets. Taiwan can comparably utilize low-cost UAVs to establish mesh networks that connect devices for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and for targeting that would be invaluable in countering a PRC amphibious assault. Lessons from Ukraine further highlight the importance of having the right mix of drone types and capabilities in substantial stockpiles, capable of a variety of missions. Notably, Ukrainian officials have called for the production of more than one million domestically produced drones in 2024.⁸⁹ Then-President Tsai’s formation of a civilian-led “drone national team” program is a commendable step in this direction and underscores the power of collaborative innovation in joint efforts between users.⁹⁰ Encouraging cooperation between Taiwan drone makers and US private industry will accelerate the development of a combat-ready unmanned systems fleet with sufficient range, endurance, and payload to enhance situational awareness and battlefield effects.

Concurrent with those efforts utilizing unmanned systems, Taiwan should bolster its naval mining capabilities as a strategic measure against PRC aggression. Naval mines represent one of the most cost-effective and immediately impactful layers of defense.⁹¹ In this regard, Taiwan’s new Min Jiang class of FMLB represents the right type of investments in capabilities which could prove pivotal in thwarting potential invasion attempts.

Even more significantly for a Taiwan audience, Ukraine broke a blockade of its Black Sea ports using a combination of naval drones and coastal defense missiles—and repelled the once-mighty Russian Black Sea Fleet—all without a traditional navy of its own.⁹² Faced with clear intent by a PLA Navy practicing daily to isolate the island, the time is past due for Taiwanese authorities to hone their own counterblockade skills including a heavy reliance on unmanned surface vehicles.

Taiwan should also make rapid investments in port infrastructure and defenses along Taiwan’s eastern seaboard in places such as Su’ao and Hualien harbors, which can serve as deepwater ports that are accessible, strategic, antiblockade strongpoints, and where any conceivable PLA blockade would be at its weakest and most vulnerable point logistically. Su’ao harbor, as a potential future homeport for Taiwan’s new indigenous Hai Kun-class diesel submarines, could also serve a dual purpose as an experimentation and development zone for public-private collaboration on unmanned-systems employment and operations. Infrastructure investments in East Coast ports could enhance the island’s ability to attain emergency resupply of energy, food, humanitarian supplies, and munitions under all conditions, broadening options for international community aid and complicating PLA efforts.

Fourth, every new capability needs trained operators who are empowered to employ and engage. This year Taiwan began implementation of a new, one-year conscript training system for male adults born after January 1, 2005 (up from a wholly inadequate four months of conscription in the past decade).⁹³ Taiwan’s “all-out defense” plan realigns into a frontline main battle force consisting of all-volunteer career military personnel, backed up by a standing garrison force composed mainly of conscripted military personnel guarding infrastructure, along with a civil defense system integrated with local governments and private-sector resources. Upon mobilization, there would also be a reserve force to supplement the main battle and garrison forces.

According to details laid out in its 2023 National Defense Report, Taiwan’s revamped one-year conscript system and reorganized reserve mobilization system place significant emphasis on traditional military combat skills, such as rifle marksmanship and operation of mortars.⁹⁴ However, in response to evolving security challenges and the changing nature of warfare, Taiwan’s military should incorporate greater training in emerging technologies and unconventional tactics, along with decentralized command and control, especially in the areas of drone warfare, where unmanned aerial vehicles and surface vessels play a crucial role in reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeted strikes. By integrating drone warfare training into the conscript system as well as in annual reserve call-up training, Taiwan can better prepare its military personnel to adapt to modern battlefield environments and effectively counter emerging threats.

Integrating drone operations into military operations down to the conscript and reservist level offers a cost-effective means to enhance battlefield situational awareness and operational capabilities, and also has the added benefit of enhancing the attractiveness and value of a mandatory conscription system emerging from years of low morale and characterized by Taiwan’s outgoing president as “insufficient” and “full of outmoded training.”⁹⁵ Recognizing the imperative to modernize military training to face up to a rapidly expanding PLA threat, Taiwan’s military force realignment plan came with a promise to “include training in the use of Stinger missiles, Javelin missiles, Kestrel rockets, drones, and other new types of weapons . . . in accordance with mission requirements to meet the needs of modern warfare.”⁹⁶ Looking at the example of Ukraine, where drones have been utilized, underscores the importance of incorporating drone warfare training into its asymmetric strategy.

The Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act “prioritize[d] realistic training” by the United States, with Taiwan authorizing “an enduring rotational United States military presence that assists Taiwan in maintaining force readiness.”⁹⁷ There have been numerous reports of US special forces in Taiwan,⁹⁸ and those forces could provide training in tactical air control, dynamic targeting, urban warfare, and comparable capabilities.⁹⁹ Likewise, parts of an Army Security Force Assistance Brigade could do similar work on a rotational basis, on- or off-island.

To facilitate a comprehensive and integrated approach to defense planning and preparedness between the military, government agencies, and civilian organizations, Taiwan has also established the All-out Defense Mobilization Agency, which (as noted above) is a centralized body subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense that is tasked with coordinating efforts across various sectors, down to the local level, to enhance national defense readiness. That agency would be significantly more effective if raised to the national level with a broadened mandate as part of a comprehensive approach.

The Taiwanese leadership also should consider elevating their efforts to create a large-scale civil defense force, offering practical skills training which would appeal to Taiwanese willing to dedicate time and effort toward defense of their communities and localities. These skills could include emergency medical training, casualty evacuation, additive manufacturing, drone flying, and open-source intelligence. Private, nonprofit civil defense organizations such as Taiwan’s Kuma Academy hold widespread appeal to citizens seeking to enhance basic preparedness skills.¹⁰⁰ With a curriculum that covers topics ranging from basic first aid to cognitive warfare, Kuma Academy’s popular classes typically sell out within minutes of going online. According to a recent survey of domestic Taiwan opinions sponsored by Spirit of America, “When facing external threats, 75.3% of the people agree that Taiwanese citizens have an obligation to defend Taiwan.”¹⁰¹ A well-trained civil defense force and other whole-of-society resilience measures provide an additional layer of defense and enhance social cohesion to better deny Beijing’s ultimate political objective of subjugating the will of the people.

Defense resilience recommendations for Taiwan

Raise defense spending to at least 3 percent of GDP.
Adopt Ukraine’s model of grass-roots innovation in defense.
Focus a large portion of its defense budget on low-cost, highly effective systems including unmanned vehicles and naval mines.
Incorporate greater training in emerging technologies and unconventional tactics for conscripts and reserves.
Invest in East Coast port infrastructure as counterblockade strongholds.
Elevate the All-out Defense Mobilization Agency to the national level and implement a larger civil defense force that fully integrates civilian agencies and local governments.

Conclusion

On April 3, 2024, Taiwan was struck by the strongest earthquake in twenty-five years. In the face of this magnitude 7.4 quake, Taiwan’s response highlights the effectiveness of robust investment in stricter building codes, earthquake alert systems, and resilience policies, resulting in minimal casualties and low infrastructure damage.¹⁰² Taiwan’s precarious position on the seismically vulnerable Ring of Fire, a belt of volcanoes around the Pacific Ocean, mirrors its vulnerability under constant threat of military and gray zone aggression from a mainland China seeking seismic changes in geopolitical power. Drawing from its success in preparing for and mitigating the impact of natural disasters, Taiwan can apply a similarly proactive approach in its defense preparedness. Safeguarding Taiwan’s sovereignty and security requires investments in a comprehensive security strategy for resilience across society—including cybersecurity for critical infrastructures, bolstering energy security, and enhanced defense resilience. Such an approach would provide Taiwan the greatest likelihood of deterring or, if necessary, defeating PRC aggression including through blockade or kinetic conflict.

About the authors

Franklin D. Kramer is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a member of its board. He is a former US assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.

Philip Yu is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and a retired US Navy rear admiral.

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and editor of the independent China-Russia Report.

Elizabeth “Beth” Sizeland is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Earlier, she served in the United Kingdom’s government including as deputy national security adviser and as adviser to the UK prime minister on intelligence, security, and resilience issues.

This analysis reflects the personal opinions of the authors.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank the following individuals for their helpful comments and feedback: Amber Lin, Elsie Hung, Kwangyin Liu, and Alison O’Neil.

Four steps that NATO’s southern flank strategy needs to succeed

Jason Davidson — Tue, 25 Jun 2024 20:11:44 +0000

At next month’s Washington summit, NATO’s response to the third year of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine will undoubtedly garner allies’ attention and headline news coverage. Much of the Alliance’s focus is understandably to the east and the threat from Moscow. But the Washington summit will also see NATO look in another direction: south. In Washington, the Alliance will adopt its first ever southern flank strategy. As to the east, Russia’s disruptive actions are a concern along NATO’s southern flank, too.

In May, NATO published a thirty-three-page report by a group of experts on the Alliance’s “southern neighborhood,” which includes North Africa, the Sahel, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean Sea. The experts’ report highlights how instability from these regions has a direct impact on allies and suggests several important considerations as the Alliance finalizes its southern flank strategy in Washington. The report is a great start and should be read carefully, but NATO needs to take four additional measures if it genuinely wants to improve the situation on the Alliance’s southern flank.

Why look south?

Why should NATO spend time and energy on a southern flank strategy when it faces such a clear and present threat to the east? NATO’s 2022 strategic concept, adopted at the Madrid summit, outlines two fundamental threats the Alliance faces. The strategic concept declares that Russia is the “most significant and direct threat” to allies’ security and that terrorism is the “most direct asymmetric threat” to the security of citizens, international peace, and prosperity. As US Ambassador to NATO Julianne Smith recently noted, Russia and terrorist groups benefit from and contribute to instability in NATO’s southern neighborhoods and provide the central reason why the Alliance needs a southern flank strategy.

Russia’s Africa Corps (the successor to the Wagner Group in Africa) has taken advantage of instability in these neighborhoods, providing fighters, trainers, and materiel in Libya, Mali, Sudan, and Burkina Faso. Russia has a naval base in Tartus, Syria, and uses it to sail its vessels in the Mediterranean, posing a threat to naval security and maritime commerce. Instability in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Sahel has also provided an environment where radical Islamic terrorist groups expanded in recent decades. Instability in Iraq and Syria allowed the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) to establish a large territorial footprint across those countries. Recent research suggests that the Sahel region has become the global epicenter of Islamic radical terrorism. Left unchecked, instability in NATO’s southern neighborhood translates into opportunities for Russian intervention and metastasized terrorist groups. This instability also drives other important problems for NATO’s southern flank allies: irregular migration, drug smuggling, piracy, and organized crime, which, in turn, threaten energy security (especially as European countries have moved away from Russian oil and gas) and maritime commerce.

Getting concrete with the recommendations

At NATO’s 2023 Vilnius summit, the allies agreed to engage in a “comprehensive and deep reflection on existing and emerging threats and challenges” emanating from the southern neighborhoods. In October 2023, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg appointed a group of eleven experts to provide “concrete recommendations to shape NATO’s future approach.”

Released on May 7, the report includes recommendations that can be grouped in four basic categories.

First, it makes several overarching organizational suggestions. These include the appointment of a special envoy for the southern neighborhoods, periodic review of NATO’s relationship with the southern neighborhoods, and a better integration of NATO’s Strategic Direction-South Hub in Naples within the NATO structure to strengthen the link between the hub and the Alliance’s political leadership.

Second, the report suggests strengthening dialogue with and about the southern neighborhoods, as well as enhancing cooperation with relevant regional and international organizations. Specifically, it recommends a special summit of all NATO’s southern partners (members of the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative), the creation of a high-level regional security and stability dialogue, and improved consultation with the European Union and representation from the African Union.

Third, the report suggests several important strategic communications measures, recognizing that NATO’s image in the region—in part due to Russian misinformation campaigns—needs improvement. The report proposes a permanent “Facts for Peace” initiative to fight disinformation in the southern neighborhoods and the establishment of a center with the same mission.

Fourth, the report discusses areas where NATO should expand its capacity to act. For example, NATO could set up a standing mission dedicated to training and capacity building for partners. NATO might also enhance cooperation with partners on resilience, which would include information and advice on resilience planning, including on disaster response. The report also suggests that NATO build on recent successes in counterpiracy and “identify further areas for maritime security cooperation” with partners.

This group of experts’ recommendations are detailed and thoughtful. Leaders of NATO’s member states would do well to implement most if not all of them. But four additional steps should be added to form an effective southern flank strategy.

Four steps forward

In releasing his fiscal 2024 budget, US President Joe Biden shared a quote that he attributed to his father. “Don’t tell me what you value,” he said. “Show me your budget—and I’ll tell you what you value.”

If NATO truly cares about addressing the challenges in its southern neighborhoods, then it should be willing to incur the costs to do so. If NATO adopts a southern flank strategy at the Washington summit that entails real increases in spending on the Alliance’s activities in the region, it will signal to Russia and to the leaders of terrorist groups that it cares enough about the southern neighborhoods to invest resources there. In agreeing to increased spending, NATO would also signal to southern flank member governments and their publics that the Alliance is willing to incur the costs for something other than defense of its eastern flank.

Moreover, the Alliance’s additional spending should focus on four specific areas:

First, NATO members should commit significantly more resources to Operation Sea Guardian and its three tasks, which are to contribute to maritime capacity building with regional partners, maintain maritime situational awareness, and support maritime counterterrorism. All three tasks are means to directly address the threats from Russia and terrorism in the southern neighborhoods.

Second, NATO should commit to an amply resourced training and capacity-building mission for the southern neighborhoods, and it should look for local partners interested in receiving such assistance.

Third, NATO should commit the resources to stand up a multinational division for the southern flank, which would be available for deployment to a crisis in the region if necessary and appropriate.

Fourth, at the Washington summit, allies should commit to increase funding for the Defense Against Terrorism Programme of Work, which aims to protect against and prevent nonconventional attacks, such as attacks on critical infrastructure and terrorist attacks using emerging and disruptive technologies.

If allies agree to these four recommendations as well as to the group of experts’ recommendations, they will demonstrate to all parties that the southern neighborhoods are of great interest and they will be engaging in meaningful steps to improve stability there.

Jason Davidson is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is also professor of political science and international affairs and director of the Security and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Mary Washington in Fredericksburg, Virginia.

NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary is a milestone in a remarkable story of reinvention, adaptation, and unity. However, as the Alliance seeks to secure its future for the next seventy-five years, it faces the revanchism of old rivals, escalating strategic competition, and uncertainties over the future of the rules-based international order.

With partners and allies turning attention from celebrations to challenges, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative invited contributors to engage with the most pressing concerns ahead of the historic Washington summit and chart a path for the Alliance’s future. This series will feature seven essays focused on concrete issues that NATO must address at the Washington summit and five essays that examine longer-term challenges the Alliance must confront to ensure transatlantic security.

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Beniamino Irdi featured in Formiche on Italy’s ability to combat hybrid threats

Beniamino Irdi — Wed, 12 Jun 2024 19:52:00 +0000

Original Article (Source in Italian)

On June 12, Transatlantic Security Initiative nonresident senior fellow Beniamino Irdi wrote an article in Formiche discussing Italy’s susceptibility to hybrid threats and the need for a more consolidated approach to combating them.

Fellow

Beniamino Irdi

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Disinformation English

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Polymeropoulos on a Cipher Brief podcast about Havana Syndrome

gmatchett — Mon, 20 May 2024 15:50:30 +0000

Original Source

On May 20, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Marc Polymeropoulos spoke on a Cipher Brief podcast titled “Is Russia Attacking U.S. Government Employees Using High-Energy Weapons?” about Havana Syndrome.

Fellow

Marc Polymeropoulos

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Europe & Eurasia

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Polymeropoulos cited in The Spectator “Is Havana Syndrome real?”

gmatchett — Sun, 05 May 2024 17:47:23 +0000

Original Source

On May 5, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Marc Polymeropoulos was cited in a Spectator article by John Foreman about Havana Syndrome.

Fellow

Marc Polymeropoulos

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Europe & Eurasia

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Starling and Gen. Cartwright publish in Defense One emphasizing the value of a new image for special operations forces

gmatchett — Sun, 05 May 2024 15:04:25 +0000

Original Source

On May 5, Forward Defense Director Clementine Starling and Atlantic Council Board Director General James E. Cartwright, USMC (Ret.), published commentary in Defense One about the value that special operations forces (SOF) have in today’s great power competition.

They argued that SOF should reinforce not only their direct-action capabilities, but also the indirect competencies—special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, civil affairs operations, military information support operations, and security force assistance—that can be employed both before, during, and after different phases of conflict. Starling and Cartwright emphasized that enhancing the role special operations forces in strategic competition requires the national security enterprise to support a new image of special operators as valuable enablers and a not just a last-minute force for avoiding escalation.

Staff

Clementine G. Starling-Daniels

Director, Forward Defense

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense NATO

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Report

Mar 7, 2024

Stealth, speed, and adaptability: The role of special operations forces in strategic competition

By Clementine G. Starling and Alyxandra Marine

Clementine G. Starling and Alyxandra Marine discuss how special operations forces enhance US readiness in an era of strategic competition.

Conflict Defense Policy

New Atlanticist

Apr 19, 2024

Great power competition is back. What does that mean for US special operations forces?

By Alyxandra Marine

With their wide array of capabilities, US special operations forces can play a central role in strategic competition.

China Conflict

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Polymeropoulos quoted by CNN about growing frustration with Havana Syndrome recognition for victims

gmatchett — Wed, 01 May 2024 15:39:32 +0000

Original SOurce

On May 1, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Marc Polymeropoulos spoke to CNN about his frustration with the Trump administration’s handling of Havana Syndrome as a victim and outspoken advocate.

Fellow

Marc Polymeropoulos

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Europe & Eurasia

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Polymeropoulos cited in 60 minutes Australia and nine.com about Havana Syndrome

gmatchett — Sun, 28 Apr 2024 15:35:31 +0000

Original Source

On April 28, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Marc Polymeropoulos was cited on 60 minutes Australia and nine.com about his struggles with Havana Syndrome symptoms.

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The post Polymeropoulos cited in 60 minutes Australia and nine.com about Havana Syndrome appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Hammes referenced in a Georgetown Security Studies Review article about autonomous military systems

gmatchett — Fri, 19 Apr 2024 16:01:32 +0000

Original Source

On April 18, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Thomas X. Hammes was referenced in a Georgetown Security Studies Review piece titled “From Sling and Stone to Autonomous Drone? Key Questions for Determining Whether Autonomy Favors Davids or Goliaths,” about autonomous military systems (AMS) favoring conventionally “weaker” or poorer actors.

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Thomas X. Hammes

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Conflict Defense Industry

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Idlbi quoted in Arabi 21 on new US captagon law

Atlantic Council — Fri, 19 Apr 2024 15:55:57 +0000

original source

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Groen at 2024 US Cyber Command Legal Conference on AI risks and innovation

gmatchett — Thu, 11 Apr 2024 03:14:43 +0000

Original Source

On April 10, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Michael Groen spoke at the 2024 US Cyber Command Legal Conference about implementing AI and balancing risk with defense innovation.

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Michael Groen

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

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Zeneli quoted by Voice of America on Russian and Chinese influence in the Western Balkans

Valbona Zeneli — Thu, 01 Feb 2024 14:58:00 +0000

Original source

On February 1, Transatlantic Security Initiative nonresident senior fellow Valbona Zeneli was quoted by Voice of America on Russia’s and China’s influence in the Western Balkans. 

Fellow

Valbona Zeneli

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Albanian Corruption

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Russia’s growing dark fleet: Risks for the global maritime order

Elisabeth Braw — Thu, 11 Jan 2024 19:00:00 +0000

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the dark fleet of old vessels that lack proper insurance, have opaque ownership, and “flag hop” between different permissive ship registries has grown explosively, to an estimated 1,400 ships. Their presence poses considerable risk to other ships, to the environment, and to countries experiencing maritime accidents caused by the vessels. In addition to serving the transportation needs of Russia (as well as Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela), the shadow fleet forms quintessential “gray zone” aggression, causing tangible harm that targeted countries can do little to punish. If countries do try to block dark ships from their waters, or escort them away, it could prompt retaliation and escalation by Russia.

I. Introduction

II. Background

III. Changes in tanker traffic from Russia

IV. Shadow fleet incidents and accidents

V. Can countries block the dark fleet?

VI. The shadow fleet and sanctions: Harm and gray zone aggression

I. Introduction

Economic sanctions are designed to throttle the sanctioned country’s business activities and make daily life so cumbersome that its citizens and eventually its rulers begin questioning the country’s policies. That’s also what Western governments are trying to achieve through their sanctions against Russia, including the oil price cap introduced in December 2022 by a coalition including the Group of Seven countries and the European Union.¹ They and other Western countries already promised to phase out Russian crude oil from their own markets. The price cap, which barred Western shipping and insurance companies from involvement in Russian crude exports above $60 per barrel, was intended to significantly reduce Russia’s oil exports and thus its revenues. They and other Western countries already promised to phase out Russian crude oil from their own markets. The price cap, which barred Western shipping and insurance companies from involvement in Russian crude exports above $60 per barrel, was intended to significantly reduce Russia’s oil exports and thus its revenues.

But Russia has been successful in circumventing these sanctions, especially through its extensive use of so-called shadow vessels, which are old and lack proper insurance. These vessels play a role in the gray zone, state-linked aggression below the threshold of armed military violence.² That results in considerable expense for vessels they damage and the countries in whose waters the accidents occur. The dark fleet has already begun causing incidents—from the Bay of Gibraltar to the waters of China, Cuba, and Indonesia, to name a few—and the calamities will quickly mount, not just because the shadow fleet is growing rapidly but also because it is aging, making the vessels increasingly susceptible to malfunction.

II. Background

The shadow fleet, also known as the dark fleet, comprises mostly aging ships that sail without the industry’s standard Western insurance, have opaque ownership, frequently change their names and flag registrations, and generally operate outside maritime regulations. Because the world lacks a maritime police, vessels have operated in this manner for practically as long as there has been an organized maritime industry. However, in recent decades, as Western governments have imposed economic sanctions on Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela, the fleet has become an established phenomenon. Indeed, the three countries have perfected the use of such ships, which transport all manner of goods. The fleets thus ensure a tolerable existence for the sanctioned countries’ citizens in addition to generating revenues for hostile activities such as Iran’s nuclear program. (Regular shipping lines don’t transport sanctioned goods as Western insurance would not insure such cargo.)

In the months since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, vessels have joined the shadow fleet at an extraordinary rate. Twelve months into the war, the fleet had grown to some 600 tankers and other types of vessels. According to the commodity trading firm Trafigura, some 400 crude-oil tankers were among the vessels that had gone dark—some 20 percent of the world’s total crude-oil fleet.³ In a subsequent report, the analytics firms Vortexa and Windward estimated the number of dark vessels at 1,100. The firms also noted that the Russia’s war on Ukraine had triggered the emergence of a smaller category of noncompliant vessels, the “gray fleet,” which haven’t gone completely dark but whose ownership and sanctions compliance are difficult to ascertain: the gray fleet encompasses some 900 vessels, they estimated. That meant that the dark fleet made up ten percent of the global wet cargo fleet (i.e., carrying liquids), while the gray fleet accounted for eight percent.⁴ And the fleet kept growing rapidly: by October 2023, Windward raised its estimate of the dark fleet to 1,400 vessels, up from 1,100.⁵ But in reality, nobody knows for certain how many shadow vessels there are. In December 2023, Vortexa calculated that 1,649 vessels have operated in the opaque market since January 2021, including 1,089 tankers transporting Russian crude.⁶

The existence of the shadow fleet matters greatly, not just because the vessels are old but also because they don’t comply with the rules that govern maritime operations. Several aspects are of particular significance:

Shadow vessels lack Western protection and indemnity insurance. P&I insurance is the industry standard; other types of insurance—such as the alternative schemes offered by the Russian and Iranian governments—are highly insufficient.⁷ By October 2023, two thirds of tankers carrying Russian crude oil were insured by “unknown.”⁸
Shadow vessels’ owners are based in non-Western countries and disguise their identities through complex arrangements. In many cases, they are entirely new outfits that even lack an address.
Because new vessels are too valuable to use in the risky shadow fleet, dark vessels are old. Indeed, the rise of the shadow fleet has kept old vessels in traffic. Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, vessels more than twenty years old made up three percent of the global tanker fleet. Their share is now expected to rise to 11 percent by 2025.⁹
Since they operate outside established maritime regulations, shadow vessels don’t undergo regular maintenance.
Shadow vessels engage in risky ship-to-ship transfers of sanctioned cargo.
To disguise their activity, shadow vessels frequently turn off automatic identification systems (AIS).¹⁰

III. Changes in tanker traffic from Russia

Tanker traffic from Russia via the Baltic Sea gives a good indication of shadow fleet activity (though some tankers departing Russian ports are not dark ships).

Between March 2020 and March 2022, journeys by crude-oil tankers taking this route grew significantly. Analysis by the Norwegian Coastal Administration shows an increase from an average of 662 journeys per month during that period to an average of 955 voyages per month between April 2022 and September 2023. The size of the crude oil tankers also grew. Between 2020 and 2022, their total deadweight—the weight of cargo a ship is able to carry—increased from 60,354,000 metric tons to 92,043,000 metric tons. Notably, the increase began in April 2022. The length of the tankers also increased, from around 247 meters in 2020 to around 250 meters in October 2023. In another important development, the average age of the crude oil tankers increased from an average of 8.3 years in 2020 to 14.6 years in 2023 (January-November). At the time of writing, the average age of crude oil tankers departing from Kaliningrad is particularly high: 29.3 years, up from 15.4 years in 2020.¹¹ The crude oil carriers’ destinations have also changed significantly since Russia invaded Ukraine. The Norwegian Coastal Administration analysis shows that from 2020 until the end of January 2022, most calls by crude oil tankers from Russia via the Baltic Sea were to European or US ports. Starting in 2022, the majority of the vessels’ port calls took place in India, Greece, China, and Morocco; the Norwegian Coastal Administration also observed ship-to-ship transfers by the tankers to other tankers off the coasts of Morocco and Greece.

Liberia, a so-called flag-of-convenience state, remains the dominant flag state for vessels leaving Russian ports via the Baltic Sea (as well as along Norway’s western coast). It’s followed by the Marshall Islands, Russia, and Panama, whose vessels also increased their journeys along the two routes. Journeys by vessels sailing from Russian ports under other countries’ flags decreased. (The Marshall Islands and Panama are flag-of-convenience states.) In another noteworthy development, since 2021 six other flag-of-convenience states (Cook Islands, Gabon, Cameroon, Palau, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Vietnam) have also begun transporting Russian crude oil. The increase in journeys under convenience flags also indicates an increase in shadow vessel operations. Gabon has, in fact, become the destination of choice for dark vessels; according to S&P Global Market Intelligence, Gabon’s ship registry doubled in size during the first half of 2023, and an estimated 98 percent of the tankers sailing under its flag are high-risk or have no identifiable owner.¹²

IV. Shadow fleet incidents and accidents

The nature of the shadow fleet’s aging and poorly maintained vessels makes incidents and accidents far more likely than is the case in regular shipping. Incidents are also made more likely by the fact that the vessels turn off their AIS, which means authorities and other vessels don’t know their location. The fact that the vessels frequently engage in risky ship-to-ship transfers further adds to the risk of incidents.

These risks matter because the shadow vessels lack proper insurance. In case of an incident involving a legally operating vessel, that vessel (through its insurer) is likely to have to pay. “The little piece of paper a dark ship may have that says it’s insured is not worth the paper it’s written on,” Simon Lockwood, a maritime executive with the insurance broker WTW, said in conversation with the author for a Politico Europe article in October 2023; incidents involving a legally operating vessel and a dark one are “like having a crash with an uninsured driver,” he added.¹³ If the incident involves only the dark vessel, the country in whose territorial waters or exclusive economic zone the incident occurs faces having to handle it without financial contribution from an insurer. With P&I, Lockwood noted, “there’s protection if there’s an incident. If a shadow fleet tanker breaks up in the English Channel, who pays? The UK and French taxpayers will have to pay.”¹⁴

That makes it extremely important to track dark fleet incidents. Such monitoring provides insight into the vessels involved and the type of incidents caused, which can be used for forward planning. It is, indeed, vital for governments and legally operating shipping companies to have a clear picture of vessels and accidents involving the shadow fleet, and it’s equally important for environmental organizations and seafarer welfare organizations to have a comprehensive understanding of the accidents.

Within just a few hours on February 20, 2023, for example, two shadow fleet tankers got into difficulty in the Bay of Gibraltar and had to be aided by tugs and a salvage ship. Both tankers had recently changed names and flag registrations, one to Palau, the other to Gabon.¹⁵ Without the vessels having proper insurance, taxpayers faced having to pick up the tab. A few months before that, the Cuban-flagged tanker Petion, carrying sanctioned Venezuelan oil, collided with another vessel off the coast of Cuba.¹⁶ In March 2022, the Panama-flagged tanker Arzoyi ran aground off the Chinese port of Qingdao.¹⁷ In May 2023, the Gabon-flagged tanker Pablo caught fire off the coast off Malaysia. Malaysian authorities responded to the incident, rescued the crew (though three could not be located) and extinguished the fire.¹⁸ In October 2023, the twenty-six-year-old Cameroon-flagged tanker Turba, which had its last inspection in 2017, lost engine power some 300 kilometers off the coast of Indonesia.¹⁹ And in December, Indonesian salvage teams had to rescue a twenty-three-year-old Cameroon-flagged shadow vessel carrying Venezuelan oil.²⁰

Worldwide maritime salvage operations are conducted using the Lloyd’s Open Form, under which a vessel’s owner accepts an offer from a salvage company to recover a vessel that is no longer operational.²¹ The salvage company conducts the recovery in exchange for a reward, typically part of the proceeds from the sale of the vessel or what remains of it. But the Lloyd’s Open Form depends on a vessel having a bona fide owner that can be located in case of an incident. As we have seen, shadow vessels typically don’t. At the time of writing, the charred skeleton of the Pablo remains off the coast of Malaysia.²²

If no salvage company is willing to remove the Pablo (either because no owner can be located or because the owner won’t agree to signing a Lloyd’s Open Form), the Malaysian taxpayer is likely to have to fund her removal. This expense would join those already incurred as Malaysian authorities responded to the explosion. The Malaysian taxpayer also faces footing the bill for the removal of the oil leaked by the Pablo; fortunately the vessel only carried a small amount of crude as she had just made a delivery. Although the International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds (IOPC Funds) provide financial compensation for oil tanker spills in its member states, it’s not yet clear whether it will compensate coastal states for spills by shadow tankers.

V. Can countries block the dark fleet?

Blocking shadow vessels from territorial waters or exclusive economic zones involves significant hurdles that make doing so unfeasible and even impossible. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) grants vessels the right of innocent passage, which means the right to “freely navigate through territorial seas.”²³ A country’s territorial waters comprise the twelve nautical miles adjacent to its coast. The journeys must truly be innocent, defined by UNCLOS as “(a) traversing that sea without entering internal waters calling at a roadstead or port facility outside internal waters; or (b) proceeding to or from internal waters or a call at such roadstead or port facility.” Vessels must also obey the laws of the country whose waters they traverse; those laws include the ship being in good repair and possessing proper insurance. Most countries, though, would consider it too risky to try to block shadow vessels and suspected shadow vessels on such grounds, especially since there is no internationally acknowledged registry of shadow vessels.

UNCLOS provides more significant rights to vessels traveling in countries’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs), which extend 200 nautical miles beyond the territorial waters. A country has the exclusive rights to natural resources within its EEZ as well as the exclusive rights to offshore installations there. It does not, however, have legal powers over the EEZ beyond the policing of those resources and installations.²⁴ A country would thus struggle to ban shadow vessels from its EEZ. Retired Rear Adm. Nils Wang, a former chief of the Danish Navy (which is also responsible for most of Denmark’s coast guard functions), told me that “the whole construct of merchant shipping rests on very significant rights of free navigation. As long as you’re in the high seas, a country’s EEZ, or the outer edge of its territorial waters, you have the right to ‘innocent passage’. That means that if you’re not doing anything harmful to the environment or the seabed, the coastal country can’t impose any sanctions on you.”²⁵ If the ship enters a port or passes through the inner territorial waters, the territorial state can block the ship, but that doesn’t help the many countries whose waters the shadow vessels simply pass through. Countries are also wary of detaining shadow vessels in their waters, even if they have strong suspicions the vessels are violating maritime rules. “Nobody is interested in taking the vessels into a port and arrest[ing] the crew, because then you’re stuck with the ship in your harbor. Everyone hopes that it will pass your waters without any damage,” Wang noted.²⁶

A senior official in a NATO member state’s coast guard told me that “if the vessels have problems, we can intervene when they enter territorial waters, but there’s also a certain opportunity for intervention in the EEZ if the vessels threaten our installations.” Email correspondence of a coast guard official from a NATO member state with the author, November 17, 2023; the official is not named by mutual agreement. Such a ban, though, would take place against the background of the International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution. The convention allows countries to “prevent, mitigate or eliminate danger to its coastline or related interests from pollution by oil or the threat thereof, following upon a maritime casualty.”²⁷ In other words, a country can ban a vessel from its waters if an oil spill seems likely.

According to my figures, some four dozen incidents involving suspected shadow vessels have already taken place. The incidents feature the same types of calamities: fires, engine failures, collisions, loss of steerage, and oil spills. Each time such an accident occurs, another vessel’s insurer or a government has had to cover most of the expenses involved. As the shadow fleet continues to grow, age, and cause more incidents, these expenses will grow rapidly. For the authorities of the countries in whose waters the incidents occur, the burden of carrying out many more incident responses will continue to climb.

In an interview, Wang outlined the vast scope of the burden for coastal nations, citing the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue:

If you have a ship in distress, the coastal state has obligations according to the search and rescue convention. The entire globe is divided into thirteen search and rescue zones. Australia and New Zealand, for example, have search and rescue obligations pretty much all the way down to the Antarctic. No matter where you are, if you’re in distress a specific coastal state will have Search and Rescue responsibility. That means that as a coastal state you’re obliged to save persons distress if the vessel is within your geographic area of responsibility. You can’t start speculating whether it has insurance.²⁸

For the environment, the likely growth in shadow vessel incidents poses a similarly large burden. Because most of the shadow vessels carry oil, the risk of oil spills is concrete. The Pablo oil spill was relatively minor because she had just made a delivery, but other shadow vessels are likely to catch fire, explode, or collide carrying significant amounts of oil. Countries’ authorities may also be reluctant to ban entry under the “Intervention Convention, since the vessel’s owner can demand compensation on the basis that an entry ban is too harsh.²⁹ The country in whose waters the accident occurs thus faces the burden and expense of cleaning the spill up, and its maritime environment will face the harm caused even by a cleaned-up oil spill. Even if IOPC decides to provide compensation for oil spills caused by dark vessels, it’s unlikely to be able to sustain the regular oil spills that are likely to be caused by the fleet.³⁰

VI. The shadow fleet and sanctions: Harm and gray zone aggression

The shadow fleet poses mounting risks to other vessels, to coastal countries, and to countries in whose search and rescue areas of responsibility the vessels may have incidents. Already a risk when the fleet was relatively small and primarily serviced Iran and Venezuela, its explosive growth since early 2022 means it’s likely to cause far more extensive harm to other ships (and their owners and insurers) and to countries in whose waters it sails.

The incidents and accidents caused by shadow vessels are, one might argue, a by-product of sanctioned countries’ efforts to keep their economies afloat. Seen from that perspective, fires, explosions, collisions, mechanical failures, and oil spills involving dark vessels are accidental harm.

But Russia is also instrumentalizing the dark fleet, using it especially as a primary conveyor of oil exports. If it acted in good faith, the Russian government could issue insurance covering all the damage dark vessels are likely to cause and introduce mandatory maintenance for the vessels. It could, in other words, ensure that the shadow fleet operates on safety and insurance standards similar to those of the legal fleet.

Russian authorities, though, have done no such thing. Instead they (like the governments of Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela) build the country’s economic well-being on a fleet that causes financial and environmental harm wherever the vessels go. The countries and companies facing the bills, meanwhile, can do little to prevent the vessels from traversing territorial waters, EEZs, and especially the high seas: there is no official list of dark vessels and governments would be loath to risk escalation with Russia.

The shadow fleet, in fact, seems intended not just to transport goods to and from Russia but to cause harm to other countries. The countries that have chosen to trade with Russia by means of shadow vessels clearly do so in the knowledge that such vessels can cause incidents in their waters, but they evidently calculate that the benefits of sanctions-busting trade with Russia outweigh the costs of potential shadow-vessel incidents.

Countries that don’t utilize the shadow fleet but whose waters the vessels use are the real victims of the shadow activities. Denmark and Norway, located on the shadow vessels’ routes to and from Russia, are prime examples—one maritime insurer calculates that twelve shadow vessels pass through Norwegian waters on an average day³¹–but so are the random countries in whose waters the vessels perform ship-to-ship (STS) transfers.

The Norwegian Coastal Administration told me it has seen significant changes in traffic with crude oil tankers from Russia through the Baltic Sea.³² This route originates in Russia’s Baltic ports of Saint Petersburg, Primorsk, and Kaliningrad and ends in the North Sea, from where the vessels travel to their final destinations. It goes through the Baltic Sea, which includes Swedish, Finnish, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Polish waters, but primarily Danish waters, as the route continues through the Great Belt and Skagerrak, and on to the waters north of Denmark and south of Norway and then the North Sea. (The Great Belt is considered an international strait, though it’s administered by Denmark, which also provides optional pilotage.) Vessels departing Russia’s Arctic ports can also sail around Norway’s North Cape and south along the Norwegian coast. According to analysis by the Norwegian Coastal Administration, most crude oil tankers use the Baltic Sea route, which puts Denmark in particular at risk of oil spills and other incidents.³³ Since 2022, the tankers traveling the Baltic Sea route have grown in both size and length.³⁴

In particular, the Norwegian Coastal Administration found that within a few months of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the sailing pattern of the tanker fleet from Russian Baltic Sea ports had changed. Transport of crude oil had increased, and the oil was being transported over longer distances. The Norwegian Coastal Administration considers it likely that part of the oil leaving Russia’s Baltic ports is being transshipped—delivered to other tankers through STS transfers—several times before reaching a final destination. Some of the tankers monitored by the Norwegian Coastal Administration show unexplained stops in the Mediterranean and the Arabian Seas, which suggests likely ship-to-ship activities.³⁵

The US government has sought to remind countries and ports that receive shadow vessels of the costs and environmental harm that could result, but this has not led to any significant change in behavior. In October 2023, the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which administers US economic sanctions, sanctioned one shadow vessel operator based in the United Arab Emirates and another one based in Turkey, along with two vessels operated by them.³⁶ In early December OFAC sanctioned another three operators and three vessels, while the United Kingdom sanctioned twenty-one vessels.³⁷ That, though, still leaves virtually all dark ships in operation, and as long as Western sanctions against Russia remain, more ships will enter the dark fleet. A few days after the December sanctions were imposed, one of the vessels sanctioned by OFAC—which flies the Liberian flag and whose owner owns no other vessels—was found loitering in international waters off Malta.³⁸

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) also has tried to address the problems caused by the parallel fleet. Ahead of the IMO Assembly’s semiannual meeting in November-December 2023, a group of IMO member states submitted a draft IMO Assembly resolution that would oblige member states to take action. Iran, however, objected to the resolution, especially the use of terms like “dark ship” or “illicit,” which Iran noted are not defined in international law. The country—which has an obvious interest in allowing the dark fleet to continue to operate—instead proposed that the IMO improve the standards for ship-to-ship transfers.³⁹ In the end, the IMO Assembly adopted a resolution calling on flag states to “adhere to measures which lawfully prohibit or regulate” ship-to-ship transfers. The resolution also stipulated that ships update their operation plans for STS transfers, “especially if engaged in a mid-ocean transfer with another vessel,” and recommended that port states conduct enhanced inspections on suspected shadow vessels.⁴⁰

But even though the resolution is hardly burdensome, countries and ships can choose to ignore it. “Maybe the solution is to pass regulation on ship acquisitions. But ship ownership has been difficult to monitor, because the demand for transport contraband will always be there,” Wang observed.⁴¹ In November 2023, the European Commission proposed banning the sale of crude oil tankers to Russia. Under the proposal, the sale of tankers by EU-based entities to third countries could include a clause that bans the buyer from selling the vessel on to a Russian buyer.⁴² It is, however, unlikely that the authorities in such countries would enforce such a ban, and as shown above, shadow vessels transporting Russian cargo are typically owned by obscure entities typically not registered in Russia.

The potential harm to coastal states is tangible, but since the aggression doesn’t involve military means it’s virtually impossible for a country to avenge harm caused to it by a shadow vessel, even if it can prove the ship is transporting Russian cargo. The EU has proposed that Denmark could conduct insurance inspections on suspected shadow-fleet vessels passing the Great Belt.⁴³ But if the Danish Navy (which, again, is also responsible for most coast guard functions) tried to block a confirmed dark vessel from entering Danish waters on the grounds that it lacked the necessary insurance and maintenance record, Russia could retaliate, either by sending navy vessels to the dark vessel’s aid or through completely different measures of its choosing. In an era of gray zone aggression, the plot lines of Okkupert (Occupied), a Norwegian television thriller involving a Russian invasion to restart oil and gas production,⁴⁴ may no longer be purely a matter of fiction.

Indeed, the shadow fleet forms a clear example of gray-zone aggression. As long as Russia remains under sanctions, it will continue to use the shadow fleet for trade—and for subliminal aggression against other countries. Though tackling the shadow fleet is extremely challenging, countries should start by recognizing that the fleet is not just a tool for maritime transportation.

VII. About the author

Fellow

Elisabeth Braw

Senior Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

NATO Resilience & Society

Econographics Apr 17, 2025

Russia Sanctions Database

By Kimberly Donovan, Maia Nikoladze, Lize de Kruijf

Eastern Europe Economic Sanctions

Issue Brief Apr 18, 2023

NATO deterrence and defense: Military priorities for the Vilnius Summit

By Franklin D. Kramer

Ahead of the NATO Summit in Vilnius, this issue brief sets forth six priority actions that NATO should undertake to enhance its deterrent and defense posture.

Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia

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1 “G7 Agrees Oil Price Cap: Reducing Russia’s Revenues, while Keeping Global Energy Markets Stable,” European Commission, December 3, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_7468

2 Elisabeth Braw, The Defender’s Dilemma: Identifying and Deterring Gray-Zone Aggression, American Enterprise Institute, 2022, https://www.amazon.com/Defenders-Dilemma-Identifying-Deterring-Aggression/dp/0844750409

3 “Russia’s ‘Shadow Fleet’ of Tankers Swells to 600 Ships, Trafigura Says,” Bloomberg, February 3, 2023, https://gcaptain.com/russias-shadow-fleet-of-tankers-swells-to-600-ships-trafigura-says/

4 “Illuminating Russia’s Shadow Fleet,” joint report of Windward and Vortexa, last accessed December 27, 2023, https://windward.ai/knowledge-base/illuminating-russias-shadow-fleet/

5 “2 Dark Fleet Risks You’re Overlooking,” Windward° (blog), October 5, 2023, https://windward.ai/blog/2-dark-fleet-risks-youre-overlooking/

6 “The Fleet Operating in Opaque Markets: One Year Since the EU Import Ban,” Vortexa, December 2023, 6, https://marketinfo.vortexa.com/rs/837-MZE-578/images/Vortexa-Exclusive-Report-Opaque-Markets-Dec2023.pdf?version=0?utm_source=Website&utm_medium=Medium&utm_campaign=2000.EU-Ban-Anniversary–Report

7 Jonathan Saul, “Russia’s State-owned RNRC to Reinsure Russian Oil Shipments, Sources Say,” Reuters, June 10, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/article/russia-oil-shipping-insurance-idAFL8N2XT16F

8 Conall Heussaff et al., “Russian Crude Oil Tracker,” Bruegel dataset, October 11, 2023, https://www.bruegel.org/dataset/russian-crude-oil-tracker

9 Sam Chambers, “Growth of the Shadow Fleet Has Made Russian Oil Price Cap ‘Unenforceable’: World Bank,” Splash newsletter, Asia Shipping Media, November 1, 2023, https://splash247.com/growth-of-the-shadow-fleet-has-made-russian-oil-price-cap-unenforceable-world-bank/

10 For information about AIS, see “Automatic Identification Systems Overview,” Navigation Center, US Coast Guard website, accessed December 21, 2023, https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/automatic-identification-system-overview

11 Norwegian Coastal Administration internal report, November 2023, viewed by the author with permission, November 29, 2023.

12 Byron McKinney, “Russian Shadow Shipping–Emerging New Owners,” S&P Global Market Intelligence, May 17, 2023, https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/mi/research-analysis/russian-shadow-shipping-emerging-new-owners.html

13 Elisabeth Braw, “Russia’s Shadow Fleet Is a Disaster Waiting to Happen,” Politico Europe, October 30, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-shadow-fleet-oil-tankers-ships-accidents-ukraine-war-sanctions/

14 Braw, “Russia’s Shadow Fleet.”

15 “Two Tankers Drag Anchor in Western Med,” Insurance Marine News, February 22, 2023, https://insurancemarinenews.com/insurance-marine-news/two-tankers-drag-anchor-in-western-med/

16 Jonathan Saul, “Insight: Oil Spills and Near Misses: More Ghost Tankers Ship Sanctioned Fuel,” Reuters, March 23, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/oil-spills-near-misses-more-ghost-tankers-ship-sanctioned-fuel-2023-03-23/

17 Cichen Chen, “Sanctions-busting Suspect VLCC Runs Aground in China,” Lloyd’s List, March 22, 2022, https://lloydslist.com/LL1140250/Sanctions-busting-suspect-VLCC-runs-aground-in-China

18 Jonathan Yerushalmy and Haylena Krishnamoorthy, “How a Burnt Out, Abandoned Ship Reveals the Secrets of a Shadow Tanker Network,” Guardian, September 17, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/sep/18/how-a-burnt-out-abandoned-ship-reveals-the-secrets-of-a-shadow-tanker-network

19 Alaric Nightingale and Chandra Asmara, “Shadow Fleet Oil Tanker Drifted for Two Days in Indian Ocean,” Bloomberg, October 11, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-11/an-oil-tanker-adrift-in-indian-ocean-is-latest-dark-fleet-menace?sref=NeFsviTJ

20 Sam Chambers, “Salvage Teams in Indonesia Attend to Grounded Dark Tanker,” Splash, December 8, 2023, https://splash247.com/salvage-teams-in-indonesia-attend-to-grounded-dark-tanker/

21 Lloyd’s Standard Form of Salvage Agreement, 2020, https://assets.lloyds.com/assets/pdf-lloyds-open-form-lof-lof-2020/1/pdf-lloyds-open-form-lof-LOF-2020.pdf

22 Sam Chambers, “Malaysia Still Stuck with Charred Remains of Abandoned Pablo Tanker,” Splash, September 6, 2023, https://splash247.com/malaysia-still-stuck-with-charred-remains-of-abandoned-pablo-tanker

23 Jennifer El-Fakir, “Retaliatory or Lawful?: How Iran’s Seizure of the Stena Impero in the Strait of Hormuz Violated International Law,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, June 1, 2021, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5daf8b1ab45413657badbc03/t/60b81cc493d11c66ed07c387/1622678725110/59-2%28h%29+El-Fakir+Note.pdf

24 El-Fakir, “Retaliatory or Lawful?”

25 Nils Wang (retired rear admiral, Danish Navy), in interview with the author, November 21, 2023.

26 Wang, interview with the author, November 21, 2023.

27 International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, 1969, International Maritime Organization, https://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/International-Convention-Relating-to-Intervention-on-the-High-Seas-in-Cases-of-Oil-Pollution-Casualties.aspx

28 Wang, interview with the author.

29 International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties

30 “Funds Overview,” International Oil Pollution Compensation (IOPC) Funds, https://iopcfunds.org/about-us

31 Conversation with the author, December 4, 2023.

32 Email to the author, November 29, 2023.

33 Norwegian Coastal Administration internal report, November 2023, viewed by the author with permission, November 29, 2023.

34 Norwegian Coastal Administration internal report.

35 Norwegian Coastal Administration internal report.

36 Sam Finkelstein, “OFAC Ramps Up Price Cap Enforcement as Coalition Publishes Compliance Advisory for Maritime Oil Industry,” JDSupra, October 13, 2023, https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ofac-ramps-up-price-cap-enforcement-as-8651195/

37 “Ghost Fleet Update: OFAC Designates Additional Vessels, Companies,” Herbert Smith Freehills, December 6, 2023, https://hsfnotes.com/sanctions/2023/12/06/ghost-fleet-update-ofac-designates-additional-vessels-companies/; and Michelle Wiese Bockmann, “UK Sanctions Four Companies Linked to 82 Tankers in Russian Oil Trades,” Lloyd’s List, December 7, 2023, https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1147544/UK-sanctions-four-companies-linked-to-82-tankers-in-Russian-oil-trades

38 Michelle Wiese Bockmann, “Malta’s Loitering Sanctioned Tanker Is First from Dark Fleet to Be Targeted by Regulators,” Lloyd’s List, December 5, 2023, https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1147521/Maltas-loitering-sanctioned-tanker-is-first-from-dark-fleet-to-be-targeted-by-regulators

39 Dean Mikkelsen, ”Sea of Secrecy: Iran Challenges IMO Over Controversial ‘Dark Shipping’ Resolution,” Oil and Gas Middle East, November 24, 2023, https://www.oilandgasmiddleeast.com/news/sea-of-secrecy-iran-challenges-imo-over-controversial-dark-shipping-resolution

40 Jonathan Saul, “UN Ship Agency Adopts Tougher Resolution to Tackle Illicit ‘Shadow’ Fleet,” Reuters, December 6, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/un-ship-agency-adopts-tougher-resolution-tackle-illicit-shadow-fleet-2023-12-06

41 Wang, interview with the author.

42 “EU to Ban Sale of Tankers to Russia to Curb Shadow Fleet Growth,” Reuters, November 17, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/eu-ban-sale-tankers-russia-curb-shadow-fleet-growth-2023-11-17/

43 “Denmark May Begin Checking Russian Tankers’ Insurance in Baltic,” Maritime Executive, November 15, 2023, https://maritime-executive.com/article/denmark-may-begin-checking-russian-tankers-insurance-in-baltic

44 See the series description on IMDb, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt4192998/

The post Russia’s growing dark fleet: Risks for the global maritime order appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A maritime blockade of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China: A strategy to defeat fear and coercion

Marek Jestrab — Tue, 12 Dec 2023 14:00:00 +0000

FORWARD DEFENSE

STRATEGY PAPER LAUNCH

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The United States faces an increasingly challenging international security environment with ongoing conflicts in Europe and the Middle East. Tensions are also rising across the Taiwan Strait. With Xi Jinping charging his military to give him the ability to invade Taiwan by 2027, US and allied defense strategists are rightly concerned about a military contingency in the Taiwan Strait. Yet, while an invasion poses the greatest threat to Taiwan’s sovereignty, a naval blockade might be the most viable option for China.

