On June 16, Atlantic Council Senior Advisor Harlan Ullman published an op-ed in the Hill warning of a potential “crisis point” for the US government if domestic immigration protests intensify while tensions escalate in the Middle East. He argues that convergence of crises at home and abroad could overwhelm policymakers and stain the US government’s ability to respond effectively.

International Advisory Board member

Harlan Ullman

Senior Advisor

The post Ullman in the Hill on how the simultaneity of crises threaten US national security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On June 13, Matthew Kroenig, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director, was quoted in the Wall Street Journal on how President Trump may choose to present Israel’s strikes on Iranian military and nuclear installations, as well as its military leadership, in light of his “peacemaker” pledge.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig quoted in the Wall Street Journal on Trump’s potential framing of Israel’s strikes on Iran appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On May 28, Caroline Zier, nonresident senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative, was published in the Military Times examining the Trump administration’s policy of using miliary personnel at the US southern border. Zier argues that the military’s “unprecedented” role at the border diverts time and resources from national security operations that “only the military can perform” like deterring China in the Indo-Pacific.

Fellow

Caroline Zier

Nonresident Senior Fellow

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Security & Defense

The post Zier in Military Times analyzes US military deployment at southern border appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Israel’s operation came as US-Iranian negotiations on Iran’s advancing nuclear program seemed to have reached an impasse and just after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concluded that Tehran was in breach of its nuclear nonproliferation obligations. So how might Iranian forces respond? What will this mean for Israel, Iran’s nuclear program, the US-Israel relationship, and a region already experiencing great upheaval? Below, Atlantic Council experts shed light on what happened and what to expect next.

This article will be updated as additional expert contributions come in. 

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Jonathan Panikoff: Four questions that could shape the Middle East’s future 

Daniel B. Shapiro: Iran has never looked weaker

Shalom Lipner: Iran will seek to exact a heavy toll on both Israel and the United States

Landon Derentz: Sometimes you keep oil prices low for a reason

Matt Kroenig: An inevitability that will quickly de-escalate

Richard LeBaron: The US is getting dragged into a war it doesn’t want

Diana Rayes: Civilians are likely to be hit hardest in a prolonged regional conflict

R. Clarke Cooper: Iran apparently was given two choices

Daniel E. Mouton: This move will likely exacerbate Israel-US tensions

Kirsten Fontenrose: Will Arab states help defend against Iranian retaliation, or look the other way?

Mark N. Katz: Russia is not coming to Iran’s rescue

Perrihan Al-Riffai: This conflict threatens an already fragile global economy

Ellen Wald: Oil prices spike despite minimal material risk 

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: How will strikes impact Israel’s war in Gaza? 

Ariel Ezrahi: Netanyahu lacks the trust of his people to carry out this war 

Nicholas Blanford: Hezbollah is likely to express restraint

Sarah Zaaimi: Jerusalem prepares for the long haul

Thomas Warrick: It’s not too soon to think about the postwar plan

Rachel Whitlark: Israel likely achieved its goal of setting back Iran’s nuclear program

Emily Milliken: Israel’s strike could unravel the US cease-fire with the Houthis

Joze Pelayo: Trump should work with Gulf countries on a diplomatic response

Yaseen Rashed: Israel is taking a major risk with its Begin Doctrine

Four questions that could shape the Middle East’s future

The questions after Israel’s sweeping strikes against Iran’s military and nuclear sites outnumber the answers. In particular, there are four key questions whose answers will help determine the trajectory of the Middle East and perhaps beyond—not only over the coming weeks, but potentially for the coming years:

1. What is the scale of Israeli military operations in Iran?

Israel’s focus now is on Iran’s nuclear facilities, as well as undermining Iran’s command and control and military leadership, with the goal of trying to mitigate the intensity of Israel’s response (which started last night with Tehran launching one hundred drones). The Israelis are going to continue strikes for at least the coming days. The expectation is that they will go after key Iranian nuclear infrastructure to delay Iran’s timeline to a nuclear bomb, even if Israel on its own cannot fully eliminate Iran’s pathway to one.  

But is the scale of the attacks to come so large and diverse that Israel’s end goal is not only crippling Iran’s nuclear program but fomenting regime change? The targets Israel chooses will help determine the answer to that question, but a warning is also warranted. For years, many in Israel have insisted that regime change in Iran would prompt a new and better day—that nothing could be worse than the current theocratic regime. Iran is indeed led by a terrible autocracy that has undermined the growth of the country and tremendously hurt its own people. But history tells us it can always be worse. What is likely to follow a theocratic Iranian government is not democracy but Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–istan. Such a government is likely, at least initially, to be much more hardline than the current one. In such a case, Israel might find itself in a perpetual, ongoing, and far more intense war that is no longer in the shadows, as it has been for years.

Continue reading here:

New Atlanticist

Jun 13, 2025

After Israel’s strikes on Iran, these four questions could determine the Middle East’s future

By Jonathan Panikoff

The trajectory of the Middle East could be determined by how just a few critical questions are answered the coming days and weeks.

Iran Israel

—Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council.

Iran has never looked weaker

Israel’s stunning, multifaceted strike against Iranian nuclear, ballistic missile, and regime leadership targets has thrown much into chaos: Iran’s ability to project power, Trump’s nuclear diplomacy, and US-Israel regional coordination.

Israel’s strikes lay bare the depth of Iran’s miscalculation following Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack against Israel. Tehran’s Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah, and its key regional ally, the Assad regime in Syria, lie in ruins. Iran’s own state-to-state attacks against Israel in April and October 2024 produced little damage, while Iran suffered significantly from Israel’s October response.

Now, with that taboo also in the dustbin of history, Israel demonstrated its full penetration of Iran, and ability to wreak havoc across the Iranian system. Iran has never looked weaker, and its ability to respond meaningfully will be tested.

But the story does not end here. Israel pledges additional attacks, but Iran will now be supremely motivated to sprint to a nuclear breakout at hardened, underground facilities. The United States will surely assist Israel with defense against any Iranian retaliation. But Trump’s dream of a diplomatic resolution that ends Iranian enrichment appears dead. More likely, the US president will be faced with a decision on whether to use the United States’ unique capabilities to destroy Tehran’s underground nuclear facilities and prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon. The decision will split his advisers and political base, amid accusations, and perhaps his own misgivings, that Netanyahu is attempting to drag him into war.

The repercussions on trust and coordination in the US-Israel relationship could be long lasting, with implications for future rounds of conflict with Iran, negotiations on the next US-Israel military assistance agreement, and the wind-down to the war in Gaza. An ‘America first’ president, and an ‘Israel first’ prime minister, who have each made fateful decisions with minimal consultation or taking each other’s interests into account, will coexist uneasily for as many more months and years as they both serve.

—Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He served as US ambassador to Israel from 2011 to 2017, and most recently as deputy assistant secretary of defense for Middle East policy. He also previously served as the director of the Atlantic Council’s N7 Initiative.

Iran will seek to exact a heavy toll on both Israel and the United States

JERUSALEM—Years of speculation over the possibility of an Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities ended at approximately 3:30 a.m. (Israel time) on Friday when first reports of explosions in Tehran began to circulate.

The timing of the Israeli operation—which was authorized after Israel’s leadership concluded that the Islamic Republic was on the threshold of a dangerous breakthrough in its efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability—took advantage of a rapidly shrinking window for military action, before relevant Iranian infrastructure became too advanced or well-protected. Trump’s declaration on Thursday that “I don’t want to say [an attack] is imminent,” together with expectations that Israel would stand down until (at least) after this weekend’s planned US-Iran talks in Oman, narrowed the opportunity for any element of surprise.

Israel’s initial targets have covered a wide spectrum, including, reportedly, multiple nuclear and other installations, as well as senior IRGC commanders and nuclear scientists. Israel’s intent is not only to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program, but also to undermine its potential to inflict retaliatory harm on Israel and defend against subsequent waves of Israel’s offensive.

The degree of Israeli coordination with the Trump administration will be pivotal to how this crisis unfolds. Rubio’s cryptic statement that “Israel advised us that they believe this action was necessary for its self-defense” does not clarify the extent of US (dis)agreement with that determination, or exactly what prior warning Israel may have supplied to the White House. Notwithstanding, and despite Rubio’s clarification that “we are not involved in strikes against Iran,” Iranian threats to exact a heavy price from both Israel and the United States will thrust the latter into the eye of the storm. Forthcoming decisions by the White House on the contours of US engagement will have a direct impact on Israel’s ability to persist with this campaign.

—Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative who previously worked in foreign policy and public diplomacy during his time at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem, where he served in the administration of seven consecutive Israeli premiers.

Sometimes you keep oil prices low for a reason

The Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure may be reverberating across global energy markets, but the tremors are far more restrained than the stakes might have suggested. Brent crude rose more than 10 percent, yet the per-barrel price remains below eighty dollars, well short of crisis levels. The moment underscores how strategic foresight in energy policy can shape the contours of geopolitical risk in the world’s most volatile corridors.

While headlines are focused on missiles and centrifuges, a quieter story lies in the market conditions that made such a strike politically viable. Israel’s actions benefited from the political leeway made possible by Trump’s efforts to “bring down the cost of oil.” It’s not to say the strike wouldn’t have happened otherwise, but—as shown during Trump’s first term—when energy markets can shield consumers from the worst effects of a supply disruption, policymakers have far greater latitude to escalate.

In 2018, Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal and impose “maximum pressure” was rooted in a belief that oil markets could absorb the shock. Internal White House analysis forecasted only modest price increases, with US production gains and global spare capacity acting as a buffer. Crucially, while the Strait of Hormuz has long symbolized energy risk, it was—and remains—unlikely to be closed. Iran needs the revenue. This gave the Trump administration confidence to confront Iran without fear of major energy disruption.

Israel’s strike today reinforces that view, operating in an energy environment shaped by the same strategic logic. Oil doesn’t need to stay cheap forever—just long enough to change the geopolitical equation. Trump’s push to keep prices low may have done more than remake global energy flows—it may have helped lay the groundwork for a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. 

—Landon Derentz is senior director and Morningstar Chair for Global Energy Security at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center. He previously served as director for energy at the White House National Security Council and director for Middle Eastern and African affairs at the US Department of Energy.

An inevitability that will quickly de-escalate

As I wrote more than a decade ago, this was inevitable.  

There were only three possible outcomes in the decades-long battle over Tehran’s nuclear aspirations: allow Iran to go nuclear, negotiate a permanent deal, or military action. A nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable. A permanent deal is highly unlikely—as former US President Barack Obama’s 2015 nuclear deal proved. So, military action is the only viable option left.  

There are three key facilities for Iran’s nuclear opponents to destroy: Isfahan, Natanz, and Fordow. A US strike would have been more effective as it could have meaningfully degraded all of Iran’s key nuclear facilities, while Israel can destroy the above-ground facilities. The underground facilities are difficult, but don’t count Israel out. No one would have predicted it could take out Hezbollah with walkie talkies last year. Did Israel conduct commando raids or other creative attacks on the underground facilities? If so, this will meaningfully set back Iran’s nuclear program.  

As for the question of likely retaliation—Iran has few good options. Its Hamas and Hezbollah proxies are degraded, and Israel’s Iron Dome can demonstrably defend against missile and drone attacks. Iran is also afraid of a wider war, though those fears are misguided. This will de-escalate quickly, like Trump’s strike on Qassem Soleimani during his first term. The key questions are: What will happen in the coming weeks and months? Does Iran rebuild? Does Israel mow the grass? Or does Iran decide that it is not worth it to spend decades, and billions of dollars, and only have a pile of rubble to show for it? 

—Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Council’s director of studies. 

The US is getting dragged into a war it doesn’t want

Israel’s attack on Iranian nuclear and military facilities was in direct defiance of Trump’s call for caution and negotiation. The United States has been seeking a negotiated solution—one that was not supported by Netanyahu’s government.  

The question now is not whether, but how, the United States will be dragged into a war it doesn’t want, and that Gulf states fear. Iranian retaliation directly against Israel will not translate into non-involvement from Washington, as Israel will then be drawn into a spiral of retaliation and counter-retaliation—requiring US military supplies, intelligence support, and diplomatic cover.  

So far, there is no evidence that Gulf states looked the other way as Israel used their airspace for the attacks, and this won’t be very difficult to confirm or deny.  

Then the question becomes how to protect US troops in the region and how to come to the aid of Guif friends. Given the Trump administration’s close ties to the Gulf, as well as Trump’s personal admiration for certain Gulf leaders, the region will expect the US administration to provide any help they request.  

—Richard LeBaron is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is a former US ambassador to Kuwait and a former deputy chief of mission at the US embassy in Israel. 

Civilians are likely to be hit hardest in a prolonged regional conflict

Just as corners of the Middle East were experiencing some semblance of stability, such as in parts of Syria and Lebanon, this latest escalation has the potential to reverse the region’s recent fragile gains. Beyond the immediate political and military consequences, the most profound impacts will be felt by civilians, particularly those already in humanitarian crises. 

A prolonged disruption in regional commerce and air travel, alongside rising fuel and food prices, will hit displaced populations, host communities, and those living under the poverty line the hardest. In Syria, where around 90 percent of the population lives in poverty, any shock to commodity prices or aid delivery will be devastating. In Lebanon and Jordan, already overstretched in hosting among the world’s highest refugee populations, the economic fallout may further strain public services and deepen social tensions. 

Meanwhile, the risk of environmental damage or public health crises from military action, including oil spills, water contamination, or infrastructure damage, could pose grave risks to civilians in both the Gulf and Iran. These are not theoretical concerns—they are real threats to food security, access to care, and basic human dignity for millions. 

The United States has a responsibility to act in ways that reduce harm, avoid a full-scale regional war, and protect civilian lives. That means using its leverage not to escalate but to contain the conflict, pressing all parties, including allies, to prioritize diplomacy over devastation. Failure to do so will not only ignite another war in the region, but it will also exacerbate existing circumstances for fragile communities across the region. 

—Diana Rayes is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Iran apparently was given two choices

The Israeli preemptive strike is likely to disrupt Iran’s immediate capacity to develop a nuclear weapons program. However, it remains uncertain whether such an action will effectively deter the Iranian regime’s nuclear ambitions. 

The Iranian regime appears to have been given two choices: abandon its nuclear aspirations or face a lack of intervention from the Trump administration if Israel decided to strike Iranian nuclear facilities. 

Israel may have advocated for an earlier attack window, while the United States likely attempted to apply diplomatic measures. When diplomacy failed, the United States understandably announced an ordered departure for US embassy staff in Baghdad, while other US diplomatic posts in the region were placed on stand-by for ordered departure. 

Regardless of when the Trump administration became aware that the Israeli strike was imminent, questions remain: Will this unilateral action by Israel sufficiently deter Iran’s nuclear ambitions? How might the regime in Tehran respond? And how will the United States and the Gulf states seek to contain further conflict in the region? 

What is immediately clear is that economic and security conditions in the Middle East have become more volatile.  

—R. Clarke Cooper is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and is the founder and president of Guard Hill House, LLC. He previously served as assistant secretary for political-military affairs at the US Department of State. 

This move will likely exacerbate Israel-US tensions

The start of what is likely to be a multi-day series of Israeli strikes across Iran is an unprecedented exchange in a long history of attacks between the regional rivals. Most importantly, Israel is going alone against Iran. In previous instances, the United States and Israel maintained regular communication and a coordinated defense posture. This coordination was spectacularly successful in the defense of Israel—including in both April and October 2024, which saw unbelievably low casualties and damage in light of the hundreds of missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles fired against Israel.  

This time is different. Trump’s pursuit of Iran nuclear negotiations has created skepticism in Israel. The unilateral nature of US negotiations and the removal of the Trump administration’s pro-Israel proponents, such as former National Security Advisor Mike Waltz and former Deputy Special Presidential Envoy Morgan Ortagus, could have only escalated this tension with Israel. These moves came alongside Trump’s avoidance of an Israel stop during his recent visit to the Middle East, as well as Netanyahu’s Oval Office visit in April, where he left empty handed on both tariff relief and Iran. 

The beginning of unilateral Israeli strikes is a sign that the country feels that it must take action to ensure its own security. Regardless of what led Israel to take this step, it is likely to further exacerbate any preexisting tensions between Israel and the United States.

Finally, Iran will now feel obligated to respond. Depending on the degree of damage that Israel has inflicted, Iran may respond in a way that broadens the conflict and creates collateral damage elsewhere in the region. How this will end is an unknown, but as has been the case in the past, a speedier ending is likely to depend on the United States.

—Daniel E. Mouton is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He served on the National Security Council from 2021 to 2023 as the director for defense and political-military policy for the Middle East and North Africa for Coordinator Brett McGurk.

Will Arab states help defend against Iranian retaliation, or look the other way?

Among the many lessons to be drawn from this operation is one about the importance of speaking truth to power. The IRGC makes a practice of minimizing its vulnerabilities in reports to senior leadership. Leaked IRGC documents from the past several years revealed overstatements of capability and omissions of setbacks, perhaps intended to deflect questions about the bang for the buck in their budget. Recently the IRGC was reassuring political leadership that its air defenses could withstand an Israeli strike. This may have contributed to Tehran’s decision to refrain from making a deal with the United States before Trump’s two-month timeline elapsed. This resulted in Israel’s assessment that diplomacy has failed and strikes were necessary. The generals behind those white lies were the first targets.

But now comes the expected retaliation. And the big question is: Will the states in the Middle East participate in Israel’s defense as before? As nuclear talks went nowhere, both Iran and the United States wanted to know, leading to tug-of-war diplomacy in the Arab world.

The United States wants Arab states to turn on missile and drone detection and mitigation systems and look out for munitions launched from Iran toward Israel, while Iran wants Arab states to consider looking the other way if it stages retaliatory strikes that cross Arab airspace. Arab states have a logical reason to rebuff Iran’s request. Munitions flown into a country’s airspace without coordination with its capital are violations of sovereignty and a threat to its people and infrastructure. Taking them down is such a no-brainer that the United States would likely conclude that any munitions not reported or mitigated by Arab states were intentionally ignored. Neither the United States nor its Arab partners want that kind of tension to arise.

—Kirsten Fontenrose is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She was previously the senior director for the Gulf at the National Security Council.

Russia is not coming to Iran’s rescue 

Just as on previous occasions when Israeli forces attacked Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran itself, Moscow does not seem willing to defend its ally in Tehran. The Russian statement issued Friday was critical of Israel but gave no indication that Russia will take concrete actions against it or in support of Iran. Instead, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs called for all parties to exercise restraint and prevent further escalation. Most remarkably, the last sentence of the statement noted that “we would like to remind you of the US’s readiness to hold another round of negotiations with Iran on the Iranian nuclear program in Oman.” In other words, Moscow itself seems to be calling on the Trump administration to resolve the situation instead of promoting Russia for the lead role in this. 

Moscow’s less than fulsome support (so far) for Iran must be causing renewed doubts in Tehran about what Iran is getting from Moscow in return for Iranian support to its war against Ukraine. On the other hand, there is nobody else Iran can turn to who would give it greater support in responding to Israel. Despite Iran’s threats about targeting American forces in the Gulf region, working with the Trump administration may be Iran’s best hope for restraining Israel. The Russian Foreign Ministry itself seems to be suggesting this. 

—Mark N. Katz is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and professor emeritus of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government. 

This conflict threatens an already fragile global economy 

Israel’s attack on Iran’s nuclear and military sites—resulting in the death of senior IRGC commanders—sparked immediate volatility in global energy markets. Brent crude jumped up as much as 14 percent intraday, briefly peaking at $78.50 before settling around $75, marking the sharpest spike since early 2022. While previous shocks during the Israel-Gaza war faded due to resilient oil infrastructure and global oversupply, this escalation is different: an oil exporter is now under direct attack. 

Markets are pricing in a heightened geopolitical risk premium, especially amid Iran’s threat to disrupt oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz, which carries nearly 20 percent of global crude. If Iran’s oil infrastructure is damaged or tanker routes are disrupted, Brent could surge to $120–$130 per barrel. Though OPEC+ could ease some pressure, market uncertainty remains high. 

At the same time, US tariff policies are weighing on global demand. The International Monetary Fund forecasts a 0.5 percent drop in global growth in 2025 due to ongoing trade tensions. This could counteract some of the supply-driven price spikes. However, if the United States joins the conflict—especially if nuclear talks collapse—the risk of sustained stagflation rises, threatening an already fragile global economy. 

—Perrihan Al-Riffai is a nonresident senior fellow with the empowerME Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. 

Oil prices spike despite minimal material risk

As Israeli jets attacked targets across Iran early Friday morning in the Middle East, oil futures started rising. Oil benchmarks initially rose 6 percent, then 9 percent and up to 11 percent as the scope of the attacks widened. Oil prices generally spike in response to any conflict in the Middle East, even when neither of the parties involved are major oil suppliers. In this case, Iran is a significant oil supplier, Israel is not.  
 
The reality is that the supply of oil from the Persian Gulf (about 20 percent of global seaborne oil shipments) is not materially at risk after Israel’s strikes, and it is unlikely to come under threat from Iran. That’s because of a few reasons: One, Israel isn’t targeting Iran’s oil production and export sites, so Iran derives no net benefit if it prevents Saudi, Emirati, Kuwaiti, Iraqi, Qatari or Bahraini oil from leaving the Persian Gulf. Two, should Tehran attempt to block Arab oil exports, its own oil exports would, in turn, be blocked. Iran can only benefit from stopping others from exporting if Tehran has no capacity to export oil itself. And three, Iran can’t stop traffic through the Strait of Hormuz for any significant amount of time because sea traffic can be rerouted around Iranian waters if necessary. 
 
China, which purchases most of Iran’s crude oil, does not want to see the flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf impeded. While China doesn’t have the naval capacity in the Persian Gulf to ensure this, it has become such a significant trading partner of Iran’s, that Iran cannot afford to see its trade with China disrupted. China is Iran’s largest customer and a significant customer of oil from Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries. China will use the full weight of its economic power to ensure that oil from all Persian Gulf exporters to Asia is not disrupted. 
  
Due to the severity of this attack, and the paradigm shift in diplomatic and nuclear relations that will result, oil prices may not retreat as quickly as they have after previous attacks. Much depends on when, how and against whom Iran retaliates. Regardless, it is important to remember that this is not the oil market of the 1990s and early 2000s. The market is well supplied from a variety of producers, with plenty of spare capacity should the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) choose to employ it. The United States is not beholden to foreign oil producers and its foreign policy should reflect that. 
 
—Ellen Wald, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center and the president of Transversal Consulting. She is the author of “Saudi, Inc.: The Arabian Kingdom’s Pursuit of Profit and Power,” a book on the history and strategy of Aramco and Saudi Arabia. 

How will strikes impact Israel’s war in Gaza? 

The large-scale and devastating Israeli strikes against the Islamic Republic of Iran have opened a new chapter in the post-October 7 Middle East world. In addition to the kinetic damage that they have caused, the strikes are a clear indication that Tehran was proceeding with acquiring enough technology and materials to procure a nuclear weapon, which would have changed the entirety of the Middle East’s security and geopolitical architecture.  

Critically, there is the question of how these strikes impact Israel’s war in Gaza against Hamas and factions that are supported by the IRGC. Will Israel assassinate the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) leadership in Tehran, along with other terror operatives? Will the attacks distract from Gaza, or provide the Israeli military with an opportunity to expand its assault on the Strip without international scrutiny? 

Another dimension of the Iranian ladder of escalation is what happens in the West Bank, which is under the fragile control of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Israeli military occupation. Does the IRGC have assets in the West Bank that it can activate to sow some chaos against the PA, in hopes of starting skirmishes with the Israel Defense Forces? Are there assets inside Israel who could engage in a targeted terror attack? 

Regardless of the rhetoric, and while this is a serious escalation, it is unlikely, at least for now, that the wave of Israeli airstrikes will result in a massive, global, or even regional war like many have been warning for years. This is due to the fact that Arab countries, the United States, and even Israel want to be measured and deploy strategies to avoid a regional conflagration that leads to massive death and destruction.

—Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib leads Realign For Palestine, an Atlantic Council project that challenges entrenched narratives in the Israel and Palestine discourse. 

Netanyahu lacks the trust of his people to carry out this war

The Iranian regime is a group of dead men walking. Iran’s reign of terror both internally and externally has been a destructive and destabilizing force since the Islamic Revolution, supporting terrorist groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. Diplomatic efforts over the years to stall Iran’s race to obtain nuclear weapons have not been a resounding success so far. Hence the recent Israeli attack does not come as a surprise.  

That said, millions of Israelis distrust Netanyahu’s motivations and actions, whether as a peacetime or especially as a wartime prime minister. The Gaza war is a case in point. He appears to be prime minister bent on saving his own skin, aka saving his extreme right coalition to avoid facing trial for corruption and being held accountable for his government’s failure in connection with the October 7 attacks. He has done so at the clear expense of his country’s national security and democracy, as there is consensus among Israel’s security top brass and indeed the country that as prime minister Netanyahu needs to take responsibility. Netanyahu’s relations with Trump, the European Union, and most of the Middle East are at an all-time low, and there is unprecedented polarization within Israel stemming from Netanyahu’s divisive and inciting policies. This is not encouraging, to say the least, in this situation. 

One only hopes that the United States, working with its sensible Middle Eastern allies such as the United Arab Emirates, will help to bring a sensible outcome to this explosive time. 

—Ariel Ezrahi is a senior nonresident fellow at the Middle East Programs, the architect of the Gas for Gaza project, and the head of the Energy Transition Sub-Committee for MENA2050. He also works in the climate finance space.

Hezbollah is likely to express restraint

With Israel launching an unprecedented wave of attacks against Iran’s nuclear facilities and related assets, many eyes are turning toward Lebanon to see if Hezbollah will respond on behalf of its patron. For now, however, Hezbollah is likely to adopt a policy of restraint, and the Iranians may not call upon its proxy to strike back. 

Until the recent fourteen-month war between Hezbollah and Israel, the Lebanese group was seen as a vital component of Iran’s deterrence architecture against the possibility of an attack on Iran’s nuclear program and on the regime itself. However, even before the latest war between Hezbollah and Israel, there were no guarantees that if Iran was struck by Israel, the United States, or a combination of the two that Tehran would call upon Hezbollah to respond with a punishing barrage of precision-guided missiles against targets across Israel.

That decision—whether or not to trigger a Hezbollah response—would have likely been based on the scale of the damage in Iran, and whether it posed an existential threat to the regime. If the Iranians calculated that the attack was survivable, then a Hezbollah response would be unnecessary and potentially counterproductive. Instead, Hezbollah would be held in reserve for the day the Iranians really needed it. That same calculus applies now, but with the added factor that Hezbollah’s military capabilities have been so degraded by the recent war that it no longer poses the same level of threat toward Israel. In addition, there is a strong sentiment of anger and frustration within the rank and file against Iran for, as they perceive it, letting Hezbollah down during the recent war by refusing to allow it to employ the full gamut of its military might to inflict real pain on the Israeli home front. 

That mood of resentment may have been on subtle display during the recent visit to Beirut by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who reportedly held a frosty meeting with Hezbollah leader Sheikh Naim Qassem, and was accompanied by two relatively junior party lawmakers while paying his respects to the tomb of late Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah.

For now, domestic calculations will likely help stay Hezbollah’s hand. However, that restraint could falter if the Israeli strikes against Iran continue and pose a direct threat to the regime. 

—Nicholas Blanford is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, covering the politics and security affairs of Lebanon and Syria.

Jerusalem prepares for the long haul

JERUSALEM—Despite the early signs of an imminent strike, with US regional embassies and military facilities evacuating a number of their staff, our plane landed in busy and bustling Ben Gurion airport undeterred by the news of a potential pre-emptive attack on Iranian nuclear facilities and leadership.

Just hours ago, senior experts and a US official at a Jerusalem dinner seemed optimistic that nothing out of the ordinary would occur and that the week’s developments represented a mere tactical escalation amid important nuclear talks. Analysts familiar with Israeli politics jokingly noted that if anything serious were to happen between Iran and Israel, it would need to be after next week due to Netanyahu’s son’s upcoming wedding. We later came to understand that the United States might have overestimated its capacity to deter their Israeli counterparts.

At 3:00 a.m. the peaceful Jerusalem ancient city walls were suddenly disturbed by piercing alarms calling everyone to take shelter in the nearest safe space. Our security team informed us that Israel had initiated a unilateral strike on Iran and that the United States was given a heads up about the events of the night. Sources reported that the Israeli war cabinet was gathering to discuss a Gaza cease-fire and hostage deal, and were surprised to discover that it was a briefing on the attacks. Some of them were sworn in writing to secrecy.

As we stand now, the mood in Israel is dug in for a long-haul operation to disable the capabilities of what they call the “head of the octopus,” after cutting many of its tentacles in Gaza, Beirut, and Damascus last year. Israel called thousands of its reservists back to duty, and Jerusalem is preparing for a potentially consequential retaliation from Tehran, as initial reports reveal substantial losses among the Iranian military leadership and nuclear scientists.

The Mullah regime’s response might not come immediately, as we witnessed with the 2024 events. Tehran will have to rally its defense systems after being drastically diminished, and now also face a crisis of leadership amid tonight’s high-level targets.

The United States, however, clearly tried to distance itself from the attacks and focused on prioritizing the safety and security of US facilities and personnel in the Middle East, although signaling a deadlock in US-Iranian nuclear talks. President Donald Trump is faced today with a crucial dilemma of either further decoupling from Israel and confirming US isolationism, or seizing a moment of weakness among Iran and its proxies by supporting Israeli ambitions to annihilate an enemy at the source.

—Sarah Zaaimi is a resident senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs. She is also the center’s deputy director for communications, overseeing strategic communications, editorial agenda, media relations, and social and digital marketing efforts.

It’s not too soon to think about the postwar plan

Israel’s strikes against Iranian command, nuclear, and military sites were not a warning shot. They were intended to start a change as decisive against the Iranian regime as Israel’s 2024 campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Importantly, Israel has no postwar plan for Iran beyond ending an existential nuclear threat. Israel should have thought this through months ago, but it really needs to think now about its post-war strategy. Regime change will not happen after an aerial campaign, no matter how effective. However much the IRGC was weakened by Israel’s strikes, including the reported death of senior IRGC military leaders, Tehran is still strong and coherent enough to prevent a popular “color” revolution. Regime change efforts from the United States and others elsewhere in the world should be a cautionary example of how hard this would be.

Israel is going to have to sustain a homeland defense strategy and keep striking nuclear, missile, and drone facilities in Iran. It also needs to develop, or work with the United States to develop, a workable strategy that gets Iran to end its nuclear threat to Israel. This will not be easy, and it will involve serious tradeoffs by Israel’s leaders, including how to end the war in Gaza on terms that will keep Hamas from coming back into power while giving the Palestinians a path toward reconstruction, dignity, and peace.

The best thing the United States can do now is to redouble its efforts to get a durable peace between Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza. Such a peace will require greater contributions by the United States, Arab allies, and Israel than anyone has been willing to make until now.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security.

Israel likely achieved its goal of setting back Iran’s nuclear program

Early reporting suggests that the ongoing Israeli attack against Iran, Operation Rising Lion, has multiple, complementary goals. Israel appears to be aiming to cripple Iranian nuclear capacity and degrade Iranian retaliatory capabilities. To achieve these ends, Israel is conducting a combined air and intelligence operation to target nuclear installations, ballistic missile and air-defense sites, and key personnel in both the nuclear and military command structures.

We can understand this multipronged effort as targeting multiple threats to Israel’s security. First, successive Israeli prime ministers have described an Iranian adversary armed with nuclear weapons as an existential threat to Israel. As Netanyahu described in a video statement as the attacks were underway, the operation targeted both the Natanz enrichment facility (among others) and leading Iranian nuclear scientists. Targeting both the facilities and the key scientists should degrade and delay Iran’s ability to develop nuclear weapons. Second, Israel also sought to limit Iranian retaliatory capabilities by attacking ballistic missile and drone installations, as well as key individuals in the military command structure, including General Hossein Salami, the chief of the IRGC, and Gholam Ali Rashid, the deputy commander of the Iranian armed forces. There may be a third, larger goal beyond degrading Iran’s nuclear and retaliatory capacity: regime decapitation. Indeed, beyond targeting the nuclear infrastructure, the expansive attacks against the military forces and the IRGC could be suggestive of a larger regime-level goal.

Especially as events continue to unfold, it is difficult to determine operational success. Nevertheless, we can expect Israeli leaders to define success as delaying Iran’s ability to produce weapons-grade uranium or advance to nuclear weapons, which Israel is likely to have achieved through damaging and destroying critical nuclear infrastructure and killing senior scientists. Further, to the extent that an eventual Iranian retaliation is limited because of Israel’s attack on key military sites and personnel or blunted by Israel’s own defenses, such developments may signify another layer of success. Of course, it is difficult to know exactly what an Iranian attack might have looked like had Israel not targeted key military facilities during this strike and earlier attacks on Iranian air defenses in 2024.

—Rachel Whitlark is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense program in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Israel’s strike could unravel the US cease-fire with the Houthis

Israeli strikes on Iran risk provoking a response from Yemen’s Houthi rebels and potentially upending last month’s bilateral cease-fire agreement between the United States and the Houthis. While the Trump administration made it clear that the strike was a unilateral action by Israel, the Houthis could perceive the United States as complicit, as the rebels often conflate Israeli and US actions in their public messaging. Adding to those concerns, earlier this week a Houthi source threatened to retaliate if the United States or Israel struck Iran, following reports that American nonessential personnel and family members were being evacuated throughout the Middle East. 

Moreover, the Houthis have been playing a more prominent role in Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” since the October 7 attacks, particularly as other proxies such as Hamas and Hezbollah faced leadership losses and setbacks. For the group, renewed confrontation could be an opportunity to reinforce its position within Iran’s network of allies and proxies and claim a major propaganda win—even if it means the end of the cease-fire with the United States. 

While the Trump administration’s “Operation Rough Rider” imposed meaningful damage on the group, the Houthis have proven their resilience and ability to adapt in the face of continued strikes. They may also calculate that the Trump administration’s decision to pursue a cease-fire is a sign of limited appetite to re-engage in Yemen, especially given that “Operation Rough Rider” cost more than one billion dollars in a month and failed to degrade the Houthis, who have continued strikes on Israeli territory. 

—Emily Milliken is the associate director of media and communications for the N7 Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. 

Trump should work with Gulf countries on a diplomatic response 

Gulf States—mainly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar—have no appetite for a regional war that involves Iran and would rather not be put in a place to choose between Israel and Iran. Their economic visions hinge on regional stability and on striking a balance to protect their interests, both economic and political. While their emerging role as mediators has enhanced their geopolitical role and diplomatic leverage, that role—now at risk—depends on stability for trust-building purposes when dealing with an actor like Iran.  

Under the Trump administration, Gulf states have taken the front seat in driving the new regional order. However, Israel’s strikes, following the IAEA’s strongest rebuke in twenty years and Iran’s announcement of a third uranium site, seem to have temporarily disrupted the Gulf capitals’ preferred approach for diplomacy and placed them now in the crossfire for retaliation.  

The Trump administration must rally its Gulf allies for an emergency meeting to coordinate a response aimed at preserving any diplomatic gains made so far. Oman, as a trusted intermediary, could be in a good place to lower the temperature and lobby Tehran against attacking Gulf capitals and US assets in the region—especially since Washington had no role in the attack. While this escalation carries serious risks, Israel’s attacks seem to have focused on the IRGC, which is responsible for continuously pursuing a destabilizing influence across the Levant and the Gulf and targeting US service members—making the IRGC a legitimate target. However, failure to deescalate would risk a broader regional conflict, the collapse of the Gulf-led peace process, the destabilization of global energy markets, and further disruption of key navigation routes in the Red Sea.  

—Joze Pelayo is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. 

Israel is taking a major risk with its Begin Doctrine

Israel’s launch of strikes on Iran demonstrates a continued invocation of its Begin Doctrine—its long-standing policy of pre-emptively striking nuclear facilities and weapons of mass destruction. Named after Israel’s former Prime Minister Menachem Begin, the doctrine was first created in 1981 during Operation Opera when Israel destroyed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor near Baghdad in a targeted attack.

Similar to Netanyahu today, Begin carried out the strike without US approval. Many feared an escalation if former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein were to retaliate, however, at the time, Saddam was already embroiled in a war with Iran and could not afford to respond.

Israel applied the doctrine again in 2007 when it covertly destroyed Syria’s Al-Kibar reactor in an operation it did not publicly acknowledge until 2018. Responding to the strike, then-President Bashar al-Assad denied the existence of the site entirely to avoid domestic and regional pressure to retaliate.

Now, for the third time, Israel appears to be invoking the doctrine, this time against Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile infrastructure, again without Washington. But unlike prior episodes, Iran is expected to retaliate, and likely with far greater intensity than previous strikes in April and October 2024—especially if Iran’s regional proxies join its retaliation to overwhelm Israel’s Iron Dome.

All eyes now turn to Muscat, where US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff is still scheduled to meet with Iranian negotiators this weekend in what could be the final round of nuclear talks. The outlook for any deal appears bleak following the strikes. Should negotiations collapse, the region could face an escalation unlike anything seen in decades.

—Yaseen Rashed is the assistant director of media and communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs and a Libya researcher.

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Maybe so. There were plenty of novel elements to Ukraine’s “Operation Spiderweb,” which destroyed a dozen or more large Russian military aircraft—including bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons—across the length and breadth of Russia, using drones launched from containers positioned near Russian airfields.

But in my field of nuclear deterrence, the attack was enlightening in another way: It reinforced principles that have been hiding in plain sight for years. For US nuclear strategists, the attack yielded at least four crucial lessons.  

1. The risk of nuclear escalation over conventional attacks is exaggerated

Ukraine’s drone strikes were a blow to the widely held belief that nonnuclear military attacks on nuclear-relevant facilities or assets will lead automatically to uncontrollable nuclear escalation.

As I have argued previously, too many analysts of nuclear affairs appear to overweight the risk that if a nuclear-armed country is facing attacks on nuclear-relevant locations or assets by conventional weapon systems or dual-capable ones (systems relevant to both nuclear and conventional missions), then that country will feel overwhelming pressure to escalate to the use of nuclear weapons, perhaps even before assessing the extent of the attacks. This logic looks convincing. But it is empirically unsupported.

Russia may yet respond to the Ukrainian attack. But Russian nuclear retaliation in Ukraine seems unlikely, even after Russia lowered its stated threshold for nuclear use in September 2024. Ukrainian drone strikes on multiple Russian bomber bases would seem to be exactly the sort of attack that would trigger Russia’s lower threshold for resorting to nuclear weapons. Yet no such use has materialized.

To be clear, nuclear-armed states may well resort to nuclear use to coerce an end to military operations that could lead to unacceptable costs, such as the destruction of a large portion of that state’s nuclear arsenal. But last weekend’s operation is further evidence that attacks falling short of this threshold are not likely to trigger a major nuclear exchange.

2. Nuclear forces are only as dependable as their defenses

Ukraine’s attacks vividly illustrated the vulnerability of the US bomber fleet, which is often sitting on the tarmac. Drone threats are just one of a variety of air and missile threats to the US homeland, though certainly one that has received less attention in the strategic forces community. The 2023 Congressional Strategic Posture Commission Report and a recent Atlantic Council study on missile defense both concluded that the United States must enhance its air and missile defense. In particular, it must pay attention to countering coercive attacks on civilian and military infrastructure, as well as on US nuclear forces.

Reflecting on the Ukrainian attacks, General Thomas Bussiere, the commander of US Air Force Global Strike Command, said at an Atlantic Council event on June 5 that the Air Force already deploys counter-drone systems around strategic air bases. The strikes on Russia this past weekend underscore that these efforts should improve and expand, perhaps under the aegis of the Trump administration’s proposed “Golden Dome.” This active defense must be completed by improved sensing, better coordination among responsible agencies, and the advancement of passive measures, such as the use of hardened shelters in peacetime, as well as air alerts and backup airfields in conflict or crisis.

3. Drones should be factored into nuclear-capabilities planning

There’s another truism in nuclear affairs rendered all the truer by last weekend’s operation: Advanced and emerging technologies can powerfully complement nuclear weapons in holding an adversary’s strategic nuclear forces at risk.

This possibility is especially tantalizing as US nuclear strategists grapple with the fact that China’s nuclear-weapons arsenal is expected to reach near-parity with the US nuclear arsenal in the mid-2030s. Because holding at risk an adversary’s nuclear weapons is an important part of how the United States deters nuclear war, the growth in China’s nuclear arsenal puts pressure on the United States to increase the size of its own nuclear arsenal. Advanced conventional weapons might complement these forces or even reduce the extent to which the United States will need to expand its nuclear forces. Perhaps drones could play a part in that equation.

4. Special forces should be at the center of major power competition

As my Atlantic Council colleagues have argued in recent reports, US special operations forces, which have been occupied with counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in the Middle East for two decades, can play an important role in US competition with major powers such as Russia, marking a return to their Cold War-era roots. Ukraine’s attack on Russian bombers is best understood in the context of a long history of operations behind enemy lines to disrupt airfields.

Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb was certainly daring and will reduce the capacity of Russia’s long-range aviation for some time. More than marking a new chapter in the history of warfare, however, the strikes should spur the US government to address the vulnerabilities and opportunities that nuclear strategists have focused on for years.

Mark J. Massa is the deputy director for strategic forces policy in the Forward Defense program of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.

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European policymakers have reacted to Trump’s moves with shock and doubt about the US commitment to NATO, and some have stepped up their defense pledges accordingly. “We still believe that the ‘N’ in NATO stands for North Atlantic and that our European allies should maximize their comparative advantage on the continent,” US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said last week at the Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore. “And thanks to President Trump, they are stepping up. An alliance cannot be ironclad if in reality or perception it is seen as one-sided.”

For its part, the European Union (EU) has approved a €150 billion defense funding loan program and allowed its members to exceed normal debt limits for military expenditures. Even before the EU’s moves, allies such as Poland and the Baltic States—who Hegseth called “model allies” in Singapore—were ramping up spending and sounding the alarm over the threat they face from Russia. But too many European allies have not yet increased their defense spending sufficiently.

What explains this contrast? Leading NATO allies (France, Germany, Italy, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States) diverge from one another because they face different threats and levels of threat perception. These differences explain each ally’s major defense decisions (defense spending, military structure, and military posture) as well as the ally’s role in and relationship to NATO. I explore this issue more deeply in my forthcoming book on NATO, drawing from ninety-eight interviews with current and former policymakers.

NATO allies’ different threat perceptions can explain much of the current crisis within the Alliance, and they provide the backdrop for what could be a contentious summit.

The United States: China trumps Europe

The Trump administration sees China as the most significant state security threat to US interests. The 2025 Annual Threat Assessment says that “China stands out as the actor most capable of threatening US interests globally.” The administration’s Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance reportedly focuses on the threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan as one of two priorities for the Pentagon, along with combating drug cartels.

The Trump administration has cited the threat from China to explain its European security policy. Hegseth said in February that the United States could not remain the primary guarantor of European security, telling allied military leaders in Brussels: “The US is prioritizing deterring war with China in the Pacific, recognizing the reality of scarcity, and making the resourcing tradeoffs to ensure deterrence does not fail.” The Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance reportedly concludes that because of the focus on China, European allies must do more for their own defense.

This view of China can also explain the Trump administration’s policy toward Greenland, an autonomous territory of NATO ally Denmark. Melting sea ice means that Greenland’s location will be critical for those seeking to control Artic sea lanes and it is home to large quantities of rare-earth minerals. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has stressed that the United States would not use force to seize Greenland but only to protect it from encroachment by China.

This can also explain Trump’s significant, though inconsistent, turn toward Russia. Some have argued that the Trump administration is attempting a “reverse Kissinger,” aligning with Russia to weaken its ties to China. The Trump administration may even be turning toward Russia to pressure NATO allies into taking more responsibility for their own defense, as Victoria Coates, a former deputy national security advisor in Trump’s first term, has argued. Even though Trump has criticized Russian President Vladimir Putin, it is reasonable for European leaders to fear that a grand bargain between Washington and Moscow remains a distinct possibility.

Europe: Divided by diverse levels of threat

Europe is unable to defend itself without the United States. Europe lacks integrated air and missile defense, long-range precision strike, transport aircraft, as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. European allies are struggling to recruit, train, and equip sufficient troops for NATO’s new force model—doing so in the next decade without the United States would most likely be a bridge too far.

But even faced with these challenges, not every European NATO ally has shown the same level of urgency when it comes to increasing defense spending. The reason is that leading European allies face different threats and levels of threat, limiting the incentives of some allies to act. 

Meanwhile, from strategy documents and official statements, it is clear that Poland, Germany, France, and Britain all view Russia as their greatest security threat. However, they each have different levels of threat perception, which informs the differing approaches they have taken toward military spending.

Preserving a mutually beneficial relationship

The United States’ greater focus on China and push for Europeans to take more responsibility for their defense are likely irreversible trends. But the NATO Summit in The Hague later this month provides an opportunity for the United States and its European allies to reaffirm their commitments to the Alliance amid these shifting dynamics.

First, the Trump administration should use the summit to work with its European allies on a phased and structured exchange of responsibility for European security over the next decade. Under such a plan, the United States would work with European allies to develop defense capabilities they do not currently have while maintaining the commitment of the US nuclear deterrent.

Second, Trump should take the opportunity to reassure European allies. He should affirm that the United States would come to the aid of any NATO ally that is attacked. Trump should also state plainly that his administration will work with Denmark to bolster the defense of Greenland and that it does not intend to acquire the island by force.

Third, European countries should use the summit to announce further commitments on defense spending. Following through on such commitments will entail costly domestic tradeoffs. The present moment requires courage: European leaders must make the case that significantly more defense spending is necessary because of the threat Russia poses and the United States’ turn toward the Indo-Pacific. Italy’s government in particular will have a challenging task. Because Italians are focused on threats from the Mediterranean, officials in Rome will have to make the case that Russia’s threat to European security matters for Italy. European governments like Italy’s can also make a compelling case that spending more on defense may boost overall economic growth.

If NATO allies take these steps at this year’s summit, they can help build a future Europe more capable of defending itself and an Alliance that better serves both US and European interests.

Jason Davidson is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is also a professor of political science and international affairs and director of the Security and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Mary Washington in Fredericksburg, Virginia.

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The frontier has become the front line.

Canada’s choice is binary: secure its portion of the Arctic or suffer the consequences of foreign powers acting with impunity in and around Canada’s Arctic. Ottawa’s central challenge, therefore, is to harden its Arctic presence with dual-use infrastructure and supply chain resilience while hostile powers increase their influence around the pole.

