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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

Since the sinking of the Moskva, Ukraine has used a combination of domestically developed naval drones and cruise missiles provided by Kyiv’s French and British partners to decimate Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Ukrainian Navy officials claim they have managed to damage or destroy around one-third of Putin’s entire fleet, while forcing the remaining Russian warships to retreat from occupied Crimea to the relative safety of ports in Russia itself. This has severely limited the Russian Navy’s ability to operate in the Black Sea. By spring 2024, Britain’s Defense Ministry declared that the Russian Black Sea Fleet had become “functionally inactive.”

Ukraine’s stunning success in the Battle of the Black Sea has yet to receive the international attention it deserves. By breaking the Russian naval blockade of Ukraine’s seaports, it has allowed Kyiv to resume maritime exports and secure a vital economic lifeline.

Crucially, the Russian Navy’s humiliating retreat from Crimea has also made a complete mockery of the Kremlin’s so-called red lines and has demonstrated the emptiness of Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling. The Russian dictator has long championed the seizure of Crimea as his crowning achievement, and has repeatedly hinted that he is willing to use nuclear weapons in defense of his conquests. But when confronted by the harsh military realities of Ukraine’s deadly naval drones, he withdraw the bulk of Russia’s fleet from Crimea with barely a murmur.

The Battle of the Black Sea is far from over, of course. While Ukraine develops groundbreaking new naval drones capable of hitting warplanes as well as warships, Russia continues to bombard Ukrainian seaports and targets merchant shipping carrying Ukrainian exports to global markets. The Russian Navy is also producing marine drones of its own, and is adopting defensive measures to protect the remainder of the Black Sea Fleet. Nevertheless, Kyiv’s Black Sea innovations are a reminder that Ukraine is an increasingly formidable military power in its own right and is shaping the future of drone warfare at sea as well as on land.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The primary role of drones in modern warfare is as weapons. Over the past three years, first person view (FPV) drones have become a ubiquitous feature of the contemporary battlefield and are believed to be responsible for the vast majority of Russian and Ukrainian casualties. This is changing the way the war is fought. Any vehicles operating close to the front lines must now rely on jamming devices, with many also favoring the additional protection of so-called “cope cage” coverings to shield against drone attacks. With larger groups of infantry deemed too vulnerable to drone strikes, attacks are typically carried out by small groups, often using highly mobile transport such as motorbikes or buggies.

Ukraine has also pioneered the use of drones and accompanying software to perform surveillance tasks mapping out the battlefield and providing real-time situational awareness of enemy deployments. This reconnaissance capability is not new in itself, but has undergone significant upgrades in recent years. Accurate and up-to-date information allows commanders to make informed decisions quickly, improving the effectiveness of military operations.

Beyond the battlefield, Ukraine has also transformed international understanding of drone warfare at sea. Since 2022, Ukrainian naval drones have succeeded in sinking or damaging around one-third of Russia’s entire Black Sea Fleet, forcing the remainder of Putin’s warships to retreat from Russian-occupied Crimea to the relative safety of Russia’s own Black Sea ports. Most recently, Ukraine claimed to have used naval drones to shoot down two Russian warplanes over the Black Sea.

Eurasia Center events

Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

In addition to strike and surveillance functions, Ukraine has also employed drones in logistical roles. The Ukrainian army uses both aerial and ground-based unmanned systems to deliver ammunition, food, medicine, and other supplies to troops operating in dangerous or inaccessible areas, thereby reducing the need to expose personnel to hostile environments. Drone-based solutions can also potentially facilitate the evacuation of the wounded when manned rescue is deemed to be too risky.

One of the most creative Ukrainian uses of drones on the battlefield has been to help take surrendering Russian soldiers prisoner. This method reduces the need for physical engagement with enemy troops and therefore limits the risks to the Ukrainian side. Drones are used to give instructions using printed messages or via loudspeakers to guide enemy soldiers and indicate safe directions that will allow them to surrender without coming under fire.

Ukrainian unmanned systems are also playing an important role in efforts to document Russian war crimes. Drones are able to record the time, location, and nature of potential crimes, along with the identity of the perpetrators in some cases. Over the past three years, Ukrainian drones have captured evidence of potential war crimes including the execution of unarmed POWs and attacks on civilians. This footage can be used in future prosecutions and increases the chances that those responsible for war crimes in Ukraine will be held accountable.

The growing role of drones in warfare creates a range of challenges in terms of the accepted norms governing military operations. With this in mind, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence has drawn up and issued internal guidelines for drone operators and legal teams to ensure adherence to the laws of armed conflict. These guidelines incorporate real-world combat scenarios to help drone operators understand how to treat categories such as medical personnel, retreating enemy troops, and those engaged in the evacuation of the wounded. This initiative is a step toward establishing broader global standards for responsible drone warfare.

Ukraine’s unique experience of drone warfare offers valuable insights that will shape military doctrines for many years to come, while also helping to define international standards for the use of drones in a military context. It is already clear that drones are transforming the battlefield in ways the evoke the twentieth century rise of air power. As drone technologies continue to advance, Ukraine is likely to remain a key player in this new wave of military innovation.

Vitaliy Nabukhotny is a human rights lawyer and external legal advisor to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence’s Legal Department.

A subjective standard of risk

RMF is the US government’s structured approach to ensuring information systems are secure and resilient before they are allowed to operate within government networks. It was designed to replace checklist-style compliance with a risk-based decision-making process. Under RMF, systems go through several stages—categorization, control selection, implementation, assessment, authorization, and continuous monitoring. At the heart of the process is the ATO—a formal decision by an authorizing official that a system’s security posture is acceptable for use. To reach this decision, program teams must document security controls, undergo assessments by independent cybersecurity experts, and respond to findings. The intent is to ensure systems are secure before they are fielded—but in practice, the process often results in extended delays, overly cautious reviews, and inconsistent standards across organizations.

One of the most challenging aspects of the ATO process is the subjectivity of risk determination. What is deemed an acceptable risk by one authorizing official may be an unacceptable liability to another. With no shared standard of risk tolerance, system owners must often start from scratch depending on who sits in the approval seat. This variability leads to costly rework, long delays, and disillusioned program teams. Worse, it creates a culture where innovation is stifled not by bad technology, but by indecision and fear.

This is not just a bureaucratic issue; it’s a mission-impact issue. Delays of twelve to eighteen months for an ATO mean that a new targeting application, mission planning software, or AI-enabled intelligence tool never reaches the unit that needs it. When marines or soldiers are using outdated or spreadsheet-based tools while Silicon Valley technologies sit behind compliance gates, something is broken. Compliance activities do have their place. They provide a framework and a set of standards that system owners should utilize. But compliance activities make up only one facet of a resilient security posture.

When it comes to the documentation for this process, the only thing consistent about it is its inconsistency. Each security control assessor, information systems security manager, and authorizing official has their own preferences for how security controls, and security requirement guides should be documented. Even when software as a service systems have received accreditation in one military service, the ATO often does not carry over to other services, requiring the process to start over again at each service.

Across most systems in the DoD, ATOs are manual one-time reviews that only look at a snapshot in time rather than monitoring software continuously. What’s more, this inadequate review takes a significant amount of time, labor, and resources. It requires a team of cybersecurity professionals to manually review and analyze all ATO documentation to meet compliance thresholds. Because there are few security assessor teams across the DoD, there is often a delay in getting the third-party assessor on schedule to conduct the manual review.

These one-time ATO reviews, which often approve a software for one to three years, are not useful for tracking a system’s long-term security posture. In fact, leaving a system approved for this long without further review increases its security risk. Continuous monitoring is a key step in the RMF, but it is often haphazardly implemented, with security scans sometimes occurring only monthly or even quarterly. Moreover, authorizing officials ultimately accept the risk with critical or high vulnerabilities to keep systems available for users. Instead, ATO and security posture should be continually assessed through an agreed-upon standard for security guardrails and thresholds. This continual assessment should in no way be manual. Rather, it should be baked into the day-to-day software development lifecycle through automated regression, quality, and security testing with each delivery of code.

The talent gap in modern cybersecurity

Compounding the problems with the ATO process is a talent management challenge. Many cybersecurity professionals tasked with evaluating and authorizing systems are not trained in modern software development or cloud-native architectures. Developments such as the shifts to hybrid cloud, containerized applications, and infrastructure as code have dramatically outpaced cybersecurity workforce training.

Security professionals steeped in legacy systems may treat every cloud deployment as a threat, rather than an opportunity for enhanced resilience, scalability, and automation. As a result, the process designed to manage risk often ends up misunderstanding it—focusing on outdated indicators instead of real attack vectors. In one of the ATO renewals I supported, our cybersecurity assessor subject matter experts didn’t know about cloud-hosted Kubernetes technologies, which are widely implemented across DoD software organizations. They also did not understand how to implement the Kubernetes security technical implementation guide, even though they were supposed to be assessing our security compliance. As a result, the first few days of the assessment were spent teaching assessors about containers, Kubernetes, microservices, and ephemeral IP ranges before the ATO process could move forward.

The DoD can’t automate trust, but it can automate verification. And that’s where the changes to the process must begin.

Recommendations for reform

To speed up the delivery of secure software, the DoD must rethink how it defines and manages risk. The following actions would make the ATO process more efficient, ensuring that warfighters can use the software they need to meet mission success.

Invest in talent management and training. The DoD must invest in a new cadre of cyber professionals who understand development security and operations, continuous integration/continuous deployment pipelines, and cloud-native patterns. This starts with developing targeted training, incentives for continuous learning, and career pathways that reward technical skills over legacy tenure. It also requires an incentive structure that holds authorizing officials accountable for delayed ATO timelines, especially for software-as-a-service products that have already received ATOs in other organizations.
Automate guardrails and thresholds. To embrace a continuous ATO framework, programs should implement automated security checks that enforce zero trust principles, identity policies, and vulnerability scanning. They should also require logging standards directly in the pipeline. When software is built with these guardrails from the start, this reduces the need for manual reviews, bolstering confidence in the system. That way, when code is pushed and meets the predefined security guardrails, it can go straight into production environments.
Reduce redundant documentation. Much of the RMF burden is paperwork for paperwork’s sake. By adopting living documentation generated from automated pipelines—like real-time architecture diagrams, test coverage, and security telemetry—the Pentagon can save thousands of hours that are currently being wasted on static Word documents no one ever reads.

The SWFT strategy: A moment for culture change

The DoD’s new Software Fast Track (SWFT) methodology, announced on May 5, offers a hopeful roadmap. SWFT aims to make software development more agile by implementing regular software releases, modern and modular architectures, and outcomes-based measures that meet warfighter needs. But to be truly transformative, it must be paired with a culture shift across the acquisition and cybersecurity communities.

Acquisition and cybersecurity personnel must move away from compliance as a box-checking exercise and toward compliance as a byproduct of good engineering. The future lies in continuous ATOs, risk quantification tools, and AI-assisted cybersecurity—if the Pentagon is willing to invest in people and process changes.

If the DoD wants to outpace its adversaries and empower its warfighters with the tools they need, it must treat secure software delivery as a warfighting imperative—not a compliance chore. The ATO process, as it stands today, is a bottleneck the United States can no longer afford.

The call to action is clear: upgrade the workforce, automate security, and embrace a cultural change toward cybersecurity compliance. SWFT provides an opportunity—now it’s time to put it into practice.

Hannah Hunt is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a distinguished technical fellow at MetroStar Systems. She was previously the chief of product at the Army Software Factory under Army Futures Command and chief of staff at the US Air Force’s Kessel Run.

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Stephen Rodriguez Joins AI+Expo Panel on Government Procurement Reform

clee — Wed, 04 Jun 2025 16:23:08 +0000

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On June 3, Stephen Rodriguez, Senior Advisor at Forward Defense and Director of the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare, joined a panel at the AI+Expo to discuss “Reindustrializing America via Government Procurement Reform.”

He was joined by Eric Lofgren, Staff Member, U.S. House Armed Services Committee; Scott Friedman, Vice President of Government Affairs at Altana Technologies; and Mike Manazir, Vice President, Federal at Hadrian.

Fellow

Stephen Rodriguez

Senior Advisor

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The UK Strategic Defence Review lays out an ambitious roadmap for reform. Will the government deliver?

AM Sir Christopher Harper, KBE, RAF (Ret.) — Wed, 04 Jun 2025 15:06:10 +0000

By publishing its long-awaited Strategic Defence Review (SDR) on Monday, the United Kingdom has taken a positive step toward the reinvigoration and reform of its defense posture. Recognizing the perilous nature of the geostrategic scene, drawing lessons from the war in Ukraine, and seeking to enhance its leading role in NATO, the review is rigorous, thoughtful, and compelling; it offers one of the more realistic assessments of the United Kingdom’s security posture in recent memory. Its success, however, will hinge on funding and follow-through.

The SDR was written independently by Lord George Robertson, a former UK defense secretary and NATO secretary general; General Sir Richard Barrons, a former commander of the UK Joint Forces Command; and Fiona Hill, a foreign policy expert and former senior director for Europe and Russia at the US National Security Council. It benefits from the authors’ deep expertise and freedom to speak frankly.

In my assessment as a former Royal Air Force senior officer and director general of the NATO headquarters International Military Staff, I find the review blunt and refreshingly free of political gloss while still being infused with strategic depth. It offers a sobering analysis of the threats Britain faces and a coherent and comprehensive plan to deal with them.

If the UK media coverage of the review is anything to go by, then it has already been successful in promoting a national debate on the severity of the strategic risks the United Kingdom and its allies face. One of the review’s core aims is to foster a “total defence” culture, an understanding that security is not the sole preserve of the armed forces but a collective national responsibility.

No more “hollowing out”

British Prime Minister Keir Starmer echoed this whole-of-society message in a speech he delivered in Glasgow on Monday to launch the SDR. In the speech, he warned that the United Kingdom must prepare for a dangerous decade ahead. The United Kingdom would become, he said, “a battle-ready, armor-clad nation, with the strongest alliances and the most advanced capabilities, equipped for the decades to come.” Indeed, the review is laced throughout with the concept of “NATO first” and the United Kingdom’s aspiration to play a leading role in the Alliance.

On capabilities, the review outlines a serious agenda for restoring UK military strength after years of “hollowing out.” Among the most significant commitments is the acceleration of the United Kingdom’s sovereign nuclear warhead program (at a cost of £15 billion) to ensure that the country maintains an independent and credible deterrent. This is paired with equally serious investment in conventional capabilities, including the commitments to produce seven thousand long-range and cruise missiles and to construct six new munitions factories.

The SDR further calls for the United Kingdom to become a leading technology-enabled defense power, with an integrated force that deters, fights, and wins through constant innovation at wartime pace. To achieve that, it proposes a “three Is” model: integrated (rather than joint) forces, which are innovation-led and backed by industry. It emphasizes that greater attention must be given to the space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains. It also proposes making the army ten times more lethal by 2035 by exploiting autonomous systems and a “digital targeting web,” all informed by lessons learned from the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

The government has also pledged £1.5 billion for the modernization and refurbishment of military living accommodations. This, together with a move to take a whole-force, skills-based approach to workforce planning, would constitute long-overdue investments that could begin to address the current crisis surrounding the recruitment and retention of personnel.

None of the review’s recommendations reflect a marginal upgrade. Striking the appropriate balance between mass, speed, and resilience has returned to relevance alongside the need to reinvigorate stockpiles, munitions manufacturing, autonomous systems, and the United Kingdom’s technological edge. As demonstrated by the war in Ukraine, all these factors will increasingly define combat effectiveness. The SDR further recognizes the need to radically transform defense procurement processes and practice. For Britain to remain a serious military power, addressing these issues is both overdue and essential.

Finding the funding

Crucially, all sixty-two of the SDR’s recommendations have been accepted by the UK government—an indication, at least on paper, of genuine resolve.

And yet, despite the soundness of the review and the seriousness of its ambitions, an inevitable question mark remains over how these recommendations will be funded.

The government’s pledge to raise defense spending to 2.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) by 2027 is a step in the right direction. This review is unique in recent British history for being accompanied by increases rather than cuts in the budget. But this is still only a step. The longer-term ambition to reach 3 percent of GDP is not backed by binding Treasury policy or formal financial commitment. Moreover, it seems to hinge on a “defence dividend” of economic growth from a revitalized defense industrial base. Such an aspiration is not enough. In the face of a deteriorating strategic environment, Alliance members are likely to demand a minimum of 3.5 percent of GDP expenditure on defense at the upcoming NATO Summit in The Hague, which could lead to the United Kingdom falling behind the level of spending expected of a leading NATO power. Effective deterrence depends on credibility—and credibility hinges not on promises but on funded and delivered capabilities.

This financial dimension is especially critical in light of shifting US priorities. While the United States is unlikely to totally withdraw from NATO, there is a looming sense that Washington’s focus is inexorably moving away from Europe and toward the Indo-Pacific. Successive US administrations—regardless of party—have made clear that they expect European allies to carry more of the burden for their own defense. This has been brought into stark relief by the current US administration. A more self-reliant and militarily capable Europe is, therefore, no longer a theoretical objective—it is a strategic necessity.

For Britain, this means more than incremental increases in spending. It means making hard political choices and long-term industrial commitments now. The SDR lays out what needs to be done. The government has signaled its agreement. The next step—the most important one—will be putting money behind this critical endeavor.

Air Marshal Sir Christopher Harper is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served in the Royal Air Force, including as the UK military representative to NATO and the EU in Brussels and as director general of the NATO headquarters International Military Staff.

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After Ukraine’s innovative airbase attacks, nowhere in Russia is safe

David Kirichenko — Tue, 03 Jun 2025 20:55:58 +0000

Ukraine carried out one of the most audacious operations in modern military history on June 1, using swarms of smuggled drones to strike four Russian airbases simultaneously and destroy a significant portion of Putin’s bomber fleet. While the full extent of the damage remains disputed, open source evidence has already confirmed that Russia lost at least ten strategic bombers and possibly many more.

The attack highlighted Ukraine’s innovative use of military technologies and confirmed the country’s status as a world leader in the rapidly evolving art of drone warfare. Crucially, it also underlined Kyiv’s ability to conduct complex offensive operations deep inside Russia. This will force the Kremlin to radically rethink its domestic security stance, which could lead to the diversion of resources away from the invasion of Ukraine.

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According to Ukrainian sources, preparations for Operation Spider’s Web had been underway since late 2023. Ukraine was able to move a series of modified cargo containers into Russia along with more than one hundred first-person view (FPV) drones. The containers were then loaded with the drones and mounted on lorries before being moved into position close to Russian airbases. On Sunday morning, the green light was given and the drones were remotely activated, emerging from their containers to strike nearby Russian bombers.

The bombers targeted in these drone attacks play a key role in Russia’s air war and are regularly used to launch cruise missiles at Ukrainian cities. While Ukraine’s June 1 success will not bring this bombing campaign to an end, it may help save Ukrainian lives by reducing the number of available planes and forcing Russia to disperse its remaining strategic bombers to locations further away from Ukraine.

While any reduction on Russia’s ability to bomb Ukrainian civilians is welcome, the impact of Ukraine’s airbase attacks on the future course of the war is likely to be far more profound. Sunday’s Ukrainian strikes at locations across Russia have transformed the situation on Putin’s home front. Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than three years ago, Russians have grown accustomed to viewing the war as something that is taking place far away. That sense of security has now been shattered.

Eurasia Center events

Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

This was not the first time Ukraine has struck deep inside Russia. For much of the war, Ukraine has been using its growing fleet of long-range drones to target Russian military bases and the country’s oil and gas industry. Russian Air Force hubs such as the Engels airbase in Saratov Oblast have been hit multiple times.

Ukraine’s attacks have gained momentum as the country’s long-range drone fleet has evolved and as Kyiv has developed its own missile capabilities. This mounting proficiency has not gone unnoticed internationally. Indeed, China reportedly asked Ukraine to refrain from attacking Moscow during the recent Victory Day parade on May 9, as Beijing was apparently unsure whether the Russians themselves could provide sufficient protection for the visiting Chinese leader.

Sunday’s operation represents a new stage in Ukraine’s efforts to bring Putin’s invasion home to Russia. By deploying large numbers of drones surreptitiously across the Russian Federation and activating them remotely, Ukraine demonstrated an ability to strike anywhere without warning. The consequences of this are potentially far-reaching. Russia must now increase security at every single military base, military-industrial site, command center, and transport hub throughout the country.

In addition to ramping up defensive measures around military infrastructure, Russia must also introduce further checks at the country’s borders and closely monitor all activity along endless highways stretching from Europe’s eastern frontier to the Pacific Ocean. This is a logistical nightmare. For example, thanks to Ukraine’s attack, all cargo containers must now be treated with suspicion. There are already reports of bottlenecks emerging at locations across Russia as alarmed officials inspect lorries in the hunt for more Ukrainian drones.

Given the colossal size of the Russian Federation, addressing the threat posed by Ukraine’s Trojan Horse tactics is a truly Herculean task. Russia’s vastness has traditionally been viewed as one of the country’s greatest strengths. The new form of warfare being pioneered by Ukraine could now turn this size into a major weakness. US President Donald Trump has repeatedly stated that Ukraine does not “have any cards” in its war with Russia, but Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy may just have played the ace of drones.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

2024 in the rear view

Rich Outzen — Mon, 02 Jun 2025 14:00:00 +0000

2024 brought a host of developments and changes in the security and defense environment facing the United States, Turkey, and their NATO partners. Some of these dynamics were political and geopolitical in nature, some operational, others military and technical. As the Defense Journal assesses and describes the state of the Alliance in 2025 for its readers, a brief retrospective on the year just passed and its impact provides a part of the necessary context.

Geopolitical shaping events

Momentous geopolitical events since our winter issue have included the advent of Donald Trump’s second term as US president, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, and the apparent revelation in Europe that conventional military defense is a sovereign responsibility that cannot be outsourced in perpetuity. These events have had significant implications for the security of NATO, Turkey, and the United States.

Trump’s return has had several immediate effects on the United States (and thus the global) security environment. His approach narrows the US global mission from maintaining a liberal world order to pursuing US national interests, while adopting a tone of strategic ambiguity toward both rivals and allies. He has simultaneously directed reform of the US military to reemphasize combat readiness and lethality while minimizing social or ideological programs. As commander in chief, Trump has directed US soldiers to conduct counterterror strikes in places like Somalia and Yemen even as his negotiators seek to defuse conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and elsewhere.

The fall of Bashar al-Assad after an eleven-day rebel offensive reshaped the strategic map of the Middle East. Iran lost a valuable strategic position in its multidimensional “resistance” against Israel and Western influence. Russia lost its sunk investment in Assad and a degree of its influence in the Middle East. Turkey has gained greater stability on its southern border, close defense and intelligence ties with the new Syrian authorities, and prospects for expanded regional trade and a leading role in Syrian reconstruction. The challenges of stabilizing Syria, and tensions between Israel and Turkey stemming from their respective threat perceptions, have no immediate or apparent solution, and will require deft diplomacy to manage.

Shifts that might have attracted more attention in other times were easy to miss, but still noteworthy in terms of global security. China and Russia took steps to bolster the military junta in Myanmar that is teetering on the edge of collapse against a rebel coalition. Battles between the Sudanese army (backed by Egypt, Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia) and the antigovernment Rapid Support Forces (supported by Russia and the United Arab Emirates) have shifted decisively in favor of the army, though not yet presaging an end to the civil war. The war in Ukraine grinds on amid serious attempts by Trump to forge a ceasefire. Early 2025 continues to be an era of persistent conflict and great power competition, but one with dramatic developments that will echo throughout this and future years.

Strategic alliance development

International patterns of alliance and armament over the past half-year have reflected the weight of geopolitical changes noted above. Deep and effective US support to Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression has led to a tighter convergence of what has been referred to as the axis of upheaval, with China, Iran, and North Korea sending weapons, supplies, and even soldiers to aid the Russian war effort. A dozen or more other countries have provided diplomatic support to Moscow, but these three have become critical suppliers of weapons and cash for the Kremlin. This is a trend that began before 2024, but has only accelerated in recent months.

The global arms market continues to shift in other significant ways. The United States in 2024 cemented its leading position in arms exports, accounting for 43 percent of global exports. Russian exports have sharply decreased as domestic production has been consumed by the ongoing war in Ukraine. Italy and Turkey have more than doubled their national shares of global exports over the past several years (2 percent to 4.8 percent for Italy and 0.8 percent to 1.7 percent for Turkey). Five Turkish defense firms rank among the one hundred largest in the world—and a sixth, Baykar, would almost certainly be high on the list if all of its sales data were publicly released. Only the United States, China, Germany, and the United Kingdom match or exceed this number. Of particular note has been the continued rise in demand for Turkish armaments from Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar.

Europe, for its part, has shown signs of finally getting serious about developing its own conventional military deterrent vis-à-vis Russia—or at least talking about doing so. Shocked by Trump’s heavy-handed conditionality on future aid to Ukraine, Brussels and its member states have drawn up plans for massive new defense spending and other deterrent steps—if taxpayers and military-age youth prove willing. Yet the European Union’s initial formulation of deterrence against Russia independent of Washington and without integrating Turkish geography, military capabilities, and strategic resources does not inspire confidence, especially given the long years needed to restore defense industrial capacity even assuming consistent commitment. European firms and national leaders would do well to welcome Turkish contributions to European defense planning and resourcing both in NATO and in EU planning by following through on plans to sell Ankara Eurofighters and encouraging more collaboration like that between Italy’s Leonardo and Turkey’s Baykar.

While the past half year has demonstrated volatility at the geopolitical and political levels, it has brought multipolarity and diffusion of power at the strategic level. This has played out in the evolution of alliances and the flow of arms and trade more broadly. In mid-2024 dualistic constructs (autocracy versus democracy, the US-led Alliance against an axis of evil) retained some utility. The current environment is messier, with issue-specific coalitions and transactional diplomacy creating a kaleidoscope of rivals, partners, and targets that, for now at least, deny predictable patterns and lead some to question the credibility of the international system’s most potent actor.

Operational trends

As geopolitics and alliances continue to evolve, so, too, does war in operational terms. In a world with ongoing “hot wars” in Ukraine, the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere, several discernible trends can be identified. These include diminishing returns for artillery as seen in Ukraine, failure to achieve military victory through ground maneuver forces for Russia and Israel, and the fragility of lightly armed proxy forces in various theaters.

Russia since 2022 has compensated for shortcomings in its infantry, armor, and air forces through reliance on superior tube and rocket artillery, exacting a heavy toll on Ukrainian defenders in the process. Yet in late 2024, losses among Russian artillery units rose as Ukrainian drone tactics and counterbattery fire became more effective. While Russia still outproduces NATO in artillery ammunition and continues to fire it at prodigious rates, its advantage is decreasing in relative terms.

Russia has continued to advance at high cost to try and consolidate control over the nearly 20 percent of Ukrainian territory it occupies, but has failed to end the war via ground maneuver after three years. The difficulty of ending wars through ground maneuver even against inferior opponents can also be seen in Gaza, where operations which have continued for eighteen months are not yet meeting the stated war goals of military and political leaders. Both the Russian and Israeli campaigns reflect the historical difficulty of reconciling the political nature of conflict termination with the operational conduct of wars, and a resultant tendency for destructive wars to yield stalemate when that task remains incomplete.

The recent period produced impressive operational results in other cases, notably Israel’s campaign against Iran’s regional proxy network and the Sudanese army’s efforts to regain control of the national capital region from the insurgent Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia. In late 2024 Israel crippled Lebanese Hezbollah and struck Iranian-supported militia targets in Syria and Iraq during an audacious campaign involving air strikes, ground maneuver, and exploding cellphones. Between November 2024 and March 2025 the Sudanese Army routed the RSF from Khartoum and other areas in central Sudan. The RSF had been supported by a number of foreign sponsors, including the United Arab Emirates and several other regional countries, but ultimately failed to achieve local or regional legitimacy—as had the Iranian proxy groups in Lebanon and Syria, and arguably in Iraq and Yemen as well. The past several months have badly undermined the notion popular over the past decade that proxy wars can effectively “enable intervention on the cheap.”

Military technical developments on the horizon

Over the past several months sixth-generation fighter aircraft have moved from concept to reality. China flew two prototypes in December 2024, one produced by Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group and the other by AVIC Shenyang Aircraft. US prototypes for a Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) aircraft have been under evaluation since 2020, but in March 2025 the Boeing F-47 was officially selected as the program’s platform. A half-dozen other countries have done some sixth-generation work—integrating advanced stealth, artificial intelligence, manned-unmanned teaming, and other advanced technologies—though even for those with the deepest pockets, fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft will be mainstays for the foreseeable future.

Artificial intelligence is a growing element in military planning and readiness. While the United States and many of its allies have endorsed the Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy, many potential adversaries and rivals have not. Military applications for AI focus at present on information processing, threat identification, and decision-making, areas in which the United States has relative advantage. The Department of Defense’s Defense Innovation Unit is implementing a project, Thunderforge, to deploy such capabilities to headquarters in Asia and Europe. The military services each have designated units to test concepts and systems related to AI in the field. The drive to develop effective defenses against small unmanned aerial systems (UAS) has gained urgency with the continued broad proliferation of cheap, easy-to-use, lethal UAS around the world. The December 2024 Department of Defense adoption of a classified strategy to accelerate counter-UAS development signals the rising criticality of the need for cost-effective and combat-effective counters to the cheap and plentiful threat. This is an area ripe for technical development and fielding in the near future.

Adaptive Alliance

The shifting dynamics at all these levels—geopolitical, strategic, operational, and technical—shape the contours of defense and security challenges for the United States and its NATO allies. These are certainly challenging times, yet the Alliance has endured for over seven decades through other chaotic and difficult periods because the basic value proposition of mutual defense among the members remains sound. Secretary General Mark Rutte strikes the right tone with his assessment that “there is no alternative to NATO” for either the United States or its partners, and that despite frictions related to burden sharing, domestic politics, and sometimes divergent national interest, NATO’s summit in The Hague in late June will show the Alliance evolving rather than dissolving.

Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Turkey with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on X @RichOutzen.

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The Atlantic Council in Turkey aims to promote and strengthen transatlantic engagement with the region by providing a high-level forum and pursuing programming to address the most important issues on energy, economics, security, and defense.

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Q&A with Haluk Bayraktar

Atlantic Council Turkey Programs — Mon, 02 Jun 2025 14:00:00 +0000

Haluk Bayraktar is the CEO of Baykar, an autonomous technology company based in Turkey. He began his tenure at Baykar in 2004 as an engineering manager, when Baykar’s autonomous technology efforts were still nascent, and has been involved in every aspect of the business’s growth into a leading firm in the Turkish defense sector: project management, logistics, and business development. Baykar’s pioneering role in the rise of the Turkish drone industry makes Bayraktar a fascinating and well-informed observer on security and alliance dynamics affecting Turkey, NATO, and the region.

This interview has been lightly edited for style.

Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY (DJ): Thanks for taking the time to talk with us. Let’s start with developments of common interest to readers in Turkey, the United States, and Europe. Following the industrial and technology cooperation deal with Italian defense and aerospace group Leonardo, what’s next for Baykar in the Western market?

Bayraktar: Baykar has become the world’s biggest drone maker, with thirty-eight international partners now—from Europe and NATO to the Turkic countries, Africa, and the Middle East. Among NATO allies, we have partnered with Poland, Romania, Kosovo, Croatia, and of course, Turkey’s military, law enforcement, and disaster relief agencies. Turkey is a NATO ally, so all our products and technologies follow the technical standards and military specifications of the West and are entirely compatible with Western systems. The Western market is critical for us.

As for Leonardo, we are on the path to establishing a joint venture (JV). They are a major player in Europe, and their work areas are highly compatible with ours—a lot of synergies and complementarity. We were already working with them, integrating payloads and systems with our products: This has become a very strong bond or marriage. A JV is a great opportunity/potential to bring robust, field-proven systems to a broader market. Baykar has drones all around the world, including tactical and strategic platforms. Leonardo produces critical subsystems with great potential for Europe and broader markets where they have a presence, including South America and elsewhere, but Europe is our main focus. In Europe, there is no other mature alternative to what we have.

DJ: What differentiates your approach to manned technology? What is the key to your value proposition?

Bayraktar: We are a tech developer but not just tech. It’s about tech but also about ways to use that technology—about operational employment. Our approach centers on reliability, safety, and robustness. Our experience brings lots of feedback from various areas, which makes our products even more robust. So, we combine technology with real-world experience. Our fleet now exceeds 300,000 flight hours per year, so there is a lot to analyze. Our systems offer the highest performance-to-cost across the market. They are the most adaptable with continuous innovation, and they are equipped with the most advanced technology. In the defense sector, there are huge manufacturing capacity challenges everywhere, whereas there has been a great buildup in Turkey in the last twenty-five years. Over just twenty years, we’ve gone from roughly seventy to over 3,000 companies in the sector, with thousands of products. It’s a great ecosystem with important internal synergies. Baykar has established mass production capacity for unmanned systems. Our Istanbul base is the biggest facility of its kind in the world. So, potential customers know we can deliver quickly. We produce 250 Bayraktar TB2 [unmanned combat aerial vehicles] per year, fifty Akinci [high-altitude, long-endurance] UCAVs per year, and we’re ramping up to support larger capacity as the Bayraktar TB3 UCAV and the Kizilelma unmanned fighter jet move from development to production.

DJ: What is your conceptual and defense technological approach to Kizilelma? Do you see it as a loyal wingman to the fifth-generation Kaan fighter or a pathway to replace Kaan in the future?

Bayraktar: Kaan is a national manned fighter program, funded by the government. Kizilelma is Baykar’s own design and project. It is our final target on the unmanned family of products—a fighter with both subsonic and supersonic capabilities. We do not envision it as a loyal wingman, though it can work as an integrated adjunct in theory, if one were to couple it and use it with manned fighters in risky environments. US President Donald Trump recently introduced the American F-47 as a mothership controlling other fighters, and the consortium developing [the Global Combat Air Program involving Italy, the United Kingdom, and Japan] conceived it in similar fashion. But we envision Kizilelma as operating on its own with a fleet control system. As a company, we don’t develop manned systems. We exclusively invest in drones. That is our focus. Kizilelma is an aircraft with aggressive maneuvering, autonomous operation, and controls that can be flown by few operators. It completed its first flight in 2022, and we see that as a revolution. Bayraktar TB3 has the capability to take off and land on short-runway aircraft carriers. Kizilelma will have this feature too.

Fighter pilots stationed at aircraft carriers have to fly every single day and complete a certain number of sorties annually to stay current. That’s perhaps fifty training flights per day. By contrast, unmanned platforms do not require as much effort or so many daily landings to be certified for carriers. Moreover, Kizilelma will integrate artificial intelligence to assist with delegation of command and other operational aspects.

DJ: How do you view the F-35 debate in the United States, especially Elon Musk’s view that manned aircraft are not the best path forward?

Bayraktar: There are about 13,000 manned fighters worldwide right now–Russian, Chinese, US, and other systems combined. We believe that all those platforms will eventually be converted to unmanned systems, even though one cannot prove that point just yet. But when you look at the field, it’s clearly headed in that direction. To be clear, they may not be replaced one for one. It may be more like three to five unmanned platforms to replace each manned fighter. Unmanned systems will be everywhere, and it will be a crowded airspace—not just unmanned fighters but smaller first-person view drones and loitering munitions. They will be everywhere, and every country will need the ability to build and use these things. For nations to defend themselves in this century, this is a necessary capability—much like the ability to produce bullets.

DJ: Turkey has shown great agility in what has been termed “drone diplomacy,” or complementing regional policy initiatives with defense sales. What is the nature of public/private partnership in Turkish drone diplomacy?

Bayraktar: Overall, the major players in the Turkish defense ecosystem are still government-owned institutional firms. The private sector is smaller but dynamic and growing. Of course, I think that the private sector’s dynamism is preferable. SAHA is the industry group representing the smaller and midsize firms that comprise most of our private sector, and I am currently serving as the chairman.

Still, the system operates similarly for public and private firms. Anyone wishing to export applies to the Ministry of National Defense, which in turn coordinates with the Foreign Ministry and the intelligence community to issue an export license. It is the government’s decision at the end of the day. The government doesn’t promote private-sector firms per se. The Defense Industry Agency (SSB) has foreign relationships and partnerships, and they generally favor government-affiliated companies. One of the objectives of SAHA has been to help small and medium-sized companies become more visible. Our annual exhibition helps smaller players. Baykar is an example of successful growth: We’ve gone from five employees in 2004 to over 6,000 today. We know how important it is to become more visible, and we support other firms doing that. We try to make it easier for the newcomers. That is my responsibility as SAHA chairman.

My view is that European countries are better at using governmental influence to promote national commercial products. Baykar’s products promote themselves through their unique utility as well as aggressive marketing and social media presence. The Turkish government doesn’t subsidize sales, although other countries may. But we don’t rely on public credit or government grants. This is unique to Baykar: We’ve developed an unmanned fighter with the company’s own money. At the end of the day, since companies are required to receive a permit to export, the government plays an important role. The higher levels [of government officials] do talk about it and the firms need approval. The government spending environment matters greatly for domestic firms, too. And while Turkey spent 4.5 percent of its [gross domestic product] on defense before 2000, that number has remained close to 2 percent for two decades now. It was just in the last two years that it approached 3 percent.

The bottom line is that drone diplomacy is a reality and the Bayraktar TB2, in particular, has proven that. But the government doesn’t lead: market demand leads, the company follows, and the government supports.

DJ: Can you talk a little bit about the price/performance balance for Baykar systems?

Bayraktar: The Bayraktar TB2 is a very good example for price/performance balance. The initial purchase price or acquisition cost is one factor, but the life cycle, including maintenance and durability, has to be considered as well because reliability affects long-term costs. Let’s say you procure an alternative to Bayraktar TB2 for half the price. In reality, this is not an advantage if this “alternative” has double the crash rate. So, Bayraktar TB2 has a reliability advantage because you don’t face as many crashes and the cost consideration changes.

Unmanned systems represent a new niche in the defense ecosystem. Aerospace is conservative, especially for manned systems: extensive certifications and regulations serve to protect human life. But unmanned [aerial] vehicles are a different paradigm—you can add new sensors, new technology, and new operational approaches rapidly. An example is the fact that manned systems still use mechanical gyros, whereas the technologically advanced UAVs are currently using even cheaper MEMS [i.e., microelectromechanical system) sensors, fiber-optic alternatives with high-end software systems. You can easily innovate in the unmanned realm with the latest technology, whereas you need to be conservative in the manned domain because you need to make sure that each new step complies with the certification and safety standards of manned aviation. You can qualify unmanned systems with very high-end software—even AI software—and hardware much more quickly.

Baykar has a price advantage because we are vertically integrated. We have strong in-house avionics, power systems, and ground element design. This allows us to tailor critical subsystems and enable attractive pricing with high-end capability. The TB2, with a six-unit ground system and everything, still costs less than a manned platform. Our TB2 fleet recently passed the one-million-hour milestone, so our operating cost is just several hundred dollars per hour—compared to a minimum of $20,000 per hour for a single manned F-16. When you can mass produce, availability and reliability turn into a potent combination. Additionally, customers benefit from the rapid in-service schedule compared to a manned system. A country can field a full UAV system with trained people within a year, providing a very quick and affordable defense capability compared to a manned system, which is a multiyear exercise.

DJ: You mentioned thirty-eight international partners earlier. Ukraine was one of your earliest: Have you been able to apply lessons from that partnership with newer programs, such as those with the Gulf countries?

Bayraktar: Ukraine was Baykar’s first export customer. Our cooperation with Ukraine opened up the strategic level of cooperation for us. We had been working with them since 2011, but things moved rapidly after 2014. In 2014, no one else would sell them armed drones. We didn’t yet have a mature system, but we agreed to help. They were in need, huge need, and searching. That was more than ten years ago. They couldn’t get what they wanted elsewhere either, so they came to Turkey. President Erdoğan’s leadership mattered at that point, as he considered Ukraine a neighbor and friend in need. With the government’s support, we supplied armed drones starting in 2019—the order was placed in 2018. They were very happy and this was very important. President Zelensky visited in August 2019 after taking office. At his request, we agreed to build a factory in Ukraine. He acquired more systems, and we discussed an offset-type obligation. I told them: “You have very good engines. Maybe we can figure out a way to use your engines on our platforms.” So, we created effective cooperation with Motor Sich and others. In a sense, Turkey and Ukraine are complementary countries. When the war escalated in 2022, we did our best to support Ukraine. You may remember the European crowd-sourcing campaigns for Europeans to buy TB2s on Ukraine’s behalf, but we never accepted the money. We donated the platforms, giving up over $110 million in income that we chose not to generate. We are not war profiteers. We delivered all Bayraktar TB2s free of charge as part of those campaigns and the campaign funds were used for humanitarian aid and other pressing needs to support Ukraine.

Haluk Bayraktar is the CEO of Baykar, an autonomous technology company based in Turkey. Follow him on X at @haluk.

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Transatlantic relations and a region in flux

Atlantic Council Turkey Program — Mon, 02 Jun 2025 14:00:00 +0000

Foreword

Dramatic events altered the geopolitical landscape, affecting Turkey, the United States, and NATO in late 2024 and early 2025. The election of Donald Trump as the forty seventh president of America, a ceasefire in Gaza after months of showdown between Israel and Iran’s Axis of Resistance, and the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria have challenged many assumptions and regional political-military considerations. The fifth issue of the Defense Journal assesses key dynamics as we enter a new era. The Defense Journal team examines the rise of the hyperwar concept via military applications of artificial intelligence and the frontier of development for robotic systems. We also look at trends in key US policy concerns in the region to the south of Turkey, including Israel and Syria. If the first months of the second Trump administration are any indication, rapid change and a high tempo in US foreign policy decisions affecting Washington, Ankara, and their shared interests across several regions is the new normal. The Editorial Team hopes you find these contributions interesting and useful.

Rich Outzen and Can Kasapoglu, Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY Co-managing editors

Articles

2024 in the rear view

By Rich Outzen

Hyperwar, artificial intelligence, and Homo sapien

By Can Kasapoğlu

Turkish-American defense and energy partnerships suit the new transatlantic landscape

By Greg Bloom

Q&A with Dov Zakheim

By Atlantic Council Turkey Program

In Syria’s fragile transition there’s a glimmer of a more stable Middle East

By Charles Lister

Q&A with Haluk Bayraktar

By Atlantic Council Turkey Program

Why the Middle Corridor matters amid a geopolitical resorting

By Karel Valansi

Honorary advisory board

The Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY‘s honorary advisory board provides vision and direction for the journal. We are honored to have Atlantic Council board directors Gen. Wesley K. Clark, former commander of US European Command; Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky, former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs; Gen. James L. Jones, former national security advisor to the President of the United States; Franklin D. Kramer, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute, former US Ambassador to NATO; and Dov S. Zakheim, former Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer for the Department of Defense.

Gen. Wesley K. Clark

Chairman and CEO of Wesley K. Clark & Associates & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO

Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky, Ph.D.

Senior Fellow at Harvard University JFK Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs; Board Director, Atlantic Council; former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs (2001-2009)

Gen. James L. Jones

President, Jones Group International and Executive Chairman Emeritus, Atlantic Council; former National Security Advisor to the President of the United States

Franklin D. Kramer

Distinguished Fellow & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Assistant Secretary of Defense

Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute

CEO, Cambridge Global Advisors & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Permanent Representative to NATO

Dov S. Zakheim

Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Senior Fellow, CNA Corporation; Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Under Secretary of Defense

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Hyperwar, artificial intelligence, and Homo sapiens

Can Kasapoğlu — Mon, 02 Jun 2025 14:00:00 +0000

Rethinking the modern neuroanatomical charts of warfare

According to Napoleon, an army walks on its stomach. War, nonetheless, chiefly revolves around cognitive functions. Take a nineteenth-century Napoleonic artillery officer calculating the range of his guns to the target, for example. The officer’s prefrontal cortex hosts three major components: control, short-term memory, and arithmetic logic. This prefrontal exercise operates on the data provided by two other sources: a premotor-parietal top-down system optimized to update and continuously transform external data into an internal format, and a hippocampal bottom-up system to serve as an access code to memory from previously acquired knowledge or to detect novel information. In other words, an army fights on mathematical military data processing systems of the parietal and prefrontal brain regions. No matter how technological improvements have run extra miles to the present day, this cognitive formulation has not changed even on the margins. A contemporary F-35 pilot, assessing the processed situational data harvested by the aircraft’s AN/AAQ-37 Distributed Aperture System showcased on the helmet-mounted display, uses precisely the same biological decision-making algorithms as the Napoleonic artillery officer posited above—albeit on steroids and with a high-performance computing edge.

Today, mankind stands on the eve of a great change in this oldest cognitive tradition of warfighting. For the first time in military history, parietal and prefrontal brain regions may take a back seat in deciding concepts of operations and concepts of employment, perhaps even strategic planning prior to combat operations, while artificial intelligence will likely assume the lead. With the rise of autonomous weapon systems in distributed battlegrounds, the neuroanatomical outlook of warfare may be evolving into a new reality.

Smart digital algorithms and autonomous robotic warfighters are poised to replace not only the muscles but also the brains of warfare. This can occur because they can replicate electronically what our brains do in the biological realm and thus can overtake us by simply performing better, not differently. Robotics and artificial intelligence mimic the core characteristics of nature. Machine-learning and artificial neural networks are good examples of this mimicry. Our everyday AI features of facial and voice recognition and smart internet search predictions function in the virtual world much as they do in the human brain. Likewise, swarming is not merely a robotic function. Birds, bee colonies, and even bacteria swarm. AI might be “smarter” than humans through faster processing of effective mimicry, and robots similarly may swarm in a more coordinated and agile manner than biological agents.

AI and hyperwar: Data, robots, and satellites

In their 2017 Proceedings article released by the US Naval Institute, US Marine Corps General John Allen and high-technology entrepreneur Amir Husain described “hyperwar” as an emerging type of armed conflict that significantly reduces human decision-making. In the new type of wars, the authors argued, Homo sapiens’cognitive function of decision-making will nearly disappear from the OODA loop (observe, orient, decide, act). Autonomous swarms of robotic warfare systems, high-speed networks married to machine-learning algorithms, AI-enabled cyber warfare tools, and miniaturized high-powered computing are likely to assume the lead roles in fighting wars. More importantly, humans might be removed from operational planning, with their role to be confined to merely very high-level and broad input. The rise of hyperwars will essentially bring groundbreaking combinations of emerging technologies, much as the German blitzkrieg combined in novel ways fast armor, air support, and radio communications. General Allen and Husain concluded that the gap between winners and losers would very likely resemble that of Saddam’s Iraqi Army facing the “second offset” technologies of electronic warfare, precision-guided munitions, and stealth platforms.

The Russo-Ukraine War serves as a battlefield laboratory to test possible elements of the coming hyperwars and the impact of artificial intelligence on conducting and analyzing warfare. First, the integration of satellite imagery intelligence and target and object recognition technologies has provided the Ukrainian military with a very important geospatial intelligence edge in kinetic operations. Second, the Ukrainian intelligence apparatus has resorted to neural networks to run ground social media content and other open-source data to monitor Russian servicemen and weapons systems, then to translate the input into target acquisition information and military intelligence. Third, playing smart with data has also sparked a capability hike in drone warfare. Open-source defense intelligence studies suggest that Ukrainian arms makers used publicly available artificial intelligence models to retrain drone software applications with the real-world data harvested from the conflict. This modified data has then been used to operate the drones themselves. Ukrainian robotic warfare assets have seen a capability boost in precision and targeting with the help of the data-mastering process. In the future, some robotic baselines will likely see a faster and more profound improvement with the new leap in AI and information management. Specific drone warfare systems, such as the American Switchblade and Russian Lancet-3, already have design philosophies that prioritize computer vision to run target identification.

It appears that the zeitgeistis on the side of the hyperwar. After all, digital data has been on a huge and exponential growth trend for at least one decade. In 2013, the world generated 4.4 zettabytes of data—with a zettabyte amounting to 10²¹ bytes. Estimates from that period forecast 163 zettabytes of global data to be produced in 2025, which was considered a gigantic magnitude. At current rates, the reality this year will be even higher, at 180 zettabytes of data, or even more. The climb in data generation is intertwined with a rise in drone warfare systems proliferation and employment globally, as well as the production of robotic warfare systems. The dual hike in data and robots forms the very basis of hyperwars.

Other areas to monitor are orbital warfare and space warfare systems. Unlike warfighting and maneuver warfare on the planet Earth, the space operational environment presents technical challenges rather than strategic ones. Satellites are very vulnerable to offensive action since their movements are very limited and incur massive technical requirements for even small moves. A recent war-gaming exercise by American space and defense bodies showcase that one way to boost survivability in space warfare is to reposition “bodyguard satellites” to block access to key orbital slots. AI would be a key asset in accomplishing this concept in a preventive way. Being able to process very large data accumulations to detect hostile action patterns invisible to intelligence analysts, AI offers a new early-warning set of capabilities to decision-makers on Earth.

Horses, dogs, and human warfighters

Mankind as a species has long been fighting in cooperation with other members of the animal kingdom. The cavalry, for instance, for centuries leveraged the synergic warfighting mix of the domesticated horse—Equus ferus caballus—and Homo sapiens. Dogs—Canis lupus familiaris—are another example, as the first species domesticated by our kind and thus long-accustomed to fighting at our side. The role of war dogs is not restricted to history books or ceremonies and parades: a Belgian Malinois took part in the US killing of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the founder of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), back in 2019. Another dog of the same breed operated alongside the American Navy Seals in 2011, during Operation Neptune Spear, to kill the mastermind behind the 9/11 terror attacks, al-Qaeda ringleader Osama bin Ladin.

Scientifically speaking, Homosapiens not only befriended horses and dogs—we neuroscientifically altered these domesticated species’ decision-making algorithms through selective breeding. Scientific experiments showcase that domesticated horses have learned to read human cues to adapt their behaviors. War dogs are the product of key manipulations via human intervention across generations of deliberate breeding. Magnetic resonance imaging studies have proven that through selective breeding over centuries, humans have significantly altered the brains of domestic dog lineages to achieve behavioral specialization, such as scent hunting or guard capabilities and tasks.

The advent of AI requires us to accept that human brains, like those of domesticated animals with military utility, have adapted and will continue to adapt in response to neural stimuli. Combat formations, ranging from mechanized divisions to fighter squadrons, function as the musculoskeletal frame of warfare, while the human decision-making system functions as the brains and neurons. Throughout military history, the brain and the limbs interacted with various ways of communications—be it trumpets of military bands ordering a line march or contemporary tactical data links of modern warfare sharing real-time updates between a fifth-generation aircraft and a frigate’s onboard systems. Homo sapienshas been at the very epicenter of the equation no matter what technological leaps have taken place and will adapt in unpredictable ways to being the slower and more marginal element in decision architecture. Drone warfare has not led to autonomous killer robots but to the rise of a new warrior class: drone operators with massive kill rates, seen both in Putin’s invading army and the Ukrainian military. The rise of hyperwars may produce even further change to the human role, though, as the biological brain races to compete with accelerating decision cycles and nonbiological elements that outpace us. Domesticating AI in warfare will prove more challenging than either dogs or horses, and it is not yet clear what would ensue if we were to design servants quicker and more agile than the masters.

Implications for US-Turkish defense cooperation

The United States and Turkey are not only the two largest militaries within NATO; they have the broadest and most combat-proven drone warfare prowess. Their robotic warfare solutions have been rising quickly in autonomous characteristics and have already reached the human-in-the-loop level in combat operations. In the coming decades, human-out-of-the-loop CONOPS (concepts of operations) will likely emerge for both the US and Turkish militaries. This common feature of defense technology and geopolitics presages a lucrative path for cooperating within the hyperwar environment.

Moreover, Washington and Ankara can enhance their respective collaborations with Ukraine, a nation with the most recent drone warfare experience against the Russian Federation—a direct threat to NATO member states, as officially manifested by the alliance’s incumbent strategic concept. The Ukrainian case extends to utilizing satellite internet connection in the C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) aspect of robotic warfare, as well as employing private satellite imagery in target acquisition widely.

Kyiv has already developed close defense ties with the United States and Turkey—even taking part in the latter’s drone proliferation, particularly in the engine segment (for example, Baykar’s Kizilelma). Establishing a trilateral lessons-learned mechanism, which would incorporate defense industries alongside government agencies, would boost such an effort.

Overall, hyperwar seems to be paradigm for future warfare. The United States and Turkey make it possible, and through collaboration perhaps likely, that NATO will retain the upper hand in the hyperwars of the future.

Can Kasapoglu is a non-resident senior fellow at Hudson Institute. Follow him on X @ckasapoglu1.

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How NATO’s eastern flank is setting the standard for collective defense

Justina Budginaite-Froehly — Fri, 30 May 2025 16:04:21 +0000

“I am glad to be in Vilnius today,” said German Chancellor Friedrich Merz on May 22. “Because it is right here, in Lithuania, where we are taking the defense of NATO’s eastern flank into our own hands.”

Merz was in Vilnius to formally inaugurate the 45^th Armored Brigade in Lithuania, which will embed German combat power at the heart of Baltic defense. Germany will implement a phased deployment—it sent advanced elements in early 2024 and formally activated the brigade on April 1. The brigade is expected to reach full combat readiness by 2027. Once complete, this will offer Lithuania and its neighbors a sustained, high-end deterrent anchored in the NATO framework.

But it’s not just Germany that is helping bolster the defenses of NATO’s strategically exposed eastern flank. The eastern flank countries themselves are implementing concrete measures to overcome Europe’s entrenched defense fragmentation. Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland—all located along the eastern border of both NATO and the European Union (EU) with mainland Russia, its Kaliningrad exclave, and Belarus—are emerging as leaders in bolstering regional defense integration, the benefits of which could extend throughout Europe. This shift is especially significant amid growing transatlantic tensions and renewed calls from the United States for Europe to assume greater responsibility for its own security and conventional defense.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, these countries have aligned their border protection efforts by integrating their counter-mobility measures. They have initiated the process of cooperatively developing deep-strike capabilities. They have also started the procurement process for German weapon systems, introduced the German defense industry to the region, and will soon host the first-ever permanently deployed German brigade. All these initiatives show that Europe’s defense efforts are well-positioned to grow together and consolidate from the epicenter in the northeast of the continent. By anchoring their defense planning in regional realities, the eastern flank countries are demonstrating that regional coordination, backed by political determination, can transform exposed vulnerabilities into strategic assets that enhance deterrence and operational readiness.

Integrating counter-mobility systems

Faced with growing geostrategic pressure along their borders with Russia and Belarus, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland have taken decisive, coordinated steps to reinforce border protection and defense. Increasingly aligned in their strategic approach, these countries are developing integrated fortification systems that form a continuous defensive line along the eastern border of NATO and the EU.

Two major initiatives launched in 2024—the Baltic Defense Line covering Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and Poland’s East Shield—share the common goal of strengthening deterrence and denying adversaries access to NATO and EU territory. These efforts include expanding existing forested areas, deepening drainage ditches, building engineering depots to store physical barriers such as “dragons’ teeth,” “hedgehogs,” “Spanish horse,” and solid concrete road barriers, as well as installing anti-tank landmines and mine-laying equipment. There are also plans for developing reinforcements with drone and anti-drone technologies. The overall goal is to ensure the two defense initiatives’ integrity, especially as they converge at the Suwałki Gap, a security chokepoint and the primary axis for NATO’s land reinforcement to the Baltic states.

Finland’s accession to NATO added 1,340 kilometers to the Alliance’s border with Russia. Unlike the more exposed terrain of the Baltic states and Poland, Finland’s border region is naturally defensive, dominated by forests, lakes, and wetlands, which would complicate a large-scale Russian ground incursion. Accordingly, Finland has chosen not to build physical fortifications along the border.

However, to reinforce deterrence and secure vulnerable segments, Finland aligned itself with the regional consensus by withdrawing from the Ottawa Convention banning the use of anti-personnel landmines. This means the eastern flank countries can jointly deploy and stockpile anti-personnel landmines as a shared border defense tool against Russia. Both Russia and Ukraine have used anti-personnel landmines in Ukraine.

The regional integration of border defense has triggered broader EU interest. Following Baltic and Polish calls for a collective response, the European Council’s conclusions on European defense, released on March 6, recognized the importance of EU border defense. The EU’s White Paper on Defense, published in late March, endorsed the idea of creating an “Eastern Border Shield” and in April, the European Parliament passed a resolution recognizing the East Shield and the Baltic Defense Line as flagship projects for common security. This momentum must now translate into concrete EU support—and funding—for transforming the eastern flank countries’ national efforts into a unified, layered European border defense architecture.

Coordinated development of deep strike capabilities

The Baltic states, Poland, and Finland are also integrating their long-range firepower into a regional deep-strike architecture, which significantly raises the threshold for aggression along the eastern flank of NATO and the EU.

Since Russia launched its full-scale war against Ukraine in 2022, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have each contracted High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) launchers and committed to trilateral cooperation with the United States on HIMARS integration, personnel training, system maintenance, and service. Embedding HIMARS into a joint operational concept will allow the Baltic states to conduct combined live-fire exercises and harmonize sustainment through shared maintenance, training, and logistics chains. Estonia’s six launchers, delivered in April, now reach well beyond four hundred kilometers. Lithuania’s eight launchers, due to arrive by 2026, will achieve a similar reach. Latvia is set to receive six launchers in 2027, which will complete the Baltic deep-strike firewall.

This Baltic cluster is dovetailing with Poland’s even larger “Homar-A” deep-strike program, under which some 486 additional HIMARS variants will be mounted on Polish Jelcz trucks and integrated into Poland’s Topaz command system. Together, Poland and the Baltic states are planning a joint logistics hub to manage munitions stockpiles, spare parts, and forward displacement. They are also planning to exercise joint targeting and coordinate fire support across borders.

Finland has opted to upgrade its M270 multiple-launch rocket systems rather than buy HIMARS. The upgrade, approved in 2023, allows Finnish M270s to fire the same munitions as their Baltic neighbors. This technical alignment transforms Finland’s forces into a seamless fourth pillar of the regional deep-strike ensemble, enabling integrated planning, data‐sharing, and cross-border reinforcement exercises.

By integrating US-provided launchers, coordinated doctrine, shared logistics, and interoperable fire-control standards, the five eastern flank nations are establishing a continuous, multi-tiered long-range fire network that spans from Finland to Poland. This network helps project deterrence and complicate adversary planning, solidifying a new level of collective defense integration on the eastern flank.

Regional consolidation with German weapon systems

The eastern flank countries have also deepened their partnerships with German weapon manufacturers. Lithuania is aligning its force modernization with the German brigade’s forward posture in the Baltics. In December, Lithuania’s defense ministry signed a €950 million contract with for forty-four Leopard 2 A8 main battle tanks—its first indigenous tank battalion—which will arrive through 2030, alongside an expanded fleet of twenty-seven additional Boxer “Vilkas” infantry fighting vehicles, which will arrive by 2029. Finland and Poland likewise use Leopard 2 variants, creating a shared main battle tank backbone across the eastern flank.

In the air defense domain, Estonia and Latvia will each field three IRIS-T surface-launched missile batteries this year, while Lithuania has bolstered its two national advanced surface-to-air missile systems (NASAMS) batteries (initially deployed in 2020) with additional systems due to arrive in 2026. To underpin sustained operations, German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall’s new NATO-standard 155 mm ammunition plant in Lithuania, scheduled to be online by mid-2026, will produce tens of thousands of shells annually, significantly enhancing regional munitions resilience.

In the defense innovation field, Lithuanian laser technology firm Aktyvus Photonics has partnered with German drone manufacturer Quantum Systems, having signed a memorandum of understanding on strategic collaboration in unmanned systems this month. Together, they will codevelop and field-test unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with laser capabilities, aiming to expedite deployment timelines and establish a standard for next-generation, networked unmanned systems in NATO’s eastern defenses.

Beyond procurement, production, and innovation, Lithuania has also positioned itself as a regional arms maintenance hub: Through the establishment of Lithuania Defense Services—a joint venture between Rheinmetall Landsysteme and French-German defense manufacturer KNDS—it provides repair, overhaul, and upgrade services for German vehicle platforms, including Boxer Vilkas IFVs, PzH 2000 howitzers, the Leopard main battle tank family, and tactical logistics vehicles.

Collectively, these deployments, procurements, and industrial partnerships do more than fill capability gaps: They forge a contiguous eastern flank defense ecosystem. By standardizing on German platforms, harmonizing training and logistics, co-locating production and repair facilities, and co-training under unified command structures, Finland, the Baltic states, and Poland, together with Germany, can achieve unprecedented interoperability and strategic depth. These initiatives are transforming NATO’s eastern flank into a seamless, multi-domain bulwark.

Strategic depth through regional alignment

The eastern flank’s transformation from a collection of fragmented national postures into a cohesive, multi-domain defense network exemplifies how sustained regional integration can overcome long-standing capability gaps. By aligning border defense, harmonizing long-range fires, and embedding German heavy armor and sustainment infrastructure, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are creating a continuous belt of deterrence that leverages shared doctrine, logistics, and industry. This holistic approach raises the cost of aggression and sets a new standard for European collective defense: one where interoperability and joint capacity-building replace duplication and dependency, anchoring strategic depth at NATO’s most exposed frontier.

Justina Budginaite-Froehly, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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Fiber optic drones could play decisive role in Russia’s summer offensive

David Kirichenko — Thu, 29 May 2025 18:48:59 +0000

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than three years ago, the war in Ukraine has been shaped by a technological arms race as both countries have struggled to achieve an innovative edge on the battlefield. While Ukraine’s dynamic tech sector and less cumbersome bureaucracy initially gave it the advantage, Russia may now be gaining the upper hand.

The weapon that is turning the tide in Russia’s favor is the rather humble-looking fiber optic drone. This variation on the first-person view (FPV) drones that have dominated the skies above the battlefield since 2022 may appear inconspicuous at first glance, but it is having a major impact on the front lines of the war and is expected to play a crucial role in Russia’s unfolding summer offensive.

As the name suggests, fiber optic drones are controlled by wire-thin cables linked to operators. Crucially, this makes them immune to the jamming systems that have become near-ubiquitous in the Russian and Ukrainian armies due to the rapid evolution of drone warfare. Thanks to their data-transporting cables, fiber optic drones benefit from improved video quality and can also operate at lower altitudes than their wireless counterparts, but it is their invulnerability to electronic jamming that makes them such a potentially game-changing weapon.

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There are some drawbacks to this kind of drone. Key problems include limited range and a tendency to become entangled in obstacles such as trees and pylons. Nevertheless, there is mounting recognition on both sides of the front lines and among international military observers that fiber optic drones are now indispensable. In a recent report, the BBC called these drones “the terrifying new weapon changing the war in Ukraine.” Meanwhile, the Washington Post noted that Moscow’s focus on fiber optic drones represents “the first time Russia has surpassed Ukraine in front-line drone technology since the full-scale invasion in 2022.”

The combat effectiveness of fiber optic drones became increasingly apparent amid heavy fighting in Russia’s Kursk region during the early months of 2025. Russia’s campaign to push Ukrainian forces out of the Kursk region used large numbers of fiber optic drones to attack Ukraine’s flanks, cut supply lines, and cripple Ukrainian logistics. This eventually forced Ukrainian troops to retreat, ending an extended incursion into Russian territory that had been hugely embarrassing for Vladimir Putin. Ukrainian troops who fought in Kursk later reported that the only thing capable of stopping fiber optic drones was bad weather.

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The technology behind fiber optic drones is no secret and is available to Ukraine as well as Russia. However, as is so often the case, Moscow benefits from weight of numbers and is looking to exploit its strengths. While Ukraine has experimented with a wide variety of drones produced by hundreds of different startup-style defense companies, Russia has concentrated its vast resources on the mass production of a relatively small number of specific weapons categories including fiber optic drones and shahed kamikaze drones. Moscow’s strategy is to focus on volume with the goal of overwhelming Ukraine’s defenses. Russia has also benefited from close ties with China, which is a key drone producer and ranks among the world’s leading suppliers of fiber optic cables.

Ukraine’s front line military commanders and the country’s tech sector developers recognize the growing importance of fiber optic drones and are now rapidly increasing production. However, they are currently lagging far behind Russia and have much work to do before they can catch up. It is a race Ukraine cannot afford to lose. One of the country’s largest drone manufacturers recently warned that if the current trajectory continues, Kyiv will soon be unable to defend against the sheer scale of Russia’s mass production.

Increased foreign investment in Ukraine’s defense industry could help close the gap. By financing the development and production of fiber optic drones, Ukraine’s international partners can put the country’s defenses on a firmer footing and enable the Ukrainian military to address the threat posed by Russia’s cable-connected drones. This trend has already been underway for some time, with more and more partner countries allocating funds for Ukrainian defense sector production. The challenge now is to channel this financing specifically toward fiber optic drones.

Time may not be on Ukraine’s side. The Russian army is currently in the early stages of a summer offensive that promises to be one of the largest and most ambitious of the entire war, with fighting already intensifying at various points along the front lines. If Putin’s commanders can implement the fiber optic drone tactics that proved so successful in the Kursk region, they may be able to finally overcome Ukraine’s dogged defenses and achieve a long-awaited breakthrough. In a war defined by attrition and innovation, Ukraine must now come up with urgent solutions to counter Russia’s fiber optic drone fleet.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Robert Soofer

Arms Control Defense Policy

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US-Ukraine minerals deal creates potential for economic and security benefits

Svitlana Kovalchuk — Tue, 20 May 2025 20:50:09 +0000

The Ukrainian parliament ratified a landmark economic partnership agreement with the United States in early May, setting the stage for a new chapter in bilateral relations between Kyiv and Washington. The minerals deal envisages long-term cooperation in the development of Ukrainian natural resources. It marks an historic shift in Ukraine’s status from aid recipient to economic partner, while potentially paving the way for the attraction of strategic investments that could help fuel the country’s recovery.

The agreement was widely welcomed in Kyiv. Ukraine’s Minister of Economy and First Deputy Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko called the deal “the foundation of a new model of interaction with a key strategic partner,” and noted that the Reconstruction Investment Fund within the framework of the agreement would be operational within a matter of weeks. “Its success will depend on the level of US engagement,” she emphasized.

This deal isn’t just about mining and investment. It is a new kind of partnership that combines economic cooperation with security interests. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, who played a key role in negotiating the terms of the agreement, said the minerals deal was a signal to Americans that the United States could “be partners in the success of the Ukrainian people.” Others have stressed that the partnership will allow the US to recoup the billions spent supporting Ukraine in the war against Russia. However, the deal isn’t primarily about reimbursement. It is a declaration of a strategic alliance rooted in mutual economic interest.

The new agreement between Kyiv and Washington differs greatly from classic concession deals as Ukraine retains full ownership of national natural resources while the Reconstruction Investment Fund will be under joint management. Unlike more traditional trade deals or resource acquisitions, this is a strategic agreement that combines commercial objectives with geopolitical interests, making it a textbook example of economic statecraft. By establishing military aid as a form of capital investment, the United States is securing a long-term stake in Ukraine’s security and the management of the country’s resources.

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The minerals deal with Ukraine offers a number of obvious potential advantages for the United States. Crucially, it ensures preferential access to rare and highly valued natural resources like lithium and titanium, thereby reducing dependency on China. This is a strategic win for Washington with the possibility of significant long-term geopolitical implications. The deal also creates a framework for further US military aid to be treated as an investment via the Reconstruction Investment Fund, providing opportunities for the United States to benefit economically from continued support for Ukraine.

By signing a long-term resource-sharing agreement, the United States is also sending an important signal to Moscow about its commitment to Ukraine. Any US investments in line with the minerals deal will involve a significant American financial and physical presence in Ukraine, including in areas that are close to the current front lines of the war. Advocates of the deal believe this could help deter further Russian aggression. Kremlin officials are also doubtless aware that around forty percent of Ukraine’s critical mineral reserves are located in regions currently under Russian occupation.

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There are fears that the mineral deal makes Ukraine too dependent on the United States and leaves the country unable to manage its own resources independently. Some critics have even argued that it is a form of dependency theory in action, with Ukraine’s mineral wealth set to primarily fuel the needs of US industry rather than building up the country’s domestic economy. However, advocates argue that Ukraine was able to negotiate favorable terms that create a credible partnership, while also potentially securing valuable geopolitical benefits.

The agreement provides the US with a form of priority access but not exclusivity. Specifically, the US is granted the right to be informed about investment opportunities in critical minerals and to negotiate purchase rights under market conditions. However, the framework of the agreement explicitly respects Ukraine’s commitments to the EU, ensuring that European companies can still compete for resource access.

In terms of implementation, it is important to keep practical challenges in mind. The identification, mining, and processing of mineral resources is not a short-term business with immediate payoffs. On the contrary, it could take between one and two decades to fully develop many of Ukraine’s most potentially profitable mines. Without a sustainable peace, it will be very difficult to secure the investment necessary to access Ukraine’s resources. Without investment, the Reconstruction Investment Fund risks becoming an empty gesture rather than an economic powerhouse.

The minerals deal has the potential to shift the dynamics of the war while shaping the US-Ukrainian relationship for years to come. The United States is not only investing in resources, it is also investing in influence. Viewed from Washington, the agreement is less about producing quick payoffs and more about allowing President Trump to make a statement to US citizens and to the Russians. For Ukraine, the minerals deal provides a boost to bilateral relations and creates opportunities for a new economic partnership. America’s strategic rivals will be watching closely to see how this partnership now develops.

Svitlana Kovalchuk is Executive Director at Yalta European Strategy (YES).

If these companies are forced to close, skilled professionals will seek employment abroad. This could lead to the leakage of knowledge and technologies. Meanwhile, with NATO countries likely to be focused on their own defense industries and strategic priorities, it is reasonable to assume that many Ukrainian defense sector companies will concentrate on exporting to more volatile regions. The potentially destabilizing impact of these trends is obvious. It is therefore vital to adopt effective measures to limit the spread of Ukrainian defense sector technologies, data, and finished products along with skilled developers, engineers, and operators to potential conflict zones around the world.

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Ukraine’s defense sector innovations fall into two categories. The first includes innovations that are easily replicated using readily available technologies. The second category features more complex systems requiring skilled professionals. It makes little sense to focus regulatory efforts on the first category. Instead, preventing proliferation is more effectively managed through intelligence operations and security measures. Preventative efforts should focus on those innovations that are more complex in both development and deployment.