In this installment of the Atlantic Council Strategy Papers Series, 2022-2023 Senior US Navy Fellow Marek Jestrab articulates a vision to prevent and, if needed, defeat a maritime blockade of Taiwan by China. This strategy paper demonstrates that a maritime blockade is the most strategically viable action for the PRC, that Taiwan is uniquely vulnerable to a blockade, and that a blockade is both a present and enduring challenge. The author presents specific actions for Taiwan, the United States, and like-minded nations with the goal of deterring and, if deterrence fails, defeating a PRC blockade of Taiwan.

The only predictable element of warfare is that it is inherently unpredictable; a near-singular focus on a Chinese invasion by force risks catching the Taiwanese, US, and likeminded militaries unprepared in the event of a non-kinetic naval blockade.
Stephen J. Hadley, 20th National Security Advisor

Executive summary

Blockade: The most strategically viable option for the PRC

The People’s Republic of China’s intention to unify Taiwan with the mainland is clear. Leveraging decades of sustained military modernization, the PRC possesses the capability and regional overmatch of maritime capacity required to execute a blockade of Taiwan. The specific actions that the PRC could execute will be discussed as part of this paper, but the term “blockade” in the context of this strategy refers to the PRC using coercive actions to prevent merchant shipping from having freedom of navigation in the waters surrounding Taiwan, and sealing off Taiwan’s seaports to prevent merchant shipping from being able to enter or exit the island.

A blockade is the most likely and dangerous scenario, due to Taiwan’s reliance on maritime trade to sustain its economic prosperity. Moreover, a nonkinetic blockade is appealing to the PRC, as it is the lowest level of coercive action that could remain below the threshold of open hostilities and still achieve its national objectives. The PRC’s maritime threat would be a coercive act, designed to instill fear in the Taiwanese population and the merchant shipping industry.

The PRC views the existence of Taiwan as a direct threat to its national sovereignty. Because of these perceived threats, the strategic plans of the PRC call for resolution of the “Taiwan question” before China is able to achieve its desired “national rejuvenation” by 2049. To accomplish this goal, the PRC refuses to renounce the use of force to compel unification of Taiwan with the mainland.

Additionally, the Russia-Ukraine war has made clear that unprovoked invasions of neighboring countries are simple for the world population to understand, and for leaders to rally against. Unlike an invasion, a blockade does not present the same strategic-messaging flaws. Moreover, the PRC’s military strategy indicates an openness to blockades and other uses of “restraint warfare,” which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) defines as seeking to avoid war first through military preparedness and powerful conventional and strategic forces that act in concert with political and diplomatic efforts to “subdue enemy’s forces without fighting.”¹

All these factors point to a maritime blockade of Taiwan as the PRC’s most strategically viable option. Therefore, what is required is a strategy specifically tailored to deterring and, if deterrence fails, defeating a PRC maritime blockade of Taiwan. The major elements of this strategy include Taiwan investing in capabilities that help demonstrate the resilience to resist, the United States maintaining the capability to sustain Taiwan in the face of a blockade, and like-minded nations providing enabling capabilities and additional maritime capacity.

The focus of this paper is on a nonkinetic blockade, but it is worth noting that there are multiple scenarios in which the PRC could utilize maritime advantages in its attempt to unify Taiwan with the mainland. A fundamental challenge of these actions is that the PRC can dynamically scale the operations based on evolving conditions.

Potential blockade scenarios

Kinetic blockade: Focusing effort only on the maritime domain, and the merchant shipping that is vital to sustaining Taiwan’s economic activity, the PRC could attack to sink or disable any merchant ship transiting to Taiwan—clearly constituting an act or acts of war. A coalition response would utilize the same forces that would be vital to countering an invasion scenario and PRC maritime forces. These include long-range precision fires from land-based missile batteries, standoff attacks by aircraft and surface ships, and undersea attacks from submarines. Comprehensive missile-defeat capabilities in the space, cyber, and electronic-warfare domains would also need to be employed to assist in the survivability of merchant shipping.
Nonkinetic blockade: In this scenario, which is the focus of this paper, the PRC would use advantages of mass—enabled by having the world’s largest navy and coast guard, and a government-funded and government-controlled maritime militia—to prevent merchant shipping from entering ports in Taiwan. The PRC has used these tactics on a smaller scale in disputed maritime areas in the South China Sea.
Sporadic and tailored blockade: Utilizing some combination of the kinetic and nonkinetic actions described in this paper, the PRC could slowly erode Taiwan’s will to resist and that of like-minded nations. The PRC could conduct this effort over a longer period that is deliberately unpredictable. The merchant-shipping industry might evaluate the waters around Taiwan as unsafe and disputed, in turn causing insurance-premium increases that prevent the business case for continuing to sail merchant ships to and from Taiwan’s maritime ports.
Embargo/quarantine: The PRC could utilize its maritime forces to attempt to enforce an “embargo” that would prevent certain products from entering Taiwan. The PRC would leverage its success at shutting out Taiwan from international organizations, claiming the action as a “domestic matter” and no concern of the international community. Utilizing the world’s largest coast guard, the PRC would inspect merchant ships transiting to Taiwan or force them to divert to the mainland.

While there is no consensus on a perfect term to describe the possible coercive actions that the PRC could employ in the maritime domain, “blockade” is utilized in this paper as it is the best available and most wildly understood term.²

This paper puts forth a strategy to prevent and, if needed, defeat a PRC blockade of Taiwan. This is consistent with the US government’s existing One China Policy, with a legal basis grounded in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, the US-PRC Joint Communiques of 1972, 1978, and 1982, and President Ronald Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan of 1982.³

What is required is a strategy specifically tailored to deterring and, if deterrence fails, defeating a PRC maritime blockade of Taiwan.
Commander Marek Jestrab, Academic Year 2022-23 Senior US Navy Fellow

Taiwan’s unique vulnerability to blockade

The PRC today possesses the maritime force structure needed for regional overmatch in a blockade scenario. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) commands the world’s largest navy, the world’s largest coast guard, and a massive government-subsidized maritime militia. From 2005 to 2022, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has added 135 ships to its inventory, while in the same period the US Navy added just two.⁴

Located only one hundred nautical miles from mainland China, Taiwan is uniquely vulnerable to a blockade. Taiwan’s dependence on maritime trade is evidenced by the imbalance of its gross domestic product (GDP) in relation to its port activity: Taiwan is the world’s twenty-first largest economy by GDP, yet requires the world’s sixth greatest number of port calls by container ships to sustain this level of economic activity. Taiwan’s largest vulnerability is its energy sector, as it relies on maritime trade to import nearly 98 percent of its energy.

PRC coercive actions in a maritime blockade of Taiwan

A PRC nonkinetic blockade of Taiwan would consist of a series of coercive actions that are uniquely scalable, and even reversible if the CCP does not believe they will be successful at that time. The goal of these coercive actions would be to create fear of maritime shipping and urge the Taiwan population to force negotiations in which the PRC has maximum leverage over Taiwan. A nonkinetic blockade by the PRC would likely include:

Strategic messaging to warn countries against interfering in an “internal dispute”;
Clearly visible maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and military aircraft presence;
People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) swarming and ramming merchant shipping;
Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) harassing and attempting “law-enforcement” interdictions;
PLAN ships acting as barriers to transit and clearly visible live-fire exercises;
Offensive cyberattacks on government organizations and financial institutions;
Severing or holding at risk undersea cables that connect Taiwan to the world;
Missile exercises from mainland China that land in the waters surrounding Taiwan;
Clearly visible deployment of sea mines; and
Limited covert and deniable submarine attacks on merchant shipping.

Counter-blockade response by Taiwan and the United States

A coalition response coordinated among Taiwan, the United States, and like–minded nations would be needed to restore deterrence. The desired end state would demonstrate the ability to sustain Taiwan’s economy indefinitely in the face of a PRC blockade. Senior leaders of the coalition would likely seek response options that manage the horizontal and vertical escalation of the conflict. Counter blockade actions by Taiwan, the United States, and like-minded nations would likely include:

Condemnation through coordinated strategic messaging, with a focus on the harm caused by the PRC’s actions to the global economy;
Taiwan demonstrating resilience and a will to resist, through implementing resource-rationing programs and reserve-force mobilization;
Targeted sanctions against the PRC that limit its access to global financial markets and critical technology;
Maritime ISR being continuously deployed to document the PRC’s actions;
Reflagging of merchant shipping to coalition national flags that the PRC would be hesitant to attack;
Escort of merchant shipping through the PRC forces by coalition naval warships;
Mine countermeasure forces identifying minefields for merchant shipping to avoid; and
Defensive cyber operations.

Actions to defeat the fear and coercion of a PRC Blockade

Deterring the PRC from even attempting a blockade requires a strategy that communicates to the PRC that its attempted coercive act would fail and prove to be a grave miscalculation. To communicate this message, an international coalition is required that can demonstrate the capability, ability, and will to sustain Taiwan’s economy indefinitely if it were confronted with a blockade. Implementing this strategy would require that:

Taiwan demonstrate the resilience to resist;
The United States demonstrate the capability to respond; and
Like-minded nations demonstrate enabling capabilities and maritime capacity.

To read the full strategy paper, download the PDF.

Strategy Paper Editorial board

Executive editors

Frederick Kempe
Alexander V. Mirtchev

Editor-in-chief

Matthew Kroenig

Managing Editor

Andrew A. Michta

Editorial board members

James L. Jones
Odeh Aburdene
Paula Dobriansky
Stephen J. Hadley
Jane Holl Lute
Ginny Mulberger
Stephanie Murphy
Dan Poneman
Arnold Punaro

Lead author

Fellow

Marek Jestrab

2022-23 Senior US Navy Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Indo-Pacific

This strategy paper contains the author’s personal views, and do not represent official positions of the US Navy or Department of Defense.

The author would like to thank Matthew Kroenig, Clementine Starling, Markus Garlauskas, Joseph Webster, and Kitsch Liao for their review and feedback. The author would also like to thank Julia Siegel and Shreya Lad for their editing and administrative support.

With a Foreword by

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Stephen J. Hadley

Chairman, International Advisory Board

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1 “2023 Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” US Department of Defense (DOD), October 19, 202, https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

2 Bradley Martin et al., “Implications of a Coercive Quarantine of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China,” RAND Corp., 2022, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1279-1.html.

3 Susan V. Lawrence and Caitlin Campbell, “Taiwan: Political and Security Issues,” Congressional Research Service, April 26, 2023, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10275.

4 Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, May 15, 2023, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33153/267.

The post A maritime blockade of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China: A strategy to defeat fear and coercion appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Novak published on Timor-Leste through the Lowy Institute and Jakarta Post

kyusko — Fri, 01 Dec 2023 20:46:53 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

On November 29, IPSI/GCH nonresident fellow Parker Novak published a piece via the Lowy Institute, titled “Timor-Leste’s uncertain future.” He wrote that “Timor-Leste has accomplished a great deal over the past two decades but faces headwinds that, if left unaddressed, could undo much of what it has achieved.”

On November 30, Novak also published an article titled “Timor-Leste faces uncertainty in every direction” in the Jakarta Post. In his piece, he explained that despite its status as “one of Southeast Asia’s most vibrant and resilient democracies,” Timor-Leste currently faces a number of serious economic, environmental, geopolitical, transnational, and domestic political challenges.

Fellow

Parker Novak

Nonresident Fellow

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Australia Democratic Transitions

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Dean quoted in Reuters and Sydney Morning Herald on new Australia-Tuvalu pact

kyusko — Tue, 14 Nov 2023 22:10:59 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

On November 13, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Peter Dean was quoted in Reuters on a recent Australian security guarantee to Tuvalu. On November 11, Dean’s comments on the new Australia-Tuvalu pact were also featured in the Sydney Morning Herald. He explained that the agreement, which also offers permanent residency to 280 Tuvalu citizens per year, “serves as a model for the region,” offering something that China cannot and undermining PRC influence in the region.

Fellow

Peter J. Dean

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Australia Conflict

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What Colombia’s ambitious new anti-drug plan means for US relations

Lucie Kneip and Geoff Ramsey — Mon, 13 Nov 2023 20:07:43 +0000

Colombia, the world’s largest cocaine producer, has once again broken its own record for illicit coca leaf cultivation, leading to a surge in cocaine production. Coca cultivation increased by 13 percent in 2022 according to the latest report from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), with a potential to produce a record 1,738 metric tons of refined cocaine—the highest figure ever recorded by the UNODC.

Colombia’s response to this booming illicit industry is forcing an important discussion on the future of US-Colombia cooperation. Washington and Bogotá must decide whether their shared security priorities will pave the way for a revitalized counternarcotics approach or risk the unraveling of decades of bilateral coordination.

On November 3, Colombian President Gustavo Petro visited Washington for the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity Leaders’ Summit, marking his second visit this year to the White House, after a meeting with US President Joe Biden in April. While the April meeting saw both presidents commit to bolstering anti-drug efforts through increased intelligence and interdiction cooperation, uncertainty has grown in the seven months since about the future of security and counternarcotics coordination between the two countries.

Amid questions over its counterdrug strategy, the Colombian government unveiled a new ten-year drug strategy in September, attempting to break from a half-century of policies that have failed to curb coca production. A hallmark of Petro’s new counternarcotics strategy is putting into action his 2022 campaign promise to better consult with the long-neglected rural communities that are most affected by the drug trade. In developing the new strategy, the Colombian Ministry of Justice carried out twenty-seven community dialogues from January to July of this year in sixteen Colombian provinces and Bogotá. Each of these dialogues was organized in partnership with the UNODC, which facilitated the participation of local residents as well as organizations of rural farmers, Afro-Colombians, and indigenous Colombians. Atlantic Council staff were invited to observe one of the meetings in June in Corinto, Cauca.

Greetings from Corinto, Cauca, where #Colombia’s government hosted its latest forum with communities affected by the drug trade, meant to inform a new drug strategy that will be presented next month.

The timing is key, and stakes are high for :us:-:flag-co: relations. Thread (1/6): pic.twitter.com/XfDc8jpmTj
— Geoff Ramsey (@GRamsey_LatAm) June 25, 2023

The forum in Corinto and the other community dialogues consisted of structured breakout conversations in small groups followed by an assembly in which Colombian authorities listened to input from participants. Attendees in Corinto, many of whom were growers of illicit crops such as coca, cannabis, and poppy, broadly expressed a willingness to transition to legal crop cultivation. They highlighted the lack of state presence, basic infrastructure, and few opportunities in their communities as barriers to connecting to the formal economy. After decades of various administrations failing to deliver on promises of rural development, communities such as Corinto are pushing the government to address their needs in order to transition. These needs include building basic infrastructure, such as bridges and roads, and increasing access to non-military state presence, such as social service resources. It remains to be seen whether the Petro administration will meet these requests to help rural communities break their dependence on cultivating illicit crops.

Ministry of Justice Drug Policy Director Gloria Miranda responds to a question from a cannabis grower at a government-organized forum with communities in Corinto, Cauca. Credit: Geoff Ramsey.

The government’s decision to carry out these community dialogues reflects the importance of connecting any counternarcotics strategy with a strategy to address the needs of those most affected by the drug trade. However, to truly be successful in diminishing the supply of drugs, Colombia and the United States must ramp up their coordination on this strategy.

On the surface, both governments have expressed an interest in continued cooperation. Following the launch of Petro’s new approach, the US and Colombian governments agreed to continue developing a comprehensive counternarcotics approach that promotes public health and human security. They committed to increasing interdiction efforts through joint training, capacity building, and intelligence sharing, as well as combatting money laundering, protecting the environment, increasing state presence in rural areas, and mitigating drug consumption. The biggest question, however, lies at the root of the plant. What strategy should be adopted to provide opportunities to those who are currently dependent on illicit coca crops as a livelihood?

While previous Colombian governments have favored forced eradication, the Petro administration is leaning into crop substitution. The ten-year drug strategy aims to enable roughly 50,000 out of 115,000 families economically dependent on coca cultivation to transition to legal means of income. This is part of an ambitious plan that seeks to cut both cocaine and coca production by 40 percent in the next decade. The plan is structured around two strategies, dubbed “oxygen” and “asphyxiation.” The “oxygen” pillar aims to provide relief to vulnerable communities affected by the drug trade, including subsistence growers and individual consumers. This includes investing in public health, environmental protection, and transitions to legal crops for small-scale coca growers. The “asphyxiation” pillar targets key actors in the organized crime and transnational drug trafficking networks to mitigate market proliferation and violence precipitated by criminal groups in coca-growing regions. The government plans to increase interdiction and strategic coca eradication of industrial-scale plantations.

Both forced eradication and crop substitution are imperfect strategies. Aerial fumigation has been banned by Colombia’s supreme court for its effects on public health and environmental degradation, and coca cultivation has continued to skyrocket under national policies centered on forced eradication by ground troops, who sometimes face opposition from local communities.

Meanwhile, thousands of families are still waiting for compensation and technical support after enrolling in the national crop substitution program (PNIS) that was created following the 2016 peace accords. The program has experienced years of delay due to a slow rollout and a lack of financial and infrastructural support. While 94 percent of families enrolled in the PNIS voluntarily eradicated their coca without replanting, the government has failed to fulfill its subsidy promises.

Forced and voluntary eradication find commonality in the loss of human life: More than 1,500 social leaders in communities that agreed to crop substitution reportedly have been killed since the 2016 accords. Security forces have been targeted in forced eradication operations. Armed drug trafficking organizations dominate remote areas where coca is grown and have developed sophisticated processes for transportation and processing.

What the United States and Colombia can do together

It is natural that Colombia and the United States view this issue somewhat differently, given the different ways the drug industry has impacted each country. Colombia’s leaders are foremost concerned with investing in communities that are currently under the control of drug trafficking groups and need help shifting away from the illicit trade. They are also seeking alternatives to the harmful public health and environmental effects of chemical crop eradication. At the same time, there are questions over how the Petro administration will leverage the necessary infrastructure to conduct large-scale crop substitution, both in terms of funding and implementation capacity. Cocaine markets and criminal groups are rapidly evolving, increasing pressure for forceful and direct action.

Clearly, funding will be a challenge. Colombian Minister of Justice Néstor Osuna has indicated that crop substitution alone would require five billion dollars in investments. This does not account for the drug strategy’s other initiatives in security, public health, environmental conservation, and infrastructure. Yet if the funding materializes, it may provide an important opportunity to address issues such as environmental protection and increasing the visibility of marginalized groups.

For the United States, what is most important is that a prolonged influx of drugs from Colombia has devastated US communities and created a public health crisis. The cocaine industry also brings with it a number of transnational criminal organizations that have consistently found ways to evolve, break into new markets, and exploit ground, sea, and air routes to avoid security forces. Many US policymakers view security-centered policies, particularly eradication, as essential to curbing the increase in coca leaf and cocaine production.

With Congress currently debating how much to set aside for economic and security assistance to Colombia in 2024, and even whether to set aside funding, there is likely to be turbulence ahead for the US-Colombia relationship. But in spite of differences between and within the US and Colombian governments on how to address the coca issue, there are a number of areas where the two countries’ interests overlap. Both countries understand the changing nature of transnational trafficking networks and have committed to strengthening interdiction efforts. There is also consensus on the need to increase state presence in rural communities in Colombia to provide the necessary security conditions for families to transition to the legal economy. Further, both countries understand the link between demand and consumption and have underscored the necessity of addressing the narcotics issue from both ends. And in the April 2023 meeting between Biden and Petro, both leaders displayed a shared commitment to combatting climate change and preserving the Amazon, which could aid in counternarcotics discussions linked to environmental conservation.

Going forward, for example, the United States and Colombia could focus more on resource allocation to protect critical forest areas and restore those damaged by illicit crop cultivation. They could also support the efforts of Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities in promoting leadership and community participation, which has been shown to be an effective deterrent to the expansion of illegal coca crops. These and other policies are opportunities to reinvigorate US-Colombia coordination to take on this scourge that has caused so much pain and suffering in both countries.

Lucie Kneip is a project assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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Hamas’s attack on Israel was straight out of Hezbollah’s playbook

David Daoud — Wed, 11 Oct 2023 17:50:26 +0000

Israel is a country tragically all too familiar with violence and warfare. But even in the bloody annals of the Jewish state, October 7, 2023, is and will likely remain a unique wound. The images of murdered civilians strewn in the streets of the towns surrounding the Gaza Strip intertwining with the cries of abducted children being carted off into the Hamas-controlled enclave will haunt the Israeli national psyche—and all people of conscience—for decades. But as much as Hamas is ultimately responsible for the perfidious attack that has claimed more than 1,200 lives in Israel, the group could not have planned or executed this operation alone.

Hamas has long ceased to be a lone militant organization. Since 2018, the group has officially operated as a first among equals of the twelve-member “Joint Operations Room of the Palestinian Resistance Factions,” an entity whose technical genesis stretches back to 2006. Indeed, judging from the headbands worn by some of the assailants who infiltrated southern Israel, these other factions were well represented among the attackers. More broadly, since the 1990s Hamas has been gradually integrated into the Iranian-led “Resistance Axis,” a regional network of anti-Israel political parties and militant groups. Among Tehran’s constellation of forces, Hezbollah has taken point on coordinating the Khomeinist regime’s relationship with its Palestinian proxies, and the Shia group’s fingerprints can be detected all over this week’s attack on Israel.

For years, Hezbollah has been promising to “liberate the Galilee” in a future war with Israel. Hezbollah’s secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, stated this objective in a February 2011 speech, and the group has conducted exercises simulating the execution of this promise since then. At different times, Hezbollah threatened that it would launch a traditional invasion, meant to seize and permanently hold territory. But such a conventional military maneuver was then, and remains, beyond the group’s capabilities. Such an action would require Hezbollah to establish static supply lines and expose massive numbers of its fighters on Israeli territory, where the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would possess the numerical and qualitative advantage, in addition to armor, artillery, and air power. In other words, Hezbollah would be discarding the advantages conferred by its hybrid-guerilla warfare methods, without developing the conventional methods or doctrine necessary to match or neutralize the IDF’s vast superiority in conventional warfare.

It would appear, then, that Hezbollah imparted its plans, and the training to execute them, to its Resistance Axis partners in the Gaza Strip.

What, then, would the intended invasion of the Galilee have looked like? Precisely how Hamas’s October 7 attack, dubbed Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, unfolded: a territorially limited surprise incursion, focused on murdering and kidnapping as many Israelis as possible, and capturing the attack on video to maximize the psychological impact on Israeli society and to boost the morale of the supporters of the “resistance.” It would appear, then, that Hezbollah imparted its plans, and the training to execute them, to its Resistance Axis partners in the Gaza Strip. In fact, Hezbollah appears to have shared this knowledge with Hamas and other Gaza-based militant groups at least a decade ago: Israeli security sources noted that the IDF launched 2014’s Operation Protective Edge to preempt exactly such a mass casualty scenario that had been planned by Hamas for that year’s Rosh Hashanah.

Hezbollah appears to have contributed more to the execution of Al-Aqsa Flood than the operational blueprint. The Shia group—constrained in its direct ability to attack Israel by Lebanon’s economic collapse, and not wanting to be seen as compounding Lebanese misery with a security conflagration—has effectively exported its attacks against Israel to Palestinian actors, both within Israel and Israeli-held territories, and from inside Lebanon. Either working directly with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or separately at its behest, Hezbollah has spent considerable efforts recruiting assets inside Israel—from among Arab Israelis and Palestinians—to gather intelligence and establish sleeper cells within Israel to plan terror attacks. Here, Hezbollah’s ties to Lebanese and Arab Israeli criminal networks have proven invaluable.

The Shia organization has also spent the past eighteen years building up the warfighting capabilities of militant groups in the Gaza Strip. This effort began in earnest after Israel’s 2005 withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, when Hezbollah’s then-military commander Imad Mughniyeh spent months training Palestinian militants in a coastal enclave. This training included producing rockets and launching pads, as well as tunnel and rocket warfare. Credible reporting—and the admissions of Hamas spokesmen—also reveals that the inception of this particular attack occurred months ago in Beirut, in coordination with the IRGC, but also doubtlessly under the watchful eye and with the input of Hezbollah.

The genesis of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood appears to originate with Hezbollah, at least in part. The pressing question now is what will Hezbollah do next?

So far, Hezbollah’s actions have differed little from the group’s prior behavior during fighting between Gaza-based militants and the IDF, particularly since the October 17, 2019, economic crisis further complicated its ability to act openly or aggressively against Israel. The group has voiced its now customary support for Hamas, stressing the attack on Israel was a message “to the Arab and Islamic world . . . especially those seeking normalization” with the Jewish state (and thus signaling that Hamas’s attack was intended to derail ongoing Saudi-Israeli normalization talks). One of its ad-hoc formations, named after Imad Mughniyeh, conducted a largely symbolic solidarity mortar strike in Shebaa Farms—in other words, in a territory understood by both Hezbollah and Israel as within the red lines governing their conflict. Likely by design, the strike caused no casualties. Israeli forces have exchanged fire with Hezbollah every day since October 7.

If Hamas and its allies find themselves in dire straits against an expected Israeli ground incursion, Iran could deem it necessary to activate Hezbollah.

But otherwise, Hezbollah has so far sat out the fight. It was quick to deny involvement in a Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) infiltration into northern Israel on October 9. The group’s response to Israel killing three Hezbollah fighters while retaliating for that incursion was also limited and measured. Hezbollah’s promise that this reprisal was only its “preliminary response,” and other belligerent statements, should be taken in the context of similar previously unfulfilled vows to avenge fallen fighters—either to say it will delay avenging them until a time more suitable to Hezbollah or, as happened on October 10, carrying out a limited attack meant to convey the message to the Israelis that the matter is now considered closed.

Furthermore, it should also be understood in the context of its other statements—a promise to Lebanese Foreign Minister Abdullah Bou Habib to abstain from getting involved in the Gaza conflict unless Israel “harasses” Lebanon. Hezbollah spokesman and Lebanese Member of Parliament Ibrahim al-Mousaoui said on Tuesday that Hamas’s operation was a “preview of what the resistance factions will execute in the future.”

The likeliest scenario, therefore, is that Hezbollah will continue to allow Palestinian militants to engage in limited harassment against Israel from Lebanon, thus contributing to Gaza-based militant war efforts by keeping the IDF partially focused on the northern border but without sparking a major conflagration. Hezbollah’s calculus could change, however, as the IDF’s battle against Hamas and the remaining Resistance Axis factions in Gaza progresses. If Hamas and its allies find themselves in dire straits against an expected Israeli ground incursion, Iran could deem it necessary to activate Hezbollah. Alternatively, the Shia organization may already have its orders to enter the war. Its direct and indirect harassment on the northern border may be intended to goad the IDF into a serious enough retaliation that Hezbollah could then use it to justify attacking Israel to its supporters and the broader Lebanese public as an act of self-defense against so-called “Zionist aggression.”

David Daoud is the director of Israel, Lebanon, and Syria Research at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) and is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council.

A version of this article originally appeared in United Against Nuclear Iran. It is reprinted here with the author’s and publisher’s permission.

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Wechsler mentioned in Formiche on the Israel-Hamas war

Atlantic Council — Tue, 10 Oct 2023 18:28:46 +0000

Original source

For the American think tanker, there are a number of questions — from the future of the Strip to new fronts, from regional integration to domestic politics — that Israel is asking itself in deciding the timing and methods of the counter-offensive against Hamas

From a purely military point of view, Hamas lost the war the moment it decided to start it. Israel is a far superior power, and in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks by Hamas, the Israeli public appears deeply shocked, incredibly united and firmly resolute in the work to be done.

William F. Wechsler

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Warrick quoted in Bloomberg Government

Atlantic Council — Thu, 21 Sep 2023 18:54:50 +0000

original source

On September 21, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Thomas Warrick was quoted in Bloomberg Government. He expressed concern about congressional gridlock and its subsequent effects on the expected expiration of several DHS protection measures. Warrick warns that these safeguards are integral to US national security.

What I worry is about the idea that we’re not shoring up our defenses at a time when it’s hard to predict where the next attack or serious threat is going to come from.

Arnold Punaro

Fellow

Thomas S. Warrick

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative GeoStrategy Initiative

National Security Terrorism

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Warrick in The Hill on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

Atlantic Council — Mon, 04 Sep 2023 18:51:41 +0000

original source

On September 3, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Thomas S. Warrick published an article in The Hill on the importance of renewing section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

Before Dec. 31, Congress should renew, with reforms, section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which authorizes targeted collection of communications by foreign terrorists and other foreign adversaries.

Thomas S. Warrick

Fellow

Thomas S. Warrick

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative GeoStrategy Initiative

National Security Terrorism

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Russia accused of deliberately targeting journalists in Ukraine

Mercedes Sapuppo — Thu, 10 Aug 2023 21:25:14 +0000

A deadly Russian airstrike close to a Ukrainian hotel and restaurant frequented by international journalists is fueling accusations that the Kremlin is deliberately targeting international media representatives in Ukraine. The August 7 bombing in east Ukrainian city Pokrovsk that killed nine people and wounded nearly 90 was the latest in a series of attacks on civilian targets known to be popular among journalists covering the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

This week’s Pokrovsk bombing shared many similarities with a June 2023 attack in nearby Kramatorsk, which struck civilian targets in the city center including a restaurant used by visiting journalists and international aid workers. Victims included prominent Ukrainian writer and journalist Victoria Amelina.

Allegations regarding the deliberate targeting of journalists are not new and first surfaced in the early months of the Russian invasion. In April 2022, the Institute for War & Peace Reporting published a dispatch entitled Ukraine: Journalists “Are Russia’s First Target,” which detailed the deaths of journalists in Ukraine during the first weeks of the war.

In February 2023, International media watchdog Reporters Without Borders and the Institute of Mass Information found that at least 26 journalists were deliberately targeted with rifle or artillery fire during the first year of the war. Reporters Without Borders has since filed multiple war crimes complaints against Russia with the International Criminal Court concerning 44 alleged acts of abuse and violence involving over 100 journalists and journalistic infrastructure.

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The targeting of international journalists in Ukraine would certainly be in line with the hard line media policies adopted by the Kremlin within Russia itself. One of Vladimir Putin’s first major steps during the early years of his reign was to assert Kremlin control over the Russian mainstream media. For the past two decades, dissenting voices inside Russia have been steadily silenced, while independent media outlets have been taken over by loyalists or forced to close down. Meanwhile, a number of individual journalists have suffered violent or otherwise suspicious deaths.

The Putin regime’s efforts to suppress free speech have intensified over the past eighteen months following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In today’s Russia, merely referring to the invasion as a “war” is a criminal offense, with media outlets instead obliged to use the Kremlin’s preferred euphemism of “Special Military Operation.”

Critics allege the Putin regime’s efforts to muzzle the media also extend to deliberate attacks on international journalists attempting to report on the invasion from Ukraine. “For the Russians, the press is the enemy. They do not want their crimes to be recorded and known to the whole world,” commented Oksana Romanyuk, executive director of the Kyiv-based Mass Media Institute.

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In response to Monday’s Russian attack in Pokrovsk, the International Federation of Journalists tweeted out a statement condemning “in the strongest terms the targeting of facilities frequented by journalists. Enough is enough.”

Many international correspondents covering the war in Ukraine have also suggested that the Pokrovsk airstrike deliberately targeted journalists. Financial Times reporter Christopher Miller underlined the popularity of the Pokrovsk hotel and restaurant among correspondents. “I and so many others stayed at Druzhba, conducted interviews at Corleone, and filed stories from both countless times over the years. They are among the few places operating near the front line. No doubt they were targeted by Russia because journalists and military have frequented them,” he tweeted.

Numerous other international reporters expressed similar opinions. The chief international correspondent of Britain’s Independent newspaper, Bel Trew, noted that the hotel and restaurant targeted in Monday’s bombing were well known for hosting journalists and humanitarian aid workers, and claimed the attack “looks like a pattern.” Meanwhile, senior Guardian correspondent Peter Beaumont declared the strikes “very much not a coincidence.”

While it will be extremely difficult to prove conclusively that Russia is engaged in the deliberate targeting of journalists in Ukraine, this is certainly the impression shared by international media watchdog organizations and many of the correspondents working on the front lines of the war. Moscow has an obvious motive for seeking to intimidate international reporters; over the past eighteen months, courageous on-the-spot coverage has frequently highlighted the brutality of Russia’s invasion and exposed the war crimes being committed by the Russian military in Ukraine.

Attempts to prevent reporters from chronicling Russia’s invasion cannot be allowed to succeed. The war unleashed by Vladimir Putin in February 2022 is already widely recognized as a major milestone in the evolution of war reporting, with correspondents able to share updates on a minute-by-minute basis via social media. In this new information reality, it is vital to demonstrate that authoritarian regimes can no longer hope to silence the international media.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Economic security underpins military security

Members of the EU and NATO face a number of threats from authoritarian corrosive capital and critical economic dependencies. Whether originating from private or state-owned enterprises, unaccountable investments lack transparency, accountability, and market orientation. Corrosive capital largely originates from authoritarian states and exaggerates governance gaps to influence economic, political, and social developments in recipient countries. For example, authoritarian regimes, particularly China, use subsidies and other uncompetitive practices to invest in critical or other digital infrastructure that can have a dual military-civilian purpose, such as in port infrastructure in southeast Europe which could be used to transit military gear in support of NATO operations. Nontransparent investment flows, particularly in Bulgaria and the Western Balkans, undermine transparency and abet corruption. In the higher value-added sectors of the economy such as the thriving information and communications technology sectors in Bulgaria, unaccountable investments threaten the valuable intellectual property of Europe’s established firms and emerging start-ups alike. Last year, China weaponized Europe’s critical trade and supply chain dependency on the huge Chinese market to block Lithuanian imports to China, seeking to punish Vilnius for its foreign policy choices. Europe’s urgent transition in the last year away from Russian natural gas to renewable resources such as solar and wind power, which are dominated by China, risks replacing one set of strategic energy dependencies for another.

To address these challenges, many European countries have developed new EU-wide investment screening regulations and the European Union has proposed legislation to counter economic coercion. Since 2020, EU member states are required to have an investment screening mechanism in place as part of the EU-wide investment screening coordination framework—but the details are left up to the individual countries, which are responsible for their own national security.

NATO’s southeastern flank is the most vulnerable and least-prepared region to protect its economies from authoritarian corrosive capital. Montenegro has become famous for its “white elephant” Chinese-funded infrastructure projects. Croatia is host to the Chinese Southeast European Business Association and has actively courted Chinese investments in critical infrastructure, including ports and the EU-funded and China-built Peljesac bridge, the first example of subsidized Chinese firms beating out European firms for EU-funded projects in Europe. Bulgaria and North Macedonia have more pronounced links to unaccountable flows of Russian capital, including in the energy sector.

Among these countries, only Croatia is in the early stages of exploring the development of an investment screening law, and it is doing so at a leisurely pace. Bulgaria is in an even earlier stage than Croatia, but has an opportunity with its new government to make progress. North Macedonia, Albania, and Montenegro also lack an investment screening mechanism, leaving NATO’s most vulnerable members and economies open to the risk of corrosive capital and unaccountable investment. These governments have largely failed to put investment security legislation and processes on the table because of a lack of political will. An initiative by key allies to put this issue on the table at NATO would help push lagging governments in southeast Europe to prioritize this issue. Yet, a push by NATO allies to close the investment security gap in southeast Europe should also be coupled with practical assistance to help those allies develop inclusive, transparent legislation on investment screening.

The risks of regulating economic activity in fragile democracies

Emerging markets in NATO’s southeastern flank, including Albania, Bulgaria, North Macedonia, and Croatia, face some of the greatest challenges to equipping themselves with the tools to protect their economies from national security threats. These allies face capacity and governance challenges that will require coordinated support from NATO, the EU, and key bilateral allies to help implement effective investment screening legislation.

First, the economies of southeastern Europe are among the least developed within NATO. As a result, most business leaders in these countries are desperate for any investment they can attract and are instinctively hostile to the idea of screening any investment. Coaxing the private sector into compliance with any relevant legislation will require an intentional and transparent process of policy dialogue between government and business to reassure business that legislation will not meaningfully harm the economy.

Second, these countries largely lack governmental capacity to effectively screen foreign investments, a highly technical process requiring competent bureaucrats armed with both economic and national security data and expertise. A related challenge is the need for the bureaucracy to maintain the confidentiality of proprietary corporate data during the screening process; leaks of government deliberations to tabloids are a pervasive problem in southeast European policymaking.

Third, the democracies of southeastern Europe are by and large low-trust societies with weak public-private dialogue and an often fragile rule of law, making effective and informed policy formulation a challenge. To ensure economic fairness and guard against regulatory abuse, any new tools allowing governments to regulate economic activity will need proper transparency, checks and balances, and oversight.

NATO and the EU face a conundrum in dealing with the geoeconomic challenges to southeastern Europe’s market, particularly in Bulgaria and Croatia, which are already in the European common market. On the one hand, failure to develop screening mechanisms and other tools in these economies leaves both the EU and NATO vulnerable to economic risk that could impact the wider single market. On the other hand, given the governance and capacity challenges in these countries, a rushed or opaque policy process could result in lack of awareness and compliance by the private sector or the emergence of unintended consequences such as barriers to legitimate competition.

What the EU, NATO, and Three Seas Initiative can do

To address these challenges, NATO, the European Union, and individual allies can play complementary roles.

Through its regulatory role, the EU should take the lead in supporting these countries in developing economic security legislation. The European Commission can provide technical support to help governments align their investment screening legislation with EU standards, particularly countries that are candidates for accession, such as Albania and North Macedonia. Meanwhile, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development can provide technical support to member governments such as Croatia to help them understand the likely impact an investment screening law will have on its economy and competitiveness as an investment destination.

Because the EU leads on economic and trade issues, NATO’s role will involve helping allies assess national security implications of investment risk in dual-use economic assets that can have a military or other national security purpose. Here, planning groups within NATO’s Resilience Committee can provide guidance on how to ensure that screening mechanisms meet compliance with NATO’s baseline requirements for national resilience. In the interest of building political will, the NATO summit communiqué at Vilnius could set a deadline to have investment screening legislation in place by the seventy-fifth anniversary Washington summit next year.

Finally, select allies can provide bilateral mentorship and support for these southeast European nations on best practices for securing business buy-in and compliance with screening mechanisms. A system modeled after the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States may not align with the needs, economic structure, or capacities of smaller countries in southeast Europe. Smaller allies such as the Czech Republic can advise southeastern European governments on the lessons learned from their experience, perhaps bringing in chambers of commerce and business associations to share their experiences on compliance with the law.

The Three Seas Initiative, an informal gathering supported by the Atlantic Council and including twelve Central and Eastern European member states focused on north-south infrastructure development, could also help. It could serve as a venue for members to coordinate economic-security regulations to ensure wider harmonization of economic policy. Differences in investment security regulations across countries complicate the kind of cross-border investments that the Three Seas Initiative is designed to attract and finance. The Three Seas business forums in particular can serve as a channel for business associations and chambers from within the Three Seas region and neighboring countries in the Western Balkans. The forums offer a place for parties to share their experiences, challenges, and concerns about complexities caused by differences in screening legislation within the region and to formulate recommendations on how to minimize the impact on the investment environment.

Ultimately, the national governments of Croatia, Bulgaria, Albania, North Macedonia, and Montenegro will have to do the hard work themselves to adopt these best practices and craft successful legislation. Governments will need to consult with the business sector before legislation is drafted to help promote understanding of these processes, incorporate recommendations to streamline red tape, and raise awareness in the business community of critical threats that can allow them to adapt their internal due diligence. But this will require a balance to ensure that economic security is not traded away for the sake of economic development. Including civil society is also essential to ensure effective transparency and monitoring of review processes to make sure they are not used for corrupt purposes or overlook key threats.

As NATO heads into its seventy-fifth year, its member states and partner institutions need to adapt to new challenges. Robust investment screening across the whole of the Alliance will help strengthen NATO against economic weapons that are increasingly central to today’s conflicts.

Jeffrey Lightfoot is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and is the Bratislava-based program director for Europe at the Center for International Private Enterprise.

John Kay is a program manager at the Center for International Private Enterprise and worked previously in the Balkans with the US Agency for International Development.

The post Authoritarian investment in southeastern Europe is a security threat. Here’s what NATO can do. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Operationalizing integrated deterrence: Applying joint force targeting across the competition continuum

Thu, 08 Jun 2023 17:30:21 +0000

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Introduction: Why the United States needs a new targeting model better suited for cooperation
Expanding the joint force’s competitive mindset
Operationalizing integrated deterrence: A new model for targeting and effects
Explaining the model of a modified targeting and effects process
I. Placement and access
II. Focused understanding
III. Options
Targeting throughout the competition continuum
Harnessing data to improve the targeting and effects process
Data
Sense
Make sense
Act
Using the competition space to prepare for high-end armed conflict
Shaping the environment
Shaping across the physical and virtual domains
Capability development
The way forward
Culture: Adapting the joint force’s mindset to global problems across the competition continuum
Incorporating all instruments of power
Embracing the global nature of problem sets
Technology and data: Building a resilient and holistic data architecture
Authorities, rules of engagement, and risk: Updating DOD guidelines and standards
Conclusion
About the authors

Introduction: Why the United States needs a new targeting model better suited for competition

In these times, business as usual at the department is not acceptable.

— Lloyd J. Austin, Secretary of Defense

Traditional joint force deterrence is no longer sufficient: a near-singular focus on armed conflict and platform-based capability development fails to deter strategic adversaries like China and Russia from their pursuit of strategic objectives while simultaneously increasing the risk of war. Simply owning the most advanced weaponry, while ceding ground in the competitive space left of conflict, is not enough to meet US deterrence needs, nor is it sufficient to ensure the joint force prevails in conflict. Expanding the joint force’s construct for targeting and effects generation will enable the Department of Defense (DOD) to more effectively deter future conflict while simultaneously shaping the environment to the joint force’s advantage in conflict should deterrence fail.

Why the twenty-first century security environment merits an updated approach

Today’s security threats span the competition continuum, cut across theaters and domains, and are intensified through the application of emerging technologies. The joint force faces challenges spanning the full competition continuum from high-end conflict to gray zone competition, including cyber threats and economic coercion, to cooperation. Technological advancements have changed the character of threats, the types of activities that the DOD can conduct, the speed at which it can act, and expanded its notion of physical and non-physical tools and effects. Specifically, the evolution of the cyber domain has enabled the joint force to gain access to non-physical spaces and generate options to achieve effects in a matter of milliseconds. The realities of twenty-first century competition drive the need to confront adversaries across a global contact layer to counter malign activities and proactively advance US strategic objectives. In other words, actions in one theater or domain can generate options and lead to outcomes in distant corners of the globe.

Moreover, the joint force faces a far more sophisticated adversary in China—qualitatively and quantitatively—than it did in countering violent extremist organizations over the past two decades. Strategic competition requires a significant mindset shift to effectively harness the effects of multiple instruments of power in a global, multi-domain, and coherent manner. DOD doctrine acknowledges this, but the department and joint force have yet to fully operationalize it.

While many activities executed along the competition continuum can enable success in conflict, specific operations, activities, and investments are necessary to ensure joint force superiority in direct combat, especially considering the criticality of combined arms warfare with allies and partners, as well as the seamless integration of multi-domain fires and effects. joint force activities must continually pursue positional advantage across the competition continuum to achieve the necessary balance between deterrence and conflict preparation. Yet, currently, the level of attention to and investment in preparation for armed conflict inhibits the joint force from leveraging the vast data, tools, and authorities at its disposal to prevent such conflict from occurring in the first place.

How joint force operations can meet an evolving threat landscape

The joint force must update its approach to targeting and effects generation to respond to the range of security challenges at hand, else it risks losing without going to war. Success across the full competition continuum will be enabled by the joint force’s ability to effectively harness data and a wide spectrum of tools and authorities with speed, precision, and lethality. This necessitates a deeper and more informed understanding of adversary capabilities, the operating environment, the interconnected nature of the physical and virtual domains, and the range of data sources available to operators. By “expanding its competitive mindset and competitive approach”¹ —to include and integrate tools, information, and actions that span the competition continuum—the joint force can exploit this understanding to apply the right effects to the right problems at the right times, advancing strategic objectives and maintaining informational, decisional, and combat dominance. An expanded competitive mindset will allow the joint force to view competition not as an inevitable march toward future conflict, but rather as a persistent effort to gain and maintain positional advantage across all domains.

The joint force is designed to excel at crisis response; it must make a deliberate mindset shift to plan prior to impending crisis (and prevent such scenarios from occurring in the first place). However, while the urgency of evolving the joint force’s targeting framework is evident across doctrine and policy,² the joint force has not yet taken to scale an assertive approach to dominating across the competitive space. Doctrine included in the DOD’s 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the Joint Concept for Competing, for instance, make clear that the department and joint force are thinking about strategic competition more broadly, yet operationally—through authorities, combatant commands, and collaboration with different agencies and allies—DOD and the joint force have yet to fully realize integrated deterrence.

Explainer: Targeting and effects generation

Targeting: Traditional joint or dynamic targeting is “the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them.” In this paper, targeting is an enabler of options, characterized as a continuous activity that furthers the pursuit of objectives by addressing critical intelligence and operational requirements and shaping the environment through a multitude of proactive means. Targeting includes everything from illuminating human networks and key actors, to finding and fixing mobile capabilities, to identifying cyber access vectors and vulnerabilities.

Effects: While conventionally viewed as the “finish” of the targeting cycle—the kinetic fire or kill—effects generation here refers to the employment of instruments of national power (individually or in concert) to achieve a desired outcome. This ranges from traditional kinetic military fires to information operations, cyber tools, and electronic warfare, to targeted economic sanctions and law enforcement actions, to diplomatic démarche or other means of localized leverage.

What this report sets out to achieve

Operationally, the joint force has not adapted to an era of strategic competition, which requires targeting across theaters and domains, the entire competition continuum, and leveraging the range of data sources at its disposal. Doing so requires the joint force to stitch together the data, tools, and authorities needed to achieve global objectives—rather than viewing missions as constrained to a singular region or ends, as has been the status quo.

This report outlines a framework to leverage existing targeting models to more assertively and deliberately compete by: 1) incorporating an expanded use of military and interagency capabilities; 2) leveraging expansive public and private data and harnessing it for effect through emerging technologies; and 3) smartly balancing priorities and weight of effort related to competition and conflict preparation. The authors offer key action areas for implementation at scale.

Expanding the joint force’s competitive mindset

To achieve unity of effort, the joint force must seek opportunities to integrate its operations and activities in time, space, and purpose with the activities of interorganizational partners, proxies, and surrogates.

— Joint Concept for Competing³

While the Pentagon recognizes it must adopt a new mindset to prevail across the competition continuum, it continues to approach targeting and fires through a lens of armed conflict. Traditional approaches to targeting and fires still prevail across the joint force despite the recognition of a need to expand them. Traditionally, the joint force aligns “sensors to shooters” (i.e., targeting) to inflict damage on enemy personnel, materiel, or infrastructure (i.e., fires or effects generation). This sentiment is expressed through variations of the targeting cycle, whether it be the dynamic targeting kill chain (Find, Fix, Target, Track, Engage, Assess) or the Special Operations Forces-preferred cycle (Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, Disseminate). These processes lend well to a temporal and kinetic approach to targeting and fires—exemplified by strikes on violent extremist organization (VEO) leadership networks or disabling mobile surface-to-air threats as part of a layered suppression of enemy air defenses effort—yet they are insufficient for generating the nonlethal and continuous effects necessary in today’s expansive security environment. This traditional approach to targeting and fires is incongruent with current DOD realities, given “most joint force activities occur in the context of cooperation and competition below armed conflict.”⁴

US Army Cyber Command hosts a town hall. Credit: US Army photo/ Candy Knight

As the DOD recognizes through its integrated deterrence concept, the joint force’s tool kit expands beyond the military arsenal, and solely relying on traditional approaches for targeting and effects is limiting. As articulated in the NDS, integrated deterrence campaigning calls for the joint force—in alignment with and often in a supporting role to other instruments of power found across the interagency—to execute “logically linked” activities to advance “strategy-aligned priorities over time” in order to counter or complicate competitors’ coercion across the globe.⁵ Linking activities across global campaigns require a high level of understanding of competitors’ intent and capabilities and their underlying geopolitical realities, enabled by prolonged access across multiple domains, which creates options to leverage multiple effects in achieving desired ends. For example, developing an understanding of how China’s coercive economic activities in Africa and Latin America support its broader global ambitions can inform the breadth (and complexity) of US response options. While the joint force typically excels at responding to crises, single-purpose platforms and the constant rotation of forces often prohibit the long-duration stare that integrated deterrence requires for proactive campaigning left of crisis.

Operationalizing integrated deterrence: A new model for targeting and effects

To achieve integrated deterrence, this paper outlines a model for operationalizing it. The joint force must meld the existing framework for joint targeting with a model that places a premium on gaining placement and access in a domain or region, enabling a focused understanding of an entity of interest, to facilitate a range of options for the joint force to execute in concert with other instruments of power, whether in a supported or supporting role. Each layer includes the concepts of persistence, local distinction, and global relevance, and can be in a near-constant state of change based on the sensing environment. For example, security cooperation with a partner in Southeast Asia requires access, understanding, and options that are: 1) persistent, to ensure ongoing understanding and to achieve effects over the long term; 2) locally distinct based on regional and local considerations; and 3) globally relevant, acknowledging that awareness and action related to one country affects global dynamics and goals. This layered model is represented in Figures 1 and 2 and further described below.

Integrated Deterrence Targeting. The figures above convey the elements of the joint targeting cycle and the dynamic targeting process (figure 1), with a philosophical and nonlinear pyramid approach to developing options for complex problems (figure 2). These two frameworks must be fused together to operationalize integrated deterrence. The joint force’s traditional targeting cycle must be informed by a foundation of situational awareness. Data, tools, and authorities are all necessary mechanisms to establish situational awareness.

Placement and access

virtual and/or physical proximity to an entity of interest

Focused understanding

situational awareness and perception of an entity (actor and/or location) and how it fits into broader geostrategic missions

Options

potential pathways forward to respond to a complex problem set and achieve outcomes, informed by focused understanding and placement and access

Explaining the model of a modified targeting and effects process

Adopting this layered model is critical for two reasons. First, the complex, global, and multi-domain problem sets the DOD faces today necessitate options that are similarly sophisticated in nature and cut across the competition continuum. By prioritizing a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of problem sets, the joint force is presented with a wider array of options to address key challenges. Such focused understanding is possible when the near-infinite amount of data available across the public and private sectors is transformed into usable information and, ultimately, intelligence.

Second, a new competitive mindset requires broadening the joint force’s tool kit beyond traditional military effects. The joint force has the authority to, and does, execute non-kinetic targeting, albeit insufficiently, yet it prioritizes kinetic fires as part of the traditional targeting cycle. Fusing kinetic and non-kinetic fires is critical not only from a deterrence perspective but also, more significantly, to enable victory in armed conflict. Yet, alone, the military instrument of power is insufficient for the problem sets germane to integrated deterrence. While the joint force has significantly advanced its organic non-kinetic capabilities, it primarily leverages kinetic effects, which neglects other instruments of power, disincentivizes creative thinking, and leads to poor integration with interagency partners.⁶ A high degree of awareness of the capabilities and authorities that other instruments of power bring to the table is critical such that they can be synchronized with, or amplified by, joint force activities at all echelons.