This task gets more difficult the longer Ottawa dithers because change manifests across many vectors concurrently. The infrastructure and supply chains critical to the region are underdeveloped and ill-suited for the future—and they do not improve with age. Climate change continues to alter the contours of the region, often to Canada’s strategic disadvantage. An ascendant generation of US strategists proclaim that the Canadian Arctic is the “new soft underbelly” of North America. And it is no longer fantasy to suggest that the Arctic is ground zero for the new ‘Great Game’ between the United States, Russia, and China.

The region has been one of strategic contest since 1921, when Joseph Stalin claimed the North Pole for the Soviet Union, a claim re-animated by Moscow in 2015. It may lack the trenches and dragon’s teeth in Europe, or the clashes between fishing vessels and coast guard ships in southeast Asia. But the Arctic is no longer a low-threat, low-force posture environment that can be defended by a couple Coast Guard icebreakers and some Canadian Rangers on snowmobiles.

It is a region of strategic consequence and likely to be more so in the coming decades, which begs the question—why does Canada lag allies and adversaries alike in both the defense and development of its Arctic territory?

The simplistic answer is that Ottawa is torn among competing interests and an inability, or an unwillingness, to marshal the domestic resources necessary to protect its Arctic from a growing cast of players keen to exploit perceived vulnerabilities in pursuit of their interests.

The Atlantic Council delved deeper into Canada’s challenge to bolster infrastructure and supply chain resilience in the region. Research included literature reviews, interviews, and off-the-record conversations with a broad range of government and private-sector stakeholders. Interviews yielded constructive, if passionate, views from respondents who expressed repeatedly how much they want Canada to secure its part of the Arctic and enable its full development.

Analysis revealed that Ottawa knows the region well; the Canadian government has few peers in understanding the Arctic and what is required to right supply chains there. Geological surveys and development plans are completed to a gold standard. Stakeholders know the problem and solution space—and have for decades. But domestic policy, not climate change or geopolitical calculus, is the primary factor influencing strategic decisions for Canada’s north.

Key players (and honorable mentions)

Climate change has made the Arctic accessible. Glacier melting has created new sea routes, extended shipping seasons, and unveiled vast natural resources. But it has also created an opening in the region for strategic contest. Three threat vectors shape the region’s security dynamics for Canada.

Russia

More than half of the Arctic Circle’s population and half its economy are Russian. Russia sits at the end of one of the Arctic’s most accessible regions. Russia is opening old bases and building new infrastructure throughout the region. It holds more than 50 percent of Arctic investment (made between 2017 and 2022), and its military doctrine treats the north as central to economic and national defense. Since 2014, the Kremlin has launched Cold War-style investments in Arctic airfields, radar systems, submarine networks, and year-round basing. Russian military planners are considering anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) domes extending over the Northern Sea Route.

Moscow likely observes that Canadian defense planning remains rooted in an outdated peace dividend mindset—one that grossly underestimates the threat of state-on-state conflict in the Arctic. Canada’s lack of comprehensive undersea surveillance renders its Arctic maritime approaches effectively blind, and its military presence in the region—symbolized by a modest footprint of Canadian Rangers—leaves much to be desired in terms of deterrence or rapid response. Equipment remains outdated, modernization plans languish in bureaucratic limbo, and logistics chains are stretched perilously thin. These gaps create space for Russian forces to maneuver below the threshold of war, exploiting ambiguity and Canada’s limited detection capabilities to assert influence or project force unchallenged.

The Kremlin likes to see how Canada’s strategic dependence on the United States substitutes alliance commitments for genuine sovereign deterrence. Ottawa’s whole-of-government approach—while inclusive in theory—has fragmented decision-making in practice, rendering Canada slow and reactive at a time when speed and coherence are strategic advantages. Indigenous consultation, while legally and morally necessary, remains procedurally rigid and politicized, often becoming a brake on critical national security decisions rather than a channel for partnership and empowerment.

While Russia invests heavily in its Arctic capabilities, Canada’s Arctic capability is stuck in the twentieth century. Surveillance assets are aging, space-based platforms are insufficient, and investment in modern ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) technology remains anemic. Communications remain unreliable across vast regions, exposing both civilian and military systems to disruption. Cyber defenses—especially around critical infrastructure—are poorly funded and unevenly deployed, inviting adversaries to strike via code rather than missile.

China

China considers itself a “near-Arctic power” and its Polar Silk Road links Arctic shipping to its global Belt and Road ambitions. China’s white papers frame the region as a commons to be commercially and scientifically accessed. Icebreaker construction in Chinese shipyards matches the tempo of a nation preparing for permanent presence.

Beijing understands that Canada’s economic infrastructure in the Arctic is brittle. Melting permafrost, seasonal reliance on ice roads, and a near-total absence of deepwater ports make northern logistics vulnerable to both climate and conflict. These choke points offer asymmetric opportunities to disrupt supply chains or sabotage dual-use facilities. China could exploit these vulnerabilities by embedding itself through ostensibly civilian investments in Arctic mining, telecommunications, or transportation infrastructure—investments that are strategic positioning by other means. In such a fragile environment, any hybrid attack or technological failure could sever vital arteries with catastrophic effects.

From China’s vantage point, Canada’s Arctic declarations are noble but hollow—bold in language but weak in execution. For Beijing, which has increased defense spending every year for three decades, Canada’s plan to reach two percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense spending by 2030 is symbolic. Procurement remains tangled in inefficiency and overregulation, hampering modernization and undermining operational readiness. Economic pressures, shifting political winds, and lukewarm support for military spending are likely to derail Canada’s commitments before they mature. Moreover, China likely sees Canada’s overreliance on its NATO allies as a strategic liability. The Arctic can be probed or pressured just below NATO’s collective defense thresholds—ensuring ambiguity, diffusing Western resolve, and highlighting Canada’s limited unilateral options.

Manpower shortages, insufficient Arctic basing, and the long-delayed Nanisivik port all point to structural underinvestment in hard infrastructure. These gaps offer Beijing a rich menu of asymmetric opportunities to: subvert Arctic economies through proxy investments; cultivate cultural ties through scholarships, research partnerships, and diplomatic outreach; sabotage digital and physical infrastructure through cyberattacks or dependency entrapments; and sow political dissent by financing Indigenous, environmental, or anti-militarization movements within Canada’s own democratic fabric.

The United States (and others)

For Washington, Canada’s failure to defend its Arctic territory is not merely a function of limited resources, but of deliberate strategic neglect. The refusal to acquire nuclear-powered submarines—essential for year-round under-ice patrols and true sovereignty enforcement—reveals a deeper aversion to the burdens of great power responsibility. While adversaries invest in undersea dominance and dual-use Arctic infrastructure, Ottawa opts for half-measures: diesel patrol submarines that can’t operate under the polar ice, minimal surveillance capabilities, and no permanent military basing north of 60.

The US view is shifting from a posture of “monitor and respond” to one of “prepare and deter.” Pentagon reports no longer downplay the Arctic as a region of strategic importance. Even smaller powers have taken notice. India published its Arctic strategy in 2021, emphasizing scientific diplomacy. Turkey signed the Svalbard Treaty to gain access rights to the Arctic in 2023. France and Germany are also exploring greater footprints in the region.

While the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (ICE) Pact with Canada and Finland represents a trilateral effort to rebuild icebreaker capacity and harden the Arctic industrial base, it is not enough. Canada remains trapped in a peacetime posture and mentality—symbolic patrols and seasonal exercises—while the region becomes increasingly contested by powers that are, at best, are neutral to Canada’s concerns and, at worst, openly hostile to them.

This inertia is rooted in a political culture that prioritizes accommodation over assertiveness. Successive governments have deferred to progressive special interest groups whose influence blunts hard security policies. Environmentalist and Indigenous consultations, while important, are often weaponized procedurally to paralyze decisive action. The result is a government debilitated by process, one that speaks of sovereignty but shrinks from the instruments necessary to enforce it. Even modest defense initiatives face resistance if they challenge entrenched activist orthodoxies or require confronting Canada’s internal contradictions. This includes the legal quagmire of provincial and territorial jurisdiction in the North, which Ottawa remains unwilling to override or reform.

Perhaps most damning for Washington is Canada’s lack of strategic coherence. Ottawa provides a strategic framework for the Arctic but fails to dedicate the resources to achieve the objectives contained therein. Policy and strategy without resource commitments are unseriousness ideas. Moreover, Canada’s policies do not form a doctrine of Arctic deterrence, convey no idea on how to mobilize federal will, and fail to weave a unifying narrative that connects Arctic defense to the survival of Canada as a sovereign nation in an increasingly anarchic world.

America cannot—and will not—permit a soft underbelly to fester in a domain as critical as the Arctic. It is not inconceivable for US forces unilaterally securing parts of the Canadian Arctic in the event of a crisis. Such actions, while diplomatically uncomfortable, would be strategically necessary if Canadian gaps remain unaddressed. To be blunt: if pressed and in a fight with Russia or China in the Arctic, the US will almost certainly be “Elbows Up” in defense of North America, even if it offends Canadian sensitivities.

Five “cold kills”

Our research unearthed five factors that contribute to Canada’s Arctic inertia. Each of these “cold kills” continues to impede progress on increasing supply chain and defense resilience.

1. Lacking multipartisan consensus on the region as “ground zero” for a new “Great Game.”

Canada cannot do much in the Arctic if it lacks enduring political will to support and fund dual-use infrastructure over decades. The growing importance of the Arctic for great-power competition underscores the need for politicians, defense planners, local communities, industry partners, and other relevant stakeholders to walk in the same general direction, if not in lockstep. Despite the urgency of this task, no sustained, cross-partisan strategy for Arctic defense exists. Without it, investments, infrastructure development, and operational planning will almost certainly come up short. In 2025, Natural Resources Canada is projected to invest $12.1 million toward climate adaptation projects in the North—which is necessary, but insufficient when compared to similar efforts by other Arctic powers.

Yet, allies offer a contrast. Norway’s Arktis 2030 fund and its defense pledge of 3 percent of GDP underscore a whole-of-society approach. Finland’s NATO entry boosted its participation in Arctic exercises. Sweden utilizes Arctic data to create a stronger and better informed national defense policy. Denmark leverages Greenland’s geostrategic importance in its Arctic defense. While Canada’s Arctic is inaccessible by comparison, it can look at what NATO allies do right in the region and their whole-of-society approaches.

2. Placing too much of the strategic burden on local communities.

The Canadian government continues to place disproportionate responsibility for Arctic security on local communities, revealing a dangerous strategic asymmetry between rhetoric and capability. The Canadian Rangers, though a symbol of national resolve and cultural integration, are not a substitute for a modern, standing military presence. They are lightly armed, part-time volunteers—valuable in their knowledge of the land but structurally unfit to deter or respond to the increasing threats posed by adversarial state actors operating just beyond the line of sight. This over-reliance has created a strategic mirage: Ottawa appears engaged in Arctic defence, but the burden is unfairly borne by those with the fewest resources and the highest exposure.

In effect, Canada’s Arctic is not treated as an equal part of Confederation, but as a frontier outpost whose primary function is surveillance and symbolic sovereignty. The political imagination to raise Arctic communities to the standard of living of rural southern Canada is absent. There is no serious nation-building project underway—no long-term vision to tie infrastructure, broadband, energy, healthcare, and education in the North to the national grid of opportunity.

The region is home to significant deposits of iron ore, gold, diamonds, and rare earth elements. The Mary River Mine on Baffin Island is one of the world’s richest reserves of high-grade iron ore, producing millions of tons annually. Similarly, the Hope Bay and Meliadine gold mines contribute substantially to Canada’s mineral output. These resources are critical for economic development and for national security, given their importance in defense manufacturing and technology. Yet, the extraction and transportation of these resources are hampered by limited infrastructure that eludes further development due to lack of coordination and investment at all levels of government. While the Yukon Security Advisory Council can be a model for shared governance federal, territorial, and Indigenous jurisdictions overlap without coherent authority. The result is a bureaucratic bottleneck that limits response agility and accountability, especially in scenarios involving mass casualty events or foreign incursions below the threshold of war.

3. Misunderstanding the Arctic as a land- or maritime-centric domain, instead of a multidomain one.

Canada’s Arctic strategy remains anchored in a legacy mindset—fixated on land and maritime domains—while the battlespace has already expanded far beyond the ice and tundra. The Canadian Arctic is a multi-domain operating environment in the most rigorous sense: a crucible where air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace domains converge. Focusing primarily on ground mobility or maritime choke points is antiquated.

In an era defined by precision-guided conflict, gray zone incursions, and orbital competition, the North requires integrated deterrence across all domains. The space domain is already decisive; Russia and China have launched dual-use satellites optimized for polar reconnaissance, while Canada’s surveillance constellation remains limited and aging. Cyberspace, too, is an active front. Persistent foreign probing of Canada’s critical Arctic infrastructure—from power grids to fiber lines—underscores the need for zero-trust architectures and sovereign cyber capacity hardened against both disinformation and sabotage. The air domain, often overshadowed, remains underutilized despite offering cost-effective ISR opportunities via high-altitude, long-endurance drones and balloon-based sensors that can supplement space assets in degraded environments.

Canada must approach the Arctic as a multi-domain region. Infrastructure nodes at Iqaluit, Yellowknife, and Inuvik must be conceived not as mere logistics hubs, but as permanent and staffed bases in a broader multi-domain lattice of deterrence. Airfields should be hardened, satellites shielded, networks encrypted, and data fused in real time. The resilience and infrastructure footprint must be multi-domain: ISR in orbit, radar on ice, seaborne logistics hubs, and hardened cyber networks. It might even be cheaper to establish and easier to maintain air-based sensors to augment space-based sensors, such as high-altitude, long-endurance drones and high-altitude balloons.

4. Missing the point that infrastructure spending enables both military and local resilience.

Canada’s policy frameworks fail to grasp a foundational truth: infrastructure is not ancillary to defence; it is defence. Roads, railways, hospitals, and power stations in the Arctic are bulwarks of resilience and lifelines to national unity. The harsh environment demands more than token outposts; it demands permanence that begins with infrastructure designed for both civilian and military pursuits.

Canada’s persistent underinvestment in Arctic infrastructure can be attributed largely to sticker shock. Building in the north is expensive at the outset, but those initial costs conceal long-term value. Roads, railways, and ports that facilitate the movement of Canadian forces and provide necessary infrastructure for local communities also enhance NATO mobility and resilience.

The Grays Bay Road and Port Project is unlikely to open before 2035. Until then, the Port of Churchill remains Canada’s only Arctic deepwater port for more than 106,000 miles of coastline—and even it is more than 800 kilometres south of the Arctic Circle. The overland situation is equally stark. The long-considered Mackenzie Valley Highway remains unbuilt. Meant to replace unreliable winter roads and connect remote Arctic communities, the highway should be considered as a defense artery.

Moreover, the North needs cyber towers as much as radar domes; fibre optic cables as much as sonar arrays. Schools and post-secondary institutions—anchored by Arctic research centres—should be erected alongside hardened military installations to attract families, not just forces. In Alaska, the dual-use success of the University of Alaska Fairbanks and the Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport provides a model: educational and aerospace ecosystems aligned with the broader security posture of the United States.

Still, there are signs of acceleration. The Department of National Defence has committed $230 million to extend the main runway at Inuvik Airport. The upgrades include modern lighting and arrestor systems—investments tailored for sustained military operations and a rare example of a concrete commitment in a domain often shaped by abstraction. Canada should build Arctic spaceports and drone launch facilities for persistent surveillance and communications dominance—assets that would likely qualify as defence expenditures under a broadened NATO definition. And that definition is evolving. With calls to raise the alliance-wide benchmark to five percent of GDP, the line between civil and military investment will blur. Forward-thinking allies are already redefining defence to include national resilience, critical infrastructure, and technological redundancy.

5. Failing to call out the need to achieve A2/AD capability.

Canada’s current Arctic strategy is more performative than purposeful. It remains anchored in rituals of presence rather than a doctrine of deterrence. The reasons are structural and cultural: A2/AD sounds too aggressive for a nation wedded to peacekeeping identity and constrained by intergovernmental jurisdictional frictions. But if Canada is to hold the Arctic, it must defend it—not merely inhabit it. That demands something Canada has never attempted: a comprehensive anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy adapted for the circumpolar battlespace.

A2/AD refers to the deployment of integrated capabilities that prevent an adversary from operating freely within a region. This includes long-range fires, persistent surveillance, advanced radar, cyber denial tools, hardened command-and-control infrastructure, and air and maritime denial platforms. Canada does not mention A2/AD in its Arctic lexicon because it fears what it implies: that the North is no longer a sanctuary but a frontier. Building an Arctic A2/AD network would require political will, sustained investment, and a strategic mindset that accepts confrontation as a precondition for sovereignty. It would also provoke diplomatic risk—Russia would label such a move provocative, and China would test the perimeter with gray-zone maneuvers masked as scientific exploration or commercial navigation. Yet the absence of such a posture risks far greater cost: a hollow sovereignty, subject to erosion by increments.

Investments in some areas do not amount to A2/AD. True, Canada’s $38.6-billion commitment over twenty years to modernize NORAD is substantial. If fully implemented, this would be the largest reinvestment in continental defense since the early Cold War. Arctic over-the-horizon radar systems will track threats from the US-Canada border to the Arctic Circle. A more powerful polar variant will extend coverage into the Arctic archipelago and beyond. Crossbow—a classified network of advanced sensors—will supplement these systems with real-time precision. And the Defence Enhanced Surveillance for Space (DESSP) project will allow space-based tracking of adversary launch and maneuver capabilities. Canada has partnered with Australia on a next-generation Arctic early-warning detection system. But even these investments are insufficient; they do not achieve A2/AD in the Arctic. Canada has ISR blind spots, insufficient logistical depth, and infrastructure degraded by thawing permafrost. RADARSAT’s capabilities are aging; the Northwest Passage is functionally unmonitored. There is no cruise missile defense layer.

A Canadian A2/AD architecture would extend ISR reach from geostationary orbit to the ocean floor. At its core: Over-the-Horizon Radar (AOTHR), high-altitude drones, and advanced satellite constellations fused via a hardened C4ISR backbone. Any credible A2/AD structure must project deterrence not only northward but outward via NORAD, integrating seamlessly with allied efforts across the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap and the European High North.

Challenge and opportunity

We recommend the following six steps to shape decision-making vis-à-vis Canada’s Arctic. Addressing each of them is necessary for more resilient supply chains and robust infrastructure for defense of the Canadian Arctic.

1. Achieve enduring domestic political consensus.

Without sustained, bipartisan consensus on the strategic value of the Arctic, Canada’s northern policy will remain fragmented, underfunded, and vulnerable to reversal.

Canada should establish a nonpartisan Arctic Strategy Council, drawing on members from federal, provincial, territorial, and Indigenous governments, as well as the private sector. This council could be modeled loosely on the United Kingdom’s National Security Council, with a standing mandate to oversee and report on Arctic development milestones.

To correct course, Parliament should adopt a minimum percentage of GDP for Arctic infrastructure and defense investments—similar to how NATO’s 2-percent defense spending benchmark frames national priorities. A 0.5-percent GDP floor specifically earmarked for Arctic readiness would send a powerful signal to allies, adversaries, and Canadians alike.

2. Build permanent bases and infrastructure.

Sovereignty requires presence. Canada cannot assert command over its northern territory while maintaining a transient, seasonal military posture.

Canada must develop at least two permanent Arctic bases by 2035 and reinforce the air infrastructures in Yellowknife. These installations should support multi-domain enablers: ground forces, drone squadrons, ISR satellites, and cyber defense detachments. One proposed location is Resolute Bay in Nunavut—a strategic logistics point halfway through the Northwest Passage. Another is Tuktoyaktuk in the Northwest Territories, where the Inuvik-Tuktoyaktuk Highway provides ground access to the Beaufort Sea.

Canada need not sacrifice environmental stewardship to bolster its dual-use infrastructure in the region. On the contrary, the development of small modular reactors (SMRs) offers a way to meet energy needs in a sustainable and flexible manner. These compact, deployable energy systems would enable off-grid installations to power radar stations, bases, and airstrips—allowing the Canadian Armed Forces to operate autonomously across a vast and power-starved frontier.

Canada can and should discover best practices in other nations and adopt to the fullest extent possible. The Arctic Remote Energy Networks Academy is training a new generation in clean energy implementation, building the intellectual and technical foundation for sustainable Arctic energy systems. It is one example of innovation that can help make strides in the Arctic.

3. Reorient superclusters toward strategic innovation.

Canada’s innovation ecosystem is misaligned with its strategic realities.

To adapt, Canada must integrate Arctic operational challenges into supercluster mandates. The focus of these superclusters has strayed too far from core security imperatives, and redirecting their mandate toward the defense and security sector could allow Canada to reanimate its atrophied defense industrial base, stimulate Indigenous research and development, and provide a platform for strategic innovation drawn from academic and private-sector talent.

The Global Innovation Cluster for Advanced Manufacturing could sponsor development of modular Arctic housing for deployed forces. The Digital Technology Cluster could support remote communications networks hardened against magnetic interference. And the Protein Industries Cluster could help devise shelf-stable, high-calorie rations adapted to extreme environments.

Canada should establish a national challenge prize—modeled on the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Grand Challenge—to spur innovation in climate-resilient infrastructure, Arctic mobility, and remote power generation. Such efforts should be coordinated by a Defence Innovation Agency akin to the United Kingdom’s Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA), ensuring alignment between technological output and operational need.

4. Integrate civil-military infrastructure.

Canada must adopt a whole-of-society approach to Arctic logistics—one that erases the line between civilian and military use.

Every kilometer of highway, every meter of runway, and every watt of power grid must serve dual purposes. Similarly, the Grays Bay Road and Port Project, which aims to connect the rich mineral fields of western Nunavut with the Northwest Passage, must be prioritized for its economic benefits and geopolitical value. Its completion would give Canada a second deepwater Arctic port—an essential node for resupply, power projection, and emergency response.

Meanwhile, the feasibility of Arctic spaceports must be considered thoughtfully. With global competition accelerating in polar orbit surveillance, Canada’s geography is a latent advantage. Nunavut and the Northwest Territories are prime candidates for launching satellites into sun-synchronous and polar orbits, a domain critical for ISR.

5. Accelerate NORAD modernization and ISR integration.

Canada must modernize its Arctic surveillance and early-warning capabilities through the renewal of NORAD and deep integration of orbital, aerial, and terrestrial ISR platforms.

Canada must move decisively to modernize its contributions to NORAD and integrate a layered, multi-domain ISR architecture that meets the threats of the 21st century. The existing North Warning System (NWS)—a relic of the Cold War—is functionally obsolete. It is increasingly vulnerable to kinetic destruction, electronic warfare, and deception by adversaries leveraging hypersonic, low-flying, and space-enabled strike platforms. While Canada has acknowledged this through its stated commitment to over-the-horizon radar (OTHR) and new space-based capabilities, progress has been halting, piecemeal, and under-resourced.

Canada should fast-track its involvement in key pillars of NORAD modernization alongside the United States by:

1. Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTHR): Advance procurement and installation of Arctic-facing OTHR systems based in Labrador and Nunavut to create a persistent early-warning envelope stretching across the polar approaches. These systems must be hardened against electromagnetic disruption and integrated into NORAD’s command-and-control nodes in real time.
2. Ballistic Missile Defence and the Golden Dome: Canada must shed outdated policy inhibitions and join the continental Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) architecture. A Canadian contribution to a “Golden Dome” over North America—built on Aegis Ashore components, ship-based interceptors, and ground-based midcourse defence systems—would reinforce deterrence and mitigate the strategic vacuum currently inviting adversary escalation. Participation in the US Missile Defense Review and integration into layered BMD command structures should begin immediately.
3. Space and High-Altitude ISR: The integration of RADARSAT Constellation Mission (RCM) assets with Gray Jay microsatellites must be complemented by investment in high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) UAVs, stratospheric balloons, and commercial space partnerships. Persistent polar orbit surveillance is not a luxury—it is the sinew of a sovereign Canadian deterrent.

A modern NORAD without a full Canadian partner is a NORAD weakened in scope, credibility, and political cohesion. In an age of hypersonics, space militarization, and AI-driven surveillance, Canada’s northern shield must be not just symbolic but steel-wrought—an active, intelligent barrier underpinned by the best minds and machines the alliance can field. The window to shape this future is closing fast. Canada must step forward now, not as a follower, but as a co-architect of North America’s defence.

6. Integrate the Arctic with broader national and allied defense postures.

Canada’s Arctic strategy must not be treated in isolation.

Canada must integrate its Arctic strategy into a broader, assertive national defence posture—one that acknowledges the indivisibility of Canadian sovereignty and its responsibilities as a G7 power. The Arctic is not a separate theatre, but the forward glacis of the North American fortress. What begins as radar coverage over Baffin Bay ends in deterrence posture from Vilnius to the Taiwan Strait. Canadian defence policy must therefore harmonize Arctic readiness with strategic power projection abroad, ensuring the nation can respond decisively to threats—whether they emerge from the Beaufort Sea, the Black Sea, or the South China Sea.

The Arctic remains critical—but it is not Canada’s only defence priority. A myopic focus on the North risks undermining broader global responsibilities. Canada must project credible force across multiple domains and theatres. That means integrating Arctic surveillance—through over-the-horizon radar, low Earth orbit satellite constellations, and AI-driven ISR—directly into NORAD’s early warning lattice. These capabilities must be interoperable with US Northern Command, NATO’s Arctic flank, and allied sensors in the Indo-Pacific. Surveillance is not enough; it must be paired with striking power and forward basing.

Strategic mobility and offensive reach are essential. Arctic airbases must be upgraded to sustain F-35 squadrons year-round, with rapid deployment capabilities for long-range precision fires and mobile expeditionary forces. Arctic-class naval platforms should anchor presence and power projection into contested waters, with the logistical depth to pivot between the Arctic archipelago and Pacific choke points. Canadian-built UAVs and high-altitude drones should patrol both the Northwest Passage and Western Pacific, forming a twin-hemisphere presence. Above all, Canada must act as a sovereign Arctic nation capable of defending its territory, while remaining a credible contributor to the rules-based international order. The Arctic is the crucible, but Canada’s responsibilities—and its enemies—do not stop at the pole.

Canada’s Arctic infrastructure and supply chain resilience are foundational components to its basic expression of sovereignty. But the future of the Arctic belongs to those who show up first and endure longest. The question is not whether Canada can afford Arctic sovereignty, but whether it can afford its absence.

Jeff Reynolds is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Kristen Taylor is an assistant director with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

This research was made possible by the generous support of the Canada Mobilizing Insights in Defense and Security (MINDS) program.

New Atlanticist Mar 10, 2025

Experts react: What Mark Carney means for the US-Canada relationship

By Atlantic Council experts

As the next prime minister of Canada prepares to take office, Atlantic Council experts look at what’s ahead for Ottawa and its relationship with Washington.

Elections Politics & Diplomacy

New Atlanticist May 1, 2025

Foreign policy was a hot topic in Canada’s election. Now it’s on Carney to make it last.

By Imran Bayoumi, Maite Gonzalez Latorre

The campaign is over. Now, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney faces several important choices, from how to increase defense spending to what a new relationship with the United States should look like.

Elections Politics & Diplomacy

The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

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On May 22, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow T.X. Hammes was quoted in The Economist in an article titled “America’s new ship-killer missiles come to the Philippines.” Hammes believes that the deployment of the short-range missile system will create uncertainty for China’s military leaders, enhancing US deterrence efforts in the region.

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Thomas X. Hammes

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Conflict Defense Industry

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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On May 20, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Nicholas Eftimiades was interviewed by NTS News, in a segment entitled, “Former Intelligence Officer: China Leverages Entire Society for Intel.” With Tiffany Meier, Eftimiades discusses the Chinese Communist Party’s espionage strategy, pulling insights from his book, Chinese Intelligence Operations and Tactics.

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Nicholas Eftimiades

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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On May 26, Rob Murray, non-resident senior fellow at Forward Defense and the Transatlantic Security Initiative, published a piece in Politico Europe on the proposed multilateral Defense, Security, and Resilience (DSR) Bank and the importance of defense financing mechanisms to boost European defense spending. Murray discussed the importance of the new Safety Action for Europe (SAFE) program and its potential benefits and argued for the creation of the DSR bank to help Europe achieve its security goals.

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Rob Murray

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

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On April 25, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow August Cole sat down with US Marine Corps Major General Peter D. Huntley, Commander of the Marine Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC), to discuss the command’s future pathways and the strategic challenges it faces today.

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August Cole

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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On May 3, Forward Defense director Clementine Starling-Daniels and assistant director Theresa Luetkefend were quoted in a WMAL article titled “In Great Power Competition, Special Ops to Play Key Role.” The article highlights their argument that, after two decades primarily focused on counterterrorism and direct-action missions during the Global War on Terror, today’s peer and near-peer competition demands a broader application of US special operations forces’ core activities.

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Clementine G. Starling-Daniels

Director, Forward Defense

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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Theresa Luetkefend

Assistant Director

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy German

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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This showdown between countries that each possess approximately 170 nuclear warheads has been fueled by decades-long disputes over Kashmir and historical enmity. It unfolded following a terrorist attack on April 22 that killed twenty-six, mostly Indian civilians. India attributed the attack to Pakistan-based militants and last week responded with drone strikes, missile exchanges, and a significant airstrike on Pakistan’s Nur Khan air base, raising Pakistani fears that India would launch a decapitation strike on its nuclear command.

On May 8, US Vice President JD Vance asserted that the conflict was “fundamentally none of our business.” But then the United States received an intelligence briefing on Friday, one that likely highlighted grave developments such as, potentially, intercepted communications or troop mobilizations. Within twenty-four hours, Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio were compelled by a fear that the crisis could go nuclear to engage directly with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Pakistani leaders to secure a cease-fire. India and Pakistan agreed to that cease-fire on Saturday, although both sides have since issued accusations that the truce had been violated.

This rapid shift from Vance’s isolationist rhetoric to high-stakes diplomacy demonstrates the global stakes of nuclear crises and the impossibility of dismissing them as regional concerns. A nuclear exchange would devastate any region, disrupt trade routes, spike energy prices, and generate millions of refugees, overwhelming international systems. Radioactive fallout would pose environmental risks far beyond the countries involved, directly impacting US economic and security interests.

Those stakes are why the United States must prevent Iran’s regime from retaining the technological capability to develop nuclear weapons. Allowing Tehran such capabilities risks replicating the perilous dynamics of the South Asian nuclear standoff, with profound global consequences.

Vance’s initial claim that the conflict was “none of our business” ignored these consequences, but the crisis’s rapid escalation forced US action. The Iran nuclear negotiations must internalize this lesson.

Tehran’s regime, with its history of supporting proxy groups such as Hezbollah and the Houthis, has demonstrated a propensity for destabilization, as seen in the 2019 Aramco attack. If Iran retains the technological infrastructure for nuclear weapons, it could leverage the threat of weaponization to escalate regional aggression or actively work clandestinely to develop a weapon, creating a crisis that, like India and Pakistan’s, becomes a global liability.

The South Asian crisis also illustrates how nuclear technology can embolden provocative behavior under the guise of deterrence. India’s retaliation for the April 22 attack, which it blamed on Pakistan, and Pakistan’s counterstrikes reflect a cycle of escalation enabled by mutual nuclear capabilities. Despite Vance’s hope that the conflict would not “spiral into a broader regional war or, God forbid, a nuclear conflict,” the rapid deterioration necessitated US intervention.

Iran poses an even greater risk. With nuclear technology, Tehran could intensify proxy operations—Hezbollah targeting Israel or the Houthis disrupting Red Sea shipping—confident that its potential nuclear arsenal deters retaliation. This could spark a regional arms race, with Saudi Arabia and others pursuing nuclear capabilities, heightening the risk of miscalculation.

The India-Pakistan experience highlights the challenges of managing nuclear-armed states. Decades of diplomacy have failed to resolve their tensions, as mutual distrust and nuclear arsenals perpetuate a fragile stalemate. Iran’s history of evading International Atomic Energy Agency oversight and prolonging negotiations, as seen with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, suggests similar challenges. The United States must pursue a stringent approach in the negotiations that lie ahead, demanding that Iran dismantle its nuclear weaponization infrastructure, backed by robust verification, sustained sanctions, and a credible military deterrent.

The latest India-Pakistan crisis, triggered by a terrorist attack and propelled to the brink of nuclear conflict, forced Vance to abandon his “none of our business” posture and engage urgently to avert catastrophe. Like it or not, Washington carries a heavy burden in these crises, and that’s why it must ensure Iran cannot develop nuclear weapons—before it’s too late.

Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. He leads the initiative’s Counterterrorism Project. He is currently a principal and industry director at Providence Consulting Group for aerospace, defense, and high-tech electronics.

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Labor’s resounding election victory is now being viewed as a mandate for the sensible center of Australian politics and a rejection of Trump-style politics in Australia. One Australian political commentator saw the results as rebuffing “bunyip Trumpism,” a reference to a mythical Aboriginal creature that inhabits waterholes, which is colloquially used to describe something that is seen as an imposter or pretender. But this election was a rejection of not just hard-right policies but also of the hard left. The Australian Greens Party ran a campaign on cost-of-living measures but also identity politics, Gaza, and anti-Israel sentiment. The party lost two of its previous four lower house seats, while Adam Bandt, the party leader, lost his seat. The party made no gains in the Senate, and its hopes of a “Greenslide” were demolished.

Labor now looks set to claim up to ninety of the 150 seats in the House of Representatives, as well as up to three additional senators. The conservative opposition looks set to be reduced to forty seats or less in the House.

But while Australian voters made clear their rejection of Trump, they still are remarkably pro-United States. The Albanese government will have to balance those two notions as it maps out its foreign policy in the months ahead.

How Labor won

Albanese is the first Australian prime minister to be re-elected since John Howard in 2004, and he is the first premier in one hundred years to increase their party’s majority after the first term. Albanese is now set to lead the largest Labor majority in history. The scale of Labor’s election win almost guarantees the party a third term in government in three years’ time. Meanwhile, the conservative coalition was defeated so soundly that even Dutton lost his parliamentary seat, leaving the conservative opposition leaderless and rudderless. 

But this was not a pre-ordained outcome. From late 2024 through early this year, Dutton’s coalition was ahead in the opinion polls. Albanese and his government were seen to be struggling in the face of cost-of-living pressures and global uncertainty. Media outlets were calling the election a tight race, predicting a minority Labor government that would be dependent on a large cross bench of independents and Greens in the House of Representative and the Senate in order to govern.

But Dutton’s coalition made significant missteps in the five-week campaign, including several proposals reminiscent of Trump policies. Dutton failed to develop policies to win back seats lost at the last election to the center-right independents known as the Teals. He proposed unpopular policies on nuclear power, healthcare, and cost-of-living relief. Moreover, Dutton proposed massive cuts to public service jobs, which echoed the Trump administration’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). A key moment for the campaign was when Jacinta Nampijinpa Price, a controversial conservative senator, vowed to “make Australia great again,” and accused the media of being “Trump-obsessed.”

These nods to Trump policies and slogans did the conservative coalition no favors. Since the beginning of Trump’s second term, Lowy Institute polling has recorded that Australians’ trust in the United States to act responsibly in the world fell by 20 percent, with only 36 percent of the public expressing any level of trust. Almost two thirds of the public (64 percent) say they hold “not very much” trust (32 percent) or no trust “at all” (32 percent) in the United States to act responsibly. Australians widely disapprove of several aspects of Trump’s policy agenda, including his proposal for a Ukraine peace deal that would cede territory to Russia (74 percent) and using tariffs to pressure other countries (81 percent). A majority of Australians also oppose the United States withdrawing from the World Health Organization (76 percent) and exiting from international climate change agreements (74 percent). 

What will Labor do with this mandate?

The results leave the Labor Government with a strong mandate domestically and internationally. Albanese will likely continue with his steady, incremental reform agenda at home and abroad, focused on stability and pragmatism. Foreign policy was a carefully crafted balance among deepening the alliance with the United States; engaging in regional minilateralism, focused on Southeast Asia, Pacific Island nations, and India; and deepening security relations with Japan, both bilaterally and trilaterally with the United States.

Albanese’s brand of pragmatism will continue to drive how he engages with Trump and the United States. His government has refused to respond with reciprocal tariffs on the United States and has focused on dealing with the US president on the basis of Australia’s advantages in critical minerals, the US trade surplus with Australia, and a broader commitment to international free trade. Support for the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) security partnership was bipartisan in the campaign. Defense spending is set to rise, even if modestly, and the alliance remains core to Australian strategy. One of the key features of Labor’s last terms in office were advances in US force posture in Australia and the alignment of strategic posture around denial and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, which will continue to be a core focus over the next three years.

In addition, key areas such as shipbuilding, nuclear-powered submarine production, defense industrial collaboration, and the manufacture of guided weapons are priorities both of the Labor government and the Trump administration. This provides a strong foundation for defense cooperation. However, Australia and the United States diverge on key issues around international trade and the rules-based international order. This means there will be points of friction, and the Albanese government should be expected to carefully and tactfully point out policy differences on these issues.

Crucially, Australian dislike of the Trump administration should not be mistaken for antipathy toward the United States. The same Lowy Institute poll that showed a rejection of Trump’s policies shows that the Australian public is rock-solid in its support of the United States. Eighty percent of Australians continue to support the alliance with the United States (only a 3 percent drop from 2024) and they are evenly split on Trump’s demand that allies spend more on defense.

Labor will continue to focus on the Indo-Pacific, working closely with the United States and its regional allies and partners. It will keep dealing cautiously with, and balancing against, China and doubling down on ties with Southeast Asia, Pacific Island nations, Japan, India, and South Korea. With Albanese ascendant, expect more of the steady hand of Australia’s center-left government over the next three years rather than any policy radicalism.

Peter J. Dean is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and director of foreign policy and defense at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney.

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Look at what happened as recently as last month. In early March, Congress passed the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2025, a stopgap measure that locks the Pentagon into last year’s funding levels with only a modest $6.1 billion—or 0.7 percent—increase in defense funding, bringing the total to $892.5 billion. However, after accounting for inflation and rising personnel costs, this amounts to a cut in real terms. The total also falls more than $2.5 billion short of the Biden administration’s earlier $895.2 billion request for FY 2025.

Trump and Hegseth have floated a one-trillion-dollar topline for FY 2026, with congressional Republicans backing projections that hit that mark by 2031. But projections alone won’t modernize the force. The longer Congress relies on continuing resolutions, the further the Pentagon is likely to drift from the trillion-dollar goal.

Talk big, fund small

The biggest casualty of flat budgets is modernization. Of the $6.1 billion increase under the FY 2025 continuing resolution, more than $5.6 billion is consumed by rising personnel costs—including a 4.5 percent military pay raise and a 10 percent bump for junior enlisted. While these expenses are core to sustaining force readiness and quality of life for junior enlisted military personnel, they leave scant room for investment in next-generation weapon systems, shipbuilding, and advanced technology—all of which are needed to counter and deter future global threats.

Moreover, modernization and procurement budgets took hits in the latest continuing resolution—down $7.1 billion and $4.6 billion, respectively, compared to FY 2024. This isn’t a future-proofing strategy. It’s triage. And it reinforces a hard truth: the Pentagon is being forced to choose between readiness now and capabilities tomorrow.

As a result of this approach by Congress, a chasm has emerged between what the Pentagon says it needs and what Congress has been able to fund. Even with increased flexibilities granted under this continuing resolution, including fewer restrictions on program-level spending, the Pentagon cannot modernize on cruise control without deliberate and sustained investment. Without real growth in the defense topline, any flexibility becomes a license to reshuffle limited dollars, not expand capabilities.

Strategic signals, budget headwinds

Additionally, the Trump administration’s early moves—deployments to the southern border and near the Panama Canal, counter-narcotics operations, and a reorientation of posture toward homeland defense and regional security initiatives—highlight a shift in defense priorities. But these actions are being underwritten by a budget that isn’t built for strategic transformation.

This spring, the Trump administration’s FY 2026 request is expected to better reflect the new administration’s priorities, since the current budget was mostly shaped by the previous administration and major changes take time to fully appear. One key area to watch is its proposed $50 billion reallocation plan, redirecting funds from “noncritical” areas toward defense programs such as nuclear modernization, missile defense, drone technology, autonomous weapons, and cybersecurity. The Trump administration likely considers these activities necessary to bolster border security and strengthen US military capabilities in response to perceived threats to the homeland.

Regardless of the merits of using defense dollars and personnel for homeland security efforts, without a significant increase in overall funding, the administration will face tough choices between delivering on these priorities and meeting modernization and readiness goals.

The path forward: Congress holds the key

None of this is sustainable without a timely and predictable appropriations process. Even after making tough trade-offs, the Department of Defense cannot sustain modernization, support military pay raises, and reinvigorate domestic policy initiatives without meaningful real-term growth in its overall budget topline. 

While continuing resolutions offer short-term stability, they erode long-term planning and procurement. They lock in outdated funding priorities, stall new projects and procurement efforts before they begin, and limit the Defense Department’s capacity to invest in multi-year efforts that benefit from future financial predictability. When the Department of Defense has to begin the fiscal year without an annual appropriations bill in place, it can lead to training disruptions due to uncertainty over available resources, as well as deferred equipment and facility maintenance, which can cause backlogs and increase long-term costs. It can also cause delays in awarding new contracts, affecting industrial base stability and workforce planning. Continuing resolutions also lead to cost inefficiencies from operating under constrained funding and require higher costs to “catch up” later. These stopgap measures also risk a gradual degradation of military readiness from the inability to execute planned operations, training, and maintenance. Even omnibus bills, often seen as a compromise, fall short of the predictability and purchasing power that full-year appropriations—enacted before the start of a fiscal year—offer. Relying on omnibus bills creates uncertainty for long-term modernization efforts and reduces the Defense Department’s ability to plan, start contracts, and invest early in the fiscal year.

The Pentagon needs more than authority and increased flexibility—it needs actual dollars. Timely appropriations passed by Congress are essential to making that possible. Yet persistent delays have become the norm rather than the exception. Without consistent, meaningful, and sustained funding, modernization will remain an ambition rather than a battlefield reality. The one-trillion-dollar vision for the defense budget may serve short-term political goals, but absent decisive and urgent action by Congress, the numbers won’t add up.

One important step Congress can take each year is to pass the annual defense appropriations bill on time, fulfilling its constitutional duty to fund essential government programs and defense functions that serve the national interest. A timely and focused appropriations bill would restore predictability to the budget process and enhance the capacity of the defense industrial base. It would also give military leaders the certainty they need to plan, build, and make more effective long-term investments across administrations.

Congress holds the keys. The question is whether it has the political will to turn them.

Jongsun A. Kim is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a former deputy comptroller for budget and appropriations affairs at the Department of Defense.

The post To fund US military modernization, Congress needs to pass on-time annual defense budgets appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On April 21, Atlantic Council Senior Advisor Harlan Ullman published an op-ed in the Hill on the need to update US strategic documents to reflect the geopolitical moment and ensure the United States can effectively respond to adversaries. He argues that US leadership should “[start] from first principles and [understand] exactly what threat China or Russia poses before moving to the strategy for countering it.”  

International Advisory Board member

Harlan Ullman

Senior Advisor

The post Ullman in the Hill calls for a “fundamental review” of US national security strategy  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This is a ground-breaking revelation. Beijing generally aims to portray the CCG as a nonmilitary actor despite its legally mandated dual role as both law enforcement and a component of China’s armed forces. This is also significant considering a previous incident in February 2024 in which Taiwan confronted the CCG when the latter was caught executing war-fighting functions against Taiwan under the guise of law enforcement activities. At the time, it was unclear whether this was merely a one-off experimental arrangement or the act of an overzealous CCG officer. It is now clear that the PLA exercises operational control over the CCG and uses the cover of law enforcement to gain military advantage over the United States, Taiwan, and their allies and partners without drawing much public attention.

China’s use of its coast guard for military purposes under the guise of law enforcement poses a threat to Taiwan that requires a strong response from Taipei, as well as the United States and its allies and partners in the region. Countering the CCG’s gray zone activities will require an active response from Taiwan and public messaging that makes clear that certain CCG law enforcement activity is a cover for military activities. It will also require a coordinated response from the US Coast Guard and Washington’s allies to provide deterrence and impose costs on China for using the CCG’s law enforcement cover to threaten Taiwan’s security.

‘White hulls’ in the gray zone

Taiwanese media reported in February 2024 that CCG vessels were identifying Taiwanese vessels and targets and providing real-time precise locations to the PLA for subsequent missile strikes while acting in a law enforcement capacity. Three CCG cutters entered the Western Pacific through the southern tip of the Miyako Strait and turned south until parallel to Taiwan’s east coast before speeding at eighteen to twenty knots eastward directly toward Taiwan. The cutters maintained radio silence, turned off their automatic identification system, and exercised emission control, an unusual precaution generally taken by military vessels, civilian vessels going through conflict zones, or vessels conducting illegal activities. The CCG cutters entered Taiwan’s twenty-four-nautical-mile contiguous zone, a buffer area internationally recognized for identification and interception of unknown vessels, and streaked past Taiwanese military and coast guard vessels sent to intercept them.

Intelligence provided to Taiwan by an undisclosed allied country indicated that these CCG vessels were validating functionalities of China’s Guo Wang, or “state network,” satellite constellation. Guo Wang designates targets for DF-21/DF-26 ballistic missiles supporting future PLA rocket force strikes against both Taiwan and US allied forces operating in the Western Pacific. The vessels only activated their automatic identification system and identified as belonging to the China Coast Guard after they passed the Taiwan Coast Guard’s TCG Nantou and came perilously close to Taiwan’s territorial waters.

Most countries’ coast guards, including those of the United States, China, and the Philippines, identify as both law enforcement and military, thus sailing in gray waters under international law. However, there is still a widely accepted norm that “white hull” vessels conducting law enforcement activities and promoting stability at sea are treated differently than “gray hull” warships safeguarding individual countries’ national interests. White hull activities near another country’s territorial waters are generally received with more goodwill and elicit less provocative reactions. China understands this and has been actively exploiting this divide since at least 2016.

The type-818 CCG vessels in the 2024 incident were 3,800-ton cutters built on People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 054A-class frigate hulls, equipped with 76 mm guns and the standard PLAN communication suite—essentially a “gray hull” in all but name. Through operational control over CCG, the PLA can use the cover of a “white hull” law enforcement facade to conduct exclusively “gray hull” military activities that would otherwise receive much stronger pushback.

How China has militarized its coast guard

Beijing reorganized the CCG in 2018, moving it from China’s State Oceanic Administration to the People’s Armed Police. The People’s Armed Police is a paramilitary that reports directly to the Central Military Commission, China’s highest military authority. The CCG’s placement under the Central Military Commission’s authority is an unusual arrangement. In the United States, for example, although the US Coast Guard is a branch of the armed forces, its chain of command runs through the Department of Homeland Security, not the Department of Defense, unless it is otherwise directed by the president or Congress during wartime. Taiwan’s Coast Guard administration also follows a similar logic.