Efforts to prevent Ukrainian defense technologies from fueling conflicts around the world will depend to a significant degree on enforcement. While Ukraine has made some progress in combating corruption over the past decade, this remains a major issue, particularly in the country’s dramatically expanded defense sector. A successful approach to limiting the spread of Ukrainian defense tech know-how should therefore incorporate a combination of positive and negative incentives.

Positive incentives can include opening up NATO markets to Ukrainian companies and supporting their efforts to comply with NATO standards. This would likely encourage a broader culture of compliance throughout the Ukrainian defense tech sector as companies sought to access the world’s most lucrative client base.

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Creating the conditions for the acquisition of Ukrainian companies by major international defense industry players could help to encourage a responsible corporate culture among Ukrainian companies while bolstering the country’s position globally. Likewise, enhanced access to funding and a simplified route to work visas and citizenship in the EU and US would help attract and retain talent. This would further strengthen Ukraine’s defense sector and encourage corporate compliance.

Professional organizations also have a potential role to play. Promoting the development of robust industry and professional associations for Ukrainians in the defense sector would encourage collaboration, knowledge sharing, and the establishment of industry standards, which could further propel innovation and growth within Ukraine’s defense industry, while creating a climate more conducive to regulation. Regulatory measures could include enhanced access to Western defense markets, with strict penalties for non-compliance.

Targeted export controls are another important measure. By establishing robust controls over critical components such as processors and specialized equipment, Ukraine can limit the availability of these technologies in regions with high conflict potential. Enhanced monitoring mechanisms should be implemented to track the transfer of technologies and the movement of skilled personnel. International cooperation is also crucial. Ukraine should look to work closely with global partners to synchronize regulatory standards and enforcement strategies, thereby reducing the challenges presented by regions with weak legal mechanisms.

Ukraine is now recognized internationally as a leading defense tech innovator in areas including AI solutions, cyber security, and drone warfare. There is huge global appetite for such technologies, but unregulated distribution could have disastrous consequences for international security. By combining enforceable regulatory measures with strategic incentives, it is possible to reduce the risks associated with the spread of Ukraine’s wartime innovations, while simultaneously maintaining an environment that supports ongoing innovation and growth in a controlled and secure manner.

Vitaliy Goncharuk is a US-based tech entrepreneur with Ukrainian roots who previously served as Chairman of the Artificial Intelligence Committee of Ukraine from 2019 to 2022.

Drone superpower: Ukrainian wartime innovation offers lessons for NATO

David Kirichenko — Tue, 13 May 2025 21:10:46 +0000

Ever since the onset of Russian aggression against Ukraine eleven years ago, military training has been a core element of Western support for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. As Moscow’s invasion has escalated into the largest European war since World War II, the relationship between Ukraine and the country’s partners has become much more of a two-way street. While Ukrainian troops continue to train with Western instructors, it is now increasingly apparent that NATO also has a lot to learn from Ukraine.

The Ukrainian military has evolved dramatically during the past three years of full-scale war against Russia to become the largest and most effective fighting force in Europe. Innovation has played a key role in this process, with Ukraine relying on the country’s vibrant tech sector and traditionally strong defense industry to counter Russia’s overwhelming advantages in terms of both manpower and firepower. This has resulted in an army capable of developing and implementing the latest military technologies at speeds that are unmatched by any Western countries with their far more bureaucratic procurement cycles.

Ukraine’s innovative approach to defense is most immediately obvious in the country’s ability to produce and deploy a wide variety of drones. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, the experience of the Ukrainian army has underlined the growing dominance of drones on the modern battlefield, and has redefined our understanding of drone warfare in ways that will shape military doctrines around the world for many years to come.

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The most important tools in Ukraine’s unmanned arsenal are the country’s growing fleet of First Person View (FPV) drones. These drones in many ways function as the infantry of drone warfare. They have become a central pillar of Ukraine’s war effort, inflicting up to 80 percent of Russian battlefield casualties and making it possible to hold the line even when Ukrainian troops have found themselves starved of artillery shells.

Ukrainian production of FPV drones has mushroomed in recent years, with domestic companies also gradually moving away from an initial reliance on imported components. By early 2025, Ukraine was reportedly producing 200,000 FPV drones per month. Cheap to manufacture, they are capable of destroying tanks and other military equipment worth millions of dollars.

Russia is also relentlessly adapting to technological changes on the battlefield, creating a daily race to innovate that runs in parallel to the actual fighting on the front lines of the war. The dominance of FPV drones has led to a variety of countermeasures, ranging from the widespread use of netting and so-called “cope cages,” to increasingly sophisticated electronic blocking and the jamming of signals. In response, both Russia and Ukraine are turning to fiber optic drones that are not susceptible to jamming technologies.

As the full-scale war approaches a fourth summer, the evolution of drone tactics continues. Over the past year, Ukraine has sought to establish a 15-kilometer kill zone patrolled by drones along the front lines of the conflict, making it extremely challenging to concentrate troops for major offensive operations. The strength of Ukraine’s so-called “drone wall” defenses will be severely tested in the coming few months by Russia’s ongoing offensive. Building on Ukraine’s experience, NATO is reportedly exploring the idea of creating a “drone wall” of its own on the alliance’s eastern flank.

Beyond the front lines, Ukraine has developed an expanding fleet of long-range drones capable of striking targets deep inside Russia. This has made it possible to carry out a wide range of attacks on Russian military bases, ammunition storage facilities, air defenses, and Putin’s economically vital but vulnerable oil and gas industry. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has called the country’s growing long range capabilities “a clear and effective guarantee of Ukraine’s security.”

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Ukrainian drone innovations are also transforming naval warfare. During the first two years of the war, Ukraine used marine drones to target Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, sinking or damaging multiple warships and forcing the remainder to retreat from Russian-occupied Crimea. This remarkable success made it possible to lift the naval blockade on Ukrainian ports and reopen commercial maritime routes, providing Kyiv with a vital economic lifeline.

More recently, Ukraine has begun using naval drones as launch platforms for missiles and smaller unmanned systems. The results have been spectacular. In January 2025, missile-armed Ukrainian naval drones reportedly destroyed several Russian helicopters over the Black Sea. In another world first, Ukrainian officials announced in early May that they had shot down two Russian fighter jets using marine drones equipped with anti-aircraft missile systems.

Ukrainian military planners are now working on a range of unmanned ground systems as they look to take drone warfare to the next level. With support from the country’s government-backed defense tech cluster Brave1, work is underway to develop dozens of robotic models capable of performing a variety of combat and logistical tasks. In December 2024, Ukrainian forces claimed to have made history by conducting the world’s first fully unmanned assault on Russian positions using ground-based robotic systems and FPV drones.

Speaking in April 2025, Ukraine’s former commander in chief Valeriy Zaluzhniy underlined how his country’s use of new technologies was transforming the battlefield. “The Russian-Ukrainian War has completely changed the nature of warfare,” he commented. Zaluzhniy predicted that the wars of the future would be won by countries that focus their resources on the development of drones, electronic warfare, and artificial intelligence. “It is obvious that victory on the battlefield now depends entirely on the ability to outpace the enemy in technological development,” he noted.

Western leaders and military commanders are clearly taking note of the remarkable progress made by the Ukrainian Armed Forces since 2022. Many are now incorporating Ukraine’s unique battlefield experience into their own programs, while NATO members including Britain and Denmark are reportedly already receiving training in drone warfare from Ukrainian military instructors. This is likely to be just the beginning, as more countries seek to benefit from Ukrainian expertise.

For many years, it has been customary to view Ukraine as being almost entirely dependent on Western aid and know-how for its survival. This was always an oversimplification; it is now hopelessly outdated. In reality, today’s Ukraine is a drone superpower with an innovative domestic defense industry that can provide its NATO allies with important lessons in the realities of twenty-first century warfare.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Forward Defense’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare aims to digitally transform the armed forces for success in future battlefields. Comprised of a distinguished group of subject-matter and industry commissioners, the Commission has developed a framework to enhance US and allied forces through emergent digital capabilities.

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Hinote and Parker in Breaking Defense on the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare

Atlantic Council — Fri, 02 May 2025 16:00:00 +0000

On May 2, Breaking Defense published an article by retired Lt Gen Clinton Hinote and Nathan Parker, Commissioners on Forward Defense‘s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare, emphasizing the urgent need for the Department of Defense to prioritize agile, testable software development practices. Drawing on findings from the Commission’s final report, the authors argue that software is now a decisive element in military advantage and call for immediate cultural and institutional shifts within the Pentagon to meet this strategic imperative.

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Putin confirms North Korean troops are fighting for Russia against Ukraine

Olivia Yanchik — Thu, 01 May 2025 20:43:55 +0000

More than six months after the story was first reported, Russian President Vladimir Putin has officially confirmed the presence of North Korean troops in Russia’s war against Ukraine. “We will always honor the Korean heroes who gave their lives for Russia, for our common freedom, on an equal basis with their Russian brothers in arms,” he commented on April 27.

Putin’s announcement was mirrored by similar official confirmation from the North Korean side. Pyongyang praised the “heroic feats” of North Korean troops fighting alongside the Russian army in a front page article published by the state-run Rodong Sinmun newspaper last weekend.

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Claims of North Korean troops participating in Russia’s war against Ukraine first began to circulate in October 2024. However, the Kremlin initially denied the North Korean presence, with Russian officials remaining tight-lipped on the subject until late April.

Moscow and Pyongyang appear to have coordinated their recent statements, indicating that both partners felt the time was now right to confirm the involvement of North Korean forces in Russia’s war. Official confirmation came as Putin proclaimed the defeat of Ukrainian forces in Russia’s Kursk region, where the bulk of North Korean soldiers are believed to have been deployed.

Moscow’s decision to confirm the presence of North Korean soldiers after months of denials could prove damaging to the Kremlin’s credibility at a time when questions are already being asked over Russia’s commitment to US-led peace talks to end the war in Ukraine. In recent days, US President Donald Trump has signaled his mounting frustration with Putin’s apparent stalling tactics, and has suggested that the Russian leader may be “tapping” him along.

The appearance of North Korean troops alongside their Russian counterparts on the front lines of the war against Ukraine represents the latest stage in a deepening military alliance between the two countries. North Korea has been supplying Russia with significant quantities of military aid since the early stages of the war in 2022. Deliveries have included millions of artillery shells as well as ballistic missiles, which have been used to devastating effect against Ukrainian cities.

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North Korea’s direct participation in the war against Ukraine is a watershed moment in modern European history. It is also widely seen an indication of the Russian army’s mounting recruitment issues.

While the Kremlin still has vast untapped reserves of available manpower to call upon, Putin is thought to be deeply reluctant to conduct a new mobilization due to fears of a possible domestic backlash inside Russia. This is making it increasingly challenging to replenish the depleted ranks of his invading army amid continued heavy losses.

For much of the war, Putin has relied on a combination of recruits drawn from Russia’s prison population and volunteer soldiers attracted by generous financial incentives that are typically many times higher than average Russian salaries. However, with the Russian army now reportedly averaging over a thousand casualties per day, it is becoming more difficult to find sufficient manpower to maintain the momentum of offensive operations in Ukraine.

So far, the North Korean contingent has seen action inside the Russian Federation itself amid fierce battles to push Ukrainian forces out of Russia’s Kursk region. However, with their participation now publicly confirmed by both Moscow and Pyongyang, officials in Kyiv are voicing concerns that North Korean troops could soon be redeployed to Ukrainian territory. This would represent a dangerous international escalation with unpredictable consequences for the wider region.

North Korea has now firmly established itself as one of the Kremlin’s most important allies in the invasion of Ukraine. Pyongyang’s involvement began with the supply of artillery shells and has expanded to include ballistic missiles and large numbers of combat troops. This comprehensive military support is enabling Russia to sustain the current war effort.

Ukraine’s allies are still searching for a suitable reaction to the expanding North Korean military presence on Europe’s eastern frontier. Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has called for the strengthening of sanctions against Russia and North Korea, while also warning that the Koreans are gaining valuable experience of modern warfare in Ukraine that could have grave implications for international security. In the absence of an overwhelming Western response, it seems safe to assume that North Korea’s involvement in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will continue to deepen.

Olivia Yanchik is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

US officials do not believe the recently captured fighters have direct ties to the Chinese government, Reuters reports. However, there are mounting concerns in Washington and other Western capitals over reports that Beijing is sending army officers to observe the Russian invasion of Ukraine in a bid to learn tactical lessons from the war. This could provide the Chinese military with important insights into drone warfare and the rapidly changing nature of the modern battlefield.

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In a further indication of growing frustration in Kyiv over China’s alleged support for Russia’s invasion, Zelenskyy recently accused Chinese citizens of working at a Russian manufacturing plant producing drones for the war in Ukraine. In the past month, the Ukrainian authorities have also imposed sanctions on three Chinese companies for alleged involvement in the production of Iskander ballistic missiles, which Russia often uses in the war against Ukraine.

The most serious Ukrainian allegations came in the middle of April, when Zelenskyy claimed that China was now supplying weapons and gunpowder to Russia. This was the first time the Ukrainian leader had openly accused Beijing of providing Moscow with direct military assistance. Although, last fall US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell had also suggested that China was providing Russia with technology that was “not dual-use capabilities,” contributing directly to Russia’s war production.

Claims of expanding Chinese involvement in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine do not come as a complete surprise. After all, China has long been seen as one of the Kremlin’s key allies and has emerged over the past decade as Moscow’s most important economic partner.

On the eve of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, China and Russia declared a “no limits” partnership. Over the past three years, the two countries have repeatedly underlined their shared geopolitical vision, which includes a commitment to ending the era of US dominance and ushering in a new multipolar world order. These strengthening ties have been further highlighted by a number of bilateral summit meetings between the Russian and Chinese leaders.

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Despite its close relations with Moscow, China has officially adopted a neutral stance toward Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This has included refraining from any overt gestures of support and publicly backing calls for peace. Nevertheless, Beijing has faced accusations of enabling the Russian war effort in important ways through the provision of restricted items including sanctioned components and dual-use technologies used in the production of missiles, tanks, and aircraft. By providing the vast majority of these exports to Russia, US officials believe that China has helped Russia greatly boost its arsenal and ramp up military production.

US officials have also alleged that China is providing Russia with geospatial intelligence to aid the invasion of Ukraine.

Claims of growing Chinese involvement are fueling speculation that this could lead to a possible international escalation in Russia’s war against Ukraine. There is also alarm over what Russia may be providing in exchange for Chinese support. US officials have alleged that China is receiving unprecedented access to highly sophisticated Russian defense technologies. The US Congress has also suggested that the Kremlin could be providing China with critical knowledge about the vulnerabilities of Western weapons systems based on combat experience acquired in Ukraine.

While Beijing has denied providing any material support for Moscow’s war, there is no question that the geopolitical partnership between China and Russia has reached new levels against the backdrop of the conflict.

With the United States now looking to reduce its involvement in European security, opportunities may soon emerge for China to play a greater role in peace efforts to end the war. However, Beijing would first need to align its actions with its words to convince Kyiv that it is a plausible peacemaker rather than a Russian ally.

Katherine Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Editor’s note: This article was updated on April 30, 2025, to clarify that reports of Chinese support for Russia’s war effort have been persistent before Kyiv’s recent accusations.

To fund US military modernization, Congress needs to pass on-time annual defense budgets

Jongsun Kim — Tue, 29 Apr 2025 20:26:53 +0000

On April 7, US President Donald Trump and US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth made clear their ambitions: a one-trillion-dollar budget by fiscal year (FY) 2026 to fund a modern, agile, and globally competitive military. This is an ambitious goal, but if current funding trends hold, that future is far from guaranteed. Despite ongoing threats and bold declarations from the White House and the Pentagon, defense modernization is being squeezed by flat budgets, rising personnel costs, and a Congress that for more than a quarter century has failed to deliver predictable, on-time annual appropriations, which are essential for sustained military investment.

Look at what happened as recently as last month. In early March, Congress passed the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2025, a stopgap measure that locks the Pentagon into last year’s funding levels with only a modest $6.1 billion—or 0.7 percent—increase in defense funding, bringing the total to $892.5 billion. However, after accounting for inflation and rising personnel costs, this amounts to a cut in real terms. The total also falls more than $2.5 billion short of the Biden administration’s earlier $895.2 billion request for FY 2025.

Trump and Hegseth have floated a one-trillion-dollar topline for FY 2026, with congressional Republicans backing projections that hit that mark by 2031. But projections alone won’t modernize the force. The longer Congress relies on continuing resolutions, the further the Pentagon is likely to drift from the trillion-dollar goal.

Talk big, fund small

The biggest casualty of flat budgets is modernization. Of the $6.1 billion increase under the FY 2025 continuing resolution, more than $5.6 billion is consumed by rising personnel costs—including a 4.5 percent military pay raise and a 10 percent bump for junior enlisted. While these expenses are core to sustaining force readiness and quality of life for junior enlisted military personnel, they leave scant room for investment in next-generation weapon systems, shipbuilding, and advanced technology—all of which are needed to counter and deter future global threats.

Moreover, modernization and procurement budgets took hits in the latest continuing resolution—down $7.1 billion and $4.6 billion, respectively, compared to FY 2024. This isn’t a future-proofing strategy. It’s triage. And it reinforces a hard truth: the Pentagon is being forced to choose between readiness now and capabilities tomorrow.

As a result of this approach by Congress, a chasm has emerged between what the Pentagon says it needs and what Congress has been able to fund. Even with increased flexibilities granted under this continuing resolution, including fewer restrictions on program-level spending, the Pentagon cannot modernize on cruise control without deliberate and sustained investment. Without real growth in the defense topline, any flexibility becomes a license to reshuffle limited dollars, not expand capabilities.

Strategic signals, budget headwinds

Additionally, the Trump administration’s early moves—deployments to the southern border and near the Panama Canal, counter-narcotics operations, and a reorientation of posture toward homeland defense and regional security initiatives—highlight a shift in defense priorities. But these actions are being underwritten by a budget that isn’t built for strategic transformation.

This spring, the Trump administration’s FY 2026 request is expected to better reflect the new administration’s priorities, since the current budget was mostly shaped by the previous administration and major changes take time to fully appear. One key area to watch is its proposed $50 billion reallocation plan, redirecting funds from “noncritical” areas toward defense programs such as nuclear modernization, missile defense, drone technology, autonomous weapons, and cybersecurity. The Trump administration likely considers these activities necessary to bolster border security and strengthen US military capabilities in response to perceived threats to the homeland.

Regardless of the merits of using defense dollars and personnel for homeland security efforts, without a significant increase in overall funding, the administration will face tough choices between delivering on these priorities and meeting modernization and readiness goals.

The path forward: Congress holds the key

None of this is sustainable without a timely and predictable appropriations process. Even after making tough trade-offs, the Department of Defense cannot sustain modernization, support military pay raises, and reinvigorate domestic policy initiatives without meaningful real-term growth in its overall budget topline.

While continuing resolutions offer short-term stability, they erode long-term planning and procurement. They lock in outdated funding priorities, stall new projects and procurement efforts before they begin, and limit the Defense Department’s capacity to invest in multi-year efforts that benefit from future financial predictability. When the Department of Defense has to begin the fiscal year without an annual appropriations bill in place, it can lead to training disruptions due to uncertainty over available resources, as well as deferred equipment and facility maintenance, which can cause backlogs and increase long-term costs. It can also cause delays in awarding new contracts, affecting industrial base stability and workforce planning. Continuing resolutions also lead to cost inefficiencies from operating under constrained funding and require higher costs to “catch up” later. These stopgap measures also risk a gradual degradation of military readiness from the inability to execute planned operations, training, and maintenance. Even omnibus bills, often seen as a compromise, fall short of the predictability and purchasing power that full-year appropriations—enacted before the start of a fiscal year—offer. Relying on omnibus bills creates uncertainty for long-term modernization efforts and reduces the Defense Department’s ability to plan, start contracts, and invest early in the fiscal year.

The Pentagon needs more than authority and increased flexibility—it needs actual dollars. Timely appropriations passed by Congress are essential to making that possible. Yet persistent delays have become the norm rather than the exception. Without consistent, meaningful, and sustained funding, modernization will remain an ambition rather than a battlefield reality. The one-trillion-dollar vision for the defense budget may serve short-term political goals, but absent decisive and urgent action by Congress, the numbers won’t add up.

One important step Congress can take each year is to pass the annual defense appropriations bill on time, fulfilling its constitutional duty to fund essential government programs and defense functions that serve the national interest. A timely and focused appropriations bill would restore predictability to the budget process and enhance the capacity of the defense industrial base. It would also give military leaders the certainty they need to plan, build, and make more effective long-term investments across administrations.

Congress holds the keys. The question is whether it has the political will to turn them.

Jongsun A. Kim is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a former deputy comptroller for budget and appropriations affairs at the Department of Defense.

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Ukraine’s innovative army can help Europe defend itself against Russia

David Kirichenko — Thu, 24 Apr 2025 21:39:48 +0000

When Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he cited Ukraine’s “demilitarization” as one of his two key war aims. He has not yet succeeded in achieving this goal, to put it mildly. Rather than disarming Ukraine, Putin’s invasion has actually transformed the country into one of Europe’s most formidable military powers.

The emergence of the Ukrainian army as a serious international fighting force can be traced back to the beginning of Russia’s invasion in 2014. At the time, decades of neglect and corruption had left Ukraine virtually defenseless. With the country’s existence under threat, a program of military modernization was rapidly adopted. During the following years, the Ukrainian Armed Forces expanded dramatically and implemented a series of far-reaching reforms in line with NATO standards.

Following the full-scale Russian invasion of February 2022, the transformation of the Ukrainian military entered a new phase. The number of men and women in uniform swelled to around one million, making the Ukrainian army by far the largest in Europe. They have been backed by a domestic defense industry that has grown by orders of magnitude over the past three years and now accounts for around 40 percent of Ukraine’s military needs.

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For today’s Ukraine, a strong domestic defense sector is now a matter of national survival. During the initial stages of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian authorities relied heavily on military aid from the country’s partners. This support helped enable Ukraine’s early victories but was also often subject to prolonged delays that left Kyiv vulnerable to changing political priorities in various Western capitals.

The need for greater military self-sufficiency has been underlined in recent months by the return of US President Donald Trump to the White House. The new US leader has made clear that he does not intend to maintain United States military support for Ukraine, and plans instead to downgrade the overall American commitment to European security. This shift in US policy has confirmed the wisdom of Ukraine’s earlier decision to prioritize the expansion of the country’s domestic defense industry.

Ukraine’s growing military capabilities owe much to a defense tech revolution that has been underway in the country since 2022. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion, hundreds of Ukrainian companies have begun producing innovative new technologies for the military ranging from software to combat drones. By focusing on relatively simple and affordable defense tech solutions, Ukraine has been able to close the gap on Russia despite Moscow’s often overwhelming advantages in terms of manpower, firepower, and resources.

Eurasia Center events

Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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More than three years since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, it is now clear that wartime necessity has transformed Ukraine into perhaps the most agile and experimental military ecosystem in the world. Whereas Western arms procurement cycles typically span several years, Ukraine can translate ideas into operational weapons within the space of just a few months. This has helped establish Ukraine as a global leader in drone warfare. The country’s use of inexpensive FPV drones is increasingly defining the modern battlefield and now accounts for approximately 80 percent of all Russian casualties.

Ukraine’s domestic drone production capacity is growing at a remarkable rate. According to the country’s Deputy Defense Minister Ivan Havryliuk, Ukrainian forces are currently receiving approximately 200,000 drones per month, a tenfold increase on the figure from just one year ago. Kyiv is also making rapid progress in the development of numerous other cutting edge military technologies including robotic systems, marine drones, and cruise missiles.

Ukraine’s dramatically expanded armed forces and groundbreaking defense tech sector make the country an indispensable partner for Europe. After decades of reliance on US security support, European leaders currently find themselves confronted with the new political realities of an isolationist United States and an expansionist Russia. In this uncertain environment, it makes good sense for Europe to upgrade its support for the Ukrainian army while deepening collaboration with Ukrainian defense tech companies.

European investment in the Ukrainian defense industry is already on the rise, both in terms of government donor funds and private sector investment. This trend looks set to intensify in the coming months as Ukrainians and their European partners increasingly acknowledge that their collective future security depends on closer cooperation. Russia’s invasion has forced Ukraine to become a major military power and a leading defense tech innovator. This status looks set to guarantee the country a position at the heart of Europe’s security architecture for many years to come.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Robert Soofer

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Arms Control Defense Policy

Staff

Mark J. Massa

Deputy Director

Defense Policy National Security

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Axios on the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare final report

Atlantic Council — Wed, 23 Apr 2025 16:00:00 +0000

On April 23, Colin Demarest of Axios published an article mentioning Forward Defense‘s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare report, highlighting how the report reflects growing pressure, both within and outside the Pentagon, to smartly adopt software. The piece suggests that Domino Data Lab’s recent $16.5 million dollar AI contract may be evidence that this pressure is beginning to yield results.

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National Defense reports on the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare final report

Atlantic Council — Tue, 22 Apr 2025 20:00:00 +0000

On April 22, Joanna Ye of National Defense published an article highlighting the key recommendations from Forward Defense’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare report. Entitled “Reforming Pentagon Software Practices Key to Countering Threats, Report Finds,” the article emphasizes the Commission’s hope that, by adopting its recommendations, the Department of Defense can enhance its capabilities and preserve the United States’ strategic advantage.

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The Ukrainian army is now Europe’s most credible security guarantee

Pavlo Verkhniatskyi — Thu, 17 Apr 2025 21:22:52 +0000

Ever since the first months of Russia’s full-scale invasion in spring 2022, Kyiv has played host to a steady stream of visiting European officials eager to demonstrate their support for Ukraine. With the war now in its fourth year, there are growing signs that this relationship is evolving and becoming more balanced. While Kyiv continues to rely on European aid, it is increasingly clear that Ukraine also has much to offer and can play a major part in the future security of Europe.

Following his return to the White House in January, US President Donald Trump has initiated a dramatic shift in United States foreign policy that has left many in Europe unsure of the transatlantic alliance and keen to ramp up their own defense capabilities. This geopolitical instability is also encouraging European policymakers to rethink Ukraine’s role in the defense of the continent. With unparalleled combat experience and proven ability to scale up arms production at relatively low cost, Ukraine is in many ways the ideal partner for European countries as they confront the twin challenges of an expansionist Russia and an isolationist US.

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Ukraine’s defense industry has grown at a remarkably rapid rate since 2022 and is now capable of meeting approximately 40 percent of the country’s military needs. The segment that has attracted the most international attention so far is drone production, with Ukraine widely recognized as a global leader in drone warfare. It requires a careful approach in order to identify the few true gems from among the hundreds of Ukrainian companies currently producing over a million of drones per year, but the potential for groundbreaking advances in drone technologies is obvious.

In order to make the most of this potential, Ukraine must first safeguard its survival as an independent nation. Looking ahead, a key challenge for the Ukrainian authorities will be creating the kind of business climate that can enable the country’s emerging defense industry to prosper in a postwar environment that is likely to feature declining defense budgets.

At present, many Ukrainian defense sector companies are moving production to locations outside Ukraine due to a combination of factors including export bans and a lack of financing options inside the country. The most elegant solution to this problem is to promote more defense sector partnerships with Ukraine’s European allies.

Eurasia Center events

Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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During the first few years of Russia’s full-scale invasion, security cooperation between Ukraine and the country’s partners was generally a one-way street, with weapons and ammunition flowing to Kyiv. More recently, a new model has emerged involving Western countries funding production at Ukrainian defense companies. This approach is efficient and strategically sound. It boosts Ukraine militarily and economically, while also taking advantage of the country’s strengths as a cost-effective and innovative arms producer. However, it lacks long-term appeal for Ukraine’s partners.

Establishing joint ventures between Ukrainian and European defense companies may be a more attractive and sustainable format. This would be a financially attractive way of fueling Europe’s rearmament, and would allow participating companies to build on a wide range of potential research and development synergies. Setting up production facilities in wartime Ukraine would clearly involve an element of risk, but this need not necessarily be a deal breaker if sensible security measures are implemented.

The scope for such joint ventures is huge. Indeed, it would make good sense to invest in specialized business and science parks providing the full range of related services and industry expertise. Initially, jointly produced equipment could be fast-tracked to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Further down the line, output could also be exported to partner countries and global markets. The growth of joint ventures would significantly improve Ukraine’s defensive potential and enhance the country’s ability to shield Europe from the Russian threat.

An ambitious European rearmament plan is currently taking shape that could significantly accelerate the integration of Ukraine’s defense industry. For this to happen, a number of regulatory and operational issues must first be resolved in Kyiv, Brussels, and various European capitals. While Ukraine can undoubtedly make a meaningful contribution to European security, the continent’s political complexities are particularly pronounced when it comes to defense budgets and procurement policies. It will require a degree of pragmatism to dismantle bureaucratic hurdles and overcome narrow national interests.

As European leaders adapt to radical shifts in the geopolitical landscape, Kyiv is ideally positioned to help the continent address its most pressing security needs. Ukraine’s army is by far the largest in Europe and has unique experience of modern warfare. It is backed by a domestic arms industry that is growing at a phenomenal rate while benefiting from an innovative startup culture that is transforming the twenty-first century battlefield. With sufficient international funding and technological cooperation, the Ukrainian defense sector can serve as a cornerstone of Europe’s security architecture for decades to come.

Pavlo Verkhniatskyi is managing partner of COSA, co-founder of Fincord-Polytech Science Park, and advisor to the Defense Group at the Ukraine Facility Platform.

Defense Acquisition University on the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare final report

Atlantic Council — Fri, 11 Apr 2025 19:00:00 +0000

On April 11, Defense Acquisition University (DAU) published an article entitled “Finding the Way on Software-Defined Warfare,” highlighting the enterprise-level challenges identified in Forward Defense‘s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare report, along with the report’s nine key recommendations. The article also explores how DAU supports the Commission’s proposals, particularly by providing training programs to cultivate software talent and by providing entry points for the acquisition workforce to stay informed on emerging developments.

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General Kevin P. Chilton in Air & Space Forces Magazine

Atlantic Council — Thu, 10 Apr 2025 18:04:34 +0000

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On April 4, Forward Defense distinguished fellow Kevin P. Chilton was featured in an Air & Space Forces article by Greg Hadley entitled, “Space Superiority Takes Center Stage.” Gen. Chilton is cited arguing for more “openness, saying there cannot be deterrent value in having offensive capabilities in space if the Space Force isn’t allowed to talk about the topic.”

Fellow

Kevin P. Chilton

Distinguished Fellow

Cybersecurity Defense Industry

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Win fast or lose big against China

Bradley T. Gericke — Thu, 10 Apr 2025 13:00:00 +0000

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“For indecision brings its own delays,
And days are lost lamenting o’er lost days.”

– Johann Wolfgang von Goethe in Faust

It seems that “protraction” as a way of war is having a moment, especially through the lens of a future war against China. The Army is holding wargames and conferences addressing it. Even fresh scholarship is skeptical of short wars. All of which is somewhat bewildering because history is replete with long wars, and the record of long wars is one of much blood and great cost. Tinkering with notions of protracted war allows military decision-makers to be distracted and to make a poor bargain, like the trade made by the legendary Doctor Faust that comes with extraordinary cost.

Clearly, the cost of long wars is extraordinarily high. In every respect, long wars should be an unwelcome result, not an outcome to be acquiesced. The Army especially cannot afford to mischaracterize the inevitability of long war. Acceptance of protraction as an inevitability is to surrender the United States’ best way to win militarily against China, which is to fight and win the first battle of any war. Appearing to accept that the United States will not win the first battle in a US-China war could also fatally undermine deterrence by signaling a lack of confidence in US capabilities. Winning in a future contest and strengthening deterrence means making decisions now: real choices must be made regarding forward posture, organizational structure, training, and modernization to create a battlefield system that leverages US advantages.

Of course, wars become long when they aren’t concluded promptly. That seemingly tautological outcome is often due to a failure to identify war objectives and to align warfighting means properly. Or maybe, as game theory suggests, long wars are caused by information asymmetries. Whatever the reason, long wars are a recurring feature of the international state system, and not one to encourage. There isn’t space in this short essay to fully parse “long” war from “total” war, but it is a fair assumption in an era of all-domain contests that the longer a war protracts, the more total it will become, and the more awful the butcher’s bill. In every respect, the longer the war the more it becomes a widening conflagration and a losing hand for the United States. The present dalliance with protraction can only lead to expenses the United States cannot afford, and strategic ends it cannot determine. Because the United States doesn’t have many good ways to escape long wars once they become, well, long, the best approach is to plan and resource its armed forces to win at the onset of conflict.

Today neither the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) nor the United States is seeking the elimination of the other party. Hence, today’s immediate war-waging problem is not one of preparing for an existential fight between the United States and China. Whether the flashpoint is the South China Sea, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, or Taiwan, the military problem to solve is not how to eliminate China as a great power but to defeat its armed forces. In other words, the challenge is how to fight and win a regional, limited war against a nuclear-armed great power—that is, a short war. In the Pacific, such a war with China is the kind the United States is most likely to confront, and one that it can win.

There is no doubt that the historical record of war is not encouraging. In the Western military tradition, even the names of long-ago conflicts are suggestive of drawn-out carnage. The details of the Hundred Years’ War (1337–1453) between England and France and the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1634), which caused prolonged bloodshed between most of the powers of Europe, might be distant cultural memories, but their costs and consequences were felt for centuries thereafter.

Closer to home, the United States’ own military history features winning decisive battles, but America’s record of winning at the onset of conflict is inconsistent. In the Asia-Pacific theater, the US Army’s comprehensive defeat after Pearl Harbor and through the first half of 1942 as American forces were swept out of the Philippines is perhaps the twentieth century’s most noteworthy example of the costs of unpreparedness.

Of course, the United States’ adversaries face the same challenge regarding first battles. The Japanese failed to compel the United States in World War II despite their early victories. For instance, they won the battle of Pearl Harbor but not as decisively as they could have—as Admiral Chester Nimitz himself pointed out. The timing of the attack meant that the US carrier fleet escaped unscathed, while the narrowly focused and short raid also failed to destroy the submarine base and the vast stockpiles of fuel at Pearl Harbor. Carriers, submarines, and fuel proved critical to enabling the US counteroffensive in the months and years that followed. They attacked without enough force to deliver an irrevocable battlefield outcome. The same became true on the Korean Peninsula. The US Army’s performance in June 1950 in the form of Task Force Smith was a tragic defeat, yet North Korea’s invasion ultimately failed. Again, the opening blow was insufficient and long war ensued. All of which is to say that winning early is not a panacea. But readying armed forces to win early, and decisively, is still better than submitting to attritional wars of protraction.

The Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) is deserving of further consideration as a template for future conflict in the Pacific. While that war resulted in large numbers of casualties and demanded mass mobilization by each side to equip their armed forces, it also featured sustained campaigns of maneuver and military initiative, especially by Japan on both land and sea that led to the war’s termination in nineteen months. Longish wars admittedly happen frequently, but it is also true that decisive battles occur regularly. The fact remains that being ready to wage a decisive first battle is the best outcome.

Against China specifically, a short, regional, and limited war is how US armed forces avoid nuclear escalation and global, all-domain conflict that can be enormously damaging to each nation’s key infrastructure. It is in such damage to state cyber, space, and communication assets that real escalatory risk resides. Thus, the logic of each side’s objectives converges on a short, sharp war as the best way to settle a conflict if deterrence fails.

An opening campaign can be won by maneuver on and from the ground, enabled by on-time and on-target fires. Maneuver, which is simply the requirement to seize and hold ground, is the only way to obtain the battlefield ends that can lead to diplomacy and, ultimately, a return to civil order. The United States was swept out of the Pacific in 1942 because its garrisons could not maneuver and lacked strike capabilities that could destroy, or at least damage, invading Japanese forces. Even its largest concentration of forces in the Philippines lacked the depth to evict the Japanese. The result was three more years of savage killing and serious destruction to the Japanese homeland before the war ended. This is not the kind of future war the United States want to fight. While its adversaries in the Pacific have changed, the topography and the populations concentrated near and on mainland Asia remain. If war in the Pacific comes, this is where it will be waged.

It is important to highlight that it has become conventional wisdom in US policy and strategy circles that a future war in the Pacific will be primarily a naval and air conflict. That has not been the case historically, as demonstrated by the Boxer Rebellion, Philippine Insurrection, World War II (in which more than twenty US divisions deployed), Korean War, and Vietnam War. Nor will it be so in a future war. Ground forces in the Pacific create operational advantage by influencing or controlling a series of sustained and protected positions, as ground forces are more difficult to target than, for example, large naval surface combatants. This undermines the adversary’s decision space and morale. US Army forces can pursue positions of advantage primarily through offense, but positional advantage applies to both offense and defense. In terms of defense, positional advantage allows US land forces to defend key terrain over large areas. Against a peer adversary, mastery of positional advantage is essential.

Positions of advantage can be physical or non-physical. Physical or geographic positions of advantage in the Indo-Pacific include maritime chokepoints (such as the Sunda and Lombok straits), major political-economic centers (such as Seoul; Taipei; and Makati, Philippines), and major transportation hubs (such as Shinjuku City, Tokyo; and Makassar, Indonesia). Non-physical positions of advantage might include adversary leadership’s confidence in its information systems or the connectedness a population feels with its defense forces.

From these positions, Army forces provide the collection, command and control, protection, and sustainment to enable operational endurance. This is critical to maneuvering and attacking from multiple ranges and directions against the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which benefits from shorter lines of operation. When Army forces are integrated with the Joint Force, the PLA (or any adversary) will lose both time and space, which denies the enemy’s maneuver and also protects populations, land resources, and borders.

Likewise, land-based effects into other domains provide a suite of tools to integrate into the Joint Force’s kill chains from the onset of conflict. This includes short-, medium-, and long-range precision fires to strike adversary formations across the depth of the battlefield. Army forces provide tailorable, theater-level command posts for integrating and synchronizing joint and combined military actions across the battle space. A war in the Pacific cannot be conceived, nor will it be waged, in terms of a straight line penciled on a map from Hawaii to any part of the Pacific, whether that be North Korea, Taiwan, or the South China Sea.

The United States must train, equip, and posture both the Army and Joint Forces as an operational system that enables ground-gaining fires and maneuver. The PLA’s leadership certainly understands this. Mao Zedong spoke and wrote extensively about protracted war. In the years following Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931, Mao developed an extensive theory about China’s fight to expel Japan. It is worth noting that he considered a protracted conflict inevitable because of the disparities in China’s and Japan’s war-waging capabilities at the onset of the conflict. But the war-winning phase of the conflict was one of “quick-decision offensive warfare” characterized by “mobile warfare.” He recognized the key feature of how a war is won is the maneuver of friendly forces to compel an adversary so that it has no other choice, or only worse choices, and must yield to avoid obliteration.

Winning early and winning on land is the responsibility of the US Army, and it is the Army that must lead the Joint Force by building and sustaining a first-win operational warfighting system. It is time for Army leaders to make needed decisions. The key components of winning early from the land include the following:

Forward access and presence: The warfighting-campaigning-wargaming approach being undertaken by US Army Pacific (USARPAC) to build habitual land-power access and combined-arms proficiency is a template that is working. A robust experimentation program of testing and evaluation of both concepts and technologies adopted by the entire Army will improve interoperability with partners and allow the United States to expose gaps in its capabilities that it can then solve.
Highly trained forces: There is no substitute for tactical units that are ready to fight. Individual soldier skills and expert collective task performance are bedrocks of small-unit readiness. The US Army excels at this already. But integrating all arms both operationally and tactically remains problematic and merits further organizational solutions. More Army units should be trained in the Pacific theater under combat-like conditions, including with US Joint Forces as well as partner armies they will fight alongside.
Focused, dynamic sustainment: The Army must possess all kinds of supply in forward-stationed packages that can be distributed in greater quantities and more channels than they are today. Army Prepositioned Stocks must be thoroughly reformed. They must be tailored to the force packages that the Army and Joint Forces plan to deploy in the opening days of a conflict. Redundant and resilient ways and means of medical and personnel support must likewise be built and rehearsed.
Strategic deployment: Rapid deployment of land forces over long distances is remarkably challenging, and the throughput of Army forces that can move from home station is not sufficient today. It is therefore imperative that Mobilization Force Generation Installations be made much more ready. Present deployment timelines are too long, and the reserve components are not sufficiently aligned to overseas contingency missions. It should be a principle that every Army organization in a war plan must be able to deploy to its assigned position in a forward theater within six months of receiving its order. Any Army unit that cannot get out the door in that time frame should be considered for restructuring, assignment to a different Army component, or elimination from the force structure.
All-range fires convergence: The Army’s Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs) should become the template for future Army Corps and divisional designs. The MDTFs should no longer be viewed as experiments foremost. Instead, they point to how Multi-Domain Operations, the Army’s new doctrine, will be executed. Yet the Army is reluctant to change its structure. It must do so and do it aggressively and comprehensively.
Globally integrated plans: Major operational war plans against China and other state actors must be integrated across Combatant Commands (COCOMs) and services from inception. In 2018–2019, the Joint Staff led such planning, but indifference from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and COCOMs caused the plans to be abandoned. The Department of Defense’s Unified Command Plan leads to a regionally focused department whose subordinate echelons resist globally integrated US capabilities. Short of congressionally supported COCOM reform, globally integrated plans are the only way to fight and win.
Divesting: The Army’s Mobile Protected Firepower system (M10 Booker) is a head-scratcher. The Army’s attempt to brand it as a tank for the infantry is a clumsy attempt to obfuscate the fact that the Service is fielding an unneeded weapon. In real terms, the M10 is simply a “light” tank that is not light and sub-optimizes both protection and firepower. There is no requirement for a forty-plus-ton tank in any significant operational plan that the long-serving Abrams cannot perform. The Booker is simply an unnecessary and expensive platform. The Army must make choices to save both people and dollars; this is an easy trade. Eliminating outmoded unmanned aerial systems (UAS) is another obvious opportunity to harvest savings from legacy force structure.

It is imperative that military planners and decision-makers keep their eyes on building battlefield warfighting systems that can fight and win a short war, especially on the land, to achieve national policy ends in the shortest time possible. Fighting and winning a short war saves both lives and treasure. An Army and a Joint Force that are unready to fight and win tonight make a self-imposed long war nearly a fait accompli. Planners should not accept that only surrender or protracted war are the United States’ fate in the Pacific or anywhere else. They should build forward-postured, trained, ready, rehearsed, equipped, and dynamically sustained forces as the best way to win and deter at the lowest cost. Doing so is not easy, but the cost of failing to do so will be much higher. Ultimately, the best way to deter the start of what could become a long war could be to visibly improve the ability to fight a short one.

About the author

Major General Bradley Gericke, US Army (ret.), is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The Tiger Project, an Atlantic Council effort, develops new insights and actionable recommendations for the United States, as well as its allies and partners, to deter and counter aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Explore our collection of work, including expert commentary, multimedia content, and in-depth analysis, on strategic defense and deterrence issues in the region.

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The Indo-Pacific Security Initiative (IPSI) informs and shapes the strategies, plans, and policies of the United States and its allies and partners to address the most important rising security challenges in the Indo-Pacific, including China’s growing threat to the international order and North Korea’s destabilizing nuclear weapons advancements. IPSI produces innovative analysis, conducts tabletop exercises, hosts public and private convenings, and engages with US, allied, and partner governments, militaries, media, other key private and public-sector stakeholders, and publics.

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Russian advance slows in March as Putin’s invasion loses momentum

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 01 Apr 2025 21:16:38 +0000

Russia’s Ukraine invasion continued to lose momentum in March 2025, with the Kremlin’s territorial gains reportedly falling for a fourth consecutive month. According to new data from the Institute for the Study of War, Russian forces captured 240 square kilometers of Ukrainian land throughout March, representing the smallest monthly total since the current wave of offensive operations began in summer 2024.

News of Russia’s slowing advance comes as Russian President Vladimir Putin claims that his invading army currently holds the “strategic initiative” along the entire front line of the war in Ukraine. “There are now reasons to believe we can finish off” the Ukrainian military, he told submarine crews last week during a visit to the north Russian port city of Murmansk.

While Putin predicts impending Russian victory, the evidence on the ground in Ukraine would seem to suggest otherwise. Far from being on the verge of crumbling, Ukraine’s defensive lines have strengthened significantly in recent months. As a result, advancing Russian forces continue to suffer heavy losses without achieving any meaningful breakthroughs.

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Ukrainian commanders are well aware that the recent lull in Russian battlefield gains may only be a temporary phenomenon as Putin’s army regroups following months of intense fighting. Officials and analysts in Kyiv are now warning that preparations are likely well underway for a major new Russian offensive that is expected to begin in the coming weeks and last until late in 2025.

Putin hopes this new campaign can help strengthen his position as negotiations intensify over a possible compromise settlement to end the war. Speaking last week in Paris, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy accused the Kremlin dictator of “dragging out talks and trying to get the United States stuck in endless and pointless discussions about fake conditions just to buy time and then try to grab more land.”

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

Russia’s modest battlefield gains since the start of the current year provide important perspective at a time when international media coverage and Western commentaries often create the misleading impression that Ukraine’s position is hopeless. In reality, the Ukrainian army has stood up to the full might of the Russian military for more than three years and represents a formidable obstacle to Putin’s plans for the complete subjugation of the country.

Today’s Ukrainian army is by far the largest and most experienced force in Europe, and is backed by a rapidly expanding domestic defense industry that already accounts for around forty percent of Ukraine’s military needs. Since early 2022, Ukrainian troops have succeeded in liberating around half of all the territory occupied by Russia, and have won a string of famous victories in the Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson regions.

Over the past three years, Ukraine has also emerged as a technologically advanced drone warfare superpower. Ukrainian drone manufacturers now produce millions of drones each year and continue to innovate on a daily basis. This is having a huge impact on the battlefield, where drones now account for well over half of all Russian casualties.

At sea, marine drones have enabled Ukraine to sink or damage around one-third of Russia’s entire Black Sea Fleet. This has transformed the Battle of the Black Sea and forced the remainder of Russia’s warships to retreat from Crimea. Meanwhile, Ukrainian commanders are using the country’s expanding arsenal of long-range drones and domestically produced cruise missiles to bring Putin’s invasion home by striking military and energy industry infrastructure deep inside Russia.

The remarkable evolution of the Ukrainian Armed Forces since February 2022 should give pause to all those who insist that Ukraine “has no cards” to play in future negotiations. While Kyiv cannot realistically hope to match Russia’s overwhelming advantages in terms of manpower, firepower, funding, and industrial capacity, Ukraine is now a major military power in its own right and will not agree to any peace deal that leaves the continued existence of the country in doubt.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Adding to the problem is the slow feedback loop. It can take as long as 180 days to request and receive user feedback through formal exercises, or “touch points”—an eternity when it comes to the fast-paced, ever-changing landscape of military operations. Even after receiving feedback, the Project Management Offices often don’t prioritize updates or changes. They often seem to focus more on meeting cost and schedule metrics than on ensuring the system works well for its intended users. This leads to a software-development cycle in which changes and adjustments are often delayed, resulting in systems that miss the mark.

In response to these issues, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth further codified the value of the Software Acquisition Pathway (SWP) as the gold standard for software-intensive system procurement. While this may sound like a new initiative, organizations such as the Air Force’s Kessel Run have been championing this approach for more than three years. The SWP introduces a shift toward more agile and user-centered development practices. The pathway mandates regular engagement with the end-user community, emphasizes the integration of user metrics to gauge the system’s value, and ensures that the system aligns with mission needs.

However, despite its potential, the implementation of the SWP is still mired in bureaucracy, often stalling progress before it reaches the users who need it most, with only eighty-two out of more than two thousand programs currently leveraging the pathway.

To truly address the user experience challenge, Department of Defense programs should ingrain user-centered design practices into the culture of software acquisition and bring it into the development process from the very beginning. This requires a shift in how the Department of Defense develops software: Instead of making assumptions about what users need—or leveraging “user representatives,” who may not have the latest operational context—development processes should incorporate regular user interviews, ad hoc reviews, and feedback loops. Weekly user interviews and the ability to present mockups and prototypes allow developers to adjust features based on real-time feedback. It does not require a full two-week User Acceptance Testing or a full-scale exercise; rather, it takes a couple hours a week of a warfighter’s time to provide input to critical software. This is ultimately a more cost-effective and streamlined investment of time to make sure the “right” thing is built. This data-driven approach helps to ensure that the system evolves according to the needs of the end-users, rather than being locked into rigid design specifications that may no longer be relevant by the time the system is fielded.

One critical aspect of improving the software development process is the creation of balanced product teams and acquisition teams. When teams are aligned in their objectives and share a focus on the user, the development process becomes more streamlined, efficient, and effective. This alignment reduces the need for rework, saving time and resources, while also creating happier, more satisfied users, and ultimately increasing readiness and lethality. By ensuring that acquisition professionals understand the importance of delivering a product that works well for the end-user, the Pentagon can create systems that not only meet cost and schedule metrics but also provide real value to those who need them the most.

Iteration is key in any software development process, and the Department of Defense must embrace this reality. Agile practices—such as continuous testing, rapid prototyping, and user feedback—should be integrated at scale into the development lifecycle as often as possible. Instead, developers too often fall into what is called an “agile-scrum-fall” approach, in which the process may appear to be agile and may even have agile-like instances but is in fact largely sequential, rigid, and linear.

The more frequently software is updated and improved based on real-user input, the more likely it is to meet the mission requirements and provide the right tools for success. This process ensures that software is not a one-and-done development effort but an ongoing evolution that aligns with the dynamic nature of military operations.

Ultimately, the Department of Defense must make user experience a priority in its software-development efforts. Only by focusing on the real needs of the people who will use these systems every day can the US military build software that enhances mission readiness and improves the overall lethality of US forces.

As it moves forward, the Department of Defense should follow four principles to bring warfighter user experience to the forefront of its development efforts.

Implement continuous user engagement: Introduce regular, structured user interviews, prototype testing, and feedback loops throughout the development process. Investing in enterprise design software, such as Figma, enables the ability to quickly generate mock-ups and gain feedback without investing engineering hours in coding a solution. This ensures that user needs are consistently addressed and prioritized at every stage of development.

Reduce the bureaucratic bottleneck: Streamline the JCIDS requirements process to ensure that feedback from junior enlisted servicemembers and officers is taken into account early in the planning stages. This will help align system development with real-world operational needs.

Adopt agile and iterative development practices: Embrace continuous iteration, rapid prototyping, and real-time user feedback to ensure that software evolves to meet user needs and mission requirements over time. This will reduce the need for costly rework and improve the overall user experience.

Align product and acquisition teams: Ensure that product teams and acquisition teams are closely aligned, with a shared focus on delivering software that meets both mission requirements and user needs. This alignment will drive efficiency, reduce rework, and lead to happier, more satisfied end users.

Some may be tempted to view a focus on UX as a luxury at odds with the tough, make-do image the US military is famous for. But on the twenty-first-century battlefield, where tech is woven into all parts of fighting, nothing could be further from the truth. It can be the difference between life and death.

Hannah Hunt is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a distinguished technical fellow at MetroStar Systems. She was previously the chief of product at the Army Software Factory under Army Futures Command and chief of staff at the US Air Force’s Kessel Run.

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Air & Space Forces Magazine on the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare final report

Atlantic Council — Sat, 29 Mar 2025 03:30:00 +0000

On March 28, Air & Space Forces Magazine published an article by Shaun Waterman titled, “Experts: US Military Needs ‘Software Literate’ Workforce, Not Just Coders.” The piece highlights key recommendations from the final report of Forward Defense’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare and discussions from its public launch event on March 27.

The report emphasizes the need for a software-literate workforce—not coders, but individuals who can ask the right questions, understand software limitations, and interpret inputs and outputs. This workforce will be essential to truly adopting the Software Acquisition Pathway, which the report recommends modernizing and implementing to achieving both short-term and long-term success in the Pentagon.

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Chiang, Esper, and Fox published in DefenseNews and C4ISRNET on software-defined warfare

Atlantic Council — Fri, 28 Mar 2025 16:00:00 +0000

On March 28, Mung Chiang, Mark Esper, and Christine Fox published an op-ed highlighting key ideas from the final report of Forward Defense’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare. Entitled, “America’s arsenal of democracy needs a software renaissance,” the piece published in DefenseNews and C4ISRNET underscores the critical role of software in future conflicts, “the ability to collect, process and act on data faster than the adversary is critical in prevailing in future conflicts.”

The authors emphasize the Commission’s recommendations, including investing in artificial intelligence enablers, mandating the creation of enterprise data repositories, and shifting toward commercial software acquisition. They argue that by prioritizing data management and commercial software acquisition, the Department of Defense can achieve immediate improvements while laying the groundwork for long-term strategic success.

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ExecutiveGov reports on the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare final report

Atlantic Council — Fri, 28 Mar 2025 15:00:00 +0000

On March 28, Jane Edwards of ExecutiveGov published an article highlighting the key recommendations from the final report of Forward Defense’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare. Entitled, “Atlantic Council Calls for DOD to Advance Software-Defined Warfare,” the piece discusses the Commission’s suggestions that advanced software capabilities could elevate the Pentagon’s efficiency, effectiveness, and capacity.

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Breaking Defense reports on the Commission of Software-Defined Warfare final report

Atlantic Council — Thu, 27 Mar 2025 16:00:00 +0000

On March 27, Carly Welch of Breaking Defense published an article titled, “Experts warn Pentagon to embrace software-defined warfare to counter China’s military advantage.” The piece features key recommendations made in the final report of Forward Defense’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare, emphasizing the urgent need for the Department of Defense to modernize its approach to software and data management. Welch underscores the Commission’s concerns that without swift action, the US could risk losing its technological edge over China.

The post Breaking Defense reports on the Commission of Software-Defined Warfare final report appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Atlantic Council Commission on Software-Defined Warfare: Final report

Whitney M. McNamara, Peter Modigliani, Tate Nurkin — Thu, 27 Mar 2025 13:00:00 +0000

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Executive summary
Foreword
Overview

Recommendations:

Mandate data and invest in AI enablers
Ensure software interoperability and integration
Modernize test and evaluation infrastructure
Enforce commercial as the default approach for software
Transform DoD software requirements
Remove all restrictions on software funding
Measure what matters for DoD software
Enable software talent across the enterprise
Fully establish a DoD software cadre

Conclusion
Biographies
Acknowledgements

Executive summary

A profoundly transformed global security environment presents the United States with its most significant geopolitical and geoeconomic challenges since the Cold War—and perhaps since World War II. China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—together a new “axis of aggressors”—are increasingly collaborating to support their revisionist geopolitical goals and challenge global stability. Meanwhile, US domestic constraints—such as relative-to-inflation flat defense budgets, military recruitment and talent shortfalls, byzantine acquisition processes, and inadequate industrial capacity—severely limit the US ability to adequately deter and address these threats at speed and scale.

During World War II, US industrial strength and manufacturing capacity decisively factored into the Allies’ victory. Today, however, US defense production capacity falls short of potential wartime demands. In contrast, China’s industrial policies, manufacturing prowess, and strategic focus on software-defined technologies—including artificial intelligence (AI), cloud computing, and development, security, and operations (DevSecOps)—have propelled Beijing to rapidly advance its defense capabilities.

Maintaining the Department of Defense (DoD) status quo—anchored to a defense acquisition system ill-suited to the rapid tempo of modern technological innovation—places the United States at significant risk. This approach undermines the nation’s ability to effectively deter near-peer adversaries in the short term and jeopardizes its capacity to prevail in a major conflict.

Addressing these systemic challenges demands a sustained, long-term effort. Meanwhile, there is an urgent need for near-term, high-impact initiatives to bridge existing capability gaps and reestablish an advantage. That is what this report’s concept of software-defined warfare presents.

Final Report

Report authors: Whitney M. McNamara, Peter Modigliani, and Tate Nurkin

Co-chairs: Mung Chiang, Mark T. Esper, and Christine H. Fox

Commission director: Stephen Rodriguez

Program director: Clementine G. Starling-Daniels

Commission staff: Mark J. Massa, Curtis Lee, Abigail Rudolph, Alexander S. Young

Commissioners

Mung Chiang, president, Purdue University; co-chair of the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare, Atlantic Council 

Mark T. Esper, board director, Atlantic Council; 27th secretary of defense; co-chair of the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare, Atlantic Council

Christine H. Fox, former acting deputy secretary of defense; senior fellow, John Hopkins University Applied Research Laboratory; co-chair of the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare, Atlantic Council 

Steve Bowsher, president, chief executive officer, In-Q-Tel

General James E. Cartwright, USMC (ret.), board director, Atlantic Council; 8th vice chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC (ret.), board director, Atlantic Council; 19th chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Frank A. Finelli, managing director, The Carlyle Group

James “Hondo” Geurts, distinguished fellow, Business Executives for National Security; former assistant secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, US Department of Defense

Susan M. Gordon, former principal deputy director of national intelligence

Lieutenant General S. Clinton Hinote, USAF (ret.), former deputy chief of staff, Air Force Futures

Paul Kwan, managing director, Global Resilience Practice, General Catalyst

Ellen M. Lord, former under secretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, US Department of Defense

John Ridge, CBE, chief adoption officer, NATO Innovation Fund

Nadia Schadlow, senior fellow, Hudson Institute; former US deputy national security advisor for strategy

Lieutenant General Jack Shanahan, USAF (ret.), former director, Joint Artificial Intelligence Center

Trae Stephens, general partner, Founders Fund

Admiral Scott H. Swift, USN (ret.), 35th Commander, US Pacific Fleet

Industry commissioners

Rob Bassett Cross MC, founder, chief executive officer, Adarga; nonresident senior fellow, Atlantic Council

Prashant Bhuyan, founder, chief executive officer, Accrete AI

Michael D. Brasseur, chief strategy officer, Saab, Inc.

Todd Bryer, vice president for strategic growth, CAE

Jordan Coleman, chief legal and policy officer, Kodiak Robotics

Scott Cooper, vice president, Government Relations, Peraton

Steven Escaravage, president, Defense Technology Group, Booz Allen Hamilton

Jon Gruen, chief executive officer, Fortem Technologies

Adam Hammer, co-founder, chief executive officer, Roadrunner Venture Studios

Jags Kandasamy, co-founder, chief executive officer, Latent AI

Rob Lehman, co-founder, chief commercial officer, Saronic Technologies

Joel Meyer, president of public sector, Domino

Sean Moriarty, chief executive officer, Primer AI

Nathan Parker, chief executive officer, Edge Case Research

Gundbert Scherf, co-founder & co-chief executive officer, Helsing

Zachary Staples, founder & chief executive officer, Fathom5

Tyler Sweatt, chief executive officer, Second Front Systems

Dan Tadross, head of federal delivery, Scale AI

Jim Taiclet, chairman, president & chief executive officer, Lockheed Martin

Chris Taylor, founder, chief executive officer, Aalyria Technologies

Mark Valentine, president, Global Government, Skydio

Advisors

Lieutenant General Michael S. Groen, USMC (ret.), former director, Joint Artificial Intelligence Center

Rob Murray, nonresident senior fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council

Major General Arnold L. Punaro, USMC (ret.), advisory council member, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council

Stu Shea, managing partner and strategic advisor, Shea Strategies, LLC

Foreword

The United States stands at the threshold of a new era in defense and national security. Dramatic changes in the global security environment are upending the established world order, presenting new and unexpected challenges. The war in Ukraine, conflict in the Middle East, and rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific underscore shifting power dynamics. At the same time, we are in an age marked by an escalating pace of technological change. Innovations such as the fusion of AI, autonomy, and robotic systems are poised to profoundly influence national security and economic power. This moment demands decisive action to prepare the US military to adapt swiftly to evolving conditions and reclaim its tactical, operational, and strategic advantages.

An impartial assessment of global geopolitics and geoeconomics reveals significant and widening gaps in US capabilities. These gaps not only undermine deterrence but also place the ability of US military forces to prevail in future conflicts at risk. The shifting geopolitical landscape exposes vulnerabilities in the nation’s approach to capability design, development, fielding, and sustainment. Addressing these gaps is imperative to prepare for emerging threats, yet immediate solutions are also needed to confront present dangers. While the principle of “speaking softly and carrying a big stick” has long guided US foreign policy, it is now imperative that US military power and economic strength are capable of deterring potential adversaries and, if deterrence fails, prevailing in conflict. Software-defined warfare presents a vital opportunity to bridge these challenges, providing a pathway to both near-term readiness and long-term competitive advantage.

A software-defined mindset and capabilities are essential to modern military readiness. From enterprise solutions to autonomous systems to personnel, software underpins the effectiveness of defense operations. However, Industrial Age, hardware-centric acquisition processes are unsuitable for software systems that need to be updated with the rapid cycle of technological advancement. To preserve its competitive advantages, the DoD must embrace a more agile and integrated approach to software—one that fosters continuous modernization, capitalizes on cutting-edge commercial innovations, and deepens collaboration with allies and partners.

The Atlantic Council’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare was convened to address these challenges and identify solutions. Comprising leaders from government, industry, and academia, the commission identified clear, actionable, and meaningful recommendations that will position the DoD for enduring success. This report’s roadmap is organized around three core pillars: technology, process, and people. The recommendations outlined herein propose actionable steps to shape software investments, build a cohesive digital ecosystem, modernize software development practices, and cultivate a skilled and sustainable workforce. Together, these recommendations provide a clear pathway to establishing a software-defined DoD capable of responding rapidly and effectively to emerging threats in an increasingly dynamic security environment.

As we present these recommendations, we acknowledge the support and insights of the many contributors who have helped shape this vision. We believe this work will provide leaders with the tools and direction needed to build a DoD that is resilient, innovative, and more fully prepared for the future. Now is the time to build a modern, software-defined defense infrastructure to ensure the safety and security of the United States.

Mung Chiang

President, Purdue University

Mark T. Esper

27th United States secretary of defense

Christine H. Fox

Former acting deputy secretary of defense

Overview

Enterprise challenges

The commission started with a vision for what the future of software-defined modernization and warfare could look like if optimized. Striving to go beyond diagnosing the challenges facing the DoD enterprise, this commission outlined desired outcomes to help the DoD overcome such challenges.

There is an absence of DoD enterprise processes and enablers that rapidly update software with novel capabilities that keep pace with threats.
The DoD has limited processes or proving grounds to allow end users to experiment with, and rapidly adopt and scale, novel software solutions, including AI and autonomy-enabled systems.
The DoD lacks established best practices for developing or buying software.
The industry faces challenges in providing and deploying its capabilities due to a lack of transparency and predictability, and other bureaucratic hurdles.
There is a major shortfall of software pipelines, talent, and resources to meet the demand for software-defined warfare within DoD organizations.
Systems, capabilities, and platforms are generated in silos. This hinders the integration of systems on the battlefield, creation of an interoperable force structure, and the DoD’s goal of a joint warfighting concept, as well as partner and allied collaboration.
The absence of a software-centric culture across the DoD impedes the employment of modern DevSecOps, which fosters rapid iterations

Top recommendations

To address these challenges, the Commission recommends that DoD leaders, congressional defense committees, and other executive branch agencies take the following ten high-priority actions to accelerate DoD innovation adoption:

Mandate enterprise data and invest in AI enablers
Ensure software interoperability and integration
Modernize test and evaluation infrastructure
Enforce commercial as the default approach for software
Transform DoD software requirements
Remove all restrictions on software funding
Measure what matters for DoD software
Enable software talent across the enterprise
Fully establish a DoD software cadre

Recommendation 1: Mandate enterprise data and invest in AI enablers

The deputy secretary of defense should direct the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO) to track enterprise-wide progress and recommend actions to the deputy secretary and vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to accelerate DoD-wide adoption of data best practices. The CDAO should ensure this process prioritizes collecting and categorizing data in a way that makes high-priority data sources readily usable for analysis and refinement for AI training, functional, and operational pipelines.
Resource the CDAO to acquire and sustain unified, shared platforms that support and accelerate the end-to-end development, deployment, and governance of AI solutions—including Machine Learning Operations capabilities, tools for developing, deploying, and reusing models, and reusable AI-ready datasets.
CDAO should consider the best strategy to make these tools accessible to the end-user community across innovation organizations, services, and combatant commands (CCMDs) to empower users to operationalize AI to solve mission-critical problems.
Services should designate a CDAO liaison that helps the services discover what is available to them at the CDAO repository and identify gaps in service-specific investments to ensure department-wide investments are not redundant and better streamline demand for new capabilities.
Service Chief Information Officers (CIOs), in collaboration with the CIO, should be resourced to invest in AI enablers that are domain- and service-specific, and in which the CDAO is unlikely to invest.
Both the CDAO and the services should maintain unclassified and classified datasets of highly relevant DoD use cases that are available for industry to use to demonstrate capability viability.

Success measure: DoD end users are empowered to leverage their domain expertise to experiment with and operationalize robust and governed AI pipelines with best-of-breed capabilities from the industry. AI adoption can be scaled faster and more efficiently because capabilities are built with scale and reproducibility in mind. The DoD saves money by not buying the same capabilities many times over. There is better coordination and transparency across the department on AI adoption and resourcing.

Notional example: The Army’s 101st Airborne Division realizes the potential of an AI use case for automatic target recognition. Instead of building something from scratch, leadership first engages the CDAO and Army CIO shop to determine what AI pillars are available to them. Using these foundational tools, operational experts spend their time addressing their specific operational problems and experimenting with integrating these new capabilities into their existing decision-making processes. Once it reaches a minimum viable product (MVP), senior leadership makes plans to integrate the capability to be part of Next Generation Command and Control (NGC2), or C2 Next.

Recommendation 2: Ensure software interoperability and integration

To ensure interoperability between new capabilities being adopted, service CIOs, in coordination with the DoD CIO, should mandate
- Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA) frameworks applied to the maximum extent practical;
- defining modules and leveraging Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) and modular system interfaces to enable data interchange between disparate platforms;
- industry and government co-collaborated reference architecture for multi-vendor environments as a best practice;
- industry, where possible, ensuring the capabilities it provides to different parts of the DoD can interoperate with one another; and
- when feasible, reference architectures are shared with allies and partners to streamline coalition interoperability.
To aid in interoperability with allies and partners, these best practices should be shared as early and often as possible with partners through existing allied technical exchanges.
Service chiefs should designate one Program Executive Office (PEO) to
- Consolidate the development, acquisition, management, and modernization of non-proprietary mission integration tools under a dedicated program office within the designated PEO shop to elevate the role of mission integration.
- The designated PEO should leverage simulation tools to imitate the feasibility of the technical integration to
  - ensure the successful integration of new and legacy systems, including the use of open-computer architecture to facilitate the deployment of capability on associated hardware;
  - create demand signals for software mission integration tools; and
  - identify new software-enabled capabilities that can enable SoS warfare.

Success measure: Services are incentivized to proactively establish open compute requirements and identify seams between capabilities that would prevent them from carrying out their highest-priority missions and creating acquisition pathways for mission integration tools.

Notional example: The Navy’s PEO for integrated warfare systems (IWS) is designated as the Navy’s “effects” organization. PEO for IWS identifies three relevant operational problems and begins simulating and combining existing force structures to address them. IWS 1.0 stands up with the authority to procure and sustain mission integration tools identified during simulation exercises, as well as to capture Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) in which end users creatively overcome inorganic integration.

Recommendation 3: Modernize test and evaluation infrastructure

In partnership with CDAO and the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), charge the Test Resource Management Center (TRMC) and resource it effectively to provide the digital infrastructure to provide developmental and operational testing proving grounds for innovation organizations leading on commercial software adoption.
The TRMC should partner with industry to explore metrics for vendor self-certification for both test and evaluation (T&E) and verification and validation (V&V) for more mature vendors that have invested in their own state-of-the-art capabilities. This measure will both alleviate the department being a bottleneck to deployment and help to rapidly deploy capabilities that have met the required T&E thresholds co-developed by the TRMC.
The TRMC, in partnership with innovation organizations and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) leaders, should establish joint operational testing and development testing teams that share data, analysis, and tooling across development and deployment stages. This approach should reduce barriers, streamline the test process, and provide continuous system performance improvement, while also incentivizing a DevSecOps pipeline for T&E that is informed by and applies industry best practices for enterprise scalability, advanced analysis, and data sharing.

Success measure: Simulating capability viability becomes a widely accessible and organic part of validating and testing digitally enabled technologies. In addition, metrics are established to drive progress toward the automation of qualification processes and alternative certification paths. This adoption helps create a pipeline that rapidly scales the deployment of robust and trusted software-defined capabilities.

Notional example: The TRMC invests in digital infrastructure focused on testing drones’ ability to swarm to overwhelm enemy defenses. The DIU uses this infrastructure to quickly validate compelling candidates for its Commercial Service Openings submissions rapidly and iteratively. The initial testing helps identify existing deficiencies—potentially including adversarial embedded code in a commercial component—as well as best practices for managing the data flows required to monitor the performance of these capabilities, and cross-functional teams organized to begin addressing the problem.