The process of generating placement and access, focused understanding, and options is not linear, and each stage can and should inform the others over time. Specific placement and access may be generated to understand a particular problem in a sophisticated manner such that novel options can be developed. Similarly, focused understanding may drive the need for additional or alternative access to close critical intelligence gaps and inform options. Likewise, commanders may demand options to address a particular problem, which in turn will inform the planning process to generate the necessary access and understanding. Below is an overview of the three foundational elements of the pyramid.

I. Placement and access

To develop the focused understanding required for integrated deterrence, the joint force cannot stare at problems from afar. Placement and access are foundational to developing an enhanced understanding of the problem sets facing the United States. Placement and access, however, does not necessarily mean physical proximity of the military to a particular interest area—it also encompasses virtual presence and can be developed by the joint force, interagency partners, and allied counterparts. It also implies some degree of usability, sustainability, and repeatability; simply visiting a location or gaining virtual access to a network does not equate to true placement and access. Rather, that access must be repeatable if it is temporal in nature, sustainable over operationally relevant time periods, and usable for alternate purposes such as data collection, security cooperation, or reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. Placement and access can be enhanced by leveraging data from a multitude of sources to enable the joint force insight into digital networks of value to access, or the nature of key partnerships required for physical access. Additionally, enhancing existing authorities and making them more flexible would allow units pursuing a mission set in one area to adapt and undertake additional mission sets that may be valuable for a broader or global mission set.

Evolving the joint force approach to placement and access will open a range of opportunities given the interconnected nature of global problem sets. For example, France’s historical security cooperation and counterterrorism activities in the Sahel region of West Africa, during the 2010s, could have also served as an access vector to increasing understanding of the growing threat of Russian private military corporations (PMC) like Wagner Group in the region. This physical proximity can enable a deeper understanding of Wagner’s activities in the region, potentially driving requirements for further physical or virtual access or informing options in line with global campaign plans to counter Russian malign influence. Critically, the joint force must explore means to creatively exploit access when mission convergences exist—units or platforms deployed for one purpose, such as countering VEO, may enable access vectors to support another mission, such as strategic competition, and vice versa. While clarity of primary and secondary objectives of missions would need to remain, the makeup of units and task forces, and the requisite authorities given to them, should be meaningfully considered to capitalize on mission convergences. Not only does this approach create efficiencies with respect to endeavors like security cooperation, but it also offers the opportunity to obfuscate strategic intentions.

II. Focused understanding

Focused understanding of an actor, environment, or relationship is required to solve complex problems, not only due to the sophisticated capabilities of strategic adversaries but also because integrated deterrence campaigns are global in nature. Transregional, multi-domain problems cannot be thoroughly addressed in compartmentalized and only localized ways. Rather, the joint force must stitch together regional understandings based on local access and conditions with broader knowledge informed by other global touch points. The roles of partners, both interagency and international, are critical in developing focused understanding. Not only do they enable multi-domain access, but they also provide unique perspectives. The vast amounts of commercial and government data can and should be harnessed and fused to improve focused understanding of actors and problem sets. While data from traditional sources is immensely valuable, open-source information—organized into actionable information—can drastically improve understanding of patterns and behavior. For example, social media data may help inform US forces of the presence of an adversarial force’s covert presence in a country that may be hard to identify or find evidence for using other means. Ultimately, the fusing of different data sources more consistently can help understanding across the competition continuum.

Building on the previous example, to address Wagner Group’s activities in the Sahel, the joint force should first understand how those activities tie into Russia’s global campaign to secure influence and create instability through expeditionary PMC activities. A holistic understanding of Wagner’s activities across the Sahel, Central Africa, Latin America, Syria, and Eastern Europe presents a more informed picture of the totality of the problem, as well as the associated pressure points, vulnerabilities, and opportunities. Moreover, the local US country team, elements of the intelligence community, French forces, and host-nation partners will all view the Wagner problem in different lights, which can enhance the joint force’s perspective and is necessary in developing viable options leveraging all instruments of power.

This combination of regional and global understanding, enabled by joint force and partner access and capabilities, ultimately informs a far greater range of options than is achieved strictly through a regional military lens, which has been the status quo. Critically, focused understanding better informs risk assessments at echelon, abating risk aversion frequently seen at higher levels of command authority that are farthest removed from the tactical edge.

III. Options

Senior leaders and commanders typically request a range of options to address problems, both to allow flexibility and enable sound decision-making in light of strategic priorities and risks. The Joint Concept for Competing calls for the joint force to:

Identify approaches that enable it to apply its military capabilities proactively, and differently in some cases, to gain influence, advantage, and leverage over adversaries to establish the necessary conditions to achieve strategic outcomes.

— Joint Concept for Competing⁷

While doctrinally this is clear, today’s traditional approach to targeting and competition limits the most effective suite of options from being generated. More-nuanced options may place the joint force in a supporting role to other departments and agencies: for example, conducting traditional manhunting activities (via military authorities) to enable a diplomatic action such as a démarche (via Department of State authorities). The level of sophistication required to achieve what the Joint Concept calls for, especially across activities below armed conflict, makes both risk and efficacy assessments challenging. It is far more difficult to quantify the effectiveness of a campaign to counter Chinese regional influence—for example, assessing long-duration efforts to obstruct effort by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to secure access, basing, and overflight—than it was to measure the success of kinetic drone strikes during the Global War on Terrorism. This challenge is met not only by prioritizing focused understanding but also by parlaying that understanding into a range of options that may be locally distinct but support global campaign plan objectives.

Ultimately, options for senior decision-makers are developed to achieve outcomes that are in service of more-aspirational objectives. Again, examining Wagner activity, a desired outcome of an operation could be to deny Wagner’s ability to securely communicate between several outstations across the Sahel. The aspirational objective is to critically degrade Wagner’s ability to conduct and sustain expeditionary activities globally.

Targeting throughout the competition continuum

This model for the generation of options for complex problems must be melded with an adaptation in the application of traditional joint force targeting processes. Joint targeting is not solely reliant on joint force tools, capabilities, and authorities; it can and should incorporate other instruments of power—by collaborating across departments and agencies—to bolster data and inform understanding, as well as “identify, develop, and affect targets to meet commander objectives.”⁸

Take, for example, a PRC network in Latin America that facilitates command and control of dual-use infrastructure. Here, data could be harnessed from the intelligence (e.g., National Security Agency) and diplomatic (e.g., Department of State Regional Security Office) instruments of power to identify a particular local criminal network that facilitates relevant PRC contracting activities. Host-nation law enforcement can then apply pressure on the criminal network to share information about the PRC actors with whom it engages routinely. Over time, this information can help generate several options to gain access to the objective network through Special Operations Forces-enabled cyber activities. Throughout, the military (e.g., Military Information Support Operations) and diplomatic (e.g., Department of State Global Engagement Center) instruments of power can expose malign PRC practices through information operations to positively shape narratives in line with strategic objectives. The joint targeting cycle could be leveraged multiple times for:

Employing traditional manhunting techniques to find and fix specific local criminal actors of interest, develop their pattern of life, then using non-kinetic fires to register their phones with specific networks that enable intelligence access to key digital data.
Leveraging data obtained through financial (e.g., Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets Control) instruments of power to target specific institutions that enable transactions between local criminal networks and the PRC. This data can be correlated with intelligence derived from the activities above, as well as populated to other portions of the joint force focused on countering PRC dual-use activities to further global understanding of their tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Conducting intelligence preparation of the cyber environment to find and fix key nodes that are vulnerable to offensive cyber fires (e.g., US Cyber Command), as well as to bolster and amplify information operations that counter local PRC propaganda strategies.

The myriad of joint targeting activities outlined above not only enable specific tactical actions but also inform or further placement and access that continuously matures the collective understanding of the operating environment. Given the nature of strategic competitors, much of this understanding can be exported to other locations to bolster awareness and enable the linking of activities in a logical way as outlined in the NDS. At the center of this process is data, and as stated by former Deputy Secretary of Defense David L. Norquist, “our ability to fight and win wars requires that we become world leaders in operationalizing and protecting our data resources at speed and scale.”⁹

Harnessing data to improve the targeting and effects process

Data is a strategic asset that must be operationalized in order to provide a lethal and effective joint force.

— DOD Data Strategy¹⁰

The joint force’s ability to leverage data at speed and scale, predicated on its adoption of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), enables this framework for targeting and effects generation. Data informs the nature of required access, feeds the focused understanding process, and enables the development of well-informed options that artfully balance desired outcomes with strategic risk. However, raw and unstructured data in isolation does not create a decisive advantage. Rather, it must be harnessed for effect, transforming data into both information and intelligence that is usable and accessible at the speed of relevance.

The US Space Command Joint Operations Center is responsible for integrating data and status from multiple operations centers, the services, and agencies to provide the commander with critical Command and Control capabilities. The capabilities are being increasingly leveraged by other services in support of joint global operations. Credit: US Space Command

While the importance of data is nothing new, the joint force must grapple with the explosion of available data spanning all domains, sectors, and sources. Technologies such as AI and machine learning (ML) present meaningful ways to navigate this near-infinite amount of data. The 2020 DOD Data Strategy envisions the department as a “data-centric organization that uses data at speed and scale for operational advantage and increased efficiency,” with particular focus on enabling all-domain operations, more rapid and informed decision-making, and organizational business analytics.¹¹ Moreover, AI makes determinations and finds data connections in ways humans alone cannot, encapsulating everything from making obvious connections more rapidly (e.g., using satellite data to geolocate battlefield equipment) to identifying valuable datasets overlooked by humans (e.g., how commercial shipping telemetry data can enable deeper understanding of the PRC’s fifth-generation [5G] infrastructure development in Africa).

Data

Data is obtained by a variety of automated or manual and physical or virtual means. Any entity that can obtain data is considered a sensor. Data becomes information once put into context prescribed with meaning by the observer. Often, the meaning prescribed by the observer can be adapted as understanding of the environment grows, making particular datasets more or less useful. The process by which information is transformed into intelligence is complex and combines both art and science as described in JP 2-0 Joint Intelligence:

Intelligence fuses and evaluates information from multiple sources to provide the most accurate assessment possible of the current state of the operating environment.
From current assessments, intelligence draws predictive estimates of the full range of potential alternative future states of the operating environment.
To inform decisions, intelligence illuminates how the operating environment may react to different friendly options under consideration.¹²

The flow from data to intelligence—known as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) cycle—is illustrated in Figure 3, overlaid with the targeting framework from Figure 2.

The automation of PED enhances and accelerates the path from raw data to actionable intelligence, or from “sensor to shooter.”

The nature of today’s security environment necessitates the execution of PED at greater speed and scale than is achievable by humans alone. Particularly, the operating environment below armed conflict—which encompasses most joint force activities—places a premium on scale. To effectively compete globally and deter China and Russia, large quantities of data must be triaged and transformed into intelligence to inform transregional and multi-domain activities that are logically linked. In contrast, armed conflict—the highest-risk joint force activity—places a premium on speed. Rapidly processing and disseminating targeting data, effectively integrating kinetic and non-kinetic fires against mobile targets, and incorporating virtual capabilities that can affect adversary nodes within milliseconds would be impossible without AI/ML and human-machine teaming. The Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) concept describes the importance of this flow from data to intelligence based on the requirement for “joint force commanders to ‘sense,’ ‘make sense,’ and ‘act’ in the operational environment.”¹³ While this paper is not focused on the JADC2 and Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO) concepts, the employment of this paper’s updated targeting and effects process would support the more rapid implementation of JADO/JADC2 across the joint force.

Sense

The joint force must consider nearly all entities to be sensors, ranging from sensitive intelligence collection activities to open-source commercial datasets. Adopting a more competitive mindset requires the joint force to democratize data, allowing for a wide array of data-gathering streams to interact with AI algorithms trained to produce usable information. Much attention is placed on gathering data from the tactical edge, yet the edge can take many forms across physical and virtual spaces, regions, and domains. Critically, leveraging nonmilitary instruments of power, as well as allied and partner sensors, can both increase and diversify the data gathered. The role of commercial data is invaluable, with the private sector often having access to people, places, and things that are difficult, if not impossible, for overt government entities to replicate. However, while nontraditional data sources are crucial to building global situational awareness, the DOD does not currently have the communications infrastructure to integrate data from these various inputs at speed and scale—this change must be accelerated.

Make sense

Making sense of the operating environment correlates to the process depicted in Figure 2. The importance of AI/ML becomes paramount here, such that the joint force can achieve automation of prediction at speed and scale, while reserving judgment for human decision-makers on or in the loop. Ultimately, larger and more diverse datasets correlate to more sophisticated training of AI/ML algorithms, increasing the precision of predictive modeling to inform human decision-making. Analysis of the nature of adversary activities—and the subsequent options to address them—may look quite different when viewed through a whole-of-government versus strictly military lens. Furthermore, allies’ and partners’ perspectives on problem sets, especially those close to home, offer invaluable information to complement the joint force’s understanding of the operating environment.

Act

Taking action is a data-driven endeavor—not only in regard to the appropriate action but also the expected adversary reaction and the associated risks. Data-informed decision-making, given its bias toward empiricism, helps challenge assumptions, drive rigorous planning, and enable more-decentralized and potentially faster decision-making. Indeed, the focus of this framework is to utilize access-enabled understanding, coupled with sophisticated data-harnessing techniques, to ultimately provide commanders with a range of well-informed, data-driven options to act. It should be emphasized that to act does not signify finality of the process. As stated in the Joint Concept for Competing, “strategic competition is an enduring condition to be managed, not a problem to be solved.”US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing, 7. In fact, the “act” could be a decision to develop further placement and access to address critical intelligence gaps, or to submit requirements to inform further capability development for an unaddressed operational need.

The process of sensing, making sense, and acting is continuous. The speed by which this process plays out is variable based on the nature of the domain, location along the continuum, commander’s intent, and both local and global risk considerations. Deliberate planning and preparation of the operating environment, to include the establishment of relationships and infrastructure, deployment of sensors, and data architecture, and other such activities are necessary to enable this process to occur with speed downstream. In particular, active conflict places a premium on achieving maximum speed for this process, which simultaneously necessitates extensive preparation and autonomy.

Using the competition space to prepare for high-end armed conflict

Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win.

— Sun Tzu, The Art of War¹⁴

Conflict preparation is the persistent, locally distinct, and global sensing of the target ecosystem. It is a dynamic process that constantly generates and updates the integrated targeting planning and execution decisions. Prevailing in armed conflict is the ultimate basis for the existence of the joint force, and places a significant premium on preparation to maintain a position of advantage, inform capability development, and hold adversaries at risk. Armed conflict exists on the far-right side of the competition continuum and represents the most consequential activity the joint force must prepare for and, when called upon, execute. While often referred to in sterilized terminology, a clear description of armed conflict—the application of violence to destroy an enemy’s will and means to resist—serves to highlight the care and attention that preparation for conflict requires. While any type of conflict requires serious attention, high-end armed conflict against a peer adversary represents the most potentially dangerous scenario for which the joint force must prepare. While the objective of integrated deterrence is to deter conflict from occurring in the first place, it is equally about shaping the environment to ensure joint force dominance should deterrence fail. As outlined in Joint Publication 3-0, “while commanders conduct activities of cooperation and adversarial competition, they are still preparing for armed conflict.”¹⁵

Trilateral exercises between the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, Australian Defense Force, and US Navy support shared goals of peace and stability while enhancing regional security. Credit: US Navy/ Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Codie L. Soule

Conflict preparation is a balancing act. The joint force must weigh concerns of strategic risk and escalation management: “Tilting the competitive balance too far in one’s own favor will affect an adversary’s decision-making and behavior, but the effect may be vertical or horizontal escalation, not compliance.”¹⁶ Smartly preparing for conflict to create and maintain advantage over an adversary can be a campaign in its own right and must involve shaping activities as well as capability development. These activities will often nest within an overarching integrated deterrence campaign, but at times these endeavors may diverge, at which point the balance of priority and weight of effort must be considered. For example, winning a conflict to defend the Panama Canal would be a clear priority of the United States. However, preparation for such a conflict is not assigned the same weight of effort as, for example, the defense of Taiwan, which is being treated as a high-likelihood event by the Pentagon today.

The United States will not achieve a decisive warfighting advantage against a near-peer competitor through sheer mass or weapon systems alone—rather, the victor will be the military that stacks the deck in its advantage before conflict erupts. Russia’s current war in Ukraine highlights the severity of high-end armed conflict involving near-peer competitors. While great wartime effort is aimed at bolstering sustainment through industrial base and supply chain modernization, operational activities will eventually be curtailed to whatever pace can be sustained through resupply. The joint force’s future advantage will hinge on its ability to: 1) advantageously shape the environment and 2) field capabilities with greater speed, precision, and lethality than its adversary.

Shaping the environment

Shaping the environment is crucial to securing a position of advantage across multiple domains left of conflict. In the context of targeting and effects generation, activities to shape the environment must center around closing critical operational and intelligence gaps associated with a prioritized target list tied to operational plans. These activities are intended to enhance precision and lethality of engagement and shorten the kill chain once armed conflict begins. In line with the framework espoused in this report, focused understanding of the enemy’s order of battle, critical infrastructure, battle management tactics, techniques and procedures, and standard operating procedures is key to establishing and maintaining a prioritized target list. In this way, portions of the joint targeting cycle are accomplished prior to conflict, informing weaponeering recommendations across kinetic and non-kinetic effects, as well as the requirements necessary to develop new capabilities to counter enemy systems for which the joint force does not yet possess a solution.

Moreover, shaping activities can be geared toward increasing resiliency in the joint targeting process. Much attention is given to the challenges of contested, degraded, and operationally limited (CDO) environments and how they complicate traditional means by which the joint force projects combat power. Peer adversaries can contest environments in a multitude of ways such as anti-access/area denial capabilities, electromagnetic interference, countering space situational awareness, and defensive cyber operations. Shaping activities must prioritize alternate means of accomplishing warfighting functions given the potential for primary means to become denied or degraded. Ironically, the CDO nature of Russia’s war in Ukraine has led to a much more conventional and analogue fight than anticipated. This highlights the importance of bolstering resiliency through shaping operations, as peer adversary denial capabilities may effectively cancel out one another’s high-end platforms.

Shaping across the physical and virtual domains

As is the case throughout the competition continuum, the contact layer for armed conflict is both physical and virtual. Traditional physical targets include surface-to-air missile systems, radars, maritime vessels, and command posts, and they exist in quantities of hundreds or thousands; virtual targets include network nodes tied to communication systems, power infrastructure, situational awareness, and early warning, and they are quantified in the millions. When expanding the battlefield to the virtual domain, synchronization of kinetic and non-kinetic effects can lead to significant advantages across the joint warfighting functions¹⁷ and with regard to the principle of mass.

Gaining a competitive advantage traditionally depends on availability and posture: the forces available, and on what timeline, are determined by their current posture. In the physical world, this construct presents challenging time-distance problems when considering global conflicts, raising questions for both escalation management as well as force preservation. The virtual world can alter this paradigm by enabling virtual mass, leveraging cyber operations to hold adversary networks and capabilities at risk at unprecedented speed and scale. Even modest impact on adversary capabilities executed on this scale of mass and speed can complicate the enemy’s risk calculus and mitigate some risk associated with physical force flow into theater. Given the challenges of logistics and sustainment, efficiencies gained through the employment of virtual capabilities provide a significant advantage during a protracted conflict. Saying this, virtual capabilities are not a silver bullet and effects delivered through cyberspace are insufficient in isolation during armed conflict, and often require large up-front investment in time and resources.

The evolution of virtual targeting and effects, to include the integration with physical targeting and fires, drives a greater premium on shaping the environment prior to conflict. To hold millions of virtual targets at risk instantaneously necessitates significant preparation of the environment. Indeed, a multiyear campaign built around access and understanding—by, with, and through regional allies and partners—may be necessary to simply gain access to the right adversary networks. Development and installation of cyber capabilities would be executed in parallel, with the associated development and intelligence gaps feeding back into the overall campaign approach. Shaping campaigns can provide the decisive advantage once armed conflict begins, all while informing the joint force of its own potential vulnerabilities and thus allowing for continued defensive hardening in stride.

Capability development

While fielding innovative and advanced technologies is critical to maintaining a decisive battlefield advantage, technology (whether platform or software-based) does not on its own equate to capability.¹⁸ Rather, it is the combination of technology, tactics, and training that creates a true capability—for instance, the United States sells fifth-generation fighter jets to other nations, but those nations do not instantly gain the capability to execute low-observable deep strike operations. Technology development must be informed by an understanding of the operating environment, the capabilities of adversaries, and the nature by which the joint force executes operations. To that end, furthering capability development is an objective for the campaigning framework outlined in this paper.

Training AI/ML algorithms often emulates or requires real-world data, further underscoring the need for capability development to harness data for effect. While great strides have been made in emulation for training, the real world offers the most significant data, which is accessible through robust campaigning activities across the joint force in concert with interagency and international partners. The integration of emerging weapon system technology such as hypersonics, lasers, and space-based fires is equally critical. Capabilities such as JADC2 seek to establish the necessary datacentric architecture for seamless integration of information and effects, which span employment times from milliseconds to hours. However, without AI/ML-driven predictive capabilities in the loop, joint force commanders will be challenged to make appropriate targeting and weaponeering decisions amid a large-scale conflict, creating significant risk with respect to sustainment, logistics, and force protection. Without a similar distribution of situational awareness, authority, and capability to the tactical edge, the joint force will not be able to field a credible combat force in a CDO environment where being disconnected from higher headquarters is the norm.

Lastly, while security cooperation is a foundational activity underlying integrated deterrence, the execution of high-end combined arms warfare with allies and partners requires a great deal of specific investment. This includes years of combined training, exercises, and rehearsals to create a dependable capability, especially when factoring in the complexity of integrating emerging technology. Incorporating allies and partners into the joint force-led scheme of maneuver will be critical to maintaining an advantage in targeting and effects generation. However, information-sharing hurdles, disparate rules of engagement, authorities, and cultural considerations must be ironed out in advance of conflict such that the full force of allied firepower can be realized. Ensuring that key allies are fielding capabilities that are JADC2 compatible will be critical to achieving the shared situational awareness required for a common operating picture. Making strides of this nature and fielding a combat-credible combined force will not be accomplished through sporadic exercises, key leader engagements, or exchanges; the joint force must train with allies and partners in the same manner with which it trains internally.

In sum, high-end conflict with a peer adversary presents the most difficult and high-risk challenge, and it requires specific attention given the gravity of its nature. When adequately prioritized, preparation for armed conflict prescribes a unique set of requirements for the joint force and its partners to execute during cooperation and competition and across multiple domains and instruments of power, which at times may overlap or diverge from deterrence. Shaping activities of this nature fall expressly within the proposed proactive targeting and effects framework given that, in the event of war, “these capabilities will shape the environment to ensure combat dominance and our ability to end any conflict on our terms.”¹⁹

The way forward

If we don’t change – if we fail to adapt – we risk losing the certainty with which we have defended our national interests for decades. We risk losing a high-end fight.

— Gen Charles Q. Brown, Jr., US Air Force Chief of Staff²⁰

Implementing change is no easy task, especially when considering the massive scale of the joint force. Nonetheless, a tidal wave of contemporary strategies, guidance and policy documents, and service visions all speak to the urgent need for change. Culture—coupled with procedural and technological changes—will be key to enabling sustainable adoption of a new approach.

Culture: Adapting the joint force’s mindset to global problems across the competition continuum

First, to deter armed conflict the joint force must adopt and operationalize the competitive mindset shift outlined in recent strategic doctrine. While armed conflict is never desirable, regardless of scale, high-end warfare between nuclear-armed peer competitors is of such gravity that deterring it from ever occurring is crucial. General Mark A. Milley’s assertion that “traditional joint force deterrence” is “less effective,” alludes to the notion that owning the most sophisticated or greatest quantity of weaponry is inadequate on its own as a deterrent.²¹ Moreover, while an adversary’s belief in the joint force’s will to act is critical to deterrence, it cannot solely revolve around direct military force given escalation concerns. Rather, adopting a more proactive and creative approach to strategic competition can simultaneously deter malign behavior while complicating, confusing, and frustrating adversary decision-making. The spectrum of views on Russia’s war in Ukraine are informative in this regard: Some highlight US and NATO success in arming Ukraine in its valiant campaign to oppose Russia’s invasion, whereas others view the ongoing war as “a direct result of the West’s lack of resolve and failure to credibly deter Russia” from waging war on the European continent more broadly, regardless of NATO borders.²² This latter sentiment pushes the force to adopt cultural change in order to deter future conflicts. Of course, the United States cannot deter all conflicts from occurring. However, well-informed global campaign plans can and should inform the prioritization of operational activities tied to certain potential conflicts the joint force deliberately seeks to deter.

Incorporating all instruments of power

The joint force need not abandon its traditional strengths; rather, it ought to smartly evolve its approaches to incorporate all instruments of power to expand access, fuel understanding, and generate a range of options regardless of location within the competition continuum. Increased training and education on the nature of authorities and tools that the various instruments of power can bring to the fight is critical for joint leaders. In this way, entities like the State Department or Intelligence Community do not simply represent “concurrence” boxes that must be checked to get military operations approved. Rather, they can be incorporated as partners that offer unique access vectors, diverse understanding, and a variety of tools to support or be supported by military actions, whether at the tactical, operational, or strategic levels. As described in this framework, adopting this change bolsters the joint force’s capability to target within any domain, and similarly expands the nature of effects, fires, and actions available to achieve desired outcomes.

Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) exemplify this approach and could be scaled to enable joint targeting and effects generation. Scaling a similar approach to that of the JIATF, however, requires cultural adaptation. JIATFs are tailor-built to address singular problems and combine multiple instruments of power—and their accompanying authorities and capabilities—under a single chain of command to create unity of effort. However, unity of effort does not necessitate unity of command: The joint force can lead the integrated deterrence effort without being in charge, and it often does play a supporting role to its interagency counterparts. This requires senior leaders to establish a culture that moves beyond “coordination” and “deconfliction” and toward “collaboration.” Increased organizational trust, built upon real-world operational experiences, will increase trust both across departments and in the disparate datasets produced across the instruments of power, ultimately amplifying the predictive capabilities of the AI architecture this framework is reliant upon. Moving toward collaboration is similarly critical as it pertains to enhancing the aggregate power among allies and partners.

Embracing the global nature of problem sets

The joint force must also embrace the concept of a global, multi-domain contact layer. When viewing the world solely through the lens of armed conflict, the joint force focuses narrowly on Russia in Europe and the PRC in the Indo-Pacific. Targeting and effects generation in Latin America, Africa, or the Arctic are then insufficiently regarded as supporting, complementary, or niche efforts rather than as potential key components of integrated deterrence. Many operational efforts—such as security force assistance, building a partner’s combat capability, gaining access, and illuminating vulnerabilities of an adversary’s capabilities—require significant time and resource investments. Senior leaders must understand why, for example, a multiyear effort to gain placement and access in Equatorial Guinea fits within the global campaign to counter PRC malign influence; otherwise they will be less likely to resource it (in this case, Equatorial Guinea is a candidate for the establishment of what would be the PRC’s first Atlantic naval base).²³ As such, combatant commanders who lead global campaign plans, such as the global campaign plan for China, should prioritize regularly communicating their priorities to other combatant commands when activities take place in another geographic area of command. This is especially important when activity falls under the authority of a different combatant command.

Generating senior leader understanding is a by-product of cultivating a joint force that thinks with a competitive mindset. As former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph F. Dunford recognized, the United States “think[s] of being at peace or war…our adversaries don’t think that way.”²⁴ Altering the “peace or war” mentality to a deeper understanding of activities across the competition continuum—and adopting a strategy of proactive targeting harnessing all instruments of power—is necessary to simultaneously deter aggression and effectively prepare for conflict. Combatant command force structure changes; intergovernmental professional training, education, and exercises; and in-garrison and deployed intergovernmental cross-pollination are beyond the scope of this paper but are among concepts worth exploring to enable cultural changes at scale.

Technology and data: Building a resilient and holistic data architecture

The DOD must build a robust and extensive data architecture, fusing private sector data with government data, and build frameworks and standards to harness it into actionable information. Data fuels everything from access and understanding, to options, targeting, and analysis, to predictions and recommendations. For data to be usable, however, it must first be accessible. Accessibility must occur at echelon given the nature of CDO environments and the expectation that severed links between the tactical edge and higher headquarters elements will be the norm, not the exception.

The joint force needs a data architecture in line with, and as a central component of, the JADC2 concept that aggregates data from all sensors across all domains to enable a proactive framework for targeting and effect. The architecture must encompass the tactical edge, fusing commercial and government-procured data across a spectrum of classification levels. In line with the DoD Data Strategy, such an architecture must make data visible, accessible, understandable, linked, trustworthy, interoperable, and secure.²⁵ The DOD must involve the private sector in the process of building this architecture and consider how interoperability standards and technologies can be integrated and kept up to date. Not only will this help the joint force accelerate the PED cycle and act on intelligence, but it will also allow the joint force to operate across the scale of attribution to mitigate the operational and counterintelligence risks inherent to strategic competition.

Airmen from the 7th Reconnaissance Squadron communications flight conduct a satellite communications training course. Credit: US Air Force/ Senior Airman Ashley Richards

Moreover, the joint force must explore how classified intelligence can safely be used to facilitate AI/ML algorithmic training. Otherwise, it may inadvertently incur risk to sources, methods, or exquisite platforms. Alternatively, with the appropriate mechanisms, AI/ML algorithms can be trained to reach similar conclusions as classified analysis using only open-source data. This will greatly enhance the joint force’s ability to export capabilities to allies and partners without concern for security-sharing agreements or classification obstacles.

Authorities, rules of engagement, and risk: Updating DOD guidelines and standards

DOD guidelines and standards must be updated to harness all tools of national power and to enable combatant commands to prioritize global issues alongside their regional areas of responsibility. For distribution of data to achieve the desired effect, the joint force must explore changes in the distribution of authorities, rules of engagement, and the nature of assessing risk. While a lack of authorities is frequently cited as a barrier to accomplishing operational activities, it is often the cumbersome means by which to access existing authorities that stands in the way. If a joint force commander (JFC) can exercise kinetic strike authority at their level but require permission from several echelons higher to execute information operations, the JFC will increasingly rely on kinetic effects. Authorities often lack clear processes by which subordinate commanders can quickly access them. Similarly, when authorities are reserved at the highest echelons, the approval authority is farthest removed from the problem, lacks adequate understanding, and often leads to excessive risk aversion. This plays out with the array of authorities germane to the joint force and will only become more complex and burdensome when expanding the aperture to include other instruments of power. At a minimum, when the National Command Authority delegates authorities to combatant commanders, there ought to be a standardized and coherent process by which subordinate echelons of command can access them efficiently. Additionally, an effective JADO/JADC2 operating environment that collects, disseminates, and harnesses data requires more effective coordination across the US services and manufacturers. The development of standards must be pursued to advance capabilities that are interoperable across the joint force and with US allies. Doing so will help improve the speed and precision of the targeting cycle.

Second, streamlining the approach to accessing authorities goes hand in hand with updating the joint force’s rules of engagement. These concepts help mitigate the concerns around disparate joint force elements operating with degraded or nonexistent contact with higher headquarters elements. Rules of engagement allow for commanders to lead through intent instead of specific guidance, facilitating more rapid and creative localized targeting and effects generation. Distribution of authorities and associated rules of engagement could transform a unit’s guidance from “employ electronic warfare (EW) effects against Russian ORLAN-10s” to “disrupt Russian ISR below 5,000 feet AGL.” The former is prescriptive and limiting; the latter is intent based, provides greater flexibility, and informs the necessary capabilities for the tactical edge to operate autonomously for longer periods of time.

Finally, the department must rethink the way it assesses risk in light of integrated deterrence and a global contact layer. Making informed decisions on risk management is a key underpinning of this framework. Yet, risk assessments are traditionally conducted in a temporal manner: the risk associated with a particular activity, in a particular location, with a particular target. Risks associated with strategic competition are not, however, suited to traditional ways of thinking. Competing with adversaries across a global contact layer requires considering how local risk ties into strategic risk, whether that be transregional or trans-domain. This is further complicated by the imperative to effectively prepare the joint force for combat. If, for example, a particular PRC capability presented a significant problem for the joint force’s ability to execute a contingency response plan, significant investment may be required to mitigate the threat. This may lead to a scenario in which the joint force assumes greater risk elsewhere in the globe to gain access to locations where the PRC has proliferated similar capabilities to increase understanding and develop options for use during crisis. A similar situation could arise where the joint force makes the decision to reveal a capability it would otherwise hold in reserve to complicate an adversary’s decision-making and risk calculus, thus enhancing deterrence. Maturing the joint force’s ability to assess risk in this manner must begin with data-informed understanding, shared consciousness, and unity of effort across all instruments of power.

Conclusion

Cultivating a joint force that enables and supports a whole-of-government approach to integrated deterrence is a daunting yet achievable vision, requiring transformational leadership to achieve. “Humans are more important than hardware,” and how leaders harness the joint force’s enduring strategic advantage of human capital will dictate whether success is achieved.²⁶ This paper has outlined a vision to update the way the joint force conducts targeting and effects generation for an era of strategic competition. Evolving the joint force’s model for targeting and effects will require adopting a mindset shift that sees competition as key to setting the conditions for, and ideally avoiding, armed conflict. To truly operationalize integrated deterrence, the joint force must embrace targeting and effects across the competition continuum, leveraging the range of tools at its disposal across its domestic and international counterparts, and avoiding a solely military or kinetic lens. Moreover, through the power of AI, the DOD can harness data for effect and fuel the proactive, continuous, and global campaigning required for integrated deterrence.

About the authors

Gen James E. Cartwright, USMC (ret.)

Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Department of Defense

Fellow

Justin M. Conelli

2022-23 Senior US Air Force Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan National Security

Staff

Clementine G. Starling-Daniels

Director, Forward Defense

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense NATO

Former staff

Julia Siegel

Former Associate Director

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, Intellectual Property—Patents, Patent Related Matters, Trademarks and Copyrights, 1 September 1998, this research paper is not copyrighted but is the property of the United States government.

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1 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing, February 2023, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23698400/20230213-joint-concept-for-competing-signed.pdf.

2 DOD guidance and Joint Doctrine, such as the integrated deterrence concept nested within the National Defense Strategy and the Joint Concept for Competing, recognize that security challenges facing the United States span the competition continuum. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing, February 10, 2023, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23698400/20230213-joint-concept-for-competing-signed.pdf, and US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 2022, 8-11, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF.

3 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing, v.

4 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfighting, Joint Publication 1 (JP 1), July 2019, II-13.

5 US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 1.

6 Cesar Augusto Rodriguez, Timothy Charles Walton, and Hyong Chu, Putting the “FIL” into “DIME”: Growing Joint Understanding of the Instruments of Power, Joint Force Quarterly, April 2020, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1099537.pdf.

7 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing, v.

8 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Targeting, Joint Publication 3-60 (JP 3-60), September 2019, II-8 – 11-9.

9 Department of Defense, DOD Data Strategy, September 2020, i, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/08/2002514180/-1/-1/0/DOD-DATA-STRATEGY.PDF.

10 US Department of Defense, DoD Data Strategy, i.

11 US Department of Defense, DoD Data Strategy, 2.

12 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence, Joint Publication 2-0 (JP 2-0), May 2022, I-2.

13 US Department of Defense, Summary of the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) Strategy, March 2022, 4, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/17/2002958406/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-OF-THE-JOINT-ALL-DOMAIN-COMMAND-AND-CONTROL-STRATEGY.PDF.

14 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 401.

15 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Campaigns and Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (JP 3-0), June 2022, xxx.

16 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing, 22.

17 The joint warfighting functions include command and control, information, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment.

18 Tate Nurkin, The Five Revolutions: Examining Defense Innovation in the Indo-Pacific Region, Atlantic Council, November 20, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Five-Revolutions-Report.pdf.

19 Department of Defense, Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy, October 2020, 1, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/02/2002510472/-1/-1/0/Irregular-Warfare-Annex-to-the-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.PDF.

20 Charles Q. Brown, Accelerate Change or Lose, US Air Force, August 2020, https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/csaf/CSAF_22/CSAF_22_Strategic_Approach_Accelerate_Change_or_Lose_31_Aug_2020.pdf.

21 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Competing.

22 Liam Collins and Frank Sobchak, “U.S. Deterrence Failed in Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, February 20, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/20/ukraine-deterrence-failed-putin-invasion/.

23 David Vergun, “General Says China Is Seeking a Naval Base in West Africa,” US Department of Defense, March 17, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2969935/general-says-china-is-seeking-a-naval-base-in-west-africa/

24 Dunford: Challenges Require More Than ‘Buying New Hardware,’ Association of the United Stated Army, October 10, 2016, https://www.ausa.org/news/dunford-challenges-require-new-hardware.

25 US Department of Defense, DOD Data Strategy.

26 US Special Operations Command, “SOF Truths,” https://www.socom.mil/about/sof-truths.

The post Operationalizing integrated deterrence: Applying joint force targeting across the competition continuum appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Starling joins Irregular Warfare Initiative podcast to discuss gray zone conflict

Atlantic Council — Fri, 19 May 2023 16:29:24 +0000

original source

On May 19, Forward Defense director Clementine G. Starling was featured on an episode of the Irregular Warfare Initiative’s podcast to discuss gray zone conflict. She was joined by David Van, who is a member of the Australian Senate for Victoria.

Starling discussed Forward Defense’s report “Seizing the advantage: A vision for the next US national defense strategy” which laid out an approach for the US address challenges across the competition continuum. She also described how policymakers think about the gray zone as a space between cooperation and armed conflict.

[There is] a spectrum of activities and intent. On the far left there is cooperation, on the far right is armed conflict and warfare and then in the middle is the gray zone…adversarial competition below the level of armed conflict.

Clementine Starling

Staff

Clementine G. Starling-Daniels

Director, Forward Defense

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense NATO

Learn more

The post Starling joins Irregular Warfare Initiative podcast to discuss gray zone conflict appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What is driving the adoption of Chinese surveillance technology in Africa?

Bulelani Jili — Mon, 15 May 2023 13:49:00 +0000

Executive summary
Introduction
Go global
The use of Chinese public security systems in Africa
A case from Kenya
Comparisons across the continent
Global insecurities and US interests
US-China competition’s impact on Africa

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Executive summary

When examining the proliferation of Chinese surveillance systems and cyber capabilities in Africa, research disproportionately focuses on the motivations and ambitions of the supplier. This perspective, while it highlights Chinese diplomatic ambitions and corporate opportunities, ignores local features that drive the adoption of Chinese surveillance tools. This paper discusses African demand factors through an examination of the primary case study of Kenya and examples from South Africa and Uganda. By drawing attention to local efforts to procure and collaborate with Chinese firms to establish public security systems, this work seeks to address the motivations behind the adoption of Chinese information and communication technology (ICT) systems, which include artificial intelligence (AI) surveillance tools and other biometric identification systems, and illustrates the consequences of the proliferation of digital surveillance tools for local and global communities. The paper emphasizes African volition—recognizing its salience—as a way to go beyond myopic representations of Africa as a passive recipient and partner in Africa-China relations.

This work examines the proliferation of Chinese surveillance tools as a dynamic multilateral process. To stem the proliferation of surveillance tools, US policy must understand African demand and accordingly help address local priorities. Accordingly, this paper assesses how demand factors contribute to the proliferation of surveillance technologies, addressing an underexplored facet of the proliferation process, while underscoring the risks of these tools’ buildup. Local procurement is critically driven by public security ambitions and justified as a means of achieving development and security aims. While these tools arrive on ostensibly permissible grounds, their acquisition and application come without public consent or robust accountability measures. It is this gap between the adoption of novel digital surveillance technologies and robust regulatory measures that inspires trepidation. Despite growing concerns over human rights violations domestically and the real risk of installed backdoors in hardware and software, African leaders continue to procure surveillance tools from the People’s Republic of China. This decision is predicated on the availability and financial feasibility of Chinese platforms as well as on the technology’s supposed capacity to address infrastructure gaps and local public security threats. Discussions of African agency that fail to underscore some of the impediments to its expression only romanticize African volition.

Issue Brief

Oct 17, 2022

China’s surveillance ecosystem and the global spread of its tools

By Bulelani Jili

This paper seeks to offer insights into how China’s domestic surveillance market and cyber capability ecosystem operate, especially given the limited number of systematic studies that have analyzed its industry objectives.

Cybersecurity

Introduction

Countries across Africa are procuring and employing surveillance tools from China. This trend is a product of China’s diplomatic strategy, its technological ambitions, and growing corporate power and reach, as well as African domestic demands. Thus, both supply and demand factors contribute to the growing proliferation of surveillance tools. A companion paper to this issue brief focused on the key “push factors” from China and their significance for Global South actors.¹ This paper focuses on a diagnostic account of the pull factors in African states.

This paper is divided into three sections. It begins with a brief overview of China’s global expansion into African markets.² This study’s focus on the proliferation and procurement of Chinese surveillance tools does not presume the party-state’s exceptional nature in the distribution of digital surveillance tools or seek to obfuscate the broader international market for surveillance tools and cyber intrusive systems, which involves Western firms. Rather, this close examination of the proliferation of Chinese public security systems is an attempt to understand China’s growing role in African ICT markets. An investigation into the spread of Chinese digital surveillance technologies in Africa offers a grounded basis for examining how party-state ambitions and corporate firm activities are entangled and, critically, meditated by local vectors. Principally, it expands our understanding of the local and global risks that the adoption of these systems entails while providing greater insight into the client decision-making process, a crucial and underexamined feature of this proliferation.

Then, this paper examines the factors driving the adoption of digital infrastructure in Africa and the consequences for civil liberties. The size and scope of this inquiry do not permit an exhaustive review of the global ecosystem of surveillance technologies. Instead, primary attention is given to the spread of public security technology from China to Africa. Kenya, South Africa, and Uganda are salient examples of broader China-Africa dynamics, and have been selected to help explore how China’s growing cyber footprint is driven by local realities in Africa, how Chinese diplomatic engagements and corporate expansion are mediated by local adoption patterns, and how these local demand factors have their own inertia that drives outcomes. The paper emphasizes African volition—recognizing its salience—as a way to go beyond myopic representations of Africa as a passive recipient and partner in Africa-China relations.

The paper draws attention to drivers for the adoption of digital infrastructure in Africa and the consequences for civil liberties. By privileging the perspective of recipient countries and their local milieu, it demonstrates not only how China promotes its products abroad but precisely how local actors adopt and help drive the proliferation and use of Chinese digital surveillance technology.³ In light of this, the paper seeks to offer both a grounded study and a systematic analysis of the global and local features at play.

Finally, this paper aims to investigate the features that motivate the procurement of these digital surveillance tools. In so doing, it demonstrates that China’s proclivity to provide aid and support to African state actors financially, regardless of their human rights record, thus rendering citizens vulnerable to the misuse of these surveillance technologies. The final sections emphasize that the risks of using these surveillance tools without adequate regulatory frameworks are vast, particularly in a region with established challenges at the intersection of crime, penury, policing, governance, and race. This paper examines the implications of the distribution of Chinese surveillance tools, including the deeper, hidden costs of their adoption, how these new digital tools challenge global norms and standards around data protection, and how American policymakers should respond to the global adoption of these tools. Addressing these questions has significant implications for international security, digital development, and global cybersecurity.

Go global

This section highlights some of the key factors that motivate the supply of ICT products into African markets. Current analysis on the distribution of Chinese surveillance tools and cyber capability platforms scrutinizes China’s diplomatic activities and questions the degree to which the party-state, with the aid of private firms, enables autocratic digital practices across the globe. These accounts speculate on the level of coordination between Beijing and its corporate actors. While the degree of coordination cannot be empirically fixed, financial incentives in the form of aid and loans are used to incentivize African state procurement and the proliferation of surveillance technologies.

Accordingly, several interconnected economic policy initiatives that helped Chinese firms gain overseas infrastructure development experience were primary contributors to China’s global expansion into African ICT markets. Surplus capital is lent abroad to create novel commercial opportunities for Chinese firms.⁴ The aim of assisting the internationalization of domestic firms was in part about improving Chinese brand recognition globally, easing fierce domestic competition, and exploiting commercial opportunities made available in part by the absence of US investment in Africa.⁵

A 2011 foreign aid white paper precisely outlines Beijing’s approach to global expansion and development aid.⁶ Naming this initiative “South-South cooperation,” the party-state aims to foster a remunerative orientation with African countries while also simultaneously seeking to carve out a distinct auxiliary role when compared to traditional Western development partners. Therefore, rather than promoting politically conditioned foreign aid that asks for democratic reforms or value-driven commitments like gender equity, Beijing offers aid without political conditions. While this posture suggests a “no strings attached” approach to development, it obfuscates the economic asymmetries that condition relations.⁷ China’s resource-backed lending finances projects while also demanding that borrowing countries commit to repaying loans with future revenues earned from their infrastructure projects or their natural resources.⁸ The posture of “no strings attached” to loans seeks to augment legitimacy for Beijing’s development work in the Global South while also effacing the broad economic features that prompt its engagement and responsibility for the consequences of its financial involvement on the ground.

While China’s surveillance system is confined to its national borders, the private firms that make its surveillance architecture possible are selling their tools to an African customer base. With the aid of state funding, Chinese tech firms expanded into African ICT markets. Firms like Huawei initially worked to expand internet connectivity in Kenya, but in 2014 they began selling their smart city products. Proponents of this move argue that public security systems provide vital intelligence to authorities while acting as a deterrent to criminals. Adam Lane, deputy chief executive of government affairs at Huawei Kenya, echoes this sentiment by contending that “authorities can now conduct panoramic video surveillance of Nairobi’s urban center, as well as maintain a highly agile command and dispatch setup that runs on satellite-based GPS and software-based geographic information system.”⁹ Yet, this sanguine outlook does not account for the real risk of exacerbating established problems like the misuse of public security systems and debt stress levels.¹⁰ While Chinese firms promise a technological fix to traditional problems like public safety and state security, they under-deliver in those areas. More significantly, investigative reporting and digital rights organizations have raised concerns about cybersecurity threats, digital surveillance tools, and biometric data collection by these Chinese surveillance tools. These groups contend that the ubiquitous and underregulated use of these technologies threatens privacy rights.¹¹ Needless to say, they believe that the adoption of digital tools without robust institutional checks and balances, renders citizens more vulnerable to state surveillance and suppression. It is this gap between novel technological adoption and regulatory framework implementation that creates emerging risks.

The use of Chinese public security systems in Africa

Surveillance cameras in Nairobi’s Central Business District, taken by Bulelani Jili

This section underscores the demand for digital surveillance tools and their domestic applications. Namely, African states seek out and acquire surveillance systems for a number of reasons, largely as part of a wider effort to augment state security response and capability. Africa’s significant digital infrastructure gap is being addressed through Chinese investment and state support. Annually, there is an estimated infrastructure funding gap of up to $107.5 billion a year.¹² China plays a monopolistic role in Africa’s telecommunications sector, supplying approximately 70 percent of the continent’s digital infrastructure.¹³ Surveillance tools are typically purchased as part of a package of ICT systems, which include data centers, closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems, and high-tech biometrics that are integrated and used in tandem with AI products—thus supporting public security authorities and development ambitions.¹⁴

Digital infrastructure investments, including the promotion of public security systems, in Africa’s telecommunications sector have largely been built by China, mostly through state-to-state engagements, but also supplemented by the growing involvement of Chinese private sector actors. According to a review of datasets and reports on the acquisition of Chinese digital surveillance tools in Africa, about 22 African states have contracted with companies like Huawei to adopt digital surveillance technology.¹⁵ Usually procured under the banner of smart city initiatives, these systems collect, integrate, and analyze data from various sources, like national diametric databases that are made available by state partners. The system supports crime prevention and recovery operations. African demand drives the procurement and application of these tools, specifically, to address Africa’s digital infrastructure gap.¹⁶ African state and city officials in Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, South Africa, and other countries are reaching out to Chinese firms to aid their varying domestic aims. Together these examples illustrate the establishment of local digital governance regimes. They are not simply a derivative of a Beijing concocted vision, rather, Chinese firms are acquiescing to the ambitions of their host. Crucially, these surveillance regimes are embedded within local private-public ventures. As such, we must consider a more balanced approach that helps to tease out the degree to which local agency is helping shape geopolitical relations while also examining the interplay between Chinese firms and party-state activities on the continent. It is this more balanced approach that offers a vantage point from which to defamiliarize and reimagine politics on the ground.

Issue Brief

Oct 17, 2022

China’s surveillance ecosystem and the global spread of its tools

By Bulelani Jili

Cybersecurity

A case from Kenya

China’s principal entry into Kenya’s telecommunication market came through the docking of fiber-optic cables. Led by Huawei and ZTE, two giant Chinese technology firms that specialize in telecommunication, the docking of submarine cables enabled the Kenyan government to liberalize their ICT market, which allowed for a more competitive telecommunication section.¹⁷ In an interview with the author, a former ICT official said, “ [the ministry] then set in motion a series of policies, including the National Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Policy, that aimed at the liberalization of the telecommunications sector that created opportunities for more actors to be involved. With financing that came from US banks and the Export-Import Bank of China, we looked to close the infrastructure gap that hampered growth.”¹⁸ To establish the country’s first National Optic Fiber Backbone Infrastructure, which brought high-speed connectivity, the government jointly contracted Huawei and ZTE.¹⁹ Each company was expected to manage a different region across the country. ZTE laid the cables for the west, and Huawei handled Nairobi and the central parts of the country.²⁰ This novel digital capacity empowered the state to pursue e-government projects, which include public security systems and cyber intrusion platform solutions.

As such, the Kenyan government primarily enlists these surveillance tools as a means to scale public security capabilities, national security prerogatives, and data security. The adoption of surveillance tools is made possible through the sale of Chinese equipment and soft loans from the Export-Import Bank of China, which are crucial in making public security platforms financially attainable for Nairobi and other African governments. Beyond Huawei, Chinese companies like Dahua, Hikvision, and others are involved in the adoption of digital surveillance systems.²¹ In 2012, the Kenyan government awarded Nanjing Les Information Technology, a high-tech provider that offers urban traffic management and urban governance tools, a tender to supply digital surveillance cameras.²² The goal of the initiative was to augment public security and intelligent traffic management systems in downtown Nairobi. According to official figures, the platform cost the government 463,960,697 Kenyan shillings, which amounts to $3.8 million.²³ The expected date of completion was June 2013, but, due to delays, the project was not completed until April 2014.²⁴ Constant power shortages and access to privately owned buildings for installation purposes were the main reasons for delays. No less important, the adoption plan for these tools did not include corresponding data protection measures to promote and maintain privacy rights, rather inadequate planning before the start of the program presaged the delays and data policy omissions.