Since the 2018 reorganization, the CCG has used its law enforcement facade to great effect in gray zone operations against Taiwan, the Philippines, and other US regional allies and partners. In the South China Sea, the CCG has been using its vessels, which include the largest coast guard cutters in the world, to “shoulder,”  or attempt to ram, other countries’ coast guard vessels and force them to divert course. All the while, these vessels use their white hull cover to justify these incidents as law enforcement actions.

To protect this useful subterfuge, Beijing has been careful to disaggregate exercises conducted by the PLA and those conducted by the CCG against Taiwan since the Chinese military exercises around Taiwan that came in response to then US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island in 2022. This means careful messaging from the official Weibo accounts of both the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command and the CCG. While exercises from the two entities seemed to take place within similar and sometimes overlapping timeframes, the Eastern Theater Command and CCG have different names for their respective exercises and take care to deconflict areas of operation.

Observers have long suspected operational coordination between the PLA and the CCG, but to date, only circumstantial evidence has linked the organizations. It is known that the PLA coordinates some of China’s gray zone operations through the Eastern Theater Command’s Joint Operations Command Center (JOCC). Previous concurrent CCG exercises with PLA in the Taiwan Strait have not provided sufficient direct evidence of operational coordination by observing PLAN and CCG movements alone, though international reporting sometimes characterizes the two entities’ actions as a combined exercise.

The revelation came from Taiwan’s Coast Guard administration, which stated on April 1 that the CCG, while ostensibly law enforcement, operates under the control of military theater commands. In the case of exercises against Taiwan, this would mean the Eastern Theater Command’s JOCC. Additionally, for the first time since the exercises in response to Pelosi’s visit in 2022, the CCG conducted joint operations with the PLA east of Taiwan, confirming its role in exercises for a potential joint quarantine/blockade against Taiwan.

Consequently, the April exercise indicates that the CCG is operationally controlled by PLA. And the 2024 incident provided an example of China unilaterally escalating cross-strait tension by conducting military operations with ostensibly law enforcement white hull vessels against Taiwan during peacetime, without even the facade of declaring a military exercise. These developments have far-reaching implications beyond garden-variety gray zone operations. These practices are highly provocative and require strong but measured responses from the United States and Taiwan, as well as their partners and allies in the region.

How the US and Taiwan should respond

To stop Beijing from gaining additional military advantage under the guise of law enforcement activities, Taiwan must combine a proper active response with strong public messaging. Taipei’s active responses must be commensurate with the nature of each incident—dispatching military assets to intercept and guard against the CCG’s military activities against Taiwan while leaving law enforcement issues for Taiwan’s Coast Guard. This will create significant challenges for the Taiwan Navy and Coast Guard’s existing command-and-control, but it is essential to counter China’s use of the CCG as cover to gain military advantage over Taiwan. Taiwan’s public messaging must adequately establish this. Taiwan should present the public with credible evidence, including intercepted signals intelligence, electro-optical recordings, and the exact courses and speeds of offending CCG vessels.

Meanwhile, the United States and its allies and partners must impose additional costs for the CCG’s clandestine activity. Joint patrols led by the US Coast Guard and the coast guards of other allied nations can form a credible deterrent against China’s militarization of law enforcement activities. The US Coast Guard already extensively collaborates with the Taiwan Coast Guard. A joint patrol within Taiwan’s exclusive economic zone or even within the twenty-four nautical mile contiguous zone, modeled after the US Coast Guard’s agreement with Taiwan’s diplomatic ally Palau, can impose significant costs for the CCG should it decide to engage in provocative behaviors like the February 2024 missile targeting incident. Additional support from Japan or even the Philippine Coast Guard, such as joint patrols, could lend further legitimacy to counter the militarization of the CCG. Taken together, these measures can send a strong message to Beijing and mark clear redlines against the CCG’s participation in the PLA’s gray zone activities.

Kitsch Liao is an associate director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Previously, he worked in the US Congress, in diplomatic postings, and as a cyber intelligence analyst for the private sector.

The post China is militarizing its coast guard against Taiwan. Here’s how Taipei and its allies can respond. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On April 3, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Daryl G. Press was interviewed for an ABC News article entitled, “Satellite images show multiple US B-2 nuclear-capable bombers deployed to Indian Ocean.” In the article, Press was quoted as saying, “The movement of the aircraft to Diego Garcia definitely sends a signal to Iran about the extent to which they are in jeopardy, and the extent of seriousness the Trump administration feels with regard to its various demands.”

Fellow

Daryl G. Press

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Arms Control Defense Policy

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Daryl Press interviewed for ABC News article on B-2 nuclear-capable bombers appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On April 4, Forward Defense Senior Air Force Fellow Lieutenant Colonel Edward Brady published a commentary on War on the Rocks, entitled, “Greenland’s Military Possibilities for the United States.” The article argues that Greenland is a critical strategic asset for US Arctic defense and global power projection and recommends cost-effective investments in surveillance, infrastructure, and force deployment to counter growing threats from Russia and China.

Fellow

Edward Brady

Senior Air Force Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Middle East

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Lt Col Edward Brady, USAF, commentary published by War on the Rocks appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 31, 2025, Atlantic Council Senior Advisor Harlan Ullman published an op-ed in the Hill on the potential implications of national security officials using Signal for official communication and planning. He argues that US allies will take the recent Signal breach “very, very seriously,” which could disrupt intelligence sharing.   

International Advisory Board member

Harlan Ullman

Senior Advisor

The post Ullman in the Hill urging vigilance in national security communication  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 28, Mung Chiang, Mark Esper, and Christine Fox published an op-ed highlighting key ideas from the final report of Forward Defense’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare. Entitled, “America’s arsenal of democracy needs a software renaissance,” the piece published in DefenseNews and C4ISRNET underscores the critical role of software in future conflicts, “the ability to collect, process and act on data faster than the adversary is critical in prevailing in future conflicts.”

The authors emphasize the Commission’s recommendations, including investing in artificial intelligence enablers, mandating the creation of enterprise data repositories, and shifting toward commercial software acquisition. They argue that by prioritizing data management and commercial software acquisition, the Department of Defense can achieve immediate improvements while laying the groundwork for long-term strategic success.

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

Forward Defense’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare aims to digitally transform the armed forces for success in future battlefields. Comprised of a distinguished group of subject-matter and industry commissioners, the Commission has developed a framework to enhance US and allied forces through emergent digital capabilities.

Learn More

The post Chiang, Esper, and Fox published in DefenseNews and C4ISRNET on software-defined warfare appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In response to the crime wave, the government on March 17 declared its third state of emergency in less than a year, suspending basic liberties to allow police to make arrests without judicial orders. Yet, while authorities focus on crackdowns against violent crime, they risk ignoring the deeper cause of the crisis: a decade of institutional decay marked by jailed presidents and pervasive corruption.

In the absence of broad-based political reforms and a sincere effort to address corruption as a root cause, Peru might soon fall into the same trap it did in 2021. Amid the devastating COVID-19 pandemic, voters elected populist Pedro Castillo as president. Castillo fed off the discontent against the state and sought to break Peru’s democratic order with an unsuccessful “self-coup,” for which he was later impeached and imprisoned. As Peru enters a new electoral cycle amid a crime wave, candidates must prioritize meaningful institutional reforms over hollow tough-on-crime rhetoric. Otherwise, the country will remain trapped in a cycle in which corruption breeds crime and democracy hangs by a thread.

As in neighboring Ecuador and Chile, the current crime wave has ground Peru to a halt. Between 2019 and 2024, reported extortions increased sixfold, and in 2025 every third Peruvian reports knowing a victim of extortion, many of whom are small business owners. Homicides, too, have doubled since 2019. And in January of this year alone, there were 203 percent more homicides than in January of 2017.

Behind these alarming figures hide strengthened transnational criminal organizations, such as the Tren de Aragua, as well as a myriad of other drug trafficking organizations, mafia syndicates, and gangs that alternately cooperate, collude, and compete for the control of illegal activities. While drug trafficking, homicides, and extortions are terrorizing Peru’s populous coastal cities, Peru’s Amazon has been ravaged by illegal gold mining, where illegal miners have made record profits as the value of gold has soared in international markets. In 2025, over 75 percent of Peruvians report being scared when leaving their homes.

While transnational criminal organizations are the actors behind the current crime wave, it is weak state capacity that has allowed the crime to permeate. The Peruvian sate’s capacity to respond has been impaired by political corruption, often influenced by criminal actors themselves. By 2024, 67 of 130 Congress members (a simple majority of Peru’s legislature) were under criminal investigation. When prosecutors charged Congress members of allegedly being part of criminal organizations, Congress passed a law narrowing the definition of “organized crime,” hindering investigations into corruption and extortion. President Dina Boluarte did not veto this bill, and it became law in August 2024. (Congress later reinstated extortion under the definition of organized crime but left many corruption offenses excluded.) Congress also passed a law in in September 2024 that placed a larger role of the police in criminal investigations, taking functions away from the Attorney General’s Office, which legal experts warned would weaken investigative efficiency. And Boluarte has weakened the Attorney General’s Office as she herself is being investigated for corruption. As a result, the state’s ability to prosecute crimes has been stymied by public officials seeking to blunt investigations against themselves.

Peruvians will vote next year amid a crisis that the state is incapable of protecting its citizens from. The parallels between the 2021 and 2026 elections are clear. In 2021, voters were enraged by Peru’s world-highest per capita COVID-19 death rate and a scandal in which political elites received vaccines before the public. Peruvians’ frustration propelled Castillo—then a little-known populist with no governing plan—to victory. After leading a government ridden with corruption, Castillo and his advisors sought to break the constitutional order with a “self-coup.” Peruvian democratic institutions held up and their attempt remained short-lived.

Now, heading into 2026, voters face a new crisis: a crime wave and a state failing to ensure public safety. This climate is fertile ground for populist promises of a mano dura, or “iron fist,” approach to combating crime. But any real solution must also tackle crime’s institutional roots. Candidates should promote a comprehensive political reform that reduces organized crime’s influence in the country’s political bodies. This reform should include steps that make running for office more difficult for those charged with corruption. In addition, the Attorney General’s Office should be depoliticized and promote a new cohort of competent, apolitical prosecutors and judges.

At the same time, the United States and other partner nations must recognize the risk that corruption poses to the survival of Peruvian democracy. The US State Department should designate Peruvian public officials engaged in corruption and prevent them from entering the United States, an action it took this month against former Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, who was convicted of corruption charges in Argentina. Equally critical is addressing other root causes of crime—poverty, inequality, and lack of education—which have made Peru’s youth vulnerable to recruitment by criminal gangs in the first place.

Politicians promising to be the “Peruvian Bukele” may garner attention. But leaving the institutional causes of crime unaddressed will only deepen Peru’s democratic crisis while doing little to curb crime.

Martin Cassinelli, a Peruvian native, is an assistant director at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center of the Atlantic Council.

The post Peru’s crime wave: A populist opening or a chance for reform? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 26, Theresa Maher of Inside Defense published an article highlighting the key recommendations from the final report of Forward Defense’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare. Entitled “Think tankers urge DOD to keep software procurement simple,” the article underscores the Commission’s call for a commercial-first mindset, improved data collection and sharing, and stronger collaboration between the Department of Defense (DoD) and congressional appropriation staffers.

With China outproducing the United States in military hardware, software has become essential to maintaining a competitive edge. Maher highlights the “Davidson Window,” the prediction that China may take military action against Taiwan by 2027, underscoring the urgency behind the Commission’s near-term recommendations. The report outlines how the Pentagon can leverage software practices to enhance and strengthen US defense strategies.

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

Forward Defense’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare aims to digitally transform the armed forces for success in future battlefields. Comprised of a distinguished group of subject-matter and industry commissioners, the Commission has developed a framework to enhance US and allied forces through emergent digital capabilities.

LEARN MORE

The post Inside Defense reports on the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare final report appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While the urgency and importance of this debate cannot be overstated, there has been a tendency to overlook Ukraine’s own agency and the country’s ability to defend itself. It is true that the Ukrainian war effort since 2022 has relied heavily on Western support, but Ukraine’s military has also evolved dramatically over the past three years to become by far Europe’s biggest and most effective fighting force.

Ukraine currently has approximately one million people in arms defending the country against Russia’s invasion. This makes the Ukrainian Armed Forces more than four times larger than Europe’s next biggest military. Ukraine’s troops are also battle-hardened and have unmatched knowledge of the twenty-first century battlefield. Indeed, in many areas, they are now setting the standards for others to follow.

Crucially, Ukraine’s army is backed by a highly innovative and rapidly expanding domestic military-industrial complex that is harnessing the excellence of Ukraine’s prewar tech sector and reviving long neglected Soviet era capabilities. Any discussion on the likely future course of the war against Russia and the terms of any peace deal must therefore take into account the fact that Ukraine is a now major military power in its own right.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

For the past year, international media coverage of Russia’s invasion has tended to create the impression that Putin’s army is slowly but surely grinding forward toward a costly but inevitable victory. The reality is less straightforward.

Russian troops reclaimed the battlefield initiative in early 2024 and have been advancing fairly steadily ever since, but they have only achieved relatively modest territorial gains while suffering record casualties. Analysts estimate that at the current pace, it would take Russia almost a century to complete the conquest of Ukraine.

Viewed from a broader perspective encompassing the entire full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s military performance becomes even more impressive. Since spring 2022, The Ukrainian Armed Forces have succeeded in liberating around half of all the territory seized by the Russian army, and have won a series of key battles in the Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson regions. Russia has been unable to capture and hold a single Ukrainian regional capital, and is still struggling to force Ukrainian troops out of Russia itself following Kyiv’s bold August 2024 cross-border incursion into the Kursk region.

Far beyond the battlefield, Ukraine has also overachieved. In the Black Sea, Ukrainian marine drones have revolutionized naval warfare and forced Putin to withdraw his fleet from Russian-occupied Crimea to the relative safety of Russian ports. Deep inside Russia, long-range Ukrainian drones strike at military assets, logistical hubs, and energy infrastructure with growing frequency.

Ukraine’s resilience owes much to the international military assistance the country has received. However, this support has often been subject to delays and has frequently fallen victim to political considerations that have cost Ukraine dearly. In order to minimize these vulnerabilities, the Ukrainian authorities have prioritized the development of the country’s domestic defense industry.

The results have been striking. In 2025, the overall capacity of Ukraine’s defense industry is expected to reach a new high of $35 billion, up from just $1 billion at the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion. While this capacity is not yet being fully utilized due to defense budget limitations, Ukraine now produces around one-third of all weapons, ammunition, and equipment used by the country’s armed forces. In critical areas such as drone production, the figure is now close to one hundred percent.

Meanwhile, Kyiv is encouraging international partners to invest in Ukrainian defense sector companies and finance weapons production in Ukraine. A number of countries have already responded by committing large sums and promoting joint projects within the Ukrainian defense industry. This trend is expected to gain pace during 2025 as the US pivot away from Europe fuels increased defense spending across the continent.

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Online Event Tue, June 17, 2025 • 1:00 pm ET

Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

Ukraine’s biggest defense industry success has been the development of the domestic drone manufacturing sector. On the eve of the full-scale invasion, the country boasted only a handful of drone producers. The sector has now mushroomed to include over 200 businesses producing millions of drones annually, with output expected to treble during the current year. In order to harness this rapidly growing strike potential and maximize battlefield impact, Ukraine last year established a special branch of the armed forces dedicated to drone warfare.

Ukraine’s emergence as a drone warfare superpower owes much to the country’s strong tech traditions and entrepreneurial spirit. Since 2022, Ukrainian drone developers have proved highly innovative and are now recognized internationally as world leaders in military drone technologies. “Foreign models are like Toyotas now, while Ukrainian drones are Mercedes. Ours are just leagues ahead,” one Ukrainian commander told Ukrainska Pravda recently.

Ukraine now has a formidable arsenal of drones for use on the battlefield, at sea, and for long-range attacks against targets across Russia. The country also has a growing collection of hybrid missile-drones and missiles. President Zelenskyy recently confirmed that Ukraine had carried out an attack with the domestically produced Long Neptune cruise missile for the first time, underlining the country’s growing potential to strike back at Russia. Further innovations are in the pipeline, with domestic missile production expected to increase in the coming months if Kyiv is able to secure the necessary additional funding.

The Ukrainian military still faces a range of major challenges. The biggest issue remains manpower shortages. So far, Kyiv has sought to address mobilization problems by updating training and offering recruits the opportunity to choose the unit they will serve in, but shortfalls persist. A new initiative aimed at potential recruits between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five was launched in February 2025, featuring attractive enlistment packages and one-year service contracts.

There is also no escaping the fact that Ukraine remains dependent on Western support in order to maintain the country’s war effort. While officials in Kyiv have spoken of increasing the share of domestically produced war materials to fifty percent, Ukraine cannot realistically expect to match Russia’s overwhelming advantages in manpower, firepower, industrial capacity, and financing without continued assistance from the West.

Despite these limitations, Ukraine’s growing military strength must be taken into consideration during coming negotiations over a potential compromise peace deal with Russia. While nobody in Kyiv would relish the grim prospect of fighting on without Western assistance, the country is far from defenseless and will not accept a bad peace that places Ukrainian statehood in jeopardy.

Russia made the mistake of underestimating Ukraine in 2022, and has since paid a terrible price. Three years on, there can be little doubt that the Ukrainian army is now the most powerful fighting force in Europe. This military reality will help shape the contours of any future peace deal. It should also guarantee Ukraine’s place at the heart of Europe’s changing security system as the continent adjusts to the new geopolitical realities of an isolationist United States and an expansionist Russia.

Serhii Kuzan is Chairman of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center (USCC). He formerly served as an adviser to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (2022-2023) and advisor to the Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council (2014).

Further reading

UkraineAlert Mar 18, 2025

Britain takes the lead as Europe seeks to boost support for Ukraine

By Alina Hrytsenko

With the future of US support for Ukraine in doubt, Britain is leading European efforts to bolster the Ukrainian war effort and deny Putin an historic victory that would place the whole of Europe in peril, writes Alina Hrytsenko.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Mar 20, 2025

Putin is ruthlessly erasing Ukrainian identity in Russian-occupied Ukraine

By Peter Dickinson

Kremlin dictator Vladimir Putin is pursuing policies in Russian-occupied Ukraine that almost certainly meet the definition of ethnic cleansing and may qualify as genocide, writes Peter Dickinson.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Mar 20, 2025

Trump’s energy sector ceasefire could be good news for Putin’s war machine

By David Kirichenko 

Russian dictator Vladimir Putin has backed US President Donald Trump’s proposal for a partial ceasefire on energy sector attacks, but this may be a strategic step rather than an indication of his readiness to end the invasion of Ukraine, writes David Kirichenko.

Conflict Drones

The post Ukraine’s growing military strength is an underrated factor in peace talks appeared first on Atlantic Council.

During his Naval Postgraduate School speech in May 2022, Admiral William K. Lescher, vice chief of naval operations, explained the Navy’s new “Get Real, Get Better” initiative, which had been announced in the July 2022 Navigation Plan (NAVPLAN). He stated: “We have to self-assess and be our own toughest critics. We need to be honest about our abilities and be fully transparent about our performance. Once we ‘embrace the red,’ we will be able to identify solutions and more realistically predict our mission readiness.”¹

The “Get Real, Get Better” mandate must apply to all levels of the Navy including at the strategic level. This Atlantic Council Issue Brief does exactly what Lescher called the Navy to do by critically assessing the Navy’s 2024 overarching strategic planning document: the 2024 Navigation Plan.² This evaluation embraces the red by identifying course corrections and the need for greater clarity, specificity, and transparency in its guidance.

The short life of the Navy’s 2024 NAVPLAN

Admiral Lisa M. Franchetti, the thirty-third chief of naval operations (CNO), published the Navigation Plan for America’s Warfighting Navy 2024 (NAVPLAN) on September 18, 2024.³ This NAVPLAN is already outdated, no longer applicable, and requires replacement.

The inauguration of President Donald J. Trump on January 20, 2025, voided the 2024 NAVPLAN. Trump wants a bigger Navy by building more ships and has congressional majorities to back-up his policies, while the Navy in its NAVPLAN ranks a bigger Navy—what the Navy calls capacity—as its lowest priority. Indeed, the 2024 NAVPLAN clearly states the Navy “will continue to prioritize readiness, capability, and capacity in that order.”⁴ The twenty-eight-page NAVPLAN devotes a few sentences to express the need for a larger Navy, indicating, however, that it will not happen for over a generation because of insufficient funding and an inadequate industrial base.

During an interview on the January 6, 2025, “Hugh Hewitt Show,” Trump announced his policy to build more ships for the US Navy. He noted that the United States is “sitting back watching” as China rapidly expands its navy, opining that the United States has “suffered tremendously.”⁵ (Figure 1 displays the trend lines for the size of these two navies.) He said his administration will announce “some things that are going to be very good having to do with the Navy. We need ships. We have to get ships.”⁶ At his January 14, 2025, Senate confirmation hearing, Peter Hegseth, now secretary of defense, echoed that guidance: “President Trump has said definitively to me and publicly that shipbuilding will be one of his absolute top priorities of this administration. We need to reinvigorate our defense industrial base in this country to include our shipbuilding capacity.⁷ In addition, Hegseth (in a response to a policy question in this confirmation process) penned that, “Shipbuilding is an urgent national security priority. If confirmed, I will immediately direct the Secretary of the Navy and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to create a shipbuilding roadmap to increase our capacity.”⁸ 

In his March 4^th joint address to Congress, Trump followed through on his January comments made on the “Hugh Hewitt Show.” He announced his plan to revive US naval and commercial shipbuilding by establishing a White House Office of Shipbuilding. With the exception of its purpose—“To boost our defense industrial base” in order to “make [ships] very fast, very soon”—details on how this office would function remain scarce. Regardless, Trump signaled that shipbuilding is a key theme of his administration and a component of his plan to build “the most powerful military of the future.”⁹

Figure 1: US and Chinese naval force levels: Actual and projected (2000 to 2030)

Overview of the Navy’s NAVPLAN

NAVPLANs are a series of planning documents that convey the Navy’s most important policies for implementation above all other Navy guidance documents, including the tri-service, unclassified strategies, such as the 2007 A Cooperative Strategy for 21^st Century Seapower,¹¹ the 2015 revision of A Cooperative Strategy for 21^st Century Seapower,¹² and the 2020 Advantage at Sea.¹³ Each CNO personally authors an unclassified strategic plan—a NAVPLAN—to outline a path for the Navy’s forward progress during their four-year tenure. Modern NAVPLANs have four purposes: explain how the Navy, as part of the Joint Force, intends to deter and defeat threats to US national security; guide prioritizing and rationalizing Navy plans and programs; provide a persuasive framework for Navy funding requests; and source strategic communications to deter threats and reassure allies and partners.¹⁴

Crafted ostensibly for an internal Navy audience, these NAVPLANs identify the “biggest challenges to [the Navy’s] forward progress” and provide a “coherent approach to overcoming them.”¹⁵ NAVPLANs also have three other audiences: allies and partners, as well as potential adversaries; key decision-makers in the executive and legislative branches of the US government; and national security thought leaders in the public domain (e.g., think tanks, academia, news media, and industry). As discussed below, the latter two audiences are critically important to the Navy. The American public, however, is not a primary audience because its interests typically lag behind emerging security issues.

The 2024 NAVPLAN: Recognize the good

The 2024 NAVPLAN is a remarkable document with three instances of notable clarity. First, the NAVPLAN unequivocally declares a strategic end to achieve “readiness for the possibility of war with the People’s Republic of China by 2027.”¹⁶ By specifying China as a primary threat and with a select year for potential conflict, the NAVPLAN provides focus and clarity of purpose. The NAVPLAN zeroes in on China and describes seven priority areas to improve Navy readiness. This is a positive, clear expression of the ranking that past documents lacked. Second, the 2024 NAVPLAN cites and supports former CNO Michael Gilday’s 2022 guidance by calling for 3 percent to 5 percent “sustained budget growth above actual inflation [to] simultaneously modernize and grow the capacity of our Fleet.”¹⁷ The NAVPLAN warns, “Without substantial growth in Navy resourcing now, we will eventually face deep strategic constraints on our ability to simultaneously address day-to-day crises while also modernizing the Fleet to enhance readiness for war both today and in the future.”¹⁸ Last, this document devotes an entire page correctly highlighting how unmanned ships and aircraft technologies are the “changing character of war,”¹⁹ by “pushing asymmetric capability, at lower cost, to state and non-state actors alike.”²⁰ In response, the NAVPLAN focuses the Navy to operationalize “robotic and autonomous systems,” ²¹commonly known as drones. ²² This clarity of expression is admirable.

The 2024 NAVPLAN: Embrace the red

As mentioned, this issue brief is a critical assessment in the spirit of “Get Real, Get Better.” The 2024 NAVPLAN has major deficiencies that require correction in the next NAVPLAN. Overall, the current NAVPLAN projects an aspirational tone, with its lack of explicit strategic assumptions, risk assessments, and descriptions of the “why” and “how” of achieving its objectives. Specifically, it lacks:

1. Focus on the Navy’s two most important audiences
2. Clarity and specificity
3. Guidance on consequential issues
4. Frankness
5. A serious format for a serious document

1. Lack of focus on the Navy’s two most important audiences

The NAVPLAN’s two most critically important audiences have a learned membership, making them substantially different from the American public. They are the key decision-makers in the executive and legislative branches of the US government, and national security thought leaders in the public domain (e.g., think tanks, academia, news media, and industry). The NAVPLAN is the Navy’s only unclassified document to inform these two influential audiences, whose decisions and activities control in large part the funding for the Navy’s force structure, capabilities, and personnel requirements. Indeed, this is why Navy senior leaders make the rounds to Washington think tanks, security forums, and the war colleges and interact with news media to explain the NAVPLAN’s guidance. For this reason—garnering support and advocacy for the Navy’s budget—the information requirements of these two principal audiences eclipse the needs of the other audiences.

In contrast, the American public is a secondary audience because it is a reactive rather than a proactive audience. Most Americans are not reading and reflecting on the nation’s current global security challenges and the need to rearm. Instead, the American public responds to events usually after seeing graphic, tangible evidence. For example, viewing disturbing images of dead American military personnel and destroyed US aircraft during the April 1980 Operation Eagle Claw, a flawed mission that helped to elect Ronald Reagan and generated enormous public support for his defense buildup.

2. Lack of clarity and specificity

The 2024 NAVPLAN has numerous instances of inadequate clarity and specificity. For example, the NAVPLAN directs the Navy to increase its readiness for a possible conflict with China by 2027. The Navy, however, must convey more than readiness for a global war with China. It must also unequivocally transmit that the Navy will deny China their preferred kind of war, destroy²³ the Chinese navy, and terminate the war on terms favorable to the United States.²⁴Beijing must feel the force of President Reagan’s famous words: “You lose; we win.”²⁵ The US Navy needs to signal the unquestionable destruction and defeat of Chinese maritime forces. This unabashed expression of lethality was a great strength of the 1980s Maritime Strategy. Moreover, the Navy’s allies and partners must comprehend that the Navy is fully committed and prepared for a potential war with China.

The NAVPLAN omits explanations about why and how the Navy achieves its objectives. Without this explanation and context, the NAVPLAN’s statements are no more than assertions. For example, the document states, “We establish deterrence and prevail in war when we work as part of a Joint and Combined force.”²⁶ There are no further particulars about how the Navy intends to deter and win in a war. This guidance—or rather this assertion—implies that the Navy uses the same approach regardless of who is the enemy. Obviously, the differences between a war with China or Russia are profound, and the Navy’s approaches to deter and win are different. For starters, each adversary has entirely different strategic objectives. Moreover, a war with China occurs in a predominantly maritime theater with few US allies, whereas as a war with Russia occurs in a predominantly continental theater with an effective NATO security alliance. The differences continue, demanding greater specificity than the NAVPLAN’s abstract and broad statements that provide little useful guidance, especially given the ominous, if not dire, warnings by the Commission on the National Defense Strategy.²⁷ This lack of specificity becomes more disturbing in light of the NAVPLAN’s clarion call to prepare for a possible conflict with China in 2027. It is a confounding disconnect.

To paraphrase Dr. Samuel P. Huntington, the eminent American political scientist and author of The Soldier and the State and Clash of Civilizations,²⁸ the Navy’s two principal audiences cannot support the Navy’s requests for funding without pertinent information. As Huntington expounded, they need to know how, when, and where the Navy expects to protect the nation against military threats, such as those now posed by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. 

Furthermore, the 2024 NAVPLAN misses another opportunity to communicate the Navy’s relevance to a war with China by not expounding on the implications of a war in a predominantly maritime theater with few US allies. George Friedman, an internationally recognized geopolitical forecaster and strategist on international affairs, recently commented on the Navy’s vital role in this theater. He explained that the “balance of power in the Pacific between U.S. and Chinese naval forces remains key to American hegemony and the alliance that upholds it. In the event of war, more extreme and technological threats remain secondary to the conventional naval threat the U.S. poses to China and China poses to the U.S.”²⁹ The thinking behind his observation is a significant strategic factor that the Navy should have recognized independently and included in its NAVPLAN.

A time-tested military maxim says to tell your boss what you need to get the job done; second, tell your boss the consequences of not receiving what’s needed; and finally, make the best of what you have to accomplish the mission. The NAVPLAN studiously avoids specifying the consequences and the risks. For instance, it states, “Without substantial growth in Navy resourcing now, we will eventually face deep strategic constraints on our ability to simultaneously address day-to-day crises while also modernizing the fleet to enhance readiness for war both today and in the future.”³⁰

What are these “deep strategic constraints” and what are the consequences and the risks caused by these constraints? The NAVPLAN provides no answers. These are critically important omissions and striking deficiencies. The NAVPLAN also states that the Navy is “continuing to advocate for the resources needed to expand all aspects of the Navy’s force structure necessary to preserve the peace, respond in crisis, and win decisively in war.”³¹ This is a confusing and alarming statement. It appears to indicate that the Navy currently does not have a force structure that can “win decisively in war.”³² If this is what the Navy is communicating, it is not done with transparency.

The 2024 NAVPLAN does explain the effects of an important planning factor that limits the Navy’s options for developing its readiness efforts for a possible war with China in 2027. The Navy has only one more budget cycle—the development of the fiscal year (FY) 2027 budget—to make any meaningful changes to its capabilities in preparation for a 2027 potential conflict. Consequently, the Navy’s existing fleet of ships, in terms of mix and numbers in 2024, is largely the fleet the Navy will have in 2027. This is a significant planning factor as the Navy addresses its readiness for 2027. As Donald Rumsfeld, a former secretary of defense, once famously stated, “As you know, you go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time.”³³

The 2024 NAVPLAN has a confusing relationship with a separate, but embedded, Navy initiative called Project 33. The NAVPLAN described this project as an effort to “get more ready players on the field by 2027,”³⁴ and identified seven high-priority mitigations that the Navy needs to accelerate.³⁵ By default, these seven actions became the NAVPLAN’s primary objectives, yet the Navy referred to these objectives as Project 33 and not NAVPLAN objectives, thereby muddying the waters about whether the NAVPLAN or Project 33 is the Navy’s overarching strategic guidance. In fact, Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, penned a January 2025 essay titled “Project 33 Is Enabling Joint All-Domain Operations in the Indo-Pacific”—and not “NAVPLAN Is Enabling Joint All-Domain Operations in the Indo-Pacific.” He wrote numerous sentences beginning with Project 33 such as “Project 33’s vision to provide more munitions will. . . ”³⁶ The lack of clarity between these documents only confuses the Navy’s two principal audiences.

The harmful effects of the NAVLAN’s lack of clarity and specificity are compounded by a similar set of deficiencies in higher-order national guidance. The Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Reform reported in March 2024 that the National Defense Strategy (NDS) was “not designed to be sufficiently specific enough to guide the programming phase of PPBE.” The commission’s report also stated that the Defense Planning Guidance was a “consensus-driven document that does not make hard choices, is overly broad, and lacks explicit linkages to prioritized goals, timeframes, risk assessments, and resource allocations.” The PPBE Reform report further stated these deficiencies did not provide “top-down guidance needed during the programming phase of PPBE.”³⁷ Inadequate and incomplete guidance, by the Defense Department and the Navy, undermines effective strategic and force-planning decision-making.

3. Lack of guidance on consequential issues

The 2024 NAVPLAN falls short of addressing critical high-level issues, leaving its two principal external audiences with an insufficient understanding of the Navy’s resource requirements. Given that the NAVPLAN is a prime tool for strategic communications and is the sole document to express the Navy’s way ahead to its external audiences, the scant commentary on key issues represents a missed opportunity for the Navy.

Key issue: A larger navy

While the 2024 NAVPLAN acknowledges the need for an on-the-record requirement for 381 crewed ships,³⁸ it did not explain why or when the Navy needs these ships. In 2025, the Navy has 297 battle force ships,³⁹ with a shortfall of eighty-four ships. The document makes no attempt to communicate the strategic risk to the nation from the lack of warships, and it offers no plan B to offset the gap in assets. Furthermore, the Navy’s thirty-year shipbuilding plan for FY 2025⁴⁰ indicated that the Navy will “reach a low of 280 ships in fiscal year 2027,”⁴¹ the very year that the NAVPLAN directed the Navy to be ready for a possible war with China.

The lack of discussion on this significant matter is inexplicable. The unease is further increased with the realization that a global war with China in 2027 or even in 2030 will place impossible demands on the Navy to address multiple critical missions far exceeding its capacity. The Navy, as part of the joint force, will need to conduct, at a minimum, this sample of unprioritized missions:⁴²

1. Destroy Chinese naval and air forces invading Taiwan.
2. Defend Japan, South Korea, and Australia from naval and air attacks.
3. Isolate China from war-making resources—conduct economic warfare with blockade.
4. Conduct horizontal escalation, i.e., destroy Chinese forces at Djibouti.
5. Protect small amphibious ships inserting and extracting US Marine Corps stand-in forces inside Chinese weapons envelope.
6. Protect sustainment of US Marine Corps stand-in forces inside Chinese weapons envelope.
7. Protect US Marine Corps forces embarked in Navy large amphibious ships.
8. Protect in transit Navy combat logistics forces sustaining Navy forces conducting distributed operations.
9. Protect in transit Military Sealift Command forces sustaining Joint Force.
10. Conduct homeland defense—continental United States, i.e., integrated air missile defense of critical seaports and Navy bases.
11. Deter Russia as opportunistic adversary.
12. Deter Iran as opportunistic adversary.
13. Maintain surveillance of Chinese ballistic missile submarines.
14. Maintain surveillance of Russian ballistic missile submarines.
15. Maintain Navy strategic reserve to ensure combat credibility throughout war’s duration.

The Navy will be in a protracted war in a global conflict with China. While conducting those fifteen missions and the myriad other things required of the Navy, ships will incur far greater sustainment, maintenance, and repair requirements—further reducing the available numbers. In short, the Navy is likely to face a strategy-force mismatch. Ship numbers matter, and the US Navy does not have enough ships. As former Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) once quipped, “At some point, numbers do count. At some point, technology fails to offset mass. At some point, Kipling’s ‘thin red line of heroes’ gives way.”⁴³

Admiral Chas Richard, then-commander of the US Strategic Command, in a November 2022 speech made it very clear that the Navy lacked sufficient ships. He warned, “As I assess our level of deterrence against China, the ship is slowly sinking . . . it isn’t going to matter how good our [operating plan] is or how good our commanders are, or how good our forces are—we’re not going to have enough of them. And that is a very near-term problem.”⁴⁴ Over the last two decades, however, no Congress and no administration, regardless of party, has attempted to fund a larger Navy. The nation cannot afford the number of ships the Navy says it needs to deter and defeat America’s potential enemies. The election of President Trump appears to have changed this calculus.

Key issue: Domain transparency

Another significant issue the 2024 NAVPLAN fails to address is the impact of surveillance technology on the changing character of war. This technology has increasingly made it easier to detect and target combatants on the oceans’ surface and aircraft in air space above it, calling into question the continued viability of manned ships and aircraft operating in such an environment. In a December 2022 essay, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work and former Google chief executive officer Eric Schmidt noted:

• One key change is that militaries will have great difficulty hiding from or surprising one another. Sensors will be ubiquitous, and once-impenetrable intelligence will be vulnerable to quantum advances in decryption. Highly adaptable and mobile weapons systems, including drones, loitering munitions, and hypersonic missiles will largely inhibit militaries from amassing forces to invade.⁴⁵

In the 1930s, the US Navy experienced a similar change in the character of warfare as technological improvements increased the operational performance of aircraft carriers and the lethality of aircraft the carriers launched in terms of reliability, operating distance, and weight of bomb load. Eventually, this increased lethality (or relative combat effectiveness) surpassed the battleship’s lethality, and the Navy experienced a fundamental inflection point in its warfighting capabilities. The Navy observed this evolution of the aircraft’s increasing lethality but did not fully comprehend that the aircraft carrier and its aircraft’s steady progress would replace the battleship as the Navy’s capital weapon system. Not until actual combat—such as the Royal Navy’s November 1940 attack on the Italian Navy at its Taranto base,⁴⁶ and the Imperial Japanese Navy’s December 1941 attack on the US Navy in Pearl Harbor—did complete comprehension “sink in” about the carrier and its aircraft’s more lethal effectiveness. 

Similarly, given the comments by Work, Grady, and others in this decade, the Navy faces another seminal inflection point if Chinese surveillance capabilities advance to make the oceans’ surface and the air space above it transparent. The implications for the continued viability of surface ships in such an environment are staggering. The Navy, however, appears to have bet its surface ships will still be viable in this enhanced surveillance environment and remains committed to its planned acquisition of replacement surface ships to include the Constellation-class frigates, Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines, Ford-class aircraft carriers, and the continuation of building Burke-class destroyers along with its acquisition plans to buy large numbers of unmanned surface platforms.

4. Lack of frankness

Today is like 1938. Indeed, Franchetti has said so, but omitted her prescient comments from the 2024 NAVPLAN. As the vice CNO, she commented that the 1930s was a decisive decade that “rhymes in some key ways” with today’s security environment: She noted that both eras reflect periods of constrained defense spending, reduced construction of Navy ships, and a growing disparity in the capability and capacity between the US Navy and its principal adversaries—Imperial Japan in the 1930s and the authoritarian People’s Republic of China in the 2020s—resulting in a US fleet that was “too small and insufficiently resourced for total war,”⁴⁷ and ineffective for deterrence. She is in excellent company. Kaja Kallas, then-prime minister of Estonia and now the European foreign policy chief, has reasoned that the current global security environment reflects 1938, “when a wider war was imminent, but the West had not yet joined the dots.”⁴⁸ Dr. Hal Brands, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute,⁴⁹ has also commented on the striking parallels between today’s geostrategic events and those of the 1930s. Ominously, the Commission on the National Defense Strategy concluded in July 2024 that the “US military lacks both the capabilities, and the capacity required to be confident it can deter and prevail in combat.⁵⁰The Wall Street Journal wrote a sober editorial saying, “The world today is more like the late 1930s, as dictators build their militaries and form a new axis of animosity, while the American political class sleeps.”⁵¹

This security environment demands frankness of expression about the threats, risks, and defense requirements by US senior military leaders. There isn’t much public evidence of US senior military leaders providing candid expression. In May 2024, US Senator Roger Wicker (R-MS) cautioned in a New York Times commentary, titled “America’s Military Is Not Prepared for War or Peace,” that:

• When America’s senior military leaders testify before my colleagues and me on the US Senate Armed Services Committee behind closed doors, they have said that we face some of the most dangerous global threat environments since World War II. Then, they darken that already unsettling picture by explaining that our armed forces are at risk of being underequipped and outgunned.⁵²

The notable exception is General D. W. Allvin, US Air Force and the current chief of staff, who stated in January 2025 that, “As the arc of the threat increases daily, it is my assessment this risk is unacceptable and will continue to rise without substantially increased investment.”⁵³ Perhaps all current service chiefs share the same opinion about their individual service, but if they do, they are not speaking up and out.

Lack of frankness is a Navy practice

In its public congressional testimony, the Navy’s posture statements submitted in April and May 2024 to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and to the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Defense do not reflect any discussion of “at risk of being underequipped and outgunned.” In the two instances that the word “risk” is used in these statements, it is associated with “sealift investments” and “installation investments.”⁵⁴ 

Indeed, the Navy’s 2024 posture statements to Congress are very upbeat documents with statements such as: “In every ocean, we uphold and protect the post-World War II rules-based international order that we fought to establish and have continued to defend for nearly three-quarters of a century.” This is clearly not true for the Red Sea. Well before the publication of the posture statements, the Houthis waged an effective sea denial campaign that the US Navy was unable to prevent. These posture statements do add that the Houthis have disrupted “the free flow of maritime commerce in the Red Sea.” As reported by General Christopher Mahoney, the assistant commandant of the Marine Corps, “The Houthi’s sea-denial campaign has altered global trade routes, imposed global economic costs, enhanced its international profile, and perhaps most importantly tied up a significant portion of American naval power at a time when demand for our naval ships outstrips supply.”⁵⁵ There is, however, no discussion in the Navy’s 2024 posture statements of the implications of this Houthi warfare campaign on the Navy’s force structure, weapons, operational concepts, readiness, etc. Nor is there a mention of the high cost of fighting the Houthis and defending Israel.⁵⁶ Likewise, there is no treatment of the implications of naval warfare by the Ukrainian Navy’s use of unmanned surface vessels (i.e., drones) to its highly effective sea denial campaign against the Russian Navy in the Black Sea.

Despite affirming that the Navy needs more ships to meet its mission in this decade, the Navy’s posture statements profess that the president’s FY 2025 budget submission for the Navy “funds a strong, global Navy that is postured and ready to deter potential adversaries . . . [and] win decisively in war.”⁵⁷ The documents conclude that the Navy “continues to meet its Title 10 mission to be organized, trained, and equipped . . . for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea.”⁵⁸

These statements are disconcerting. If the Navy is funded and postured to deter and win per the April and May 2024 posture statements, it is ambiguous if these statements contradict or support the Navy’s formal requirements for 381 crewed ships. Furthermore, it is worrisome that the Navy plainly states that it can deter and win, while the July 2024 report by the Commission on the National Defense Strategy states: “The Joint Force is at the breaking point of maintaining readiness today. Adding more burden without adding resources to rebuild readiness will cause it to break.”⁵⁹ Moreover, the report adds, “The nation was last prepared for such a [global] fight during the Cold War, which ended 35 years ago. It is not prepared today.”⁶⁰

Communicating frankness with integrity and without offense

Two 1970s exemplars are instructive. In their back-to-back tenures as the Navy’s service chiefs, CNO Elmo Zumwalt and CNO James L. Holloway III confronted declining budgets, shrinking numbers of ships, plummeting readiness levels, and growing Soviet military capabilities. Moreover, things went from bad to worse during President Jimmy Carter’s administration. While President Gerald Ford proposed to Congress in 1977 the construction of 157 new ships, his successor, Jimmy Carter, in 1978 proposed only 70.“⁶¹ The collective time Zumwalt and Holloway held office has “become known to American history as the post-Vietnam ‘hollow force.‘”⁶² The two CNOs knew what had to be done. They had to lead and communicate frankly the issues confronting the Navy—issues no different from those challenging the Navy in 2025.

Zumwalt, in 1971, calculated the Navy had a 45 percent chance of defeating the Soviet Navy in a conventional war at sea. One year later, as he drafted the Navy’s FY 1973 budget, he reevaluated the chances at 35 percent.⁶³, Holloway, and the Soviet Navy Threat Zumwalt stated in a 1971 US News & World Report interview, “If the US continues to reduce and the Soviet Union continues to increase, it’s got to be inevitable that the day will come when the result will go against the US.”⁶⁴ In June 1975, Holloway on the pages of the US Naval Institute Proceedings wrote:

• We have been decommissioning ships faster than we have been building new ones. And although today we can accomplish the naval tasks of our national strategy, in some areas it is only with the barest margin of success. As Soviet maritime capabilities continue to increase, it is clear to me, as it must be apparent to you, that it is essential to reverse the declining trend of our naval force levels.⁶⁵

These two CNOs, “did not shy away from noticeably outlining the threats, challenges, and shortcomings of the fleet;” they unhesitatingly alerted the nation to the “security and technological dangers of a seemingly new age.”⁶⁶ In short, Zumwalt and Holloway provided leadership underwritten with intellectual and moral courage to sound a clarion call about the Navy’s declining readiness posture. For their integrity and forthrightness, their civilian bosses did not censure them. 

The American public saw similar CNO leadership in January 2015 when Jonathan Greenert testified before Congress about the effects of sequestration on the Navy’s readiness to execute the Defense Strategic Guidance. He concluded that the Navy could not “confidently execute the current defense strategy within dictated budget constraints.”⁶⁷ Greenert accompanied his testimony with a table displaying the ten missions the Defense Strategic Guidance required and the associated risk for each mission caused by sequestration. See figure 2, which depicts the key portion of Greenert’s table. His table showed two missions in red highlighting that the Navy could not execute and five missions in yellow highlighting that were “high risk” for the Navy.⁶⁸ Greenert declared that naval forces “will not be able to carry out the Nation’s defense strategy as written.” His assessment finished with a dire warning that when facing major contingencies, the Navy’s “ability to fight and win will neither be quick nor decisive.”⁶⁹

Figure 2: Excerpt of CNO Greenert’s assessment of 2015 mission impacts to a sequestered US Navy

5. Lack of a serious format for a serious document

With no maps of maritime terrain or tables of hard net assessment data and the inclusion of too many “eye candy” glossy images of kit, the 2024 NAVPLAN has the look and feel of a coffee table publication, meant for casual and light reading with limited analysis and a superficial approach to naval strategic planning. Serious people produce serious documents. The NAVPLAN’s format signals an indifferent document, unlike the formats used for the National Security Strategy. The lack of hard data on net assessment is a significant weakness, especially the lack of maps, which help make the relationship between sea power and physical space evident. Indeed, understanding maritime geography “facilitates communication and strategic thinking and can help construct a compelling public narrative in support of [Navy] policy.”⁷⁰ The below figures illustrate the type of maps to include in a serious strategic planning document. Figure 3 depicts the “tyranny of distance”⁷¹ in the Indo-Pacific theater, and figure 4 shows the strategic importance of the “first island chain” in effectively “containing” China.

Figure 3: Western Pacific maritime geography: Tyranny of distance, lack of US strategic depth

Figure 4: The first island chain’s strategic importance in preventing the Chinese navy from entering the Pacific and Indian oceans

Conclusion: Course corrections for a 2025 NAVPLAN

As the Navy’s senior strategic leader,⁷² the CNO must: “(1) get the big ideas right; (2) communicate those ideas effectively; (3) oversee the implementation of the ideas, and (4) determine how to refine the big ideas and then repeat the cycle.”⁷³ The Navy’s “big ideas” address its national defense role and the requisite force structure to support that role.