Recommendation 4: Enforce commercial as the default approach for software

Requirements, acquisition, and contracting executives install checkpoints in the early phases of software-intensive programs to enforce statutory preferences for commercial software. Require added justification and approvals to pursue a non-commercial software solution.
Service Chief Technology Officers (CTOs) and the DIU align DoD and industry groups to provide enterprise market intelligence and due diligence for in-depth insights into the commercial software market and include those of allies and partners. Service CIOs and the DIU should leverage or establish a platform to share these insights. These offices should publish and maintain a clearer software total addressable market (TAM) by technology segments. This roadmap should outline how they plan to leverage software as part of their annual budget documents to better incentivize and shape industry research and development. This TAM should map to commercial TAMs to identify dual-use or DoD-unique software.
Update Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.87 on the software acquisition pathway and related acquisition policies and regulations to require program managers and contracting officers to capture in software acquisition and contracting strategies that they pursued commercial solutions to the maximum extent practicable. This should include
- engaging industry, industry-focused organizations, and consortia to communicate their needs and understand existing solutions;
- capturing holistic timelines and costs of buying commercial solutions compared to developing new software (contracting, acquisition, development, integration, test, and updates);
- ensuring contracting requirements are captured in a manner that would not preclude viable commercial solutions as partial or whole solutions to address the capability needs;
- ensuring contract strategies do not preclude commercial solutions and that they enable leading software vendors and nontraditional defense companies to compete;
- enabling DoD users and industry to rapidly demonstrate, prototype, and experiment with commercial solutions for defense applications;
- working with testers and certifiers to understand cybersecurity, integration, and other factors to assess the risks and processes of using the software in the defense domain;
- ensuring prime contractors and subcontractors default to commercial solutions;
- identifying how modular open systems, common interfaces, and standards are leveraged;
- publishing the non-commercial item determination in the solicitations for custom software development to allow vendors to appeal that decision, if justified;
- ensuring realistic intellectual-property (IP) strategies avoid unrealistic demands for source code while enabling the DoD to update or pivot if costs or performance are unsuitable;
- having acquisition sponsors provide supporting justification if commercial solutions are not viable and new development is warranted; and
- ensuring requirements and acquisition approving officials or boards must validate the commercial solution analysis early in the process.
The services, in collaboration with the defense acquisition executive, Defense Acquisition University, DIU, and the CDAO, should expand guidebooks and training for acquisition and requirements professionals on effectively leveraging commercial software. These protocols should be maintained online and regularly updated with insights and resources from across the DoD, government, and industry. They shall include the documentation and compliance tasks avoided by using commercial software. Program offices and portfolio executives should provide regular inputs to guide the community on best practices, lessons learned, and adoption metrics.
Service CTOs, in partnership with the DIU and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, should meet quarterly to review software research and development efforts by science and technology (S&T) organizations to minimize duplication with the commercial sector. They should also incentivize organizations charged with developing concepts of operations to do so collaboratively, based on consistent industry engagement, to understand the state of play in commercial technologies that can be leveraged for warfighting missions. CTOs and CIOs should have authority to work with the PEOs to co-direct software factory funding. This authorization will ensure the factories focus on the intended objectives and can achieve the performance metrics developed per the Software Modernization Implementation Plan. Based on a clear inventory of platforms, services, and personnel, the CTOs and CIOs, in partnership with the PEOs, should adjust investments that maximize efficiencies and effectiveness. These adjustments could include reducing personnel billets and increasing software licenses. These factories should enable increased speed and quality of deploying code to various environments while maximizing interoperability and cybersecurity. PEOs, CTOs, and CIOs should hold software factory leadership accountable to continuously improve performance metrics and enable software-intensive acquisition programs and operations on the tactical edge. Similarly, the CTOs and CIOs should be accountable to continuously improve enabling policies, resources, authorities to operate, and reciprocity across organizations and the services.

Success measure: The DoD identifies and tracks commercial software acquisition metrics and TAM. The DoD demonstrates a significant increase in commercial software usage, particularly for systems with well-bounded, government-defined modular system interfaces. This approach improves system cost, schedule, and performance.

Notional example: One of the Army’s autonomy programs deviates from its strategy of a lengthy government-developed autonomy stack and rapidly acquires commercial software from leading vendors. The program saves years in development and millions in costs, while delivering higher-quality software to operations faster.

Recommendation 5: Transform DoD software requirements

The DoD should exempt all software requirements below the Major Defense Acquisition Program thresholds from the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) approval processes. This exemption should include requirements for new software capabilities and software upgrades to legacy systems, regardless of the acquisition pathway used.
Service requirements organizations—in collaboration with Joint Staff J8 forces, acquisition executives, and software leaders—should establish separate, yet complementary, structures, processes, and training to manage software requirements in a streamlined, dynamic, and collaborative environment.
- While a high-level document might be used to capture initial operational capability needs, the bulk of software requirements will be managed via dynamic backlogs with active stakeholder engagements.
- Policies should delineate hardware and software requirements and enable each to operate on separate timelines and processes. When capabilities reach appropriate maturity levels during system development, use integrated hardware-software testing, digital engineering, modeling, and simulation to verify desired system performance.
- Requirements should enable operational agility measured in days and weeks, tailoring for both global and regional needs across the full range of military operations, and should enable operational commands to define and tailor capabilities based on edge-generated data, while providing insight to service software capabilities.
Service requirements organizations should update policies to require sponsors to provide written justification in an appendix to the requirements document or a companion document, demonstrating that they pursued commercial solutions to the maximum extent practicable. This includes identifying how the requirements community, through the acquisition community, actively engaged industry and the DoD S&T ecosystem to
- communicate operational needs, challenges, and environments;
- understand what commercial solutions exist, the existing applications of these solutions, and the emerging software capabilities that could have military applications;
- capture requirements in a manner that would not preclude viable commercial solutions as partial or whole solutions to address the capability needs; and
- foster discussions between the DoD and industry to reduce barriers to buying commercial solutions.

Success measure: Each of the military services update their software requirements processes to enable greater speed, agility, and quality. Updated training, guidance, and resources enable the requirements and acquisition communities to successfully adopt modern software practices.

Notional example: A major weapons system was unable to detect or react to adversary drones in theater. Through a dynamic software requirements process, this threat becomes the top priority for the next software release. The vendors work closely with operators and testers to rapidly iterate on software upgrades that drastically improve mission operations within weeks.

Recommendation 6: Remove all restrictions on software funding

The DoD should immediately discontinue the Budget Authority-8 pilots and implement the pilot intent.
The DoD comptroller, in collaboration with service comptrollers and congressional appropriations staff, should update the Financial Management Regulation (FMR) to enable the DoD to acquire, update, operate, and sustain software capabilities with available Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E), procurement, or Operation and Maintenance (O&M) funding appropriated for the capability. This echoes the congressionally directed Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Reform Commission’s recommendation 11A.
The DoD comptroller should issue a policy memo for immediate action and clarification while adding these changes to the ongoing comprehensive FMR updates per the PPBE Reform Commission.
DoD and service comptrollers should communicate guidance on implementing the changes across the workforce.
The language would enable any funding appropriated for a software capability to be used regardless of the software activities (e.g., new development versus maintenance) or how it is acquired (e.g., development, Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS), or as a service). This new language should enable
- rapid acquisition and delivery of leading software capabilities;
- improved responsiveness to changes in threats, operations, and technologies; and
- reduced operational, cybersecurity, and programmatic risks.

Success measure: The DoD comptroller issues a software funding directive removing appropriation restrictions and provides clear direction to the workforce on flexible software funding execution.

Notional example: To meet a critical operational requirement, a program explores a range of software acquisition and contracting strategies unburdened by the mix of funding appropriations.

Recommendation 7: Measure what matters for DoD software

The acquisition executives’ staff should collaboratively develop new software metrics for most acquisition programs. PEOs, services, agencies, and the OSD should compile and share quarterly or annual reports across the DoD workforce and leadership to provide visibility into trends, best practices, and enterprise issues to drive regular discussions and actions on how to accelerate delivery. These metrics often identify program trends and issues to drive corrective action and continuous improvement. The Navy’s PEO Digital established World-Class Alignment Metrics (WAMS), which are a model for others to follow. These reports should include the following metrics.
- Deployment frequency: The number of software updates deployed to the operational environment (production) in the last year (or time between deployments). Goal: more than once per week.
- Time to initial deployment: Time from the initiation of software development to the date the initial software capabilities are deployed to an operational environment.
- Automated testing use and timelines: Program and portfolio use of automated testing and testing timelines. Goal: daily automated testing, development and operational testing timelines declining.
- Mean times to restore (MTTR): The average amount of time it takes to address a critical vulnerability or issue, including testing, certifying, and authority to operate. Goal: less than one day.
- API use: Total API usage each week or month to enable interoperability and data sharing across applications. Goal: increasing usage each month.
- Production software defect density: Defect density of production software in operations each month. Goal: heavily domain dependent.
- Security vulnerabilities: Number of security vulnerabilities identified and remediated. Goal: heavily domain dependent.
- Change failure rate: Percentage of software changes that resulted in system disruptions, including downtime, errors, or negative impacts on users. Goal: less than 10 percent and heavily domain dependent.
- Customer satisfaction: Quantitative metrics or qualitative value assessments of customer satisfaction. Goal: greater than 80 percent of customers rate software high value.
- User engagement: Number of user engagements per month by software developers. Goal: end users engaged weekly.
- Software reuse: Number of acquisition programs able to reuse software capabilities and infrastructure. Goal: increasing reuse each month.
The focus of the metrics and subsequent actions at the program, portfolio, and enterprise levels is to continuously deliver impactful software to the user communities to improve mission impact. Each program and organization might have different objectives or challenges to address, such as release velocity, software quality, or user satisfaction. Some of these may have competing forces that must be managed (e.g., quality vs. speed). Defense of the Realm Act’s annual Accelerate State of DevOps report provides industry-leading metrics for software, including levels for elite, high, medium, and low performance. The DoD should strive toward these commercial goals as objectives and tailor performance levels to unique DoD environments.
Major programs and software-intensive portfolios should map out the processes to develop, test, certify, and deploy software, including actual timelines for each phase; key stakeholders involved (by name or organization); key bottlenecks; the opportunities to streamline software delivery timelines; and how stakeholders are accountable to accelerate software delivery speed, manage operational and development risks, and ensure high-quality and secure software. Furthermore, programs and portfolios should identify where additional resources (personnel, tools, and services) at a program, portfolio, or enterprise level would enable speed of delivery. These metrics are more for internal DoD operations, with a subset that might be shared with Congress or publicly.

Success measure: The military services and related organizations track, share, and use a core set of software metrics across the defense enterprise and leverage insights for key decisions, investments, and continuous improvement in speed, quality, reuse, and user satisfaction (mission impact).

Notional example: A PEO of a software-intensive portfolio has an online dashboard of software metrics that is integrated into program and portfolio operations. Program, portfolio, and policy decisions are made based on these metrics, with the workforce culture focused on leaning out processes and barriers to enable rapid, iterative, and quality software deliveries to operations. Acquisition professionals and vendors are incentivized to continuously improve.

Recommendation 8: Enable software talent across the enterprise

Develop an extensive, connected, layered, and modular software-centric training program that involves both digital and in-person learning and incorporates the specific requirements of different roles and missions across the force. The objective of this effort is to increase awareness of the importance of software to DoD operations, instill a basic to intermediate-level understanding of commercial software best practices and agile software development and their value, and build the skills required to more effectively integrate and operate software in specific roles.
Specifically, the DoD should do the following.
- Partner with leading academic institutions in software development to create a curriculum for an approximately week-long in-person or hybrid training course tailored to senior leaders in the DoD. This executive training curriculum should concentrate on commercial software development best practices and the importance of software to mission execution for senior leaders in the DoD. Training emerging and current senior leaders on these topics can help the DoD develop leaders more willing to create the conditions and culture that will facilitate accelerated adoption.
- Leverage and expand existing successful mechanisms and models for software training, such as the Army Software Factory, and access to digital training libraries at both non-DoD and DoD academic institutions.
- Defense education institutions across the DoD should enrich training to deepen understanding of the importance of software, commercial software best practices and development approaches, and integration of software into DoD activities. The course curriculum should engage and harness insights from leading software experts in industry, as well as in academia, to determine the skill sets and knowledge bases most relevant to the defense context.
In addition to enhancing software literacy through training, the DoD needs to scale formal software career fields and paths for military and civilian personnel to harness the software talent for new and expanded roles. For example, in February 2024, the Air Force reestablished warrant officers for information technology (IT) and cyber career fields to improve technical expertise in cyber and information technologies.
As part of this effort, the DoD should increase opportunities for identified DoD software-focused professionals to interact with both traditional defense industry companies and commercial companies involved in developing software for the DoD. This should include, but not be limited to, embedding DoD talent in these companies for several months to gain firsthand experience in software development cycles and challenges associated with software acquisition. The ability to engage more closely with commercial industry should also extend to the CCMDs, which should expand opportunities for operators to train and experiment directly with commercial industry through exercises such as the Army’s Scarlet Dragon, among others.

Success measure: The DoD increases software and technical literacy across the enterprise through scalable training tailored to different DoD levels and roles. The DoD creates opportunities for the identification, enhanced training, and deployment of software talent that can be deployed across the organization to drive software adoption and use.

Notional example: A Navy officer with demonstrated software competence is placed in a leading commercial software company that supports the DoD on a six-month rotation or internship. The officer learns from product developers and product managers to understand commercial development and improvement processes and brings this knowledge back to help operators in a CCMD more efficiently and effectively operate software-defined capabilities.

Recommendation 9: Fully establish a DoD software cadre

The DoD should recruit fifty to one hundred experienced software engineers in modern development environments and place them in key roles across the enterprise. These individuals’ expertise will be used to inform decision-makers on software pipelines, architectures, and leading commercial solutions. They can address key software issues and guide efforts to develop software requirements, acquisition strategies, integration, certification, and employment of software. They can be placed in prominent roles across the DoD, including program management offices and portfolios responsible for acquiring software capabilities; CIO, software factories, and AI and data organizations focused on enterprise services; in operational commands that need to rapidly iterate on tactics and software upgrades; and as executives who oversee major programs, shape budgets, and lead combat operations. Members of this cadre would operate as a network, potentially rotating and surging to meet prioritized problems related to software acquisition, integration, and employment, and sharing best practices and insights.
Candidates can be hired in a full-time role using existing hiring authorities such as Highly Qualified Experts. They can also be engaged on a temporary or episodic basis through commercial talent exchange programs such as CDAO’s AI and Data Acceleration program or through Search Generative Experiences to provide iterative specialized services for a restricted number of days throughout the year. The services should also implement direct commissioning of willing experienced software engineers in the reserves, up to and including the general officer level (as is done for specialized roles such as doctors and lawyers) and should also identify and engage leading software talent already serving in the reserves, similar to the Marine Innovation Unit approach. Programs like GigEagle help identify talent in the reserves for short-term problem sets. By leveraging reservists throughout the year, the DoD can capitalize on existing expertise while mitigating financial and professional risks for those working with the DoD.
Increasing reliance on short-term commercial or reservist software talent will necessitate a review and refinement of conflict-of-interest rules to balance the need to protect the DoD from the risk of providing companies unfair advantages and the need to make it easier for top-level talent to move between the DoD and the commercial sector.
In addition to meeting current demand, the DoD should partner with academic institutions to develop talent pipelines of individuals who are educated and certified in commercial software processes and engineering as well as in the DoD processes and requirements. The DoD should work with interested institutions to develop curriculum and certification criteria that will allow students to be fast-tracked into the DoD software cadre positions.

Success measure: The DoD successfully recruits an increased number of software experts and solutions architects over the next two years to advise on software development, acquisition, and adoption within program offices and CCMDs in particular, while also building a pipeline of software-focused talent.

Notional example: Cadre members placed in program offices use their expertise to understand the significance of decisions a vendor has made in its software development process and inform program managers and acquisition officers on the implications that development decisions hold for future integration and certification. This guidance allows acquisition professionals to make decisions better informed by downstream considerations, reducing costs and time associated with integration, certification, and upgrading of critical software systems.

Conclusion

The commission’s report presents clear, actionable recommendations and outlines the desired outcomes to address a critical aspect of modern defense and security. While the adoption of software-defined warfare currently poses a challenge, it is also an area of a defining opportunity. The rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape, marked by an axis of aggressors, demands immediate and decisive action to maintain US strategic advantage. If these recommendations are fully implemented, the United States will possess a modern, agile, and resilient defense infrastructure that is capable of fostering a robust software foundation that will bolster the capabilities of US hardware, while streamlining interoperability across services, allies, and partners. However, failure to act will leave the nation vulnerable and unable to adequately adapt to rapidly evolving threats. The time to act is now—while the United States prepares for the challenges of tomorrow, software-defined warfare provides a timely and practical solution to strengthen US defense capabilities today. Leaders in the DoD, Congress, and the private sector should work to implement these recommendations with a sense of urgency—the members of this commission stand by to help them do so. At stake is nothing less than the stability of the US-led, rules-based international order and the decades of unprecedented peace and prosperity it has undergirded.

About the authors

Mung Chiang

Board director and co-chair of the commission, Atlantic Council; president, Purdue University

Mung Chiang is the president of Purdue University and the Roscoe H. George distinguished professor of electrical and computer engineering. Prior to being elected university president in 2022, he was the John A. Edwardson dean of the college of engineering and executive vice president for strategic initiatives at Purdue University.

Chiang received his BS (1999), MS (2000) and his PhD (2003) from Stanford University and an honorary doctorate (2024) from Dartmouth College. Before 2017, Chiang was the Arthur LeGrand Doty professor of electrical engineering and an affiliated faculty in computer science and in applied mathematics at Princeton University.

He founded the Princeton EDGE Lab in 2009 and co-founded several startup companies and industry consortia since the early years of edge computing. Most of his twenty-six US patents are licensed for network deployment. He co-authored two textbooks based on massive open online courses: Networked Life (2012) and Power of Networks (2016). For his research in communication networks, wireless technology, and network optimization, he received the NSF Alan T. Waterman Award (2013), as well as the IEEE Founders Medal (2025), the IEEE INFOCOM Achievement Award (2022), the IEEE Kiyo Tomiyasu Award (2012), and the Guggenheim Fellowship (2014). He was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (Class of Mathematical and Physical Sciences 2024), the National Academy of Inventors (2020) and the Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences (2020).

In 2020, as the Science and Technology adviser to the US secretary of state, Chiang initiated tech diplomacy programs in the US government. In 2024, he started serving on the inaugural board of the US Foundation for Energy Security and Innovation, and was elected to the Board of Directors of the US Olympic and Paralympic Committee as an independent director.

Mark T. Esper

Board director and co-chair of the commission, Atlantic Council; 27th US secretary of defense

Mark T. Esper served as secretary of defense from 2019-2020, and as secretary of the army from 2017-2019. A distinguished graduate of West Point, he spent twenty-one years in uniform, including a combat tour in the Gulf War. Esper earned a PhD from George Washington University while working on Capitol Hill, at the Pentagon as a political appointee, and as a commissioner on the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. He was also a senior executive at a prestigious think tank, two business associations, and a Fortune 100 technology company. Esper is the recipient of multiple civilian and military awards. He currently sits on several public policy and business boards.

Christine H. Fox

Board director and co-chair of the commission, Atlantic Council; former acting deputy secretary of defense

Christine Fox is a senior fellow at Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL). Previously, she was the assistant director for policy and analysis at JHU/APL, a position she held from 2014 to early 2022. Before joining APL, she served as acting deputy secretary of defense from 2013 to 2014 and as director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) from 2009 to 2013. As director of CAPE, Fox served as chief analyst to the secretary of defense. Prior to her DoD positions, she served as president of the Center for Naval Analyses from 2005 to 2009, after working there as a research analyst and manager since 1981. Currently, she also serves on many governance and advisory boards including the Strategic Competitive Studies Project, Palantir Technologies, Muon Space, DEFCON AI, and Brown Advisory. Fox holds a bachelor’s and master’s degree in applied mathematics from George Mason University. She is a three-time recipient of the Department of Defense Distinguished Public Service Medal and of the Army’s Decoration for Distinguished Civilian Service.

Whitney M. McNamara

Senior vice president, Beacon Global Strategies; nonresident senior fellow, author, Commission on Software-Defined Warfare, Atlantic Council

Whitney McNamara is a senior vice president at Beacon Global Strategies where she works with disruptive technology companies. She is also a co-author of both the Atlantic Council’s Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption and Commission on Software-Defined Warfare reports. Previously, McNamara worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, where she led the S&T portfolio of the Defense Innovation Board and as a technology policy subject matter expert at the DoD Chief Information Office. Prior, she was a senior analyst at the national security think tank Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, where she worked at the intersection of future operation concepts and emerging technology adoption and advised the Department of Defense on technology acquisition strategies.

Peter Modigliani

Senior advisor, Govini; author, Commission on Software-Defined Warfare, Atlantic Council

Peter Modigliani is a senior advisor at Govini, advising USD(A&S) and ASD(A) on strategic acquisition initiatives. Prior to that, he was a vice president at Beacon Global Strategies. Modigliani subsequently served as a defense acquisition leader within the MITRE Corporation, enabling the DoD and intelligence community to deliver innovative solutions with greater speed and agility. He works with acquisition and CIO executives, program managers, the Section 809 Panel, congressional staffs, industry, and academia to shape acquisition reforms, strategic initiatives, and major program strategies. Prior to MITRE, he was an assistant vice president with Alion Science and Technology. Modigliani began his career as an Air Force program manager for C4ISR programs.

Tate Nurkin

Founder, OTH Intelligence Group; author, Commission on Software-Defined Warfare, Atlantic Council

Tate Nurkin is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense and Indo-Pacific Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is also the founder of OTH Intelligence Group.

Before establishing OTH Intelligence Group in March 2018, Nurkin spent twelve years at Jane’s by IHS Markit where he served in a variety of roles, including managing Jane’s Defense, Risk, and Security Consulting practice. From 2013 until his departure, he served as the founding executive director of the Strategic Assessments and Futures Studies (SAFS) Center, which provided thought leadership and customized analysis on global competition in geopolitics, future military capabilities, and the global defence industry.

Substantively, Nurkin’s research and analysis has a particularly strong focus on US-China competition, defense technology, the future of military capabilities, and the global defense industry and its market issues. He also specializes in the design and delivery of alternative futures analysis exercises such as scenario planning, red teaming, and wargaming.

Nurkin is a frequent author and speaker on these overlapping research priorities. For example, he was the lead author of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission’s report entitled China’s Advanced Weapons Systems, which was published in May 2018, and has provided testimony to the Commission on two occasions. In March 2019, he was featured on a Center for Strategic and International Studies China Power podcast on China’s unmanned systems. He was the lead author of the Atlantic Council’s 2019 strategy white paper on artificial intelligence.

He previously worked for Joint Management Services, the Strategic Assessment Center of SAIC, and the Modeling, Simulation, Wargaming, and Analysis team of Booz Allen Hamilton. From 2014 to 2018 he served consecutive two-year terms on the World Economic Forum’s Nuclear Security Global Agenda Council and its Future Council on International Security, which was established to diagnose and assess the security and defense implications of the Fourth Industrial Revolution.

Nurkin holds a MS in international affairs from the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Tech and a BA in history and political science from Duke University. He lives in Charlotte, NC.

Stephen Rodriguez

Managing partner, One Defense; senior advisor and study director of the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council

Stephen Rodriguez is a senior advisor with the Forward Defense program at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the managing partner of One Defense, a strategic advisory firm that leverages machine learning to identify advanced software and hardware commercial capabilities and accelerate their transition into the defense industrial base. He is also an investor at Refinery Ventures, an early-scale fund investing in dual-use technologies across the country.

Rodriguez began his career at Booz Allen Hamilton shortly before 9/11 supporting its national security practice. In his capacity as an expert on game theoretic applications, he supported the United States Intelligence Community, Department of Defense, and Department of Homeland Security as a lead architect for the Thor’s Hammer, Schriever II/III and Cyber Storm wargames. He subsequently was a vice president at an artificial intelligence company (Sentia Group) and served as chief marketing officer for an international defense corporation (NCL Holdings). Rodriguez serves as a board director or board advisor of ten venture-backed companies (Applied Intuition, Duco, Edgybees, Firestorm, Titaniam, Ursa Major Technologies, Vantage Robotics, WarOnTheRocks, ZeroMark, and Zignal Labs). He is a special advisor at America’s Frontier Fund, a commission director at the Atlantic Council and a life member at the Council on Foreign Relations. Rodriguez received his BBA degree from Texas A&M University and an MA degree from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. He is published in Foreign Policy, WarOnTheRocks, National Review, and RealClearDefense.

Clementine G. Starling-Daniels

Program director, senior resident fellow, Forward Defense, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council

Clementine G. Starling-Daniels is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program and a resident fellow within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. In her role, she shapes the Center’s US defense research agenda, leads Forward Defense’s team of nine staff and forty fellows, and produces thought leadership on US security strategies and the evolving character of warfare. Her research focuses on long-term US thinking on issues like China’s and Russia’s defense strategies, space security, defense industry, and emerging technology. Prior to launching Forward Defense, Starling served as deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security team, specializing in European security policy and NATO.

From 2016, she supported NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division at two NATO summits (Brussels and London) and organized and managed three senior Atlantic Council task forces on US force posture in Europe, military mobility, and US defense innovation adoption. During her time at the Atlantic Council, Starling has written numerous reports and commentary on US space strategy, deterrence, operational concepts, coalition warfare, and US-Europe relations. She regularly serves as a panelist and moderator at public conferences. Among the outlets that have featured her analysis and commentary are Defense One, Defense News, RealClearDefense, the National Interest, SpaceNews, NATO’s Joint Air and Space Power Conference, the BBC, National Public Radio, ABC News, and Government Matters, among others. Starling was named the 2022 Herbert Roback scholar by the US National Academy of Public Administration. She also served as the 2020 security and defense fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy. Originally from the United Kingdom, Starling previously worked in the UK Parliament focusing on technology, defense, Middle East security, and Ukraine. She also supported the Britain Stronger in Europe campaign, championing for the United Kingdom to remain within the European Union. She graduated with honors from the London School of Economics with a BS in international relations and history and is an MA candidate in security studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.

Mark J. Massa is a deputy director in the Forward Defense practice of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. A founding member of Forward Defense, Massa supports the director in the management of the program’s strategy, budget, personnel, and impact.

Massa leads Forward Defense’s portfolio of work on strategic forces issues, including nuclear strategy, space security, missile defense, and long-range conventional strike. His writing and commentary have appeared in the Hill, Defense News, RealClearDefense, Forbes, Air and Space Forces Magazine, the National Interest, CNBC, Sky News, and CTV News.

Massa earned his MA from Georgetown University’s security studies program. He received a BS in foreign service magna cum laude from Georgetown University with a degree in science, technology, and international affairs. He was awarded honors in his major for a senior thesis on a theory of nuclear ballistic missile submarine strategy.

Abigail Rudolph is a program assistant in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She contributes to the program’s defense industry and innovation portfolio.

Previously, Rudolph interned with the Cleveland Council on World Affairs where she contributed to its foreign policy forums and committees on foreign relations. As an undergraduate, she co-authored an op-ed detailing net-zero carbon emissions pathways for Ohioans; conducted an independent study evaluating the environmental impacts of war; cofounded the Women in National Security Initiative at her university; and completed her senior thesis which focused on an assessment of, and recommendations for bolstering NATO’s China policy.

She graduated with honors from Baldwin Wallace University, earning a BA in national security with a minor in sustainability.

Curtis Lee is a program assistant in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Lee is a recent graduate from Carnegie Mellon University, where he received a MS in public policy and management, a BS in policy and management, and a BA in Chinese studies. He has experience working on numerous topics in defense and foreign policy with a focus on the Indo-Pacific region and China. Lee completed his senior thesis on analyzing the supply chain vulnerabilities of US future technologies as a result of US-China decoupling policies.

In addition to his role at the Atlantic Council, Lee is currently a military intelligence officer in the US Army Reserves.

Alexander S. Young is a project assistant in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, where he supports the program’s defense industry, innovation, and technology work.

Young is a graduate of the London School of Economics and Political Science, where he earned a MA with merit in global politics. He previously graduated with high honors from the University of California, Santa Barbara, completing a double major in political science and global studies with emphases in international relations and the Middle East and the North Africa region. Having studied and worked in both Europe and the Middle East, Young wrote his master’s dissertation about the impacts of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on the geopolitics of the eastern Mediterranean and its natural gas projects.

Previously, Young also worked as an English teacher in underserved communities in Israel, having taught at An-Najah Comprehensive Junior High School in Rahat and Dizengoff Elementary School in Tel Aviv.

Young’s interests include geopolitics, ethnic and religious conflict, natural resources, defense industry issues, conflict resolution, and conflict stabilization.

Acknowledgements

This report was written and prepared with the support and input of its authors, commissioners on the Atlantic Council’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare, and the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

This effort was conducted under the supervision of commission director Stephen Rodriguez, Forward Defense director Clementine Starling-Daniels, and Forward Defense deputy director Mark J. Massa. Special thanks to Atlantic Council CEO Fred Kempe and Matthew Kroenig for their support of this effort.

This effort has been made possible through the generous support of Booz Allen Hamilton, CAE, Helsing, Lockheed Martin, and Second Front Systems as the foundational sponsors, as well as sponsorship from Aalyria, Accrete AI, Adarga, Domino Data Lab, Edge Case Research, Fathom 5, Fortem Technologies, Kodiak Robotics, Latent AI, Peraton, Primer AI, SAAB, Saronic, Scale AI, and Skydio.

Foundational sponsors

Sponsors

To produce this report, the authors conducted more than fifty interviews and consultations with current and former officials in the US Department of Defense, congressional staff members, allied embassies in Washington, DC, and other academic and think tank organizations. However, the analysis and recommendations presented in this report are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of individuals consulted, commissioners, commission sponsors, the Atlantic Council, or any US government organization. Moreover, the authors, commissioners, and consulted experts participated in a personal, not institutional, capacity.

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If Trump wants peace in Ukraine, he must increase the pressure on Putin

Doug Klain — Thu, 27 Mar 2025 01:52:25 +0000

For months, US President Donald Trump and allies such as Senator Lindsey Graham have stated that if Russian President Vladimir Putin rejects peace efforts, the United States will impose new sanctions to bring Russia to the negotiating table. So far, however, the Kremlin has refused to join Ukraine in accepting a US-proposed ceasefire. Instead, Putin has this week demanded sanctions relief in exchange for a limited maritime ceasefire that favors Russia. It may now be time to consider putting more pressure on Moscow.

Putin certainly does not appear to be very interested in ending the war. Since agreeing to a pause on energy infrastructure attacks during a March 18 call with Trump, he has launched multiple large-scale drone and missile bombardments of Ukrainian civilian and energy targets.

If the US uses sanctions alone to pressure Putin, the impact will not be felt immediately. In order to get the Russian leader’s attention, new sanctions must be paired with tougher enforcement of existing sanctions and expanded military assistance to put Ukraine in a better position on the battlefield. More than anything else, the military reality on the ground in Ukraine is the deciding factor in efforts to end the war. Luckily, this is the area where Trump has the greatest ability to shape perceptions.

Republicans in Congress have shown an interest in expanding sanctions against Russia, particularly in going after Moscow’s energy revenues while boosting US energy exports to cut into Putin’s war chest. Any legislation to make good on these objectives should also include new appropriations for the Presidential Drawdown Authority so that Trump can send armored vehicles, long-range fires, air defenses, and more to Ukraine, while also backfilling US stocks with new replacements.

Legislative steps could also include funding for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative. This would allow the president to issue contracts for new weapons that will benefit Ukraine, while creating jobs for US manufacturers and revitalizing the domestic defense industrial base.

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Passing new military assistance would send a much-needed signal of resolve after two months of softball tactics from the Trump administration toward Russia. A record high number of Americans currently think Trump is doing too little to help Ukraine and believe he is siding with Russia. Trump’s Special Envoy Steve Witkoff recently added to these concerns by uncritically repeating a series of false narratives used by the Kremlin to justify the invasion of Ukraine during an interview with Tucker Carlson.

Members of Trump’s team have already outlined arguments in favor of more military aid to Ukraine. Last April, Special Envoy for Ukraine Keith Kellogg wrote that if Kyiv wouldn’t come to the table for talks, the US should withhold military assistance, while if Russia refused to negotiate, aid to Ukraine should be increased. Trump has since followed through on cutting aid to Ukraine, but resumed deliveries after Kyiv declared it was ready to accept Trump’s proposal for an unconditional ceasefire.

With Ukraine now backing Trump’s ceasefire proposal while Putin keeps finding new reasons to delay, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Russia is the main obstacle to peace. The recently announced ceasefire in the Black Sea is far from Trump’s original proposal, with the Russians requiring sanctions relief before implementing it. Putin has sought to introduce his own ceasefire conditions, while also demanding “the complete cessation of foreign military aid and the provision of intelligence information to Kyiv.” This would leave Ukraine isolated and disarmed in exchange for a pause in the fighting.

Trump should respond to Putin’s stalling tactics by following the recommendations of his own secretary of state, who said back in January that Ukraine needed greater leverage over Russia. That means changing Putin’s calculus on the battlefield and stopping the Russian military’s grinding advances.

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Strengthening Ukraine’s position on the battlefield could be politically advantageous for Trump. Former US President Joe Biden was long criticized for his flawed approach to providing Ukraine with military assistance. As a result of Biden’s cautious policies, Ukraine received enough to survive but not to win.

Trump could now correct Biden’s mistake by making an historic presidential drawdown and surging military assistance to Ukraine in order to bring Russia to the table. He could also use the REPO Act to make Russia’s own frozen assets pay for any new aid, an idea Speaker Mike Johnson has previously called “pure poetry.”

Russia is not yet ready to enter into serious peace talks, but Putin is in a vulnerable position. He is sacrificing huge numbers of soldiers for modest gains in Ukraine, and is struggling to replace the large quantities of military equipment being lost in costly frontal offensives. Domestically, the Russian economy is showing signs of strain, with high inflation and a shortage of workers.

Despite this deteriorating outlook, Putin is still betting that he can outlast the West in Ukraine. With continued US support for Ukraine in question and deep divisions emerging within the transatlantic alliance, he now has less reason than ever to compromise.

In Trump’s book, The Art of the Deal, he argues that the best way to negotiate is to “just keep pushing and pushing and pushing to get what I want.” So far, we’ve seen the president exert massive pressure on Ukraine by pausing aid, siding with Moscow at the UN, and even calling Zelenskyy a dictator. We’ve yet to see similar pressure on Russia.

Putin’s approach to negotiations currently resembles The Art of the Deal far more than Trump’s. The Russian dictator is pushing and pushing for further concessions, while offering very little in return. If Trump wants to achieve a genuine peace, he will need to put far more pressure on Moscow. Increased sanctions are a necessary step, but giving Ukraine the weapons it needs to push Russia back on the battlefield will likely prove far more effective.

Doug Klain is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a policy analyst for Razom for Ukraine, a US-based nonprofit humanitarian aid and advocacy organization.

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DefenseNews reports on Commission on Software-Defined Warfare final report

Atlantic Council — Wed, 26 Mar 2025 20:00:00 +0000

On March 26, Courtney Albon of DefenseNews published an article analyzing the defense industry’s response to Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s recent directive on software acquisition, highlighting Forward Defense‘s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare report as a key framework for understanding the broader reforms required. The piece, “In the wake of Hegseth’s software memo, experts eye further change,” details how military officials and industry executives have expressed “a mix of optimism and angst” about the mandate while calling for more comprehensive reforms.

The article underscores how the commission’s report identified workforce expertise as a critical need for the Pentagon and details its recommendation that Department of Defense (DoD) develop an “extensive, connected, layered and modular software-centric training program” to establish a foundational understanding of commercial best practices. The DefenseNews piece directly quotes from the commission’s findings, noting “While the DoD has taken steps to upskill its existing workforce for the digital age, a widely acknowledged software proficiency shortfall remains.”

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Cartwright and Kandasamy in COTS Journal on the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare

Atlantic Council — Wed, 26 Mar 2025 20:00:00 +0000

On March 26, COTS Journal published an article by Gen James “Hoss” Cartwright, USMC (ret.) and Jags Kandasamy, Commissioners on Forward Defense’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare, highlighting key recommendations from the Commission’s final report. The piece explores enterprise software and operational software, outlining a strategic approach to their procurement and use. The authors urge the Department of Defense to adopt both software systems to enhance warfighter protection, ensure effective equipping, and improve battlefield safety.

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Exclusive on Atlantic Council Commission on Software-Defined Warfare final report published in Axios

Atlantic Council — Wed, 26 Mar 2025 14:00:00 +0000

On March 26, Colin Demarest, future of defense reporter at Axios, published an exclusive article on the Pentagon’s software-hardware balance and featured Forward Defense‘s Commision on Software-Defined Warfare report. The article, “Exclusive: The Pentagon’s software-hardware tug of war,” highlights the commission’s conclusions on the era of “software-defined warfare” and the urgent need for the US military to enhance its software capabilities to compete with China.

The piece examines key findings from the Atlantic Council report, which was the product of eighteen months of work and over seventy interviews. According to the article, the commission concluded that the US military is still anchored to an acquisition system “ill-suited to the rapid tempo of modern technological innovation,” putting the country “at significant risk.” The report emphasizes the Department of Defense’s lack of “sufficient software expertise” and recommends establishing a software cadre by recruiting dozens of specialists to be deployed across various defense departments.

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Ukraine’s growing military strength is an underrated factor in peace talks

Serhii Kuzan — Tue, 25 Mar 2025 21:06:03 +0000

Can Ukraine survive without US military aid? Could Kyiv’s European partners potentially fill the gap in weapons deliveries? Policymakers, analysts, and commentators around the world have been wrestling with these questions in recent weeks as they come to terms with US President Donald Trump’s foreign policy pivot away from Europe and his administration’s overtures toward Russia.

While the urgency and importance of this debate cannot be overstated, there has been a tendency to overlook Ukraine’s own agency and the country’s ability to defend itself. It is true that the Ukrainian war effort since 2022 has relied heavily on Western support, but Ukraine’s military has also evolved dramatically over the past three years to become by far Europe’s biggest and most effective fighting force.

Ukraine currently has approximately one million people in arms defending the country against Russia’s invasion. This makes the Ukrainian Armed Forces more than four times larger than Europe’s next biggest military. Ukraine’s troops are also battle-hardened and have unmatched knowledge of the twenty-first century battlefield. Indeed, in many areas, they are now setting the standards for others to follow.

Crucially, Ukraine’s army is backed by a highly innovative and rapidly expanding domestic military-industrial complex that is harnessing the excellence of Ukraine’s prewar tech sector and reviving long neglected Soviet era capabilities. Any discussion on the likely future course of the war against Russia and the terms of any peace deal must therefore take into account the fact that Ukraine is a now major military power in its own right.

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For the past year, international media coverage of Russia’s invasion has tended to create the impression that Putin’s army is slowly but surely grinding forward toward a costly but inevitable victory. The reality is less straightforward.

Russian troops reclaimed the battlefield initiative in early 2024 and have been advancing fairly steadily ever since, but they have only achieved relatively modest territorial gains while suffering record casualties. Analysts estimate that at the current pace, it would take Russia almost a century to complete the conquest of Ukraine.

Viewed from a broader perspective encompassing the entire full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s military performance becomes even more impressive. Since spring 2022, The Ukrainian Armed Forces have succeeded in liberating around half of all the territory seized by the Russian army, and have won a series of key battles in the Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson regions. Russia has been unable to capture and hold a single Ukrainian regional capital, and is still struggling to force Ukrainian troops out of Russia itself following Kyiv’s bold August 2024 cross-border incursion into the Kursk region.

Far beyond the battlefield, Ukraine has also overachieved. In the Black Sea, Ukrainian marine drones have revolutionized naval warfare and forced Putin to withdraw his fleet from Russian-occupied Crimea to the relative safety of Russian ports. Deep inside Russia, long-range Ukrainian drones strike at military assets, logistical hubs, and energy infrastructure with growing frequency.

Ukraine’s resilience owes much to the international military assistance the country has received. However, this support has often been subject to delays and has frequently fallen victim to political considerations that have cost Ukraine dearly. In order to minimize these vulnerabilities, the Ukrainian authorities have prioritized the development of the country’s domestic defense industry.

The results have been striking. In 2025, the overall capacity of Ukraine’s defense industry is expected to reach a new high of $35 billion, up from just $1 billion at the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion. While this capacity is not yet being fully utilized due to defense budget limitations, Ukraine now produces around one-third of all weapons, ammunition, and equipment used by the country’s armed forces. In critical areas such as drone production, the figure is now close to one hundred percent.

Meanwhile, Kyiv is encouraging international partners to invest in Ukrainian defense sector companies and finance weapons production in Ukraine. A number of countries have already responded by committing large sums and promoting joint projects within the Ukrainian defense industry. This trend is expected to gain pace during 2025 as the US pivot away from Europe fuels increased defense spending across the continent.

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Ukraine’s biggest defense industry success has been the development of the domestic drone manufacturing sector. On the eve of the full-scale invasion, the country boasted only a handful of drone producers. The sector has now mushroomed to include over 200 businesses producing millions of drones annually, with output expected to treble during the current year. In order to harness this rapidly growing strike potential and maximize battlefield impact, Ukraine last year established a special branch of the armed forces dedicated to drone warfare.

Ukraine’s emergence as a drone warfare superpower owes much to the country’s strong tech traditions and entrepreneurial spirit. Since 2022, Ukrainian drone developers have proved highly innovative and are now recognized internationally as world leaders in military drone technologies. “Foreign models are like Toyotas now, while Ukrainian drones are Mercedes. Ours are just leagues ahead,” one Ukrainian commander told Ukrainska Pravda recently.

Ukraine now has a formidable arsenal of drones for use on the battlefield, at sea, and for long-range attacks against targets across Russia. The country also has a growing collection of hybrid missile-drones and missiles. President Zelenskyy recently confirmed that Ukraine had carried out an attack with the domestically produced Long Neptune cruise missile for the first time, underlining the country’s growing potential to strike back at Russia. Further innovations are in the pipeline, with domestic missile production expected to increase in the coming months if Kyiv is able to secure the necessary additional funding.

The Ukrainian military still faces a range of major challenges. The biggest issue remains manpower shortages. So far, Kyiv has sought to address mobilization problems by updating training and offering recruits the opportunity to choose the unit they will serve in, but shortfalls persist. A new initiative aimed at potential recruits between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five was launched in February 2025, featuring attractive enlistment packages and one-year service contracts.

There is also no escaping the fact that Ukraine remains dependent on Western support in order to maintain the country’s war effort. While officials in Kyiv have spoken of increasing the share of domestically produced war materials to fifty percent, Ukraine cannot realistically expect to match Russia’s overwhelming advantages in manpower, firepower, industrial capacity, and financing without continued assistance from the West.

Despite these limitations, Ukraine’s growing military strength must be taken into consideration during coming negotiations over a potential compromise peace deal with Russia. While nobody in Kyiv would relish the grim prospect of fighting on without Western assistance, the country is far from defenseless and will not accept a bad peace that places Ukrainian statehood in jeopardy.

Russia made the mistake of underestimating Ukraine in 2022, and has since paid a terrible price. Three years on, there can be little doubt that the Ukrainian army is now the most powerful fighting force in Europe. This military reality will help shape the contours of any future peace deal. It should also guarantee Ukraine’s place at the heart of Europe’s changing security system as the continent adjusts to the new geopolitical realities of an isolationist United States and an expansionist Russia.

Serhii Kuzan is Chairman of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center (USCC). He formerly served as an adviser to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (2022-2023) and advisor to the Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council (2014).

Rodriguez, Shanahan, and Sweatt cut into the stakes and opportunities of software-defined warfare on All Quiet on the Second Front podcast

Atlantic Council — Mon, 24 Mar 2025 18:00:00 +0000

On March 24, Stephen Rodriguez, senior advisor at Forward Defense and director of FD’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare, was a featured guest alongside Lt Gen Jack Shanahan, a commissioner on the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare, on the podcast All Quiet on the Second Front, hosted by Tyler Sweatt, a commissioner on the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare. This episode, entitled “Software Defined Warfare with Lt. Gen. Jack Shanahan and Stephen Rodriguez,” shed light on the urgency of developing innovative strategies that will best prepare the DoD to navigate an increasingly software-driven defense landscape.

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Soofer featured at NSSA’s SpaceTime event on “Golden Dome for America”

Atlantic Council — Fri, 21 Mar 2025 14:43:50 +0000

On March 20, Forward Defense senior fellow Robert Soofer joined Lt. Gen. Henry “Trey” Obering, USAF (Ret.), and Chris Williams for NSSA’s SpaceTime event, “Golden Dome for America.” The discussion explored the policy, budgetary, and programmatic implications of President Trump’s recent executive order establishing a homeland air and missile defense system.

Former fellow

Robert Soofer

Arms Control Defense Policy

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Shanker interviewed about the use of drones in Ukraine on the RealClearPolitics podcast

Atlantic Council — Tue, 18 Mar 2025 20:08:59 +0000

Nonresident Senior Fellow

On March 13, Scowcroft Center nonresident senior fellow Thom Shanker was interviewed by Andrew Walworth on the RealClearPolitics podcast to discuss how the use of drones following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has redefined modern warfare. According to Shanker, “Drones have really redefined the battle plan in Ukraine… Currently, 70% of all deaths and injuries in Ukraine are caused by drones.”

Fellow

Thom Shanker

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Cybersecurity Defense Policy

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

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Ukraine’s innovative defense tech sector is the country’s trump card

David Kirichenko — Thu, 13 Mar 2025 21:50:27 +0000

As tempers flared last month during Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s disastrous Oval Office confrontation with US President Donald Trump and Vice-President JD Vance, Trump offered a blunt assessment of Ukraine’s limited leverage in any future negotiations with Russia. “You don’t have the cards,” he told Zelenskyy. It is a message the US leader has repeated on multiple occasions as he seeks to broker a peace deal and end the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Trump’s logic is easy enough to understand. After all, Ukraine is currently locked into a brutal war of attrition against a far larger and wealthier enemy. For over a year, the Russian army has been slowly but steadily advancing as Ukraine struggles to address mounting troop shortages and encounters regular issues with the flow of military assistance from the country’s Western allies. If this continues, most observers believe Moscow’s overwhelming advantages in terms of manpower, firepower, and funding make eventual Russian victory virtually inevitable.

The Ukrainians are acutely aware that the odds are stacked against them. However, they also understand that Russia’s invasion represents an existential threat to their nation. This helps to explain the remarkable resilience displayed by Ukraine’s army and Ukrainian society as a whole. Faced with a fight for survival against a military superpower, Ukrainians recognize that they cannot realistically expect to match Russia in terms of conventional military strength. Instead, their country’s trump card in this uneven struggle is the innovative and rapidly expanding Ukrainian defense tech sector.

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Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion just over three years ago, an improvised industry of defense tech startups has mushroomed in garages, workshops, and warehouses across Ukraine. This trend has benefited from the country’s vibrant prewar IT industry, with many existing IT businesses and tech entrepreneurs switching their focus in 2022 to support the Ukrainian army.

This has led to dramatic increases in the domestic production of key items such as surveillance and attack drones, with Ukrainian developers engaged in a relentless daily race to stay ahead of their Russian adversaries. Hundreds of Ukrainian companies are now engaged in drone manufacturing, compared to a mere handful in 2021. The Ukrainian government recently unveiled plans to purchase around 4.5 million first person view drones in 2025, more than doubling last year’s number. This is enhancing Ukraine’s reputation as a global defense tech hub and boosting the country’s efforts to reduce its reliance on military aid from the West.

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Ukrainian drones are playing a key role in transforming the modern battlefield and are now responsible for around two-thirds of Russian losses, according to a recent report by the Royal United Services Institute. Ukraine’s progress has been so groundbreaking that leading Western defense companies are increasingly looking to learn from the country. For example, Silicon Valley companies are tapping into the know-how of Ukrainian drone makers, the Wall Street Journal reports.

The impact of Ukraine’s defense tech prowess is perhaps most evident in the Black Sea. At the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s navy was virtually nonexistent, while the dominance of the Russian Black Sea Fleet was taken for granted. Three years on, Ukraine has successfully leveraged low-cost, high-impact naval drones to offset Russia’s initial advantages and break the blockade of the country’s Black Sea ports.

Ukraine’s maritime drones have repeatedly proved their effectiveness, sinking or damaging numerous Russian warships and forcing Putin to withdraw the bulk of his fleet from Crimea to the safety of Russia itself. Despite the distances involved, Ukrainian naval drones are able to pose a threat to Russian shipping far from Crimea. In summer 2023, Ukraine launched a long-range drone attack that reportedly damaged a warship close the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, around six hundred kilometers from the nearest Ukrainian naval bases in the Odesa region.

Ukraine’s naval drone fleet continues to evolve at a rapid pace. In recent months, a new model equipped with missiles reportedly shot down a Russian helicopter over the Black Sea. Marine drones have also been developed as launch craft for aerial drones. Ukrainian officials claim these “miniature aircraft carriers” have already been used to hit Russian military targets in occupied Crimea and southern Ukraine. Looking ahead, the use of naval drones as platforms for aerial attacks could create opportunities for Ukraine to bypass Russian front line defenses and launch strikes from unexpected angles.

As Ukraine enters a fourth year of full-scale war against one of the world’s leading military powers, the need for continuous innovation on the battlefield and at sea remains critical. Ukraine’s remarkable success in the Battle for the Black Sea is an indication of what can be achieved when the Ukrainian military makes the most of the country’s innovative defense tech industry. Kyiv’s partners should take note of the key role being played by Ukrainian defense tech innovators and maximize their support for this strategically crucial sector.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Robert Soofer

Arms Control Defense Policy

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NATO’s capability development: A call for urgent reform

David Julazadeh — Thu, 13 Mar 2025 17:52:48 +0000

In today’s fast-evolving security environment, NATO finds itself at a critical crossroads. Rapid technological advances and shifting geopolitics mean that while adversaries swiftly deploy disruptive technologies, test NATO’s deterrence, and reshape the global landscape, the Alliance remains hampered by slow, cumbersome processes for developing and delivering vital capabilities. NATO cannot afford to be reactive. The choice is stark: Will NATO develop, acquire, and deliver common-funded capabilities at the speed of operational need? Or will it remain mired in bureaucracy while adversaries surge ahead?

As NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Transformation Admiral Pierre Vandier warned in an interview with Politico in November, NATO must “take more risks, spend more, be faster, and cut bureaucracy.” Important equipment ranging from frigates and armored personnel carriers to ammunition are often delayed or stuck in bureaucratic limbo.

Making these changes will not be easy. Despite past reform efforts, NATO’s common-funded capability development and delivery remains slow, fragmented, and risk-averse. Procedural compliance is often prioritized over effectiveness, and consensus-driven decision-making delays urgent operational needs.

But without urgent reform, NATO risks eroding its credibility and failing to provide warfighters with the tools they need, when they need them. NATO must increase efficiency, maintain its technological edge, improve interoperability, and ensure its forces can fight as a cohesive Alliance.

The case for urgent reform

NATO’s capability development process is structurally misaligned with its operational needs. Here are four ways to reform the capability development and delivery process.

1. Prioritize speed and outcomes over process

NATO’s risk-averse, process-driven culture leads to excessive delays. Capabilities stall not due to technical challenges but because of bureaucratic approvals, redundant reviews, and slow decision-making. Even urgent capability needs must clear multiple layers of approval, leading to delays measured in years instead of months.

These delays hinder NATO’s ability to field critical technologies, such as artificial intelligence-enabled decision support, cyber defense tools, and space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—capabilities that adversaries are deploying at speed. By the time NATO makes a decision, the operational environment has often already shifted, making some investments obsolete before they are even employed.

NATO must replace its risk-averse, process-driven culture with one that rewards speed, effectiveness, and operational impact. Governance should focus on timely decision-making, with clear, enforceable timelines for capability approvals. NATO should also streamline redundant reviews and adopt commercial-sector best practices, such as rapid prototyping and iterative fielding.

2. Establish a single accountable authority

NATO’s Common-Funded Capability Development (CFCD) process is fragmented across multiple organizations. Therefore, no single entity is accountable for delivering capabilities from concept to fielding. This diffusion of responsibility creates inefficiencies and capability gaps that weaken NATO’s deterrence.

Although Allied Command Transformation’s deputy chief of staff for capability development (DCOS CD) informally coordinates efforts across NATO Headquarters and procurement agencies, the absence of authority to set deadlines, assign priorities, or enforce accountability hampers progress.

Recognizing this challenge, the DCOS CD has begun to strengthen the Capability Management Authority and refine the Strategic Portfolio Review to improve prioritization and coordination. These are positive steps, but they remain dependent on consensus-based decision-making and lack the enforcement mechanisms to accelerate delivery.

One solution is to establish a senior leader—such as an assistant secretary general for acquisition and capability delivery (ASG ACD)—to oversee CFCD execution. Supported by a directorate drawn from existing expertise, this leader would have the power to set priorities, enforce timelines, resolve disputes, and ensure capability gaps are closed on time. Such a role would institutionalize ongoing efforts, ensuring prioritization, sequencing, and execution occur under the necessary accountable and empowered authority to drive results.

3. Align capability development with national force planning

NATO’s CFCD process and the NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP) operate separately despite being inextricably linked. CFCD funds shared capabilities, while the NDPP ensures nations develop forces that meet collective requirements. When these processes are not aligned, capability gaps and interoperability challenges emerge.

The modernization of NATO’s Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) highlights this misalignment. For nearly a decade, NATO debated whether to sustain, replace, or transition away from AWACS. The Alliance Future Surveillance and Control initiative, launched in 2017, remained a study rather than a structured procurement effort. Meanwhile, CFCD decision-making lacked urgency, leaving allies uncertain about their role in NATO’s future surveillance and control capability. If CFCD investments do not align with NDPP-generated national capabilities, NATO risks funding systems that are incomplete or unable to integrate into broader force structures. The result? Delays, misaligned capabilities, and an Alliance less prepared to fight as a unified force.

To address this, NATO should institutionalize a formal mechanism to synchronize CFCD and NDPP decision-making. The Alliance has recently taken promising steps, such as reestablishing linkages through the introduction of ‘collective targets’ in the next version of NATO’s political guidance document, which is currently in development and slated for approval in 2027. However, deeper and more sustained alignment is necessary to prevent delays and ensure NATO’s investments integrate seamlessly with national force development.

4. Reform industry engagement and procurement agility

NATO’s rigid procurement processes prevent it from rapidly integrating cutting-edge technologies in artificial intelligence, cyber, and space. While adversaries exploit emerging capabilities, NATO remains bound by slow, inflexible acquisition rules.

To overcome these barriers, NATO must overhaul its approach to industry engagement and procurement. The pending Industry Engagement Strategy for Space is a step in the right direction, potentially bringing commercial space capabilities and technology to the Alliance, but further action is required. NATO should establish fast-track acquisition pathways, modeled on successful national defense programs, to accelerate the procurement of emerging technologies. Additionally, NATO Security Investment Program funding mechanisms must become more flexible, allowing for adaptive, needs-driven investments that keep pace with evolving threats.

NATO must act now

The urgency of reform cannot be overstated. NATO’s capability development system is not keeping pace with modern warfare. If the Alliance does not act decisively, its deterrence credibility and warfighting effectiveness will erode while adversaries accelerate their technological and military capabilities.

Reforming decision-making, empowering dedicated leadership, aligning CFCD with NDPP, and modernizing procurement are strategic imperatives. NATO’s ability to deter, respond, and prevail depends on fielding capabilities at the speed of operational need.

NATO must act now to remain ready, relevant, and dominant in the battlespace of tomorrow. Incremental change is no longer an option.

Lieutenant General (Ret.) David J. Julazadeh is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He most recently served at NATO’s Allied Command Transformation as the deputy chief of staff, capability development.

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The hypersonic imperative

Michael E. White — Wed, 12 Mar 2025 18:27:12 +0000

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Capabilities that are lethal, survivable, and responsive from long range, will be essential for the United States to achieve battlefield dominance in the highly contested battle space anticipated in any future conflict with major power adversaries. This is why the Department of Defense and Congress must prioritize the accelerated fielding of these capabilities.

Key points

China and Russia have seized an advantage in hypersonic capabilities, challenging the security of the US homeland and its forward bases, ultimately undermining deterrence of great-power war and eroding US assurance of its allies and partners.
Hypersonic vehicles fly and maneuver at greater than five times the speed of sound (Mach 5) and often much faster. Long-range hypersonic weapons offer the potential to strike fleeting targets deep within an adversary nation and avoid ever-more-sophisticated air and missile defenses.
The US Department of Defense and Congress must make the acceleration of current-generation hypersonic weapon and counter-hypersonic defense programs a national priority while investing in the next generation of affordable capabilities, including the underlying workforce, T&E, S&T, the supply chain, and the broader industrial base.

What are hypersonic capabilities?

As a general rule, hypersonic vehicles fly a significant portion of their trajectory at speeds in excess of five times the speed of sound (Mach 5, or about 3400 miles per hour at altitude). Note that many hypersonic vehicles fly at speeds well above Mach 5. The manned X-15 experimental hypersonic aircraft flew at just below Mach 7. Ballistic missiles reenter Earth’s atmosphere between Mach 10 and Mach 20, depending on their range. The space shuttles reentered from Earth orbit around Mach 25.

Urgent investment needed to address unacceptable asymmetry

There has been a recent focus on the development of long-range, hypersonic weapons that maneuver high within the atmosphere leveraging speed, a survivable altitude corridor, and lethality to change the dynamic on the battlefield. Unfortunately, potential US adversaries have seized the initiative to develop, field, and use this new class of weapons to help create an asymmetry that challenges US and allied battlefield dominance. The United States must not let that asymmetry persist.

<10 MINUTES	Time-to-target of a hypersonic missile at five-hundred-miles range
MACH 10+	Glide speed of most hypersonic glide vehicles
2021	The year China tested a global range hypersonic glide vehicle, alarming US observers
2018	Russia starts production of Avangard intercontinental range hypersonic nuclear armed glide vehicle
2023	USAF AARW development successfully completed without transitioning to production

Why are hypersonic capabilities important on the battlefield?

Hypersonic weapons can defeat heavily defended, high-value targets from long range within minutes. To deliver effects on a target at five hundred miles, a traditional subsonic cruise missile, such as the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) or Tomahawk, would take approximately one hour of flight time. Hypersonic cruise missiles can make that trip in less than ten minutes. A hypersonic glide vehicle can make the trip between Guam and the Taiwan straights in under 30 minutes. Additionally, these missiles cruise or glide above most air-defense systems and below most ballistic-missile-defense systems and are highly maneuverable. Hypersonic weapons, therefore, dramatically compress the timescale of relevance on the battlefield, are highly survivable, and have long range to ensure survivability of their launch platform.

The US ability to dominate the current and near-future battlefield has been significantly degraded by the current, and projected, asymmetry in hypersonic weapons

—Michael E. White, former principal director for hypersonics in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, Research and Engineering

What is the current posture in hypersonics?

Russia and China have aggressively pursued the development of long-range hypersonic weapons and have developed and fielded several types of hypersonic strike weapons that hold US theater land and sea bases at great risk. Furthermore, potential adversaries such as North Korea and Iran have reportedly developed and deployed hypersonic weapons. Russia has developed and deployed a nuclear-armed hypersonic weapon that holds the US mainland at risk from a highly survivable nuclear first strike. While the United States has made great progress developing a first generation of air-, land-, and sea-launched hypersonic strike weapons over the past five years, Washington has not yet fielded its first weapon. Most notably, the US Air Force decided not to field the Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW), a boost-glide hypersonic weapon, when it was ready at the end of 2023. Additionally, while there have now been two very successful flight tests, delays in fielding the Army Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) and Navy Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) weapons, originally scheduled to field in 2023 and 2025, respectively. As a result, the US ability to dominate the current and near-future battlefield has been significantly degraded by the current, and projected, asymmetry in hypersonic weapons.

The hypersonic imperative

To address the battlefield asymmetry that Washington currently faces in hypersonics, it is imperative that the United States

accelerate the fielding of recently matured air-, land-, and sea-launched weapons in numbers;
establish block upgrade programs that insert advanced capabilities in a timely manner;
prioritize cost-reduction initiatives to ensure the United States can affordably field the necessary capacity;
accelerate fielding of capability to defend against adversary hypersonic systems;
develop and mature next-generation weapon systems, including reusable hypersonic aircraft;
enhance hypersonic ground and flight test capability, modeling and
simulation (M&S), science and technology (S&T), and workforce initiatives;
energize the broad industrial base to instill affordability and innovation across the portfolio; and
work with allies to capture innovation and enable accelerated fielding of affordable capacity

Should the United States fail to improve its offensive hypersonic capabilities, Washington’s ability to penetrate adversary A2/AD nodes and manage escalation could degrade, making it more difficult to deter great-power war and manage intrawar deterrence. Failing to protect the United States from hypersonic weapons could allow adversaries to more effectively coerce the United States by threatening limited warning conventional strike against key civilian and military infrastructure, as well as attacking US forces deployed abroad.

Why now?

The United States must field and evolve hypersonic capabilities now as part of a comprehensive warfighting strategy to maintain its ability to dominate the battlefield against an increasingly capable set of adversaries. These adversaries have developed integrated capabilities to create a highly contested environment to defeat US and allied forces across all domains: air, land, sea, and space. This multi-domain threat must be addressed with a comprehensive and layered defeat strategy that leverages new offensive and defensive capabilities across kinetic and non-kinetic domains to attack and disable adversaries’ high-end systems before and after launch. Hypersonic strike weapons, launched from stand-off ranges that protect launch platforms, will be essential to allowing US and allied forces to defeat these systems with lethal, survivable effects in a timescale of relevance on a modern battlefield. This offensive capability must be coupled with effective, layered, kinetic, and non-kinetic defenses against adversary hypersonic and ballistic missile capabilities.

The Hypersonic Capabilities Task Force

To address these issues, the Atlantic Council has assembled a Hypersonic Capabilities Task Force to

benchmark US efforts in offensive and defensive hypersonic capabilities;
identify gaps in technology, policy, and procurement; and
recommend actionable solutions to ensure the United States remains at the forefront of hypersonic innovation.

The task force is co-chaired

Deborah Lee James, former secretary of the US Air Force; and
Ryan McCarthy, former secretary of the US Army

This task force is directed by

Stephen Rodriguez, senior advisor, Forward Defense, Atlantic Council

The task force author is

Michael White, former principal director for hypersonics in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, Research and Engineering

Task force members include

Jim Cooper, former congressman; former Chair of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee
Madelyn Creedon, former senior Defense Department and Energy Department leader;
Doug Lamborn, former congressman; former Chair of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee
GEN James McConville, USA (ret), former Army Chief of Staff; and
Whitney McNamara, Atlantic Council nonresident senior fellow.

Industry task force members include

Felipe Gomez del Campo, chief executive officer, Specter Aerospace;
Hank Holland, chairman and chief executive officer of Amaero International Ltd.;
Katrina Hornstein, hypersonic portfolio director at Ursa Major;
Michael Johns, senior vice president, Kratos Defense and Security Solutions;
Cameron McCord, co founder and chief executive officer of Nominal;
Chris Power, founder and chief executive officer of Hadrian;
Mark Rettig, vice president at GE Aerospace;
Ralph Sandfry, director for hypersonics and directed energy at Lockheed Martin;
Zach Shore, chief revenue officer at Hermeus; and
Brian Zimmerman, senior vice president at Booz Allen Hamilton.

Task force staff include

Mark J. Massa, deputy director, Forward Defense, Atlantic Council
Jonathan Rosenstein, program assistant, Forward Defense, Atlantic Council

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Soofer quoted at National Institute for Public Policy symposium on nuclear and missile defense policy

Atlantic Council — Tue, 11 Mar 2025 14:11:04 +0000

On November 20, 2024, Forward Defense senior fellow Robert Soofer gave remarks at a symposium on “Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy in the Second Trump Administration: What to Expect and What Should be Done” hosted by the National Institute for Public Policy. In the published notes from the symposium, Soofer was quoted on the unique challenges and opportunities the Trump administration faces, with respect to nuclear and missile defense policy.

Former fellow

Robert Soofer

Arms Control Defense Policy

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Chilton interviewed about the “Golden Dome” on Aerospace Advantage Podcast

Atlantic Council — Tue, 11 Mar 2025 14:09:14 +0000

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 8, Forward Defense distinguished fellow Kevin P. Chilton was interviewed on The Aerospace Advantage podcast by The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. In the episode, Chilton spoke on the realities of the “Golden Dome,” saying, “I’m 100 percent for it for the United States of America but I would say first things first. It would be nice if we could defend an area as long as Israel as effectively as they just defended against Iran and I’m not convinced we can today.”

Fellow

Kevin P. Chilton

Distinguished Fellow

Cybersecurity Defense Industry

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Leaders of Hypersonics Capabilities Task Force author SpaceNews op-ed

Atlantic Council — Fri, 07 Mar 2025 15:20:26 +0000

On March 6, Hypersonic Capabilities Task Force co-chairs Deborah Lee James, Ryan McCarthy, and lead author, Michael E. White, published an op-ed in SpaceNews entitled, “How the nation can make fielding hypersonic capabilities a national priority.” The article argues that the U.S. must urgently prioritize the development and deployment of hypersonic capabilities to counter growing threats from adversaries such as China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran.

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Grundman on Investor’s Business Daily on technological innovation in the defense sector

Atlantic Council — Wed, 05 Mar 2025 20:00:00 +0000

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 5, Steven Grundman, senior fellow at Forward Defense, was featured on Investor’s Business Daily in a segment of their Growth Stories, “Palantir Is Shaking Up The Defense Sector. What Comes Next As The AI Revolution Heads To The Front Lines?” Grundman discusses how software is emerging as a key differentiator in military programs.

Fellow

Steven Grundman

Senior Fellow

Defense Industry Defense Policy

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Making AUKUS work: The case for an Indo-Pacific defense innovation consortium

Elliot Silverberg, Jacob Sharpe, and Rob Murray — Tue, 04 Mar 2025 15:34:04 +0000

Now well into its fourth year, the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) security partnership remains many months away from rapidly delivering advanced capability to the Indo-Pacific. Notwithstanding its prominent place in Washington’s ambitions to design a “hellscape” for China in the region, AUKUS has continued to focus primarily on assisting Australia in building a fleet of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines—a long-term project that will take years, if not decades, to materialize. To bridge this gap, the AUKUS nations have concentrated on creating a seamless export environment for emerging and disruptive technologies with more immediate applications. AUKUS Pillar II, already intended to advance the joint development of advanced capabilities, should be better engineered to support advanced co-development, co-production, and co-sustainment quickly and effectively.

The reality of multilateral defense innovation cooperation, however, is that existing technology-sharing rules and a general lack of understanding of how to navigate the defense sector—both basic requirements for establishing a foothold in a tightly regulated market—remain significant barriers to enhanced industrial collaboration within AUKUS and beyond. In particular, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and Export Administration Regulations (EAR), the US defense and dual-use technology-sharing regimes, continue to obstruct meaningful allied co-innovation despite reform efforts spanning the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations. Even a much-touted new ITAR exemption for AUKUS, currently undergoing implementation, took years of lobbying and legislating to enact, and its ultimate impact remains uncertain, contingent on industry buy-in.

Even as the Trump 2.0 administration will likely continue restricting transfers of sensitive capabilities, these export barriers should not prevent the United States from acting swiftly—where clear win-win benefits exist—to enhance cooperation on high technology with key allies. With tensions rising over Taiwan, Washington has a substantial opportunity to advance this agenda in the Department of Defense’s priority region. While ITAR and EAR reform will take time, the Indo-Pacific offers fertile ground for collaboration, with its diverse—if disparate—network of technologists, companies, and investors eager to participate in defense innovation. The important groundwork of fostering relationships between commercial sellers and military buyers cannot and need not wait for these legal frameworks to catch up. These efforts must necessarily proceed in tandem with new export rulemaking and, indeed, would help justify and accelerate those legal changes. To seize this moment, a new mechanism is needed.

Enter the Indo-Pacific Strategic Partnership for Accelerated Research and Knowledge in Defense (SPARK). Inspired by and drawing from the best practices of ongoing NATO innovation efforts—which Rob Murray, one of this article’s authors, created and oversaw for a time—SPARK is our proposed Indo-Pacific initiative to actualize AUKUS Pillar II with dedicated capital and procurement vehicles. If properly constructed, SPARK will rapidly cultivate government relationships, institutional knowledge, and public-private investment pathfinders—critical lifelines for a small business or start-up seeking to navigate the capital-intensive defense innovation landscape.

For SPARK to achieve its potential, it will require strong backing from a wide array of public and private actors to meet the unique demands of its strategic environment. Despite its current limitations, AUKUS Pillar II already carries the broad political and institutional support necessary to grow a new regional effort, making it an ideal initial tether for SPARK and a launchpad for expanded Pillar II engagement with Japan, South Korea, and other key security partners. This new construct will enable Pillar II to establish new structures and incentives for innovators across the Indo-Pacific and facilitate the vast technology talent and capital flows already present in the region.

Growing priority, piecemeal approach

Defense technology has become a central regional priority amid China’s rapid expansion of its nuclear forces, naval fleet, and munitions stockpiles, as well as its continued provocations in the South China Sea. In 2023, the Department of Defense spent over $1.2 billion on partner capacity-building efforts in the Indo-Pacific, nearly a third of its entire international security cooperation budget. That same year, the Pentagon’s Pacific Deterrence Initiative was funded at a record $9.1 billion—$3 billion more than the original request to Congress. Buttressed by record-high foreign military sales driven by the war in Ukraine, US armaments cooperation in the Indo-Pacific has expanded accordingly.

Yet, despite these efforts, the lack of a unified Indo-Pacific defense innovation framework has become increasingly apparent. While various US-led efforts—such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Minerals Security Partnership, and informal Chips 4 Alliance—are slowly addressing this gap, no comprehensive approach exists to rapidly enhance strategic technology acquisition and investment in the Indo-Pacific. The Pentagon’s defense innovation partnerships with Japan, Singapore, and India are all important stepping stones toward greater cooperation, but these bilateral “defense tech bridges” remain fragmented and limited in scope. AUKUS Pillar II, despite its potential for expansion, still limits the involvement of key regional leaders, further restricting its impact. Currently, Washington’s new Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience (PIPIR) seeks to unite the region’s national armaments directors, adopting a similar approach to the Ramstein Group established within NATO after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

While encouraging, PIPIR’s efforts may dissipate unless a means exists to channel this momentum into concrete investments in immediately fieldable capabilities, alongside the longer-term AUKUS submarine effort (Pillar I). At present, US efforts to invest in Pillar II—though regarded as Washington’s flagship defense industrial cooperation effort in the Indo-Pacific—may not be up to the task of scaling development and production. The 2024 National Defense Authorization Act allocated $25 million for “AUKUS innovation initiatives,” while the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2024 provided an additional $12.5 million for these initiatives, alongside $14.7 million for “AUKUS and coalition warfare” prize challenges. The President’s Budget Request for 2025 identified a further $79.8 million in research, development, test, and evaluation funds for AUKUS Pillar II—three times the 2024 budget. While these funds add some heft to the Pillar II project, the scale of investment needed to fully realize the transformative potential of these emerging technologies is vast, far exceeding current appropriations. To put these numbers in context, just in the first quarter of 2024, Alphabet, Apple, Microsoft, and Nvidia collectively spent $30 billion on research and development. Since 2021, the US defense technology sector has absorbed $130 billion in private venture capital. As it stands, AUKUS Pillar II lacks the sustained, comprehensive investment needed to fulfill its ambitious goals, risking significant delays in a climate where speed and scale increasingly determine success or failure. If the Indo-Pacific’s purse strings tighten permanently—after expanded military budgets are wasted on outdated or untested capabilities with few relevant uses—the United States may miss a critical opportunity for meaningful change. Failure to mobilize public and private networks around Pillar II now may risk a return to a more anemic, capital-scarce Indo-Pacific defense technology ecosystem—an outcome that SPARK could help arrest or entirely avoid.