China’s oversized role in African ICT markets engenders a dependence on their products and expertise. Digital public security systems are embedded within state-driven processes that are contingent on private-public ventures. The use and effectiveness of these tools, though nominally operated by and for the purposes of Kenyan government officials, are heavily reliant on Chinese contractors to operate public security platforms. An audit by the auditor-general’s office found that senior staff sent by the Kenyan government to China to learn how to operate public security systems did not acquire the necessary skills.²⁵ Instead, the staff spent time inspecting the parts of the system to be delivered. During that visit, no attempts were made to learn or teach how to operate the system.²⁶ For this reason, questions remain about Kenya’s ability to operate and maintain its public security systems. Furthermore, technical matters having to do with the upkeep of the system are managed by the contractor. The National Police, who are tasked with the responsibility of operating the system, had not even developed the capability to work the control room.²⁷ To complicate matters, the manual language of the control room was in Chinese. Most of the digital surveillance cameras installed within Nairobi’s central business district stopped working months after they were installed. Even more worrying is that there were limited security protocols for accessing the system, which increased the possibility of unauthorized access or the launch of malicious code on the server by unauthorized users.

To supplement its earlier public security system, Huawei was invited to install its public security system in Kenya. In Kenya, as in the rest of the continent, Huawei promised that its new product, the safe city, would improve public security. The safe city is a form of a smart city, which is a computational model of urban planning that aims to utilize technological innovation to enhance operational efficiencies. The safe city platform utilizes a series of interconnected technologies like video cameras, tracking devices, software, and cloud storage systems to link technologies and processes as a means to integrate them into a larger and more cohesive whole to advance public initiatives like managing traffic, policing, and streamlining service delivery.²⁸ The first safe city system by Huawei was able to connect 1,800 high-definition cameras and 200 high-definition traffic surveillance infrastructures across Nairobi.²⁹ A command center was also installed, which supports over 9,000 police officers in 195 police stations.³⁰ The Kenyan government is pursuing smart city initiatives as a way to resolve public security challenges and address the country’s digital infrastructure gap. Digital surveillance platforms are part of a wider state-led initiative to utilize technologies to help resolve structural challenges and, thus, make development more attainable.

Comparisons across the continent

This section highlights the motivations for and incentives of local surveillance procurement in Uganda and South Africa. It lends weight to an examination of the proliferation of Chinese surveillance tools in Africa as a dynamic process shaped by demand and supply factors. Uganda, like Kenya, is also procuring public security systems from Huawei. The Kampala police procured AI facial recognition systems from Huawei in 2019, supposedly to address the city’s growing crime rate.³¹Uganda is working with Huawei to help close digital infrastructure gaps and address domestic challenges with crime. In contrast, Kenya’s particular history with terrorist attacks by Islamist militants has motivated the state’s adoption of surveillance systems. As in Kenya, Huawei claims that safe city tools meet several service delivery demands, including real-time surveillance, evidence collection, and video browsing that support policing initiatives.

Opposition leaders in Uganda, civil society, and international observers highlight the misuse of surveillance tools, and how these platforms are instead used to monitor and target political opposition to the administration of President Yoweri Museveni.³² To be sure, the misuse of public security platforms is not the only reason for concern. Facial recognition technologies require mass biometric data for training data collection, software integration, and algorithm development. As a result, acquiring and using these tools without strong privacy safeguards poses a threat to privacy rights.

South Africa’s experience with high rates of crime is the primary motivation for the state to adopt public security platforms as a means to manage the perennial threat. While demand is a response to concerns about crime and governance, it also due to state efforts to close infrastructure gaps and bolster state digital capabilities. Smart city initiatives in South Africa seek to resolve structural challenges while also offering solutions to social challenges like crime. Former Rustenburg mayor Mpho Kunou explains that “the Rustenburg Smart City project aims to develop the economy, enhance citizen participation, improve public safety and transportation, expand the scope of government services, and implement digitalized public utilities through leading technologies.”³³ The increased presence of Chinese surveillance technology in South Africa has raised concerns in Washington about the party-state’s influence over South Africa’s digital infrastructure.³⁴ In addition to Huawei, in South Africa, local company Vumacam is a leading provider of digital surveillance tools. For example, in the city of Johannesburg, Huawei digital cameras are paired platforms from Vumacam and Hikvision, another Chinese digital surveillance tool provider.³⁵ The various surveillance tools are deployed by the police, local municipalities, and private security firms. This example, like the previously mentioned public security systems in Kenya, illustrates African states’ tendency to use multifarious governance and surveillance platforms.

The lack of evidence that public security systems reduce crime does not deter the promotion of public security platforms. In fact, in the case of Kenya, crime rates have risen in areas supported by these technologies.³⁶With the growing concern over the promotion and misuse of surveillance tools, Adam Lane, deputy chief executive of government affairs at Huawei Kenya, dismisses these concerns by contending that “Huawei’s role is to develop, install, deploy, and maintain the technology according to the request and need of the National Police Service. The National Police Service is responsible for operating it and using it according to their policies in line with any national laws.”³⁷This popular framing is reductive, if not completely misleading. It rests, somewhat simplistically, on an all-or-nothing approach to responsibility for negative outcomes. The argument draws attention to the behavior of the National Police but says nothing about the consequences of the sale of these systems or whether regulations are necessary to mitigate negative outcomes. The company position de-emphasizes its role in enabling state actors to surveil citizens, instead placing sole blame and responsibility on state actors for any misconduct.

Government officials, including Kenyan, South African, and Ugandan state representatives, see digital surveillance systems as possible solutions to the traditional challenges that their countries face. This contention challenges presuppositions about the adoption of Chinese surveillance tools as strictly a reflection of Beijing’s efforts to promote digital authoritarianism. Rather, African governments assemble hybridized surveillance systems, in part from Chinese companies, as part of a broader digital infrastructure initiative that seeks to address infrastructure gaps while connecting various heterogeneous tools whose application promises to ameliorate domestic problems like violent crime and terrorism. These objectives, however, are not supported by robust legal measures to protect civil liberties. With the introduction of public security platforms, policymakers are faced with challenge to devise appropriate data policies and privacy measures to deal with the intensification of datafication and surveillance.

Global insecurities and US interests

This section examines the consequences of the global proliferation of Chinese surveillance tools. Precisely, it raises a series of questions for both the international community and local stakeholders, especially about transparency and accountability. For example, most African governments, including Kenya and Uganda, have limited transparency with respect to the acquisition of surveillance tools, despite provisions in their federal laws that demand state transparency.³⁸ More saliently, there is a need for more transparency around the use of Chinese loans and procurement of public security platforms, as well as technologies that have the potential to be repurposed deployed for surveillance purposes. The party-state’s willingness to support digital infrastructure projects that include public security platforms is problematic in the context of authoritarian states like Uganda or Zimbabwe, which have a history of utilizing cyber intrusion systems to undercut human rights and conduct unwarranted state surveillance.³⁹ The adoption of public security platforms enhances the state’s capabilities to conduct surveillance. Even in a relatively healthy democracy like South Africa or Kenya, skewing power toward the state can result in unwarranted surveillance practices that lead to the atrophy of rights, especially in the absence of robust institutional checks and balances.⁴⁰ It is this gap between the adoption of public security systems and regulatory frameworks that poses a critical risk to civil liberties. As such, transparency and accountability measures must extend to digital infrastructure development, which creates room for the misuse of public security products to advance surveillance and other modalities that incentivize democratic backsliding.

The global spread of Chinese surveillance tools could pose threats to privacy and cybersecurity. Several researchers and observers have warned about misuses and various cybersecurity vulnerabilities with Hikvision surveillance products.⁴¹ The incessant product vulnerabilities have led researchers to claim “backdoors” are intentionally designed to enable Chinese intelligence collection.⁴² This position is further bolstered by the fact that the party-state recently introduced several laws—the national intelligence law of 2017, the data security law of 2021, the national security law of 2015, and the cybersecurity law of 2016—that establish obligations for private firms to comply with state demands for data while also offering limited means to reject or appeal unwarranted requests from the Beijing government.⁴³ Vitally, however, this kind of argument still presumes a level of party-state intention and collaboration with firms. At this time, there is no empirical evidence from Kenya, South Africa, or Uganda that establishes coordination and collaboration between Chinese state authorities and Hikvision that results in intentional data theft. Similar allegations leveled against other companies, such as Huawei, cannot be emphatically proven. However, the absence of concrete evidence or attribution does not categorically dispel escalating concerns and vulnerabilities. In fact, it further demonstrates the need for ensuring supply chain security and integrity given the ever-present potential for furtive insertions like backdoors in software and hardware products.

US-China competition’s impact on Africa

This section details the United States should respond to the proliferation and adoption of Chinese surveillance tools. Currently, the growing adoption of Chinese surveillance tools in Africa and the United States’ ambition to mitigate this spread are encouraging the bifurcation of the world, staging Africa and the Global South generally as the theater for a dispute between China and the United States. This division between procurers and non-procurers does not support US interests or the health and inclusive posture of the international liberal order. Indeed, it further ignores the real political challenges and financial motivations behind nation-states’ procurement of Chinese tools. To stem the proliferation of these technologies and the real harm felt locally and globally, the United States must develop a more nuanced posture on the proliferation of Chinese surveillance and cyber-offensive systems, one that responds to the real political challenges and financial motivations behind nation-states’ procurement of Chinese tools.⁴⁴

American and international observers must pay greater attention to the contextual motivations for the growing demand for Chinese digital infrastructure and public security systems. Precisely, it is important to consider how local factors mediate and condition China’s geopolitical footprint. To curtail the spread and misuse of surveillance technologies, Washington and its European allies should focus not on the “supply” side but on the factors driving African demand for public security platforms.

The primary driver of procurement of surveillance technology in Kenya is contingent on their promise to close digital infrastructure gaps and address traditional challenges like crime and terror. This most prominent example of terrorism in the country is the 2013 al-Shabaab militant attack on an upscale shopping center in Nairobi, killing 67 people and injuring hundreds more. This argument suggests that the United States cannot afford to take a parochial approach and message to the risks posed by the adoption of Chinese technologies. The message shared with the world must speak to the challenges confronting African leaders and partners. Working with African authorities to build digital infrastructure, implement data protection measures, and address challenges like terrorism are ways to mitigate the negative consequences of the proliferation of public security systems. Indeed, a policy that meets African stakeholders where they are with regard to their development challenges is needed. This kind of message will inform a more nuanced approach and understanding, which will help the United States and its allies work within and against the challenges, priorities, and incentives that drive the adoption of Chinese public security systems.

An approach that centers on dissuading African countries from working with companies like Huawei, which are believed to pose cybersecurity threats, risks misunderstanding the objectives and priorities that drive the adoption of Huawei’s tools. For instance, the appeal of Huawei’s safe city project is its financial feasibility, its comprehensive offerings, and its promise to resolve traditional problems like crime. A message that stresses the risks involved is pivotal, but alone, this point runs counter to local priorities. To limit the proliferation of surveillance tools, US policy must better understand African demand and accordingly help address local priorities by offering attainable and safer alternatives to assist local initiatives, while emphasizing that these tools are not automatic remedy for domestic challenges but rather auxiliary instruments. In fact, their adoption can exacerbate challenges in a region with established concerns around crime, governance, corruption, and policing, particularly in the absence of robust checks and balances.

Initiatives like the smart city blur the distinction between service delivery initiatives and invasive surveillance practices. Accordingly, the adoption of these tools has implications for civil liberties, particularly in legal environments that lack robust regulatory frameworks.⁴⁵ This raises questions about the need for mechanisms that govern the distribution and use of these platforms. Chinese firms and actors have been swift in its attempts to establish norms for the application of these systems. As stated before, this effort is pursued through the development of several domestic laws, training programs involving recipient nations, diplomatic exchanges with African partners, and ventures to influence global standards around the regulation of these platforms.⁴⁶ Such endeavors include active participation and leadership in intergovernmental institutions like the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which is responsible for influencing the global standards and regulatory frameworks for the use of surveillance platforms. To counter the concerted push along this front from the Chinese government, the US government must actively promote standards, regulations, and norms that mirror its democratic values and interests domestically and in multilateral institutions like the ITU. Meanwhile, working alongside likeminded democracies can also help strengthen and promote human rights and democratic values.

The United States and its European partners can play a significant role in helping build local data protection and cybersecurity capacity in regulating the use of public security systems. Many countries on the continent, including Kenya, still lack a comprehensive legal and policy framework to address cybersecurity risks. For example, the Data Protection Act (2019) empowers regulators and requires mandatory registration by data processors, yet it remains unclear what authority the data protection commissioner has to enforce state privacy abuses emerging.⁴⁷ Likewise, there are no means to audit the algorithms that power facial recognition technology or to halt the harvesting of biometric data from the population without an adequate system of checks and balances. Kenya, like many countries in the continent, must work toward building a more conducive legal and policy environment to address growing cybersecurity threats.

In giving an intelligible account of China’s expanding geopolitical footprint, it is important to underscore party-state ambitions and activities in Africa while also illuminating how these aims are mediated by local state and substate actions. Digital surveillance tools on the continent are enlisted to address social challenges like crime, but also a way to index and catalyze digital development. Indeed, while African governments’ ambitions are laudable on the surface, without checks and balances, surveillance activities pose a threat to civil liberties, particularly in a region that struggles with challenges at the intersection of policing, governance, surveillance, race, and crime. Work must be done to advance legal measures to mitigate the negative consequences of intensified surveillance practices.

About the author

Bulelani Jili is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative. His research interests include ICT development, Africa-China relations, cybersecurity, post-colonial thought, and privacy law. He is also a Meta Research PhD fellow at Harvard University, visiting fellow at Yale Law School, cybersecurity fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, scholar-in-residence at the Electronic Privacy Information Center, visiting fellow at Hong Kong University Law, and research associate at Oxford University.

Acknowledgments

Without friends and colleagues’ support, it would have been an arduous task to bring this work to conclusion. It is their advice, research, and critical reflections that enable this work and its insights.

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1 Bulelani Jili, China’s Surveillance Ecosystem & The Global Spread of Its Tools, Atlantic Council, October 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/chinese-surveillance-ecosystem-and-the-global-spread-of-its-tools/.

2 See, for example: China’s Tech-Enhanced Authoritarianism, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Samantha Hoffman, nonresident fellow, Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s International Cyber Policy Centre); Steven Feldstein, The Global Expansion of AI Surveillance, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 17, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/09/17/global-expansion-of-ai-surveillance-pub-79847.

3 A privileging of the local, while illuminating, can also overlook the broader political and economic forces that shape the particular. However worthy it may be to pursue a strictly grounded study, inquiry risks misidentifying the global forces that—increasingly, with varying degrees of efficacy—are besetting the local.

4 Kevin Cai, ”Outward Foreign Direct Investment: A Novel Dimension of China’s Integration into the Regional and Global Economy,” The China Quarterly (1999), 856.

5 Nathaniel Ahrens, China’s Competitiveness Myth, Reality, and Lessons for the United States and Japan, Center for Strategic and International Studies February 2013, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/130215_competitiveness_Huawei_casestudy_Web.pdf.

6 Ministry of Commerce State Council Information Office, China’s Foreign Aid White Paper (中国的对外援助白皮书), last updated May 1, 2011, http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ywzn/dwyz/zcfg/201911/20191102911291.shtml.

7 Bulelani Jili, “Chinese ICT and Smart City Initiatives in Kenya,” Asia Policy (2022): 44, https://www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/asiapolicy17.3_africa-china_relations_rt_july2022.pdf.

8 Zainab Usman, What Do We Know About Chinese Lending in Africa?, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/02/what-do-we-know-about-chinese-lending-in-africa-pub-84648.

9 N.D. Francois, “Huawei’s Surveillance Tech in Kenya: A Safe Bet,” Africa Times,December 18, 2019, https://africatimes.com/2019/12/18/huaweis-surveillance-tech-in-kenya-a-safe-bet /.

10 Although Beijing does not impose any political conditions on investment, there are economic conditions to its loans. Accordingly, this strategy has permitted resource-rich and high-risk countries the means to secure funds. With the collapse of commodity prices, borrowers in Africa have managed all the risk of debt default. Debt in a way has emerged as the dominant tenure that structures Africa-China relations. Thus far, the party-state has not weaponized debt for geopolitical ends. Rather, it continues to refinance lending terms at lower rates and for longer payment durations. While this willingness to renegotiate does not resolve the problems of accumulating debt, it maintains China’s image as an agreeable development partner for Africa.

11 See, for example: Grace Githaiga and Victor Kapiyo, Kenya’s Cybersecurity Framework: Time to Up the Game! KICTANet, December 2019, https://www.kictanet.or.ke/mdocs-posts/cybersecurity-in-kenya-policy-brief-december-2019/; Karen Allen and Isel van Zyl, Who’s Watching Who? Biometric Surveillance in Kenya and South Africa, Enact,November 2020, https://enactafrica.org/research/research-papers/whos-watching-who-biometric-surveillance-in-kenya-and-south-africa; Tevin Mwenda and Victor Kapiyo, Personal Data and Elections 2022, KICTANet, February 2022, https://www.kictanet.or.ke/policy-brief-personal-data-and-elections-2022/.

12 African Development Bank Group, “Africa’s Infrastructure: Great Potential but Little Impact on Inclusive Growth,” Chapter 3 in African Economic Outlook 2018, January 24, 2018, https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents /Publications/2018AEO/African_Economic_Outlook_2018_-_EN_Chapter3.pdf. See the full report: https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/document/africaneconomic-outlook-aoe-2018-99877.

13 Halligan Agade, “China’s Telecommunications Footprint in Africa,” CGTN, September 2, 2021, https://africa.cgtn.com/2021/09/02/chinas-telecommunications-footprint-in-africa/; Amy Mackinnon, “For Africa, Chinese-Built Internet Is Better Than No Internet at All,” Foreign Policy, March 19, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/19/for-africa-chinese-built-internet-is-better-than-no-internet-at-all/.

14 See, for example: Huawei, Huawei Hosts Safe City Summit in Africa to Showcase Industry Best Practices [Press Release], October 17, 2016, https://www.huawei.com/en/news/2016/10/safe-city-summit-africa; “Safe City Summit in a Safe City,” Hi-Tech Security Solutions, February 2017, http://www.securitysa.com/56445n.

15 Bulelani Jili, The Rise of Chinese Surveillance Technology in Africa, Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), August 25, 2022, https://epic.org/the-rise-of-chinese-surveillance-technology-in-africa-part-4-of-6/; Feldstein, The Global Expansion of AI Surveillance; Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Dealing with the Demand for China’s Global Surveillance Exports, The Brookings Institution,April 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/research/dealing-with-demand-for-chinas-global-surveillance-exports/; Jonathan Hillman and Laura Rivas, Global Networks 2030, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2021, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/210329_Hillman_Global_Networks_2030.pdf?U9r90Zabm5MGoAuHQkVsmqH33SasTi70; Samantha Hoffman, “‘Mapping China’s Tech Giants: Covid-19, Supply Chains and Strategic Competition,’ The Strategist,June 8, 2021, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/china-tech-giants-map-update-3-launch-major-updates/.

16 Huawei, Rustenburg: World Platinum Capital Deploys Smart City ‘Gold Mine’ [Case Study] (2017), https://e.huawei.com/topic/leading-new-ict-ua/rustenburg-smartcity-case.html.

17 Bitange Ndemo and Tim Weiss, Digital Kenya: An Entrepreneurial Revolution in the Making (London: Springer Nature, 2017).

18 An one-one interview with the official was conducted with the author during a 11 month fieldwork study in Nairobi.

19 Iginio Gagliardone, China, Africa, and the Future of the Internet (London: Zed Books, 2019).

20 Muriuki Mureithi, Telecommunication Ecosystem Evolution in Kenya, 2009-2019: Setting the Pace and, Unbundling the Turbulent Journey to a Digital Economy in a 4IR Era, Institute of Economic Affairs, March 2021, https://ieakenya.or.ke/download/telecommunication-ecosystem-evolution-in-kenya-2009-2019-setting-the-pace-and-unbundling-the-turbulent-journey-to-a-digital-economy-in-a-4ir-era/.

21 Bulelani Jili, “Chinese ICT and Smart City Initiatives in Kenya.

22 Office of the Auditor General of Kenya, Performance Audit Report of the Auditor-General on Integrated Urban Surveillance System for Nairobi Metropolitan Area , February 2017, https://www.oagkenya .go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Integrated-Urban-Surveillance-System-for-Nairobi-Metropolitan.pdf.

23 Office of the Auditor General of Kenya, Performance Audit Report.

24 Office of the Auditor General of Kenya, Performance Audit Report.

25 Office of the Auditor General of Kenya, Performance Audit Report.

26 Office of the Auditor General of Kenya, Performance Audit Report.

27 Office of the Auditor General of Kenya, Performance Audit Report.

28 Huawei. “Huawei Hosts Safe City Summit in Africa to Showcase Industry Best Practices” October 17, 2016, https://www.huawei.com/us/news/2016/10/safe-city-summit-africa; Frank Hersey, “Digital ID in Africa this Week: Biometrics for Tea Workers, Financial Inclusion with a Thumbprint,” Biometric Update, August 23, 2019, https ://www.biometricupdate.com/201908/digital-id-in-africa-this-week-biometrics-for-tea-workers-financial-inclusion-with-a-thumbprint.

29 Bulelani Jili, The Spread of Chinese Surveillance Tools in Africa, Oxford University China, Law and Development Project,June 30, 2020, https://cld.web.ox.ac.uk/files/finaljilipdf.; Hi-tech security, “Safe city summit in a safe city,” Hi-tech security, February 2017, http://www.securitysa.com/56445n ; China’s Strategic Aims in Africa: Goals of China’s Africa Policy and Consequences of Beijing’s Influence, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 116^th Cong. (2020) (statement of Steve Feldstein, nonresident fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).

30 See, for example: Jili, The Spread of Chinese Surveillance Tool.

31 Tom Wilson and Madhumita Murgia, “Uganda Confirms Use of Huawei Facial Recognition Cameras,” Financial Times, August 20, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/e20580de-c35f-11e9-a8e9-296ca66511c9.

32 Elias Biryabarema, “Uganda’s Cash-Strapped Cops Spend $126 Million on CCTV from Huawei,” Reuters,August 15, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uganda-crime-idUSKCN1V50RF.

33 Huawei, Rustenburg: World Platinum Capital.

34 Opposing the Republic of South Africa’s hosting of military exercises with the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation, and calling on the Biden administration to conduct a thorough review of the United States-South Africa relationship, ‘H.R. Res.145, 118^th Cong. (2023).

35 Karen Hao and Heidi Swart, “South Africa’s Private Surveillance Machine is Fueling a Digital Apartheid,” MIT Technology Review, April 19, 2022, https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/04/19/1049996/south-africa-ai -surveillance-digital-apartheid/.

36 National Police Service of the Republic of Kenya, Annual Crime Report 2018, September 12, 2019, http://www.nationalpolice.go.ke/crime-statistics.html.

37 N.D. Francois, “Huawei’s Surveillance Tech in Kenya: A Safe Bet,” African Times, December 18, 2019, https ://africatimes.com/2019/12/18/huaweis-surveillance-tech-in-kenya-a-safe-bet/.

38 Christopher Musodza, Kuda Hove, and Otto Saki, Digital Influence in Africa, Friedrich Naumann Foundation, November 2022, https://shop.freiheit.org/download/P2@1351/661343/China’s%20digital%20influence%20in%20Africa_Friedrich%20Naumann%20Foundation.pdf; “Mapping and Analysis of Privacy Laws in Africa,” Collaboration on International ICT Policy in East and Southern Africa (CIPESA), November 2021, https://cipesa.org/?wpfb_dl=479.

39 Allen Munoriyarwa , and Sarah H. Chiumbu, “Big Brother is Watching: Surveillance Regulation and its Effects on Journalistic Practices in Zimbabwe,” African Journalism Studies (2019), 26-41.

40 Bulelani Jili, “The Spread of Chinese Surveillance Tools in Africa: A Focus on Ethiopia and Kenya.’” in Africa–Europe Cooperation and Digital Transformation, ed. Chux Daniels, Benedikt Erforth and Chloe Teevan. (London: Routledge, 2022), 32-49.

41 John Honovich, “Hikvision has ‘Highest Level of Critical Vulnerability,’ Impacting 100+ Million Devices,’ IPVM,September 20, 2021, https://ipvm.com/reports/hikvision-36260#:~:text=Hikvision%20has%20admitted%20a%209.8,it%20impacts%20100%2B%20million%20devices; Valentin Weber and Vasilis Ververis, “China’s Surveillance State: A Global Project,” Top10VPN, August 2021, https://www.top10vpn.com/assets/2021/07/Chinas-Surveillance-State.pdf; Wilson and Murgia, “Uganda Confirms Use of Huawei Facial Recognition Cameras”.

42 Heidi Swart, “Joburg’s New Hi-Tech Surveillance Cameras: A Threat to Minorities that Could See the Law Targeting Thousands of Innocents,” Daily Maverick, September 28, 2018, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-09-28-joburgs-new-hi-tech-surveillance-cameras-a-threat-to-minorities-that-could-see-the-law-targeting-thousands-of-innocents/.

43 “National Intelligence Law of the People’s Republic of China.” (“中华人民共和国国家情报法”), The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, June 12, 2017, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/201806/483221713dac4f31bda7f9d951108912.shtml; “Data Security Law of the People’s Republic of China.” (“中华人民共和国数据安全法”), The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, June 10, 2021, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/202106/7c9af12f51334a73b56d7938f99a788a.shtml; “National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China.” (“中华人民共和国国家安全法”), The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, July 7, 2015, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c10134/201507/5232f27b80084e1e869500b57ecc35d6.shtml; “Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China” (“中华人民共和国网络安全法”), November 7, 2016, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/201611/270b43e8b35e4f7ea98502b6f0e26f8a.shtml.

44 Greitens, Dealing with the Demand.

45 Bulelani Jili, ‘Africa: Regulate Surveillance Technologies and Personal Data,’ Nature (2022), 445–448.

46 Emma Rafaelof, Rogier Creemers, Samm Sacks, Katharin Tai, Graham Webster, and Kevin Neville, China’s ‘Data Security Law, New America, July 2, 2020, https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/translation-chinas-data-security-law-draft/; Li Wanyi, “Delegation of South African Parliament Police Committee Visits Shanghai (南非议会警察委员会代表团访问上海),” Jiefang Daily, October 4, 2107, http://shzw.eastday.com/shzw/G/20171014/u1a13342865.html; Li Zhengwei, “The China-Africa Internet Development and Cooperation Forum Held (中非互联网发展与合作论坛举办),” Guangming, August 24, 2021, https://m.gmw.cn/baijia/2021-08/24/35106965.html; Ministry of National Defense People’s Republic of China, Wei Fenghe Meets with Representatives of the First China-Africa Defense and Security Forum (魏凤和会见首届中非防务安全论坛代表) [Press release], July 10, 2018, http://www.mod.gov.cn/topnews/2018-07/10/content_4818896.htm.

47 Office of the Data Protection Commissioner of Kenya, Data Protection Act, 2019, https://www.odpc.go.ke/dpa-act/.

The post What is driving the adoption of Chinese surveillance technology in Africa? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

To secure the Black Sea, the West must help Moldova stand up to Russian aggression

Arnold C. Dupuy — Fri, 05 May 2023 17:58:12 +0000

In recent months, Moldova has withstood Russia’s relentless attempts to draw Chisinau into the Kremlin’s political orbit. But it needs the support of its allies in the West to send a clear, unmistakable message to Moscow that it will not fall into the Kremlin’s grasp.

Moscow has led its coercion campaign ever since pro-European Union (EU) candidate Maia Sandu won the presidential election in a landslide in November 2020—much to the Kremlin’s displeasure. Then, Sandu’s Party of Action and Solidarity won the 2021 parliamentary elections, paving the way for Sandu to officially apply to join the EU. A sustained effort by the Kremlin to undermine the Moldovan government’s credibility followed, and with the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, this intimidation campaign moved into high gear, notably through airspace violations, energy-supply manipulation, and official comments about Moldova being “the next Ukraine.” In the most recent example of this campaign, Russian armored forces conducted unannounced military maneuvers in the pro-Russian breakaway region of Transnistria last week.

On February 10 this year, Moldovan Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilita resigned following months of protests over inflation and high energy prices, resulting from Moscow’s decision to limit gas exports to Moldova, which is almost completely dependent on Russian energy. Then on February 21, Russian President Vladimir Putin abrogated a 2012 decree that acknowledged Moldovan sovereignty in resolving questions over the future of Transnistria. That cancelation, viewed in Moldova as a hostile act, de facto signaled Putin’s willingness to use force to achieve his aims, as Russian troops in the region lost their status as “peacekeepers” and instead became more like occupation forces. It also shows the lengths to which the Kremlin will go to open a new front in its invasion of Ukraine and to advance its interests in the Black Sea.

Moldova’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is roughly $5,200 a year (one of the lowest in Europe), and its inflation rate peaked at 34 percent after Russia invaded Ukraine and reduced fuel supplies. Yet many Moldovans blame their own government, not the Kremlin, an indication of Russia’s disinformation efforts that inflame the already tense domestic political divide.

While it is landlocked, Moldovan territory includes the Prut, the Dniester, and the Danube rivers, which empty into the Black Sea. Moreover, because it borders Ukraine and is only fifty kilometers from Odesa (Ukraine’s largest seaport), instability in Moldova—especially in Transnistria, which is effectively controlled by Moscow—could directly impact its neighbor’s security. A Russian-dominated Moldova could effectively become a southern Kaliningrad, and in conjunction with Crimea, it could provide Moscow with more control over the northern Black Sea and also possibly the ability to hamper Ukraine’s maritime activities. And, should Russia gain access to more Moldovan territory and flip Chisinau in its favor, Moscow’s expanded presence would also threaten Romania’s security and put even greater pressure on NATO’s southeastern flank.

Moldova has maintained its neutrality, which it had enshrined in its constitution. Despite this sentiment, Moldova is a member of the Partnership for Peace, which allows cooperation with NATO on a variety of activities. Yet Moldova has starved its security sector for decades, hoping its neutrality and Ukraine would protect it. Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year, Chisinau has sought to reverse this neglect of its military; for example, it expanded its 2024 defense budget by 68 percent compared to its budget in 2022—but that’s still only an increase of approximately eighty million dollars, or 0.55 percent of its GDP.

On paper, Moldova can field a security contingent of 45,000 personnel; however, this force is poorly trained and equipped with virtually no air support. In Transnistria, Russia has 1,500 troops, mainly comprising local recruits. While Moscow might seek to augment these forces, that would be logistically difficult given its failure to take Odesa. Moscow does, however, have significant agents of influence in Moldova who could work more forcefully against the government.

Keeping Moldova out of the Kremlin’s grasp is vital to Eastern European security and NATO’s Black Sea mission. Moldova, NATO, and the West must send clear, unmistakable signals to the Kremlin:

The EU should approve the fast-tracking of Moldova’s EU accession, a plan for which Poland recently made the case.
While it would be problematic to offer Moldova a fast track to NATO membership—as the Alliance is viewed unfavorably in Moldova, and leaving the policy of neutrality is unpopular there—NATO or its members can take other actions. For example, the promise of air defense and heavy weapons and training in the case of conflict with Russia/Transnistria would be a deterrent.
Moldova and the West should provide Moldova’s armed forces with more training and modern equipment, ultimately to improve capabilities and interoperability. Ukraine demonstrated how a Western-oriented training program can give a smaller country’s military an edge over Russia’s armed forces. This could be accomplished without violating Moldova’s neutrality as it would not require deploying foreign forces on Moldovan territory.
Moldova should institute a robust strategic-communications and cyber-defense platform to counter Russian malign influence—and the West should help. A platform designed to counter misinformation and disinformation could help galvanize domestic support for greater alignment with NATO and the West.
Finally, Moldova is one of the world’s least energy-self-sufficient countries. While Chisinau, with the West’s support, has made progress in source diversification and sector reform, it should continue to wean itself off of Russian oil and gas and electricity from Transnistria. Moldova must build a more resilient energy infrastructure that is not dependent on Russia.

Through its energy manipulation, military intimidation, and official threats, the Kremlin is conducting a classic hybrid warfare campaign against Moldova. In comparison to early 2014—when the world stood stunned in the wake of ‘little green men’ and the effective dismemberment of Ukraine—NATO and Western allies have become more sophisticated in detecting and combating hybrid warfare tactics. Additionally, NATO members’ support to Ukraine, while belated and arguably still inadequate, has been instrumental in Kyiv’s successful defense against Russia’s full-scale invasion. The lessons in Ukraine are unmistakable and should not be lost on Western and Moldovan leadership. Strong leadership, a determined population, and NATO support are indispensable in halting Russian aggression.

Arnold C. Dupuy is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, a faculty member of the US Naval Postgraduate School, and chair of the NATO Science and Technology Organization’s SAS-183, “Energy Security Capabilities, Resilience and Interoperability.”

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Russia’s Wagner Group is a feature not a bug of the Putin regime

Allen Maggard — Tue, 04 Apr 2023 19:57:07 +0000

Of the various parties embroiled in Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine, few have attracted as much international attention as the paramilitary Wagner Group. Indeed, a veritable cottage industry has emerged dedicated to monitoring the Wagner network’s alleged involvement as unofficial agents of Russian foreign policy everywhere from Estonia to Sub-Saharan Africa.

The general consensus is that private military companies (PMCs) like Wagner Group must be countered because they advance Kremlin interests and help the Putin regime to project Russian power internationally. But a closer look suggests the Wagner Group and other Russian mercenary organizations may ultimately be liabilities and not assets for Putin.

For Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin, 2023 already looks to be a tumultuous year. He has accused senior Russian military leaders of “treason” for allegedly holding up logistical and material support to Wagner mercenaries battling for control of Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine, and recently complained of being cut off altogether from the Kremlin.

Some commentators believe Prigozhin’s frequent jabs at members of the Russian elite could presage a contest for political power that may reach the heights of the Kremlin towers. Indeed, Prigozhin now says that he plans to remold Wagner into “an army with an ideology,” suggesting that he seeks to officially re-brand himself as an out-and-out political operator.

For all the speculation regarding the potential threat Prigozhin poses to the stability of the Putin regime, few have explored the Wagner leader’s relationship to the power structures that Putin himself depends upon for the perpetuation of his rule. In reality, the Wagner Group is as much a product of this system as it is a tool of Kremlin foreign and military policy. Western policymakers seeking to understand the role of Russian private paramilitaries should treat them as a symptom of the institutionalized corruption at the heart of Putin’s regime and not as just another instrument in Russia’s hybrid warfare toolbox.

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Prigozhin has managed to carve a niche for himself by leveraging opaque corporate networks to facilitate Russian hard and soft power projection in Ukraine, Syria, and various conflict zones across Africa. This appears to be profitable work; his companies have reportedly raked in hundreds of millions of dollars from mineral extraction alone. White House officials have even claimed in recent months that Prigozhin directed Wagner fighters to capture the Ukrainian town of Soledar in order to secure access to nearby salt and gypsum mines. The notion that Prigozhin personally benefits from enabling the Kremlin’s foreign policy adventures appears to be a feature rather than a bug of Putin’s particular approach to governance.

Political scientists generally characterize Putin’s rule as a corrupt patron-client system in which elites are compensated for their allegiance with access to resources. Vladimir Gel’man of the University of Helsinki contends that Putin accepts bad governance by trusted elites to cultivate a loyal, informal power base separate from those formal institutions which might challenge his authority. Russia analyst Mark Galeotti likens this arrangement to a public-private “adhocracy” in which informal networks of enterprising business and political elites, rather than formal institutions, end up taking the initiative in divining and executing official policy.

The Wagner phenomenon reflects a political ecosystem that rewards the stewards of government policy with official as well as illicit perks in exchange for loyalty. Wagner benefits Putin by providing deniable cover for a wide range of military operations outside of Russia. In exchange, Prigozhin is allowed to pursue commercial ventures in the countries where his forces are active.

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Prigozhin’s trajectory is an indication that the Russian state’s claim to a monopoly on violence may be the next frontier to be challenged by Kremlin elites. The Wagner Group’s example appears to have encouraged everyone from Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov to Russian natural gas giant Gazprom to organize PMCs of their own, a trend that some analysts argue could portend a “descent into warlordism.” Recent reports of a company owned by longtime Putin associate Gennadiy Timchenko hiring another PMC outfit not affiliated with Wagner to secure oil and gas infrastructure in Syria further suggest that Prigozhin is not the only person vying to supply PMC services to regime insiders.

International efforts to counter the Wagner network will require many of the same mechanisms used to combat corruption more generally. This will require governments to reflect on how their own institutions play into the interests of figures like Prigozhin, who has pursued journalists through the British courts despite being the subject of UK sanctions. Critics claim transnational imbalances in financial transparency that allow offshore jurisdictions to provide a veil of corporate secrecy to American and European nationals also help to obscure the Wagner network’s operations.

Efforts by the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control to target Wagner-linked shell companies registered in tax havens are a step in the right direction. But Western governments should also aim to hold accountable those individuals responsible for managing the network of corporate entities behind Wagner’s more mundane business operations.

One may reasonably question why Ukraine and its allies should go after Russian PMCs at all if their continued presence has the potential to undo Putin. Why not let them multiply and further weaken the foundations of the Putin regime? While potentially tempting, such an approach would involve considerable risks. If and when Putin leaves office, this is likely to create a power vacuum in which Russia’s nascent PMC class would flourish. Such an outcome could return Russia to a state of lawlessness reminiscent of the “wild nineties,” a period characterized by a proliferation of organized crime groups whose mercenary enforcers were often veterans of military campaigns in Afghanistan and Chechnya.

Putin often invokes the chaos of the 1990s to justify his authoritarian rule. Tolerating the presence of PMCs like the Wagner Group in the hope that they could unseat Putin risks reducing Russia to new depths of disorder and thereby facilitating the rise of aspiring autocrats in the years to come. Combating Russia’s private paramilitaries is essential not just in order to contain Putin, but to preempt the empowerment of future Russian leaders molded in his likeness.

Allen Maggard is a Russia analyst and specialist in the intersection of Russian political economy and the defense industry at C4ADS.

TikTok’s connections to China’s government stem from it being a wholly owned subsidiary of the Beijing-based company ByteDance. Chew testified that “ByteDance is not owned or controlled by the Chinese government.” However, Article VII of China’s National Intelligence Law of 2017 makes clear the mandated responsibility for private sector companies (and any Chinese organization) to “support, assist, and cooperate” with China’s intelligence community. ByteDance, therefore, has an absolute obligation to turn over to China’s intelligence apparatus any data it requests.

There are significant reasons to be skeptical of Chew’s claims that “Project Texas”—TikTok’s effort to wall off US user data from Chinese authorities by solely storing it in the United States—will prevent China from having access to US user data in the future. Worse, even if one takes Chew at his word that “Project Texas” will accomplish this feat, it defies logic to believe that ByteDance would not—independently or compelled by China’s intelligence agencies—retain a copy of all 150 million current US users’ data.

At the same time, TikTok is just a symptom of a much bigger problem. The United States and its allies have a more fundamental issue when it comes to their citizens using China-based apps, programs, or any technology that collects their data. All China-based companies have the same obligations to provide data information to China’s intelligence services whenever requested.

What the US government can do

TikTok’s ban would mitigate the immediate threat posed by the ByteDance subsidiary, but there’s far more work that needs to be done. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) has, up until now, been the most prominent tool used to prevent foreign governments, or individuals associated with them, from making investments in the United States that could be used to ultimately undermine US national security. CFIUS has a specific and meaningful role focused on investments, but nowadays it has too often become the default instrument for reconciling an increasingly broad swath of national security challenges. This is in part because it has a track record of success, but also because it’s one of the only meaningful tools available to policymakers. But it is not an ideal tool for every situation, something best demonstrated by CFIUS’s challenge in resolving TikTok’s ongoing review that has stretched on for more than two years now.

The bipartisan RESTRICT Act—which would give the Department of Commerce the right to review foreign technologies and ban them in the United States or force their sale—is a thoughtful place from which to begin discussions about additional ways to mitigate the US national security challenges related to information and communications platforms available for mass use. But that act alone would not solve the broader data challenges as they exist today.

The lack of federal regulation related to commercial data brokers, which today can and do legally collect and resell the data of millions of Americans, is a glaring gap that needs to be filled immediately. A ban on TikTok, for example, would do nothing to prevent data brokers from aggregating the same consumer data from other apps and re-selling it to commercial entities, including those in China.

The threat posed by China to US national security, and to Americans’ individual data, is acute. The good news is the United States can deal with these challenges, but it will take more than just banning TikTok.

Jonathan Panikoff is a senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and the former director of the Investment Security Group, overseeing the intelligence community’s CFIUS efforts, at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

The views expressed in this publication are the author’s and do not imply endorsement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the intelligence community, or any other US government agency.

The post Banning TikTok alone will not solve the problem of US data security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A parallel terrain: Public-private defense of the Ukrainian information environment

Emma Schroeder with Sean Dack — Mon, 27 Feb 2023 05:01:00 +0000

Executive summary

In the year since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the conventional assault and advances into Ukrainian territory have been paralleled by a simultaneous invasion of the Ukrainian information environment. This environment, composed of cyber infrastructure, both digital and physical, and the data, networks, and ideas that flow through and across it, is more than a domain through which the combatants engage or a set of tools by which combatants interact—it is a parallel territory that Russia is intent on severing from the global environment and claiming for itself.

Russian assaults on the Ukrainian information environment are conducted against, and through, largely privately owned infrastructure, and Ukrainian defense in this space is likewise bound up in cooperative efforts with those infrastructure owners and other technology companies providing aid and assistance. The role of private companies in this conflict seems likely to grow, along with the scale, complexity, and criticality of the information infrastructure they operate.

Examining and mitigating the risks related to the involvement of private technology companies in the war in Ukraine is crucial and looking forward, the United States government must also examine the same questions with regard to its own security and defense:

What is the complete incentive structure behind a company’s decision to provide products or services to a state at war?
How dependent are states on the privately held portions of the information environment, including infrastructure, tools, knowledge, data, skills, and more, for their own national security and defense?
How can the public and private sectors work together better as partners to understand and prepare these areas of reliance during peace and across the continuum of conflict in a sustained, rather than ad hoc, nature?

Russia’s war against Ukraine is not over and similar aggressions are likely to occur in new contexts and with new actors in the future. By learning these lessons now and strengthening the government’s ability to work cooperatively with the private sector in and through the information space, the United States will be more effective and resilient against future threats.

Introduction

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 held none of the illusory cover of its 2014 operation; instead of “little green men” unclaimed by Moscow, Putin built up his forces on Ukraine’s border for the entire international community to see. His ambitions were clear: To remove and replace the elected government of Ukraine with a figurehead who would pull the country back under Russia’s hold, whether through literal absorption of the state or by subsuming the entire Ukrainian population under Russia’s political and information control. In the year since the Russian invasion, Ukraine’s defense has held back the Russian war machine with far greater strength than many thought possible in the early months of 2022. President Zelenskyy, the Ukrainian government, and the Ukrainian people have repeatedly repelled Russian attempts to topple the state, buttressed in part by the outpouring of assistance from not just allied states, but also local and transnational private sector companies.

Amidst the largest conventional land war in Europe since the fall of the Third Reich, both Russia and Ukraine have directed considerable effort toward the conflict’s information environment, defined as the physical and digital infrastructure over and through which information moves, the tools used to interact with that information, and information itself. This is not only a domain through which combatants engage, but a parallel territory that the Kremlin seeks to contest and claim. Russian efforts in this realm, to destroy or replace Ukraine’s underpinning infrastructure and inhibit the accessibility and reach of infrastructure and tools within the environment, are countered by a Ukrainian defense that prioritizes openness and accessibility.

The information environment, and all the components therein, is not a state or military dominated environment; it is largely owned, operated, and populated by private organizations and individuals around the globe. The Ukrainian information environment, referring to Ukrainian infrastructure operators, service providers, and users, is linked to and part of a global environment of state and non-state actors where the infrastructure and the terrain is largely private. Russian operations within the Ukrainian information environment are conducted against, and through, this privately owned infrastructure, and the Ukrainian defense is likewise bound up in cooperative efforts with those infrastructure owners and other technology companies that are providing aid and assistance. These efforts have contributed materially, and in some cases uniquely, to Ukraine’s defense.

The centrality of this environment to the conduct of this war, raises important questions about the degree to which states and societies are dependent on information infrastructure and functionalities owned and operated by private actors, and especially transnational private actors. Although private sector involvement in the war in Ukraine has generally been positive, the fact that the conduct of war and other responsibilities in the realm of statehood are reliant on private actors leads to new challenges for these companies, for the Ukrainian government, and for the United States and allies.

The United States government must improve its understanding of, and facility for, joint public-private action to contest over and through the information environment. The recommendations in this report are intended to facilitate the ability of US technology companies to send necessary aid to Ukraine, ensure that the US government has a complete picture of US private-sector involvement in the war in Ukraine, and contribute more effectively to the resilience of the Ukrainian information environment. First, the US government should issue a directive providing assurance and clarification as to the legality of private sector cyber, information, capacity building, and technical aid to Ukraine. Second, a task force pulling from agencies and offices across government should coordinate to track past, current, and future aid from the private sector in these areas to create a better map of US collaboration with Ukraine across the public and private sectors. Third, the US government should increase its facilitation of private technology aid by providing logistical and financial support.

These recommendations, focused on Ukraine’s defense, are borne of and provoke larger questions that will only become more important to tackle. The information environment and attempts to control it have long been a facet of conflict, but the centrality of privately owned and operated technology—and the primacy of some private sector security capabilities in relation to all but a handful of states—pose increasingly novel challenges to the United States and allied policymaking communities. Especially in future conflicts, the risks associated with private sector action in defense of, or directly against, a combatant could be significantly greater and multifaceted, rendering existing cooperative models insufficient.

The Russian information offensive

The Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs defines information space—of which cyberspace is a part—as “the sphere of activity connected with the formation, creation, conversion, transfer, use, and storage of information and which has an effect on individual and social consciousness, the information infrastructure, and information itself.¹ Isolating the Ukrainian information space is key to both the short- and long-term plans of the Russian government. In the short term, the Kremlin pursues efforts to control both the flow and content of communications across the occupied areas.² In the longer term, occupation of the information environment represents an integral step in Russian plans to occupy and claim control over the Ukrainian population.

In distinct opposition to the global nature of the information environment, over the past decade or so, the Kremlin has produced successive legislation “to impose ‘sovereignty’ over the infrastructure, content, and data traversing Russia’s ‘information space,’” creating a sectioned-off portion of the internet now known as RuNet.³ Within this space, the Russian government has greater control over what information Russian citizens see and a greater ability to monitor what Russian citizens do online.⁴ This exclusionary interpretation is an exercise in regime security against what the Kremlin perceives as constant Western information warfare against it.⁵ As Gavin Wilde, senior fellow with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes, the Russian government views the information environment “as an ecosystem to be decisively dominated.”⁶

To the Kremlin, domination of the information environment in Ukraine is an essential step toward pulling the nation into its fold and under its control. Just as Putin views information domination as critical to his regime’s exercise of power within Russia, in Ukraine, Russian forces systematically conduct offensives against the Ukrainian information environment in an attempt to create a similar model of influence and control that would further enable physical domination. This strategy is evident across the Kremlin’s efforts to weaken the Ukrainian state for the last decade at least. In the 2014 and 2022 invasions, occupied, annexed, and newly “independent” regions of Ukraine were variously cut off from the wider information space and pulled into the restricted Russian information space.

The Crimean precedent – 2014

The Russian invasion of Ukraine did not begin in 2022, but in 2014. Examining this earlier Russian incursion illustrates the pattern of Russian offensive behavior in and through the information environment going back nearly a decade—a combination of physical, cyber, financial, and informational maneuvers that largely target or move through private information infrastructure. In 2014, although obfuscated behind a carefully constructed veil of legitimacy, Russian forces specifically targeted Ukrainian information infrastructure to separate the Crimean population from the Ukrainian information environment, and thereby the global information environment, and filled that vacuum with Russian infrastructure and information.

The Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014 was a direct response to the year-long Euromaidan Revolution, which took place across Ukraine in protest of then-President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to spurn closer relations with the European Union and ignore growing calls to counter Russian influence and corruption within the Ukrainian government. These protests were organized, mobilized, and sustained partially through coordination, information exchange, and message amplification over social media sites like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Ustream—as well as traditional media.⁷ In February 2014, after Yanukovych fled to Russia, the Ukrainian parliament established a new acting government and announced that elections for a new president would be held in May. Tensions immediately heightened, as Russian forces began operating in Crimea with the approval of Federal Assembly of Russia at the request of “President” Yanukovych, although Putin denied that they were anything other than “local self-defense forces.”⁸ On March 21, Putin signed the annexation of Crimea.⁹

During the February 2014 invasion of Crimea, the seizure and co-option of Ukrainian physical information infrastructure was a priority. Reportedly, among the first targets of Russian special forces was the Simferopol Internet Exchange Point (IXP), a network facility that enables internet traffic exchange.¹⁰ Ukraine’s state-owned telecommunications company Ukrtelecom reported that armed men seized its offices in Crimea and tampered with fiber-optic internet and telephone cables.¹¹ Following the raid, the company lost the “technical capacity to provide connection between the peninsula and the rest of Ukraine and probably across the peninsula, too.”¹² Around the same time, the head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), Valentyn Nalivaichenko, reported that the mobile phones of Ukrainian parliament members, including his own, were blocked from connecting through Ukrtelecom networks in Crimea.¹³

Over the next three years, and through the “progressive centralization of routing paths and monopolization of Internet Service market in Crimea … the topology of Crimean networks has evolved to a singular state where paths bound to the peninsula converge to two ISPs (Rosetelecom and Fiord),” owned and operated by Russia.¹⁴ Russian forces manipulated the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)—the system that helps connects user traffic flowing from ISPs to the wider internet—modifying routes to force Crimean internet traffic through Russian systems, “drawing a kind of ‘digital frontline’ consistent with the military one.”¹⁵ Residents of Crimea found their choices increasingly limited, until their internet service could only route through Russia, instead of Ukraine, subject to the same level of censorship and internet controls as in Russia. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) monitored communications from residents of Crimea, both within the peninsula and with people in Ukraine and beyond.¹⁶ Collaboration between ISPs operating in Crimea through Russian servers and the FSB appears to be a crucial piece of this wider monitoring effort. This claim was partially confirmed by a 2018 Russian decree that forbade internet providers from publicly sharing any information regarding their cooperation with “the authorized state bodies carrying out search and investigative activities to ensure the security of the Russian Federation.”¹⁷

From March to June 2014, Russian state-owned telecom company Rostelcom began and completed construction of the Kerch Strait cable, measuring 46 kilometers (about 28.5 miles) and costing somewhere between $11 and $25 million, to connect the Crimean internet with the Russian RuNet.¹⁸ Rostelcom, using a local agent in Crimea called Miranda Media, became the main transit network for several Crimean internet service providers (ISPs), including KCT, ACS-Group, CrimeaCom, and CRELCOM in a short period of time.¹⁹ There was a slower transition of customers from the Ukrainian company Datagroup to Russian ISPs, but nonetheless, the number of Datagroup customers in Crimea greatly decreased throughout 2014. According to one ISP interviewed by Romain Fontugne, Ksenia Ermoshina, and Emile Aben, “the Kerch Strait cable was used first of all for voice communication … The traffic capacity of this cable was rather weak for commercial communications.”²⁰ But by the end of 2017, remnant usage of Ukrainian ISPs had virtually disappeared, following the completion of a second, better internet cable through the Kerch Strait and a series of restrictions placed on Russian social media platforms, news outlets, and a major search engine by Ukrainian President Poroshenko.²¹The combination of the new restrictions, and the improved service of Russian ISPs encouraged more Crimeans to move away from Ukrainian ISPs.