When first published in September 2024, the NAVPLAN correctly got the Navy’s big ideas right. The arrival of a new commander in chief in January 2025 changed the nation’s defense priorities, and now the Navy must replace its NAVPLAN with a version aligned with President Trump’s priority to build ships for the Navy. The president superseded the Navy’s priorities in the order of readiness, capability, and capacity. Far from being an onerous burden for the Navy to craft a new 2025 NAVPLAN, the nation’s other armed services should be so fortunate.

In addition to embracing the president’s direction, the new 2025 NAVPLAN should address the deficiencies outlined in this paper. While retaining its commendable attributes, especially its strategic objective to concentrate on “readiness for the possibility of war with the People’s Republic of China by 2027,” the 2025 NAVPLAN should incorporate the following course corrections:

• Increase its focus on the Navy’s two most important and influential audiences by addressing their information needs. They require a description of a possible war with China and Russia and how the Navy, as part of the Joint Force, would prevail. Such a sobering, informative description is not a multivolume addition but an executive summary with sufficient detail for these audiences to grasp the broad outlines and scope of a conflict and the implications for the Navy. The description must contain Chinese and Russian capabilities and numbers, logistic challenges, key military problems to overcome, and the role of allies and partners illustrated with maps and net assessment tables.
• Improve clarity and specificity by providing the context of “why” and “how” the Navy intends to achieve its strategic objectives. Such context provides substance to the NAVPLAN and eliminates the use of assertions, which are a form of self-serving rhetoric, often informally called “happy talk.” In addition, the NAVPLAN must list the strategic assumptions the Navy used to craft the documents and address the implications of risk.
• Address the Navy’s approach to resolving its other consequential issues—besides the need for a larger Navy and domain transparency—such as the ongoing depletion of ordnance war stocks for kinetic operations in the Middle East,⁷⁴ the slow and painful development of directed energy weapons,⁷⁵ and the yearslong debate over the acquisition of the medium landing ship.⁷⁶ The 2025 NAVPLAN must forthrightly treat these issues head-on, lucidly conveying the implications, risk, assumptions, and mitigations.
• Advance frankness by fully reflecting the Navy’s leadership philosophy of “Get Real, Get Better,” which requires Navy leaders to “be honest about our abilities and be fully transparent about our performance.”⁷⁷ The Navy must speak frankly about how US adversaries, especially China, are harming US national interests and set forth a well-crafted message to explain how the Navy—properly resourced to be lethal and ready—will preserve the nation’s security in an increasingly dangerous world. The Wall Street Journal Editorial Board maintains that the United States “is slouching ahead in blind complacency until China invades Taiwan or takes some other action that damages US interests or allies because Beijing thinks the United States can do nothing about it.”⁷⁸ The Navy should not partake in “blind complacency.” The threats to the United States are all too real.
• Turn the NAVPLAN into a serious strategic planning document, produced by serious people, shedding the look of a coffee-table book or public-affairs handout. Eliminate all “glossy” images of ships and airplanes in the document and replace them with graphics that are relevant to and useful for the Navy’s two principal audiences as well as force planners and strategists of all ilk: maps depicting maritime terrain and net assessment tables regarding China and Russia in particular.

Collectively these Navy course corrections to the NAVPLAN will enable all Navy audiences to better grasp the severity of the security threats confronting America and comprehend the Navy’s funding requirements. With greater candor, explicitness, and detail—and amply illustrated with maps and tables depicting hard-threat data—the 2025 NAVPLAN can, indeed, demonstrate that clarity is power.

Bruce Stubbs

Bruce Stubbs had assignments on the staffs of the secretary of the Navy and the chief of naval operations from 2009 to 2022 as a member of the US senior executive service. He was a former director of Strategy and Strategic Concepts in the N3N5 and N7 directorates. As a career US Coast Guard officer, he had a posting as the Assistant Commandant for Capability in Headquarters, served on the staff of the National Security Council, taught at the Naval War College, commanded a major cutter, and served a combat tour with the US Navy in Vietnam during the 1972 Easter Offensive. The author drew upon his forthcoming publication, Cold Iron: The Demise of Navy Strategy Development and Force Planning, to compose portions of this commentary.

The views expressed are the author’s and do not represent those of any organization or affiliation.

Transcript Oct 16, 2024

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The post Clarity is power: The Trump administration needs a new US Navy Navigation Plan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This paper examines the potential for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to exploit its growing network of overseas ports and bases to challenge control of the seas in a conventional war with the United States. Security concerns with Chinese ownership of overseas ports fall into three main categories. First, China collects vast amounts of intelligence via its port network. Second, it could use that intelligence and its control of key ports and piers to disrupt US shipments during wartime. Finally, China could leverage these ports to pre-position weapons, ammunition, and equipment to resupply its warships and armed merchants or rapidly establish anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) nodes near major maritime choke points. In short, China could exploit this network to challenge the sea control essential to US success in an armed conflict.

This paper does not speculate on why the United States and China might enter a global conflict. In fact, current Chinese writings indicate China does not seek a global confrontation. Rather, Chinese strategic literature reflects a preference for winning without fighting and, if forced to fight, fighting one local enemy at a time after politically isolating that enemy.

As with all future papers, this one starts with assumptions. It then examines China’s current network of overseas ports and its expansion of that network. The rationale behind China’s pursuit of overseas ports is explored through an analysis of Chinese strategic vulnerabilities. This paper considers three potential applications for these bases, including an improbable worst-case scenario, to assess how China may exploit this advantage.

After evaluating China’s potential actions, the paper examines possible US responses and concludes with recommendations for the capabilities, training, organization, and equipment necessary to execute those missions effectively.

Assumptions

Assumptions are critical to planning. They provide guidance concerning essential but inherently unknowable factors required to initiate planning.¹ The following assumptions are key to assessing China’s potential use of overseas bases and ports in a conflict with the United States.

Assumption 1: The war will be long.

By the time the modern state and its military institutions fully emerged at the end of the seventeenth century, wars were won or lost on the ability of financial and economic systems to sustain and support armies in the field and navies at sea.²

Since 1750, conflicts between healthy, major powers lasted years to decades, even though national leaders often assumed they would be short. The Seven Years’ War, the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the US Civil War, the First and Second World Wars, and the Russo-Ukrainian War lasted between three to twenty-three years.

War games have repeatedly shown that the United States would run out of critical munitions just eight days into a high-intensity conflict with China over Taiwan.”³ However, this does not mean a war with China would be short. In both the US Civil War and the First World War, ammunition shortages reduced the intensity of fighting for up to a year. Yet, both sides mobilized their industries and replenished ammunition stocks even as they raised massive armies. These wars continued for years after the combatants overcame their initial shortages. The current Russo-Ukrainian War follows this pattern.

These long wars have ended in one of two ways: a negotiated treaty or the destruction of the enemy’s forces and subsequent occupation of its homeland. Economic exhaustion of one or both parties was a key factor in these conflicts.

However, nuclear weapons introduced a new factor that makes occupying a nuclear-armed power a highly dangerous proposition. Andrew Krepinevich, Jr., president and chief operating officer of Solarium LLC, a defense consulting firm, notes:

• [W]ith the advent of nuclear weapons, wars between great powers can be protracted only if political constraints are imposed on vertical escalation.⁴

The presence of nuclear weapons appears to rule out a strategy of annihilation or large-scale attacks on either combatant’s homeland. Instead of seeking a decisive victory, the United States and China would likely pursue a strategy of exhaustion, pitting their economic and fiscal systems against each other. In this conflict, sea control would be critical.

Assumption 2: China is establishing a mix of overseas military bases, ownership of overseas commercial ports, and access to other nations’ commercial ports.

Chinese entanglement in foreign bases and ports is not an assumption but a reality. The only uncertainty is which facilities China could access in a conflict. In 2018, Ely Ratner, at the time the Maurice R. Greenberg senior fellow for China studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, noted, “China’s government is actively searching for overseas bases.”⁵ Since then, China has continued to invest heavily in overseas facilities.⁶

Assumption 3: China is developing fully autonomous uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), uncrewed surface vessels (USVs), and uncrewed underwater vessels (UUVs).

Currently, several nations deploy weapons capable of autonomously hunting targets post-launch.⁷ China, already a leader in drones and autonomy technologies, will undoubtedly operate post-launch autonomous drones across air, land, and sea domains within a few years. As the Houthis have demonstrated, even a small number of inexpensive drones can challenge current US Navy capabilities. China has the potential to produce these in the millions.⁸

Assumption 4: China could execute a plan using its Chinese-owned overseas ports and bases with its current capabilities.

The PLA already possesses the capabilities required to exploit Chinese bases and Chinese-owned overseas ports. The key will be China’s willingness to think differently and commit forces to missions with a slight chance of those forces returning.

Assumption 5: The United States cannot predict which nations will allow US forces to operate from their territories during a war. Therefore, the United States must plan for various permissions and structure future forces accordingly.

International relations in the Indo-Pacific are in flux. While many analysts believe Australia and Japan will allow US forces to use their territory in a conflict with China, there is much less confidence regarding the positions other nations in the region will take. In the last few years, China has pulled back from its “wolf-warrior” approach to diplomacy and refocused its Belt and Road Initiative. This may lead Pacific nations toward neutrality or even alignment with China.

Chinese overseas port posture

Numerous studies have examined China’s rapid and ongoing expansion of ownership or management of ports globally. Most provide detailed analyses of why China is seeking a global footprint, and several papers also analyze China’s reasoning for selecting specific ports.⁹

However, there is no consensus on precisely which facilities China will own or have access to. All studies note China’s naval base in Djibouti. More recently, Newsweek reported that China continues to expand naval facilities in Ream, Cambodia.¹⁰ The Washington Post reported China continued its efforts to establish “military facilities at the United Arab Emirates port of Kalifa.”¹¹ RAND rated four countries—Cambodia, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Pakistan—as highly desirable and feasible candidates for subsequent naval bases.¹²

Isaac B. Kardon and Wendy Leutert note that “the [People’s Liberation Army Navy] enjoys privileged access to dual-use facilities that Chinese firms own and operate.”¹³ This means Chinese personnel could oversee the day-to-day operations at these terminals. Chinese firms “hold an equity stake in the lease or concession on at least one terminal in ninety-six foreign ports.”¹⁴ Forty-five of the ninety-six ports lie along significant sea lines of communications (SLOCs) critical to Chinese imports and exports. Fifty-five percent of the ports are within 480 nautical miles (one steaming day) of critical choke points on these SLOCs. While China may focus on protecting its SLOCs, these routes are essential to the global economy. Chinese ownership or management of these ports allows China to build military capabilities at overseas bases covertly.

Chinese strategic vulnerabilities

China has key strategic vulnerabilities that can be exploited in a long war. Chinese leaders have identified two vulnerabilities of great strategic concern: the “Malacca Dilemma” and internal instability that could threaten the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) rule.¹⁵ While Chinese officials no longer use the phrase “Malacca Dilemma,” it still captures China’s fundamental vulnerability to a blockade. If exploited, this vulnerability would contribute significantly to China’s economic exhaustion.

Malacca dilemma

China’s greatest geostrategic vulnerability is its isolation from the Pacific and Indian Oceans by the First Island Chain. This makes Chinese seaborne trade highly vulnerable to interdiction. Further, since most of the major exits to the South China and East China Seas are at significant distances from the Chinese mainland, China would have to project its military forces over longer ranges to disrupt any US or allied blockade operations. Even if China can penetrate a blockade of the First Island Chain, it faces additional maritime choke points en route to European and Middle Eastern markets. Most notable are the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab Strait.

The Chinese leadership’s concern over the Malacca Dilemma is based on genuine economic vulnerabilities. China’s energy, food, and productive capacity heavily rely on seaborne trade. To reduce its vulnerability to interruption of its seaborne commerce, China has invested significant resources in pipelines and overland rail routes.

China has made serious investments to reduce its vulnerability to blockade operations. It is essential to examine those steps and the reasons they remain vulnerable.

Rail–an effort to overcome the Malacca Dilemma?

China has invested heavily in improving its ability to ship to Europe by rail. According to the China State Railway Group Company, it moved 1,460,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) by rail in 2021.¹⁶ This peak throughput occurred prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, which has restricted rail traffic. For comparison, China’s ports handled 262 million TEUs in 2021.¹⁷ Thus, rail routes accounted for only 0.6 percent of its global seaborne trade.

Expanding capacity to handle more than a minor fraction of seaborne trade will be extremely difficult. Russian Railways projects that it will be able to transit 4 million containers by 2027. However, its spokesman admits that shortages of container platforms, skilled workers, throughput capacity, and marshaling yards restrict its current operations.¹⁸ Kazakh railways, the only other route, do not offer prospects for increased trade. The Kazakh-China border crossings are regularly overwhelmed by traffic. At the beginning of September 2024, fifty-five trains were backed up at the border. To reduce the congestion, Kazakhstan banned further containers until it could clear the backlog.¹⁹ Further complicating any efforts to increase overland transportation throughput is the fact both rail and road connections pass through thousands of miles of the most hostile terrain in the world—mountains, jungles, and deserts. These conditions magnify both the expense of transport and the cost of maintaining rail and road networks. Additionally, most of the rail infrastructure is not operated or maintained by China, but instead by Russia and Kazakhstan. Finally, the very nature of rail lines makes them subject to wartime interdiction.

China has also proposed rail projects to Thailand, Myanmar, and Pakistan, but these projects continue to face delays.²⁰ The cargo that will eventually feed these rail connections must come primarily from maritime shipping. Thus, these proposed rail lines will not dramatically reduce China’s dependence on the sea but will only allow it to avoid key choke points created by the First Island Chain. However, even if these lines triple rail throughput, they will still provide less than 2 percent of China’s current seaborne trade. The fact remains that rail simply cannot provide China with a significant substitute for seaborne trade.

This calls into question whether China designed these rail lines not as alternate trade routes but as inland routes to support distant overseas ports and bases. China and Pakistan are planning a rail line to link Kashgar, China, to Gwadar, a Pakistani port city on the Arabian Sea.²¹ In late 2023, China and Myanmar announced the resumption of work on the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, which will link Kunming, China, to Kyaukpyu and Yangon, Myanmar—both located on the Bay of Bengal.²²

Energy

Not surprisingly, China uses a full range of energy sources. At 55.6 percent of the total, coal is by far China’s largest energy source. The next largest source is oil, at 17.7 percent. Then, in descending order, are natural gas (8.4 percent), renewables (8.4 percent), hydro (7.7 percent), and nuclear power (2.3 percent).²³

China has massive coal production capacity and reserves. Yet, in 2022, it imported 375 million metric tons of coal, or 8 percent of its coal needs.²⁴ The imports, primarily from Indonesia and Australia, consisted of higher-quality coal unavailable in China but needed for certain industrial processes.

Analysis often cites the fact that China imports 72 percent of the oil it consumes as a primary strategic vulnerability.²⁵ But too often, analysts do not note that oil represented less than 18 percent of China’s primary energy consumption in 2022. Recognizing a potential vulnerability, China began building a strategic petroleum oil reserve in 2007. Today,

• China’s inventory [is] near 1.3bn barrels, enough to cover 115 days of imports (America holds 800m barrels). On top of this, China has told oil firms to add 60m to stockpiles by the end of March [2025]. Rapidan [Energy] thinks reserves will grow even faster, with China adding as many as 700m barrels by the end of 2025.²⁶

In the past, China has also delivered oil by rail. With full mobilization, China might be able to import five hundred thousand barrels per day from Russia and Kazakhstan.²⁷ However, this would displace other potential traffic. That said, most of China’s liquid energy imports are used in the transportation and petrochemical industries.

Natural gas does not represent a significant vulnerability either. As of spring 2024, China had only about twenty-three days’ natural gas supply in storage. However, in 2022, natural gas imported by sea represented only 2 percent of China’s total energy.²⁸ The reductions in liquid energy consumption seen during the COVID-19 pandemic indicate the impact that wartime restrictions on civilian movement could have on China’s energy demands.²⁹

Any major conflict between the United States and China would cause significant economic disruption globally, thus strongly reducing the demand for Chinese products. This would further reduce China’s liquid energy requirements and extend the life of its energy reserves. In sum, interruptions of imported liquid energy would strain China’s economy but would not be decisive.

Food

China faces insoluble food security issues. With only 10 percent of the world’s arable land, it must feed 20 percent of the world’s population.³⁰ In 2014, China’s government reported that 20 percent of its arable land suffered from heavy metal pollution. Compounding these problems is the carbon content of Chinese soil, which is 30 percent lower than the world average. To compensate, Chinese farmers use 33 percent of all fertilizer produced worldwide. This overuse of fertilizer causes acidification and hardens the soil.³¹ In addition, over 40 percent of China’s land area is affected by erosion—perhaps the most severe damage in the world.³²

The net result is that China:

• [I]mports more of these [food] products—including soybeans, corn, wheat, rice, and dairy products—than any other country. Between 2000 and 2020, the country’s food self-sufficiency ratio decreased from 93.6 percent to 65.8 percent. Changing diet patterns have also driven up China’s imports of edible oils, sugar, meat, and processed foods. In 2021, the country’s edible oil import-dependency ratio reached nearly 70 percent…³³

Chinese leaders are acutely aware that food shortages have historically led to instability and have, therefore, stockpiled a year’s worth of wheat and maize.³⁴ The chart below demonstrates the massive increase in grain purchases since 2010. This trend partly reflects China’s growing wealth and the need to feed more livestock as the Chinese diet increasingly includes meat.³⁵

China also faces severe water shortages, particularly in the north, where much of its agricultural production is concentrated. That region holds just 4 percent of the country’s water. As a result, Chinese agriculture relies heavily on groundwater, but half of its aquifers are too polluted for irrigation. Nationwide, up to 25 percent of river water is also unsuitable for agricultural use.³⁶ To address its water distribution problem, China is building massive water transportation systems, but it is unlikely to significantly increase grain production in a crisis.

Productive capacity

In 2022, China imported more than $325 million in non-food raw materials per month.³⁷ This included 70 percent of total global seaborne iron ore imports—about 1.2 billion tons per year.³⁸ Chinese domestic production that year was 380 million tons, covering only 24 percent of its annual needs.³⁹ While China is the world’s fourth-largest producer of copper,⁴⁰ it is also the world’s largest importer, accounting for 58 percent of global copper ore imports.⁴¹

Although China has the world’s largest shipbuilding industry, accounting for 48.4 percent of the global shipbuilding tonnage, the industry is heavily dependent on imports.⁴² If US allies can maintain sea control in a prolonged conflict, China will struggle to obtain the raw materials needed to sustain its economy and war production. Nations that have been blockaded in the past have made significant cuts to civilian production to support their war efforts. Doing so allowed the Confederacy, Germany, and Japan to extend their military efforts for years; however, in the end, blockades caused substantial reductions in their industrial outputs.

Trade

China has made significant efforts to shift from an export-based economy to a domestic demand-driven one. It has reduced its dependence on trade from over 60 percent of its GDP in 2006 to 38 percent in 2022.⁴³ However, 90 percent of this trade remains seaborne.⁴⁴ To illustrate the potential impact of interruptions to seaborne trade, the Great Depression reduced the US GDP by 29 percent from 1929 to 1933.⁴⁵ A RAND study noted that China’s economy may contract by 25 to 35 percent in a prolonged war.⁴⁶ A contraction of this magnitude would not only severely hinder China’s military-industrial production but could also contribute to internal instability—Chinese President Xi Jinping’s primary concern.

Internal instability

The CCP’s leadership views internal instability as the primary threat to its continued rule. Since the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre, China has dramatically increased its focus on internal security. It reorganized the People’s Armed Police, and by 2017, its internal security budget was 118 percent of its national defense budget.

China no longer publishes its internal security budget. However, its massive efforts to suppress Uighurs in Xinjiang, its coordinated nationwide surveillance of nearly every aspect of its citizens’ lives, and its extensive control over information all underscore the CCP leadership’s belief that internal instability is a major strategic threat.

Joel Wuthnow, a senior research fellow at the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs within the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, noted:

• The ultimate irony of the regime presiding over the ‘people’s republic’ is that its greatest fear is that one day, it will have to confront the wrath of the Chinese people directly. Worrying about internal challenges is ‘what keeps Chinese leaders awake at night.’⁴⁷

The People’s Liberation Army

The Office of the US Secretary of Defense provides an unclassified Annual Report to Congress, and the Congressional Research Service regularly produces reports on the PLA. This article does not attempt to duplicate these efforts. Instead, it focuses on how China can use existing and projected PLA capabilities to disrupt international shipping during a conflict with the United States.

Chinese potential use of overseas ports and bases

Security concerns regarding Chinese ownership of overseas ports fall into three general categories. First is the massive amount of intelligence China collects. Second is the potential to use this intelligence and control of key ports and piers to disrupt US shipments in times of war. Finally, there is the possibility that China could leverage its control of these ports to pre-position weapons, ammunition, and equipment—either to replenish its warships and armed merchants or to rapidly establish A2/AD nodes near major maritime choke points. In short, it can disrupt global maritime trade.

Simply by running international ports, China acquires and collects enormous amounts of information on maritime trade flows. It also developed its National Transportation and Logistics Public Information Platform, known as LOGINK, a software system designed to manage global shipping. As John Konrad writes:

• Initially marketed outside of China in 2010, LOGINK has since expanded its footprint, securing cooperation agreements with at least 24 global ports. Its capacity to amass sensitive business and foreign government data, such as corporate registries, vessel details, and cargo data, has raised significant security concerns.

Quoting a U.S.-China Economic and Security Commission report,⁴⁸ Konrad adds:

• COSCO [China COSCO Shipping Corporation] currently operates terminals at Long Beach, Los Angeles, and Seattle, potentially granting LOGINK a window into vessel, container, and other data at those ports.⁴⁹

This information could provide China with global intelligence on the movement of US forces, materiel, and equipment during a crisis. China could use this intelligence to disrupt the movement of US and allied materiel in the event of conflict. It did so in 2016 when it seized eight Singaporean Terrex infantry carriers as they transited the port of Hong Kong while returning from exercises in Taiwan.⁵⁰

Due to the United States’ heavy reliance on commercial shipping, some of this maritime traffic will pass through Chinese-controlled ports. Much more will be visible in LOGINK. Both possibilities create opportunities to corrupt logistics databases and even reroute critical items. There is a also concern that the widespread use of Chinese-produced cranes could allow China to disrupt trade in ports it neither owns nor operates.⁵¹

The third threat is the potential to use these ports—or even individual piers—to pre-position equipment that could transform each into an intelligence collection node, a rearming point to replenish containerized missiles on Chinese warships or merchant ships, an A2/AD node to disrupt international shipping, or any combination of the three.

In the least aggressive approach, China could employ these ports for intelligence gathering and soft-kill operations. PLA personnel could use pre-positioned electronic warfare (EW) and cyber equipment for offensive operations or as a basis for intelligence collection beyond what is obtained through LOGINK. The PLA could also deploy long-endurance drones or balloons as platforms for multi-spectral, synthetic-aperture radar (SAR), radar, and EW sensors. While permitting the use of these ports in a conflict could legally render the host nation a belligerent, it is not difficult to envision host nations turning a blind eye to drones collecting “weather” or “environmental” information. Nor would it be surprising if the host nations simply pretended not to know about any Chinese intelligence personnel conducting cyber or EW operations from their soil. Every port could become an intelligence collection node along key maritime routes.

The next step would be to use these ports to replenish containerized weapons deployed on Chinese-owned commercial ships. Since these vessels would routinely load and unload containers at the piers, the activity would not appear unusual and would be subtle enough for the host nation to ignore. The PLA has displayed these systems at trade shows since 2022.⁵² Its systems appear very similar to the Club-K family of containerized missiles that Russia has offered for sale since 2010.⁵³ In recent years, Israel, Iran, the United States, and the Netherlands have also tested containerized missiles. These ports could also be used to rearm People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships.

The final—and least likely, but most aggressive—course of action would be to use these ports to establish effective counter-intervention nodes. These nodes would require effective command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, as well as anti-ship defenses, anti-air defenses, and EW units. Depending on the location and the potential for US or allied response, they may also require limited ground defenses to protect against attempts to destroy the Chinese weapons systems stationed there.

Prior to a conflict, China could pre-position weapons, ammunition, and equipment without the host nations’ knowledge. The PLA could build significant stockpiles of command and control (C2), EW, cyber, anti-air, anti-ship, and anti-armor equipment and munitions by transporting them in commercial containers via Chinese shipping companies. Upon arrival, they could be unloaded and stored in warehouses or container lots controlled by Chinese companies. Similar to US pre-positioning programs, China would only need to fly in personnel and limited equipment to rapidly establish fully equipped intelligence centers or combat formations. If flights were impossible, smugglers have demonstrated that large numbers of people can be moved in containers on merchant ships.

Weapons and vehicles too large to be containerized could be shipped aboard one of China’s numerous commercial vessels, which could be specifically modified to carry military equipment. Personnel could be flown in or travel with their equipment on these ships.

Given that Chinese forces would likely be focused on air and sea interdiction, these forces would not require large, personnel-intensive infantry, logistics, and aircraft maintenance units. Thus, deployment and employment could be executed rapidly in peacetime. These factors could provide China with robust forces capable of shutting down shipping at maritime choke points across the South China Sea, Indian Ocean, Middle East, and potentially parts of the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea.

If these ports are configured to be effective A2/AD nodes, they could be used in two ways. First, China could assert that these forces would not be used unless the United States or its allies attempted to cut off maritime trade to China. Alternatively, China could threaten the maritime trade of individual nations that choose to support the United States. If these threats fail and the United States imposed a distant naval blockade, China could use these nodes to cause massive disruption to global trade.

Meia Nouwens of the International Institute for Strategic Studies says that Chinese leaders understand that an Indo-Pacific war will not be “a short, quick, swift victory after a surprise attack, but [acknowledge] that potential conflict might be protracted, and a war of attrition.”⁵⁴ China is aware that a prolonged war will be won or lost on economic and industrial resilience. Cutting global trade would significantly and negatively impact US economic and industrial capacity. Chinese leaders are likely aware this step would alienate the international community and perhaps convince some nations to align with the United States. While this is a significant risk, the CCP would have already taken an existential risk (for the party, not the country) by choosing conventional warfare with the United States.

By the same standards, US efforts to disrupt these sites risk alienating host nations. This will be particularly true if the Chinese are merely conducting intelligence-gathering operations without kinetic actions or interference with the host nation’s trade.

US intelligence has tracked China’s development of mainland counter-intervention (A2/AD) capabilities for over a decade. China has spent decades developing the systems and weapons necessary to create overlapping, integrated observation and fire zones at ever-greater distances from its mainland. Today, China is emphasizing the integration of air, land, sea, space, cyber, EW, and information capabilities to maximize the effectiveness of its counter-intervention capability. It is also increasing its inventory of mobile systems and showcasing containerized systems at international trade shows.⁵⁵

Combined with its ownership and control of overseas ports, this capability gives China the potential to create “pop-up” counter-intervention nodes near critical maritime choke points. The capabilities discussed below can all be deployed to overseas ports using standard shipping containers or roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) shipping. With the C2 systems, weapons, and munitions pre-positioned in these ports, personnel can be flown in and establish effective units in a matter of days.

Systems China could covertly deploy to overseas ports/bases

Command-and-control systems

The critical asset that will enable China to integrate its wide-ranging locations and coordinate the employment of the systems is an effective global C2 system. The theater commands the PLA established in 2016 are still working toward achieving full joint capability, and none have been designated to conduct the type of operations described in this paper. Therefore, how China would command such an operation remains an open question. To date, the naval headquarters has commanded the PLAN deployments to the Middle East. However, given the PLA’s determined efforts to master joint operations, China is likely developing some form of joint command for overseas deployments.⁵⁶

The PLA will require a robust C2 with integrated global communications; long-range intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); EW; and cyber defense. The technical components necessary for such a command structure either already exist or are currently under development.

China is a near-peer or peer in military remote sensing, creating new and enhanced dilemmas for US and allied military planners: The United States will face a PLA with improved intelligence, tracking, and targeting capabilities, complicating efforts to deter or carry out military operations within the second island chain in the Indo-Pacific.⁵⁷

China has plans to launch twenty-six thousand communication satellites into low-earth orbit (LEO) to provide Starlink-like global broadband capabilities.⁵⁸ To augment its existing BeiDou Global Navigation Satellite System and ChinaSat communications satellites, China launched Weixing Hulianwan Gaogui-01, its first “high orbit internet satellite.”⁵⁹ BeiDou, ChinaSat, and Gaogui-01 operate in geosynchronous orbit (GEO).

In December 2023, China launched Yaogan-41, a remote-sensing satellite, into GEO. It added to China’s constellation of 144 Yaogan satellites, providing “an unprecedented ability to identify and track car-sized objects throughout the entire Indo-Pacific.”⁶⁰ As a GEO orbiting satellite, it provides a constant observation of the same region, unlike LEO satellites, which make intermittent passes. China also operates three Gaofen electro-optical equipped satellites in GEO, with resolutions as precise as 15 meters. In 2023, China launched the world’s only SAR satellite in GEO orbit, enabling the satellite to see through clouds and in darkness.⁶¹

These systems will provide a local commander access to Chinese satellite intelligence and can be augmented by long-range drones and balloons. China could deploy its vertically launched Sunflower drones, which have a 1,200-mile range and an 88-pound payload, allowing them to carry various sensors and communications systems. China has already demonstrated its ability to use high-altitude balloons as collection platforms.

The Russo-Ukrainian War has highlighted the importance of effective EW and electronic intelligence systems. It has also demonstrated the growing effectiveness of relatively small EW systems that could easily fit in a TEU. Even before the war in Ukraine, China took steps to strengthen its EW capabilities. In 2015, China established the Strategic Support Force (SSF) to develop and coordinate space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare capabilities. In April 2024, China announced that it had split the SSF into three branches: the Information Support Force, Network Space Force, and Military Aerospace Support Force.⁶² While analysts still do not fully understand how responsibilities will be divided among these new forces, it is clear that China remains committed to enhancing its capabilities in these domains.

A key advantage of these C2 capabilities is that the equipment—and even personnel—can be covertly transported and deployed.

Anti-ship systems

Anti-ship systems, ranging from low-cost weapons to high-end cruise missiles, will be central to any Chinese attempt to use overseas bases and ports to disrupt trade.

Sea mines

Sea mines are among the cheapest and most effective anti-ship systems. Given the widely recognized deficiencies in the US Navy’s modern counter-mine warfare, China is well aware of their effectiveness.⁶³ In 2023, the China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College’s Center for Naval Warfare Studies noted:

• China has begun to prioritize mine warfare and the PLAN has a comprehensive, sophisticated sea mine program …. [A] large, diverse inventory of sea mines including advanced variants and trains extensively in minelaying.⁶⁴

While many studies have focused on China’s use of mines to isolate Taiwan, sea mines are easy to transport and can be covertly deployed by almost any ship. China has designated mine-laying a mission for commercial vessels in its naval reserve. Given the challenges of mine sweeping and the limited capabilities among Western nations, even a small number of mines in maritime choke points could cause long-term trade disruptions. Following the Gulf War, it took Australians almost five months to search “two square kilometres and [deal] with [just] 60 mines.”⁶⁵ Those mines employed decades-old technology. The modern mines in China’s arsenal will be exponentially more difficult to neutralize. Even if an area can be cleared, it can easily be reseeded by false-flagged commercial or fishing vessels during routine passages through maritime choke points.

Uncrewed aerial vehicles

In Ukraine, UAVs have destroyed targets ranging from individual soldiers to armored vehicles to major industrial facilities and even warships—at distances of up to 1,800 kilometers.⁶⁶

China is well known for manufacturing most of the world’s quadcopters, but it also produces a family of military drones. China’s FH-901, for example, bears a remarkable resemblance to the US Switchblade.⁶⁷ These munitions have limited range but carry more powerful warheads than the hobby quadcopters widely used in Ukraine. They would be particularly effective in very restricted waterways such as the Bab al-Mandab Strait.

China’s Sunflower 200 represents a significant leap in capability. Online videos show China developing a launching system similar to Iran’s commercial truck-mounted launcher.⁶⁸ These relatively inexpensive, mass-produced drones pose a clear threat to merchant shipping as well as commercial and military base facilities.

China is also developing high-performance, long-range drones. The Feihong FH-97A is “capable of ‘all-day, all-weather’ operations in support of reconnaissance and attack missions.”⁶⁹ The FH-97A bears a striking resemblance to the US XQ-58A Valkyrie, which has a range of 3,500 miles, can carry up to 1,000 pounds, and cruises at Mach 0.7.⁷⁰ If the FH-97A’s capabilities match those of the Valkyrie, it could provide a globally deployable long-range strike. Given China’s investment in artificial intelligence, it is likely that these aircraft will soon be autonomous—if they are not already.

If concealed in standard shipping containers, these weapons could be quickly shipped into any port controlled by a Chinese company. The FH-97’s estimated 3,000-mile range means it could strike shipping throughout the Indian Ocean, most of the Atlantic, and much of the Pacific from a Chinese-controlled port. Even more concerning, these systems could target fixed air bases or ports supporting US operations.

Uncrewed surface vessels/uncrewed underwater vessels

Over the last two years, Ukraine’s USVs have sunk or damaged Russian naval vessels both in the open sea and in port.⁷¹ The China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College’s Center for Naval Warfare Studies recently reported:

• “The PLAN either has or is poised to integrate USVs and UUVs into its operational force. It seeks to build larger USVs and UUVs to carry more capable payloads and perform a broader range of operations. Combat USVs are currently undergoing sea trials and AI integration.”⁷²

Potential employment of uncrewed systems

Since most of these systems are small enough to fit in a standard TEU, they are an obvious choice for supporting sea denial operations from overseas ports. Of particular concern is the potential for these drones to hunt autonomously. The map below illustrates the vast areas these drones could cover when launched from Chinese-owned ports. Of course, range rings do not prevent opposing forces from maneuvering within them, but the imminent threat of damage may lead commercial shipping to avoid the area. Illustrative of this point, major shipping firms have largely abandoned the use of the Suez Canal due to the threat of drones and missiles from the Houthis in Yemen.

Multiple rocket launchers

China fields battalions of PCH191 multiple rocket launchers equipped with satellite or inertial navigation systems, capable of firing the TL-7B missile. This missile can conduct sea-skimming flights to deliver a 700-pound warhead at a range of 120 miles.⁷³ While most multiple rocket launchers are too large to fit in a shipping container, the rocket pods themselves fit easily in standard forty-foot-equivalent-unit containers. Over time, China could discreetly transport and stockpile rocket ammunition in Chinese-owned containers within the port. The launchers could then be loaded onto various Chinese-owned RO/RO ships and offloaded just before a campaign begins. The primary disadvantage is that their function would be difficult to conceal if the launchers were observed during loading or unloading.

Cruise missiles

Cruise missiles are proven ship-killers, and several of these systems have capabilities that would enable Chinese-held ports to provide mutual support. China currently fields six major anti-ship cruise missile systems (ASCMs): YJ-12, YJ-18, YJ-21, YJ-62, YJ-83, and CJ-100. These systems carry ship-killing warheads with ranges ranging from 130 to 1,000 miles. All can be embarked on modified RO/RO vessels, while the YJ-18 and YJ-83 can be containerized.

Maximum range of Chinese missiles

Anti-ship ballistic missiles

The DF-21D is a road-mobile ballistic missile system with a range of 1,500 kilometers. From mainland China, it can reach most of the South China Sea and significant parts of the Bay of Bengal. The longer-range DF-26 (4,000 kilometers) can cover the entire South China Sea, much of the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the eastern one-third of the Mediterranean Sea.⁷⁴ The DF-27 has a range between 5,000 and 8,000 kilometers, it is also road-mobile, carries a hypersonic glide vehicle, and, like the DF-26, comes in land-attack and anti-ship variants.⁷⁵ It can target the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and most of the Mediterranean Sea. In short, the PLA can leverage its China-based ballistic missiles to reinforce sea denial operations across most of Asia, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean Sea.

Ground-based anti-air systems

This past year, the challenge of locating and destroying mobile missile systems from the air has been widely demonstrated in both Ukraine and Yemen. This suggests that an effective counter-intervention system composed of mobile missile systems can operate without air defense.⁷⁶ However, the inclusion of mobile air defense systems would significantly complicate US or allied efforts to regain control of the ports. Unfortunately, China has developed a family of air defense systems that can be easily transported via RO/RO ships or shipped in containers.

In 2022, PLA air defense units focused on enhancing their tactical air defense against low- and slow-moving threats like UAS and loitering munitions to meet evolving air defense requirements.⁷⁷ Although these systems are primarily designed to counter UAVs, Ukrainian forces have achieved remarkable success using them to destroy Russian helicopters and jets. Larger Ukrainian air defense systems have forced Russian aviation to operate at lower altitudes, bringing with them the engagement range of these lighter systems.

While the anti-UAS systems will be easiest to place in overseas ports, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force also operates a large force of medium and advanced long-range SAM systems. These include Russian-sourced SA-20 (S-300) and SA-21 (S-400) batteries.⁷⁸ It also fields the domestically produced HQ-9 and HQ-22. The HQ-9 has a range of 120 miles and a maximum altitude of 30,000 meters. Designed to target aircraft, it is typically deployed as a battalion, though even a single battery includes eight transporter erector launchers.⁷⁹ The HQ-22 has a range of 110 miles and a maximum altitude of 27,000 meters. Often compared to the US Patriot system, it can engage cruise missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, aircraft, and drones.⁸⁰

These larger systems would require a RO/RO or ferry for deployment. Once operational, they would create an obvious signature but would significantly expand the air defense envelope for hastily established anti-access sites in Chinese-controlled ports. In short, China could rapidly establish an integrated air defense system by unloading large vehicles from Chinese-owned RO/ROs or ferries and integrating them with smaller vehicles and missile stores that had been pre-positioned in the designated port.

Surface warships

China, which already operates the world’s largest navy, plans to continue expanding both the size and capabilities of its surface fleet. By 2035, China will likely be more confident in deploying naval task forces much farther afield. Given its rapid progress in carrier aviation, China will likely possess the capability to launch limited carrier-based aviation in support of surface forces.

The United States must also consider the impact of China placing containerized FH-97A high-performance UAVs—or their successors—on a wide variety of warships and even merchant ships. These UAVs could provide limited air support that outranges projected US naval aircraft. Of particular concern is the potential to arm massive numbers of ships. China currently possesses 3,600 long-range fishing ships and 5,500 large merchant vessels.⁸¹ With the addition of containerized weapons, C2 suites, and ISR systems, these ships have the potential to sink most merchant vessels and engage many warships. Furthermore, surface ships could both be reinforced and reinforced by any counter-intervention umbrellas provided by Chinese overseas ports and bases.

Transportation

Chinese firms control either entire ports or individual piers in dozens of locations globally.⁸² These ports handle tens of thousands of containers daily. Even if the host nation attempted to monitor the contents, it would be virtually impossible—especially since many ports rely on Chinese information systems to track cargo. Thus, China could covertly deliver and store large numbers of containerized C2 systems, weapons, munitions, and supplies without the knowledge of the United States, its allies, or the host nation.

In 2022, China employed thirty RO/ROs in large-scale sealift exercises and further increased production rates, ordering an additional seventy-six for Chinese companies.⁸³ These ships are primarily used to export Chinese cars globally, making their presence a routine part of international shipping.

While a large RO/RO ferry or vehicle carrier could transport more vehicles or troops, a single armored unit—consisting of approximately one hundred and fifty vehicles and one thousand personnel—is a reasonable estimate of what these civilian ships would likely carry in practice.⁸⁴ If a host nation is friendly to China, the PLA could also use its growing inventory of amphibious shipping, long-range military aircraft, and commercial planes to rapidly position its forces.

Potential force for the overseas mission

The PLA possesses all the necessary equipment to exploit its overseas bases and ports. But which Chinese unit could execute such a mission? In October 2021, the China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College reported:

• Since 2017, the PLAN Marine Corps increased from two to eight brigades – six Marine Brigades, one Maritime Aviation Brigade, and one Special Operations Brigade. The Special Operations Brigade are fashioning themselves after US Navy SEALs.⁸⁵

In a January 2024 article, Task & Purpose paraphrased Timothy Heath, a senior international defense researcher at the RAND Corporation, as saying:

• Chinese leaders have said they plan to [further] expand the size of the People’s Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps because they anticipate facing a higher demand for ground forces that can carry out a wide range of missions abroad.⁸⁶

Since the People’s Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps already maintains a battalion-sized force in Djibouti, it is well-positioned to adapt to the fundamentally new mission of establishing covert forces at overseas stations.

Missions of US forces

The potential for China to employ its overseas ports and facilities in a significant conflict presents a serious challenge for US forces. Yet, the challenge lies well within the US Navy’s traditional missions. The 2020 Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare features this quote from Admiral Raymond A. Spruance as a clear statement that the most critical wartime mission for the navy/Marine Corps team is sea control:

• I can see plenty of changes in weapons, methods, and procedures in naval warfare brought about by technical developments, but I can see no change in the future role of our Navy from what it has been for ages past for the Navy of a dominant sea power to gain and exercise the control of the sea… ⁸⁷

In a long war with China, a foundational mission of US naval forces will be to reestablish and maintain sea control to sustain allied wartime production while severely restricting China’s access to the raw materials essential to its wartime economy.

The emergence of persistent surveillance technologies, along with long-range, mobile, land-based anti-ship missiles, rockets, and drones means that land-based systems can, at times, deny China access to key maritime choke points.

Unfortunately, the PLA arrived at this conclusion much earlier than the United States and has systematically developed a land-based A2/AD capability with deep magazines and redundant coverage extending to increasing ranges from the shore. The Chinese have worked hard to ensure these systems are mobile and, therefore, much more difficult to defeat. While China’s focus to date has been on protecting the Chinese mainland and its near seas, the growing global trend of containerizing effective anti-air, anti-ship, and long-range strike weapons creates new options for the global deployment and employment of these systems.

Pre-conflict, the Joint Force cannot prevent China from leveraging its overseas ports and control of shipping data to disrupt the movement of allied material or to conceal its own material shipments.

Upon the commencement of hostilities, the Joint Force will require an operational approach suited to a war of exhaustion. National command authority will need to establish priorities among competing global demands. While it is impossible to predict how senior officials will prioritize, the Joint Force must be prepared to execute the following tasks in support of sea control:

1. Locate and neutralize Chinese efforts to interrupt global trade.
2. Establish effective blockades to severely degrade Chinese international trade.

Fortunately, these two missions will draw on different elements of the Joint Force. Unfortunately, the current US Navy thirty-year shipbuilding plan suggests the fleet will be too small to execute a worldwide campaign against Chinese forces and facilities. The US Navy’s combat forces will be insufficient to confront the world’s largest navy and maintain global sea control. To succeed, they will require support from elements of the Joint Force that are not fully engaged. Most analysts predict that the opening campaigns of a US-China conflict will be primarily air and sea battles. If this holds true, the US Army and US Marine Corps will likely not be fully committed.

Potential roles for land-based forces in establishing global sea control

Locate and neutralize Chinese efforts to disrupt military logistics and global trade.

Given the enormous distances involved and the reliance of the United States and its allies on maritime logistics, the first mission must neutralize Chinese efforts to disrupt military logistics. As part of this effort, major fleet and air combat elements must focus on preventing the PLAN from breaking out of the First Island Chain. If granted permission to operate ashore, the Marine Littoral Regiments and Army Multi-Domain Task Forces can provide direct support to this mission. If not, these units have the potential to operate from amphibious or merchant ships. Both services have demonstrated the ability to launch anti-ship cruise missiles from containers, and both could provide helicopter-borne boarding teams to seize ships at sea.

While containing the PLAN is the priority mission, neutralizing Chinese efforts to disrupt trade will also require removing Chinese forces from ports and bases overseas. If equipped as described above, these ports and bases would be capable of interdicting shipping at key maritime choke points. Eliminating this threat will require significant, capable combat forces. However, until these Chinese forces can be reduced, the United States and its allies could establish alternative routes that bypass the South and East China Seas, allowing shipping to reach key allied states such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. These alternative routes would enable US and allied forces to focus first on clearing the key choke points in the Middle East.

A primary challenge to US and allied forces will be determining the strength and disposition of PLA forces in targeted locations. Each plan of action will require a unique approach based on the PLA forces in place, their activities, the host nation’s stance toward both Chinese and US actions, and the availability of joint or combined forces. The same tactics currently planned for degrading China’s mainland A2/AD network will apply to mini A2/AD locations but will require modification based on these conditions.

Given the extended range of Chinese aerial drones, basing aircraft such as the F-35 within range of the weapons systems deployed to Chinese ports would pose a major risk of destruction on the ground or aboard a ship. This risk is particularly high if the base or port has stockpiles of Sunflower drones. The additional presence of FH-97A drones would dramatically extend the range of the threat and pose a significant danger to any aerial tankers used to extend the range of US aircraft.

While US long-range bombers are an obvious first choice to destroy identified targets in these ports, there is a high probability these assets will be tasked with other missions. In any case, the missile batteries assigned to US ground units could provide the initial firepower needed to degrade the port or base’s defenses. As US and allied ground forces continue to field batteries capable of firing Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles, SM-6s, and Precision Strike Missiles, they will be able to match the range of potential Chinese A2/AD systems forward-deployed to ports and bases. Both services need to train to operate these batteries from both naval and commercial ships.

A second, significantly cheaper option would be for naval forces to develop long-range, containerized loitering munitions similar to the Sunflower and deploy them from the proposed Marine Landing Ships Medium (LSM) or small merchant ships. The predicted collapse of global trade at the onset of a US-China war suggests that many merchant ships will be available.⁸⁸ The United States should be able to rapidly produce a drone with Sunflower-level capabilities. These systems’ smaller payloads would minimize collateral damage in key international ports. If the Marine Corps continues developing the XQ-58A Valkyrie, the Fleet Marine Force could employ its derivatives from distances exceeding the range of Chinese weapons likely to be at contested ports.

Another option to overcome the tyranny of distance is pre-positioned warehouses that could supply fly-in forces ashore to counter the Chinese pop-up bases. However, this would require permission from both the host nation and major investments in pre-positioning facilities and equipment. Chinese intelligence will likely know where the pre-positioned equipment is located, enabling Chinese missile and drone forces to attack the warehouses or the unloading Maritime Prepositioning Ships as part of the opening volleys of the war.

If host nations will not permit pre-positioning of US forces in the region, or the United States chooses not to, missile batteries could be deployed on the proposed LSMs or merchant ships as afloat pre-positioned batteries. Marines and soldiers could be flown in to meet these ships and then operate from them. This would eliminate the requirement for host nation permission and reduce the vulnerability inherent in unloading.

