By fusing years of intelligence preparation with special operations capabilities, Israel achieved strategic surprise and devastating effect against Iran’s nuclear program and military leadership despite months and years of mounting tensions. The operation offers critical lessons for Western military planners facing similar challenges with peer competitors who possess advanced air defenses, nuclear ambitions, and totalitarian control.

Of course, Friday’s Israeli strike on Iran occurred under relatively favorable conditions—already degraded air defenses, neutralized proxies, and no existing nuclear deterrent—complicating direct comparisons to potential preemptive strikes on true US peers such as Russia or China. Still, the concepts retain value worth exploring as Western militaries seek unconventional options to address emerging threats.

Anatomy of a surprise

Israel’s Mossad spy agency had smuggled weapons into Iran ahead of Friday’s strikes, establishing a base of operations from which it remotely launched explosive-laden drones and positioning short-range, precision weapons near critical surface-to-air missile systems. This multiyear preparation enabled what Israeli officials describe as a coordinated campaign targeting Iran’s main enrichment facility in Natanz, its nuclear scientists and military leaders, and parts of its ballistic missile program with devastating precision.

This three-pronged approach demonstrates sophisticated planning that Western intelligence and special operations forces (SOF) should study carefully. First, Mossad commando units deployed precision-guided weapons systems near Iranian surface-to-air missile installations, which activated immediately preceding Israeli Air Force strikes to drop Tehran’s defenses at a critical juncture. Second, specialized equipment and munitions were clandestinely emplaced across Iran to carry out the full range of attacks that achieved the effective decapitation of Iran’s military leadership. Third, explosive drone bases were established deep in Iranian territory to target Iran’s offensive missile systems at strategic sites to deny Tehran an immediate response capability.

The power of pre-positioned munitions

The most striking aspect of Operation Rising Lion was Israel’s ability to achieve tactical surprise through pre-positioned assets rather than relying solely on standoff weapons or penetrating strikes. According to Israeli security sources, Mossad operatives established drone and missile bases “in the open, not far from Iran’s air defense systems” and used vehicle-based weapons platforms throughout the country. This approach allowed over two hundred Israeli aircraft to drop more than 330 munitions on some one hundred targets during the opening strikes while facing degraded air defenses.

The strategic logic parallels successful special operations from previous conflicts. As I wrote recently about Ukraine’s experience against Russia, the core tenets of deep special operations remain constant: “the element of surprise achieved through operational security and misdirection; the targeting of high-value, lightly defended assets in the enemy’s rear areas; and the psychological impact that far exceeds the tactical damage inflicted.” Israel’s pre-positioning strategy enabled all three simultaneously.

Decapitation through intelligence fusion

The operation successfully eliminated Iran’s top military leadership, including Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Commander Hossein Salami, Chief of Staff Mohammad Hossein Bagheri, Emergency Forces Commander Gholam Rashid, and several nuclear scientists. This represents one of the most successful decapitation strikes in modern warfare, demonstrating how intelligence preparation can enable surgical targeting of command structures.

The targeting methodology reflects years of intelligence preparation. Israeli officials compiled detailed intelligence dossiers on senior Iranian defense officials and nuclear scientists, enabling precise targeted assassinations while conducting a coordinated campaign to neutralize Iran’s strategic missile array through airstrikes and deep-cover operations. This holistic approach—combining human intelligence, technical collection, and operational preparation—offers a template for future operations against peer adversaries.

Asymmetric air-defense suppression

Perhaps the most operationally significant aspect was Israel’s innovative approach to suppressing Iranian air defenses. Rather than relying solely on conventional airborne Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses missions, Israel used pre-positioned systems to launch precision strikes simultaneously toward designated targets with remarkable accuracy. It deployed advanced technologies mounted on vehicles that completely destroyed Iranian air-defense targets at the onset of the attack.

This approach enabled Israeli planes to achieve air superiority and freedom of maneuver during subsequent waves of the operation. The methodology demonstrates how special operations can create windows of vulnerability in sophisticated air defense networks that conventional forces can then exploit. As the West looks at China’s growing anti-access/area denial capabilities across the Western Pacific, SOF could pursue similar approaches to prevent Beijing from isolating Taiwan, Japan, or the Philippines with long-range antiaircraft systems.

The element of strategic surprise

The operation’s most remarkable feat may be that it achieved strategic surprise despite widespread expectations of Israeli action. Multiple reports over recent days suggested that US officials believed Israel could be preparing to strike Iran, with American personnel evacuated from the region and diplomatic warnings about potential mass casualty events. Yet Iran appeared unprepared for the scale and coordination of the actual attack.

This suggests that strategic surprise in modern warfare depends less on concealing intentions than on concealing capabilities and timing. Israel’s years-long preparation phase enabled operational surprise even when strategic intentions were evident to all parties. As an Israeli security official told the Times of Israel, the mission relied on “groundbreaking thinking, bold planning and surgical operation of advanced technologies, special forces and agents operating in the heart of Iran while evading the eyes of local intelligence.”

Specifically, Western defense planners should carry forward six lessons.

1. The operation demonstrates how long-term intelligence-SOF fusion can serve deterrent functions while providing robust options if deterrence fails. Israel’s ability to pre-position assets and develop detailed targeting packages likely influenced Iranian decision-making for years before the actual strike. When deterrence ultimately failed, these preparations enabled decisive action rather than graduated escalation.
2. The use of technologies ranging from precision-guided missiles to explosive-laden drones and vehicle-based weapons platforms demonstrates how modern capabilities can enhance rather than replace classical special operations principles. Ukraine’s recent “Operation Spiderweb” similarly shows how, as I wrote recently, “technological evolution from Lewes bombs to precision drones masks deeper continuities in special operations thinking.” SOF must continue to innovate to provide options for strategic surprise.
3. Israel’s strikes provide a model for how intelligence services and SOF, through prior operational preparation, can provide robust options for national leadership. This confidence appears grounded in extensive preparation and multiple redundant capabilities that enabled coordinated strikes across multiple Iranian nuclear facilities while simultaneously targeting military command structures.
4. Western nations should prioritize intelligence-SOF fusion capabilities that enable long-term operational preparation in potential conflict zones. This requires sustained investment in human intelligence capabilities, technical collection systems, and special operations units trained for extended autonomous operations in denied areas.
5. Israel’s early success despite obvious tensions suggests that operational security remains achievable even under intense scrutiny. The effort relied on close coordination between the Israel Defense Forces and the Mossad intelligence agency over multiple years, indicating that compartmentalization and operational discipline can preserve surprise even in highly monitored environments.
6. This operation tests the value of preemption. If Iran’s counterattacks fail to deliver a major impact, Israel’s attack could show how well-prepared preemptive action can end conflicts on favorable terms rather than beginning them. By targeting Iran’s nuclear program, missile capabilities, and military leadership simultaneously, Israel appears to have degraded Iran’s ability to sustain prolonged conflict while achieving its core security objectives.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s declaration that the operation would continue “for as many days as it takes to remove this threat” suggests confidence in sustained capabilities rather than one-off strikes. While Tehran retaliated Friday with drones and missiles that killed three people and caused dozens of Israeli injuries, it remains to be seen just how effective its responses will be in light of the regime’s severely degraded capabilities.

Operation Rising Lion represents the evolution of modern special operations principles established during World War II and refined through decades of irregular warfare. The integration of multiyear intelligence preparation, pre-positioned capabilities, and coordinated targeting demonstrates how democratic nations can achieve strategic surprise against peer adversaries even in highly scrutinized security environments.

For Western military planners, the operation offers both inspiration and instruction. The challenge lies not in replicating Israeli capabilities but in developing equivalent intelligence-SOF fusion that provides national leadership with robust options across the spectrum of conflict. Unlike Iran, both China and Russia possess large, survivable nuclear arsenals, which introduces significant escalation risks to any decapitation strike or preemptive action, even if conventional thresholds are initially observed. As tensions with peer competitors continue to mount, the ability to achieve strategic surprise through patient preparation rather than reactive escalation may prove decisive.

The Greek warriors who hid away in the Trojan Horse before springing forth to storm the gates of Troy would recognize the operational logic, if not the technology, used by today’s special operators. Strategic surprise through careful preparation, audacious execution, and clear purpose remains the foundation of effective special operations. Israel’s achievement lies in demonstrating how these timeless principles can be adapted to counter twenty-first-century threats while providing templates for democratic nations facing similar challenges with authoritarian adversaries.

The lesson for future irregular warfare is clear: When facing peer adversaries with advanced capabilities and nuclear ambitions, patient intelligence preparation combined with innovative special operations can achieve effects that conventional deterrence alone cannot guarantee. The investment in such capabilities may prove the difference between managing conflict and winning it decisively.

Doug Livermore is the director of engagements for the Irregular Warfare Initiative, a member of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Group, the national vice president for the Special Operations Association of America, national director for external communications at the Special Forces Association, and the deputy commander for Special Operations Detachment–Joint Special Operations Command in the North Carolina Army National Guard. He is a former senior government civilian, intelligence officer, and contractor in various roles at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of the Navy, and Department of the Army.

The views expressed are the author’s and do not represent official US government, Department of Defense, or Department of the Army positions.

The post By fusing intelligence and special operations, Israel’s strikes on Iran are a lesson in strategic surprise appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On May 20, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Nicholas Eftimiades was interviewed by NTS News, in a segment entitled, “Former Intelligence Officer: China Leverages Entire Society for Intel.” With Tiffany Meier, Eftimiades discusses the Chinese Communist Party’s espionage strategy, pulling insights from his book, Chinese Intelligence Operations and Tactics.

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Nicholas Eftimiades

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Eftimiades interviewed by NTD on Chinese espionage appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On May 15, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow August Cole was a featured guest on the Marine Corps Association podcast Scuttlebutt. In this episode, titled “Useful Fiction With August Cole From Modern Day Marine,” Cole discusses how asymmetric forces like fiction and narrative have an outsized impact on today’s battlefield.

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August Cole

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Cole speaks about the role of fiction and narrative in current affairs on the Marine Corps Association Scuttlebutt podcast appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Lichfield quoted by Bloomberg on US intelligence sharing with Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 31, 2025, Atlantic Council Senior Advisor Harlan Ullman published an op-ed in the Hill on the potential implications of national security officials using Signal for official communication and planning. He argues that US allies will take the recent Signal breach “very, very seriously,” which could disrupt intelligence sharing.   

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Harlan Ullman

Senior Advisor

The post Ullman in the Hill urging vigilance in national security communication  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Click to jump to a lesson:

What did we learn about US Middle East policy?

What did we learn about how this White House views Europe?

What are the intelligence implications of this leak?

What are the information-security implications of this group chat?

There was a big debate in the chat about who benefits from the Suez Canal. What is the real story?

What did we learn about the campaign against the Houthis?

What did we learn about US Middle East policy?

We learned that while there are predictable differences within the Principals Committee, Trump is clearly calling the shots. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth cited the “POTUS directive to reopen shipping lanes,” while Homeland Security Advisor Stephen Miller recalled that “the President was clear” and Vice President JD Vance noted that “the strongest reason to do this, as POTUS said, was to send a message.”  

This exchange revealed a group of senior officials primarily focused on executing a presidential decision, not working to undermine or reverse that decision, as was often the case during the first Trump administration. Even Vance’s somewhat condescending comment about his boss (“I’m not sure the President is aware how inconsistent this is with his message”) was quickly followed by a preemptive retreat (“I am willing to support the consensus of the team and keep these concerns to myself.”) Trump is undoubtedly pleased by the stark difference from his prior experience during his first term with then Secretary of Defense James Mattis, then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, then Chief of Staff John Kelly, and the other “adults in the room.”  

Trump made the right decision to attack the Houthis to defend freedom of navigation through critical maritime chokepoints, an action I have encouraged for years. (I would prefer a sustained, lengthy special operations–led air campaign against Houthi leadership, rather than the more expensive conventional approach recommended by US Central Command, however.) Trump is similarly correct in his frustrations that governments in the Middle East, Asia, and Europe (with the United Kingdom being the exception) have thus far largely refused to share the burden of reopening the sea lanes. Trump deserves credit, however, for not allowing those understandable frustrations to prevent him from carrying out these duties—as National Security Advisor Michael Waltz aptly summarized in the group chat: “we have a fundamental decision of allowing the sea lanes to remain closed or to re-open them now or later, [and] we are the only ones with the capability.”

But Trump, now mirrored by certain members of his team, remains fundamentally wrong in his minimization of continuing vital US interests in the Middle East. As the world’s largest importer and second-largest exporter, the United States would be disproportionately hurt by any abandonment of the principle of freedom of navigation. Any sharp and unexpected increases in the globally traded price of oil—a price that is directly affected by stability in the Middle East—causes inflation to rise in the United States. Diminishing Houthi capacity to project power, especially in the wake of Israel’s successful campaigns to diminish Hamas and Hezbollah’s ability to do so, further limits Iranian power in the region, a factor that may be critical if a nuclear crisis with Tehran emerges on Trump’s watch. The United States projects its own power in the region first and foremost because it helps secure US economic and national security interests and not as a gift to others—and certainly not, as Miller put it in the group chat, in order to get “some further economic gain extracted in return.”

For many decades, across Republican and Democratic administrations alike, US presidents have all understood this. But Trump’s contrarian views on this subject are clear, long-standing, and well documented. Indeed, even back when Trump announced the first of the Abraham Accords from the Oval Office—one of the crowning achievements of his first term—he still couldn’t have been clearer: “We don’t have to be there anymore. We don’t need oil . . . We no longer have to be there. It started off when we had to be there, but as of a few years ago, we don’t have to be there. We don’t have to be patrolling the straits. We’re doing things that other countries wouldn’t do. But we put ourselves, over the last few years, in a position where we no longer have to be in areas that, at one point, were vital. And that’s a big statement.”

Indeed. And now that Trump has assembled an administration that truly allows him to call the shots, nobody in the region should be surprised by the direction of policies to come. 

—William F. Wechsler is the senior director of Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. His most recent US government position was deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and combating terrorism.

***

One of the least-remarked-upon aspects of the US strikes in Yemen against the Houthis has been the strategic justification for the strikes. Besides Trump’s statement on March 15 at the start of the strikes, Hegseth articulated a justification for the strikes that carried with it strategic continuity that aligns with decades of US national security policy. Hegseth noted that the strikes were principally about freedom of navigation and restoring deterrence in the Middle East region.  

These principles transcend individual presidential administrations. Then US President Joe Biden’s statements at the 2022 US-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit contained these principles, as did Trump’s statement at the 2017 US-GCC Summit.  Historically, Hegseth’s thinking can trace its lineage from the Roosevelt administration to the Eisenhower administration and the United States’ leading role in shaping the security of the Middle East region. This policy eventually evolved with the Carter and Reagan administrations’ efforts to counter the hostile nature of a revolutionary Iran. The Trump administration’s bombing campaign is the latest manifestation of this approach. Whether it is acknowledged or not, there is considerable strategic continuity in the most recent US military actions in the region.

—Daniel E. Mouton is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He served on the National Security Council from 2021 to 2023 as the director for defense and political-military policy for the Middle East and North Africa for Coordinator Brett McGurk. 

What did we learn about how this White House views Europe?

Most European observers will take these revelations as confirmation of what they sensed before—that parts of this US administration are reflexively anti-European. This anti-European camp prefers to beat up on allies on the continent over addressing real and significant challenges. It reduces Europeans to a caricature of free-riders. It does not grasp the complex, 9.5 trillion-dollar economic integration and interdependency between the United States and the European Union (EU). And it views decades-old alliances as zero-sum games, if not a protection racket-like arrangement. And while this camp eschews foreign entanglements, it also shows an almost childish fascination with the unconstrained exercise of US hard power. Administration officials with these views are among the most senior in Trump’s cabinet.

But European decision makers should take away a few more insights and—most importantly—action items from the exchange. For one, there are officials in the Trump administration who do understand the importance of freedom of navigation and just how integrated global shipping, transatlantic supply chains, and US-EU trading relations are. That’s something to build on as the United States and the EU are on the brink of a trade war, likely to undercut each other while benefiting strategic competitors. Second, Europe will not be taken seriously by this White House until it develops some key capabilities to take care of its own core national security interests. In the current debate, European leaders should take this as further motivation to think big, get ambitious, and move fast to address defense spending, capability gaps, and defense-industrial shortcomings. Third, Europeans should be ready to throw these free-rider comments back at the White House when it inevitably criticizes Europe for requiring moderate levels of European taxpayer money for new military budgets to be spent on buying European.

—Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

***

One of the most pronounced themes in the exchange is its overall negative attitude toward Europe. The continent is referred to in the chat as “pathetic” and “free-loading,” suggesting that relations with Europe are increasingly seen as a burden. Since these private comments are now public, they are likely to strengthen the already negative attitudes toward the United States emanating from the capitals of the largest European countries. It is also striking that in the discussion, Europe is treated as a unitary actor, with no differentiation between individual allies, some of which, like those in NATO’s northeastern corridor, have done precisely what Trump has asked for all along: increased their spending on defense. It remains to be seen whether and how those Eastern flank countries will react, and if this exchange will impact their policies going forward.

—Andrew Michta is a senior fellow and director of the Scowcroft GeoStrategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council. The views expressed here are his own.

What are the intelligence implications of this leak?

The Atlantic’s publication of the near-complete Signal chat by Trump administration officials discussing plans for attacks against the Houthis may negatively affect the United States’ ability to collect intelligence against the Houthis and enable the militant group to better prepare for future US military operations. The exposure of the Signal chat may put any US human sources at risk, as well, because the Houthis are likely to suspect that the United States’ ability to strike certain Houthi military targets and individuals also comes from information provided by insiders. Finally, the Houthis may be able to glean from the sequencing of US military operations described in the Signal chat ways to better position Houthi assets to mitigate the effects of future US attacks. 

But there may be a silver lining for the United States, as well. The reference in the chat to the specific movements and locations of Houthi officials will undoubtedly prompt the group to try to tighten up the way its members communicate with one another, particularly regarding how and when cell phones can be used. While the negative consequences for the United States are potentially significant, Houthi concerns about their communications and spies may play to the US advantage. If the Houthis reduce their use of cell phones, and perhaps rely instead on passing verbal or written messages, it will slow the group’s response to threats. And Houthi internal spy hunts are likely to create suspicion and mistrust within the organization, which could undercut the group’s military effectiveness. 

—Alan Pino is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. He previously served for thirty-seven years at the Central Intelligence Agency, covering the Middle East and counterterrorism.

What are the information-security implications of this group chat?

I spent two years as a National Security Council staffer who helped to coordinate Principals Committee meetings on counterterrorism policy and operations. The United States government allocates enormous resources and capacity to make sure national security deliberations and decisions—and the personnel impacted by both—are kept safe. The use of a publicly available messaging platform and the inadvertent inclusion of a prominent journalist in an operational counterterrorism decision is a stunning breach of security. Three things stick out. 

The first issue is the technical risk. Signal is one of the more secure-by-design encrypted messaging apps with forty million to seventy million monthly active users. It’s a great app that prioritizes privacy, but the platform’s design pales in comparison to the security footprint and communications infrastructure that senior US officials travel around the world with to ensure they can communicate securely. 

The second issue is operational risk. Decisions, deliberations, and the information that feeds both are typically classified. The substance of the leaked chat seems to contain all three.

The third issue is good governance. Parts of the leaked Signal chat were set to automatically delete after one week, with others disappearing after four weeks. Communications by government officials about government decisions, like counterterrorism operations, are subject to laws like the Presidential Records Act to ensure transparency and oversight of government is possible. Not having a record of one of the most serious national security decisions an administration can make is a hindrance to the transparency and accountability expected in a functioning democracy.

—Graham Brookie is the Atlantic Council’s vice president for technology programs and strategy, as well as the senior director of the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab).

***

The “Houthi PC Small Group” chat is one of the most revealing windows into real-time US national security policymaking since the release of the Kennedy-era Cuban Missile Crisis tapes. Of course, the Cuban Missile Crisis tapes were released twenty years after the fact and following exhaustive legal review. The internal deliberations of the Trump-era Principals Committee were revealed while the bomb remnants were still smoldering and because no one thought to check the Signal chat’s participant list. 

There are two clear implications for US national and information security. The first is that the personal devices of senior US national security officials—always a focus of foreign actors—have almost certainly become the highest-priority collection target in the world. If these senior-most policymakers are sharing this much information on commercial systems, it begs the question of whether other appointees are sharing sensitive information on platforms such as Signal—or even less cryptographically secure apps.

The second implication is the deeply demoralizing effect that this scandal will have across the US defense and intelligence professional apparatus. The specific operational information shared by Hegseth is always marked at least the Secret level and releasable in only rare instances. The information is not classified at a higher level only because US military components must be ready to act on it and may not have access to the most secure communications in the field. What Hegseth shared—a complete operational snapshot two hours before US air strikes commenced—is only ever supposed to be known to a few dozen decision makers. It only belongs on government systems and certainly not in a journalist’s messaging app. 

Service members and defense and intelligence professionals have collectively spent millions of hours learning how to safeguard sensitive national security information. Many are left wondering why they face the threat of immediate expulsion or imprisonment for mishandling such information if there is no accountability at the top. 

—Emerson T. Brooking is director of strategy and resident senior fellow at the DFRLab of the Atlantic Council Technology Programs. From 2022 to 2023, he served as cyber policy advisor within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, where he was an author of the 2023 Department of Defense Cyber Strategy.

***

Signal is known for its robust end-to-end (E2E) encryption, often considered the most secure by default among messaging apps. The Signal encryption protocol is trusted to protect messages from unauthorized access during transit and at both ends of conversations. However, the Houthi Principals Committee group chat incident underscores that even robust E2E encryption like Signal’s is insufficient for US cabinet-level discussions, particularly military operation planning.

Several factors contribute to this inadequacy. While encryption secures the content, it doesn’t address operational and physical security risks associated with using consumer apps on personal devices. High-ranking officials using mobile phones in potentially unsecured environments expose themselves to greater surveillance and interception risks.

This case also demonstrates critical user behavior pitfalls. Displaying full names and accidentally adding unauthorized individuals to sensitive chats nullify the intended security of any encryption protocol. No encryption can prevent such human errors.

Finally, regardless of encryption, discussing highly sensitive military and national-security topics on mobile phones inherently carries cybersecurity risks. The ease with which personal mobile devices can be compromised poses a significant threat to classified information. Government communication systems employ far more extensive security measures than consumer apps. The use of personal phones and unauthorized apps can easily be exploited by adversarial actors with communication-interception capabilities.

—Iria Puyosa is a senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Democracy+Tech Initiative.

There was a big debate in the chat about who benefits from the Suez Canal. What is the real story?

The Suez Canal is not just a European concern—it’s a critical global artery that benefits the entire world, including the United States. While only about 3 percent of US trade passes through the canal directly, that figure understates the canal’s broader strategic and economic relevance. Around 30 percent of global container traffic and 40 percent of Asia-Europe trade flows through the Suez, much of which is embedded in US-linked supply chains. What happens in the canal affects global shipping costs, manufacturing inputs, and ultimately US businesses, consumers, and inflation levels more broadly.

The canal is also a key conduit for global energy flows, with around 9 percent of global seaborne oil flows and 8 percent of liquefied natural gas (LNG) volumes passing through it. Disruptions lead to price spikes and increased volatility in global energy markets, which directly impact US economic stability and consumer prices.

Beyond economics, the canal holds military importance, enabling rapid US naval deployment between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. The Signal chat’s dismissive tone about its importance reflects a narrow understanding of global interdependence. The Suez is a strategic chokepoint—its security is a shared responsibility. Treating it as merely “Europe’s problem” underestimates how deeply interconnected our global systems truly are.

—Racha Helwa is the director of the empowerME Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East.

Issue Brief

Mar 20, 2025

A lifeline under threat: Why the Suez Canal’s security matters for the world

By Racha Helwa, Perrihan Al-Riffai

The Suez Canal is both a maritime choke point and vital waterway for global trade and energy security. Given its strategic role as the fastest sea route between Asia and Europe, any disruption to the Suez Canal can have outsized impacts on global commerce and energy markets, as have occurred in recent years.

Economy & Business International Markets

What did we learn about the campaign against the Houthis?

The leaked Signal conversation reveals a reckless method of bombing that is immoral as well as irresponsible. It is political performance rather than war effort—one more keen on signaling than on meaningful action.

These attacks are an extension of the campaign initiated under the Biden administration but on a much larger scale. The messages show that the Trump administration is chasing headlines without any concern for the wider consequences of targeting the Houthis. The war is being waged at a distance, with no real concern for the devastation left behind. The lives of civilians are collateral damage, while the Houthis themselves are spared to a large extent.

More troublingly, the leaked messages indicate officials gloating over these attacks with emojis, even though there have been subsequent reports of high civilian casualties. These attacks are not meant to incapacitate the Houthis but to send a message to Iran and validate Trump’s criticisms of the Biden administration’s efforts to deter the Houthis. Meanwhile, Meanwhile, the most senior Houthi leaders continue to implement security measures to keep them safe from attacks, limiting their vulnerability to strikes even as lower-level leaders and members are killed.

This bombing campaign is no serious effort to undermine the Houthis, nor is it an articulation of a coherent Yemen policy. Instead, Yemen is being used as a battlefield in an even broader war against Iran with little regard for the millions of Yemeni citizens who call the country home.

—Osamah Al Rawhani is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

***

The published Signal chat offers a rare glimpse into how the Trump administration assesses the Houthis’ current threat level, as well as their military capabilities. Although the group remains a serious threat to Israel and international maritime traffic, the chat suggests that their threat trajectory is not rapidly accelerating. Officials including Central Intelligence Agency Director John Ratcliffe, Hegseth, and Joe Kent, Trump’s nominee to be director of the National Counterterrorism Center, all indicated that delaying the operation would not significantly alter the rebels’ strategic position. This suggests that the Houthis may be persistent, but they are not rapidly advancing.

The messages also underscore the Houthis’ continued success in shielding their senior leadership from detection. Ratcliffe’s comment that more time would be useful “to identify starting points for coverage on Houthi leadership” highlights the success of the group’s long-standing efforts to keep their leaders hidden, especially the group’s leader, Abdel Malik al-Houthi, who is rarely seen in public and frequently relocates to avoid being targeted. By keeping their senior leadership structure largely intact, the Houthis have maintained operational control even when faced with sustained external pressure.

Additionally, the chat contained comments stating that the Houthis’ arsenal of missiles and drones are effective enough to evade European naval defenses. This shows that Iranian efforts to transform the group from a small militant faction to a capable military force, which have been limited compared to what Tehran has provided other groups like Hezbollah, have been largely successful. That revelation raises concerns that additional assistance from Iran, as well as support from other US adversaries such as Russia and China, could act as a force multiplier and accelerate the Houthis’ long-term transition into a fully modernized military force capable of exerting significant influence over regional security. 

—Emily Milliken is the associate director of media and communications for the N7 Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

The post Our experts separate Signal from noise in the Trump team’s messages about bombing the Houthis appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 5, Matthew Kroenig, vice president and senior director of the Scowcroft Center, was interviewed on BBC Radio 5 on President Trump’s tactics to bring Russia and Ukraine to the negotiating table and end the war in Ukraine. He argues that the United States is not aligning with Russia but instead acting as a neutral arbiter to end the war.  

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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The post Kroenig interviewed on BBC Radio 5 on the United States’ role in ending the war in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

After having withdrawn from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) during his first term, Trump has since expressed an interest in a negotiated settlement with Tehran. But with all deals, the details matter. And while it is true that the Trump administration has not yet given its blessing to Israel for military strikes against Iran—as US intelligence reportedly portends—it was unrealistic to expect such a move from Trump as the opening act of his presidency. Trump needed time to build his team, formulate a policy, and secure international legitimacy and support for military action should it become necessary. The third task requires leaving open a lane for diplomacy to make it possible to blame Tehran should negotiations fail and to secure political support from US allies and partners.

Right now, signs indicate that the United States and Iran are headed towards confrontation, not a successful diplomatic outcome.

The Islamic Republic has not yet softened its position on the nuclear file, even after being weakened by a series of killings of leaders across its proxy network and by the degrading of a chunk of its air defenses and missile capacities. While Iranian decisionmakers have recognized the reality that the 2015 text of the JCPOA is long dead, they have clung to the vision of resurrecting a new deal premised on the basic bargain of temporary nuclear constraints in exchange for sanctions relief, using the JCPOA as a reference point or framework. 

Some Iranian officials have taken to the airwaves to hint that there may be willingness to discuss nonnuclear concerns, but those who are the real decisionmakers on these issues—the supreme leader and commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—have shunned talks over its missile and drone programs and other regional files. Their stances speak louder than the propagandists trying to give an impression to Western constituencies and others that such fundamental change is possible. History has shown that it is not.

In February, the supreme leader himself delivered public remarks warning against negotiations with the Trump administration: “One shall not negotiate with a government like this,” he said. “Negotiating is unwise, unintelligent, not honorable.” Already this has triggered hardened rhetoric from Iranian officials, such as President Masoud Pezeshkian, who had previously made more conciliatory comments towards the Trump administration. Since Khamenei’s speech, the Pezeshkian administration has experienced further headwinds with the impeachment of Economy Minister Abdolnaser Hemmati as well as the resignation of Vice President for Strategic Affairs Javad Zarif, who has long been seen as the face of the Islamic Republic’s engagement with the United States.

But Khamenei’s warning last month was not the sweeping ban he laid down in September 2019, when he said, “the policy of maximum pressure on the Iranian nation is of little importance, and all the officials in the Islamic Republic unanimously believe that there will be no negotiations at any level with the United States.” The Islamic Republic under Khamenei will likely never truly walk away completely from the negotiating table, as its political weaponization is a valuable tool to buy time for the regime and divide the United States from within and from its allies. This does not necessarily mean there will be direct and public diplomacy with the Trump administration at this juncture. However, Khamenei’s latest comments seem to leave some room for diplomacy in that they do not necessarily rule out indirect discussions. Such discussions could take place through various channels of communication that Tehran has long maintained with Washington, including through Arab regional interlocutors and European governments. Russia has also reportedly agreed to serve as an intermediary. Still, the obstacles are significant.

For now, on substance, Iran and the United States are talking past each other about “deals.” Iran is still speaking in the language of the JCPOA. But US officials appear to have something different in mind. In a recent interview, Trump publicly disavowed the JCPOA formula, complaining about its short-term duration. This was followed by his national security advisor expressing a willingness to talk to Iran as long as Tehran wants to give up its entire nuclear program. The US secretary of state hinted at a similar demand, noting that in the past, “efforts that Iran has undertaken diplomatically have been only about how to extend the time frame” for its nuclear program and to continue to enrich, sponsor terrorism, build long-range weapons, and “sow instability throughout the region.” 