Russia’s efforts to control the information environment within Crimea, and the Russian government’s ability to monitor communications and restrict access to non-Russian approved servers, severely curtailed freedom of expression and belief—earning the region zero out of four in this category from Freedom House.²² Through physical, and formerly private, information infrastructure, Russia was able to largely take control of the information environment within Crimea.

A parallel occupation – 2022

Digital information infrastructure

Just as in 2014, one of the first priorities of invading Russian forces in 2022 was the assault of key Ukrainian information infrastructure, including digital infrastructure. Before, during, and following the invasion, Russian and Russian-aligned forces targeted Ukrainian digital infrastructure through cyber operations, ranging in type, target, and sophistication. Through some combination of Ukrainian preparedness, partner intervention, and Russian planning shortfalls, among other factors, large-scale cyber operations disrupting Ukrainian critical infrastructure, such as those seen previously in 2015 with BlackEnergy and NotPetya, did not materialize.²³ This could be because such cyber operations require significant time and resources, and similar ends can be more cheaply achieved through direct, physical means. Russian cyber operators, however, have not been idle.

Preceding the physical invasion, there was a spate of activity attributed to both Russian and Russian-aligned organizations targeting a combination of state and private organizations.²⁴ From January 13 to 14, for example, hackers briefly took control of seventy Ukrainian government websites, including the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, adding threatening messages to the top of these official sites.²⁵ The following day, January 15, Microsoft’s Threat Intelligence Center reported the discovery of wiper malware, disguised as ransomware, in dozens of Ukrainian government systems, including agencies which “provide critical executive branch or emergency response function,” and an information technology firm that services those agencies.²⁶ A month later, on February 15, Russian hackers targeted several websites with distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, forcing Ukrainian defense ministry and armed forces websites, as well as those of PrivatBank and Oschadbank, offline.²⁷ Around the same time, according to Microsoft’s special report on Ukraine, “likely” Russian actors were discovered in the networks of unidentified critical infrastructure in Odessa and Sumy.²⁸ The day before the invasion, cybersecurity companies ESET and Symantec reported that a new destructive wiper was spreading across Ukrainian, Latvian, and Lithuanian networks, as a second round of DDoS attacks again took down a spate of government and financial institution websites.“²⁹ This activity centered around information—with defacements sending a clear threat to the Ukrainian government and population, DDoS attacks impairing accurate communication, and wiper malware degrading Ukrainian data—and gaining access to Ukrainian data for Russia. Although many of these operations targeted Ukrainian government networks, the attacks moved through or against privately operated infrastructure and, notably, the first public notification and detailing of several of these operations was undertaken by transnational technology companies.

After February 24, Russian cyber activity continued and the targets included a number of private information infrastructure operators. A March hack of Ukrtelecom—Ukraine’s largest landline operator, which also provides internet and mobile services to civilians and the Ukrainian government and military—resulted in a collapse of the company’s network to just 13 percent capacity, the most severe disruption in service the firm recorded since the invasion began.³⁰ Another such operation targeted Triolan—a Ukrainian telecommunications provider—on February 24 in tandem with the physical offensive and a second time on March 9. These incursions on the Triolan network took down key nodes and caused widespread service outages. Following the March 9 attack, the company was able to restore service, but these efforts were complicated by the need to physically access some of the equipment located in active conflict zones.³¹ These attacks against Ukraine-based information infrastructure companies caused service outages that were concurrent with the physical invasion and afterwards, restricted communications among Ukrainians and impeded the population’s ability to respond to current and truthful information.

This unacceptable cyberattack is yet another example of Russia’s continued pattern of irresponsible behaviour in cyberspace, which also formed an integral part of its illegal and unjustified invasion of Ukraine.¹

Council of the European Union

These types of operations, however, were not restricted to Ukraine-based information infrastructure. A significant opening salvo in Russia’s invasion was a cyber operation directed against ViaSat, a private American-based satellite internet company that provides services to users throughout the world, including the Ukrainian military.³² Instead of targeting the satellites in orbit, Russia targeted the modems in ViaSat’s KA-SAT satellite broadband network that connected users with the internet.³³ Specifically, Russia exploited a “misconfiguration in a VPN [virtual private network] appliance to gain remote access to the trusted management segment of the KA-SAT network.”³⁴ From there, the attackers were able to move laterally though the network to the segment used to manage and operate the broader system.³⁵ They then “overwrote key data in flash memory on the modems,” making it impossible for the modems to access the broader network.³⁶ Overall, the effects of the hack were short-lived, with ViaSat reporting the restoration of connectivity within a few days after shipping approximately 30,000 new modems to affected customers.³⁷

SentinelOne, a cybersecurity firm, identified the malware used to wipe the modems and routers of the information they needed to operate.³⁸ The firm assessed “with medium-confidence“ that AcidRain, the malware used in the attack, had ”developmental similarities” with an older malware, VPNFilter, that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the US Department of Justice have previously linked to the Russian government.³⁹ The United States, United Kingdom, and European Union all subsequently attributed the ViaSat hack to Russian-state backed actors.⁴⁰

The effectiveness of the operation is debated, although the logic of the attack is straightforward. Russia wanted to constrain, or preferably eliminate, an important channel of communication for the Ukrainian military during the initial stages of the invasion. Traditional, land-based radios, which the Ukrainian military relies on for most of their communications, only work over a limited geographic range, therefore making it more difficult to use advanced, long-range weapons systems.⁴¹ It should be expected that landline and conventional telephony would suffer outages during the opening phases of the war and struggle to keep up with rapidly moving forces.

Initially, it was widely reported that the Russian strike on ViaSat was effective. On March 15, a senior Ukrainian cybersecurity official, Viktor Zhora, was quoted saying that the attack on ViaSat caused “a really huge loss in communications in the very beginning of the war.⁴² When asked follow-up questions about his quote, Zhora said at the time that he was unable to elaborate, leading journalists and industry experts to believe that the attack had impacted the Ukrainian military’s ability to communicate.⁴³ However, several months later, on September 26, Zhora revised his initial comments, stating that the hack would have impacted military communications if satellite communications had been the Ukrainian military’s principal medium of communication. However, Zhora stated that the Ukrainian military instead relies on landlines for communication, with satellites as a back-up method. He went on to say that “in the case land lines were destroyed, that could be a serious issue in the first hours of war.”⁴⁴ The tension, and potential contradictions, in Zhora’s comments underlines the inherent complications in analyzing cyber operations during war: long-term consequences can be difficult to infer from short-term effects, and countries seek to actively control the narratives surrounding conflict.

The effectiveness of the ViaSat hack boils down to how the Ukrainian military communicates, and how adaptable it was in the early hours of the invasion. However, it is apparent how such a hack could impact military effectiveness. If Russia, or any other belligerent, was able to simultaneously disrupt satellite communications while also jamming or destroying landlines, forces on the frontlines would be at best poorly connected with their superiors. In such a scenario, an army would be cut off from commanders in other locations and would not be able to report back or receive new directives; they would be stranded until communications could be restored.

The ViaSat hack had a military objective: to disrupt Ukrainian military access to satellite communications. But the effects were not limited to this objective. The operation had spillover effects that rippled across Europe. In Germany, nearly 6,000 wind turbines were taken offline, with roughly 2,000 of those turbines remaining offline for nearly a month after the initial hack due to the loss of remote connectivity.⁴⁵ In France, modems used by emergency services vehicles, including firetrucks and ambulances, were also affected.⁴⁶

ViaSat is not a purely military target. It is a civilian firm that counts the Ukrainian military as a customer. The targeting of civilian infrastructure with dual civilian and military capability and use has occurred throughout history and has been the center of debate in international law, especially when there are cross-border spillover effects in non-combatant countries. Both the principle of proportionality and international humanitarian law require the aggressor to target only military objects, defined as objects “whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage” in a manner proportional to the military gain foreseen by the operation. ⁴⁷ What this means in practice, however, is that the aggressor determines whether they deem a target to be a military object and a beneficial target and, therefore, what is legitimate. Konstantin Vorontsov, the Head of the Russian Delegation to the United Nations, attempted to justify Russian actions in October 2022 by saying that the use of civilian space infrastructure to aid the Ukrainian war effort may be a violation of the Outer Space Treaty, thereby rendering this infrastructure a legitimate military target.⁴⁸ Similar operations like that against ViaSat are likely to be the new norm in modern warfare. As Mauro Vignati, the adviser on new digital technologies of warfare at the Red Cross, said in November 2022, insofar as private companies own and operate the information infrastructure of the domain, including infrastructure acting as military assets, “when war start[s], those companies, they are inside the battlefield.”⁴⁹

Physical information infrastructure

In February 2022, as Russian forces moved to seize airfields and key physical assets in Ukraine, they simultaneously assaulted the physical information infrastructure operating within and beneath the Ukrainian information environment. Russian forces targeted this infrastructure, largely privately operated, by taking control of assets where possible and destroying them where not, including through a series of Russian air strikes targeting Ukrainian servers, cables, and cell phone towers.⁵⁰ As of June 2022, about 15 percent of Ukrainian information infrastructure had been damaged or destroyed; by July, 12.2 percent of homes had lost access to mobile communication services, 11 percent of base stations for mobile operators were out of service, and approximately 20 percent of the country’s telecommunications infrastructure was damaged or destroyed.⁵¹ By August “the number of users connecting to the Internet in Ukraine [had] shrunk by at least 16 percent nationwide.”⁵²

In some areas of Ukraine, digital blackouts were enforced by Russian troops to cut the local population off from the highly contested information space. In Mariupol, the last cell tower connecting the city with the outside world was tirelessly tended by two Kyivstar engineers, who kept it alive with backup generators that they manually refilled with gasoline. Once the Russians entered the city, however, the Ukrainian soldiers who had been protecting the cell tower location left to engage with the enemy, leaving the Kyivstar engineers alone to tend to their charge. For three days the engineers withstood the bombing of the city until March 21, when Russian troops disconnected the tower and it went silent.⁵³

Russian forces coerced Ukrainian occupied territories onto Russian ISPs, once again through Rostelcom’s local agent Miranda Media, and onto Russian mobile service providers.⁵⁴ Information infrastructure in Ukraine is made up of overlapping networks of mobile service and ISPs, a legacy of the country’s complicated post-Soviet modernization process. This complexity may have been a boon for its resilience. Russian forces, observed digital-rights researcher Samuel Woodhams, “couldn’t go into one office and take down a whole region … There were hundreds of these offices and the actual hardware was quite geographically separated.⁵⁵ Across eastern Ukraine, including Kherson, Mlitopol, and Mariupol, the Russians aimed to subjugate the physical territory, constituent populations, and Ukrainian information space. In Kherson, Russian forces entered the offices of a Ukrainian ISP and at gunpoint, forced staff to transfer control to them.⁵⁶

Russian bombardment of telecommunications antennas in Kiev (Attribution: Mvs.gov.ua)

Routing the internet and communications access of occupied territories through Russia meant that Moscow could suppress communications to and from these occupied areas, especially through social media and Ukrainian news sites, sever access to essential services in Ukraine, and flood the populations with its own propaganda, as was proved in Crimea in 2014. Moving forward, Russia could use this dependency to “disconnect, throttle, or restrict access to the internet” in occupied territories, cutting off the occupied population from the Ukrainian government and the wider Ukrainian and international community.⁵⁷

The Kremlin’s primary purpose in the invasion of Ukraine was and is to remove the Ukrainian government and, likely, install a pro-Russian puppet government to bring to an end an independent Ukraine.⁵⁸ Therefore, isolating the information environment of occupied populations, in concert with anti-Ukrainian government disinformation, such as the multiple false allegations that President Zelenskyy had fled the country and abandoned the Ukrainian people,⁵⁹ were a means to sway the allegiances, or at least dilute the active resistance, of the Ukrainian people.⁶⁰ Without connectivity to alternative outlets, the occupying Russians could promote false and largely uncontested claims about the progress of the war. In early May 2022 for example, when Kherson lost connectivity for three days, the deputy of the Kherson Regional Council, Serhiy Khlan, reported that the Russians “began to spread propaganda that they were in fact winning and had captured almost all of Mykolaiv.”⁶¹

Russia used its assault on the information environment to undermine the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and its ability to fulfill its governmental duties to the Ukrainian people. Whether through complete connectivity blackouts or through the restrictions imposed by Russian networks, the Russians blocked any communications from the Ukrainian government to occupied populations—not least President Zelenskyy’s June 13, 2022 address, intended most for those very populations, in which he promised to liberate all occupied Ukrainian land and reassured those populations that they had not been forgotten. Zelenskyy acknowledged the Russian barrier between himself and Ukrainians in occupied territories, saying, “They are trying to make people not just know nothing about Ukraine… They are trying to make them stop even thinking about returning to normal life, forcing them to reconcile.”⁶²

Isolating occupied populations from the Ukrainian information space is intended, in large part, said Stas Prybytko, the head of mobile broadband development within the Ukrainian Ministry of Digital Transformation, to “block them from communicating with their families in other cities and keep them from receiving truthful information.”⁶³ Throughout 2022, so much of what the international community knew about the war came—through Twitter, TikTok, Telegram, and more—from Ukrainians themselves. From videos of the indiscriminate Russian shelling of civilian neighborhoods to recordings tracking Russian troop movements, Ukrainians used their personal devices to capture and communicate the progress of the war directly to living rooms, board rooms, and government offices around the world.⁶⁴The power of this distributed information collection and open-source intelligence relies upon mobile and internet access. The accounts that were shared after Ukrainian towns and cities were liberated from Russian occupation lay bare just how much suffering, arrest, torture, and murder was kept hidden from international view by the purposeful isolation of the information environment and the constant surveillance of Ukrainians’ personal devices.⁶⁵ The war in Ukraine has highlighted the growing impact of distributed open source intelligence during the conduct of war that is carried out by civilians in Ukraine and by the wider open source research community though various social media and messaging platforms.⁶⁶

Narrative Warfare: How the Kremlin and Russian news outlets justified a war of aggression against Ukraine

Undermining Ukraine: How the Kremlin employs information operations to erode global confidence in Ukraine

Russian operations against, especially transnational, digital infrastructure companies can mostly be categorized as disruption, degradation, and information gathering, which saw Russian or Russian-aligned hackers moving in and through the Ukrainian information environment. The attacks against Ukrainian physical infrastructure, however, are of a slightly different character. Invading forces employed physically mediated cyberattacks, a method defined by Herb Lin as “attacks that compromise cyber functionality through the use of or the threat of physical force” to pursue the complete destruction or seizure and occupation of this infrastructure.⁶⁷ Both ends begin with the same purpose: to create a vacuum of information between the Ukrainian government, the Ukrainian people, and the global population, effectively ending the connection between the Ukrainian information environment and the global environment. But the seizure of this infrastructure takes things a step beyond: to occupy the Ukrainian information environment and pull its infrastructure and its people into an isolated, controlled Russian information space.

Reclaiming the Ukrainian information environment

Preparation of the environment

The Russian assault on the Ukrainian information environment is far from unanswered. Russian efforts have been countered by the Ukrainian government in concert with allied states and with technology companies located both within and outside Ukraine. Russia’s aim to pull occupied Ukrainian territory onto Russian networks to be controlled and monitored has been well understood, and Ukraine has been hardening its information infrastructure since the initial 2014 invasion. Ukraine released its Cyber Security Strategy in 2016, which laid out the government’s priorities in this space, including the defense against the range of active cyber threats they face, with an emphasis on the “cyber protection of information infrastructure.”⁶⁸ The government initially focused on centralizing its networks in Kyiv to make it more difficult “for Russian hackers to penetrate computers that store critical data and provide services such as pension benefits, or to use formerly government-run networks in the occupied territories to launch cyberattacks on Kyiv.”⁶⁹

As part of its digitalization and security efforts, the Ukrainian government also sought out new partners, both public and private, to build and bolster its threat detection and response capabilities. Before and since the 2022 invasion, the Ukrainian government has worked with partner governments and an array of technology companies around the world to create resilience through increased connectivity and digitalization.

Bolstering Ukrainian connectivity

Since the 2014 invasion and annexation of Crimea, Ukraine-serving telecommunications operators have developed plans to prepare for future Russian aggression. Lifecell, the third largest Ukrainian mobile telephone operator, prepared its network for an anticipated Russian attack. The company shifted their office archives, documentation, and critical network equipment from eastern to western Ukraine, where it would be better insulated from violence, added additional network redundancy, and increased the coordination and response capabilities of their staff.⁷⁰ Similarly, Kyivstar and Vodafone Ukraine increased their network bandwidth to withstand extreme demand. In October 2021, these three companies initiated an infrastructure sharing agreement to expand LTE (Long Term Evolution) networks into rural Ukraine and, in cooperation with the Ukrainian government, expanded the 4G telecommunications network to bring “mobile network coverage to an estimated 91.6 per cent of the population.”⁷¹

The expansion and improvement of Ukrainian telecommunications continued through international partnerships as well. Datagroup, for example, announced a $20 million partnership in 2021 with Cisco, a US-based digital communications company, to modernize and expand the bandwidth of its extensive networks.⁷² Since the February 2022 invasion, Cisco has also worked with the French government to provide over $5 million of secure, wireless networking equipment and software, including firewalls, for free to the Ukrainian government.⁷³

This network expansion is an integral part of the Ukrainian government’s digitalization plans for the country, championed by President Zelenskyy. Rather than the invasion putting an end to these efforts, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov claimed that during the war “digitalization became the foundation of all our life. The economy continues to work … due to digitalization.⁷⁴ The digital provision of government services has created an alternate pathway for Ukrainians to engage in the economy and with their government. The flagship government initiative Diia, launched in February 2020, is a digital portal through which the 21.7 million Ukrainian users can access legal identification, make social services payments, register a business, and even register property damage from Russian missile strikes.⁷⁵ The Russian advance and consequent physical destruction that displaced Ukrainians means that the ability to provide government services through alternate and resilient means is more essential than ever, placing an additional premium on defending Ukrainian information infrastructure.

Backing up a government

As Russian forces built up along Ukraine’s borders, Ukrainian network centralization may have increased risk, despite the country’s improved defense capabilities. In preparation for the cyber and physical attacks against the country’s information infrastructure, Fedorov moved to amend Ukrainian data protection laws to allow the government to store and process data in the cloud and worked closely with several technology companies, including Microsoft, Amazon Web Services, and Google, to effect the transfer of critical government data to infrastructure hosted outside the country.⁷⁶ Cloud computing describes “a collection of technologies and organizational processes which enable ubiquitous, on-demand access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources.”⁷⁷ Cloud computing is dominated by the four hyperscalers—Amazon, Microsoft, Google, and Alibaba—that provide computing and storage at enterprise scale and are responsible for the operation and security of data centers all around the world, any of which could host customer data according to local laws and regulations.⁷⁸

According to its April 2022 Ukraine war report, Microsoft “committed at no charge a total of $107 million of technology services to support this effort” and renewed the relationship in November, promising to ensure that “government agencies, critical infrastructure and other sectors in Ukraine can continue to run their digital infrastructure and serve citizens through the Microsoft Cloud” at a value of about $100 million.⁷⁹ Amazon and Google have also committed to supporting cloud services for the Ukrainian government, for select companies, and for humanitarian organizations focused on aiding Ukraine.⁸⁰ In accordance with the Ukrainian government’s concerns, Russian missile attacks targeted the Ukrainian government’s main data center in Kyiv soon after the invasion, partially destroying the facility, and cyberattacks aggressively tested Ukrainian networks.⁸¹

Unlike other lines of aid provided by the international community to strengthen the defense of the Ukrainian information environment, cloud services are provided only by the private sector.⁸² While this aid has had a transformative effect on Ukrainian defense, that transformative quality has also raised concerns. Microsoft, in its special report on Ukraine, several times cites its cloud services as one of the determining factors that limited the effect of Russian cyber and kinetic attacks on Ukrainian government data centers, and details how their services, in particular, were instrumental in this defense.⁸³ In this same report, Microsoft claims to be most worried about those states and organizations that do not use cloud services, and provides corroborating data.⁸⁴ Microsoft and other technology companies offering their services at a reduced rate, or for free, are acting—at least in part—out of a belief in the rightness of the Ukrainian cause. However, they are still private companies with responsibilities to shareholders or board members, and they still must seek profit. Services provided, especially establishing information infrastructure like Cloud services, are likely to establish long-term business relationships with the Ukrainian government and potentially with other governments and clients, who see the effectiveness of those services illustrated through the defense of Ukraine.

Mounting an elastic defense

Working for wireless

Alongside and parallel to the Ukrainian efforts to defend and reclaim occupied physical territory is the fight for Ukrainian connectivity. Ukrainian telecommunications companies have been integral to preserving connectivity to the extent possible. In March 2022, Ukrainian telecom operators Kyivstar, Vodafone Ukraine, and Lifecell made the decision to provide free national mobile roaming services across mobile provider networks, creating redundancy and resilience in the mobile network to combat frequent service outages.⁸⁵ The free mobile service provided by these companies is valued at more than UAH 980 million (USD 26.8 million).⁸⁶ In addition, Kyivstar in July 2022 committed to the allocation of UAH 300 million (about USD 8.2 mil) for the modernization of Ukraine’s information infrastructure in cooperation with the Ukrainian Ministry of Digital transformation.⁸⁷ The statements that accompanied the commitments from Kyivstar and Lifecell—both headquartered in Ukraine—emphasized each company’s dedication to Ukrainian defense and their role in it, regardless of the short-term financial impact.⁸⁸ These are Ukrainian companies with Ukrainian infrastructure and Ukrainian customers, and their fate is tied inextricably to the outcome of this war.

As Russian forces advanced and attempted to seize control of information infrastructure, in at least one instance, Ukrainian internet and mobile service employees sabotaged their own equipment first. Facing threats of imprisonment and death from occupying Russians, employees in several Ukrtelecom facilities withstood pressure to share technical network details and instead deleted key files from the systems. According to Ukrtelecom Chief Executive Officer Yuriy Kurmaz, “The Russians tried to connect their control boards and some equipment to our networks, but they were not able to reconfigure it because we completely destroyed the software.”⁸⁹ Without functional infrastructure, Russian forces struggled to pull those areas onto Russian networks.

The destruction of telecommunications infrastructure has meant that these areas and many others along the war front are, in some areas, without reliable information infrastructure, either wireless or wired. While the Ukrainian government and a bevy of local and international private sector companies battle for control of on-the-ground internet and communications infrastructure, they also pursued new pathways to connectivity.

Searching for satellite

Two days after the invasion, Deputy Prime Minister Fedorov tweeted at Elon Musk, the Chief Executive Officer of SpaceX, that “while you try to colonize Mars — Russia try [sic] to occupy Ukraine! While your rockets successfully land from space — Russian rockets attack Ukrainian civil people! We ask you to provide Ukraine with Starlink stations and to address sane Russians to stand.”⁹⁰ Just another two days later, Fedorov confirmed the arrival of the first shipment of Starlink stations.⁹¹

Starlink, a network of low-orbit satellites working in constellations operated by SpaceX, relies on satellite receivers no larger than a backpack that are easily installed and transported. Because Russian targeting of cellular towers made communications coverage unreliable, says Fedorov, the government “made a decision to use satellite communication for such emergencies” from American companies like SpaceX.⁹² Starlink has proven more resilient than any other alternative throughout the war. Due to the low orbit of Starlink satellites, they can broadcast to their receivers at relatively higher power than satellites in higher orbits. There has been little reporting on successful Russian efforts to jam Starlink transmissions, and the Starlink base stations—the physical, earthbound infrastructure that communicates directly with the satellites—are located on NATO territory, ensuring any direct attack on them would be a significant escalation in the war.⁹³

Starlink has been employed across sectors almost since the war began. President Zelenskyy has used the devices himself when delivering addresses to the Ukrainian people, as well as to foreign governments and populations.⁹⁴ Fedorov has said that sustained missile strikes against energy and communication infrastructure have been effectively countered through the deployment of Starlink devices that can restore connection where it is most needed. He even called the system “an essential part of critical infrastructure.”⁹⁵

Starlink has also found direct military applications. The portability of these devices means that Ukrainian troops can often, though not always, stay connected to command elements and peer units while deployed.⁹⁶ Ukrainian soldiers have also used internet connections to coordinate attacks on Russian targets with artillery-battery commanders.⁹⁷ The Aerorozvidka, a specialist air reconnaissance unit within the Ukrainian military that conducts hundreds of information gathering missions every day, has used Starlink devices in areas of Ukraine without functional communications infrastructure to “monitor and coordinate unmanned aerial vehicles, enabling soldiers to fire anti-tank weapons with targeted precision.”⁹⁸ Reports have also suggested that a Starlink device was integrated into an unmanned surface vehicle discovered near Sevastopol, potentially used by the Ukrainian military for reconnaissance or even to carry and deliver munitions.⁹⁹ According to one Ukrainian soldier, “Starlink is our oxygen,” and were it to disappear, “our army would collapse into chaos.”¹⁰⁰

The initial package of Starlink devices included 3,667 terminals donated by SpaceX and 1,333 terminals purchased by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).¹⁰¹ SpaceX initially offered free Starlink service for all the devices, although the offer has already been walked back by Musk, and then reversed again. CNN obtained proof of a letter sent by Musk to the Pentagon in September 2022 stating that SpaceX would be unable to continue funding Starlink service in Ukraine. The letter requested that the Pentagon pay what would amount to “more than $120 million for the rest of the year and could cost close to $400 million for the next 12 months.” It also clarified that the vast majority of the 20,000 Starlink devices sent to Ukraine were financed at least in part by outside funders like the United States, United Kingdom, and Polish governments.¹⁰²

After the letter was sent, but before it became public, Musk got into a Twitter spat with Ukrainian diplomat Adrij Melnyk after the former wrote a tweet on October 3 proposing terms of peace between Russia and Ukraine. Musk’s proposal included Ukraine renouncing its claims to Crimea and pledging to remain neutral, with the only apparent concession from Russia a promise to ensure water supply in Crimea. The plan was rejected by the public poll Musk included in the tweet, and Melnyk replied and tagged Musk, saying “Fuck off is my very diplomatic reply to you @elonmusk.”¹⁰³ After CNN released the SpaceX letter to the Pentagon, Musk seemingly doubled down on his decision to reduce SpaceX funding at first. He responded on October 14 to a tweet summarizing the incident, justifying possible reduced SpaceX assistance stating, “We’re just following his [Melnyk’s] recommendation,” even though the letter was sent before the Twitter exchange. Musk then tweeted the following day, “The hell with it … even though Starlink is still losing money & other companies are getting billions of taxpayer $, we’ll just keep funding Ukraine govt for free.”¹⁰⁴ Two days later, in response to a Politico tweet reporting that the Pentagon was considering covering the Starlink service costs, Musk stated that “SpaceX has already withdrawn its request for funding.”¹⁰⁵ Musk’s characterization of SpaceX’s contribution to the war effort has sparked confusion and reprimand, with his public remarks often implying that his company is entirely footing the bill when in fact, tens of millions of dollars’ worth of terminals and service are being covered by several governments every month.

The Starlink saga, however, was not over yet. Several weeks later in late October, 1,300 Starlink terminals in Ukraine, purchased in March 2020 by a British company for use in Ukrainian combat-related operations, were disconnected, allegedly due to lack of funding, causing a communications outage for the Ukrainian military.¹⁰⁶ Although operation was restored, the entire narrative eroded confidence in SpaceX as a guarantor of flexible connectivity in Ukraine. In November 2022, Federov noted that while Ukraine has no intention of breaking off its relationship with Starlink, the government is exploring working with other satellite communications operators.¹⁰⁷ Starlink is not the only satellite communications network of its kind, but its competitors have not yet reached the same level of operation. Satellite communications company OneWeb, based in London with ties to the British military, is just now launching its satellite constellation, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine required the company to change its launch partner from Roscosmos to SpaceX.¹⁰⁸ The US Space Development Agency, within the United States Space Force, will launch the first low earth orbit satellites of the new National Defense Space Architecture in March 2023. Other more traditional satellite companies cannot provide the same flexibility as Starlink’s small, transportable receivers.

UA Support Forces use Starlink (Attribution: Mil.gov.ua)

With the market effectively cornered for the moment, SpaceX can dictate the terms, including the physical bounds, of Starlink’s operations, thereby wielding immense influence on the battlefield. Starlink devices used by advancing Ukrainian forces near the front, for example, have reported inconsistent reliability.¹⁰⁹ Indeed CNN reported on February 9^th that this bounding was a deliberate attempt to separate the devices from direct military use, as SpaceX President Gwynne Shotwell explained “our intent was never to have them use it for offensive purposes.”¹¹⁰ The bounding decision, similar to the rationale behind the company’s decision to refuse to activate Starlink service in Crimea, was likely made to contain escalation, especially escalation by means of SpaceX devices.¹¹¹

But SpaceX is not the only satellite company making decisions to bound the area of operation of their products to avoid playing—or being perceived to play—a role in potential escalation. On March 16, 2022, Minister Fedorov tweeted at DJI, a Chinese drone producer, “@DJIGlobal are you sure you want to be a partner in these murders? Block your products that are helping russia to kill the Ukrainians!”¹¹² DJI responded directly to the tweet the same day, saying “If the Ukrainian government formally requests that DJI set up geofencing throughout Ukraine, we will arrange it,” but pointed out that such geofencing would inhibit all users of their product in Ukraine, not just Russians.¹¹³

While Russia continues to bombard the Ukrainian electrical grid, Starlink terminals have grown more expensive for new Ukrainian consumers, increasing from $385 earlier this year to $700, although it is unclear if this price increase also affected government purchasers.¹¹⁴ According to Andrew Cavalier, a technology industry analyst with ABI Research, the indispensability of the devices gives “Musk and Starlink a major head start [against its competitors] that its use in the Russia–Ukraine war will only consolidate.”¹¹⁵ Indeed, the valuation of SpaceX was $127 million in May 2022, and the company raised $2 billion in the first seven months of 2022.¹¹⁶ For SpaceX, the war in Ukraine has been an impressive showcase of Starlink’s capabilities and has proven the worth of its services to future customers. The company recently launched a new initiative, Starshield, intended to leverage “SpaceX’s Starlink technology and launch capability to support national security efforts. While Starlink is designed for consumer and commercial use, Starshield is designed for government use.”¹¹⁷ It is clear that SpaceX intends to capitalize on the very public success of its Starlink network in Ukraine.

Reclaiming Territory

The Russian assault is not over, but Ukraine has reclaimed “54 percent of the land Russia has captured since the beginning of the war” and the front line has remained relatively stable since November 2022.¹¹⁸ Videos and reports from reclaimed territory show the exultation of the liberated population. As Ukrainian military forces reclaim formerly occupied areas, the parallel reclamation of the information environment, by or with Ukrainian and transnational information infrastructure operators, follows quickly.

In newly liberated areas, Starlink terminals are often the first tool for establishing connectivity. In Kherson, the first regional capital that fell to the Russian invasion and reclaimed by Ukrainian troops on November 11, 2022, residents lined up in public spaces to connect to the internet through Starlink.¹¹⁹ The Ministry of Digital Transformation provided Starlink devices to the largest service providers, Vodaphone and Kyivstar, to facilitate communication while their engineers repaired the necessary infrastructure for reestablishing mobile and internet service.¹²⁰ A week after Kherson was recaptured, five Kyivstar base stations were made operational and Vodaphone had reestablished coverage over most of the city.¹²¹

Due to the importance of reclaiming the information space, operators are working just behind Ukrainian soldiers to reconnect populations in reclaimed territories to the Ukrainian and global information environment as quickly as possible, which means working in very dangerous conditions. In the Sumy region, a Ukrtelecom vehicle pulling up to a television tower drove over a land mine, injuring three of the passengers and killing the driver.¹²² Stanislav Prybytko, the head of the mobile broadband department in the Ukrainian Ministry of Digital Transformation, says “It’s still very dangerous to do this work, but we can’t wait to do this, because there are a lot of citizens in liberated villages who urgently need to connect.”¹²³ Prybytko and his eleven-person team have been central to the Ukrainian effort to stitch Ukrainian connectivity back together. The team works across a public-private collaborative, coordinating with various government officials and mobile service providers to repair critical nodes in the network and to reestablish communications and connectivity.¹²⁴ According to Ukrainian government figures, 80 percent of liberated settlements have partially restored internet connection, and more than 1,400 base stations have been rebuilt by Ukrainian mobile operators since April 2022.¹²⁵

Key Takeaways

The information environment is a key domain through which this war is being contested. The Russian government has demonstrated for over a decade the importance it places on control of the information environment, both domestically and as part of campaigns to expand the Russian sphere of influence abroad. Yet, despite this Russian focus, the Ukrainian government has demonstrated incredible resilience against physical assaults, cyberattacks, and disinformation campaigns against and within the Ukrainian information environment and has committed to further interlacing government services and digital platforms.

The centrality of this environment to the conduct of this war means that private actors are necessarily enmeshed in the conflict. As providers of products and services used for Ukrainian defense, these companies are an important part of the buttressing structure of that defense. The centrality of private companies in the conduct of the war in Ukraine brings to light new and increasingly important questions about what it means for companies to act as information infrastructure during wartime, including:

What is the complete incentive structure behind a company’s decision to provide products or services to a state at war?
How dependent are states on the privately held portions of the information environment, including infrastructure, tools, knowledge, data, skills, and more, for their own national security and defense?
How can the public and private sectors work together better as partners to understand and prepare these areas of reliance during peace and across the continuum of conflict in a sustained, rather than ad hoc, nature?

Incentives

The war in Ukraine spurred an exceptional degree of cooperation and aid from private companies within Ukraine and from around the globe. Much of public messaging around the private sector’s assistance of Ukrainian defense centers around the conviction of company leadership and staff that they were compelled by a responsibility to act. This is certainly one factor in their decision. But the depth of private actor involvement in this conflict demands a more nuanced understanding of the full picture of incentives and disincentives that drive a company’s decision to enter into new, or expand upon existing, business relationships with and in a country at war. What risks, for example, do companies undertake in a war in which Russia has already demonstrated its conviction that private companies are viable military targets? The ViaSat hack was a reminder of the uncertainty that surrounds the designation of dual-use technology, and the impact that such designations have in practice. What role did public recognition play in companies’ decisions to provide products and services, and how might this recognition influence future earnings potential? For example, while their remarks differed in tone, both Elon Musk on Twitter and Microsoft in its special report on Ukraine publicly claimed partial credit for the defense of Ukraine.

As the war continues into its second year, these questions are important to maintaining Ukraine’s cooperation with these entities. With a better understanding of existing and potential incentives, the companies, the United States, and its allies can make the decision to responsibly aid Ukraine much easier.

Dependencies

Private companies play an important role in armed conflict, operating much of the infrastructure that supports the information environment through which both state and non-state actors compete for control. The war in Ukraine has illustrated the willingness of private actors, from Ukrainian telecommunications companies to transnational cloud and satellite companies, to participate as partners in the defense of Ukraine. State dependence on privately held physical infrastructure is not unique to the information environment, but state dependence on infrastructure that is headquartered and operated extraterritorially is a particular feature.

Prior to and throughout the war, the Ukrainian government has coordinated successfully with local telecommunication companies to expand, preserve, and restore mobile, radio, and internet connectivity to its population. This connectivity preserved what Russia was attempting to dismantle—a free and open Ukrainian information environment through which the Ukrainian government and population can communicate and coordinate. The Ukrainian government has relied on these companies to provide service and connectivity, working alongside them before and during the war to improve infrastructure and to communicate priorities. These companies are truly engaging as partners in Ukrainian defense, especially because this information infrastructure is not just a medium through which Russia launches attacks but an environment that Russia is attempting to seize control of. This dependence has not been unidirectional—the companies themselves are inextricably linked to this conflict through their infrastructure, employees, and customers in Ukraine. Each is dependent to some degree on the other and during times of crisis, their incentives create a dynamic of mutual need.

The Ukrainian government has also relied on a variety of transnational companies though the provision of technology products or services and information infrastructure. As examined in this report, two areas where the involvement of these companies has been especially impactful are cloud services and satellite internet services. Cloud services have preserved data integrity and security by moving information to data centers distributed around the world, outside of Ukrainian territory and under the cyber-protection of those cloud service companies. Satellite services have enabled flexible and resilient connectivity, once again located and run primarily outside of Ukraine. These companies can provide essential services within the information environment and the physical environment of Ukraine, but are not fundamentally reliant on the integrity of the country. This dynamic is heightened by the fact that cloud service providers like Microsoft, Amazon Web Services, Google, and satellite internet service providers like Space X’s Starlink are operating within a market with global reach and very few competitors. While these companies and others have made the laudable decision to contribute to Ukrainian defense, the fact is that had they not, there are only a few, if any, other companies with comparable capabilities and infrastructure at scale. Additionally, there’s very little Ukraine or even the US government could have done to directly provide the same capabilities and infrastructure.

Coordination

Built into the discussions around dependency and incentives is the need for government and the private companies who own and operate information infrastructure to coordinate with each other from a more extensive foundation. While coordination with Ukrainian companies and some transnational companies emerged from sustained effort, many instances of private sector involvement were forged on an ad hoc basis and therefore could not be planned on in advance. The ad hoc approach can produce rapid results, as seen by Minister Fedorov’s tweet at Elon Musk and receipt of Starlink devices just days later. While this approach has been wielded by the Ukrainian government, and the Ministry for Digital Transformation in particular, to great effect, this very same example illustrates the complexity of transforming ad hoc aid into sustainable partnerships. Sustainability is especially important when states are facing threats outside of open war, across the continuum of insecurity and conflict where many of these capabilities and infrastructures will continue to be relied upon. Security and defense in the information environment requires states to work in coordination with a diverse range of local and transnational private actors.

Recommendations

Key recommendations from this paper ask the US government, in coordination with the Ukrainian government, to better understand the incentives that surround private sector involvement, to delineate states’ dependency on private information infrastructure, and to improve long-term public-private coordination through three pathways:

Define support parameters. Clarify how private technology companies can and should provide aid
Track support. Create a living database to track the patterns of technological aid to Ukraine from US private companies
Facilitate support requests. Add to the resilience of the Ukrainian information environment by facilitating US private aid.

Define support parameters

Private information infrastructure companies will continue to play a key role in this war. However, there are a number of unresolved questions regarding the decisions these companies are making about if, and how, to provide support to the Ukrainian government to sustain its defense. A significant barrier may be the lack of clarity about the risks of partnership in wartime, which may disincentivize action or may alter existing partnerships. Recent SpaceX statements surrounding the bounding of Starlink use is an example, at least in part, of just such a risk calculous in action. The US government and its allies should release a public directive clarifying how companies can ensure that their involvement is in line with US and international law—especially for dual-use technologies. Reaffirming, with consistent guidelines, how the United States defines civilian participation in times of war will be crucial for ensuring that such actions do not unintentionally legitimize private entities as belligerents and legitimate targets in wartime. At the direction of the National Security Advisor, the US Attorney General and Secretary of State, working through the Office of the Legal Advisor at the State Department, should issue public guidance on how US companies can provide essential aid to Ukraine while avoiding the designation of legitimate military target or combatant under the best available interpretation of prevailing law.

Track support

While a large amount of support for Ukraine has been given directly by or coordinated through governments, many private companies have started providing technological support directly to the Ukrainian government. Some private companies, especially those with offices or customers in Ukraine, got in touch directly with, or were contacted by, various Ukrainian government offices, often with specific requests depending on the company’s products and services.¹²⁶

However, the US government does not have a full and complete picture of this assistance, which limits the ability of US policymakers to track the implications of changing types of support or the nature of the conflict. Policymakers should have access to not only what kind of support is being provided by private US companies, but also the projected period of involvement, what types of support are being requested and denied by companies (in which case, where the US government may be able to act as an alternative provider), and what types of support are being supplied by private sector actors without a significant government equity or involvement. A more fulsome mapping of this assistance and its dependency structure would make it possible for policymakers and others to assess its impact and effectiveness. This data, were it or some version of it publicly available, would also help private companies providing the support to better understand how their contributions fit within the wider context of US assistance and to communicate the effect their products or services are having to stakeholders and shareholders. Such information may play a role in a company’s decision to partner or abstain in the future.

The US government should create a collaborative task force to track US-based private sector support to Ukraine. Because of the wide equities across the US government in this area, this team should be led by the State Department’s Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy and include representatives from USAID, the Department of Defense’s Cyber Policy Office, the National Security Agency’s Collaboration Center, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security’s Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative. This task force should initially focus on creating a picture of public-private support to Ukraine from entities within the United States, but its remit could extend to work with allies and partners, creating a fulsome picture of international public-private support.

Facilitate support requests

Tracking the technical support that is requested, promised, and delivered to the Ukrainian government is an important first step toward gaining a better understanding of the evolving shape of the critical role that the private sector is increasingly playing in conflict. But closer tracking, perhaps by an associated body, could go further by acting as a process facilitator. Government offices and agencies have long been facilitators of private aid, but now states are increasingly able to interact with, and request support from, private companies directly, especially for smaller quantities or more specific products and services. While this pathway can be more direct and efficient, it also requires a near constant churn of request, provision, and renewal actions from private companies and Ukrainian government officials.

Private organizations have stepped into this breach, including the Cyber Defense Assistance Collaboration (CDAC), founded by Greg Rattray and Matthew Murray, now a part of the US-based non-profit CRDF Global. CDAC works with a number of US private technology companies, as well as the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine and the Ukrainian think tank Global Cyber Cooperative Center, to match the specific needs of Ukrainian government and state-owned enterprises with needed products and services offered by companies working in coordination.¹²⁷

The growth and reach of this effort demonstrate the potential impact that a government-housed, or even a government-sponsored mechanism, could have in increasing the capacity to facilitate requests from the Ukrainian government, decreasing the number of bureaucratic steps required by Ukrainian government officials while increasing the amount and quality of support they receive. In addition, government facilitation would ease progress toward the previously stated recommendations by building in clarity around what kind of support can be provided and putting facilitation and aid tracking within a single process. As discussed above, this facilitation should start with a focus on US public-private support, but can grow to work alongside similar allied efforts. This could include, for example, coordination with the United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) program, which “enables Ukrainian agencies to access the services of commercial cybersecurity companies.”¹²⁸ Crucially, this task force, helmed by the State Department’s Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy, would act as a facilitator, not as a restricting body. Its mission in this task would be to make connections and provide information.

In line with tracking, US government facilitation would enable government entities to communicate where assistance can be most useful, such as shoring up key vulnerabilities or ensuring that essential defense activities are not dependent on a single private sector entity, and ideally, avoiding dependency on a single source of private sector assistance. A company’s financial situation or philanthropic priorities are always subject to change, and the US government should be aware of such risks and create resilience through redundancy.

Central to this resilience will be the provision of support to bolster key nodes in the Ukrainian telecommunications infrastructure network against not just cyber attacks but also against physical assault, including things like firewalls, mine clearing equipment, and power generators. Aiding the Ukrainian government in the search for another reliable partner for satellite communication devices that offer similar flexibility as Starlink is also necessary, and a representative from the Pentagon has confirmed that such a process is underway, following Musk’s various and contradictory statements regarding the future of SpaceX’s aid to Ukraine back in October.¹²⁹ Regardless, the entire SpaceX experience illustrates the need to address single dependencies in advance whenever possible.

A roadblock to ensuring assistance redundancy is the financial ability of companies to provide products and services to the Ukrainian government without charge or to the degree necessary. While the US government does provide funding for private technological assistance (as in the Starlink example), creating a pool of funding that is tied to the aforementioned task force and overseen by the State Department’s Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy, would enable increased flexibility for companies to cover areas of single dependence, even in instances that would require piecemeal rather than one-to-one redundancy. As previously discussed, many companies are providing support out of a belief that it is the right thing to do, both for their customers and as members of a global society. However, depending on whether that support is paid or provided for free, or publicly or privately given, a mechanism that provides government clarity on private sector support, tracks the landscape of US private support to Ukraine, and facilitates support requests would make it easier for companies to make the decision to start or continue to provide support when weighed against the costs and potential risks of offering assistance.

Looking forward and inward

The questions that have emerged from Ukraine’s experience of defense in and through the information environment are not limited to this context. Private companies have a role in armed conflict and that role seems likely to grow, along with the scale, complexity, and criticality of the information infrastructures they own and operate. Companies will, in some capacity, be participants in the battlespace. This is being demonstrated in real time, exposing gaps that the United States and its allies and partners must address in advance of future conflicts.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has created an environment in which both public and private assistance in support of Ukrainian information infrastructure is motivated by a common aversion toward Russian aggression, as well as a commitment to the stability and protection of the Ukrainian government and people. This war is not over and despite any hopes to the contrary, similar aggressions will occur in new contexts, and with new actors in the future. It is crucial that in conjunction with examining and mitigating the risks related to the involvement of private technology companies in the war in Ukraine, the US government also examines these questions regarding its own national security and defense.

The information environment is increasingly central to not just warfighting but also to the practice of governance and the daily life of populations around the world. Governments and populations live in part within that environment and therefore atop infrastructure that is owned and operated by the private sector. As adversaries seek to reshape the information environment to their own advantage, US and allied public and private sectors must confront the challenges of their existing interdependence. This includes defining in what form national security and defense plans in and through the information environment are dependent upon private companies, developing a better understanding of the differing incentive structures that guide private sector decision-making, and working in coordination with private companies to create a more resilient information infrastructure network through redundancy and diversification. It is difficult to know what forms future conflict and future adversaries will take, or the incentives that may exist for companies in those new contexts, but by better understanding the key role that private information and technology companies already play in this domain, the United States and allies can better prepare for future threats.

About the Authors

Emma Schroeder is an associate director with the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, within the Digital Forensic Research Lab, and leads the team’s work studying conflict in and through cyberspace. Her focus in this role is on developing statecraft and strategy for cyberspace that is useful for both policymakers and practitioners. Schroeder holds an MA in History of War from King’s College London’s War Studies Department and also attained her BA in International Relations & History from the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.

Sean Dack was a Young Global Professional with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative during the fall of 2022. He is now a Researcher at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, where he focuses on the long-term strategic and economic implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Dack graduated from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in December 2022 with his MA in Strategic Studies and International Economics.

Acknowledgements

The authors thank Justin Sherman, Gregory Rattray, and Gavin Wilde for their comments on earlier drafts of this document, and Trey Herr and the Cyber Statecraft team for their support. The authors also thank all the participants, who shall remain anonymous, in multiple Chatham House Rule discussions and one-on-one conversations about the issue.

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1 ”The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Convention on International Information Security (2011), https://carnegieendowment.org/files/RUSSIAN-DRAFT-CONVENTION-ON-INTERNATIONAL-INFORMATION-SECURITY.pdf.

2 To learn more about Russian disinformation efforts against Ukraine and its allies, check out the Russian Narratives Reports from the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab: Nika Aleksejeva et al., Andy Carvin ed., “Narrative Warfare: How the Kremlin and Russian News Outlets Justified a War of Aggression against Ukraine,” Atlantic Council, February 22, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/narrative-warfare/; Roman Osadchuk et al., Andy Carvin ed., “Undermining Ukraine: How the Kremlin Employs Information Operations to Erode Global Confidence in Ukraine,” Atlantic Council, February 22, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/undermining-ukraine/.

3 Previously, the term RuNet described Russian language portions of the global internet accessible anywhere in the world. However, since Russia passed a domestic internet law in May 2019, RuNet has come to refer to a technically isolated version of the internet that services users within the borders of Russia. Gavin Wilde and Justin Sherman, No Water’s Edge: Russia’s Information War and Regime Security, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 4, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/01/04/no-water-s-edge-russia-s-information-war-and-regime-security-pub-88644; Justin Sherman, Reassessing Runet: Russian Internet Isolation and Implications for Russian Cyber Behavior, Atlantic Council, July 7, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/reassessing-runet-russian-internet-isolation-and-implications-for-russian-cyber-behavior/.

4 Adam Satariano and Valerie Hopkins, “Russia, Blocked from the Global Internet, Plunges into Digital Isolation,” New York Times, March 7, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/07/technology/russia-ukraine-internet-isolation.html.

5 Gavin Wilde and Justin Sherman, No Water’s Edge: Russia’s Information War and Regime Security, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 4, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/01/04/no-water-s-edge-russia-s-information-war-and-regime-security-pub-88644; Stephen Blank, “Russian Information Warfare as Domestic Counterinsurgency,” American Foreign Policy Interests 35, no. 1 (2013): 31–44, https://doi.org/10.1080/10803920.2013.757946.

6 Gavin Wilde, Cyber Operations in Ukraine: Russia’s Unmet Expectations, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 12, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/12/12/cyber-operations-in-ukraine-russia-s-unmet-expectations-pub-88607.

7 Tetyana Bohdanova, “Unexpected Revolution: The Role of Social Media in Ukraine’s Euromaidan Uprising,” European View 13, no. 1: (2014), https://doi.org/10.1007/s12290-014-0296-4; Megan MacDuffee Metzger, and Joshua A. Tucker. “Social Media and EuroMaidan: A Review Essay,” Slavic Review 76, no. 1 (2017): 169–91, doi:10.1017/slr.2017.16.

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10 Kenneth Geers, ed., Cyber War in Perspective: Russian Aggression Against Ukraine (Tallinn: NATO CCD COE Publications, 2015), 9; Keir Giles, “Russia and Its Neighbours: Old Attitudes, New Capabilities,” in Geers, Cyber War in Perspective, 25; ‘Кримські регіональні підрозділи ПАТ «Укртелеком» офіційно повідомляють про блокування невідомими декількох вузлів зв’язку на півострові’ [Ukrtelekom officially reports blocking of communications nodes on peninsula by unknown actors], Ukrtelekom, February 28, 2014, http://www.ukrtelecom.ua/presscenter/news/official?id=120327.

11 Pavel Polityuk and Jim Finkle, “Ukraine Says Communications Hit, MPs Phones Blocked,” Reuters, March 4, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-cybersecurity/ukraine-says-communications-hit-mps-phones-blocked-idINL6N0M12CF20140304.

12 Jen Weedon, “Beyond ‘Cyber War’: Russia’s Use of Strategic Cyber Espionage and Information Operations in Ukraine,” in Geers, Cyber War in Perspective, 76; Liisa Past, “Missing in Action: Rhetoric on Cyber Warfare,” in Geers, Cyber War in Perspective, 91; “Ukrtelecom’s Crimean Sub-Branches Officially Report that Unknown People Have Seized Several Telecommunications Nodes in the Crimea,” Ukrtelecom, February 28, 2014, http://en.ukrtelecom.ua/about/news?id=120467; “Feb. 28 Updates on the Crisis in Ukraine,” New York Times, February 28, 2014, https://archive.nytimes.com/thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/latest-updates-tensions-in-ukraine/?_r=0; “The Crimean Regional Units of PJSC ‘Ukrtelecom’ Officially Inform About the Blocking by Unknown Persons of Several Communication Nodes on the Peninsula,” Ukrtelecom, February 28, 2014, https://web.archive.org/web/20140305001208/, http://www.ukrtelecom.ua/presscenter/news/official?id=120327.