The Marine Corps should also adopt the US Air Force’s Rapid Dragon concept to use C-130s and MV-22s to provide a longer-range strike capability than available from the F-35.⁸⁹ The Rapid Dragon program loads cruise missiles onto pallets. These pallets are then air-dropped from the aft bay of a cargo aircraft. The missiles fall free, ignite, and proceed to their targets as normal. These platforms could deliver cruise missiles for a fraction of the cost of F-35s. The use of Rapid Dragon technology would also free up F-35s for other essential operations against the PLA. To further reduce costs, the United States should pursue the air force’s Grey Wolf/Golden Horde low-cost cruise missile program, which is a fraction of the cost of more advanced cruise missiles operated by the Joint Force.⁹⁰

As Chinese long-range systems are eliminated, US and allied forces could close the range to conduct a suppression of enemy air defenses campaign against remaining Chinese air defenses. However, as the Ukrainians have demonstrated, mobile anti-air systems are exceptionally difficult to destroy. Allied forces will need to develop tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment that will allow them to successfully engage mobile air defense systems. Once the long-range and anti-air capabilities have been stripped away, US or allied ground forces, in cooperation with host nation forces (if available), can clear the ports and bases of Chinese weapons.

The final, and perhaps most time-consuming, action will be mine clearance operations. Even with allied assistance, clearing mines—particularly modern smart mines—will be a major challenge. Further, China may elect to re-seed minefields using merchant and fishing vessels flying false flags. The US Navy currently severely underinvests in mine clearance capabilities, and this underinvestment seems unlikely to change by 2035.

Establish effective blockades to severely degrade Chinese international trade.

To reduce the strain on US naval and air power, the second mission—establishing an effective blockade—can be built around air-capable amphibious ships, container ships converted to operate light helicopters, operational light helicopter squadrons, Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) with ASCMs (or containerized ASCMs aboard the amphibious ships), ISR assets, and Marine or army infantry units. In short, new units or equipment would not be required, but existing forces would need to be trained in planning and executing blockade operations.

The limited number of exits from the South and East China Seas significantly reduces blockade requirements. Additionally, crippling China’s economy does not require stopping all shipping—only large container ships, tankers, and bulk carriers, which are easier to track. With accurate intelligence on the movement of large Chinese commercial ships, US and allied blockade forces would be able to operate near the restricted passages south of the Bashi Channel.

Small task forces composed of helicopter-capable ships, infantry boarding parties trained to fast-rope, light helicopters, LCSs, or container ships armed with ASCMs and drones could be stationed to cover each of the major exits from the South China Sea. The United States must establish procedures and units for taking command of seized ships, moving them to a quarantine area, and passing control to a prize court to adjudicate their disposition.

If granted host nation permission, the Joint Force can establish support facilities near major choke points. These facilities would provide basing for persistent ISR of the choke points. They can also be used to resupply and maintain blockade ships and aircraft. If host nations along the First Island Chain refuse, maintaining the blockade will be more difficult but could still be supported from Guam and, if permitted, northern Australian ports. This approach would require the commitment of most of the US Navy’s large amphibious ships, which could be augmented by allied amphibious ships. While sufficient amphibious ships may be unavailable, container ships can be quickly modified to house light helicopters and boarding parties. The navy and Marine Corps developed this capability in the 1990s, designating the ships as T-AVBs. ⁹¹

Should maintaining a blockade at the First Island Chain become untenable, the blockade can shift back to the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok Straits, as well as the passages north and south of Australia. These straits are very narrow: the Malacca Strait is only 1.8 nautical miles wide at its narrowest point, the Sunda Strait is 2.4 nautical miles wide, and the Lombok Strait is 5.4 nautical miles wide.⁹²

A final blockade line could be established at the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, and Cape of Good Hope. Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb are particularly narrow. Even from the Cape of Good Hope, the blockade force could interrupt trade between China and Europe or the Middle East. While the passages around Australia and the Cape of Good Hope extend for hundreds of miles, long-endurance drones and satellites can track large vessels and provide intercept paths for blockade forces.

The blockading force will challenge designated ships and direct them to prepare to receive a boarding party. Most commercial ships will comply to avoid the damage associated with being stopped by force. Many crews will likely agree to stay on board, particularly if they are paid at union rates and guaranteed a flight home upon arrival in port. If necessary, the blockading force could employ light attack helicopters to engage ships that refuse orders. When a target ship complies, Marines or soldiers could fast-rope onto the vessel as necessary to seize control and then direct it to a designated anchorage. Upon arrival, the ship could be turned over to contractors for anchor watch until it can be adjudicated by a prize court.

Of course, if the PLA makes a significant effort to penetrate the blockade, major US Pacific Fleet combat elements will be required to intercept and engage the PLA force. Such a mission would align with the primary objective of containing the PLAN inside the First Island Chain.

New capabilities required for this mission

Neutralizing Chinese overseas A2/AD bastions and supporting blockade operations are appropriate roles for ground forces as part of a joint campaign. In addition to already programmed units and equipment, the forces will require:

• Persistent satellite ISR coverage of maritime choke points and Chinese overseas bases/ports. This will require access to national and commercial space assets.
• Long-range, but more affordable, ISR drones like the Flexrotor commercial drone.
• Ground-based, persistent, all-weather ISR that can be inserted from range and operate undetected near a Chinese facility.
• Large numbers of autonomous, GPS-independent drones as substitutes for current aviation capabilities.
• A Rapid Dragon-like capability to enable long-range strikes.
• A Starlink-like communications network to provide high-speed communications for widely dispersed units.
• Access to naval and commercial shipping to deploy and operate in target areas.
• Missile/rocket batteries trained to operate from commercial or amphibious ships.
• Task forces consisting of infantry and light helicopters trained to seize commercial ships while operating from non-doctrinal platforms.
• Task forces trained to fight in complex urban and port environments to execute the final stage of clearing Chinese overseas bases and ports.
• Offensive mine warfare capabilities to close certain passages and compensate for shortages in other capabilities.
• Major investments in mine-clearing capabilities.

Conclusion

This paper aimed to examine low-probability but potentially high-impact ways China could exploit its growing global network of ports. Defeating these Chinese operations would strain the capacity of US joint forces but would not require expensive new capabilities. As noted, by focusing on relatively inexpensive drones, commercial shipping, and containerized weapons, US forces can position themselves to neutralize Chinese actions at overseas ports. While drones represent a minor part of the United States’ current force structure, the Russo-Ukrainian War has dramatically illustrated their increasing value to the Joint Force. Even at its usual slow pace, the Department of Defense should be able to rapidly field large numbers of autonomous drones and loitering munitions.

Finally, preparing to counter these Chinese actions will require planning with allies, training for blockade and port seizure operations, and integrating the new capabilities into operational forces. These are not expensive options, but they are necessary if the Joint Force is to be ready at the onset of war.

Fellow

Thomas X. Hammes

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Conflict Defense Industry

T. X. Hammes is a distinguished research fellow at the Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the views of the Department of Defense or the National Defense University.

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Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post China’s exploitation of overseas ports and bases appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 18, Thomas Warrick, a nonresident senior fellow with the Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative, was quoted in the Associated Press on personnel cuts to the Department of Homeland Security’s Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships. He argues that the center is central in averting terrorist attacks by identifying individuals before they perpetrate acts of violence.  

Fellow

Thomas S. Warrick

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative

Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative GeoStrategy Initiative

National Security Terrorism

The post Warrick quoted in the Associated Press on cuts to the Department of Homeland Security   appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 9, Matthew Kroening, vice president and senior director of the Scowcroft Center, was quoted in the Washington Post on the “fusion” of foreign policy priorities between former US President Ronald Reagan and current US President Donald Trump. He argues, in line with his newest book We Win, They Lose: Republican Foreign Policy & the New Cold War, that American exceptionalism is a uniting factor in both president’s foreign policy.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig quoted in the Washington Post on the similarities between Reagan and Trump’s foreign policy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Two weeks earlier, on February 20, the Trump administration officially designated eight Latin American cartels, including six from Mexico, as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) for their major roles in drug smuggling and human trafficking into the United States. The move marks a major escalation in the administration’s efforts to cripple the cartels, as an FTO designation grants the administration access to enhanced counterterrorism authorities, such as the ability to launch covert operations authorized by the president. The FTO designation came only days after the Mexican Senate approved the presence of the US Army’s 7th Special Forces Group to conduct joint training with Mexico’s elite Naval Marine Corps.

The Trump administration’s FTO designation and US Special Forces presence in Mexico comes as the administration is taking other notable steps. The United States has imposed new tariffs on Canada and Mexico to pressure them into greater cooperation against cartels and trafficking. On orders from the president, US Northern Command launched new deployments at the US southern border. And Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) surveillance drone flights, approved by Mexico, have reportedly gathered intelligence on cartel operations within the country. The rapid speed and scale of these apparent foreign counteroffensive preparations, arguably not seen since the early stages of the War on Terror, may indicate that the United States is on the verge of direct military action, either unilaterally or with the Mexican military, against cartels on Mexican soil.

While it remains unclear what the US administration will decide next, a scenario outlining what such an engagement might entail can be constructed by examining recent developments in the US-Mexico relationship and US counterterrorism efforts.

The following outlines a potential four-part sequence of events that could unfold if the United States conducts a direct military action against the cartels.

Step 1: Build relationships and training

US-Mexico cooperation is the best method of addressing the cartel problem. Therefore, at the start of this scenario, the new administration will likely work to establish operational partnerships with its Mexican counterparts. However, fostering reliable relationships may be challenging due to the country’s alleged entanglement with cartels. 

Two recent criminal cases brought by the US Department of Justice against two of Mexico’s highest-ranking former law enforcement and military officials highlight the problem. In 2020, former Defense Minister Gen. Salvador Cienfuegos Zepeda was accused of using his position to aid the H-2 Cartel in drug smuggling. In 2024, former Mexican Secretary of Public Security Genaro García Luna was sentenced to thirty-eight years in prison for taking bribes from the Sinaloa Cartel in exchange for assisting the cartel. Moreover, a US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) report found evidence that cartels had funneled millions into the 2006 presidential campaign of Andrés Manuel López Obrador, known as AMLO. 

In a move that perhaps anticipates the difficulty of engaging a government compromised by cartel influence, Trump appointed Ron Johnson as US ambassador to Mexico. Johnson is a former US ambassador to El Salvador, retired Green Beret, and veteran CIA officer with more than twenty years of experience leading sensitive paramilitary operations. He is uniquely equipped to secure cooperation from civilian officials while mitigating counterintelligence risks from cartel-affiliated public officials.

The US-Mexico military relationship presents a different set of challenges. During his term as president of Mexico (2018-2024), ALMO increased the funding and authority of the Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA) in order to expand the main military branch’s role beyond military operations into civilian functions, such as law enforcement and infrastructure projects. However, this expansion occurred during a three-year absence (2019-2021) of a formal US-Mexico counternarcotics agreement, after AMLO pulled out of the Merida Initiative agreement in his first months in office. During this time, cartels extended their territorial control and fueled the rise of fentanyl-related overdose deaths in United States. The Mexican military’s expanding role in civil society and private business in recent years, coupled with allegations of corruption and cartel collusion, particularly around intelligence leaks, may complicate the US relationship with Mexico’s primary military branch. However, given its dominant role in Mexico’s national security, the US will continue to engage with SEDENA on conventional military cooperation, particularly in curbing migration and drug smuggling on the US-Mexico border. 

By contrast, the smaller Secretariat of the Navy (SEMAR), a separate federal executive cabinet member, has built a strong record in conducting successful specialized counter-narcotics operations and has maintained a long-standing partnership with US forces and the DEA. Given its specialized capabilities and established US relationships, SEMAR is well-positioned to be a key partner in any potential US-led joint operations with Mexico against cartel leadership. The fact that the first joint training under the Trump administration was conducted by Green Berets and SEMAR further suggests this likelihood. 

Step 2: Identifying first targets

What cartels might the United States target first? Among the candidates, the Sinaloa Cartel, one of two cartels reportedly responsible for the majority of drug trafficking into the United States, is likely high on the list. As the most powerful drug-trafficking organization in the Western Hemisphere, its influence extends beyond narcotics and human smuggling. The cartel has been involved in business extortion, illegal mining, and oil theft, as well as infiltrating formal businesses to launder money.

But what sets the Sinaloa Cartel apart is its deep ties to China in the fentanyl trade. The cartel has reportedly relied on Chinese suppliers for precursor chemicals, and it uses Chinese money-laundering networks to clean its illegal profits. The Sinaloa Cartel’s danger to US interests is so significant that it has been the primary target of congressional investigations and aggressive US law enforcement actions in recent years, with the most notable recent step against the group being the arrest of Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada, the co-founder and leader of the group, in 2024 by the Biden administration.

The Sinaloa Cartel’s willingness to partner with a major state adversary to flood the United States with deadly drugs underscores its growing brazenness in violating US sovereignty and undermining national security. Targeting the Sinaloa Cartel first would not only disrupt one of the largest fentanyl producers in the Western Hemisphere but also send a clear message to other cartels to refrain from engaging with China and other states hostile to the United States.

Step 3: Covert action and “shock and awe” strategy

Once training operations conclude and intelligence assets finalize target selection, the United States will need to consider its next steps. In the past, countercartel efforts have been managed primarily by US law enforcement agencies, such as the DEA and Federal Bureau of Investigation. These agencies conduct criminal investigations and collaborate with their Mexican counterparts to arrest cartel operatives for prosecution in Mexico or extradition to the United States for trial.

However, the new US administration’s decision to allocate significant resources from the Department of Defense and the CIA to dismantle the cartels suggests that more aggressive measures are also being considered, potentially including the launch of a military campaign. Such a step would require the administration to initiate a formal procedure for authorization.

The first option the Trump administration can pursue is a formal Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) approved by Congress. This would allow the administration to deploy military assets in an open and continuous manner under Title 10 of the US Code. However, given the political sensitivity of US troops operating on Mexican soil, the administration may instead opt for a second option: a CIA-directed covert action conducted in secrecy and under Title 50. In this scenario, Trump would issue a presidential finding that authorizes the CIA to conduct covert actions against the cartels. From there, CIA paramilitary officers or special forces units, typically under Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), would be used to carry out the secret operations. Trump has historically favored covert operations in counterterrorism efforts against al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), making this a more likely scenario. 

Regardless of which option the administration chooses, it is likely to launch robust kinetic operations during the initial phase of the conflict. The Trump administration’s designation of the eight cartels as FTOs strongly supports this expectation. This is because the first Trump administration may have set a precedent when it placed Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force on the FTO list just eight months prior to the assassination of its leader Qasem Soleimani. Importantly, the Department of Defense announcement of his killing references his leadership in the FTO-designated group in the opening sentence. 

Specifically, in the cartel context, the United States may employ a “shock and awe” strategy that is similar to the first Trump administration’s rapid-strike military campaigns against ISIS. The goal of this approach would be to overwhelm the cartels’ forces through raids and to eliminate high-value cartel targets, particularly sicarios and mid-level commanders coordinating logistics and enforcement operations. In such a scenario, the United States would likely provide heavy air support in order to prevent cartel counteroffensives and ensure that targeted cells cannot regroup or retaliate. This may include US forces embedding with the Mexican navy’s special forces. Drone warfare may also be used to eliminate high-value cartel command centers, fentanyl production labs, and weapons depots. 

Finally, it’s important to note that such direct actions against cartel factions will likely complement, not replace, ongoing bilateral operations between the United States and Mexico to extradite senior cartel leaders for prosecution. Instead, lethal actions can be expected to focus on cartel security forces and professional sicarios responsible for enforcing the cartel’s rule through violence in Mexico, including the assassination of elected officials, journalists, and innocent civilians.

Step 4: Concession and enforcement

Military force will be central in the early phases of the conflict, but the Trump administration has historically followed extreme pressure with engagement. Accordingly, after an initial shock-and-awe campaign, the administration is likely to push for the Mexican government to lead discussions with the cartels to compel them to end their drug smuggling, particularly synthetic drugs, and human trafficking operations in the United States, while also demanding that they sever business ties with state adversaries such as China.

Early signs of this strategy may already be emerging. In February, open-source intelligence indicated a ceasefire was brokered between the Grupo Escorpion and Metros cartels in the northern state of Tamaulipas that called for the end of fighting between the groups and an end to fentanyl trafficking into south Texas. This event, credited to pressure from the Mexican government, could serve as the recipe for future US efforts. This model of applying overwhelming force to compel cartels into submission, followed by behind-the-scenes discussions, will likely define the long-term course of the conflict. Continuous monitoring and enforcement will be essential to ensure compliance with the concessions.

After “shock and awe”

How would cartels respond to a “shock and awe” military campaign similar to that which destroyed the ISIS caliphate? While cartels control territory, command militia-style forces, and possess military-grade weaponry, they lack a standing army, which makes it more difficult for them to survive a sustained military campaign. Additionally, their tactics are limited to lightweight ambushes and terroristic actions, primarily targeting civilians and rival groups. 

Unlike ideological terrorist organizations, cartels operate as businesses. When their funding streams and resources are severely threatened, they are more likely to adapt, negotiate, and shift operations rather than engage in prolonged conventional warfare. Therefore, targeted military attacks on cartels could potentially lead to successful cartel concessions. Furthermore, while direct narco-terrorist attacks on US soil from Mexican cartels are unlikely, US military actions against them could create an opportunity for other state-sponsored groups to conduct counteroffensive attacks, such as targeting US law enforcement officials and terrorizing civilians. 

While it remains to be seen whether the United States will conduct direct military action, one thing is clear: the Trump administration’s efforts to combat drug smuggling and human trafficking into the United States is not likely to be a short-term political goal. Instead, these efforts represent a significant step in redefining US grand strategy away from maintaining the country’s post–World War II global primacy toward securing concrete national interests closer to home. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth articulated this shifting policy during a recent Pentagon town hall, stating, “Chaos happens when the perception of American strength is not complete. And so, we aim to reestablish that deterrence, and it starts with our own southern border. It starts with the defense of our homeland.”

James Fowler is a counterterrorism expert who specializes in leveraging technology to support democratic governance and institutional resilience. A retired Special Operations Command (SOCOM) operator, he brings extensive experience in counterterrorism operations and security strategy. Fowler is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project, where he contributes to policy discussions and strategic initiatives aimed at enhancing global security.

Alicia Nieves is a legal expert in immigration and refugee law, specializing in humanitarian assistance and conflict rescue. She is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project and co-founder of the Gaza Family Project, an initiative of the Arab-American Civil Rights League (ACRL) dedicated to helping American families impacted by the Israel-Hamas war.

The post How US military action against drug cartels in Mexico could unfold appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Congressional approval should resemble the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) enacted after the September 11 attacks, enabling the deployment of military assets against cartel infrastructure both within and beyond US borders. Congressman Dan Crenshaw, who co-sponsored the previous AUMF legislation targeting the cartels, has called for the formation of a “Select Committee to Defeat the Mexican Drug Cartels” that could eventually recommend such an AUMF. An AUMF against the Mexican drug cartels would unite various government agencies in a coordinated effort to combat what administration officials correctly regard as an existential threat to US security. An AUMF would also ensure that the United States could continue combating these terrorist groups when they inevitably fracture, change their names, or otherwise morph into groups that are different from those eight cartels originally designated.

These cartels have extended their networks into the United States, infiltrating major US cities and establishing themselves in furtherance of their criminal empires. The time has come for a whole-of-government response.

Mexican cooperation and challenges

Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum’s administration has demonstrated unprecedented willingness to collaborate with US counternarcotics efforts. In the past month, he Mexican government has taken significant steps, including announcing that it would deploy ten thousand troops to the US-Mexico border specifically tasked with combating fentanyl trafficking. The Mexican Senate has also approved measures allowing US Special Forces to resume training with Mexican Marines, while enhanced bilateral cooperation on counternarcotics operations continues to develop. However, the path forward is complicated by years of cartel influence through their “plata o plomo” (silver or lead) intimidation tactics, which have entrenched corruption within Mexican institutions. This presents significant challenges for intelligence sharing and operational coordination between Mexico City and Washington, requiring careful consideration on how sensitive information and joint operations are managed.

The China connection

Perhaps most alarming is the emerging evidence of Chinese involvement in the narcotics trade. Intelligence reports indicate that Chinese companies, often operating with apparent impunity, supply Mexican cartels with fentanyl and precursor chemicals, while providing critical financial infrastructure for money laundering operations.

The Chinese doctrinal concept of “unrestricted warfare” proposes multiple indirect approaches for undermining strategic competitors, particularly the United States. Within this broader construct, the US House Oversight Committee identified “drug warfare” as one means by which China deviously attacks the very fabric of US society. This strategic dimension transforms what might otherwise be viewed as a law enforcement issue into a matter of national security. According to a September 2024 report by the Heritage Foundation, China’s facilitation of the fentanyl trade into the United States causes approximately two hundred deaths per day and cost the US economy upward of $1.5 trillion in 2020 alone.

A new strategic approach

Drawing lessons from successful counterterrorism campaigns, the administration should pursue a multi-faceted strategy that would fundamentally reshape the approach to combating cartels. As with the first Trump administration’s successful campaign to dismantle the caliphate of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), the strategy should include both taking military action against criminal organizations’ infrastructure and strengthening diplomatic partnerships with regional allies. Equal emphasis must also be applied to targeting the financial networks that facilitate drug trafficking, as well as addressing the corruption and institutional weaknesses that enable cartel operations to flourish.

This threat must be understood within the broader context of strategic competition with China, as these cartels are effectively serving as proxy forces in a nefarious indirect attack on the United States.

Looking forward

Success will require sustained commitment from both the Mexican and US governments, along with unprecedented levels of international cooperation. Any proposed AUMF would provide a legal framework for military operations, but that force must be combined with other elements of national power to achieve lasting success.

Such an initiative is ultimately about creating alternatives for the Mexican people while eliminating the cartels’ ability to serve as proxies in China’s unrestricted warfare against the United States. This approach addresses both the United States’ and Mexico’s shared security interests and creates opportunities for mutual economic benefit.

As the administration moves forward with these proposals, influential members of Congress are already signaling support for expanded authorities to combat cartel influence. With bipartisan concern over fentanyl deaths and growing awareness of Chinese strategic involvement, the stage appears set for a significant shift in how the United States confronts this evolving threat to national security.

Doug Livermore is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Program, the director of engagements for the Irregular Warfare Initiative, the national vice president for the Special Operations Association of America, national director for external communications at the Special Forces Association, and the deputy commander for Special Operations Detachment–Joint Special Operations Command in the North Carolina Army National Guard. He also previously served in the Department of Defense as a senior government civilian, intelligence officer, and contractor.

The views expressed are the author’s and do not represent official US government, US Department of Defense, or US Department of the Army positions.

The post To tackle China-enabled drug cartels in Mexico, Trump will need military authorization appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On February 17, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Nicholas Eftimiades was quoted in a The Bureau article entitled, “Inside The Massive PRC Intelligence Machine Working On US Soil,” where he briefed security experts on his upcoming book. The article notes the importance of Eftimiades’ new book, drawing “insights from nearly 900 cases, including Linda Sun, who worked for two state governors.”

Fellow

Nicholas Eftimiades

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Eftimiades quoted in a The Bureau article entitled, “Inside The Massive PRC Intelligence Machine Working On US Soil” appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On February 17, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Nicholas Eftimiades was interviewed on NTD Evening News on the confirmation of Tulsi Gabbard as Director of National Intelligence. In the interview, Eftimiades spoke to Gabbard’s national security priorities and understanding of strategic threats to the United States today.

Fellow

Nicholas Eftimiades

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Eftimiades interviewed by NTD on Tulsi Gabbard as Director of National Intelligence appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Wechsler quoted in Haaretz on the dynamics between Trump and Netanyahu ahead of negotiations appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Citrinowicz quoted in 24 Digital on Israeli targeting of Syrian assets appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Samaan quoted in The Washington Post on the potential of Lebanon’s army securing the south appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Evolution of freedom

The only non-Atlantic member of the G7, Japan is a country that defies easy categorization. Even as it has experienced comparative macroeconomic stagnation over the past three decades, Japanese companies have remained innovative and the country as a whole remains prosperous. While the persistence of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leadership has led some to characterize Japan as an immature democracy, it also enjoys enviable political stability and its democratic institutions and culture have deep-rooted foundations. Even as Japan has been criticized for its overly rigid labor markets, it has earned admiration for low levels of inequality, high levels of safety, and the stoic persistence of the Japanese people in the face of recurrent natural disasters. Both the great strengths of Japan and the many challenges that it faces ahead are in sharp relief in this year’s Freedom Index, which makes a continued and important contribution to our understanding of the dynamics of freedom around the world. In this essay, I explore several of these trends, offering potential explanations and—at times—respectful disagreements, as well as suggesting opportunities for Japan to continue to strengthen the foundations of its freedom and prosperity in the years to come.  

As the Freedom Index recognizes, Japan is among the world’s leading democracies, with well-developed institutions and a mature economy that promote a high degree of freedom and prosperity for its citizens and residents. Notably, the country’s scores in the political and legal subindexes are both significantly above the OECD average and have experienced only minor fluctuations in the last three decades. That Japan is a stable and mature democracy is reflected not only in the Freedom Index but other well-known indices such as those released by the Economist Intelligence Unit and Freedom House. 

At the same time, as the Freedom Index recognizes, Japan has further opportunities to strengthen the foundations of its own democracy and prosperity. This is perhaps most evident in scores in the economic subindex of the Freedom Index, which lag behind Japan’s scores in the political and legal subindices. In 2023, Japan’s economic score fell six points below the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average and lagged behind peer countries such as Australia, Germany, and the United States by approximately ten points. This gap is explained largely by poor performance in two components: women’s economic freedom, and investment freedom.  

Regarding the former, the underlying data used to construct the component (the World Bank’s Women, Business and the Law index) point to two important aspects in which Japan’s legislation does not reach the same standards of gender equality as other developed countries, specifically equal pay, and workplace protection. Although “womenomics” was a major theme of former Prime Minister Abe’s premiership from 2012–20 and has remained a priority in subsequent administrations, it is true that there is still work to be done.  

In particular, Japan has struggled to right the so-called “M-curve” whereby women in their thirties have much lower labor force participation rates than younger and older age groups, often reflecting temporary withdrawal from the workforce in the early stages of child-rearing. Although this phenomenon is evident in many developed countries, structural rigidities and other distinctive features of Japan’s labor market and work culture have had the effect of limiting women’s ability to return to career-track roles after childbirth. Although the most recent national data suggest significant improvements in this area, the persistent gap between female and male labor force participation in managerial roles attests to the continued importance of this challenge. 

The evolution of investment freedom in Japan is also distinct from many other developed nations. In general, Japan has averaged a ten- to twenty-point gap between the OECD average since 1995, though this gap has narrowed somewhat since 2004, reflecting in part liberalization efforts introduced by the Koizumi and Abe administrations as well as sustained improvements in Japanese corporate governance standards. These have had an important effect over time in attracting additional foreign investment, which has helped to improve Japan’s score. Anecdotally, foreign involvement in state-supported strategic national projects, such as a joint Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC)-Sony-Denso semiconductor fabrication facility in Kumamoto, also attest to more welcoming attitudes and approaches to both foreign direct and portfolio investment. In light of contemporary trends in economic analysis, such as work by the International Monetary Fund and other international institutions to highlight the pernicious economic effects of inequality, it is also reasonable to question whether Japanese labor protections that count against its economic freedom score are truly a mark against economic freedom. An alternative reading might suggest they are instead an example of the kind of stakeholder capitalism that institutions such as The Business Roundtable have called for the United States and others to embrace.  

As for Japan’s score on the political subindex, high marks reflect the extraordinary stability of Japan’s democratic institutions, not only since 1995 but over the last sixty years. To be sure, some commentators have argued that the persistent dominance of the LDP throughout most of the postwar period suggests Japan is an immature democracy. However, the success of the Democratic Party of Japan (2009–12) in capturing a sweeping majority—and then the clear electoral rebuke that followed persistent policy missteps and returned the LDP to power—demonstrate the ability of the Japanese electorate and Japan’s democratic institutions to both generate change and support a peaceful transition of  power. Further, a major reason for the LDP’s persistent electoral success has been its willingness to adapt and accommodate a wide range of political views from moderate conservatism to right-wing nationalism. Political leadership is strongly supported by the bureaucratic system, which has been the driving force of the policymaking process.  

Even the visible (if relatively small in magnitude) drop in the Freedom Index’s civil liberties component in 2019 can readily be explained by restrictions imposed to try to tackle the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, as evidenced by the subsequent rebound in 2022. A similar fall is observable in the Index’s rating for legislative constraints on the executive. In this case, the drop has been persistent but the cause—and implications—of this drop are worth evaluating critically. One potential explanation is the fact that the national legislature did not decisively condemn multiple scandals related to political appointees in the executive branches and several members of the Cabinet during the late Abe administration (2012–20) and across the Suga and Kishida administrations (2020–24). At the same time, in foreign policy circles, the emergence of a more empowered and decisive Japanese premiership has been widely lauded as vital in allowing Japan to cope with an increasingly complex and severe foreign policy environment. Given that effective foreign policy is a critical guarantor of Japan’s economic freedom—and a critical buttress for the rules-based international economic order that Japan seeks to uphold—these scores deserve cautious interpretation. 

By contrast, the reduction in political rights observed in the Index—though relatively small—is nonetheless a cause for sober reflection. This drop in particular coincides with the former Prime Minister Abe’s second term. Abe’s strong leadership had many positive effects but its treatment of the press at times did not live up to the ideals of Japanese democracy. For example, certain journalists were practically expelled from press conferences when the administration felt their questions were unfair, which can be seen as an indirect restriction of freedom of information. This minor episode reflects a pressure that was looming over journalism in Japan, where the law regulating broadcasting gives an extraordinary importance to the neutrality of public and private media outlets (see Article fourof the Broadcasting Act of Japan). 

Finally, the most notable trend in the legal subindex, which seeks to capture bureaucratic quality and control of corruption, showed a more than fourteen-point improvement from 2002 to 2014, perhaps reflecting the legacy of major government restructuring efforts launched by the Hashimoto administration (1996–98) and carried forward under the subsequent Koizumi administration (2001–05). These gains have since been somewhat sustained, reflecting perhaps the intermittent revelation of corruption scandals, such as a notable case concerning Japan Highway Public Corporation in the 2000s and the recent incident affecting several ministers of the LDP accused of misuse of political donations.

Evolution of prosperity

Just as it is free, Japan is also among the most prosperous countries of the world, a reality well reflected by its high scores across the Prosperity Index. However, rather than dwell on Japan’s considerable strengths, I will focus here primarily on several caveats that highlight challenges ahead for the Japanese economy.  

First, although Japan is prosperous, growth in both gross domestic product (GDP) and income over the past two decades has been extremely limited. This in part reflects a basic reality that maintaining high levels of growth at the economic frontier is always difficult, particularly following the global financial crisis and in the shadow of rising public debt burdens around the world. Nonetheless, it is also true that Japan has underperformed even relative to most of its G7 and developed country peers, leading to a widening gap in income levels between Japan and the United States, France, and Germany (Figure 1). 

Figure 1: Change in Income for Selected Countries (1995-2023)

Source : World Bank GDP per capita, PPP

Second, Japan has experienced a slow rise in economic inequality since the start of the millennium. This is especially notable given the emphasis that Japanese culture and policy place on equality and homogeneity. Although in comparison to both large developed countries such as the United States and large developing countries such as the People’s Republic of China, Japan remains an almost shockingly egalitarian country, it is nonetheless true that policy efforts to increase the level of competition and productivity across the Japanese economy are correlated with increases in inequality. Whether it is these domestic policy changes that have caused inequality to rise, or whether it is structural shifts in the international economy that have led, for example, to many Japanese firms increasing the share of flexible contract employees over protected permanent employees, is unclear. However, the reality that a growing share of Japanese households are facing economic instability and seeing their incomes eroded by rising food and energy prices is unambiguous and a pressing policy challenge.  

Finally, it is worth commenting on Japan’s performance in terms of education. Once more, when compared to the global or regional average, Japan’s score stands as relatively high. Japan’s education system has long been regarded as one of the best in the world, with high literacy rates and a strong emphasis on the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. For example, Japan exceeded the OECD average for number of fifteen-year-old students amongst the top performers in the OECD Program for International Student Assessment (PISA). Nonetheless, the picture is not so optimistic when noting that Japan’s gap with respect to countries such as Germany or the United States is very sizeable (twelve and six points respectively). This gap could be explained partly by the lack of recognition of the importance of higher education. With the aging population, the need for lifelong learning and reskilling workers have become challenging priorities for Japan. 

The path forward

Looking forward to what the evolution of freedom and prosperity for Japan may look like in the near future, I would like to touch upon four major challenges that Japan may face.  

First is its demographic challenges. Japan is one of the most rapidly aging societies in the world with a shrinking working-age population. According to the World Bank, Japan’s population growth rate has been negative since 2011, and the decreasing workforce also means that there are fewer contributors to social security systems, exacerbating already strained public finances. The government is making various efforts to tackle this issue, including policies to increase the birth rate and address rural depopulation. However, their effects are limited in scale and scope. Immigration policy also remains relatively restricted and, while the necessity of reform is obvious in any macroeconomic analysis, the political economy of large-scale immigration is one where Japan closely resembles its developed country peers: there are no simple answers on offer. These policy areas could be considered both as difficult challenges and potential opportunities for growth.  

Second, Japan has substantial opportunity to more assertively promote diversity, equity, and inclusion. For example, couples married under current law are not allowed to elect to maintain separate surnames, despite a clear public majority in favor of such a reform. Same-sex marriage also enjoys strong public support and is even being considered in some local municipalities but progress at the national level has been slow across both the legislative and judicial branches. As discussed above, Japan also has further room to expand economic opportunities for women. When combined with other strategic labor market reforms, this could lead to significant productivity gains.  

Third, the shifting labor and investment market may affect Japan’s scores in the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes. As noted, Japan’s labor market used to lack flexibility and maintains significant structural rigidities when compared with most developed Western economies. Even today, most Japanese who join a company or government agency as regular employees out of college will think of their career with that institution in terms of decades rather than years. This stability of employment and accompanying seniority-based wage hikes have certain virtues in cultivating skilled, dedicated core employee bases. At the same time, locking away talent within companies and limiting incentives for top performers to excel may have reduced incentives and opportunities for innovation and entrepreneurship. Further, strong protections for some sections of the workforce may have come at the expense of others; as illustrated by the aforementioned rise in the frequency of dual-track employment structures. In this sense, as Japanese companies look to build job-type employment structures, they have an opportunity to square this circle, maintaining the low levels of inequality for which Japan is rightly praised while also providing more opportunities for flexible and dynamic career paths that will promote economy-wide productivity gains (and, hopefully, better work-life balance). 

Last but not least, the increasingly severe security and geopolitical circumstances surrounding Japan are likely to shape the country’s domestic political economy. A belligerent North Korea and the rising threat of a Taiwan Strait contingency remain as important regional security threats, while the situations in Ukraine and the Middle East are also of concern for Japan. In concert with the United States and like-minded partners, Japan is preparing itself for such contingencies while also seeking to proactively reduce the risk that they will occur. As part of this general trend, there is increasing discussion about a potential amendment to the Constitution of Japan, including a part of Article Nine. In some respects, such reforms might be seen as weakening Japan’s freedom—and may well register as such in the Freedom Index—but their actual impact is a matter of interpretation. Likewise, as US-People’s Republic of China tensions have contributed to Japan’s implementation of a world-leading economic security program, measures undertaken to promote Japan’s economic autonomy may alternatively be interpreted by some stakeholders as undermining economic freedom.  

As Japan prepares in 2025 to mark the eightieth anniversary of the end of World War II, it faces an uncertain political and economic future and a complex and challenging international security environment. However, the roots of freedom, prosperity, and democracy run deep in Japan, and Tokyo’s continued commitment to promoting a free and open rules-based international order is clear. Further, Japan’s ability to build a model of capitalism that delivers both freedom and broad-based prosperity is worth learning from, just as Japan must continue learning from its developed country peers as well as the Global South. 

Kotaro Shiojiri is a Japan Foundation visiting scholar at the Wilson Center, fellow at the Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, and visiting associate professor at the Graduate Schools for Law and Politics at the University of Tokyo. Shiojiri earned his BA in law, MA in international studies, and PhD in public policy from the University of Tokyo, and his LLM from Harvard Law School. 

The Atlantic Council and its staff, fellows, and directors generate their own ideas and programming, consistent with the Council’s mission, their related body of work, and the independent records of the participating team members. The Council as an organization does not adopt or advocate positions on particular matters. The Council’s publications always represent the views of the author(s) rather than those of the institution.

2024 Atlas: Freedom and Prosperity Around the World

Twenty leading economists and government officials from eighteen countries contributed to this comprehensive volume, which serves as a roadmap for navigating the complexities of contemporary governance. 

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The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

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Russia is “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security.” So states the NATO Strategic Concept promulgated at the Alliance’s Madrid Summit in June 2022, just four months after Russia’s massive escalation of its invasion of Ukraine.¹ The concept and NATO declarations not only underscore the illegality and brutality of that ongoing attack but also highlight Moscow’s use of nuclear and conventional military aggression, annexation, subversion, sabotage, and other forms of coercion and violence against NATO allies and partners.

Ever since its invasion of Georgia in 2008, Russia’s aggression against the Alliance has steadily intensified. This led NATO leaders at their 2024 Washington Summit to task the development of “recommendations on NATO’s strategic approach to Russia, taking into account the changing security environment.”² The Alliance’s “Russia strategy” is due for consideration at NATO’s next summit at The Hague in June 2025.³ This issue brief reviews Moscow’s actions affecting the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and presents the enduring realities, objectives, and actions that should constitute the core of an effective NATO strategy to counter the threat posed by Russia.

Intensified and globalized Russian aggression

Russia’s objectives go far beyond the subordination of Ukraine. Moscow seeks to reassert hegemony and control over the space of the former Soviet Union, diminish the power of the democratic community of nations, and delegitimize the international rules-based order. Moscow aims to subjugate its neighbors and to weaken—if not shatter—NATO, the key impediment to its European ambitions.

Toward these ends and under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin, Russia:

• Has illegally occupied Moldova’s Transnistria region since the early 1990s.
• Invaded Georgia in 2008, has continued to occupy portions of that country, and recently increased its influence, if not control, over the nation’s governance.
• Invaded Ukraine in 2014 and significantly escalated this ongoing war in February 2022.
• Militarized the Arctic by increasing its military presence in the region, including through reopening Soviet-era bases and building new facilities to buttress Russian territorial claims over Arctic waters.
• Leveraged trade and energy embargoes and other forms of economic pressure to intimidate and coerce its European neighbors.
• Conducts an escalating campaign of active measures short of war against NATO allies and partners, including information warfare, election interference, sabotage, assassination, weaponized migration, cyberattacks, GPS jamming, and other actions.
• Expanded its conventional and nuclear military capabilities, an effort that was part of President Putin’s preparations to invade Ukraine.
• Violated, suspended, and abrogated international arms control agreements, including New START Treaty, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Open Skies Agreement, and others.⁴

Enduring realities

A NATO strategy to counter Russia’s aggression is long overdue. Its absence cedes to Russia the initiative, leaving the Alliance too often in a reactive, if not indecisive and passive, posture in this relationship. An effective strategy requires recognition of nine enduring realities:

First, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a failure of deterrence. The weakness of the Alliance’s response to Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, NATO’s failure to respond forcefully to Russia’s months long mobilization of forces along Ukraine’s frontiers in 2021, and NATO’s acquiescence to Putin’s exercise of nuclear coercion emboldened and facilitated Putin’s actions against Ukraine. As a result, the credibility of the Alliance’s commitment to defend resolutely its interests and values has been damaged.

Second, Russia is at war, not just against Ukraine. It is also at war against NATO. The Alliance can no longer approach the relationship as one of competition or confrontation considering the military invasions, active measures, and other forms of violence and coercion Russia has undertaken against NATO allies and partners.⁵ As former US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun has written, “Quite simply, Putin has declared war on the West, but the West does not yet understand we are at war with Russia.”⁶ By failing to recognize this reality, NATO has ceded escalation dominance to Russia as evidenced by its limiting of support to Ukraine and its inaction against repeated Russian aggression and provocations. The Alliance must recognize and act upon the reality that Moscow has pushed the NATO-Russia relationship into the state of war.

Third, NATO faces long-term conflict with Russia. Putin cannot be expected to abandon his ambitions, even if defeated in Ukraine. Ever since Putin’s speech before the February 2007 Munich Security Conference in which he railed against the international order and NATO’s expanding membership, Russia’s campaign to subjugate its neighbors and to intimidate, divide, and weaken the Alliance has been unceasing and relentless. Nor can the Alliance assume that Putin’s successor will significantly diverge from the objectives and policies that drive Russia’s actions today. Peaceful coexistence with Russia is not attainable in the short to medium term and will be difficult to attain in the long term.

Fourth, Russia will continue efforts to increase the size and capability of its armed forces. While Russian land forces have suffered significant losses in its invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has reconstituted that force faster than expected. Russia’s land forces were estimated to be 15 percent larger in April 2024 than when Russia attacked Kyiv in February 2022.⁷ Earlier this year, Russia announced new ambitious plans to restructure and expand its ground forces to 1.5 million active personnel.⁸ Moreover, the Russian air force and navy have not been significantly degraded by the war against Ukraine. Russia’s air force has only lost some 10 percent of its aircraft. While Russian naval ships have been destroyed in the Black Sea, Russian naval activity worldwide has increased.⁹ Similarly, Russian nuclear forces have been unaffected by the conflict in Ukraine. Russia retains the world’s largest arsenal of deployed and nondeployed nuclear weapons and continues to develop new models of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM), hypersonic boost-glide vehicles, nuclear-powered cruise missiles, nuclear-powered subsurface drones, antisatellite weapons, and orbital space weapons.¹⁰ With some 6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) being directed to its military, Moscow is investing to increase its defense-industrial and research and development capacities.¹¹ Russia’s industrial base produces more ammunition than that produced by all NATO members and is fielding new high-tech weapons systems, such as the nuclear-capable multiple warhead IRBM Oreshnik Russia, which was demonstrated in combat against Ukraine last November.¹² In April 2024, NATO SACEUR General Christopher Cavoli testified to the US Congress that:

• “Russia is on track to command the largest military on the continent and a defense industrial complex capable of generating substantial amounts of ammunition and material in support of large-scale combat operations. Regardless of the outcome of the war in Ukraine, Russia will be larger, more lethal and angrier with the West than when it invaded.”¹³

Fifth, Moscow’s aggressive actions short of war will continue and escalate. Putin has yet to face a response from the Alliance that will dissuade him from further exercising information warfare, cyber warfare, energy and trade embargoes, assassination, GPS jamming, sabotage, fomenting separatist movements, and other forms of hybrid warfare. These actions are intended to intimidate governments; weaken the credibility of the Alliance’s security guarantee; create and exacerbate internal divisions; and divide allies, among other objectives. Left unchecked, they threaten to undermine the Alliance’s ability to attain consensus necessary to take decisive action against Russia.

Sixth, Moscow’s exercise of nuclear coercion will continue as a key element of Russia’s strategy and should be expected to intensify. Threats of nuclear warfare are a key element of Putin’s strategy to preclude NATO and its members from providing Ukraine support that would enable it to decisively defeat Russia’s invasion. This repeated exercise of nuclear coercion includes verbal threats from President Putin and other senior Russian officials; the launching of nuclear capable ICBMs; the use of a nuclear capable IRBM against Ukraine, the first use of such a system in a conflict; nuclear weapons exercises; and the deployment of nuclear weapons to Belarus, according to both Russia and Belarus.¹⁴ NATO allies have repeatedly rewarded this coercion by expressing fear of nuclear war; declaring that NATO forces will not enter Ukraine; restricting NATO’s role in assisting Ukraine; limiting the flow of weapons to Ukraine; and restricting their use against legitimate military targets in Russia. Rewarding nuclear coercion encourages its repeated exercise and escalation. It risks leading Russia to conclude it has attained escalation dominance. A key challenge for NATO going forward will be to demonstrate that Russia’s threats of nuclear strikes are counterproductive, and the Alliance cannot be deterred by nuclear coercion.

Seventh, Moscow is conducting a global campaign of aggression to weaken the democratic community of nations and the rules-based international order. Over the last two decades, Russia has exercised its military, informational, and economic assets to generate anti-Western sentiment across the globe, including in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific region. This has included military support to authoritarian, anti-Western regimes well beyond Europe, including Venezuela, Syria, and Mali. The most concerning element of Russia’s global campaign is the partnerships it has operationalized with China, Iran, and North Korea. Russia’s “no limits partnership” with China enables Putin to mitigate the impacts of Western sanctions on his war economy. Both Iran and North Korea have provided Russia with weapons and ammunition, and North Korean soldiers have joined Russia’s fight against Ukraine. In return, Russia has supplied missile and nuclear technologies, oil and gas, and economic support to these nations that enables them to stoke violence across the Middle East, threaten the Korean Peninsula, and drive forward Beijing’s hegemonic ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region.

Eighth, an effective Russia strategy will require a coordinated leveraging of all the instruments of power available through the Alliance, its member states, and its key partners, including the European Union. This includes the application of diplomatic, economic, ideological, informational, and other elements of power—none of which are the Alliance’s primary capacity, military power—that can be marshaled through its members states and multinational institutions, such as the European Union, where the Alliance and its member states have influence and authority.

Ninth, NATO significantly overmatches Russia in military and economic power.
NATO Headquarters estimates the combined GDP of Alliance member states to be $54 trillion, more than twenty-five times Russia’s estimated GDP of more than $2 trillion.¹⁵ The combined defense budget of NATO members amounts to approximately $1.5 trillion,¹⁶ more than ten times that of Russia’s publicly projected defense budget of $128 billion for 2025.¹⁷ This imbalance of power favoring the Alliance will be enduring and makes the execution of an effective Russia strategy not a matter of capacity, but one of strategic vision and political will.

Core objectives

To counter the direct and significant threat posed by Moscow, a NATO strategy for Russia should be structured around four core objectives:¹⁸

• Defeat Russia in Ukraine: NATO must defeat Russia’s war against Ukraine. This is its most urgent priority. Failure to do so—and failure includes the conflict’s perpetuation—increases the risk of a wider war in Europe and will encourage other adversaries around the world to pursue their revisionist and hegemonic ambitions. Russia’s decisive defeat in Ukraine is essential to return stability to Europe and to reinforce the credibility of the Alliance’s deterrent posture.