Key priorities

To maximize its effectiveness, SPARK should serve as a catalyst for AUKUS Pillar II industry engagement, drawing on lessons from other alliance consortia—especially those with a proven record of fostering innovation. For instance, NATO’s Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) and its sister initiative, NATO Innovation Fund (NIF), launched in 2022 and 2023, respectively, offer a promising model for this new Indo-Pacific framework. DIANA, which became operational in June 2023, seeks to accelerate technology adoption through a network of accelerators and test sites, as well as mentorship and grant opportunities. Meanwhile, NIF was established to provide long-term investment in deep-technology start-ups. With its comprehensive approach toward innovation, the DIANA-NIF model—adapted to the unique requirements of the Indo-Pacific—could galvanize public-private collaboration and innovation across a range of allies and partners. In particular, SPARK should emulate a few key aspects of the DIANA-NIF efforts:

First, SPARK should establish overlapping networks of accelerators and test sites aimed at both low- and high-technology and information-readiness-level partners. As with DIANA, this network should not be overly restrictive, stretching across the AUKUS nations and extending to other important industrial partners in the Indo-Pacific—especially Japan, South Korea, Canada, New Zealand, Singapore, the Philippines, and India.

Second, SPARK should adopt a set of enhanced mechanisms for continuous engagement between the private sector and potential military end users. Like DIANA, SPARK should host regular prize challenges in critical technology areas. Successful applicants to these SPARK challenges would receive access to initial grant seed funding, mentorship, and complimentary facilities before undergoing a second round of reviews to secure additional funding for transition assistance across the acquisition valley of death. Moreover, SPARK should assign a military expert to all successful applicants to ensure frequent and formal end-user engagement as their capabilities progress from prototype to production (idea to impact). While DIANA has begun to bridge this servicemember-technologist gap in NATO, its companies still have infrequent exposure to live end-user feedback. SPARK can avoid this shortcoming by establishing a formalized network of postings for military test and evaluation personnel.

Third, SPARK should strengthen this support by establishing its own rapid acquisition vehicle, designed to provide companies in priority areas with targeted assistance to scale production. Through targeted transition assistance in the form of matching government funding and commercial investment, this vehicle would emulate recent enhancements to the Pentagon’s commercial and dual-use technology procurement efforts, led by organizations such as the Defense Innovation Unit, Strategic Capabilities Office, and Office of Strategic Capital. Along with service-level innovation units like the US Air Force’s AFWERX and US Navy’s Disruptive Capabilities Office, these improved acquisition pathfinders have proven effective in unlocking new technologies for the US military. By implementing a similar combination of activities in the AUKUS+ context, SPARK would help introduce the Indo-Pacific defense industrial base to new contracting models with built-in flexibilities to accommodate today’s rapid innovation cycles and the private sector’s focus on commercialization.

Fourth, SPARK should create an Indo-Pacific Trusted Capital Marketplace where vetted investors can engage defense and dual-use technology start-ups aligned with regional security priorities. The SPARK investment arm should consider a two-track financing approach, building on US efforts to invest in strategic technologies while combating adversarial capital. Track one, inspired by NIF but focused on debt rather than equity, should provide capital-intensive loans and loan-based guarantees (as opposed to equity financing) with long maturity timelines and highly favorable lending terms necessary for deep technology research and maturation. Given the paucity of deep-tech loan financing for national security, a more attractive set of investment mechanisms, backed by the capital and credit of the United States and key regional allies, would fill a crucial gap and complement wider venture capital efforts. Track two, similar to DIANA’s Allied Capital Community, is a new effort intended to fulfill short-term investments for late-stage prototype development. It would cater to “impatient capital” and quickly move projects to operational status.

Finally, SPARK should establish a Joint Interoperability Center of Excellence. Without an alliance architecture resembling NATO, Indo-Pacific countries struggle to achieve and maintain interoperability with the US military, much less with one another. A center of excellence focused on this exact issue would help define the functional and performance requirements of systems operating within an Indo-Pacific coalition across a variety of specific contingencies. By enabling industry to better understand and meet the demands that will be placed on dual-use systems, this center would ensure that companies with little experience working alongside the military can develop into effective partners quickly.

Road map for adoption

The war in Ukraine has underscored the critical importance of rapid technological adaptation and the swift deployment of advanced capabilities, particularly in electronic warfare. Ukraine’s efforts to counter sophisticated Russian electronic warfare tactics with innovative, quickly developed solutions demonstrate the need for a defense framework that can respond rapidly to immediate threats and foster long-term technological advancement. Drawing on these lessons, SPARK should prioritize the development and deployment of electronic warfare systems, unmanned platforms, and cyber defense tools to ensure that Indo-Pacific forces can swiftly adapt to an evolving security environment.

To achieve this parity, SPARK must balance the rapid deployment and production of existing technologies with the development of new innovations. Initial priorities should focus on immediately impactful technologies such as unmanned systems, cyber defense, and secure communications. Longer-term projects should cover game-changing technologies, such as responsible artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and advanced materials. SPARK should operate on three strategic tracks:

Rapid deployment track: Focus on quickly deploying mature technologies that are near operational readiness, ensuring they can be delivered to operators in the field as soon as possible.
Innovation track: Concentrate on developing early-stage technologies that require more time to mature but hold significant future potential. This track will drive sustained innovation and technological superiority.
Production track: Address the critical challenge of scaling production to meet urgent demands. This track will support and accelerate manufacturing capabilities, ensuring that new technologies can be produced at speed and scale.

Attracting private venture capital to SPARK will be crucial, particularly in aligning investment with mission-driven objectives rather than purely profit-maximizing strategies. The incentives for private capital should focus on profit optimization rather than profit maximization—emphasizing stable, long-term returns over short-term gains. Investors will be drawn to the opportunity to participate in projects with significant strategic importance, backed by government and military support, and the potential for steady, reliable returns over time.

To maximize effectiveness, SPARK should be structured as a cohesive entity that integrates research, development, testing, production, and investment under a unified governance framework. Unlike NATO’s DIANA-NIF model, where components function independently, SPARK’s unified structure will ensure seamless coordination across these tracks. It should be established as a regional consortium, open to Indo-Pacific nations beyond AUKUS, with a central management office overseeing operations. This office, potentially based in a neutral regional location, would enable rapid decision-making and coordination, supported by a rotating leadership structure and an advisory board comprising representatives from government, military, and industry sectors.

An Indo-Pacific SPARK would fulfill the glaring need for a unified innovation and technology acquisition framework in Washington’s most consequential arena of superpower industrial competition. A phased approach will be essential. In its first two years, through 2027, SPARK should focus on deploying mature technologies, enhancing production capabilities to meet immediate needs, and augmenting existing efforts such as the Replicator Initiative. Establishing accelerated production lines and leveraging private sector capacity will be critical in this phase. The subsequent phase will expand research and prototype development, guided by continuous feedback from end users. This integrated, multitrack strategy would ensure that SPARK can deliver immediate operational results while also securing long-term technological superiority, making it a cornerstone of regional security and technological collaboration tailored to the Indo-Pacific’s unique environment.

About the authors

Elliot Silverberg is the Director of Research at the Defense Innovation Board (DIB) in the US Department of Defense.

Jacob Sharpe is a Project Lead at the Defense Innovation Board (DIB) in the US Department of Defense.

Rob Murray is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense program and the Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The views expressed are the authors’ and do not represent those of any organization or affiliation.

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Soofer interviewed on NucleCast podcast about homeland missile defense

Atlantic Council — Fri, 28 Feb 2025 20:03:43 +0000

On February 25 Forward Defense senior fellow Robert Soofer was interviewed by Dr. Adam Lowther, Strategic Advisor to the ANWA Deterrence Center, on the NucleCast podcast. In the episode, they discussed the evolving threats from countries like North Korea, Russia, and China, and the need for a robust missile defense strategy that reassures allies and deters adversaries.

Former fellow

Robert Soofer

Arms Control Defense Policy

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Ukraine’s IT sector offers opportunities for pragmatic partnership with the US

Anatoly Motkin, Hanna Myshko — Thu, 27 Feb 2025 21:03:50 +0000

As the new Trump administration reassesses its foreign partnerships through a lens of transactional pragmatism, Ukraine’s IT sector presents a potentially compelling case for deepening bilateral cooperation.

While Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has sought to maintain strong ties with the United States, the current shift away from aid-based diplomacy signals that Ukraine must further demonstrate its economic value. In this context, the thriving Ukrainian IT industry is a key asset. This sector not only drives domestic economic resilience, but also offers tangible benefits to American businesses through investment, technological innovation, and cybersecurity expertise.

Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion three years ago, Ukraine’s IT industry has proven to be a resilient and dynamic force. Despite the ongoing war with Russia, the sector has demonstrated remarkable adaptability. In 2024, Ukraine’s IT services exports reached $6.45 billion, contributing 4.4 percent of the country’s GDP and accounting for approximately 38 percent of Ukraine’s total service exports. This strong performance has been possible despite the challenges posed by the largest European invasion since World War II, underscoring the Ukrainian IT sector’s ability to operate under extreme conditions.

Beyond its financial contribution, the Ukrainian IT industry also plays a crucial role in employment. By 2024, Ukraine’s IT workforce had grown to more than 300,000 specialists, solidifying its position as a major employer and a pillar of Ukrainian economic stability in today’s wartime environment.

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The United States is already an important partner for Ukraine’s IT industry. In 2023, the US was the largest importer of Ukrainian IT services, accounting for $2.39 billion or 37.2 percent of the industry’s total exports. This presents opportunities for intensified bilateral collaboration in both the private and public sectors that have the potential to transcend the kind of aid-based relations found elsewhere in the region.

Ukrainian IT companies are not seeking handouts but are actively investing in the US market. Rather than displacing American jobs, they are creating new opportunities and fostering technological advancements. Importantly, these companies are not appropriating US technologies but are in many cases sharing their own advanced developments. This cooperative approach could strengthen both economies, reinforcing a business-driven relationship that aligns with the Trump administration’s strategic vision.

Eurasia Center events

Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

The knowledge-based economy benefits immensely from such international partnerships. Unlike resource-dependent models, this framework ensures a two-way exchange of expertise. Ukraine’s IT professionals are already playing a significant role in cybersecurity, actively defending against digital threats and ensuring the integrity of critical infrastructure. From the early days of Russia’s full-scale invasion, they have consistently delivered in even the most difficult of circumstances and have enhanced Ukraine’s global reputation as a leading tech nation.

Moreover, the war has propelled Ukrainian engineers to the forefront of innovation in autonomous systems including aerial, maritime, and other drone technologies. Many of Ukraine’s most recent innovations in the drone sphere leverage AI. The depth of experience gained in developing and deploying these systems under real combat conditions is unparalleled worldwide. For the US defense industry, collaboration with Ukraine in this domain could be invaluable, offering access to battle-tested innovations that have the potential to redefine modern warfare.

The obvious synergies between the US and Ukrainian tech industries extends beyond the private sector. Cooperation in areas such as dual-use technologies should be prioritized by both governments to enhance security and drive innovation. Strengthening this partnership could contribute to a safer and more prosperous future for both nations.

By leveraging Ukraine’s IT expertise, the United States can improve its own technological capabilities while supporting a partner nation at a critical time. This partnership can bring further economic and strategic benefits to both parties. As the Trump administration moves toward a business-driven approach to US foreign policy, strengthening ties with Ukraine’s IT sector could boost innovation and security while also offering a range of business opportunities.

Anatoly Motkin is president of StrategEast, a non-profit organization with offices in the United States, Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan dedicated to developing knowledge-driven economies in the Eurasian region. Hanna Myshko is regional director for Ukraine, Moldova, and the Gulf at StrategEast.

Given the benefits the Houthis continue to enjoy from shooting down these drones, the United States needs to adjust its drone deployment strategy to ensure that MQ-9 Reapers are less vulnerable to the militant group’s attacks.

The offensive

The surge of attacks on US UAVs and the anti-shipping campaign are major pieces of the Houthi’s latest offensive. Since mid-November 2023, the Houthis have held Red Sea freedom of navigation and seaborne commerce hostage, launching hundreds of attacks on merchant vessels. Framing its anti-shipping campaign as an act of solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza, the Houthis have delivered a severe blow to maritime traffic in the commercial artery connecting the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.

Quickly after the Houthis’ campaign against Red Sea shipping began, the Yemeni armed group significantly broadened its targets to any ship owned or operated by international shipping lines whose vessels service Israel’s ports. Yet, the group’s limited identification and tracking capabilities led to attacks on ships with no official links to Israel, including occasional strikes on Chinese– and Russian-linked vessels (which have since been largely spared from Houthi attacks following Iran-facilitated deals to ensure their safe transit).

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As the Red Sea basin’s maritime security deteriorated in 2023, the United States and the European Union sought to deter the Houthis by setting up multinational naval coalitions: Operation Prosperity Guardian and Operation Aspides. Though successful in countering dozens of Houthi attacks on commercial vessels, Western maritime security missions only partially restored the safety of shipping lanes. In 2024, the United States and the United Kingdom launched Operation Poseidon Archer to conduct precise air strikes on military targets in Yemen’s Houthi-controlled territories. The Houthi naval offensive’s operational tempo appears to have reduced in recent months, with the most recent attack on merchant ships occurring in mid-November 2024.

Since 2002, the United States has regularly fielded UAVs such as the MQ-9 Reaper for surveillance and strike missions in Yemen, especially for gathering intelligence on and eliminating operatives affiliated with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Despite their protracted deployment, the number of US drones lost to hostile fire was minimal, with only three MQ-9 Reapers shot down by the Houthis between 2017 and 2019.

During the Houthis’ anti-shipping campaign, there has been a marked escalation in the group’s tactical proficiency against US drones. Since November 2023, the Houthis have claimed responsibility for downing fourteen MQ-9 Reaper drones, in a series of attacks that have targeted US assets primarily in Marib and Sa’ada governorates. The intensifying operational tempo and increasing success rate of Houthi attacks on US drones are unprecedented, showcasing the militia’s improved marksmanship and expanding offensive capabilities.

While it isn’t clear what exactly is in the Houthi missile force, and thus is bolstering this offensive capability, a rough sense can be gleaned from Houthi military parades and from seizures of military-grade materials from dhows smuggling Iran’s lethal aid. The Houthi arsenal of surface-to-air missiles includes Russian-made missiles originating from prewar Yemeni army stocks, such as the SA-6/Faster (Innovator) surface-to-air missile and the Thaqib (Piercer) missile family. In addition, the Houthis claim to produce indigenous missile designs. However, those designs are either variants of Iranian weapon systems or based on Iran’s technology, such as the Sayyad-2C (Hunter) missile, the Saqr series (Iran’s 358 missile), and the Barq missile family (Iran’s Taer series).

Inside the Houthis’ strategy

Tactically, the Houthi shootdowns of MQ-9 drones primarily aim to blind the US intelligence and targeting systems. Operation Poseidon Archer significantly relies on data gathered by UAVs to plan US-UK joint air strikes on hostile ground targets in Houthi-controlled territories. Although designed to be a top-notch “hunter-kill” drone, the MQ-9 Reaper also plays an important role in intelligence gathering, surveillance, and recognition thanks to its twenty-four-hour endurance and maximum operational altitude of fifty-thousand feet. The intensification of Poseidon Archer’s precision strikes on Houthi radar, storage, and launch sites compelled the group to rely more on underground facilities and hideouts in Yemen’s rugged interior. The Houthis’ efforts to conceal strategic sites have heightened the Western coalition’s dependence on UAVs to collect actionable intelligence on military installations.

For the Houthis, the shootdowns of US drones also hold symbolic value. Direct armed confrontation with the United States and Israel is part and parcel of its ideological foundation. Wanting to be seen as capable of standing up to the United States, the Houthis have heavily propagandized the downing of MQ-9 Reapers. For instance, as noted by Mohammed Al-Basha (founder of the consultancy Basha Report), the Houthis have turned the US UAV into the main character of a satirical song titled baw-wart (“useless” in local slang) that mocks the drone’s poor combat capabilities.

The Houthis have also sought to strengthen domestic political legitimacy and gain regional recognition by attacking US aerial assets. The shootdowns of US drones boost morale for Houthi supporters at a time of great hardship under Western and Israeli air strikes. From a regional standpoint, claiming the destruction of MQ-9s has allowed the Houthis to portray themselves as the most lethal member of the Iran-led Axis of Resistance and to win the sympathy of anti-US and pro-Palestinian voices in the Arab world.

However, the Houthis’ claims warrant skepticism. The insurgent group is well known for its propaganda operations, including wielding unverifiable declarations to inflate the perception of its military performance. Since the anti-shipping campaign’s onset, the Houthis have often vaunted successful strikes on US naval assets deployed in the Red Sea, although US Central Command has been swift to say such claims are false. Similarly, the downing of MQ-9 Reapers represents a powerful attention-grabber to trumpet the Houthis’ offensive air warfare capabilities. Factual or not, these claims serve to inflate the Houthis’ perceived combat strength and burnish their image as a militia capable of confronting US forces head-on.

The Houthis’ dangerous partners

Although the MQ-9 Reapers have been shot down over Yemen, the negative ramifications of these Houthi attacks on US military assets could spill over beyond the country’s borders. After the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, there has been a marked acceleration in military cooperation, diplomatic coordination, and symbolic support between the Houthis and Iran (the group’s most crucial lifeline), Russia, China, and other regional armed groups in the Tehran-led Axis of Resistance.

Russia has significantly deepened political engagements with the Houthis, showcasing diplomatic solidarity with the group’s military actions and offering a counterweight to Washington’s hardline position against it at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In addition, US intelligence revealed that Iran mediated talksbetween Russia and the Houthis that led to Moscow supplying Russian-made advanced anti-ship cruise missiles to the group. It also reported the forward basing of Russian military advisors in Yemen, which allegedly provided the Houthis with ship tracking data and targeting guidance to increase the precision of attacks on commercial shipping.

Similarly to Moscow, Beijing seems to have intensified engagement with the Houthis since mid-November 2023. Beijing reportedly struck a deal with the militia to ensure safe passage for Chinese-flagged commercial ships. The Houthis have allegedly benefitted from China’s neutral stance at the UNSC and the procurement of Chinese-made military and dual-use components to support its domestic military-industrial base.

While motivated by different strategic goals, each of these actors share similar deep-rooted anti-West sentiments, a common denominator that the Houthis have sought to leverage to their advantage. In this regard, the militant group could offer Yemen and the Red Sea as battlegrounds from which Washington’s adversaries can get their hands on US military hardware. Anti-Western forces could have their eye on accessing US-made technology components for multiple purposes: They could attempt to reverse engineer the components, design tailored countermeasures, and obtaining potentially sensitive information stored in the MQ-9 Reapers. For Iran, getting access to US military equipment has long been a coveted prize. For instance, in mid-2019, Iran rushed to retrieve a US Navy MQ-4C Triton that the IRGC shot down over the Strait of Hormuz. But getting access to US-made technology could prove useful for others as well, including China, which faces heightening competition in the Indo-Pacific.

Bolstering the MQ-9 Reaper’s defenses

The MQ-9 Reaper is the backbone of the United States’s UAV fleet, providing US military planners with tactical depth into Yemen’s rugged interior. However, despite its technical edge over the Houthis’ missile force, it has proved vulnerable to basic anti-air weapon systems. Undoubtedly, the deployment of drones remains a preferable alternative to manned aircraft when operating in a high-risk environment such as Yemen. Yet, the rate of MQ-9 drones lost in combat since mid-November 2023 warrants attention from US military strategists. MQ-9 Reapers are worth around thirty million dollars apiece, and losing them at this pace—nearly one a month over the fifteen-month anti-shipping campaign, according to Houthi claims—is not sustainable.

Although the Houthi missile arsenal remains a low-tier threat to US aerial assets, the group has proved capable of partially blunting the United States’ combat edge, denting US air superiority, and exposing significant vulnerabilities in the MQ-9 Reaper’s defense layers. Washington’s adversaries could seek to capitalize on these gaps to further their strategic interests. After the Israel-Hamas cease-fire was brokered in January, the Houthis vowed to scale down their naval offensive, but freedom of safe navigation is far from being restored in the Red Sea. Washington should take advantage of the current lull in Houthi attacks to adjust its drone deployment strategy and accelerate the integration of self-protection kits into the MQ-9 Reaper that bolster its survivability against hostile fire. For example, such kits could include active and passive countermeasure systems against cyber and radio frequency or infrared threats.

Since November 2023, the Houthis have successfully turned the shootdowns of MQ-9 drones into a propaganda boon to tout their military performance domestically and abroad. Should the group conclude that keeping up attacks on US aircraft pays dividends, the Houthis are likely to intensify strikes on US assets. The group’s strong determination to heighten military confrontation with Washington can be seen in attempted strikes on February 19, in which Houthi rebels reportedly fired surface-to-air missiles at a US F-16 fighter jet and MQ-9 Reaper drone (but the missiles did not strike their targets).

The United States needs to keep its guard up. As the security conditions remain volatile in the Red Sea, MQ-9 Reaper drones are poised to keep playing a paramount role in strengthening the United States’ threat awareness over the Houthi menace.

Leonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco is a researcher who focuses on the security affairs of the Gulf region. He is also an analyst at Gulf State Analytics, a Washington DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy. Follow him on X: @mazz_Leonardo.

The post How the Houthis’ strikes on US MQ-9 Reaper drones serve a wider regional agenda appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bakir joins Strait Talk to discuss Syria’s interest in KAAN

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:15:43 +0000

Europe Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

The post Bakir joins Strait Talk to discuss Syria’s interest in KAAN appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Issue brief: A NATO strategy for countering Russia

Ian Brzezinski, Ryan Arick — Thu, 20 Feb 2025 19:56:35 +0000

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Key takeaways

Russia is the most direct and significant threat to the security of NATO member states—and since Moscow’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 this threat continues to grow. It now encompasses the war in Ukraine, the militarization of the Arctic, hybrid warfare, and violations of arms control treaties.
While NATO holds a significant advantage over Russia in military and economic power, an effective and unified strategy is needed to counter Russia’s aggression and fully harness the Alliance’s collective capabilities.
To effectively counter Russia, NATO must defeat Russia in Ukraine, deter Russian aggression against NATO allies and partners, contain Russian influence beyond its borders, and degrade Russia’s ability and will to accomplish its revisionist agenda. That will require, among other actions, a significant increase of support and commitment to Ukraine’s defense against Russia, and a more robust Alliance force posture including the modernization of its nuclear deterrent, the permanent stationing of brigade elements along NATO’s eastern frontier and increased defense industrial capacities.

Russia is “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security.” So states the NATO Strategic Concept promulgated at the Alliance’s Madrid Summit in June 2022, just four months after Russia’s massive escalation of its invasion of Ukraine.¹ The concept and NATO declarations not only underscore the illegality and brutality of that ongoing attack but also highlight Moscow’s use of nuclear and conventional military aggression, annexation, subversion, sabotage, and other forms of coercion and violence against NATO allies and partners.

Ever since its invasion of Georgia in 2008, Russia’s aggression against the Alliance has steadily intensified. This led NATO leaders at their 2024 Washington Summit to task the development of “recommendations on NATO’s strategic approach to Russia, taking into account the changing security environment.”² The Alliance’s “Russia strategy” is due for consideration at NATO’s next summit at The Hague in June 2025.³ This issue brief reviews Moscow’s actions affecting the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and presents the enduring realities, objectives, and actions that should constitute the core of an effective NATO strategy to counter the threat posed by Russia.

Intensified and globalized Russian aggression

Russia’s objectives go far beyond the subordination of Ukraine. Moscow seeks to reassert hegemony and control over the space of the former Soviet Union, diminish the power of the democratic community of nations, and delegitimize the international rules-based order. Moscow aims to subjugate its neighbors and to weaken—if not shatter—NATO, the key impediment to its European ambitions.

Toward these ends and under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin, Russia:

Has illegally occupied Moldova’s Transnistria region since the early 1990s.
Invaded Georgia in 2008, has continued to occupy portions of that country, and recently increased its influence, if not control, over the nation’s governance.
Invaded Ukraine in 2014 and significantly escalated this ongoing war in February 2022.
Militarized the Arctic by increasing its military presence in the region, including through reopening Soviet-era bases and building new facilities to buttress Russian territorial claims over Arctic waters.
Leveraged trade and energy embargoes and other forms of economic pressure to intimidate and coerce its European neighbors.
Conducts an escalating campaign of active measures short of war against NATO allies and partners, including information warfare, election interference, sabotage, assassination, weaponized migration, cyberattacks, GPS jamming, and other actions.
Expanded its conventional and nuclear military capabilities, an effort that was part of President Putin’s preparations to invade Ukraine.
Violated, suspended, and abrogated international arms control agreements, including New START Treaty, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Open Skies Agreement, and others.⁴

Enduring realities

A NATO strategy to counter Russia’s aggression is long overdue. Its absence cedes to Russia the initiative, leaving the Alliance too often in a reactive, if not indecisive and passive, posture in this relationship. An effective strategy requires recognition of nine enduring realities:

First, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a failure of deterrence. The weakness of the Alliance’s response to Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, NATO’s failure to respond forcefully to Russia’s months long mobilization of forces along Ukraine’s frontiers in 2021, and NATO’s acquiescence to Putin’s exercise of nuclear coercion emboldened and facilitated Putin’s actions against Ukraine. As a result, the credibility of the Alliance’s commitment to defend resolutely its interests and values has been damaged.

A destroyed Russian tank remains on the side of the road near the frontline town of Kreminna, amid Russia’s attack on Ukraine, in Luhansk region, Ukraine March 24, 2023. REUTERS/Violeta Santos Moura

Second, Russia is at war, not just against Ukraine. It is also at war against NATO. The Alliance can no longer approach the relationship as one of competition or confrontation considering the military invasions, active measures, and other forms of violence and coercion Russia has undertaken against NATO allies and partners.⁵ As former US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun has written, “Quite simply, Putin has declared war on the West, but the West does not yet understand we are at war with Russia.”⁶ By failing to recognize this reality, NATO has ceded escalation dominance to Russia as evidenced by its limiting of support to Ukraine and its inaction against repeated Russian aggression and provocations. The Alliance must recognize and act upon the reality that Moscow has pushed the NATO-Russia relationship into the state of war.

Third, NATO faces long-term conflict with Russia. Putin cannot be expected to abandon his ambitions, even if defeated in Ukraine. Ever since Putin’s speech before the February 2007 Munich Security Conference in which he railed against the international order and NATO’s expanding membership, Russia’s campaign to subjugate its neighbors and to intimidate, divide, and weaken the Alliance has been unceasing and relentless. Nor can the Alliance assume that Putin’s successor will significantly diverge from the objectives and policies that drive Russia’s actions today. Peaceful coexistence with Russia is not attainable in the short to medium term and will be difficult to attain in the long term.

Quite simply, Putin has declared war on the West, but the West does not yet understand we are at war with Russia.

—Stephen Biegun, former US Deputy Secretary of State

Fourth, Russia will continue efforts to increase the size and capability of its armed forces. While Russian land forces have suffered significant losses in its invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has reconstituted that force faster than expected. Russia’s land forces were estimated to be 15 percent larger in April 2024 than when Russia attacked Kyiv in February 2022.⁷ Earlier this year, Russia announced new ambitious plans to restructure and expand its ground forces to 1.5 million active personnel.⁸ Moreover, the Russian air force and navy have not been significantly degraded by the war against Ukraine. Russia’s air force has only lost some 10 percent of its aircraft. While Russian naval ships have been destroyed in the Black Sea, Russian naval activity worldwide has increased.⁹ Similarly, Russian nuclear forces have been unaffected by the conflict in Ukraine. Russia retains the world’s largest arsenal of deployed and nondeployed nuclear weapons and continues to develop new models of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM), hypersonic boost-glide vehicles, nuclear-powered cruise missiles, nuclear-powered subsurface drones, antisatellite weapons, and orbital space weapons.¹⁰ With some 6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) being directed to its military, Moscow is investing to increase its defense-industrial and research and development capacities.¹¹ Russia’s industrial base produces more ammunition than that produced by all NATO members and is fielding new high-tech weapons systems, such as the nuclear-capable multiple warhead IRBM Oreshnik Russia, which was demonstrated in combat against Ukraine last November.¹² In April 2024, NATO SACEUR General Christopher Cavoli testified to the US Congress that:

“Russia is on track to command the largest military on the continent and a defense industrial complex capable of generating substantial amounts of ammunition and material in support of large-scale combat operations. Regardless of the outcome of the war in Ukraine, Russia will be larger, more lethal and angrier with the West than when it invaded.”¹³

Fifth, Moscow’s aggressive actions short of war will continue and escalate. Putin has yet to face a response from the Alliance that will dissuade him from further exercising information warfare, cyber warfare, energy and trade embargoes, assassination, GPS jamming, sabotage, fomenting separatist movements, and other forms of hybrid warfare. These actions are intended to intimidate governments; weaken the credibility of the Alliance’s security guarantee; create and exacerbate internal divisions; and divide allies, among other objectives. Left unchecked, they threaten to undermine the Alliance’s ability to attain consensus necessary to take decisive action against Russia.

Sixth, Moscow’s exercise of nuclear coercion will continue as a key element of Russia’s strategy and should be expected to intensify. Threats of nuclear warfare are a key element of Putin’s strategy to preclude NATO and its members from providing Ukraine support that would enable it to decisively defeat Russia’s invasion. This repeated exercise of nuclear coercion includes verbal threats from President Putin and other senior Russian officials; the launching of nuclear capable ICBMs; the use of a nuclear capable IRBM against Ukraine, the first use of such a system in a conflict; nuclear weapons exercises; and the deployment of nuclear weapons to Belarus, according to both Russia and Belarus.¹⁴ NATO allies have repeatedly rewarded this coercion by expressing fear of nuclear war; declaring that NATO forces will not enter Ukraine; restricting NATO’s role in assisting Ukraine; limiting the flow of weapons to Ukraine; and restricting their use against legitimate military targets in Russia. Rewarding nuclear coercion encourages its repeated exercise and escalation. It risks leading Russia to conclude it has attained escalation dominance. A key challenge for NATO going forward will be to demonstrate that Russia’s threats of nuclear strikes are counterproductive, and the Alliance cannot be deterred by nuclear coercion.

NATO leaders stand together for a photo at NATO’s 75th anniversary summit in Washington in July 2024. REUTERS/Yves Herman

Seventh, Moscow is conducting a global campaign of aggression to weaken the democratic community of nations and the rules-based international order. Over the last two decades, Russia has exercised its military, informational, and economic assets to generate anti-Western sentiment across the globe, including in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific region. This has included military support to authoritarian, anti-Western regimes well beyond Europe, including Venezuela, Syria, and Mali. The most concerning element of Russia’s global campaign is the partnerships it has operationalized with China, Iran, and North Korea. Russia’s “no limits partnership” with China enables Putin to mitigate the impacts of Western sanctions on his war economy. Both Iran and North Korea have provided Russia with weapons and ammunition, and North Korean soldiers have joined Russia’s fight against Ukraine. In return, Russia has supplied missile and nuclear technologies, oil and gas, and economic support to these nations that enables them to stoke violence across the Middle East, threaten the Korean Peninsula, and drive forward Beijing’s hegemonic ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region.

Eighth, an effective Russia strategy will require a coordinated leveraging of all the instruments of power available through the Alliance, its member states, and its key partners, including the European Union. This includes the application of diplomatic, economic, ideological, informational, and other elements of power—none of which are the Alliance’s primary capacity, military power—that can be marshaled through its members states and multinational institutions, such as the European Union, where the Alliance and its member states have influence and authority.

Ninth, NATO significantly overmatches Russia in military and economic power.
NATO Headquarters estimates the combined GDP of Alliance member states to be $54 trillion, more than twenty-five times Russia’s estimated GDP of more than $2 trillion.¹⁵ The combined defense budget of NATO members amounts to approximately $1.5 trillion,¹⁶ more than ten times that of Russia’s publicly projected defense budget of $128 billion for 2025.¹⁷ This imbalance of power favoring the Alliance will be enduring and makes the execution of an effective Russia strategy not a matter of capacity, but one of strategic vision and political will.

Core objectives

To counter the direct and significant threat posed by Moscow, a NATO strategy for Russia should be structured around four core objectives:¹⁸

Defeat Russia in Ukraine: NATO must defeat Russia’s war against Ukraine. This is its most urgent priority. Failure to do so—and failure includes the conflict’s perpetuation—increases the risk of a wider war in Europe and will encourage other adversaries around the world to pursue their revisionist and hegemonic ambitions. Russia’s decisive defeat in Ukraine is essential to return stability to Europe and to reinforce the credibility of the Alliance’s deterrent posture.

Deter aggression by Russia: A key Alliance priority must be the effective deterrence of Russia aggression against the Alliance. A robust conventional and nuclear posture that deters Russian military aggression is far less costly than an active war. Deterrence must also be more effectively exercised against Russia’s actions short of war. Failure to deter aggression in this domain can undermine confidence in the Alliance and increase the risk of war.
Contain Russia’s influence and control: The Alliance must actively contain Russia’s efforts to assert influence and control beyond its borders. The Alliance must assist Europe’s non-NATO neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and in Central Asia to strengthen their defenses and resilience to Russian pressure. NATO and NATO allies should also work to counter and roll back Russia’s influence and engagement around the globe.
Degrade Russia’s capabilities and determination: A core objective for the Alliance should include weakening Russia’s capacity and will to pursue its hegemonic ambitions. Denying Russia access to international markets would further degrade its economy, including its defense-industrial capacity. Active engagement of the Russian public and other key stakeholders should aim to generate opposition to Putin and the Kremlin’s international aggression.

Achievement of these objectives would compel the Kremlin to conclude that its revanchist ambitions, including the diminishment or destruction of NATO, are unachievable and self-damaging. It would diminish Russia’s will and ability to continue aggression in Europe and weaken the impact of Russia’s partnerships, including with China, Iran, and North Korea. In addition, achieving these objectives would return a modicum of stability to Europe that in the long-term would enhance the prospects for NATO’s peaceful coexistence with Russia.

Regardless of the outcome of the war in Ukraine, Russia will be larger, more lethal, and angrier with the West than when it invaded.

—Gen. Christopher Cavoli, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe

Recommended actions

A NATO strategy to defeat, deter, contain, and degrade Russian aggression and influence should effectuate the following actions by the Alliance, its member states, and partners:

Defeat Russia in Ukraine and accelerate Ukraine’s accession into the NATO alliance Defeating Russian aggression against Ukraine requires its own strategy, which should feature five key elements: adopting Ukraine’s war objectives, including total territorial reconstitution (i.e., the Alliance must never recognize Russian sovereignty over the territories it illegally seized from Ukraine); maximizing the flow of military equipment and supplies to Ukraine, free of restrictions on their use against legitimate military targets in Russia; imposing severe economic sanctions on Russia; deploying aggressive information operations to generate opposition in Russia against Putin’s aggression; and presenting a clear, accelerated path for Ukraine to NATO membership. NATO membership, and the security guarantee it provides, would add real risk and complexity to Russian military planning. NATO membership for Ukraine is the only way to convince the Kremlin that Ukraine cannot be subject to Russian hegemony and would provide security conditions needed for Ukraine’s rapid reconstruction and economic integration into Europe.
Fulfill and operationalize NATO’s regional defense plans. To establish a credible and effective deterrent against Russian military aggression, NATO allies must:
- Build and deploy the requisite national forces. Military plans are no more than visions in the absence of required capabilities. NATO’s European and Canadian allies need to generate more forces, with requisite firepower, mobility, and enabling capacities. In short, given European allies’ obligations under NATO’s new regional defense plans, they must act with urgency.
- Strengthen transatlantic defense industrial capacity. High intensity warfare, as seen in Ukraine, consumes massive amounts of weapons stocks, much of which have to be in a near constant state of modernization to match the technological adaptations of the adversary. Today, the Alliance has struggled (and often failed) to match the defense-industrial capacity of Russia and its partners. NATO’s defense industrial base must expand its production capacities and its ability to rapidly develop, update, and field weapons systems.
- Increase allied defense spending to the equivalent of 5 percent of GDP. To facilitate the aforementioned requirements and to address emerging challenges beyond Europe that could simultaneously challenge the transatlantic community, NATO allies need to increase the agreed floor of defense spending from 2 percent to 5 percent and fulfill that new commitment with immediacy. NATO members cannot allow themselves to be forced to choose between defending against Russia and another geopolitical challenge beyond Europe.

Terminate the NATO Russia Founding Act (NRFA). Russia has repeatedly and blatantly violated the principles and commitments laid out in the Founding Act. Russia’s actions include having invaded Ukraine both in 2014 and in 2022, using nuclear coercion and escalatory rhetoric to pressue the Alliance, and deploying nonstrategic nuclear weapons to Belarus, as both Russia and Belarus have affirmed. Consequently, NATO should formally render the NRFA defunct, including the Alliance’s commitments to:
- Adhere to the “three nuclear no’s” that NATO member states “have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy – and do not foresee any future need to do so.”¹⁹
- Abstain from permanently stationing “substantial combat forces” in Central and Eastern Europe.²⁰

Update NATO’s nuclear force posture. In response to Russia’s modernization of its nuclear arsenal, exercise of nuclear coercion, and adjustments to its nuclear strategy that lowers the threshold for first use of nuclear weapons, the Alliance must update its own nuclear posture. The objectives should be to provide NATO with a broader and more credible spectrum of nuclear weapons options. An updated force posture would improve NATO’s ability to manage, if not dominate, the ladder of conflict escalation, complicate Russian military planning, and thereby weaken Moscow’s confidence in its own military posture and its strategy of nuclear “escalation to de escalate.” Toward these ends, the Alliance should:
- Increase the spectrum of NATO’s nuclear capabilities. This should include a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) and a ground-launched variant. The breadth and number of NATO nuclear weapons exercises, such as the yearly Steadfast Noon, should be expanded and further integrated with exercises of conventional forces.
- Expand the number of members participating in the Alliance’s nuclear sharing agreements. Doing so will expand the tactical options available to NATO and underscore more forcefully Alliance unity behind its nuclear posture.
- Broaden the number and locations of infrastructure capable of hosting the Alliance’s nuclear posture. The Alliance’s nuclear posture still relies solely on Cold War legacy infrastructure in Western Europe. Given the threat posed by Russia, NATO should establish facilities capable of handling nuclear weapons and dual capable systems, including nuclear weapons storage sites, in NATO member states along its eastern frontier.

Reinforce NATO’s eastern flank. Russia’s assault on Ukraine and its growing provocations against NATO member states and partners underscore the need to further reinforce the Alliance’s eastern frontier. To date, NATO’s deployments along its eastern flank amount to more of a trip-wire force rather than one designed for a strategy of defense by denial. To give greater credibility to the Alliance’s pledge not to “cede one inch” when considering a potential attack by Russia, NATO should:
- Establish a more robust permanent military presence along the Alliance’s eastern frontier. NATO is expanding its eight multinational battlegroups deployed to Central and Eastern Europe. But each of these deployments should be further upgraded to full brigades that are permanently stationed there. These elements should feature robust enabling capacities, particularly air and missile defenses and long-range fires. If the United States is expected to sustain a presence of 100,000 troops in Europe, the least Western Europe and Canada can do is to forward station some 32,000 troops combined in Central and Eastern Europe.
- Conduct large-scale, concentrated exercises on NATO’s eastern flank. The Alliance has commendably reanimated its emphasis on large-scale joint military exercises. However, those exercises have yet to be concentrated on NATO’s eastern flank. Doing so would enhance readiness, reassure the Alliance’s Central and Eastern European member states, and demonstrate resolve and preparedness in the face of Russian aggression.
- Upgrade the Alliance’s air defense and ballistic missile defense systems to more robustly address Russian threats. In its attacks on Ukraine, Russia has demonstrated with brutality its emphasis on missile and long-range drone strikes against military and civilian targets. As part of its efforts to upgrade its air and missile defense capacities, NATO should direct the European Phased Adaptive Approach to address threats from Russia.²¹

A Grad-P Partizan single rocket launcher is fired towards Russian troops by servicemen of the 110th Territorial Defence Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, amid Russia’s attack on Ukraine, on a frontline in Zaporizhzhia region, Ukraine January 21, 2025. REUTERS/Stringer

Expand the NATO SACEUR’s authority to order deployments and conduct operations along NATO’s eastern frontier. The Alliance’s regional defense plans are said to provide SACEUR with greater authority to activate and deploy NATO forces before crisis and conflict situations. Due to the aggressiveness of Russia’s ambitions, NATO should consider further expanding those authorities as they relate to the deployment and missions of forces along the Alliance’s eastern frontier. The actions of a deterrent force can be even more important than the magnitude of their presence.
Augment the Alliance’s posture in the Arctic. Russia has heavily militarized the Arctic, upgraded the status and capability of its Northern Fleet, and deepened its military cooperation with China in the region while the Kremlin continues to assert Arctic territorial claims that conflict with those of NATO allies. While NATO has been increasing the tempo of its Arctic operations and improving its Arctic capabilities, Russia continues to pose a significant threat in the region and possibly outmatches the Alliance in the High North. To further reinforce deterrence against Russian aggression in the Arctic, the Alliance should:
- Develop a comprehensive NATO strategy to defend its interests in the High North. Such a document would underscore the Alliance’s commitment to the region and help foster allied investments in infrastructure, capabilities, and training needed to defend and deter Russian threats in the High North.
- Establish a NATO Arctic Command and Joint Force. The Arctic poses a unique set of geographic and climatic challenges requiring tailored operational capabilities. A command and air-ground-naval force focused specifically on the High North would provide the Alliance a dedicated and tailored deterrent to counter Russian aggression in the Arctic.²²

Bolster deterrence against Russian actions short of war by strengthening resilience and through more assertive and punitive counteractions. NATO and NATO member states’ failure to respond robustly to Russia’s hybrid warfare—whether it is information warfare, cyberattacks, sabotage, assassinations, or other forms of aggression — has resulted in Russia’s intensification and escalation of these actions. The transatlantic community must strengthen its resilience against such attacks but also take stronger punitive measures against Russia if it is to persuade Russia to cease these attacks. While much of what needs to be done falls beyond the remit of NATO’s military capabilities, greater consideration should be given to how military assets can be leveraged to gather intelligence about Russian activity and provide a military dimension to the transatlantic community’s response to such provocations. For example, when a Russian ship fired a warning shot directed at a commercial Norwegian fishing boat within Norway’s exclusive economic zone or when Russia pulled out Estonian navigation buoys from the Narva River,²³ an immediate show of force from NATO could have been an appropriate response.
Strengthen the deterrence and resilience capacities of non-NATO nations in Europe and Russia’s periphery. Recent elections in Georgia, Moldova, and Romania reflect the intensity of Russia’s determination to claw back control and influence over the space of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. A key priority of a Russia strategy should be to strengthen efforts by the Alliance, its member states, and key institutional partners, such as the European Union, to reinforce the resilience and defense capabilities of non-NATO nations in Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. NATO’s programs, such as the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative, warrant even greater emphasis and resources, particularly in those regions.
Intensify Russia’s economic and diplomatic isolation. The current set of measures taken against Moscow in these realms have failed to sufficiently degrade Russia’s war economy and its ability to sustain its invasion of Ukraine and provocations elsewhere in the world. A key priority for NATO and its member states should be to significantly escalate economic sanctions, including the exercise of secondary sanctions to eliminate Moscow’s ability to generate international revenue from energy exports and attain critical technologies needed by its defense industrial sector.
Increase efforts to generate internal Russian opposition to the Kremlin’s revanchist objectives and greater support for democratic principles and governance. Russia has undertaken aggressive campaigns to influence the politics of NATO allies and partners. In the recent elections of Moldova and Romania, Russian intervention nearly effectuated regime change. For too long, the transatlantic community has remained on the defensive in this realm. NATO and its member states need to shift to the offensive and weaponize the power of truth to illuminate the brutal realities of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, the corruption of Russian officials, and other realties of Russian governance. NATO allies must more actively support Russian stakeholders—particularly civil society—that are more aligned with transatlantic values. This is critical to degrading the political will of the Russian state to continue its aggressions.
Modulate dialogue with Russia, limiting it to what is operationally necessary. The Alliance should formally disband the NATO-Russia Council—which last met in 2022—until Moscow has demonstrated genuine commitment to a constructive relationship. Nonetheless, the Alliance should establish and/or maintain lines of communication between the NATO secretary general and the Kremlin, as well as between Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the Russian General Staff, to enable crisis management and provide transparency needed for military stability. This would not preclude NATO allies from dialogues with Russia deemed necessary, for example, to assist Ukraine or pursue arms control measures.

The bottom line

As noted, NATO possesses an overmatching capacity to defeat Russia in Ukraine, deter Russian aggression, contain Russian influence beyond its borders, and degrade Russia’s ability and will to accomplish its revisionist agenda. Today, there is no better time to achieve these objectives by fully marshaling the Alliance’s assets and potential. Moscow cannot undertake an all-out military attack on NATO without risking the viability of Russia’s armed forces and thus its regime. The accomplishment of these objectives would provide stability to Europe’s eastern frontier and establish the best foundation for an eventual relationship with Moscow that is minimally confrontational, if not cooperative and constructive. However, this will take political will and resources. Russia today is determined to prevail in Ukraine, expand its military capabilities, and further leverage its partners, particularly China, Iran, and North Korea, to defeat the community of democracies and, particularly, the Alliance. Russia already envisions itself as being at war with NATO.

About the authors

Fellow

Ian Brzezinski

Senior Fellow

Central Europe Defense Policy

Staff

Ryan Arick

Associate Director

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

NATO Security & Defense

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The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

What’s missing from the AI debate? Patience.

Trey Herr — Tue, 18 Feb 2025 18:44:14 +0000

Artificial intelligence (AI) is evolving quickly, but the forces driving its development—computing infrastructure, model design, and the economics of deployment—are far from settled. There are no magic beans, no single indicators. Rather, there are a handful of strong signals that interact with each other such that interpreting one in isolation can easily lead to mistaken predictions on where AI is headed. Assuming that more compute power inevitably produces better models, for example, ignores that different companies and lines of research are taking different paths to solve the “systems problem” of AI.

Unfortunately, too many institutions—investors chasing returns, policymakers rushing to position themselves, and media outlets eager to shape the narrative—currently mistake motion for progress. In dollar terms, around 50 percent of all new venture capital investments went into AI service and related companies in 2024, including more than 60 percent of all activity in the fourth quarter and “six of the top ten deals.”

Balancing on a bubble

There is an AI bubble, and it is not just financial; it is also intellectual and political, fueled by a self-reinforcing churn of investment, commentary, and ambition. Discussions of AI leadership increasingly rely on confident expressions of urgency. Foreign policy outlets, high-profile thinkers, and former senior government officials churn out breathless analyses with dire warnings about how the United States might lose a “race for global AI primacy” and other claims of national fragility. An evolving set of technologies, only a fraction of whose potential is expressed through the chatbots visible to most users, is dropped into clichéd narratives of a narrowing window in which the United States must act decisively or risk losing an edge. While that does not mean the technology itself is a mirage, even Nvidia, which has experienced a generational shift in market valuation at warp speed, is suffering from changes driven partly by an unsustainable momentum and narrative.

The result is a cycle in which financial momentum and technological progress are often conflated, making it harder to distinguish durable innovation from speculative excess. This excess was on display recently with the news that a Chinese company, DeepSeek, had released a high-performing new model trained on only a fraction of the computing power of its competitors. Much of the reporting demonstrated a mix of confusion, limited information, and an early misreading of DeepSeek’s accompanying paper, all of which was then recycled by outlets further up the line.

In the responses to the announcement of DeepSeek’s r1 model, as with so many other single technical accomplishments, the missing ingredient is often patience. Sustainable breakthroughs take time; over-indexing on a single innovation will distort policy in ways that could harm both users and future tech development. Distinguishing meaningful innovation from hype requires scrutiny; failure to do so risks channeling ever increasing attention and capital toward dead ends and emphasizing commercialization over real research and design breakthroughs. The market, the policy environment, and even the technologies themselves demand a more disciplined approach and greater scrutiny from both the public and private sectors.

The career-breaking volumes of capital being poured into AI hardware and infrastructure should raise sharp questions about sustainability as firms invest at a scale detached from clear paths to profitability. Meanwhile, the broader AI ecosystem is shaped by investors, corporate leaders, and public voices with strong incentives to sustain a narrative of inevitable success. This alignment of interests has blurred the distinction between technological advancement and market exuberance.

The systems problem in AI

There is no fixed formula governing the relationship between computing resources, training techniques, and AI model performance. Computing power, the design and bandwidth of connections between chips and data centers, and the speed and size of memory are not fixed. Moreover, they do not function independently of the training methods and data-labeling techniques used to produce AI systems or the different technical approaches to how models are deployed, combined, and queried. Together, all of these choices produce an AI system.

As hardware scales and software optimizations improve, model performance shifts in ways that are difficult to predict. The field has broadly converged on the need for vast datasets and, in many (but certainly not all) cases, ever-larger parameter counts. Yet, the simple equation of “more computing power equals better models” overlooks the complexities that matter most. AI development is not a matter of turning up the frame rate on a video game—it is a systems problem. That is, it requires understanding the behavior of many different technologies and how they interact both in theory and in the harsh light of practice.

There are only a handful of infrastructure developers, operators, model researchers, and builders who are driving the current era of AI. Their technical approaches and “bet the farm” investments represent a range of assumptions, not an absolute consensus. For example, more decisive than just the speed of compute is how models are broken up and distributed across the computing infrastructure of AI—chips, racks, and entire data centers—during training. Differences in managing this distribution help define key competitive lines among designers, such as Nvidia, AMD, and Intel, and among cloud providers, such as Microsoft, Google, and Amazon.

Where it is that generative AI models think, referred to as “inference,” is another fault line, with Apple and Qualcomm prioritizing on-device processing while “pure” AI firms, such as OpenAI, Anthropic, and DeepSeek, build models that depend on centralized cloud infrastructure. Decisions around context—how much information a model retains across interactions or shares with other models in an ensemble—influence both performance and cost. Profitability remains an open question, as well: the economic calculus of AI looks different for a company like Meta, for which the model itself is not the secret sauce but a channel to other technology products, than for a firm like Renaissance Technologies, which focuses on AI for its own specialized, high-margin applications.

These questions are in flux, and the answers will not be the same for every model or company. Nvidia has become the defining technology investment of the moment, with institutional investors, hedge funds, and retail traders all heavily exposed to its trajectory. But its meteoric rise in this decade stems from choices in the last two. In 2007, Nvidia launched CUDA, which is now a market-defining software package. In 2019, it acquired Mellanox, a high-performance chip design and technology company. Both decisions helped Nvidia, which was misunderstood by many as a hardware firm for Bitcoin enthusiasts and gamers, make a deliberate turn to the data center.

Patience is all you need

The DeepSeek episode helps to highlight the importance of patience in the analysis of new technology developments in a domain that is still unsettled not just in terms of what problems the technology is being used to solve but how. It is important for policymakers to be able to access analysis that prizes long-term understanding and maps the growth of ecosystems around a technology instead of hyping acts of singular invention.

First, analysis of AI technological developments must be put into context. AI is a systems problem: unprecedented speed on a chip creates new bottlenecks in networking bandwidth; larger models demand more memory; new training techniques mean building new models and new training time.

Second, policy analysts have to acknowledge uncertainty in how the benefits of different AI capabilities are combined into expressions of national power. The potential fallacy of the “arms race” metaphor is that all participants have a shared understanding of how those arms might be employed. But scholars have already highlighted how fragile and divergent that understanding can be, even for relatively mature technologies. Being first to claim illusory control confers little lasting strategic advantage.

Finally, policymakers need to recognize the distorting effects of a bubble on the state of the debate. There is no one path of development in AI, no single end state or “win condition.” On its best day, what is presented as AI is a fractious basket of commercial technologies, open- and closed-source software, computing infrastructure, and research projects being combined in ever more clever permutations. “Winning” looks wildly different across companies, countries, and user communities. The distorting effects of the bubble appear to create certainty where there is little to be had, a sense of urgency in all things when it is not always warranted.

Patience is the missing ingredient, the real disruptive trend, in the systems problem for AI. Policy requires sustained attention for effective outcomes and mitigation of risk. Markets demand greater scrutiny of lurid claims and medium-term trajectory. But distinguishing signal from noise remains essential.

Even for the most intelligent systems—human and artificial—that still takes time.

Trey Herr is senior director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative (CSI), part of the Atlantic Council Technology Programs, and assistant professor of global security and policy at American University’s School of International Service.

Disclosure: Several companies mentioned in this article—Nvidia, Meta, Google, Amazon, and Microsoft—are donors to the Atlantic Council Technology Programs. This article, which did not involve these donors, reflects the author’s views.

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Ukrainian drones reportedly knock out 10 percent of Russian refining capacity

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 13 Feb 2025 22:17:50 +0000

Ukraine’s recent campaign of drone strikes on Russian energy infrastructure has succeeded in knocking out around one-tenth of Russia’s refining capacity, according to analysis by news agency Reuters.

Since the beginning of 2025, Ukraine has launched a wave of long-range drone attacks against military and industrial targets inside Russia. The Kremlin remains tight-lipped over the impact of these air strikes, but open source data and media reports point to significant damage to at least eight Russian refineries along with a number of oil depots and key logistical points such as pumping stations and ports used for oil and gas exports. The range of targets suggests a well-planned Ukrainian campaign to methodically dismantle Russia’s energy infrastructure.

Ukraine’s bombing offensive is proving effective. Calculations by Reuters analysts based on oil industry trading figures covering the period from January to early February 2025 indicate that Ukrainian drone attacks have disabled approximately 10 percent of Russia’s refining capacity. Coupled with the impact of recently imposed United States sanctions against the Kremlin’s shadow fleet of oil tankers, this is expected to leave Moscow with no choice but to slow oil production in the coming months.

Reports of significant disruption to Russia’s energy industry will be welcomed in Kyiv. Ukrainian officials have made no secret of their intention to target the Russian oil and gas sector, which serves as the economic engine of Vladimir Putin’s war machine. The first Ukrainian attacks took place during the initial months of the war, with a marked increase in frequency during 2024. Ukraine’s air offensive against Russia’s energy industry now appears to be entering a new phase of heightened intensity.

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Ukraine’s efforts to bring Putin’s invasion home to Russia have been hampered by restrictions imposed on the use of Western-supplied weapons amid a reluctance among Kyiv’s partners to risk escalating the conflict. The Kremlin has skillfully exploited these fears, with Putin warning explicitly in September 2024 that any attempt to lift restrictions on long-range strikes would mean NATO and Russia were “at war.”

In order to bypass Western restrictions, Ukraine has prioritized the domestic production of long-range drones and missiles capable of striking targets deep inside Russia. Thanks to Ukraine’s innovative defense tech sector and the country’s strong aerospace legacy from the Soviet era, progress has been rapid. In late 2024, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy showcased a number of new domestically produced drones and missiles with expanded ranges and payloads.

Ukrainian officials have stated that they intend to manufacture 30,000 long-range drones and 3000 missiles during the current year. Some of Kyiv’s Western partners also appear to recognize the strategic importance of Ukraine’s growing long-range arsenal, and are providing financing for production along with technical support. However, it will still be some time before Ukraine has sufficient long-range firepower to seriously threaten Russia’s ability to wage war.

At present, Ukraine’s air offensive is achieving the more limited goals of disrupting Russia’s energy industry, stretching the Kremlin’s limited air defenses, and undermining Moscow’s efforts to insulate ordinary Russians from the war. Since the onset of the full-scale invasion three years ago, Putin has been careful to cultivate a business-as-usual climate within Russia itself. Ukraine’s eye-catching daily strikes on oil refineries and storage depots are now sending a powerful message to the Russian public that the war unleashed by the Kremlin in February 2022 will not be fought exclusively on foreign soil.

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Ukraine’s expanding arsenal of domestically produced long-range weapons is particularly important at a time of growing uncertainty over the future of US military aid for the country. Throughout the war, the Ukrainian military has been heavily reliant on the United States and other Western partners for vital weapons supplies. However, there are now mounting concerns in Kyiv that US President Donald Trump’s efforts to reach a compromise peace deal with Putin could leave Ukraine isolated and vulnerable to further Russian aggression.

In the absence of credible NATO-style security guarantees, Ukrainian leaders believe one of the few reliable deterrents would be the proven ability to strike back powerfully at targets inside Russia. Zelenskyy’s “victory plan,” which he presented to Western partners in the final months of 2024, included a call for the supply of long-range missiles as part of a “non-nuclear deterrence package” designed to prevent a fresh Russian invasion. In his traditional New Year address, Zelenskyy spoke at length about Ukraine’s numerous new missile models, calling them “arguments for a just peace.”

There is currently very little to suggest that Putin is interested in any kind of peace with Ukraine, of course. On the contrary, he looks to be more confident of victory than ever, and appears unwilling to compromise on his original war aim of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood. However, if Ukraine can continue escalating its current wave of attacks on Russia’s economically vital but vulnerable energy industry, the Russian dictator may be forced to reassess the prospects of his invasion.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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Soofer’s report ‘First, we will defend the homeland’ quoted in SPIEGEL article on Trump’s ‘Iron Dome’

Atlantic Council — Thu, 13 Feb 2025 14:31:44 +0000

On January 29, Forward Defense senior fellow Robert Soofer was quoted in a SPIEGEL article with the translated title, “That’s why Trump wants an American Iron Dome.” The article cites his recent Atlantic Council report, “‘First, we will defend the homeland’: The case for homeland missile defense,” where he warns of the threat to US territory from missiles.

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Soofer quoted in Matthew Kroenig’s Foreign Policy article arguing for an ‘Iron Dome’

Atlantic Council — Thu, 06 Feb 2025 20:49:18 +0000

On February 5, Forward Defense senior fellow Robert Soofer was quoted in a Foreign Policy article by Matthew Kroenig, Vice President and Senior Director of the Scowcroft Center. The argument piece was titled, “The United States Needs an Iron Dome.” Kroenig quotes Soofer’s recent report, “‘First, we will defend the homeland’: The case for homeland missile defense” on how the United States should pursue a layered defense with an expanded set of interceptors.

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Soofer quoted in Washington Post article on Trump’s ‘Iron Dome’

Atlantic Council — Mon, 03 Feb 2025 17:53:48 +0000

On January 30, Forward Defense senior fellow Robert Soofer was quoted in a Washington Post article titled, “Could Trump’s Iron Dome work? Only if Canada attacks Detroit.” The article quotes Soofer’s recent report, “‘First, we will defend the homeland’: The case for homeland missile defense” on how refocusing missile defenses will “enhance US nuclear survivability.”

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The West must study the success of Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces

Doug Livermore — Thu, 30 Jan 2025 01:32:53 +0000

Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, much has been written about the extensive training provided to the Ukrainian military by the country’s Western partners. However, the West also has much to learn from Ukraine’s unique military experience. In particular, the successes of Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces provide a range of valuable lessons for their Western counterparts that will shape military doctrines for years to come.

The effectiveness of Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces can be largely attributed to their exceptional adaptability in rapidly changing battlefield conditions. When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukrainian SOF units quickly adjusted to meet the immediate challenges of high-intensity conflict against a far larger and better armed enemy.

This adaptability has manifested in several crucial ways. The rapid reconfiguration of small unit tactics to counter Russian mechanized forces has been particularly noteworthy, as has the development of innovative solutions to overcome numerical disadvantages. Ukrainian SOF units have consistently shown their ability to adopt new technologies and tactics based on battlefield feedback. Perhaps most importantly, they have implemented flexible command structures that enable decentralized decision-making, allowing for rapid responses to emerging threats and opportunities.

Ukraine’s ability to adapt has been further demonstrated through the innovative use of civilian infrastructure and technologies. Ukrainian SOF units have effectively incorporated commercial drones, civilian communications networks, and other non-military technologies, showing remarkable creativity in overcoming resource constraints.

One of the most significant lessons from the conflict has been the effective integration of SOF units with conventional military forces engaged in large-scale combat operations. Ukrainian SOF units also played a vital role in preparing the battlefield before and during the initial phases of the invasion. They established networks of resistance, gathered intelligence, and identified key targets that would later prove crucial for conventional forces.

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Ukraine’s achievements since 2022 have owed much to years of solid preparations. Following Russia’s occupation of Crimea in 2014, Ukrainian Special Operations Forces underwent significant transformation with assistance from NATO countries, particularly the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada. Between 2015 and 2021, Ukraine also implemented major structural reforms to align with NATO standards, including the establishment of dedicated SOF training centers.

These steps helped lay the foundations for a sophisticated network of resistance capabilities across potential invasion routes by early 2022. Ukrainian SOF units mapped key infrastructure, identified potential targets, and established relationships with local civilian networks, while developing protocols for rapid information sharing between SOF units, conventional forces, and civilian resistance elements. These preparations proved vital, enabling Ukrainian forces to target Russian supply lines, command nodes, and communications systems using real-time intelligence.

Throughout the invasion, coordination between Ukrainian SOF units and conventional forces has enabled effective combined arms operations. SOF units frequently act as forward observers, providing targeting data to artillery units and conducting battle damage assessments. The ability to rapidly share intelligence has been particularly important in urban environments, where the complexity of the battlefield requires close cooperation between different military elements.

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Russia’s invasion has reinforced the importance of unconventional warfare in modern conflicts. Ukrainian SOF units have successfully employed various unconventional warfare techniques that have had strategic impacts far beyond their tactical execution.

Ukraine’s implementation of guerrilla tactics and sabotage alongside partisans has been highly effective, with numerous successful operations conducted behind enemy lines. This has included the disruption of Russian supply lines, targeting of key military infrastructure and command centers, and the execution of precision strikes on high-value targets.

The psychological aspect of warfare has proven equally important, with Ukrainian SOF units making significant contributions to information warfare campaigns that have influenced both domestic and international audiences. They have conducted deception operations that have complicated Russian planning and operations, while also executing morale operations targeting both enemy forces and occupied populations.

The successful integration of modern technology has been a key characteristic of Ukrainian SOF operations. Despite facing a far wealthier and numerically superior adversary, Ukrainian SOF units have leveraged various technological capabilities to maintain operational effectiveness. They have utilized commercial technologies for reconnaissance and surveillance, integrated drone operations into tactical planning and execution, and leveraged artificial intelligence and big data analytics for targeting and planning.

Ukraine’s SOF operations provide several critical lessons for the country’s Western partners. In terms of doctrine development, it is clear that military organizations must emphasize flexibility and adaptability in force structure and training, while integrating SOF capabilities more deeply in support of conventional forces.

The importance of technological integration and adaptation cannot be overstated. Future military forces must be prepared to operate in environments where commercial technology plays an increasingly important role, and where the ability to utilize these technologies can provide crucial advantages. In terms of equipment, Western planners should focus on communications jamming and interception, improved surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, and integrating AI tools to aid in intelligence collection and analysis.

The role of Ukrainian SOF operations in the current war provides valuable insights for military forces worldwide. Their impact demonstrates the critical importance of adaptability and the effective use of technology in modern warfare. These lessons are particularly relevant as military organizations prepare for future high-intensity conflicts in increasingly complex operational environments.

Doug Livermore is national vice president for the Special Operations Association of America and deputy commander for Special Operations Detachment–Joint Special Operations Command in the North Carolina Army National Guard. The views expressed are the author’s and do not represent official US Government, Department of Defense, or Department of the Army positions.

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Soofer cited in New York Times article on Trump’s ‘Iron Dome’ Executive Order

Atlantic Council — Wed, 29 Jan 2025 15:46:13 +0000

On January 28, Forward Defense senior fellow Robert Soofer was cited in a New York Times article entitled, “Trump Orders an ‘Iron Dome’-Style Defense System. Experts Are Skeptical.” The article quotes Soofer’s recent report, “‘First, we will defend the homeland’: The case for homeland missile defense” on how the “current approach to homeland missile defense will no longer suffice for US national security goals.”

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Ukrainian drones and missiles target Putin’s war machine inside Russia

David Kirichenko — Tue, 28 Jan 2025 21:04:22 +0000

As the Trump administration outlines plans to pressure Vladimir Putin with economic measures against Russia’s energy sector, Ukraine is taking an altogether more direct approach. Since the start of 2025, Ukrainian forces have conducted a series of bombing raids on oil refineries and other energy infrastructure deep inside Russia. The attacks are part of an ambitious Ukrainian air offensive that is also targeting Russian military logistics and defense production sites.

Ukraine’s expanding airstrike campaign highlights the country’s growing long-range capabilities thanks to the rapid evolution of domestic drone and missile production since 2022. The attacks come at a time when Russian troops are making slow but steady progress in eastern Ukraine. By bringing Putin’s invasion home to Russia, Kyiv aims to disrupt Moscow’s battlefield operations, expose Russia’s vulnerability, and establish the kind of deterrence that could eventually help set the stage for a durable peace.

Russia remains tight-lipped over the impact of Ukraine’s recent bombing raids, with Kremlin officials typically attributing any evidence of successful strikes to “debris” from Ukrainian drones shot down by Russian air defenses. In reality, however, there are growing indications the campaign is causing significant damage. On January 28, Reuters reported that work at Russia’s Ryazan oil refinery had been suspended following a series of drone attacks. The refinery is one of the four largest in the country and supplies the Russian military.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently used his daily video address to emphasize the importance of his country’s air offensive. “I would like to thank all developers and producers of our long-range drones and missiles,” he said on January 26. “Everyone can see their effectiveness. Our weapons are bringing the war back to Russia and reducing Russia’s military potential.”

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Ukraine’s early 2025 bombing campaign owes much to advances made in the development of the country’s drone fleet. Speaking in January, Ukrainian officials claimed the military now has drone models capable of reaching targets located up to 2000 kilometers inside Russia. “Our main goal is to conduct strikes to hit logistics hubs in the rear, ammunition warehouses, and decrease our enemy’s pressure on the front,” commented a battalion commander of Ukraine’s 14th Unmanned Aerial Systems Regiment, which is focused specifically on long-range strikes.

In addition to drones, Ukraine’s air offensive is also utilizing the country’s growing missile arsenal. Since 2022, the Ukrainian authorities have revived the domestic missile industry following decades of stagnation as part of efforts to boost firepower and reduce reliance on Western arms supplies. This has resulted in the development of numerous new models including the Palianytsia, Peklo, Ruta, Neptune, and Sapsan missiles. However, scaling production remains a major challenge requiring significant investment, foreign partnerships, and secure manufacturing locations to evade Russian attacks.

A number of Western allies such as Britain and Denmark are already stepping up support for Kyiv’s missile program, which is seen as a cost-effective way of supporting the Ukrainian war effort. Deploying domestically produced Ukrainian missiles also reduces the risk of potential escalations from the use of Western-supplied weapons against targets inside Russia, a key concern among Kyiv’s partners. While this offers obvious advantages, progress is unlikely to be rapid. On the contrary, some experts believe Ukraine will need at least another year before it can increase missile production to levels that could pose a serious threat to Russia.

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Ukraine’s bombing campaign has a number of strategic goals. Most immediately, it disrupts the logistics of Russia’s invasion and increases the cumulative strain on supply chains while reducing the output of Putin’s defense industry. Attacks on energy infrastructure such as ports and refineries are designed to weaken a central pillar of Russia’s war economy, limiting the Kremlin’s ability to generate vital energy export revenues.

Airstrikes deep inside Russia also play a significant role in shaping perceptions of the war. For the Ukrainian public and international audiences, these attacks are convincing evidence of Ukraine’s mounting ability to strike back against Russia despite the Kremlin’s overwhelming advantages in both manpower and firepower. The lack of an emphatic response from Moscow is also further eroding notions of Russian red lines and encouraging Ukraine’s Western allies to overcome their fear of escalation.

Meanwhile, increasing Ukrainian drone and missile strikes are sparking public alarm in Russia and directly undermining the Kremlin’s painstaking efforts to shield ordinary Russians from the consequences of the invasion. Much like Ukraine’s ongoing incursion into Russia’s Kursk region, the attacks confirm that the war cannot be contained within the borders of Ukraine and will increasingly spread to Russia itself.

From a longer term perspective, officials in Kyiv hope Ukraine’s proven ability to strike targets deep inside Russia can strengthen the country’s position in possible negotiations and serve as a powerful deterrent against future Russian aggression. With this in mind, Zelenskyy has stated that Ukraine’s rapidly evolving drone and missile programs are “our arguments for a just peace.” In order for that argument to be truly persuasive, Ukraine will need to continue increasing the frequency of long-range drone strikes, while also significantly expanding the country’s domestic missile industry.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Geurts testifies at the Senate Committee on Armed Services hearing on defense innovation and acquisition reform

Atlantic Council — Tue, 28 Jan 2025 17:00:00 +0000

On January 28, Hondo Geurts, former Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, and a Commissioner on Forward Defense‘s Commision on Software-Defined Warfare, testified to the Senate Committee on Armed Services Hearing on defense innovation and acquisition reform. Geurts emphasized the need for the Department of Defense to streamline its acquisition processes, reduce bureaucratic delays, and foster a culture of innovation to maintain a technological edge over adversaries like China. He also called for reforms to procurement protests, proposing limits on multiple challenges and disincentives for companies that habitually delay defense contracts.

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Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program launches Hypersonic Capabilities Task Force

zbaddorf — Fri, 24 Jan 2025 18:59:09 +0000

WASHINGTON, JANUARY 24, 2025 — The Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program has convened former government officials and industry leaders on a Hypersonic Capabilities Task Force to address the opportunities that hypersonic capabilities offer to the United States to enhance deterrence and the challenges posed by adversary hypersonic capabilities.

Co-chaired by former Secretary of the US Air Force Deborah Lee James and former Secretary of the US Army Ryan McCarthy, this task force aims to explore the strategic implications, operational applications, and policy priorities surrounding hypersonic weapons and counter-hypersonic defenses.

“In our time in the Pentagon, we both witnessed commendable efforts to develop hypersonic weapons and counter-hypersonic defenses,” said James. “But more needs to be done. This task force will call attention to the national priority that ought to be placed on hypersonic capabilities, even among other crucial defense needs,” said McCarthy.