Trump’s National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 (NSPM-2) included related pledges, vowing to “deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon and end the regime’s nuclear extortion racket.” NSPM-2 also employed mandatory language stating that the US ambassador to the United Nations will “work with key allies to complete the snapback”—or restoration—”of international sanctions and restrictions on Iran.” This language evokes past US demands for zero enrichment or reprocessing in Iran, which the first Trump administration endorsed. Triggering snapback would also restore previous UN Security Council resolutions, inked before the 2015 JCPOA, which included demands for Iran to suspend “all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities . . . and work on all heavy-water related projects.”

NSPM-2 likewise declared that it is US policy that “Iran be denied a nuclear weapon and intercontinental ballistic missiles,” among other measures to counter Iran’s malign behavior beyond its nuclear program. These US positions are reminiscent of the 2003 Libya disarmament deal, in which the country pledged to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction programs, including nuclear, and to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime. However, this is a fundamentally different paradigm from the JCPOA, which allowed Iran to enrich uranium up to 3.67 percent purity and did not touch its missile program.

In fact, Iran’s supreme leader has warned that US officials “intend to systematically reduce Iran’s nuclear facilities, similar to how they did with a North African country”—a hint at Libya—”ultimately leading to the shutdown of Iran’s nuclear industry.” In 2011, Khamenei (referring to Libyan dictator Muammar Ghaddafi) said that “this gentleman wrapped up all his nuclear facilities, packed them on a ship and delivered them to the West and said, ‘Take them!’” He added, “Look where we are, and in what position they are now.” In 2023, after talks about reviving the JCPOA stalled, Khamenei reiterated that “there is nothing wrong with the agreement [with the West], but the infrastructure of our nuclear industry should not be touched.” 

Despite forty-six years of failed diplomacy, outside observers have been insisting Iran is ripe for a durable diplomatic arrangement with the United States. Some supporters of negotiations with Iran have also been wishcasting that Trump suddenly adopted the Obama administration’s Iran policy based on an overreading of the new president’s rhetoric and the absence of certain officials, such as former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo who took a hardline stance, from the policymaking process. But this is a false narrative, one that even some Islamic Republic officials like to promote while arguing that Trump was suckered into an Iran policy that was not his own, despite him expressing disapproval of the JCPOA during his first presidential campaign, well before his national security team was assembled.

There is no public evidence to date that the maximum Tehran is prepared to give—a JCPOA-style arrangement—will meet the minimum the Trump administration is prepared to accept. If current positions hold, this sets the stage for a showdown, not a deal, in the near term, necessitating the development of a robust pressure architecture to further sharpen Tehran’s choices.

Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI). His research focus includes Iranian leadership dynamics and Iran’s military and security apparatus. He is on X @JasonMBrodsky.

The post The stage is set for a US-Iran showdown—not a deal appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On February 17, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Nicholas Eftimiades was quoted in a The Bureau article entitled, “Inside The Massive PRC Intelligence Machine Working On US Soil,” where he briefed security experts on his upcoming book. The article notes the importance of Eftimiades’ new book, drawing “insights from nearly 900 cases, including Linda Sun, who worked for two state governors.”

Fellow

Nicholas Eftimiades

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

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On February 17, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Nicholas Eftimiades was interviewed on NTD Evening News on the confirmation of Tulsi Gabbard as Director of National Intelligence. In the interview, Eftimiades spoke to Gabbard’s national security priorities and understanding of strategic threats to the United States today.

Fellow

Nicholas Eftimiades

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Eftimiades interviewed by NTD on Tulsi Gabbard as Director of National Intelligence appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What stand out most are the potential of cross-border attacks, the lower technological barriers to causing major damage, the escalatory risks arising from coordination among terrorist groups, and the power of psychological warfare to shape a conflict.

Securing the border

The inciting attack of October 7 was not a “typical” terrorist act; it was meticulously planned and executed as both an invasion and a declaration of war on Israel. While the attack included elements traditionally associated with terrorism—such as the mass murder of civilians, including women and children; heinous acts like rape; and the abduction of hostages, mostly civilians, taken to Gaza—it went far beyond the conventional scope of terrorism.

The attack underscored for Israel, and probably for other nations, the urgent need to reevaluate its approach to border security, as the threat of terror-attack-as-invasion has become a tangible reality. In the aftermath of October 7, there is a growing possibility that other terrorist organizations, or even some established armies, may attempt to replicate such operations, combining invasion tactics with acts of terror.

Israel learned this lesson the hardest way. But other nations—particularly those with adversaries along their borders—should now consider preparing for similar scenarios to ensure the security of their borders and the safety of their civilian populations, thereby minimizing the risk of similar attacks. This includes actively protecting borders, even when an immediate threat is not expected. Israel’s experience has shown that technological measures alone are not always sufficient. In defending against terrorist organizations, the best approach is to prepare based on their capabilities rather than their often difficult-to-predict motivations. Also, we can expect a rise in investments in anti-missile armor, as capabilities such as Israel’s Iron Dome can play a crucial role in maintaining and protecting civilian lives.

Low-tech terror

Another important lesson learned from the tactics and capabilities used by Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and even Iran is that low-cost technology is now transforming the nature of armed conflicts around the world—from the Middle East to Ukraine. Tools such as drones and unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as low-cost rockets and outdated and primitive missile launchers, are enhancing the precision and effectiveness of attacks, demonstrating that terrorist organizations do not require advanced, high-tech capabilities to achieve strategic goals and inflict significant damage on their adversaries. Terrorist organizations, as well as sovereign countries and established armies, can use simple tools, some of which are purchased online, and adapt them to their needs without necessarily relying on arms industries to challenge their enemies. These methods can prove effective against Western militaries that have chosen to defend against attacks by investing in capabilities such as fighter jets, sophisticated radar systems, naval vessels, and high-end ammunition. 

This should serve as a wake-up call for countries to adapt to the evolving threats posed by inexpensive and accessible technologies. For example, countries should develop solutions to counter drones and other precision capabilities in areas where the Iron Dome system has only partial success. Most importantly, countries must closely monitor developments in their enemies’ capabilities as threats will continue to evolve. This understanding is crucial, as low-tech attacks can persist for extended periods and cause significant damage to both civilian and military targets.

The risk of escalation

The October 7 attack and subsequent active involvement of other terror groups and countries demonstrated how attacks of this nature can quickly escalate into full-scale wars with multiple participants. Besides Israel and Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, the Houthis, and Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria also became involved in the wide-scale war, although they were not initially part of the attack and could have chosen to remain uninvolved. These groups’ involvement also drew in the United States, the United Kingdom, and others who hit back against them.

This expansion of the conflict had profound consequences for the civilian populations and governments of the countries where these groups operate. More than one million civilians fled their homes in Lebanon during the armed conflict with Israel, following counterattacks by the Israel Defense Forces. This is not to mention the tremendous damage and suffering to the people in the Gaza Strip.

It is now clear that Hamas’s attack not only dramatically damaged Hamas itself, but also weakened the broader Axis of Resistance, as the region’s Iran-backed armed groups are known. This dynamic may lead some terrorist groups to reconsider their actions in the future. These groups likely will seek prior confirmation and support from their allies—meaning Iran, in the case of Hamas and Hezbollah—before any future large-scale operations. 

The important lesson, once again learned from Israel’s harsh experience, is that large-scale, multi-arena wars can erupt unexpectedly, even when the parties’ interests do not fully align. Initially, it was not clear that the October 7 attack would draw Hezbollah into the conflict given that it had not been strong allies with Hamas, but the two groups took greater risks for one another than Western analysts expected. Their initial motivation was driven by hatred toward Israel, a commitment to their terrorist agenda, and a desire to avoid standing idle while another terrorist organization waged a large-scale fight against Israel. Additionally, they sought to avoid appearing less committed to terrorism or less opposed to Israel. 

Therefore, countries must take this into account and understand that previously unconnected terrorist organizations may cooperate toward the same goal—requiring preparation for war scenarios involving multiple fronts. It is likely that their cooperation will be based on a shared ideology, such as resistance to Western influence. It is difficult to determine if external intervention can eliminate such collaborations between terrorist organizations, but terrorist groups must be made to understand that becoming involved in a full-scale war will come at a significant cost to them and their host countries. 

In addition, the United States and Israel, with the support of Western allies, should focus on disrupting cooperation, however limited, between terrorist organizations during peacetime. These efforts should complement other steps aimed at reducing the empowerment of terrorist organizations in the future. This includes capitalizing on the vulnerabilities of the Axis of Resistance to disrupt its empowerment and arms transfers, and strengthen alternatives within their home countries to provide the civilian services previously offered by these organizations—ensuring that, unlike in recent decades, these groups do not take over their countries. 

Additionally, the United States and Israel, along with Western allies, should apply pressure to the countries where these terrorist organizations originate to prevent them from using civilian areas for operations, including by threatening to withhold financial backing. Furthermore, those allies should take action against terror facilities in civilian areas as soon as they are identified. This could come in the form of military action, exposing these facilities so the terrorist organizations would be reluctant to use them, and pressuring countries to take action against these facilities themselves. The goal should always be to minimize civilian harm, reduce the threat posed by such facilities, and deter terrorist groups from operating in these areas due to the risk of destruction and loss of resources.

The psychological war

Following the catastrophe of October 7, Israel quickly regained its military effectiveness and succeeded in inflicting substantial damage on its enemies. This recovery was further strengthened by the remarkable support of its allies, which enhanced both its capabilities and strategic position. This model could also apply to other countries that may be attacked in the future. 

Although Israel managed to recover from the shock of the October 7 attack, the broader perspective of the Gaza war highlighted the significant impact of psychological terror on both the civilian population and government decision-making. This represents a new type of warfare, one that involves not only mainstream media and news reports but also underground sources. Actions by Hamas, such as releasing hostage videos, spreading rumors, and leaking information, profoundly influenced public sentiment, contributing to the chaos seen in Israel, particularly in the war’s early months.

This is another shared lesson from both the Middle East conflict and the Russia-Ukraine war. It’s hard to predict whether future conflicts with terrorist organizations will necessarily involve these kinds of psychological threats and tactics. However, it is clear that the flow of information today—via social media, messaging apps, and other platforms—not only shapes public opinion but also influences the battlefield.

The conflicts across the Middle East that erupted in late 2023 will carry a lasting legacy for the entire region. As policymakers turn to the future of Gaza and other political negotiations, they should also take note of the lessons learned over the past sixteen months as they seek to reshape the region and reduce the impact of terrorism. This particular series of conflicts may be coming to a close, but the threat is not going away.

Maayan Dagan is a visiting research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

The post What the Middle East conflicts reveal about the future of terrorism appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russia is “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security.” So states the NATO Strategic Concept promulgated at the Alliance’s Madrid Summit in June 2022, just four months after Russia’s massive escalation of its invasion of Ukraine.¹ The concept and NATO declarations not only underscore the illegality and brutality of that ongoing attack but also highlight Moscow’s use of nuclear and conventional military aggression, annexation, subversion, sabotage, and other forms of coercion and violence against NATO allies and partners.

Ever since its invasion of Georgia in 2008, Russia’s aggression against the Alliance has steadily intensified. This led NATO leaders at their 2024 Washington Summit to task the development of “recommendations on NATO’s strategic approach to Russia, taking into account the changing security environment.”² The Alliance’s “Russia strategy” is due for consideration at NATO’s next summit at The Hague in June 2025.³ This issue brief reviews Moscow’s actions affecting the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and presents the enduring realities, objectives, and actions that should constitute the core of an effective NATO strategy to counter the threat posed by Russia.

Intensified and globalized Russian aggression

Russia’s objectives go far beyond the subordination of Ukraine. Moscow seeks to reassert hegemony and control over the space of the former Soviet Union, diminish the power of the democratic community of nations, and delegitimize the international rules-based order. Moscow aims to subjugate its neighbors and to weaken—if not shatter—NATO, the key impediment to its European ambitions.

Toward these ends and under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin, Russia:

• Has illegally occupied Moldova’s Transnistria region since the early 1990s.
• Invaded Georgia in 2008, has continued to occupy portions of that country, and recently increased its influence, if not control, over the nation’s governance.
• Invaded Ukraine in 2014 and significantly escalated this ongoing war in February 2022.
• Militarized the Arctic by increasing its military presence in the region, including through reopening Soviet-era bases and building new facilities to buttress Russian territorial claims over Arctic waters.
• Leveraged trade and energy embargoes and other forms of economic pressure to intimidate and coerce its European neighbors.
• Conducts an escalating campaign of active measures short of war against NATO allies and partners, including information warfare, election interference, sabotage, assassination, weaponized migration, cyberattacks, GPS jamming, and other actions.
• Expanded its conventional and nuclear military capabilities, an effort that was part of President Putin’s preparations to invade Ukraine.
• Violated, suspended, and abrogated international arms control agreements, including New START Treaty, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Open Skies Agreement, and others.⁴

Enduring realities

A NATO strategy to counter Russia’s aggression is long overdue. Its absence cedes to Russia the initiative, leaving the Alliance too often in a reactive, if not indecisive and passive, posture in this relationship. An effective strategy requires recognition of nine enduring realities:

First, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a failure of deterrence. The weakness of the Alliance’s response to Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, NATO’s failure to respond forcefully to Russia’s months long mobilization of forces along Ukraine’s frontiers in 2021, and NATO’s acquiescence to Putin’s exercise of nuclear coercion emboldened and facilitated Putin’s actions against Ukraine. As a result, the credibility of the Alliance’s commitment to defend resolutely its interests and values has been damaged.

Second, Russia is at war, not just against Ukraine. It is also at war against NATO. The Alliance can no longer approach the relationship as one of competition or confrontation considering the military invasions, active measures, and other forms of violence and coercion Russia has undertaken against NATO allies and partners.⁵ As former US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun has written, “Quite simply, Putin has declared war on the West, but the West does not yet understand we are at war with Russia.”⁶ By failing to recognize this reality, NATO has ceded escalation dominance to Russia as evidenced by its limiting of support to Ukraine and its inaction against repeated Russian aggression and provocations. The Alliance must recognize and act upon the reality that Moscow has pushed the NATO-Russia relationship into the state of war.

Third, NATO faces long-term conflict with Russia. Putin cannot be expected to abandon his ambitions, even if defeated in Ukraine. Ever since Putin’s speech before the February 2007 Munich Security Conference in which he railed against the international order and NATO’s expanding membership, Russia’s campaign to subjugate its neighbors and to intimidate, divide, and weaken the Alliance has been unceasing and relentless. Nor can the Alliance assume that Putin’s successor will significantly diverge from the objectives and policies that drive Russia’s actions today. Peaceful coexistence with Russia is not attainable in the short to medium term and will be difficult to attain in the long term.

Fourth, Russia will continue efforts to increase the size and capability of its armed forces. While Russian land forces have suffered significant losses in its invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has reconstituted that force faster than expected. Russia’s land forces were estimated to be 15 percent larger in April 2024 than when Russia attacked Kyiv in February 2022.⁷ Earlier this year, Russia announced new ambitious plans to restructure and expand its ground forces to 1.5 million active personnel.⁸ Moreover, the Russian air force and navy have not been significantly degraded by the war against Ukraine. Russia’s air force has only lost some 10 percent of its aircraft. While Russian naval ships have been destroyed in the Black Sea, Russian naval activity worldwide has increased.⁹ Similarly, Russian nuclear forces have been unaffected by the conflict in Ukraine. Russia retains the world’s largest arsenal of deployed and nondeployed nuclear weapons and continues to develop new models of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM), hypersonic boost-glide vehicles, nuclear-powered cruise missiles, nuclear-powered subsurface drones, antisatellite weapons, and orbital space weapons.¹⁰ With some 6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) being directed to its military, Moscow is investing to increase its defense-industrial and research and development capacities.¹¹ Russia’s industrial base produces more ammunition than that produced by all NATO members and is fielding new high-tech weapons systems, such as the nuclear-capable multiple warhead IRBM Oreshnik Russia, which was demonstrated in combat against Ukraine last November.¹² In April 2024, NATO SACEUR General Christopher Cavoli testified to the US Congress that:

• “Russia is on track to command the largest military on the continent and a defense industrial complex capable of generating substantial amounts of ammunition and material in support of large-scale combat operations. Regardless of the outcome of the war in Ukraine, Russia will be larger, more lethal and angrier with the West than when it invaded.”¹³

Fifth, Moscow’s aggressive actions short of war will continue and escalate. Putin has yet to face a response from the Alliance that will dissuade him from further exercising information warfare, cyber warfare, energy and trade embargoes, assassination, GPS jamming, sabotage, fomenting separatist movements, and other forms of hybrid warfare. These actions are intended to intimidate governments; weaken the credibility of the Alliance’s security guarantee; create and exacerbate internal divisions; and divide allies, among other objectives. Left unchecked, they threaten to undermine the Alliance’s ability to attain consensus necessary to take decisive action against Russia.

Sixth, Moscow’s exercise of nuclear coercion will continue as a key element of Russia’s strategy and should be expected to intensify. Threats of nuclear warfare are a key element of Putin’s strategy to preclude NATO and its members from providing Ukraine support that would enable it to decisively defeat Russia’s invasion. This repeated exercise of nuclear coercion includes verbal threats from President Putin and other senior Russian officials; the launching of nuclear capable ICBMs; the use of a nuclear capable IRBM against Ukraine, the first use of such a system in a conflict; nuclear weapons exercises; and the deployment of nuclear weapons to Belarus, according to both Russia and Belarus.¹⁴ NATO allies have repeatedly rewarded this coercion by expressing fear of nuclear war; declaring that NATO forces will not enter Ukraine; restricting NATO’s role in assisting Ukraine; limiting the flow of weapons to Ukraine; and restricting their use against legitimate military targets in Russia. Rewarding nuclear coercion encourages its repeated exercise and escalation. It risks leading Russia to conclude it has attained escalation dominance. A key challenge for NATO going forward will be to demonstrate that Russia’s threats of nuclear strikes are counterproductive, and the Alliance cannot be deterred by nuclear coercion.

Seventh, Moscow is conducting a global campaign of aggression to weaken the democratic community of nations and the rules-based international order. Over the last two decades, Russia has exercised its military, informational, and economic assets to generate anti-Western sentiment across the globe, including in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific region. This has included military support to authoritarian, anti-Western regimes well beyond Europe, including Venezuela, Syria, and Mali. The most concerning element of Russia’s global campaign is the partnerships it has operationalized with China, Iran, and North Korea. Russia’s “no limits partnership” with China enables Putin to mitigate the impacts of Western sanctions on his war economy. Both Iran and North Korea have provided Russia with weapons and ammunition, and North Korean soldiers have joined Russia’s fight against Ukraine. In return, Russia has supplied missile and nuclear technologies, oil and gas, and economic support to these nations that enables them to stoke violence across the Middle East, threaten the Korean Peninsula, and drive forward Beijing’s hegemonic ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region.

Eighth, an effective Russia strategy will require a coordinated leveraging of all the instruments of power available through the Alliance, its member states, and its key partners, including the European Union. This includes the application of diplomatic, economic, ideological, informational, and other elements of power—none of which are the Alliance’s primary capacity, military power—that can be marshaled through its members states and multinational institutions, such as the European Union, where the Alliance and its member states have influence and authority.

Ninth, NATO significantly overmatches Russia in military and economic power.
NATO Headquarters estimates the combined GDP of Alliance member states to be $54 trillion, more than twenty-five times Russia’s estimated GDP of more than $2 trillion.¹⁵ The combined defense budget of NATO members amounts to approximately $1.5 trillion,¹⁶ more than ten times that of Russia’s publicly projected defense budget of $128 billion for 2025.¹⁷ This imbalance of power favoring the Alliance will be enduring and makes the execution of an effective Russia strategy not a matter of capacity, but one of strategic vision and political will.

Core objectives

To counter the direct and significant threat posed by Moscow, a NATO strategy for Russia should be structured around four core objectives:¹⁸

• Defeat Russia in Ukraine: NATO must defeat Russia’s war against Ukraine. This is its most urgent priority. Failure to do so—and failure includes the conflict’s perpetuation—increases the risk of a wider war in Europe and will encourage other adversaries around the world to pursue their revisionist and hegemonic ambitions. Russia’s decisive defeat in Ukraine is essential to return stability to Europe and to reinforce the credibility of the Alliance’s deterrent posture.

• Deter aggression by Russia: A key Alliance priority must be the effective deterrence of Russia aggression against the Alliance. A robust conventional and nuclear posture that deters Russian military aggression is far less costly than an active war. Deterrence must also be more effectively exercised against Russia’s actions short of war. Failure to deter aggression in this domain can undermine confidence in the Alliance and increase the risk of war.
• Contain Russia’s influence and control: The Alliance must actively contain Russia’s efforts to assert influence and control beyond its borders. The Alliance must assist Europe’s non-NATO neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and in Central Asia to strengthen their defenses and resilience to Russian pressure. NATO and NATO allies should also work to counter and roll back Russia’s influence and engagement around the globe.
• Degrade Russia’s capabilities and determination: A core objective for the Alliance should include weakening Russia’s capacity and will to pursue its hegemonic ambitions. Denying Russia access to international markets would further degrade its economy, including its defense-industrial capacity. Active engagement of the Russian public and other key stakeholders should aim to generate opposition to Putin and the Kremlin’s international aggression.

Achievement of these objectives would compel the Kremlin to conclude that its revanchist ambitions, including the diminishment or destruction of NATO, are unachievable and self-damaging. It would diminish Russia’s will and ability to continue aggression in Europe and weaken the impact of Russia’s partnerships, including with China, Iran, and North Korea. In addition, achieving these objectives would return a modicum of stability to Europe that in the long-term would enhance the prospects for NATO’s peaceful coexistence with Russia.

Recommended actions

A NATO strategy to defeat, deter, contain, and degrade Russian aggression and influence should effectuate the following actions by the Alliance, its member states, and partners:

• Defeat Russia in Ukraine and accelerate Ukraine’s accession into the NATO alliance Defeating Russian aggression against Ukraine requires its own strategy, which should feature five key elements: adopting Ukraine’s war objectives, including total territorial reconstitution (i.e., the Alliance must never recognize Russian sovereignty over the territories it illegally seized from Ukraine); maximizing the flow of military equipment and supplies to Ukraine, free of restrictions on their use against legitimate military targets in Russia; imposing severe economic sanctions on Russia; deploying aggressive information operations to generate opposition in Russia against Putin’s aggression; and presenting a clear, accelerated path for Ukraine to NATO membership. NATO membership, and the security guarantee it provides, would add real risk and complexity to Russian military planning. NATO membership for Ukraine is the only way to convince the Kremlin that Ukraine cannot be subject to Russian hegemony and would provide security conditions needed for Ukraine’s rapid reconstruction and economic integration into Europe.
• Fulfill and operationalize NATO’s regional defense plans. To establish a credible and effective deterrent against Russian military aggression, NATO allies must:
  • Build and deploy the requisite national forces. Military plans are no more than visions in the absence of required capabilities. NATO’s European and Canadian allies need to generate more forces, with requisite firepower, mobility, and enabling capacities. In short, given European allies’ obligations under NATO’s new regional defense plans, they must act with urgency.
  • Strengthen transatlantic defense industrial capacity. High intensity warfare, as seen in Ukraine, consumes massive amounts of weapons stocks, much of which have to be in a near constant state of modernization to match the technological adaptations of the adversary. Today, the Alliance has struggled (and often failed) to match the defense-industrial capacity of Russia and its partners. NATO’s defense industrial base must expand its production capacities and its ability to rapidly develop, update, and field weapons systems.
  • Increase allied defense spending to the equivalent of 5 percent of GDP. To facilitate the aforementioned requirements and to address emerging challenges beyond Europe that could simultaneously challenge the transatlantic community, NATO allies need to increase the agreed floor of defense spending from 2 percent to 5 percent and fulfill that new commitment with immediacy. NATO members cannot allow themselves to be forced to choose between defending against Russia and another geopolitical challenge beyond Europe.

• Terminate the NATO Russia Founding Act (NRFA). Russia has repeatedly and blatantly violated the principles and commitments laid out in the Founding Act. Russia’s actions include having invaded Ukraine both in 2014 and in 2022, using nuclear coercion and escalatory rhetoric to pressue the Alliance, and deploying nonstrategic nuclear weapons to Belarus, as both Russia and Belarus have affirmed. Consequently, NATO should formally render the NRFA defunct, including the Alliance’s commitments to:
  • Adhere to the “three nuclear no’s” that NATO member states “have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy – and do not foresee any future need to do so.”¹⁹
  • Abstain from permanently stationing “substantial combat forces” in Central and Eastern Europe.²⁰

• Update NATO’s nuclear force posture. In response to Russia’s modernization of its nuclear arsenal, exercise of nuclear coercion, and adjustments to its nuclear strategy that lowers the threshold for first use of nuclear weapons, the Alliance must update its own nuclear posture. The objectives should be to provide NATO with a broader and more credible spectrum of nuclear weapons options. An updated force posture would improve NATO’s ability to manage, if not dominate, the ladder of conflict escalation, complicate Russian military planning, and thereby weaken Moscow’s confidence in its own military posture and its strategy of nuclear “escalation to de escalate.” Toward these ends, the Alliance should:
  • Increase the spectrum of NATO’s nuclear capabilities. This should include a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) and a ground-launched variant. The breadth and number of NATO nuclear weapons exercises, such as the yearly Steadfast Noon, should be expanded and further integrated with exercises of conventional forces.
  • Expand the number of members participating in the Alliance’s nuclear sharing agreements. Doing so will expand the tactical options available to NATO and underscore more forcefully Alliance unity behind its nuclear posture.
  • Broaden the number and locations of infrastructure capable of hosting the Alliance’s nuclear posture. The Alliance’s nuclear posture still relies solely on Cold War legacy infrastructure in Western Europe. Given the threat posed by Russia, NATO should establish facilities capable of handling nuclear weapons and dual capable systems, including nuclear weapons storage sites, in NATO member states along its eastern frontier.

• Reinforce NATO’s eastern flank. Russia’s assault on Ukraine and its growing provocations against NATO member states and partners underscore the need to further reinforce the Alliance’s eastern frontier. To date, NATO’s deployments along its eastern flank amount to more of a trip-wire force rather than one designed for a strategy of defense by denial. To give greater credibility to the Alliance’s pledge not to “cede one inch” when considering a potential attack by Russia, NATO should:
  • Establish a more robust permanent military presence along the Alliance’s eastern frontier. NATO is expanding its eight multinational battlegroups deployed to Central and Eastern Europe. But each of these deployments should be further upgraded to full brigades that are permanently stationed there. These elements should feature robust enabling capacities, particularly air and missile defenses and long-range fires. If the United States is expected to sustain a presence of 100,000 troops in Europe, the least Western Europe and Canada can do is to forward station some 32,000 troops combined in Central and Eastern Europe.
  • Conduct large-scale, concentrated exercises on NATO’s eastern flank. The Alliance has commendably reanimated its emphasis on large-scale joint military exercises. However, those exercises have yet to be concentrated on NATO’s eastern flank. Doing so would enhance readiness, reassure the Alliance’s Central and Eastern European member states, and demonstrate resolve and preparedness in the face of Russian aggression.
  • Upgrade the Alliance’s air defense and ballistic missile defense systems to more robustly address Russian threats. In its attacks on Ukraine, Russia has demonstrated with brutality its emphasis on missile and long-range drone strikes against military and civilian targets. As part of its efforts to upgrade its air and missile defense capacities, NATO should direct the European Phased Adaptive Approach to address threats from Russia.²¹

• Expand the NATO SACEUR’s authority to order deployments and conduct operations along NATO’s eastern frontier. The Alliance’s regional defense plans are said to provide SACEUR with greater authority to activate and deploy NATO forces before crisis and conflict situations. Due to the aggressiveness of Russia’s ambitions, NATO should consider further expanding those authorities as they relate to the deployment and missions of forces along the Alliance’s eastern frontier. The actions of a deterrent force can be even more important than the magnitude of their presence.
• Augment the Alliance’s posture in the Arctic. Russia has heavily militarized the Arctic, upgraded the status and capability of its Northern Fleet, and deepened its military cooperation with China in the region while the Kremlin continues to assert Arctic territorial claims that conflict with those of NATO allies. While NATO has been increasing the tempo of its Arctic operations and improving its Arctic capabilities, Russia continues to pose a significant threat in the region and possibly outmatches the Alliance in the High North. To further reinforce deterrence against Russian aggression in the Arctic, the Alliance should:
  • Develop a comprehensive NATO strategy to defend its interests in the High North. Such a document would underscore the Alliance’s commitment to the region and help foster allied investments in infrastructure, capabilities, and training needed to defend and deter Russian threats in the High North.
  • Establish a NATO Arctic Command and Joint Force. The Arctic poses a unique set of geographic and climatic challenges requiring tailored operational capabilities. A command and air-ground-naval force focused specifically on the High North would provide the Alliance a dedicated and tailored deterrent to counter Russian aggression in the Arctic.²²

• Bolster deterrence against Russian actions short of war by strengthening resilience and through more assertive and punitive counteractions. NATO and NATO member states’ failure to respond robustly to Russia’s hybrid warfare—whether it is information warfare, cyberattacks, sabotage, assassinations, or other forms of aggression — has resulted in Russia’s intensification and escalation of these actions. The transatlantic community must strengthen its resilience against such attacks but also take stronger punitive measures against Russia if it is to persuade Russia to cease these attacks. While much of what needs to be done falls beyond the remit of NATO’s military capabilities, greater consideration should be given to how military assets can be leveraged to gather intelligence about Russian activity and provide a military dimension to the transatlantic community’s response to such provocations. For example, when a Russian ship fired a warning shot directed at a commercial Norwegian fishing boat within Norway’s exclusive economic zone or when Russia pulled out Estonian navigation buoys from the Narva River,²³ an immediate show of force from NATO could have been an appropriate response.
• Strengthen the deterrence and resilience capacities of non-NATO nations in Europe and Russia’s periphery. Recent elections in Georgia, Moldova, and Romania reflect the intensity of Russia’s determination to claw back control and influence over the space of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. A key priority of a Russia strategy should be to strengthen efforts by the Alliance, its member states, and key institutional partners, such as the European Union, to reinforce the resilience and defense capabilities of non-NATO nations in Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. NATO’s programs, such as the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative, warrant even greater emphasis and resources, particularly in those regions.
• Intensify Russia’s economic and diplomatic isolation. The current set of measures taken against Moscow in these realms have failed to sufficiently degrade Russia’s war economy and its ability to sustain its invasion of Ukraine and provocations elsewhere in the world. A key priority for NATO and its member states should be to significantly escalate economic sanctions, including the exercise of secondary sanctions to eliminate Moscow’s ability to generate international revenue from energy exports and attain critical technologies needed by its defense industrial sector.
• Increase efforts to generate internal Russian opposition to the Kremlin’s revanchist objectives and greater support for democratic principles and governance. Russia has undertaken aggressive campaigns to influence the politics of NATO allies and partners. In the recent elections of Moldova and Romania, Russian intervention nearly effectuated regime change. For too long, the transatlantic community has remained on the defensive in this realm. NATO and its member states need to shift to the offensive and weaponize the power of truth to illuminate the brutal realities of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, the corruption of Russian officials, and other realties of Russian governance. NATO allies must more actively support Russian stakeholders—particularly civil society—that are more aligned with transatlantic values. This is critical to degrading the political will of the Russian state to continue its aggressions.
• Modulate dialogue with Russia, limiting it to what is operationally necessary. The Alliance should formally disband the NATO-Russia Council—which last met in 2022—until Moscow has demonstrated genuine commitment to a constructive relationship. Nonetheless, the Alliance should establish and/or maintain lines of communication between the NATO secretary general and the Kremlin, as well as between Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the Russian General Staff, to enable crisis management and provide transparency needed for military stability. This would not preclude NATO allies from dialogues with Russia deemed necessary, for example, to assist Ukraine or pursue arms control measures.