13 Polityuk and Finkle, “Ukraine Says Communications Hit”; John Leyden, “Cyber Battle Apparently under Way in Russia–Ukraine Conflict,” The Register, April 25, 2018, https://www.theregister.com/2014/03/04/ukraine_cyber_conflict/.

14 Fontugne, Ermoshina, and Aben, “The Internet in Crimea.”

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16 Yaropolk Brynykh and Anastasiia Lykholat, “Occupied Crimea: Victims and Oppressors,” Freedom House, August 30, 2018, https://freedomhouse.org/article/occupied-crimea-victims-and-oppressors.

17 Halya Coynash, “Internet Providers Forced to Conceal Total FSB Surveillance in Occupied Crimea and Russia,” Kyiv Post, February 2, 2018, https://www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/halya-coynash-internet-providers-forced-conceal-total-fsb-surveillance-occupied-crimea-russia.html.

18 Joseph Cox, “Russia Built an Underwater Cable to Bring Its Internet to Newly Annexed Crimea,” VICE, August 1, 2014, https://www.vice.com/en/article/ypw35k/russia-built-an-underwater-cable-to-bring-its-internet-to-newly-annexed-crimea.

19 Cox, “Russia Built an Underwater Cable.”

20 Romain Fontugne, Ksenia Ermoshina, and Emile Aben, “The Internet in Crimea: A Case Study on Routing Interregnum,” 2020 IFIP Networking Conference, Paris, France, June 22–25, 2020, https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03100247/document.

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22 “Crimea: Freedom in the World 2020 Country Report,” Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/country/crimea/freedom-world/2020.

23 Kim Zetter, “Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine’s Power Grid,” Wired, March 3, 2016, https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/; Andy Greenberg, “The Untold Story of Notpetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in History,” Wired, August 22, 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/.

24 “Special Report: Ukraine An Overview of Russia’s Cyberattack Activity in Ukraine,” Microsoft Digital Security Unit, April 27, 2022, https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RE4Vwwd; Kyle Fendorf and Jessie Miller, “Tracking Cyber Operations and Actors in the Russia–Ukraine War,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 24, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/blog/tracking-cyber-operations-and-actors-russia-ukraine-war.

25 Jakub Przetacznik and Simona Tarpova, “Russia’s War on Ukraine: Timeline of Cyber-Attacks,” European Parliament, June 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/733549/EPRS_BRI(2022)733549_EN.pdf; Catalin Cimpanu, “Hackers Deface Ukrainian Government Websites,” The Record, January 14, 2022, https://therecord.media/hackers-deface-ukrainian-government-websites/.

26 Tom Burt, “Malware Attacks Targeting Ukraine Government,” Microsoft, January 15, 2022, https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/01/15/mstic-malware-cyberattacks-ukraine-government/.

27 Roman Osadchuk, Russian Hybrid Threats Report: Evacuations Begin in Ukrainian Breakaway Regions, Atlantic Council, February 18, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-hybrid-threats-report-evacuations-begin-in-ukrainian-breakaway-regions/#cyberattack; Sean Lyngaas and Tim Lister, “Cyberattack Hits Websites of Ukraine Defense Ministry and Armed Forces,” CNN, February 15, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/15/world/ukraine-cyberattack-intl/index.html.

28 Microsoft, “Special Report Ukraine.”

29 ESET Research: Ukraine Hit by Destructive Attacks Before and During the Russian Invasion with HermeticWiper and IsaacWiper,” ESET, March 1, 2022, https://www.eset.com/int/about/newsroom/press-releases/research/eset-research-ukraine-hit-by-destructive-attacks-before-and-during-the-russian-invasion-with-hermet/; “Ukraine: Disk-Wiping Attacks Precede Russian Invasion,” Symantec Threat Hunter Team, February 24, 2022, https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ukraine-wiper-malware-russia; “Ukraine Computers Hit by Data-Wiping Software as Russia Launched Invasion,” Reuters, February 24, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-government-foreign-ministry-parliament-websites-down-2022-02-23/.

30 Britney Nguyen, “Telecom Workers in Occupied Parts of Ukraine Destroyed Software to Avoid Russian Control over Data and Communications,” Business Insider, June 22, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/telecom-workers-ukraine-destroyed-software-avoid-russian-control-2022-6; Net Blocks (@netblocks), “Confirmed: A major internet disruption has been registered across #Ukraine on national provider #Ukrtelecom; real-time network data show connectivity collapsing …,” Twitter, March 28, 2022, 10:38 a.m., https://twitter.com/netblocks/status/1508453511176065033; Net Blocks (@netblocks), “Update: Ukraine’s national internet provider Ukrtelecom has confirmed a cyberattack on its core infrastructure. Real-time network data show an ongoing and …,” Twitter, March 28, 2022 11:25 a.m., https://twitter.com/netblocks/status/1508465391244304389; Andrea Peterson, “Traffic at Major Ukrainian Internet Service Provider Ukrtelecom Disrupted,” The Record, March 28, 2022, https://therecord.media/traffic-at-major-ukrainian-internet-service-provider-ukrtelecom-disrupted/; James Andrew Lewis, Cyber War and Ukraine, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 10, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/cyber-war-and-ukraine.

31 Thomas Brewster, “As Russia Invaded, Hackers Broke into A Ukrainian Internet Provider. Then Did It Again As Bombs Rained Down,” Forbes, March 10, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2022/03/10/cyberattack-on-major-ukraine-internet-provider-causes-major-outages/?sh=51d16b9c6573.

32 “Global Communications: Services, Solutions and Satellite Internet,” ViaSat, accessed November 14, 2022, http://data.danetsoft.com/viasat.com; Matt Burgess, “A Mysterious Satellite Hack Has Victims Far beyond Ukraine,” Wired, March 23, 2022, https://www.wired.com/story/viasat-internet-hack-ukraine-russia/.

33 Michael Kan, “ViaSat Hack Tied to Data-Wiping Malware Designed to Shut down Modems,” PCMag, March 31, 2022, https://www.pcmag.com/news/viasat-hack-tied-to-data-wiping-malware-designed-to-shut-down-modems.

34 “Ka-Sat Network Cyber Attack Overview,” ViaSat, September 12, 2022, https://news.viasat.com/blog/corporate/ka-sat-network-cyber-attack-overview.

35 Lee Mathews, “ViaSat Reveals How Russian Hackers Knocked Thousands of Ukrainians Offline,” Forbes, March 31, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2022/03/31/viasat-reveals-how-russian-hackers-knocked-thousands-of-ukrainians-offline/?sh=4683638b60d6; ViaSat, “Ka-Sat Network.”

36 ViaSat, “Ka-Sat Network.”

37 Andrea Valentina, “Why the Viasat Hack Still Echoes,” Aerospace America, November 2022, https://aerospaceamerica.aiaa.org/features/why-the-viasat-hack-still-echoes.

38 Juan Andres Guerrero-Saade and Max van Amerongen, “Acidrain: A Modem Wiper Rains down on Europe,” SentinelOne, April 1, 2022, https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/acidrain-a-modem-wiper-rains-down-on-europe/.

39 Guerrero-Saade and Van Amerongen, “Acidrain.”

40 Joe Uchill, “UK, US, and EU Attribute Viasat Hack Against Ukraine to Russia,” SC Media, June 23, 2022, https://www.scmagazine.com/analysis/threat-intelligence/uk-us-and-eu-attribute-viasat-hack-against-ukraine-to-russia; David E. Sanger and Kate Conger, “Russia Was Behind Cyberattack in Run-Up to Ukraine War, Investigation Finds,” New York Times, May 10, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/10/us/politics/russia-cyberattack-ukraine-war.html.

41 Kim Zetter, “ViaSat Hack ‘Did Not’ Have Huge Impact on Ukrainian Military Communications, Official Says,” Zero Day, September 26, 2022, https://zetter.substack.com/p/viasat-hack-did-not-have-huge-impact; “Satellite Outage Caused ‘Huge Loss in Communications’ at War’s Outset—Ukrainian Official,” Reuters, March 15, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/satellite-outage-caused-huge-loss-communications-wars-outset-ukrainian-official-2022-03-15/.

42 ”Reuters, “Satellite Outage.”

43 Sean Lyngaas, “US Satellite Operator Says Persistent Cyberattack at Beginning of Ukraine War Affected Tens of Thousands of Customers, CNN, March 30, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/30/politics/ukraine-cyberattack-viasat-satellite/index.html.

44 Zetter, “ViaSat Hack.”

45 Burgess, “A Mysterious Satellite Hack” Zetter, “ViaSat Hack”; Valentino, “Why the ViaSat Hack.”

46 Jurgita Lapienytė, “ViaSat Hack Impacted French Critical Services,” CyberNews, August 22, 2022, https://cybernews.com/news/viasat-hack-impacted-french-critical-services/.

47 International Committee of the Red Cross, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 1125 UNTS 3 (June 8, 1977), accessed January 18, 2023, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36b4.html; Zhanna L. Malekos Smith, “No ‘Bright-Line Rule’ Shines on Targeting Commercial Satellites,” The Hill, November 28, 2022, https://thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/3747182-no-bright-line-rule-shines-on-targeting-commercial-satellites/; Anaïs Maroonian, “Proportionality in International Humanitarian Law: A Principle and a Rule,” Lieber Institute West Point, October 24, 2022, https://lieber.westpoint.edu/proportionality-international-humanitarian-law-principle-rule/#:~:text=The%20rule%20of%20proportionality%20requires,destruction%20of%20a%20military%20objective; Travis Normand and Jessica Poarch, “4 Basic Principles,” The Law of Armed Conflict, January 1, 2017, https://loacblog.com/loac-basics/4-basic-principles/.

48 “Statement by Deputy Head of the Russian Delegation Mr. Konstantin Vorontsov at the Thematic Discussion on Outer Space (Disarmament Aspects) in the First Committee of the 77th Session of the Unga,” Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, October 26, 2022, https://russiaun.ru/en/news/261022_v.

49 Mauro Vignati, “LABScon Replay: Are Digital Technologies Eroding the Principle of Distinction in War?” SentinelOne, November 16, 2022, https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/are-digital-technologies-eroding-the-principle-of-distinction-in-war/.

50 Matt Burgess, “Russia Is Taking over Ukraine’s Internet,” Wired, June 15, 2022, https://www.wired.com/story/ukraine-russia-internet-takeover/.

51 Nino Kuninidze et al., “Interim Assessment on Damages to Telecommunication Infrastructure and Resilience of the ICT Ecosystem in Ukraine.”

52 Adam Satariano and Scott Reinhard, “How Russia Took Over Ukraine’s Internet in Occupied Territories,” The New York Times, August 9, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/08/09/technology/ukraine-internet-russia-censorship.html; https://time.com/6222111/ukraine-internet-russia-reclaimed-territory/

53 Thomas Brewster, “The Last Days of Mariupol’s Internet,” Forbes, March 31, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2022/03/31/the-last-days-of-mariupols-internet/.

54 Matt Burgess, “Russia Is Taking over Ukraine’s Internet,” Wired, June 15, 2022, https://www.wired.com/story/ukraine-russia-internet-takeover/; Satariano and Reinhard, “How Russia Took.”

55 ”Vera Bergengruen, “The Battle for Control over Ukraine’s Internet,” Time, October 18, 2022, https://time.com/6222111/ukraine-internet-russia-reclaimed-territory/.

56 Herbert Lin, “Russian Cyber Operations in the Invasion of Ukraine,” Cyber Defense Review (Fall 2022): 35, https://cyberdefensereview.army.mil/Portals/6/Documents/2022_fall/02_Lin.pdf, Herb Lin, “The Emergence of Physically Mediated Cyberattacks?,” Lawfare, May 21, 2022, https://www.lawfareblog.com/emergence-physically-mediated-cyberattacks; “Invaders Use Blackmailing and Intimidation to Force Ukrainian Internet Service Providers to Connect to Russian Networks,” State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine, May 13, 2022, https://cip.gov.ua/en/news/okupanti-shantazhem-i-pogrozami-zmushuyut-ukrayinskikh-provaideriv-pidklyuchatisya-do-rosiiskikh-merezh; Satariano and Reinhard, “How Russia Took.”

57 Gian M. Volpicelli, “How Ukraine’s Internet Can Fend off Russian Attacks,” Wired, March 1, 2022, https://www.wired.com/story/internet-ukraine-russia-cyberattacks/; Satariano and Reinhard, “How Russia Took.”

58 David R. Marples, “Russia’s War Goals in Ukraine,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 64, no. 2–3 (March 2022): 207–219, https://doi.org/10.1080/00085006.2022.2107837.

59 David Klepper, “Russian Propaganda ‘Outgunned’ by Social Media Rebuttals,” AP News, March 4, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-volodymyr-zelenskyy-kyiv-technology-misinformation-5e884b85f8dbb54d16f5f10d105fe850; Marc Champion and Daryna Krasnolutska, “Ukraine’s TV Comedian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy Finds His Role as Wartime Leader,” Japan Times, June 7, 2022, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/02/26/world/volodymyr-zelenskyy-wartime-president/;“Российское Телевидение Сообщило Об ‘Бегстве Зеленского’ Из Киева, Но Умолчало Про Жертвы Среди Гражданских,” Агентство, October 10, 2022, https://web.archive.org/web/20221010195154/https://www.agents.media/propaganda-obstreli/.

60 To learn more about Russian disinformation efforts against Ukraine and its allies, check out the Russian Narratives Reports from the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab: Nika Aleksejeva et al., Andy Carvin ed., “Narrative Warfare: How the Kremlin and Russian News Outlets Justified a War of Aggression against Ukraine,” Atlantic Council, February 22, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/narrative-warfare/; Roman Osadchuk et al., Andy Carvin ed., “Undermining Ukraine: How the Kremlin Employs Information Operations to Erode Global Confidence in Ukraine,” Atlantic Council, February 22, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/undermining-ukraine/.

61 Олександр Янковський, “‘Бояться Спротиву’. Для Чого РФ Захоплює Мобільний Зв’язок Та Інтернет На Херсонщині?,” Радіо Свобода, May 7, 2022, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/novyny-pryazovya-khersonshchyna-okupatsiya-rosiya-mobilnyy-zvyazok-internet/31838946.html.

62 Volodymyr Zelenskyy, “Tell People in the Occupied Territories about Ukraine, That the Ukrainian Army Will Definitely Come—Address by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy,” President of Ukraine Official Website, June 13, 2022, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/govorit-lyudyam-na-okupovanih-teritoriyah-pro-ukrayinu-pro-t-75801.

63 Satariano and Reinhard, “How Russia Took.”

64 Michael Sheldon, “Geolocating Russia’s Indiscriminate Shelling of Kharkiv,” DFRLab, March 1, 2022, https://medium.com/dfrlab/geolocating-russias-indiscriminate-shelling-of-kharkiv-deaccc830846; Michael Sheldon, “Kharkiv Neighborhood Experienced Ongoing Shelling Prior to February 28 Attack,” DFRLab, February 28, 2022, https://medium.com/dfrlab/kharkiv-neighborhood-experienced-ongoing-shelling-prior-to-february-28-attack-f767230ad6f6; https://maphub.net/Cen4infoRes/russian-ukraine-monitor; Michael Sheldon (@Michael1Sheldon), “Damage to civilian houses in the Zalyutino neighborhood of Kharkiv. https://t.me/c/1347456995/38991 …,” Twitter, February 27, 2022, 4:15 p.m., https://twitter.com/Michael1Sheldon/status/1498044130416594947; Michael Sheldon, “Missile Systems and Tanks Spotted in Russian Far East, Heading West,” DFRLab, January 27, 2022, https://medium.com/dfrlab/missile-systems-and-tanks-spotted-in-russian-far-east-heading-west-6d2a4fe7717a; Jay in Kyiv (@JayinKyiv), “Not yet 24 hours after Ukraine devastated Russian positions in Kherson, a massive Russian convoy is now leaving Melitopol to replace them. This is on Alekseev …,” Twitter, July 12, 2022, 7:50 a.m., https://twitter.com/JayinKyiv/status/1546824416218193921; “Eyes on Russia Map,” Centre for Information Resilience, https://eyesonrussia.org/.

65 Katerina Sergatskova, What You Should Know About Life in the Occupied Areas in Ukraine, Wilson Center, September 14, 2022, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/what-you-should-know-about-life-occupied-areas-ukraine; Jonathan Landay, “Village near Kherson Rejoices at Russian Rout, Recalls Life under Occupation,” Reuters, November 12, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/village-near-kherson-rejoices-russian-rout-recalls-life-under-occupation-2022-11-11/.

66 Andrew Salerno-Garthwaite, “OSINT in Ukraine: Civilians in the Kill Chain and the Information Space,” Global Defence Technology 137 (2022), https://defence.nridigital.com/global_defence_technology_oct22/osint_in_ukraine; “How Has Open-Source Intelligence Influenced the War in Ukraine?” Economist, August 30, 2022, https://www.economist.com/ukraine-osint-pod; Gillian Tett, “Inside Ukraine’s Open-Source War,” Financial Times, July 22, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/297d3300-1a65-4793-982b-1ba2372241a3; Amy Zegart, “Open Secrets,” Foreign Affairs, January 7, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/open-secrets-ukraine-intelligence-revolution-amy-zegart?utm_source=twitter_posts&utm_campaign=tw_daily_soc&utm_medium=social.

67 Lin, “The Emergence.”

68 “Cyber Security Strategy of Ukraine,” Presidential Decree of Ukraine, March 15, 2016, https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/NationalCyberSecurityStrategy_Ukraine.pdf.

69 Eric Geller, “Ukraine Prepares to Remove Data from Russia’s Reach,” POLITICO, February 22, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/02/22/ukraine-centralized-its-data-after-the-last-russian-invasion-now-it-may-need-to-evacuate-it-00010777.

70 Kuninidze et al., “Interim Assessment.”

71 Kuninidze et al., “Interim Assessment.”

72 “Datagroup to Invest $20 Million into a Large-Scale Network Modernization Project in Partnership with Cisco,” Datagroup, April 8, 2021, https://www.datagroup.ua/en/novyny/datagrup-investuye-20-mln-dolariv-u-masshtabnij-proyekt-iz-m-314.

73 Lauriane Giet, “Eutech4ukraine—Cisco’s Contribution to Bring Connectivity and Cybersecurity to Ukraine and Skills to Ukrainian Refugees,” Futurium, June 22, 2022, https://futurium.ec.europa.eu/en/digital-compass/tech4ukraine/your-support-ukraine/ciscos-contribution-bring-connectivity-and-cybersecurity-ukraine-and-skills-ukrainian-refugees; “Communiqué de Presse Solidarité Européenne Envers l’Ukraine: Nouveau Convoi d’Équipements Informatiques,” Government of France, May 25, 2022, https://minefi.hosting.augure.com/Augure_Minefi/r/ContenuEnLigne/Download?id=4FFB30F8-F59C-45A0-979E-379E3CEC18AF&filename=06%20-%20Solidarit%C3%A9%20europ%C3%A9enne%20envers%20l%E2%80%99Ukraine%20-%20nouveau%20convoi%20d%E2%80%99%C3%A9quipements%20informatiques.pdf.

74 ”Atlantic Council, “Ukraine’s Digital Resilience: A conversation with Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Mykhailo Fedorov,” December 2, 2022, YouTube video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vl75e0QU6uE.

75 “Digital Country—Official Website of Ukraine,” Ukraine Now (Government of Ukraine), accessed January 17, 2023, https://ukraine.ua/invest-trade/digitalization/; Atlantic Council, “Ukraine’s Digital Resilience.”

76 Brad Smith, “Extending Our Vital Technology Support for Ukraine,” Microsoft, November 3, 2022, https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/11/03/our-tech-support-ukraine/; “How Amazon Is Assisting in Ukraine,” Amazon, March 1, 2022, https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/community/amazons-assistance-in-ukraine; Phil Venables, “How Google Cloud Is Helping Those Affected by War in Ukraine,” Google, March 3, 2022, https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/identity-security/how-google-cloud-is-helping-those-affected-by-war-in-ukraine.

77 Simon Handler, Lily Liu, and Trey Herr, Dude, Where’s My Cloud? A Guide for Wonks and Users, Atlantic Council, July 7, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/dude-wheres-my-cloud-a-guide-for-wonks-and-users/.

78 Handler, Liu, and Herr, “Dude, Where’s My Cloud?”

79 Brad Smith, “Defending Ukraine: Early Lessons from the Cyber War,” Microsoft On the Issues, November 2, 2022, https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/06/22/defending-ukraine-early-lessons-from-the-cyber-war/; Smith, “Extending Our Vital Technology.”

80 Amazon, “How Amazon Is Assisting”; Sebastian Moss, “Ukraine Awards Microsoft and AWS Peace Prize for Cloud Services and Digital Support,” Data Center Dynamics, January 12, 2023, https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/ukraine-awards-microsoft-and-aws-peace-prize-for-cloud-services-digital-support/; Venables, “How Google Cloud”; Kent Walker, “Helping Ukraine,” Google, March 4, 2022, https://blog.google/inside-google/company-announcements/helping-ukraine/.

81 Catherine Stupp, “Ukraine Has Begun Moving Sensitive Data Outside Its Borders,” Wall Street Journal, June 14, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-has-begun-moving-sensitive-data-outside-its-borders-11655199002; Atlantic Council, “Ukraine’s Digital Resilience”; Smith, “Defending Ukraine.”

82 Nick Beecroft, Evaluating the International Support to Ukrainian Cyber Defense, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 3, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/11/03/evaluating-international-support-to-ukrainian-cyber-defense-pub-88322.

83 Smith, “Defending Ukraine,” 5, 6, 9.

84 Smith, “Defending Ukraine,” 3, 11.

85 Thomas Brewster, “Bombs and Hackers Are Battering Ukraine’s Internet Providers. ‘Hidden Heroes’ Risk Their Lives to Keep Their Country Online,” Forbes, March 15, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2022/03/15/internet-technicians-are-the-hidden-heroes-of-the-russia-ukraine-war/?sh=be5da1428844.

86 Kuninidze et al., “Interim Assessment,” 40.

87 Kuninidze et al., “Interim Assessment,”40; ““Київстар Виділяє 300 Мільйонів Гривень Для Відновлення Цифрової Інфраструктури України,” Київстар, July 4, 2022, https://kyivstar.ua/uk/mm/news-and-promotions/kyyivstar-vydilyaye-300-milyoniv-gryven-dlya-vidnovlennya-cyfrovoyi.

88 Київстар, “Київстар Виділяє”; “Mobile Connection Lifecell—Lifecell Ukraine,” Lifecell UA, accessed January 17, 2023, https://www.lifecell.ua/en/.

89 Ryan Gallagher, “Russia–Ukraine War: Telecom Workers Damage Own Equipment to Thwart Russia,” Bloomberg, June 21, 2022), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-21/ukrainian-telecom-workers-damage-own-equipment-to-thwart-russia.

90 Mykhailo Fedorov (@FedorovMykhailo), Twitter, February 26, 2022, 7:06 a.m., https://twitter.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/1497543633293266944?s=20&t=c9Uc7CDXEBr-e5-nd2hEtw.

91 Mykhailo Fedorov (@FedorovMykhailo), “Starlink — here. Thanks, @elonmusk,” Twitter, February 28, 2022, 3:19 p.m., https://twitter.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/1498392515262746630?s=20&t=vtCM9UqgWRkfxfrEHzYTGg.

92 Atlantic Council, “Ukraine’s Digital Resilience.”

93 “How Elon Musk’s Satellites Have Saved Ukraine and Changed Warfare,” Economist, January 5, 2023, https://www.economist.com/briefing/2023/01/05/how-elon-musks-satellites-have-saved-ukraine-and-changed-warfare.

94 Alexander Freund, “Ukraine Using Starlink for Drone Strikes,” Deutsche Welle, March 27, 2022, https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-is-using-elon-musks-starlink-for-drone-strikes/a-61270528.

95 Mykhailo Fedorov (@FedorovMykhailo), “Over 100 cruise missiles attacked 🇺🇦 energy and communications infrastructure. But with Starlink we quickly restored the connection in critical areas. Starlink …,” Twitter, October 12, 2022 3:12 p.m., https://twitter.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/1580275214272802817.

96 Rishi Iyengar, “Why Ukraine Is Stuck with Elon (for Now),” Foreign Policy, November 22, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/22/ukraine-internet-starlink-elon-musk-russia-war/.

97 Economist, “How Elon Musk’s.”

98 Freund, “Ukraine Using Starlink”; Nick Allen and James Titcomb, “Elon Musk’s Starlink Helping Ukraine to Win the Drone War,” Telegraph, March 18, 2022, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/03/18/elon-musks-starlink-helping-ukraine-win-drone-war/; Charlie Parker, “Specialist Ukrainian Drone Unit Picks off Invading Russian Forces as They Sleep,” Times, March 18, 2022, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/specialist-drone-unit-picks-off-invading-forces-as-they-sleep-zlx3dj7bb.

99 Matthew Gault, “Mysterious Sea Drone Surfaces in Crimea,” Vice, September 26, 2022, https://www.vice.com/en/article/xgy4q7/mysterious-sea-drone-surfaces-in-crimea.

100 Economist, “How Elon Musk’s.”

101 Akash Sriram, “SpaceX, USAID Deliver 5,000 Satellite Internet Terminals to Ukraine Akash Sriram,” Reuters, April 6, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/technology/spacex-usaid-deliver-5000-satellite-internet-terminals-ukraine-2022-04-06/.

102 Alex Marquardt, “Exclusive: Musk’s Spacex Says It Can No Longer Pay for Critical Satellite Services in Ukraine, Asks Pentagon to Pick up the Tab,” CNN, October 14, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/13/politics/elon-musk-spacex-starlink-ukraine.

103 Elon Musk (@elonmusk), “Ukraine-Russia Peace: – Redo elections of annexed regions under UN supervision. Russia leaves if that is will of the people. – Crimea formally part of Russia, as it has been since 1783 (until …” Twitter, October 3, 2022 12:15 p.m., https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1576969255031296000; Andrij Melnyk (@MelnykAndrij), Twitter, October 3, 2022, 12:46 p.m., https://twitter.com/MelnykAndrij/status/1576977000178208768.

104 Elon Musk (@elonmusk), Twitter, October 14, 2022, 3:14 a.m., https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1580819437824839681; Elon Musk (@elonmusk), Twitter, October 15, 2022, 2:06 p.m., https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1581345747777179651.

105 Elon Musk (@elonmusk), Twitter, October 17, 2022, 3:52 p.m., https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1582097354576265217; Sawyer Merrit (@SawyerMerritt), “BREAKING: The Pentagon is considering paying for @SpaceX ‘s Starlink satellite network — which has been a lifeline for Ukraine — from a fund that has been used …,” Twitter, October 17, 2022, 3:09 p.m., https://twitter.com/SawyerMerritt/status/1582086349305262080.

106 Alex Marquardt and Sean Lyngaas, “Ukraine Suffered a Comms Outage When 1,300 SpaceX Satellite Units Went Offline over Funding Issues” CNN, November 7, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/04/politics/spacex-ukraine-elon-musk-starlink-internet-outage/; Iyengar, “Why Ukraine Is Stuck.”

107 Ryan Browne, “Ukraine Government Is Seeking Alternatives to Elon Musk’s Starlink, Vice PM Says,” CNBC, November 3, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/11/03/ukraine-government-seeking-alternatives-to-elon-musks-starlink.html.

108 William Harwood, “SpaceX Launches 40 OneWeb Broadband Satellites, Lighting up Overnight Sky,” CBS News, January 10, 2023, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/spacex-launches-40-oneweb-broadband-satellites-in-overnight-spectacle/.

109 Marquardt and Lyngaas, “Ukraine Suffered”; Mehul Srivastava et al., “Ukrainian Forces Report Starlink Outages During Push Against Russia,” Financial Times, October 7, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/9a7b922b-2435-4ac7-acdb-0ec9a6dc8397.

110 Alex Marquardt and Kristin Fisher, “SpaceX admits blocking Ukrainian troops from using satellite technology,” CNN, February 9, https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/09/politics/spacex-ukrainian-troops-satellite-technology/index.html.

111 Charles R. Davis, “Elon Musk Blocked Ukraine from Using Starlink in Crimea over Concern that Putin Could Use Nuclear Weapons, Political Analyst Says,” Business Insider, October 11, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/elon-musk-blocks-starlink-in-crimea-amid-nuclear-fears-report-2022-10; Elon Musk (@elonmusk), Twitter, February 12, 2022, 4:00 p.m., https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1624876021433368578.

112 Mykhailo Fedorov (@FedorovMykhailo), “In 21 days of the war, russian troops has already killed 100 Ukrainian children. they are using DJI products in order to navigate their missile. @DJIGlobal are you sure you want to be a …,” Twitter, March 16, 2022, 8:14 a.m., https://twitter.com/fedorovmykhailo/status/1504068644195733504; Cat Zakrzewski, “4,000 Letters and Four Hours of Sleep: Ukrainian Leader Wages Digital War,” Washington Post, March 30, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/03/30/mykhailo-fedorov-ukraine-digital-front/.

113 DJI Global (@DJIGlobal), “Dear Vice Prime Minister Federov: All DJI products are designed for civilian use and do not meet military specifications. The visibility given by AeroScope and further Remote ID …,” Twitter, March 16, 2022, 5:42 p.m., https://twitter.com/DJIGlobal/status/1504206884240183297.

114 Mehul Srivastava and Roman Olearchyk, “Starlink Prices in Ukraine Nearly Double as Mobile Networks Falter,” Financial Times, November 29, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/f69b75cf-c36a-4ab3-9eb7-ad0aa00d230c.

115 Iyengar, “Why Ukraine Is Stuck.”

116 Michael Sheetz, “SpaceX Raises Another $250 Million in Equity, Lifts Total to $2 Billion in 2022,” CNBC, August 5, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/08/05/elon-musks-spacex-raises-250-million-in-equity.html.

117 “Starshield,” SpaceX, accessed January 17, 2023, https://www.spacex.com/starshield/; Micah Maidenberg and Drew FitzGerald, “Elon Musk’s Spacex Courts Military with New Starshield Project,” Wall Street Journal, December 8, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/elon-musks-spacex-courts-military-with-new-starshield-project-11670511020.

118 “Maps: Tracking the Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” New York Times, February 14, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/world/europe/ukraine-maps.html#:~:text=Ukraine%20has%20reclaimed%2054%20percent,for%20the%20Study%20of%20War; Júlia Ledur, Laris Karklis, Ruby Mellen, Chris Alcantara, Aaron Steckelberg and Lauren Tierney, “Follow the 600-mile front line between Ukrainian and Russian forces,” The Washington Post, February 21, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2023/russia-ukraine-front-line-map/.

119 Jimmy Rushton (@JimmySecUK), “Ukrainian soldiers deploying a Starlink satellite internet system in liberated Kherson, allowing local residents to communicate with their relatives in other areas of Ukraine,” Twitter, November 12, 2022, 8:07 a.m., https://twitter.com/JimmySecUK/status/1591417328134402050; José Andrés (@chefjoseandres), “@elonmusk While I don’t agree with you about giving voice to people that brings the worst out of all of us, thanks for @SpaceXStarlink in Kherson, a city with no electricity, or in a train from …,” Twitter, November 20, 2022, 1:58 a.m., https://twitter.com/chefjoseandres/status/1594223613795762176.

120 Mykhailo Fedorov (@FedorovMykhailo), “Every front makes its contribution to the upcoming victory. These are Anatoliy, Viktor, Ivan and Andrii from @Vodafone_UA team, who work daily to restore mobile and Internet communications …,” Twitter, April 25, 2022, 1:13 p.m., https://twitter.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/1518639261624455168; Mykhailo Fedorov (@FedorovMykhailo), “Can you see a Starlink? But it’s here. While providers are repairing cable damages, Gostomel’s humanitarian headquarter works via the Starlink. Thanks to @SpaceX …,” Twitter, May 8, 2022, 9:48 a.m., https://twitter.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/1523298788794052615.

121 Thomas Brewster, “Ukraine’s Engineers Dodged Russian Mines to Get Kherson Back Online–with a Little Help from Elon Musk’s Satellites,” Forbes, November 18, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2022/11/18/ukraine-gets-kherson-online-after-russian-retreat-with-elon-musk-starlink-help/?sh=186e24b0ef1e.

122 Mark Didenko, ed., “Ukrtelecom Car Hits Landmine in Sumy Region, One Dead, Three Injured,” Yahoo!, October 2, 2022, https://www.yahoo.com/video/ukrtelecom-car-hits-landmine-sumy-104300649.html.

123 Vera Bergengruen, “The Battle for Control over Ukraine’s Internet,” Time, October 18, 2022, https://time.com/6222111/ukraine-internet-russia-reclaimed-territory/.

124 Bergengruen, “The Battle for Control over Ukraine’s Internet.”

125 Atlantic Council, “Ukraine’s Digital Resilience: A conversation with Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Mykhailo Fedorov,” December 2, 2022, YouTube video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vl75e0QU6uE; “Keeping connected: connectivity resilience in Ukraine,” EU4Digital, February 13, 2022, https://eufordigital.eu/keeping-connected-connectivity-resilience-in-ukraine/.

126 Greg Rattray, Geoff Brown, and Robert Taj Moore, “The Cyber Defense Assistance Imperative Lessons from Ukraine,” The Aspen Institute, February 16, 2023, https://www.aspeninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Aspen-Digital_The-Cyber-Defense-Assistance-Imperative-Lessons-from-Ukraine.pdf, 8.

127 CRDF Global, “CRDF Global becomes Platform for Cyber Defense Assistance Collaborative (CDAC) for Ukraine,” News 19, November 14, 2022, https://whnt.com/business/press-releases/cision/20221114DC34776/crdf-global-becomes-platform-for-cyber-defense-assistance-collaborative-cdac-for-ukraine/; Dina Temple-Raston, “EXCLUSIVE: Rounding Up a Cyber Posse for Ukraine,” The Record, November 18, 2022, https://therecord.media/exclusive-rounding-up-a-cyber-posse-for-ukraine/; Rattray, Brown, and Moore, “The Cyber Defense Assistance Imperative Lessons from Ukraine.”

128 Beecroft, Evaluating the International Support.

129 Lee Hudson, “‘There’s Not Just SpaceX’: Pentagon Looks Beyond Starlink after Musk Says He May End Services in Ukraine,” POLITICO, October 14, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/10/14/starlink-ukraine-elon-musk-pentagon-00061896.

The post A parallel terrain: Public-private defense of the Ukrainian information environment appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Wagner Group fights French ‘zombies’ in cartoon propaganda

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 20 Jan 2023 19:07:43 +0000

As Russia continues its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than seven years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine, as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union (EU), DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

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Reports emerge of internal power struggles between Wagner and Russian defense ministry

On January 13, the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed its forces had taken control of Soledar and could encircle Bakhmut, threatening Ukrainian supply lines. In the statement, the MoD praised the efforts of aviation, artillery, and airborne troops, but did not mention the notable role Wagner played in securing Soledar.

Moscow’s announcement highlighted a long-simmering tension between Wagner and the official structure of the Russian MoD. On January 17, an old letter written by Valery Gerasimov, commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, re-circulated online. The letter, dated December 29, 2022, stated that Wagner is not included in the structure of the Russian armed forces. Gerasimov wrote the letter in response to an inquiry to the Russian MoD made by Evgeny Stupin, a lawyer for the Moscow City Duma. On January 15, President Vladimir Putin also attributed the Soledar success to the MoD.

On the day that Russia claimed Soledar, military bloggers affiliated with the Kremlin claimed there was an ongoing conflict between the MoD and Wagner founder Yevgeny Prigozhin. On January 15, Prigozhin awarded medals to Wagner soldiers for the capture of Soledar. On January 16, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov dispelled reports of an ongoing conflict between Prigozhin and Russian army command, claiming the reports are “products of information manipulation.” Later in the day, when asked about Peskov’s comments, Prigozhin also dispelled the reports, saying, “I see no reason not to trust Peskov.”

On January 19, Prigozhin said that Wagner soldiers were concentrating on taking the suburban city of Klishchiivka, south of Bakhmut. This information has yet to be confirmed by the Russian MoD.

Elsewhere, on January 14, Ukrainian officials reported that Russia conducted fifty missile and three air strikes against Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Kryvyi Rih, Dnipro, Vinnytsia, and other settlements in West Ukraine. Ukrainian forces said that Russia used S-300 and S-400 systems against ground targets in Kyiv in the morning and later launched high-precision weapons, including twenty-eight cruise missile strikes using Kh-101, Kh-555, and Kh-59 guided air missiles and the sea-based 3M-14 Kalibr.

In Marinka, the Ukrainian army repelled renewed Russian attacks on January 17 and 18. Russian forces have been storming the settlement since last March, resulting in widespread destruction. The Russian forces also conducted raids in the area of Bilohorivka in Luhansk oblast and Krasna Hora, Bakhmut, Klischiyivka, Vodyane, Nevelske, and Pobieda in Donetsk oblast.

Chechen volunteer forces have become increasingly active in the fight around Bakhmut. There are at least two battalions of Chechens—the Sheikh Mansur Battalion and Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion—fighting for the Ukrainian army on the Bakhmut frontline. On a tactical level, the Chechen battalions are working together in some areas, like in Opytne, where they attacked Russian positions. The Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion also maintains a reconnaissance unit, “Adam,” currently located in Donetsk oblast.

On January 16, a Russian rocket struck a civilian building in Dnipro, killing at least forty-five people, including six children, marking the single deadliest civilian attack since the war began. Ukraine said it does not have air-defense systems that can intercept Russian KH-22 missiles; to ward off future missiles would require Western partners to donate advanced air defenses such as the US MIM-104 Patriot missile system.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Russian forces allegedly use incendiary munitions in Kherson, youth center burns

On January 18, Russian shelling intensified on the southern frontline in Ukraine, which stretches from Kamianske in the Zaporizhzhia region to Vuhledar in the south of Donetsk oblast. After a night of heavy shelling, videos and photos emerged online showing that the Russian army had used what appears to incendiary ammunition in city of Kherson and nearby Beryslav.

The morning after the strike, videos and photos shared online showed the resulting damage. A local Kherson newspaper reported that a religious youth center had burned down as a result of the shelling. The DFRLab geolocated the youth center and confirmed that it was along the pathway of the airstrike but cannot confirm whether incendiary munitions were involved.

Top left: Screenshot of footage showing the burning youth center. Top right: Google Street View image of the youth center prior to the incident. Bottom left: Google map view of the building from above. Bottom right: Google map view from a higher altitude. Green boxes show the front of the building while blue boxes show the building’s windows. (Source: Kherson Online, top left; Google Maps, top right, bottom left, and bottom right)

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Missile fragments, rocket warhead fall on Moldovan territory

Fragments of a Russian missile targeting Ukraine fell on Moldova territory on January 14 in the town of Larga, Briceni district. According to Moldova’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, a warhead fueled with approximately eighty kilograms of explosive material was also discovered among the debris. The next day, authorities reported that specialist teams had carried out controlled detonations of the remaining explosives. The Ministry of Defense noted that the army’s aerial surveillance system did not record a violation of Moldovan airspace, however.

Authorities in Chisinau have strongly condemned the attacks on neighboring Ukraine. “This is the reality of war, imposed by the aggressor, right here in our region,” stressed Moldovan President Maia Sandu. “The missiles reach Moldova as well—the fragments discovered yesterday in the Briceni district testify to this. We strongly condemn Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Attacks on urban infrastructure and the killing of civilians are war crimes; they have no justification.”

Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilita also condemned Russia’s January 14 missile attacks on Ukrainian cities. “There is no political, historical, and even more so moral justification for killing civilians and attacking the infrastructure that ensures the survival of the population,” she said. “I express my deep indignation at the new massive attack on Ukraine. I express my support for the heroic Ukrainian people and our support for the victims of Russia’s barbaric attacks.”

This is the third time missile fragments have landed in Moldova, which is not a member of the European Union or NATO. On December 5, Moldovan border police discovered a missile in an orchard, also in the Briceni district. In October 2022, a Russian missile shot down by a Ukrainian anti-aircraft system fell in the village of Naslavcea, located along the border with Ukraine, shattering windows of several residences as a result of the explosion.

—Victoria Olari, research assistant, Chisinau, Moldova

Animation depicts Wagner forces fighting French “zombies” in West Africa

An animated video showing a Wagner operative helping West African countries defeat zombie French soldiers began circulating on social media and pro-Kremlin Telegram channels this week. While the origin of the video is currently unknown, it appears to have first shown up on Twitter on January 14th, then migrated to alternative video platforms before being shared across pro-Russian Telegram channels.

Après le rat, une nouvelle animation où le groupe #WagnerGroup apparaît en sauveur du #Mali et #BurkinaFaso contre la #France qui est cette fois dépeinte comme un serpent / new anti French / pro #WagnerGroup cartoon emerging on social media https://t.co/Nxi5Esn2Oo
— alleyesonwagner (@alleyesonwagner) January 14, 2023

By depicting Wagner forces as heroes, the video promotes a pro-Russian, anti-French narrative that has spread in recent years across West African social media. The animation depicts Wagner soldiers assisting local militaries in Mali and Burkina Faso in removing French forces, represented in the animation as hordes of zombies and a giant cobra. In Mali, a Wagner operative parachutes into the zombie horde and provides ammunition to a Malian soldier who is subsequently able to defeat the undead, while in Burkina Faso, Wagner provides a rocket-propelled grenade to kill the French cobra.

A screenshot of the video shows a Malian soldier and Wagner operative grasping hands after successfully defeating French zombies, likely an homage to the Arnold Schwarzenegger film Predator and the many memes it spawned.

Russia’s involvement in West Africa does not come in the form of simple weapons deliveries, however. Recent reports indicate that since Russia’s deployment in Mali more than one year ago, violence against civilians has significantly increased, and extremist forces have grown stronger.

The final shots of the animated video show Wagner operatives driving from Burkina Faso to Côte d’Ivoire, which is also under siege by French zombies.

The video ends with Wagner forces heading towards Côte d’Ivoire, where French zombies overwhelm an Ivorian soldier. The imagery implies that Wagner aims to send forces to the coastal country.

This is not the first time Wagner has created animated propaganda. In another animation, France was represented as a rat killed by Wagner. And in a comic strip spread in Central African Republic (CAR), Wagner operatives are again depicted fighting zombies, however in the case of CAR the zombies do not represent the French.

Support for France has declined significantly in Francophone Africa, while calls for Russian assistance to fight jihadists has increased.

—Tessa Knight, research associate, London, United Kingdom

Flurry of conflicting theories circulate among pro-Kremlin sources following deadly helicopter crash

On January 18, a helicopter crash in Brovary, near Kyiv, killed sixteen people, including three children, Ukraine’s interior minister, his deputy, and the ministry secretary. The helicopter crashed near a kindergarten. Ukrainian security services investigating the crash are considering three possible scenarios, including a violation of flight rules, a technical malfunction, or intentional sabotage. In the meantime, pro-Kremlin sources are already sharing conflicting narratives about the incident.

One of the first narratives to emerge suggested that Ukraine’s air-defense systems shot down the helicopter. The claim was amplified by pro-Kremlin TV host Olga Skabeyeva on her Telegram channel. Another pro-Kremlin Telegram channel added more details to the claim, saying that “unofficial Ukrainian sources” said the aircraft was shot down by the Stinger or Igla air-defense systems. The claim was also shared on Twitter by a pro-Kremlin account, spreading the narrative to English-speaking audiences. At the time of writing, the English tweet had more than one million views.

Ukrainian air defense shot down Ukrainian helicopter with Ukrainian Minister of Internal Affairs and his deputy onboard. The helicopter crashed in residential area, killing 16 people, incl 2 children. pic.twitter.com/5bFn7jc8Dg
— Vera Van Horne (@VeraVanHorne) January 18, 2023

Other sources took the claim further. The pro-Kremlin Russian outlet Regnum hypothesized that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was behind the crash, publishing a story with the headline, “The crash of the helicopter of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in Brovary – executed by Zelenskyy?”

Meanwhile, pro-Kremlin reporter Sasha Kots reported that European countries had suspended the helicopter model, either a Eurocopter EC225 Super Puma or a H225M, after a 2016 crash in Norway. While it is true that the European Aviation Safety Agency grounded both aircraft type after the Norway crash, it allowed flights to resume roughly six months later. Helicopters of this type are used by both military and civilian operators in France, Brazil, Vietnam, and many other countries. Kots also claimed that after the two models were grounded, France sold its supply to Ukraine, implying that France is also responsible for the tragedy.

In December 2021, Romania and Ukraine entered into an agreement to upgrade five of these helicopter models.

—Roman Osadchuk, research associate

Belarusian state TV accuses Ukrainian embassy of recruiting foreign fighters

On January 16, the state-controlled TV channel Belarus 1 reported that Belarusian security services had arrested Georgian citizen Giorgi Zirakishvili for allegedly trying to enter Ukraine via Belarus to fight against Russia. Belarus 1 reported that the Ukrainian Embassy in Georgia had advised Zirakishvili to travel from Georgia to Ukraine through Belarus. The broadcaster also claimed that Zirakishvili had planned to meet Igor Kizim, Ukraine’s ambassador to Belarus, upon arrival to receive instructions on how to reach Ukraine and join the Georgian Legion, a paramilitary unit mostly comprised of ethnically Georgian volunteers who fight for Ukraine. Belarus 1 also broadcast an alleged recording of a phone conversation in which Zirakishvili believes he is speaking to representatives from the Ukrainian embassy in Belarus. However, Belarus 1 reported that Zirakishvili was actually speaking to representatives from Belarusian security services, who discovered Zirakishvili’s alleged intentions and connected with him by impersonating Ukrainian embassy staff. The report also contains a video recording of Zirakishvili’s meeting with representatives from Belarusian security services, who he apparently believed were representatives of the Ukrainian embassy.

Belarus 1 did not provide any concrete evidence that Zirakishvili had communicated with anyone from the Ukrainian embassy in Belarus. Despite this, the report claims that Kizim is actively recruiting foreign fighters to send to Ukraine. The ambassador responded to the allegations, saying the Belarus 1 story was “nonsense” and “lies, manipulation, and hypocrisy.” He added that the Ukrainian embassy was in contact with the Belarusian foreign affairs ministry regarding the matter.

—Givi Gigitashvili, research associate, Warsaw, Poland

Russian media amplify and exploit Wagner story about French Foreign Legion deserter killed in Ukraine

A January 17 Telegram post published on Yevgeny Prigozhin’s press channel claimed that Wagner forces tracked down and killed a Ukrainian member of the French Foreign Legion in Donetsk. The channel also shared identity cards belonging to a YevheniiKoulyk, including a Ukrainian driver’s license, a French military card, and a French train card.

Yevgeny Prigozhin’s press channel shared Yevhenii Koulyk’s French and Ukrainian identity documents. (Source: Press Service of Prigozhin)

The post was reshared by the Telegram channel WarDonbass and the pro-Russian news outlet DonbassInsider. The Russian press agency TASS also reported on the claim. Several Russian-owned media outlets and Telegram channels shared the post, garnering at least 647,000 views at the time of writing.

The story was then picked up by the Russian news outlet Argumenty I fakty (Arguments and facts), which claimed Koulyk was a NATO agent. One VK post suggested Koulyk was a foreign mercenary and accused Ukraine of not disclosing the number of foreign soldiers killed in the war. The author compared Koulyk’s death to that of Hryhorii Tsekhmystrenko, a Ukrainian-born Canadian volunteer reported killed in Ukraine this week.

According to French journalist and military expert Philippe Chapeleau, the French Foreign Legion allowed its Ukrainian-born fighters a period of leave so they could safely resettle their families in neighboring countries. Those who did not return would be considered deserters. According to that same source, Koulyk had been missing since August 2022 and was therefore considered a deserter.

Koulyk’s death was previously reported as early as January 12. As of January 19, there were a total of 189 posts across news outlets and social media discussing Koulyk.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Serbian president accuses Wagner of recruiting Serbian citizens

In a TV interview on January 16, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic criticized Wagner Group for its attempts to recruit Serbian citizens to participate in the Ukraine war. Vucic slammed Wagner, saying, “Why do you do that to Serbia? Why do you, from Wagner, call anyone from Serbia when you know that it is against our regulations?” He also noted that Serbian legislation prohibits its citizens from participating in foreign armed conflicts and denied recent allegations that Wagner has a presence in Serbia. On January 17, Yevgeny Prigozhin stated that there are no Serbian citizens active in Wagner and that Wagner has never been active in Serbia. The DFRLab previously reported on claims made by Wagner that it was establishing a presence in Serbia.

Vucic also condemned a Wagner advertisement published by the newly established Serbian arm of RT. On January 5, RT Balkan reportedly published an article with the headline, “Wagner published an ad for volunteers, the conditions are more than tempting.” The article, which is no longer available on RT Balkan’s website, allegedly said that Wagner was looking for volunteers ages twenty-two to fifty who are not citizens of Ukraine or any EU or NATO member states. Volunteers were required to be physically healthy, interested in learning, patriots, and strong in spirit; in turn, “everything else will be taught by Wagner members.”

A Google search for the original headline, “Vagnerovci objavili oglas za dobrovoljce, uslovi više nego primamljivi,” retrieved an article with the same title, but the original URL now leads to a different article about Russian prisoners who joined Wagner, fought in Ukraine, and peacefully returned to Russia, where all charges against them were dropped.

—Givi Gigitashvili, research associate, Warsaw, Poland

Ukraine’s allies continue to send military aid, including heavy equipment

Ukraine will receive an unspecified number of Archer systems from Sweden, with Swedish media reporting that Kyiv will receive twelve units. Stockholm will also send fifty CV90 vehicles. Latvia will deliver another military aid package to Ukraine that includes Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, helicopters, small arms, and drones.

Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced on January 10 that the country would donate more NASAMS air-defense systems to Ukraine. These systems will enable Ukrainian forces to enhance ground protection around troop deployments and civilian infrastructure. Canada will also transfer another two hundred armored LAV ACSV Super Bison vehicles to Ukraine.

According to the New York Times, the Pentagon is tapping into a stockpile of US ammunition in Israel to help meet Ukraine’s need for artillery shells. The arms and ammunition stockpile is typically reserved for the Pentagon to use in the Middle East. Meanwhile, on January 19, the Pentagon announced a $2.5 billion security package for Ukraine, including for the first time ninety Stryker armored personnel carriers. These mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles could help infantry advance further into the frontlines. Additionally, the US will provide energy equipment to help Ukraine deal with energy shortages. The $125 million support pack would include turbines, backup power banks, and high-voltage transformers.

On January 14, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak spoke to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and announced that the United Kingdom will send Ukraine fourteen Challenger 2 battle tanks and artillery systems. As of 2021, the British army possessed 227 battle tanks. Sending additional tanks is likely to increase pressure on Germany to send its own Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine, though Germany’s defense minister said Friday that Berlin has not yet decided on the Leopard 2.