Adversaries like Russia and China have developed advanced hypersonic systems capable of both nuclear and conventional strikes, threatening US forces, allies, and the homeland. Despite growing US investments in hypersonic weapons and defenses, questions persist about prioritization, resource allocation, and the readiness to address these challenges.

The task force will leverage insights from a world-class group of subject-matter experts, composed of former senior government officials and leading industry representatives. Task Force members include former Congressman Jim Cooper; the Hon. Madelyn Creedon; former Congressman Doug Lamborn; GEN James McConville, USA (ret); and Whitney McNamara. Industry Task Force members include Hank Holland, chairman and CEO of Amaero International Ltd; Katrina Hornstein, Hypersonic Portfolio director at Ursa Major; Cameron McCord, co-founder and CEO of Nominal; Chris Power, founder and CEO of Hadrian; Mark Rettig, vice president and general manager of New and Derivative Products at GE Aerospace; Ralph Sandfry, director for Hypersonics and Directed Energy at Lockheed Martin; Zach Shore, chief revenue officer at Hermeus; and Brian Zimmerman, senior vice president at Booz Allen Hamilton.

The task force will be directed by Stephen Rodriguez, with former DoD Principal Director for Hypersonics Michael E. White serving as the task force’s lead author. “This Task Force comes at a crucial moment for US national security,” stated White. “Unless the United States accelerates its production and fielding of hypersonic capabilities, we risk falling behind rapid developments in Russia and China.” Former senior Pentagon leaders Dr. Reginald Brothers and Justin Johnson will serve as senior advisors to the task force.

This effort will evaluate these threats, benchmark US efforts, and explore solutions to bridge gaps in technology, policy, and procurement. By fostering an informed dialogue, the project aims to unify key stakeholders and advance a cohesive strategy to maintain US leadership in this critical domain.

The Atlantic Council task force staff include Mark Massa, Alyxandra Marine, and Jonathan Rosenstein, overseen by Forward Defense director Clementine Starling-Daniels.

For media inquiries, please contact press@atlanticcouncil.org.

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NATO chief: Cost of Russian victory in Ukraine would be ‘trillions not billions’

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 23 Jan 2025 22:14:45 +0000

NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte has warned alliance members that if the Russian invasion of Ukraine is allowed to succeed, the cost of reestablishing NATO’s international credibility would be measured in the trillions of dollars.

Speaking on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Rutte highlighted the economic argument for increased military spending in support of the Ukrainian war effort. “If Ukraine loses then to restore the deterrence of the rest of NATO again, it will be a much, much higher price than what we are contemplating at this moment in terms of ramping up our spending and ramping up our industrial production,” commented Rutte. “It will not be billions extra. It will be trillions extra.”

Underscoring his warning, the NATO chief conjured up images of Russian dictator Vladimir Putin and his authoritarian allies celebrating victory over the West. “If we get a bad deal, it would only mean that we will see the President of Russia high-fiving with the leaders from North Korea, Iran, and China. We cannot accept that. It would be a big, big geopolitical mistake.”

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Rutte’s alarming forecast comes as NATO leaders grapple with new US President Donald Trump’s calls for member states to increase defense spending from today’s two percent of GDP to five percent. Trump is also pushing for Europe to play a far more prominent role in the coalition of countries backing Ukraine. He argues that the Russian invasion is primarily a problem for European leaders to address, and has also long been critical of what he sees as the uneven security relationship between Europe and the United States.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has echoed Trump’s position on the need for dramatically increased European defense spending. In a strongly worded address to the World Economic Forum this week, he suggested that the continent was in danger of sliding into geopolitical irrelevance and must be able to defend itself. “All European countries must be willing to spend as much on security as is truly needed, not just as much as they’ve gotten used to during years of neglect. If it takes five percent of GDP to cover defense, then so be it,” the Ukrainian leader stated.

A number of senior European figures have already voiced their opposition to Trump’s vision for sharp rises in defense spending. While defense budgets across the continent have been growing in recent years against the backdrop of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, many NATO members are still struggling to meet the current two percent guidelines and see talk of a leap to five percent as wholly unrealistic.

European countries have also struggled to expand domestic military production in response to Russia’s invasion. During the initial stages of the war, existing stockpiles of weapons and equipment across Europe were sent to Ukraine. However, these reserves have now been largely exhausted. While Russia has managed to make the transition to a wartime economy, Europe’s defense sector is still unable to keep the Ukrainian military adequately supplied despite some progress.

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Critics of the Western response to Russia’s invasion say there is still no sense of urgency in many European capitals, despite the unprecedented security challenges presented by the continent’s largest armed conflict since World War II. Instead, decisions regarding weapons deliveries to Ukraine often remain subject to extended delays, while measures to boost Europe’s defense manufacturing capacity have frequently fallen victim to domestic politics or internal EU rivalries.

Europe’s hesitancy over defense spending is short-sighted, to say the least. As the NATO Secretary-General pointed out this week in Switzerland, the cost of supporting Ukraine’s defense will be dwarfed by the price of confronting a triumphant Russia if Putin is permitted to complete the conquest and subjugation of Ukraine.

Even if a victorious Russia did not immediately go further, Europe’s sense of security would be shattered and the balance of power on the continent transformed. Putin’s war machine would be greatly strengthened by the acquisition of Ukraine’s immense military strength, its vast industrial capacities, and the country’s natural resources. He would have Europe’s two largest armies under his control, and would be firmly established along the eastern borders of the European Union.

In such favorable circumstances, it is dangerously delusional to suggest that Putin might stop voluntarily or adopt a conciliatory approach toward the largely undefended nations of Europe. He has made no secret of his desire to reverse the verdict of 1991 and overturn the current world order. Victory in Ukraine would present Putin with a once in a lifetime opportunity to achieve these historic goals. Europe’s current levels of defense spending would be unlikely to deter him.

The debate over European defense budgets looks set to escalate during the coming months, with the new Trump administration and officials in Kyiv making the case for a radical rethink. Many across Europe will support them in principle, but past experience suggests that not all of these allies will have the requisite political will to act accordingly.

The importance of this debate cannot be overstated, with the outcome set to shape the course of the war in Ukraine and define the future of European security. For anyone who recognizes the threat posed by Putin’s Russia, the arguments for larger European defense budgets and expanded industrial production seem overwhelming. Supporting Ukraine today may be expensive, but it is a lot cheaper than facing an emboldened Russia tomorrow.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

North Korea is using Russia’s Ukraine invasion to upgrade its army

Alina Hrytsenko — Thu, 23 Jan 2025 19:09:38 +0000

The first North Korean soldiers were taken prisoner by Ukraine in early January, providing final confirmation of the Hermit Kingdom’s involvement in the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine following initial reports in late 2024. The participation of North Korean troops represents a dangerous escalation in what is already the largest European war since World War II, with potentially alarming implications for global security.

Pyongyang’s support for the Russian war effort began in late 2022 with the delivery of artillery shells. The list of armaments was subsequently expanded to include ballistic missiles. These supplies have helped Russia maintain the momentum of its invasion despite the country’s significantly depleted stores of munitions. With Moscow now also facing manpower shortages and reluctant to order a fresh round of mobilization, the arrival of North Korean troops helps relieve domestic pressure to recruit more Russians for the war.

While no official data is available, Ukrainian, US, and South Korean sources have estimated that North Korea has sent at least 11,000 soldiers to join Russia’s invasion. Some are believed to be drawn from highly trained elite units. Materials found on dead North Korean troops and battlefield accounts from Ukrainian forces indicate that the heavily indoctrinated North Koreans have been ordered to kill themselves if necessary to avoid being captured alive and taken prisoner.

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Pyongyang has a very specific interest in sending troops to fight against Ukraine. While the deployment is unlikely to dramatically alter the battlefield situation in the Kremlin’s favor, it allows the North Koreans to acquire priceless combat experience, test weapons systems, gain access to Russian military technologies, and secure Moscow’s further assistance in countering UN sanctions.

North Korea currently boasts one of the world’s largest armies with around 1.3 million active soldiers. However, unlike Russia, the Korean People’s Army (KPA) has not been directly involved in any major wars for many years. This lack of battlefield experience is a source of considerable concern for North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un, who is anxious to counter South Korea’s more technologically advanced military.

Sending thousands of troops to fight in the Russian invasion of Ukraine provides the KPA with valuable insights into what is widely recognized as the most technologically advanced battlefield environment in the history of warfare. North Korean soldiers are now learning the realities of modern drone warfare first-hand. As a result, North Korea will be “more capable of waging war against its neighbors,” senior US officials have warned.

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Ukrainians have been impressed by the skill and tenacity of the North Koreans they have encountered, including their ability to shoot down drones. “They are young, motivated, physically fit, brave, and good at using small arms. They are also disciplined. They have everything you need for a good infantryman,” Ukrainian army spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Yaroslav Chepurnyi told POLITICO.

North Korea is believed to receive significant financial and technological incentives for supplying Putin with soldiers. South Korean intelligence officials estimate that Moscow is paying Pyongyang $2000 per solder each month. While this money is no doubt welcome, the real prize is access to advanced Russian military tech. In exchange for troops, North Korea is believed to be receiving support from Moscow that will help upgrade its military, including the country’s anti-aircraft, submarine, and missile capabilities.

The Ukrainian front also serves as a valuable testing ground for North Korea, allowing the country to assess the effectiveness of the weapons it supplies to Russia. This will make it possible for Pyongyang to improve the quality of its own domestic arms industry and adapt future output to the realities of the modern battlefield. Meanwhile, the troops who survive their time on the Ukrainian front lines are expected to return home and become instructors, sharing their knowledge of modern warfare with colleagues.

At this point, North Korea’s participation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine looks to be less about supporting Putin’s imperial ambitions and more about upgrading Kim Jong Un’s war machine. In the short term, the presence of North Korean soldiers is allowing Russia to overcome mounting manpower shortages. But with Russia believed to be losing tens of thousands of troops each month, there is little chance that Pyongyang will be able to fully satisfy Moscow’s insatiable demand for additional manpower.

Looking ahead, the historically unprecedented appearance of North Korean soldiers on the battlefields of Europe could alter the security equation on the Korean peninsula and beyond. “For the first time in decades, the North Korean army is gaining real military experience,” commented Ukrainian military intelligence spokesman Andrii Yusov. “This is a global challenge. Not just for Ukraine and Europe, but for the entire world.”

Alina Hrytsenko is an analyst at Ukraine’s National Institute for Strategic Studies.

Rodriguez and Geurts promote the need for rapid adoption of new defense software on Building the Base podcast

Atlantic Council — Mon, 20 Jan 2025 17:00:00 +0000

On January 20, Stephen Rodriguez, senior advisor at Forward Defense and director of FD’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare was a featured guest on the podcast Building the Base, hosted by Hondo Geurts, commissioner on the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare. The episode, entitled “Looking Ahead: National Security in a New Administration with Nadia Schadlow and Stephen Rodriguez,” focused on the need for the Department of Defense to accelerate pathways to adoption of cutting-edge technologies, the crafting of an effective National Security Strategy, and the potential benefits of utilizing innovative technologies to reform the department. The Commission on Software-Defined Warfare’s upcoming final report was highlighted.

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Why Saudi Arabia is so keen on the Turkish KAAN

Ali Bakir — Sat, 18 Jan 2025 12:54:59 +0000

Just before the turn of the year, Saudi and Turkish officials engaged in a flurry of talks on defense cooperation. In one such conversation—which included Turkish defense industry representatives—Saudi Arabia reportedly indicated it intends to buy one hundred Turkish KAAN fighter jets.

But with Saudi Arabia previously keen on acquiring F-35 fighter jets from the United States, what has steered Riyadh toward Turkish technology?

Securing an upgrade

The KAAN is a Turkish fifth-generation, multi-role, stealth fighter aircraft developed by the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) and BAE Systems, which is based in London.

The project to develop the aircraft began in 2010, with the aim of replacing Turkey’s aging F-16 fleet and boosting Turkey’s autonomy, self-dependency, and overall military and national power. The urgency to develop this aircraft increased after Turkey was removed from the F-35 program in 2019. The KAAN made its maiden flight in February 2024.

Riyadh has expressed interest in acquiring F-35 fighter jets since 2017; however, the United States has not committed to the sale, and the situation has been prolonged. Riyadh is likely also feeling unsure about its ability to secure an F-35 deal considering the experiences of its neighbors. For example, while the Trump administration signed a multi-billion-dollar deal with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for F-35s in 2021 (as a reward for Abu Dhabi’s normalization with Israel in 2020), the UAE suspended talks over concerns with the Biden administration’s terms, citing “sovereign operational restrictions” and “technical requirements,” among other reasons. While some reports indicated that the UAE hopes to revive the deal with the incoming Trump administration, a UAE official said that Abu Dhabi does not expect to resume talks.

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Moreover, Saudi Arabia could be worried about its ability to secure the F-35 deal because the United States often prioritizes Israel, aiming to maintain its qualitative military edge over all regional powers. Additionally, such equipment typically comes with numerous strings attached to it, and the US Congress frequently impedes the sale of advanced military assets to other nations, including allies and partners. These factors have prompted some countries and regional powers to seek advanced weapons elsewhere, even though US military equipment is technologically superior.

As conveyed in Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 for the kingdom, Riyadh aims not only to purchase weapons but also to produce them, pursuing the necessary know-how and technology transfer to build its own defense industry. Regarding fighter jets, Saudi Arabia requested to join the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), a collaborative effort among Britain, Italy, and Japan to develop a sixth-generation stealth fighter jet to replace the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Mitsubishi F-2. The new jet is expected to be airborne by 2040.

While the United Kingdom and Italy support Saudi Arabia’s request to join GCAP, Japan has reportedly firmly opposed Riyadh’s membership in the project. Thus, the partnership has not yet been extended to Saudi Arabia. And on December 13—over a year after Saudi Arabia first submitted its request to join GCAP—BAE Systems, Italy’s Leonardo, and Japan Aircraft Industrial Enhancement reached an agreement on the venture, with each holding a 33.3 percent share in the new joint company developing the jet.

Riyadh’s extensive ties with China and amicable relations with Russia could explain why Japan would oppose Saudi Arabia’s inclusion. Accepting Saudi Arabia as a partner could raise questions regarding who has the authority to sell or block the sale of fighter jets to certain nations (including, for example, China and Russia). Furthermore, Japan’s opposition could be attributed to its concerns that incorporating Saudi Arabia would ultimately slow progress and delay timelines due to Riyadh’s need for technology transfers—especially given that Saudi Arabia currently lacks the necessary infrastructure and human resources for this project.

Although news about Saudi Arabia’s consideration of the Turkish KAAN first emerged last October, the finalization of the GCAP project may explain the resurgence of Saudi interest in the KAAN just a few days later. For the Saudis, timing is crucial. Unlike the GCAP, the Turkish jet has already taken to the air. Mass production is expected to begin in 2028, meaning that the KAAN project is likely at least ten years ahead of the GCAP. Even once the KAAN is operational, it is still possible to make updates to the jet incorporating sixth-generation technology, making it better aligned with Saudi Vision 2030 in terms of timelines and requirements.

Furthermore, the KAAN could appeal to Saudi Arabia because of uncertainty about Riyadh’s ability to acquire a GCAP jet should it remain excluded from the project. Japan’s opposition to Saudi Arabia’s involvement currently suggests that in the future, Tokyo could veto an attempt by Saudi Arabia to purchase the jet. Waiting over fifteen years to acquire new fighter jets only to face a potential veto would be an unwise move, especially considering two factors. First, Saudi Arabia’s ties with China are expected to strengthen if current trends persist, suggesting that a veto would become more likely. Second, it would be unwise because of Saudi Arabia’s desire to quickly establish a localized defense industry, diversify its military purchases, and acquire advanced fighter jets. In contrast to the GCAP countries, Turkey is already open to exporting the jet to allies and partners, including to Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Ukraine; the head of TAI predicts his company will deliver roughly 150 aircraft to such partner countries.

The thirty-thousand-foot view

By signaling its intention to acquire one hundred KAAN fighter jets, Saudi Arabia appears to be strengthening its strategic partnerships and elevating its geopolitical standing in the Middle East. This approach is particularly significant in light of shifting regional security dynamics, in which the need for a robust and independent defense posture has become increasingly critical. Through the diversification of its defense procurement strategies—and, ultimately, through enhancing its military capabilities, strengthening its deterrence, and fostering new strategic partnerships—Saudi Arabia is not only enhancing its military readiness but also asserting its influence in evolving regional geopolitics.

Moreover, by pursuing fighter jet acquisitions from Turkey, Saudi Arabia is strategically positioning itself to reduce its reliance on Western military hardware, including US military equipment. This shift is driven by complex political dynamics, especially with US restrictions on the sale of advanced fighters such as the F-35 and Washington’s prioritization of maintaining Israel’s qualitative military edge.

From 2015 to 2020, the Saudi Arabia-Turkey relationship experienced fluctuations due to unfavorable regional developments and differing ideological agendas. However, those factors began to shift after the normalization of ties following the Gulf Cooperation Council’s al-Ula declaration in 2021, marking the beginning of an unprecedented era of regional de-escalation and normalization efforts.

A notable indication of the evolving nature of defense cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Turkey is Riyadh’s procurement of the Turkish Akıncı unmanned combat aerial vehicle. While the exact value of the agreement has not been disclosed, it has been estimated at over three billion dollars. Baykar’s chief executive officer said it was “the biggest defense and aviation export contract” in Turkey’s history. If the KAAN deal is realized, it would represent a significant advancement that would cement the transformation of defense and security cooperation between Riyadh and Ankara.

Saudi Arabia is not only a global financial power but also one of the largest arms purchasers in the world. From the Turkish perspective, the Saudi purchase would provide a lucrative source of funding to expand the production line, helping expedite production and reduce the cost per unit (currently exceeding one hundred million dollars). This would be a double win for Riyadh because it would not only acquire the KAAN with no strings attached to the deal but also have an opportunity to request that parts of the production line be located in Saudi Arabia, expediting the expansion of its local defense industry.

For some time, Ankara has been seeking potential partners to join its flagship defense industry program. In July 2023, Azerbaijan became a partner in the development of the KAAN. Under the partnership, Baku’s financial resources from its oil and gas reserves help Turkey with the costs of production. Meanwhile, joint production creates job opportunities in Azerbaijan, facilitates technology transfer, and will help Baku replace its aging fighter jets with more modern ones.

Pakistan has also expressed interest in joining the KAAN program, and the two countries are reportedly in advanced discussions about such a possibility. On August 2, 2023, Turkish Deputy Defence Minister Celal Sami Tüfekçi revealed that nearly two hundred Pakistanis were already involved in the development of the KAAN. A nuclear power with a competent military, Pakistan boasts one of the largest air forces in the world. Like Turkey, Pakistan is seeking to replace its fourth-generation F-16 fighter jets with a fifth-generation alternative.

Additionally, there are reports that Russia and Ukraine have approached Turkey with joint production proposals. Malaysia has also been named as a potential partner for Turkey.

Ankara has created a trilateral mechanism that aims to elevate cooperation between Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan with a specific focus on political, economic, and defense and military ties. Similarly, Ankara has been working on cementing another trilateral mechanism—this one between Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia—for coordinating defense cooperation, boosting defense trade, facilitating technology transfer, and localizing the defense industry. The first meeting of the latter trilateral arrangement was held in Riyadh in August 2023, and several rounds of discussion have since taken place. In addition, there are various forms of bilateral defense cooperation shared between Turkey and Pakistan and also Saudi Arabia and Pakistan: For example, Pakistan has deployed troops to Saudi Arabia for various reasons, and the two countries conduct military exercises regularly.

For all these reasons, it makes sense that Saudi Arabia would have its eye on KAAN jets. But ultimately, whether the Saudis will acquire KAAN jets hinges on several factors, including the jet’s operational readiness and strategic value (gauged after its development is complete), the robustness of Saudi Arabia’s defense infrastructure, and evolving geopolitical dynamics within the region, which significantly influence defense collaborations. In addition, the Saudis typically take a long time to finalize such deals. Even if they do reach a decision, there is uncertainty regarding their commitment to it, especially if disagreements arise on other issues. In such cases, Riyadh tends to respond by halting or canceling all aspects of cooperation—political, economic, defense, and security—rather than engaging in dialogue to address the specific disagreement.

Thus, as regional powers navigate these complexities, they will likely need to take time before fully recalibrating their defense postures in response to a KAAN purchase. But this waiting period may provide opportunities for such regional powers and Saudi Arabia to work together to assess their strategic interests and align their defense strategies accordingly.

Ali Bakir is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

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Ukraine’s escalating air attacks bring Putin’s invasion home to Russia

Maria Avdeeva — Thu, 16 Jan 2025 21:01:13 +0000

Ukraine launched what officials termed as the country’s “most massive” air attack of the war this week as Kyiv seeks to bring Putin’s invasion home to Russia. In the early hours of January 14, Ukrainian drones and missiles struck a series of strategic targets in multiple Russian regions including Bryansk, Saratov, Tula, and Tatarstan. The strikes at distances of up to 1000 kilometers from the Ukrainian border underscored Ukraine’s growing capacity to conduct long-range bombardments against high-value Russian targets.

This week’s attack was notable both for its scale and sophistication, with drones and missiles deployed in coordinated airstrikes that exploited the weaknesses of Russia’s air defenses. Representatives of Ukraine’s 14th Separate Regiment of Unmanned Aerial Systems confirmed that decoy drones were used to distract and overwhelm Russian air defenses, creating openings for missiles to hit primary targets. Once defenses were compromised, some targets were then struck by additional waves of long-range drones.

While Russian officials remain tight-lipped over the scale of the damage inflicted, media reports and open source data indicate that a range of military and industrial objects were hit. Targets included oil refineries and storage facilities, an airbase used for attacks against Ukraine, and various industrial plants involved in the production of materials critical for the Russian war effort.

These simultaneous strikes against multiple high-priority targets deep inside Russia highlight Ukraine’s ability to conduct increasingly complex long-range air operations. The attacks of January 14 required close coordination between Ukrainian drone and missile crews along with military intelligence and special operations units.

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Ukraine’s rapidly evolving drone industry is at the heart of the escalating air war inside Russia. Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion almost three years ago, Ukrainian drone production has increased dramatically, with hundreds of new companies from within Ukraine’s vibrant tech sector emerging to develop and manufacture a wide array of different drone models.

The Ukrainian authorities have sought to make the most of this potential, establishing the Brave1 platform in spring 2023 to streamline cooperation between the Ukrainian military, state organs, private sector developers, and investors. In summer 2024, Ukraine became the first country to establish a new branch of its military dedicated to drone warfare. The creation of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces underlined the country’s emphasis on innovation as Kyiv seeks to compensate for Russia’s often overwhelming advantages in terms of manpower, firepower, and other vital military resources.

In addition to an expanding arsenal of long-range strike drones, Ukraine is also working hard to develop domestic missile production. In recent months, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has showcased a number of new missiles as Kyiv looks to reduce its dependence on Western partners for the supply of missiles capable of hitting targets inside Russia.

This emphasis on domestic drone and missile production is part of a broader shift away from reliance on foreign military aid. It also reflects longstanding frustration in Ukraine over the reluctance of the country’s partners to authorize attacks inside Russia due to fears of possible retaliation from the Kremlin. While US President Joe Biden partially lifted restrictions on strikes against Russian targets in late 2024, President-elect Donald Trump has since been critical of the decision. This has added weight to arguments that Ukraine must rely on its own drones and missiles to strike back against Russia.

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The impact of Ukrainian airstrikes inside Russia goes far beyond disruption to military logistics, damage to oil refineries, and reductions in Russia’s military output. Together with the ongoing Ukrainian occupation of hundreds of square kilometers in Russia’s Kursk region, Ukraine’s air war is undermining the illusion of Putin’s invulnerability and eroding Russian confidence in the Kremlin’s ability to defend the country.

Since February 2022, the Putin regime has gone to great lengths to shield the Russian public from the consequences of the war in Ukraine while maintaining an air of normality. However, frequent footage on social media of burning Russian infrastructure and powerful Ukrainian airstrikes is now directly challenging Moscow’s tightly controlled narrative. This is causing a visible change in mood, with even leading regime propagandists such as Vladimir Solovyov now voicing their displeasure over the failure of Russia’s air defenses.

Growing signs of demoralization within Russia reflect the sobering realization that the country’s existing air defenses are unable to cope with Ukraine’s growing deep strike capabilities. For Kyiv, this represents an important window of opportunity. In all likelihood, Russia will eventually address the vulnerabilities of its vast military and industrial infrastructure to drone and missile attacks. However, if Ukraine can continue expanding the current air offensive in the coming months, it could succeed in striking a significant blow to the Russian war effort.

For now, Ukraine’s air attacks are sending a clear message to Moscow and to Kyiv’s own partners that the Ukrainian military is capable of escalating on its own terms and does not share Western concerns over so-called Russian red lines. Maintaining this momentum and securing the means to continue offensive strikes inside Russia will be paramount to determining not just the direction of the war, but also its eventual outcome.

Maria Avdeeva is a Ukrainian security analyst and strategic communication expert.

Stephen Rodriguez

Senior Advisor

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

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Ukraine hopes robot army can counter Russia’s battlefield advantages

David Kirichenko — Thu, 09 Jan 2025 16:38:26 +0000

In December 2024, Ukrainian forces operating north of Kharkiv reportedly conducted their first ever attack on Russian positions using exclusively unmanned technologies. This landmark military operation, which featured a combination of machine gun-equipped ground drones and kamikaze aerial drones, underscored Ukraine’s increasingly sophisticated use of robotic systems, while also highlighting the evolving role being played by these technologies on the modern battlefield.

As Ukrainian commanders prepare for a fourth year of combat in Europe’s largest war since World War II, they are now hoping that their country’s growing arsenal of robotic systems can help counter Russia’s often overwhelming advantages in both manpower and firepower. “Ukrainian officials have repeatedly highlighted Ukraine’s efforts to utilize technological innovations and asymmetric strike capabilities to offset Ukraine’s manpower limitations in contrast with Russia’s willingness to accept unsustainable casualty rates for marginal territorial gains,” noted the Institute for the Study of War in late 2024.

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Ukraine’s emphasis on unmanned robotic systems certainly makes good sense. While overall Ukrainian casualties during the first three years of the full-scale invasion are thought to be significantly lower than Russian losses, Russia’s far larger population means Ukraine has little prospect of success in a grinding war of attrition. Over the past year, reports of Ukrainian mobilization challenges and personnel shortages have become more and more frequent, with desertion rates also reaching record highs.

With the Ukrainian military outnumbered and outgunned, defense tech innovations have played an important part in Kyiv’s war effort since 2022. Many of Ukraine’s key advances have come via the country’s vibrant startup sector, much of which pivoted to military projects in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion. In July 2024, the Associated Press reported that Ukraine had developed an ecosystem of laboratories to create a robot army, with around 250 defense startups active in secret locations “that typically look like rural car repair shops.”

The Ukrainian government has sought to support these grassroots efforts with the creation of initiatives like the BRAVE1 defense tech cluster, which was established in spring 2023 to streamline cooperation between the private sector, the state, and the Ukrainian military. In a move hailed by officials in Kyiv as a unique development, Ukraine launched a dedicated drone warfare branch of the country’s military in summer 2024. The establishment of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces demonstrated that Kyiv was preparing for “the war of the future, not the war of the past,” commented USF commander Colonel Vadym Sukharevskyi.

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Robotic systems alone cannot solve the Ukrainian military’s manpower shortages. At present, the focus is on developing technologies capable of performing a range of specific combat and logistical tasks. For example, Ukraine plans to deploy tens of thousands of robotic ground vehicles along the one thousand kilometer front line of the war during 2024. These systems will handle functions including mine-laying and de-mining, the delivery of ammunition and other supplies to troops in trenches, and the evacuation of wounded soldiers to rear positions where they can receive medical treatment.

Unmanned ground vehicles are seen by Ukrainian military planners as a particularly effective response to the ubiquity of reconnaissance and attack drones above the battlefield. With the entire front line area now under more or less constant surveillance, it can be extremely difficult for soldiers to move about above ground, and virtually impossible to travel in vehicles without electronic jamming devices. Robotic systems capable of operating in dangerous environments can go some way to addressing this problem, and can help make sure front line units are resupplied in a timely fashion.

The Ukrainian army’s use of robotic systems is already attracting consideration international attention. With new models typically undergoing testing in combat conditions, the cycle from development to deployment is often exceptionally dynamic, creating unprecedented opportunities for defense tech companies. Maintaining Ukraine’s current rapid pace of innovation is recognized as vital in order to remain one step ahead of Russia, which is also investing heavily in robotic systems and drones.

With Ukrainian efforts to implement AI technologies expected to advance in 2025, there are concerns that the fledgling robot armies currently taking shape on the battlefields of Ukraine could reduce the barriers to killing and dramatically escalate the potential for future conflicts. However, with their country fighting for survival, Ukrainian defense tech developers are primarily concerned with saving the lives of their compatriots and defeating Russia’s invasion.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Nurkin co-authors report on China’s remote sensing

Atlantic Council — Wed, 08 Jan 2025 19:39:56 +0000

Nonresident Senior Fellow

On December 16, the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission released a report on China’s remote sensing capabilities, on which Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow Tate Nurkin was a supporting author. This report details rapid development of mature remote sensing capabilities in pursuit of its economic and societal development, national security and geopolitical interests, and military modernization.

Fellow

Tate Nurkin

Forward Defense Indo-Pacific Security Initiative

China Defense Industry

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‘First, we will defend the homeland’: The case for homeland missile defense

Sat, 04 Jan 2025 09:30:00 +0000

Download the Report

Executive summary
List of acronyms
Section one: Introduction
Section two: US homeland missile defense policy
Section three: homeland missile defense and US security
Section four: Staying ahead of North Korea
Section five: Deterring Chinese and Russia limited coercive missile threats
Section six: The two-nuclear-peer problem: Enhancing nuclear force survivability
Section seven: Missile defense basics and architectural challenges
Section eight: Advantages of layered defense
Section nine: A better strategy for homeland missile defense
Section ten: cruise missile defense of the homeland
Section eleven: Russian and Chinese strategic missile defense: Doctrine, capabilities, and development
Section twelve: Conclusion and policy recommendations
Acknowledgments
About the authors

Executive summary

“First, we will defend the homeland,” proclaims the 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States (NDS) on its initial page.¹ Indeed, the United States goes to great lengths to protect the nation from military threats, terrorists, cyberattacks, and other potential dangers. US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) stands guard against land, air, and sea attacks; the intelligence community tracks and warns of potential dangers; and the Homeland Security Act of 2002 specifically established the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to secure the nation against the many threats it faces. Yet, the nation falls short in fully protecting against an ever-growing number, diversity, and sophistication of long-range missile threats. This does not make sense.

How should the United States defend its homeland from missile attacks? In the post-Cold War era, US defense policymakers have settled on an answer articulated most recently by the 2022 Missile Defense Review (MDR): staying ahead of the North Korean missile threat through “a comprehensive missile defeat approach” while relying on “strategic deterrence … to address and deter large intercontinental-range, nuclear missile threats to the homeland from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation (Russia).”² There are at least four reasons to believe that such an approach to homeland missile defense will no longer suffice for US national security goals.

Threats and challenges

First, the expansion of North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) arsenal will likely drive an increase in the number of deployed US Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) as the United States tries to stay ahead of the threat. The Biden administration’s intent to increase the number of GBIs by twenty starting in 2028 will spark a debate about whether US homeland missile defenses could upset strategic stability with Russia and China as these countries grow concerned about rising levels of US homeland missile protection, albeit intended against North Korea. Some analysts judge that the United States can rely on nuclear deterrence against North Korea, arguing that staying ahead of the North Korean threat is unaffordable—and will upset strategic stability with Russia and China.³ Other analysts find that reducing US vulnerability to rogue nation missile threats is essential for a US grand strategy reliant on allies.⁴ Allies might perceive a United States unwilling to protect itself against North Korea as unwilling to take risks on their behalf.

Second, the United States must now simultaneously deter two nuclear-armed great powers—Russia and China. A feature of this problem is a Russian and Chinese nuclear doctrine (supported by forces) that allows for the limited use of nuclear and conventional weapons to coerce the United States. According to some US experts, “Moscow and Beijing appear now to calculate that their respective threats to escalate to limited nuclear war will be sufficient to paralyze direct US opposition to their regional expansionism.”⁵ These forces may include dual-use capabilities to attack US nuclear forces, command and control, and national leadership. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) recognizes this problem, stating that the United States must prepare to deter large-scale and limited nuclear use from its nuclear-armed adversaries, especially in light of the increasing reliance on the coercive threat of limited nuclear use in these states’ strategies.⁶ Likewise, the congressionally mandated Strategic Posture Commission, a bipartisan twelve-appointee group,⁷ recommended in its October 2023 report that the “United States should develop and field homeland IAMD [integrated air and missile defense] capabilities that can deter and defeat coercive attacks by Russia and China.”⁸

Another facet of the two-nuclear-great-power problem is the potential vulnerability of US nuclear forces to a combined or nearly sequential Chinese and Russian disarming nuclear first strike.⁹ As China expands its nuclear forces, defense strategists must consider whether US nuclear forces suffice to deter two great powers, perhaps at the same time, under any conditions. The US ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons under any circumstances is essential. Layered, preferential missile defenses for US nuclear forces; national leadership; and nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) would enhance US nuclear survivability. Such defenses, which would not provide significant protection for the population, could enhance deterrence by complicating Russian and Chinese first-strike plans.¹⁰ Even short of a combined disarming strike, missile defense of the nuclear triad could increase the endurance of US nuclear forces in a limited nuclear exchange from one power, preserving sufficient nuclear forces to dissuade an opportunistic aggressor armed with nuclear weapons.

Finally, any assessment of expanding US homeland missile defense should consider Russia’s and China’s capabilities in this area. Russia and China claim a role for missile defense in their security strategies. Both are building defenses against cruise and ballistic missiles (including ICBM defenses). For example, Russian homeland missile defenses include sixty-eight nuclear-armed interceptors protecting the Moscow region and likely some portion of Russia’s ICBM force. Russia’s missile defenses are undergoing modernization with new interceptors. According to the US Department of Defense (DOD), China is pursuing a ballistic missile defense architecture with endo- and exo-atmospheric components, including a midcourse element “that may have capabilities against IRBMs [intermediate-range ballistic missiles] and possibly ICBMs”; further, the “PLA’s cruise missile defense capability is more robust than that of its ballistic missile defenses.”¹¹ Defense against US ICBMs and cruise missiles could provide Russia and China an asymmetric advantage that could impact the military balance in certain situations and complicate US limited options.

The argument in brief

This study advances the following argument:

First, the 2022 NDS clearly defines the requirement for homeland missile defense. Moreover, the strategy designates the defense of the homeland as the first priority, followed by deterring strategic attacks against the homeland.¹² More to the point, the 2022 MDR provides that missile defenses “are critical to the top priority of defending the homeland and deterring attacks against the United States.”¹³ This overarching policy reflects continuity with prior administrations.

Second, the threat driving that requirement is growing. According to senior administration officials, Russia and China are “fielding more advanced offensive missiles—ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic—in greater numbers to not only deter [US] involvement in a regional conflict but also to directly target the US homeland. The scale and scope of these multi-dimensional threats present significant risks to the American people and the homeland.”¹⁴ The North Korean ICBM threat continues apace and may include missiles with multiple warheads in the future. Senior US military commanders are starting to fear that currently planned missile defense capabilities will not be able to maintain the advantageous US position against North Korea and potentially Iran.

Third, the strategy behind these threats is clear. Potential adversaries will seek to exploit vulnerabilities in the “American way of war” by posing threats to the US homeland “in an effort to jeopardize the U.S. military’s ability to project power and counter regional aggression.”¹⁵ These states’ intent also is to break the will of US political leaders who may be unwilling to fulfill commitments to allies if it means running extraordinary risks to the homeland.

Fourth, if left unaddressed, these threats to the homeland could significantly narrow US decision-making and curtail a president’s freedom of action during crisis and conflict. Adversaries know that the United States depends on its allies and partners to maintain its “global strategic advantage,” and that allies, in turn, depend on US security commitments.¹⁶ Russia and China hope to weaken US alliance ties by creating doubts about US security commitments among its allies. Allies, fearing a weakening of US commitment due to an increasing US vulnerability to attack, could seek accommodation with challengers in their region or develop their respective nuclear weapons to deter these threats.

Fifth, the objective or purpose of US homeland missile defense is not to create an impenetrable missile shield for the American public, but rather to frustrate adversary strategies that rely on threatening missile attacks against the United States. Missile defense systems are meant to supplement the deterrence value provided by US nuclear forces and the prospect of an overwhelming conventional response to attacks against the homeland—not to replace deterrence by the threat of punishment. The objective of the missile defense system is to create enough doubt in the adversary’s mind about the prospect of a successful attack that the adversary concludes such an attack is not worth the risk—especially alongside fears of enormous consequences. In other words, such an attack would be futile and fatal.

Sixth, to solve the missile problem, the United States incorporates other military means in its comprehensive missile defense and defeat strategy. In addition to active defenses meant to intercept warheads after launch, the United States will employ means to stop an adversary from successfully launching its offensive missiles when possible. In this way, “offensive measures add credibility to our defensive efforts and reduce the possibility of continued attacks.”¹⁷ This comprehensive approach compensates for any shortcomings in the missile defense architecture, so the United States need not rely only on active defenses.

Seventh, modest, though important, improvements to current homeland defenses are available over the next five years to address these threats if policymakers choose to do so. More advanced technologies for missile defense and defeat are on the horizon and could be exploited with sufficient funding. Increasing the funding for homeland missile defense—to a full one percent of the annual defense budget—may be sufficient to achieve the missile defense objectives discussed in this study.

Eighth, arguments against expanding US homeland missile defense because it could stoke an arms race with Russia and China need to be put in perspective. Not only are Russia and China pursuing their own homeland air and missile defenses against limited US missile strikes (Russia deploys more homeland defense interceptors than the United States), but it is counterfactual to assume that US missile defenses will provoke an “action-reaction” arms race. Quite the opposite has occurred: following the US withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty in 2002, US and Russian nuclear arsenals declined by two-thirds. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), in effect since February 2011, took numbers even lower. Nevertheless, the United States should work with Russia and China to make its missile defense plans as transparent as possible.

To summarize, the missile threat to the homeland is real and growing and, if left unaddressed, could seriously undermine US grand strategy and the very basis of national defense strategy. Since the objective of missile defense is to supplement and enhance deterrence by complicating attacker plans—rather than comprehensive population protection—the defensive architecture does not need to be leak-proof. Rather, a layered architecture with certain key attributes, based on existing and future technology, can provide an affordable defense to restore the basis for US defense strategy while reassuring allies.

A change in policy

The principal recommendation of this study is to update US homeland missile defense policy to remove the false distinction between rogue-state and major-power missile threats and to eliminate sole reliance on nuclear retaliation to deter Russian and Chinese limited coercive missile attacks against the homeland. Improving the survivability of US nuclear forces and nuclear command and control also should be a policy objective. Likewise, the distinction in policy for addressing ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic glide threats no longer makes sense: If the United States is going to defend against Russian cruise missiles (which is current policy), then Washington should defend against Russian ballistic missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs).

The objective of homeland missile defense is not an impregnable missile defense shield for the country, but rather sufficient defenses to counter adversary missile threats of coercion—to enable US regional defense strategy—and defenses adequate to ensure the survivability and endurance of US nuclear retaliatory forces and nuclear command and control against any combination of adversaries. This requires some tailoring of the missile defense mission depending on the strategy objectives and missile capabilities of potential adversaries.

The study outlines three categories of threats or scenarios for which missile defense must provide a solution: first, there are the smaller and possibly undeterrable threats presented by accidental and unauthorized launches as well as by countries such as North Korea that have limited nuclear capabilities; the second category is limited Russian and Chinese missile threats meant to coerce the United States (to provoke but not enrage); finally, there is the larger scale (but still limited) preemptive attack against US nuclear forces and command and control designed to prevent nuclear retaliation.

Accordingly, it should be US policy to:

Stay ahead of the North Korean long-range missile threat through a strategy of layered missile defense combined with offensive measures to prevent launches before they occur;
Deploy a layered missile defense system to thwart Russian and Chinese coercive strikes (as well as unauthorized or accidental launches), sized to about one hundred Russian or Chinese warheads, including missiles armed with HGVs. The objective is not to replace nuclear deterrence provided by US nuclear forces, but to strengthen deterrence by invalidating Russian and Chinese limited coercive threats.
Enhance the survivability of US nuclear forces and nuclear command and control through a layered missile defense composed of GBIs, Standard Missile (SM) 3 block IIA missiles deployed on land and at sea, Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missiles for preferential terminal defense of US nuclear forces, and requisite defenses against cruise missiles;
Protect critical US civilian and military infrastructure against air- and sea-launched cruise missile attacks by Russia and China to the extent feasible and necessary to allow the United States to stay in the fight; and
Increase funding for research and development of next-generation missile defense capabilities to stay ahead of the threats, including improved space-based sensors, space-based interceptors (SBIs), and directed-energy capabilities.

Homeland defense system design

There is far too much stress placed on the efficacy of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system with its GBIs and radars for the defense of the homeland. Originally intended to undergo regular upgrades after its initial deployment in 2004, modernization of the GMD system has failed to keep pace with advancing missile threats. Moreover, the GMD system was never meant to stand alone against the threat—but rather as part of a layered approach that contemplates defenses in other phases of flight to compensate for the GMD system’s shortcomings and to provide additional intercept opportunities.

Layering is essential to a successful missile defense architecture (See Figure 1). This approach improves overall effectiveness by intercepting warheads during different phases of flight and with different interceptor missiles supported by a range of radars and sensors. Intercepts at each layer “thins the herd” for the following layers. Attacking warheads containing countermeasures that may fool the defense in one layer may prove useless in another. Multiple layers greatly complicate the calculations of the attacker, while reducing the technical requirements for any given interceptor, because no single layer must work perfectly.

Though layered missile defense has been a long-standing mission of the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA), only GBIs protect the homeland today. In the near term, the SM-3 and THAAD missiles can bolster homeland protection by providing additional shot opportunities against incoming warheads that penetrate the GBI defense, but these systems have not been integrated with the GMD system. Sensor support from satellites under development can substantially improve the viability of layered missile defense early in the next decade by helping to distinguish between real warheads and countermeasures. When viewed from the attacker’s perspective, a layered missile defense system presents a very difficult challenge that cannot be solved simply with increased numbers.

The recommended near-term steps are meant to be a bridge to follow-on technologies necessary to create a next-generation missile defense capability to defend the homeland.

The DOD must also place more emphasis on investing in future, revolutionary capabilities, such as space sensors, SBIs, and non-kinetic options (such as directed energy) to outpace adversary capability development. Another option that has been considered over the years is the development of an air-launched weapon that could engage threat missiles early in their trajectory.

The MDA also needs to get back into the technology business. The MDA’s technology budget has been dismal over the past four to five years. Notably, in Fiscal Year (FY) 2024, the MDA’s science and technology (S&T) budget was at a historical low, below one percent of its Total Obligational Authority (TOA). Sticking to only incremental improvements will not defeat rapidly evolving threats. The DOD should make high-priority technology investments to prove out the Discriminating Space Sensor (DSS) concept on orbit and rapidly field the capability, per the US Space Development Agency (SDA) model. Other pursuits should include an SBI testbed demonstration alongside increased investments in directed energy, more robust funding for advanced discrimination techniques, as well as technological investments in lighter-weight, lower-cost interceptors to make kinetic interceptor options more affordable.

Addressing Russian and Chinese concerns

The politics of missile defense

Russian and Chinese criticism will not be the only stumbling block to pursuing the recommendations in this study. The challenges of securing funding, developing and integrating new technology, and building congressional support will be daunting. It is not by accident that twenty years after withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, the United States has only forty-four homeland defense interceptors to show for it. To be sure, senior leadership commitment and focus will require direction from the president and, through him or her, the secretary of defense.

Costs will be significant, but a reasonable starting point for this report’s recommendations is an additional $4–5 billion per year above the approximately $3 billion allocated for homeland missile defense within the MDA budget. Combined, this would amount to about one percent of the defense budget for the number-one national defense priority. Providing a layered defense over the next five years would not require developing new technology—only increased procurement and integration of interceptors, radars, and battle management systems currently in service. Procurement of additional THAAD and SM-3 missiles, as determined by the threat, is feasible and necessary for regional and homeland defense.¹⁹ Other musts to consider include additional long-lead funding to procure Next Generation Interceptors (NGIs) beyond the first twenty and added funding for research and development of next-generation missile defense systems that lead to deployment decisions toward the end of the decade.

Congressional debate is inevitable. House Armed Services Committee Republicans want to go beyond the planned sixty-four homeland defense interceptors and regard SBIs as part of the solution, whereas some Democratic members seem wary of any significant expansion of homeland defenses for fear of starting an arms race with Russia and China. Moreover, there appears to be little appetite for additional significant missile defense funding in the appropriations process unless total defense spending receives a commensurate boost.

Most importantly, the future course of US homeland missile defense will depend largely on the next president. One of the most consequential shifts in US missile defense policy occurred when then-President George W. Bush made the decision to withdraw the United States from the ABM Treaty and begin fielding GBIs in 2004 to address the rogue state ICBM threat. Today, the missile threat to the homeland is growing, not just from North Korea, but also from Russia and China, which have military doctrines that include the threat of limited missile strikes against the US homeland. Considering these new threats and the priority to defend the homeland, the next administration will want to consider whether planned missile defense capabilities are sufficient for the task. The ability of the United States to assure its allies and deter and, if necessary, prevail in great-power conflict depends on it.

Figure 1: Notional near-term layered missile defense concept
©2021, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, originally published in Strategic Comments: “The strategic implications of layered missile defence.” Reproduced with permission.

List of acronyms

ABL – Airborne laser

ABM – Anti-ballistic missile

AFB – Air Force base

ALBM – Air-launched ballistic missile

ALCM – Air-launched cruise missile

ALPS – Army Long-range Persistent Surveillance

AN/TPY – Army/Navy Transportable Radar Surveillance

ASAT – Anti-satellite

ASW – Anti-submarine warfare

ATA – US Intelligence Community’s Annual Threat Assessment

AWACS – Airborne Warning and Control System

BMD – Ballistic missile defense

BMDR – Ballistic Missile Defense Review

BMDS – Ballistic Missile Defense System

CCP – Chinese Communist Party

CGSR – Center for Global Security Research

CMD-H – Cruise missile defense for the homeland

CONOPS – Concepts of operation

CRS – US Congressional Research Service

C2BMC – Command and Control, Battle Management and Communication

DHS – US Department of Homeland Security

DOD – US Department of Defense

DPAL – Diode-pumped alkali laser

DPRK – Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)

DSP – Defense Support Program

DSS – Discriminating Space Sensor

EP – Electronic protection

EMP – Electromagnetic pulse

EW – electronic warfare

FAA – US Federal Aviation Administration

FOBS – Fractional orbital bombardment system

FY – Fiscal year

FYDP – Future Years Defense Program

GAO – US Government Accountability Office

GBI – Ground-Based Interceptor

GEO – Geostationary Earth orbit

GLCM – Ground-launched cruise missile

GMD – Ground-Based Midcourse Defense

GPI – Glide Phase Interceptor

HASC – US House Armed Services Committee

HBMD – Homeland ballistic missile defense

HBTSS – Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor

HCM – Hypersonic cruise missile

HGV – Hypersonic glide vehicle

HMD – Homeland missile defense

HPM – High-power microwave

IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency

IAMD – Integrated air and missile defense

IBCS – Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System

ICBM – Intercontinental ballistic missile

IR – Infrared

IRBM – Intermediate-range ballistic missile

IRGC – Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps

JADC2 – Joint All-Domain Command and Control

JCPOA – Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

JLENS – Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System

LACM – Land-attack cruise missile

LEO – Low-Earth orbit

LOW – Launch on warning

LR – Long-range

LRDR – Long-Range Discrimination Radar

MaRV – Maneuvering reentry vehicle

MDA – US Missile Defense Agency

MDR – Missile Defense Review

MEO – Medium-Earth orbit

MFOV – Medium field of view

MIRVs – Multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles

MOBS – Multiple orbit bombardment system

MRBM – Medium-range ballistic missile

MRV – Multiple reentry vehicle

MSE – Missile Segment Enhancement

MX – LGM-118 Missile (formerly known as “Missile, Experimental”)

NASAMS – National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCG – Nuclear Consultative Group

NC3 – Nuclear command, control, and communications

NDAA – National Defense Authorization Act

NDS – National Defense Strategy

New START – New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

NFU – No first use

NGI – Next-Generation Interceptor

NMD – National missile defense

NNSA – US National Nuclear Security Agency

NORAD – North American Aerospace Defense Command

NPR – Nuclear Posture Review

NPT – Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

NSC – US National Security Council

NSS – National Security Strategy

OPIR – Overhead persistent infrared

OTHR – Over-the-horizon radar

OUSD(R&E) – Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering

PAC – Patriot Advanced Capability

PBR – President’s Budget Request

PBV – Post-boost vehicle

PLA – Chinese People’s Liberation Army

PLAAF – People’s Liberation Army Air Force

PLAN – People’s Liberation Army Navy

PMRF – Pacific Missile Range Facility, Hawaii

PRC – People’s Republic of China

PWSA – Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture

R&D – Research and development

RKV – Redesigned Kill Vehicle

ROK – Republic of Korea (South Korea)

RV – Reentry vehicle

SALT – Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

SAM – Surface-to-air missile

PAC – Patriot Advanced Capability

PBR – President’s Budget Request

PBV – Post-boost vehicle

PLA – Chinese People’s Liberation Army

PLAAF – People’s Liberation Army Air Force

PLAN – People’s Liberation Army Navy

PMRF – Pacific Missile Range Facility, Hawaii

PRC – People’s Republic of China

PWSA – Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture

R&D – Research and development

RKV – Redesigned Kill Vehicle

ROK – Republic of Korea (South Korea)

RV – Reentry vehicle

SALT – Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

SAM – Surface-to-air missile

SASC – Senate Armed Services Committee

SBI – Space-based interceptor

SBIRS – Space-Based Infrared System

SBT – Sea-Based Terminal

SBX – Sea-Based X-band radar

SCO – US Department of Defense Strategic Capabilities Office

SDA – US Space Development Agency

SDI – Strategic Defense Initiative

SFS – Space Force station

SKA – Space-based kill assessment

SLBM – Submarine-launched ballistic missile

SLCM-N – Nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile

SLEP – Service life extension program

SLV – Space-launch vehicle

SM – Standard Missile

SODCIT – Strategic operations for the destruction of critically important targets

SORT – Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty

SPC – US Congressional Strategic Posture Commission

SPY – Search Protect Radar

SRBM – Short-range ballistic missile

SSBN – Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine

SSGN – Nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine

SSPK – Single shot probability of kill

STSS – Space Tracking and Surveillance System

S&T – Science and Technology

TEL – Transporter-erector-launcher

THAAD – Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense

TLAM/N – Nuclear-armed Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile

TNT – Trinitrotoluene

TOA – Total Obligational Authority

UAV – Uncrewed aerial vehicle

UEWR – Upgraded Early Warning Radar

USINDOPACOM – US Indo-Pacific Command

USNORTHCOM – US Northern Command

USSTRATCOM – US Strategic Command

USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (the Soviet Union)

VKS – Russian Aerospace Forces

VLS – Vertical launch system

WFOV – Wide field of view

WMD – Weapon of mass destruction

Section one: Introduction

“First, we will defend the homeland,” proclaims the 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States (NDS) on its very first page. Indeed, the United States goes to great lengths to protect the nation from military threats, terrorists, cyberattacks, and other potential dangers. US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) stands guard against land, air, and sea attacks; the intelligence community tracks and warns of potential dangers; and the Homeland Security Act of 2002 specifically established the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to secure the nation against the many threats it faces. Yet, the nation falls short in fully protecting against an ever-growing number, diversity, and sophistication of long-range missile threats. This does not make sense.

How should the United States defend its homeland from missile attacks? In the post-Cold War era, US defense policymakers have settled on an answer articulated most recently by the 2022 Missile Defense Review (MDR): staying ahead of the North Korean missile threat through “a comprehensive missile defeat approach” while relying on “strategic deterrence … to address and deter large intercontinental-range, nuclear missile threats to the homeland from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation (Russia).“²⁰ There are at least four reasons to believe that such an approach to homeland missile defense will no longer suffice for US national security goals.

First, North Korea’s expanding nuclear arsenal places upward pressure on the US homeland missile defense architecture and will likely continue to do so beyond the existing missile defense program of record. Second, missile defense contributes to nuclear deterrence by enhancing the survivability of US nuclear retaliatory forces in the face of the United States’ ongoing challenge to simultaneously deter two great-power rivals with nuclear arsenals in the same order of magnitude as the United States. Third, conventional—or even nuclear—missile strikes on the US homeland are likely to play into the counter-power-projection and escalation control strategies of Russia and China (defined later as “coercive” strategies). Finally, Russia and China are both expanding their respective missile defense capabilities, with uncertain implications for US strategic forces planning, including missile defenses, as well as arms control.

If the United States is to expand its homeland missile defense posture to not only keep pace with a growing North Korean nuclear missile threat but also address the missile threats posed by great-power competitors, then US analysts will need to consider a variety of possible technologies and architectures with a focused range of capabilities. Appropriate sensors, when fielded, must detect the wider range of missile threats presented across a range of different attack vectors (e.g., south-facing). Sensors and interceptors will need the capacity to acquire targets in evermore complicated threat clouds (that is, the range of warheads and decoys that any one missile can eject). And the ability to field layers of interceptors, where and when needed, capable of boost-phase, midcourse, late exo-atmospheric, and even terminal defense, will also be essential. Each element of such architectures would require evaluations for effectiveness, cost, impact on strategic stability, and fungibility across different attack scenarios, among other factors.

Complicating this issue is the long-standing conceptual debate over the value of homeland missile defense. One school of thought—extending back to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty—suggests that homeland missile defense creates incentives for arms racing because each side would need to build up its offensive nuclear forces to maintain its “assured destruction” capability against the other. Another school of thought argues that even limited missile defenses can enhance deterrence by complicating an adversary’s nuclear first-use or first-strike plans; without confidence in disarming the adversary, leaving both sides with no rationale for employing nuclear weapons. The debate has extended to US allies as well, with some viewing US homeland missile defense as strengthening US nuclear guarantees by lessening the vulnerability of the United States, while others see it as “decoupling” the United States from their security predicament. These points of view persist even today and will factor into any reconsideration of US homeland missile defense policy.

US President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev sign the ABM Treaty and SALT agreement in Moscow, 1972. Source: Richard Nixon Presidential Library.

The case for re-examining homeland missile defense policy

The changing security environment calls for a reexamination of homeland missile defense policy. The US determination to stay ahead of the North Korean threat while also contemplating the value of missile defense for the broader integrated deterrence strategy against the two nuclear great powers has returned homeland missile defense policy to the forefront of the strategic defense debate.

First, the expansion of North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) arsenal will likely drive an increase in the number of deployed midcourse US Ground-based Interceptors (GBIs) as the United States tries to maintain the effectiveness of its defenses in the face of an expanding threat. The Biden administration’s intent to increase the number of GBIs by twenty—from forty-four to sixty-four—starting in 2028 will drive a debate about whether US homeland missile defenses could upset strategic stability with Russia and China as these countries grow concerned about rising levels of US homeland missile protection, albeit intended against North Korea. Some analysts judge that the United States can rely on nuclear deterrence against North Korea, arguing that staying ahead of the North Korean missile threat is unaffordable—and will upset strategic stability with Russia and China.²¹ Other analysts find that reducing US vulnerability to rogue-nation missile threats is essential for a US grand strategy reliant on allies.²² These analysts note that allies may perceive a United States unwilling to proactively protect itself against North Korea as unwilling to take risks on allies’ behalf. Likewise, US homeland defenses would likely communicate to Pyongyang that the United States remains tightly coupled to its extended deterrence allies South Korea and Japan—enhancing deterrence.

Second, the United States must now simultaneously deter two nuclear-armed great powers—Russia and China. A feature of this problem is a Russian and Chinese nuclear doctrine (supported by forces) that allows for the limited use of nuclear weapons to coerce the United States. According to some US experts, “Moscow and Beijing appear now to calculate that their respective threats to escalate to limited nuclear war will be sufficient to paralyze direct US opposition to their regional expansionism.“²³ These forces may include dual-use capabilities to attack US nuclear forces, command and control, and national leadership. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) recognizes this problem, stating that the United States must prepare to deter large-scale and limited nuclear use from its nuclear-armed adversaries, especially in light of the increasing reliance on the coercive threat of limited nuclear use in these states’ strategies.²⁴ More recently, Gen. Gregory Guillot, then a lieutenant general and the nominee to become the new commander of USNORTHCOM and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), told Congress in July 2023 that the US Department of Defense (DOD) should consider expanding current national missile defense policy to also counter a limited attack on the United States by Russia or China.²⁵ Deterring limited nuclear or conventional strikes on the US homeland, including small-scale coercive attacks by Russia and China, requires a combination of appropriate nuclear and conventional forces and missile defenses. The 2022 MDR notes that missile defenses can help the United States deter or defend against limited nuclear use, effectively taking small-scale nuclear coercion off the table.²⁶

Gen. Gregory M. Guillot, commander of US Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, testifies before the House Armed Services Committee in Washington, DC, March 21, 2024. Source: EJ Hersom/US Department of Defense.

The missile threat to the homeland—both nuclear and conventional—is growing. According to Gen. Glen VanHerck, the commander of USNORTHCOM and NORAD from August 2020 to February 5, 2024, US great-power competitors and rogue states alike pose kinetic and non-kinetic threats to US homeland infrastructure and are only increasing their ability to do so.²⁷ Army Secretary Christine Wormuth went even further: “If we got into a major war with China, … They are going to go after the will of the United States public.”²⁸ Moreover, VanHerck’s March 2023 comments to the House Armed Services Committee put Russia as the principal homeland threat, with cruise missiles across domains (e.g., air, sea, and ground) capable of holding at risk US civilian and military infrastructure like. These capabilities include the AS-23a/Kh-101 air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) and the Severodvinsk nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine (SSGN) with dual-capable cruise missiles, including the Tsirkon hypersonic cruise missile (HCM). China, too, has begun to develop similar capabilities that could target US decision-making, force flow, and national will in wartime.²⁹

Third, another facet of the two-nuclear-great-power problem is the potential vulnerability of US nuclear forces to a combined or nearly sequential Chinese and Russian disarming nuclear first strike.³⁰ As China expands its nuclear forces, defense strategists must consider whether US nuclear forces suffice to deter two great powers, perhaps at the same time, under any conditions. The US ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons under any circumstances is essential. Layered, preferential missile defenses for US nuclear forces; national leadership; and nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) would enhance US nuclear survivability. Such defenses, which would not provide significant protection for the population, could enhance deterrence by complicating Russian and Chinese first-strike plans.³¹ Even short of a combined disarming strike, missile defense of the nuclear triad could increase endurance in a limited nuclear exchange from one power, preserving sufficient nuclear forces to dissuade an opportunistic aggressor.

Detailed analysis of the two-nuclear-peer problem facing the United States is just beginning, with early indications evincing a possible role for missile defense. An influential March 2023 paper from the Center for Global Security Research recommends an assessment of “fielding limited cruise and ballistic missile defenses to protect select assets, such as critical NC3 nodes in comparison with other means of enhancing survivability and endurance.”³² And as noted in the Executive Summary, the Strategic Posture Commission recommended in its October 2023 report that the “United States should develop and field homeland [integrated air and missile defense] capabilities that can deter and defeat coercive attacks by Russia and China.”³³

Finally, any assessment of expanding US homeland missile defense should consider Russia’s and China’s capabilities in this area. Russia and China claim a role for missile defense in their security strategies and are building defenses against cruise and ballistic missiles (including ICBM defenses). For example, Russian homeland missile defenses include sixty-eight nuclear-armed interceptors protecting the Moscow region and likely some portion of Russia’s ICBM force. Russia’s missile defenses are undergoing modernization with new interceptors. The new S-500 system will be capable in the future of intercepting long-range ballistic missiles.³⁴ According to the DOD, China is pursuing a ballistic missile defense architecture with endo- and exo-atmospheric components, including a midcourse element “that may have capabilities against IRBMs and possibly ICBMs”; further, the “PLA’s cruise missile defense capability is more robust than that of its ballistic missile defenses.“³⁵ Moreover, because Russia and China are likely to be closer to the operational battle, their regional missile defenses also provide homeland defense, unlike those of the United States. Defense against US ICBMs and cruise missiles could provide Russia and China an asymmetric advantage, as an expansion of Russian and Chinese homeland air and missile defenses would likely impact the military balance in certain situations, complicating US limited options.

Report organization

The opening section of the report sets the stage by evaluating current homeland missile defense policy for strategic logic, coherence, and relevance to the current and emerging strategic environment. An examination follows on how homeland missile defense can supplement US nuclear deterrence rather than replace it. The thesis of this report is that a missile defense and defeat strategy, one that effectively hinders an adversary’s confidence and expectations in its ability to succeed in striking the United States, would bolster and strengthen deterrence based on offensive threats of retaliation. In other words, an adversary’s use of nuclear weapons would be futile (because it would not achieve the intended outcome of the attack) and fatal (because the United States would surely respond to such an attack with its surviving nuclear forces).

Key to the broader argument is the notion that missile defenses do not have to provide flawless protection to have a deterrent effect—instead, the objective is to create doubt and uncertainty about the benefits of the attack in the mind of the adversary. Russia and China are unlikely to attack US cities in an initial nuclear attack because the United States would likely respond in kind. The more likely initial attack would be a limited strike against military targets or critical infrastructure, designed to coerce US capitulation rather than enrage the United States into a massive nuclear response. The other potential strategic purpose behind an initial attack would be to prevent US nuclear retaliation by destroying US nuclear forces and nuclear command and control—a so-called disarming first strike. In these cases, the United States does not require comprehensive missile defenses—just enough to complicate the attack. The study then applies this broader argument to the cases of Russia and China.

This paper also examines the potential growth in North Korean long-range missile threats to determine whether current US plans for expanding its Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, along with missile defeat activities, is sufficient to stay ahead of the North Korean threat. The paper then assesses the benefits of homeland defense against North Korea compared with the potential risks associated with alternate approaches for deterring Pyongyang and assuring Seoul and Tokyo, as well as the converse risks of upsetting strategic stability with Russia and China. The section concludes with a net assessment with recommendations for US homeland missile defense policy and defensive posture.

The following sections then assess Russian and Chinese doctrines for limited nuclear employment as well as their capabilities under development for this purpose (and specifically directed against the US homeland). The two-sided question addresses: How does limited nuclear use against the United States figure into the Chinese and Russian theory of victory, and what should be the US strategy and force posture for countering this strategy, with a focus on preferential homeland ballistic missile defense (HBMD)? The report assesses whether various limited US missile defense deployments could disrupt Russian and Chinese doctrines that rely on limited nuclear threats to coerce the United States into not reinforcing its allies during crisis or conflict or destroying the infrastructure necessary to do so. Relatedly, the study examines whether a limited defense of US nuclear retaliatory forces could improve the survivability of those forces and thereby lessen the requirements for additional US nuclear weapons to counter the expansion of Russian and Chinese nuclear capabilities. In other words, rather than build more US nuclear weapons to cover targets presented by China’s expanding nuclear arsenal, the United States can devalue those forces by ensuring they cannot disarm the United States in a large-scale nuclear attack.

The study then devotes four sections to examining how the strategy objectives for homeland missile defense relate to various combinations of missile defense interceptors and sensors and the overarching architecture necessary to accomplish defense objectives. The report focuses on the key concept of layered missile defenses to provide a more effective and affordable means to defend against missile threats, compared to the current approach that depends solely on the long-range GBI. The study makes recommendations on those nascent missile defense technologies, useful to address the challenges identified by this paper, that merit additional technical research and development. The study dedicates a separate section to cruise missile defense of the homeland, given the somewhat separate requirements for sensors, effectors, and missile defeat for that attack mode.

The report then devotes a section to Russian and Chinese homeland missile defense doctrines and capabilities that, at the very least, debunk those countries’ long-standing objections to US homeland missile defense. It also offers a preliminary assessment of the implications for US strategy should Russia and China continue to expand their nascent homeland missile defense capabilities while the United States maintains its vulnerability to some of those same threats.

Policy implications

Congress continues to grapple with legislation to expand US IAMD protection for the homeland, and it is an issue that will not go away. At least one of the two presidential candidates in the 2024 US presidential election (at the time of this writing) proposes a next-generation missile defense system for the protection of the nation. To be sure, nuclear and missile threats are growing—and how to address those threats will be a constant source of evaluation and debate.

This study recommends an expanded role for homeland missile defense because Russia and China are developing capabilities and doctrine to strike the US homeland during regional conflict to prevent US support of allies. The objective of such missile defenses is not absolute protection for the American people, but rather to enhance deterrence by creating doubt in the mind of the Russian or Chinese leadership that the purpose of their attacks will succeed. This doubt of a successful attack, along with the very real prospect of US retaliation, contributes to deterrence at the outset. It is this redefinition and clarification of the purpose for homeland missile defense that rests on the same foundational premise of strategic nuclear offensive weapons and may provide the basis for consensus on a new missile defense policy that both addresses the expanding missile threat and still holds the possibility of avoiding a costly arms race.

A key driver of this study is the fear that the growing US vulnerability to missile strikes, whether from small or major nuclear powers, will weaken deterrence of regional conflict because adversaries and allies may increasingly wonder whether the United States will be willing to run risks to secure its regional interests. If this is the case, then lessening the exposure of the United States to these threats could enhance the credibility of US extended deterrence and grand strategy more broadly.

Section two: US homeland missile defense policy

Introduction

United States missile defense policy today lacks coherence. There are different policies for homeland and regional missile defense, and, within homeland missile defense policy, distinctions exist for the type of missile threats (ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic glide) and the type of attacker (rogue state or major power). In an ideal world, the drivers of missile defense policy should be threat assessment and the contributions of missile defense to the broader national defense strategy. However, in reality, other factors intrude, including assumptions about technology, differences in deterrence theory, implications for arms control, and ideologically held positions about missile defense passed on from the earliest days of the Cold War. Moreover, geopolitical and adversary capability growth has outpaced US technology development and acquisition, contributing to the mismatch between policy and reality.

Underlying and driving these different policies has been a long-standing fundamental disagreement over the strategic benefits and risks of defending the nation against long-range nuclear-armed missiles. Writing in 1973, renowned nuclear strategist Bernard Brodie observed that “the ABM question touched off so intense and emotional a debate within this country as to be virtually without precedent on any issue of weaponry.”³⁶ While those same emotions and arguments persist today, the question for this study is whether changes in the geopolitical and threat environment are such that the United States must “move the needle” on expanded roles for homeland missile defense.

This section provides a summary and update of the missile defense policy debate since the end of the Cold War, examines the current policy for homeland missile defense for strategic logic and consistency with the emerging threat, and touches on the role that Congress plays in the debate over homeland missile defense policy. (Section Three assesses the specific role for missile defense in US defense and deterrence strategy.) This study argues that the expanding missile threat to the homeland from small and major nuclear powers justifies a change in policy to allow defense of the homeland against any missile threat posed by any potential adversary. Later sections address the size and type of missile defenses necessary to support this policy.

A review of US homeland missile defense policy after the Cold War

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the priority of US missile defense shifted from a Cold War focus on the Soviet Union and China to building defenses to address emerging threats to the homeland posed by smaller, more unpredictable regional actors—“rogue powers,” in the popular vernacular. The 1999 National Missile Defense (NMD) Act is the foundation and anchor for the post-Cold War US missile defense policy. The legislation set a national policy to “deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective national missile defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack, whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate.” This shift in US policy resulted from the assessment that the threats facing the United States and its allies following the collapse of the Soviet Union, particularly the 1998 North Korean Taepodong test, require a more tailored approach to deterrence and a new set of defense tools to maintain it. In highlighting the insufficiency of offensive capabilities alone to deter the spectrum of threats facing the United States, the Bush administration in 2003 publicly articulated the view that “the strategic logic of the past may not apply to these new [rogue state] threats, and we cannot be wholly dependent on our [offensive] capability to deter them.”³⁷

Furthermore, the United States worried that adversaries could employ threats of ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) to intimidate and deter Washington from supporting allies and friends in the face of aggression. US officials concluded that, to counter such threats, the United States must devalue missiles in the eyes of its adversaries as tools of extortion, blackmail, and aggression. Under these circumstances, missile defenses would serve to blunt the utility of missile-backed political coercion by denying hostile states the ability to constrain US freedom of action abroad by threatening the US homeland. By diminishing the anticipated coercive and military effectiveness of an opponent’s missile attack plans, the United States would strengthen deterrence.

This approach remains the foundation of US homeland missile defense policy. Since 1999, every administration, including the Biden administration, has elaborated policies within the framework of the NMD Act centered around the defense of the United States against nuclear-armed, long-range ballistic missiles from regional adversaries. This reflects the enduring judgment within US policy circles that nuclear deterrence may not be fully reliable in preventing these unpredictable and unstable nuclear states from seeking to threaten a missile attack or employ such weapons in a crisis or conflict. At the same time, each administration has also pursued specific policies seeking to reassure Russia and (to a lesser extent) China that the design and intent of US homeland missile defenses do not negate these states’ strategic forces. The United States has consistently affirmed its policy, most recently in the 2022 MDR, that it relies on nuclear deterrence and the threat of retaliation to address the large and sophisticated Russian and Chinese nuclear ballistic missile capabilities.

In 2002, Bush directed the DOD to proceed with the fielding of an initial set of homeland missile defense capabilities, including ground- and sea-based interceptors supported by a variety of sensors, to begin operating in 2004–05. For the homeland, this took the form of the GMD system incorporating GBIs deployed in Alaska and California. The scope and scale of these deployment decisions—an initial force structure of forty-four GBIs—made clear the focus was on “limited” ICBM attacks to address the “new rogue state threats.” Nowhere in early US policy did it suggest any intention to build defenses scaled to counter a large Russian strategic attack. It did state as a matter of policy, however, that such defenses would improve over time to remain effective against evolving missile threats.