The bottom line

As noted, NATO possesses an overmatching capacity to defeat Russia in Ukraine, deter Russian aggression, contain Russian influence beyond its borders, and degrade Russia’s ability and will to accomplish its revisionist agenda. Today, there is no better time to achieve these objectives by fully marshaling the Alliance’s assets and potential. Moscow cannot undertake an all-out military attack on NATO without risking the viability of Russia’s armed forces and thus its regime. The accomplishment of these objectives would provide stability to Europe’s eastern frontier and establish the best foundation for an eventual relationship with Moscow that is minimally confrontational, if not cooperative and constructive. However, this will take political will and resources. Russia today is determined to prevail in Ukraine, expand its military capabilities, and further leverage its partners, particularly China, Iran, and North Korea, to defeat the community of democracies and, particularly, the Alliance. Russia already envisions itself as being at war with NATO.

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Ian Brzezinski

Senior Fellow

Europe Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Central Europe Defense Policy

Staff

Ryan Arick

Associate Director

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

NATO Security & Defense

The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

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New Atlanticist Feb 22, 2023

Russia policy after the war: A new strategy of containment

By Alexander Vershbow

To prevent further damage to the rules-based international order, the United States and its allies will need a strategy of containment to deter Russia militarily and decouple Russia from the international community, until Moscow has earned the right to be considered a partner once more.

Arms Control Defense Policy

Report Sep 19, 2024

NATO-Russia dynamics: Prospects for reconstitution of Russian military power

By Andrew A. Michta, Joslyn Brodfuehrer

How will Russia reconstitute its land forces in response to the war in Ukraine and the changes in NATO’s force model? The NATO allies closest to Russia can provide valuable insight.

Central Europe Eastern Europe

Memo to… Oct 10, 2023

Memo to the president: A bold agenda for the Washington summit: How to advance vital US interests by helping Ukraine win and defining its path to NATO membership

The upcoming NATO summit marking the Alliance’s seventy-fifth anniversary presents an opportunity for US leadership to meet this danger by taking steps to provide Ukraine the means to win the war and by setting a clear path for Ukraine’s membership in NATO.

Central Europe Conflict

The post Issue brief: A NATO strategy for countering Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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To advance peace through strength, the US military must be capable of denying the People’s Republic of China (PRC) any chance of taking Taiwan by force. This will take more than military modernization. The Trump administration needs to transform the Intelligence Community’s (IC) early-warning capabilities. It’s time to inject unprecedented speed and efficiency into this national mission with a clear goal: attaining real-time awareness across all domains—space, cyberspace, sea, land, and air. Creating this capability is crucial for gathering intelligence against hard targets, understanding emerging events, anticipating the future, and maintaining decision advantage. It’s a tall order, but it’s achievable with the president’s leadership and industry’s cutting-edge tech.

A conflict with the PRC over Taiwan is neither imminent nor inevitable. The PRC has a strategy for annexing Taiwan without an invasion—and it’s in use right now. This strategy has more to do with cyber power than firepower. But the Joint Force and the IC must be prepared for all potential futures—including the risk that the PRC might one day try to blockade or invade Taiwan, sparking a global security crisis.

Operationalize the JWC and JADC2

In the unfortunate event of a future crisis or conflict with the PRC, the IC would need to deliver real-time, decision-quality information advantage in all warfighting domains. The Defense Department’s Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC) theorizes new ways to array the Joint Force with a kill web linking any sensor to any shooter. The enabling Joint All-Domain Command and Control System (JADC2) concept is the holistic underlying approach to link these sensors and associated data into the joint all-domain kill web. For the United States, partners, and allies to operate effectively, the JWC and JADC2 will require those forces to possess real-time information because the side that sees first decides first, and the one that acts first will have the advantage.

If deterrence fails, conflict with the PRC would be unlike any other in history. It would be much faster, more lethal, and more autonomous in an era with swarm technology and hypersonic weapons. It could even include the unthinkable: the use of nuclear capabilities. In addition to combat in the traditional air, land, and sea domains, operations in space and cyberspace would play outsized roles. To be ready to prevail, the entire US intelligence enterprise must rethink and retool how it collects in all domains, and how it uses artificial intelligence (AI) and advanced techniques to analyze and deliver information at speed, enabling JWC/JADC2 in new ways. Speed, timing, and escalation would depend on US and allied reactions, as well as readiness levels and positioning of forces that might be involved. Scenarios involving blockades or an invasion would pose unique challenges to current indication and warning methodologies and models.

Overcome silos that hinder national security

Attaining a real-time, all-domain awareness capability will require a unified effort across the IC, which comprises eighteen independent agencies with authorities to collect, analyze, and report. While some roles and missions overlap, they all have unique capabilities and specified intelligence tasks under Title 50, established laws, and associated IC policy documents. All use different sources, methods, and unique tradecraft to produce intelligence on a variety of national security threats and challenges.

Each agency collects sensitive and restricted information not available to all consumers. Agencies operate on their own top-secret networks and with proprietary software and tools. Each agency partners differently and disseminates intelligence on an as-needed basis (some with more restrictions than others). Each agency has grown its culture, governed its own rice bowls, and competed for scarce resources, creating a competitive atmosphere in the IC that limits collaboration and integration.

To be sure, the IC was highly effective in the lead-up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Time and observables were contributing factors, as Russian force movements were visible months before the invasion and the US military had time to posture for the conflict. At the national level, agile disclosure policies allowed for timely and accurate sharing with partners and allies, empowering a coalition build that enabled rapid military and political support for Ukraine. But it is unlikely that a crisis or conflict with the PRC would unfold in a similar way. The PRC has carefully studied Russian mistakes in Ukraine and is unlikely to repeat them in a Taiwan scenario. Moreover, the proximity of Taiwan to the mainland—combined with the tyrannies of time, distance, and force posture in the region—could create larger dilemmas for the IC.

Proactively strengthen the IC’s posture

All in all, the IC’s preparedness for potential crisis and conflict scenarios involving the PRC has significant room for improvement. The IC has grown incredible capabilities but also daunting bureaucracies that stifle true integration. Combine this with the explosion of information sources, collection techniques, analytical tools, AI advancements, technical hurdles, tradecraft discrepancies, and individual agency priorities, and the result is a lack of unity across the intelligence enterprise. The status quo puts at risk the IC’s ability to see what’s coming in real time—potentially with damaging and cascading consequences.

The IC posture shortfalls are amplified by a lack of information integration across the Department of Defense (DoD). JWC and JADC2 require both intelligence and non-intelligence information sharing at speed for rapid situational understanding and decision advantage. But this underpinning of real-time authoritative intelligence—to see, decide, and act first—does not yet exist. Right now, the IC is inundated with data and tools, but has no way to integrate at scale. It’s time for major changes to the system.

The armed services, intelligence agencies, and many US partners have collection tools and capabilities to identify threats. But if there were a crisis or conflict with the PRC, imagine how many People’s Liberation Army (PLA) objects and targets would be involved. In a conflict scenario, the Joint Force would need a clear integrator of the data streams or multiple intelligence (multi-INT) analysis required to hold all those foreign military objects and targets at risk, or to service those targets kinetically or non-kinetically when required. Such a capability is crucial for deterring and defeating threats.

Avoid governing by crisis

Too often, sweeping changes have come only during or after a great crisis, usually with great loss of life and national embarrassment.

• The 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor resulted in the wartime mass mobilization and the eventual first use of an atomic bomb.
• It took the humiliating failures associated with Operation Eagle Claw in 1980 to drive the wide-ranging reforms in the 1987 Goldwater-Nichols Act, which brought about dramatic improvements at DoD. That statute mandated new doctrine for joint operations, the creation of US Special Operations Command, new ways to educate and manage DoD personnel, and changes in how the US military operates.
• The response to the 9/11 attacks drove comprehensive changes in civil society and national security, culminating in the creation of a new cabinet position to unify the IC and prevent strategic surprise and catastrophic attacks against the United States or its allies and partners.

These changes only occurred with presidential leadership and bipartisan congressional consensus. Otherwise, the United States’ layered governmental bureaucracy, policies, bifurcated political system, and funding process do not normally allow for effective, incremental strategic change. The nation cannot afford to govern by crisis or to rely on twentieth-century-style incremental intelligence reform. Without a strong national mandate, the IC will maintain its current trajectory. That trajectory is inadequate in peacetime and will not suffice in a crisis that leads to conflict.

Integrating intelligence is key

To advance peace through strength, leadership is needed now. The Trump administration has the opportunity to raise public awareness about the range of threats posed by the PRC, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, and to accelerate national security to deal with those threats—particularly by building real-time, all-domain awareness. This awareness can enable the Joint Force to have well-established, rehearsed, and standardized kill chains for credible deterrence. What’s more, it can position the United States to identify and address growing threats in the gray zone—where rivals are trying to compete with the United States without resorting to direct conflict.

In a recent, positive development, the undersecretary of defense for intelligence and security (USD-I&S) signed a directive designating the Defense Intelligence Agency as the “enterprise lead” for the common intelligence picture (CIP). This is a good start. But given the enormity of the task, limited time available, and bureaucratic hurdles, DoD will need to go much further—and that won’t happen without a presidential directive, bipartisan congressional support, and a comprehensive approach spanning DoD, the IC, and industry.

Imagine a nationally mandated and funded project to integrate intelligence from all disciplines to gain and maintain real-time, all-domain awareness across multiple networks and classification levels. Turning this idea into reality is the only way the United States and its allies and partners can proactively seize the initiative, reestablish deterrence, and prevail in the event of conflict. To demonstrate US national resolve and potentially advance strategic deterrence, the high-level commitment to intelligence integration and JADC2 should be highly visible to the PRC and Russia while the sensitive details remain carefully guarded.

The president can drive the change

A presidential directive focused on realizing JWC/JADC2 capabilities to address the PRC threat could empower and drive a “whole of DoD and IC” effort to achieve full operating capabilities with strategic impact. This would strengthen the nation’s competitive edge and position the military and the IC to deliver peace through strength. With ten of the nation’s intelligence agencies under DoD’s umbrella, the secretary of defense should lead this effort in collaboration with the director of national intelligence. This could entail empowering a senior DoD leader such as the USD-I&S with real authority to effect change.

The JWC mandate should require delivery of actionable capabilities within specified timelines, include technical, AI, and tradecraft experimentation, and provide other transaction authority (OTA) or other rapid-acquisition authorities that optimize industry support. For the incoming USD-I&S, the quick stand-up of actionable working groups with deliverables and timelines will be critical. At a minimum, technical, tradecraft, AI, integration, experimentation, and industry work groups should be established. Deputies from each DoD intelligence agency and the services should be assigned to this effort on a full-time basis. Ruthless enforcement of timelines and deliverables by the deputy secretary of defense and USD-I&S will be the only way to effectively lead and direct this effort.

There is no time to lose. Attaining real-time awareness across all domains is vital for national security and defense. With the new administration’s leadership and industry’s cutting-edge tech, transforming early-warning capabilities with real-time, all-domain awareness can become both a strategic and budgetary priority and an operational reality.

Lieutenant General, US Army (ret.) Scott D. Berrier is a nonresident senior fellow at the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a senior vice president in the intelligence and national security sector with Booz Allen Hamilton.

Report Feb 7, 2025

Toplines: The United States and its allies must be ready to deter a two-front war and nuclear attacks in East Asia

By Markus Garlauskas

The “toplines” from Markus Garlauskus’ report on two emerging and interrelated deterrence challenges in East Asia with grave risks to US national security.

Arms Control China

New Atlanticist Jun 28, 2024

Dispatch from Taipei: Why Taiwan’s survival may depend on deterrence through resilience

By Markus Garlauskas

A repeated theme in recent discussions in Taipei was Taiwan’s ability to withstand Chinese coercion and to adapt and sustain its defenses while under attack.

China Indo-Pacific

New Atlanticist Jun 14, 2024

Think China can already take Taiwan easily? Think again.

By Brian Kerg

Beijing’s influence campaign in pursuit of a “cognitive fait accompli” against Taiwan is conducted across multiple lines of operation.

China Indo-Pacific

The post Deterring Chinese aggression takes real-time intelligence appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On February 5, Whitney McNamara, nonresident senior fellow at Forward Defense, published a piece in the Pell Center’s series, “The Project on U.S. – China Technology Competition” entitled, “For an Enduring Advantage, Accelerate Adoption over Stymieing Theft.” McNamara discusses how China’s widespread espionage targeting critical intellectual property threatens US economic and military power and emphasizes the vital role that the Department of Defense should be playing in regard to a solution. 

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Whitney McNamara

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post McNamara published in Pell Center series on espionage of US intellectual property appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On January 31st, Arnold Punaro, non-resident senior fellow at Forward Defense and Scowcroft Center Advisory Council member, was featured on Fox Business to discuss the Black Hawk helicopter involved in the DC plane crash and Tulsi Gabbard’s Senate confirmation hearing. Punaro emphasized that the incident could have been avoided and expressed his trust in the Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Tom Cotton. 

Advisory Council member

Arnold Punaro

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Punaro on Fox Business on the DC plane crash and Tulsi Gabbard appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The effectiveness of Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces can be largely attributed to their exceptional adaptability in rapidly changing battlefield conditions. When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukrainian SOF units quickly adjusted to meet the immediate challenges of high-intensity conflict against a far larger and better armed enemy.

This adaptability has manifested in several crucial ways. The rapid reconfiguration of small unit tactics to counter Russian mechanized forces has been particularly noteworthy, as has the development of innovative solutions to overcome numerical disadvantages. Ukrainian SOF units have consistently shown their ability to adopt new technologies and tactics based on battlefield feedback. Perhaps most importantly, they have implemented flexible command structures that enable decentralized decision-making, allowing for rapid responses to emerging threats and opportunities.

Ukraine’s ability to adapt has been further demonstrated through the innovative use of civilian infrastructure and technologies. Ukrainian SOF units have effectively incorporated commercial drones, civilian communications networks, and other non-military technologies, showing remarkable creativity in overcoming resource constraints.

One of the most significant lessons from the conflict has been the effective integration of SOF units with conventional military forces engaged in large-scale combat operations. Ukrainian SOF units also played a vital role in preparing the battlefield before and during the initial phases of the invasion. They established networks of resistance, gathered intelligence, and identified key targets that would later prove crucial for conventional forces.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Ukraine’s achievements since 2022 have owed much to years of solid preparations. Following Russia’s occupation of Crimea in 2014, Ukrainian Special Operations Forces underwent significant transformation with assistance from NATO countries, particularly the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada. Between 2015 and 2021, Ukraine also implemented major structural reforms to align with NATO standards, including the establishment of dedicated SOF training centers.

These steps helped lay the foundations for a sophisticated network of resistance capabilities across potential invasion routes by early 2022. Ukrainian SOF units mapped key infrastructure, identified potential targets, and established relationships with local civilian networks, while developing protocols for rapid information sharing between SOF units, conventional forces, and civilian resistance elements. These preparations proved vital, enabling Ukrainian forces to target Russian supply lines, command nodes, and communications systems using real-time intelligence.

Throughout the invasion, coordination between Ukrainian SOF units and conventional forces has enabled effective combined arms operations. SOF units frequently act as forward observers, providing targeting data to artillery units and conducting battle damage assessments. The ability to rapidly share intelligence has been particularly important in urban environments, where the complexity of the battlefield requires close cooperation between different military elements.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Tue, June 17, 2025 • 1:00 pm ET

Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

Russia’s invasion has reinforced the importance of unconventional warfare in modern conflicts. Ukrainian SOF units have successfully employed various unconventional warfare techniques that have had strategic impacts far beyond their tactical execution.

Ukraine’s implementation of guerrilla tactics and sabotage alongside partisans has been highly effective, with numerous successful operations conducted behind enemy lines. This has included the disruption of Russian supply lines, targeting of key military infrastructure and command centers, and the execution of precision strikes on high-value targets.

The psychological aspect of warfare has proven equally important, with Ukrainian SOF units making significant contributions to information warfare campaigns that have influenced both domestic and international audiences. They have conducted deception operations that have complicated Russian planning and operations, while also executing morale operations targeting both enemy forces and occupied populations.

The successful integration of modern technology has been a key characteristic of Ukrainian SOF operations. Despite facing a far wealthier and numerically superior adversary, Ukrainian SOF units have leveraged various technological capabilities to maintain operational effectiveness. They have utilized commercial technologies for reconnaissance and surveillance, integrated drone operations into tactical planning and execution, and leveraged artificial intelligence and big data analytics for targeting and planning.

Ukraine’s SOF operations provide several critical lessons for the country’s Western partners. In terms of doctrine development, it is clear that military organizations must emphasize flexibility and adaptability in force structure and training, while integrating SOF capabilities more deeply in support of conventional forces.

The importance of technological integration and adaptation cannot be overstated. Future military forces must be prepared to operate in environments where commercial technology plays an increasingly important role, and where the ability to utilize these technologies can provide crucial advantages. In terms of equipment, Western planners should focus on communications jamming and interception, improved surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, and integrating AI tools to aid in intelligence collection and analysis.

The role of Ukrainian SOF operations in the current war provides valuable insights for military forces worldwide. Their impact demonstrates the critical importance of adaptability and the effective use of technology in modern warfare. These lessons are particularly relevant as military organizations prepare for future high-intensity conflicts in increasingly complex operational environments.

Doug Livermore is national vice president for the Special Operations Association of America and deputy commander for Special Operations Detachment–Joint Special Operations Command in the North Carolina Army National Guard. The views expressed are the author’s and do not represent official US Government, Department of Defense, or Department of the Army positions.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jan 15, 2025

Appeasement will only fuel Vladimir Putin’s imperial ambitions in Ukraine

By Anastasiia Marushevska

Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is an old-fashioned colonial war rooted in centuries of Russian imperial history that cannot be ended by limited territorial concessions or other attempts at appeasement, writes Anastasiia Marushevska.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Dec 19, 2024

Five things Russia’s invasion has taught the world about Ukraine

By Peter Dickinson

Vladimir Putin’s brutal invasion of Ukraine has thrust the country into the global spotlight and transformed international perceptions of Ukraine in ways that will resonate for decades to come, writes Peter Dickinson.

Defense Technologies Disinformation

UkraineAlert Jan 21, 2025

Donald Trump’s promise of strong US leadership should begin with Ukraine

By Arseniy Yatsenyuk

By resolutely backing Ukraine, President Trump can prevent the slide toward World War III and reestablish US leadership in a world threatened by Putin’s Axis of Autocrats, writes former Ukrainian PM Arseniy Yatsenyuk.

Conflict European Union

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post The West must study the success of Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Pyongyang’s support for the Russian war effort began in late 2022 with the delivery of artillery shells. The list of armaments was subsequently expanded to include ballistic missiles. These supplies have helped Russia maintain the momentum of its invasion despite the country’s significantly depleted stores of munitions. With Moscow now also facing manpower shortages and reluctant to order a fresh round of mobilization, the arrival of North Korean troops helps relieve domestic pressure to recruit more Russians for the war.

While no official data is available, Ukrainian, US, and South Korean sources have estimated that North Korea has sent at least 11,000 soldiers to join Russia’s invasion. Some are believed to be drawn from highly trained elite units. Materials found on dead North Korean troops and battlefield accounts from Ukrainian forces indicate that the heavily indoctrinated North Koreans have been ordered to kill themselves if necessary to avoid being captured alive and taken prisoner.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Pyongyang has a very specific interest in sending troops to fight against Ukraine. While the deployment is unlikely to dramatically alter the battlefield situation in the Kremlin’s favor, it allows the North Koreans to acquire priceless combat experience, test weapons systems, gain access to Russian military technologies, and secure Moscow’s further assistance in countering UN sanctions.

North Korea currently boasts one of the world’s largest armies with around 1.3 million active soldiers. However, unlike Russia, the Korean People’s Army (KPA) has not been directly involved in any major wars for many years. This lack of battlefield experience is a source of considerable concern for North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un, who is anxious to counter South Korea’s more technologically advanced military.

Sending thousands of troops to fight in the Russian invasion of Ukraine provides the KPA with valuable insights into what is widely recognized as the most technologically advanced battlefield environment in the history of warfare. North Korean soldiers are now learning the realities of modern drone warfare first-hand. As a result, North Korea will be “more capable of waging war against its neighbors,” senior US officials have warned.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Tue, June 17, 2025 • 1:00 pm ET

Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

Ukrainians have been impressed by the skill and tenacity of the North Koreans they have encountered, including their ability to shoot down drones. “They are young, motivated, physically fit, brave, and good at using small arms. They are also disciplined. They have everything you need for a good infantryman,” Ukrainian army spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Yaroslav Chepurnyi told POLITICO.

North Korea is believed to receive significant financial and technological incentives for supplying Putin with soldiers. South Korean intelligence officials estimate that Moscow is paying Pyongyang $2000 per solder each month. While this money is no doubt welcome, the real prize is access to advanced Russian military tech. In exchange for troops, North Korea is believed to be receiving support from Moscow that will help upgrade its military, including the country’s anti-aircraft, submarine, and missile capabilities.

The Ukrainian front also serves as a valuable testing ground for North Korea, allowing the country to assess the effectiveness of the weapons it supplies to Russia. This will make it possible for Pyongyang to improve the quality of its own domestic arms industry and adapt future output to the realities of the modern battlefield. Meanwhile, the troops who survive their time on the Ukrainian front lines are expected to return home and become instructors, sharing their knowledge of modern warfare with colleagues.

At this point, North Korea’s participation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine looks to be less about supporting Putin’s imperial ambitions and more about upgrading Kim Jong Un’s war machine. In the short term, the presence of North Korean soldiers is allowing Russia to overcome mounting manpower shortages. But with Russia believed to be losing tens of thousands of troops each month, there is little chance that Pyongyang will be able to fully satisfy Moscow’s insatiable demand for additional manpower.

Looking ahead, the historically unprecedented appearance of North Korean soldiers on the battlefields of Europe could alter the security equation on the Korean peninsula and beyond. “For the first time in decades, the North Korean army is gaining real military experience,” commented Ukrainian military intelligence spokesman Andrii Yusov. “This is a global challenge. Not just for Ukraine and Europe, but for the entire world.”

Alina Hrytsenko is an analyst at Ukraine’s National Institute for Strategic Studies.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jan 21, 2025

Donald Trump’s promise of strong US leadership should begin with Ukraine

By Arseniy Yatsenyuk

By resolutely backing Ukraine, President Trump can prevent the slide toward World War III and reestablish US leadership in a world threatened by Putin’s Axis of Autocrats, writes former Ukrainian PM Arseniy Yatsenyuk.

Conflict European Union

UkraineAlert Dec 19, 2024

Five things Russia’s invasion has taught the world about Ukraine

By Peter Dickinson

Vladimir Putin’s brutal invasion of Ukraine has thrust the country into the global spotlight and transformed international perceptions of Ukraine in ways that will resonate for decades to come, writes Peter Dickinson.

Defense Technologies Disinformation

UkraineAlert Jan 15, 2025

Appeasement will only fuel Vladimir Putin’s imperial ambitions in Ukraine

By Anastasiia Marushevska

Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is an old-fashioned colonial war rooted in centuries of Russian imperial history that cannot be ended by limited territorial concessions or other attempts at appeasement, writes Anastasiia Marushevska.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post North Korea is using Russia’s Ukraine invasion to upgrade its army appeared first on Atlantic Council.

It’s hard to dispute that there’s federal fat to be trimmed, and Trump’s calling for cuts resonates with Americans well beyond his base. At what point, however, do those cuts hit the muscle and bone required for US global leadership at a far more dangerous time than Trump faced during his first presidency?

With wars in the Middle East and Europe, with escalating tensions with China, and with an accelerating contest for technology’s commanding heights, the answer is simple: A purge of career intelligence professionals would have far-reaching negative consequences at a moment when the United States needs even more capable, confident, and motivated espionage agencies.

That was the context today for the New York Times’ lead essay by John Sipher, an Atlantic Council senior fellow and twenty-eight-year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency’s National Clandestine Service, and Michael V. Hayden, an Atlantic Council board member and former director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. They worry “that Mr. Trump may be interested in wrecking the operation of the intelligence community.” 

Write Sipher and Hayden: “Needless to say, the notion that the intelligence community is disloyal is false. The community is filled with skilled professionals committed to providing the president—any president—with the best possible intelligence, often at great personal sacrifice.”

In today’s Wall Street Journal, hardly a newspaper that echoes the New York Times’ opinions, the lead editorial questions Trump’s nomination of Tulsi Gabbard, former member of Congress and military officer, to lead his intelligence agencies at such a challenging moment.

The Journal’s editorial board based its concerns heavily on Gabbard’s record of opposition to policies that worked in the first Trump administration, so this piece might resonate more at Mar-a-Lago than Sipher and Hayden’s.

“Ms. Gabbard is on ample record as a dogmatic opponent of the policies that made Mr. Trump’s first-term foreign policy a success and that Democrats resisted,” the editorial board writes under the headline “How Tulsi Gabbard Sees the World.” “The former Democrat would be a risky fit as director of national intelligence.”

The editorial board based that judgment on the argument that the Director of National Intelligence’s job is to “convey intelligence fairly,” and that her “record suggests she is as likely to reject new intel and muddy the waters.”

The piece reminds readers that she defended Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad against findings of chemical weapons use, about which Trump had no doubts. It notes that Gabbard accused Trump of wanting war with Iran, when his “maximum pressure” campaign achieved the opposite. She accused Trump, through his strike killing Iranian military commander Qasem Soleimani, of “pushing our nation headlong into a war with Iran.” Wrong again. 

The editorial board argues that supporters of Trump’s foreign policy will “think twice about confirming her.” 

Sipher and Hayden remind us that Trump’s promises to destroy “the deep state” predate his first term in the White House. His nominations and rhetoric underscore that he might be more determined to achieve that outcome in his second term.

Trump is right that the world has grown far too dangerous and unstable. History will judge him on how he addresses that reality. The incoming president’s dilemma is that this more perilous world will require him to lean on the proven patriots in intelligence and also those in the military whom he has disparaged in the past.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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Achieving combat readiness is a comprehensive process that involves several key components:

1. Training and education: Regular drills and exercises, specialized training, and continuous education on the latest technology, tactics, and global security developments.
2. Logistical preparation: Efficient supply chain management, maintenance and upkeep of equipment, and rapid deployment capabilities.
3. Technological readiness: Modernization of equipment and robust cybersecurity measures to maintain operational integrity.
4. Intelligence and surveillance: Accurate and timely intelligence, supported by robust surveillance systems and networks.
5. Strategic planning: Effective scenario planning and flexible strategies.
6. Physical and mental preparedness: Ensuring physical conditioning and mental resilience.
7. Interoperability and coordination: Conducting joint operations and fostering allied cooperation.
8. Leadership and command structure: Maintaining strong leadership and a clear command structure.

In this article, I will strategically examine NATO exercises within the field of training and education.

While war games and military exercises simulate real scenarios, they differ in execution. Military exercises involve actual troops and equipment, focusing on replicating wartime decisions for training purposes. In contrast, war games use simulations with artificial players and models to explore potential decisions and outcomes.

Exercises serve various purposes, including testing tactics, demonstrating deterrence, and ensuring forces are prepared for combat. They also verify the readiness of units before deployment.

NATO held its first military exercise in 1951 to develop a unified military force under centralized command. Since then, NATO has conducted thousands of exercises across various domains, particularly during the Cold War. Notable exercises include the REFORGER (Return of Forces to Germany) series, which tested the rapid deployment of North American troops to Europe, with the last major exercise being REFORGER 88, involving 125,000 personnel.

NATO’s rapid reaction forces have evolved since the creation of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF) in 1960, which played a crucial role in deterrence and defense during the Cold War. Subsequently, NATO expanded its mission to include crisis response, reflecting the evolving security environment.

In 2002, the AMF was restructured into the NATO Response Force (NRF), which continues to be integral to NATO’s strategy, ensuring readiness and adaptability through operational exercises.

Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, NATO significantly increased its collective defense exercises and further enhanced its defense plans.

Now, let us explore NATO and member exercises conducted in 2024 to gain some insights:

1. Steadfast Defender 24: NATO’s largest military exercise held from January to May 2024, showcased the enduring unity between Europe and North America, reflecting the shared commitment to safeguarding over one billion people for the past seventy-five years. The exercise involved over 90,000 troops from all thirty-two NATO members and was conducted in two main phases: securing the Atlantic region and rapidly moving troops across Europe, from the High North to Central and Eastern Europe. This exercise demonstrated NATO’s ability to respond swiftly to emerging threats and highlighted the Alliance’s readiness and collective defense capabilities.
2. Coalition Warrior Interoperability Exercise (CWIX): An annual NATO exercise celebrating its twenty-fifth anniversary in 2024, CWIX enhances the readiness and resilience of command-and-control capabilities and IT services. Hosted at NATO’s Joint Force Training Centre in Poland, CWIX 2024 involved over 2,500 participants and tested more than 26,000 cases across 480 capabilities, from emerging technologies to proven tools. CWIX plays a crucial role in ensuring interoperability among NATO forces.
3. EFES 2024: The largest joint military exercise conducted by the Turkish Armed Forces, held from April 25 to May 31, 2024, took place in two phases: a computer-assisted command post phase in Istanbul and a live-fire phase in Izmir. With participation from forty-five nations and nearly 11,000 military personnel, EFES 2024 demonstrated significant international military collaboration and commitment. Participants included nine NATO members, sixteen NATO partners, fifteen African Union countries, two Latin American nations, one Middle Eastern nation, one other European nation, and one Asian nation, highlighting its importance in regional and global security.
4. Baltic Operations 2024, Ramstein Legacy 24, and other exercises also involved members and partners.