• Deter aggression by Russia: A key Alliance priority must be the effective deterrence of Russia aggression against the Alliance. A robust conventional and nuclear posture that deters Russian military aggression is far less costly than an active war. Deterrence must also be more effectively exercised against Russia’s actions short of war. Failure to deter aggression in this domain can undermine confidence in the Alliance and increase the risk of war.
• Contain Russia’s influence and control: The Alliance must actively contain Russia’s efforts to assert influence and control beyond its borders. The Alliance must assist Europe’s non-NATO neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and in Central Asia to strengthen their defenses and resilience to Russian pressure. NATO and NATO allies should also work to counter and roll back Russia’s influence and engagement around the globe.
• Degrade Russia’s capabilities and determination: A core objective for the Alliance should include weakening Russia’s capacity and will to pursue its hegemonic ambitions. Denying Russia access to international markets would further degrade its economy, including its defense-industrial capacity. Active engagement of the Russian public and other key stakeholders should aim to generate opposition to Putin and the Kremlin’s international aggression.

Achievement of these objectives would compel the Kremlin to conclude that its revanchist ambitions, including the diminishment or destruction of NATO, are unachievable and self-damaging. It would diminish Russia’s will and ability to continue aggression in Europe and weaken the impact of Russia’s partnerships, including with China, Iran, and North Korea. In addition, achieving these objectives would return a modicum of stability to Europe that in the long-term would enhance the prospects for NATO’s peaceful coexistence with Russia.

Recommended actions

A NATO strategy to defeat, deter, contain, and degrade Russian aggression and influence should effectuate the following actions by the Alliance, its member states, and partners:

• Defeat Russia in Ukraine and accelerate Ukraine’s accession into the NATO alliance Defeating Russian aggression against Ukraine requires its own strategy, which should feature five key elements: adopting Ukraine’s war objectives, including total territorial reconstitution (i.e., the Alliance must never recognize Russian sovereignty over the territories it illegally seized from Ukraine); maximizing the flow of military equipment and supplies to Ukraine, free of restrictions on their use against legitimate military targets in Russia; imposing severe economic sanctions on Russia; deploying aggressive information operations to generate opposition in Russia against Putin’s aggression; and presenting a clear, accelerated path for Ukraine to NATO membership. NATO membership, and the security guarantee it provides, would add real risk and complexity to Russian military planning. NATO membership for Ukraine is the only way to convince the Kremlin that Ukraine cannot be subject to Russian hegemony and would provide security conditions needed for Ukraine’s rapid reconstruction and economic integration into Europe.
• Fulfill and operationalize NATO’s regional defense plans. To establish a credible and effective deterrent against Russian military aggression, NATO allies must:
  • Build and deploy the requisite national forces. Military plans are no more than visions in the absence of required capabilities. NATO’s European and Canadian allies need to generate more forces, with requisite firepower, mobility, and enabling capacities. In short, given European allies’ obligations under NATO’s new regional defense plans, they must act with urgency.
  • Strengthen transatlantic defense industrial capacity. High intensity warfare, as seen in Ukraine, consumes massive amounts of weapons stocks, much of which have to be in a near constant state of modernization to match the technological adaptations of the adversary. Today, the Alliance has struggled (and often failed) to match the defense-industrial capacity of Russia and its partners. NATO’s defense industrial base must expand its production capacities and its ability to rapidly develop, update, and field weapons systems.
  • Increase allied defense spending to the equivalent of 5 percent of GDP. To facilitate the aforementioned requirements and to address emerging challenges beyond Europe that could simultaneously challenge the transatlantic community, NATO allies need to increase the agreed floor of defense spending from 2 percent to 5 percent and fulfill that new commitment with immediacy. NATO members cannot allow themselves to be forced to choose between defending against Russia and another geopolitical challenge beyond Europe.

• Terminate the NATO Russia Founding Act (NRFA). Russia has repeatedly and blatantly violated the principles and commitments laid out in the Founding Act. Russia’s actions include having invaded Ukraine both in 2014 and in 2022, using nuclear coercion and escalatory rhetoric to pressue the Alliance, and deploying nonstrategic nuclear weapons to Belarus, as both Russia and Belarus have affirmed. Consequently, NATO should formally render the NRFA defunct, including the Alliance’s commitments to:
  • Adhere to the “three nuclear no’s” that NATO member states “have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy – and do not foresee any future need to do so.”¹⁹
  • Abstain from permanently stationing “substantial combat forces” in Central and Eastern Europe.²⁰

• Update NATO’s nuclear force posture. In response to Russia’s modernization of its nuclear arsenal, exercise of nuclear coercion, and adjustments to its nuclear strategy that lowers the threshold for first use of nuclear weapons, the Alliance must update its own nuclear posture. The objectives should be to provide NATO with a broader and more credible spectrum of nuclear weapons options. An updated force posture would improve NATO’s ability to manage, if not dominate, the ladder of conflict escalation, complicate Russian military planning, and thereby weaken Moscow’s confidence in its own military posture and its strategy of nuclear “escalation to de escalate.” Toward these ends, the Alliance should:
  • Increase the spectrum of NATO’s nuclear capabilities. This should include a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) and a ground-launched variant. The breadth and number of NATO nuclear weapons exercises, such as the yearly Steadfast Noon, should be expanded and further integrated with exercises of conventional forces.
  • Expand the number of members participating in the Alliance’s nuclear sharing agreements. Doing so will expand the tactical options available to NATO and underscore more forcefully Alliance unity behind its nuclear posture.
  • Broaden the number and locations of infrastructure capable of hosting the Alliance’s nuclear posture. The Alliance’s nuclear posture still relies solely on Cold War legacy infrastructure in Western Europe. Given the threat posed by Russia, NATO should establish facilities capable of handling nuclear weapons and dual capable systems, including nuclear weapons storage sites, in NATO member states along its eastern frontier.

• Reinforce NATO’s eastern flank. Russia’s assault on Ukraine and its growing provocations against NATO member states and partners underscore the need to further reinforce the Alliance’s eastern frontier. To date, NATO’s deployments along its eastern flank amount to more of a trip-wire force rather than one designed for a strategy of defense by denial. To give greater credibility to the Alliance’s pledge not to “cede one inch” when considering a potential attack by Russia, NATO should:
  • Establish a more robust permanent military presence along the Alliance’s eastern frontier. NATO is expanding its eight multinational battlegroups deployed to Central and Eastern Europe. But each of these deployments should be further upgraded to full brigades that are permanently stationed there. These elements should feature robust enabling capacities, particularly air and missile defenses and long-range fires. If the United States is expected to sustain a presence of 100,000 troops in Europe, the least Western Europe and Canada can do is to forward station some 32,000 troops combined in Central and Eastern Europe.
  • Conduct large-scale, concentrated exercises on NATO’s eastern flank. The Alliance has commendably reanimated its emphasis on large-scale joint military exercises. However, those exercises have yet to be concentrated on NATO’s eastern flank. Doing so would enhance readiness, reassure the Alliance’s Central and Eastern European member states, and demonstrate resolve and preparedness in the face of Russian aggression.
  • Upgrade the Alliance’s air defense and ballistic missile defense systems to more robustly address Russian threats. In its attacks on Ukraine, Russia has demonstrated with brutality its emphasis on missile and long-range drone strikes against military and civilian targets. As part of its efforts to upgrade its air and missile defense capacities, NATO should direct the European Phased Adaptive Approach to address threats from Russia.²¹

• Expand the NATO SACEUR’s authority to order deployments and conduct operations along NATO’s eastern frontier. The Alliance’s regional defense plans are said to provide SACEUR with greater authority to activate and deploy NATO forces before crisis and conflict situations. Due to the aggressiveness of Russia’s ambitions, NATO should consider further expanding those authorities as they relate to the deployment and missions of forces along the Alliance’s eastern frontier. The actions of a deterrent force can be even more important than the magnitude of their presence.
• Augment the Alliance’s posture in the Arctic. Russia has heavily militarized the Arctic, upgraded the status and capability of its Northern Fleet, and deepened its military cooperation with China in the region while the Kremlin continues to assert Arctic territorial claims that conflict with those of NATO allies. While NATO has been increasing the tempo of its Arctic operations and improving its Arctic capabilities, Russia continues to pose a significant threat in the region and possibly outmatches the Alliance in the High North. To further reinforce deterrence against Russian aggression in the Arctic, the Alliance should:
  • Develop a comprehensive NATO strategy to defend its interests in the High North. Such a document would underscore the Alliance’s commitment to the region and help foster allied investments in infrastructure, capabilities, and training needed to defend and deter Russian threats in the High North.
  • Establish a NATO Arctic Command and Joint Force. The Arctic poses a unique set of geographic and climatic challenges requiring tailored operational capabilities. A command and air-ground-naval force focused specifically on the High North would provide the Alliance a dedicated and tailored deterrent to counter Russian aggression in the Arctic.²²

• Bolster deterrence against Russian actions short of war by strengthening resilience and through more assertive and punitive counteractions. NATO and NATO member states’ failure to respond robustly to Russia’s hybrid warfare—whether it is information warfare, cyberattacks, sabotage, assassinations, or other forms of aggression — has resulted in Russia’s intensification and escalation of these actions. The transatlantic community must strengthen its resilience against such attacks but also take stronger punitive measures against Russia if it is to persuade Russia to cease these attacks. While much of what needs to be done falls beyond the remit of NATO’s military capabilities, greater consideration should be given to how military assets can be leveraged to gather intelligence about Russian activity and provide a military dimension to the transatlantic community’s response to such provocations. For example, when a Russian ship fired a warning shot directed at a commercial Norwegian fishing boat within Norway’s exclusive economic zone or when Russia pulled out Estonian navigation buoys from the Narva River,²³ an immediate show of force from NATO could have been an appropriate response.
• Strengthen the deterrence and resilience capacities of non-NATO nations in Europe and Russia’s periphery. Recent elections in Georgia, Moldova, and Romania reflect the intensity of Russia’s determination to claw back control and influence over the space of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. A key priority of a Russia strategy should be to strengthen efforts by the Alliance, its member states, and key institutional partners, such as the European Union, to reinforce the resilience and defense capabilities of non-NATO nations in Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. NATO’s programs, such as the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative, warrant even greater emphasis and resources, particularly in those regions.
• Intensify Russia’s economic and diplomatic isolation. The current set of measures taken against Moscow in these realms have failed to sufficiently degrade Russia’s war economy and its ability to sustain its invasion of Ukraine and provocations elsewhere in the world. A key priority for NATO and its member states should be to significantly escalate economic sanctions, including the exercise of secondary sanctions to eliminate Moscow’s ability to generate international revenue from energy exports and attain critical technologies needed by its defense industrial sector.
• Increase efforts to generate internal Russian opposition to the Kremlin’s revanchist objectives and greater support for democratic principles and governance. Russia has undertaken aggressive campaigns to influence the politics of NATO allies and partners. In the recent elections of Moldova and Romania, Russian intervention nearly effectuated regime change. For too long, the transatlantic community has remained on the defensive in this realm. NATO and its member states need to shift to the offensive and weaponize the power of truth to illuminate the brutal realities of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, the corruption of Russian officials, and other realties of Russian governance. NATO allies must more actively support Russian stakeholders—particularly civil society—that are more aligned with transatlantic values. This is critical to degrading the political will of the Russian state to continue its aggressions.
• Modulate dialogue with Russia, limiting it to what is operationally necessary. The Alliance should formally disband the NATO-Russia Council—which last met in 2022—until Moscow has demonstrated genuine commitment to a constructive relationship. Nonetheless, the Alliance should establish and/or maintain lines of communication between the NATO secretary general and the Kremlin, as well as between Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the Russian General Staff, to enable crisis management and provide transparency needed for military stability. This would not preclude NATO allies from dialogues with Russia deemed necessary, for example, to assist Ukraine or pursue arms control measures.

The bottom line

As noted, NATO possesses an overmatching capacity to defeat Russia in Ukraine, deter Russian aggression, contain Russian influence beyond its borders, and degrade Russia’s ability and will to accomplish its revisionist agenda. Today, there is no better time to achieve these objectives by fully marshaling the Alliance’s assets and potential. Moscow cannot undertake an all-out military attack on NATO without risking the viability of Russia’s armed forces and thus its regime. The accomplishment of these objectives would provide stability to Europe’s eastern frontier and establish the best foundation for an eventual relationship with Moscow that is minimally confrontational, if not cooperative and constructive. However, this will take political will and resources. Russia today is determined to prevail in Ukraine, expand its military capabilities, and further leverage its partners, particularly China, Iran, and North Korea, to defeat the community of democracies and, particularly, the Alliance. Russia already envisions itself as being at war with NATO.

Fellow

Ian Brzezinski

Senior Fellow

Europe Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Central Europe Defense Policy

Staff

Ryan Arick

Associate Director

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

NATO Security & Defense

The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

Learn more

New Atlanticist Feb 22, 2023

Russia policy after the war: A new strategy of containment

By Alexander Vershbow

To prevent further damage to the rules-based international order, the United States and its allies will need a strategy of containment to deter Russia militarily and decouple Russia from the international community, until Moscow has earned the right to be considered a partner once more.

Arms Control Defense Policy

Report Sep 19, 2024

NATO-Russia dynamics: Prospects for reconstitution of Russian military power

By Andrew A. Michta, Joslyn Brodfuehrer

How will Russia reconstitute its land forces in response to the war in Ukraine and the changes in NATO’s force model? The NATO allies closest to Russia can provide valuable insight.

Central Europe Eastern Europe

Memo to… Oct 10, 2023

Memo to the president: A bold agenda for the Washington summit: How to advance vital US interests by helping Ukraine win and defining its path to NATO membership

The upcoming NATO summit marking the Alliance’s seventy-fifth anniversary presents an opportunity for US leadership to meet this danger by taking steps to provide Ukraine the means to win the war and by setting a clear path for Ukraine’s membership in NATO.

Central Europe Conflict

The post Issue brief: A NATO strategy for countering Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member McIver, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the important topic of Chinese strategic port investments in the Western Hemisphere and the implications for US homeland security. 

I want to assist your work by sharing insights gleaned from my more than two decades of experience working on US national security policy at the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, and now as a scholar at Georgetown University, and a vice president at the Atlantic Council. 

My message today is simple: China’s port investments in the Western Hemisphere pose a serious national security threat to the United States and its allies and partners in the region. Washington and regional states should work together to decouple from Chinese investments in ports and other areas critical to national security.  

China poses the greatest contemporary threat to US national security. It is a comprehensive challenge with economic, technological, diplomatic, ideological, and military dimensions. Ultimately, the rivalry concerns the leadership of global order.  

China employs overseas infrastructure investments, including in the Western Hemisphere, as part of its grand strategy. Countries in the Western Hemisphere are often attracted to China’s infrastructure investments, but they come at a cost. Through its investments, China cements access to resources, captures elites, gains leverage over governments, shifts national policies in its favor, and undermines democratic norms, transparency, and environmental standards. 

China’s investments in ports, including in Peru and Panama, pose a number of threats to US homeland security. Chinese-operated ports are used to facilitate the shipment of fentanyl precursors to the United States. China exploits the presence of technology and access to data for an intelligence advantage. China could restrict or block access to ports, threatening American trade and economic wellbeing. In the event of a crisis or war, China could hinder the passage of American naval vessels, undermining American war plans. China could also use deep water ports to host People’s Liberation Army Navy vessels, enabling the projection of military power into the Western Hemisphere. 

As Secretary of State Marco Rubio correctly stated, this status quo is unacceptable. There are a number of steps the United States should take to counter Chinese port investments in the Western Hemisphere and protect US and allied security, freedom, and prosperity.  

The United States should encourage countries in the Western Hemisphere to adopt a de-risking approach to China. Regional governments do not need to choose between the United States and China. They can continue lucrative trade with China in non-sensitive domains, such as agriculture. But US allies and partners should pursue a hard decoupling with China in areas of sensitive national security concern, such as: telecommunications, advanced technology, ground satellite stations, surveillance systems, military and intelligence cooperation, critical minerals, and critical infrastructure, including ports.  

President Donald J. Trump said, “China is operating the Panama Canal and we didn’t give it to China, we gave it to Panama, and we’re taking it back.” 

I applaud the Panamanian government’s subsequent decision to forgo renewal of their participation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Panama should use its current audit of operators in the Panama Canal area as an opportunity to sever the contracts with Chinese companies and to re-bid the contract to US or allied companies that will better ensure American and Panamanian interests. 

Pressuring regional countries to de-risk from China will often be doing these countries a favor. Many Latin American countries entered into agreements with China years ago under previous governments, in a different geopolitical environment. Today, these same countries now understand that undue Chinese influence in sensitive sectors is not in their interest, but they do not have the ability to stand up to China on their own. Pointing to American pressure, as the “bad cop,” can help these countries take necessary steps that would be difficult to take on their own. 

Washington cannot, however, expect regional countries to trade something for nothing. 

The United States must provide credible and affordable alternatives to Chinese infrastructure investments. The US government cannot compete with Chinese-subsidized infrastructure investments on price or scale, but it has a number of other advantages. 

First, it should incentivize its vibrant private sector to invest in the region. Institutions like the International Development Finance Corporation and the Export-Import Bank should continue their transformation into instruments to advance American interests in this new era of great power confrontation. 

Second, the United States should leverage its global network of allies and partners for great power competition in the Global South. The European Union and US allies in the Indo-Pacific, such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea, have world class technology companies, extensive trade relationships in the Western Hemisphere, and significant foreign aid programs. To be most effective, however, the various activities should be brought together in a coordinated fashion, guided by Washington. 

Third, the United States and its allies can compete on quality. While Chinese investments are often economically attractive, they come with strings attached. The United States and its free world allies can outcompete China on free and fair-trade practices, transparency, anti-corruption, rule of law, technical know-how, and high labor and environmental standards.  

Finally, as the Trump administration looks to increase defense spending and debates regional priorities, it should boost the budget of US Southern Command and increase SOUTHCOM training and exercises with regional partners. In the worst-case scenarios, SOUTHCOM must be prepared to step in and secure access to ports and open sea lines of communication. 

Appended to this statement is a copy of A Strategy to Counter Malign Chinese and Russian Influence in Latin America and the Caribbean, an Atlantic Council report I co-authored last year that explores these issues in greater detail and provides actionable recommendations.  

I am honored that the Committee on Homeland Security has invited me to share my views on these challenges, and I look forward to taking your questions. 

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Matthew Kroenig testifies to the House Committee on Homeland Security on China’s strategic port investments in the Western Hemisphere  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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To advance peace through strength, the US military must be capable of denying the People’s Republic of China (PRC) any chance of taking Taiwan by force. This will take more than military modernization. The Trump administration needs to transform the Intelligence Community’s (IC) early-warning capabilities. It’s time to inject unprecedented speed and efficiency into this national mission with a clear goal: attaining real-time awareness across all domains—space, cyberspace, sea, land, and air. Creating this capability is crucial for gathering intelligence against hard targets, understanding emerging events, anticipating the future, and maintaining decision advantage. It’s a tall order, but it’s achievable with the president’s leadership and industry’s cutting-edge tech.

A conflict with the PRC over Taiwan is neither imminent nor inevitable. The PRC has a strategy for annexing Taiwan without an invasion—and it’s in use right now. This strategy has more to do with cyber power than firepower. But the Joint Force and the IC must be prepared for all potential futures—including the risk that the PRC might one day try to blockade or invade Taiwan, sparking a global security crisis.

Operationalize the JWC and JADC2

In the unfortunate event of a future crisis or conflict with the PRC, the IC would need to deliver real-time, decision-quality information advantage in all warfighting domains. The Defense Department’s Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) theorizes new ways to array the Joint Force with a kill web linking any sensor to any shooter. The enabling Joint All-Domain Command and Control System (JADC2) concept is the holistic underlying approach to link these sensors and associated data into the joint all-domain kill web. For the United States, partners, and allies to operate effectively, the JWC and JADC2 will require those forces to possess real-time information because the side that sees first decides first, and the one that acts first will have the advantage.

If deterrence fails, conflict with the PRC would be unlike any other in history. It would be much faster, more lethal, and more autonomous in an era with swarm technology and hypersonic weapons. It could even include the unthinkable: the use of nuclear capabilities. In addition to combat in the traditional air, land, and sea domains, operations in space and cyberspace would play outsized roles. To be ready to prevail, the entire US intelligence enterprise must rethink and retool how it collects in all domains, and how it uses artificial intelligence (AI) and advanced techniques to analyze and deliver information at speed, enabling JWC/JADC2 in new ways. Speed, timing, and escalation would depend on US and allied reactions, as well as readiness levels and positioning of forces that might be involved. Scenarios involving blockades or an invasion would pose unique challenges to current indication and warning methodologies and models.

Overcome silos that hinder national security

Attaining a real-time, all-domain awareness capability will require a unified effort across the IC, which comprises eighteen independent agencies with authorities to collect, analyze, and report. While some roles and missions overlap, they all have unique capabilities and specified intelligence tasks under Title 50, established laws, and associated IC policy documents. All use different sources, methods, and unique tradecraft to produce intelligence on a variety of national security threats and challenges.

Each agency collects sensitive and restricted information not available to all consumers. Agencies operate on their own top-secret networks and with proprietary software and tools. Each agency partners differently and disseminates intelligence on an as-needed basis (some with more restrictions than others). Each agency has grown its culture, governed its own rice bowls, and competed for scarce resources, creating a competitive atmosphere in the IC that limits collaboration and integration.

To be sure, the IC was highly effective in the lead-up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Time and observables were contributing factors, as Russian force movements were visible months before the invasion and the US military had time to posture for the conflict. At the national level, agile disclosure policies allowed for timely and accurate sharing with partners and allies, empowering a coalition build that enabled rapid military and political support for Ukraine. But it is unlikely that a crisis or conflict with the PRC would unfold in a similar way. The PRC has carefully studied Russian mistakes in Ukraine and is unlikely to repeat them in a Taiwan scenario. Moreover, the proximity of Taiwan to the mainland—combined with the tyrannies of time, distance, and force posture in the region—could create larger dilemmas for the IC.

Proactively strengthen the IC’s posture

All in all, the IC’s preparedness for potential crisis and conflict scenarios involving the PRC has significant room for improvement. The IC has grown incredible capabilities but also daunting bureaucracies that stifle true integration. Combine this with the explosion of information sources, collection techniques, analytical tools, AI advancements, technical hurdles, tradecraft discrepancies, and individual agency priorities, and the result is a lack of unity across the intelligence enterprise. The status quo puts at risk the IC’s ability to see what’s coming in real time—potentially with damaging and cascading consequences.

The IC posture shortfalls are amplified by a lack of information integration across the Department of Defense (DoD). JWC and JADC2 require both intelligence and non-intelligence information sharing at speed for rapid situational understanding and decision advantage. But this underpinning of real-time authoritative intelligence—to see, decide, and act first—does not yet exist. Right now, the IC is inundated with data and tools, but has no way to integrate at scale. It’s time for major changes to the system.

The armed services, intelligence agencies, and many US partners have collection tools and capabilities to identify threats. But if there were a crisis or conflict with the PRC, imagine how many People’s Liberation Army (PLA) objects and targets would be involved. In a conflict scenario, the Joint Force would need a clear integrator of the data streams or multiple intelligence (multi-INT) analysis required to hold all those foreign military objects and targets at risk, or to service those targets kinetically or non-kinetically when required. Such a capability is crucial for deterring and defeating threats.

Avoid governing by crisis

Too often, sweeping changes have come only during or after a great crisis, usually with great loss of life and national embarrassment.

• The 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor resulted in the wartime mass mobilization and the eventual first use of an atomic bomb.
• It took the humiliating failures associated with Operation Eagle Claw in 1980 to drive the wide-ranging reforms in the 1987 Goldwater-Nichols Act, which brought about dramatic improvements at DoD. That statute mandated new doctrine for joint operations, the creation of US Special Operations Command, new ways to educate and manage DoD personnel, and changes in how the US military operates.
• The response to the 9/11 attacks drove comprehensive changes in civil society and national security, culminating in the creation of a new cabinet position to unify the IC and prevent strategic surprise and catastrophic attacks against the United States or its allies and partners.

These changes only occurred with presidential leadership and bipartisan congressional consensus. Otherwise, the United States’ layered governmental bureaucracy, policies, bifurcated political system, and funding process do not normally allow for effective, incremental strategic change. The nation cannot afford to govern by crisis or to rely on twentieth-century-style incremental intelligence reform. Without a strong national mandate, the IC will maintain its current trajectory. That trajectory is inadequate in peacetime and will not suffice in a crisis that leads to conflict.

Integrating intelligence is key

To advance peace through strength, leadership is needed now. The Trump administration has the opportunity to raise public awareness about the range of threats posed by the PRC, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, and to accelerate national security to deal with those threats—particularly by building real-time, all-domain awareness. This awareness can enable the Joint Force to have well-established, rehearsed, and standardized kill chains for credible deterrence. What’s more, it can position the United States to identify and address growing threats in the gray zone—where rivals are trying to compete with the United States without resorting to direct conflict.

In a recent, positive development, the undersecretary of defense for intelligence and security (USD-I&S) signed a directive designating the Defense Intelligence Agency as the “enterprise lead” for the common intelligence picture (CIP). This is a good start. But given the enormity of the task, limited time available, and bureaucratic hurdles, DoD will need to go much further—and that won’t happen without a presidential directive, bipartisan congressional support, and a comprehensive approach spanning DoD, the IC, and industry.

Imagine a nationally mandated and funded project to integrate intelligence from all disciplines to gain and maintain real-time, all-domain awareness across multiple networks and classification levels. Turning this idea into reality is the only way the United States and its allies and partners can proactively seize the initiative, reestablish deterrence, and prevail in the event of conflict. To demonstrate US national resolve and potentially advance strategic deterrence, the high-level commitment to intelligence integration and JADC2 should be highly visible to the PRC and Russia while the sensitive details remain carefully guarded.

The president can drive the change

A presidential directive focused on realizing JWC/JADC2 capabilities to address the PRC threat could empower and drive a “whole of DoD and IC” effort to achieve full operating capabilities with strategic impact. This would strengthen the nation’s competitive edge and position the military and the IC to deliver peace through strength. With ten of the nation’s intelligence agencies under DoD’s umbrella, the secretary of defense should lead this effort in collaboration with the director of national intelligence. This could entail empowering a senior DoD leader such as the USD-I&S with real authority to effect change.

The JWC mandate should require delivery of actionable capabilities within specified timelines, include technical, AI, and tradecraft experimentation, and provide other transaction authority (OTA) or other rapid-acquisition authorities that optimize industry support. For the incoming USD-I&S, the quick stand-up of actionable working groups with deliverables and timelines will be critical. At a minimum, technical, tradecraft, AI, integration, experimentation, and industry work groups should be established. Deputies from each DoD intelligence agency and the services should be assigned to this effort on a full-time basis. Ruthless enforcement of timelines and deliverables by the deputy secretary of defense and USD-I&S will be the only way to effectively lead and direct this effort.

There is no time to lose. Attaining real-time awareness across all domains is vital for national security and defense. With the new administration’s leadership and industry’s cutting-edge tech, transforming early-warning capabilities with real-time, all-domain awareness can become both a strategic and budgetary priority and an operational reality.

Lieutenant General, US Army (ret.) Scott D. Berrier is a nonresident senior fellow at the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a senior vice president in the intelligence and national security sector with Booz Allen Hamilton.

Report Feb 7, 2025

Toplines: The United States and its allies must be ready to deter a two-front war and nuclear attacks in East Asia

By Markus Garlauskas

The “toplines” from Markus Garlauskus’ report on two emerging and interrelated deterrence challenges in East Asia with grave risks to US national security.

Arms Control China

New Atlanticist Jun 28, 2024

Dispatch from Taipei: Why Taiwan’s survival may depend on deterrence through resilience

By Markus Garlauskas

A repeated theme in recent discussions in Taipei was Taiwan’s ability to withstand Chinese coercion and to adapt and sustain its defenses while under attack.

China Indo-Pacific

New Atlanticist Jun 14, 2024

Think China can already take Taiwan easily? Think again.

By Brian Kerg

Beijing’s influence campaign in pursuit of a “cognitive fait accompli” against Taiwan is conducted across multiple lines of operation.

China Indo-Pacific

The post Deterring Chinese aggression takes real-time intelligence appeared first on Atlantic Council.

By Mary Kate Aylward, Peter Engelke, Uri Friedman, and Paul Kielstra

Not all the projections were pessimistic. Fifty-eight percent of those who participated in our Global Foresight 2025 survey, for example, felt that artificial intelligence would, on balance, have a positive impact on global affairs over the next ten years—an increase of 7 percentage points from our Global Foresight 2024 survey. Roughly half of respondents foresaw an expansion of global cooperation on climate change.  

But the grimmer forecasts were in keeping with a dark global outlook overall, with 62 percent of respondents expecting the world a decade from now to be worse off than it is today, and only 38 percent predicting that it will be better off.  

The 357 survey respondents were mostly citizens of the United States (just under 55 percent of those polled), with the others spread across sixty countries and every continent but Antarctica. Respondents skewed male and older, and were dispersed across a range of fields including the private sector, nonprofits, academic or educational organizations, and government and multilateral institutions.  

So what do these forecasters of the global future anticipate over the coming decade? Below are the survey’s ten biggest findings. 

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series

Feb 12, 2025

The Global Foresight 2025 survey: Full results

In the fall of 2024 after the outcome of the US presidential election, the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security surveyed the future, asking leading global strategists and foresight practitioners around the world to answer our most burning questions about the biggest drivers of change over the next ten years. Here are the full results.

Africa China

1. Forty percent of respondents expect a world war in the next decade—one that could go nuclear and extend to space 

For the first time in our annual survey, we asked respondents whether they expected there to be another world war by 2035. We defined such a war as involving a multifront conflict among great powers. And the results were alarming, with 40 percent saying yes.  

While this was a new question, our Global Foresight 2024 survey surfaced a similar concern, with nearly a quarter of respondents pointing to war between major powers as the greatest threat to global prosperity over the next ten years.

The finding tracks with worries expressed by other experts amid major wars in Europe and the Middle East, growing tensions between the United States and China, and increasing cooperation among China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Surveying this treacherous global landscape this past summer, for example, the historian and former US diplomat Philip Zelikow assigned a 20 to 30 percent probability to the prospect of “worldwide warfare” and warned of a “period of maximum danger” within the next one to three years. 

Judging by our respondents’ answers, another world war might feature nuclear weapons. Forty-eight percent of respondents overall (and 63 percent of those predicting World War III) expected nuclear weapons to be used in the coming decade by at least one actor.  

Such a conflict also may play out in outer space. Forty-five percent of respondents overall (and 60 percent of those predicting World War III) expected the next decade to include a direct military conflict fought, at least in part, in space.  

And it could be devastating to the global economy. Twenty-eight percent of respondents identified war among major powers as the single biggest threat to global prosperity over the next ten years. 

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2. Tensions with China and Russia are potential vectors for major conflict 

By definition, a world war would involve more than two belligerent nations. But across multiple questions in the survey, respondents forecast a future in which today’s strategic competition and geopolitical tensions between the United States and China in particular could sharpen into something more dangerous.  

Survey respondents, for instance, were significantly more inclined than a year earlier to foresee a military conflict over Taiwan, which could draw in the United States in support of the island and against China. Sixty-five percent of all respondents somewhat or strongly agreed that China will try to retake Taiwan by force within the next decade, and only 24 percent somewhat or strongly disagreed. In our Global Foresight 2024 survey, that split was 50 percent to 30 percent. Among those predicting the breakout of another world war, the proportion was even higher: Seventy-nine percent believed China will attempt to forcibly retake Taiwan over the next ten years. 

Expand to read expert insight by Markus Garlauskas

Though this year’s survey findings may seem worrisome at first because respondents see increasing risks of war, I find them reassuring. The change from last year shows a greater awareness of the nature of the threats we face in the Indo-Pacific, particularly the risk of confronting simultaneous conflicts with multiple adversaries and nuclear attacks.

That a clear majority of respondents now expect Beijing to try to take Taiwan by force in the coming decade is actually a hopeful signal to me. Chinese President Xi Jinping has been clearly building up military forces suited for offensive operations and has repeatedly stated that he will not renounce the use of force to bring Taiwan under control. Meanwhile, polls suggest that the vast majority of the people of Taiwan are disinclined to be ruled by Beijing, favoring either the status quo or outright independence.

This would seem to set Beijing and Taipei on an inevitable collision course. Yet there is also good reason to believe that China overwhelming Taiwan is not inevitable, in part because invasion would be a far more difficult operation than is commonly recognized. It will take the increasing sense of threat of force identified by the survey to prompt Taiwan and the United States to make the investments necessary to increase their preparedness for deterring and defeating such use of force.

This growing awakening on the part of the United States and its allies can become the basis for a call to action for the populations, governments, and militaries of these countries. The United States has typically waited until war was thrust upon it before preparing comprehensively. Now is the time to act, to prepare, ideally to deter such aggression, and to be ready to hold firm if deterrence fails and we face either a short, sharp war or a protracted one. 

—Markus Garlauskas, director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

A US-China confrontation is not the only potential pathway to a multifront conflict among great powers. Forty-five percent of respondents somewhat or strongly agreed that Russia and NATO will engage in a direct military conflict within the next ten years—a significant increase from the 29 percent who felt this way in our Global Foresight 2024 survey. Among respondents expecting another world war within the next decade, 69 percent anticipated a direct clash between Russia and NATO.

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3. Just under half of respondents expect China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea to be formal allies within a decade, potentially in a world featuring China- and US-aligned blocs 

Other geopolitical dynamics forecast by survey respondents could serve as the kindling for whatever spark ignites a wider war or, alternatively, emerge as byproducts of such a conflict.  

Forty-seven percent of respondents predicted that, by 2035, the world will largely be divided into China-aligned and US-aligned blocs; among that group, nearly 60 percent expected the China-aligned bloc to include Russia, Iran, and North Korea as formal allies, presumably with China leading the alliance.  

Overall, just under half of our survey respondents (46 percent) agreed that the emerging axis of Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea will be formal allies in 2035. While this was the first time we asked this question regarding all four countries, in our Global Foresight 2024 survey 33 percent of respondents thought Russia and China would be formal allies in ten years’ time. 

Many respondents appeared to associate these potential developments with the prospect of a world war. Among respondents who foresaw both the world being divided into China- and US-aligned blocs and China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea becoming formal allies, 62 percent also anticipated another world war over the next decade; among other survey respondents, that figure was far lower at 33 percent. 

Expand to read expert insight by Melanie Hart

Economically, there is movement underway toward a US-and-allies versus China-aligned bloc structure, but this movement is still nascent. How far it goes will largely depend on whether the United States can overcome its domestic political reticence to actively shaping the global economic order and once again begin negotiating market-access trade deals.

Beijing seeks a global system in which other nations must abide by its wishes and there are no constraints—legal, normative, or otherwise—limiting Beijing’s own actions. Beijing is using global commerce to enforce this approach. For nations that depend on trade or investment with China, Beijing is increasingly willing to shut off the flow of goods and capital to enforce its demands in other issue areas. Beijing is also using those partners as consumption dumping grounds, exporting excess capacity across a wide array of goods (such as steel and electric vehicles) at rock-bottom prices, which addresses over-supply in the China market but drives local producers out of business. This is leading many nations to reduce their exposure and vulnerabilities to Beijing’s market interference. Many of those nations increasingly view Western, US-centric supply chains as a more attractive option.

As this shift unfolds, it could lead to new economic blocs—for example, a new multilateral trading structure in which the United States and its allies are at the center of a global trading bloc that China is not allowed to join. However, that will depend on Washington shaking off its trade malaise and figuring out how to negotiate new trade deals that create new, formal structures centered on US and allied rules of the road. China is busy creating its own options—such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in Asia—but the United States is hanging back. Without more assertive US-led action on the trade front, the biggest risk is that China will form a new, massive global economic bloc and write the rules to benefit itself at our expense, while the United States and its allies watch from the sidelines.

As for China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, these four nations are partners with a clear shared interest—namely, their desire to undermine the United States and the liberal international order—but they are not true allies. China’s need for integration with the global economy is likely to limit the degree to which today’s partnership evolves in the future into a more formal alliance similar to the alliance the United States enjoys with its NATO partners.

The Chinese Communist Party has staked its regime legitimacy—its pitch for the Chinese people’s continued support—largely on its ability to deliver economically. Unfortunately, the party has also decided that the reforms required to deliver next-level economic growth are too risky, as they would require the party to cede more internal political control over the nation’s economy, legal system, and society. As long as Chinese leaders are unwilling to do that, they will lag behind the West in technology innovation, and they will depend on access to Western companies, universities, and markets to help fill that gap. That dependence limits China’s willingness to sign up for a comprehensive alliance with Russia, Iran, or North Korea, because Beijing does not want to join those nations in an economic wilderness that cuts Chinese companies off from the world’s leading technology powers.

—Melanie Hart, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub 

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4. The proliferation and use of nuclear weapons is a growing risk, with nearly half of respondents expecting a nuclear weapon to be used by 2035

Since the dawn of the Atomic Age and particularly since the latter part of the Cold War, nuclear nonproliferation efforts have sought to prevent additional countries from acquiring the world’s most destructive weapons, with varying success. And after the United States did so in 1945, no country has used nuclear weapons in war. But according to our survey respondents, the coming decade could bring very concerning developments on both these fronts. 

Iran is the most likely—but not the only potential—new nuclear-weapons power on the horizon 

In our latest survey, 88 percent of respondents expected at least one new country to obtain nuclear weapons in the coming decade, a slight uptick from 84 percent in the Global Foresight 2024 edition. As in our previous survey, just under three quarters of respondents predicted that Iran will go beyond its current threshold status and join the nuclear-weapons club within the next ten years, making it the survey’s most-cited candidate to become a nuclear-weapons state in the future.  

The coming years could bring a range of policy responses to this anticipated development, from strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities to a new round of nuclear negotiations with Tehran. Perhaps in recognition of these scenarios, more than a third of respondents expected Israel to have engaged in a direct war with Iran by 2035.

Expand to read expert insight by Alan Pino

Is Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon inevitable or at least highly likely in the next decade? Far from it. Whether Iran acquires a nuclear weapon will depend on policy choices made by Iran, Israel, and the United States regarding Tehran’s nuclear program.

Currently, Iran still officially disavows an intent to produce a nuclear weapon, but there has been much more talk among Iranian officials during the past year of the need for one as pressure on Iran has increased due to Israeli military actions against Tehran’s “resistance axis” and Iran itself.

Iran’s military and economic weaknesses have intensified an ongoing debate between moderates and hardliners in Iran over the direction of the country’s foreign and nuclear policy. Moderates want to negotiate a freeze on Iran’s nuclear program in return for the lifting of economic sanctions and an opening of trade and investment with the West and Arab Gulf states. Hardliners argue Iran must double down on its expansionist regional policies, its threshold status as a military nuclear power, its growing ties to Russia and China, and its hardline stance toward the United States and the West to rebuild deterrence and resilience.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will have to make the call on which policy to pursue, and uppermost in his mind will be which approach—or mixture of the two—best ensures the survival of the Islamic Republic, his overarching priority.

Israeli officials continue to monitor Iran’s nuclear program closely and have reiterated warnings that Israel will resort to military force if Iran seeks to acquire a nuclear weapon. Israel under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been emboldened by its military successes over the past year, including the destruction of Hamas’s and Hezbollah’s military capabilities and Iran’s air defenses, as well as the weakening of Iran’s missile-production capabilities. Senior Israeli officials probably believe conditions are ripe to destroy or set back Iran’s nuclear program without major threat of retaliation, given the Islamic Republic’s current vulnerability, but also seem to recognize that Israel would need US military support to do lasting damage.

The Trump administration is committed to restoring its previous maximum-pressure campaign of sanctions against Iran to compel it to agree to a new nuclear deal and curbs on its malign regional behavior. Trump’s transition team reportedly discussed the possibility of a preemptive attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities given that Iran now has enough highly enriched uranium for several bombs and that sanctions could take a long time to work. They may have leaked this option to frighten Iran into agreeing to negotiations, but clearly the Trump administration is signaling a willingness to go beyond sanctions and diplomacy to achieve its objectives.

With Iran’s axis of resistance shredded, and Iran itself weakened militarily and economically, the United States has an extraordinary opportunity—working with Israel, Arab allies, and European countries—to use economic and diplomatic pressure backed by the threat of military force to secure an agreement that walks Iran back from the nuclear brink and curbs its destabilizing regional policies.

—Alan Pino, former US national intelligence officer for the Near East 

What is new is the jump in the percentage of respondents expecting other countries to get these weapons. In our Global Foresight 2024 survey, for example, a quarter of respondents thought South Korea would acquire nuclear weapons. In our most recent survey, that figure was 40 percent. The percentage of respondents expecting Japan—the only country ever subject to a nuclear-weapons attack, where the survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings are a prominent national presence—to acquire nuclear weapons also increased ten percentage points over 2024, from 19 percent to 29 percent. (Notably, while the percentage of respondents anticipating a nuclear Iran in ten years’ time remained steady year over year, so did the roughly 40 percent of respondents expecting nearby rival Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons as well.) 

North Korea and Russia are considered the most likely to launch a nuclear-weapons attack

Forty-eight percent of respondents expected nuclear weapons to be used in the coming decade, up from 37 percent in our previous survey.  

Expand to read expert insight by Matthew Kroenig

This finding demonstrates that nuclear weapons have returned to the center of geopolitics. For years after the end of the Cold War, many assumed that nuclear weapons were obsolete relics from the past. The Obama administration made eliminating nuclear weapons a top priority. At the time, Washington assessed that there was virtually zero chance of a nuclear war among states and the greatest nuclear threats came from terrorism or accident.

Now, nearly half of our respondents assess that nuclear weapons will be used in the coming decade. This shows that nuclear weapons are not twentieth-century curiosities but the ultimate instrument of force and essential tools of great-power competition. China is engaging in the most rapid nuclear buildup since the 1960s, Russia is issuing regular nuclear threats, North Korea’s nuclear arsenal continues to grow, and Iran’s dash time to the bomb is now measured in weeks.

This means that the United States will need to once again strengthen its strategic forces to deter adversaries and assure allies. By doing so, I hope the United States can prove our respondents wrong and ensure that the world’s most powerful weapons are never used again.

—Matthew Kroenig, vice president and senior director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security 

Roughly one-quarter of respondents predicted that Russia will use a nuclear weapon by 2035, with around the same percentage saying the same regarding North Korea, amid reports of near-Russian nuclear use early in its war against Ukraine and concerns about crumbling deterrence on the Korean peninsula. Both cases represent significant increases relative to our previous survey, when only 14 percent expected Russia to employ a nuke and 15 percent believed North Korea would do so. 

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5. The United States is still likely to be dominant militarily in 2035—but with relatively less economic, diplomatic, and soft power as it navigates a multipolar world

Three-quarters of respondents in our latest survey agreed that the world in 2035 will be multipolar, with multiple centers of power, in line with the findings in our previous survey. 

A slightly smaller percentage of respondents—71 percent—expected the United States to remain the world’s dominant military power by that time. A majority (58 percent) envisioned the United States being the world’s dominant technology innovator a decade from now.  

On other measures of power—economic, cultural, and diplomatic—respondents predicting US dominance in 2035 were in the minority, if only ever so slightly in the case of economic power, in which 49 percent of respondents expected the United States to be dominant. 

Between our latest survey and the previous year’s, confidence in US dominance over the next decade dropped across several measures of power, particularly diplomatic and military clout. Those forecasting US dominance in ten years’ time declined from 81 percent to 71 percent for military power, 63 percent to 58 percent for technological innovation, 52 percent to 49 percent for economic power, and 32 percent to 24 percent for diplomatic power. (The Global Foresight 2024 survey did not ask about future US dominance in cultural or soft power, which 35 percent of respondents expected in our most recent survey.) Slightly more respondents (12 percent) relative to our prior survey (7 percent) forecast that the United States will be dominant in none of these areas by 2035. 

A bright but more uncertain future for US alliances 

While a majority of respondents (61 percent) expected the United States to maintain its security alliances and partnerships in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East in 2035, this figure was markedly down from our previous survey (79 percent), with much of the shift seeming to stem from those answering that they “don’t know” (26 percent in the Global Foresight 2025 edition relative to 12 percent in the 2024 edition).  

Responses on the future of US military dominance and alliances appear correlated. Among those who expected the United States to retain such dominance by 2035, 67 percent believed that it would maintain its network of alliances. Among those who did not think the United States would be the world’s dominant military power in a decade, only 46 percent believed that the country would preserve its alliance network. 

In our Global Foresight 2024 survey, just under a third of respondents expected Europe to have achieved “strategic autonomy” within the next decade by taking more responsibility for its own security and thus relying less on the United States. In our latest survey, however, almost half of respondents (48 percent) expected Europe to achieve “strategic autonomy” over the next ten years—a notable increase as President Donald Trump presses European countries to substantially increase their defense spending.

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the state of alliances and partnerships in 2035:

The dangers of a diminished United States 

Those who anticipate a diminished United States over the next decade may link such a scenario to worse outcomes for the world. Among respondents who said that by 2035 the United States will be the dominant power in none of the domains listed in the survey, for instance, only 24 percent believed that the world will be better off in a decade’s time. Among other respondents, 40 percent expected the world to be better off ten years from now. Similarly, among those who didn’t expect US dominance in any domain of power in a decade, 62 percent envisioned a world war occurring over that timeframe. For the rest of the survey pool, 38 percent anticipated another world war.  

Expand to read expert insight by Matthew Kroenig

In the United States, declinism is a national pastime with a poor track record. In the 1970s, many thought the Soviet Union was on a trajectory to overtake the United States as the world’s leading superpower. In the 1980s, economists projected that Japan would unseat the United States as the world’s leading economy. In the 2010s, many thought it was inevitable that China would become the world’s largest economic power.

All of those predictions turned out to be incorrect.

The United States is now a rising power, claiming 26 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP), its largest share in two decades. Meanwhile, China is declining; Xi Jinping’s desire to assert Chinese Communist Party control over all aspects of Chinese society is stifling Chinese growth, and his aggressive foreign policy is undercutting the global economic engagement strategy that fueled China’s rise. Europe’s share of global GDP has fallen from a quarter in the 1980s to roughly 15 percent today. Russia’s GDP is smaller than Italy’s and Spain’s. To whom then is the United States supposedly ceding all of this power?

Is the United States in decline? I wouldn’t bet on it.

—Matthew Kroenig, vice president and senior director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security 

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6. Many respondents are pessimistic about the war in Ukraine ending on terms favorable to Ukraine

Amid a push by the incoming Trump administration to bring the war in Ukraine to an end three years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country, and as Ukraine and Russia each seek to secure the best possible terms in any future negotiated peace deal, respondents were split on the likely outcome of the conflict. Forty-seven percent predicted that Russia’s war against Ukraine will end on terms largely favorable to Russia and 43 percent forecast that it will result in a “frozen conflict.” Only 4 percent expected the war to end on terms largely favorable to Ukraine.  