The Obama administration elaborated its missile defense policy largely within this framework. As noted in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), maintaining an advantageous homeland defense posture against limited ballistic missile threats, such as those emanating from North Korea and potentially Iran, has been the guiding principle of US missile defense policy across Republican and Democratic administrations since the end of the Cold War.³⁸ Two important points are worth noting here. First, the fielding of homeland missile defense capabilities, initiated under Bush and sustained by his successor, former President Barack Obama, supplied a force size that allowed the United States to reliably provide a high level of protection against any potential small ICBM threat from rogue states. During this period, prospective rogue state ICBM inventories, as far as the US intelligence community could ascertain, remained either in the developmental stage or were small. Second, the policy focus remained exclusively on ballistic missiles, as that is where the dominant threat came from. Obama also sought to highlight the importance of strategic stability in the missile defense context more explicitly than the Bush administration, which remained wary of the concept and its Cold War application to constrain missile defense efforts.

To stay ahead of the North Korean ballistic missile threat to the homeland, the Obama administration reversed its earlier decision to pause US GBI deployments at thirty and decided in 2013 to add another fourteen. The action was in response to evidence that the North Korean ICBM program was moving forward with the development of a new missile system, specifically, its exhibition of the Hwasong-13 ICBM at a parade in 2012. The Obama administration also initiated plans to enhance the GMD system with a redesigned kill vehicle (RKV) for the GBI, to boost each GBI’s reliability and effectiveness.

The 2019 Trump administration MDR reaffirmed that “U.S. homeland missile defense will stay ahead of rogue states’ missile threats.”³⁹ In light of anticipated growth in the size of North Korea’s nuclear-tipped ICBM arsenal, and technical problems with the development of the RKV program, the Trump administration altered the acquisition approach to include a fully modernized interceptor (both rocket boosters and kill vehicle) called the Next-Generation Interceptor (NGI) alongside plans to supplement the forty-four GBIs deployed in Alaska and California with twenty NGIs. The 2019 MDR also pointed to a broader shift taking place in the threat environment, concluding that not only were nations continuing to improve and expand their ballistic missile capabilities, but they were also adding “new and unprecedented types of missiles” to their arsenals.⁴⁰ Considering this, the Trump administration renamed its review the Missile Defense Review—deliberately dropping the term ballistic to signal the wider scope of threats missile defense must henceforth address. With respect to Russia and China, the 2019 MDR stated, as the 2010 BMDR did, that the United States continues to rely on its nuclear forces to deter nuclear threats against the homeland.

The Biden administration’s 2022 MDR suggests more continuity than change for the role of missile defense within its deterrence strategy. Missile defenses represent a key “deterrence by denial” component within the administration’s “Integrated Deterrence” framework. Active defense is part of a comprehensive “missile defeat” approach, which according to the MDR, complements the credible threat of direct cost imposition through nuclear and non-nuclear means. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has testified to Congress that missile defense against rogue state threats is a “central component” to keeping the homeland safe.

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III provides testimony at a House Armed Services Committee hearing on the Department of Defense fiscal 2025 budget request. Source: Chad McNeeley/ Office of the Secretary of Defense Public Affairs.

In support of this priority, the Biden administration continues to improve the GMD system, including the forty-four GBIs, through a service life extension program (SLEP). The DOD is also undertaking a major modernization of the GMD system to ensure it can effectively counter larger and more sophisticated rogue state ICBM threats in the future. This includes $1.7 billion in the FY 2025 budget toward the planned fielding of the twenty NGIs, expected to start in 2028.⁴¹ Furthermore, as the forty-four GBIs move toward the end of their service life in the 2030s, senior Pentagon officials have testified that NGIs would be available to replace or backfill them, providing for a fully modernized missile defense system of sixty-four interceptors.

A Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) loaded into a silo at Fort Greely, Alaska, in July 2004. Source: US Missile Defense Agency.

Congress and missile defense policy

Congress plays an important role in the formulation of missile defense policy. Lawmakers have constrained presidential ambitions at times, yet, in other instances, they have worked to force the hand of reluctant administrations to do more to protect the homeland against all long-range missile threats. From the start, congressional views on homeland missile defense, have reflected a fundamental divide in opinion and ambivalence about the merits and costs of such defenses. A 1969 Senate vote to fund the Safeguard ABM System, proposed by the Nixon administration, required the vice president to cast the deciding vote and break the 50-50 tie. Partisan lines were much sharper during the second major missile defense debate prompted by former President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1983. The fate of the 1972 ABM Treaty was at stake in addition to the usual arguments for and against homeland missile defense, which took the debate up a steep notch. Republicans tended to favor homeland defense, while Democrats continued to defend the ABM Treaty.⁴²

The end of the Cold War seemed to make compromise feasible. The first sign came in the form of the 1991 Missile Defense Act, which made it the goal of US policy to deploy at the “earliest possible date” an ABM Treaty-compliant missile defense system able to provide “a highly effective defense of the U.S. against limited attacks of ballistic missiles.”⁴³ (The ABM Treaty limited each side to two interceptor sites, with one hundred missiles each, and was meant not to provide a territorial defense of the nation.) It also called for any actions to be consistent with the goal of “maintaining strategic stability,” and stated that nothing in the act should imply congressional authorization for development or testing of ABM systems in violation of the ABM Treaty. So, while the compromise seemed to move the needle forward on homeland missile defense, any resulting research and development must be within the framework of the ABM Treaty—the basis for an uneasy comprise that still begged the question: what to deploy and when?

The debate over homeland missile defense continued in Congress when, in August 1998, North Korea tested a three-stage rocket, catching the US intelligence community by surprise. The test provided the impetus for Republicans in Congress to increase efforts to accelerate the deployment of missile defenses and seemed to have a profound impact on the Clinton administration, forcing the administration to take more seriously the issue of homeland missile defense.⁴⁴ In January 1999, the Clinton administration announced allocating funding in its future years defense plan for deployment of a national missile defense system to comprise up to one hundred interceptors, while both houses of Congress passed by wide margins the 1999 Missile Defense Act, which declares that it is US policy to: (1) deploy as soon as technologically possible a National Missile Defense (NMD) system capable of defending US territory against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate), with funding subject to the annual authorization of appropriations and the annual appropriation of funds for NMD; and (2) seek continued negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces.⁴⁵ The commitment to homeland missile defenses gratified Republicans, while Democrats took comfort in the linkage to arms control.

Current missile defense policy

Since this study seeks to change homeland missile defense policy, it is useful to review that policy as a basis for further analyses. With respect to regional crises and conflict, it is the policy of the United States to defend US forces, allies, and partners against all missile threats (ballistic, cruise, hypersonic glide) from any country. Regarding the homeland, the United States will defend against air- and sea-launched cruise missile threats from any country but will only pursue defenses against ballistic missiles launched by rogue states, such as North Korea and potentially Iran. US homeland missile defenses are not intended to defend against Russian and Chinese ballistic missiles; instead, the United States relies on the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter such threats. This section will now examine the stated policy in more detail before assessing it.

Regarding theater or regional missile defense, the 2022 MDR prescribes an IAMD approach and states that:

To strengthen regional defense and deterrence … the United States will continue to pursue Joint, Allied, and partner IAMD capabilities needed to maintain a credible level of regional defense capability for joint maneuver forces and critical infrastructure against all missile threats from any adversary in order to protect U.S. forces abroad, maintain freedom of maneuver, and strengthen security commitments to our Allies and partners.⁴⁶

Regarding ballistic missile defense of the US homeland, the 2022 MDR maintains the distinction between North Korean threats and those posed by Russia and China. For North Korea, the 2022 MDR explains that:

As the scale and complexity of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) missile capabilities increase, the United States will also continue to stay ahead of North Korean missile threats to the homeland through a comprehensive missile defeat approach complemented by the credible threat of direct cost imposition through nuclear and non-nuclear means.⁴⁷

By contrast, for Russia and China, the 2022 MDR takes a different approach stating that:

Though the United States maintains the right to defend itself against attacks from any source, GMD is neither intended for, nor capable of, defeating the large and sophisticated ICBM, air-, or sea-launched ballistic missile threats from Russia and the PRC. The United States relies on strategic deterrence to address those threats.⁴⁸

Making a further distinction, the 2022 MDR spells out a different approach to the defense of the homeland against cruise missile threats. For cruise missile defense generally, the 2022 MDR states that:

To deter attempts by adversaries to stay under the nuclear threshold and achieve strategic results with conventional capabilities, the United States will examine active and possible defense measures to decrease the risk from any cruise missile strike against critical assets, regardless of origin.⁴⁹

On a closely related issue, air and cruise missile defense of the homeland, an April 2024 statement from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy to the House Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee reminds:

In September 2023, Secretary Austin issued policy guidance for Air and Cruise Missile Defense of the Homeland. The secretary’s actions followed a comprehensive re-assessment … to pace homeland defense air activities to the growing multi-domain threat posed by the PRC while also accounting for the acute threat posed by Russia. In the near term … the Department is taking measures … that will improve our ability to detect and respond to such strikes and thereby decrease the risks from cruise missile strikes against U.S. critical assets.⁵⁰

Against the threat from hypersonic glide weapons, the 2022 MDR frames defenses as a regional issue, stating that:

On regional hypersonic defense, the Department is currently engaged in the development of a future capability called the Glide Phase Interceptor, or GPI. GPI will supplement the Sea-based Terminal defense capability to provide a maritime layered defense against regional hypersonic threats.⁵¹

The entire 2022 MDR is framed through a comprehensive missile defeat approach, which “encompasses the range of activities to counter the development, acquisition, proliferation and actual use of adversary offensive missiles of all types, and to limit damage from such use.”⁵² Or, in the words of then-Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy John Plumb,“Speaking more plainly, [comprehensive missile defeat] is any and all left-of-launch and right-of-launch means to stop an adversary from successfully using its growing array of offensive missiles.”⁵³

Chief of Space Operations Gen. John W. “Jay” Raymond, left, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. CQ Brown, Jr. testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Department of the Air Force’s fiscal year 2023 budget request, Washington, D.C., May 3, 2022. Source: Eric Dietrich/US Air Force

An assessment of current policy

Several aspects of current missile defense policy bear scrutiny for inherent inconsistency and potential lack of strategic logic, especially considering the expanding missile threat to the homeland.

Why is it appropriate to defend against Russian and Chinese cruise missile threats to the homeland but not ballistic missiles? Should the logic of defending against nuclear and conventional cruise missile strikes not also extend to ballistic missile strikes? Both threats have uses against critical infrastructure for coercive purposes and for attacking critical US nuclear command-and-control nodes and other nuclear bases and ports. If Russia and China were to contemplate limited coercive attacks against the US homeland (as this study explores in Section Four), then it is not clear why these states would be less inclined to use ballistic missiles as well as cruise missiles. China, for example, may be developing a conventionally armed ICBM that Beijing could use expressly for this purpose. Moreover, should the United States address the cruise missile threat—as included in current policy—then adversaries would likely seek to exploit the US vulnerability to ballistic missile threats. While one might question the value of defending against cruise and ballistic missile threats, which the study later discusses, defending against one and not the other makes no strategic sense.

Next, across Republican and Democratic administrations, all have understood that one of the most crucial roles for missile defense is to reassure allies. As noted recently in the 2022 MDR, “missile defense systems such as the GMD offer a visible measure of protection for the U.S. while reassuring Allies and partners that the United States will not be coerced by threats to the homeland from states such as North Korea and potentially Iran.”⁵⁴ But why only North Korea and potentially Iran? European NATO Allies and other allies, like Japan and South Korea, must also wonder whether the United States would run risks on behalf of their security should Russia or China escalate to the use of nuclear weapons against the US homeland, as is consistent with Russian nuclear doctrine and within China’s capabilities. While the threat of US nuclear retaliation remains a strong deterrent to such attacks, reducing the vulnerability of the United States to limited Russian and Chinese nuclear attacks can serve to reduce the attractiveness of such attacks in the first place and strengthen the resolve of a future US president in the face of escalatory challenges and thereby provide increased reassurance to allies. If there are reassurance benefits to be had by protection from rogue state nuclear threats, then these benefits must also apply to major nuclear powers.

Finally, though current policy states that the United States will rely on strategic deterrence to address Russian and Chinese ICBM, air-, or sea-launched ballistic missile threats, the justification or rationale for this policy is not explicit in the 2022 MDR or any other strategy document or testimony produced by Biden administration defense officials. It is merely asserted. The 2022 MDR affirms that the US GMD system “is neither intended for, nor capable of, defeating the large and sophisticated” missile threats from Russia and China but does not explain the rationale behind that intent. One can only assume that it is the “large” and “sophisticated” nature of the threat that guides the decision not to defend against these threats.

There are other clues to the administration’s rationale for excluding HBMD directed against Russia and China. In opposing a provision to broaden the scope of national missile defense policy, proposed in the FY 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the Biden administration argued that such language:

Would signal intent to develop U.S. homeland missile defenses to counter large intercontinental-range, nuclear missile threats such as those fielded by the PRC and Russia. Implementing the policy … would be both cost prohibitive and not technically executable. Also, establishing such a policy would undermine U.S. strategic deterrence with the PRC and Russia and overturn two decades of well-established missile defense policy.⁵⁵

The administration does not explain how such a policy would undermine strategic deterrence, nor is it clear why such a policy would be cost prohibitive and not technically executable. Cost and technology requirements would depend on the goals for the missile defense system: a very large leakproof defense of the nation’s population could be technically infeasible and quite costly, but more modest objectives, such as deterring limited strikes or protecting nuclear command-and-control sites could be well within current technological prowess and affordable (as this study argues in Sections 7–9). The administration, in rejecting homeland defenses against Russia and China, assumes that the objective must be to “counter large intercontinental threats,” but, in fact, the objective, as explained later in this study, can be more modest.

Still less clear is why the administration believes that defending against Russian and Chinese long-range ballistic missiles would undermine US strategic deterrence. One possible explanation comes from Rep. Seth Moulton (D-MA-06), the senior Democrat on the US House Armed Services Committee’s Strategic Forces Subcommittee, who argues that pursuing homeland defenses against near-peer nuclear powers would be “fundamentally destabilizing.” He goes on to explain:

The crazy logic of atomic peace is achieved through mutual vulnerability, where no major nuclear power would launch a nuclear attack because they know that the result would be a nuclear holocaust … If we were to try to render our adversaries’ missiles incapable, they would simply develop new ones to defeat our defenses, as we have seen with the deployment of increasingly sophisticated maneuvering weapons to evade current U.S. missile defense radars.⁵⁶

This argument and strategic logic, addressed later in this study, may offer an explanation or rationale for the administration’s stated policy not to defend against Russian and Chinese long-range ballistic missiles. Notably, previous administrations, including under Republicans, have adopted the same policy of not building missile defenses against Russia and China, though one cannot be certain it is for the same reasons chosen by Moulton and, presumably, the Biden administration.

Moulton’s concern extends to the expansion of US defenses against North Korea as well, evidenced by his contention that:

At some point, if we continue to expand our current arsenal of interceptors, we must ask not just how North Korea will respond, but how Russia and the [Chinese Communist Party] CCP will respond as they see a pathway for our missile shield to impact their deterrent as well. … At what point will this arms race provoke a response from Russia and the CCP?⁵⁷

According to this logic, the United States should reconsider even pacing the North Korean ICBM threat for fear that doing so could spark an arms race with Russia and China. If this logic were to prevail, then it would be difficult to find support for defenses against the Russian and Chinese coercive threat, though the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission does recommend this course of action. House Armed Services Committee Republicans, however, believe current missile defenses are inadequate to address the growing missile threat to the homeland, tweeting on February 14, 2023, that “it needs to be the missile defense policy of the US to outpace the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] threat to the homeland. It is clear that 44 Ground Based Interceptors are not enough. We need to accelerate Next Generation Interceptors [NGIs] and begin moving to space based defenses.”

Republicans, increasingly concerned about the growing missile threat to the homeland from Russia and China (as well as North Korea), came to believe the 1999 Missile Defense Act was too restrictive in its policy to build defenses against only a “limited ballistic missile attack.” This led to a modification of the policy language to drop the modifier “limited” and instead “provide effective, layered missile defense capabilities to defeat increasingly complex missile threats in all phases of flight.”⁵⁸ According to proponents of this modified language, this would allow and encourage research and development of missile defense systems against larger and more sophisticated Russian and Chinese missile threats—not only the missile threat posed by North Korea. Not all Members of Congress were comfortable with this formulation, for the language also includes the caveat that the United States will “rely on nuclear deterrence to address more sophisticated and larger quantity near-peer intercontinental missile threats to the homeland of the United States.”⁵⁹ The Biden administration would no doubt interpret this provision as consistent with its current policy to stay ahead of the North Korean missile threat while relying on nuclear deterrence to address the Russian and Chinese long-range missile threat—in other words, asserting that the United States does not have to build defenses against Russia and China because it can rely on its nuclear forces to deter those threats.

In the final analysis, the long-standing debate concerning homeland missile defenses against Russia and China remains unresolved in Congress and between Congress and the Biden administration. The recommendation of the 2023 Strategic Posture Commission that “the United States should develop and field IAMD capabilities that can deter and defeat coercive attacks by Russia and China” could shift the nature of the homeland missile defense debate in Congress in favor of developing defenses against Russia and China, though it may be too early to tell.⁶⁰ In one sign of the shifting mood, the FY 2024 Defense Appropriations Act contains a provision directing the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to provide a report outlining technologies and investments across the future years defense program “which will allow MDA to keep pace with these [hypersonic and advanced ballistic missiles] advanced threats to the homeland.”⁶¹ Congress also directed, in the FY 2024 NDAA, a study examining the technical feasibility and cost of developing and deploying space-based interceptors (SBIs)—a capability well suited to defense against all long-range ballistic missiles, including those of Russia and China.

Conclusion

As this discussion of US missile defense policy from the end of the Cold War to today suggests, the existing homeland missile defense policy has been a convenient compromise between the advocates and critics of homeland missile defenses, or perhaps between different versions of homeland missile defense. The end of the Cold War and the hope of moving beyond great-power competition allowed policymakers to focus US missile defense requirements on the growing regional threats, such as North Korea. Today, however, the return of great-power competition with Russia and China and the expansion of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and ICBM force is likely to reopen that compromise—and with it, the long-standing debate over homeland missile defense: Is it destabilizing, or will it enhance deterrence?

Section three: Homeland missile defense and US security

Introduction

Post-Cold War Republican and Democratic administrations, as evidenced by their respective MDRs, have well established the role of missile defense in US defense strategy. During crises and conflicts, missile defenses offer additional military options to help the White House and military leadership deter and, if necessary, counter adversary aggression and strategy. Missile defense is a contributor to integrated deterrence—not a standalone capability. Protection of the homeland, military forces, and other critical assets is meant to enable US military strategy and the achievement of war aims more broadly. Missile defenses contribute to and complement other military capabilities.

While the 2022 MDR is the focal point for analysis, the strategic value of missile defenses cannot be understood without reference to higher-order documents such as the NDS and the National Security Strategy (NSS). How missile defenses contribute to these first-order security and strategy principles and objectives should determine the priorities afforded to these defenses in a constrained defense budget. Put another way, US regional and homeland missile defense capabilities are an enabler of US grand strategy, complement other military capabilities necessary for deterrence and defense, play a critical role in defeating adversary strategies (or theories of victory), and ensure the survivability of US nuclear forces—the ultimate insurance policy against existential threats to the nation.

This section first examines the important role assigned to missile defense within the broader national security and national defense strategies—sometimes referred to as US grand strategy. It then elaborates on the benefits of missile defense in deterring aggression and fulfilling US theater and operational objectives during a war. Based on this assessment, this section draws some conclusions about the type and effectiveness of missile defenses needed to contribute to US strategy objectives. Complicating this assessment is the fact that missile defenses have viable uses in a theater or regional contingency (for the protection of allies, US forces, and key military forces and facilities), and these defenses also can work to protect the homeland against long-range missile threats. While US missile defense policy does distinguish between the objectives for homeland and regional missile defenses, this study argues that the military and strategic benefits provided by missile defense extend to both regional and homeland missile defense. For example, both regional and homeland missile defenses can undermine an adversary’s confidence in the employment of missiles by introducing doubt and uncertainty into attack planning—whether these are conventionally armed medium-range missiles or nuclear-armed ICBMs attempting a disarming first strike.

Missile defense and US grand strategy

The Biden administration’s NSS declares that “the post-Cold War era is definitively over and a competition is underway between the major powers to shape what comes next.”⁶² It is a challenge from “powers that layer authoritarian governance with a revisionist foreign policy” such that “the risk of conflict between major powers is increasing,” and the “need for a strong purposeful American role in the world has never been greater.”⁶³ To address this challenge and to achieve the US goal of a “free, open, prosperous, and secure international order,” the United States “will build the strongest possible coalition of nations to enhance our collective influence to shape the global strategic environment.”⁶⁴ Framed another way, the United States seeks to maintain favorable balances of power in key regions of the world for the protection of US vital national interests and its allies. But to do so, the United States recognizes that its alliances and partnerships around the world are its most important strategic asset in deterring aggression and that “we are stronger in each region because of our affirmative engagement in the others.”⁶⁵

For the first time, a photo at the July 2024 Washington summit captures all 32 NATO member states’ delegation groups together. Source: The White House.

If US grand strategy has as its base the support of allies for its execution, then it is axiomatic that allies must have confidence that the United States will come to their aid in times of great distress. The credibility of US security guarantees, therefore, influences whether allies will remain confident and work to strengthen the alliance or accommodate regional challengers for fear that the United States will not be there when it counts. If this is the case, then the United States must convince allies that it is willing to run risks on their behalf—risks that include, ultimately, nuclear threats to the US homeland. As these risks continue to increase—they are now from even small powers such as North Korea—it becomes harder to convince allies that the United States will be there in extremis.

To be sure, the United States goes to great lengths—though troop deployments, exercises, demonstrations of will, and high-level consultations—to reassure allies of its alliance commitments, but the increasing vulnerability of the United States to nuclear missile threats (ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic glide) against its homeland certainly must be considered. A rising public opinion in South Korea in favor of acquiring its own nuclear weapons, for example, reflects this concern. As one conservative politician frames it, “Can the United States defend Seoul while risking New York turning into a sea of fire?” As if to recall that this is not a new situation, he adds, “Now is the time that we show our determination like de Gaulle’s,” who, in the early 1960s, asked whether the United States was willing to trade New York for Paris.⁶⁶ Likewise, the vice defense minister of Japan, during a briefing for reporters after a North Korean ICBM test in December 2023, noted that, based on this test, the new missile could range all of the United States.⁶⁷ When was the last occasion a major ally called attention to the increasing vulnerability of the US homeland? Clearly, the growing exposure of the United States to long-range nuclear threats has not gone unnoticed by allies. Indeed, many US allies have faced these threats recently from Russia during its re-invasion of Ukraine, while Chinese regional missiles continue to taunt US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.

Then US Defense Secretary Ash Carter and then US Secretary of State John Kerry attend a bilateral meeting with South Korean Defense Minister Han Min Koo and South Korean Foreign Affairs Minister Yun Byung-se at the State Department, Washington, DC, October 2016. Source: Amber I. Smith, US Department of Defense.

Washington has long understood the critical relationship between protection of the homeland and the United States’ ability to project military power on behalf of allies and US vital interests. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, conducted by the DOD, is emphatic on this point and bears repeating here:

Defending the Nation from attack is the foundation of strategy. As the tragic September terror attacks demonstrate, potential adversaries will seek to threaten the centers of gravity of the United States, its allies and its friends. As the U.S. military increased its ability to project power at long-range, adversaries have noted the relative vulnerability of the U.S. homeland. They are placing greater emphasis on the development of capabilities to threaten the United States directly in order to counter U.S. operational advantages with their own strategic effects.⁶⁸

As the following sections of this report argue, US adversaries, more specifically North Korea, Russia, and China, may believe that holding at risk the US homeland—with conventional, nuclear, or other WMDs—will weaken the US center of gravity and thereby US resolve in any conflict. That is a risky strategy, to be sure: the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 did not weaken US resolve; quite the opposite. But, on other occasions, such as the 1983 bombing of the US Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, Lebanon (resulting in the loss of 241 service members), which led to the withdrawal of the US military presence in that country, the United States has reconsidered its policy and strategy objectives based on perceived risks. It is those risks that adversaries will seek to exploit with missiles and other strikes against the homeland.

Missile defense and national defense strategy

It is no wonder, then, that protecting the homeland has consistently been the first priority of US defense strategy. The DOD in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review reflected a realization that “the homeland is no longer a sanctuary” and that “we must anticipate the increased likelihood of an attack on U.S. soil.”⁶⁹ That priority was maintained in subsequent reviews and assessments and reflects prominently on the first page of the 2022 NDS, which declares: “first, we will defend the homeland.”⁷⁰ This priority is followed by “deterring strategic attacks against the United States, our allies and partners,” which also has implications for missile defense.⁷¹ Like prior US strategy documents, the 2022 NDS reiterates that the United States cannot meet today’s challenges alone and that “mutually-beneficial alliances and partnerships are our greatest global strategic advantage—and they are a center of gravity for this strategy.”⁷² Again, this emphasis is further evidence that attending to growing allied concerns about increasing US homeland vulnerability must be a priority and is central to US strategy.

The NDS further implicates US homeland vulnerability by pointing out that “competitor strategies seek to exploit perceived vulnerabilities in the American way of war, including by … posing all-domain threats to the U.S. homeland in an effort to jeopardize the U.S. military’s ability to project power and counter regional aggression.”⁷³ Specifically, “the PLA [Chinese People’s Liberation Army] seeks to target the ability of the Joint Force to project power to defend vital U.S. interests and aid our allies in crisis and conflict,” and that “Russia has incorporated these capabilities and methods into an overall strategy that, like the PRC, seeks to exploit advantages in geography and time backed by a mix of threats to the U.S. homeland and to our allies and partners.”⁷⁴ The methods referred to include nuclear threats to the homeland and long-range cruise missile threats.

Most importantly, according to the NDS:

[T]he scope and scale of threats to the homeland have fundamentally changed … the PRC or Russia could use a wide array of tools in an attempt to hinder U.S. military preparation and response in a conflict, including actions aimed at undermining the will of the U.S. public, and to target our critical infrastructure and other systems.⁷⁵

Similar warnings have been taken up by multiple US Northern Command leaders, as well as the Secretary of the Army, who warned that in “a major war with China, the United States homeland would be at risk … with both kinetic and non-kinetic attacks. … They are going to go after the will of the United States public. They are going to try to erode support for a conflict.”⁷⁶ Taken together, the NDS warns that these capabilities “threaten to erode the United States’ ability to deter aggression and to help maintain favorable balances of power in critical regions.”⁷⁷

Recognizing these threats, how, then, does the NDS suggest that the United States can deter them? The broad answer includes a combination of denial, resilience, and cost imposition. With respect to the homeland specifically, the NDS declares:

[The] Department will take steps to raise potential attackers’ direct and indirect costs while reducing their expected benefits for aggressive action against the homeland, particularly by increasing resilience. Nuclear attacks against the United States are to be deterred by modernized nuclear forces, while deterring regional nuclear threats include tailored combinations of conventional, cyber, space and information capabilities along with nuclear weapons.⁷⁸

Although it is not explicitly stated by the NDS, raising the attacker’s costs (through punishment) while reducing expected benefits (by denying the objectives of their attacks) illustrates the important role that missile defenses play in the broader US national defense strategy. In other words, deterrence and missile defense are complementary; resilience through missile defense helps make credible US threats of cost imposition (punishment) by reducing US vulnerability and the risks of escalation. Currently, adversaries enjoy a “free ride” against the US homeland, which may promote the belief by Russian and Chinese leadership that they can successfully coerce US leadership by threatening US population or critical infrastructure. Even a modest level of protection for the United States presents adversaries the worst of both worlds: They must contemplate that their attacks will fail to achieve their objectives and that such attacks may provoke an unacceptable US response. Further, they must assign larger numbers of weapons to accomplish their desired effects, running greater escalation risks if the damage they inflict is greater than originally intended.

To summarize thus far, a central objective of US grand strategy is to maintain favorable balances of power in regions of vital interest. To do so, maintaining strong alliances is essential. The enduring support of allies, in turn, depends on the perception that the United States remains committed to their security and would run risks to its own security to fulfill those commitments. Adversaries recognize the vulnerability of the US homeland as a center of gravity to exploit with threatened attacks. It follows, therefore, that the first priority of US defense strategy is to protect the homeland. If, as it is increasingly evident, potential adversaries are expanding their missile arsenals to hold at risk the United States (with nuclear and conventional warheads), then lessening that vulnerability (and the perception of that vulnerability) through a comprehensive missile defense and defeat strategy is essential for US grand strategy. This logic applies to rogue states such as North Korea as well as great-power competitors with large and sophisticated long-range conventional and nuclear forces.

Likewise, allies will interpret the credibility and efficacy of US nuclear guarantees in the context of US interests and the risks associated with employing nuclear weapons against nuclear-armed adversaries. If allies perceive the United States as unwilling to defend its homeland against these threats, they may wonder whether the United States would be willing to protect them under similar circumstances. The 2022 MDR acknowledges this concern, stating that:

[M]issile defense systems such as the GMD offer a visible measure of protection for the U.S. population while reassuring allies and partners that the United States will not be coerced by threats to the homeland from states like North Korea and potentially Iran.⁷⁹

Missile defense, integrated deterrence, and military operations

Having established the critical role of homeland missile defense in lessening the vulnerability of the homeland to missile strikes, the 2022 MDR emphasizes how missile defenses are a “core deterrence-by-denial component of an integrated deterrence strategy” meant to counter the continued use of missiles by adversaries “as a principal means by which to project conventional or nuclear power.”⁸⁰

Based on the 2022 MDR, missile defenses for the homeland:

Add resilience to US conventional defenses and undermine adversary confidence in missile use by introducing doubt and uncertainty into strike planning and execution. In the regional context, protection of US and allied ports, bases, transportation nodes, and critical infrastructure allows the United States to continue military operations and flow in reinforcements. In the strategic nuclear context, the protection of US nuclear forces and nuclear command-and-control nodes makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the adversary nuclear attack planner to execute a disarming first strike with any confidence.
Reduce the incentive to conduct small-scale coercive attacks, decreasing the probability of attack success, and raising the threshold for conflict. In instances in which the adversary contemplates limited conventional or nuclear attacks against US and allied forces in the region—or against the US homeland—such defenses reduce the likelihood of success and may require much larger adversary strikes that could force an escalation far beyond what the adversary is willing to risk.
Reinforce US diplomatic and security posture to reassure allies and partners that the United States will not falter in fulfilling its global commitments. This might include deploying regional missile defenses to allied countries during crises but also applies to the defense of the US homeland, as stated previously. Safeguarding this role is vital for maintaining alliance cohesion, particularly during a crisis or conflict.
Provide additional military options that help counter the expanding presence of missile threats and may be less escalatory than employing offensive weapons. A prime example of this is the defense of Israel against Iranian missile strikes in April 2024. Israel’s retaliation was measured. But, if Israel had sustained serious damage without such defenses, then Israeli leadership likely would have, of necessity, retaliated more significantly against Iran. This wider retaliation could have forced a wider war between Israel and Iran at a time when Israel remains engaged in a campaign against Hamas in Gaza.
Offer some damage limitation against missile strikes, expanding the decision-making space for senior leaders at all levels of conflict, preserving capability and freedom of maneuver for US forces in a conflict region. For example, keeping an airbase or seaport operational longer could provide additional and better options for military leaders conducting offensive strikes or reinforcing forces in the region.

Implications for homeland defense objectives and architectures

Defense of the homeland against missile attack contributes to US national security at the regional, strategic, and grand-strategic levels. The protection of US military forces and war-supporting critical military and transportation infrastructure in the homeland enables the execution of US war plans that depend on moving reinforcements into battle as soon as possible. At the strategic (national defense) level, missile defense protection for the homeland against an adversary’s limited conventional or nuclear strikes removes that as a coercive tactic against the United States because adversaries would lack confidence that those limited strikes will reach their intended targets, while also having to worry of an escalatory response by the United States. Finally, homeland missile defenses play a critical role in a US grand strategy that depends on allies to protect its vital interests in key regions; reducing US homeland vulnerability demonstrates, to adversaries and allies alike, the US commitment to run risks on behalf of its vital interests and allies.

General considerations

From the discussion above, it is possible to derive certain general principles to guide the consideration of the type and scope of missile defenses necessary to provide the strategy benefits heretofore mentioned.

First, the objective is not to replace deterrence provided by other military forces or even US nuclear retaliatory capabilities. Rather, it is to strengthen the credibility of US nuclear threats and conventional force commitments by lessening (not eliminating) the potential vulnerability of the US homeland to missile threats. In this sense, missile defense and deterrence are complementary and mutually reinforcing.

Second, the objective or “strategic effect” is not the comprehensive protection of the homeland, but to create attack uncertainty or erode attacker confidence in the attack plans, thereby defeating the adversary’s strategy. For example, an adversary might contemplate attacks against US sea- and airports of embarkation for reinforcements to slow a US response, alongside added political aims, such as loss of public support for the military campaign. In this example, protection would be for specified key ports rather than broad swaths of US territory.

Third, from these objectives, which drive the limited scope of the missile defense architecture, one can derive that the United States does not intend to undermine the Russian or Chinese nuclear second-strike capability.

Finally, these objectives for homeland missile defense lead to the crucial conclusion that even limited missile defenses can create fundamental strategic and deterrence effects. As such, one could reduce the scope, efficacy, and cost of the defense system required to generate the desired effects.

Missile defense and deterrence are complementary

Senior defense policymakers and strategists across Republican and Democratic administrations have long realized the complementary nature of deterrence and defense. One of the best such examples is in the 1999 congressional testimony of Walter Slocombe, the undersecretary of defense for policy in the Clinton administration, who on that day explained to the House Armed Services Committee the administration’s plans to deploy defenses capable of protecting the US homeland against up to a few dozen North Korean ICBM warheads:

Active defenses can play an important role in strengthening and complementing our overall deterrence policy. There is no contradiction between defenses and deterrence. At the core of deterrence is convincing an adversary that the assured negative consequences of an action greatly outweigh any potential positive results of that action. Thus, there are two sides to deterrence. The threat of retaliation drives home that the negative consequences would be huge. But it is also valuable for deterrence to reduce the chance that an attack would succeed in the first place; that is, to reduce the prospect of positive results. And missile defenses can do that.⁸¹

The Biden administration seems to share this view and explains that “missile defense and nuclear capabilities are complementary. U.S. nuclear weapons present a credible threat of a robust response and overwhelming cost imposition, while missile defenses contribute to deterrence by denial.”⁸² Yet, the extent to which this strategic logic applies to Russian and Chinese nuclear ballistic missile threats to the homeland is unclear.

While this notion seems self-evident to most military planners, it has been a point of some debate between advocates and opponents of homeland missile defenses reaching back to the 1960s debate leading up to the 1972 ABM Treaty. One school of thought believes nuclear deterrence is best preserved through the maintenance of mutual vulnerability to nuclear counterstrikes—a theory of deterrence supposedly codified in the ABM Treaty. Yet there has always been an alternative view arguing that mutual vulnerability should not be the basis for deterrence—and that mutual vulnerability, by definition, makes it difficult for the United States to run risks on behalf of allies (thereby diminishing the credibility of extended deterrence). Adherents of the deterrence through mutual vulnerability school have drawn the conclusion that since it is necessary to “deter” (through the threat of retaliation), one, therefore, must not “defend.”

The approach outlined in this study does not advocate a defense-only approach to military strategy. Rather, it argues that missile defenses—by increasing attacker uncertainty and reducing US vulnerability—contribute to the broader integrated deterrence approach by countering adversary strategy that increasingly relies on missile threats to the homeland to weaken US national will and prevent reinforcement of allies in a timely fashion.

Uncertainty’s contribution to deterrence

Missile defenses do not have to work perfectly or be cost-prohibitive to have the intended strategic effect on adversaries—which is to convince them that conventional or nuclear missile attacks against the US homeland will not tilt conflicts in their favor—and that the consequences of these inconsequential attacks will make the attackers worse off or risk further intolerable escalation by the United States. The main objective, then, is to erase enemies’ confidence in their success: either a large-scale preemptive attack against US nuclear retaliatory forces, or more limited strikes intended to coerce the United States at lower levels of the escalation ladder.

Uncertainty for deterrence is not a new concept. A few examples from the Cold War are instructive. Norman Augustine, a former undersecretary of the Army and distinguished aerospace executive, explains the advantage of uncertainty in this excerpt from a 1980s-era study on ballistic missile defense:

Since deterrence is in the eye of the beholder, the cause of deterrence can be served merely by eroding the enemy’s confidence in the success of an attack … Today a Soviet planner can calculate almost exactly how many reliable ballistic missiles are required to eliminate the strategic bomber bases, the command and control structure, the ICBM force, submarines in harbors, and so on. In contrast, a defense that can at the last minute be devoted in its full force to the protection of a specific subset of these assets makes high-confidence attacks difficult to carry out successfully, reduces the chances of silver bullet attacks against uniquely valuable targets, and makes survival strikes much less plausible.⁸³

Henry Kissinger, former secretary of state and national security advisor (and architect of the 1972 ABM Treaty), in the 1980s, makes a similar point:

Even granting as I do that a perfect defense of our population is almost certainly unattainable, the existence of some defense means that the attacker must plan on saturating it. This massively complicates the attacker’s calculation. Anything that magnifies doubt inspires hesitation and adds to deterrence.⁸⁴

As does Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security advisor to former President Jimmy Carter:

A limited strategic defense … would have the key effect of introducing a high degree of randomness into any calculation of the consequences of a nuclear attack … this would enhance strategic deterrence and inhibit a Soviet conventional attack because it would provide the United States with the confidence needed for responding firmly on various levels of possible conflict.⁸⁵

Contemplating a disarming first strike against the United States would be a huge gamble for any enemy. Yet, it is a gamble an enemy might take if convinced that the planned attack has a decent, calculated probability of success based on the number of weapons that could target key US nuclear forces and command and control. Injecting missile defenses into that calculation, regardless of presumed effectiveness, would raise so many doubts as to make that gamble too risky for the attacker. And for this purpose, missile defenses do not have to be perfect.

Homeland missile defense against two major nuclear powers

Today’s nuclear deterrence problem is arguably more difficult than what the United States faced during the Cold War. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the central principles of missile defense discussed above need reimagining.⁸⁶ As this report later explains in more detail (see Sections Six and Seven), there are two general conflict scenarios with Russia and China in which missile defenses may play an important role in the United States’ broader integrated deterrence approach. The first concerns limited coercive strikes against the homeland by Russia and China, and the second involves larger-scale attacks against US nuclear forces by Russia, China, or a combination of the two, intended to prevent significant nuclear retaliation.

The deployment of even a modestly sized missile defense system can contribute to the deterrence of such attacks by creating uncertainty in the minds of the adversary leadership. Unable to calculate the odds of a successful attack and fearful of the resulting escalation, the adversary would likely choose restraint—or such is the hope. Without the complicating factor of missile defenses, the adversary still must make a difficult decision. However, with defenses, the problem would become appreciably more daunting to the adversary. In the first instance, the attacker cannot successfully calibrate an attack that is small enough to coerce, yet not large enough to elicit a major nuclear response from the United States. In the second instance, the attacker is unsure of success in targeting US forces before they would disperse or launch against the attacker—a task made more difficult because the United States must maintain a strategic reserve capable of surviving a general nuclear exchange with the first adversary that would then be available against the second adversary. Limited, preferential defenses for US nuclear forces and nuclear command and control against Russian and Chinese attacks could help in this respect.

Impact on crisis stability and arms control

When assessing the role of enhanced missile defenses for the protection of the homeland, the discussion quickly turns to Russian and Chinese responses. While it is not unreasonable to ask how Moscow and Beijing might respond to expanded US homeland defenses, the answer to this question is harder to divine than most people imagine. There is no shortage of Russian and Chinese views—official and otherwise—to suggest that these countries will object to any expansion of US homeland missile defenses, as these states have done in the past for the expansion of virtually all US missile defense systems, including those theater missile defense systems deployed abroad to protect US forces, allies, and partners. Less appreciated, however, is the gap between what the Russians and Chinese say, and what they do or will do in response to US missile defense capabilities. Perhaps the best example of this “say-do” gap is the Russian reaction to the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002. Based on Russia’s complaints about US missile defenses during the Cold War (particularly the 1984 SDI), one would have expected Russia to respond to the US withdrawal by building up its nuclear arsenal. Instead, Russia joined the United States in reducing its nuclear arsenal by some two-thirds in the Moscow Treaty. If Russia were truly apprehensive about US homeland defenses, that would have been the time to expand, not contract, its nuclear forces.

In addition to the arms race stability argument, critics of homeland missile defense also suggest US missile defenses will increase incentives for a nuclear first strike during a crisis. Homeland missile defense, some argue, would make the Russians nervous during a crisis, fearing that the United States might strike first, believing that its missile defense system could deal with any resulting (and greatly weakened) Russian retaliation. The report goes into more later, but this is a highly unrealistic crisis scenario. US and Russian nuclear forces would be on alert, meaning the launch readiness of their respective nuclear forces compromise and eliminate the prospects for success of a surprise first strike from either side. Russia would gain nothing by launching first due to the protection of US nuclear forces afforded by the missile defense system. Not only would Moscow’s attack fail to prevent retaliation, but Russia would suffer intolerable consequences.

Rather than revisit these arguments in comprehensive form, this study suggests a different way of thinking about the problem. The objectives for a US homeland missile defense system, as proposed in this study would, by definition and design, not be able to provide comprehensive protection for the US population—whether the United States struck first or second. With each of their second-strike capabilities intact, Russia and China would have little reason to begin an arms race to counter US missile defense deployments. Russia may continue to field in modest numbers the new novel nuclear systems it has developed (e.g., a long-range underwater nuclear torpedo and nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed cruise missile), but this would not add appreciably to the threat currently posed by Russia nor substantially impact the nuclear balance. Russia and China may also avail themselves of the homeland missile defense capabilities they currently have under development and deployed in small numbers to improve the survivability of their respective nuclear forces—but this would be a stable situation.

The central point is that the inherently limited nature of the proposed US homeland missile defense system could serve as a basis for assuaging Russian and Chinese concerns. Regardless of the likely success of such efforts, at the end of the day, the United States cannot allow Russia and China a veto over measures the United States deems necessary to assure its security and that of its allies. There may be unknown risks in going forward with expanded homeland defenses, but there are surely risks associated with maintaining the vulnerability of the United States to adversary missile strikes. A country unwilling to take measures to protect itself against these threats may be seen by adversaries and allies alike as unwilling to take risks during a crisis—this poses the greatest danger to deterrence.

Allies must also understand that US homeland missile defense makes Washington more likely—not less—to come to their aid and increases—rather than jeopardizes—strategic deterrence across the alliance. Historically, allies have manifested three primary concerns about US homeland missile defenses. First, allies have worried about strategic stability and arms racing. As explained above and throughout this report, those concerns are overblown and hypocritical (as Section Eleven explains). Indeed, as allies develop their homeland defenses against limited attacks, especially in Europe under the “Skyshield” initiative, it is becoming apparent that European capitals see a similar logic to what this study proposes.

Second, allies have long-standing concerns about decoupling, that is, the fear that an impervious defense of the US homeland would leave the United States less invested in the defense of its allies. The approach proposed here would do just the opposite, giving US political leadership increased confidence that it could run risks on behalf of allies and reduce the likelihood that adversary “cheap shops” could coerce Washington to abstain from intervening in defense of allies or sue for peace on terms unfavorable for allies.

Third, the United Kingdom and France worry that a marked improvement in Russian and Chinese strategic missile defenses (perhaps driven by US developments in this area) could reduce the credibility of these states’ nuclear arsenals. It is in the national interest of the United States for the United Kingdom and France to have confidence in their nuclear deterrents, and the separate decision-making centers for nuclear use in these countries contribute to overall strategic deterrence. Regardless of the drivers of Russian and Chinese strategic missile defenses, the United States should work with its nuclear-armed allies to ensure they retain confidence in their strategic deterrence even as adversary strategic defenses improve.

Section four: Staying ahead of North Korea

Introduction

The long-range, nuclear-armed missile threat from North Korea is today the primary motivator for HBMD in the United States. To address the expanding North Korean ICBM threat to the US homeland, US HBMD will need to become more robust to contribute to comprehensive missile defeat. While it is difficult to judge from open sources, planned upgrades will make defenses significantly more capable against the current North Korean ICBM threat. Although the United States has in the past deterred adversaries and assured allies without the benefit of comprehensive population HBMD, doing so has costs in terms of proliferation and other measures needed to achieve assurance in the absence of HBMD. While the upgraded defenses will have a very limited latent capability against a small quantity of incoming ballistic missiles from Russia or China, the defenses proposed in this paper are insufficient to threaten these states’ assured retaliation and seem unlikely to completely defeat their most likely modes of limited missile attack on the US homeland.

This study argues that the United States should maintain a population defense against North Korean ICBMs through comprehensive missile defeat because the costs of assurance and risks of proliferation would be too high in the absence of such an approach. Moreover, HBMD scoped to the North Korean ICBM threat delivers a vital contribution to the defense against coercive attacks and combined disarming strikes, as argued later in the paper.

This section begins by explaining the current US nuclear deterrence and missile defense strategy toward North Korea, assessing the growth of North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities, and evaluating whether current US strategy is sustainable. Next, it assesses the costs and disadvantages of relying solely on deterrence by punishment for North Korea. Finally, it examines the implications of a US HBMD system scoped to the evolving North Korean threat for strategic stability with—and defense against—Russia and China.

Can current US policy hold as the North Korean missile threat grows?

Current US nuclear deterrence and missile defense policy toward North Korea—to defend the entire US population through comprehensive missile defeat and to end the Kim regime in the event of any nuclear use—can be maintained even as North Korea’s nuclear and ICBM arsenals expand, but doing so will require that planned upgrades to US HBMD proceed apace and may require exploration of new systems.

Current US nuclear deterrence and missile defeat policy for North Korea

The current US nuclear deterrence and missile defense policy toward North Korea is essentially a nuclear superiority approach. The United States threatens to terminate the Kim regime in the event of any nuclear weapons use. And Washington plans to use a combination of direct strikes on Pyongyang’s missile launchers, available non-kinetic tools, and active missile defenses to counter any possible North Korean missile launch.

The United States makes a deterrence-by-punishment threat to North Korea that is unique among US tailored deterrent approaches. The 2022 NPR states that “any nuclear attack by North Korea against the United States or its Allies and partners is unacceptable and will result in the end of [the Kim] regime. There is no scenario in which the Kim regime could employ nuclear weapons and survive.”⁸⁷ Making this pledge credible is quite a demanding task for the United States. Washington must threaten, even in response to limited nuclear use by North Korea (say, a North Korean nuclear attack on a South Korean naval vessel which kills only a few dozen sailors), to eliminate the Kim regime.

This is especially challenging since North Korea’s nuclear strategy includes threatening intercontinental nuclear strikes on the US homeland to split the US alliance with Japan and South Korea, as well as possibly backstop limited nuclear use in the region, including for battlefield purposes. Pyongyang would also consider counter-value strikes on Japan and South Korea. Finally, North Korea has laid out a “fail deadly” posture, in which attacks on North Korean nuclear forces, nuclear command and control, or the Kim regime itself would trigger an “automatic” nuclear counterattack.⁸⁸ Since the stated US goal is regime elimination, then the Kim regime has no reason not to order an all-out attack. For the US threat to be credible, then, US forces must be able to eliminate the North Korean intercontinental nuclear threat through attack operations and active defenses.

In the words of the 2022 MDR, “as the scale and the complexity of [North Korea’s] missile capabilities increase, the United States will also continue to stay ahead of North Korean missile threats to the homeland through a comprehensive missile defeat approach, complemented by the credible threat of direct cost imposition through nuclear and non-nuclear means.”⁸⁹ Comprehensive missile defeat therefore includes counterproliferation efforts to impede Pyongyang’s missile development and testing, so-called “left-of-launch” operations to destroy nuclear missiles and their associated equipment before ignition, and active missile defense to intercept North Korean weapons.

Through counterproliferation activities, the United States and its allies and partners work to constrain North Korea’s WMD and ballistic missile programs by preventing Pyongyang’s acquisition of technology relevant to these programs and imposing sanctions that punish proliferation and restrict the resources available. Economic sanctions on North Korea include limits or bans on its imports and exports of weapons and dual-use technologies, hydrocarbons, foodstuffs, textiles, luxury goods, and industrial products and components; prohibitions on North Korean nationals working abroad; and requirements to counteract vessels engaged in sanctioned activity; among other measures.⁹⁰ North Korea’s global campaign to evade these sanctions is robust and is a major focus of US, allied, and partner counterproliferation efforts. Russia and China have played significant roles in allowing the DPRK to evade certain sanctions. Moreover, in April 2024, Russia vetoed the renewal of a key UN panel charged with detailing violations.⁹¹

Through left-of-launch operations, the United States would attempt to destroy North Korean ICBMs (and other nuclear missiles) before Pyongyang could launch them by using a range of kinetic and non-kinetic strike capabilities. Public discussion of those capabilities is limited, but, Guillot, in his March 2024 statement as the USNORTHCOM and NORAD commander to the US Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), said, “It is a near certainty that homeland defense in the coming years will rely less on point defense and traditional kinetic defeat mechanisms in favor of area defense and left-of-launch effects that take full advantage of multi-domain capabilities.”⁹² There is speculation in the news media that some failures of Pyongyang’s missile programs are attributable to US cyber and electronic interference.⁹³

Attack operations on North Korean forces would be a whole-of-alliance activity. The Republic of Korea (South Korea) has a “kill chain” concept and plans to integrate strike forces (such as its ballistic missiles and F-35A strike fighters) into its own Strategic Command to carry out such attacks.⁹⁴ One US Marine Corps general suggested that ROK Strategic Command would plan to engage in “counter-nuclear operations, conventional nuclear integration, and conventional support to nuclear operations.”⁹⁵

US F-35 fighter jets from the 356th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron conduct combined training with the Republic of Korea Air Force, July 5, 2022. Source: US Indo-Pacific Command.

Finally, the United States deploys a limited number of exo-atmospheric midcourse interceptors to actively defend against incoming North Korean ballistic missiles. The United States fields a force of forty-four silo-based GBIs capable of intercepting North Korean reentry vehicles (RVs) in the midcourse phase, that a variety of space-, land-, and sea-based sensors support. On November 16, 2020, the United States successfully shot down an ICBM-class target with the Standard Missile (SM) 3 block IIA missile, which was originally designed against intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs).⁹⁶ The SM-3 could therefore play a role in a layered defense of the US homeland from North Korean ballistic missiles. (See Section Nine for a more thorough explanation of the current US HBMD system.)

A successful test flight of the SM-3 Block IIA missile in 2015 by the Missile Development Agency, US Navy, and Japanese Ministry of Defense in Point Mugu Sea Range, San Nicolas Island, California. Source: Ralph Scott/Missile Defense Agency.

Current and projected North Korean nuclear-armed long-range missile threat to the United States

The 2022 NPR recognizes that North Korea presents a “persistent threat and growing danger to the U.S. homeland and the Indo-Pacific region as it expands, diversifies, and improves its nuclear, ballistic missile, and non-nuclear capabilities. …”⁹⁷ And 2022 MDR elaborates that “North Korea continues to improve, expand, and diversify its conventional and nuclear missile capabilities, posing an increasing risk to the U.S. homeland. …”⁹⁸ While North Korea’s existing long-range nuclear missile arsenal would already stress US countermeasures, at least four factors in the development of North Korea’s long-range nuclear force further complicate US comprehensive missile defeat and defense operations: solid fueling, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) arming, countermeasures, and growth in launcher count.

North Korea has tested intercontinental missiles of increasing range and sophistication. In 2017, Pyongyang tested its first two ICBM-class missiles—the Hwasong-14 and -15—on lofted trajectories; both missiles are road mobile and liquid-fueled.⁹⁹ In 2022, Pyongyang conducted three lofted-trajectory tests of a new ICBM dubbed the Hwasong-17.¹⁰⁰ The US Defense Intelligence Agency assessed this missile as “probably designed to deliver multiple warheads.”¹⁰¹ Most recently, North Korea paraded the Hwasong-18 solid-fueled road-mobile missile and then flight tested it three times in 2023.¹⁰² Solid fueling is a major advancement for Pyongyang. It is generally very difficult to store or move liquid-fueled missiles while fueled, which often requires positioning them before fueling. The missile is highly vulnerable to attack operations during this hours-long process. A more widespread combination of mobility and solid fueling would likely degrade US missile defeat operations. North Korea is also developing countermeasures for its ICBMs, which would complicate US attempts at interception.

In addition to the improvement in the quality of the North’s missiles, the quantity of the missiles and their attendant transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) is growing. In 2023, Pyongyang paraded eleven Hwasong-17 ICBMs.¹⁰³ Since the “publicly stated shot doctrine for the GMD [Ground-based Midcourse Defense] system is four to five interceptors per one incoming ICBM,” that may indicate that the North could overwhelm existing US defenses (in a worst-case scenario in which all North Korean weapons worked as expected and the United States and allies were unable to strike before launch).¹⁰⁴ More importantly, perhaps, than the number of missiles paraded at one point in time is Pyongyang’s ability to indigenously manufacture heavy TELs, a capability which had previously been a limiting factor, but which Kim Jong-Un highlighted in a recent visit.¹⁰⁵ (The North is also exploring rail-mobile launchers, which would further complicate US and allied attack operations. Shorter-range missiles are already armed on rail launchers.)¹⁰⁶

Pyongyang continues its development and testing of space-launch vehicles (SLV), in violation of UN Security Council mandates. SLV testing helps the DPRK develop missile technology and test other components necessary for a successful ICBM strike. Russia is actively assisting North Korea in this effort.¹⁰⁷

North Korea has steadily expanded its stockpile of fissile material, and nongovernmental experts assess a growth in the size of its nuclear arsenal. While there is no public US government estimate of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, a 2024 estimate from the well-regarded “Nuclear Notebook” lists fissile material sufficient for up to ninety warheads, of which fifty might be deliverable by missiles.¹⁰⁸ A Congressional Research Service (CRS) survey of open-source estimates reports a range of fissile material sufficient for twenty to sixty warheads.¹⁰⁹ In September 2023, Kim called for an “exponential” increase in Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal, a policy that the country’s legislature endorsed in a constitutional amendment.¹¹⁰ One RAND report estimates that Pyongyang could grow its nuclear arsenal to up to two hundred warheads by 2030.¹¹¹

There are several key uncertainties in the degree of threat that North Korea’s nuclear program will pose as it progresses. North Korea has never tested a RV for its ICBMs on a minimum energy trajectory, so it remains unclear if its nuclear weapons can survive reentry into Earth’s atmosphere. (Several nongovernmental experts assess that Pyongyang would not face difficulty doing so.)¹¹² For that matter, despite analysis of the capability of North Korean ICBMs, based on size and throw weight, to deliver multiple warheads and decoys, there has been no open-source documentation of Pyongyang testing multiple reentry vehicles (MRVs), post-boost vehicles (PBVs), MIRVs, or penaids. (In June 2024, North Korea claimed to have tested underlying technology for a MIRV; South Korean officials cast doubt on this claim.)¹¹³ Preventing North Korea from testing these systems, in the view of some distinguished Korea watchers, should be a top priority for US policy toward Pyongyang.¹¹⁴

Even still, the current and ongoing developments in North Korea’s nuclear weapons program are likely to pose severe challenges to the current US HBMD system.

It is worth noting the missile threats from North Korea that are unlikely to impact the US homeland in the timeframe of this study. North Korea fields a variety of cruise missiles, but does not possess the surface, submarine, or long-range aviation force necessary to threaten the US homeland with those weapons, and such developments are unlikely in the coming decade.

Similarly, at the time of writing, in June 2024, a North Korean missile test described as “hypersonic” failed midair. The range and mode of the missile were not immediately clear.¹¹⁵ An April 2024 test of a short-range hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) did not demonstrate key characteristics of a meaningful hypersonic capability.¹¹⁶ North Korea has claimed to have armed its Hwasong-16b IRBM with an HGV, putting the US territories of Guam and Wake Island potentially in range.¹¹⁷ While North Korea may develop some HGV capability in the coming decade, it is unlikely to pose a credible threat to the contiguous United States.

Finally, North Korea is also developing a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) capability. Pyongyang successfully tested its first SLBM, the Pukguksong-1, in 2016 and 2017, from a Sinpo-class diesel-powered submarine.¹¹⁸ It also strains credulity that North Korea could, in the coming years, develop ballistic missile submarines capable of deterrence patrols in the Pacific and with sufficiently long-range SLBMs to threaten the contiguous United States.

It is possible that North Korea could pose a nuclear-armed fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) or multiple orbital bombardment system (MOBS) threat to the United States. Analysts have noted that existing North Korean satellites are in a similar orbit to planned Soviet FOBS.¹¹⁹ Pyongyang would not likely worry about the escalatory implications or diplomatic consequences of placing a nuclear weapon in orbit. There is no indication at present that North Korea is pursuing such a capability.

A key uncertainty in the progress of North Korea’s nuclear and long-range missile arsenal is the degree of restraint—or more likely encouragement—that Russia and China provide. North Korea supplies thousands of infantry soldiers, artillery, missiles, and other systems to Russia in support of its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine.¹²⁰ Pyongyang receives in exchange cash, battlefield testing experience for its kit, and diplomatic chits with Moscow that culminated in an upgraded bilateral relationship announced in June 2024.

Sufficiency of current and planned US HBMD against North Korea

Given current US nuclear deterrence and missile defense policy and North Korea’s advancing nuclear and long-range missile capabilities, are the planned upgrades to US HBMD sufficient? It is not clear.

In the words of the 2022 MDR, “As North Korean ballistic missile threats to the U.S. homeland continue to evolve, the United States is committed to improving the capability and reliability of the GMD system. This includes development of the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) to augment and potentially replace the existing Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI).“¹²¹ The United States is modernizing GMD through NGI—slated to be online by the end FY 2028. Each NGI will feature multiple kill vehicles, able to intercept multiple objects—whether they be warheads or decoys.¹²² However, in June 2024, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified risks to the realism of the modeling and testing that the NGI will undergo.¹²³ The MDA also conducts a SLEP specific to a subset of the oldest existing GBIs to improve their reliability and service life, given their age.¹²⁴

The United States is also upgrading its sensor network to complement these improved effectors. For instance, the Long-Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR), an S-band radar at Clear Space Force Station in Alaska, should achieve full operating capability in early 2025; the LRDR is slated to enhance discrimination between RVs and decoys.¹²⁵ In addition, the Space Development Agency’s (SDA) planned Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA) is slated to include sensors in support HBMD. Through its so-called “tracking layer,” the PWSA’s tranche one (slated to launch in 2025) will provide missile warning and missile tracking capabilities; tranche two and further demonstrations are expected to provide fire-control-quality tracking and cueing for missile defense.¹²⁶ (See Section Nine for a more thorough description of the planned sensor upgrades.)

Given the uncertain timeframe and performance of the NGI; the uncertain success of US attack operations against North Korean road-mobile, solid-fueled ICBMs; and the uncertain pace of North Korean warhead, missile, and launcher building, it is not possible to assess with any confidence the sufficiency of the existing program of record to “stay ahead” of the North Korean threat.

Is there an alternative? Will deterrence by punishment work?

Though critics argue that the United States should accept a nuclear deterrence relationship with North Korea centered around deterrence by punishment, taking that approach would have grave repercussions for US grand strategy, principally through the risks of assurance to the ROK and Japan.

Assurance and US nuclear and missile defense strategy

Assuring US extended nuclear deterrence allies that the United States is willing to use nuclear weapons on their behalf is perhaps the most vexing challenge of US nuclear strategy. Indeed, the 2022 NPR recognizes that the network of US alliances globally is “a military center of gravity” and that “U.S. extended nuclear deterrence is foundational to this network.” Moreover, the NPR states, “Allies must be confident that the United States is willing and able to deter the range of strategic threats they face, and mitigate the risks they will assume in a crisis or conflict.”¹²⁷ Furthermore, as the 2022 MDR states, “missile defense systems such as the GMD … reassure[s] Allies and partners that the United States will not be coerced by threats to the homeland from states like North Korea. …”¹²⁸

State of US nuclear assurance to South Korea and Japan today and consequences of its failure

North Korea’s growing nuclear arsenal is stressing extended deterrence in South Korea and Japan, though proximity and a different attitude toward nuclear weapons means that these concerns are more dire in Seoul than they are in Tokyo.

In the years since North Korea’s test of an ICBM capable of striking the US homeland, South Korea’s leaders and public are demonstrating an increased skepticism of US extended deterrence and interest in developing indigenous ROK nuclear weapons. In January 2023, ROK President Yoon Suk Yeol publicly mused that Seoul would consider developing its own nuclear weapons or asking for US nuclear forces to be deployed to the Peninsula, should the nuclear threat from Pyongyang continue to escalate.¹²⁹ In June 2024, following a Russian announcement that seemed tantamount to a mutual defense pledge with North Korea, leading South Korean politicians called for the ROK to develop nuclear capabilities, with one leader even going so far as to call for Seoul to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to do so.¹³⁰ Another senior politician from the ruling People Power Party vowed to include the pursuit of nuclear weapons in the party’s political platform.¹³¹ The same month, a South Korean state-run think tank released a report explicitly linking the North Korean ability to hold the US homeland at risk with South Korean doubts in US extended deterrence commitments.¹³² (The more liberal Democratic Party, currently in opposition, is far less sanguine on ROK nuclear capabilities, and some of its representatives condemned statements in favor of South Korean nuclear weapons.)¹³³ Pro-nuclear sentiments are not limited to political leadership. According to a Chicago Council on Global Affairs opinion poll in February 2022, a remarkable 71 percent of South Koreans supported an indigenous nuclear weapons program, and a majority supported the deployment of US nuclear weapons.¹³⁴

In response to the worsening security environment and risks to the assurance of Seoul, President Joe Biden and President Yoon held an April 2023 summit and issued the Washington Declaration, spelling out several steps to strengthen extended deterrence. These included the routine visit of US strategic assets to the ROK (including existing strategic bomber overflights and renewed ballistic missile submarine port visits), the standup of a US-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), enhanced ROK conventional support to US nuclear operations, increased scenario-based exercises for nuclear contingencies, etc. The ROK, for its part, reaffirmed its commitments under the NPT to not acquire nuclear weapons.¹³⁵”¹³⁶ The NCG held its third meeting in June 2024.¹³⁷ ROK Prime Minister Han Duck-soo reaffirmed that the additional measures implemented following the Washington Declaration were sufficient for Seoul’s assurance “for now” without developing or hosting nuclear capabilities.¹³⁸

Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and US President Donald Trump holding a joint press conference in February 2017. Source: Prime Minister’s Office of Japan

Japan is also taking steps to enhance its deterrence capabilities and the extended deterrence relationship with the United States, even though Tokyo mutes its concerns about US vulnerability to North Korean missile attack more than Seoul. Japanese politicians have floated the need for an indigenous Japanese nuclear program since the Cold War, and events like North Korea’s nuclear weapons tests and missile tests often provoke similar reactions.¹³⁹ Then-Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe pointed out in 2016 after a North Korean missile test the challenge that system poses to the United States.¹⁴⁰ In response to a December 2023 test of the Hwasong-18, Japan’s Parliamentary Vice Minister of Defense Shingo Miyake made a point of noting that the missile could range the continental United States.¹⁴¹ That senior Japanese officials call attention to the ability of North Korea to hold the US homeland at risk demonstrates the impact that US homeland vulnerability has on assurance to allies.

To address these concerns, Japan is enhancing its conventional forces and deepening its extended deterrence relationship with the United States; calls for nuclear sharing or nuclear modernization are also present but lack the public support evident across the Korea Strait. Japan has increased its conventional military capabilities, revising its constitution to allow for a greater range of military operations, raising its defense budget to 2 percent of gross domestic product, and developing so-called “counterstrike” capabilities for long-range conventional precision strikes.¹⁴² Notably, a justification for these capabilities is to complement a missile defeat approach for North Korean nuclear weapons.¹⁴³ While not explicitly conducted in a nuclear context, the Japanese military has conducted joint exercises with US nuclear-capable bombers.¹⁴⁴ Since 2010, the United States and Japan have conducted the Extended Deterrence Dialogue. The latest edition, held in June 2024, covered measures to enhance extended deterrence, exchange views on strategic threats in the Indo-Pacific region, and improve coordination on missile defense. Japanese officials also participated in a tabletop exercise and viewed US ICBM facilities.¹⁴⁵ The United States, Japan, and the ROK are also deepening trilateral cooperation on several fronts, including a facility to exchange real-time missile tracking and missile warning information on North Korean missile launches.¹⁴⁶

While Japanese political and national security leadership has raised consideration of nuclear sharing, public support has not materialized for this idea. Japan, of course, is the only nation to suffer atomic bombings in wartime and has made countering nuclear dangers a centerpiece of its foreign policy. US nuclear weapons were withdrawn from the Japanese island of Okinawa after it reverted to Japanese control in 1972.¹⁴⁷ For decades, Japan has benefitted from a robust civilian nuclear power program, including a domestic nuclear fuel cycle, giving Japan so-called “nuclear latency,” or the ability to develop nuclear weapons quickly in exigent circumstances.¹⁴⁸ Following the Russian re-invasion of Ukraine in 2022, then-former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called for a national debate in Japan on adopting a NATO-like nuclear-sharing arrangement, a position endorsed by some influential Japanese leaders.¹⁴⁹ Unlike in the ROK, however, Japanese public opinion is not firmly in favor of moving in this direction. While polling after Abe’s statement indicated an openness to have such a debate, the government of current Prime Minister Fumio Kishida (incidentally a representative from Hiroshima) has disavowed the pursuit of nuclear sharing.¹⁵⁰

Instead of nuclear sharing, the Japanese strategic community remains more focused on US theater nuclear forces that do not require basing on Japanese territory. Japanese officials registered objections to the Obama administration’s retirement of the nuclear-armed Tomahawk land-attack missile (TLAM/N). Moreover, consultation with Japanese government officials helped inform the Trump administration’s decision to call for the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N). While the development of this weapon would be a welcome contribution to US strategic posture in the region, its deployment will not take place until 2034, and it may not address all of Tokyo’s assurance concerns.¹⁵¹

A possible future decision by either the ROK or (less likely) Japan to seek indigenous nuclear weapons would have deleterious effects on US grand strategic and foreign policy goals. In general, the United States has sought since the dawn of the atomic era to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, even to allies. Doing so reduces the dangers that nuclear weapons might fall into the wrong hands and helps maintain US international standing by demonstrating leadership in nuclear risk reduction. Denying nuclear weapons to (most of) its allies has also increased these states’ reliance on Washington and discouraged them from turning to more independent foreign policies that would be less aligned with US national interests. Specifically, for the ROK or Japan, a decision to seek indigenous nuclear weapons would bring significant international opprobrium to Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington; could lead to economic sanctions against these allies; and could make continuing US support for the alliances politically toxic.

Cost and desirability of other measures that would be necessary to reassure South Korea and Japan without robust HBMD

While the United States has in the past successfully assured allies and prevented proliferation without the benefit of comprehensive missile defense, doing so for Seoul or Tokyo might require additional US forces in the region and a change to the tailored deterrence approach to the DPRK, which may be less politically desirable than maintaining a robust HBMD.

North Korea is the only state against which the United States has ever fielded a comprehensive HBMD system. Yet Washington has successfully prevented nuclear proliferation (with the notable exceptions of France and Israel) and assured allies in Europe and Asia against the nuclear threats from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics/Russia and China for decades. Critics of missile defense might ask: Why could this approach not work for South Korea and Japan today?

The critics have a point; the United States could likely assure the ROK and Japan without HBMD. But it would come at a cost. The United States backs its extended deterrence pledge to NATO through nuclear sharing and forward-deployed US nuclear weapons in Europe. The United States has had no such forces in East Asia since 1991. To head off an ROK or (less likely) Japanese indigenous nuclear program, the United States may need to develop limited nuclear options tailored to the Indo-Pacific region, such as the SLCM-N, or deploy US nuclear weapons to South Korean or Japanese territory, possibly under a nuclear-sharing arrangement. In the absence of effective HBMD, the push for nuclear sharing could accelerate, which may be desirable, but would not be without costs.

A Tomahawk guided missile flight test launch from the destroyer USS Dewey (DDG 105) in the Western Pacific Ocean, August 17, 2018. Source: Devin Langer/US Navy.

The other cost to relatively degraded HBMD might be the US pledge to end the Kim regime in the event of any nuclear use. The United States does not make such a pledge for any other nuclear-armed state. Promising to destroy the Kim regime in the event of any nuclear weapons use is credible only so long as the United States and its allies can execute a disarming strike combined with missile defenses to mop up remaining warheads. If HBMD does not keep pace (barring a great improvement in attack operations) and the United States moves to a deterrence-by-punishment approach, then Washington might need to abandon the regime-elimination plan. Instead, in the event of North Korean limited nuclear weapons use, US planners may need to develop a plan for controlled and graduated use of nuclear and nonnuclear strategic weapons to restore deterrence under the best possible political terms—which is today’s strategy toward Russia and China. While many in Washington are already skeptical of this approach, Seoul has been a strong proponent of this remaining US policy. Changing the policy could have costs to assurance.

Another alternative to assure South Korea or Japan without sufficient missile defense could require further investment in the other half of comprehensive missile defeat—left-of-launch operations. While attack operations should receive investment, they face the “inevitable political constraints” that mobile missiles would likely disperse as a crisis unfolds, and an overreliance on attack operations compounds pressures for a disarming strike early in a crisis.¹⁵²

What are the implications for “staying ahead” of North Korea for relations with Russian and China?

The United States can stay ahead of the North Korean nuclear missile threat without undermining a Russian or Chinese assured second-strike capability due to the size of those states’ arsenals and the diversity of their nuclear delivery vehicles. An HBMD system scoped solely to the current (or even projected) threat from North Korea would provide only very modest protection from limited missile strikes from Russia and China (as the next section discusses) or a combined disarming strike from both powers (as Section Seven reviews). While Russia and China are both likely to use US HBMD as a propaganda tool to argue that the United States is harming strategic stability globally and spurring an arms race, there are good reasons to believe these claims are disingenuous.