Based on the exercises, three separate reports, analyses, and the ongoing Ukraine-Russia war since 2022, we can conclude that although NATO has made substantial progress in areas such as defense spending, forward defense, high-readiness forces, command and control, and collective defense exercises, as well as integrating new members, the alliance is prepared for immediate combat but may not be fully equipped for a protracted war. Therefore, what are our short- and mid-term solutions to address the vulnerabilities?”

Drawing from my NATO and national experience, as well as academic research, I offer the following recommendations for improving exercises to strengthen deterrence:

• Address and overcome key lessons learned in meetings at all levels, from the chair of the NATO Military Committee (CMC), supreme allied commander Europe (SACEUR), and supreme allied commander transformation (SACT), down to component commanders, chiefs of staff, mentors, and directors of centers of excellence.
• Designate mentors/senior fellows with academic and combat experience to NATO institutions, such as the NATO Defense College and NATO School.
• Develop more effective leadership training at all levels to ensure quick and accurate decision-making.
• Enhance response plans for various conflict scenarios, including asymmetric and future challenges, to improve forces’ readiness for unforeseen situations.
• Test physical and psychological training to ensure troops manage combat demands and stresses.
• Improve national resilience and interoperability across all domains through joint, allied, and live-fire exercises and operations.
• Ensure that the southern region also is included in exercises.

Lastly, to guarantee alliance security, we must prepare our troops without hesitation, with combat readiness listed as a top priority.

Uğur Tarçın is a retired Turkish Lieutenant General. He served in Italy, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Belgium, the USA, and İzmir, throughout his NATO career. Currently, he teaches at Marmara University and SAHA ISTANBUL Academy.

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The Atlantic Council in Turkey aims to promote and strengthen transatlantic engagement with the region by providing a high-level forum and pursuing programming to address the most important issues on energy, economics, security, and defense.

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On November 24, Marc Polymeropoulos joined MSNBC to discuss what the defense and intelligence community can expect from President-elect Trump’s promised changes.

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Marc Polymeropoulos

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Europe & Eurasia

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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On November 21, Michael Groen, non-resident senior fellow at Forward Defense, authored an op-ed for Real Clear Defense arguing that the United States must focus on securing AI laboratories to protect its razor-thin advantage in the AI race with China. In his words, to address threats from China’s cyber-espionage and intellectual property theft, “the U.S. government, academia, and the private sector need to take coordinated action.”

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Michael Groen

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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A push for real intelligence sharing

Notably, one of Niinistö’s top recommendations goes a step beyond usual European diplomatic rhetoric: the creation of a unified European Union (EU) intelligence service. “As a long-term objective, the EU should have a fully-fledged intelligence cooperation service, serving all EU institutions and Member States,” he writes in the report. However, he goes on to note that its aim “should not be to emulate the tasks of Member States’ national foreign intelligence and domestic security services, nor to interfere with their prerogative on national security.”

Instead, Niinistö suggests strengthening the EU’s Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity, which includes both the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre and EU military intelligence within the EU Military Staff under the European External Action Service, the diplomatic service of the EU. Both entities operate under the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, and former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas is the designate for this position. This framework should serve as an official channel for intelligence exchange among the EU’s intelligence services. The need for such a channel was made clear following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and China’s pledge of a “no limits” relationship with Russia, which underscored how ill unprepared the EU was for the emerging challenges posed by Moscow and Beijing.

In practice, this would mean deeper, more structured cooperation among member states to share intelligence and respond faster to hybrid threats, such as cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns. This recommendation acknowledges the reality that Europe’s security challenges demand something stronger than piecemeal national efforts or ad hoc alliances, as the hybrid attack on the Finnish, Polish, Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian borders made clear. 

Many Russian and Chinese diplomats have been expelled from European capitals due to espionage allegations, while Brussels, home to numerous institutions and embassies, has become a hub for covert activities. The war in Ukraine has further fueled instability within the EU, with incidents ranging from drones surveilling military training areas and assassination plots against arms industry executives to sabotage. Western nations already collaborate on intelligence through the Five Eyes alliance, which links the agencies of the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Niinistö emphasized that any EU intelligence body should focus on leveraging and effectively utilizing existing intelligence.

More civil-military coordination

Another standout from the report is Niinistö’s call for a European Civil Defence Mechanism to bridge the gap between military and civilian responses. The war in Ukraine has shown that keeping essential services running during conflict is just as crucial as maintaining military strength.

The report points out that Europe needs to move past its fragmented approach and ensure that when a crisis hits, military and civilian authorities are coordinated. This isn’t just theory; it’s the kind of readiness that can save lives and stabilize societies.

Public-private partnerships

The COVID-19 pandemic was a crash course in why private sector involvement is indispensable in a crisis. During the pandemic, partnerships with private companies were essential for vaccine development and distribution.

In his report, Niinistö argues that these lessons need to be expanded to broader crisis preparedness. This means developing clear rules for public-private cooperation, especially in industries vital for crisis response such as energy, medicine, and transportation.

Stockpiles and supply chains

Europe’s supply chain issues during recent crises exposed a major weakness. In response, Niinistö calls for a comprehensive EU-level stockpiling strategy to prevent future shortages.

Coordinating reserves across public and private sectors can buffer against disruptions, whether they come from geopolitical tensions or natural disasters. An EU-wide stockpiling strategy is practical, overdue, and aligns with similar calls in Draghi’s economic competitiveness report.

Getting citizens on board

Preparedness isn’t just a government affair; it’s a societal effort. Currently, only 32 percent of Europeans indicate that they would be willing to defend their country if it were involved in a war.

The Niinistö report stresses that Europeans need to be informed, engaged, and prepared at a personal level. Encouraging citizens to take an active role, from learning basic crisis management to preparing for power outages, is part of a realistic resilience plan.

Another report, but what next?

Reports like Niinistö’s and Draghi’s outline clear paths forward, but their effectiveness depends on political will and follow-through. In Niinistö’s report, the ambitions are clearly outlined: intelligence cooperation, military-civil readiness, and crisis preparedness. Niinistö’s report will contribute to the agenda of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s upcoming term, during which the EU is set to appoint its first defense commissioner (former Lithuanian Prime Minister Andrius Kubilius). This new role will include the responsibility of preparing a comprehensive defense white paper, expected to be unveiled by next spring.

What Europe needs now is to move past endless discussions and start implementing real, measurable actions. If these ideas remain only on paper, Europe’s preparedness will continue to lag behind the evolving threats it faces.

Piotr Arak is an assistant professor of economic sciences at the University of Warsaw and chief economist at VeloBank Poland.

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Online Event Wed, October 30, 2024 • 2:00 pm ET

Elections 2024: Congressman Mike Turner on geopolitics and the next US president

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—Congressman Mike Turner, chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, lays out his expectations of the foreign policy challenges facing the next administration and what lies ahead for the 119th Congress.

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The next presidential administration is going to have to “step up to the plate” in terms of leadership to “change the direction” of the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, said US Congressman Mike Turner at an Atlantic Council Front Page event on Wednesday. 

Turner, an Ohio Republican who is chair of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, added that the next president must ensure that US adversaries “see a United States that is going to step up and say, ‘We’re going to not only de-escalate but resolve these conflicts in favor of the United States.’”

He also addressed the recent movement of thousands of North Korean troops into Russia to fight Ukraine, which Turner said should be considered a “red line” for Ukraine’s Western partners. “The United States and NATO allies should seriously discuss and consider attacking directly North Korean troops that are in Ukraine and that are attacking Ukraine,” he said. “I’m not saying that it should be a decision that is finalized,” he added, but he said that NATO leaders should “have the discussion.”

Below are more highlights from this discussion on the US election and the national security threats the next administration will face, which was moderated by Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe.

An emerging axis

• Turner said that “China is the most significant threat” that the United States faces, but he added that the “most immediate threat” to US interests is the “emerging axis of evil,” referring to increasing defense and economic cooperation among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.
• The next administration, Turner said, must understand that this enhanced defense cooperation “is a direct threat” to the United States and the West. “These are not small territorial skirmishes. They’re not regional conflicts. This is a much broader conflict,” he said.
• Meeting this threat, he said, will require significant investments in the “deferred maintenance and modernization that needs to happen to the United States’ military systems so that we can have parity with our great power competitors.”

Nuclear threats

• Comparing the US nuclear arsenal to an antique car, Turner said the United States needed to modernize its nuclear weapons capabilities. Since Russia’s and China’s nuclear weapons are newer, Turner argued, they “don’t look at us as having the same level of deterrence that they do.”
• Turner highlighted the threat that would be posed if Russia were to put an anti-satellite nuclear weapon in space, as US intelligence that Turner made public in February indicates Moscow has made advances toward. Comparing the prospect to a “Cuban missile crisis in space,” he said that if Russia were to detonate such a weapon, “all low-Earth orbit satellites would be decimated,” and financial, communications, and military infrastructure relying on space “would be wiped out.”
• As Israel has dealt severe blows to the Iranian-backed Hezbollah and Hamas, there is “an opportunity to impact Iran’s march to becoming a nuclear weapon state.” With Tehran’s proxies diminished, Turner said, “the focus becomes directly on Iran itself.”

The way forward in Ukraine

• Turner argued that more robust support for Kyiv, such as allowing Ukrainian forces to strike deeper inside Russia with US and Western weapons, would lead to greater congressional support for more Ukraine aid. “People want a plan to win,” he said. “If there is viable support and strong support” for Ukraine from the next administration, he added, “I think you’ll see stronger support in Congress.”
• On a potential peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia, Turner said that whatever the outcome of such negotiations, “we need to make certain that Crimea does not become militarized.” If Russia kept Crimea in a peace settlement and militarized it, Turner warned, then along with the exclave of Kaliningrad, Russia will have “reconstituted the reach of the former Soviet Union through the Warsaw Pact countries by merely owning two pieces of real estate.”

Daniel Hojnacki is an assistant editor on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council.

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In 2024, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Nicholas Eftimiades was interviewed for an award-winning documentary by France Télévisions on Chinese espionage and transnational repression efforts. The documentary outlines recent cases of international spying by China’s Ministry of State Security (Guoanbu), as well as examples of the arrest and repatriation of Chinese nationals under the Chinese government’s Operation Fox Hunt. Eftimiades was interviewed and quoted extensively throughout the film, saying that “The Ministry of State Security has about a hundred thousand people, which is five times [the size of] the largest intelligence services out there. We’ve never seen anything like this in history before. Even the old days of the Soviet Trust in the 1930s had nowhere near this much reach and power.”

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Nicholas Eftimiades

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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On October 22, Transatlantic Security Initiative senior fellow Elisabeth Braw wrote an op-ed in Politico discussing the changes that the Western allies need to make to make sure their intelligence capabilities remain up to the task.

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Elisabeth Braw

Senior Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

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The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

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On October 10, Foreign Policy published an op-ed co-authored by Marc Polymeropoulos, nonresident senior fellow at Forward Defense, David V. Gioe, and Elena Grossfeld, about the renaissance of Israel’s intelligence after the failure of October 7.

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Marc Polymeropoulos

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Europe & Eurasia

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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On September 30, Marc Polymeropoulos, nonresident senior fellow at at Forward Defense, was quoted by NBC in an article analyzing the future of Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’ after Israel’s significant blows to Hamas and Hezbollah. In his words, “The one concern we should have is a return to the old kind of terrorist game, soft targets such as embassies overseas, both Israeli and U.S.”

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Marc Polymeropoulos

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Europe & Eurasia

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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On September 23, Marc Polymeropoulos, nonresident senior fellow at Forward Defense, joined Danielle Pletka and Marc A. Thiessen on The American Enterprise Institute’s What The Hell Is Going On podcast to talk about the pager attacks Israel carried out against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

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Marc Polymeropoulos

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Europe & Eurasia

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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On September 21, YNET News, an Israeli media outlet, mentioned comments from Marc Polymeropoulos, nonresident senior fellow at Forward Defense, calling Hezbollah pager attacks as ” the most impressive kinetic operation I can recall in my career. Israeli intelligence is living in [Hasan] Nasrallah’s brain.” These comments were inserted in an article detailing reactions from US national security leadership and community.

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Marc Polymeropoulos

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Europe & Eurasia

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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On September 21, SpyTalk’s weekly roundabout on the latest news about intelligence, foreign policy, and military operations mentioned Marc Polymeropoulos, nonresident senior fellow at Forward Defense, for his tweet calling Hezbollah pager attacks “most impressive denied area kinetic op I have witnessed in my career.” 

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Marc Polymeropoulos

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Europe & Eurasia

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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On September 21, Marc Polymeropoulos, nonresident senior fellow at Forward Defense, was mentioned in “Israel’s pager attack an intelligence triumph, with uncertain ends” by Shane Harris in the Washington Post. The article mentioned Polymeropoulos’ comment describing the attacks as “the most impressive denied area kinetic op I have witnessed in my career.”

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Marc Polymeropoulos

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Europe & Eurasia

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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On September 20, Marc Polymeropoulos, nonresident senior fellow at Forward Defense, spoke with the South China Morning Post about possible Israeli intentions behind the pager attacks against Hezbollah. In his remarks, Polymeropoulos explored the possibility that the Hezbollah pager attacks may be part of a wider Israeli strategy of “escalate to deescalate.”

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Marc Polymeropoulos

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Europe & Eurasia

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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On September 19, Marc Polymeropoulos, nonresident senior fellow at Forward Defense, joined NBC News’ Raf Sanchez and retired Gen. Barry McCaffrey to discuss Israel’s military strikes against Hezbollah in Lebanon after the waves of walkie-talkies and pagers explosions.

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Marc Polymeropoulos

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Europe & Eurasia

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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On September 20, Marc Polymeropoulos, nonresident senior fellow at Forward Defense, joined MSNBC Peter Alexander and Colin Clarke of The Soufan Group to assess Israel’s officials claim “entire senior Hezbollah ‘command'” has been eliminated.

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Marc Polymeropoulos

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Europe & Eurasia

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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Kirsten Fontenrose, nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, testifies before the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs on how Tehran’s terror campaign threatens the US and allies. Below are her prepared remarks.

Chairman Burchett, Ranking Member Phillips, and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify.  I served as the Senior Director for Gulf Affairs at the National Security Council for 2018, after nearly twenty years of service focused on the Middle East and Africa at the Department of Defense, Department of State and other branches of government. In each role I witnessed the advancement of a positive American agenda for catalyzing strong security partners, welcoming markets, and stable governments across the Middle East stymied by a determination in Tehran to undermine U.S. partnerships and extirpate U.S. influence from Marrakesh to Bangladesh.  

This influence underpins American economic power in the region, opening doors for American businesses, increasing access to critical natural and technical resources, and ensuring strong currencies are tightly intertwined with the dollar. It underpins the U.S.’ ability to sustain strategic reach without a large footprint, creating demand to equip and train militaries with whom the U.S. can plug-and-play when necessary. It underpins the willingness of regional partners to engage with the U.S. on ways to expand civil liberties and personal freedoms anathema to Iran’s oppressive theocracy.  

I closely track the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) development of weaponry. Because of growth in their missile and drone programs, accelerated by the lapse of U.N. sanctions and provisions in UNSCR 2231 in 2020 and 2023, Iran is now able to deliver lethal effects to every country in the Middle East.  

Iran has learned to exploit swings in U.S. policy, divisions between the U.S. and partners in Europe and the Middle East, the openness of American society, commercially available dual-use technology, and criminal gangs in their multi-pronged, terrorism-based effort to ensure the regime’s survival and weaken U.S. resolve. In the last three administrations the U.S. strove to alter Iran’s foreign policy using carrots, then sticks, then carrots again.  What has not been tried is a long-term, multi-domain, bipartisan strategy for addressing Iran’s goal to unseat the U.S. as the partner of choice for many important Arab states. 

Tehran Believes it is Winning  

Iran does not want a full-scale war in the Middle East at this moment. Leaders in Tehran do not seek to invite American military operations against their homeland. In their estimation, making the region inhospitable to U.S. forces is the more prudent way to actualize the Supreme Leader’s vision of a “great estate” in which the theocracy dictates the foreign policy of western Asia.  

With this goal in mind, Tehran believes it is winning, at low cost. Iran’s lesson learned from the Gaza conflict is that the return on their investment in Hamas, the Houthis, Hezbollah and lesser militias has paid off handsomely: U.S. society is divided; Israeli society is divided; the U.S.-Israel relationship is strained; the U.S. reputation internationally is tarnished; 60,000 Israelis are displaced from the northern border; the Abraham Accords are paused; militias in Syria and Iraq are sustaining pressure on U.S. troops; and maintaining a heightened defense posture at home and at its embassies globally while Tehran deliberates retaliation for the deaths of Ismail Haniyeh and Fuad Shukr is straining Israel’s manpower and budget.  

This upheaval is equally useful to Tehran in distracting attention in western capitals from IRGC operations that should be the focus of a coordinated coalition counter effort.  These operations are poorly addressed and merit smarter action in cooperation with partners: 

• Houthi attacks on global shipping from Yemen. All 6 types of anti-ship ballistic missiles and 4 of the 6 types of cruise missiles used by the Houthis in attacking ships in the Red Sea are provided by Iran or fitted with Iranian guidance kits. Protecting the freedom of navigation in global shipping lanes is a top U.S. objective per both the U.S. National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, yet the U.S. currently outsources implementation of this objective to European navies with a fraction of the U.S. capability to address it.  

• Ties to terrorist groups with American blood on their hands. In the astute words of a 30-year veteran of the U.S. intelligence community with deep knowledge of Iran’s covert activities, “Iran is the only country in the world that has maintained a relationship with Al Qaeda – to include allowing an active Al Qaeda facilitation cell on its territory – without paying a price.” 

• Ties to criminal networks in the U.S. and Europe in the service of assassination and kidnapping plots. Operations to silence journalists and dissidents abroad have been a pillar of Iran’s foreign policy for 40 years. These have evolved in an alarming way, as reported by the Washington Post on September 12^th of this year. Western intelligence services accustomed to tracking IRGC Quds Force operatives see a new reliance on western criminal networks who traverse borders with ease.  The Financial Times has reported on attempts by Iran and Hezbollah to acquire weapons from drug cartels.

• Disinformation campaigns to divide America from within. Microsoft and Open AI discovered 5 Iran-backed websites aimed at English speakers globally that promulgate false narratives about the U.S.  The Foundation for Defense of Democracies identified 14 more. Examples include “Afro Majority” which targets African Americans, and “Not Our War” targeting American veterans.  Specific to the war in Gaza, Iran removed the data in a Palestinian polling group’s survey results and replaced them with false numbers that implied an inaccurately high rate of Palestinian support for Hamas as future leaders of Gaza. In the summer of 2024 U.S. ODNI revealed that Tehran sponsored anti-Israel protests on U.S. college campuses and attempted hacks on the Presidential campaigns of both major U.S. political parties. Iran’s alignment with China in the pursuit of sowing division among American communities gives the regime unfettered access to American youth via Chinese-owned social media platforms. To apply a military term, Iran and China are engaged in Phase 0 (pre conflict) shaping of the environment in the U.S., continuously exposing Americans to disinformation. Without hyperbole, the risk in not addressing this activity is that future generations of American decision makers will be fed an unhealthy dose of what our adversaries want them to consume. 

• Sales of ballistic missiles and drones to aid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The U.S. and European partners were aghast when Iran sold Shahed series attack drones to Russia yet actions did nothing to deter further sales.  Russia now produces those drones domestically, geometrically increasing their use on the battlefield. Iran followed with the sale of Fatteh-136 short range ballistic missiles. The only effective defense against these missiles are Patriot interceptors, which are expensive and in low stock. Looking forward, it is logical to expect the Iran-Russia weapons program propinquity to expand to co-development and production of new weaponry. 

Calculus in Tehran 

The Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations (U.N.) denied this missile transfer. The framing of this denial is important because it illustrates the duplicity inherent in the regime’s foreign policy, and it is as ironic in the context of Gaza as it is in Ukraine: “Iran’s position vis-à-vis the Ukraine conflict remains unchanged. Iran considers the provision of military assistance to the parties engaged in the conflict – which leads to increased human casualties, destruction of infrastructure, and a distancing from ceasefire negotiations – to be inhumane.  Thus, not only does Iran abstain from engaging in such actions itself, but it also calls upon other countries to cease the supply of weapons to the sides involved in the conflict.” 

Iran recently elected a President marketed as a “moderate” in a vote with the lowest turnout in the regime’s history. While President Pezashkian may truly harbor dreams of reform, he is in no position to enact them.  His engineered election is proof of a shrewd calculation by the regime inner circle.  They expect that offering new nuclear negotiations may entice a Harris administration or create obstacles for a Trump administration in ways that protect the regime’s interests.  

Being at the table for nuclear talks has proven to be a sweet spot for this regime.  The talks are the goal.  They have no intention of signing a deal.  Tehran expects that if a Harris administration takes the helm they can freeze nuclear enrichment while engaging in talks and this will result in lackadaisical sanctions enforcement. This allows the continuation of roughly 1.5 million barrels per day of oil and up to 300,000 barrels per day of condensate exports.  Combined with production for domestic use, Iran’s production is just half a million barrels less than they could produce sustainably in a wholly unsanctioned environment according to industry analysts.  

Iran’s President Pezashkian said Iran needs more than $100 billion in foreign investment, and the lack of sanctions enforcement is also hoped to entice foreign investment from the UAE and Saudi Arabia.  All without closing a centrifuge or disposing of enriched material. 

If a Trump administration takes office, Tehran reasons that the window dressing provided by a few moderate officials and their current hints at willingness to restart nuclear talks will convince the international community to reject U.S. requests to reapply maximum economic pressure.  

However, a close look at the new Cabinet formed by President Pezashkian confirms that the regime remains committed to hardline policies. At least three are members of the IRGC, including those who control the Ministries of Intelligence, Justice, and Interior. 

The Regime’s Technology Toolbox 

Cyber. In addition to the nuclear program and terrorist proxy sponsorship, Iran invests in deadly military hardware and software, projects it defends as critical foreign policy tools. 

The Economist’s Byte by Byte podcast calculated the increase in Iranian cyber attack activity since October 7^thof last year at 300%.  While Iran’s cyber capability does not yet match that of Israel, it is improving consistently.  In the Arab world, Iran’s capability is comparable to that of the United Arab Emirates, but at a larger scale. Vulnerabilities that previously took Iranian cyber actors weeks to exploit now take days. Iran has transferred cyber expertise to Hezbollah and could choose to offer the same to additional armed groups.  Of concern to Israel is the possibility that advanced cyber techniques or tools could be passed by Russia to Iran as part of their expanding security interdependency.   

Missiles and Drones. Despite a flurry of U.S. effort to prevent it, the U.N. arms embargo on Iran expired in October of 2020. As I warned would happen in an article the previous June titled “The Gulf is Watching Washington’s Moves on the UN Embargo on Iran”, Iran has made lethal strides in its missile and drone programs. The IRGC has added new ballistic missiles to their arsenal and extended the range and accuracy of pre-existing models. The new missiles display improved precision in tests, thanks to the acquisition of better guidance systems and better targeting technology.  Iran has advanced its utilization of solid fuel technology, making IRGC missiles easier to transport and faster to launch – therefore harder to detect and preemptively strike. Iran’s cruise missiles and drones also boast extended ranges, better guidance systems, longer flight durations.  Drone payload capacity has also been improved, both in size and quality, with the import of advanced surveillance technologies, for example.  

Iran extends this largesse to its affiliates across the region.  With specific regard to the crippling of Red Sea shipping, note that the International Institute for Strategic Studies wrote in October of 2023 “With Iranian assistance, the Houthis have managed to build up an array of precisionguided rockets, ballistic missiles, land attack cruise missiles and anti-shipping capabilities in a remarkably short period of time.” In February of this year the IRGC Navy fired two ballistic missiles from a ship for the first time.  This capability equates to an extension of its missile arsenal range.  

In October of 2023 restrictions on Iran’s missile program under UNSCR 2231 ended.  These restrictions prevented Iran from importing or exporting missiles, drones, or components of either. At the time of its expiration 48 states signed a statement calling Iran’s missile program “one of the greatest challenges to international non-proliferation efforts” and stressing that Iran’s foreign policy of arming militias abroad “endangers international stability and escalates regional tension.”  According to the U.N., Iran’s sale of ballistic missiles to Russia is legal.  

UNSCR 2231 also prohibited Iran from converting missiles into nuclear delivery vehicles. Iran did not abide by this prohibition while it was active, but the expiration of these restrictions means IRGC work in this area is unencumbered. 

A Note on Nukes. Perhaps the greatest danger posed by Iran’s missile program is its potential to deliver a nuclear warhead.  The series most likely to serve this purpose in the IRGC arsenal today are, in order of capability, the Khorramshar 1/2, the Shahab-3, the Emad. Should Iran cross the threshold of nuclear weaponization, the risk of deadly escalation in any exchange of fire between Iran and Israel will spike, due to payload uncertainty.  Barring intelligence to the contrary, any missile of a nuclear-capable variant fired from Iran would be assumed to carry a nuclear payload. In a wargame the scenario becomes mutually assured destruction.   

The conflict in Gaza, the war in Ukraine, the war in Yemen, and the nonsensical Houthi campaign against global shipping are all laboratories in which Iranian engineers study and tweak IRGC weaponry.  Allowing Iran’s partners to continue deploying Iranian munitions in these theaters effectively furthers Iranian R&D.   

What the US Can Do About It 

Congressional Action. While altering Iranian behavior is a complex task, altering our own should not be.   

1. Iran’s missile sales to Russia provide ample justification for passing legislation that truncates the process for transferring to Ukraine weapons seized in intercepted Iranian shipments to proxies.  When Iranian weapons are used against Russia, it could be in Russia’s interest to pressure Iran to halt those shipments.  

• Iranian meddling in the election campaigns of America’s two largest political parties must be fully understood to be mitigated. Congress could urge the appointment of a Special Counsel and establish a bipartisan task force to draft policy recommendations based on the Special Counsel’s findings.  

• The dangerous spectrum of Iranian actions designed to abrogate U.S. influence from the Middle East justifies the framing of a unified strategy, perhaps by a Select Committee, that reflects the U.S. mission to see an Iran that does not possess a nuclear weapon, does not sponsor terrorism, does not suppress the will of its people, and does not interfere with U.S. 

elections or the American social fabric.   

Diplomacy. The sanctions, military deterrence, and diplomacy drawn on in successive attempts to change these Iranian behaviors remain valid tools but require tweaking. Diplomatic efforts should be in the service of forming and mobilizing a coalition to refine and adopt the Americanled strategy instead of in the service of exchanging messages with intransigent Iranian nuclear negotiators or Hamas representatives. 

I recommend the coalition adopt a position that rejects the entry of missiles and drones into sovereign airspace and waters without approval and assigns repercussions for violations.  Further, that the coalition be mobilized to disrupt operations that enable the Iranian programs that have violated and continue to violate this position. Finally, that the coalition discuss with Iran and, barring improvement, announce that should Iran continue to destabilize and suppress economic growth in either or all of Lebanon, Yemen, the Palestinian territories, Syria and Iraq, the bill for resultant reconstruction projects will be Iran’s and not born by any members of the Coalition. This announcement could lead to populations of these countries reassessing Iran’s role in their midst.  

This coalition should agree on and publish actions that will be taken against Iran when a citizen of a coalition member country is kidnapped by the IRGC anywhere in the world. Stronger action should be triggered when a citizen is assassinated, or an assassination is attempted. Heeding human rights lawyers, the U.S. should push for universal jurisdiction tools to be applied to Iran by the coalition. Many countries currently refrain from doing so due to fear of retributive kidnappings. The coalition should agree to open structural investigations into human rights abuses at the hands of Iranian officials where victims who can provide evidence have moved into jurisdictions that can host criminal trials or file for civil litigation. 

Note that this discussion of a coalition is entirely removed from discussions of military posture or action. Separating these asks makes it easier for partner nations to participate at the level supported by their populace.    

Military Deterrence. Diplomacy has not – and arguably cannot – reduce Iran’s intent to conduct acts of terror. Deterrence is established when an enemy believes they have more to lose than gain from a hostile action. Iran’s Supreme Leader, as the head of a nation with near absolute power, has quite a bit to lose. This logic underpins Iran’s proxy-based foreign policy.  Potential losses are offloaded to external entities, increasing Iran’s risk tolerance.  This is also why Iran has refused to negotiate on its support of proxies like it has on its nuclear program.  The value of proxies far outweighs the cost of arming them and treating them as negotiable would fray their loyalty.  

How to counter this logic?  The U.S. has shied away from kinetic action inside Iran over several administrations with good reason.  Tehran understands that primary among these were U.S. concerns about civilian loss of life and the risk of fomenting popular support for the regime.  Advances in precision weaponry drastically reduce these risks.  Following Iran’s April 13^th multifront drone and missile attack on Israel, Israel’s 3-missile strike on a Russian-made S300 air defense system near one of the IRGC’s nuclear sites elicited nary a blink from average Iranians. The U.S. should make it clear to the leadership of Iran’s proxy, drone and missile programs that new capabilities now permit the U.S. and partners to dismantle their facilities and chains of command with low to no risk of negative secondary effects.  Though “AUMF” is a four letter word in Congress, an Authorized Use of Military Force could convey this quickly and clearly.  

The barrage of munitions fired from Iranian and proxy stockpiles on April 13^th in what the IRGC termed Operation True Promise was a test of both Israel’s air defenses and the US-led network of countries pledged to peace with Israel. Since then, Iran has worked to undermine and to court America’s partners in the region. Years of CENTCOM engagement are one reason this work has so far failed.  But integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) is not yet fully realized and neither our partner nations nor our citizens are well-protected from Iranian weaponry. The Diplomatic Security Service can be asked to provide details on the threat level from missiles and drones to our embassies abroad, especially in countries where Iran has influence and affiliates.  