Our previous survey a year earlier, which asked a different and more detailed question about Ukraine in ten years’ time, reflected more optimism, with 48 percent of respondents predicting that Ukraine would emerge from the war as an independent, sovereign state in control of the territory it held before Russia’s escalated assault on the country in 2022. 

Expand to read expert insight by John Herbst

Expectations about the future change in the wake of historic developments and perceptions of those developments. Perhaps the single most important factor in determining the outcome of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine is US policy.

Simply put, a strong US policy providing Ukraine the weapons to drive Russian forces largely out of Ukraine and rallying the political West to supply Ukraine’s economic needs would lead to a clear defeat for Russian President Vladimir Putin that would return much of occupied Ukraine to Kyiv’s control, and with a US-led effort would vouchsafe Ukraine’s security and territorial integrity via NATO membership. Alternatively, a US decision to cut off aid to Ukraine would likely lead to a disaster that would ensure Kremlin political control of the country, produce a direct threat to NATO, and encourage aggression by US adversaries in the Far and Middle East.

US President Joe Biden gave substantial support to Ukraine, but he stopped well short of giving Ukraine the arms and permission to take back most of the country. Trump has stated that he wants Ukraine to survive and would not abandon the country, but he is seeking a durable peace that requires compromise from Ukraine as well as Russia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has indicated a readiness to compromise; Putin has not. Recognizing this, Trump and his team have identified Putin as the recalcitrant party and have spoken of major economic measures—tougher sanctions, transferring the $300 billion in frozen Russian state assets to Ukraine—to persuade Russia to negotiate. Respondents to the survey pay attention to the major factors affecting this war, including the Trump angle. But respondents to surveys are not seers, and survey questions are not written to explore the insights that seers might provide.

What therefore might we expect to happen with the war this coming year? First, Trump will roll out a peace initiative that likely includes four elements already public. Two are hard for Zelenskyy: territorial concessions (at least de facto) and no NATO membership for Ukraine for twenty years minimum. And two are hard for Putin: the demilitarized zone enforced by European troops and arming Ukraine to the hilt to prevent future Russian aggression. We can expect Putin to try hard to get Trump to drop those last two points before and then during the talks. But if Putin is persuaded that Trump will arm Ukraine with far more advanced weapons if Russia is unyielding, he might agree to terms that he intends to violate. Trump’s hopes for a Nobel Peace Prize depend on him insisting that Russia compromise to the point of ensuring a viable and stable future for Ukraine, and being ready to confront the ever-treacherous Russian dictator if Putin violates an agreement whose terms would yield that outcome.

—John Herbst, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center 

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7. Respondents are much more optimistic about a breakthrough in Israeli-Saudi relations than in Israeli-Palestinian peace  

Ever since Hamas’s October 7, 2023 terrorist attacks against Israel and Israel’s ensuing war in Gaza set off transformative changes in the broader Middle East, US officials have linked reviving work on normalizing diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia with renewing the push for a pathway to a Palestinian state as part of an eventual Israeli-Palestinian peace deal, with the Saudis insisting on the latter as a condition for the former.  

But our survey respondents—who, notably, shared their views before Israel and Hamas reached their January cease-fire and hostage deal—were much more bullish about the prospects for Israeli-Saudi normalization in the coming decade than about the chances of an Israeli-Palestinian two-state solution. Fifty-six percent envisioned Israel having normalized diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia by 2035—roughly similar to the percentage who said the same in our post-October 7, 2023, Global Foresight 2024 survey—relative to 17 percent who expected Israel to be coexisting next to a sovereign, independent Palestinian state within that timeframe. More than 60 percent of respondents predicted that when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, today’s status quo, with occupied Palestinian territories, will persist. 

Expand to read expert insight by Alan Pino

In 2035, will Israel have the status quo that exists today, with occupied Palestinian territories?

Hamas’s surprise attack on Israel on October 7, 2023 has taught us the dangers of thinking a status quo will continue indefinitely. Israeli leaders’ belief that Hamas had reconciled itself to the status quo in Gaza—in which Gazans received economic benefits in return for Hamas not attacking Israel—left them unprepared for the most devastating attack on the Jewish state since its war of independence in 1948.

And the war in Gaza that resulted from Hamas’s attack has brought further surprises: Israel’s almost complete destruction of Hamas as a military and political organization; the killing of most of Hezbollah’s military leaders and elimination of a majority of its vaunted rocket and missile arsenal; direct Iranian and Israeli attacks on each other’s territory, with Israel wiping out all of Iran’s most advanced air-defense systems; and the almost overnight collapse of the Syrian military and the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in the face of a renewed rebel offensive.

The Middle East’s geopolitical landscape has been dramatically transformed, and Iran’s image as a regional hegemon and defender of the Palestinians badly tarnished. Israeli leaders have been emboldened by Israel’s military successes and seem to believe that maintaining military dominance alone will deter the country’s enemies.

But some observers, looking ahead, ask whether the cycle of violence since October 7 is likely to repeat itself at some point if Israel doesn’t address the issue of Palestinian aspirations for independence. The Biden administration and others have called for a return to the idea of a two-state solution as necessary to forestall future cycles of Israeli-Palestinian violence.

Admittedly, the current environment is not propitious for discussion of a Palestinian state. A large majority of Israelis, still traumatized by Hamas’s horrific attack on October 7, reject the idea as posing a grave risk to Israel’s security. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly refused calls from the United States to incorporate the concept of an eventual Palestinian state into Israel’s post-war strategy, and right-wingers in the current Israeli government want to annex a large part of the West Bank, keep long-term control of the Gaza Strip, and return Israeli settlements to Gaza.

But the Palestinian issue is not likely to go away. Anti-Israel militancy and violence by Palestinians is growing in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, and Israel hasn’t totally suppressed attacks by Hamas in Gaza after more than a year of fighting. Arab publics are seething with anger over the large number of Palestinians killed and displaced by Israeli military operations in Gaza. And world opinion has increasingly turned against Israel as Palestinian casualties have mounted.

The Palestinian issue remains a roadblock to Israel becoming fully integrated into the region, a key goal of Netanyahu’s that he hopes will put a capstone on his legacy as Israel’s longest-serving prime minister. Responding to popular sentiment, Saudi leaders have indicated that Riyadh won’t normalize relations with Israel—an essential step to create a political and security bulwark against renewed threats from Iran—unless Jerusalem endorses a clear pathway to Palestinian statehood.

New elections will probably need to take place in Israel, bringing new leadership open to the idea of a political horizon for the Palestinians, if the current status quo is to change. The United States has an important role to play here by encouraging Israeli leaders to think about how to translate their military success into a regional strategy that includes a vision for ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The odds of such a development seem long right now, but October 7 is a reminder that clinging to an unstable status quo can be riskier than seeking to change it.

—Alan Pino, former US national intelligence officer for the Near East 

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8. As global organizations become less capable of solving the world’s problems, regional groupings and the BRICS may rise in importance   

Respondents foresaw many global institutions growing less effective over the coming decade. Seventy-five percent expected the United Nations (UN) to be less capable of solving challenges core to its mission by 2035 relative to today, compared with 9 percent who anticipated it becoming more capable of doing so. The figures for the United Nations Security Council are only slightly better, with 67 percent of respondents predicting less capability and 9 percent more capability. Sixty percent of respondents envisioned the World Trade Organization being less capable in a decade than it is today.  

Respondents also may be skeptical about the UN’s capacity to tackle global-governance challenges such as climate change. Just under 40 percent of respondents predicted that greenhouse-gas emissions will have peaked and begun to decline by 2035, despite signs that this tipping point is already near. Only about half of respondents believed that renewable energy technologies will be the dominant form of electricity production globally by then, despite significant growth in demand for renewable energy. 

The forecast was less dire for the World Bank, with 46 percent predicting less capability and 19 percent more capability, and International Monetary Fund (IMF), with 41 percent predicting less capability and 20 percent more capability. A similar if slightly more sanguine picture emerged regarding organizations consisting of the world’s leading powers. Forty-nine percent of respondents predicted less capability and 21 percent more capability for the Group of Seven (G7), while 38 percent expected less capability and 29 percent more capability for the Group of Twenty (G20). 

But respondents seemed to hold out even more hope for regional blocs and the BRICS, which is now expanding its membership beyond Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Forty percent of respondents predicted that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations will be more capable of fulfilling its mission by 2035, while 20 percent said the opposite. For the European Union, those figures were 40 percent and 33 percent. (Respondents from EU countries were even more optimistic, with 50 percent expecting greater capability and 22 percent less capability.) For the BRICS, the numbers were 43 percent and 31 percent. 

Expand to read expert insight by Josh Lipsky

The findings show in hard data what many analysts believe—that the international financial institutions, in particular the Bretton Woods institutions, remain the most functional parts of the multilateral system. That’s because they deliver real money every day to countries around the world. 

But the responses also show a growing recognition that these institutions are not self-perpetuating. The tenuous consensus that allows them to go about day-to-day business is predicated on an understanding that functioning IMF and World Bank institutions serve every country (including the United States) better than dysfunctional ones. With Donald Trump’s return to office, there are questions about whether that consensus will hold. For what it’s worth: The first time Trump was in office, it did, and Trump and his team saw the value in both institutions, even if they disagreed with some policy decisions. 

The one area of the findings that seems off-target is on the BRICS. The likelihood of the BRICS succeeding in fulfilling their main goals seems vastly overstated in these findings (likely a product of media reporting on BRICS expansion during 2023 and 2024). Here’s the question that is much tougher to answer: What do the BRICS actually want to achieve? What they oppose—the Western-led system—is clear. But what is their proactive agenda? Until they answer that question, the ability of BRICS to succeed as an institution will be limited at best.   

—Josh Lipsky, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center 

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9. Today’s democratic recession may deepen into a democratic depression

Overall, respondents appeared gloomy about the prospects for democracy around the world by 2035. Just under half envisioned the current “democratic recession” worsening and becoming a “democratic depression,” while only 17 percent anticipated a “democratic renaissance” instead. The remaining 37 percent expected the global state of democracy to remain much as it is today, with some encouraging progress but also considerable headwinds and backsliding. 

Sixty-five percent of respondents also forecast that global press freedoms will decrease by 2035, with another quarter expecting them to stay about the same as they are today and very few anticipating those freedoms increasing over the coming decade. 

Our question on the state of global democracy in our previous survey was not identical and therefore not directly comparable. Nevertheless, its results—24 percent expected more democracies a decade hence, 38 percent forecast fewer democracies, and another 37 percent foresaw stasis—presaged the dim outlook expressed in our latest survey. 

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10. Women are more pessimistic about the global future than men are 

Women notably expressed a bleaker outlook across many questions in the survey related to conflict, their own rights, and US clout over the next decade. 

For instance, 61 percent of female respondents predicted that nuclear weapons will be used in the coming decade, compared with 44 percent of male respondents who said the same. Women (54 percent) were also more likely than men (44 percent) to expect a democratic depression. Thirty-two percent of women pointed to women as the most likely group to have their rights curtailed in the coming decade—twice the proportion of men who gave the same answer. Women, moreover, were less likely than men to envision the United States as the world’s dominant military power (58 percent relative to 76 percent) and technological innovator (47 percent relative to 61 percent) in a decade’s time.  

Expand to read expert insight by Nicole Goldin

The pessimism from women likely reflects persistent inequities in military, economic, and political representation and participation, as well as the disproportionate impacts of crises and shocks—whether those are economic (like inflation), security-related (from wars such as those in Ukraine or Gaza), the result of political turmoil or transition, or the product of natural disasters and climate events.

Compounding these situations are the challenges of child or family care and pay gaps, which limit the work and earnings of many women, and worsening domestic and gender-based violence, which devastates women’s lives in all dimensions. In the United States, the rollback of Roe v. Wade has left many women believing their rights and protection more broadly are at risk.

—Nicole Goldin, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and head of equitable development at United Nations University Centre for Policy Research 

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About the authors

Mary Kate Aylward, Publications Editor, Atlantic Council

Aylward was an editor at War on the Rocks and Army AL&T before joining the Council. She was previously a junior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Peter Engelke, Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

Engelke is on the adjunct faculty at Georgetown University’s School of Continuing Studies and is a frequent lecturer to the US Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute. He was previously a member of the World Economic Forum’s Global Future Council on Complex Risks, an executive-in-residence at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, a Bosch fellow with the Robert Bosch Foundation, and a visiting fellow at the Stimson Center.

Uri Friedman, Senior Editorial Director, Atlantic Council

Friedman is also a contributing writer at The Atlantic, where he writes a regular column on international affairs. He was previously a senior staff writer at The Atlantic covering national security and global affairs, the editor of The Atlantic’s Global section, and the deputy managing editor of Foreign Policy magazine.

Paul Kielstra, Freelance Analyst

Kielstra is a freelance author who has published extensively in fields including business analysis, healthcare, energy policy, fraud control, international trade, and international relations. His work regularly includes the drafting and analysis of large surveys, along with desk research, expert interviews, and scenario building. His clients have included the Atlantic Council, the Economist Group, the Financial Times Group, the World Health Organization, and Kroll. Kielstra holds a doctorate in modern history from the University of Oxford, a graduate diploma in economics from the London School of Economics, and a bachelor of arts from the University of Toronto. He is also a published historian.

Global Foresight 2025

In this year’s Global Foresight edition, our experts share findings from our survey of global strategists on how human affairs could unfold over the next decade. Our team of next-generation scholars spot “snow leopards” that could have major unexpected impacts in 2025 and beyond. And our foresight practitioners imagine three different scenarios for the next decade.

Learn More Full Survey

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Welcome to 2035: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts

In the fall of 2024 after the outcome of the US presidential election, the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security surveyed the future, asking leading global strategists and foresight practitioners around the world to answer our most burning questions about the biggest drivers of change over the next ten years. Here are the full results.

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Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2025

By Emily Milliken, Imran Bayoumi, Ginger Matchett, Srujan Palkar, Sydney Sherry

Atlantic Council foresight experts spot the underappreciated phenomena that could have outsized impact on the world, driving global change and shaping the future.

Civil Society Climate Change & Climate Action

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Three worlds in 2035: Imagining scenarios for how the world could be transformed over the next decade

2024 was marked by increased climate shocks and collaboration of autocratic adversaries. What will the world look like in the next decade? The Atlantic Council’s top experts brought their globe-spanning expertise to the task of forecasting three different scenarios for the future.

Africa China

The post Welcome to 2035: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts appeared first on Atlantic Council.

By Peter Engelke, Greg Lindsay, and Paul Saffo

Welcome to three possible worlds in the year 2035. As resident and non-resident senior fellows in the Atlantic Council’s foresight practice, we produced these scenarios by assessing how current trends and uncertainties across a variety of categories—including geopolitics, the economy, demography, the environment, technology, and society—might interact with one another in the years to come. 

These are not forecasts or predictions of what the future will bring. Instead, these scenarios are intended to inspire imagination and spur readers to consider possible futures, including future worlds that do not align with the readers’ expectations. To paraphrase a sentiment often expressed by the physicist and futurist Herman Kahn, the point of working with future scenarios is to find out what you don’t know and should know but that you didn’t even know you didn’t know. 

We invite readers to interpret these scenarios in that spirit. Consider the interplay among the cause-and-effect elements that lead to each of the potential future worlds, as well as the myriad other possible scenarios that could emerge in the years to come.

Perhaps the world of 2035 might vaguely resemble one of the three scenarios presented here, but that is not the central purpose of this exercise. The primary reason why we crafted these scenarios is to generate deeper insights into how today’s actions and inactions might create a better or worse world ten years from now.

The reluctant international order

Global governance has never been more complicated than it is in 2035. But although the problems are complex, thus far the governance landscape is proving capable of containing at least some of them, as occurred several years ago when we endured a near-miss catastrophe from a bioweapon-fueled pandemic.  

We might not be experiencing the halcyon days of a revitalized multilateralism, but thankfully we’re also not inhabiting a kill-or-be-killed nihilistic hellscape. We seem to be living through what some commentators are now calling the “Reluctant International Order.” 

Let’s begin with what has not happened: neither the much-feared collapse nor the much-hoped-for revitalization of what often is called the rules-based international order (we’ll use the acronym “RBIO”). Which means that neither the 1930s nor the 1990s have returned.  

The international order that the United States and its allies created and maintained after 1945 delivered benefits for decades—benefits that were admittedly partial and often uneven but nonetheless real. Embedded within the RBIO are norms, such as non-aggression toward other countries and respect for human rights, that are laudable ideals. And at its core are multilateral institutions, including the United Nations (UN), World Bank, and World Health Organization (WHO), which were designed to contain conflict, assist with economic development, anticipate and then manage crises of various kinds, and provide some governance in an otherwise anarchic world. The whole order is premised on the notion that international cooperation, combined with the open exchange of ideas and goods, will lead to a better and more peaceful world. 

Yet there has long been dissatisfaction with the RBIO. Today, as before, many countries are unhappy with the RBIO and seek to upend or reform it. China and Russia, the two most powerful and vocal of these states, have remained steadfast in their opposition to at least parts of this order, although it also has become clear that their ends are not identical. A decade ago, both began to join with North Korea and Iran to form a grouping that was labeled an “axis of aggressors” because of widespread concern about those countries coordinating to directly challenge the West and the international order, militarily and otherwise. Numerous other countries, often middle and emerging powers in the so-called Global South have sought, at a minimum, to modify the RBIO. These states—with India and Brazil the most prominent examples—have accused the RBIO of being unrepresentative and its defenders of being hypocritical because of their selective application of the order’s underpinning norms. Even the core group of democratic nations that historically defended the order, including the United States, often have acted against the RBIO when it suited their interests. 

Resilient rules

Despite all this, the various challenges to the RBIO have never been powerful enough to destroy it. Neither the axis of aggressors nor the partnership between China and Russia ever amounted to real military alliances, reflecting weak rather than strong bonds among them. These revisionist states have acted in disjointed fashion, as a result of their divergent interests, and never staged a coordinated attempt to directly confront the West. Partly for that reason, there has been no global war and thus no wholesale shock that reset the global governance system, as occurred after World War II.  

Russia emerged from its war against Ukraine (which ended in a negotiated peace in 2026) far weaker than it was when the conflict began, and it has yet to sufficiently recover to mount another similar challenge westward in Europe. China has made no overt move to seize control of Taiwan either. Evidently, Chinese President Xi Jinping has decided he does not want to gamble his country’s future in a confrontation with the United States, which after all remains a great economic and military power with a formidable nuclear deterrent. (The United States’ increased investment in defense of the Western Pacific also appears to have influenced Xi’s calculations.) It does not help China that Russia is a much-debilitated junior partner. 

The case of Taiwan is important for another reason. It underscores that, so far, China and the United States have decided that coexistence is the preferable direction for their relationship, which has prevented the international system from collapsing altogether. Their rivalry has been channeled through other pathways short of war, including diplomatic efforts to curry favor abroad and support for various minilateral and multilateral institutions. And they’ve found, more than occasionally, that their interests actually intersect. In the realm of nuclear nonproliferation, for example, both China and the United States have continued working in tandem to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, albeit by utilizing very different mechanisms and forms of leverage. 

But while the RBIO has not collapsed—meaning there has been no repeat of the era between World War I and World War II—it also has not been revitalized. There has been no return to a triumphalist end of history, no 1990s-style heyday wherein major and middle powers mostly work in concordance with one another toward peaceful and prosperous coexistence within what they perceive as a benign set of global norms and institutions. Hence the increasing references to a “Reluctant International Order,” if meant in jest. 

What has happened instead has been an evolution rather than a revolution, characterized more by experimentation and incrementalism than by some jarring disruption. This has occurred because the world’s problems demand coordinated responses even for countries reluctant to do so and because those countries recognize that the opportunity costs of not engaging are so high.  

Today, the outward institutional trappings of the RBIO remain in place. The UN continues its work as before, partially because China does not want to destroy it. (The UN’s embrace of state sovereignty, for example, appeals to China’s interests.) Global trade is still growing, despite the tariff wars of the mid-to-late 2020s, owing in part to technological developments that have continued to lower the cost of trade. And the norms underpinning the RBIO haven’t disappeared, either, since many around the world—national and sub-national governments, civil-society and non-profit organizations, grassroots groups and ordinary citizens—want to preserve them and continue to see value in cooperative approaches to transnational problems. 

Trading places

Consider trade. More than a decade ago, many nations began curtailing their exposure to global trade flows out of justifiable concern that trade was having detrimental impacts on their security, economies, and societies. Yet despite extensive anti-globalization rhetoric and policies (with the tariff wars the best example), the prevailing perception is that the benefits of trade continue to outweigh the costs. China and the United States, for instance, still have one of the largest bilateral trade relationships of any two countries in the world, despite their now lengthy history of trade disputes, including tariffs and a range of trade restrictions in sensitive technologies.  

The leaders of many countries have realized that they have a compelling interest in remaining engaged in trade and talks to increase trade. This has resulted in the creation, maintenance, or expansion of a number of regional free-trade agreements. Several of these efforts have proven quite successful, perhaps best illustrated by the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Over the past fifteen years, African states have joined with the African Union to extend and deepen AfCFTA and, in so doing, to realize several of its longer-term objectives such as the reduction of intra-continental tariffs and loosening of visa restrictions. The case of AfCFTA and others like it—for instance, strengthened trade agreements between the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Asian countries—underscore that while global trade volume has grown since the mid-2020s, the geography of trade continues to shift.   

Nonstate actors have been critical to the maintenance of this system. Multinational companies around the world have made their support for trade well-known, which has helped compel countries to continue defining their interests in pro-trade terms. 

Bioweapon-inspired cooperation

Nothing underscored both the value of cooperation and the powers (positive and negative) of nonstate actors like the 2029 bioweapon scare.  

That year, a shadowy, transnational doomsday cult—akin to Aum Shinrikyo, which terrorized Japan with sarin gas in 1995—used an artificial intelligence (AI)-enhanced synthetic biology (“SynBio”) process to develop a deadlier and more easily transmissible strain of smallpox. Because the cult’s plot to release it was foiled at the last minute, owing to frantic collaboration among national intelligence services and INTERPOL, the world narrowly avoided a pandemic that would have been far worse than the COVID-19 pandemic.  

Horrified by this close call, most of the world’s governments—including the United States, China, and Russia—grasped for solutions. Since pandemics do not respect boundaries, world leaders recognized that there was an upper limit on how much they could protect their people on their own. In response, they quickly sought to deepen collaboration with one another and with leading multilateral public-health institutions such as the WHO, multinational corporations including companies that develop major AI platforms, and the global scientific community that sets standards and runs laboratories. The mandate was clear: Determine how to monitor and regulate the biotechnology space more effectively—or risk perhaps hundreds of millions dying in an AI-enhanced, SynBio-caused (“AIxBio”) pandemic along the lines that the doomsday cult had almost willed into existence.  

One of this new coalition’s proposals, which was quickly funded and implemented, was to create an institution similar to the International Atomic Energy Agency but focused on AIxBio. Its formal membership is based on a novel multi-stakeholder model that includes national governments, big-tech firms, and scientific organizations.  

The smallpox bioweapon scare vividly illustrated, even for adversarial major powers, the intolerably high risk of countries not engaging with one another through international institutions and on international norms to address the world’s greatest challenges—and on the enduring relevance and value of the RBIO ninety years after its creation. Halting progress in some areas of the international system doesn’t qualify as a renaissance. But even a Reluctant International Order is better than retreat. 

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China ascendant

Welcome to 2035, and a world whose center of gravity has shifted decisively toward Beijing.  

China now has more influence on world affairs than does any other country, including the United States. It is ascendant on every metric of power—diplomatic, military, economic, and technological. That power has enabled Beijing to begin remaking the world to its liking. It has been busy recasting the global system, including multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN), in its preferred image, and is in the process of dismantling the democratic norms that have animated the international order since 1945.  

China has arrived at this ascendant position in part because the United States has not done much to stand in its way. At the turn of this century, such an outcome would have been impossible to imagine. Even a decade ago, when Washington’s commitment to the rules-based international order showed initial signs of wavering, such an outcome would have been difficult to forecast. But US leaders have been consumed by the challenges of dealing with the country’s weakening economy, fraying societal bonds, and unrelentingly harsh domestic politics. These dynamics have eliminated the longstanding bipartisan consensus around defending the global order that the United States, along with its many allies and partners, had built and maintained for decades.  

The result has been that the United States no longer has an unwavering commitment to its allies and partners, the core multilateral institutions at the center of the order that it built, and the norms and principles that it stood behind all those years. Instead, the United States has definitively turned inward. By nearly every metric, the United States remains a major power. But it no longer has much interest in maintaining its leadership role in the world. It has ceded that ground to others, especially to China. 

Taiwan-style tipping points

The impact of the US withdrawal from global affairs is evident in various flashpoints around the world, including in Taiwan. While the prevailing fear in the 2010s and early 2020s was of a devastating clash between the United States and China over the island, the Taiwan issue was resolved without firing a shot. China subordinated Taiwan by applying intense pressure—via sabotage, cyber operations, propaganda campaigns, overt and covert influence campaigns within Taiwan, espionage, murky hybrid operations on the island and around its waters—to influence Taiwanese domestic politics toward a cross-Straits settlement with the People’s Republic of China. Its efforts to shape domestic politics within Taiwan succeeded. In 2030, Taiwan’s government agreed to (among other things) such a settlement, which included ceasing defense cooperation with foreign governments and reducing Taiwan’s direct engagement with foreign officials. The United States, which did not respond to China’s various forms of pressure against Taiwan, ultimately could not prevent the cross-Straits agreement, given the Taiwanese government’s support for it. None of China’s individual provocations were dramatic enough for an already hesitant United States to risk a direct military confrontation with China over it.  

What happened in Taiwan has also played out on a global scale. There was no one exceptional event or even set of events that triggered a transformation of the international system—no explosion that China engineered to blow up the global order. Thus, there never was a single focal point for China’s rivals—especially the United States—to rally their citizens around and respond to in a coordinated and decisive way. Rather, there has been a gradual and now inexorable shift away from the US-led order and toward a Chinese-led one. This shift resulted from decisions made by both US and Chinese leaders: inward-looking in the case of the former, outward-looking in the case of the latter. It was, in short, a slow-motion fait accompli. 

China has positioned itself as the world’s inevitable leader, seizing on its strengths to curry favor with other countries and on the opportunity presented by the United States’ implosion to diminish its rival. Take the performance of the two countries’ economies as an example. A decade ago, the economic outlook was bleaker for China than it was for the United States. But over the past ten years, that script has flipped. In the mid-2020s, Chinese President Xi Jinping managed to right China’s sputtering economy, stabilizing it and returning it to steady growth (if less spectacular growth than during the country’s long boom). He did so by successfully transitioning the country to what many are now calling “an innovation system with Chinese characteristics,” striking a balance of rewarding innovation and entrepreneurialism while maintaining the Chinese Communist Party’s control over the nation’s political apparatus.  

All this has enabled China to return to selling itself and its economic rebound on the one hand, plus the United States’ economic stagnation (due to dysfunctional politics) on the other, as a compelling reason why the United States is both unreliable and a poor economic model for the rest of the world, and by extension why China represents a better model. That message has even more resonance around the world now than it did ten years ago.  

Because of the pull of China’s growing economy, which remains integrated within global trade flows, plus the relative weakness of the US economy, foreign governments have become more willing to sign onto China’s various economic diplomacy efforts, such as the Global Development Initiative. Beijing now hosts a robust schedule of international economic forums that position it at the center of the economic universe, and thus as the destination for intergovernmental bargaining and influence on issues such as trade and investment. To outside observers, the economic pull of Beijing has eclipsed that of Washington and, for that matter, of Brussels, London, Paris, Seoul, or Tokyo.  

As a result, China’s influence has grown in many parts of the world. In the Global South, lower- and middle-income countries in Africa, Latin America, and South Asia (where China remains engaged with India in a long-running contest for influence) have been even more eager to trade with and receive investment from China than they were in the 2020s. This outcome is the product of years (in some cases decades) of aggressive economic diplomacy by China and disinterest from the US government. It also stemmed from reform to China’s overseas lending and investment vehicles, which China recognized needed fine-tuning to make them more palatable abroad and deflect rising criticism of the unsustainable debt and other problems they engendered. Thus far, these policy shifts appear to have worked. China has also become the world’s largest trading nation for both imports and exports, ahead of the United States. Shifting trade in goods also has accelerated movement away from trade denominated in US dollars and toward trade denominated in renminbi—a sure sign of the relative strengths of the two economies.  

For China, the advantages are enormous: more wealth at home and influence abroad. China’s diplomatic ties with major materials exporters such as Brazil (soybeans and other crops), the Gulf Cooperation Council states (oil), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (critical minerals such as cobalt) have increased. For the United States, the reverse has been true. For the average American, wages and incomes have stagnated, and imported goods are more expensive. Abroad, US goods are less competitive in foreign markets than Chinese goods are.   

Allies hedging 

The United States still has numerous allies and partners, but the bonds that held them together are weaker now than they were in the past owing to the rise of China and the self-induced retreat of the United States. 

In Asia, nervous US allies including Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines are hedging between China and the United States in more ways than they were in the 2020s. But now, having witnessed what happened in Taiwan, these countries are even more concerned about the security guarantee that the United States has provided to them. Both Japan and South Korea have admitted that they are exploring options to acquire nuclear weapons in order to deter China and North Korea, and most analysts expect both to become nuclear-weapons states by 2040. Various forms of US-led minilateral diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific such as the Quad have died slow deaths, the result of both US indifference and Asian countries’ doubts about the value of these efforts to counter and contain a rising China. India, for example, believes it can achieve more through its own bilateral actions to check Chinese influence than it can by working through such forums.  

Also contributing to the deep unease of US allies is the growth of China’s military in size and capabilities, and its increasing forward presence in the Asia-Pacific and elsewhere around the world. China has been steadily increasing its number of basing agreements globally to the point where, just as US intelligence services feared a decade ago, China now has bases in Africa, South Asia, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and the islands in the Pacific and Indian oceans.  

A similar story is playing out in Europe, albeit focused on a different threat. There, European NATO members are arming themselves rapidly, spending well above the 2 percent of gross domestic product threshold for defense spending that Washington had been requesting for decades. Although that amounts to a victory of sorts for US foreign policy, it really is a defeat because the spending is an expression of serious doubt about the United States’ commitment to NATO and the Alliance’s Article 5 collective-defense pledge should war come again to the continent. Although the previous war in Ukraine ended in a negotiated stalemate, most European observers believe that it is only a matter of time before a rearmed and resurgent Russia decides to test NATO, likely through a long-feared invasion focused on the Baltics.  

In this climate, many are pinning their hopes on Beijing rather than Washington, believing that China will restrain Russia, its junior partner, from going on the offensive in Europe. Partly for this reason, and the fact that China is now Europe’s largest trading partner (having surpassed the United States in the early 2030s), European leaders have muted their criticisms of China’s record on human rights, including privacy rights, and have eased China’s access to the common market despite ongoing concerns about dumping, intellectual-property theft, and other such practices.  

Institutional shifts 

In part because China never has been interested in tearing down the entire international system and replacing it with something else entirely, few Western leaders have paid much attention to how China has been busy recasting these institutions in its image. And indeed, the UN system and the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and International Monetary Fund) continue, with China maintaining its representation in them as it has for decades.  

But there have been important changes within the UN system. Recently, for instance, China has been far more successful than it was in previous decades at getting its appointees installed within various technical standard-setting bodies such as the UN’s International Telecommunication Union—a function of China’s unrelenting focus on these specialized bureaucracies plus its rising economic, scientific, and technological prowess.  

Or consider the UN’s historic role in maintaining peace and security. China was long willing to support UN peacekeeping operations around the world by providing troops and funds, at least to an extent. Yet with the United States and its democratic allies among the UN Security Council’s five permanent members—France and the United Kingdom—now far less willing to spearhead these operations, China has yet to pick up the leadership mantle. China remains willing to contribute to peacekeeping but generally not to lead large-scale efforts, whether in terms of the Security Council’s broad peacekeeping mandates or the financial, human, and technical resources necessary to build them. The result has been fewer such operations and weaker ones as well, leaving more of the world’s conflicts to devolve and even in some cases metastasize.  

Perhaps the most worrisome change has to do with the norms and principles that underpin the global system—both within the UN and more generally as well. Although China expresses support for some of the system’s principles—for example, the UN’s emphasis on state sovereignty and territorial integrity—it manifestly does not support others and especially those based upon democratic values. As a result, serious emphasis on human rights and related norms, as well as global oversight of them, has collapsed within multilateral institutions, including the UN.  

These developments are having real, on-the-ground impact. China has successfully built a more robust surveillance apparatus globally that includes more sophisticated cyber-espionage operations capable of tracking the communications of ordinary people around the world, along with a major expansion of China’s overseas police stations. The Chinese government claims that these stations are designed only to service the Chinese diaspora, but their true purpose seems to be to keep track of and pressure both the diaspora and China’s external critics as well.   

The erosion of global human-rights enforcement speaks to a broader trend: The so-called democratic recession that has been plaguing the world since the early 2000s is now bordering on a depression. With China ascendant, the world’s autocratic leaders are acting with greater confidence at home and abroad. Midway through the 2030s, the long-running contest between democratic and authoritarian systems appears to be resolving—in favor of the latter. 

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Climate of fear

In 2035, the Earth’s climate is hotter and less stable than it’s ever been in human history. This instability is causing people to turn on one another—and politics to become more abrasive than it was a decade ago. Climate-driven turbulence is making nearly every other problem—be it geopolitical or conflict-related—harder to solve. These challenges transcend national boundaries and afflict every country, whether rich or poor, to the north or south. Numerous local conflicts and one tense regional standoff (in South Asia) have been fueled by the consequences of a changing climate. 

These trends have produced some positive outcomes as well, but in the 2030s it’s difficult to foresee a bright future. As a result, many are looking to radical solutions to get humanity out of its predicament. 

Ecological crisis

There is almost no good news to be found in the natural world. A range of climate-induced problems are all worse than they were a decade ago. Observable, on-the-ground environmental changes have consistently outpaced scientists’ predictions from twenty or even ten years ago.  

The data indicates that several climate tipping points—including the drying of the Amazon rainforest, the melting of the West Antarctic ice sheet, and the ongoing slowing of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation system, which regulates temperatures and precipitation in Europe, Africa, and elsewhere—are nearer than we previously thought. Scientists’ modeling, based on real-world data in the 2030s, now points even more strongly toward one or more of these or other critical systems collapsing in the next few decades. When these systems begin to collapse, there will be no practical way back from truly horrific ecological disasters.  

Even short of such disasters, the world today lacks the capacity to adjust quickly enough to the climate impacts that are here already. Chronic heat is a problem nearly everywhere in the world, with lengthy heat waves now routine on every continent—including on Antarctica, where record highs, well above freezing, are increasingly common. Most frightening is the rapid increase in “wet bulb” days in some regions near the equator, where high heat plus high humidity make it impossible for humans to survive for long outdoors. Massive storms—flash flooding in the wake of record-breaking torrential rainfall, for example, or hurricanes and cyclones that strike well inland—are commonplace now as well. Several coastal cities around the world, including Bangkok, Miami, and Jakarta, regularly flood, even more frequently than they did a decade ago. In 2029, China’s low-lying Pearl River Delta was hit by a massive typhoon that crippled the region’s manufacturing output for months, disrupting global supply chains. 

These developments have numerous second- and third-order consequences. The world’s forests, for example, have become tinderboxes, which means that firefighting has become a significant part of national-security planning for an ever-lengthening list of the world’s governments. 

(Geo)political upheaval

Politics and geopolitics are changing with the natural world, largely for the worse. Climate change has weakened the world’s democracies, which already had suffered through decades of decline. From Spain and Greece to South Africa, Nepal, and Panama, storms and suffocating heat waves have disrupted elections by making it harder for some voters to cast their ballots. Such events have also affected who participates in elections in the first place, given how they have influenced the outflows and inflows of people through cities and countries, and the voter registration and verification problems that have followed.  

Many years ago, when climate-driven migration was first hypothesized in the scientific literature, few paid attention. Not so today, as fears about the consequences of so-called climate migrants or climate refugees have generated real policies involving real people. These fears often have been based on lurid imagination about crime and chaos rather than on facts.

In 2035, there are an estimated 150 million migrants worldwide who are either temporarily displaced or permanently on the move because of climate impacts, although no one knows the true number because migration is such a complex, multifaceted phenomenon. Yet everyone agrees that more migrants are coming.  

Most climate-driven migration remains within national boundaries, often coming in the form of rural-to-urban migration into cities such as Bogotá and Karachi. Or it is intra-regional migration within areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia. Such trends are also occurring within wealthy regions and countries such as the United States.  

These migration patterns have reminded many of the Syrian crisis of the early 2010s, which was preceded by drought-stressed migrants fleeing the countryside for the cities. Although that internal migration likely was only an indirect cause of the subsequent uprising against the Assad regime—which lasted well over a decade and ultimately resulted in the regime’s overthrow—many now see repetition of that past. They point to how climate-fueled internal displacements have increased recruitment into armed nonstate groups. They note the increasing number of communities around the world where climate impacts have exacerbated preexisting vulnerabilities to cause local conflicts, too many of which have started to become deadly. And they cite the increasing number of failed and failing states resulting in part from climate-driven disasters such as intense, multi-year drought. 

Governments have responded through pull-up-the-drawbridges measures—and not just in Europe or the United States, where one might expect that to happen, but around the world, including within the Global South. Border walls designed to keep migrants out were already widespread ten years ago. They are everywhere now.  

India, for example, has clamped down on its borders with Bangladesh and Myanmar, heavily fortifying them with more personnel, fencing, sophisticated electronic-surveillance systems, and autonomous enforcement technologies such as drones. Numerous critics, both within India and outside of it, have voiced objections, but the Indian government insists that it is only doing what its voters want. This has led to a volatile diplomatic situation in South Asia. Pakistan, which long ago patched up its relations with Bangladesh, has joined Bangladesh and Myanmar in loudly and publicly pushing India to reverse its border policies, to no avail. The region is not at war, nor is there an immediate risk of one. But it is at a knife’s edge, with climate-driven migration having become one of the biggest sources of friction. 

Turbulence-induced transformations

There are some bright spots in this otherwise discouraging picture. Renewables are now firmly established as the world’s dominant sources of energy, reflecting both their market competitiveness and the rapid electrification of the global economy. And nuclear energy has begun making a comeback in much of the world, with the latest reactor designs now seen as safely providing reliable, zero-emission electricity. (New power plants, however, remain rare.) In addition, green-technology markets are expanding rapidly across many industries such as food, water, energy, transportation, and consumer goods. Nearly a third of the world’s stock of cars and trucks is fully electric. 

The challenge lies in the rate at which decarbonization is occurring—a pace that simply has not been fast enough. Although global greenhouse-gas emissions finally peaked in the late 2020s, humankind nonetheless surpassed the carbon budget required to stay within the target of keeping global warming above pre-industrial levels to 1.5 degrees Celsius, as laid out in the 2015 Paris Agreement. Scientists had prioritized staying below this target to limit the worst impacts of climate change.  

One of the factors contributing to this challenge is that much of the world’s legacy energy infrastructure remains in place. Decommissioning such infrastructure, particularly coal and natural-gas plants, is expensive. Too many of the world’s high-carbon plants still exist, especially coal-fired power plants concentrated in China.  

Behind all this is global energy consumption, which has continued to rise fast, consistently outstripping renewables’ capacity to fully meet the demand. (A challenge here is that interest rates for borrowing in riskier storm-affected regions have increased, constraining the expansion of capital-intensive renewables such as offshore wind farms.) There are many drivers of this increasing demand, including technological developments such as advances in artificial intelligence (AI). As was feared in the mid-2020s, the infrastructure necessary to support AI’s growth—in the form of computing power and data centers—boosted global energy demand. Although tech companies have greened their models, the problem is about scale: AI’s ubiquity translates into a massive source of energy usage. Some tech companies have become players in the nuclear-energy space for this reason. 

As they navigate this turbulence, and as already foreshadowed in the 2020s, both right- and left-wing populist governments are no longer reflexively hostile to policies to combat climate change like they once were. There is renewed interest in accelerating decarbonization efforts, including revitalizing the moribund United Nations-led process for mitigating climate change.  

Another response to the unsustainable status quo has been the embrace of more radical solutions. Geoengineering—and specifically solar radiation modification (SRM), which refers to atmospheric and even space-based efforts to reduce warming by reflecting sunlight back into space—has rapidly gone from a scientific curiosity to a subject of serious research. Although SRM engineering is complex, compared with other approaches it is straightforward and inexpensive. As a result, already in 2035 both state and nonstate actors are experimenting with SRM in the atmosphere. There is great fear that the implementation of these new approaches will be a nightmare, as for-profit companies, tech billionaires, and rogue states initiate their own unilateral solutions, while countries fight over the expected (but dimly understood) impacts on their regions. Although the scientific community is warning that SRM’s consequences aren’t yet sufficiently understood, there is a growing sentiment among many (though not all) politicians that it should be tried at scale. But everyone is asking whether effective geoengineering is even possible without some sort of global governance and regulatory regime.  

Meanwhile, the clock is ticking and the climate is changing. Humankind’s efforts to master the natural world during the post-industrial era produced the climate crisis. Now, in 2035, the Earth increasingly seems the master of human affairs rather than the other way around.  

⏎ Return to top

Peter Engelke, Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

Engelke is on the adjunct faculty at Georgetown University’s School of Continuing Studies and is a frequent lecturer to the US Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute. He was previously a member of the World Economic Forum’s Global Future Council on Complex Risks, an executive-in-residence at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, a Bosch fellow with the Robert Bosch Foundation, and a visiting fellow at the Stimson Center.

Greg Lindsay, Nonresident Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

Lindsay is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s GeoStrategy Initiative, as well as a nonresident senior fellow of the Arizona State University Threatcasting Lab and the MIT Future Urban Collectives Lab.

Paul Saffo, Nonresident Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

Saffo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s GeoStrategy Initiative and co-editor of Futures Research Methodologies, which will be released later this year.

Global Foresight 2025

In this year’s Global Foresight edition, our experts share findings from our survey of global strategists on how human affairs could unfold over the next decade. Our team of next-generation scholars spot “snow leopards” that could have major unexpected impacts in 2025 and beyond. And our foresight practitioners imagine three different scenarios for the next decade.

Learn More Full Survey

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Welcome to 2035: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts

In the fall of 2024 after the outcome of the US presidential election, the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security surveyed the future, asking leading global strategists and foresight practitioners around the world to answer our most burning questions about the biggest drivers of change over the next ten years. Here are the full results.

Read More

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2025

By Emily Milliken, Imran Bayoumi, Ginger Matchett, Srujan Palkar, Sydney Sherry

Atlantic Council foresight experts spot the underappreciated phenomena that could have outsized impact on the world, driving global change and shaping the future.

Civil Society Climate Change & Climate Action

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Three worlds in 2035: Imagining scenarios for how the world could be transformed over the next decade

2024 was marked by increased climate shocks and collaboration of autocratic adversaries. What will the world look like in the next decade? The Atlantic Council’s top experts brought their globe-spanning expertise to the task of forecasting three different scenarios for the future.

Africa China

The post Three worlds in 2035: Imagining scenarios for how the world could be transformed over the next decade appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On February 3, T.X. Hammes, a nonresident senior fellow at Forward Defense, wrote with Captain R. Robinson Harris, US Navy (ret.) in the US Naval Institute’s Proceedings, that deploying containerized weapons on merchant ships would bolster the US Navy’s capacity to manage the growing threat from China.

Fellow

Thomas X. Hammes

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Conflict Defense Industry

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post T.X. Hammes proposes containerized weapons for US Navy merchant fleet in US Naval Institute Proceedings appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Once known as an “island of peace,” Ecuador has become a cautionary tale of how quickly a country can be destabilized by the corrupting power of organized crime, illicit trade, and weak institutions. The next president will inherit a country in crisis, facing the challenges of rebuilding trust in government and addressing the surge of crime that has made Ecuador the most violent country in the region—all while battling an economic recession.

Security and economic crises

In 2024, Ecuador achieved the dubious distinction of becoming the number one exporter of cocaine in Latin America and the Caribbean to Europe—a shocking turnaround for a country that doesn’t produce much of the drug itself. Sandwiched between the world’s two largest coca producers—Colombia to the north and Peru to the south—Ecuador is strategically located as a transit hub for international drug-trafficking networks. Criminal organizations associated with Mexico’s Jalisco Nueva Generación and Sinaloa cartels, Colombia’s Cali Cartel, and mafias in Europe, among other criminal groups, have exploited the country’s weak institutions and porous borders. Ecuador has become a hub to move drugs to international markets via small planes, speedboats, and even commercial seaports.

The consequences have been catastrophic. Nearly seven thousand people in Ecuador were killed in 2024 alone, making it the second deadliest year in the country’s history. An estimated 95,000 people fled the country last year, and territorial battles between gangs backed by overseas cartels have turned entire neighborhoods into war zones. Despite more than thirty-five states of emergency declared across three administrations and the militarization of conflict zones under the current president, Daniel Noboa, the security crisis is far from resolved.

Corruption has also permeated various levels of government, with police, military, judges, and prosecutors often linked to criminal networks. State institutions are weak, underfunded, and poorly coordinated, while law enforcement agencies’ capabilities are largely outdated and ill-equipped to combat sophisticated organized crime operations. This issue is further exacerbated by the rampant recruitment of children and adolescents from marginalized neighborhoods into organized crime, lured by the promise of money, weapons, and power.

Economic conditions offer little hope that the security crisis will improve. Ecuador’s economy contracted by 1.5 percent in the third quarter of 2024 compared to the same period the previous year, and the country faces a significant fiscal deficit. The next president will have to address the security crisis while attempting to rebuild an economy teetering on the brink of collapse.

A high-stakes but fragmented election

While security is the top concern for Ecuadorians, the upcoming election has offered little clarity on how the candidates plan to address the crisis. The field is fragmented, with sixteen candidates vying for the presidency, thirteen of whom poll below 3 percent. The race is expected to come down to a contest between the incumbent president, Noboa, and opposition candidate Luisa González. However, neither has presented a detailed security strategy or a comprehensive roadmap to address Ecuador’s urgent challenges.

Noboa’s campaign has been clouded by controversy. His year-and-a-half-long tenure has been marked by multiple crises, including the declaration of an internal armed conflict against twenty-two criminal gangs, widespread energy shortages that left cities without power for up to fourteen hours a day, and public disputes with Vice President Veronica Abad. Noboa’s approval rating plummeted from 72 percent in January 2024 to 45.9 percent by the end of the year. While his campaign portrays his administration as a force for change, critics question his commitment to democratic norms and point to his controversial political alliances. Notably, Noboa’s appearance at US President Donald Trump’s inauguration on January 20 gave his candidacy a significant boost in the polls and garnered extensive coverage in the Ecuadorian media.