US HBMD and deterrence with Russia and China

US HBMD scoped to “stay ahead” of North Korea will not undermine deterrence with Russia and China, despite critics’ arguments to the contrary.

In the abstract, critics’ arguments are compelling—a missile defense system capable of defeating all the missiles from a first strike from State A, a smaller nuclear power, might also be capable of defeating a ragged retaliation from State B, a larger nuclear power, after State B endured a first strike on its nuclear forces. For instance, Moulton, as the top Democrat on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, stated: “If we continue to expand our current arsenal of interceptors, we must ask not just how North Korea will respond, but how Russia and the CCP will respond as they see a pathway for our missile shield to impact their deterrent as well … at what point will this arms race provoke a response from Russia and the CCP?”¹⁵³

This straightforward, abstract interpretation falls apart when mapped onto Russia, China, and North Korea. Simply put, Russia and China would quantitatively and qualitatively overwhelm existing and planned HBMD scoped to the North Korean threat. Russian and Chinese forces could also directly attack US HBMD scoped to North Korea.

Russia and China both possess a robust second-strike capability that could quantitatively overwhelm US HBMD scoped to the current or anticipated North Korean threat. A single Russian Borei-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) can carry ninety-six nuclear warheads, which would be sufficient to overwhelm US defenses scoped to the current North Korean threat.¹⁵⁴ The probability that the United States would conduct a nuclear first strike on Russia or that such an attack would reduce Russian nuclear holdings below a few hundred surviving warheads strains credulity. China’s current nuclear arsenal is somewhat more vulnerable but is sufficiently survivable that a US first strike would be very unlikely to reduce the residual force to a level that US missile defenses could cope with. For instance, the PLA Rocket Force has MIRVed its DF-41 ICBMs, according to open-source reports, and China has an extensive network of tunnels in which these road-mobile missiles could hide. Combined, these attributes would make the DF-41 extremely challenging to target and disable.¹⁵⁵

Even if “staying ahead” of the North Korean threat required a sophisticated missile defense force of several hundred interceptors, Russia and China could still qualitatively overwhelm this defense even after absorbing a US first strike. The United States does not have a comprehensive air or cruise missile defense of the homeland, so Russia would be able to strike the contiguous United States with gravity bombs from strategic bombers or air- and submarine-launched nuclear-armed cruise missiles. If alerted, a significant fraction of Russia’s strategic aviation is survivable, and many of its nuclear-cruise-missile-armed attack submarines would likely escape destruction as well. Moreover, HBMD against North Korea concentrates on a specific geographic architecture, whereas Russia is capable of launching SLBMs from essentially any angle it chooses, including depressed trajectory launches close to US shores. Russia’s Avangard nuclear-armed HGV would circumvent defenses meant to target North Korean RVs in midcourse. And finally, Russia’s so-called “exotic” nuclear weapons—its nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise missile and nuclear-armed torpedo drone—are far beyond the scope of any plausible HBMD against North Korea. (To be clear, this study suggests that the United States ameliorates these vulnerabilities but only to a degree sufficient to address limited attacks.)

China is more of an edge case. China’s nuclear triad is more nascent than Russia’s, lacking an appreciable intercontinental air-delivered capability. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s SSBN capability is more limited than Russia’s and is more vulnerable to US and allied anti-submarine warfare (ASW). China is, however, actively developing likely nuclear-capable HGV weapons that would defeat defenses for classic ballistic missiles. One could imagine Beijing’s alarm if confronted by rapid expansions of the US ballistic missile defense arsenal scoped to North Korea but slated to arrive before Chinese nuclear modernization results in a more reliable triad. However, this requires heroic assumptions about the pace of possible US missile defense expansion and delays in China’s nuclear modernization. Even then, China’s most logical reaction would be to do what it is already doing without such a motivator—grow the quantity and quality of its nuclear arsenal.

Finally, Russia and China need not fear for their nuclear deterrents because each state could disable a US HBMD scoped to North Korea through direct attack. The current and planned US HBMD relies on a fragile network of sensors that would be almost trivial for Russia to degrade or destroy. Russia, for instance, could use nuclear or even conventional cruise missiles to destroy large, fixed radar sites like Cobra Dane in the Aleutian Islands of Alaska or the slow-moving Sea-Based X-band (SBX) radar that typically operates in the Pacific.

The Sea-Based X-Band Radar docked at Ford Island, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, July 14, 2010. Source: Robert Stirrup/US Navy.

Again, China presents more of an edge case. It seems unlikely that China would project significant long-range aviation or naval power into the Eastern Pacific in the timeframe of this study. China’s non-ballistic attack methods against the US HBMD include HGVs, cyberattacks, counterspace attacks on missile warning / missile tracking, and possibly special forces.

In sum, the projected evolution in North Korea’s strategic forces makes it possible to stay ahead of the DPRK threat without undermining Russian and Chinese second-strike capabilities, which would quantitatively or qualitatively overwhelm HBMD scoped to the North Korean threat or simply destroy it.

Applicability of HBMD scopes to North Korea to Russian and Chinese limited strikes on the US homeland

This paper argues at length that the United States should develop homeland missile defenses capable of defeating limited, coercive strikes from Russia and China across various attack modes (see the next section for the full argument). HBMD scoped to North Korea would provide a start for limited defenses.

Against Russia, this system would provide only minimal protection for limited ballistic strikes, though Russia may be less likely to reach for ballistic missiles for this purpose. The supporting sensors and command and control would have some utility for broader defenses.

Against China, HBMD scoped to North Korea would be more robust, especially in the short term. Apart from its HGV capabilities, China relies on ballistic missiles for intercontinental strikes. For nuclear strikes, the PRC would likely employ MIRVs and sophisticated decoys, capabilities which HBMD scoped to North Korea may or may not be capable of addressing. The PLA is also reportedly considering ICBMs for long-range conventional strikes.

Applicability of HBMD scoped to North Korea to Russian and/or Chinese disarming strikes on the US nuclear triad

This paper contends that the advent of the two-nuclear-peer problem means that the United States needs to enhance the survivability of its nuclear forces, and that homeland missile defenses are one way to do so. HBMD scoped to the North Korea threat would have some limited applicability to the nuclear triad protection problem set. Qualitatively, a disarming strike on the US triad consists of non-silo elements of the triad and the missile silo problem set.

The non-silo elements of the US nuclear force include submarine pens, strategic bomber bases and backup sites, and NC3 nodes. The dynamics of this target set are similar to those of the limited coercive strike target set. Russia could attack these sites using capabilities not susceptible to ballistic missile interceptors designed to a North Korea threat standard. China, by contrast, might need to depend on ballistic missiles to achieve those effects, especially in the short term.

The missile silo element of the US nuclear triad would be a more stressful attack for either state, and both would almost certainly need to rely on their ballistic missile forces to do so. China certainly lacks the non-ballistic missile capabilities for a counter-silo attack. Russia would likely need to employ ICBMs as well. According to one open-source estimate:

The Russian Navy operates 12 nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) of two classes: five Delta IV SSBNs (Project 667BRDM Delfin) and seven Borei SSBNs (Project 955/A), four of which are improved Borei-A (Project 955A) submarines. The seventh Borei-A SSBN is the Imperator Alexandr III (also known as Emperor Alexander III), which was commissioned in December 2023 … Each submarine can carry 16 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and each SLBM can carry several MIRVs, for a combined maximum loading of approximately 992 warheads on 12 submarines. … However, not all these submarines are fully operational, and the warhead loading on some of the missiles may have been reduced for Russia to stay below the New [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] START treaty limit on deployed warheads. One or two SSBNs are normally undergoing maintenance, repair, or reactor refueling at any given time and are not armed. As a result, the total number of warheads carried by Russia’s SSBN forces is possibly around 640.¹⁵⁶

The United States has 450 missile silos, and nongovernmental analysts typically assume that states target two high-accuracy warheads against hardened silos for an acceptable probability of kill.¹⁵⁷ So, while it is possible that Russia could attack US silos using only SLBMs from trajectories not covered by a counter-DPRK HBMD and other non-ballistic weapons, that would be an unlikely scenario. Moscow would likely prefer to preserve its most survivable nuclear forces to attempt to deter US retaliation and would want to cross-target US silos from a variety of platforms to reduce technical risk.

At least some Russian weapons attacking US silos would therefore likely be ICBMs traveling on a trajectory susceptible to US HBMD scoped to North Korea. Even in this case, however, these missiles are likely to have MIRVs and decoys that may be more sophisticated than a counter-DPRK system is equipped to handle. Meanwhile, Russia still possesses the capability to destroy US HBMD before conducting an attack with classic ballistic missiles.¹⁵⁸

In sum, an HBMD system scoped solely to the North Korean threat is likely to have little to no utility for Russian counterforce attacks on the US homeland, since Russia has a full range of non-ballistic missiles and could easily dismantle US defenses. In the short term, while China continues to develop a more robust nuclear triad and a conventional military capable of long-range strategic bombing and blue-water naval operations across the Pacific, HBMD scoped to North Korea may have limited utility against Chinese strikes, depending on its ability to counter more sophisticated Chinese MIRVs and decoys and its resilience to Chinese non-kinetic attacks.

Applicability of defenses HBMD scoped to North Korea for accidental or unauthorized launches

HBMD scoped to North Korea would make a modest contribution to countering accidental or unauthorized ballistic missile launches from any source. The National Missile Defense Act of 1999 explicitly included accidental and unauthorized launches as part of US ballistic missile defense policy. The key characteristics of an accidental or unauthorized attack are the limited scope of the missile raid and the lack of supporting military action.

The most stressing unauthorized scenario is a rogue Russian SSBN commander firing his entire payload at the United States—perhaps sixteen SLBMs MIRVed to six warheads each, plus decoys and countermeasures.¹⁵⁹ As stated above, an SSBN attack from near US shores or a southerly trajectory would likely evade HBMD scoped to North Korea. Depending on the effectiveness of NGI at intercepting multiple RVs, of improved US sensors in discriminating warheads from decoys in midcourse, and of SM-3 bk IIA missiles in a layered defense, intercepting ninety-six Russian warheads with an HBMD system scoped to North Korea might be possible, but it would be a stretch.

A SM-3 Block IIA missile is launched from the Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer USS McCampbell (DDG 85) off the coast of the Pacific Missile Range Facility, Hawaii, February 8, 2024. Source: Nancy Jones-Bonbrest/Missile Defense Agency.

Of course, one could imagine accidental or unauthorized launches of smaller scales. Depending on their trajectory and the sophistication of their decoys, they might also be susceptible to HBMD.

Accidental or unauthorized launches would be much less likely to be accompanied by attacks that Russia or China would otherwise be capable of conducting to degrade or disable US HBMD systems.

Current and projected Islamic Republic of Iran missile and nuclear threats to the United States

Current US missile defense policy also extends to a possible future nuclear-armed Iran. Iran poses a very limited but growing long-range missile threat to the US homeland, and Tehran continues to inch closer to a nuclear breakout. The existing GMD system could cope with a possible future nuclear-armed ICBM threat from Iran but may require a changed footprint to address the different geographic origin of the threat.

Current and projected Iranian missile threat

The United States assesses that Iran possesses the largest and most diverse missile arsenal in the Middle East.¹⁶⁰ Iran’s arsenal includes a “substantial inventory of close-range ballistic missiles (CRBMs), short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs),” as well as a growing land-attack cruise missile (LACMs) and anti-ship cruise missile (ASCMs) force, many of which are “inherently capable of carrying nuclear payloads.”¹⁶¹ While Iran retains a large missile arsenal, its self-imposed missile range limit of 2,000 kilometers falls well short of the range required to threaten the US homeland.¹⁶² However, Iran could abandon this self-imposed restriction at any moment, and, in the meantime, Iran’s missile capabilities continue to develop and pose an increasing risk to the United States.¹⁶³

Iran’s capability gap is also closing due to its increasingly successful space program, specifically its SLVs. Iran has emphasized developing solid-propellant rockets, which “have greater military utility and likely are being used to develop an alternative ICBM pathway by the Iranian security establishment.”¹⁶⁴ Iran claims that its interest in space is “peaceful,” but the growing interest of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in space capabilities and the inherent “dual civilian-military use of many space technologies” ring alarm bells.¹⁶⁵ The 2023 US Intelligence Community’s Annual Threat Assessment (ATA) confirmed that Iran’s pursuit of SLVs “shortens the timeline to an [ICBM] because SLVs and ICBMs use similar technologies.”¹⁶⁶ The Strategic Posture Commission report of 2023 concluded that Iran “could field advanced longer-range missile systems in the 2027–2035 timeframe.”¹⁶⁷

India is a historical example, for which the missile program initially began as a space launch program, highlighting that “nations driven by status and security considerations have used solid-propellant SLVs and space programs more generally to develop ICBMs.”¹⁶⁸ Following Supreme Leader Khomeini’s range restriction, the former head of Iran’s missile force, Hassan Tehrani-Moghadam, chose to work on SLVs and solid propellants to “keep this path [long-range missile capabilities] moving forward.”¹⁶⁹ Iran’s pursuit of these advanced systems is inseparable from its ideological objectives, “framing scientific accomplishment, particularly while under sanctions, as the fruits of its defiance against perceived Western attempts to impede Iranian power.”¹⁷⁰

In 2020, Iran successfully launched its first dual-purpose Noor satellite using the Qased SLV.¹⁷¹ In January 2024, following numerous failures, Iran successfully launched three satellites into orbit using the Simorgh SLV.¹⁷² The ATA specifically cites the Simorgh as a possible dual-use rocket, and experts claim that “the Simorgh SLV can provide Tehran with a pathway to at least an IRBM capability if reconfigured.“¹⁷³ Days prior, the IRGC launched its own Soraya satellite using an all-solid propellant.¹⁷⁴ These successful launches, as well as evidence presented by imagery analysts showing Iran has “conducted plausible [long-range] LR/ICBM liquid-propellant missile motor tests,” highlight Iran’s burgeoning capabilities.¹⁷⁵ Furthermore, with persistent reports of Iranian-North Korean missile cooperation and increasing ties with Russia, Iranian capabilities may continue to advance.¹⁷⁶ This cooperation has garnered concerning results, with the upper stage of North Korea’s Hwasong-14 ICBM being derived from the Iranian Safir SLV.¹⁷⁷

In sum, Iran currently lacks the missile capabilities that could credibly threaten the US homeland, but this could soon change, as the worsening security environment in the Middle East pushes Iran to pursue longer-range missile capabilities more actively. Iran seeks to overturn Middle Eastern power structures and solidify its role as a regional hegemon. However, to compensate for the relative weakness of its air force, Iran uses ballistic missiles to threaten and attack adversaries in the region.¹⁷⁸ Iran’s pursuit of a strategic counter against the United States could further drive Iran to develop an ICBM, and this would compel the United States to reassess the threat posed by Iran.¹⁷⁹

Islamic Republic of Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon

Iran’s continued pursuit of advanced missile capabilities ties intrinsically to its pursuit of a nuclear warhead.¹⁸⁰ The Strategic Posture Commission concluded that Iran “will maintain a nuclear program as part of its strategic goals …” which includes the “capability to build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons.”¹⁸¹ With two major wars diverging much of the global attention away from Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon, as well as increasing retaliatory strikes by the United States and Israel against Iranian proxies and even in Iranian territory, the regime “may have heightened motivations to pursue a nuclear weapon.”¹⁸²

The Iranian regime has taken steps to pursue all three requirements of a nuclear weapons program: fissile material, weaponization, and launch vehicles.¹⁸³ Since the withdrawal of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and Iran’s removal of all International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) surveillance and monitoring equipment and personnel, the transparency of their program has been further reduced.¹⁸⁴ Iran has made significant progress on its ability to produce weapons-grade uranium, making it “difficult if not impossible, to restore the one-year breakout timeline” associated with the JCPOA.¹⁸⁵ Additionally, Iran has produced uranium metal, which can be used for the core of a nuclear device.¹⁸⁶ Collectively, “historical efforts to conceal nuclear activities under civilian guises, along with contributions from various international sources, have facilitated Iran’s progress in nuclear technology.”¹⁸⁷ Ali Akbar Salehi, the former head of Iran’s Atomic Organization, has stated that “Iran possesses all the necessary components to construct a nuclear bomb.”¹⁸⁸

Applicability of defenses scoped to North Korea to the Iranian threat

Historically, US missile defense policy has focused on the threats posed by “unpredictable regional actors, i.e., ‘rogue’ powers.”¹⁸⁹ While North Korea has been the focus of this, with the entirety of US GBI systems located on the West Coast, the Strategic Posture Commission confirms that homeland missile defense systems need to deter, and, if necessary, defeat possible future long-range missile attacks from Iran.¹⁹⁰ Due to the relatively rudimentary nature of Iranian missiles, similar to those of North Korea, the United States should model its defense scope from North Korea to Iran.

The proposed FY 2025 NDAA, which has passed through the House, calls for completing, by the end of 2030, “an additional continental United States interceptor site, located at … Fort Drum,” to protect the homeland against “potential long-range ballistic missile originating from Iran or North Korea.”¹⁹¹ During a House Armed Services Committee hearing in 2023, Rep. Elise Stefanik (R-NY-21) questioned Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on a so-called “third site.” Milley confirmed that a third site would be strategically worthwhile and stated that developing a missile defense system on the East Coast “would further enhance the protection of the United States.”¹⁹²

The debate around a third site located at Fort Drum is not new, with a 2012 National Research Council study explaining that “an additional GBI site located in northeastern [continental United States] CONUS would be much more effective and reliable and would allow considerably more battle space and firing doctrine options.”¹⁹³ Furthermore, Gen. Charles Jacoby (Ret.), in 2014 as then-commander of USNORTHCOM and NORAD, stated, “[a third site] would give us increased inventory and increased battlespace with regards to a threat coming from the direction of the Middle East.”¹⁹⁴ As Iran continues to proliferate toward long-range ICBMs, the development of a third site located on the East Coast will be needed to address the full scope of the North Korean and Iranian missile threat to the homeland.

An “Eman” intermediate-range ballistic missile. Iran’s first precision-guided IRBM. Source: Mohammad Agah

Section five: Deterring Chinese and Russian limited coercive missile threats

Introduction

Russia and China may be considering limited, coercive strikes, both nuclear and conventional, on the US homeland in the event of war to degrade US national will, disrupt force flow, and terminate a conflict on terms acceptable to them. A combination of US government statements, Russian and Chinese military capabilities, and certain elements of both states’ military doctrines strongly suggests that these strikes are well within the realm of possibility. Russia and China possess a range of means to carry out such strikes, including aircraft, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles, and more. One way to understand these developments is to conceive of these states as expanding the anti-access, area-denial networks they already have in Europe and East Asia, respectively, to North America.

It is not necessary to develop a leak-proof, population-level defense of the entire US homeland to negate the advantages that Moscow and Beijing might seek from such attacks. Rather, limited and preferential defenses for some key sites could ameliorate this vulnerability.

Therefore, the United States should re-scope its homeland missile defense policy not only to include rogue, accidental, or unauthorized launches, but also to explicitly encompass limited strikes from Russia and China. The purpose of such defenses is to deny a “cheap shot” to either Russia or China and protect certain critical sites in the US homeland. Both states possess sufficient forces that, should they commit enough weapons, either state could destroy any particular target they choose. But limited, preferential defenses will increase the size of the force package that Russia or China would require to do so. At that point, Russian or Chinese defense planners might lose confidence that the United States would still perceive the attack as “limited” and refrain from massive retaliation. The United States should not count on Russia or China to exercise restraint in attacking the US homeland. While deterrence by punishment and deterrence by resilience have roles to play in addressing these threats, by themselves these approaches are not sufficient; missile defenses must play a role.

This section examines the role limited, coercive strikes may play in Russia’s and China’s defense strategies, the logic for those states to conduct such attacks on the US homeland, and the present and developmental capabilities that they have to do so. It then argues that deterrence by denial is an important part of addressing such attacks.

Limited and coercive threats in Russia’s theory of victory

Limited and coercive strikes, both conventional and nuclear, play a significant role in Russia’s overall military and defense strategies, and those strikes may well include attacks on the US homeland. Russia has an especially diverse range of capabilities to conduct these strikes, including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles, and crewed aircraft, among other capabilities.

Limited and coercive strikes in Russian military strategy

Russia’s military strategy likely includes limited and coercive strikes of both a conventional and nuclear nature. Russia’s formal nuclear doctrine lays out a range of circumstances in which Russia would consider using nuclear weapons, including warning of ballistic missile attack on Russia or its allies, nuclear or WMD use against Russia or its allies, attacks on Russian leadership or nuclear command and control nodes, and conventional aggression against Russia in which “the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.”¹⁹⁵ However, statements by Russian officials and Russian military capabilities suggests that the bar for Russian nuclear use may be lower than this formal doctrine implies. Around Russia’s full invasion of Ukraine since February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin has routinely raised the role of Russian nuclear weapons in deterring further Western support of Ukraine, though usually couched within Russia’s stated nuclear weapons policy.¹⁹⁶ Western analysts and US defense officials grew concerned, in the summer and fall of 2022, that Russia might use battlefield nuclear weapons in Ukraine, perhaps to stave off the collapse of the Russian front in Ukraine; Washington, London, and Paris reportedly threatened conventional retaliation against Russian forces in that eventuality.¹⁹⁷

US officials have also voiced concerns that Russia might have a so-called “escalate-to-deescalate” or “escalate-to-win” doctrine. This concern, spelled out in the 2018 NPR and elaborated on by Western analysts, posits that, in the event of a high-end war with NATO, Russia might engage in limited nuclear use, either early in a conflict to degrade NATO Allies’ will to fight and split the alliance, or deep into a conflict to prevent a Russian conventional loss that could destabilize Putin’s regime.¹⁹⁸ While the impact of the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine for Russia’s future defense and national security strategy remains contested, some US policymakers worry that Russia’s threshold for nuclear weapons use may fall further.¹⁹⁹ Other experts conclude that Russia’s perception of the success of its nuclear deterrent in its invasion of Ukraine may spur it to develop additional types of nuclear weapons.²⁰⁰

While the potential for Russian limited use of nuclear weapons is uncertain and remains contested, Russian strategy for conventional air and missile strikes on key military and critical infrastructure nodes is well established. NATO staff officer Dave Johnson has convincingly argued that Russia will conduct “strategic operations for the destruction of critically important targets (SODCIT)” through a “newly diversified strategic toolkit, which includes multiple new non-nuclear tools.”²⁰¹ Russian planners understand SODCIT to include “the massive use of precision weapons of various basing means” and “the destruction of facilities in the rear area, of the economy and communications in the entire territory of the warring parties.“²⁰² The purpose of these massed aerospace strikes is to alter the political-military ability and willingness of the adversary to continue military operations.

To emphasize further, Russian experts see the future of warfare as characterized by “degradation of military-economic potential through quick destruction of critically important military and civilian infrastructure objectives” and “simultaneous action on enemy forces at all depths of the area of operations. …”²⁰³ According to another analyst of Russian military affairs, “Russian strategic operations envision conventional strikes, single or grouped, against critical economic, military, or political objects. These may be followed by nuclear demonstration, limited nuclear strikes, and theatre nuclear warfare.“²⁰⁴ In the view of one analyst, Russian writings express a phasing of escalation against the adversary’s homeland, starting with conventional strikes on military capabilities, expanding to conventional strikes on state-supporting civilian infrastructure, and finally reaching nonstrategic and then strategic nuclear weapons use.²⁰⁵ Russian military leaders, observing the success of their long-range strike campaign in Syria, may have concluded that “deep operations” will take on increasing importance.²⁰⁶ Russian military doctrine clearly calls for non-nuclear precision strikes on opponent’s rear-area civilian and military targets.²⁰⁷ In sum, these strikes serve the purpose of denying an adversary’s military response but also directly attacking the civilian population’s will to endure through the conflict.

Importantly, Russian strategic thinking prioritizes advantage gains in the initial phase of war through such asymmetric means as the “use of weapons from unanticipated locations” and “disorganizing state government control by … targeting power plants in vastly populated areas, for example.”²⁰⁸ Russia has implemented this strategy during its re-invasion of Ukraine, carrying out devastating attacks on power-generation infrastructure, among other target sets.²⁰⁹(Russian strikes in the initial phase of war had uneven success in Ukraine, as demonstrated by the cobbled-together nature of the invading forces, failure of basic combined-arms maneuver, and ultimately, these forces’ retreat from Kyiv and the Kharkiv region in 2022.²¹⁰)

Russia could also choose to escalate against the US homeland using chemical, biological, or radiological weapons.²¹¹ Notably, Russia has engaged in attacks and quasi-nuclear brinkmanship around Ukraine’s nuclear power plants. Russian officials have threatened European nuclear power stations as well.²¹² Russian long-range conventional strikes on US nuclear power plants to generate radiological effects might be a form of intermediate escalation between conventional and nuclear weapons use against the US homeland.

US government concerns about Russian strikes on US homeland

In addition to Russian doctrines indicating an interest in coercive strikes on infrastructure in the US homeland, high-level US military and defense leaders and documents have stated time and again that the US homeland may well come under attack from Russia in the event of a war. The 2018 NDS noted that it “is now undeniable that the homeland is no longer a sanctuary,” and that, in the event of war, “attacks against our critical defense, government, and economic infrastructure must be anticipated.”²¹³ The 2022 NDS expands on that initial finding by observing that the United States faces “competitor doctrines that pose new threats to the U.S. homeland. …”²¹⁴ More specifically, US adversaries are “posing all-domain threats to the U.S. homeland in an effort to jeopardize the U.S. military’s ability to project power and counter regional aggression.”²¹⁵ The 2022 NDS goes on to assert that the “PRC or Russia could use a wide array of tools in an attempt to hinder U.S. military preparation and response in a conflict, including actions aimed at undermining the will of the U.S. public, and to target our critical infrastructure and other systems.”²¹⁶ At the highest level of US strategy, Russian threats to the US homeland are a driving concern.

For USNORTHCOM, tasked with the defense of the continental United States, Russian coercive, limited strikes are a clear threat. Guillot, in his responses to policy questions ahead of the SASC hearing on his nomination to command USNORTHCOM and NORAD, argued that “the next commander must also deter and stand ready to defend the United States against Russian … pursuit of advanced long-range conventional and nuclear missile technologies.”²¹⁷ Guillot later testified before SASC that “[Russia and China] have sought to hold defense critical infrastructure in the United States at risk with kinetic and non-kinetic systems intended to impede our ability to flow forces overseas.”²¹⁸ (Offering his best military advice, but not making an official statement of policy, Guillot recommended that the United States consider adjusting national missile defense policy to address Russian and Chinese limited strikes.)²¹⁹ Russia’s kinetic threat to the US homeland is a major concern to the US military.

A mockup of the Russian “Kalibr” cruise missile. Source: Allocer

Finally, the latest Strategic Posture Commission, a bipartisan, congressionally chartered commission which released its final report in late 2023, perhaps summarized these concerns most clearly, warning “[limited coercive] attacks are potentially designed to dissuade and deter the United States from defending or supporting its Allies and partners in a regional conflict; keep the United States from participating in any confrontation; and divide U.S. alliances. To defend against a coercive attack from China or Russia, while staying ahead of the North Korean threat, the United States will require additional [IAMD] capabilities beyond the current [program of record].²²⁰ In sum, US government sources consistently evince concern about Russian coercive strikes on the US homeland in wartime.

Russian capabilities for limited strikes on the US homeland

Russia’s strategy to strike the US homeland and US defense leaders’ concern about Russia doing so find validation in Russia’s robust range of military capabilities to conduct limited coercive strikes on the US homeland. Russia’s strategic nuclear triad is of course capable of conducting large-scale or limited nuclear attacks on the US homeland from silo-based and mobile ICBMs, SLBMs, and SLCMs launched from different directions or close to US shore, and strategic bombers capable of delivering gravity bombs or releasing ALCMs. Qualitative enhancements to Russia’s strategic forces, as numerically limiting strategic arms treaties came into effect in the 1990s and 2000s, were a notable priority of Putin’s.²²¹ Russia has modernized its ICBM arsenal in recent years, gradually phasing out the SS-18 Satan, SS-19 Stiletto, and SS-25 Satan in favor of more modern silo-based and road-mobile ICBMs.²²² Russia also fielded the Borei-class SSBNs with new SS-N-32 Bulava SLBMs, replacing older SSBN models.²²³ In addition to enhanced delivery vehicles, Russia has also deployed improved warheads and RVs capable of maneuvering.²²⁴

In addition to its traditional nuclear triad, Russia can employ its Avangard HGV with intercontinental range. The Avangard is one of the six so-called “exotic” systems announced by Putin in a 2018 address.²²⁵ Russian state media has reported that the Avangard is deployed to the SS-19 Stiletto and SS-X-29 Sarmat ICBMs.²²⁶

For more limited coercive strikes, Russia could also rely on its cruise missile arsenal and hypersonic missile capabilities. Indeed, the 2022 NDS identifies Russia’s “long-range cruise missile threats” as one of the “serious, continuing risks” that allow Russia to remain an “acute threat.”²²⁷ The 2022 MDR expands on this assertion, stating that “Russia is developing and fielding a suite of advanced precision-strike missiles that can be launched from multiple air-, sea-, and ground-based platforms, and feature many capabilities designed to defeat missile defenses.”²²⁸ VanHerck, in March 2022 testimony as the then-commander of USNORTHCOM and NORAD, doubled down on that warning, stating that “Russia has fielded a new family of advanced air-, sea-, and ground-based cruise missiles to threaten critical civilian and military infrastructure.”²²⁹ Russia gained experience employing many of these capabilities in its ongoing military operations in Syria.²³⁰

Russian long-range aviation includes the Tu-160 “Blackjack” and Tu-95 “Bear” strategic bombers. Since 2007, Russia has resumed patrols with its bombers, which routinely enter the air defense identification zone of Alaska and operate near the airspaces of US allies as well.²³¹ Both bombers are primarily cruise-missile-launching platforms, capable of launching the Kh-55 and Kh-101/102 (AS-23a/23b) dual-capable supersonic cruise missiles.²³² The range of the AS-23a “enables Russian bombers flying well outside NORAD radar coverage—and in some cases from inside Russian airspace—to threaten targets throughout North America.”²³³ The Tu-22M medium-range bomber (as well as some Russian fighters) can also carry the Kh-47 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM).²³⁴ Russia is in the midst of developing the PAK DA, its next-generation flying-wing stealth bomber reported to be projected to enter service in the late 2020s.²³⁵ Russia is also developing a next-generation long-range cruise missile, the Kh-BD.²³⁶

A Kh-47M2 Kinzhal being carried by a Mikoyan MiG-31K interceptor at the 2018 Moscow Victory Day Parade. Source: Kremlin.ru.

In addition to Russia’s air-based cruise missiles, the Russian Navy can deliver nuclear or conventional cruise missiles from surface or subsurface assets. Russian surface frigates and corvettes, as well as its Kilo-, Akula-, Yasen-, and Borei-class submarines can fire the 3M-14 Kalibr (SS-N-30A) dual-capable cruise missile, with a reported range of 1,500 – 2,500 kilometers.²³⁷ Russian Akula-class attack submarines are also capable of firing the RK-55 Granat (SS-N-21 “Sampson”) intermediate-range cruise missile; while previously nuclear capable, these missiles were converted to conventional only for compliance with START II.²³⁸ In the words of a former USNORTHCOM commander, Russian “Severodvinsk-class guided missile submarines … are designed to deploy undetected within cruise missile range of [US] coastlines to threaten critical infrastructure during an escalating crisis. This challenge will be compounded in the next few years as the Russian Navy adds the Tsirkon HCM to the Severodvinsk’s arsenal.”²³⁹ Russia announced the successfully completion of its Tsirkon testing program in June 2022 and has employed it in strikes on Ukraine in 2024.²⁴⁰

Russia’s ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) arsenal is primarily a threat to US deployed forces, allies, and partners in Europe but has some capability to hold Alaska at threat. The SSC-8/9M729 GLCM (the development of which prompted the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty) has an estimated range of 2,500 kilometers, sufficient to range Alaskan targets from the Russian Far East.²⁴¹

Some US analysts have also noted Russian interest in developing nuclear warheads with sub-kiloton yields.²⁴² Warheads of this yield, if developed and fielded, could perhaps make limited nuclear use against the US homeland more thinkable in the minds of Russian planners by further reducing the collateral damage of such strikes.

In summary, conventional strikes against homeland infrastructure are a core part of Russian military doctrine, and limited nuclear strikes may also play a part in the Kremlin’s military plans. US military and civilian defense leaders have raised the alarm about such attacks from Russia. And the Russian military has a diverse suite of capabilities capable of delivering such attacks.

Some of these capabilities proved to lack actual combat effectiveness in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Observers have noted high failure rates of cruise missiles, poor battle-damage assessment, ineffectiveness against mobile targets, susceptibility to air defenses, and evidence of poor training of Russian aircrews.²⁴³ A Ukrainian defense official stated publicly that Russia had expended more than 80 percent of its long-range land-attack missiles in the first year of the war.²⁴⁴ Western economic sanctions and export restrictions may interfere with Russia’s ability to reconstitute its long-range strike capabilities, although there is evidence that China is assisting Russia in replacing components that it can no longer acquire from Western suppliers.²⁴⁵ This performance should measure, though not dismiss, US concerns about Russian strikes on the US homeland.

Limited and coercive threats in China’s theory of victory

Chinese military strategy and plans also appear to call for limited and coercive strikes on the US homeland. China is certainly capable of conducting these strikes but is, in the short term, limited to ballistic missiles and an emerging hypersonic missile capability to do so.

Limited and coercive strikes in Chinese military strategy generally

Chinese military doctrine is opaquer than Russia’s on the topic of limited and coercive strikes on the US homeland but still evinces a clear role for precision conventional strikes aimed to degrade key infrastructure and target an opponent’s will to fight. Particularly, China’s no-first-use (NFU) declaratory policy for nuclear weapons means that potential Chinese limited nuclear first use would derive from the nature of PRC capabilities, rather than official pronouncements.

In PRC strategy, precision conventional strikes are an important way to achieve a deterrent effect. The PLA’s authoritative Science of Military Strategy (Science), last updated in 2020, notes the decreasing utility of nuclear deterrence under conditions of mutual vulnerability, a phenomenon that Western analysts recognize as the stability-instability paradox. Considering this condition, the Science notes that “the development of high-tech conventional weapons has not only narrowed the gap between combat effectiveness and nuclear weapons, but also has higher accuracy and greater controllability.”²⁴⁶ Through high-precision conventional weapons, the Science postulates, the PLA can achieve strategic effects. (Chinese strategy also recognizes “defensive deterrence” and “offensive deterrence,” a concept closer to coercion or compellence in Western thinking.)²⁴⁷ The Science also speaks of “warning military strikes,” limited, high-precision strikes on military or political targets designed to demonstrate Chinese ability and determination as one of the key “methods of strategic deterrence.”²⁴⁸ The Science further stresses the importance of timing deterrent strikes to impact the resolve of the adversary and impact its will to fight. PLA writings emphasize the nature of modern warfare as a confrontation between systems and call for “kinetic and non-kinetic strikes against key points and nodes” to defeat opposing systems, including adversary willpower.²⁴⁹ Absent from this discussion of precision strikes is the explicit reference to targets in the opponent’s homeland or rear area, evident in Russian writing on the same issues, although there are oblique references to the “deeper level and … wider field” that the PLA can expect to face in People’s War under today’s conditions.²⁵⁰ Limited, high-precision strikes to impact the adversary’s will to fight can therefore be recognized as an essential part of Chinese military strategy.²⁵¹

While nuclear weapons NFU remains official Chinese policy, US officials worry that limited, coercive nuclear first use may become part of Chinese nuclear strategy. The DOD, in the 2023 edition of its authoritative Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, assesses that, despite the NFU policy:

China’s nuclear strategy probably includes consideration of a nuclear strike in response to a nonnuclear attack threatening the viability of China’s nuclear forces or C2, or that approximates the strategic effects of a nuclear strike … Beijing probably would also consider nuclear use to restore deterrence if a conventional military defeat in Taiwan gravely threatened CCP regime survival.²⁵²

The 2022 NPR warns that “the range of nuclear options available to the PRC leadership will expand in the years ahead, allowing it potentially to adopt a broader range of strategies to achieve its objectives, to include nuclear coercion and limited nuclear first use.”²⁵³

When it comes to so-called nuclear “counterstrike” operations following an adversary’s first use, however, the DOD assesses that “military capability, population, and economy” targets are all in-scope.²⁵⁴ The 2023 edition of the authoritative DOD report on China’s military strategy and capabilities makes note of Chinese strategic thinking on the “controlled use” of lower yield nuclear warheads for “warning and deterrence,” a continuation of China’s steady departure from a nuclear posture congruent with minimum deterrence.²⁵⁵ The Military and Security Developments goes on to warn that:

PRC military writings in 2021 noted that the introduction of new precise small-yield nuclear weapons could possibly allow for the controlled use of nuclear weapons. … Such discussions provide the doctrinal basis for limited nuclear employment on the battlefield, suggesting PRC nuclear thinkers could be reconsidering their long-standing review that nuclear war is uncontrollable.²⁵⁶

The DOD goes on to assess that, after initial nuclear use, the PRC anticipates needing to conduct “multiple rounds of counterstrikes” against targets “to achieve conflict de-escalation” and “that the scale and intensity of retaliatory force needs to be carefully controlled.”²⁵⁷ It does not require much of a logical leap to combine an emerging belief that nuclear war is controllable, an appreciation for the less escalatory nature of low-yield nuclear use, and a proclivity for strikes on the US homeland to degrade force flow and national will to assess that China might conduct limited nuclear strikes on the US homeland in the event of a major war. Indeed, US defense scholars have posited a range of circumstances in which China could find it advantageous to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict with the United States.²⁵⁸

US government concerns about Chinese strikes on the US homeland

The quotations noted from the 2022 NDS, the 2023 Strategic Posture Commission, and testimony from military leaders demonstrate a concern for Chinese strikes on the US homeland in the same breath as the Russian threat. To recap, the 2018 NDS warns that “the homeland is no longer a sanctuary.”²⁵⁹ The 2022 NDS further asserts that the “PRC … could use a wide array of tools in an attempt to hinder U.S. military preparation and response in a conflict, including actions aimed at undermining the will of the U.S. public, and to target our critical infrastructure and other systems.”²⁶⁰ Guillot, in March 2024, the month after assuming command of USNORTHCOM and NORAD, argued before the Senate that “[China has] sought to hold defense critical infrastructure in the United States at risk with kinetic and non-kinetic systems intended to impede our ability to flow forces overseas.”²⁶¹ The Strategic Posture Commission stated clearly that:

[Limited coercive] attacks are potentially designed to dissuade and deter the United States from defending or supporting its Allies and partners in a regional conflict; keep the United States from participating in any confrontation; and divide U.S. alliances. To defend against a coercive attack from China or Russia … the United States will require additional [IAMD] capabilities beyond the current [program of record].²⁶²

Beyond these statements, military and defense leaders have concerns about China’s specific designs on striking the US homeland. In 2022, VanHerck, the then-commander of USNORTHCOM and NORAD, testified to Congress that “China has begun to develop new capabilities to hold our homeland at risk in multiple domains in an attempt to complicate our decision making and to disrupt, delay, and degrade force flow in crisis and destroy our will in conflict.”²⁶³ His successor, General Guillot, later elaborated that “the PRC will continue to develop increasingly advanced kinetic and non-kinetic systems capable of holding U.S. territory and interests at risk.”²⁶⁴ Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth was even more direct, warning that, in “a major war with China, the United States homeland would be at risk … with both kinetic and non-kinetic attacks. … They are going to go after the will of the United States public. They are going to try to erode support for a conflict.”²⁶⁵ Military and civilian defense leaders clearly anticipate that China would now, or plans to, in the near future, strike critical civilian and military infrastructure in the US homeland in wartime.

Chinese capabilities for limited strikes on the US homeland

While China’s ability to project air- and sea-borne power against the contiguous United States pales in comparison to Russia’s, the PRC has a robust and expanding arsenal of long-range missiles capable of delivering nuclear and conventional limited strikes against the US homeland.

China’s traditional nuclear triad includes hundreds of silo-based and solid-fueled, road-mobile ICBMs, mostly MIRVed or MIRVable, capable of ranging the US homeland. China could employ some of these forces in a limited way. The PRC also fields an SSBN and SLBM force that is growing in sophistication. The DOD assesses that the “PRC likely began near-continuous at-sea deterrence patrols with its six operations JIN class SSBNs.”²⁶⁶ While China’s SSBNs may struggle to exit the “bastions” of China’s near seas into the open ocean without interception during wartime, the new JL-3 SLBM should allow China to strike the contiguous United States from nearer to Chinese submarine ports. China is also developing a next-generation Type 096, which currently appears to be under construction.²⁶⁷

A Chinese Type 094 (JIN Class) Ballistic Missile Submarine, 2014. Source: US Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, December 2010.

China is increasing the flexibility of its nuclear force in terms of the yield of its nuclear weapons, allowing Beijing to consider lower-yield nuclear strikes more seriously than before. The DOD asserts that the:

PRC probably seeks lower yield nuclear warhead capabilities to provide proportional response options that its high-yield warheads cannot deliver. … A 2017 defense industry publication indicated a lower-yield weapon had been developed for use against campaign and tactical targets that would reduce collateral damage.²⁶⁸

Even if such weapons are developed in response to concerns about possible US nuclear low-yield nuclear first use, there is nothing that would prevent the PRC from using such low-yield weapons itself in a first strike.

US analysts have long observed the progress in China’s defense industry and acquisition system and speculated that China could be developing the capability to strike the US homeland with conventional weapons.²⁶⁹ Indeed, as far back as 2004, the Science of Second Artillery Campaigns called for the development of conventionally armed ICBMs, and some Western analysts speculated that China’s three hundred new ICBM silos revealed in 2021 could be partially for this purpose.²⁷⁰ The DOD furthered this speculation by stating that “the PRC may be exploring development of conventionally armed intercontinental range missile systems.”²⁷¹ China’s existing dual-capable DF-26 missile can range the US territory of Guam and targets in Alaska.²⁷² The DF-26 can rapidly swap between conventional and nuclear warheads.²⁷³ China is also developing the DF-27, an ICBM or IRBM supposedly capable of delivering a hypersonic warhead.²⁷⁴

In addition to its traditional nuclear and conventional ICBM force, China is developing a range of hypersonic capabilities capable of holding the US homeland at risk. According to US government reports, China has tested an HGV on its DF-41 ICBM and has developed a variety of other HGVs with shorter ranges.²⁷⁵ China has a robust capacity to design and test hypersonic weapons. In the summer of 2021, China tested an HGV deployed from a FOBS, a development that would prove even further confounding to missile warning, tracking, and defense.²⁷⁶ This test “demonstrated the weapon’s ability to survive reentry and perform high-speed and maneuvering glide after orbiting around the globe.”²⁷⁷ A FOBS could deorbit in such a way as to approach the US homeland from trajectories not currently covered by missile warning radars—such as the south.²⁷⁸ Moreover, the FOBS-delivered HGV presents a “low-altitude approach and ability to maneuver midcourse” that would frustrate existing defenses.²⁷⁹ (China could go further than a FOBS weapon, developing a MOBS, essentially a nuclear-armed satellite that could launch into orbit and then deorbit a nuclear-armed RV at will). In summary, China can carry out limited, coercive strikes against the US homeland using nuclear or conventional ICBMs and a growing number of HGVs, potentially deliverable by a FOBS.

Unlike Russia, China is less capable of striking the contiguous United States through air- or sea-launched missiles, though it is working toward developing such a capability. Since 2019, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) has operated the H-6N strategic bomber as a nuclear-capable aircraft; the H6-N can be air-to-air refueled and can carry ALBMs and ACLMs.²⁸⁰ The 2023 Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC report states that “in 2021, the Y-20U tanker entered service, supporting the continued PLAAF expansion of air refuellable fighters, bombers, and [special mission] aircraft. These new air refuellable aircraft will significantly expand the PRC’s ability to conduct long-range offensive air operations.”²⁸¹ This new capability set will complement the existing “H-6U, a modified tanker variant of the H-6 bomber, as well as a small number of larger IL-78 Midas.”²⁸² Given the range of the bomber and the limits of Chinese air-to-air refueling, it seems unlikely that the H6-N could reliably strike the contiguous United States, though USNORTHCOM has warned that the H6-N and ALBM combination will hold Alaska at risk.²⁸³ This ALBM, the DOD assesses, is armed with a maneuvering reentry vehicle (MaRV), which would complicate any US defenses.²⁸⁴

China is also developing a long-range stealth bomber. According to a DOD report, “the H-20 bomber’s range could be extended to cover the globe with aerial refueling. It is also expected to employ both conventional and nuclear weaponry. …”²⁸⁵ It is unclear when the bomber will enter service, but it may be by the late 2020s.

China clearly intends to develop a capability to strike the US homeland with sea-launched LACMs, but this capability may be some years off. The 2023 Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC presents this as a key finding regarding the capabilities of the PLAN. The document states that “in the near term, the PLAN will have the ability to conduct long-range precision strikes against land targets from its submarine and surface combatants using land-attack cruise missiles, notably enhancing the PRC’s power projection capability.”²⁸⁶ The PLAN is equipping LACMs to its Type 093/Shang-class SSGNs, guided missile destroyers, and guided-missile cruisers, among other vessels.²⁸⁷ The annual report goes on to project that “the addition of land-attack capabilities to the PLAN’s surface combatants and submarines would provide the PLA with flexible long-range strike options. This would allow the PRC to hold land targets at risk beyond the Indo-Pacific region,” an oblique reference, perhaps, to the US homeland.²⁸⁸ In a sign of the PRC’s intent to project power across the Pacific, a PLAN naval squadron conducted drills near the Aleutian Islands of Alaska with Russian counterparts in August 2023.²⁸⁹ The PLAN also fields increasingly capable replenishment vessels, which would enable long-range deployments.²⁹⁰ USNORTHCOM warns that “later this decade, China seeks to field its Type 095 guided missile submarine, which will feature improved quieting technologies and a probable land-attack cruise missile capability … these weapons will offer Beijing the option of deploying strike platforms within range of our critical infrastructure during a conflict…“²⁹¹ In the future, the United States may well need to contend with an offshore cruise missile threat to the West Coast from Chinese guided-missile submarines or surface vessels.

There is some danger in overinterpreting the intent of China’s leadership from PLA military capabilities. For instance, conventional ballistic missiles could be a stopgap measure to fill empty missile silos otherwise bottlenecked by limitations in China’s fissile material production.²⁹² Like those of all states, China’s weapons programs must conform to internal bureaucratic-political dynamics as well as the need to defend against a range of threat actors. But, on balance, the combination of Chinese official writings on military strategy, US government warnings about Chinese capability and intent, and China’s burgeoning military capabilities make a strong case for concern about Chinese limited, coercive strikes on the US homeland in wartime.

The possibility for limited coercive strikes from North Korea

It is possible that North Korea could present a limited nuclear threat to the US homeland. The logic of electing limited coercive escalation against the United States depends on the ability of the escalating state to hold out a “third strike” against what the adversary values most. That is to say, North Korea could benefit from a limited attack on the United States only if North Korean leadership could hold out the threat of a large-scale strategic attack if initial US retaliation crossed a certain unacceptable threshold. If the size of North Korea’s nuclear force and its intercontinental delivery modes continue to expand, there might be a minimal level of credulity in North Korea considering limited nuclear employment at an intercontinental range.

Why defend against limited coercive threats

Having established that Russia and China are considering limited conventional and nuclear attacks on the US homeland, this section makes the case for defending against them. Being able to defend certain key nodes within the US homeland from limited attacks is essential for deterring adversary aggression and, if deterrence fails, for projecting power in support of US grand strategy. The argument that the United States, Russia, and China can deter each other from striking another’s homeland during a large-scale and direct military conflict does not stand up to scrutiny. The logic of defenses against limited strikes is that doing so drives up the requirements for a successful attack. Against a conventional strike, this increases costs for the adversary. And, for a possible nuclear strike, even limited defenses could drive up the total force package an adversary would need to consider to be sure of the success of its attack, causing the attackers to reconsider whether such a strike would ultimately be perceived as limited.

To deter conflict, project power, and achieve US grand strategy, the United States must defend its homeland

Unless the United States fields more suitable missile defenses, Russian and Chinese limited, coercive missile threats to the US homeland will undermine US efforts to deter conflict and, if deterrence fails, to project power to key theaters. Russia and China plan to conduct long-range strikes on the US homeland to impede force flow and degrade national will. US adversaries may believe that missile attacks on the US homeland (possibly combined with antishipping campaigns in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, attacks on disembarkation points in theater, and non-kinetic campaigns globally) can prevent force flow long enough so that these adversaries can achieve a fait accompli territorial seizure and then deter or defeat an allied counterattack. Missile defense of the homeland is a key component of degrading adversaries’ confidence that they can prevent timely reinforcement and thereby help the United States deter such a conflict in the first place.

It is also essential to Russian and Chinese theories of victory to be able to control escalation once a conflict begins and convince the United States to sue for peace on terms acceptable to those regimes. They may be able to directly target the will of the US population to support such a conflict by targeting critical infrastructure, such as power plants, pipelines, water treatment facilities, etc. (Of course, while Russian and Chinese planners may think such measures will degrade US national will, examples from Pearl Harbor to September 11th suggest otherwise.) Still, US homeland missile defense might undermine Russian and Chinese confidence that they can deliver strikes tailored to control escalation, enhancing deterrence.

Both above measures—reducing vulnerability to attacks on force flow and civilian infrastructure—will be noted by allies. By better protecting itself, the United States can make clear to its allies that it is better able to stand by them in conflict. This assurance will help allies remain aligned with US foreign policy goals, even when doing so puts them in danger from aggressors.

The United States cannot avoid attempts at limited strikes on the homeland, either through deterrence or restraint

Even if Russia and China are capable of limited, coercive threats on the US homeland, critics might argue that these states would not dare conduct such attacks due to the consequences of US retaliation. The United States should not count on adversaries refraining from attacks on the US homeland for fear of reciprocal attack or constraints to US options to make such a tradeoff possible. Some might dismiss the likelihood of Russian or Chinese strikes on the US homeland, thinking that both parties to the conflict have strong incentives to avoid escalation that might come through strikes on each other’s homelands. Indeed, some US analysts have proposed entire warfighting strategies around the idea that Washington should eschew attacks on the Chinese homeland, lest nuclear war result.²⁹³ An important element of deterrence is matching the promise of punishment with assurance to withhold that punishment (in this case, strikes on Russia’s or China’s homelands) if the party one seeks to deter complies with one’s demands (in this case, not strike the US homeland). But the United States would find it very hard to win a regional war against Russia or China, without destroying at least some targets inside those countries. And if the United States is striking their territory, there is no reason to think that either state would restrain itself from reciprocating.

Nor can the United States rely solely on the threat of deterrence by punishment through nuclear escalation to address coercive threats. There is certainly a subset of conventional attacks on the US homeland that would prompt a nuclear response. In the 2018 NPR, these were called “non-nuclear strategic attacks.”²⁹⁴ The 2022 NPR does not use those exact words but restates the same concept by asserting that “nuclear forces [are] the ultimate backstop to deter attacks on the homeland.”²⁹⁵ More explicitly, the 2022 NPR “affirms that [US] nuclear forces deter all forms of strategic attack. … nuclear weapons are required to deter not only nuclear attack but also a narrow range of high consequence, strategic-level attacks.”²⁹⁶ The 2018 and 2022 NPRs both make clear that certain Russian or Chinese non-nuclear strikes on the US homeland could rise to the level of a nuclear response but are deliberately ambiguous about how consequential such strikes would need to rise to become “strategic-level attacks.”

US Northern Command Commander US Air Force Gen. Glen D. VanHerck speaks during a press briefing at the Pentagon, July 28, 2021. Source: Brittany Chase/Office of the Secretary of Defense Public Affairs.

But this nuclear threat cannot, and is not intended to, deter Moscow and Beijing from the full range of possible non-nuclear strikes on the US homeland. VanHerck, just before turning the helm of USNORTHCOM and NORAD over to Guillot, fretted that “projected developments in our strategic competitor’s kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities exploit an increasing gap between our nuclear deterrence and conventional homeland defenses.”²⁹⁷ This is a classic instance of the stability-instability paradox—a cornerstone of nuclear deterrence theory which holds that robust deterrence at one level of escalation (e.g., a strategic nuclear exchange) may permit aggression at a different level (e.g., a conventional attack) because neither side can rely on escalation to deter the lower-level attack. In the words of one scholar writing on the emerging situation in which all three great powers are capable of conventional precision strikes on each other’s homelands:

[J]ust as the great powers’ assured-nuclear-destruction capabilities provide their homelands a higher (but not absolute) level of sanctuary against nuclear escalation in the midst of conventional operations in peripheral areas, those same nuclear capabilities will still provide a higher level of sanctuary status against nuclear escalation in the era of a long-range conventional precision-strike regime, but the homelands will not necessarily serve as sanctuaries for critical assets against conventional strikes. … Under nuclear stalemate, as long as a competitor does not view enemy conventional strikes against its homeland as an existential threat, it might refrain from counter-homeland nuclear escalation out of fear of the enemy’s nuclear counterstrikes.²⁹⁸

Regardless of what deterrent message the United States may wish to send, adversary military planners may believe, despite US messaging, that the United States will strike their homelands, and they can sufficiently control escalation so as to strike the US homeland without nuclear repercussions. Two respected scholars of China’s strategic thinking have concluded that PRC strategists think this way.²⁹⁹ Russian military thought evinces great concern that Western military strategy relies on multi-domain precision strikes on Russia.³⁰⁰ And, Russian planners, for their part, believe that escalation control is essential in military planning and that the strategic use of nonnuclear weapons can help deliver the right “dose” of deterrent pain short of nuclear weapons use.³⁰¹ In sum, it is not possible or desirable to deter the full range of Russian and Chinese limited, coercive strikes on the US homeland by the threat of conventional or nuclear punishment.

Limited defenses introduce uncertainty by driving force packages

Limited homeland missile defenses make it possible to deter limited strikes, so long as defenses are in place for the range of limited attack options available to the attacker. Defenses introduce uncertainty into the calculations of an attacker. Without sufficient confidence that an attack would make it through, the attacker would need to increase the number of weapons allocated to the attack or suppress defensive systems. In this case, the attack faces a dilemma—additional weapons or the preparatory suppression of defenses would likely be evident to the adversary. The attacker, then, would also lose confidence that the adversary would perceive the attack as limited, which may invite stronger retaliation than the attacker could accept. Russian strategists already demonstrate some concern that they may not understand what level of response they would draw from specific degrees of attacks; defenses can contribute to increasing that amount to an intolerable level.³⁰²

This is the exact outcome of US missile defenses that worries some Russian analysts. One is quoted as saying that “the possibility that U.S. BMD [ballistic missile defense] could achieve a limited interception of ballistic missiles in the near future could possibly violate the principle of ‘dosing’ and guaranteed fulfillment of assigned ‘de-escalatory’ activities.”³⁰³ Perhaps ironically, the deployment by China of certain Russian-origin capabilities (S-400 air and missile defenses, airframes for airborne early warning aircraft, air-and-missile-defense-capable surface vessels, and early-warning satellites) has raised concerns for US analysts that US limited nuclear operations against China could now require an undesirably large force package.³⁰⁴

Resilience must consist of active and passive defenses

To achieve resilience against adversary attacks, some might argue that the United States is better off relying on passive measures, like redundancy. These are misguided arguments. While deterrence by passive defense has its role in addressing threats to the homeland, deterrence by active denial alongside effective defenses, if deterrence fails, plays a separate, irreplaceable role.

Deterrence by passive defense is a necessary response but is not sufficient. The 2022 NDS asserts that the “Department will improve its ability to operate in the face of multi-domain attacks on a growing surface of vital networks and critical infrastructure, both in the homeland and in collaboration with Allies and partners at risk.”³⁰⁵ The NDS further explains that the “Department will take steps to … reduce [attackers’] expected benefits for aggressive actions against the homeland, particularly by increasing resilience.”³⁰⁶ Having backup facilities and the ability to reconstitute would be valuable. But duplicating facilities might, in some cases, be prohibitively expensive and reconstitution too time-consuming. Active defenses have a niche role to defend certain key targets and introduce uncertainty into attackers’ decision-making.

Conclusion

There is strong evidence that Russian and Chinese military strategy may call for limited, coercive strikes on the US homeland in wartime. Russia has a robust, and China has a growing, arsenal of weapons capable of delivering such strikes with nuclear and conventional payloads from a variety of trajectories and delivery modes on the US homeland. US defense and military leaders are increasingly raising the alarm about the urgency of such challenges. Should these warnings go unaddressed, planners in Russia and China may come to believe that they can prevail in a conflict by disrupting US force flow and degrading US national will, allowing either state to create facts on the ground and deter a forceful US response.

How can the United States address this threat, maintain deterrence, and assure allies that the United States can protect them? Read on to Sections Seven through Ten, in which this report lays out a plan to do so.

Section six: The two-nuclear-peer problem: Enhancing nuclear force survivability

Introduction

The PRC is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal. One DOD estimate slates China to reach 1,500 deployable nuclear warheads by the year 2035.³⁰⁷ Russia, while currently capped at 1,550 accountable strategic warheads by New START, maintains the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, which also includes thousands of tactical nuclear weapons and some so-called “exotic” intercontinental-range nuclear weapons not accounted for by New START.³⁰⁸ With New START slated to expire in February of 2026 and prospects for its renewal quite dim, the United States will likely face two autocratic great-power rivals with revisionist foreign policies and nuclear arsenals similarly sized to the United States in the 2030s. This emerging two-nuclear-peer problem presents significant challenges to the United States.³⁰⁹

The two-nuclear-peer problem poses two intertwined sub-issues. The first is how to maintain the survivability of US nuclear forces to respond to novel scenarios possible with two nuclear peers. The second is the necessary size of the US nuclear force to cover the increased target set presented by larger opposing nuclear forces to the extent needed to achieve the desired deterrent effect against these states. Key to answering both questions is enhancing the total number of US deliverable nuclear warheads that would survive a nuclear first strike on the United States.

The United States engages in a range of efforts to enhance the survivability of US nuclear forces. The ongoing modernization of US nuclear forces is essentially a one-for-one replacement of the existing triad. Some analysts have suggested changes or additions to the US nuclear arsenals to address this issue—from making a portion of the ICBM force mobile and increasing the number of warheads on delivery vehicles to forward deploying a greater number of nuclear forces. The US government is also pursuing diplomatic efforts to reduce nuclear dangers. These efforts are essential, and fully analyzing them is beyond the scope of this study. But missile defenses must also be part of this equation.

The United States should expand its homeland missile defenses to address the increasing possibility of a combined Russia-China nuclear disarming threat to the ground-based elements of the US nuclear triad. The authors contend that the threat of simultaneous or sequential nuclear attack on US nuclear forces, while remote, is exactly the sort of high-consequence event against which US nuclear strategy must hedge. While such defenses will not completely defend the triad, their design should complicate adversaries’ targeting problems as to introduce an unacceptably high degree of doubt to their planning. A full analysis of means to enhance US nuclear survivability under the two-nuclear-peer problem is beyond the scope of this study. In a limited budget environment, it is possible that the marginal defense dollar would be better spent enhancing nuclear force survivability through other means, such as uploading warheads or alerting bombers. However, the work of this study is to establish that missile defense is a key arrow in the quiver of defense planners as they design a portfolio of forces capable of achieving strategic deterrent effects. Indeed, enhancing homeland missile defense can complement other solutions to the two-nuclear-peer survivability problem, since defenses improve the effectiveness of many other approaches, such as an increase in strategic offensive forces, mobility, enhanced theater-range nuclear forces, etc.

This section reviews the role of retaliatory force survivability in nuclear planning. It then analyzes the nature of the two-nuclear-peer problem and its implications for survivability, including under the conditions of simultaneous and sequential attacks. The section examines the evidence and concerns the US government and, in particular, US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) have regarding the survivability and endurance of current and planned US nuclear forces. Finally, the study argues for a role for homeland missile defense in improving nuclear force survivability.

Survivability: The sine qua non of nuclear deterrence

The first and foremost requirement for stable nuclear deterrence is the ability to survive an enemy’s disarming first strike and retaliate in a manner that inflicts unacceptable damage on what the adversary most values. How the United States postures its nuclear forces will influence an aggressor’s calculus about whether such a first strike is feasible and worth the risk. A nuclear force too small and unhardened against nuclear or precision conventional attack could prove to be a tempting target. If the United States convinces a potential adversary that a disarming or decapitation strike is not feasible (or that the success of such a strike is greatly uncertain), then this removes that threat as a means of coercion.

Ensuring the survivability of US nuclear forces against a Soviet attack was the driving concern of the 1983 Scowcroft Commission, which observed in its report that “the objective for the United States should be to have an overall program that will so confound, complicate, and frustrate the efforts of Soviet strategic war planners that, even in moments of stress, they could not believe that they could attack our ICBM forces effectively.”³¹⁰ This remains good advice today and necessary to address the threat to US nuclear forces posed by China in addition to Russia. Enhanced survivability of a leg of the triad also hedges against the potential technological failure of the other legs or a technological breakthrough, such as the ability to track and target the US ballistic submarine fleet.³¹¹

The nature of the two-nuclear-peer problem

The expansion of China’s nuclear capabilities and the persistence of the Russian nuclear threat means that the United States must now calculate the survivability of its nuclear forces against two major nuclear adversaries and across at least two different—but related—sets of circumstances. Put somewhat differently, a senior official at USSTRATCOM contends that the expansion of Chinese nuclear forces places a premium on survivable US warheads to hold at risk an expanded target set of Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons.³¹² The first scenario of concern to US planners is a simultaneous, pre-planned, and combined Russian and Chinese nuclear (and conventional) attack against US nuclear forces and NC3. The second scenario envisions deterring a second adversary (through the threat of nuclear retaliation) while already engaged in a general nuclear war with the first.³¹³ In the formulation of the 2023 Strategic Posture Commission, “the United States must maintain a resilient nuclear force that can absorb a first strike and respond effectively with enough forces to cause unacceptable damage to the aggressor while still posing a credible threat to the other nuclear power.”³¹⁴ This paper now examines both of these scenarios.

Scenario one: Surviving a simultaneous and combined disarming first strike

It is not necessary to assess the likelihood of a combined Russian and Chinese disarming first strike to appreciate the need to plan and structure forces against this possibility. Such an attack would pose the ultimate existential risk to the United States. Just the threat of such an attack, especially during a crisis or conflict with both Russia and China, could have a coercive effect on US intentions and war plans (and ultimately deterrence) if US leadership and allies thought it was a plausible option.

Soviet nuclear doctrine during the Cold War suggests Moscow made plans for a preemptive disarming strike against US nuclear forces and NC3 should deterrence fail.³¹⁵ Recent statements by Putin suggest this remains part of Russian nuclear thought today. Speaking about a disarming strike, Putin publicly said, “Maybe it’s worth thinking about using this idea developed by our U.S. partners.”³¹⁶ It is unclear how Putin concluded that the United States “has a theory of a preventive nuclear strike,” perhaps he instead is mirroring Russian nuclear doctrine. As publicly released US employment guidance makes clear, the United States does not have a doctrine for nuclear preemption, disarming first strikes, or obtaining nuclear superiority.³¹⁷

A disarming first strike against the US nuclear triad would be a daunting and risky proposition, even in the most extreme circumstances. Not only would an adversary have to destroy four hundred ICBMs deployed in hardened silos (that could launch while under attack), but it would also have to catch US nuclear ballistic missile submarines in port and bombers on bases before dispersal. However, on a day-to-day basis, the US military does not generate its bombers or submarines in port. These forces are therefore vulnerable to enemy attack, so one cannot dismiss this scenario out of hand. The calculations become even more complex when factoring into the mix an adversary’s air and missile defense systems potentially capable of intercepting those US bombers and ballistic missiles that manage to escape a preemptive strike.

The USS Michigan guided missile submarine (SSGN 727) pulls into the pier of South Korea’s Busan Naval Base, October 13, 2017. Source: Jermaine Ralliford/US Navy.

The number of US targets or “aim points” for the adversary could be as little as about five hundred: four hundred ICBM silos, about fifty launch control centers, a few strategic bomber bases, two ballistic missile submarine bases, and associated NC3 facilities. The ICBM leg of the triad illustrates the difficulty of such an attack. To be sure of destroying most, if not all, of the US ICBM force, the attacker would have to expend about one thousand nuclear warheads—roughly one-third of the 1,550 accountable warheads allowed to the United States and Russia under New START.³¹⁸ Even then, Russian attack planners cannot be sure that each missile will reach its target or be close enough to damage the silo. So, at the end of this attack, the United States will still have hundreds of nuclear warheads deployed on submarines already at sea and perhaps some dispersed nuclear bombers, and an attacker with an arsenal the size of Russia’s today or China’s in 2035 would have about a third of its nuclear force remaining. Clearly, this is not an appealing prospect for the adversary which has failed to successfully disarm the United States and now invites a devastating response.

But imagine this thought experiment with two nuclear powers with arsenals of roughly 1,500 nuclear warheads each. There are now three thousand available warheads against four hundred ICBM silos and about one hundred additional nuclear-related targets. While the United States may have some hundreds of warheads remaining on survivable submarines, Russia and China each would have at least one thousand warheads after their initial combined attack. It is this disparity that poses a potential problem for deterrence. Would Russian and Chinese leaders now think that the post-exchange ratio favors them and act accordingly—coercing the United States into surrender by threatening a “third strike” on US cities, should the United States retaliate?

This somewhat simplistic assessment illustrates how a combined Russian and Chinese nuclear force could pose a danger for US nuclear forces as currently postured. The United States must never allow Russian and Chinese military planners and leadership to conclude that a preemptive nuclear attack against US nuclear forces (or NC3) could eliminate the capability or weaken the will of the United States to respond and inflict unacceptable damage on both adversaries.

Scenario two: Preserving sufficient nuclear forces to deterring two nuclear adversaries sequentially

A combined disarming preemptive first strike is not the only danger posed by the expansion of Chinese nuclear weapons capable of counterforce attacks on US nuclear forces. The United States must also guard against the case of opportunistic aggression: the fear that a second major nuclear power may exploit a US nuclear force weakened by an adversary attack. As the 2023 Strategic Posture Commission observes: “the United States must maintain a resilient nuclear force that can absorb a first strike and respond effectively with enough forces to cause unacceptable damage to the aggressor while still posing a credible threat to the other nuclear power.”³¹⁹

In other words, US nuclear forces must be ready to fight two major nuclear adversaries sequentially, which means that the survivability and endurance of the nuclear force must be such that the United States not only maintains a strategic reserve after a major nuclear exchange, but also that the president can still communicate with those remaining forces—and, most importantly, this must be apparent to the third state. As described by the bipartisan expert study group formed by the Center for Global Strategic Research:

The prospect of fighting two nuclear adversaries sequentially places a premium on the ability of US nuclear forces and command and control systems to survive attacks by the first nuclear adversary and maintain the force generation, situational awareness, and connectivity to surviving nuclear forces necessary to deter the second challenger. Both China and Russia continue to improve their capabilities for attacking U.S. forces and associated command, control, and communications capabilities.”³²⁰

Evidence of US government concern about nuclear force survivability

While some might question the importance of addressing nuclear survivability under the two-nuclear-peer problem, statements from former senior DOD officials, current DOD actions, and concerns from Congress clearly indicate that the US government is taking this problem seriously.

For instance, Robert Gates, secretary of defense under both Bush and Obama, noted his concern when observing that “the Chinese and Russian navies are increasingly exercising together and, it would be surprising if they were not also more closely coordinating their deployed strategic nuclear forces.”³²¹ In July 2024, Russia and China conducted a joint nuclear-capable strategic bomber patrol, entering the Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zone.³²²

The DOD and USSTRATCOM continually evaluate the threat to the pre-launch survivability of US nuclear forces, though open discussion is limited for obvious reasons. Still, one can discern fresh thinking on the matter in recent years resulting from Russia’s development of novel nuclear weapon systems as well as the impending expansion of Chinese long-range nuclear capabilities. For example, Gen. Anthony Cotton, the head of USSTRATCOM, stated during his nomination hearing in 2022 that he was examining the need to “disperse bomber forces in the future, especially with two near peers.”³²³ See exchange with Sen. Dan Sullivan (R-AK). In another example, the USSTRATCOM deputy director for capability and resource integration (J-8), who is responsible for force management priorities and future concepts, noted recently in an interview that USSTRATCOM “has a requirement for resilient and robust missile warning and tracking capabilities to defend against the growing threat posed by hypersonic weapons, cruise and ballistic missiles.” Hypersonic threats, in particular, present significant operational challenges and “risk to our strategic forces, creating vulnerability and eroding deterrence.”³²⁴

Another senior USSTRATCOM official offered that the increase in the target set created by the need to deter China as a major nuclear adversary places a premium on the number of survivable and available US nuclear weapons. This is especially the case until (and if) the United States expands its deployable nuclear weapons in the future. Notably, then-STRATCOM Commander Admiral Charles Richard told Congress recently that he has “already repostured” aspects of the current nuclear force to address the growing Russian and Chinese nuclear threats, though he reserved further discussion to a classified session.³²⁵ One possible explanation of a change in US nuclear posture in response to increasing Russian and Chinese capabilities to strike the US homeland is the application of agile combat employment to the US strategic bomber force. In this program, bombers practice dispersing to fallback airfields in the United States and Canada, in part to increase the number of targets that an adversary considering a disarming strike on the bomber force would need to contemplate targeting.³²⁶

Navy Adm. Charles A. Richard, former STRATCOM commander, provides testimony at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, March 8, 2022. Source: Jackie Sanders/Office of the Secretary of Defense Public Affairs.

Congress has expressed similar concerns. Rep. Don Bacon (R-NE-02), a former US Air Force general who flew missions on the US airborne nuclear command center and is now a member of the House Armed Services Committee, noted during a hearing that:

I am concerned about the survivability of our Nuclear Command, Control and Communications (NC3) … with hypersonics and cruise missiles, perhaps submarines off our coasts, at some point again, it’s harder to ensure that command authorities can survive a first strike and conduct a second counter strike. I want to have 100 percent confidence that the Russians and Chinese have 100 percent confidence that we can do a second strike, because that ensures deterrence.³²⁷

In a separate X post, Bacon emphasized that the combination of Russia-China politico-military alignment and the shorter arrival time of missiles based closer to US shores than traditional ICBMs poses a particular risk to US NC3.Rep.³²⁸

In sum, there is significant evidence that those tasked with ensuring US nuclear deterrence are concerned about the possibility of simultaneous or sequential nuclear attacks under the two-nuclear-peer problem.