Sanctions. Acknowledging debate about the effectiveness of current sanctions on Iran, there is reason for optimism.  In 2023 Treasury was mainstreaming AI in sanctions research, per their 2021 modernization agenda. As these specialized AI tools continue to learn and be applied, the depth of research and speed the U.S. applies to uncovering IRGC front companies and compiling cases for targeted sanctions will accelerate. These tools will also enable a more thorough application of secondary sanctions against brokers and facilitators anywhere in the world who play middleman in the Chinese-Iranian oil trade or Iran’s drone sales in Africa, Central Asia, and Latin America. 

UNSCR 2231 sanctions on Iran’s authority to enrich uranium will expire in October 2025 unless snapback is triggered. Iran has threatened to immediately weaponize if this occurs and pre-2015 sanctions are automatically reimposed. While U.S. issuance of and adherence to redlines has been abysmal, consecutive administrations have been clear that Iranian possession of a nuclear weapon will not be countenanced. The current US military posture in the region presents a credible deterrent. Iran will certainly weigh these two data points. The U.S. should create conditions for Iran to walk back their threat without loss of face.  

Go for a Grand Bargain. The regime in Iran has learned from a dozen years of experimentation that its interests are best served by focusing the attention of the U.S. Government on a single issue while operating with no impediments elsewhere.  That single issue, the nuclear file, has reached a point where Iran has very little room to continue slowly ramping up the program to keep the U.S. riveted. IRGC intent is no doubt to mature the missile, drone and proxy programs to the point that any one of them can be peeled off to serve as the next single issue of focus.  To prevent another dozen years of IRGC terrorist capability advances, the U.S. should consider crafting a grand bargain comprised of carrots and sticks that establishes deterrence while allowing the partial fulfillment of an Iranian objective where it also overlaps with U.S. interests.  

While designing a multifaceted deal will be complex, the last 12 years prove that addressing the range of Iran’s hostile behaviors individually is even less likely to yield results.  

Elements could include an end to Iranian arms transfers and financial support to designated terrorist groups in other sovereign countries; a roll back of Iranian stockpiles of enriched uranium;  the proportional removal of U.S. sanctions related to the nuclear program and sponsorship of terrorism; a U.S. greenlight for foreign direct investment into Iran from Saudi Arabia and the UAE in agreed-upon sectors; the continuation of U.S. and Arab state plans for IAMD and burgeoning initiatives like the Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement (C-SIPA), as the military activities in each are purely defensive; the continuation of  Iran and Arab state cooperation ensuring mutual non-aggression and developing trade; U.S. and European cooperation with the region to establish a non-binding regional security conflict resolution mechanism for the Middle East with membership extended to both Iran and Israel; a gradual draw down of U.S. forces present in the region without the request of the host government and potential further reductions in U.S. troop presence pending Arab partners assurances to the U.S. that Iran does not demonstrate hostile intent and/or that strengthened U.S.-Arab security arrangements are sufficient. Note that such strengthened security agreements do not have to include a quartered troop commitment, rather they can be a U.S.  commitment to respond if the partner is attacked.     

The U.S. should not expect any deal reached to be more than a set of transactional arrangements. The U.S. and Iran did find ground to cooperate after 9/11 against the Taliban and later against ISIS in Iraq, when neither country wished to see a Sunni terrorist group establish a stronghold in the region.  The U.S. also provided humanitarian assistance to Iran after the Bam earthquake in 2003. Most other instances of cooperation have emerged not due to shared objectives but because Iran conducted an aggressive act the U.S. was then compelled to mitigate, like when exchanging Iranian prisoners for kidnapped Americans, negotiating the JCPOA to limit Iran’s nuclear program, or signing the Algiers Accord in 1981 after Iran held 52 Americans hostage for 444 days.  

Time spent negotiating a grand bargain is also time available in parallel lanes to develop new tools for future use in dismantling the nuclear or missile and drone programs as required. If no deal is reached, the U.S. should have contingency plans on the shelf for applying additional sanctions, conducting strikes, or implementing other options inside or outside of Iran. 

Conclusion 

Without U.S. leadership, October 2025 will mark the end of any mechanism for reimposing U.N. 

sanctions on Iran’s nuclear, missile or drone programs.  Tehran will be free to pursue further tools of terror and coercive expansionism. The interests of all actors, including Iranians, are better served by curtailing this. 

We are currently in a rare period of widespread transitions among actors in this space. The time is opportune to reset norms, establish red lines, and devise an updated approach for managing Iran’s hegemonic aspirations, incorporating lessons from the past 12 years of US strategy and four years of unencumbered Iranian weapons advancements. 

There is tragic irony in the fact that the U.S. and Iran share the same goal of someday seeing a smaller U.S. footprint in the Middle East.  The U.S. keeps 40,000 troops in the region in large part because of requests from Arab partners for defense against an Iran they see as hostile. Were Iran to reduce its harassment of these neighbors, the U.S. would see less reason to be present and would pull troops home.  Tehran would be smarter to discuss with Arab states its discontent with the continued U.S. presence, rather than directing attacks on U.S. troops. The latter only underscores the threat perception that keeps the U.S. there.    

Through our Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, the Atlantic Council works with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region.

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The post Testimony on Israel and the Middle East at a crossroads: How Tehran’s terror campaign threatens the US and our allies appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Marc Polymeropoulos: This master class in covert action is an escalation meant to de-escalate this conflict

Jonathan Panikoff: Hezbollah faces a psychological blow as it tries to avoid instigating a war

Kirsten Fontenrose: Hezbollah losing its ability to communicate is a win for Israel—and a loss for global intelligence agencies

This master class in covert action is an escalation meant to de-escalate this conflict

The operation was a master class in covert action, both from the kinetic and supply chain aspects.  

In fact, this is the most impressive kinetic intelligence operation I can recall in my career. The scale and scope of it was just staggering. It was not a decapitation strike against leadership figures, but more of an incapacitation strike, bringing Hezbollah to its knees by injuring hundreds of Hezbollah members in a single strike—and then doing it again the next day.  

Israel has now achieved complete intelligence domination over Hezbollah, from the July hit on Fuad Shukr, to the preemptive strikes that in essence prevented a wider war, and now this audacious operation. What an evolution for Israeli intelligence, as they have certainly rebounded after the disaster of October 7.

This likely will cause Hezbollah to undertake a brutal counterintelligence review, which may paralyze the group. No one will be trusted.

The supply-chain side of the operation appears to be quite extraordinary, as Israel took advantage of the Hezbollah move to pagers (think of The Wire), which ironically was designed to thwart Israeli signals intelligence collection. Israel apparently found this unique vulnerability—Hezbollah’s need to import pagers.  

In my view, this operation may have been designed to send a message—not necessarily the traditional operational prep of the environment operation, which would have signified the beginning of an Israeli ground move into Lebanon. Instead, this may have been part of the Israeli strategy of “escalate to de-escalate.” In other words, by delivering a devastatingly stark and brutal warning to Hezbollah that it has totally compromised its security, Israel signifies to the group that a wider war would be disastrous.

—Marc Polymeropoulos is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He worked for twenty-six years at the CIA before retiring in July 2019 at the senior intelligence service level.

Hezbollah faces a psychological blow as it tries to avoid instigating a war

The planning and execution of the pagers operation on Tuesday, and the walkie-talkies operation on Wednesday, almost certainly took months of effort by Israel. There is a very real potential that it could raise tensions further, and the operation absolutely could be a prelude to war. But for Israel, it may also be an effort to try and convince Hezbollah that an invasion is imminent, regardless of whether one is or not, in hopes that the group—which almost certainly does not want a full-scale war with Israel—finally moves back ten kilometers from the border. This would enable tens of thousands of northern Israeli families to return to their homes after almost a year away because of the threat posed by the group.

At the same time, this strike did not just hit Hezbollah leaders but the rank and file of the terrorist organization. As a result, it would not be a surprise to see a lot of the Hezbollah rank and file clamoring to respond. But for Hezbollah to admit that these attacks were this wide of a counterintelligence failure would be bad for the group—not to mention dangerous to its survival.

Hezbollah leaders are desperate not to be seen as the ones instigating a war with Israel. Memories of the devastating 2006 war still loom large, and Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qasim won’t want to give an excuse for global blame to be shifted from Israel—over Gaza or a potential invasion of Lebanon—to Hezbollah itself because it is viewed as striking Israel in a manner beyond what’s been occurring for the last eleven-plus months. That creates a conundrum for the group at a time when its internal credibility is going to be diminished given the psychological impact of its rank-and-file members, not just its leaders, being reminded that Israel can get them anytime, anywhere.

 —Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He is a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council.

Hezbollah losing its ability to communicate is a win for Israel—and a loss for global intelligence agencies

The spontaneous combustion of Hezbollah communications equipment is helping intelligence communities around the world map the relationships and reach of a US-designated terrorist organization with global reach—across Lebanon into Syria and Yemen, from Iran’s ambassador to Lebanon to (according to my contacts) high-ranking Lebanese officials. Intelligence communities are filling in gaps in their matrices, narrowing in on new neighborhoods for collection, trying to make the most of this momentary flash of light on a dark network map, making hay while the sun shines.

But the same intelligence communities are quietly cursing under their breath. Because as quickly as Hezbollah’s detailed network was illuminated, it will go dark. It will cause planners and fighters in Iran’s Axis of Resistance to put down their phones around the region. If you are a smuggler or drug dealer conscripted by Hezbollah in exchange for safe passage through the Syrian border, you have the perfect excuse right now to ignore their calls and not show up for duty. There are likely mothers of young men in Syria purging their sons’ rooms of everything with a battery, diamond traders in West Africa tossing phones down mine shafts, and money launderers in Latin America tossing phones off yachts. Without warning from Israel that this operation would take place, intelligence services that may have invested years in hacking the communications networks of criminals and operatives on their watch lists will have their feeds cut off.  

Communications are central to command and control; Hezbollah has effectively lost the ability, at least temporarily, to mobilize large numbers of fighters. Spooked and unreachable fighters will stay home or be forced to meet in clusters to coordinate, creating new targeting opportunities for drone strikes. Several thousand fighters are missing trigger fingers or worse. These create favorable conditions for potential operations by the Israel Defense Forces designed to push Hezbollah farther from Israel’s northern border. This is currently the subject of debate among Israeli leadership and the voices invited to weigh in are not limited to the war cabinet that has called the shots in Gaza, reflecting recognition that there is a lot at stake in such a decision. 

The negative psychological impact of this operation on Hezbollah’s rank and file and its reputational impact on the group and Iran’s Axis of Resistance are unquantifiable but undoubtedly significant.

—Kirsten Fontenrose is a nonresident fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She was previously the senior director for the Gulf at the National Security Council.

The post Experts react: What’s behind the Hezbollah beeper and walkie-talkie explosions appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukrainian officials urged their Belarusian counterparts to “cease unfriendly actions” and called for them to pull back beyond firing range. In an apparent bid to spell out the possible consequences of any further escalation, they noted that if the Belarusian military violated the border, “all troop concentrations, military facilities, and supply routes in Belarus will become legitimate targets for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.”

Ukraine’s stern message was officially addressed to Minsk, but there is little doubt in Kyiv that the current Belarusian border buildup has actually been orchestrated by the Kremlin. Indeed, Sunday’s Ukrainian statement specifically cautioned Minsk against acting “under Moscow’s pressure.”

Russia has long sought to deepen Belarus’s involvement in the war against Ukraine, but on this particular occasion the Kremlin is believed to have a very specific goal in mind. Vladimir Putin hopes that by manufacturing a potential Belarusian threat along Ukraine’s northern border, he can force Kyiv to divert troops away from the ongoing Ukrainian invasion of Russia’s Kursk region and ease the pressure on his own overstretched army.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Now in its fourth week, Ukraine’s bold cross-border offensive has succeeded in exposing the limitations of Putin’s once vaunted military machine. The Russian army had already experienced a severe loss of status during the first two years of the war thanks to a string of battlefield setbacks and embarrassing defeats. Ukraine’s recent advance into the Russian Federation itself has now done further damage to Russia’s military reputation. In a matter of days, Ukrainian forces have been able to seize more Russian land than Putin’s army gained in Ukraine during the previous seven months.

Faced with the twin challenges of conquering Ukraine and defending Russia, it has become painfully apparent in recent weeks that Vladimir Putin is struggling to do both. With virtually his entire military already committed to the fight in Ukraine, he responded to the initial shock of Kyiv’s Kursk offensive by scraping together a variety of units and calling on untested young Russian conscripts to stem the tide of the Ukrainian invasion.

Recent reports indicate that Russian resistance on the Kursk front is now finally strengthening, but it may still be some time before Moscow is able to liberate the approximately five hundred square miles of Russian territory currently under Ukrainian control and force the Ukrainian military back across the border. In order to deprive Kyiv of momentum and prevent any more unwelcome surprises, it therefore makes perfect military sense for Putin to call upon his Belarusian ally and instruct him to stage a diversion.

New Atlanticist Aug 15, 2024

Ukraine’s Kursk offensive marks Putin’s third major humiliation of the war

By Brian Whitmore

Ukrainian forces’ recent incursion into Kursk Oblast in Russia came as a shock and instantaneously transformed the narrative of the war.

Conflict Politics & Diplomacy

UkraineAlert Aug 13, 2024

Ukraine’s Kursk offensive proves surprise is still possible in modern war

By Mykola Bielieskov

Ukraine’s Kursk offensive has succeeded in demonstrating that surprise is still possible despite the increased transparency of the modern battlefield, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Aug 11, 2024

Ukraine’s invasion of Russia is erasing Vladimir Putin’s last red lines

By Peter Dickinson

Ukraine’s invasion of Russia has erased the last of Vladimir Putin’s red lines and made a complete mockery of the West’s frequently voiced escalation fears, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

Belarus dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka has evidently gone along with Putin’s plan and has ordered a significant portion of his military to deploy to the Ukrainian border. Nevertheless, a Belarusian invasion of northern Ukraine remains highly unlikely. While it is true that Lukashenka is almost entirely dependent on the Kremlin for his political survival, both he and Putin appear to understand perfectly well that any attempt to force Belarus into the war could end in disaster.

Lukashenka’s domestic position is precarious enough without engaging in foreign wars. He was almost ousted in 2020 by nationwide protests following a rigged presidential election, and only managed to cling onto power thanks to Moscow’s intervention. This reliance on Russia has robbed Lukashenka of any lingering legitimacy and forced him to accept what some have termed as the “creeping annexation” of his country by the Kremlin.

Meanwhile, Belarusian society has shown virtually no interest in joining Russia’s anti-Ukrainian crusade. While pro-Russian sentiment remains widespread in the country, there is little enthusiasm for the imperial ambitions underpinning the Russian invasion of Ukraine. On the contrary, many Belarusians feel a sense of solidarity with their Ukrainian neighbors, and recognize that today’s resurgent Russian imperialism poses a similar threat to their own country.

This mood has given rise to serious questions about the readiness of the Belarusian military to participate in Russia’s war. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, there have been numerous reports claiming that Belarusian officers are deeply reluctant to fight in Ukraine. If Lukashenka attempts to force them, there is a reasonable chance he will not be obeyed. This could destabilize his regime and lead to unpredictable consequences for the Kremlin.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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With little prospect of the Belarusian military joining the invasion of Ukraine, Putin has found different ways for Lukashenka to make himself useful. During the initial phase of the war, the Russian dictator used his Belarusian counterpart’s fiefdom as a gateway for the failed march on Kyiv and as a launch pad for air strikes on targets across Ukraine. Belarus has subsequently continued to offer Russia meaningful practical support, digging deep into its Soviet era stockpiles to deliver large quantities of much-needed military equipment.

Throughout the war, the two leaders have staged frequent personal meetings in an apparent bid to counter perceptions of Putin as an international pariah. Lukashenka has also played a supporting role in Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling, hosting Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus and participating in joint nuclear drills together with the Russian military. The current Belarusian border buildup fits neatly into this pattern, with Lukashenka once again serving as Putin’s accomplice while stopping short of direct military involvement.

For now, the Ukrainian authorities seem content to limit their response to strong words of warning along with a minimum of military precautions. While they cannot afford to completely ignore the presence of the Belarusian army on their border, there is little sign that Ukraine is prepared to slow the pace of its Kursk offensive in order to guard against an invasion threat that few in Kyiv regard as credible. Instead, they appear intent on treating it as yet another Russian ruse and calling Putin’s bluff, just as they have done with his so-called red lines and his attempts at nuclear blackmail.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Aug 1, 2024

Ukraine’s new F-16 jets won’t defeat Russia but will enhance air defenses

By Mykola Bielieskov

Ukraine’s fledgling fleet of F-16 jets will not win the war but should strengthen the country’s air defenses and help protect the civilian population from Russian bombardment, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Defense Technologies

UkraineAlert Aug 6, 2024

Russia’s Black Sea defeats get flushed down Vladimir Putin’s memory hole

By Peter Dickinson

Vladimir Putin’s readiness to flush Russia’s Black Sea naval defeats down the memory hole is a reminder that the Kremlin propaganda machine controls Russian reality and can easily rebrand any retreat from Ukraine, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert Jul 30, 2024

Paris Olympics: Ukrainian dedicates medal to athletes killed by Russia

By Mark Temnycky

Ukrainian fencing star Olga Kharlan has won the country’s first medal at the 2024 Paris Olympics and dedicated her medal to the Ukrainian athletes “who couldn’t be here because they were killed by Russia,” writes Mark Temnycky .

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Instead, I always believed as an operations officer that we must strive to collect intelligence that ultimately can provide a warning to policymakers. That warning function was—and still is—key in any CIA station’s job description. The CIA performed admirably if we sent up the bat signal, so that policymakers can decide on various courses of action if or when something went down. An event may seem likely to occur (with signs, never definitive, that an invasion or a coup was planned, for example), so the intelligence collected must spur on policymakers to consider several options. “No surprises” was the mantra I would follow. During management stints in Washington, and while serving abroad as an operations officer, I would tell my State Department, White House, and Department of Defense colleagues that my collection missions should be judged as successful if they were never blindsided.

Yet there was an important caveat to my promises: I would assure a US ambassador that we would collect, we would warn, we would analyze and assess. But do not expect the intelligence to have such a level of granularity that it implied certainty of an outcome.

During these last several days of late August, however, the Israeli intelligence community hit a grand slam by obtaining such exquisite intelligence that it was highly predictive in nature—and not only that, it also likely staved off a wider war. As such, the Israeli intelligence community deserves extraordinary credit for this intelligence coup. According to media reports, the Israelis collected information that not only indicated that Hezbollah was about to launch a significant attack against northern and central Israel, but also the precise time—5:15 a.m. local time on August 25—when the launches would occur and the specific units that would conduct the attacks.

This was a very noteworthy feat, in my view presumably gleaned from a combination of Israeli signals intelligence (an intercept of a warning order from within the Hezbollah hierarchy, for example); imagery of movement within the rocket, missile, or drone units themselves, perhaps via Israeli drones or other overhead collection; and even reporting from human sources, who could have told the Israelis the precise plans and intentions of the Hezbollah leadership. Let us not forget that Israel has shown an ability to penetrate Hezbollah, with the late July assassination in Beirut of Fuad Shukr, a close confidant and military adviser to Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.

This intelligence collection then allowed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), launching reportedly up to one hundred aircraft, to effectively preempt the Hezbollah attack, destroying up to two-thirds of the rockets and missiles that would have been launched. This will go down in Israeli military history, just like the preemptive strikes in 1967 by the IDF against Egyptian land and air forces. So once again, how good was the intelligence this time around? It seems quite clear that Israeli pilots knew the precise location of the Hezbollah rocket and missile units, which was obtained by their colleagues in the Israeli intelligence community. As such, there must have been great satisfaction in the hallways of Israeli intelligence, having provided actionable targets to their military brethren.

This intelligence saved the lives of those Israelis—both civilian and military—who might have been hit by several hundred rockets and missiles. That in and of itself is a significant success. But there is more to praise, as this Israeli intelligence coup almost certainly avoided a wider war. In fact, the preemptive strike, based on the extraordinary collection, was de-escalatory in nature. Since there was no mass casualty event in Israel (military or civilian casualties emanating from a new Hezbollah attack), a massive Israeli response, including perhaps strikes on Beirut, was avoided. The Israeli intelligence community certainly won the day by avoiding that scenario. As did the region as a whole.

Finally, Hezbollah claims it was targeting Israeli national security infrastructure, including Mossad headquarters and a building housing elements of Unit 8200, the Israeli equivalent to the US National Security Agency. I sent a message to a former Israeli government official who is a friend of mine, noting, “You know you are doing something right if the enemy is trying to kill you.” What a sign of flattery for the Israeli intelligence officers, who nearly a year ago were reeling from the catastrophic intelligence failures of October 7, 2023. The attacks that day resulted in more than 1,160 Israelis and foreigners brutally killed, smashing the aura of the Israeli intelligence community. I am sure that there remains an enormous sense of guilt within the hallways of Mossad, Israeli military intelligence, and Shin Bet—similar to what we at the CIA felt after September 11, 2001. Yet as seen from the events of the last several days, on top of the successful hunt for high-value targets, the Israeli intelligence community has pulled itself up by its bootstraps and regained its mojo. That should reassure the Israeli public and policymakers, who rely on the intelligence community as Israel’s first line of defense.

Marc Polymeropoulos is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He worked for twenty-six years at the CIA before retiring in July 2019 at the senior intelligence service level.

The post How the Israeli intelligence community got its mojo back appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Robert Bassett Cross is a former British Army officer and the founder and CEO of the UK-headquartered AI software developer Adarga. He is a nonresident senior fellow at the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and an honorary research fellow at the University of Exeter’s Strategy and Security Institute.

Writing in 1946, just a few years before NATO was founded, Director of the US Office of Strategic Services Bill Donovan knew precisely how valuable publicly available information could be.

“[E]ven a regimented press,” he wrote, “will again and again betray the national interest to a painstaking observer . . . Pamphlets, periodicals, scientific journals are mines of intelligence.”

Today, seventy-five years after the Alliance was formed, such open-source intelligence (OSINT) is more important—and more powerful—than ever. However, underinvestment in OSINT capabilities and a culture favoring classified data currently hold back member states’ intelligence-collection potential. To fully utilize the available technology to detect threats from adversaries, NATO member states must overcome these barriers to embrace open-source intelligence enabled by artificial intelligence (AI).

Understanding the threat landscape

OSINT can help leaders get a fast, up-to-date understanding of their operating environment. If you want to know who’s doing what, where, and when, then an open-source specialist can quickly tell you.

If, for example, you want to find out who’s jamming GPS systems in the Baltic region, the relevant data isn’t hard to come by. Similarly, OSINT analysts can provide insights into issues ranging from the effectiveness of Iran’s attack on Israel (and the Israeli response) to China’s current role in fueling the Russian war machine. 

In recent years, it has become increasingly clear that, in addition to insight into current and recent events, OSINT can help leaders forecast what an adversary might be planning to do weeks, months, or even years from now.

By exploiting OSINT more fully and by integrating it into the wider intelligence cycle, NATO can preempt, deter, and defeat its adversaries’ efforts to expand their influence and undermine the security of member states. Here are several ways that OSINT can be used:

1. Across the physical domains of land, air, sea, and space, NATO can exploit publicly and commercially available data to explore an adversary’s order of battle and—more importantly—monitor changes in the strength and disposition of its military units and formations to infer its intent.
2. In the cyber domain, NATO can leverage commercially available information to detect and counter the penetration of networks governing critical infrastructure, as well as those related to research organizations, academic institutions, and technology developers.
3. In the information space, OSINT can help NATO identify, understand, and counter influence campaigns, specifically when it comes to the detection and attribution of disinformation and misinformation.
4. NATO can draw on vast swaths of open-source data to infer long-term strategic intent. Every subtle change to a government’s policies, every adjustment to its economic positioning and investment strategy, every new law and regulation it enacts, every new treaty and trade agreement—all of these can help the Alliance reverse engineer an adversary’s confidential playbooks.

Given the vast quantity, complexity, and diversity of the data, it is vital that NATO employs AI to extract the maximum value from it—to enhance analysts’ abilities, accelerate the analysis cycle, and build a reliable, contextual understanding of what Donovan called “the strategy developing silently behind the mask.”

The barriers to OSINT adoption

While AI is, of course, an emerging technology, its utility is already being realized across industries and sectors outside defense. From corporate intelligence and advisory services to finance and media, more and more private-sector organizations are using AI to make sense of the information environment, drawing on an ever-expanding range of sources to manage risk, identify opportunities, and adapt to geopolitical volatility.

However, the barriers to its widespread adoption and effective exploitation in political and military circles remain considerable. A paper published in 2022 by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), in collaboration with the Centre for Emerging Technology and Security and the Alan Turing Institute, identified three in particular.

First, there are tradecraft barriers relating to the methodologies governing everything from the analysis of publicly available information to the evaluation and dissemination of the resulting intelligence. Second, there are resourcing barriers stemming from underinvestment in the requisite tools, technologies, data sets, and training.

The third barrier identified by the RUSI authors—and the most daunting one—is cultural. Presented with so much open-source data, analysts and decision makers tend to favor classified information and internal data sets. These sources and insights are easier to trust and are imbued with what the authors call “the perceived power of the ‘secret’ label.” 

Speaking at the Eurosatory exhibition in Paris in June, US Major General Matthew Van Wagenen, deputy chief of staff for operations at NATO, confirmed how great this cultural barrier is. Up to 90 percent of “what Western militaries are looking for,” he said, can be derived from open sources:

This is a revolution in how we look at information. The ways of discerning information through classical means and techniques, tactics, and procedures that militaries have been adapted to—that’s really an old model of doing business. The new open source that’s out there right now, and the speed of information and relevance of information is coming, this is how things need to be looked at.

It is reasonable to believe that the tradecraft and resourcing barriers can be overcome. Methodologies are evolving swiftly, as are the requisite technologies. In fact, many of the tools NATO needs to capitalize on OSINT already exist. New AI applications are coming online almost every week. But if NATO fails to overcome the cultural barrier, it risks going into the next conflict underinformed and ill-prepared.

How AI-enabled OSINT can earn NATO leaders’ confidence

The cultural barrier to AI-enabled OSINT cannot be surmounted simply by decree or directive. Nor can it be overcome by intelligence professionals alone. The technology—and the discipline—must earn the justified confidence of civilian leaders and military commanders across the international staff, the military committee, and the supporting agencies. This could happen if AI-enabled OSINT were applied first to the simplest intelligence-gathering tasks before being applied to the most complex. To borrow the terminology made famous by former US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, NATO should apply the discipline to corroborating “known knowns,” resolving “known unknowns,” and surfacing “unknown unknowns.”

Corroborating “known knowns”: NATO should start by recognizing where the skills of the human analyst currently outperform even the most sophisticated models, and where AI can best be applied to elevate these skills. This means asking the right kind of questions, and employing OSINT to corroborate what is already known and to triangulate insights gathered from well-established secret sources. In this way, NATO can begin to overcome the skepticism that’s too often associated with publicly available information and OSINT. 

Resolving “known unknowns”: With so much data to draw on, it is essential that NATO uses AI to help collate, process, and (where necessary) translate that data so it is ready for analysts to interpret. If AI-enabled OSINT can prove useful to intelligence professionals in this capacity, those professionals may be more willing to apply it to the most complex and valuable intelligence tasks of all—surfacing risks and opportunities that civilian and military leaders would otherwise struggle to identify.

Surfacing “unknown unknowns”: Perhaps the greatest contribution that AI can make to the intelligence-gathering discipline is identifying patterns and connections that are invisible to the human eye. Dedicated, AI-powered information-intelligence applications that synthesize publicly available information with proprietary data can help analysts and decision makers tease out insights they would otherwise miss.

This combination of publicly available information with classified data will enable NATO analysts to give military and political leaders a uniquely rich, nuanced, and highly contextualized understanding of the operating environment. Decision makers at every level will be able to examine intelligence from every angle, and apply their experience and imagination to infer an adversary’s intentions based on the interplay of evidence.

The critical need for human-machine teaming

The necessary tools and methodologies exist. What’s missing is the determination to get these tools into users’ hands, to supply the requisite training, and to capitalize on the integrated output derived from all sources of intelligence, open-source and otherwise.

OSINT is becoming known among some intelligence professionals as “the intelligence of first resort.” Compared with clandestine methods of information gathering and analysis, OSINT is fast, low-cost, and low-risk. But if it can be combined with those same methods then NATO’s analysts and leadership will have an enduring competitive edge, with access to the kind of strategic information that would likely be, in Bill Donovan’s words, “of determining influence in modern war.”

NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary is a milestone in a remarkable story of reinvention, adaptation, and unity. However, as the Alliance seeks to secure its future for the next seventy-five years, it faces the revanchism of old rivals, escalating strategic competition, and uncertainties over the future of the rules-based international order.

With partners and allies turning attention from celebrations to challenges, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative invited contributors to engage with the most pressing concerns ahead of the historic Washington summit and chart a path for the Alliance’s future. This series will feature seven essays focused on concrete issues that NATO must address at the Washington summit and five essays that examine longer-term challenges the Alliance must confront to ensure transatlantic security.

The post NATO must recognize the potential of open-source intelligence appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Open-source intelligence (OSINT) refers to intelligence derived exclusively from publicly or commercially available information that addresses specific intelligence priorities, requirements, or gaps. OSINT encompasses a wide range of sources, including public records, news media, libraries, social media platforms, images, videos, websites, and even the dark web. Commercial technical collection and imagery satellites also provide valuable open-source data. The power of OSINT lies in its ability to provide meaningful, actionable intelligence from diverse and readily available sources.

Thanks to technological advances, OSINT can provide early warning signs of a conflict to come long before it actually breaks out. On land, the proliferation of inexpensive and ubiquitous sensor networks has rendered battlefields almost transparent, making surprise maneuvers more difficult. Through open-source data from smartphones and satellites, persistent OSINT provides early warning of mobilization and other key indicators of military maneuvers. This capability is further augmented by artificial intelligence (AI)-enhanced reconnaissance and real-time data analysis, which have proven remarkably effective in modern conflicts including in Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Gaza and Israel, and Sudan. As this paradigm extends to maritime operations, it brings unique challenges and characteristics compared to land operations.

As technology races forward, Blue OSINT stands out as a key tool in the arsenal of contemporary naval warfare during global great-power competition. Blue OSINT harnesses data from commercial satellites, social media, and other publicly available sources to specifically enhance maritime domain awareness, identify emerging threats, and inform strategic decisions.

The current state of Blue OSINT across the spectrum of conflict points to an accelerating technology-driven evolution enabling maritime security and sea-control missions. The US Navy (USN) can enhance Blue OSINT collection with its own commercially procured sensor networks and bespoke uncrewed systems to shape operational environments, prevent and resolve conflicts, and ensure accessibility of sea lines of communications.