In another strategic move, Noboa hosted a lunch on January 29 with Venezuelan opposition politician Edmundo González, whom the government of Ecuador officially recognizes as Venezuela’s elected president. Noboa also extended invitations to four Ecuadorian prefects and two mayors from the opposition party Movimiento Revolución Ciudadana. However, the opposition party has not acknowledged González as Venezuela’s president, and none of them accepted the invitations. This allowed Noboa to criticize their stance on authoritarian regimes and the Venezuelan crisis, an issue that has heavily impacted Ecuador, which has taken in nearly half a million Venezuelan refugees.

On the other hand, Luisa González, the Ecuadorian opposition candidate for Movimiento Revolución Ciudadana, has focused her campaign on nostalgia for her party’s years in power under former President Rafael Correa. This was a period when crime rates were lower and the economy was stronger. But her association with Correa—who remains in exile in Brussels after being convicted of corruption—has also limited her appeal. While she resonates with older voters who remember Correa’s presidency fondly, she has struggled to connect with younger voters, who make up 25 percent of the electorate and demand fresh ideas and solutions.

A forward-looking approach to Ecuador’s challenges

The next president will face the monumental task of dismantling the well-funded, highly connected operations of organized crime while restoring trust in government and revitalizing the economy. These challenges require more than the militarization of police forces or the declaration of states of emergency; they demand systemic reforms to strengthen state institutions, create opportunities for vulnerable populations, and root out the corruption that sustains criminal networks.

Ecuador cannot tackle this crisis on its own. The transnational nature of organized crime necessitates international cooperation, particularly with the United States, one of the world’s largest consumers of cocaine. The Trump administration has already shown that tackling drug cartels will be a focus of its diplomacy with Latin America—an agenda that could pave the way for closer collaboration with Ecuador. Both the United States and Ecuador have a shared interest in combating drug trafficking, stemming the flow of illicit trade, and addressing the violence and migration crises plaguing the region. Yet, this election could also determine Ecuador’s allies in this effort. While González has hinted at alignment with the BRICS nations—the grouping made up of Brazil, Russia, China, South Africa, and several countries that have joined in the past year—Noboa has sought stronger ties with the United States and the International Monetary Fund.

A sustainable solution must begin with reforming Ecuador’s fragmented and under-resourced law enforcement agencies. Establishing a specialized task force to apprehend high-value targets and strengthening international agreements both with neighboring countries and with the United States will be essential. Equally critical is addressing the root causes of crime—poverty, inequality, and lack of education—which have made Ecuador’s youth vulnerable to recruitment by criminal gangs. Faced with severe security and economic challenges that can’t be confronted alone, Ecuador’s next president will serve a four-year term, but their leadership will be pivotal in shaping the nation’s long-term trajectory.

Isabel Chiriboga is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post What Ecuador’s election will mean for the region’s fight against organized crime appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Trump’s pre-presidency was frenetic. Never a disciple of the “one president at a time” school, he injected himself aggressively into the spotlight, dispatching Steve Witkoff, his new Middle East envoy, to that region within weeks of the November election and threatening (amorphously) that there would be “ALL HELL TO PAY” unless hostages in Hamas custody were released by the time of his inauguration. Mike Waltz, Trump’s national security advisor, was quick to attribute Israel’s ceasefires with both Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza to the advent of a new administration.

Palpable apprehension in world capitals about what courses of action Trump might—or might not—pursue has been a powerful driver of events. However, the significance of January 20 as an inflection point cannot be overexaggerated. With Trump now ensconced firmly in the Oval Office, rhetoric alone will prove insufficient to induce tangible cooperation from the United States’ counterparts, who will be monitoring the pulse of his intentions rigorously.

Washington watchers in Jerusalem have been, unsurprisingly, surveying the appointments topography for clues to decipher Trumpland, but they have found its landscape equivocal. Israeli officials are encouraged by the nominations of friendlies Mike Huckabee and Elise Stefanik—as ambassadors to Israel and the United Nations, respectively—but diplomats are not policymakers, and the perspective of Trump’s executive cadre is by no means monolithic. The president himself has toggled in recent months between pledging to “stop all wars” and, on the other hand, telling Netanyahu to “do what you have to do” when it comes to Israel’s enemies. (Relations between the two leaders have known highs and lows.)

Soon after his victory, Trump unceremoniously disinvited Mike Pompeo and Nikki Haley, two trusted interlocutors of Israel during his previous tenure, from returning to his leadership team. That vacuum has been filled apparently by Waltz and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who both advocated on Capitol Hill for a strong US-Israel bond, but few other principals share their level of prior, high-level engagement with the intricate dynamics of that alliance. Meanwhile, senior bureaucratic echelons at the Pentagon—which has been an essential partner in enhancing Israel’s national security—are being populated by staffers who favor greater detachment from the Middle East.

It is against this backdrop that Netanyahu arrives in Washington to plead his case. His wish list from Trump will include US acquiescence for Israel to continue its campaign to dislodge Hamas rule from Gaza; normalization with Saudi Arabia; and a kinetic effort—or, at least, US backing for a potential solo Israeli endeavor—to terminate the threat of a nuclear Iran. The paradox of Netanyahu’s predicament is that Trump’s favorable disposition toward that agenda does not mean their approaches will be similarly aligned.

Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich—a stalwart critic of the current truce—is touting assurances from the prime minister to intensify the Gaza war and initiate “a gradual takeover” that ensures “humanitarian aid will not reach Hamas as it has been until now.” Smotrich, a proponent of exercising Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza, has also vowed repeatedly to scuttle any diplomatic breakthrough with Riyadh that would entail territorial concessions to the Palestinians. On the Iranian front, Israeli military planners are training their sights increasingly on the near term, before Tehran can recover from the blows that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has inflicted on its defenses and on its Hamas and Hezbollah proxies.

Those parameters are almost certain to conflict with the president’s thinking. By all accounts, Trump, as evidenced through Witkoff’s interventions, is interested actually in extending the suspension of combat in Gaza, for the sake of securing the release of all captives and stabilizing the area. The track would then be cleared for Israeli-Saudi rapprochement—along lines that would likely be anathema to Smotrich—and a coveted Nobel Peace Prize for Trump. As for Iran, indications suggest that the president might prefer initially to try and settle that standoff through negotiations.

The ball is very much in Trump’s court now. Witkoff met on January 30 with Smotrich and Shas chairman Aryeh Deri, two key stakeholders of Netanyahu’s government, in an attempt to enlist their support for his mission, but their consent will hinge ultimately on the specifics involved. (Right-wing Israelis, who are hoping anxiously that Trump will adopt their cause, have latched tightly onto his manifest enthusiasm for transferring Gaza’s residents to neighboring Egypt and Jordan, although the wisdom and feasibility of that program—opposed stridently by those countries and by Palestinians themselves—are dubious.) The time for command decisions is close at hand.

Cessations of hostilities in Lebanon and Gaza are both fragile. Netanyahu’s coalition is also in crisis, with saber-rattling between its various members—who are at loggerheads over controversial legislation to exempt Ultra-Orthodox Jews from military service—jeopardizing the passage of a national budget before a March 31 deadline. Separately, Smotrich has committed to bolt unless the IDF resumes its Gaza incursion, in parallel with expanding counter-terrorism operations in the West Bank. Not only the prime minister’s political fate, but also the future of the entire Middle East is hanging in the balance, waiting for Trump to decide how much slack he is prepared to grant Netanyahu.

Much will depend on the president’s definition of friendship for Israel: Will it entail space for the IDF to keep fighting Hamas until the achievement of “total victory”—as Netanyahu has promised and many Israelis are still demanding—at the possible cost of derailing progress with Saudi Arabia? Will it, rather, obligate Israel to wind down its offensive and satisfy Saudi requirements for a pathway to Palestinian statehood, thus, in all likelihood, precipitating the collapse of Netanyahu’s majority in the Knesset? Or might it entertain tradeoffs such as greater Israeli flexibility vis-à-vis the Palestinians in exchange for an augmented US role in confronting Iran?

There will be inherent risks in any strategy that Trump chooses to embrace. The only certain thing is that now, as commander in chief, he controls an arsenal of formidable carrots and sticks to deploy in the service of his administration’s objectives. On February 4, the world will be watching to see whether he offers Netanyahu a deal that he can’t refuse.

Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow for Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. From 1990 to 2016, he served seven consecutive premiers at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem. Follow him on X: @ShalomLipner.

The post Waiting on a friend: Will Netanyahu get a sweet deal—or a raw deal—from Trump? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On February 2, Steve Grundman, a senior fellow at Forward Defense, was featured in a Newsweek article titled, “’I’d Be Stunned’: Will Pete Hegseth Survive Trump’s Whole Term?” discussing the likelihood that Hegseth will serve President Trump’s full term as defense secretary. Grundman emphasized that Hegseth’s future in the role will ultimately depend on the strength and resilience of his relationships with the executive and legislative branches.

Fellow

Steven Grundman

Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Grundman featured in Newsweek on Hegseth appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On January 10, Andrew Michta, senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative, was published in 19FortyFive on why abandoning Europe would be a strategic mistake for the United States. He argues that US geostrategic and national security interests are entangled with that of Europe’s and to allow allies in Europe to be “pulled into China’s orbit” would be to lose the “overall global balance of power favoring the United States and democracies around the world, both in economic and military terms.”

Staff

Andrew A. Michta

Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Central Europe Eastern Europe

The post Michta in 19FortyFive on why abandoning Europe would be a strategic mistake appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Strategic competition is likely to intensify over the next decade, increasing the demands on the United States to deter and defend against wide-ranging and simultaneous security challenges across multiple domains and regions worldwide. In that time frame, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Joint Force should more effectively leverage the competencies of US Special Operations Forces (USSOF) to compete with US strategic adversaries.

Three realities facing the DOD over the next decade lend themselves toward leveraging USSOF more in strategic competition. First, the growing need to counter globally active and increasingly cooperative aggressors, while the broader Joint Force remains focused on the Indo-Pacific and Europe, underscores the value of leveraging USSOF to manage competition in other regions. Second, the desire to avoid war and manage competition below the threshold of conflict aligns with USSOF’s expertise in the irregular aspects of competition. Third, unless defense spending and recruitment dramatically increase over the next decade, the Joint Force will likely have to manage more security challenges without a commensurate increase in force size and capabilities, which underscores the need for the DOD to maximize every tool at its disposal, including the use of USSOF to help manage strategic competition.

The US government must harness all instruments of national power, alongside its network of allies and partners, to uphold international security, deter attacks, and counter efforts to undermine US security interests. Achieving this requires effectively integrating and leveraging the distinct roles of the DOD, interagency partners, the intelligence community (IC), and the Joint Force, including components like USSOF that have not been traditionally prioritized in strategic competition. For the past two decades, USSOF achieved critical operational successes during the Global War on Terror, primarily through counterterrorism and direct-action missions. However, peer and near-peer competition now demands a broader application of USSOF’s twelve core activities, with emphasis on seven: special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, security force assistance, civil affairs operations, military information support operations, unconventional warfare, and direct action.

Over the next decade, the DOD should emphasize USSOF’s return to its roots—the core competencies USSOF conducted and refined during the Cold War. USSOF’s unconventional warfare support of resistance groups in Europe; its support of covert intelligence operations in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America; its evacuation missions of civilians in Africa; and its guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations helped combat Soviet influence operations worldwide. During that era, special operations became one of the US military’s key enablers to counter coercion below the threshold of armed conflict, and that is how USSOF should be applied in the next decade to help manage strategic competition.

This report outlines five ways the Department of Defense should use Special Operations Forces over the next decade to support US efforts in strategic competition. USSOF should be leveraged to:

1. Enhance the US government’s situational awareness of strategic competition dynamics globally.
2. Entangle adversaries in competition to prevent escalation.
3. Strengthen allied and partner resilience to support the US strategy of deterrence by denial.
4. Support integration across domains for greater effect at the tactical edge
5. Contribute to US information and decision advantage by leveraging USSOF’s role as a technological pathfinder.

This report seeks to clarify USSOF’s role in strategic competition over the next decade, address gaps in understanding within the DOD and the broader national security community about USSOF’s competencies, and guide future resource and force development decisions. By prioritizing the above five functions, USSOF can bolster the US competitive edge and support the DOD’s management of challenges across diverse theaters and domains.

Staff

Clementine G. Starling-Daniels

Director, Forward Defense

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense NATO

Staff

Theresa Luetkefend

Assistant Director

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy German

Report Mar 7, 2024

Stealth, speed, and adaptability: The role of special operations forces in strategic competition

By Clementine G. Starling and Alyxandra Marine

Clementine G. Starling and Alyxandra Marine discuss how special operations forces enhance US readiness in an era of strategic competition.

Conflict Defense Policy

New Atlanticist Apr 19, 2024

Great power competition is back. What does that mean for US special operations forces?

By Alyxandra Marine

With their wide array of capabilities, US special operations forces can play a central role in strategic competition.

China Conflict

Issue Brief Oct 13, 2023

Where do US Army special operations fit in a world of strategic competition?

By Richard Angle, Leo Blanken, and Philip Swintek

General Richard Angle, Leo Blanken, and Lieutenant Colonel Philip Swintek argue that building and maintaining relationships is the true competitive advantage of Army Special Forces (ARSOF).

Defense Policy National Security

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post The next decade of strategic competition: How the Pentagon can use special operations forces to better compete appeared first on Atlantic Council.

But such unilateral military action would come with risks, as the cartels have a significant capability to retaliate. In addition, even considering military action would first require strengthening complementary efforts with the Mexican government and domestically among local and federal government agencies in the United States.

Mexican cartels are not merely criminal organizations; they operate as paramilitary entities with deep financial resources, global supply chains, and sophisticated logistical networks that extend into the United States. It is unlikely that such groups would passively absorb US attacks. Instead, as history shows, cartels are highly likely to retaliate both preemptively and reactively. They possess a substantial capacity for terrorism that, when coupled with their established presence within the United States, could escalate conflict far beyond what proponents of a purely military solution may anticipate.

Given their extensive experiences and expertise in combating elusive terrorist networks, oftentimes operating quietly in the shadows while supporting partners on the ground, US special operators are ideally suited for this fight. However, US special operators and their families would likely find themselves in the cartels’ crosshairs. But there are ways that the United States should prepare for such retaliation before Washington even considers such action.

A proven capacity for retaliation

Mexican cartels have demonstrated an uncanny ability to adapt and retaliate against perceived threats, as demonstrated throughout Mexico’s history.

Soon after Felipe Calderón became president of Mexico in 2006, he declared a “war on drugs,” deploying military forces against cartels. The result was a sharp escalation in violence. The cartels retaliated by targeting law enforcement, military personnel, and government officials. Entire police forces resigned in fear, and public officials were assassinated in broad daylight. Beyond physical violence, cartels also employed psychological tactics, using brutal killings and public displays of bodies to instill terror among the population.

On October 17, 2019, Mexican forces arrested Ovidio Guzmán López, the son of drug lord and former cartel leader Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán. The Sinaloa Cartel swiftly unleashed widespread violence. Using armored vehicles, machine guns, rockets, and other heavy weapons, approximately seven hundred cartel “sicarios” conducted widespread attacks against civilian, government, and military targets across Culiacán. The cartel’s campaign of terror overwhelmed Mexican authorities in what has become known as the “Battle of Culiacán” and “Black Thursday.” This incident underscored the cartels’ operational sophistication, which ranges from coordinating large-scale attacks to leveraging public fear. And amid all the violence, the government released Guzmán.

Throughout Mexico’s recent history, cartels have routinely retaliated against perceived threats to their operations, including media organizations and civilian populations. Of the reporters who have been slain, some had written negative reports about the drug cartels themselves, while others have exposed corruption among those politicians that the cartels pay off. By controlling narratives and instilling fear, they secure compliance and deter resistance. In some years, Mexico has proven itself to be even more deadly for reporters than active warzones such as Syria and Ukraine.

Given these examples, it is not difficult to imagine how cartels might respond if US forces launched cross-border operations. The difference, however, is that the retaliation could happen within US borders.

Hitting home

The US homeland is not immune to the consequences of engaging in direct military action against Mexican cartels, and such a campaign would not see the cartels simply ceding the initiative and sitting on their side of the border waiting to be attacked. The very networks that facilitate drug trafficking, spanning from cities (such as Los Angeles and Chicago) to rural communities, provide cartels with the infrastructure for potential retaliatory strikes. Cartels have a history of assassinating government officials in Mexico, and they would likely adopt terrorist tactics in the United States against political figures, law-enforcement leaders, and even military personnel. Extensive cartel connections to Chinese underground banking and US-based gangs could readily facilitate such actions against targets inside the United States.

Beyond physical attacks, cartels could engage in cyber operations, employing such capabilities to gather information on potential targets as part of criminal dealings. Their financial power also enables them to influence local politics and law enforcement through intimidation and corruption. Cartel cyber activity could bear significant effects for the target of such operations; and if the target (for example, a government department or agency) suspends its normal operations to repair its security walls, those effects could expand across communities.

Increasingly, Mexican drug cartels have turned to the “cybercrime as a service” economy, infiltrating government and commercial institutions to advance their criminal interests. By potentially coordinating cyber activities with campaigns of terror in cartel-influenced US neighborhoods, these groups could sow panic and destabilize communities, driving Americans to call for a cessation of operations against the cartels in Mexico.

What must come first

Any US military campaign to combat the cartels would only succeed if accompanied by a robust partnership with the new Mexican administration, led by President Claudia Sheinbaum (who has expressed a desire to fight organized crime more aggressively). Joint task forces, enhanced intelligence sharing, and specialized training programs can bolster Mexico’s counter-narcotics capabilities. Equally important is addressing systemic corruption within Mexico, which has long hindered efforts to dismantle cartel operations. By empowering its partners, the United States can achieve a greater impact without exacerbating the violence that unilateral actions alone often provoke. When and where no other options exist, the United States should launch appropriate unilateral operations against high-value cartel targets at the invitation of the Mexican government and in support of counter-narcotics objectives shared by the United States and Mexico.

Domestically, the United States must prepare for potential retaliation from cartels. Washington should enhance interagency coordination—specifically between the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Homeland Security—to safeguard likely US targets and strengthen the United States’ ability to identify and neutralize cartel threats. Such coordination is outlined in the Department of Homeland Security’s 2016 National Protection Framework; it should include increased support to law enforcement countering cartel-affiliated gangs in the United States and measures to protect from potential cartel-led hacking or other cyber activity. Undertaking such initiatives to bolster domestic defenses now will set the necessary conditions before the incoming Trump administration can reasonably pursue a wider range of increased military activity directly against the Mexican cartels.

The United States will also need to address the sources of cartel power. The demand for illicit drugs in the United States fuels the cartels’ operations, making it imperative to invest in addiction treatment resources and public education programs. Reducing demand would undermine a significant source of cartel revenue. On the supply side, supporting economic development in Mexico can help create alternative opportunities for individuals who might otherwise be drawn into illicit activities. Such initiatives are not quick fixes, but they are essential components of a long-term strategy to weaken the cartels’ influence. Successfully doing so would also increase US influence in Mexico and the region, incentivizing mutually beneficial economic endeavors.

The risks of hubris

Deploying US special operations forces against Mexican cartels is worthy of serious consideration. But history and logic caution against underestimating the adaptability and resilience of these violent transnational criminal groups. Strong military action absent conscientious preparations and close collaboration with the Mexican government risks triggering a cycle of retaliation. It could, for example, bring a surge of violence to US soil, destabilize border communities, and strain domestic resources. Integrating increased military pressure with strengthened partnerships, domestic preparedness, and systemic investments would ensure that the effort is more sustainable and effective.

The opioid crisis is a danger to US national security that demands urgent action, but that action must be measured, informed, and strategic. Anything less risks compounding the very threats Washington seeks to eliminate and bringing a bloody war directly to US streets.

Doug Livermore is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Group, the national vice president for the Special Operations Association of America, senior vice president for solution engineering at the CenCore Group, and the deputy commander for Special Operations Detachment–Joint Special Operations Command in the North Carolina Army National Guard.

Disclaimer: The views expressed are the author’s and do not represent official US government, Department of Defense, or Department of the Army positions.

The post US intervention against Mexican cartels carries major risks. Here’s how to mitigate them. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As Ukrainian commanders prepare for a fourth year of combat in Europe’s largest war since World War II, they are now hoping that their country’s growing arsenal of robotic systems can help counter Russia’s often overwhelming advantages in both manpower and firepower. “Ukrainian officials have repeatedly highlighted Ukraine’s efforts to utilize technological innovations and asymmetric strike capabilities to offset Ukraine’s manpower limitations in contrast with Russia’s willingness to accept unsustainable casualty rates for marginal territorial gains,” noted the Institute for the Study of War in late 2024.

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Ukraine’s emphasis on unmanned robotic systems certainly makes good sense. While overall Ukrainian casualties during the first three years of the full-scale invasion are thought to be significantly lower than Russian losses, Russia’s far larger population means Ukraine has little prospect of success in a grinding war of attrition. Over the past year, reports of Ukrainian mobilization challenges and personnel shortages have become more and more frequent, with desertion rates also reaching record highs.

With the Ukrainian military outnumbered and outgunned, defense tech innovations have played an important part in Kyiv’s war effort since 2022. Many of Ukraine’s key advances have come via the country’s vibrant startup sector, much of which pivoted to military projects in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion. In July 2024, the Associated Press reported that Ukraine had developed an ecosystem of laboratories to create a robot army, with around 250 defense startups active in secret locations “that typically look like rural car repair shops.”

The Ukrainian government has sought to support these grassroots efforts with the creation of initiatives like the BRAVE1 defense tech cluster, which was established in spring 2023 to streamline cooperation between the private sector, the state, and the Ukrainian military. In a move hailed by officials in Kyiv as a unique development, Ukraine launched a dedicated drone warfare branch of the country’s military in summer 2024. The establishment of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces demonstrated that Kyiv was preparing for “the war of the future, not the war of the past,” commented USF commander Colonel Vadym Sukharevskyi.

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Robotic systems alone cannot solve the Ukrainian military’s manpower shortages. At present, the focus is on developing technologies capable of performing a range of specific combat and logistical tasks. For example, Ukraine plans to deploy tens of thousands of robotic ground vehicles along the one thousand kilometer front line of the war during 2024. These systems will handle functions including mine-laying and de-mining, the delivery of ammunition and other supplies to troops in trenches, and the evacuation of wounded soldiers to rear positions where they can receive medical treatment.

Unmanned ground vehicles are seen by Ukrainian military planners as a particularly effective response to the ubiquity of reconnaissance and attack drones above the battlefield. With the entire front line area now under more or less constant surveillance, it can be extremely difficult for soldiers to move about above ground, and virtually impossible to travel in vehicles without electronic jamming devices. Robotic systems capable of operating in dangerous environments can go some way to addressing this problem, and can help make sure front line units are resupplied in a timely fashion.

The Ukrainian army’s use of robotic systems is already attracting consideration international attention. With new models typically undergoing testing in combat conditions, the cycle from development to deployment is often exceptionally dynamic, creating unprecedented opportunities for defense tech companies. Maintaining Ukraine’s current rapid pace of innovation is recognized as vital in order to remain one step ahead of Russia, which is also investing heavily in robotic systems and drones.

With Ukrainian efforts to implement AI technologies expected to advance in 2025, there are concerns that the fledgling robot armies currently taking shape on the battlefields of Ukraine could reduce the barriers to killing and dramatically escalate the potential for future conflicts. However, with their country fighting for survival, Ukrainian defense tech developers are primarily concerned with saving the lives of their compatriots and defeating Russia’s invasion.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jan 2, 2025

Missiles, AI, and drone swarms: Ukraine’s 2025 defense tech priorities

By Nataliia Kushnerska

Ukrainian defense tech companies will be focusing on domestic missile production, drone swarms, and AI technologies in 2025 as Ukraine seeks to remain one step ahead of Russia in the race to innovate, writes Nataliia Kushnerska.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Dec 19, 2024

Five things Russia’s invasion has taught the world about Ukraine

By Peter Dickinson

Vladimir Putin’s brutal invasion of Ukraine has thrust the country into the global spotlight and transformed international perceptions of Ukraine in ways that will resonate for decades to come, writes Peter Dickinson.

Defense Technologies Disinformation

UkraineAlert Jan 7, 2025

Putin’s peace plan is actually a call for Ukraine’s capitulation

By Serhii Kuzan

Donald Trump has vowed to end Russia’s war in Ukraine, but Vladimir Putin’s proposed peace terms leave little room for doubt that the Kremlin dictator remains intent on erasing Ukrainian statehood entirely, writes Serhii Kuzan.

Conflict Disinformation

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The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Ukraine hopes robot army can counter Russia’s battlefield advantages appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On December 23, Andrew Michta, director and senior fellow of the GeoStrategy Initiative, published an article in 19FortyFive on connecting NATO funding and capabilities. He underlines that, while many NATO allies have increased their defense spending since 2014, the geopolitical threats facing the Alliance mean greater funding and forces are necessary. The piece was featured in RealClearDefense.

Staff

Andrew A. Michta

Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Central Europe Eastern Europe

The post Michta in 19FortyFive and RealClearDefense on connecting NATO funding and capabilities appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On January 1, Andrew Michta, director and senior fellow of the GeoStrategy Initiative, released a piece in 19FortyFive on how Russia’s imperial mindset led to its invasion of Ukraine. He argues that policymakers must recognize Russia as an empire to understand Moscow’s larger ambitions and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approach to the war in Ukraine as a “civilizational war against the West.” The article was featured in RealClearDefense and RealClearWorld.

Staff

Andrew A. Michta

Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Central Europe Eastern Europe

The post Michta in 19FortyFive, RealClearDefense, and RealClearWorld on Russia’s imperial mindset appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Nobody is more acutely aware of these security realities than the new government in Lithuania, which took office in December 2024. Situated close to Russia on the eastern frontier of the democratic world, Lithuania is a member of both NATO and the European Union. The largest of the three Baltic states, it is on the front lines of the geopolitical struggle between the West and Putin’s resurgent brand of authoritarianism.

The Russian leader is not acting alone, of course. In December 2024, Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda warned of an “emerging axis of evil” including Russia, Belarus, China, Iran, and North Korea. The Lithuanian leader stressed the importance of a “united stance” among his Western counterparts in response to this growing authoritarian alliance.

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Strengthening national security will be among the top priorities for Lithuania’s new center-left government, which took shape in the final months of the past year following the country’s October 2024 parliamentary elections. The Lithuanian authorities have already raised military spending to above 3 percent of GDP in recent years; the new government is now promising the increase this figure to 3.5 or even 4 percent.

This would put Lithuania well ahead of most other NATO member states in terms of the country’s national defense budget. Nevertheless, Lithuania’s defense spending remains small in absolute and relative terms. While the current budget of just over 3 percent of GDP represents around 2.6 billion US dollars, Russia plans to commit 6.3 percent of GDP to defense in 2025, or approximately 126 billion US dollars.

Russia is also receiving considerable financial and material support from its authoritarian allies. Belarus served as a key base for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and has since begun hosting Russian nuclear weapons. China is propping up the Russian economy by purchasing Russian oil and gas, while Iran is providing Putin with large quantities of kamikaze drones that are used to attack Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure.

Russia’s most important partner is currently North Korea. Pyongyang first began supplying artillery shells to Moscow in late 2022. By October 2024, Western intelligence agencies were claiming that North Korea was providing half of all the shells being used by Russia in Ukraine. The Hermit Kingdom has also delivered significant quantities of ballistic missiles, and has reportedly sent more than ten thousand troops to join Putin’s invasion.

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With little sign that Russia has any intention of ending its Ukraine invasion, concerns are growing that an emboldened Putin may seek to go further. Lithuania’s location makes it an obvious potential Russian target. While the country is better prepared than many other NATO members to face this threat, much remains to be done.

While Lithuania’s defense budget is growing, far greater sums may be required. Research conducted in the second half of 2024 indicated that the Lithuanian government would need to quadruple defense spending in order to acquire sufficient weapons and establish the necessary infrastructure to repel a hypothetical Russian invasion for an initial 10-day period until NATO allies could fully deploy.

Lithuanian officials appear to understand the scale of the security challenges they now face. By late 2024, President Nausėda was arguing that the country must commit at least 5.5% of GDP to defense in the coming years. This will be a key task for Lithuania’s new Defense Minister Dovilė Šakalienė.

Most observers agree that creating a comprehensive national defense strategy and committing sufficient resources is the only way for Lithuania to deter the Kremlin. This will likely prove costly, but even the most expensive deterrence is far cheaper than dealing with the horrors of a Russian invasion.

Dr. Agnia Grigas is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and author of Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Dec 24, 2024

Putin faces antisemitism accusations following attack on ‘ethnic Jews’

By Joshua Stein

Russian President Vladimir Putin is facing fresh antisemitism accusations after claiming that “ethnic Jews” are seeking to “tear apart” the Russian Orthodox Church, writes Joshua Stein

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Dec 19, 2024

Five things Russia’s invasion has taught the world about Ukraine

By Peter Dickinson

Vladimir Putin’s brutal invasion of Ukraine has thrust the country into the global spotlight and transformed international perceptions of Ukraine in ways that will resonate for decades to come, writes Peter Dickinson.

Defense Technologies Disinformation

UkraineAlert Dec 19, 2024

Ukraine seeks further progress toward EU membership in 2025

By Kateryna Odarchenko

With little prospect of an invitation to join NATO while the war with Russia continues, Ukraine will be hoping to advance further on the road toward EU integration in 2025, writes Kateryna Odarchenko.

Civil Society Conflict

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The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Lithuania prioritizes defense spending amid growing Russian threat appeared first on Atlantic Council.

It has become something of a cliché in Washington policy debates that the world today is more unstable and dangerous than at any time since the end of the Cold War. But even this statement doesn’t fully capture the gravity of the situation, for the reality is that at no point during the post-Cold War era have we witnessed a surge of direct and proxy great power conflicts comparable to what we have seen in the past decade. Nor has deterrence failed so often in such a short period of time.

A challenging time in global affairs

In only the past three years, Russia invaded Ukraine for the second time, Hamas attacked Israel—the closest US ally in the Middle East—while Iran proceeded to launch an unprecedented direct attack on Israel. Today, the North Korean military is deployed in Russia against Ukrainian forces—an Asian power and officially a noncombatant fighting in the largest war Europe has seen since 1945, with Washington seemingly at a loss as to how to respond.

At a structural level, an alliance hostile to the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia has coalesced, with Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea forming a new “Axis of Dictatorships” to support and enable each other at speed and scale, with Russia benefiting both economically and in terms of weapons and munitions supplies—and of late, also manpower—to press for advantage in Ukraine. Our world is unraveling before our eyes, with regional power balances in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia on the verge of imploding. 

The rules-based-order dilemma

So, the question must be asked: How did we get here? How did the United States fritter away so much power and influence in just one generation?

While the Cold War accustomed Western national security analysts to thinking in terms of systemic polarities, the post-Cold War decade led some to believe that US primacy meant that the “rules-based order” steeped in neoliberal economic orthodoxies that undergirded globalization would last.

Some believed that since the West offered Moscow a seat at the table after the Cold War, so to speak, that Russia would become a status quo power, with China postured to assume its future role as a “responsible stakeholder in the international system.” What these assertions missed—especially post-9/11—was the historic verity that what a revanchist imperial power wants above all is to have its own table back, and that every rapidly modernizing and industrializing power invariably becomes geostrategically assertive, first in its region and then beyond. 

As the United States took a detour into secondary theaters to pursue the Global War on Terror, its adversaries built up their forces and prepared to press for advantage in the Atlantic, the Pacific, and beyond. Instead of shoring up deterrence in key theaters, Washington kept preaching “emergent multipolarity,” as though de facto appeasement could induce the revisionists to change course.

A return to the past in geopolitics

And so, today we find ourselves in an environment increasingly reminiscent of the late 1930s, where the overarching balance of power is becoming ever-less stable, and where the difference between peace and a multi-theater system-transforming war will likely hinge on whether the United States and its allies can sustain the ever-more tenuous regional balances.

While historians like to assign precise dates to when previous wars erupted, the reality is that World War II did not start when Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union invaded Poland in 1939. It had a rolling start when precarious regional balances—from the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the Spanish Civil War, the Anschluss of Austria, and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia—began to unravel at an ever-faster pace. 

Today, much like in the run-up to that global conflict, we find ourselves in a world of protracted systemic instability. Repeated failures of deterrence make it harder to undo the damage done by the last two decades of appeasement, starting with Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia after Germany and France blocked US President George W. Bush’s push to extend an invitation to Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO.

Over the past decade, Western leaders appear to have forgotten that appeasement is the flipside of deterrence. Deterrence rests on two fundamental principles: 1) having the capabilities to respond if a red line is crossed, and 2) having the political will to do so. Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly resorted to naked military power—first when he seized Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008, then in 2014 when he invaded Crimea and severed it from Ukraine, a year later when he sent his forces into Syria, and then in 2022 with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Each time, he scored a political win, suffering only marginal consequences until 2022, when the United States and NATO finally reacted, but with no strategy for victory in place and with escalation management as the overarching priority.

The path forward

The world is at a critical juncture, one that will require the United States to restore its regional power balances so as to avoid an all-out war. The incoming Trump administration needs to set aside the normative language of the past three decades and return to the founding principles of hard power and geopolitics. The United States needs a new national security strategy that communicates to the electorate what is at stake if the regional balances unravel and, most of all, how what happens “out there” impacts US national security and prosperity. The administration needs to articulate the irreducible interests of this nation in terms that speak directly to the security and well-being of the American people.

It’s time to return to realism in US national security policy, putting hard power considerations and geopolitics front and center. There is no time to waste.

Andrew A. Michta is a senior fellow and director of the Scowcroft GeoStrategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council. The views expressed here are his own.

The post The United States must revisit the basics of geostrategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On December 15, Andrew Michta, director and senior fellow of the GeoStrategy Initiative, published an article in 19FortyFive on what ideas should underlie the next US national security strategy. He assesses that, with a new “Axis of Dictatorships” forming between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, the United States has returned to an era of unsettled regional balances and long-term systemic instability. The piece was featured in RealClearWorld and RealClearDefense, and an extensive summary was published in Verkkouutiset.

Staff

Andrew A. Michta

Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Central Europe Eastern Europe

The post Michta in 19FortyFive on why the United States must revisit the basics of geostrategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In a social media post showcasing the weapon, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the first batch of Peklo missile drones had already been delivered to the Ukrainian military and had proved its combat effectiveness. “The mission now is to scale up production and deployment,” he commented.

The Peklo is one of a number of long-range weapons currently being developed by Ukraine as the country seeks to boost its ability to strike targets inside Russia. Speaking in Kyiv on December 10, Zelenskyy announced that serial production of the long-range Palyanytsia missile drone was now underway, with trials of the new Ruta missile ongoing.

Meanwhile, a long-range version of Ukraine’s domestically produced Neptune cruise missile is expected to become operational in the near future. The Neptune is currently best known as the weapon used to sink the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, the Moskva, during the initial months of the Russian invasion in spring 2022.

In addition to these developments, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry recently announced plans to deliver more than 30,000 long-range attack drones in 2025, with production partially financed by international partners. Since the beginning of 2024, Ukraine has conducted an extensive air offensive against Russia’s energy industry and military infrastructure using long-range drones. With domestic output now reaching record levels, the coming year is likely to witness a sharp escalation in Ukrainian attacks.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Ukraine’s efforts to expand the domestic production of long-range weapons reflect widespread frustration in Kyiv over restrictions imposed by the country’s Western partners on attacks inside Russia. For almost the entire war, Western leaders have prevented Ukraine from striking back against Russian targets due to concerns over possible retaliatory measures from the Kremlin. This has allowed Russia to launch attacks against Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure with impunity, while forcing Ukraine to effectively defend itself with one arm tied behind its back.

The United States and other partners recently relaxed these restrictions and authorized some categories of Ukrainian strikes inside Russia using Western weapons. However, a number of constraints are believed to remain in place. The missiles provided to Ukraine by the country’s Western allies also have a relatively modest maximum range of up to 300 kilometers, making them of limited use against a country as vast as Russia.

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Many in Kyiv believe an expanded long-range arsenal is essential in order to secure a viable peace with Russia. Advocates of increased long-range strikes argue that unless Ukraine is able to bring Putin’s invasion home to Russia, the Kremlin dictator will have little reason to seek a settlement. They believe that missile attacks can weaken Russia’s military potential while also starving Putin’s war machine of funding by targeting oil refineries and other elements of the country’s economically crucial but highly vulnerable energy industry.

Zelenskyy has repeatedly stressed the importance of being able to strike targets deep inside Russia, and has frequently pressed Ukraine’s allies to supply more long-range weapons. His recently presented victory plan reportedly contained one confidential segment proposing the delivery of US-made Tomahawk missiles with a range of almost 2,500 kilometers as part of a “non-nuclear deterrence package.” While this request was widely dismissed as unrealistic, it underlined the importance attached to long-range strike capabilities among officials in Kyiv as Ukrainian policymakers search for the tools to secure a lasting peace.

Recent increases in the production of long-range drones and missiles come as Ukraine seeks to revive the country’s long-neglected defense industry and reduce reliance on military aid. Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion almost three years ago, Ukraine has managed to dramatically increase domestic output in areas ranging from armored vehicles and artillery shells to electronic warfare equipment and naval drones. Much of this is being financed by Ukraine’s partners, who are being encouraged to place orders with Ukrainian producers.

As talk turns to the possibility of a peace deal once Donald Trump returns to the White House in January 2025, Ukrainians are taking nothing for granted and are preparing for a fourth year of Europe’s largest war since World War II. They hope that by enhancing their ability to strike back inside Russia, they will be able to increase the pressure on Vladimir Putin and strengthen their own position ahead of any negotiations.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Nov 18, 2024

Imposing neutrality on Ukraine will not stop Putin or bring peace to Europe

By Mykola Bielieskov

Imposing neutrality on Ukraine will not bring about a durable peace in Europe. On the contrary, it would leave Ukraine at Putin’s mercy and set the stage for a new Russian invasion, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Dec 3, 2024

Vladimir Putin does not want a peace deal. He wants to destroy Ukraine.

By Yuliya Kazdobina

Donald Trump has vowed to end the war in Ukraine, but there is no sign that Vladimir Putin has any interest in a peace deal that would prevent him from achieving his goal of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood, writes Yuliya Kazdobina.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Dec 4, 2024

Tucker Carlson warns of WWIII, but Russia’s nuclear threats ring hollow

By Peter Dickinson

US media personality Tucker Carlson was back in Moscow this week warning of nuclear war as Russia struggles to address growing Western indifference to its frequent nuclear threats, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Ukraine is expanding its long-range arsenal for deep strikes inside Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The military adage that avoiding war requires preparing for it is as true today as it was for previous generations. For NATO, in the shadow of the ongoing war in Ukraine, this means considering scenarios of Russian aggression that may seem remote at the moment, but become more plausible over time. Given that Putin’s Russia has made clear a desire to reassert control over former territories and committed significant blood and treasure to the dream, the Alliance must take Putin at his word, and prepare for multiple scenarios in a generational conflict.

The conflict is ongoing in the cyber and propaganda domains, and in hybrid warfare in Syria, Africa, and elsewhere. The war in Ukraine demonstrates, however, that major conventional war remains in the Russian strategic tool kit, and Putin likely thinks it’s worked so far. Absent a strategic defeat and the advent of a more pacifist government in Moscow, the prospects for future revanchist campaigns against NATO member states are not zero.

Is NATO prepared to fight, and therefore to deter, defensive wars against Russian aggression? While some fear that the war in Ukraine could escalate into a broader NATO-Russia war, both sides seem intent on avoiding that eventuality for now. Yet if the war settles into a protracted stalemate or, worse, ends on terms that reward Russian aggression, the prospects for other revanchist conflicts will grow over time. Western military planners must understand and measure their readiness against them. This issue of the Defense Journal aims to provide a rough assessment of NATO’s readiness through the mental exercise of imagining three conflict scenarios that could embroil the Alliance in a direct combat against Russia in the coming two decades. The scenarios vary by scope and intensity, as well as location. Each presents a challenge to existing NATO readiness, and can therefore provide a useful parameter for debates on future resourcing, organizing, and exercising for the Alliance.

Assumptions

A thought exercise measuring capabilities against plausible threats inevitably entails assumptions about change over time. The following ones inform possible conflict scenarios with Russia, assuming that:

1) Russia does not suffer strategic defeat or failure in the near to medium term in Ukraine, and recovers its massive losses in equipment through new mobilization and spending;

2) military coordination and cooperation among China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran continues to deepen in the coming years;

3) Western risk aversion regarding escalatory or retaliatory steps against Russia continue; and

4) Russia and other anti-Western powers privilege conflict, mobilization, and resistance spending whereas Western powers struggle to maintain the goal of 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) for defense spending, and the United States faces growing budgetary pressure due to debt obligations.

These assumptions frame potential conventional conflicts between Russia as less unequal than a direct Russia versus NATO aggregate comparison of economic, demographic, and industrial potential. It thus avoids a temptation to wish away the threat by assuming Russia sees the asymmetry and would not tempt fate. Yet Russia does not stand alone in its drive to undermine Western power, and may see itself as more agile, subtle, ruthless, and politically unified than its targets—and better prepared for a long war.

For ease of analysis, Defense Journal excludes scenarios that would require significant geopolitical or internal political shifts to appear plausible. These would include a direct Russian attack on larger NATO member states in the north (Poland, Finland, Norway), the central area (Romania, Hungary, Slovakia), or the south (Turkey).

Pacing scenario 1: Baltic war

A group of retired senior military officers earlier this year laid out how a Russian attack through the strip of land between Poland and Lithuania could launch an effort to detach the Baltic states from their NATO allies to the west. The rationale for the attack would be to fulfill Vladimir Putin’s ambition to regain control of former Soviet territories for an expanded Russian Federation. In the experts’ view, rising defense budgets and force expansion underway in Russia comport more with a Baltic reconquista than with the scope of the current war in Ukraine.

Such a war would likely begin with massive cyber and missile attacks against key headquarters, logistics nodes, and communication assets of NATO military forces. A key point of the assault would be for Russia to seize the Suwalki gap, connecting its Kaliningrad exclave with proxy Belarus. Naval combat, perhaps including seizure of Baltic islands Bornholm and Gotland (in Denmark and Sweden, respectively) would provide distractions to NATO forces and impede reinforcement to the targets of the ground invasion.

Within a few years, this scenario could include waves of unmanned tank and armored vehicle attacks on land, and naval drones on sea coordinated via artificial intelligence programs, similar to the unmanned aerial vehicle attacks already on display in Ukraine. It could also include seizing key terrain in the Arctic to impede NATO logistical and commercial traffic along the northern seas. The ultimate goal would not be conquering larger NATO members’ territory outright, but raising the costs for them to oppose reassertion of Russian control over newer members, over which Moscow nurtures irredentist aims.

There are some scenario-specific assumptions involved here. The first would be that Russia achieves a draw or stalemate in Ukraine, so that it considers its gamble has paid off. The second is that dissent in the United States and Europe over defense obligations to the Baltic states rises to a level that encourages the Russians to accept the risk of a major gambit.

Scenario 2: Moldova and onward

Given the lack of a direct land border at present between the Russian Federation and the eastern bank of Moldova (occupied Transnistria), this scenario likely qualifies as a sequel to Russian victory in the current war in Ukraine. Unlike the first scenario, this would proceed from successful assertion of substantial, or total, Russian control along the northern coast of the Black Sea. In that event, the 1,500 or so Russian soldiers in Transnistria would no longer be isolated from supporting forces to the east. Were Ukraine to be beaten into a bad peace—potentially even losing the port of Odessa—possibilities open up in Moldova.

The Russians are already conducting political warfare against Moldova. Moscow’s intelligence service, the FSB, has drawn up a ten-year plan to destabilize the country and reorient it away from the West. Part of that plan involves framing Moldovan independence as irredentist Romanian intrigue against the people of Moldova, who by the FSB script gravitate more naturally to the Russian cultural sphere. An attack on Moldova could begin with a coup attempt from pro-Russia elements infiltrated into the national capital, Chişinău, or an appeal for protection from pro-Russian separatists in the Transnistrian regional capital, Tiraspol.

Moldova is not a NATO member, but it has a close partnership with the Alliance (and seeks to join the European Union). If conditions in Ukraine allowed a Russian reinforcement to Transnistria and intervention in Moldova proper, the Alliance could be faced with a replay of the 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine: sabotage, undeclared Russian forces operating in the guise of local volunteers, and forcible seizure of facilities and territory. There would be significant potential for spillover into NATO territory (Romania), and an unpalatable choice between tolerating a Russian fait accompli or intervening directly at the risk of escalation into a major NATO-Russia war in which Moscow portrays the West as the aggressor.

This scenario depends in large measure on significant deterioration of Ukraine’s military position, potentially including new territorial losses from 2025 onward. This could lead to Kyiv ceding ground—and strategic decoupling from the West—to salvage formal independence. Were the Russians to extend control across southern Ukraine and into Moldova while the West dithered, increased Russian hybrid war in the western Balkans would be a possible further consequence.

Scenario 3: Black Sea drone swarms

One surprising development during the current Ukraine war has been Kyiv’s ability, despite the lack of conventional naval vessels, to use sea drones, missiles, and small boats to deny much of the Black Sea to Russian ships and destroy a third of Russia’s Black Sea fleet. In a third scenario for war between NATO and Russia, Moscow might seek to turn the tables in the coming years by expanding its own inventory of asymmetric naval weapons and turning them against Western commercial and naval shipping.

The Russians have already understood the vulnerability of modern shipping and naval forces—especially aircraft carriers—to cheap and numerous container-launched missiles and drones. Iran has become a prolific producer of cheap drones, and is helping Russia build a drone inventory “orders of magnitude larger” than what it had before 2022. Russia has identified a potential “permanent presence” of NATO ships in the Black Sea as a military threat—and certainly has developed plans to deal with that threat. At the same time, Western military leaders have identified Russia’s continued attempts to strangle the Ukrainian economy at sea as creating a risk for war.

In a sense we have seen the creation of overlapping anti-access and area denial (A2AD) zones in the Black Sea region, one enforced by the West and Ukraine against Russia, the other by Russia against Ukraine—and in future perhaps against the West. In the coming years, Russian and Iranian advantages in the production of cheap and numerous systems could create a temptation for Moscow to direct a massive attack against ships and coastal facilities of NATO countries that would mitigate, or negate, the Alliance’s clear advantage on the Black, Baltic, or Mediterranean seas. 2024 has seen Houthi forces in Yemen significantly decrease shipping through the Red Sea and even fire missiles at Israel, and it doesn’t take too great a creative leap to multiply that in scope and ambition on more northerly seas. In a war pitting an adversary equipped with cheap and plentiful systems against one with few and sophisticated systems, the West is not currently well-positioned to win.