Russian citizens living in Bulgaria donated three pickup trucks to the Ukrainian army. They will be used by the Freedom of Russia Legion, a battalion made up of Russian citizens who defected to fight for Ukraine’s Foreign Legion.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

The post Russian War Report: Wagner Group fights French ‘zombies’ in cartoon propaganda appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Scoping the gray zone: Defining terms and policy priorities for engaging competitors below the threshold of conflict

Atlantic Council's Gray Zone Task Force — Thu, 22 Dec 2022 12:28:35 +0000

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TO: US National Security Community

FROM: Atlantic Council’s Gray Zone Task Force

DATE: December 22, 2022

SUBJECT: Scoping the gray zone: Defining terms and policy priorities for engaging competitors below the threshold of conflict

In October, the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense practice convened current and former practitioners and other experts for a private workshop under its Adding Color to the Gray Zone project, which seeks to advance a US and allied strategic framework for hybrid conflict. Participants discussed what actions should and should not be encompassed by the term “gray zone,” the value in defining the gray zone and hybrid conflict, and the most pressing issues for the United States to address in this realm.

Strategic context

Through hybrid conflict or warfare, US adversaries are blurring the lines between peace and war, in a space often referred to as the gray zone. Without firing a single bullet, US adversaries are striking at the fibers of US and allied societies, economies, and governments to test confidence in systems that underwrite both the US constitutional republic and the US-led, rules-based international order. Gray zone competition is a critical and practical element of twenty-first-century security. The ability of the United States to defend against gray zone threats and leverage its advantages for national imperatives will affect its competitive edge in the coming years. There is much debate, however, around what the gray zone and hybrid conflict or warfare signify. While reaching agreement on this terminology is a critical first step for any strategy, it serves only as the early pages of any strategy, and US adversaries are chapters ahead in their respective playbooks.

The value of defining key terms

While definitions for the gray zone and hybrid conflict or warfare are critical for stakeholder synchronization and coordination, reaching consensus on such terminology is neither practical nor worth the effort beyond a common critical mass accomplished through working definitions versus absolute ones. This analysis adopts the following working definitions:

The gray zone is the space in which defensive and offensive activity occurs above the level of cooperation and below the threshold of armed conflict. Gray zone operations, activities, and actions (OAA) are often, but not always, clandestine, covert, unofficial, or outside accepted norms of behavior. Gray zone OAA are aimed at undermining the security of the target entity or projecting the national or organizational interest of the initiator but without triggering active armed conflict. While the gray zone can be thought of chronologically (i.e., after peace, before active hostilities), it is referred to spatially to reflect that this is not necessarily the case. In fact, gray zone activity can occur during active armed conflict between actors.
Hybrid conflict (also referred to as hybrid warfare) is a subset of statecraft that uses the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) levers of national power across the competition continuum, including cooperation, competition (including gray zone OAA), deterrence, and armed conflict for the purposes of achieving national security objective(s) against a state or non-state actor(s). DIME has expanded to include financial, intelligence, law, and development levers, with acronyms such as MIDFIELD and DIMEFIL created to account for this. The continued use of DIME bridges the gap between past and present generations of practitioners and remains consistent with the security community’s default verbiage.

These working definitions are meant to offer a meeting point for further discussion, as the task force recognizes and welcomes debate about what is and is not considered gray zone OAA or hybrid conflict. Providing an 80 percent solution allows us to go beyond definitions and begin tackling the tougher and more substantive question of how the United States and its allies and partners act and respond in the gray zone.

According to these definitions, one might argue that few methods do not fall under the gray zone; everything from political speeches and economic policies to legal agreements and information operations, all the way up to arms sales and active armed conflict, may fall under the umbrella of hybrid conflict. This broad lens, however, deliberately offers a strategic shift in the way in which security threats are viewed. Given that security today is shaped by conventional military threats as well as unconventional military and nonmilitary threats, it compels us to redefine what is meant by conflict and consider it as a spectrum persisting well beyond the physical battlefield, threatening not just the lives of American warfighters but also the American way of life. In a sense, the gray zone can be viewed as a distinct (and limitless) domain, with hybrid conflict the activity that falls within this realm. This does not indicate a novelty in the nature of warfare so much as how war is characterized.

This characterization is another area where a strategic competitor like China is ahead of the United States. Chinese doctrinal literature like Unrestricted Warfare and concepts such as the “Three Warfares” have characterized conflict with the United States in this way for nearly thirty years. It is also consistent with theater campaign plans, which provide guidance to US geographic combatant commanders for coordinating Phase Zero activities shaping the battlespace, and ironically, with Sun Tzu’s quote that “every battle is won before it is ever fought.”

Putting definitions into context

What falls within the gray zone? Put simply, it depends. Gray zone activity persists in a delta of norms, wherein the United States, its allies, and its adversaries are all playing by distinct sets of rules and thus work under different thresholds for conflict.

Beyond lexicon, policymakers need to consider the real-world applications of the gray zone terminology, recognizing that target (who or what is being targeted) and intent (what end state the actor is aiming to accomplish) are two key variables in the gray zone equation, and they affect whether actions are characterized as gray zone activity or ordinary statecraft. Identical policy actions might be classified differently depending on whether they intentionally coerce or deter a specific target. For example, when is policy categorized as purely economic versus coercive? While US government investment requires promise of at least breaking even, China subsidizes its private sector even when a deal is projected to lose money—the former policy satisfies economic interests, whereas the latter points to an ulterior motive.

Furthermore, whether an act is classified as hybrid often depends on where one sits: The US government commonly views its own actions as statecraft while cataloging the same or similar actions conducted by adversaries as hybrid conflict. For example, the 2022 National Defense Strategy characterizes only competitor approaches as falling within the gray zone, even while referencing comparable US and allied methods. Similarly, the enemy always gets a vote, and while the United States may consider certain actions as operational preparation of the environment, competitors may view them as acts of aggression, hostility, or even war. In parallel, the way in which the United States defines and acts in the gray zone affects whether allies and partners follow suit. Definitional and values-driven consensus can ensure like-minded nations and organizations are on the same page when it comes to hybrid conflict.

Key priorities in the gray zone

Countering Chinese and Russian malign activities and deterring aggression. Specific priorities in the gray zone should be framed around the broader strategic goal of preventing and responding to Chinese and Russian hybrid threats. China and Russia are the United States’ key strategic competitors, and nowhere is this more evident than in the gray zone. China leverages hybrid activity to protect its brand of authoritarianism (for example, power projection through its Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure projects), whereas Russia aims to weaken NATO and command its near abroad (e.g., the use of unmarked “Little Green Men” to seize Crimea in 2014). Both China and Russia have long leveraged gray zone activity to inflict significant information, influence, intelligence, and technical losses on the United States and allies. How they manifest hybrid conflict, however, differs: Russia fuses military and nonmilitary methods to sow chaos, while China’s approach is far more pervasive and employs continuous nonmilitary operations to offset US military superiority. The United States’ recognition of a broadening paradigm from legacy traditional deterrence of its adversaries to increased focus on information and influence is central to the integrated deterrence mandated by the US National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy.

Adapting to the information age. Emerging technologies continue to revolutionize how people and nations receive and consume information, necessarily changing the way in which information activity is conducted in the gray zone. Technological advancements are transforming both the hybrid threats facing the United States and the tools at its disposal. For example, for all its good, technological innovation has also caused supply chain sensitivities vulnerable to adversarial exploitation including through industrial espionage, intellectual property theft, and cyberattacks. US entities need to become more creative in anticipating such threats and solving for them, such as through obfuscating data and reducing an adversary’s confidence. Another example is found in open-source intelligence (OSINT). With the proliferation of social media, OSINT can be just as critical as classified sources and methods of intelligence—yet the US government’s traditional bias toward classified intelligence is hindering its ability to stay ahead in the information domain. This space is ripe for public-private partnership, as vulnerabilities are not necessarily housed in US government entities but rather in assets and infrastructure not traditionally or organically protected by the government or military (e.g., social media platforms).

Involving economic policies and institutions. Any discussion of the gray zone is incomplete without adequate consideration of economic policies and their key stakeholders. Economic strategy is a key component of strategic competition, with industrial policy, debt financing, and sovereign debt policy being among the policies leveraged by China and Russia to meet their own strategic ends. Furthermore, US adversaries are targeting the commercial sector, shifting much of the impetus for action on economic and private sector actors that should play a leading role in the gray zone. Civil and commercial partnerships will be a cornerstone of a US response in the gray zone, and the private sector must be strengthened against economic coercion and intellectual property theft or risk weakening the US strategic approach.

The way forward

Gray zone threats are a whole-of-nation problem and should prompt a whole-of-nation response. While the United States currently views the gray zone largely through a military or intelligence framework, and a defensive one at that, other US departments and agencies, commercial stakeholders, and international entities have a major—in some cases leading—role to play.[1] A cohesive US strategy, perhaps coordinated by an entity independent of practitioner equities, is necessary to synchronize and optimize US government and commercial actors and their efforts in this space.

Such a strategy must be well resourced and well articulated. The United States should look past traditional military personnel to build out its hybrid response, creating new paradigms that do not necessarily adhere to the legacy system(s) but involve relevant stakeholders who can view the adversary without political and/or military bias. Moreover, the United States should update the training of its diplomatic corps to ensure its cadre understands the inner workings of key institutions central to their job description. Additionally, communicating with and educating a public audience will be a foundational requirement for gray zone efforts, as society at large must recognize that the United States is routinely fighting in the gray zone and citizens must understand the ways in which they play a role. This approach has precedence in World Wars I and II, and even the Cold War. Consistent and synchronized messaging across the government will help maintain the effectiveness and credibility of the messaging needed to deter adversaries from using hybrid methods.

The Atlantic Council’s Gray Zone Task Force consists of technical and policy experts, former government officials, and private sector executives. These individuals leverage their deep knowledge and extensive experience in impacted and impactful industries to examine adversarial acts in the gray zone and determine how the United States and its allies and partners can leverage hybrid tactics to meet their own strategic ends.

Explore Adding Color to the Gray Zone

Adding color to the gray zone: Establishing a strategic framework for hybrid conflict

Investigating nontraditional and hybrid threats across the competition continuum, proposing a US and allied approach to acting, reacting, and prevailing in the gray zone throughout an era of strategic competition.

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Agachi interviewed by Politico on the biggest unexpected threats to the United States

Anca Agachi — Wed, 14 Dec 2022 09:30:00 +0000

READ THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS

Fellow

Anca Agachi

Nonresident Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

Africa Conflict

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The National Defense Strategy shows the Pentagon’s increased focus on the gray zone. Here’s what that means.

Gray Zone Task Force experts — Tue, 13 Dec 2022 16:18:06 +0000

The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) marks a change in the Pentagon’s tone in several ways, but the most distinctive change may be the emphasis on operating in the gray zone—which was entirely absent from the 2018 summary. With the publication of the 2022 strategy, the Department of Defense (DOD) is officially recognizing that the escalation of competitors’ coercive and malign activities in the gray zone present a challenge to US security; it also calls for campaigning across all spectrums of conflict, pushing the department to make a deliberate effort to coordinate its activities and investments across various theaters and domains. Our experts from the Gray Zone Task Force within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense practice, which aims to develop an integrated strategic framework for US operations in the gray zone, map out what this new focus means for the US defense industry in the coming years.

1. What exactly does the Pentagon mean by activities in the gray zone?

The NDS defines gray zone methods as “coercive approaches that may fall below perceived thresholds for US military action and across areas of responsibility of different parts of the US government.” That definition acknowledges that strategic competitors are increasingly taking the fight off the physical battlefield and using unconventional and nonmilitary means to undermine US and allied security. Adversaries such as China and Russia are not solely—or even primarily—targeting military assets, but rather they are fueling societal and cultural fissures, shaping the information domain, and disrupting economic markets and trade. This is not a new concept: China’s and Russia’s use of nonmilitary means of warfare dates back to Operation Desert Storm, wherein the United States walked away celebrating a decisive battlefield victory while US adversaries began visualizing a future fight in which they could compensate for unparalleled US conventional power through hybrid means.

The DOD’s definition of gray zone activities can be interpreted as purposefully broad, implying that a discussion of modern warfare today is incomplete without discussing threats permeating from the gray zone. However, it is notable that the NDS opted to characterize only competitor or adversary methods as falling within the gray zone, even while mentioning comparable US and allied capabilities and approaches.

Overall, this NDS’s definition of gray zone methods broadens the US defense community’s understanding of who is being targeted in the gray zone and thus who should be implicated in the DOD’s response—and more significant than the definition itself is the prioritization placed on the gray zone. However, this is only one step in the right direction, as different US agencies and departments are currently working under different understandings of what does and does not fall within the gray zone. This lack of consensus or coordination, coupled with an overall lack of direction as to whether and how the United States should fight in the gray zone, hinders an effective whole-of-nation response to a whole-of-nation problem.

—Julia Siegel is an assistant director with the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice.

2. How do gray zone activities fit into the DOD’s integrated deterrence concept?

Integrated deterrence is, at its heart, about shaping behavior to “convince potential adversaries that the costs of their hostile activities far outweigh any possible benefits,” as Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin explained. Integrated deterrence ultimately relies on a full spectrum of incentives, disincentives, messaging, and negotiation, underwritten by credible deterrents of conventional and/or strategic military action. Unsurprisingly, a good amount of the spectrum below the threshold of active armed conflict will reside in the gray zone.

The United States must react to adversarial activity in the gray zone, especially in areas that adversaries perceive as important, to reduce their efficacy; that will require responses that are appropriate, proportionate, and effective. Equally important, the United States must engage proactively in the gray zone to shape competitors’ behavior. Some of the capabilities needed for engaging in the gray zone exist within the DOD, with many housed within US Special Operations Forces core activities, as well as theater security cooperation activities and those at a national level that transcend a single geographic combatant command such as coordination with Five Eyes partners (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) across the globe. Other capabilities, while not organic to the department, are at its disposal through effective partnerships with the intelligence community, other departments (e.g. State, Treasury, and Commerce), and alliances and partnerships. Improving the way the DOD leverages partnerships can potentially result in better outcomes than replicating the partners’ capabilities.

A critical part of integrated deterrence will be how the United States articulates its so-called “red lines,” or adversarial actions that trigger a US military response. In order to effectively shape behavior that supports US and allied interests, US strategy and execution must erase any doubt that such limits and consequences do exist, while simultaneously reducing adversary confidence about their knowledge of precisely where those red lines lie. That deliberate ambiguity keeps adversaries from thinking that everything up to the red line would be “fair game,” and avoids inviting lower-level malign activity. It also avoids the optics of a United States’ “bluff” being called, in part, to avoid walking back on pronounced lines. Lastly, engaging in the gray zone will buy the maneuver time and space required to maintain its competitive edge and deter aggression in the future—the United States cannot waste this advantage with denial, handwringing, and partisanship—especially when it comes to China.

—Arun Iyer is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice and leads its project Adding Color to the Gray Zone.

3. The NDS differentiates between China as the pacing threat and Russia as an acute threat. What does that look like in the gray zone?

The NDS correctly notes that China and Russia pose unique challenges to the United States. The two countries differ in how they impact the United States and in how long their threats last. China’s advances in technology, access to third-country governments and resources, and role as a key global manufacturer means that the United States and allied countries face a strategic, long-term competition against China. All-out war against China would devastate the global economy and cripple US-owned multinational businesses. In contrast, Russia lacks the reach of its Soviet Union days and its impacts on global markets are mostly limited to petrochemicals. As highlighted in its efforts in Ukraine, the Russian military’s decline has been noticed in the waning professionalism of its forces, reliability of material, and overall investment and research and development. Russia would struggle to project traditional military power much outside its border areas.

China, despite recent economic troubles, is a nation on the rise and one that feels it deserves a place at the top of the world order. Although its population is forecasted to decline in the coming years, China will be a global force for decades to come—and its network of businesses, investments, and expatriates provide the country unique access to capabilities that it can leverage both in the gray zone and to meet traditional military goals. For example, TikTok may offer China the ability to push specific anti-US government content to users of the app in North America or in locations where there are ongoing US or NATO military operations. China’s continued investment in technology, education, and international relationships means that the country will continue to build this access in business, academia, and local politics in countries around the world—levers that can be pulled to meet China’s goals without the use of traditional military operations.

In contrast, Russia’s gray-zone capabilities are limited outside of its use of the paramilitary Wagner Group, information manipulation in the digital space, and traditional diplomatic efforts which include foreign intelligence operations to project power and contribute to paramilitary, influence, and harassment operations. As the political elite focuses on ways to make the domestic Russian audience feel powerful during a period of population and economic decline, gray-zone efforts will likely focus on meeting specific needs such as port access or supporting international political leaders. The Kremlin will aim to look strong to domestic and regional audiences, especially in Eastern Europe and South Asia, where Russia typically has influence. Moscow’s overarching threat to global interests will be its use of information operations to sow discord, clearing entry ways for Russian intelligence and business leaders to access locations of interest and providing localized support to fighting parties where political interests align.

—Jennifer A. Counter is a nonresident senior fellow within the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice and is a member of its Adding Color to the Gray Zone Task Force.

4. Deterrence is inherently a messaging game. What does this NDS say about the DOD’s approach to information operations?

Deterrence depends on the adversary’s perception of the United States’ capabilities and intent to use them. It also depends on an impression that if the adversary were to present a challenge, the United States would be able to cause enough damage to outweigh any gain for the adversary and its interests. Gauging an adversary’s perception, therefore, is necessary to understand the current deterrent threshold. Moving the threshold, if necessary, is dictated by how well a military manages the information domain. If a deterrent threshold is evaporating or degrading over time, then adjustments must be made to capabilities and perceived intentions, and then adequately conveyed to the adversary to restore the value of the deterrent. The NDS highlights the Pentagon’s aim to enhance its ability to operate in the information domain as a necessary component of this strategy.

Yet questions remain. The NDS highlights several new features with significant information elements to help organize and subsequently execute military activities across the entire conflict spectrum. First, the NDS’s focus on integrated deterrence calls for improvements across domains, agencies, and countries to better manage conflict in the information domain. Second, campaigns that cover the entire conflict spectrum—overlayed with the increased demands of implementing integrated deterrence—will require significant additional resources for all information components of the DOD. Who will manage a global information campaign in which all departmental information resources must be coherent, synchronized, and operationally relevant? Will the president’s budget for fiscal year 2024 reflect the need for additional resources to adequately coordinate campaigns that are overlapping and will run simultaneously across agencies, partners, and allies? Finally, is the department adequately organized to elevate information operations as a preeminent component of national power needed to implement integrated deterrence? The NDS is a good step forward, but organization and resourcing leading up to fiscal year 2024 will determine whether it can be implemented.

—Robert J. Giesler is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice and is a member of its Adding Color to the Gray Zone Task Force.

5. How can the US government and private sector complement traditional military efforts?

In roughly eighty pages, the 2022 NDS references economic tools fewer than a dozen times. While not surprising given that the document sets forth the DOD’s strategy, which consists primarily of non-economic tools, this underscores the importance of relying on other government agencies and departments to address what the NDS refers to as “economic coercion” carried out by the China against the United States and its allies and partners. China’s Belt and Road Initiative is the shining example of this coercion, as it forces recipient nations to forfeit direct or indirect control over key strategic assets (such as a ports, airports, rail lines, and highways) if they fail to pay commercial loans. However, myriad other examples of economic coercion exist, including currency manipulation, technology transfer requirements (i.e., China requiring foreign firms to transfer technology to local firms in exchange for market access), and punitive tariffs.

So how can the United States combat economic hybrid warfare? The NDS acknowledges that DOD ought to rely on other agencies to take the lead on economic matters in the gray zone, stating that in many cases, tools such as economic measures “conducted by other US departments and agencies may prove more effective” than DOD’s military tools. This is where the panoply of US trade agencies—in conjunction with the Treasury and Commerce departments—can play a key role by establishing consistent, cross-agency policies regarding foreign investment, credit finance, trade policy, and sanctions to protect US defense interests and regain economic advantage. Still, DOD plays a significant role in advising these agencies on how to prioritize geographic focus areas and in evaluating where the greatest economic threats to US national security exist.

—David Fogel is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice and is a member of its Adding Color to the Gray Zone Task Force.

6. How should the DOD change its approach to counterintelligence (CI) under the integrated deterrence framework?

Integrated deterrence ought to include the use of CI capabilities resident within DOD’s authorities via Title 10 of the US Code, which outlines the DOD’s role in conducting military activities; Title 50 of the US Code, which grants the DOD and the intelligence community the authority to conduct intelligence and CI activities; and Executive Order 12333, which initially laid out the DOD’s intelligence and CI responsibilities. As the NDS notes, the United States can strengthen deterrence by conducting actions that raise an adversary’s cost with respect to the “perceived benefits of aggression.” One of the ways this can be accomplished is through synchronized messaging, complemented by real-world open activities and actions that utilize offensive CI operations in concert with the DOD planning community. For example, the DOD might use CI assets to pass information about a policy intent that complements a stated White House or State Department decision, all while moving DOD personnel and material into the theater to reinforce the United States’ overall intent.

Similarly, leveraging CI capabilities can help improve the resiliency of the vital networks and critical infrastructure supporting the cyber and space domains, as they utilize the same personnel, equipment, networks, and supply chains feeding into CI. The first order of business should be securing US supply chains in line with the Pentagon’s vision of delivering uncompromised, which is a DOD program aiming to bolster security across the entire defense enterprise by ensuring that foreign intelligence entities haven’t compromised technology (for example with insider threats or compromised chips) in the manufacturing process, which would assist with building enduring advantages throughout the defense ecosystem. To do so, the United States must move the manufacture of critical components back onshore to the United States and then use the tools and tradecraft of CI to ensure that the personnel, networks, intellectual property, and manufacturing processes associated with these “can’t lose” technologies are both vetted and protected.

—Thomas Ferguson was a member of Forward Defense’s Adding Color to the Gray Zone Task Force before assuming a position in government.

7. How can the Pentagon better leverage domestic and international partners, and the capabilities they own across domains, to fortify its integrated deterrence?

The NDS mandate to leverage every capability and advantage at DOD’s disposal, particularly to use advantages that DOD does not organically own, is astute and could not come at a better time for the United States. The two-decade war on terror provides a strong precedent for cross-government cooperation, which is potentially still applicable even as the US government shifts its focus from counterterrorism to strategic competition with China and Russia.

As a former Central Intelligence Agency leader, I saw first-hand the development, implementation, and impact of what was nicknamed “Title 60”—the portmanteau of titles 10 and 50 of US code—wherein the DOD and intelligence community (IC) worked seamlessly on the counterterrorism mission. This integrated cooperation between exquisite capabilities is the textbook example of what the NDS calls for, particularly in addressing competition in the gray zone. For example, both the IC and Special Operations Forces worked together to become experts at man-hunting in the war on terror, fusing signals intelligence, human intelligence, and overhead capabilities to ensure few places globally were out of reach in conducting “find, fix, finish” missions against terrorist targets. Such capabilities can similarly be used against today’s strategic competitors—why not merge joint talents to find hostile foreign intelligence officers working against US interests across the globe?

In sum, successes in the US war on terror were critically dependent on bilateral and multilateral partnerships. Both the IC and DOD deeply understand the value of partners, justifying integration on many levels such as intelligence sharing and (at times) cross-training. To meet the NDS remit to address gray zone threats, the DOD must build on these relationships and lessons and not let a new issue set cause formerly integrated capabilities to atrophy.

—Marc Polymeropoulos is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice and is a member of its Adding Color to the Gray Zone Task Force.

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Evanina testifies to Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Atlantic Council — Fri, 02 Dec 2022 15:11:02 +0000

Original Source

On September 21, the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Nonresident Senior Fellow William Evanina testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. In his testimony, Evanina discussed the growing cyber threat posed to US business and academic institutions.

America faces an unprecedented sophistication and persistence of threats by nation state actors, cyber criminals, hacktivists and terrorist organizations. Corporate America and academia have become the new counterintelligence battlespace for our nation state adversaries, especially the Communist Party of China.

William Evanina

Former fellow

William R. Evanina

Former Nonresident Senior Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Cybersecurity Disinformation

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Our military insiders’ views of the new National Defense Strategy

Atlantic Council military fellows — Mon, 21 Nov 2022 21:28:27 +0000

Last month, the US Department of Defense (DOD) released its 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS). This document outlines clear priorities for the department, namely: defense of the homeland; deterring strategic attacks on the United States, allies, and partners; deterring Chinese and Russian aggression while simultaneously maintaining readiness for conflict; and building a resilient Joint Force.

While the document’s strategic prioritization is clear, what remains uncertain is how this strategy will ultimately be implemented across DOD. Defense leadership recognizes this, as the document states that “this strategy will not be successful if we fail to resource its major initiatives or fail to make the hard choices to align available resources with the strategy’s level of ambition.”

How can DOD meet the strategic priorities laid out in the 2022 NDS? The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s military fellows—active-duty officers who are serving a one-year rotation at the Atlantic Council—weighed in, addressing potential gaps between budgets and strategy, force employment mechanisms, sustainment and logistics, and security partnerships. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied here are solely those of the authors and do not represent the views of DOD or any other US government agency.

Investing in security partnerships: The US should take larger risks to bolster Taiwan’s defense

Security cooperation has long played an essential role in US defense policy, but this NDS amplifies its role in competition for the next decade. The 2022 NDS states that “mutually beneficial Alliances and partnerships are our greatest global strategic advantage—and they are a center of gravity for this strategy.” The decisions to defend treaty allies have already been adjudicated, but the decision to support security partners such as Ukraine and Taiwan remains foggy. Overall, this NDS implies that DOD will likely need to take more significant risks to support Taiwan and to prevent a Chinese invasion.

The current war in Ukraine provides a case for security cooperation. Had the United States and NATO invested more heavily in Ukraine before Russia’s February 2022 invasion, they may have deterred Russia from attacking in the first place. In the past several months, the United States has invested approximately $17.6 billion in security assistance for Ukraine. In comparison, it only invested $2.7 billion from 2014 until February. The United States’ concerns about escalation with Russia were pervasive early in the Ukraine crisis, but along with NATO it has since taken much greater risks to help Ukraine survive and to contain Russia. US and NATO leaders are now likely pondering whether it may have been smarter and cheaper to invest earlier to prevent the war than to help Ukraine fight it.

When the United States invests in alliances and partnerships, it invests directly and indirectly to prevent (and, if necessary, respond to) any potential crisis. For instance, Operation Desert Storm (1990-91) included a coalition of thirty-nine countries worldwide. Desert Storm’s success relied heavily on a NATO alliance that was built for the Cold War threat but trained and ready for a crisis in the Middle East. US leadership in NATO has helped deepen the capability and willingness of European countries to cooperate in support of Ukraine. After Russia invaded, the speed and unity of the US, NATO, and European Union response were exemplary. The rate of armament shipments, funding supplied to Ukraine, sanctions on Russia, and the response to the humanitarian crisis should all serve as blueprints for coordination among allies and partners in the future. Enhancing US investments in Indo-Pacific alliances and partners will improve resilience for a potential conflict scenario in Taiwan or elsewhere.

The United States should implement an audacious strategy to help build Taiwan’s self-defenses and strengthen other Indo-Pacific allies and partners to help surge in a crisis. According to the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), Taiwan is a security partner. The TRA places Taiwan a tier above Ukraine in terms of US commitment to its security. The additional ten billion dollars over four years in Foreign Military Financing for Taiwan proposed in the 2023 NDAA could further solidify US commitment to the partnership. Ideally, a US funding increase would spur other Taiwan security partners to increase their support and potentially create a NATO-like framework for deterrence.

The West will likely never know for certain whether heavily arming Ukraine pre-invasion would have caused Russian escalation or prevented the invasion entirely. However, given that Russia has repeatedly threatened red lines since invading and the West has routinely surpassed them, the United States and NATO likely could have been more aggressive without triggering a broader war. US defense leaders should use the lesson of Ukraine to push the limits of investment in Taiwan—along with other Indo-Pacific allies and partners—to prevent an invasion.

—COL Benjamin Johnson is the 2022-2023 senior US Army fellow at the Scowcroft Center.

Follow the money: DOD is betting on research but not sending the right signals to industry

At every opportunity, DOD leadership has sought to highlight the linkages between the 2022 NDS and the president’s fiscal year 2023 (FY23) budget request. Yet, while this strategy and budget were developed concurrently, fiscal constraints lead to necessary tradeoffs across programs.

Consistent with the NDS, DOD cut costs from the current force structure to make significant investments in building enduring advantages. The Defense-Wide funding request increased significantly when compared to projections in the Trump administration’s final budget request (9 percent compared to an overall DOD increase of 5 percent), with these accounts containing the offices of the undersecretaries of defense for research and engineering, and for acquisition and sustainment. Notably, these two offices will execute the increases to building enduring advantages programs, to include $3.3 billion for microelectronics, $1.1 billion for artificial intelligence, and $700 million for submarine industrial-base resiliency. Such investments were partially funded by reductions to current force structure, including the retirement of sixteen Navy battle force ships before their estimated service life, a reduction of twelve thousand regular Army troops, and 102 Air Force aircraft early retirements.

Moreover, the FY23 budget contains the largest research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDTE) request in DOD history, with funding requests of $130 billion for RDTE and $146 billion for procurement. Focusing too much on RDTE at the expense of procurement contributes to the “valley of death”—or the arduous journey commercial companies take to win DOD contracts—further underscoring that DOD does not have an innovation problem, but rather an innovation adoption problem. To field cutting-edge technologies, more funds ought to shift toward procurement over future budget cycles.

However, while all eyes are on the current budget year, the out-year funding projections in the Future Years Defense Program are concerning, as they result in real growth of -1.2 percent in FY25, -0.6 percent in FY26, and -1.4 percent in FY27 (using a projected 2.2 percent inflation rate, which is far below what we’ve seen lately). This demonstrates that additional force structure reductions may be required in future budget cycles, and that heavy RDTE investments may not necessarily lead to transformational technologies in the field—if there won’t be enough money for production. The NDS prioritizes a resilient defense ecosystem and healthy industrial base, but out-year projections do not send a demand signal to industry for sustained investment and will impact NDS implementation in the long term.

Now, Congress has the next move: Work remains ongoing to finalize the FY23 National Defense Authorization Act and appropriations bills. Throughout committee mark-ups, there has been strong bipartisan support for additional FY23 defense funding.

—LCDR Marek Jestrab is the 2022-2023 senior US Navy fellow at the Scowcroft Center.

Something old and something new: Force employment modernization must match an ambitious strategy

As outlined in the NDS, the “principal approach to advancing these priorities is integrated deterrence,” which is a whole-of-government approach to deter aggressive and malign actions by US adversaries, gain and maintain advantage throughout the competition continuum, and mitigate risk in advance of potential conflicts.

As discussed above and articulated by others, there appears to be a gap between NDS objectives and budgetary realities. However, much of what is discussed as new within the NDS bears strong resemblance to strategy and guidance that has existed for several years. It can be argued that the 2018 NDS, 2018 Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning, and the 2020 Irregular Warfare Annex to the NDS already created the necessary strategy framework to drive the department toward the strategic ends outlined in the 2022 NDS. What has remained constant, however, are the mechanisms by which joint force employment is planned and executed. The new points of emphasis—in particular the reliance on campaigning, as well addressing gray-zone activities simultaneously with conflict preparation—require a modernization of joint force employment concepts.

The NDS explicitly states that “campaigning is not business as usual,” but rather a more sophisticated approach to “aggregate focus and resources” to ensure that operations, activities, and investments are linked to the stated priorities, while critically incorporating “feedback loops” ostensibly to course correct in the midst of dynamic long-term campaigns. Devising a long-term strategy to deter Chinese and Russian malign influence globally is decidedly more complex than a campaign to dismantle a violent extremist organization in a single theater. Integrated deterrence campaigns require a high degree of focused understanding about US adversaries, the effects of military operations in concert with other instruments of power, and mitigation of strategic and escalatory risks.

However, current force employment mechanisms are more conventionally rigid, generally tying expeditionary forces to operating locations and adjudicating objectives years in advance of action, making it difficult to incorporate feedback loops and adjust to adaptive adversaries. Similarly, the rotational model employed by the military often caps the amount of time a particular problem can be focused on by expeditionary units or joint task forces, which can limit understanding and ultimately the options presented to commanders. As opposed to executive branch organizations that often focus on specific problems for decades, military units may shift from divergent problem sets over several years. Given the premium the NDS places on coordination and collaboration with not only the executive branch but also allies and partners, DOD must allow more flexibility in how it aligns multi-domain capabilities against priority operational problems.

The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is critical to the ways and means in which force employment supports the strategic objectives outlined in the NDS. The military speaks in the language of requirements, which are specific and tangible activities that capability owners can use to develop operational concepts. Requirements and intermediate military objectives are defined in campaign plans, and the JSPS directs the development of Global Campaign Plans (GCP), Functional Campaign Plans, and Combatant Command Campaign Plans. In particular, GCPs “address the most pressing transregional and multi-functional strategic challenges across all domains… are global in scope and focus on integrating activities oriented against specific problems designed to achieve unity of effort for day-to-day activities,” according to the JSPS. Each GCP has a designated Coordinating Authority (CA) who has overall responsibility for the planning and execution of their associated GCP, and it is in this area where modernization is needed. Competing with Russia and China is a global endeavor, thus CAs must be armed with a global understanding of the problems sets to ensure that their campaign plans logically connect with each other and can be resourced and adjusted dynamically. The department should look to devise cross-functional teams from across the executive branch as well as key allies to provide CAs with holistic understanding of these global problem sets to better inform the development and modernization of the GCPs.

The NDS makes it clear that the United States should not look at Russia as solely a problem in the European theater, nor China as solely an Indo-Pacific issue. Nonetheless, the force employment modernization to foster global deterrence campaigning must also account for the necessary preparations for regional conflict. Creative leadership is the key, as the NDS states that “we must not over-exert, reallocate, or redesign our forces for regional crises that cross the threshold of risk to preparedness for our highest strategic priorities.” This means that the department and CAs should encourage operational activities that satisfy requirements related to conflict preparation, as well as the ability to fight in the gray zone. Often referred to as “two-fers,” these types of operations can allow for a more efficient force employment model that can be scaled as required depending on prioritization.

—Lt. Col. Justin Conelli is the 2022-2023 senior US Air Force fellow at the Scowcroft Center.

The Iron Triangle: Tradeoffs and challenges in building a sustainable, survivable logistics infrastructure

The 2022 NDS prioritizes a future force logistics capability able to operate in a contested environment and withstand attack from an adversary. Sustainability and survivability are key elements of effective logistics support, but current US sustainment, throughput, and distribution information technology (IT) systems are optimized toward neither. The pace at which the United States addresses these gaps, and the resources put toward closing them, will have an outsized impact on the nation’s ability to execute campaigns as outlined in the NDS.

Referred to as the “Iron Triangle,” the “good, fast, and cheap rule” encapsulates the tension between quality, speed, and investment in meeting stated priorities. Better understanding the tough choices confronting modernization of sustainment systems better informs the risk calculus of tradeoffs between effectiveness, speed, and cost, potentially closing the gap between possibility and probability.

The 2018 NDS made mention of logistics only insofar as to state a need for resiliency and agility “while under persistent multi-domain attack.” In contrast, the 2022 NDS’s call-out for a modernized sustainment and logistics capability is a step in the right direction in confronting changes within the operating environment. Investing big (or not) is a critical choice if the United States’ intent is to operationalize DOD’s role in strategic deterrence, maintain the edge within a campaigning construct, or buy decision space in order to maintain strategic options. Doing any of these things without aggressively resourced, suitably reinforced logistics IT systems will result in an inability to deliver effective sustainment as a means to generate combat power during enemy disruption or attack, or to credibly enforce strategic deterrence.

However, US IT logistics systems are unclassified, lacking interoperability, and multi-domain incapable, making them ill-suited to effectively support the joint force in a contested environment. While these capability gaps are nothing new, they are increasingly prime for exploitation within a competitive environment as vast as the Indo-Pacific theater. Numerous upgrade options exist across the commercial sector—to name a few, Amazon, Walmart, Maersk, and FedEx all leverage artificial intelligence, predictive algorithms, and myriad tech advancements in support of throughput/distribution models. These commercial systems capitalize on speed and quality in terms of delivering products on time and on target, possessing the elements of flexibility and resiliency long sought by DOD. Sure, ordering and receiving a personalized beer koozie within twenty-four hours is wildly different from large-scale sustainment operations in a maritime campaign—and these commercial systems are not yet wartime tested—but they are available now, offering a starting point from which to build.

Done right, the logistics systems modernization called for in the 2022 NDS will not come cheap, and developing and integrating commercially available systems will incur risk in areas that are left without funding as a result. Historically, logistics and sustainment do not compete well with high-end, exquisite tech capabilities. While a necessary function, logistics is often considered mundane and does not capture the imagination in the same way as the high-end technological advancements set out in the NDS. For now, the services are responding to the realities of logistics system limitations by experimenting with how to leverage current resources and new methods of employment. As an example, the Marine Corps, in concert with our naval counterparts, continues to develop and implement expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO), a form of expeditionary warfare involving mobile, low-signature naval expeditionary forces whose express purpose is to conduct sea denial, support sea control, or enable fleet sustainment in an austere, contested maritime environment. In sum, the United States will get what it is willing to pay for in logistics and sustainment, and its urgency in mitigating the gaps will reflect the choice to (or not to) invest heavily.

Sustainment is indeed a warfighting function, but it is often resourced as a supporting effort. The results are as one would expect when the investment is “cheap.” Setting the force specifically for operational plans looks different than multi-domain logistics when operating in the gray zone. Adapting a proactive approach to sustainment as a warfighting function, similar to intelligence and more recently communications and information in the targeting cycle, will enable effective campaigning, allowing the US to preserve strategic options and decision space in the changing security and operational environment.

—Lt. Col. Michelle Melendez is the 2022-2023 senior US Marine Corps fellow at the Scowcroft Center.

This article is part of the 21st Century Security Project by the Scowcroft Center’s Forward Defense practice with financial support from Lockheed Martin.

21st century security

Advancing the dialogue on how the United States and its allies and partners can deter, fight, and win future wars.

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The world ‘must be built with tolerance, respect’ says Indonesian president at Global Food Security Forum

Atlantic Council — Fri, 18 Nov 2022 18:39:36 +0000

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Highlights from the Global Food Security Forum

A gathering of leaders across government, industry, and civil society to assess food security as a global challenge and offer bold solutions for strengthening food systems, securing supply chains, and fighting world hunger. This Forum is co-hosted with the Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Family Foundation, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment of the Republic of Indonesia and takes place on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali.

Economy & Business Resilience & Society

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FREDERICK KEMPE: Some of you in the audience know me: This is not only the first day in my life I’ve worn batik; it is the first time that any president of the Atlantic Council in our sixty-year history has worn batik, and so we do that in your country and in honor of you.

Starting as a businessman and mayor in your home city, Surakarta in 2005, President Jokowi entered politics with the aim to work for the people. He devoted himself to eradicating poverty, reducing crime, paying spontaneous visits to poor neighborhoods and marketplaces, always ready to hear people’s voices from up close. Your refusal to accept salary for public work and your competence in transforming the city into a vibrant tourist destination won the population of Surakarta’s heart, and you were re-elected as mayor in 2010 with more than 90 percent of the vote.

Your determination to serve continued throughout your career, and you became the governor of Jakarta, and then the president of Indonesia in 2014. You were the first Indonesian president without a military or elite political background, and your victory symbolized the victory of democracy—the victory of democracy in this country of over 17,000 islands, 300 ethnic groups, and 273 million people and counting.

We will all witness your leadership here at the G20, as you bring countries together at a particularly difficult moment in the world community, in solving the most pressing challenges today in health, climate change, economic recessions, and geopolitical tensions that have us all on edge—to recover together and to recover stronger.

To make this G20 summit a success, it needs a chair of extraordinary talent and capability and heart; and someone who enjoys the trust of all parties involved. And you started becoming chair of the G20 far before you came here and launched this week; We’ve been watching your travels, we’ve been watching your meetings.

President Widodo is not just a man of the people of Indonesia, he’s also become a global citizen who embodies the spirit of global cooperation, a catalyst for collective prosperity and peace, and that is why the Atlantic Council and its jury voted to honor you with our highest honor. It’s now my pleasure to present the [2022] Atlantic Council Distinguished Global Citizen Award. President Joko Widodo of Indonesia, a man of the people, a global leader, a global citizen president.

PRESIDENT JOKO WIDODO: First of all, I would like to extend my highest appreciation for this award, the Global Citizen Award, from the Atlantic Council. I have never thought earlier that I would receive this award. So far what I’ve done… I’m doing my best. I’m working and doing my best with full responsibility, to uphold the values of humanity. Living in Indonesia, consisting of more than 17,000 islands, hundreds of ethnic groups, 162 local languages, Indonesia upholds the values of tolerance, peace, unity, and cooperation.

As a leader, I love visiting villages, I love visiting rural areas, and I also love visiting traditional markets. And since I was a child, I was taught being humble, to live modestly. And I’ve seen some people living in village or rural areas living in difficult situations, and therefore, I keep trying to do my best for the interests of common people and also for the interest of the state. The world should be built with tolerance, respect toward each other. The presidency of Indonesia in [the] G20 this year, and also we have [received] the [chairmanship] of ASEAN starting from next year. Ladies and gentlemen, once again, I would like to thank you for this Global Citizen Award that has been awarded to me. This will continually motivate me and also the government of the Republic of Indonesia to hold our responsibilities as part of the solution for the global world.

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Global Food Security Forum day two: How countries should address the food crisis in the short term

Atlantic Council — Sun, 13 Nov 2022 23:33:40 +0000

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Highlights from the Global Food Security Forum

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GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Let’s see, I want to make sure you can hear me OK. So, look, we’re going to have a panel that’s—this is going to be a pragmatic panel. We’re going to talk about what has to be done, what has to be done now, and what we’re going to as best we can demand that the G20 address.

So, without further ado, I would like to bring in the other members of the panel.

We’ll start with His Excellency the Minister of Agriculture, Republic of Indonesia, Mr.—or, His Excellency Syahrul Yasin Limpo. Mr. Minister, welcome. Please.

Next will be Ambassador David Merrill, former US ambassador to Indonesia. Long career in the US Agency of International Development. Next, please.

Next will be the Honorable Kira Rudik, who is the vice president of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, people’s deputy of Ukraine. Welcome, Kira.

And on the screen with us we should have—yes, we have—Dr. Seth Meyer, the chief economist, the—probably one of the most—foremost experts in the world on agricultural economics and technology. And, Seth, we’re delighted to have you with us. Thank you. I’m sorry you’re not here in person. And we’re looking at you continuously, but don’t let that make you nervous. We’re going to watch you the whole time.

OK, let’s get right to it. So I want to start with the deputy from Ukraine. And, Kira, I want to ask you this. You know, we were talking about this being a crisis. So we’re in a crisis. This war is not over. Of course, we’re happy that Ukraine has recovered Kherson, but we don’t know what’s going to happen next. So the odds are that we’re going to have another disrupted planting season in Ukraine, and Ukraine’s one of the breadbaskets. What can you tell us that we should ask the world to do for the farmers of Ukraine right now to give us the greatest output of grain for the world?

KIRA RUDIK: Hello. Thank you so much for having me. It’s a pleasure being here.

So when we are talking about the next harvest season and how to make sure that we prepare for it the best and most effective way, we should look at it with a business approach. So in business, when you are in crisis, the first thing is you need to fixate the losses. So right now we need to make sure that there is no more destruction or at least it’s minimized. So, for that, we need air force protection systems. And we are asking our allies—United States, European countries, United Kingdom, all countries from all over the world—to provide us with air force protection systems to protect infrastructure from further destruction. This is the first one.

Second one is, of course, de-mining. The de-mining efforts need to happen right now. They are happening, but at a very small scale because, basically, all the lands that are supposed to be agricultural lands right now partially or fully are mined. And they are not going to be able to be used to plant the harvest.

Third thing, of course, we need to fix infrastructure and use these five months before the next planting season to fix the infrastructure. As of right now, 40 percent of energy infrastructure in Ukraine is destroyed. So when the cities are experiencing electrical outages, when there is no running water, it will be very hard to continue on the commitment that we have in terms of the agriculture. So we need from the international community support on going through the winter and also fixing the infrastructure.

Fourth thing is commitment on the fuel. We understand that right now Ukraine is purchasing fuel and this, of course, has an impact on the price of the harvest on the grains, on all the products. So we need to make plans and commitments for the next year for the fuel and for the price of it. And of course, it’s a painful subject for everybody.

And the last but not the least, and a critically important point, is the grain deal. The grain deal is a temporary agreement between the United Nations, Ukraine, Russia, and Turkey that the ports where the grains are exported from are being not neutral, but the ships can go in and out easily. So the price of the harvest depends on the price of the insurance that the companies have to put on the ships that are going in and out of the warzone, basically. So having a written commitment or the general commitment so it will seem safely or look safely or be more safe for the companies to ship the grains in and out of Ukraine would decrease the price of insurance and the price of transportation.

As of—as for Ukrainian people, we want the war to be over. We are a technological and agricultural country. We want to make sure that we continue being a breadbasket for the whole world. This is one of our missions. This is what we want to do. And I can tell you part of my family are farmers. It’s sacred. It’s almost religious for us to be able to provide life, to create life instead of death. And this is critically important, and this is why we are fighting so hard to win the war, to end the war, and to make sure that we return to the safe operation where we are able to build prosperity for everyone and contradict all the crises.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Kira, thank you very much. You’ve given us some very clear guidelines, and we’ll make sure those get reflected in what we pass on to the White House and also to the—to the G20 here.

And I’d like to turn next to Minister Limpo. Minister, General Prabowo gave us this incredible presentation today that shows this progress that’s been made in Indonesia. There must be many countries all over the world who look at the example of Indonesia and say: We could do this. We would like to do this. I know we have representatives here from several African countries, and I’m sure they will be anxious to listen to your experience and your guidelines on how was this accomplished. The rice, the palm oil, the technology with cassava, how was this done? What is Indonesia doing that’s bringing it to the forefront in this way?

MINISTER SYAHRUL YASIN LIMPO: Yeah. Thank you, General.

Distinguished resource persons, ladies and gentlemen, from discussions which we have had and for the last one year, we have heard the huge challenges and issues that we are facing concerning climate change, wars, and also the impact of COVID-19 pandemic. We have talked about this in many forums.

And talking about food, food is the most strategic issue. And this issue requires the attention of states, nations, and the global citizens, as well as peace and public order. We might be able to delay other issues, but we can’t delay the issue of food. Food issue is the most essential, the most fundamental, and it has multidimensional aspects. Therefore, our president, Mr. Joko Widodo, has determined that food is a top priority, and it shall be discussed in detail.

In our countries, we look at our provinces, regencies, and sub-regencies, and also the states. And then we look at the regions. And we divide our areas in Indonesia into production regions. In two, three areas, we are dividing our areas in Indonesia into areas that have surplus in stocks, regions which have limited stocks, and which may get in trouble in a crisis if a crisis strikes. And there are also areas which have shortages. Likewise, in the global level there are countries facing shortages of food, and there are also countries having limited stocks, and there are also countries having abundant stocks. Therefore, in facing this global crisis, the food crisis, what we may do, among others, like what we do in Indonesia under the leadership of our president, is mitigate and adapt ourselves with issues including climate change, including the global supply chain, and food logistic aspects. This should be anticipated, and proper adaptation should be made by all food producers as well.

Second of all, subnational cooperation. Subnational cooperation should be promoted and regulated by the state. No subnational region should restrict its trade, fulfilling its own need only, or even close itself because it may affect the trade ecosystem as a whole. And this pattern is the same with the global pattern. We need to look at the flow of food to where it needs. We should look at the flow of supply chain, from which area does it flow.

And in Indonesia, we have dealt with food crisis. For the past three years, we have had a surplus in food reserve, especially rice, which we have used to deal with shortages in wheat because there is a problem with supply from India, Russia, and Ukraine. Therefore, we must prepare measures to substitute the wheat in the event of wheat shortage issues. So we prepare our sago, our cassava, and our sorghum to prepare for any shortages. Currently, there is no problem. This year, we are OK. We don’t have issues with wheat. But what about next year? What about the regulation? And will the regular shipping of this commodity return to normal? And what if the stocks are concentrated in a particular area? If this happens, what we need to do is to substitute such commodities.

We also have issues with cattle, which we have imported 1.2 million cattle. Therefore, in the event of shortage, what we need to do is to prepare our land, chicken, and ax supply. What I meant is handling this food crisis is a must. And there is no single country that has an ability to restrict itself because this will result in a global issue.

And as for cooperation, in the G20 agricultural ministerial meeting last time in Bali there were three points.

First, promoting the agricultural and food system that is resilient and sustainable, which includes the incorporation of technology, food variety, cooperation, and collaboration in science.

Second, promoting open, just, predictable, transparent, non-discriminative trade to ensure affordability and availability of food. Food is human rights, and therefore there shall be no country in G20 itself to restrict its trade or to protect its internal interests only because we are part of the global community of G20. And this is what we have agreed upon in the G20 agricultural ministerial meeting.

Third of all, we have had an agreement that for all countries with the agreement in Washington with G20 finance ministers and agricultural ministers, all countries should put food on the top priority. It should be on top. Therefore, we are talking about the global context—or the countries that have issues of food shortages. We need to take measures. We have to know the issues and also the target and also the methodology that we are using in dealing with and helping those nations that are facing food shortages.

We are having a surplus of 10.2 million tons of rice. Our president has prepared an adequate reserve for certain countries to help them, including African countries. The point is whenever a country has a surplus or has been able to exceed the national needs, they should plan for using the excess they have for global interests. Therefore, to me, the global cooperation should be enhanced [to include] how to monitor follow-up actions in the level of implementation in fulfilling the needs. Therefore, our strategy in Indonesia, we need to look at regions having emergency needs, including countries having conflicts, yeah, like happening between Russia and Ukraine.

What is our step? Are there any temporary measures? In Indonesia, we have prepared two years, yeah, to prepare ourselves in the event of issues. We are the fourth-largest country after China, India, and the US, followed by Pakistan. Therefore, we need to ensure that in, for example, the past two years, we didn’t have any acute food shortage issues. Then cooperation for a permanent system indicates that food security becomes important and there shall be no countries harming the trade ecosystem which we have built so far.

I think that’s all. Thank you.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Well, thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Minister. I know that there will be many countries studying what Indonesia’s doing, and we’re going to come back with some follow-up questions on that shortly.

Now I’d like to turn to Dr. Meyer, who’s with us on the screen. And Dr. Meyer, I’ve been bragging at this conference about some of the US innovations in agriculture and especially about improvements in things like bushels per acre of corn, and also talking about the role of agricultural extension services that the various states have and the Department of Agriculture. So when you look at the food security issue in the world, how do you see—what do you see as the right things for the United States to do? What would you be recommending right now if we could put you in front of the G20 in person and have all those heads of state lined up and you’d be able to tell them, one two, three, I want this done? What would you tell them?