Commercially procured sensors span a wide array of technologies, including sonar and acoustic sensors, as well as video and seismic devices that are utilized to detect activities in strategic locations. These sensors can function independently or operate from uncrewed systems, providing flexibility and adaptability in various maritime operations. For instance, uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) equipped with high-resolution cameras and radar can deliver persistent surveillance over expansive oceanic areas, while uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs) with sonar capabilities can monitor subsea activities, such as submarine movements and underwater installations. These uncrewed platforms enable the continuous collection of critical data, enhancing the Navy’s situational awareness and operational readiness without putting sailors at risk.

For the US Navy to best support the joint force and maintain its strategic edge, it must integrate ubiquitous sensor networks and Blue OSINT into naval strategies adapted for tomorrow’s increasingly complex maritime environment. The Navy’s multiyear Project Overmatch is a good start to developing its “network of networks” and contributing to the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) program.

With escalating tensions in the South China Sea, conventional forces are stretched thin and face asymmetric threats such as the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s undersea sensing arrays and China’s maritime militia forces. Integrating Blue OSINT and sensor networks into the Navy’s strategies complements traditional naval power, while allowing intelligence missions to be conducted at lower risk and cost. Moreover, the open-source nature of this information enhances the Navy’s ability to share information and collaborate with allies and partners while bypassing cumbersome security classification issues. By relying on easily shareable information, the Navy can better synchronize efforts with partner navies, making command of the sea a more coordinated and viable endeavor.

The impact of evolving open-source intelligence on warfare

The table above provides a comparison between OSINT and traditional intelligence methods, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. OSINT offers global, real-time updates at a lower cost by leveraging existing commercial infrastructure. This approach presents a lower risk, as it involves minimal direct exposure and facilitates easier information sharing due to fewer classification issues.

On the other hand, traditional intelligence methods such as human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) provide selective, targeted insights based on specific operational requirements. These methods often involve higher costs and risks due to the need for extensive human and technical resources, as well as the nature of clandestine operations. While traditional intelligence can offer deep, targeted insights, it is often limited by operational scope and security classification issues, making information sharing more challenging.

In the maritime domain, these distinctions are particularly significant. The concept of Blue OSINT integrates these principles specifically for naval operations, emphasizing the need for continuous monitoring and rapid-response capabilities.

Blue OSINT and persistent maritime monitoring

In the pre-conflict stage, global satellite coverage and social media provide a wealth of data that can map maritime activity with unprecedented detail. Nonprofit organizations like Global Fishing Watch use commercial satellite constellations to track ships and monitor maritime activity. Increased affordability and accessibility of satellite technology have enabled nongovernmental and commercial entities to contribute to maritime domain awareness in new ways. For instance, maritime radar emissions—once the exclusive domain of military and intelligence satellites—are now easily observable and “tweetable,” allowing for vessel identification to be accomplished more easily when actors execute deceptive techniques. Similarly, platforms like X (formerly Twitter) host numerous “ship spotting” accounts, where enthusiasts post photos and updates of vessels passing through strategic chokepoints and major straits, further enriching the available data.

Through persistent monitoring and large-scale data analysis, Blue OSINT can be used to significantly mitigate the challenge of monitoring large exclusive economic zones (EEZs). It offers a cost-effective alternative to traditional patrols, allowing these navies to adopt a more targeted approach when deploying their limited resources. By embracing Blue OSINT, naval forces can enhance their surveillance and response capabilities without a heavy financial burden, ensuring that these forces remain agile and effective in their maritime operations. Additionally, data streams from ubiquitous sensor networks can be coupled with Blue OSINT collection to give naval intelligence experts near-endless amounts of data in support of complex reconnaissance operations, without placing sailors and special operators at increased risk to collect it.

In addition to myriad opportunities for intelligence collection, using Blue OSINT presents technological challenges for the US Navy. The sheer volume of data generated by ubiquitous sensor networks and Blue OSINT tools necessitate substantial investments in software and analytic tools to manage and interpret this information effectively. Intelligence professionals must sift through endless amounts of data to identify actionable insights. Even the most skilled analysts need software and computer processing that can help organize and parse raw data.

To address these challenges, the US Navy and other maritime forces are ramping up investments in commercially procured sensor networks and cutting-edge analytic tools. In June 2024, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency issued its first-ever commercial solicitation for unclassified technology to help track illicit fishing in the Pacific. Such investments aim to access, exploit, and process the massive amounts of data generated, a key step to achieving comprehensive maritime domain awareness. Better software and analytic tools can help maximize the potential of Blue OSINT and sensor networks, ensuring that intelligence analysts can better inform decision-makers at the speed of relevance.

Strategic deployment of distributed sensors

While Blue OSINT provides valuable insights into chokepoints and shipping lanes, it does not yet offer comprehensive coverage of the open ocean. Its effectiveness is greater in populated and coastal areas, where the density of electronic devices and human activity is significantly higher than on the high seas. Moreover, OSINT data can often be easily manipulated, presenting challenges in ensuring the accuracy and reliability of the information gathered. For example, although ships emitting Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals can be tracked on the web, navies are aware that bad actors often tamper with their transponders in order to disguise their locations, ultimately limiting the signals’ reliability.

To bypass these limitations of open-source data, navies and intelligence agencies can enhance their Blue OSINT capabilities by augmenting them with strategically deployed clandestine sensor networks in key locations, such as harbors, straits, and other critical chokepoints. This combination of data flows allows for effective monitoring and data collection on vessel movements, communications, and adversary intentions. Additionally, other covert sensors can be hidden on the seabed or disguised on civilian vessels, like fishing boats, in regions such as the South China Sea. Using distributed sensors along with Blue OSINT data ensures continuous and comprehensive maritime situational awareness, even in areas less frequented by military assets.

However, fixed sensor networks alone are insufficient to cover the dynamic maritime environment. Deploying a mobile network of distributed sensors necessitates a diverse array of platforms and technologies. While military satellites, ships, and aircraft equipped with advanced sensors can offer intermittent coverage, they are costly and limited in number, and their findings are less easily shareable with partners and allies. To bridge these gaps, allied navies should invest in affordable and scalable solutions such as uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs), UUVs, and UASs. Outfitted with various sensors, these platforms can effectively detect and track adversary movements, ensuring that navies maintain situational awareness across the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean and other critical regions.

Small UASs launched from naval ships can be used to rapidly surveil large swaths of sea, providing real-time data on both surface and subsurface activities. Recognizing the strategic advantage of uncrewed systems, China has taken a bold step to outpace the US Navy by developing an aircraft carrier specifically designed to launch and recover UASs, rather than sophisticated manned platforms like the J-20 fighter jet. This significant investment in a carrier solely for uncrewed vehicles by the PLAN should prompt the United States to reconsider, and potentially adjust, its future resourcing strategy. Similarly, USVs can conduct long-duration patrols at a fraction of the cost of manned ship operations, exemplified by Saildrone vessels patrolling the Indian Ocean, providing the USN a robust sensor network. UUVs, deployed from submarines or surface ships, can monitor subsea activities, such as the movement of submarines and other submersible assets.

By monitoring the air, sea, and underwater environments, uncrewed vehicles and their sensors can significantly enhance overall maritime situational awareness. However, these tools are only effective if they are integrated into a cohesive architecture that combines traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) with Blue OSINT data and affordable long-term leave-behind sensors. Project Overmatch exemplifies how to achieve this integration by developing a network that links sensors, shooters, and command nodes across all domains. For instance, Project Overmatch aims to leverage advanced data analytics, artificial intelligence, and secure communications to create a unified maritime operational picture, enabling faster and more informed decision-making. By incorporating these elements, the US Navy can ensure that uncrewed vehicles and their sensors are effectively utilized to maintain operational superiority in the maritime domain.

Moreover, the low-signature nature of some of these sensors increases the odds that they can operate undetected by adversaries, providing a strategic advantage. By deploying sensors in unexpected locations, and disguising them as civilian assets in some cases, navies can gather intelligence without alerting potential threats to their presence.

Blue OSINT and sensor networks in conflict

While Blue OSINT collection and distributed sensor networks can easily collect data in uncontested waters, they have immediate applications to modern maritime conflict as well. For instance, in the event of a cross-strait invasion by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the transparency provided by Blue OSINT would make it difficult for navies to maneuver undetected. Satellites and social media continuously monitor naval piers, strategic chokepoints, and even some open ocean areas, making it increasingly difficult to achieve tactical surprise. Historical instances—such as Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, the D-Day invasion, or the successful surprise dash to transit the English Channel by the German fleet during World War II—would be much harder to achieve in the modern era due to the pervasive nature of Blue OSINT.

In the context of a potential Taiwan invasion, Blue OSINT would likely be used to detect and closely follow Chinese naval activities, including the movement of amphibious assault ships and submarines. OSINT analysts frequently examine satellite imagery of Chinese shipyards and military installations, which could provide early indications of mobilization.

However, relying solely on satellite imagery and AIS for Blue OSINT is insufficient. Multi-intelligence capabilities are essential to provide a comprehensive assessment. For instance, in 2020, two commercial firms collaborated to use radio frequency and synthetic aperture radar collection to detect Chinese illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing near the Galapagos EEZ. This open-source technique revealed the ability to identify fishing vessels that turned off their AIS to cross into the EEZ. In a future conflict with China, the same methodology of combining multiple Blue OSINT sources could be used to identify and track vessels of the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). This would bypass the AIS vulnerabilities that the PAFMM traditionally exploits to avoid detection, while also revealing its intentions as directed by the PLAN.

The Russo-Ukraine conflict revealed how OSINT can thwart surprise maneuvers and provide crucial targeting data deep behind enemy lines. However, it also underscores the limitations of OSINT in sparsely populated environments, such as the open ocean. For example, in December 2023, as missiles flew over the Red Sea, 18 percent of global container-ship capacity was rerouted. While civilian mariners and commercial shipping significantly contribute to Blue OSINT during peacetime, their absence in a high-risk conflict scenario would shift the burden more heavily onto satellite and uncrewed systems.

Deception and stealth

While the US Navy can take advantage of these technologies, its adversaries can, and almost certainly will, do the same. The US Navy and its allies must develop countermeasures to mitigate the risks posed by sensor networks while also leveraging its benefits. One approach is to invest in advanced deception tactics designed to mislead adversaries. These include the use of decoys, electronic warfare, and signal spoofing to create false targets and confuse enemy sensors. The Navy has been quietly developing these tools to obscure its true movements and intentions, ultimately confounding adversaries and making it harder for them to accurately target US forces.

In addition to deception, the United States and its allies need to enhance their naval stealth capabilities to evade adversaries’ distributed sensor networks. This involves not only minimizing the electromagnetic signatures of their vessels, but also employing innovative designs and operational tactics to reduce their radar cross-sections and avoid detection.

Distributed sensors in conflict

The ability to complement Blue OSINT with distributed sensors will be a decisive factor in near-term conflict dynamics. Just as frontline units in Ukraine are detected and targeted by cheap drones and stationary sensors, naval forces can be identified and pinpointed by similar systems at sea. Distributed sensors can provide continuous monitoring and data collection, ensuring that navies can maintain situational awareness and respond swiftly to emerging threats.

Three pillars are necessary to distribute sensors effectively across the ocean.

First, large conventional fleets play a critical role in maritime strategy. These fleets must be capable of extended operations and diverse missions, providing the backbone of naval presence, power projection, sea lines of communication, and, ultimately, sea control. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the US Navy demonstrated its endurance with record-length deployments, showcasing an advantage that could be significant in future maritime campaigns.

Second, organic reconnaissance drones are essential. Each destroyer and aircraft carrier should be equipped with its own fleet of multi-domain drones to conduct surveillance and gather intelligence. Currently, US carrier strike groups rely on land-launched surveillance drones, which are vulnerable and limited in number. Integrating organic drones into each vessel would enhance situational awareness and operational flexibility, allowing for more effective and autonomous intelligence-gathering capabilities.

Third, large fleets of affordable USVs and UUVs can deploy sensors across the ocean, increasing sensor hours at sea and improving maritime domain awareness. The first Replicator tranche is equipping forces with thousands of attritable systems to turn the Taiwan Strait into “an unmanned hellscape,” demonstrating the strategic value of uncrewed systems in contested waters. Moreover, the Navy is experimenting with diverse types of uncrewed platforms, aiming to create a distributed fleet architecture that is even more lethal than today’s carrier-centric fleet. These unmanned systems provide a cost-effective means to enhance surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities across vast oceanic areas, ensuring that the Navy can maintain a strategic advantage in both peacetime and conflict scenarios.

Recommendations

To maximize the efficacy of maritime domain awareness, it is crucial to integrate data from both Blue OSINT and ubiquitous sensor networks. While these two systems of data collection are largely distinct, their combined use can significantly enhance the accuracy and comprehensiveness of intelligence assessments and naval warfare.

1. Leverage Blue OSINT. Significant investment in artificial intelligence and advanced analytics is necessary to manage and interpret the endless amounts of data generated by open-source intelligence. By fostering a coordinated approach to maritime security, Blue OSINT can facilitate easier information sharing with allies and partners, but only if its utilization is preplanned. Collaborative pathways for Blue OSINT data collection, processing, and analysis must take shape early in the concept and planning phases. This collaborative effort will significantly enhance collective situational awareness and operational effectiveness, making it easier for navies to synchronize their efforts. Additionally, complementing Blue OSINT with traditional intelligence collection such as HUMINT and SIGINT provides a comprehensive threat assessment. By integrating these capabilities, navies can more easily attain a well-rounded understanding of adversary actions.
2. Commercially procure distributed sensing capabilities and networks. The US Navy must invest in Replicator-style unmanned platforms that can affordably deploy sensors across maritime battlefields, similar to the use of small UAS for land reconnaissance. These commercially procured distributed sensing platforms will significantly enhance the Navy’s ability to continuously and comprehensively monitor vast areas, improving overall maritime domain awareness.
3. Recognize a new maritime operating environment. The US Navy must prepare for protracted missions away from easily monitored ports and chokepoints while penetrating adversary-controlled, denied waters. This mission set requires a robust logistical framework capable of supporting extended deployments in remote and contested waters. By developing sophisticated tactics to deceive and confuse distributed sensor networks, the Navy can minimize its visibility to adversaries and maintain strategic surprise. This necessitates investing in advanced deception technologies such as electronic warfare, signal spoofing, and decoys to create false targets and obscure true movements. Additionally, enhancing the stealth capabilities of vessels through innovative designs and operational practices will further ensure that naval forces can evade detection and operate effectively in a sensor-saturated environment. By embracing these realities, the Navy can sustain its operational effectiveness and strategic advantage across the competition continuum.

Conclusion

In an era of distributed sensing networks and Blue OSINT, adaptation is not just about leveraging technology but also about evolving operational doctrines to meet the challenges of contemporary maritime conflicts. By integrating Blue OSINT capabilities, deploying distributed sensors, and countering (and employing) deception, naval forces can maintain an asymmetric advantage in the increasingly visible and contested maritime domain.

The success of modern naval operations hinges on the ability to swiftly adapt to technological advancements and evolving threats. Navies must transcend beyond traditional methods and embrace innovative strategies to remain agile and effective. This demands a concerted effort from all levels of naval leadership, from policymakers to forward operators, to implement these changes.

On the unforgiving sea, only those who rapidly transform to the era of Blue OSINT will avoid the abyss, with the rest risk sinking into obsolescence as adversaries gain decisional advantage. Navies that fail to adjust to the realities of Blue OSINT and sensor networks risk ending up like the Russian Black Sea Fleet: at the bottom of the ocean.

Guido L. Torres is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense Program and the executive director of the Irregular Warfare Initiative.

Austin Gray is co-founder and chief strategy officer of Blue Water Autonomy. He previously worked in a Ukrainian drone factory and served in US naval intelligence.

Report Jul 1, 2024

Executing distributed operations in an increasingly contested maritime environment

By Dmitry Filipoff

As the United States looks ahead to increased maritime competition in the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere, the US Navy needs to implement the right plans and capabilities. “Distributed maritime operations” is the warfighting concept at the heart of the Navy’s planning for current and future operations. How well is it poised for executing it?

Crisis Management Defense Policy

Report Apr 12, 2023

Atlantic Council Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption interim report  

By Eric Lofgren*, Whitney M. McNamara, and Peter Modigliani

The DoD must accelerate defense innovation adoption from the leading edge of the private sector. This report has ten recommendations to do so.

China Defense Industry

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Sailing through the spyglass: The strategic advantages of blue OSINT, ubiquitous sensor networks, and deception appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On May 20, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Marc Polymeropoulos spoke on a Cipher Brief podcast titled “Is Russia Attacking U.S. Government Employees Using High-Energy Weapons?” about Havana Syndrome.

Fellow

Marc Polymeropoulos

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Europe & Eurasia

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Polymeropoulos on a Cipher Brief podcast about Havana Syndrome appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On April 28, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Nicholas Eftimiades was quoted in Nikkei Asia in an article about suspected Chinese spies in Germany and the UK. Eftimiades was quoted as saying, “They are attempting to drive a wedge between Europe and the United States, implementing a divide-and-conquer strategy.” He was also quoted warning about a  “possibility of retaliation — even arbitrary arrests of Europeans in China.”

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Nicholas Eftimiades

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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On May 5, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Marc Polymeropoulos was cited in a Spectator article by John Foreman about Havana Syndrome.

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Marc Polymeropoulos

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Europe & Eurasia

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Polymeropoulos cited in The Spectator “Is Havana Syndrome real?” appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On May 3, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Nicholas Eftimiades published an article titled “Tradecraft observations on the Reichenbach/Fischer espionage case” in intelNews, detailing the alleged Chinese agents’ export of sensitive military technology from Germany.

Fellow

Nicholas Eftimiades

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Eftimiades published in intelNews on Chinese espionage appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On April 29, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Nicholas Eftimiades was interviewed by the UK’s Spectator TV. Referencing China’s recent espionage activities throughout Europe, Eftimiades asserted that “this is the largest scale series of intelligence activities we have seen in modern history.”

Fellow

Nicholas Eftimiades

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Eftimiades on Spectator TV appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In recent years, however, the global security environment has changed. Adversaries such as Russia and China are using a broad spectrum of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic tactics to challenge the US-led order and achieve their global aims. This return of strategic competition has drawn attention away from the surgical, direct-action operations so prominent during the height of the war on terror, and toward confronting the sophisticated strategies of near-peer adversaries.

So what does this mean for special operations forces?

USSOF will continue to have a central role in the era of renewed strategic competition—but only if there is a broader appreciation and application of USSOF’s capabilities, which extend far beyond just raids and precision strikes. Too often at present, however, USSOF’s distinct capabilities and expertise are overlooked or misunderstood among the broader national security community.

In the face of an evolving and increasingly complex global threat environment, USSOF represents a uniquely versatile component of the US Joint Force. It possesses an array of capabilities that, if fully leveraged, could significantly enhance US force posture. To do so, USSOF must shift its mindset and planning toward strategic competition. There must also be a concerted effort from the services and the Joint Force to integrate USSOF’s unique capabilities more effectively, and the broader defense community must take steps to make the most of the multifaceted value that USSOF brings to the table.

To begin with, USSOF must extend its reach into non-kinetic operations and expand its irregular warfare approach to address the advanced strategies of adversaries such as China and Russia. Some of these operations will require applying the operational tactics USSOF focused on since 9/11 to new challenges. For example, USSOF’s well-honed capabilities for navigating denied and niche environments, including underground operations—an important asset in past counterterrorism missions—are now vital for filling strategic gaps in unconventional warfare scenarios. The salience of this capability is evident, for example, if an adversary uses complex tunnel networks, and it represents just one aspect of USSOF’s highly specialized tactics, techniques, and procedures that can be transitioned to new strategic roles.

This transition will also require adapting USSOF’s strength in new ways. Some of this is already underway—for example, modernizations in naval capabilities are set to boost USSOF’s undersea warfare proficiency, which will help counter rivals such as China in contested spaces. USSOF should continue to prepare for the challenges posed by strategic competition by enhancing its cyber and space capabilities, investing in emerging fields such as artificial intelligence, and bolstering civil-affairs expertise for functioning in extreme and complex operating environments. Clear and decisive communication between the US assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict and the United States Special Operations Command is vital to define the strategic contributions of special operations within the Department of Defense.

Yet embracing these changes also presents challenges, particularly for USSOF to define and measure its own success. The often-preventive nature of USSOF’s missions, which are aimed at deterring adversaries and shaping their behavior, requires a nuanced approach to evaluating effectiveness. Establishing clear objectives and metrics for strategic competition will be essential, enabling USSOF to quantify its successes and adapt its strategies accordingly.

At the same time, USSOF must maintain its proficiency in essential ongoing tasks, such as combating violent extremist organizations, countering terrorism, and managing weapons of mass destruction. Doing so is necessary so that the United States avoids strategic distractions, such as a preventable terrorist attack.

As USSOF adapts its mindset and planning to meet the challenges posed by strategic competition, the Joint Force and the broader interagency must find ways to understand and maximize USSOF’s capabilities. To do so, decision makers across the Joint Force must properly recognize the full range of USSOF’s potential roles, particularly before conflict breaks out.

Unfortunately, some of these potential roles are under-resourced and underleveraged. For example, USSOF’s civil affairs and psychological operations capabilities, though currently underutilized, are essential for strategic competition. The sole brigade responsible for civil affairs is tasked with everything from economic analysis to liaising with civilian government agencies on the ground. With sufficient resources, it could expand its civil-military cooperation in volatile areas, support local governance, and respond to increasingly frequent natural disasters. Notably, United States Marine Forces Special Operations Command’s linguistic and cultural expertise, as demonstrated in long-term operations in the Philippines, highlights the value of investing more in these capacities, especially in strategic areas such as the Indo-Pacific.

Other roles for USSOF are better funded but are still underappreciated across the Department of Defense. USSOF works extensively in the information domain, pushing back against propaganda and disinformation from adversaries. According to General Richard Clarke, former commander of US Special Operations Command, commanders he visited on deployment spent about 60 percent of their time working in the information space. Such work will likely continue, since Russia and China show a growing interest in using information warfare to try to counter US strategic objectives worldwide. Despite this, unfilled billets in the Army’s Special Operations military information support operations were recently cut. This decision signals a troubling undervaluation of these vital capabilities.

If the potential capabilities that USSOF brings to strategic competition are better understood, then these capabilities are more likely to be supported, developed, and implemented in ways that will help shape the strategic environment effectively. Moreover, the capabilities will need to be integrated into a cohesive strategy across the Joint Force, coordinating USSOF’s presence within all seven geographic combatant commands and interagency partners. Doing so would allow USSOF’s capabilities to bridge the divides between different combatant command zones, which could improve the overall US strategic posture in competitive regions and facilitate improved intelligence sharing.

By enhancing USSOF’s capabilities and recognizing its value in strategic competition, the interagency and Department of Defense can ensure it effectively continues to protect US interests and contribute to global stability. Thus equipped, USSOF will remain adept at confronting modern conflict dynamics and asserting US international strategic priorities.

Alyxandra Marine is an assistant director with the Forward Defense program at the Atlantic Council. The recommendations from this piece are explained in further detailed in Stealth, speed, and adaptability: The role of special operations forces in strategic competition.

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On April 2, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Marc Polymeropoulous coauthored “The Surprising Intelligence Community Outreach to Russia” for Politico about combatting the threat posed by transnational terrorist groups like ISIS-K.

He warns that the United States must be careful when engaging with other nations for intelligence sharing and basic counterterrorism exchanges, as such outreach can sometimes morph into more issues that intelligence professionals must face.

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Marc Polymeropoulos

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Europe & Eurasia

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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On April 1, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Marc Polymeropoulos reacted to a ’60 Minutes’ report that named the Russian military intelligence unit behind the mysterious “Havana Syndrome,” neurological symptoms that US diplomats and spies have reported suffering from for nearly a decade.

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Marc Polymeropoulos

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Europe & Eurasia

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Polymeropoulos quoted in USA Today about the “Havana Syndrome” and the US intelligence community appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 31, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Marc Polymeropoulos spoke with The Insider on his suffering from “Havana Syndrome” after his 26 year career as an operations officer with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

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Marc Polymeropoulos

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Europe & Eurasia

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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On March 26, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Michael Groen coauthored an article for The Cipher Brief titled “Preparing for a Digital Battlefield: National Security and Cryptocurrency” about combatting illicit actors and nation states with blockchain intelligence. He emphasized that sanctions enforcement and counterterrorism success must include digital tools and techniques to investigate, seize, and disrupt transactions in evolving domains to protect national security.

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Michael Groen

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Groen writes in The Cipher Brief about cryptocurrency and national security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 24, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Samantha Vinograd appeared on CBS “Face the Nation” with Margaret Brennan discussing the recent terrorist attack carried out by ISIS-K in Moscow and southern US border security. She also spoke about the criticality of supplying resources for vetting architecture, intelligence sharing, and enhancing information arrangements with international partners.

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Samantha Vinograd

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Arabic Defense Policy

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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On March 12, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Nicholas Eftimiades was interviewed on “NucleCast,” hosted by the ANWA Deterrence Center. He discussed China’s whole-of-society approach to espionage and the methods that Chinese actors use to implement this approach.

Fellow

Nicholas Eftimiades

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

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On March 18, Forward Defense Nonresident Senior Fellow Marc Polymeropoulos was cited about the negative effects that Trump’s politicization of intelligence would have on gathering and sharing information, particularly with American allies.

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Marc Polymeropoulos

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Afghanistan Europe & Eurasia

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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1. What kind of risks does TikTok pose to US national security?

Chinese company ByteDance’s ownership of TikTok poses two specific risks to US national security. One has to do with concerns that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) could use its influence over the Chinese owners to use TikTok’s algorithm for propaganda purposes. Addressing this security concern is tricky due to legal protections for freedom of expression. The other risk, and the one addressed through the current House legislation, has to do with the ability of the CCP to use Chinese ownership of TikTok to access the massive amount of data that the app collects on its users. This could include data on everything from viewing tastes, to real-time location, to information stored on users’ phones outside of the app, including contact lists and keystrokes that can reveal, for example, passwords and bank activity.

—Sarah Bauerle Danzman is a resident senior fellow with the Economic Statecraft Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

This debate is not over free speech or access to social media: The question is fundamentally one of whether the United States can or should force a divestment of a social media company from a parent company (in this case ByteDance) if the company can be compelled to act under the direction of the CCP. We have to ask: Does the CCP have the intent or ability to compel data to serve its interests? There is an obvious answer here. We know that China has already collected massive amounts of sensitive data from Americans through efforts such as the Office of Personnel Management hack in 2015. Recent unclassified reports, including from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, show the skill and intent of China to use personal data for influence. And the CCP has the legal structure in place to compel companies such as ByteDance to comply and cooperate with CCP requests.

—Meg Reiss is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

2. Are those risks unique to TikTok?

TikTok is not an unproblematic platform, and there are real and significant user risks that could pose dangers to safety and security, especially for certain populations. However, focusing on TikTok ignores broader vulnerabilities in the US information ecosystem that put Americans at risk. An outright ban of TikTok as currently proposed—particularly absent clearer standards for all platforms—would not meaningfully address these broader risks and would in fact potentially undermine US interests in a much more profound way.

As our recent report outlines in detail, a ban is unlikely to achieve the intended effect of meaningfully curbing China’s ability to gather sensitive data on Americans or to conduct influence operations that harm US interests. It also may contribute to a global curbing of the free flow of data that is essential to US tech firms’ ability to innovate and maintain a competitive edge.

—Kenton Thibaut is a senior resident China fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.

Some have argued that TikTok, while on the aggressive end of the personal data collection spectrum, collects similar data to what other social media companies collect. However, the US government would counter with two points: First, TikTok has a history of skirting data privacy rules, such as those limiting data collection on children and those that prevent the collection of phone-specific identifiers called MAC numbers, and therefore the company cannot be trusted to handle sensitive personal data in accordance with the law. And second, unlike other popular apps, TikTok is ultimately beholden to Chinese regulations. This includes the 2017 Chinese National Intelligence Law that requires Chinese companies to hand over a broad range of information to the Chinese government if asked. Because China’s legal system is far more opaque than the United States’, it is unclear if the US government or its citizens would even know if the Chinese government ever asked for this data from TikTok. While TikTok’s management has denied supplying the Chinese government with such data, insider reports have uncovered Chinese employees gaining access to US user data. In other words, the US government has little reason to trust that ByteDance is keeping US user data safe from the CCP.

—Sarah Bauerle Danzman

3. What does the House bill actually do?

There are two important, related bills. The one that passed the House today is the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, which forces divestment. It is not an outright ban, and it is intended to address the real risk of ByteDance—thus TikTok—falling under the jurisdiction of China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, which compels Chinese companies to cooperate with the CCP’s requests. However, divestment doesn’t completely solve for the additional potential risks of the CCP using TikTok in a unique or systemic way for data collection, algorithmic tampering (e.g. what topics surface or don’t surface to users), or information operations (e.g. an influence campaign unique to TikTok as opposed to on other platforms as well). Second, the Protecting Americans’ Data from Foreign Adversaries Act, which cleared a House committee last week, more directly addresses a broader risk of blocking the Chinese government’s access to the type of data that TikTok and many other social media platforms collect on the open market. The former without the latter is an incomplete approach to protecting Americans’ data from the CCP—and even the two combined falls short of a federal data privacy standard.

—Graham Brookie is vice president and senior director of the Digital Forensic Research Lab.

There is no question China seeks to influence the American public and harvests large amounts of data on American citizens. As our recent report illuminates however, the Chinese state’s path to these goals depends very little on TikTok.

Today’s actions in the House underscore the disjointed nature of the US approach to governing technology. Rather than focus on TikTok specifically, it would be both legally and geopolitically wiser to pass legislation that sets standards for everyone, and not just one company. That could mean setting standards for what actions or behavior by any social media company would be unacceptable (for example on the use of algorithms or collection and selling of data). Or Congress could focus on prohibiting companies that are owned by states proven to have conducted hostile actions toward US digital infrastructure to operate in the United States. That would certainly include TikTok (and many other companies). This bill takes a halfway approach, both tying itself explicitly to TikTok owner ByteDance and hinting that it could apply to “other social media companies.”

—Rose Jackson is the director of the Democracy and Tech Initiative at the Digital Forensic Research Lab.

The recently passed House bill, if it were to become law, would create a pathway to force the divestment of Chinese ownership in TikTok or ban the app from app stores and web hosting sites. Unlike previous attempts by the Trump administration to ban the app outright or force a divestment through the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act would not just affect TikTok. Instead, the legislation would create a process through which the US government could designate social media apps that are considered to be under the control of foreign adversaries as national security threats. Once identified as threats, the companies would have 180 days to divest from the foreign ownership or be subject to a ban.

—Sarah Bauerle Danzman

4. What would be some of the global ripple effects of a TikTok ban?

The United States has always opposed efforts by authoritarian nations seeking to build “great firewalls” around themselves. This model of “cyber sovereignty” sees the open, interoperable, and free internet as a threat, which is why countries like China already have a well-funded strategy to leverage global governance platforms to drive the development of a less open and more authoritarian-friendly version. A TikTok ban would ironically benefit authoritarian governments as they seek to center state-level action (over multi-stakeholder processes) in internet governance. TikTok should not lead the United States to abandon its longstanding commitment to the values of a free, open, secure, and interoperable internet.

A ban could generate more problems than it would solve. What the United States should consider instead is passing federal privacy laws and transparency standards that apply to all companies. This would be the single most impactful way to address broader system vulnerabilities, protect US values and commitments, and address the unique risks related to TikTok’s Chinese ownership, while avoiding the potential significant downsides of a ban. 

—Kenton Thibaut

5. What do you make of TikTok’s response, particularly in pushing its users to flood Capitol Hill with calls?

Members of Congress were rightfully alarmed by TikTok’s use of its platform to send push notifications encouraging users to call their representatives. However, Uber and Lyft used this exact same tactic in California when trying to defeat legislation that would have required it to provide benefits to its drivers. If we try to solve “TikTok” and not the broader issue TikTok is illuminating, we will keep coming back to these same issues over and over again. 

—Rose Jackson

6. How is China viewing this debate?

The CCP has a tendency to throw a lot of spaghetti at the wall in an attempt to make its arguments, in this case that the divestment of TikTok from its Chinese parent company ByteDance is unnecessary. When the CCP has justified the internment of Uyghurs, it has thrown out everything from defending its repression based on terrorist beliefs across the population to claiming that it was just helping with social integration and developing work programs. The CCP has already made claims that the divestment would cause investors to lose faith in the US market and that it shows a fundamental weakness and abuse of national security. Expect many different versions of these arguments and more. But all the anticipated pushback will be focused on diverting the public argument away from the fundamental concern: The Chinese government can, under law, force a Chinese company to share information. 

—Meg Reiss

The post Will the US crack down on TikTok? Six questions (and expert answers) about the bill in Congress. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On February 20, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Nicholas Eftimiades was interviewed on Joint Special Operations University’s webinar, Think JSOU. He discussed China’s espionage methodology from his 2020 book, Chinese Espionage Operations and Tactics.

Fellow

Nicholas Eftimiades

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Eftimiades on Think JSOU on the China’s espionage methodology appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On January 31st, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Nicholas Eftimiades was quoted in iNews discussing Chinese espionage and the West’s inability to counter it.

Fellow

Nicholas Eftimiades

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Eftimiades in iNews on Chinese espionage appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On January 22, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Peter Dean was quoted in an Australian Financial Review article, where he explained that Australian private sector security arrangements are insufficient to protect sensitive AUKUS technology.

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Peter J. Dean

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Australia Conflict

The post Dean quoted in the Australian Financial Review on protecting AUKUS technology appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On January 19, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Nicholas Eftimiades was quoted in SpyTalk discussing the failure of US intelligence to detect PLA military training happening inside the US by unwitting former Navy SEALS and Army Special Forces who operate as contractors.

Fellow

Nicholas Eftimiades

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Intelligence

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

Learn more

The post Eftimiades in SpyTalk on Chinese soldier training with US contractors appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On January 16, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Brad Gericke spoke on an episode of NucleCast, a podcast produced by the Advanced Nuclear Weapons Alliance Deterrence Center. He discussed the situation leading up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the perspective of the intelligence community during this time. 

Fellow

Bradley T. Gericke

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Conflict

The post Gericke featured on episode of NucleCast podcast appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Zhao was one of two active duty US servicemembers indicted in August 2023 for providing sensitive US military information to China. The second, Jinchao Wei, was indicted for violating an espionage statute and multiple export violations in the Southern District of California. According to the indictment, he was granted US citizenship while the alleged illegal activities were taking place. (Wei is, of course, presumed innocent until proven guilty in a court of law.)

These two cases are playing out as tensions remain high between the United States and China, even after the November 2023 meeting between US President Joe Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping. In response to these court cases, there will be an understandable temptation for the United States to react by doing something to address Chinese espionage, and perhaps even pressure for systemic changes to the US counterintelligence approach. But big, sudden changes often create new and potentially greater vulnerabilities. Instead, policymakers should respond carefully and deliberately by seizing this moment to manage counterintelligence and security risks more effectively over the long term.

This can be done by decreasing the probability of future similar events from occurring, while avoiding creating new risks. Specifically, the response should consider focusing on prevention via training, enhanced information-sharing with allies and partners, and a shift to a more holistic risk-based personnel security approach for all US military members.

Intelligence collection doesn’t always mean stealing classified secrets

These two cases suggest that China’s intelligence services recognize that national security information does not have to be classified to provide them with value.  

Although both Zhao and Wei reportedly had secret-level security clearances, they were not assigned to particularly sensitive military occupational specialties, and there are no indications within the indictments that they passed classified information to Beijing’s intelligence services.

Wei was assigned to the USS Essex amphibious assault ship, which operates as a “Lightning carrier,” a platform for fifth generation F-35B Lightning strike aircraft. He allegedly used his phone to take photos that he provided to China’s intelligence services, while also providing information regarding potential vulnerabilities of the USS Wasp class of US Navy ship.

Zhao reportedly provided Chinese intelligence with information regarding the electrical system for a storage facility at a base in Okinawa housing a Ground/Air Task-Oriented Radar system. This radar system is used for expeditionary warfare that supports Marines in a contested or potentially contested maritime area—the kind of warfare that would matter in a conflict in the Western Pacific.

Given China’s resources, these were low-cost operations relative to the information allegedly received and a high return on investment to enhance Beijing’s hard power. As compensation for their alleged activities, Wei reportedly received between $10,000 and $15,000, while Zhao received the equivalent of almost $15,000.  

Three new steps to bolster counterintelligence and security

While these cases shed light on national security risks for the United States and its allies and partners, they also present the opportunity to justify new options for Washington to respond. That response should not, for example, be to limit the opportunities for foreign nationals to serve honorably in the US military or take measures that could damage recruitment and retention. Rather, it should take careful, measured steps to reinforce the foundations of counterintelligence and security. There are three steps policymakers should take next:

1. Focus more on prevention relative to treatment

In the medical community, doctors think of solutions in terms of prevention and treatment. For national security, the United States must do both, but in this instance, prevention—via training—should be the focus.

Specifically, the Department of Defense should enhance its counterintelligence threat awareness and reporting training program. This can be done by increasing the frequency of the training, presenting the information in different ways, and requiring a signed acknowledgement of responsibility from the training recipient. Such prevention measures would require additional resources for the Department of Defense counterintelligence and security system, but it would be worth the cost since the enhanced training requirements would decrease risk and potential costs overall.

2. Mobilize allies and partners to work together on counterintelligence

While protecting the integrity of the criminal justice process, the United States should consider sharing as much information as possible with its allies and partners about the methods that China’s intelligence services use to conduct their operations, particularly US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, since they are likely being targeted using similar methods. 

Specifically, the US counterintelligence community should host periodic events with its allies and partners to exchange information regarding how Beijing’s intelligence services target military members. This will help educate their military personnel regarding the evolving threat, including the types of cover used to approach potential targets. In the case of Zhao, the Chinese intelligence officer reportedly portrayed himself to Zhao as a maritime economic researcher, who needed information in order to “inform investment decisions.”

3. Establish a more holistic approach to personnel security that better integrates counterintelligence

Finally, the Department of Defense should consider enhancing the current security clearance-based system with a more holistic, risk-based personnel security approach. This would include those US military members who do not require access to classified information.

How might this work? There are various policies and systems already in place for personnel security and information security, especially for individuals who hold top secret security clearances and those who work in sensitive compartmented information facilities (SCIFs). Those important safeguards for security clearance holders should remain, but there are currently disconnects between security considerations (Do the duties of a position require working with sensitive information?) and counterintelligence findings (What information might China or other countries want?). The goal, then, should be to more closely integrate security and counterintelligence. Such an approach would fuse counterintelligence information regarding the evolving capabilities and intentions of foreign intelligence services with information about the duties of the position.

The risks of national security information being provided to foreign intelligence services have always existed and can never be eliminated, so the objective should be to optimally manage those risks. This could best be accomplished by investing in training, increasing sharing with allies and partners, and shifting to a more holistic risk-based personnel security approach for all US military members. 

Given the long-term and dynamic challenges of US-China strategic competition, now is the time to adapt US counterintelligence and security policy to effectively meet those challenges posed by China’s intelligence collection efforts.

Andrew Brown is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, where he specializes in defense and intelligence issues. He was previously a criminal investigator with the Department of Defense and was assigned to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).

The views expressed in this article are the author’s and do not reflect those of the Department of Defense or ODNI.

The post The sentencing of a US Navy sailor is a window into Chinese espionage. Here’s how the US should respond. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On December 19, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi was quoted in NK News on US-Japan-ROK trilateral sharing of information on North Korean missile launches. 

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Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Indo-Pacific

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With Geoff Ramsey and Isabel Chiriboga

Executive summary

On September 7, 2023, the Petro administration presented a new strategy to combat the illicit drug trade in Colombia—at a time when illicit coca cultivation is at an all-time high. The strategy’s emphasis on rural development and on offering viable economic alternatives for illicit crop growers, as well as changing counternarcotics priorities in Washington, provide a set of new opportunities for US-Colombia collaboration.

The United States and Colombia have a thirty-year track record of collaboration on this issue. Yet there is still a long road ahead, especially considering the growing concerns over the proliferation of organized crime in Colombia and the region writ large. In this context, progress on US-Colombia counternarcotics cooperation will require a delicate balance between reducing large-scale coca cultivation and building the capacity of security services to disrupt organized criminal networks, as well as investing in the rural communities most affected by this phenomenon.

At the same time, there is a growing recognition in the United States that the illicit drug trade is a shared responsibility primarily fueled by demand. Consumption and price have remained stable in the United States in recent years. However, the current trend of falling coca leaf and cocaine prices in Colombia present a natural incentive for coca growers to find alternative forms of income, which could mean a higher rate of success for alternative development programs and crop-substitution efforts if combined with a comprehensive law enforcement strategy.

The United States and Colombia should continue to collaborate closely to address the problems arising from the supply and demand for illicit drugs in this global context. This is crucial considering the emergence of new drug markets in West Africa and Europe, as well as the connections of certain trafficking organizations to fentanyl production. These dynamics, as well as a lack of state presence and the absence of economic alternatives in many parts of rural Colombia, have created longstanding challenges for both countries. Moving forward, it is crucial that both nations align their strategies to make the most impactful use of US assistance. The recommendations presented here are meant to bolster the approach to a decades-old problem.

US-Colombia Advisory Group recommendations

About the US-Colombia Advisory Group

Since its founding in 2017, the Advisory Group has been co-chaired by Senators Roy Blunt (R-MO) and Ben Cardin (D-MD). This year, upon Senator Blunt’s retirement, Senator Bill Hagerty (R-TN) assumes the honorary chairmanship alongside Senator Cardin.

Senators Cardin and Hagerty are both members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where, in addition to other assignments, Senator Cardin serves as Chairman and Senator Hagerty as Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on State Department & USAID Management, International Operations, & Bilateral International Development. The two senators bring additional regional and global expertise to their honorary co-chairmanship: Senator Cardin is a member of the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, & Global Women’s Issues; and Senator Hagerty is a member of the Subcommittee on East Asia, The Pacific, & International Cybersecurity Policy.

In 2023-2024, the Advisory Group will provide a concrete plan on how to navigate the potential changes in US-Colombia relations. A new administration in Colombia represents a unique opportunity to work with an increasingly diverse set of actors in the public, private, and civil society sectors to deepen US-Colombia economic and diplomatic ties. The Advisory Group will advance concrete recommendations where the United States and Colombia can advance long-lasting peace and socio-economic prosperity that mutually benefits each country.

About the writers

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. Ramsey is a leading expert on US policy towards Venezuela and has traveled regularly to the country for the last decade. Before joining the Atlantic Council, Ramsey directed the Venezuela program at the Washington Office on Latin America where he led the organization’s research on Venezuela and worked to promote lasting political agreements aimed at restoring human rights, democratic institutions, and the rule of law. Prior to that, he carried out research and reporting on security and human-rights issues in Colombia, Uruguay, and Brazil with InSight Crime and as a consultant for the Open Society Foundations. His work has been published or cited in Foreign Policy, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, the Economist, and other major media outlets. Ramsey earned a master’s degree in international affairs from the American University School of International Service, as well as a bachelor of arts in international studies with a minor in Spanish from American University.

Isabel Chiriboga is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she contributes to the center’s work on Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Chile. She also helps steward the Center’s Advisory Council. During her time at the Atlantic Council, she has supported the work of the US-Colombia Advisory Group, the US-Chile Integration Program and the center’s programming around the International Monetary Fund and World Bank meetings. Her work has been published in Foreign Policy, Miami Herald, The National Interest, Global Americans and the New Atlanticist. Prior to her time at the Atlantic Council, Chiriboga worked as a research assistant at the London School of Economics’ Department of International Relations conducting research on the impact of land inequality in Argentina’s democratization. Prior to that, she worked at the embassy of Ecuador in Washington, where she supported the trade agreement negotiations process between Ecuador and the United States. Originally from Ecuador, Chiriboga has lived in the United States, Spain, and the United Kingdom. She has a bachelor’s degree in international economics and international affairs from Trinity University. Chiriboga also completed a year-long study abroad program at the London School of Economics.  

About the Center Director

Jason Marczak is the Vice President and Senior Director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, joining the center in 2013 for its launch. He has more than twenty years of expertise in regional economics, politics, and development, working with policymakers and private-sector leaders to shape public policy. Marczak has also been an adjunct professor at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs since 2016. Among his previous positions, he served as director of policy at Americas Society/Council of the Americas in New York City and co-founder of Americas Quarterly magazine. Marczak is a frequent English- and Spanish-language contributor to major media outlets, and a sought-after speaker, and has testified before the US Congress on key regional developments. He holds a bachelor’s degree from Tufts University and a master’s degree in international affairs and economics from the Johns Hopkins University Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.

US-Colombia Advisory Group

We are beyond grateful to our US-Colombia Advisory Group members for their passion, commitment, expertise, and leadership. Members who provided crucial input and have decided to have their names associated with this report are listed below.

Honorary Co-Chairs

Members

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Adrienne Arsht for her generous support, without which the work of this Advisory Group would not have been possible.

Foremost, thank you to Senator Bill Hagerty (R-TN) and Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD) for their leadership as honorary co-chairs of this group. It is always a true pleasure and honor to work with them and to see how successful bipartisan efforts come to fruition. Thank you to Robert Zarate, Nick Checker, Lucas Da Pieve, Michael Manucy, Tom Melia, Brandon Yoder, Stephanie Oviedo, and Aidan Maese-Czeropski for facilitating the unwavering cooperation of our honorary co-chairs.

Isabel Chiriboga, Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center (AALAC) program assistant, was an instrumental force behind this project from start to finish. She played a key role in coordinating the Advisory Group, drafting the report, and organizing multiple strategy sessions. We also thank Enrique Millán-Mejía, AALAC consultant, who provided crucial expertise, important feedback, and logistical support for this project, and Lucie Kneip for her research and editorial support throughout the publication process. The success of this project is also thanks to the leadership of Jason Marczak and Geoff Ramsey, who worked to convene the Advisory Group and whose passion for a prosperous US-Colombia strategic partnership is reflected in this brief.

For decisive input, thorough research, and as an exceptional adviser on the topic we thank Ambassador Kevin Whitaker. For their precise editorial assistance and flexibility, we thank Cate Hansberry and Mary Kate Aylward and Beverly Larson. We would also like to extend our thanks to Nancy Messieh, Andrea Ratiu, and Romain Warnault for their design of another Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center publication.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

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The Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Advisory Group, is a nonpartisan, binational, and multi-sectoral group committed to advancing a whole-of-society approach to addressing the most vital policy issues facing the US-Colombia relationship—with a recognition of the broader implications for bilateral interests across the region more broadly.

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Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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Global China Hub Indo-Pacific Security Initiative

China Chinese

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Josh M. Cartin

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Chinese

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Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative GeoStrategy Initiative

National Security Terrorism

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Table of contents

• The importance of human-machine teaming and key insights
• Applications of human-machine teaming
• Demonstrating advantage through use cases
• Pathways to HMT adoption at scale and pace
• Summary of recommendations and conclusion
• Acknowledgements
• About the authors

The importance of human-machine teaming and key insights

Key takeaways

Looking through the lens of three military applications for HMT, the authors arrive at the following conclusions.

• HMT has the potential to change warfare and solve key operational challenges: AI and HMT could potentially transform conflict and noncombat operations by increasing situational awareness, improving decision-making, extending the range and lethality of human operators, and gaining and maintaining advantage across the multi-domain fight. HMT can also drive efficiencies in many supporting functions such as logistics, sustainment, and back-office administration, reducing the costs and timelines of these processes and freeing up humans to carry out higher-value tasks within these mission areas.

• DOD must expand its definitions for HMT: Definitions of HMT should be expanded to include the breadth of human interactions with autonomous uncrewed systems and AI agents, including those that have no physical form (e.g., decision support software). Extending the definition beyond interactions between humans and robots allows DOD to realize the wide-ranging use cases for HMT—ranging from the use of lethal weapon systems and drone swarms in high-intensity warfare to leveraging algorithms to fuse data and realize virtual connections in the information domain.
• HMT development and employment must prioritize human-centric teaming: AI development is moving at an impressive pace, driving potential leaps ahead in machine capability and placing a premium on ensuring the safety, reliability, and trustworthiness of AI agents. As much attention must be dedicated to developing the competencies, comfort levels, and trust of human operators to effectively exploit the value of HMT and ensure humans stay at the center of human-machine teams.
• DOD must move from the conceptual to the practical: HMT as a concept is gaining momentum within some elements of the DOD enterprise. Still, advocates for increased AI and HMT adoption stress the need to move the conversation from the conceptual to the practical—transitioning capability development into the real-time testing and employment of HMT capabilities, as has been demonstrated by the Navy’s experimentation with AI through Task Force 59—to better articulate and demonstrate the operational advantages HMT can deliver.
• Experimentation is crucial to building trust: Iterative, real-world experimentation in which humans develop new operational concepts, test the limits of their machine teammates, and better understand their breaking points, strengths, and weaknesses of machines in a range of environments will play a key role in speeding HMT adoption. This awareness is also essential to human operators as they develop the trust in their AI teammates required to effectively capitalize on the potential of HMT.
• DOD must address bureaucratic challenges to AI adoption: DOD’s risk-averse culture and siloed bureaucracy is slowing acquisition, experimentation, and adoption of HMT concepts and capabilities. Increasing the agility and flexibility of the acquisition process for HMT capabilities, iterative experimentation, incentives to take on risks, and digital literacy across the force are necessary to overcome these adoption challenges.

Definitions and components of HMT

HMT refers to the employment of AI and autonomous systems alongside human decision-makers, analysts, operators, and watchkeepers. HMT combines the capabilities of intelligent humans and machines in concert to achieve a military outcome. At its core, HMT is a relationship with four equally important elements:

• Human(s): An operator (or operators) that provides inputs for and tests machines, as well as leverages their outputs;
• Machine(s): Ranging from an AI and machine learning (ML) algorithm to a drone swarm, the machine holds a degree of agency to make determinations and supports a specified mission; and
• Interaction(s): The way in which the human(s) and machine(s) interface to meet a shared mission.
• Interface(s): The mechanisms and displays through which humans interact with machines.

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Applications of human-machine teaming

HMT is most frequently envisioned narrowly as the process of humans interacting with anywhere from one to several hundred or more autonomous uncrewed systems. In its most basic form, this vision of HMT is not new: Humans have collaborated with intelligent machines for decades—with early machine talents epitomized in 1997 by supercomputer Deep Blue defeating world champion Gary Kasparov in a game of chess—and militaries have long tested concepts to move the needle in this critical capability. The recent impressive pace of development in AI as well as in robotics, however, is driving increased consideration of the new capabilities, efficiencies, and advantages these technologies can enable.

The “loyal wingman” concept is a frequently cited example of this manifestation of HMT in which a human pilot controls the tasking and operations of a handful of relatively inexpensive, modular, attritable autonomous uncrewed aerial systems (UAS). These wingman aircraft can fly forward of the crewed aircraft to carry out a range of missions, including electronic attack or defense, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), or strike, or as decoys to attract fire away from other assets and “light up” enemy air defenses.

Interest in this manifestation of HMT has increased not just in the United States but also in most modern militaries. In addition to the United States, Australia, China, Russia, the United Kingdom, Turkey, and India all have at least one active loyal wingman development program, while the sixth-generation fighter efforts Global Combat Air Programme (United Kingdom, Italy, Japan), Next Generation Air Dominance programs (US Air Force and Navy), and Future Combat Air System (Germany, France, Spain) involve system of systems concepts of airpower that stress both HMT and machine-machine teaming.

As important as this category of HMT is and will continue to be to emerging military capabilities, discussion of HMT should include the full breadth of human interaction with AI agents (which learn from and make determinations based on their environments, experiences, and inputs), including the overwhelming majority of interactions that occur with algorithms that possess no physical form. Project Maven is one example of how DOD and now the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency use this category of HMT to autonomously detect, tag, and trace objects or humans of interest from various forms of media and collected intelligence, enabling human analysts and operators to prioritize their areas of focus.

By combining the processing power and decision support capabilities of AI with the social intelligence and judgment of humans and, in some cases, the force-multiplying effects of uncrewed systems with different degrees of autonomy, HMT can provide multiple layers of overlapping advantages to the United States and its allies and partners, including those high-level advantages listed in Figure 1.

Figure 1: High-level description of three layers of HMT value.

DOD recognition of the current and future multilayered value of HMT as part of broader efforts to “accelerate the adoption of AI and the creation of a force fit for our time” has increased. Still, several persistent challenges to adoption of AI and HMT endure throughout the Pentagon. To accelerate and deepen HMT adoption, the DOD must commit to an approach that aligns development efforts and private sector engagement, creating flexibility for acquisition officials to scale HMT solutions across the defense enterprise. This approach must be complemented by:

• Continued and increased focus on building trust between humans and machine partners;
• Leading in establishing best practices and norms around ethics and safety;
• Aggressive and iterative experimentation; and
• Clear and consistent messaging

These elements are crucial to realizing the value and advantages HMT can deliver across the multi-domain future fight.

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Demonstrating advantage through use cases

Use cases serve as a means of better understanding how HMT can provide value and lead to advantage in and across several missions and environments. Certainly, practitioners have seen or experienced use cases in various settings—including through war games and analysis of the ongoing war in Ukraine—and the slow nature of HMT adoption may call into question the utility of use cases. Still, highlighting the varied and, in certain instances, underappreciated applications of HMT can help demonstrate the different contexts in which HMT acts as a force multiplier and how this capability can support the US military in meeting the demands of the modern battlefield.

However, changing the perceptions of HMT across a large organization such as DOD is an iterative task and requires the frequent reinforcement of its value, especially as the technologies and concepts supporting HMT create new or enhanced opportunities. The three use cases discussed below are far from inclusive—our workshops and research explored several other compelling use cases—but the authors chose them because they reflect the layered value of HMT in serving missions and meeting operational threats and challenges being urgently considered by defense planners, as described in Table 1.³

Table 1: A high-level review of the advantages of each of the case studies discussed in this briefing.

Anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD): Coping with mass, range, and attrition

Determining how to conduct operations in an A2/AD environment is a clear priority for defense planners. This is especially the case in the Indo-Pacific, where the military modernization effort of the People’s Republic of China has emphasized utilizing pervasive multi-domain sensors and a surfeit of kinetic and non-kinetic strike assets to establish cordons in which US and allied forces are highly vulnerable to enemy fires and, in the worst-case scenario, unable to operate effectively.

HMT will not mitigate all risks of operating against robust A2/AD systems, though it can help US and allied forces better manage these risks in several ways, including in processing and analyzing large and complex datasets to support better and faster human decision-making.

Teaming uncrewed systems, crewed assets, and human operators

The use of attritable and expendable uncrewed systems, in conjunction with crewed assets and human controllers and decision-makers, can achieve several important objectives in the A2/AD context. Most notably, these smaller, less expensive, generally modular systems can be used to saturate A2/AD systems, identify enemy defenses, and force adversaries to expend their deep stores of munitions—all while extending the operating range of higher-value crewed and uncrewed assets and reducing the risks to crewed assets and their human operators.

The use of attritable and expendable uncrewed systems, in conjunction with crewed assets and human controllers and decision-makers, can achieve several important objectives in the A2/AD context.Attritable or reusable systems are those that are considerably lower cost than higher-end uncrewed systems such as the MQ-9 Reaper.⁴ Most notably, these smaller, less expensive, generally modular systems can be used to saturate A2/AD systems, identify enemy defenses, and force adversaries to expend their deep stores of munitions—all while extending the operating range of higher-value crewed and uncrewed assets and reducing the risks to crewed assets and their human operators.

To that end, reducing risk to human operators does not mean eliminating this risk, and the use of attritable uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) and uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs) will still incur costs. Moreover, even attritable systems and their payloads can be worth several million dollars. New calculations of value as well as increased capacity to reconstitute systems must keep pace with expected levels of attrition to ensure the right sizing of HMT-enabling force structures.

Sense-making and decision support: Enhanced situational awareness and improved decision-making at the pace of relevance

The A2/AD environment also serves as an example of how machines can support humans in the crucial and increasingly demanding task of sense-making—the art of interpreting and fusing data for enhanced decision-making.

Sense-making in A2/AD environments

A2/AD environments will be characterized by an abundance of complex datasets and both signal and noise across domains including in the electromagnetic spectrum. The amount of data available to operators will be overwhelming. Multi-domain sensors and surveillance and strike assets will be actively operating and engaging with both friendly and adversary forces, creating a need for AI agents to help process and filter data and feed relevant information back to the warfighter. The result will be to improve the quality and speed at which human operators filter data and then fix and track critical nodes in adversary A2/AD systems. This high-level A2/AD example reveals one context in which AI-enabled data fusion and processing of complex datasets can increase situational awareness and speed up decision-making. But the applications of this sense-making are impressively broad, including in increasing the speed and precision of identifying targets, determining appropriate kinetic or non-kinetic weapons to use to strike the target, and ensuring precision of effects.

Targeting: Joint all-domain command and control (JADC2)

DOD’s “connect everything” JADC2 effort offers another example of how HMT can be applied to support improved targeting and speeding up sensor-to-shooter processing. As a January 2022 Congressional Research Service report observed, “JADC2 intends to enable commanders to make better decisions by collecting data from numerous sensors, processing the data using AI algorithms to identify targets, then recommending the optimal weapon—both kinetic and non-kinetic—to engage the target.” While JADC2 is still largely a concept rather than an architecture for future military operations, the US military is already using AI to help find and track possible targets or entities of interest on the battlefield. In September 2021, Secretary of the US Air Force Frank Kendall acknowledged that the Air Force had “deployed AI algorithms for the first time to a live operational kill chain” to provide “automated target recognition.” Kendall noted that by doing so, the Air Force hoped to “significantly reduce the manpower-intensive tasks of manually identifying targets—shortening the kill chain and accelerating the speed of decision-making.”

AI in the intelligence field

Sense-making through human-machine teams is also shaping the future of disciplines such as intelligence analysis and mission planning (see sidebar below), in which AI-enabled data fusion, pattern and anomaly detection, and research and analysis support are helping analysts manage and exploit the explosion in available sources and data. Tasks that would take days for humans to perform can now be performed in hours, allowing humans to concentrate on the most relevant pieces of information derived from large datasets. For example, through the war in Ukraine, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are already using natural language processing tools that leverage AI to translate and analyze intercepted Russian communications, saving analysts time and allowing them to focus on key messages and intelligence. The use of AI is not only speeding up analysis but also demonstrating value in bringing “unknown knowns”—observed but ignored or forgotten connections, insights, and information—to the attention of an analyst and articulating the value or quality of information to the human decision-maker.⁵

Presence, prioritization, and deterrence: Coping with distance and complexity

While each command faces unique problem sets, the size and complexity of today’s security challenges are straining the limited number of forces available to deter, identify, assess, or respond to a fast-moving threat or crisis in a timely manner. HMT offers a solution to meet an increasingly sophisticated threat landscape while operating with insufficient resources.

Exporting Task Force 59: A sandbox for AI experimentation and integration

In September 2021, CENTCOM’s 5th Fleet established Task Force 59—the Navy’s testing ground for unmanned systems and AI—to experiment with teaming human operators and both smart robots and AI agents to increase presence across the region, provide persistent and expanded maritime domain awareness (MDA), and prioritize threats for in-demand crewed and high-value assets.

Task Force 59’s experimentation efforts combine AI and uncrewed systems—particularly USVs but also vertical take-off and landing UAS, which are valuable in expanding the coverage of the Navy’s ISR networks in the region—and are further amplified by cooperation with partners and allies. In comments at the February 2023 International Defence Conference in Abu Dhabi, 5th Fleet Commander Vice Admiral Brad Cooper explained that each of the small USVs with which Task Force 59 is experimenting can extend the range of ISR networks by thirty kilometers, meaning that even a modest investment in smart uncrewed systems can deliver a significant increase in MDA.⁷

AI agents then process the millions of data points collected by the uncrewed systems to create an understanding of normal patterns of life, which, in turn, serves as a baseline for AI agents to identify anomalies that require further investigation by human operators and watchkeepers. In doing so, human-machine teams can cultivate a deeper understanding of the operational environment, moving toward a predictive model in which the DOD can possibly anticipate and prevent future threats and prioritize allocation of limited resources to areas that AI agents determined are most vulnerable to disruption.

Building on the success of the Navy’s Task Force 59, both the Army and Air Force components of CENTCOM have stood up task forces to experiment with emerging technology and HMT concepts. The Army component, Task Force 39, was established in November 2022 to advance experimentation in counter-small UAS solutions that can be scaled not just within CENTCOM environments but across the DOD. The Air Force’s Task Force 99 was stood up in October 2022 as an operational task force to pair unmanned and digital technologies to improve air domain awareness in much the same way that Task Force 59 seeks to improve MDA by expanding presence and anticipating emergent threats. Lieutenant General Alexus Grynkewich, commander of CENTCOM’s Air Force component, stated in February 2023 that the objective is “not just tracking objects in the air, but maybe finding things that could be on the ground about to be launched into the air and how those could be a threat to us.”