SETH MEYER: Yeah. So I think the first place to start is in the US we’ve been incredibly productive in terms of growth in US agricultural production. You know, when I look to say, you know, what should we be doing around the world, when we look at the application of technology in the United States and what we’ve done to improve productivity, I think we did this, you know, from a three-point approach in the United States now. Which is, you know, we want not just to execute and pull every single bushel out of every acre if that’s not environmentally sustainable; or, we don’t want to apply technologies or activities which don’t make producers money.

So, again, you know, we think about this in terms of sustainable productivity growth in the United States. It’s got to make money for the farmer. It’s got to produce food that is affordable for consumers. It’s got to be environmentally sustainable. This isn’t something that you can produce for a few years and then you do damage to your system or the climate and you can’t continue to produce. So, you know, I think the US sees itself as being a reliable producer on the global market.

One of my other hats that I’ll put on here quick is the G20 has an initiative, the Ag Market Information System, and one of the—AMIS. One of the principles of AMIS is, you know, providing market information and avoiding unnecessary disruptions in the global market. So when I say the US being a reliable supplier, part of that is not putting export controls on. Part of that’s not putting export controls on, being a reliable supplier, and providing it to the rest of the world.

And in the US, you know, when we take our look at technology and sustainable productivity gains in the United States, there’s also a big interest in the United States in sharing that technology, sharing the adaptation practices from our climate hubs in the United States and taking that internationally. The secretary of agriculture mentioned that at COP27 today. So taking the lessons we’ve learned.

You’re right about our domestic Extension Service, but we’re pushing that to the next level. We’re pushing that into our Climate-Smart Commodities programs, where we’re going to—you know, we’ve put in $3 billion to experiment how to produce commodities in an environmentally friendly way, that producers can extract money and income from and yet meets the demands that the consumers want for these sustainable goods.

So, you know, what’s our principle in the United States? I think it’s to be—continue to be productive, to be productive in a sustainable way, and to share all those experiences about how we’ve done it with the rest of the world, as well, too. Because we can do lots of things in the United States, but we’re not going to achieve this goal of global food security without sharing this information which is very specific to countries’ own situations. So we’ll share our experiences with the rest of the world. I think that’s how we do it.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Well, thank you very much, Dr. Meyer. And we got a couple follow-up questions for you here if we’ve got time on some of the specific technologies we’re doing on carbon sequestration and other things, and maybe even on intellectual property.

So at this point I’d like to turn to Ambassador David Merrill, former ambassador here in Indonesia. And David, you must be really impressed by the progress Indonesia has made—it’s remarkable—in your time and experience here.

DAVID MERRILL: There’s no question about it.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: But I want to ask you, we haven’t talked that much about international institutions.

DAVID MERRILL: That’s right.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: So when you think about, as we’re looking at the G20 here, and we’ve got the minister’s experience in Indonesia—

DAVID MERRILL: Sure.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK:—we’ve got the immediate guidance from the member of parliament in Ukraine, we’ve got the willingness of the United States to share, but what about these international organizations like FAO and World Food Programme? Are they really tuned up to help us move forward?

DAVID MERRILL: Yes.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Or do we need to do more with them?

DAVID MERRILL: Yes. General Clark, thanks for that question.

I just am struck by the poignancy of this moment. I mean, here we are sitting in Bali just ahead of the G20. We are mainly NGOs. We are some government officials. We don’t know what form the G20 communique or statement or any other document on food security will take, at least I don’t know. I don’t think any of us know. But we have an obligation to use the NGO channel to address the G20 and give them our ideas.

Now, one of them is on what international institutions can do. There are the MDBs, the World Food Programme, the FAO, even the WTO. USAID has done a lot of work over the years. Other government aid agencies have done a lot. So they can work on national and local distribution schemes. They can work on internationally coordinated food emergency reserves, which I haven’t heard being done yet. They can work with NGOs and private charities.

The idea is, as you have said, to coordinate the mobilization of adequate finance, repurpose—there’s about $800 billion a year of agricultural support going through multilateral and bilateral agencies, maybe just multilateral alone. That can be taken a look at. It could be repurposed for the needs of this particular food crisis. Balance of payments and budget support. Debt relief. Adequate IFI financing, even expanded. Emergency food reserves. So that’s one.

And we want to refrain from trade restrictions on fertilizer trade that would make things worse.

We want to guarantee the affordable supplies of staple foods—physical supplies, access via trade, access via income and livelihood support, social protection programs.

And I’ll wind up with later a possible G20 forum for food security dialogue that would continue after the current G20. It doesn’t have to be another international institution. It can be a place for things related to food security to be discussed under the aegis, perhaps, of Indonesia.

The improving supplies and distribution of fertilizers is key. There are trade barriers. There are subsidy schemes that have to be revisited; redoubled efforts to improve the efficiency of fertilizer use to help farmers do more with less, to save costs, to reduce nutrient loss to the environment. There needs to be improved productivity of smallholders growing staple food crops, closing the yield gaps. There’s a gentleman from Israel here who’s using micro water injections to improve food productivity. It doesn’t even have to be fertilizer; it could be fertilizer plus no-fertilizer technology. So the resilience and sustainability of food production, there’s a lot that can be done.

And as General Prabowo said and as the Chinese say, out of crisis comes opportunity. So here’s a dilly of a crisis, but it’s also a big opportunity. And we can even change the—make at least some changes in the world’s system for dealing with this as a result of this crisis: improving the nutritional quality of diets, progress for women and children, increased use of micronutrients.

What about agricultural research? We’ve been doing that for 40 years. Taking a look at the agricultural research that’s being done, see what improvements can be made, make crops more resilient to climate change, more sustainable, higher yields on less land.

Now, it wasn’t too long ago—it was only in April or maybe March—that the G20 itself was grappling with did it even need to be concerned with the Ukraine food crisis. They said, hey, this is a political crisis. This is for other agencies of the UN. And most of us went around saying, no, this is an economic crisis. OK, it started with politics. It started with war. But if people are starving to death, isn’t that a concern of the G20? Fortunately, it took only about two, three weeks for the G20 to say that’s exactly right. So the G20 can make equally impressive leaps in the next couple weeks and years.

Now, the one thing that we have talked about is the creation of a G20 forum for food security, trying to bypass the resistance that we would encounter for setting up yet another international institution. Don’t need to. Indonesia’s in a great position because of its posture on the world stage and because it’s leading the G20 to serve as a I don’t want to say clearinghouse necessarily, but a forum for discussion of ideas on food security.

And Indonesia has a very good track record on food security. If you go back to 2008, there was a severe rice crisis and Indonesia was one of the primary—probably the primary leader on solving the regional and global rice crisis in 2008. Indonesia’s going to be chairing ASEAN. So let’s let Indonesia within ASEAN at least deal with the rice part of food security, which it’s already shown it can do a good job.

So, in sum, I think we should write up the recommendations of this conference in some form with some people designated and get them post haste to the people in the G20 that are deciding whether to have some kind of statement and what that statement should be. It’s the least we can do to make our input. That’s my suggestion.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Well, thank you very much, Ambassador. Those are some really great ideas and we’ll try to incorporate them.

OK. So we’ve got about 10 minutes. I’m going to try to do a couple of let’s call them lightning rounds and then I’m going to come back to the minister to ask another follow-up question. So the first lightning round I want to ask each of our panelists this question. When we look at classical economics, we talk about land, labor, and capital. And in agriculture, of course, there’s agricultural land, there’s the farm labor, there’s the mechanization of labor which has helped us tremendously, but capital—the world is awash in capital. We had no idea 50 years ago that capital would be so plentiful in the world. What can capital do—financial firms, investment firms, firms that want to talk about how to improve mankind? I deal with these firms in London all the time. I hear it in New York. What is our specific ask of the financial community in dealing with this world food crisis?

And I’d like to start and ask—I mean, you don’t—you may not have an answer to this, but if you do I’d like—I’d like you to come up and tell me what you think about it. And let’s talk about the Ukraine crisis first. What can the international capital leaders do? They’ve got billions of dollars of resources. What are they going to do with it to help us right now in Ukraine?

KIRA RUDIK: First of all, to secure the investments into agriculture for the next year. I think all of us, we realize that generally there has been a huge flow back of the investment into Ukraine, and this is understandable because of the war. So we need that to come back.

On all the investment forums with all the investors/bankers, we are saying we all remember the lessons of the war: The one who is coming first will get the big—the big buck. And so this is why it’s time to invest right now. The risks are high, but the output will also be extremely high. This is how fortunes are made. So this is why, if the argument of the risks and the output would not work, we will just ask saying do it as a humanitarian way, invest into Ukraine right now into agricultural sector.

Then we are coming back again to cleaning up the mines because this is—the de-mining efforts are critical right now and will require tremendous investment. Just for everyone to understand, de-mining is basically going through every field and checking and processing the certain level of the ground. So it’s just like another agricultural work, basically, and it’s an incredibly important and hard and complicated process that needs to happen. But the output of it will be extremely productive because it will give us back the very fertile land.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: OK. So I’m going to—I’m going to jump in. I’m going to say I’ve got two suggestions, OK, and you tell me if you like them, you take them back to Ukraine, we’ll go to Dr. Meyer and he’ll push them through US Department of Agriculture and get them up there.

One is farmers in Iowa have done amazing things with putting tile underneath their farmland. They have rich, deep, dark earth just like Ukraine does. It promotes drainage so you can get into the land sooner, you can take out the pockets that hold water, you can have uniform crop. Suppose we gave Ukrainian farmers no-interest loans to improve their land in that way so that they would get more productivity per hectare?

Number two, there’s been a lot of destruction and theft of agricultural equipment in Ukraine. Suppose Ukrainian farmers got no-interest loans to replace that agricultural equipment. Would that be helpful? If you like that—

KIRA RUDIK: Yeah, I do like that.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: OK, good.

KIRA RUDIK: It’s a fantastic suggestion.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Dr. Meyer, can we do that?

SETH MEYER: Well, and we’re already doing some of that—

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: All right.

SETH MEYER:—when it comes to the US government support for farmers.

So I’ll even take a step back. My Iranian—my Ukrainian colleague’s talking about infrastructure and delivery of grain. I’ll even take a step back and say we’re figuring out ways to try and help the agricultural producers to be able to afford simple things like cash flow, getting that crop planted, getting the crop stored as they work on their infrastructure. So things like temporary storage, the big silo bag. So instead of having a large barn, you have a very long, long, long plastic tube, essentially, where you’re storing grain temporarily. I think there are things that need to be done on the ground in Ukraine now for these producers to cash flow for this next crop, put that winter wheat in the ground or plant spring crop.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: That sounds good. Remember, I’m focusing on finance. Put the money in. Get the farmers the money they need at no-interest loans. They can improve productivity.

Now let me turn to the minister. Sir, I want to ask you this question. I know you’ve had a lot of foreign direct investment in agriculture in Indonesia, these palm-oil plantations and other things. But what more can the international financial community do to promote sustainable agriculture in Indonesia? What could we do to—what do we need to advertise?

And you’re the pacesetter for so many tropical environments. What do we need the bankers in London and New York to know about your needs for finance?

MINISTER SYAHRUL YASIN LIMPO:Agriculture does not only concern food. It also involves employment and a fundamental economic system to support industries, including pharmaceuticals industry. So, when it comes to agriculture, there are opportunities for investment in the agricultural cultivation stage as well as post-harvest, and there are also opportunities in agricultural industries. And the third one is the marketing of agricultural products. So there are three agendas, three segments which can be tapped into in investment. And we, on the order of our president, are working on this.

Agriculture must be the answer. And this year, after three years since Indonesia’s agriculture has been the mainstay of the Indonesian economy, other sectors have been hit hard by COVID-19, but our agriculture went up by 16.42 percent. Our global exports rose to 38.2 percent. And this is a sign that agriculture has not been much affected by the conditions and weather, except for war because we need fertilizers. Sodium and phosphate fertilizers are in Ukraine and Russia, and this is a challenge for the whole world.

Therefore, where is the investment? The investment can be made in the three areas, General. And talking about agriculture, we are a tropical country consisting of 17,000 islands. There are areas which can be invested for this in coastal and marine areas. And there are already investments that can be made. We produce a lot of tuna, up to 18 million tons a year. We can grow crops on the coastal areas, as well, with the technology that was presented by our American colleague. We have crops that are resilient against water-related challenges, can survive in swamps and can survive in salty seawater. Indonesia has many hills and mountains, and we still have enough land available to invest.

Currently, the president of Indonesia, Mr. Joko Widodo, is trying to focus several areas to be made into Food Estates called integrated farms where the large land consists of plantations, animal husbandry, and even freshwater fish cultivation, as well as horticulture. All of this requires technology, requires experts, and requires machines in order to become a product that the world needs. Therefore, agricultural products, after reaching the industrial stage, will be part that we are waiting for.

We have enough land for sugar factories. We have sugar in Indonesia in large quantities, but we still import some of it. So which bank is willing to invest?

Finally, agriculture needs capital, and this is one of President Joko’s successes in preparing a large enough budget to be accessed by small farmers in the form of people’s business loans. Its value is approximately a hundred trillion. Our farmers two years ago used these funds, around 55 trillion. The NPL was only 0.03 percent. Our farmers are honest and don’t want to be in debt.

Last year, we used 85 trillion people’s business credit funds based on government policies. It is not a subsidy, but a loan with low interest. With low interest, this can be good working capital to use. And the NPL is 0.6 percent, and that is in agricultural cultivation stage. Now, in post-harvest it’s on how micro, small, and medium enterprises can access agriculture loans.

Therefore, finally, there are five points that has become our focus from these investment funds.

First, they encourage the opening and creation of agricultural businesses, both small, medium, and large investments. I have given the example of sugar. We have sago palms in an area of 5 million hectares, and this can be used as flour, which can substitute wheat. If there is a bank that wants to invest, we will show you the place.

Second, we support young entrepreneurs to become Millennial farmers in agriculture. We focus on giving access to young farmers who want to try. We have trained more than 300 farmers using people’s business credit funds of approximately 2 trillion rupiahs. The acceleration is very fast because the younger ones have a faster network, strong motivation, and WhatsApp groups. And this works quite well.

Third, provide assistance for agricultural businesses for export. For exports, we assist them. Therefore, we bridge between buyers from one country and buyers from other countries. And the G20 must be able to bridge the assistance from the United States and what we can facilitate with the current conditions. Conducting training and assistance in the development of agricultural businesses requires experts. Even an entrepreneurial system is needed for our agriculture because our agriculture involves global matters. Our oil production is large. But does everything have to be with big industries? No, the president wants this to be done by people’s industry, and this requires capital to be facilitated so that the products can be exported to the global market at a lower price. Then, of course, we enhance our national products so that they are competitive compared to those of other countries.

I think agriculture is the answer to the global crisis and the world economic crisis in the future. If we can maintain our agriculture properly, it will be very much helpful, as everyone needs agriculture.

Thank you.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Great lessons. Great lessons. That’s great.

So, look, we’re trying to do a lightning round here and I’m going to get struck by lightning if I don’t move this thing alone. So I’d like to open up this next question to anybody who wants to do it. But in the military, we always have dreams about what technology we might have in the future. You know, we’ve always thought better communications, higher resolution imagery, those kinds of things. If you’re in the—thinking about the food problem in the world, what do we need to think about in the way of technology? What’s the—what’s the opportunity that we just need to put the resources on to really move us forward to the next level? How do we do it? Anybody. Who wants to take it? David? Seth, want to take it here from the—what do you say from the United States about it?

DAVID MERRILL: It’s a combination of international institutions and the private sector. I believe there still is an international institute on wheat research. I think it’s called CIMMYT. I have no idea what it’s been doing, but it better be doing something right now. So that’s one.

The other was the idea that Minister Prabowo said about getting private investment started. He’s doing a good job. So are others. And I think that’s equally worthy, if not more worthy, than the government programs.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Dr. Meyer, what do you say? If you could have your silver bullet here to fix this, what would it be?

SETH MEYER: I think it would be two very different things.

So, on the pure science and technology side, we’re making huge advancements in things like gene editing. So taking genes within the plant—not introducing new genes; just turning things off and on or letting the plant express genes which are already there. So impressive technology to help us do more with less, you know, ways to avoid putting—you know, rationalize better things like fertilizer use, which is both good for producers in terms of lowering cost and good for the environment.

But then I think that there are some other, you know, not cutting-edge science that really has potential for food security. And that is translating a lot of this technology and practices—some of them used by US producers—into smallholder farms or even let’s talk about the ability of women to gain capital and their productivity gaps. And even steps here where we could bring, you know, women, make them as productive. And it’s not because they’re not productive; it’s access to capital and technology. There is a huge gap that could help us close in productivity. Simply providing technology and capital to women farmers would do a tremendous amount for food security. So I think we’ve got amazing science we can apply, but we got to bring that science down to producers to fix those productivity gaps around the world.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: Well, thank you.

Now, look, here’s what we’ve done in the last 35 or 40 minutes up here. We’ve looked at the immediate crisis in Ukraine. We’ve come up with some concrete suggestions that have to be done right away. We’ve taken Indonesia as the example of a tropical country that has done marvelous work and has so many lessons to share with the world, and we congratulate Indonesia for this. We’ve listed the international institutions and a number of changes that can be made. We’ve talked about international finance. We’ve talked about the future of technology and the role of the United States still as a leading agricultural country to develop that technology, share it, and push it out. I think it’s—this is a time to come out of the crisis and look to the future with hope.

Thank you all. Let’s give our panel a big hand here. Thank you.

Watch the panel

MATTHEW KROENIG: Well, thank you, General Clark and our panelists, for a really rich discussion. I enjoyed that. I hope you did as well.

My name is Matthew Kroenig. I’m the acting director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. We’re leading the Atlantic Council’s food security work as part of our mission of developing sustainable nonpartisan strategies for addressing the most important security challenges facing the United States and its allies, including food security.

So we’ve had a terrific discussion this morning. As you’ve probably noticed, we’re running a little bit behind on our schedule. And so my team and I have updated the schedule. We’re on track to finish on time at three p.m.

What we’re going to do now is go ahead and take a break for lunch. I know some of you have been out there already, but now we’ll take a break, 30 minutes. So be back here at 1:30 and we’ll continue our discussion at that time.

And as you’re going away to lunch, it’s my pleasure to introduce a video from Congressman Pat Ryan of New York’s 19^th District. So as you’re going to lunch, enjoying your lunch, you can listen to this message from Congressman Ryan. Ryan is on the House Armed Services Committee, so he understands very well the links between food security and national security. So enjoy the video, enjoy your lunch, and we’ll see you back here in 30 minutes. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE PATRICK RYAN (D-NY): Good morning, everyone. Congressman Pat Ryan here. I want to start with a thank you to the Atlantic Council for organizing this forum, and a special thank you to Gaurav and your family foundation for hosting and convening such a timely and important conversation.

This is a topic that doesn’t always get its due, but I will say it plainly to begin: Food security is important not only for its humanitarian consequences, but also because it is inextricably connected to national security. We’ve seen this in Russia’s illegal and reprehensible war in Ukraine, but also in conflicts around the world from Nigeria and Syria to where I served in Iraq. And there is a direct linkage between food insecurity and these hostilities. In the former example, food security was a literal weapon of war used to inflict economic and human casualties. And of course, in the latter examples it deteriorates civil situations within countries and fosters environments ripe for extremism, for terrorism.

And this is a topic where I have direct frontline experience, having served two combat tours in Iraq as an Army intelligence officer. What I saw and what I really remember was a people driven to war with their own neighbors really by a lack of access to the basic necessities of everyday life: food, water, shelter—and what may come as a surprise to many of you, oil. People often overlook the complex but critical interdependence of global food systems with energy markets, even in countries like Iraq that sit on huge crude oil deposits. Proper refining capacity, shipping routes, supply lines are just as important as farming itself, and we have to make sure our solutions address this dynamic.

Right now I have the honor of serving the eighth-most rural—of 435, the eighth-most rural district in the United States; also the region that raised FDR, who tried to put the world on a path to food security almost 80 years ago. And even here we struggle with access to modern agricultural techniques. We have our own supply-line struggles.

So with both of those experiences in mind—both combat and my own community—I’ve come to Congress with an immediate focus on food security. We have to ensure that the United States is a strong voice and a strong leader in strengthening food systems, improving agricultural productivity. And we cannot underestimate the importance of energy markets in this puzzle.

What’s encouraging to me, what I’m happy to report, is that this is one of the last remaining bipartisan endeavors. Look no further than the recent Global Food Security Reauthorization Act, providing billions of dollars every year for the federal government to partner with food-insecure countries to get on a path to self-sustainability. Because of this legislation’s Feed the Future program, 5.2 million more families no longer suffer from hunger. And this is a bill that’s been led by my Democratic and Republican colleagues in both houses in true bipartisan fashion. I see this as an issue that can and should transcend a lot of the traditional economic and military alliances. It’s an opportunity for real cooperation that brings everyone to the table.

Ultimately, I am so excited to work with everyone gathered here today as we combat world hunger, as we bolster our supply chains, and increase security and safety across the globe. Thank you so much.

Watch the keynote

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Global Food Security day two: The role of tempe and cassava in a food-secure future

Atlantic Council — Sun, 13 Nov 2022 16:30:09 +0000

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Flagship Event Sat, November 12, 2022 • 12:00 am ET

Highlights from the Global Food Security Forum

Economy & Business Resilience & Society

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

AMADEUS DRIANDO AHNAN-WINARNO: Greetings. How many of you know tempe? How many of you like tempe? How many of you believe that tempe could be a potential solution to global food security problems?

I’m Driando, co-founder of the Indonesian Tempe Movement. Please allow me to walk you through why I absolutely believe that that is the case as a food scientist and technologist. I’ll make three points: why we should look into tempe in the first place, what the science says about tempe, and what the future holds for tempe.

I look into science of tempe because of three personal emotional reasons.

Cancer is running in my family. My grandpa had to perform a surgery to remove the breast cancer tumor of his own mom at his own garage. That’s why he switched to food science.

And looking into cancer is deeply related to malnutrition/overnutrition. But there’s also this other side of malnutrition, which is undernutrition, that unfortunately hits very hard to the eastern part of Indonesia, including my friends.

But not only health concern; environmental concern also hit me quite hard. I live not too far away from, unfortunately, the world’s number-one most polluted river in the world, Citarum. It got me thinking: What could we do to preserve and conserve the environment? And could we even make high-quality food if you don’t take care of the environment?

And that’s why, with the mission of the Indonesian Tempe Movement that my grandpa, my mom, and I created eight years ago as food scientists, we want to give people more access to nutritious, sustainable, and affordable food. We believe that people don’t have to be rich to live, like, a healthy and more sustainable life. And what makes us truly believe that this is the case is because of science.

So, scientifically, compared to beef in terms of nutrition, tempe contains similar amounts of energy, protein, and iron; significantly higher levels of fiber and calcium; and significantly lower levels of salt and saturated fat. Sustainability-wise, tempe could produce the same amount of protein compared to beef with four times less energy and 12 times less emission to be emitted to the atmosphere. In terms of affordability, tempe could be eight times cheaper than beef for the same amount of protein in Indonesia.

But what many people don’t know yet is that tempe is not just this food made using fermented soybean originated in Indonesia 300 years ago. Tempe is a fermentation process that we can apply to so many—almost every grain not legume bean around the world. Here I have mombin tempe, kidney bean tempe, black bean tempe, almond bean tempe. It’s a process. And not only these raw ingredients; my grandpa used to eat tempe made using tofu industry byproduct, okara, in the form of tempe gembus because he couldn’t afford the whole bean tempe. It was fancy.

And I wonder, like, how many of you wonder how the tempe fermentation works. For today, I have this tempe fermenting necklace to show you how easy tempe fermentation is. So the idea is that you want to make the baby mushroom rise up as happy. You want to serve them with tender and warm foods. You want to mate them with a food and to get them into the bedrooms. The bedrooms could be leaves, could be plastic bags, could be petri dish if you work in the lab. And in just two days you’ve got your own naturally nutritious food.

So if you look at this simple but sophisticated process, we’re just looking at the tip of the iceberg of the whole movement. After eight years of running the movement, I’ve seen beautiful, beautiful new kinds of tempe from all around the world. We’re talking about white bean tempe burger from Brazil, buckwheat tempe soba noodle from Japan, fava bean tempe wat in Ethiopia, bambara nut tempe fries from Tanzania, vegan meat made using lupin bean tempe in Europe.

Now, to end my talk, one thing that I learned from the movement is that the naturally nutritious foods that we have now were not just inventions of the past. The naturally nutritious food revolution is happening now, and I believe the tempe fermentation is a big part of it. But also, tempe is just one out of so many foods in which the R&D process has done by our ancestors years ago that are waiting for us to dig into as treasures, as the future foods that we need to feed the people, to feed us, to feed the planet in most sustainable ways possible. Thank you very much.

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ANNOUNCER: Please welcome to the stage Professor in Faculty of Agricultural Technology, University of Jember, Dr. Achmad Subagio.

ACHMAD SUBAGIO: Thank you. First of all, I would like to thank the committee to provide time for me for presentations, small presentations.

What I would like to introduce is about cassava. Maybe you know about these papers. You know also about toilet papers. You know also about biodegradable plastics. You know also about our fabric. All of these thing contain of cassava. Maybe we don’t know about that one.

But we believe that cassava right now is in our living time. All of our goods contain of cassava. That’s why I always promote cassava, because of that plant actually is very, very effective photosynthesis, two time more corn and also better than the other crops, including wheat.

And as you know, that right now, Indonesia, we have populations, as Mr. Prabowo said before, that about 273 million of people. That’s a lot of mouth and they need food. And of course, when we calculate, we need about 32 million ton of rice—that is only rice, not carbohydrate. When we calculate the carbohydrate, it’s about 45 million ton. That’s a huge amount of carbohydrate.

So when we calculate that one, of course our land is not enough when we only plant rice, because rice need a lot of waters, need a lot of fertilizers, and other thing. Not so many land can be planted by using rice, but cassava, we can grow cassava very well in sub-optimal land. We can grow cassava only if the water is about three or four months. That’s more than enough.

So, ladies and gentlemen, what I think is that we have to try to increase the cassava, the use of cassava, and of course the production of cassava. And for the consumptions, there is some problem that always people say that cassava is food for the poor people, always like that. But through our technology right now, we can provide very, very good materials from cassava. We can mix with many kind of ingredient and to be very, very good food. And this is the reality.

I think for 10 years more we need to grow about 5 million hectares of cassava because to that one we can provide a lot of food for the peoples and also feed, and also we can grow something like—we can develop something like we call bioindustries, including monosodium glutamate, sorbitols, lecithin, everything is come from cassava, because cassava can provide stats, and from stats we can provide sugar, and from sugar we can provide energies for a lot of function of bioindustries.

So this my point. And again, I encourage all peoples let’s do cassava. Thanks a lot.

Watch the keynote

ANNOUNCER: Please welcome back to the stage Gaurav Srivastava.

GAURAV SRIVASTAVA: Thank you. It’s been a long day.

Excellencies, members, sponsors, supporters, and my dear friends, the incomparable author, poet, civil right activist Maya Angelou remained a beacon of enduring hope even in her darkest of days, her eloquent voice and practical truths as relevant today as the moment she first shared them. Angelou said: “During bad circumstances, which is the human inheritance, you must decide not to be reduced. You have your humanity, and you must not allow anything to reduce that. We are obliged to know we are global citizens. Disasters remind us we are world citizens, whether we like it or not.”

It is really important to remember that while it is important to think about global issues, it is also important to address issues at home. It is important to worry about issues that are happening in Indonesia. It is important to remember that there is still a family at home. In the morning, during the speech of the minister of defense, he had poignantly mentioned that he needs to feed 5 million newborn Indonesians. This is a really important subject. But it is also important to remember that there is a hungry child at home, and for a mother and father it is most important to feed that child.

The issues that we talk about today, these are political issues. They are not only—but they are issues that require collaboration between industry, between business and policymakers. And that is important to keep in mind as we leave this room today.

As citizens of this Earth we are more interconnected than ever before, linked as social beings, innovators, artisans, and dreamers bound by a birthright as old as time: an inherent claim to inviolable human rights to freedom, dignity, and equality. As members prepare for this week’s and arguably the most critical G20 summit, they will consider the grave complications of our times. They will reflect on the important strides we have made, the disappointment and setbacks we have endured. They will commit themselves and their colleagues to an even greater investment in universal responsibility and to the safety and sanctity of our one human family. It is important to remember that it is one human family, but at the end of the day it is about the children at home. It is a legacy that we all have to preserve. It is important to think about issues on a global scale, but important to remember that it starts at your home.

As always, the United States of America stands ready to lead this charge both at home and abroad, delivering aid, promoting economic growth, enacting comprehensive health and food security initiatives. We will continue to fight hunger, malnutrition, and the senseless atrocities that have stolen the innocent lives of so many. We will heed Mother Nature’s warning, abating her tears with strong and steady push towards a timely transition to clean and renewable energy while responsibly acknowledging the interwoven, intricate, and dependent relationship between modern agriculture and oil, working diligently on a stopgap measure that will feed hungry, reward our collaborators discourage our detractors, and most importantly maintain national security.

I am so incredibly heartened by the invaluable insight and generous support conceived at and throughout this forum over the last two days. I share these blessings with my incomparable wife, Sharon, and with the brightest guiding lights of my heart and soul, my children. I implore you all to continue the quest for more answers and better solutions toward realizing global food security. We know all successes begin on the smallest of levels. The best ideas are cultivated when foundation and governments build partnership with the neighborhoods that need assistance, embracing community leaders as an irreplaceable pillar of this endeavor.

After my conversation with Fred from the Atlantic Council, I am also pleased to announce that we plan to hold our second security conference on the sidelines of the G20 in India, hopefully. I hope you will join us all again as we gather to reflect on the strides that have been made, the humanistic grounds that have been gained with your support and the implementation of actions gleaned from the dialogue we have shared at this forum. I have the greatest confidence that the momentum we have earned will be plentiful. Remember, there is nothing more human than morality.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, class is dismissed. We all have some very important homework to do. I would remember to keep one thing in mind, that we started this event with let there be bread.

Now I would like to invite the president of the Atlantic Council, Mr. Fred Kempe. Thank you for coming. God bless.

FREDERICK KEMPE: What a wonderful day. What a wonderful two days. And I have a few people to thank and a couple of things to say, but I will be brief.

So Bakur Kvezereli, the CEO of Ztractor, talked about two loud wakeup calls, COVID and the war, that have made us pay attention to food security in a way that we hadn’t. We do face the greatest food security crisis in modern history, says the World Food Programme. My own view is we should never let a crisis go to waste, so we are at work here not letting that crisis go to waste.

And then Max Peterson on the last panel talked about how, with food security, failure is—Max Peterson from AWS, a great strategic partner of the Atlantic Council, talked about how when it comes to food security failure is not an option.

So thank you, Gaurav, for your powerful final remarks, and to Gaurav and Sharon so much for being not just co-hosts of this forum but really giving it the vision, lending your friendship, and your generosity. So thank you so much. And please, everybody, thank them.

To speakers and audience members who joined us throughout the course of the conference, thank you for your valued insight and ideas.

I want to thank General Clark, Minister Prabowo, and his ministry; Minister Luhut and his ministry.

Pak Hashim, thank you so much for all your partnership through this.

We’ve heard from so many important global voices—perspectives from the Global North, the Global South, government, industry, civil society, brilliant students, seasoned experts.

I also want to thank people who are a little bit more behind the scenes and you didn’t see them as much on the stage: Matt Kroenig and his Scowcroft Center team; Iveta Kruma and her production team; Vicente, overseeing so much—or, Vicente Garcia, one of the great brilliant leaders of the Atlantic Council overseeing so much of the entire project, bringing it all together; our friends from Nouvelle Productions, and you’re going to see more from them tonight at the concert; from Edelman; from Viva Creative. Other sponsors: EMP, Unity, Harvest Commodities, Abt Associates, Arsari Group. Our media partners: CNN Indonesia, Kompas TV.

What’s clear for me from the last two days is how many of us in this room and joining online stand united in our commitment to combating food insecurity and hunger and serving as catalysts for change of the G20 and beyond. But too often, the private sector, the public sector, people all over the world don’t galvanize in this kind of setting, and I’m glad we were able to do that.

As we’ve seen and heard, food security remains a complex and multisectoral political, economic, scientific, and security challenge. Peter Engelke, who with Jeff Cimmino was leading the intellectual work that was behind this conference, will distill what we’ve learned over the last two days, put it in recommendations to the G20 and beyond, and you’ll be able to read that on our website tomorrow or the next day, Peter? Pretty soon? We’ll turn it around as quickly as we can.

What we know and what we heard from Gaurav is that the—at its core, the food security crisis and issue is a humanitarian one. It’s about that basic need for sustenance, food and water, and how they are met with dignity. We saw that powerful chart in the powerful keynote address of Minister Prabowo. And I’ll just remember FWE—food, water, energy—and the interlinkages of the three.

This is about building more sustainable food systems to better protect the planet we live on, the planet that nourishes us all. It’s about taking care of one another across communities and countries while we still have the chance. And as I said this morning, this inaugural edition—and Gaurav and I are able to reach decisions relatively quickly, and so we are going to go ahead and we’re planning on going ahead in India next year. But this inaugural edition of the Atlantic Council Global Food Security Forum marks the beginning of what we hope will be the Atlantic Council’s leadership in the global food security space alongside the Srivastava Foundation. And I look forward to continuing to convene similar forums along the G20 each year starting from India next year. That would be our hope and our plan.

I also look forward to engaging with our Indonesian partners and you all on our shared goals. This is our first major convening in Indonesia. It will not be our last. And we look forward to working with your country of 273 million people, the third-largest democracy, fourth-largest population. Just an incredible country where the US bilateral relationship will grow deeper and deeper. And as we heard from your minister this morning, this link right back to the days of your independence needs to be refreshed, deepened, and expanded.

I do want to thank again the Indonesian Ministry of Defense and Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment once again for co-hosting this forum for us. To show up with that kind of partners on the margins as an official sideline event of the G20, what a wonderful way to enter this wonderful country.

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US special envoy for global food security: Time to ‘hunker down’ because this crisis ‘is going to persist for some time’

Atlantic Council — Sun, 13 Nov 2022 16:17:19 +0000

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Flagship Event Sat, November 12, 2022 • 12:00 am ET

Highlights from the Global Food Security Forum

Economy & Business Resilience & Society

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK: And welcome back from lunch. Now we’re going to have some more information here and some more greetings from our friends in the United States, so I’m here to present them to you.

So first you’re going to hear from Dr. Cary Fowler. Cary is the special envoy for global food security at the US Department of State. He is right now at COP27, so he’s going to join us this way. Now, he’s been a food security leader both in government and in the nonprofit space as former executive director of the Global Crop Diversity Trust. In his current role with State Department, he coordinates regional, bilateral, and multilateral US diplomatic engagement on food security systems and nutrition. So he’s our top guy in State Department in the United States looking at this food security issue. We’re going to hear from Cary Fowler.

And then you’re going to hear from Ambassador Cindy McCain. Cindy is the US permanent representative to the US Mission to the UN Agencies in Rome. In her role, Ambassador McCain represents the US at Rome-based United Nations food agencies and around the world, really, all the effort that the UN is making to combat global hunger and expand food access to those in need.

So I hope you’ll enjoy their presentations, and we’ll be following that, then, with another panel. We want to fold their ideas into what we’re taking to the G20. OK, let’s roll it. Let’s hear from Cary Fowler

CARY FOWLER: Thank you for this opportunity to visit with you for a few minutes today.

I know all of you are aware of the frighteningly high numbers of food-insecure people in the world—that’s 828 million—of the 50 million who are facing starvation in 45 countries around the world.

And we all know that this food crisis that we’re in the midst of is caused by multiple factors. It’s caused by climate change. We’re having a severe drought in the Horn of Africa as we speak. It’s caused by COVID, which is disrupting supply chains. And also by conflict. Most of the people in the world that are food-insecure today are living in zones and countries that are experiencing conflict.

But we’re also finding that fertilizer prices are high, fuel prices are high. There have been trade restrictions that some countries have imposed. All of these factors are contributing to the kind of crisis that we have today, and that makes this particular world food crisis a unique one.

In the past, such global crises have typically been caused by one or two major drivers. This one has four or five; just count. And that means a couple of things. It means that it’s going to be difficult to come to grips with and to solve this particular crisis because we can’t just fix one aspect, one problem; we’re going to have to address all of them. And that’s a complicated business, as you well know. And it doesn’t come easily, doesn’t come cheaply, and it doesn’t come quickly.

And that’s the other point that I want to make, and that is that this food crisis, I’m sorry to say, is going to persist for some time. We’re looking at 2023 being a pretty difficult year. And I think we all should be aware of that and we should all be planning for it.

So the message that I want to leave you with today is a pretty simple one: Let’s hunker down and realize that we need to be in—that we are in this for the long haul. We need to be, of course, looking at meeting immediate humanitarian needs, but we also need to be addressing the long-term drivers of this particular crisis so that we don’t face this year after year after year.

That’s where I believe the G20 comes in and has an important role to play. The major countries of the world really need to be coming together now to collaborate and coordinate their actions, and ensure that we start to build the kind of food systems that we want for the future to ensure that all countries in the world and all people are, indeed, food secure.

Thank you very much.

AMBASSADOR CINDY MCCAIN: Hello, everyone. I’m so glad you are here today to discuss the most important issue of our time, food security. Thank you to the Atlantic Council for hosting this important conversation.

We find ourselves in urgent times: ongoing armed conflict, especially Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine; COVID-19 and climate change continue to strain global food systems; rising costs for food and agriculture inputs impact everyone, especially the poorest and most vulnerable around the globe. As always, America is answering the call to help, and I’m extremely proud of our response. Congress moved quickly to allocate billions of dollars in emergency food assistance. This is on top of the roughly $4 billion the US taxpayer regularly provides each year to the three UN food and agriculture agencies to provide lifesaving humanitarian aid and invest in medium- and long-term resilience.

Throughout my travels, I’ve seen the effects of conflict, increasing water scarcity, and extreme weather conditions from Kenya and Madagascar to Guatemala, Honduras, and Sri Lanka. Building resilience makes our food systems more sustainable, producing more with fewer resources. This is the challenge before us and it demands a united global front. As global leaders look for climate solutions in Egypt right now, it is clear to me that we must leverage science, technology, and innovation in agriculture to feed a growing population in a sustainable manner while generating economic opportunity.

Forums such as this are important occasions to discuss the top global concern of our time, food security. We must continue this discussion. And together, we can give a voice to the voiceless and achieve a world where no one goes to bed hungry.

Thank you.

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Global Food Security Forum day two: How Canada is taking on world hunger

Atlantic Council — Sun, 13 Nov 2022 16:15:25 +0000

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Flagship Event Sat, November 12, 2022 • 12:00 am ET

Highlights from the Global Food Security Forum

Economy & Business Resilience & Society

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

ANNOUNCER: Please welcome to the stage founder of the Srivastava Family Foundation Sharon Srivastava.

SHARON SRIVASTAVA: Hi. Our world is riddled with inconsistency. Why do some go hungry and others have more than enough is something that I’ve thought about for as long as I can remember. Many circumstances beyond one’s control play a critical role: your postal code, your ability to get an education, your support system, your gender, your race, your economic status.

I’m Sharon Srivastava, and my husband, Gaurav, and I founded the Gaurav and Sharon Srivastava Family Foundation. It is because of my husband’s unwavering commitment and service that we’re here today. And we’re honored to have partnered with the Atlantic Council, Fred Kempe, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment of the Republic of Indonesia, my dear friend Anie and her husband, Pak Hashim, on this most important forum about the state of global food security. Thank you for attending and for being part of the conversation with us.

As an American, I live in part of the world which thrives on abundance. We pride ourselves on equality and on philanthropy. But sadly, we do still have millions who go hungry every single day.

In Los Angeles, where I live with my husband and our children, we have astronomical rates of hunger. Neighborhoods have become food swamps with people unable to find accessible, affordable, and nutritious food choices. And we’re talking about one of the wealthiest cities in the wealthiest country in the world.

Nearly 30 million American children rely on their school lunch as their sole nutrient-rich meal of the day, and while great programs have been implemented to ensure that they get fed at school, one meal a day is not enough for a developing child.

When my children come home from school each day and make a dash to the fridge, I know it’s stocked with healthy options for them. But I know that for far too many mothers that’s not the case. So many mothers and fathers are forced to make the impossible choice every day of buying food or letting their kids go hungry so that they can afford other basic necessities—food or health care, food or transportation to work—and it shouldn’t be an either/or scenario.

Food insecurity is everywhere, and regardless of location, the impact on a child and a family can’t be overstated. I have seen children unable to attend school or to get an education that could help lift them and their families up out of poverty simply because they don’t have enough food to fuel their bodies and their brains. Far too many children and adults don’t know when their next meal will come.

Nearly a hundred years ago a covenant was created. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 established food as a basic human right. It was intended to ensure that our nations protect people from hunger, from starvation. And that’s nearly 80 years ago that our nations united to speak in one voice and say food is a human right.

Yet still these impossible choices between food or other necessities are being made by parents around the world each and every day. So what are we going to do about this?

Today we are called upon to have these difficult conversations, and I implore you, as you are doing through these panels and conversations, to reflect on what we have done to help achieve food security and on what we, as a collective, must do to move forward.

And with that, it’s my distinct pleasure to now introduce Christopher MacLennan, Canada’s deputy minister of International Development, and personal representative of the prime minister for the G20 summit to the stage to offer his insights as to how Canada has been stepping up as a global food security leader and where its food and humanitarian priorities lie ahead of the G20 summit and beyond. Thank you.

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CHRISTOPHER MACLENNAN: Thank you. Thank you very much, and thank you very much to the foundation, to the Atlantic Council for inviting—actually you didn’t invite me; you invited the prime minister. My deepest apologies. I am a very poor stand-in, but the prime minister will be arriving a little bit later as we all know, in advance of the G20, the leaders summit which begins in two days.

So, as all of you know, we are facing an unprecedented global food crisis. Global food prices are at historic highs, and hunger and malnutrition have been on the rise since at least 2015. It is estimated—and I’m sure you’ve heard lots of numbers today and you will hear many more—it is estimated that 828 million people were facing hunger in 2021. A heartbreaking 345 million people now live with acute food insecurity, and 50 million are on the brink of famine.

A number of factors have led to this increase in the rate of hunger; notably conflicts, climate change, and COVID-19. All these factors have been inducing more and more vulnerability into already strained food systems and are reducing the likelihood of achieving the sustainable development goal of reaching zero hunger by 2030.

Russia’s unjustified and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has exacerbated this crisis. The invasion has driven the cost of food, fuel, and fertilizer to record highs, which the United Nations Global Crisis Response Group is calling the largest cost-of-living crisis of the 21st century.

High food prices are affecting everyone in the world, but it’s the poorest and most vulnerable who are disproportionately affected as they spend most of their income already on food and other basic needs. This is especially true in Sub-Saharan Africa where the numbers of hungry and malnourished are growing faster than anywhere else. This food crisis is expected to worsen in the next year as agricultural productivity declines, driven largely by reduced fertilizer affordability alongside climate and conflict.

In these challenging times, we are also deeply concerned by Russia’s continued disinformation over the causes of global food insecurity and their use of energy, food, and fuel as weapons of war. It is unacceptable that Russia prevents food from reaching markets and then spreads disinformation that sanctions are to blame while, in fact, no sanctions address food, fertilizers, or foodstuffs.

As one of the breadbaskets of the world, Canada has a long history of being on the forefront of solutions to world hunger and is committed to doing its part to address the global food crisis. Today, in 2022, Canada has allocated a record amount of more than 615 million for humanitarian food and nutrition assistance. This funding is essential for saving lives and alleviating the suffering.

However, humanitarian assistance is not designed to address the root causes of hunger and malnutrition. This immediate support must be accompanied by critical investments to strengthen the resilience of global food systems in the longer term. This is why Canada provides support for agricultural development and food system transformation to developing countries, disbursing over 600 million in 2021.

Now in 2020, the Series 230 Initiative estimated that governments and donors would need to double their levels of investment in development assistance for agriculture and food systems, and spend an additional 33 billion US per year to achieve zero hunger by 2030.

As we step up to address the global food crisis, I would like to highlight a few priority areas for the government of Canada in our efforts globally. First, we need to ensure sufficient nutritious food is produced in a climate-smart way; sustainably increasing domestic production in countries where agricultural productivity has been underrealized; ensuring farmers, particularly women, have access to land, seeds, and essential inputs is fundamental to these efforts. Fertilizer—and we’ve heard a great deal about fertilizer already; I enjoyed the panel—is a vital input to many agricultural systems, and it’s at its least affordable levels since the 2008 food crisis. High prices can reduce use and undermine future harvests. We heard General Wesley Clark mention just the increases in Iowa alone on corn. Improving access to and sustainable use of fertilizers alongside sustainable soil health choices must be a priority.

Second, we need greater diversification and a better flow of goods along agrifood value chains. In the past, food systems and value chains have been designed primarily for economic efficiency. However, given all of the disruptions we are seeing—unforeseen, foreseen and increasing—they must be redesigned for resilience. This can mean diversifying import sources; diversifying the staple crops that are grown; having strong local, regional, and export-oriented value chains, or diversifying diets through expanding nutritious food options.

When shocks do arise—and they will—and we know there will be more shocks, implementing effective and coordinated responses to maintain the flow of goods is key. We’ve seen the importance of efforts like the Black Sea Grain Initiative to get grain moving out of Ukraine following Russia’s invasion. We saw these efforts reduce global food prices for all, as well as to ensure humanitarian shipments get to the poorest and the most vulnerable.

Third, we must listen to and work with our partners in the Global South. We must prioritize country-led, locally-owned, and participatory approaches to ensure that actions are informed by local realities and needs, and contribute to strengthening local capacities. I was very happy to hear General Clark, as well, mention the importance of not undercutting local markets with food—with food exports. This includes working with women, indigenous peoples, and other marginalized groups in the decision-making processes on food.

Fourth, we should do more to help directly poor and marginalized farmers maintain their operations in the face of shocks through risk-sharing tools like credit and crop insurance.

Finally, as a fundamental priority across all of these actions, we underscore the need to take gender-transformative approaches if we are to build resilience in our food systems at all. Women and girls are disproportionately affected by food insecurity and malnutrition. In fact, 60 percent of the world’s malnutrition are—malnourished are women. At the same time, women are key players as both consumers and producers of food, making up nearly half of all the world’s smallholder farmers. Canada recognizes that women are powerful agents of change and can actively contribute to advanced, climate-smart agriculture and improve food security and nutrition. This is why our Feminist International Assistance Policy aims to recognize and address the barriers that limit women’s success in agriculture and food production.

As we help build more resilient food systems, we need to take a gender-transformative approach that disrupts the current ways of working and puts those most impacted in the driver’s seat. Only then can we hope to reach zero hunger by 2030.

On a final note, I would like to thank you again for the opportunity to speak today and to share how Canada is focusing our efforts in response to the crisis. I look forward to the continuing discussions that are taking place today. I think, quite honestly, a year ago food security was not on the G20 agenda, not at all. I was at last year’s G20 in Rome. It is a fantastic sign that groups like the Atlantic Council are pulling together—with the help of the foundation, pulling together conversations like this because these types of conversations are what underpin the policy and political discussions that need to take place to respond so critically and so quickly as we’ve needed in responding to the food crisis. So thank you very much.

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ANNOUNCER: Please welcome the Coordinating Minister of Maritime and Investment Affairs of Indonesia Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan.

MINISTER LUHUT BINSAR PANDJAITAN: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to Bali and welcome to Global Food Security Forum. I’m glad we can gather here in Bali to discuss how can—how we can solve food security problems and create a solution to achieve food security and resilience.

Amid the current worsening condition with the pandemic, the peak of global inflation, Ukraine-Russia conflict, it affect the significant increase of food and energy prices. Crude oil prices are expected to be above $120 a barrel in the remainder of 2022. Previously, only $42 a barrel in 2020 and $70.42 a barrel in 2021. On average, in July 2022, compared to January 2022, energy like coal prices increased by 91.26 percent, natural gas by 40.5 percent, and crude oil by 25 percent. On average, in July 2022 compared to January 2022 food prices, such as corn, increased by 1.5 percent, soybean by 14.75 percent, and wheat by 7.26 percent.

[There are] several challenges in the agriculture sectors. First, global warming make the climate even more unpredictable and cause crop failure. To mitigate future courses, Indonesia enhanced national determined contribution target, national policy in departments, climate change adaption policies, and transparency frameworks in the agriculture sector. This way, it leads Indonesia back toward net-zero emission by 2060 or sooner and is able to reduce greenhouse emission from a business-as-usual scenario by 31.89 percent unconditionally and 43.20 percent by 2030.

Second, insufficient of supply chains due to the highly fragmented industry with many intermediaries producing supply-demand mismatches. Also, infrastructure has not yet been established evenly throughout the remote areas. Processing facility is also far from the farming areas.

Third, the low interest of younger generation farmers due to the cost of farming in Indonesia and the low yield. The fertilizer price is high due to an interrupted supply chain. Farming technologies and machinery are expensive compare, so Indonesia farmers still do the operation manually.

To this matter, the government of Indonesia is formulating a presidential resolution for national food security… top priority commodities such as rice, corn, soybean, shallot, tea leaf, garlic, and sugarcane. The government of Indonesia also continuously improving several key factors. First, increase the land area for these commodities. Pursuing cultivation research and development in superior seed. Forming innovation in technology and food processing. Improving the supply chain through an integrated Food Estate program and necessary infrastructure so we can cut costs and deliver a better product. Boosting the interest in farming in the younger generation and continuously enhancing formal and informal training.

In addition, we have established a Food Estate program where there will be an integrated ecosystem and a good collaboration between the government, farmer, investors… The government will provide essential infrastructure surfaces, machinery, mechanization equipment, permit, and farmer partnership with investors…. Investor will provide the working capital for the farmers based on the agreed-upon cost analysis between farmers and investors. And there will be a profit-sharing scheme between investor and farmers.

As a pilot project, we have established Food Estate in Humbang Hasundutan, North Sumatra, where approximately 12,000 hectare cultivate horticultural plants starting from potato, shallot, and garlic. We also integrate the project with science and technology park for herbal and horticulture. There will be genomic sequencing research… produce superior seed cultivation and understand herbal and horticulture profiles in Indonesia. This project is an integrated hub with the collaboration between private and international experts and companies, local and government universities, and local farmers. We hope this project can also contribute to economic development to ensure economic equality in the surrounding area as it provides a new employment opportunity and a vocation for local people. Next, we will build Food Estate in Central Sulawesi and Central Kalimantan focusing on crops such as corn, sugarcane, cocoa, and cassava.

Ladies and gentlemen, we can indeed participate in securing global food security. Start from you contributing to your community. It contributes to your country and the world. I’m sure that today all Global Food Security Forum participants will have a fruitful and productive event.

I would also like to thank to the Atlantic Council and Ministry of Defense for co-hosting this event, and I hope through this forum we can create a solution to achieve Sustainable Development Goal to end hunger, achieve food security, and improve nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture. Thank you and enjoy Bali.

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