The applicability of this HMT approach is not limited to CENTCOM; indeed, it is now being adopted in other commands. In April 2023, the US Navy announced the expansion of its experimentation with unmanned and AI tools into US Southern Command’s 4th Fleet to increase MDA awareness in a region with its own particular dynamics, threats, and MDA requirements. Notably, 4th Fleet is taking a different approach to adoption of HMT lessons and new HMT capabilities, deciding to integrate them into its command and staff structure rather than through the standing up of a discrete task force. While these task forces provide valuable models for quickly bringing off-the-shelf technologies to the warfighter, the challenge rests in scaling these solutions across services and domains (and the defense enterprise at large).

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Pathways to HMT adoption at scale and pace

The pace of AI and HMT technology development has exceeded the capacity of the DOD to adopt these technologies at scale. To more fully realize the advantages of HMT, DOD must:

• Address several cultural, bureaucratic, and organizational challenges;
• Ensure continued focus on HMT ethics, safety, and agency;
• Embrace rapid and realistic experimentation of HMT; and
• Develop the human component and enhance trust in their machine teammates.

Culture, acquisition, and melting the “frozen middle”

Organizational and cultural constraints radiate across the DOD, affecting the way the enterprise acquires and adopts the technologies, concepts, and capabilities necessary to enable HMT. Innovation and adoption are hindered by DOD’s “frozen middle”—layers of relatively senior military and civilian personnel within DOD bound by an underlying set of inherited assumptions, incentives, and instincts that are resisting the adaptive, collaborative practices necessary for adoption of HMT concepts and capabilities at pace and scale. These organizational layers and bureaucratic proclivities have a cascading effect as they embed in a DOD acquisition system. According to former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper and former Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James, co-chairs of the Atlantic Council’s Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption, the effect is slowing adoption by requiring multiple levels of review “because incentives do not exist to be bold and to move fast.”

Organizational “tribalism” also has an enervating effect on the DOD’s acquisition of key technologies and adoption of HMT-relevant capabilities. Examples of cross-service and cross-command collaboration do exist. Workshop participants highlighted joint projects on AI transparency between service laboratories and the ability of the US Special Operations Command, as a functional command, to work across regions and services. Far more frequently, though, disjointed development and vendor engagement and procurement efforts have been the norm. To achieve the necessary momentum for adoption across DOD—and, most importantly, the salutary outcomes of this adoption—requires an increased willingness to share and subsequently align research, information, development efforts, acquisition models, and best practices across the department and, particularly, the services.

In June 2022, David Tremper, director for electronic warfare in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, provided an example of how DOD siloes slow adoption of HMT-enabling capabilities. Tremper highlighted an incident in which the Navy developed an electronic warfare algorithm that was of interest to the Army, though transfer of the algorithm could not take place without a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the two service’s labs. It took nine months for the lab that developed the algorithm to approve the transfer, and, after eighteen months, the MoU was determined to be inadequate to support the algorithm migration. According to Tremper, “one service just lawyered up against the other . . . and prevented a critical capability . . . from going from one service to another service.” This example highlights the hurdles blocking the services from learning and gaining from one another’s strides in HMT; the cross-service applicability of HMT solutions is critical to avoid a service unnecessarily depleting its resources in a field where its sister service has already paved the way.

To melt this frozen middle and reduce cultural and organizational obstacles to HMT adoption, the DOD must center its efforts around three high-level aims. First, acquisition reform is a necessary and foundational step. The ability to develop, build, and acquire advanced platforms and systems with longer development times remains important to achieving DOD missions. There is also growing and urgent demand for the technologies and capabilities enabling HMT, such as software and lower-cost uncrewed systems, across the Pentagon. The program-centric system used to acquire and develop many advanced platforms—with the development of requirements, budgets, and capabilities completed individually for hundreds of programs—is not optimized for the rapid acquisition of the innovative technologies and capabilities developed by traditional defense suppliers and the commercial sector.

While the objective of this report is not to provide a comprehensive set of recommendations for acquisition reform, two principles are useful in guiding this reform: 1) the need for increased flexibility and agility within the acquisition process, enabling response to changing technologies and requirements; and 2) new incentives that stimulate an enhanced degree of risk tolerance.⁸

Second, among the workforce setting requirements for and working alongside machine teammates, a lack of understanding surrounding HMT and its applications is slowing adoption. The human element of this equation must be adequately prioritized through recruitment, retention, and training programs. Specifically, DOD must provide its personnel with opportunities to enhance digital literacy and understanding of the technologies, concepts, and applications of HMT capabilities within not just the acquisition force and those that set requirements but also among many senior decision-makers.

The human component: Trust and training

Building and calibrating appropriate levels of human trust in AI teammates is essential to HMT adoption across the DOD. This discussion typically begins with several actions designed to ensure the reliability—that is, the trustworthiness—of AI agents, such as establishment and implementation of effective best practices for the design, rigorous testing, iterative experimentation, and deployment of AI-enabled machines. Enhancing data security is another frequently cited component of building trust: Humans cannot trust algorithms if they lack faith in the integrity of the data being processed or used to train the algorithm.

Limitations in AI transparency (i.e., how machines perceive the environments they are in) and explainability (i.e., how machines come to decisions) pose another challenge. While not prohibitive to the employment of HMT in many missions and contexts, reducing the “black box” nature of AI outputs will have a positive impact on the capacity for humans to trust their machine teammates and, in turn, on the pace of adoption for the range of HMT applications.

Increased experimentation—in terms of frequency, rigor, and realism—can enhance the human operator’s understanding of how an AI agent reached a certain conclusion. The DOD must embrace accelerated experimentation across a diverse set of scenarios and use cases. By asking humans to “try to break the technology,” operators and analysts can develop a better understanding of the limits, strengths, and weaknesses of their AI-enabled teammates as well as any possible unexpected behaviors. Rapid and aggressive experimentation in conditions that replicate real-world operational conditions has been a regularly highlighted feature of Task Force 59’s success to date, though there is concern that this practice has not been adopted broadly across DOD.

Human trust in machines, however, is only one part of the discussion of the human component of HMT. At least as much attention should be focused on building up the competencies and confidence of humans to effectively engage with and employ their machine partners. Humans will require just as much preparation and training as their machine teammates to become effective team leaders and to ensure that the value of human-machine teams is realized. In a worst-case scenario, adequate human training will help avoid a circumstance in which ineffectual human engagement with machines (the inability to recognize a hallucinating machine, for example) or unnecessary interference with machine operations could lead to mistakes that carry deleterious tactical, operational, or strategic outcomes. One salient example is seen in the Marine Corps experimentation with LLMs. Experiment organizers noted that the tendency of these models to hallucinate means “falsification is still a human responsibility” and that “absent a trained user, relying on model-produced outputs risks confirmation bias,” risking the potential of individuals “prone to [acting] off the hallucinations of machines.”

This is especially the case in situations in which a general-purpose machine or set of machines is interacting with multiple humans rather than just one human controller. Protocols for determining who is in control, whose priorities are executed, and how to manage contradictory instructions become essential.

Ethics, agency, judgment, and reliability: Maintaining leadership and retaining relevance

Pathways to adoption of HMT at speed and scale do not solely rely on the DOD doing things radically differently or applying new incentives and structures. Rather, they can build on the momentum of ongoing initiatives.

The DOD has already expended commendable energy in understanding and addressing questions of ethics, safety, alignment, and agency—all of which emerged as acute areas of interest and concern during the project workshops. The DOD, in collaboration with other parts of the US government, has been proactive in articulating its positions on key questions of ethics and safety around AI development and use for military purposes since first adopting principles for AI ethics in February 2020. In February 2023, at the conclusion of the Responsible AI in the Military Domain conference, the US Department of State released a “Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy” as the foundation for the establishment of international norms and standards for the development and use of military AI. The document includes twelve best practices that emphasize concepts such as safe and secure development, extensive testing, and human control and oversight, among others, that endorsing states should implement.

These principles and best practices as well as current laws, policies, and regulations provide a useful foundation for resolving critical questions about agency, such as:

• Which component of the human-machine teams makes decisions under what circumstances?
• When might the machine’s judgment supersede that of the commander?
• What implications will these answers have on recruitment, reskilling, and retention of talent?
• How does the United States avoid or mitigate tactical events and AI/HMT mistakes that have significant strategic consequences?
• How do we judge the possible risk of AI-enabled decision-making in kill chains relative to the current and demonstrated risk of human error in these decisions?

Still, as technologies, concepts, applications, and competitions evolve, new questions are likely to be raised. Old practices may need to be iteratively revisited to ensure that adoption efforts remain relevant, current, and appropriate. DOD efforts to maintain leadership at home and internationally in establishing AI and HMT ethics and safety guidelines should be viewed as a process to follow rather than an end state to be achieved.

Understanding knock-on effects of HMT incorporation

DOD adoption of HMT into military operations will elicit responses from competitors and lead to changing risks, competitions, opportunities, and doctrine. For example, the use of HMT-enabled UAS swarms could shift targeting priorities from forward-deployed machines to the human controllers and decision-makers situated well behind contested environments. Another example can be found in the use of an AI-enabled machine to patrol a contested border, which could reduce immediate risk to human life and, as a result, reduce risks of rapid escalation. However, immediate loss of life may not be the only escalation pathway perceived by an adversary. If destroying autonomous systems is lower stakes than firing on humans, how many downed UASs would the United States tolerate? Alternatively, what if the AI-enabled machine recommends or makes a bad decision that leads to an unprovoked loss of life in the adversary state?

The United States and its allies should intensify examination of these types of what-if scenarios associated with HMT adoption. First, to preempt arguments that DOD has not thought through the long-term implications of HMT employment, and then to determine the most efficacious concepts of use and prepare for possible future risks. A combination of iterative tabletop, seminar-style, and live war games and model-based simulations would be especially useful in identifying and preparing for longer-term implications of HMT. These exercises could then inform live testing of HMT concepts and capabilities.

Shaping the narrative around military applications of HMT

Mixed feelings and misperceptions about the DOD’s use of AI and uncrewed systems persist within the defense enterprise and the US polity and society more broadly. Despite an increase in the number of young personnel who are considered to be more intuitively inclined to technological adoption, pockets of stubbornness and contrarianism, and efforts to protect institutional equities, remain throughout the force. In addition, some social and political perspectives on HMT may be skewed by fears of fully autonomous weapons systems and singularities in which AI overcomes human control with devastating consequences. Identifying and managing the variety of strategic, operational, social, and philosophical concerns about accelerating HMT adoption will necessitate a coherent and consistent campaign to shape the narrative around military AI use and HMT. This narrative should stress:

• The demonstrated and prospective advantages HMT will provide to warfighters and decision-makers, and the budgetary efficiencies that could be gained through deeper adoption of HMT;
• The measures DOD is taking to ensure the safe and ethical development and use of AI and to build humans’ trust in machines; and
• The centrality of human agency to human-machine teams.

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Summary of recommendations and conclusion

HMT offers several advantages to twenty-first-century militaries. As such, the DOD must invest sufficient time and resources to address the challenges to adoption discussed above. Catalyzing HMT adoption will necessitate a combination of new ideas, procedures, and incentives, as well as intensification of promising ongoing adoption acceleration efforts, especially related to the following areas:

The United States’ AI strides are not occurring in a vacuum; if the Pentagon is slow to adopt HMT at scale, it risks conceding military edge to strategic competitors like China that view AI as a security imperative. Machines and AI agents are becoming ubiquitous across the twenty-first-century battlespace, and the onus is on DOD to demonstrate, communicate, and realize HMT’s value to achieving future missions and national objectives.

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Acknowledgements

To produce this report, the authors conducted a number of interviews and workshops. Listed below are some of the individuals consulted and whose insights informed this report. The analysis and recommendations presented here are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily represent the views of the individuals consulted. Moreover, the named individuals participated in a personal, not institutional, capacity. 

• Maj Ezra Akin, USMC, technical PhD analyst, Commandant’s Office of Net Assessment
• Samuel Bendett, adjunct senior fellow, Technology and National Security Program, Center for a New American Security
• August Cole, nonresident senior fellow, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
• Owen J. Daniels, Andrew W. Marshall fellow, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University
• Phil Freidhoff, vice president for human centered design projects, 2Mi
• Dr. Gerald F. Goodwin, senior research scientist, personnel sciences, US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences
• Dr. Neera Jain, associate professor, School of Mechanical Engineering, Purdue University
• LCDR Marek Jestrab, USN, senior US Navy fellow, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
• Zak Kallenborn, policy fellow, Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University
• Harry Kemsley OBE, president, government and national security, Janes Group
• Dr. Margarita Konaev, nonresident senior fellow, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
• Justin Lynch, nonresident senior fellow, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
• Dr. Joseph Lyons, principal research psychologist, Air Force Research Laboratory
• Brig Gen Patrick Malackowski, USAF (ret.), director, F-16, conventional weapons, and total force, Lockheed Martin Corporation
• Col Michelle Melendez, USMC, senior US Marine Corps fellow, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
• Rob Murray, nonresident senior fellow, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
• Dr. Julie Obenauer-Motley, senior national security analyst, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab
• John T. Quinn II, head, futures branch, concepts and plans division, Marine Corps Warfighting Lab
• Dr. Laura Steckman, program officer, trust and influence, Air Force Office of Scientific Research

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Sponsored By

This report was generously sponsored by Lockheed Martin Corporation. The report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions.

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On August 3, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative Assistant Director Imran Bayoumi authored a Globe and Mail piece arguing for the need to update Canada’s National Security Strategy to accompany the recent creation of a National Security Council. Not only will an updated strategy help define what the present government perceives as a threat, Bayoumi argues, but it can also serve as a much-needed guide for resource allocation between the various agencies responsible for national defense and intelligence activities. The article was featured on Canadian Forces College’s Spotlight on Military News and International Affairs.

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On July 24, Forward Defense visiting senior fellow Deborah Cheverton co-authored a commentary in War on the Rocks identifying three areas of reform for US-allied defense cooperation: information sharing, export and technology controls, and joint strategic planning.  The authors discussed how integrated deterrence can be enhanced by better coordination in these areas, especially through flagship initiatives like AUKUS.  

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Putin’s fundamental misreading of Ukraine is now plain to see. Far from welcoming Russia’s invasion, the Ukrainian nation united and rose up in resistance. What was anticipated by the Kremlin as a brief and victorious military campaign has instead become the biggest European war since World War II. But if the scale of Putin’s blunder is obvious, it is important to note that he is far from the only Russian harboring such delusions. Russia’s elites and Russian society as a whole tend to assume everything that needs to be known (or is worth knowing) about Ukraine and Ukrainians has long been known and requires no further inquiry. This helps to explain why until fairly recently, there were hardly any academic or analytical centers in Russia devoted specifically to Ukrainian studies.

Today’s Russian attitudes toward Ukraine reflect centuries of imperial Russian and Soviet nationality policy. In the former case, Ukrainians (and Belarusians) were officially viewed as components of a larger, supranational “all-Russian people” that also included the Russians themselves. Meanwhile, for most of the Soviet period, the Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian republics were seen as the Slavic core and foundation for another supranational entity, the “Soviet people.”

The similarity between the imperial and Soviet views is unmistakable, albeit with one dissonant nuance: Soviet nationality policy, while doing all it could to erase Ukrainian national identity, at the same time officially recognized the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as a state entity and Ukrainians as a separate nationality. Putin has been highly critical of Lenin for this approach, and has claimed the Bolshevik leader was personally responsible for “creating” Ukraine. This line of thinking reached what may be seen as its logical conclusion with Putin’s insistence that Ukrainians and Russians are “one people.” By denying the existence of a separate Ukrainian national identity, Putin brought the legitimacy of Ukrainian statehood into question and set the stage for the current war.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Russian misconceptions about Ukraine are in part due to the simplistic notion that ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in Ukraine, as well as those who express an affinity for Russian culture or share Russia’s antagonism toward the EU, NATO, and the West in general, all fall within the same “pro-Russian” category. Likewise, Many Russians have been all too ready to assume that any Ukrainian expressing nostalgia for the Soviet era is waiting to be “liberated” by Moscow. These misconceptions have been echoed by numerous commentators in the West, who have similarly treated evidence of favorable Ukrainian attitudes toward modern Russia or the Soviet past as indications of a desire for some form of Russian reunion.

In reality, being “pro-Russian” is understood one way in Ukrainian cities like Donetsk, Kramatorsk, or Mariupol, and quite differently in Moscow, Omsk, or Tomsk. During the initial stages of Russian aggression against Ukraine in April 2014, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology conducted a wide-ranging poll in the eight southeastern Ukrainian provinces (excluding Crimea) targeted by the Kremlin. This revealed that 70 percent of respondents were against separation from Ukraine and unification with Russia, while just 15 percent were in favor.

If separation from Ukraine was not on their wish list, what did they in fact want? A relative majority of 45 percent preferred the decentralization of power and greater rights for their region; another 25 percent favored a federated Ukraine, while only 19 percent were happy with the existing relationship with Kyiv. Other surveys conducted at around the same time yielded similar findings.

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Unsurprisingly, Russia’s full-scale invasion has further shaped Ukrainian attitudes toward issues of national identity. Today, the people of Ukraine are more consolidated as a political nation than at any time since regaining independence more than thirty years ago. According to the Razumkov Centre, 94 percent of respondents in a May 2023 survey expressed pride in their Ukrainian citizenship; 74 percent expressed feelings of patriotism and love for their country; and 71 percent were ready to come to its defense, either with weapons in hand or as participants in volunteer support groups.

Meanwhile, negative attitudes toward Russia and Russian citizens have skyrocketed. At the end of 2019, only 20 percent of Ukrainians held negative attitudes toward Russians; six months after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion in September 2022, 80 percent of respondents asserted that they would not allow Russians into Ukraine. In terms of attitudes toward Russia, the turnaround has been even more drastic. In early February 2022, about a week before the Russian invasion, 34 percent of Ukrainians held positive views of Russia. That number dropped to just two percent three months later, with 92 percent saying they viewed the country in a negative light.

With the war clearly going badly for the Kremlin, there could now be a glimmer of hope for some reality-based adjustments to Russian illusions about Ukraine. Russian MP Konstanin Zatulin, who is well known for championing the plight of Russian “compatriots” abroad and promoting aggressive policies toward Ukraine, has recently questioned the wisdom of denying Ukrainian identity. “I would be happy if there was no Ukraine, but if we continue to constantly repeat that there is no Ukraine and no Ukrainians,” this will only strengthen their resistance on the battlefield, he noted at a June 2023 forum in Moscow.

Zatulin’s comments hint at growing recognition in Russia that widely held beliefs about Ukraine’s indivisibility from Russia are both inaccurate and unhelpful. However, resistance to the entire notion of Ukrainian statehood is so deeply ingrained in Russian society that it may take generations before the attitudes underpinning the current war are no longer dominant.

Roman Solchanyk is author of “Ukraine and Russia: The Post-Soviet Transition” (2001). He has previously served as a senior analyst at the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute and the RAND Corporation.

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With dozens of senior Russian officers reportedly detained following the Wagner revolt and a senior commander dismissed this week for criticizing the conduct of the Ukraine invasion, could Putin face a mutiny within the Russian army?

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As Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive gets underway, there are fears that Russia’s deteriorating military predicament could lead to an escalation in Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats, writes Diane Francis.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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On June 30, Markus Garlauskas and Global China Hub Nonresident Senior Fellow John Culver were the guests for Voice of America’s Washington Talk panel discussion show, which focuses on North and South Korean audiences and is often watched by the US Korea analysis and policy community. The discussion focused on the new North Korea intelligence estimate, other North Korea developments and various Korea-China issues. The show aired in the region and was posted on YouTube on July 1.

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On June 29, Markus Garlauskas was the guest for the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Capital Cable talk show. The moderator, retired US Ambassador Mark Lippert, introduced the show by highlighting Garlauskas’ New Atlanticist piece on the new North Korea intelligence estimate. The discussion that followed addressed a wide range of defense and security issues related to Korea.

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The new NIE lays out three pathways through 2030 for how North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s strategy could evolve as his nuclear weapons capabilities improve. The NIE concludes that the by far most likely pathway is for Kim to leverage his nuclear capability for “coercion, potentially including non-nuclear lethal attacks, aimed at advancing the North’s goals.” It also delineates two additional low-likelihood pathways: North Korea could employ an offensive strategy to dominate the Korean Peninsula through the use of force, or it could turn to a defensive strategy, in which nuclear weapons are used solely as a deterrent. According to the estimate, Kim is most likely to continue pursuing coercion because he will be “confident that his growing nuclear capabilities will deter any unacceptable retaliation or consequences” but that he would not actually attack with them unless he “believes his regime is in peril.”

As a former National Intelligence Officer for North Korea who led the development of NIEs, I see this document as monumental in my particular niche, but some additional context is needed to understand why. Since the 1950s, NIEs have been the US intelligence community’s most authoritative written judgments on national security issues, developed through a collaborative process led by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s National Intelligence Council (NIC) and its predecessor organizations. This new NIE is a tantalizing glimpse of the US intelligence community’s larger strategic intelligence picture on North Korea, even as it necessarily represents only the tip of the iceberg of a much longer classified document.

What is perhaps most remarkable about the latest NIE is that it highlights very recent key intelligence community judgments about North Korea. This is a major and unusual step, given that this practice was largely halted after the declassification of key judgments in the 2007 NIE on Iran’s nuclear program caused a number of public controversies. It also marks a change from how the intelligence community has generally approached public assessments of North Korea. Though US intelligence leaders have openly described North Korea as a “hard target,” they have generally been guarded in their assessments of Pyongyang’s capabilities and how they know what they know. With a few exceptions (many of them during the “fire and fury” period of 2017) most of the intelligence community’s publicly released assessments have been small portions of the larger Annual Threat Assessment provided to Congress. 

Given this history, and the fact that the NIE does not address the possibility that North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons, it could have been withheld on the unfair grounds that it could be interpreted as an implicit rebuttal to the longstanding US policy of negotiating the denuclearization of North Korea. It is therefore a testament to the sincerity of Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines’s commitment to transparency that this NIE was released. 

Even with its notable and welcome transparency, however, it does not give a full picture of the strategic North Korea nuclear challenge. There are (at least) three areas that are worth adding to the discussion.

First, China. The NIE’s analysis related to Beijing is guarded and subtle, particularly compared to how much intelligence leaders openly focus on the threat. While Washington publicly and loudly grapples with the premise that the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will likely be in a heightened state of military confrontation or outright war over Taiwan before 2030, these key judgments do not explicitly address the possibility, much less explore the massive implications this has for Korea. The declassified NIE does warn, among other factors, that an offensive strategy would “become more likely” if Kim believed he could “maintain China’s support” or “if [Kim] concluded that [an] international crisis presented a last chance to accomplish revisionist goals.” As current National Intelligence Officer Sydney Seiler acknowledged to me last week, the need to consider North Korea’s potential to escalate during a Taiwan crisis is a “no brainer.” That the key judgments omit this subject is neither surprising nor troubling to me as a former NIO. I know how hard it is to keep this document’s scope manageable and the challenges of considering hypotheticals piled upon hypotheticals. However, readers should keep in mind that the risk of North Korea using its nuclear weapons, or taking the offensive in general, could be much greater in the event of a US-PRC conflict.

Second, South Korea. Specifically, it is important to recognize Seoul’s potential to field its own nuclear arms. If Kim pursues a strategy of coercion, as the NIE judges he most likely will, and “may be willing to take greater conventional military risks, believing that nuclear weapons will deter an unacceptably strong US or South Korean response,” the value of South Korean nuclear capability to counter such threats would fuel the already-strong South Korean public sentiment for the country to acquire nuclear weapons. It would, however, be impolitic to warn that April’s Washington Declaration, wherein South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol pledged to forgo nuclear weapons, may not last beyond the end of his constitutional single term in 2027. The window between a decision for nuclear weapons and operational capability would be a logical time for a preventive attack, a concrete example of the general “now or never crisis” the NIE cites as a driver for an offensive.  

Third, military and policy prescriptions. These are outside the remit of the NIC and violate intelligence analysis tradecraft standards, so it makes sense that they are not included in the NIE. However, several logical strategic-level policy and military recommendations could be derived from this estimate’s judgments. At least three come to mind immediately:

• First, the United States should not politically recognize North Korea as a de facto or de jure legitimately nuclear-armed state in the hope that this would lead it to be a defensively focused “responsible” power, given how unlikely this is to happen. 
• Second, the United States and South Korea should ensure that their primary efforts in deterrence of North Korea are focused on the most likely threat. US and allied efforts at deterrence should not be content with just deterring an “all-out” military offensive or nuclear strikes. They should also counter as much as possible the sort of incremental creeping coercive escalation that could either fatally undermine the security of South Korea and the US position in the region over time or could spin out of control into an escalating conflict. 
• Third, the United States and South Korea should recognize that, though it is not the most likely scenario, they must be prepared to fight a nuclear war with North Korea. Washington and Seoul must contend with the unpleasant reality that there is a plausible set of conditions, particularly in the context of a hypothetical US-PRC war or a South Korean decision for nuclear arms, that could lead North Korea to undertake an offensive use of nuclear weapons. 

Though this NIE is neither the first nor the last word on the implications of North Korea’s growing nuclear capabilities, it is a huge step forward for public and classified policy debates. The NIE provides the intellectual foundation to prepare for a long struggle with an increasingly well-armed and coercive North Korea, instead of abandoning the principle of denuclearizing North Korea in a vain attempt to secure peace or embarking on the reckless path of embracing preventive war in fear that Kim will strike first. The NIE demarcates the field in which the United States and its allies must be prepared to play a high-stakes game—a contest in which the PRC’s aggression and South Korea’s own nuclear weapons could have game-changing consequences.

Markus Garlauskas served as the national intelligence officer for North Korea, leading the US intelligence community’s strategic analysis of North Korea from 2014 to 2020. He is the director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security of the Atlantic Council, and tweets at @Mister_G_2.

The post Reading between the lines of the new North Korea intelligence estimate appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Security

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Ukrainian counteroffensive sees advances in Zaporizhzhia and eastern Ukraine

On June 19, Ukrainian forces launched counteroffensive actions in at least three areas and appear to have made gains in Zaporizhzhia and eastern Ukraine. The Telegram channel of Russian military blogger WarGonzo reported that Ukrainian forces continued attacks northwest, northeast, and southwest of Bakhmut and advanced near Krasnopolivka. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Maliar announced that over the past week Ukrainian troops advanced up to seven kilometers in the direction of Zaporizhzhia and retook 113 square kilometers of territory. Russian Telegram channels also reported that fighting was ongoing south and southwest of Orikhiv on June 19. Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk oblasts continue to be the most active areas of the frontline, as the Ukrainian army attempts to advance in the directions of Novodarivka, Pryutne, Makarivka, Rivnopil, Novodanylivka, and Robotyne.

On June 17, the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks west and south of Kreminna. It also stated that the Russian army had repelled Ukrainian attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk sector. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces continued operations around Velyka Novosilka near the border between Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. 

According to Ukrainian forces, Russian forces conducted offensive actions in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The Ukrainian military reported forty-five combat engagements with Russian forces near Yampolivka, Torske, Hryhorivka, Spirne, Avdiyivka, Krasnohorivka, Marinka, Pobieda, Novomykhailivka, and Donetsk’s Dibrova and Orikhovo-Vasylivka. According to Ukraine, the Russian army continued to shell villages in the direction of Marinka, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Lyman, and Kupiansk. Ukraine also alleged that Russian forces launched Kalibr cruise missiles from a submarine in the Black Sea and Shahed drones from the eastern coast of the Sea of Azov.

On June 20, Kyrylo Budanov, chief of the Main Directorate of Intelligence for the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, alleged that Russian troops mined the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant’s cooling pond, which is necessary for the safe operation of the plant. According to Budanov, if Russia triggers an explosion, there is a “high probability that there will be significant problems.” Budanov did not provide any evidence to support the allegation, and the statement cannot be independently verified at this time. If true, however, it would put the nuclear plant at greater risk of a significant accident. The power plant complex, Europe’s largest, has been under occupation since February 2022.

On January 22, the governor of Russian-occupied Crimea accused Ukraine of targeting a bridge that connects the peninsula to Kherson Oblast, near the village of Chonhar. In a Telegram post, Vladimir Sal’do alleged that Ukraine struck the bridge with “British Storm Shadow missiles,” creating a hole in the middle of the bridge.

As fierce hostilities continue in eastern and southern Ukraine, there are signs of a new wave of arrests in Russia, including of people with ties to Ukraine. On June 20, Russian state media outlet RIA Novosti announced that a woman of Ukrainian origin was detained in Saransk and charged with treason.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Wagner attempts to draft gamers as UAV pilots

A June 19 Telegram post from Russian opposition news outlet Verstka claimed that Wagner Group is encouraging gamers to apply to serve as unmanned aerial vehicle pilots in the war against Ukraine. The media outlet reported that no prior military experience was required to apply for the position. Posts from Wagner emerged on Vkontakte the same day, inviting gamers with experience in “manipulating joysticks in flight simulators” to enroll.

Verstka, which contacted a Wagner recruiter as part of its reporting, stated that the campaign aims to recruit soldiers to pilot “copters and more serious machines.” In this particular context, “copters” (коптеры) is a reference to commercial drones that are sold to the public and have been widely used in the war against Ukraine. A May 19 investigation published by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project found that Chinese manufacturers have reportedly continued to provide Russian armed forces with DJI drones through third parties in Kazakhstan. 

Verstka also noted that in 2022, the Russian defense ministry attempted to recruit gamers with a targeted ad campaign that invited them to play “with real rules, with no cheat codes or saves.”

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Deripaska blames hackers after his website briefly takes credit for potential war crime

The Russian-language website of Russian industrialist and US-sanctioned oligarch Oleg Deripaska briefly displayed an article appearing to take credit for deporting Ukrainian children to Russian-occupied Crimea in partnership with Kremlin official Maria Lvova-Belova, who is already facing an International Criminal Court arrest warrant for allegedly deporting children. 

Yaroslav Trofimov, chief foreign affairs correspondent at the Wall Street Journal, noted the article’s appearance and disappearance in a June 15 tweet. Trofimov shared screengrabs of the article, which by that time had already been deleted from Deripaska’s Russian-language website, deripaska.ru. A complete copy of the article can be found at the Internet Archive.