Can missile defense improve triad survivability in light of the two-nuclear-peer problem?

As the previous sections suggest, senior US military and political officials have concerns about the growing vulnerability of US nuclear forces. Therefore, this study argues that it would be prudent to enhance the survivability of US nuclear forces and increase the uncertainty of attacker success to decrease the likelihood of a single or combined disarming first strike by adversaries. Missile defense is one way to do this, and its pursuit should be in conjunction with other measures.

In addition to missile defense, there are several ways to improve the survivability and endurance of US nuclear forces, including hardening, mobility, concealment, readiness posture, and dispersal. Critics of missile defense might argue that these measures are sufficient or preferable to active missile defense for enhancing triad survivability. However, these measures each have their respective costs and negative side effects, making active missile defense a valuable complement.

The means to ensure the survivability of US nuclear forces were known during the Cold War; as then-President Richard Nixon explained to Congress in 1970:

Survivability of our retaliatory forces can be assured in a number of different ways: by increasing the number of offensive forces to ensure that a sufficient number will survive a surprise attack; by defending ICBMs, bombers with air and missile defenses; by hardening our existing silos, by increasing the mobile portion of our strategic forces. …³²⁹

The means outlined by Nixon are applicable today. As the United States determines the additional nuclear forces needed to address the emerging two-nuclear-peer environment, there could be a tradeoff between improving the survivability of current forces and adding to the size of the force to increase survivability—or a combination of the two approaches. Enhancing the survivability of the US nuclear triad through a combination of additional hardening, mobility, and missile defense could reduce future nuclear force requirements by ensuring more survivable warheads for a counterstrike. Indeed, the very nature of the nuclear triad provides a level of survivability and unpredictability of success for the adversary. In the sequential peer attack scenario, it would be likely that US ICBMs were targets of the adversary or otherwise expended during the first stages of a major nuclear exchange. The United States, therefore, would have to rely on its submarine and bomber forces that survived the initial adversary attack. In addition, the United States could call upon its regional nuclear capabilities that also escaped initial attacks.

In this case, situational awareness and communication between the president and these remaining, dispersed, forces become critical. Submarines would be at sea but must eventually return to port for replenishment. Bombers dispersed to alternative runways and those returning from bombing missions would have to land and prepare for future sorties. The enemy would know the essential ports and large military bases, but not all the alternative runways. There would be many, perhaps too many, for the adversary to target with nuclear weapons or advanced conventional strikes across the US homeland and in friendly countries. In this case, enhancing the survivability of these alternative bases and alternative command-and-control channels would be imperative.

Today, these important nodes rely on mobility and deception for survivability; adding an under-layer missile defense would further enhance the ability of these forces to withstand enemy attacks. By doing so, the United States would complicate further the second adversary’s assessment concerning the ability of US nuclear forces to respond to future nuclear attacks. Put simply, missile defenses would enhance the survivability of the US strategic nuclear reserve and thereby reinforce deterrence of the first, but more so the second adversary. Comprehensive missile defense is an important approach to reducing pressure on the need for strategic nuclear force build-up to manage the increasing two-nuclear-peer threat of disarming attacks.

A US Air Force B-52 Stratofortress aircraft receives fuel from a KC-135 Stratotanker above the Mediterranean Sea, September 27, 2017. Source: US Department of Defense.

Improving the pre-launch survivability of US nuclear forces may also contribute to stability during a crisis, even absent a threat from a second peer. During peacetime and likely during the early days of a crisis, the bomber force and part of the submarine force will not be on alert or generated, and therefore vulnerable to nuclear or conventional attack. The president would have to weigh changes in the alert posture for enhancing survivability against the possibility that an adversary may interpret such changes in posture as preparation for disarming first strike. Likewise, during a nuclear attack against US ICBMs, the president has the option to launch a retaliatory strike while under attack before the offending missiles even land. Missile defense protection for US nuclear forces provides a margin of security for the president, allowing him to possibly delay not just nuclear retaliation but even nuclear force generation during a crisis without undue risk to US retaliatory forces.

Similarly, US leaders may have to consider the impact of nuclear force generation decisions on the second potential adversary: Would the generation or dispersal of US nuclear forces to deter the first adversary inadvertently cause the third party to generate its forces, or worse? The protection afforded US nuclear forces during a crisis, by even limited missile defenses, would reduce pressures for the early use of nuclear weapons by creating uncertainty about the success of preemptive strikes and by providing additional confidence that such a decision can be deferred because one’s nuclear forces are more survivable against a preemptive attack.

Section seven: Missile defense basics and architectural challenges

Introduction

The next three sections of this report explain basic missile threat and missile defense concepts, lay out the benefits of a layered missile defense architecture, and then convert the policy and strategy objectives discussed in the previous sections into a homeland missile defense strategy and architecture effective for the current and emerging threat environment.

To begin, this section addresses some key general principles for missile defense and examines the challenges to developing an effective missile defense architecture under the current security environment. What are the threat scenarios against which the United States should plan? How can the missile defense system optimally complement other conventional and nuclear military capabilities? How should one think about the types of sensors and interceptors necessary to address the growing threat from North Korean ICBMs, as well as the coercive and counterforce missile threats posed by Russia and China?

This section offers a categorical look at missile threats and then provides an overview of the challenges and opportunities for engaging various missile threats during each phase of flight. The following sections explain how “layering” the defense takes advantage of these opportunities while mitigating certain challenges unique to each layer. In this sense, the whole of the defensive architecture is much greater than the sum of its parts, in that its constituent parts make up for the potential weakness of each other.

Characteristics of airborne threats to the Homeland

As detailed earlier, US strategic competitors are “fielding more advanced offensive missiles—ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic—in greater numbers to not only deter involvement in a regional conflict but also directly target the US homeland.

Cruise missiles

All major powers have invested heavily in cruise missile technology, making this weapon class a large-scale problem. To date, the large-scale threat is only with sub-sonic missiles. Nevertheless, some supersonic or low-observable variants do provide potential adversaries with some exquisite options for deep strikes on high-value targets. The cruise missile threat class is often dual-capable, creating payload ambiguity in flight.

Adversary cruise missile-launching platforms face a tradeoff between attacking from near the United States and risking a counterattack on the platform or launching from a distance and giving missile defenders more time to complete an intercept. The exceptionally long ranges of Chinese and Russian air- and sea-launched cruise missiles make it possible that the bomber, submarine, or surface ship launching an attack on the homeland would be too far from US shore defenses to be threatened by an immediate counterattack. However, in theory, a cruise missile launched far from the homeland provides more detection time, and therefore more intercept time. Alternatively, launching an attack closer to shore provides less reaction time for homeland defenses and adds the effect of deeper penetration. But this puts the launch platform at higher risk of direct counterattack or being traced back to its home port or airfield, where reprisal would be even more costly for the adversary. These physical limits for a cruise missile-based raid provide key opportunities that should be included in an efficient counterstrategy in which early detection supports both defensive actions and counterattack options.

The logistical challenges to posing a persistent cruise missile threat are insurmountable for a rogue state outside of a terror-oriented scheme of employment. Peer actors would also be hard-pressed to sustain a cruise missile strike campaign if their launch platforms depend on attrited support airfields and ports under attack. This reality puts pressure on them to consider nuclear employment. But even a small number of conventional strikes on the homeland might achieve either a rogue or peer adversary’s coercive goals at the acceptable cost of a few lost aircraft or submarines. As recently demonstrated by Israel’s defense against an Iranian missile raid, even large-scale cruise missile attacks can be denied with sufficient early warning alongside effective positioning of defensive assets.³³⁰ In the near term, the United States’ lack of persistent cruise missile defense will continue to appear highly provocative.

Ballistic missiles

The basics of ICBMs are important to understand as part of this conversation. These weapons travel distances greater than 5,500 km (3,400 mi.) by convention and fly a generally predictable arc from launch to target.“³³¹ Because their flight is powered for only the first few minutes and they do not glide, they spend most of the 30-minute flight in space while moving more than 15,000 mph.³³² Modern Russian and US ICBMs are credited with better than 100-meter accuracy for both ICBMs and SLBMs.³³³ China has yet to prove this level of accuracy but may be close.³³⁴ This level of accuracy opens a range of critical infrastructure targets for conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs.³³⁵ The exceptional expense of intercontinental reach restricts this class of weapon from serving as a tool for consistent and protracted employment.

Technology for countermeasures to missile defense

Missile defense countermeasures became integral to Soviet and US ICBMs and SLBMs. Technology-based countermeasure systems intend to confuse sensors or decision makers within the missile defense systems. Countermeasures can range from simple chaff dispensers to mock warheads whose shape, mass, and surface are indistinguishable from a real warhead. However, fielding countermeasures incurs a cost on the attacker by reducing the throw weight dedicated to actual warheads. A credible homeland defense must account for a spectrum of sophistication in ICBM countermeasures. Yet not all threat actors or scenarios would result in the same quantity or quality employed.

Tactics for countermeasures to missile defense

Another form of countering defenses employs advanced technologies to carry out special tactics to thwart defenses. The primary tactic is simply one of approaching from an unseen or unseeable direction. Russia’s Poseidon nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered submarine drone is one such weapon whose high-speed underwater “flight” puts it outside the scope of this study. But SLBMs launched from a submarine very close to the coast can attack with either a high or low angle that complicates intercept or reduces warning time. The ultimate example of combining technology and tactics is the MaRV that can turn once it re-enters the atmosphere. However, since most of the warhead’s time is spent outside the atmosphere, maneuverability is limited, and mid-course intercept is generally unaffected. At the height of the Cold War and well before hypersonic missiles became popular, the Soviets and the United States explored MaRV technology. Because of the 1972 ABM Treaty alongside decades of incremental improvements to accuracy, there has been insufficient motivation to trade the throw weight of simple, purely ballistic RVs for their more expensive, heavy, complex, and yet more capable MaRV cousin—that is, until Russia fielded its Avangard weapon system that revives the long-range high-speed maneuvering nuclear weapon threat.The 1984 Massachusetts Institute of Technology review of US military research and development, specifically for intercontinental-range RVs, says there are two primary reasons to replace pure ballistic RVs with maneuverable ones: (1) to improve accuracy or (2) to evade defenses. It further notes, “Because of the ABM treaty of 1972, the Soviet Union has not yet made any significant deployment of anti-ballistic missiles, so MaRVs have not been required to evade ABMs. Similarly, the accuracy achievable with ballistic RVs is more than sufficient to destroy essentially any target in the Soviet Union, provided that warheads in the range of hundreds of kilotons are used.” While both US and Russian RVs have reportedly improved accuracy since 1984, there has been no significant change to defense against a disarming first strike on either side.³³⁶

Hypersonic weapons and missile defense

Hypersonic weapons have entered the defense lexicon as a term of art that describes maneuvering weapons which travel at speeds greater than Mach 5 for a large portion of their flight profile. HGVs appear similar to a traditional ballistic missile right after launch but then “tip over” and immediately reenter the atmosphere where they skip like a rock on pond water. These weapons have no engines and must rely on momentum and controlling aerodynamic surfaces to skip along on top of the thicker atmosphere near the Earth’s surface and maneuver to their target. Alternatively, HCMs might launch from an aircraft like a traditional sub-sonic cruise missile common to major military powers. But HCM engines enable continuous powered flight up to ten times faster. In either case, HGVs and HCMs fly below the radar horizon for typical ICBM detection and require an entirely different interceptor for defense. Today, Russia has a handful of maneuvering RVs in the field. The Avangard HGV sits atop what was previously an SS-19 ICBM with six non-maneuvering warheads. This repurposed Soviet ICBM illustrates the operational trade-off for maneuvering ICBMs. In this case, Moscow traded six simple warheads for one HGV. This trade-off demonstrates just one way that defense adds value to one’s strategic position.

Summary

Together, the cruise missile, ICBM or SLBM, and hypersonic threats to the homeland could be formidable. Each has uniquely useful attributes for making limited threats. But that also means that each has specific weaknesses to exploit for credible defense. The next section describes how the entire missile defense infrastructure works and the key challenges to its effectiveness.

Phases of ballistic missile defense

Figure 2 below shows a notional ballistic missile defense architecture and explains the ten steps to successful ballistic missile intercept.

Figure 2: Ten steps of a successful ballistic missile intercept
Source: Courtesy US Missile Defense Agency, overview briefing, October 2023.

Detect/Warn: A missile defense intercept begins with initial launch detection by space-based infrared (IR) sensors, currently either the Space Based-Infrared System (SBIRS) or the legacy Defense Support Program (DSP). The infrared satellites detect the heat from the initial launch and provide information on the trajectory and potential range of the threat missile. The SBIRS sensors cue downstream sensors on the threat missile’s initial position and velocity through the Command and Control, Battle Management and Communication (C2BMC) network.
Cue: The C2BMC provides initial launch detection information from SBIRS to early warning radars, including the Cobra Dane or Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWRs), which operate at low-frequency bands and provide a cue and classification (missile type) information to more precise tracking radars.

The Ballistic Missile Early Warning Radar at Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base), Greenland. Source: US Space Force.

Track: Radars such as the SBX, the LRDR, deployed in Alaska, the Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY-2), the ship-based Aegis Search Protect (SPY) radars, and in the future, the AN/TPY-6 radar provide a refined track (sufficient for engagement) to the weapon. Of note, the TPY-6 is expected to be “vastly more” powerful than the TPY-2 while taking advantage of the technology put into the Long-Range Discriminating Radar in Alaska. This will significantly improve the ability of the system to discriminate actual warheads from decoys and at an even greater range.³³⁷

The AN/SPY-1 radar (the light grey hexagonal panel) on the starboard side of the superstructure of the USS Lake Erie, Naval Station Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 2006. Source: US Navy.

Classify and select the most lethal object (discriminate): An ability to discriminate the threat RV from other objects in the scene, such as the spent booster and decoys (also referred to as countermeasures), is needed so that the interceptor knows which object in the scene is most likely the RV. Some basic discrimination begins with the early warning radars, with more refined discrimination provided by the higher-quality tracking sensors listed above.
Develop Fire Control Solution: Once the RV is identified, the tracking radars provide the range and location information to the interceptor with sufficient precision to engage the threat missile.
Launch Interceptor: The interceptor then would launch based on the fire control solution provided.
Update Interceptor: A ground system provides the interceptor with updated data in flight to refine the trajectory.
Kill Vehicle Tracking and Maneuver: As the missile gets closer to the target, the interceptor’s kill vehicle “opens its eyes.” The kill vehicle’s onboard sensors enable it to track the target on its own. The kill vehicle uses its divert and attitude control system to maneuver to engage the target. The kill vehicle’s sensor can also refine the discrimination solution based on what its sensor detects at a much closer range than offboard sensors.
Intercept: The threat missile is destroyed using the direct force of a collision, called “hit-to-kill” technology. Some terminal phase ABM systems instead use an explosive blast-fragmentation warhead. A complete missile defense system can intercept threats in any phase of flight, including boost, midcourse, and terminal phases. Below are short descriptions with specific details for each:
Boost/Ascent Phase: Boost-phase intercept occurs after the rocket launches but before fuel exhaustion. An intercept while the missile is “boosting” into space offers the option to engage the threat either prior to releasing countermeasures or force the missile to deploy its countermeasures early in flight likely making the discrimination problem easier.
Midcourse Phase: The midcourse phase begins when the ballistic missile booster burns out and it begins coasting in space towards its target in a ballistic trajectory. Most of the ballistic missile’s flight occurs during the midcourse phase.
Terminal Phase: The terminal phase begins when the payload begins to reenter the atmosphere. Several options exist for terminal-phase intercept, including Aegis BMD with the Sea Based Terminal (SM-6) Interceptor, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3). The Aegis BMD equipped with the SM-6 missile can engage both cruise and ballistic threat missiles with a fragmentation warhead as a close-in defensive system. The THAAD system provides the capability to engage short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missile threats both in space and within the atmosphere with a hit-to-kill capability. The PAC-3 missile can intercept both cruise and ballistic missile threats. Its range is shorter than that of the THAAD or SM-6 but has a proven capability to protect sites of interest from both ballistic and cruise missile threats.
Verify Hit/Kill: After intercept, it is important to verify whether the threat has been destroyed. This can occur via terrestrial radars with a line of sight to the engagement, or airborne or space-based sensors.

Missile defense system challenges

The current US Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), as described above, faces challenges from proliferating and advancing air and missile threats. Below, the report describes the challenges to each of the functions of missile defense.

The current HBMD architecture dates from the early part of the century; its original design was to completely deny limited attacks of simple ballistic missiles from rogue nations, not to counter large quantities of sophisticated ballistic or any quantity of hypersonic glide or cruise missiles. Forty-four GBIs (forty in Alaska and four in California) and ground-based radars deployed in the United States and abroad, as well as space-based early warning satellites, comprise the HBMD system (there is also a limited cruise missile defense in place in the National Capital Region). Starting in 2028, a future interceptor, the NGI, will upgrade the current emplaced GBI fleet. The NGI will provide improved reliability over the GBI and will have multiple kill vehicles on each interceptor to destroy the most credible threat objects in the scene and potentially reduce the number of interceptors needed to defeat a threat with countermeasures.“³³⁸ The United States plans to emplace twenty NGIs in Alaska, bringing the total number of long-range interceptors to sixty-four. It is not clear whether the plan is to replace the original forty-four GBIs with NGIs or if the number of total interceptors will simply increase.

Sensing challenges

Challenges to this surveillance system include discerning the threat trajectory and missile type to determine whether to engage the missile and with what system. Fixed systems far out at the edge of US-defended territory are also vulnerable to direct attack. Challenges to fire control sensors include:

Sensor coverage: The fire control sensor must have the target in direct line of sight. Sometimes, the best viewing locations for land-based radars require deployment on allied territory, necessitating host-nation approval. Many land-based radars only face one direction, making it possible for a threat to approach its target outside of the radar’s view. Low-flying threats, such as cruise missiles and HGVs, provide additional challenges to land-based or ship-based radars because the curvature of the Earth limits their view. This significantly reduces the engagement timeline because terrestrial radar cannot detect the threat until much later in the weapon’s flight.

Countermeasures: Countermeasures could include jamming the radar to significantly reduce the range at which the radar could pick out the target. Countermeasures could also use decoys to confuse the radars as to which object is the real warhead. Most forms of decoys are lighter than an actual warhead, and so late engagement, when the warhead is re-entering the atmosphere, mitigates for when mid-course sensors cannot filter countermeasures out.

Transition of threat information from fire control radars to the infrared (IR) weapon sensor: Different sensors “see” in different portions of the electromagnetic spectrum and from multiple angles. This adds more data on the threat scene, and, with good software, this would help with discernment. However, poor system communications or sensor capabilities can confuse correlating these different views, challenging discernment of which objects are the threat versus which are countermeasures.

Missile intercept challenges

Challenges to missile intercept, by phase, include the following:

Boost phase

Boost-phase intercept requires a fast enough missile, launched from a close enough distance, to engage the target in the boost phase, while it is still moving upward into space. Faster missiles at longer ranges require larger boosters, making the missile too heavy for air launch.
The launcher must also be in the right place at the right time and requires a very early decision to engage, perhaps before the missile is clearly on a threat trajectory.
An alternative approach is to put the interceptor into orbit ahead of time as an SBI. But this approach faces a similar placement challenge because many dozens if not hundreds of interceptors must remain in orbit to ensure a reasonable number are in position to intercept a raid.

The United States currently has no purpose-built systems for defense against ballistic missiles in the boost phase of flight, though it has examined ground-, sea-, and air-based variants in the past.³³⁹

Midcourse phase

Discrimination: During the midcourse phase, the threat has had the best opportunity to deploy countermeasures. Unintentional countermeasures, such as spent boosters or debris, can also confuse the scene. Discrimination is a vital component of HBMD. It reduces the number of credible objects and, therefore, the number of interceptors needed to confidently destroy the threat missile.
Reliability: Some older GBIs have lower reliability, resulting in a potential need to shoot more interceptors to provide confidence that the threat will be destroyed.³⁴⁰ The MDA continues its GBI-specific SLEP to improve the reliability, availability, and service life of the existing GBI fleet.“³⁴¹

Terminal phase

Terminal defense systems have a much smaller protection area than midcourse defense systems. The THAAD, SM-6, and PAC-3 terminal systems are too small and too slow to effectively engage ICBMs. All three systems would require modifications and a robust testing plan to show their efficacy in defense of ICBM-class threats.
Certain systems, such as SM-6 and Patriot, offer an existing and proven multi-mission capability to defend against short-to-medium-range ballistic, cruise, and some hypersonic weapons. For example, the most advanced Patriot system, PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE), can engage HGVs as they slow down while approaching their target,“³⁴² a capability proven by the successful intercept of a Russian Kh-55 missile over Ukraine under combat conditions.³⁴³ The Kh-55 is arguably an HGV, though it was moving at less than Mach 4 near the target when destroyed. Regardless, Patriot MSE has had several successes in Ukraine against relevant homeland-threatening weapon systems.

The Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) intercepted and destroyed two simultaneous targets fired from different directions using PAC-3 MSE missiles during a demonstration at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, November 6, 2013. Source: White Sands Missile Range Public Affairs.

System-level challenges

Current HBMD has a limited ability to counter large quantities of sophisticated ballistic missile and HGV threats. Some of the system-level challenges include the following:

Overwhelming raid

There are two ways an adversary can overwhelm a defensive system. Raid saturation with real and apparent warheads (countermeasures) can challenge the command-and-control system in determining the number of interceptors required, assessing which interceptor is best to engage which threat missiles, and planning for re-engagement for misses. A basic strategy for overwhelming the defense is to exhaust the interceptor inventory, an easy planning challenge for situations in which interceptor quantities are well known. One form of this tactic is firing attacking missiles faster than interceptor launchers can reload.

Cost

Missile defense interceptors are very expensive. A single GBI costs approximately $70 million, and the NGI has a slated price tag of $110 million each. An Aegis SM-3 IIA interceptor costs approximately $24 million, while a THAAD interceptor costs $10 million. The shortest-range interceptors are the least expensive, with an SM-6 interceptor costing $3.9 million and a Patriot interceptor costs $3.7 million.³⁴⁴ The current conflict in Israel as well as the war in Ukraine show the need for rapid re-supply and lower cost interceptors. It is easy to see from these numbers that it is quite costly to design a defense based on mid-course intercept alone.

Threat maneuvers

Maneuvering threats challenge radar tracking and the interceptor’s ability to rapidly change its flight path to respond to changes in threat missile trajectories.

Engagement timelines

Missile threats must be detected, tracked, identified (e.g., differentiating a satellite launch from a ballistic missile launch), and engaged in a very short time. For long-range (ICBM) threats, the window for engagement is from approximately five to twenty-five minutes after launch for mid-course engagement.

Command and control, battle management and communications integrated architecture (C2BMC)

The C2BMC provides situational awareness, battle management, training, and space sensor capabilities to combatant commands across fourteen time zones. Robust networking across the Missile Defense System is necessary to provide the coverage and effectiveness needed for robust missile defense. The network must provide resilient connectivity and low latency while retaining the highest levels of encryption-based security.

Conclusion

In summary, the ever-evolving threats present several challenges to US HBMD. Solutions exist to overcome these challenges, and foundational work has been underway to address these challenges. If sufficient funding were provided, new capabilities could be developed and integrated into the missile defense architecture. The next two sections describe concepts and strategies for layering HBMD defenses to make the whole system more robust against future threats.

Section eight: Advantages of layered defense

Introduction

The sensing and interceptor network required to defend against a complex ballistic missile attack on the US homeland is extensive. This is, in part, because it must cover multiple environments encompassing a large area and do so with a robust and resilient architecture. The interceptors must defend a huge swath of land and may come up against sophisticated penetration aids. The GMD system provides some of these necessary defensive features, but it cannot do the entire job efficiently and cost effectively even against just simple ICBMs employed in large numbers.

This section explains why layered defenses would improve on the current US HBMD system through higher effectiveness and efficiency, preferential defense, and innate survivability. Next, it applies these theoretical advantages of layering defenses to thwarting the objectives of the three different threats this report contemplates—denying a rogue state population strike, complicating major power coercive raid calibration, and degrading an attempted nuclear-disarming attack.

Theoretical advantages of layered defense

A layered missile defense system offers increased effectiveness and is more efficient. Defense-in-depth is another military term with essentially the same effectual meaning as layering, because both seek to degrade, rather than completely defeat, an attack with any single element of the defense. Rather, it is the collective result of a series of engagements that beats the attack. Layering has the additional advantage of allowing for the tactic of preferential defense. Finally, layering creates a more survivable defense architecture, complicating direct attacks on defenses from a sophisticated adversary.

Layering increases effectiveness and is more efficient

The traditional value of layered missile defense is a simple mathematical benefit similar to that of compounding interest. For example, a shoot-look-shoot intercept doctrine would be twice as effective as a shoot-shoot-look defense if the first shot is successful. Missile defense architectures that allow for engagement at different phases of a ballistic missile’s flight allow tracking and engagement with different types of interceptors and seekers. This multi-phenomenology and multi-phase engagement capability is the core characteristic of this report’s concept for layering defenses. Approaching layered missile defense in this way incorporates the core tenet of combined arms with the expectation that countering one mechanism for defense makes the attacker more vulnerable to another. The expectation is that effectiveness—the likelihood of intercept—goes up because of the complementary nature of different track and intercept mechanisms spread across each phase of flight. Efficiency and effectiveness improvements then have the knock-on effect of increasing capacity.

A raid might defeat a single layer of a ballistic missile defense in diverse ways. A typical example comes in the form of low-cost, in terms of weight, countermeasures released in space. Dispensing many tinfoil inflatable copies of a warhead is advantageous for an attacker, since this requires little tradeoff in warhead weight or missile range. Even simple countermeasures like this greatly complicate mid-course intercept. However, these countermeasures are stripped away when the warheads re-enter the atmosphere and are not typically released until well into the ascent phase of flight. This general lack of countermeasures is one reason why defeating a missile during launch or ascent is highly desirable for the defense planner, whether accomplished with land-, air-, or space-based interceptors. However, if the threat missile deploys only simple, lightweight countermeasures, then the terminal defense layer remains relatively unaffected.

Layering different defensive systems improves the overall defense in this linear sequential manner but the full advantages of layering disparate systems are also non-linear. For instance, intercepting an SLBM on a depressed trajectory meant to fly under or around the mid-course intercept layer systems might prove achievable for a terminal-phase interceptor. While the SLBM could be moving at faster speeds than the current US terminal defense system design can handle, the SLBM warheads’ lack of maneuverability makes such an intercept plausible and worthy of testing. At the conceptual level, layering in this manner allows taking advantage of both the mathematical benefits of making sequential intercept attempts to maximize system efficiency as well as challenging the multiple options an attack has available to complicate the defense at a more affordable price than a single-layer defense design.

Terminal defenses are typically forward deployable and, therefore, relocatable to be with US troops where the area that needs defending is relatively small. In this way, a small area can be well-defended in a cost-efficient manner. The target location of the strike is a known factor, simplifying this terminal defense challenge. Add to this an expectation of precision engagement, and the defense becomes even easier. Moreover, terminal ballistic missile interceptors are relatively inexpensive because they travel the least distance and engage threats in the least taxing discernment environment. The shorter the intercept range, the smaller and cheaper the rocket. Shorter-range ballistic missile interceptors like the THAAD cost about a tenth of what a regional interceptor, such as the SM-3 IIA, does and a thirtieth the price of GBI interceptors meant to defend the entire country. Of course, it is unlikely that mid-course interceptors have the same effectiveness as either regional or terminal defenses, whether or not one factors in countermeasures (notably, such effectiveness information is classified and therefore out of reach of this report). It is now tempting to assume that it is better to have thirty THAADs rather than one more GBI, but such a comparison is a vast oversimplification of the various threats the HBMD is meant to deter. However, terminal defense is sensible when the conditions, and especially when the targets, of a massive attack can be reasonably predicted. Terminal defense, as an element of a layered HMBD architecture, is most applicable for defending select high-value targets needing a thicker defense. The inherent “mobility” of the THAAD provides different deterrent effects that the report discusses later.

Two US Army THAAD launchers from the 2nd Air Defense Artillery Regiment arrive in South Korea, March 6, 2017. Source: Jaremy Larlee/US Forces Korea.

The perfect mix and number of interceptors needed to defend against ballistic missile threats to the homeland would take both exquisite intelligence and a supercomputer to work out. However, the concept of gaining efficiency through layering is foundational to this discussion and worth presenting with an example. Figure 3 below compares a single layer of defense to one with three nominal layers, the key being that each achieves the same defensive effect, but with the layered design requiring less than half the interceptors.

This is a generic three-layered defense and so is basic and conceptually oriented. It does not directly represent the functionality or effectiveness of this study’s recommended HBMD system because the degree to which each layer would or could engage in a missile raid differs across the imaginable types of attack. There are two main reasons for this. First, a single layer might be capable of a shoot-look-shoot engagement if the interceptor is fast and fire control smart. In this way, one might imagine the first and second shots; therefore, the first two layers of some engagement scenarios might consist only of GBIs. Alternatively, if the sheer quantity of threats overwhelms the GMD system, the second mid-course intercept might come from sea- or land-based SM-3 IIA missiles.³⁴⁵

For the simplified purposes of thinking through the math of missile defenses, one can view “single-layer” effectiveness as a single opportunity to engage a threat, or a single shot, that missile defense parlance refers to as a single shot probability of kill (SSPK). The other key point with this elementary description of missile defense comes with the realization that a single engagement could include multiple interceptors. Within the current US HBMD design, this shot doctrine might occur with a salvo of three GBIs to improve the overall engagement’s likelihood of intercepting a single threatening warhead.³⁴⁶ Alternatively, the planned replacement for GBI has multiple “kill vehicles” that allow a single interceptor missile to take several “shots” at the warheads. For simplification purposes, this example treats all three of these engagement types: a single missile and warhead, multiple missiles and warheads, or a single interceptor missile with a multiple kill vehicle as simply a single layer. The single-layer defense illustration below depicts the most basic version of an intercept, launching three interceptors with single warheads all at once. While crude, this depiction is agnostic to the type of attacking missile and so works for this discussion of basic concepts of defense against any threat type, be it cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons, or a mixed, complex attack.

The graphic below visualizes the simplified math in the paragraph above. For this exemplary engagement, the assumption is each interceptor has an 80 percent chance of success. This illustration ignores any degradation from things like the interference among multiple interceptors launching all at once or the potential for common failure modes, such as all three kill vehicles suffering from the same deficient part. In this case of a non-layered defense, a defender could launch three hundred interceptors to achieve one hundred engagements as a three-on-one attempted intercept. In this instance, the defender could be confident of shooting down all but one of the attacking missiles for a 99 percent effective defense. Alternatively, a three-layered defense would expend only 124 interceptors for the same result, costing far less than half the single-layered interceptors, given that layers two and three are likely cheaper interceptors. These vast cost savings would likely be true even if those lower layers employ a shot doctrine with several interceptors launched per engagement.

Several details make this an overly simplified treatment of the problem, and actual efficiency gains would surely not be this great. But that simplicity helps make the value plain. Perhaps the reality is a cost efficiency gain of a mere ten or twenty percent. But in this example, with defenses numerically overwhelmed, that efficiency gain would translate to an operational benefit of perhaps a dozen more targets defended. Alternatively, in a smaller raid, say of just twenty missiles, the excess capacity could instead bring higher confidence of complete denial or, if sufficiently effective already, might instead mean billions of dollars saved because more interceptors remain immediately available for future contingencies.

Figure 3: Fewer interceptors distributed across multiple layers can achieve the same effectiveness as a significantly larger number of interceptors concentrated in a single layer, resulting in reduced costs.
Source: Author’s own design.

In short, layering ballistic missile defense makes the system more likely to intercept both because of improved engagement options across phases of ballistic missile flight and various counter-countermeasure options. These two characteristics of layered defense that improve effectiveness directly translate to increased system efficiency. Higher efficiency can then increase defense capacity, make it more affordable, or be traded for greater confidence in denying any missile penetration at all. Furthermore, the layering concept for national missile defense does not just do the same job of a single layer better, it also adds entirely new ways to operate. Finally, just imagine the layered defense from the perspective of a would-be attacker; not only would this architecture drive up the number of attacking warheads necessary, but also the uncertainty of which or how many warheads ultimately reach their targets make any scale or scope of attack a very risky bet.

Layering allows for the tactic of preferential defense

A layered defense, underpinned by a robust and detailed sensor system, allows defenders to incorporate the tactic of preferential defense in their overall strategy. Preferential defense is perhaps more readily understood as preferential leaking. The defender decides which incoming warheads to engage and, at the extreme, which to let proceed to a supposedly inconsequential location. Preferential defense works best as an integrated effort hinging on both mobile terminal and mid-range type defenses with the goal of maximizing uncertainty for the attack planner. Preferential defense executes in several ways. In a strong sensing network, intentional leaking saves interceptors when the missile is clearly off target. Israel has employed this tactic for many years when it allows rockets to explode harmlessly in empty farmers’ fields. More germane to this conversation is positing a large raid in which some of the attacking missiles target terminal defenses (such as ICBM silos or Washington, DC, as proposed in this study). Whether or not the existence of the terminal defenses is a surprise to the attacker, the upper layers, if overtaxed, can intelligently hand off threatening objects to lower layers. This approach frees up the longest-range interceptors to focus on threats headed to less thickly defended, or otherwise undefended, targets.

Stand-alone capable but fully integrated multi-role regional defense, such as the Aegis ashore system armed with the Navy’s Standard Missiles, are the true heart of a layered architecture. Just three Aegis radar sites armed with SM-3 IIA missiles can detect and defeat ballistic missiles threatening a large portion of the contiguous United States with additional systems needed to defend both Alaska and Hawaii. Adopting the heart of the US surface Navy’s missile defense means that each shore-based site could simultaneously defend itself from cruise missiles.³⁴⁷ Aegis-commanded radars recessed into the homeland interior would also enable affordable and truly mobile terminal defense options by offboarding the radar from a potential mobile missile launcher. Moreover, the Navy’s Aegis-based defensive capability against cruise and ballistic missiles will soon include hypersonic defense. Multi-mission, long-range intercept with organic robust radar that supports true mobility enables dynamic defense decisions that severely complicate adversary attack planning.

Regional defense radars would be the third, and perhaps, final sensor layer in a homeland defense architecture. Their survivability and overlapping radar pictures improve discernment clarity, adding confidence that a perceived missile attack is no glitch or error. Furthermore, integrated battle management is a staple of any regionally oriented defense and so naturally shores up remotely launching interceptors that supports mobility and improves range. This sort of regional architecture could support a truly mobile terminal defense that sheds organic radar and so becomes more affordable. A mobile’s reduced cost, rather than a silo-based interceptor, might also allow the production of a reserve force of terminal interceptors. Reserves allow for fast expansion during a crisis, while mobility improves decoy efforts, offering an exceptionally cheap means for complicating attack planning. But the regional system would not simply be a support structure; it also has teeth.

A US Marine Corps radar technician initializes an AN/TPS-80 Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) in preparation for Exercise Arctic Edge at Fort Greely, Alaska, February 10, 2024. Source: Madisyn Paschal/US Marine Corps.

As a wide-area defense system, the regionally oriented Aegis-based middle layer can augment the capacity of the nationwide defense or serve as a hedge against technical failure in the top layer. The regional defense layer significantly increases the robustness of the entire homeland defense system. But more importantly to the overall strategy, the mid-layer massively increases the uncertainty that attack planners will see, because of what they cannot see. Attack planners must account for where mobile defenses might be, as well as what the long-range systems will choose to defend.

The regional defense layer would provide a robust, reliable second or even a third ballistic missile intercept opportunity. Terminal defense adds affordable mass and through mobility adds a degree of uncertainty. But the larger defended area of a regional system introduces the option for dynamic decision-making by the defense commander. If an adversary were to find all of the US terminal defenses, the attack planner still could not know what, or how well, the USNORTHCOM commander would choose to defend. In fact, as the attack unfolds, that plan could change with maturing information that better characterizes the attack and possibly changes defense—and counterattack—priorities. Robust, layered sensing supporting a mobile defense posture sets the uncertainty baseline for the attacker. So long as the commander’s defense decisions remain unknowable, the dynamic intercept options that the regional defense system enables will force irresolvable uncertainty upon the attack planner.

Layering creates a more survivable defense

Layering improves defense effectiveness and affords new tactical options, but it also naturally makes defenses more robust and survivable. The effort to peel back the layers, or blind them, eliminates the surprise and confidence necessary for an adversary to attack. Successful decapitation or direct counterforce strikes require surprise to preclude dispersal or launching counterstrikes before the attack completes. But directly attacking strategic early warning systems has traditionally been considered the most escalatory non-nuclear strike because, once blinded, defenders would presume massive, immediate attacks on their nuclear forces. Layering sensors with credible shooters forces a sequential attack and denies this degree of surprise. Layered sensors also add independent multi-phenomenology looks at the raid, which reduces the fear that these indications might be faulty. Road-mobile terminal defense launchers employed without co-located radar would be vastly more survivable, since they would not emit energy that is readily detectable from space. This layered posture improves the survivability of dispersed bombers or, should the Strategic Posture Commission’s recommendation for “pursuing the feasibility of fielding” road-mobile ICBMs ever move forward, these ICBMs’ survivability would also improve when dispatched within this study’s proposed layered HBMD and specifically with an accompanying mobile defense. Complimentary overlap and redundancy are the foundation of layering, and this architecture would improve the survivability of national missile defenses in the same way that the mutually reinforcing legs of the triad secure US strategic nuclear forces.

A Patriot missile battery sits on an overlook at a Turkish army base in Gaziantep, Turkey, Feb. 4, 2013. Source: Department of Defense

Summary

US homeland missile defense could very well become every bit as much a part of the homeland deterrence posture as the nuclear triad. Continuing with a single-layered approach to US national missile defense goes contrary to the foundational theory of America’s strategic nuclear posture cemented in the triad’s intentional redundancy and complementariness. The three layers of this report’s recommended national missile defense architecture improve effectiveness, allow for preferential defending, and enhance system survivability. The strength of the classic nuclear triad comes from each leg providing unique contributions for assured second-strike capacity. Moreover, each leg mitigates against potential technical failure elsewhere in the system and reduces the risk of strategic surprise by an adversary. Even if the current homeland missile defense structure (i.e., GMD) expanded in quantity or quality, it would still be too susceptible to the failure of just one kind of rocket motor, one kind of intercept seeker, or a couple of terrestrial radars. Layering missile defenses frugally gains efficiency, preferential flexibility, and survivability that vastly enhances deterrence of any form of homeland strike well into the future.

Applying layered defense theory to three categorical threats

As described earlier, this report calls for the United States to expand homeland missile defense to encompass threats posed by rogue states like North Korea; accidental or unauthorized missile launches; coercive, limited strikes from Russia or China; and a disarming strike on the US nuclear triad by any combination of hostile nuclear powers, simultaneously or in sequences. Ideally, adversaries must perceive the national missile defense system as fully capable of degrading their contemplated attacks, thus deterring any attempts. Moreover, it should completely deny an all-out attack by a small nuclear power or accidental launch while drastically reducing the consequences of an unauthorized launch. A layered missile defense efficiently mitigates or defeats each of these very different attacks, illustrating the versatility and value of a layered defense architecture.

Denying the undeterrable: Rogue states and unauthorized/accidental launch

This paper groups three different threat situations: a rogue nuclear state population, a purely accidental launch, and an unauthorized attack. This study groups these together because the United States cannot or chooses not to rely on deterrence by punishment as its primary method for protection. Technical details of each attack scenario differ significantly. But the most important aspect of each is that the defender cannot confidently rely on punishment to deter or has made a policy decision not to do so.

By definition, an accidental or unauthorized launch is undeterrable. Moreover, there is insufficient proof that any potential nuclear-armed adversary has installed the requisite security features to preclude unauthorized launches. Therefore, denial, through effective missile defense, is the only sensible way to address this problem. The scale and sophistication of such an attack have remained relatively static over time and so provide a useful baseline for a minimum standard for homeland missile defense. A single missile launched accidentally sets the worst-case for a state’s largest MIRVed system. This would be Russia’s Sarmat ICBM, which can hold up to ten RVs/warheads, while China’s DF-5 is reportedly able to carry up to five. North Korea also may be acquiring MIRVed capability—further contributing to the possibility of an accidental launch involving multiple warheads. The unauthorized launch scenario should encompass the largest number of missiles and warheads controlled by a single commander—in this case, a Russian ballistic missile submarine with sixteen SLBMs each armed with up to six warheads, resulting in a raid of approximately one hundred warheads. This should be a fruitful area for arms control discussions, to reduce both the likelihood of such an incident and the consequences should it still occur. But until such agreements are signed and executed, this number could be a stable rubric for baselining national missile defense.

Clearly, the “rogue” moniker applies to North Korea, and possibly Iran, if it realized a nuclear ICBM capability. The rogue attack category considers a state with a small and vulnerable nuclear posture, perhaps with a leader on the verge of losing power and possibly his life. Based on slim public reporting, this study assumes that Kim Jong Un could launch as many as twenty warheads against the US homeland in the near future.³⁴⁸ Regardless of the precise motivational details, the three attack types may be undeterrable and other means to reduce these threats are insufficient. Therefore, the United States must provide a nationwide active defense with a high likelihood for successful intercept.

Further analysis of a rogue, accidental, or unauthorized attack beyond just raid quantity draws out another key planning factor—the likely targets. A spiteful dictator on the verge of losing power and a rogue submarine captain might well target US cities to inflict maximum pain. Since there is no reason to hold back, the expectations are these actors would employ the best countermeasures under their control. But a nationwide missile defense capable of completely denying every warhead coming off a Russian SSBN is probably not achievable in the near future. However, incorporating this study’s recommendations for more numerous GMD interceptors, primarily by way of the more capable NGI, would significantly reduce these undeterrable nationwide threats. The complete layered HBMD, here recommended, would provide high confidence of a nearly perfect denial for the rogue state threat or accidental launch while drastically reducing risk across the spectrum of potential unauthorized launch scenarios.

Nuclear disarming attack by major powers

The next key missile defense scenario derives from the past wisdom in missile defense literature. That wisdom still applies today but requires ongoing adaptations as the secure second-strike capability of US nuclear forces and command and control come under increasing threat in the emerging two-nuclear-peer environment. Therefore, the secondary—and historically well-established—deterrent effect of layered national missile defense is to significantly degrade confidence in Russia’s and China’s ability to decapitate or destroy US nuclear forces whether unilaterally or in collaboration. Defeating such an attack does not require perfect denial. Instead, doing so rests on two key elements inherent to the layered defense: thick defense of key nuclear sites along with denying surprise and lengthening the time over which the attack unfolds.

Within the category of disarming attack, the goal is simply ensuring the continuous availability of sufficient US nuclear response options to impose unacceptable consequences on the attacker. The layered missile defense concept, in the context of a two-nuclear-peer world, deters such attempts without necessarily raising strategic stability concerns. A layered system can do its rogue, accident, unauthorized launch denial job without being so large or effective as to overly concern US adversaries that the United States would consider a disarming attack on a nuclear peer backed by homeland missile defenses to mop up a ragged retaliation (this is especially true in a two-nuclear-peer environment).

This is possible, in part, because of the steady progress towards more accuracy and higher reliability ICBMs (along with arms control measures) that have culminated in a standard of two-on-one counterforce targeting. These advancements save money for nuclear states in the same way they affect conventional strike capabilities: by reducing targeting redundancies. But an indirect effect is that as overkill comes down, the potential value of missile defense goes up. A layered homeland defense scaled to denying the undeterrable does not need or attempt to outpace and completely deny a disarming attack. Rather, it incorporates an underlayer at key nodes to preclude confidence such an attempt could achieve the desired outcomes at an acceptable cost.

Someday, North Korea may incorporate rather complex countermeasures, but a disarming strike attempt from Russia and/or China would certainly employ the most sophisticated penetration aids. This is why endo-atmospheric intercept is an important capability to include within a layered defense for degrading a disarming attack. The HBMD system, in a pure counter-force situation, can shift the upper layer’s focus to defending key nuclear targets. Yet, the relatively small and predictable areas that require thicker defense lean toward terminal defense as ideal because of its cost-effectiveness with mass and natural mitigation against space-oriented countermeasures. The role that regional defenses could play in this scenario would likely be to back up the earlier layer(s) in defending critical strategic nuclear sites that, while important, did not warrant a dedicated terminal defense. At even a modest scale, selective but effective intercept produces outsized deterrence effects by presenting the risk of partial denial. For the attacker, partial success would be the worst sort of failure, as it would steel resolve for retaliation while leaving the tools to do so. In the multi-nuclear-power threat environment of the future, modest missile defenses could serve as an alternative to nuclear buildup. In this new environment, it is also possible to see them as a part of a stabilizing strategic deterrent posture because they ensure the availability of sufficient weapons to cause unacceptable damage even after an all-out attack. In the next couple of decades, the same US nuclear force sizing of past decades will have to, after surviving a disarming attempt, retain at least a minimal deterrent posture relative to the remaining nuclear peer and rogue actor(s). Terminal point defenses at select locations provide relatively cheap capacity while mitigating mid-course defense vulnerability to sophisticated countermeasures for countering disarming attacks with ballistic missiles.

A successful disarming attack must reduce the victim’s response options below the attacker’s cost threshold before the victim can decide to respond. Early warning sensors and missile defenses, therefore, are necessary early targets. Denying this surprise aspect of disarming attacks is fundamental to the US counterstrategy predicated on seeking to ensure a surviving second-strike option while retaining a credible threat of launch before a successful disarming attack can be completed. Today’s nationwide missile defenses are single-layered and defend against only ballistic missiles, presenting a thin and informationally inadequate defense. Layering systems across the phases of ballistic missile flight from space sensors and mid-course intercept through to high-quantity end game (terminal) defense takes away all doubt as to the nature of the attack if struck directly, widely, and simultaneously. Integrating all the recommended capabilities in this report into a layered defense challenges an attacker to simultaneously defeat all these systems without convincing the president to launch retaliation as the attack unfolds. Layered defense, as an integral part of the broader strategic deterrent force, makes the whole posture anti-fragile.³⁴⁹ Layering, with integrated systems that can also function in stand-alone modes, adds the resilience and clarity that make the system stronger throughout the attack. Layered missile defense significantly improves deterrence and stability in a multi-nuclear-power environment by stretching out the attack timeline while adding presidential options and improving awareness that reduces pressure to either build up nuclear forces in peacetime or to act quickly with them during crisis.

Limited, coercive attacks from major powers

A coercive strike is the most difficult of the three scenarios to describe or defeat. An attacker must calibrate a limited attack so that the coerced state does not perceive the attack as a disarming attempt. The United States should expect potential adversaries to employ a complex strike with ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles. This attack could be purely conventional, but the fact that each delivery platform could be nuclear armed accentuates the threat. A coercive strike might be very small and launch from a single air or sea platform. The raid might also employ dozens of weapons launched from multiple directions and by widely dispersed platforms. This study considers an exemplary coercive strike of perhaps more than a hundred weapons, the majority cruise missiles, but adds a handful of hypersonic and around a dozen ballistic missiles. This report’s recommended homeland defense posture would make denial of each attack method possible, yet not perfect. The layered homeland defense counterstrategy to coercion instead relies on increasing costs for the attack while reducing their benefits and doing so in a way that maximizes uncertainty for the attacker while retaining flexibility for the defense. This section shows why the middle layer with its multi-mission regional radars and interceptors augmented with mobile terminal systems is ideally suited for addressing the ballistic missile element of a complex coercive strike.

Defending against a complex attack is easier if the targets are few or clustered into a defensible area. That is one attribute that makes a disarming attack more predictable and more defensible. However, coercive strikes may target widely dispersed critical infrastructure sites, such as power plants, transportation nodes, and military-supporting industries or military bases themselves. The dispersal of these targets up and down the US coastline rules out terminal defenses as the primary tool. Instead, regional systems (such as Aegis ashore with SM-3 and SM-6 and, soon, GPI) with their powerful radar and multi-mission long-range interceptors are more desirable to address this threat with the help of truly mobile terminal defense options. Of course, this element of the layered defense should, as well, support and complement a robust regionally oriented cruise missile defense. However, the cruise missile threat requires more extensive treatment, to which the study dedicates the entirety of Section 10.

A strategy for countering limited coercive attack: Risking two catastrophes

Perfect denial of a limited coercive strike is possible but not likely a credible claim as seen by a potential attacker. The highly dispersed nature of the targets maintains an attacker’s option to overwhelm locally. But overwhelming defense generally depends on employing many cheaper and, so shorter-range, weapons. Therefore, only major powers able to send attack platforms repeatedly against the adversary’s homeland pose a major coercive threat in this manner. But, unlike with a rogue actor, perfect defense is not a requirement to deter a limited coercive strike. Instead, the design goal is to make calibration of this attack category impossibly difficult. This paper proposes a counter-coercion strategy based on posing two intractable dilemmas for the attack planner. Too light of an attack might fail to gain the desired benefits but risk high costs. Too heavy, and the attack might lose the cloak of limited, inducing an unacceptably painful retaliation rather than compliance.

A coercive attack that mostly or completely fails risks costs beyond just military retaliation. Even incomplete denial severely risks the credibility of future threats with these weapons and perhaps calls into question even more sophisticated systems in the attacker’s arsenals as the overall credibility of its military drops. That would generate the opposite effect a limited coercive attacker sought. The two-on-one strike assumption holds for purely conventional strikes when multiple re-attacks on a target are impractical. But this thinking typically applies where there are no defenses, so a “too small” attack could be as high as three or even four weapons.

Regionally oriented defenses (i.e., those able to cover a specific US region) able to shift where and what they defend could invite catastrophic failure for the attacker by concentrating the defenses, causing the coercive attack to vastly underperform. The weapons employed in such a failed attack would suddenly and surprisingly be proven less potent than the attacker, target state, or third parties previously estimated. Iran recently experienced this degree of virtually complete failure when it launched several hundred missiles of various types in a raid against Israel. But the solution of simply sending more weapons of higher quality introduces its own kind of risks.

The other kind of catastrophe missile defense risks for a limited coercive strike is the cost of inducing too much pain; put differently, the enemy planner can no longer be confident that the attack will be perceived as limited, especially likely if the attacker’s plan accounts for the defenses being significantly more effective than reality. In the latter case, the strike size might be, in the attacker’s mind, just big enough to succeed. But the defender, knowing far more missiles will reach its targets, would see the attack as excessive. A widespread attack across many different targets would exacerbate the appearance of excessive damage. Moreover, avoiding sensitive targets is insufficient to preclude undesirable costs. The sheer volume of targets destroyed can induce an unexpected over response. These realities force the attack planner to consider the possibility of catastrophic success should the defenses prove less effective or more fragile than expected. The objective of a coercive strike is to impose the right amount of pain to gain one’s political goals but not so much that it provokes undesirable behavior, such as over response, rather than compliance. Together, the risks of over and under success imply that a limited coercive strike, in the face of a credible defense, would concentrate multiple weapons aimed at just a few targets. This narrows the likely band of strike scenarios for coercive strikes, targets, and quantity and quality of attacking missiles. Credible defense against all types of missiles raises the cost of entry while the concentration effect reduces the benefits of such an attack, all the while increasing costly risks to limited launch platforms and potentially their supporting infrastructure.

An adversary might employ exquisite weapons during a limited coercive attack to thwart defenses, yet there are several reasons this might not be the case. If the defensive system is, in fact, anti-fragile, it will get stronger from being attacked as it will gain real-world data it can use to improve future intercepts. Moreover, especially if occurring in the early stages of conflict, a limited coercive strike that lands even just a few punches will likely prompt US leaders to loosen rules of engagement for interdiction, missile defeat, or even preemption; if US capabilities have not already dispersed for fear of escalation, they more likely would do so. An attacker may be willing to risk a few navy assets or outlying airfields and somewhat willing to reveal strategic secrets by employing otherwise unseen stealthy weapon systems. However, effective US defenses backed by credible response options should give adversary leadership pause before deciding. There are too many scenarios to imagine all possible forms of coercive attack. But the extensive sensor network of a layered defense discourages coercive strike planners from exposing strategic technical capabilities or risking limited numbers of expensive power-projection platforms, such as submarines or long-range bombers. Giving defensive systems a good look at these top-of-the-line weapons or countermeasures likely reduces their effectiveness in the future.

Summary

The coercive strike planners’ task is to design a raid with enough weapons to provide high confidence that the attack will destroy most of the targets. They must do this without overly exposing technical secrets or inducing too much pain and achieving catastrophic success. Countering coercion does not require a perfect defense, but it does demand a credible capability to significantly reduce the likelihood of success for any form of attack while gathering the data needed to put the attacking platforms and their support elements at risk. Whether or not the defensive system becomes the primary target, a layered defensive system greatly reduces the provocative vulnerability of the homeland to peer coercion.

The role of the underlayer in homeland missile defense

The concept of employing regional missile defense systems as an underlayer for US homeland defense is not new. The 2010 BMDR initiated advanced technology development for a new SM-3 variant called the Block IIB, which “will ensure that the United States will stay ahead of the emerging long-range ballistic missile threat.”³⁵⁰ The Block IIB would contribute to the defense of US allies in Europe and would also augment US homeland defense by providing “an early-intercept capability against potential Iranian ICBMs.”³⁵¹ In other words, the advanced version of the SM-3 would be part of a layered homeland missile defense. Ultimately, the Pentagon canceled plans for the Block IIB missile in 2013 due to dwindling support in Congress over cost and technology concerns.³⁵²

The Trump administration also directed the MDA to investigate the feasibility of incorporating regional missile defense capabilities into the homeland missile defense architecture.³⁵³ Two US regional missile defense systems were under examination for their potential to supplement the GMD system: the Navy’s sea-based SM-3 missile and the Army’s ground-mobile THAAD system. As part of its 2017–18 missile defense policy review, the Trump administration examined the technical feasibility of employing the recently deployed sea-based SM-3 block IIA missile as an underlayer. According to the 2019 MDR:

The SM-3 Blk IIA interceptor is intended as part of the regional missile defense architecture, but also has the potential to provide an important “underlay” to existing GBIs [ground-based interceptors] for added protection against ICBM threats to the homeland. This interceptor has the potential to offer an additional defensive capability to ease the burden on the GBI system and provide continuing protection for the U.S. homeland against evolving rogue states’ long-range missile capabilities.³⁵⁴

In its FY 2021 request to Congress, the MDA included $40 million “to assess the Aegis Weapon System to determine if it can be upgraded to augment homeland defenses by supplementing the GMD system to defeat ICBM threats.”³⁵⁵ Congress, apparently thinking along the same lines, directed the DOD to conduct a test of the SM-3 against a simple ICBM target by the end of 2020. On November 17, 2020, a US Navy Aegis destroyer launched a SM-3 IIA, which intercepted a target that simulated a North Korean ICBM over the ocean northeast of Hawaii.³⁵⁶

A SM-3 Block IIA missile launches from an Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System-equipped destroyer during a flight test to intercept a target northeast of Hawaii, November 17, 2020. Source: Jason Cutshaw/ U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command.

The SM-3, designed to deploy at sea, intercepts medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile threats outside the atmosphere in the midcourse phase. The missile has currently been adapted for use as part of Aegis Ashore, a land-based version of the Navy’s Aegis BMD system, with twenty-four SM-3s deployed in Romania and an additional twenty-four in Poland. Upgrading the SM-3 missile to intercept even a simplified version of a North Korean ICBM lacking countermeasures is not trivial. An April 2021 report from the US GAO pointed out that efforts by the MDA “to include the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor in a new ‘layered’ homeland defense against ICBM threats targeting the US could introduce considerable cost, schedule, and performance uncertainty to a program that has just entered initial production.”³⁵⁷ According to Raytheon, the manufacturer of the SM-3 family of missiles, the block IIA already has the speed, range, and altitude capabilities to intercept ICBMs (though it needs software changes).³⁵⁸

While the SM-3 IIA missile deployed on Aegis ships will continue to play an important regional defense role, the interceptor may be able to provide a modest, additional layer of protection for the homeland against North Korean ICBMs in an emergency or during a crisis. The ship would have to be in the right place near US coasts at the right time, and, given its smaller size compared to the GBI, the interceptor would not provide coverage for the entire United States. It would also deprive the ship of supporting other missions, including conventional warfighting. Moreover, the SM-3 would not be capable against the more complex Russian and Chinese ballistic missiles armed with penetration aids and decoys—nor would it defend against air- and sea-launched cruise missiles.

MDA also explored the technical feasibility of including the Army’s THAAD system in the layered defense architecture, even deploying it to Hawaii for a short time in the early 2000s. The FY 2021 MDA budget request included $139 million to “initiate the development and demonstration of a THAAD interceptor prototype to support contiguous United States defense” and had anticipated a flight test in FY 2023. Meant to defend forward-deployed forces and military bases against MRBMs and IRBMs, THAAD may have some residual capability against long-range ballistic missiles and perhaps hypersonic weapons in their terminal glide phase. The defensive coverage of THAAD would be considerably smaller than the SM-3, and both would pale in comparison to the reach of the GBI, which can protect the entire nation from its two locations in Alaska and California. As a start, the MDA had proposed to examine what it would take to integrate the SM-3 and the THAAD into the GMD fire control structure to provide commanders with added defensive measures allowing a single command-and-control system to direct engagement in mid-course, late mid-course, and the terminal phase as well, should the earlier interceptors miss. The Biden administration did not pursue the underlayer concepts of SM-3 IIA and THAAD.

Figure 4 shows a notional example of the THAAD defense of key strategic assets with internal analysis by Lockheed Martin depicting the protection of a nuclear missile field in North Dakota, USSTRATCOM headquarters in Nebraska, and two batteries around the national capital region in addition to systems protecting Alaska and Hawaii.

Figure 4: Lockheed Martin example of THAAD defense of key strategic assets

Use case: Synergy for HBMD and mobile ICBMS

The Strategic Posture Commission’s 2023 report and the more recently released National Defense Strategy Commission both recommend reconsideration of the US nuclear posture with emphasis on the notion of increasing warhead count. One way to achieve this would be to field a road-mobile version of the normally silo-based ICBM. Several variations of this idea have been considered and rejected in the past. One reason past efforts failed was the exceptional financial and political expense of both the postulated two-hundred-thousand-pound specially hardened offroad vehicles and setting aside restricted lands for patrol. A recent variation on the Cold War-era mobile ICBM concept proposes housing simpler missile transporter-launchers in shelters within the existing ICBM missile field infrastructure to keep costs down. Following the recommendations of this report, the survivability of such a mobile ICBM would greatly multiply, whether in garrison or out on patrol near the missile field, where the mobile ICBM would receive the protection of all three layers of the proposed HBMD architecture.

In addition to the two over-layers, terminal defenses with a THAAD battery and its 6 launcher vehicles each carrying 8 interceptors would greatly improve the deterrence effects of the mobile ICBM force by demanding much more than just the standard two attacking warheads per silo. The complications for an attack planner start by inducing location uncertainty through mobility when deploying during a crisis and then compound when sprinting to an active defense “safe haven” when alerted to an incoming attack. The road-mobile ICBM could easily move fifteen miles in the time it takes an ICBM to complete its flight. Such a mobile missile could require half a dozen or more attacking missiles to ensure destruction based on a five-mile lethal range assuming a 200 kiloton (kt) airburst optimized for five pounds per square inch (psi). But under an active defense, the mobile ICBM would move to pre-designated defended areas unlocatable by the adversary because there is no physical marker to trace. Therefore, mobile ICBMs deployed alongside active defenses could force the attacker to double or triple the strike force to ensure destruction. This could make a dozen mobile missiles as survivable as a squadron of fifty silo-based ICBMs. This would be true even if the defensive system’s likelihood of successful intercept is quite low or the GMD and regional defenses are prioritizing other locations. With the mobile missiles able to cluster, this would require, perhaps, as few as five safe havens, meaning that as many as ten missiles could defend each mobile ICBM. If THAAD or some other terminal defensive system proves credible in this role then road-mobile ICBMs would offer huge investment returns by enabling this relatively inexpensive means of increasing the cost of entry for an attempted disarming strike.

Conclusion

The current single-layer national missile defense system is too fragile to meet national defense objectives in the emerging strategic environment, much less the increased roles proposed by this study. Layered missile defense harnesses its inherent advantages over a single-layered system by efficiently increasing capacity while improving overall effectiveness. The proposed layered architecture allows posturing to thicken defenses where and when needed, but without allowing the adversary to observe all aspects. The regional layer multi-mission capability integrated with short-range systems together massively complicate adversary attack planning. The redundancy, overlap, and uncertainty built into the layered architecture make the system inherently robust and survivable. Furthermore, thinking about layered national missile defense as a tool of national power integrated with the rest of the strategic deterrent posture illustrates how layering would make the entire enterprise anti-fragile. The United States needs to deter three very different types of potential attacks, each requiring very different deterrent effects. Layered defense efficiently provides confident denial of a rogue strike while massively complicating a coercive strike plan and augmenting strategic nuclear deterrence effects.

Section nine: A better strategy for homeland missile defense

Introduction

The current HBMD system, designed for a specific and limited threat scenario focused on North Korea, comprises only a single layer, the GBI. The United States requires not simply a new architecture for accomplishing the same old mission better but rather a new architecture and strategy that layers in new capabilities designed to meet the challenges posed by Russian and Chinese limited strikes as well as the expansion of North Korea’s missile capabilities.

Given the limitations imposed by technology, funding, and industrial capacity, a phased approach is necessary. It should focus on near-term opportunities to bolster homeland defenses against the North Korean threat. This approach should simultaneously lay the research and development groundwork for follow-on measures to deal with limited numbers of more sophisticated Russian and Chinese missile threats (ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic) and stay ahead of potential further expansion of North Korean missile capabilities and, perhaps, a nascent Iranian ICBM capability.

There is an important distinction between the technological sophistication of a North Korean missile as compared to that of Russia or China. Great-power competitors employ sophisticated countermeasures that can challenge the US ability to distinguish between real warheads and false objects—placing great stress on US sensor capabilities to find the right targets for interceptors. This challenge is different in various phases of flight such that countermeasures in one phase may be ineffective in another; this is an advantage that layered missile defense exploits well. Simply and solely building more interceptors is a poor plan to defend against the increasing numbers of North Korea. It also will not solve the Russian and Chinese problem set or, perhaps, even the not-so-distant future North Korean countermeasure capabilities—additional defensive technology is necessary.

Since layered defense is this study’s essential recommendation, this section organizes the proposed architecture by phases of flight or interception. It begins with a summary of the existing architecture for the defense of the homeland against ballistic missile threats. Then, it describes the eyes and brain of the system—the sensors and fire control system. Next, this section addresses the terminal-phase defenses, which provide limited point defenses of key assets, traditionally the strategic assets, such as ICBM silos or nuclear command-and-control nodes. It then works to describe the larger area-defense systems, such as the SM-3 missile that engages threats in the late-midcourse phase. The section follows with the continent-wide defense provided by the long-range ground-based midcourse defense system and finally to the important yet challenging boost and ascent phase, where threats could be eliminated shortly after launch, perhaps even while they are still rising above the enemy’s territory. For each phase of flight or intercept, the report summarizes recommendations for near- and longer-term research and development and potential deployment.

Current homeland ballistic missile defense systems

The cornerstone of the current US HBMD system architecture is the GMD, which defends the fifty United States against long-range ballistic missile attacks. GMD destroys intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles during the midcourse phase of their flight. The GBI is a silo-launched interceptor consisting of a solid-fueled multi-stage boost vehicle and an exo-atmospheric kill vehicle that uses hit-to-kill technology. The GMD system has been operational since 2004 and consists of forty-four GBI interceptors. The interceptors stand watch at two sites in the United States: a few missiles at Vandenberg, California, while the vast majority are at Fort Greely, Alaska. The GMD system leverages Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) satellites for initial launch detection and UEWRs for early detection and tracking, followed by more precise radars such as the LRDR and SBX radar for more precise tracking and discrimination. The C2BMC system provides planning, command and control, battle management, and communications.

A Ground-Based Midcourse Defense interceptor in a launch silo at Vandenberg Space Force Base (previously Air Force Base), California, 2006. Source: US Missile Defense Agency.

Recommended defense designs in the near and far term

Missile threats to the US homeland are rapidly outpacing the existing and planned capabilities of the US missile defense architecture. Ballistic missile defense architectures do not fully address the urgent need of today’s threats and must plan and make continual improvements to stay ahead of the threats. The United States needs to consider new and alternative concepts and capabilities to harness current and emerging technologies necessary to defend against future missile attacks, in a layered fashion.

Desired future architecture attributes

The future architecture requires global “birth to death” tracking and discriminating sensors that can provide engagement quality tracking for HGVs and can discriminate the ballistic RVs from countermeasures and decoys to minimize interceptor wastage. Multi-phenomenology sensors would provide less susceptibility to jamming and add robustness to discrimination solutions. The architecture requires a layered defense as described in the previous section. Adding boost/ascent-phase kill capability to the layered defense offers an option to engage the threat before countermeasure deployment. The whole system architecture should be designed to track and engage hypersonic and maneuvering targets and must be survivable, resilient, and able to defend against substantial raid sizes. One way to enhance survivability is to make GBIs mobile. By making these defensive systems and, more importantly, their defended assets less easily targeted because the GMD launch site is unpredictable, they become harder to target directly. The United States also needs more survivable sensors to engage in any direction and take the battle forward and far from defended assets. Above all, the architecture needs to raise the perceived cost of an attack and increase uncertainty.

Suggested defense architecture improvements

Sensors and BMC3

Sensors and BMC3 are the backbone of any defense architecture and generally support all phases of intercept: terminal, midcourse, and ascent/boost. This report does not recommend any changes beyond those currently planned for early warning radars or space sensors but describes suggested improvements to terrestrial tracking and discriminating sensors, followed by a discussion on space-based sensors.

Terrestrial sensors

Long-range discrimination radar (LCDR)

The LRDR provides enhanced warhead discrimination, precision tracking, and warhead kill assessment to GBIs, making them more effective. The MDA should continue funding the incremental software improvements to the LRDR while considering a modest expansion to add another array to cover more attack approach directions.

Discrimination and electronic protection improvements to existing radar (SBX, AN/TPY-2, SPY)

Successful missile defense requires the ability to distinguish the warhead from decoys and spent objects. This must begin as early as possible in the sensing phase of the kill chain. Equally important is the ability of the missile defense architecture to protect itself against electronic attacks, such as jamming. Electronic attacks against US missile defense systems can significantly degrade a radar’s ability and timeline to support a missile defense engagement. While current radars have some discrimination and electronic protection (EP) capability, emphasis needs to be placed on making this capability more robust as threat countermeasures and electronic attack capabilities are becoming more sophisticated. The MDA’s investment in discrimination technology has ebbed and flowed over the years; more recently, there has been less focus on discrimination. The MDA needs to reinvigorate its developments in discrimination and continue or expand its investments in EP technology across the missile defense architecture.

The DOD should continue to develop techniques and algorithms for improving discrimination by land- and sea-based sensors, making the GBI, NGI, and SM-3 interceptors more efficient and effective. In the longer term, the MDA should also assess and develop bi-static/multi-static sensing capabilities that make land- and sea-based sensors more effective when working together. If additional funds are available, the DOD could consider the deployment of more land-based sensors to provide more robust sensing in regions of increasing need, such as southern-facing radars in the contiguous United States or additional radars in Hawaii. Airborne UAV sensors should also be considered for surge operations when indications and warnings are available or during heightened alert.

Over-the-horizon radar (OTHR)

The MDA should assess the contribution of the OTHR capabilities being developed for homeland cruise missile defense and their potential application for ballistic missile defense. At a minimum, the expectation should be that this system would help identify the shooter/interceptor for cruise missiles, such as a bomber or surface ship, enabling missile defeat by targeting the launch platform.

Space-based sensors

Robust, multi-phenomenology layered sensors are essential to ensuring that the interceptor guides to the appropriate target even while the system itself is under attack. Space-based sensors can provide persistent global detection, warning, and precision tracking of threats launched from any location as well as kill assessment after interceptor engagements.

It is time for the United States to deploy space-based sensor defense tracking capability and “move the center of gravity (the major concentration of the tracking sensor architecture) from terrestrial-based sensors to space-based sensors.”³⁵⁹ Space Force’s SDA has demonstrated that the United States can develop space-based sensors at much lower costs than previously thought feasible. The DOD is assessing SDA-developed tracking space sensors and the MDA-developed Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS). Most of these will be Wide Field of View (WFOV) tracking satellites that will provide a cue to the more sensitive Medium Field of View (MFOV) satellites stated to be capable of providing target-quality data to mid-course interceptors. The HBTSS, a prototype for the MFOV missile-tracking capability, in June 2024, tracked its first hypersonic launch, a test vehicle built to prove the system’s performance.³⁶⁰ It is important that any follow-on capabilities can provide the precision needed for guiding interceptors for both ballistic and hypersonic defense, and that the MDA and the warfighter remain a strong voice in the requirements and capabilities of these sensors to ensure that they provide the needed precision.

Mockup of hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensors. Source: Missile Defense Agency

The DOD should continue funding the SDA and MDA demonstrations and fund the rapid filling of low-Earth orbit (LEO) constellations to provide initial operational capability for detecting and tracking ballistic and hypersonic threat missiles as soon as possible. Based on current plans, an initial capability of eighteen to twenty-four MFOV satellites, or more, could be available by 2032.³⁶¹ Ultimately, orbital regimes will need to include survivability in their design considerations.

The DOD should also immediately begin developing and demonstrating satellite sensor concepts that can track ballistic missiles beyond booster burnout and distinguish warheads from decoys. The MDA has initiated a demonstration sensor, called the Discriminating Space Sensor (DSS), that will be able to execute both tasks. The DSS is vital to the MDA’s vision for a space-based tracking layer and will complement HBTSS. The MDA stated that the DSS has completed ground concept testing with plans to launch a space-based demonstration sensor by 2029.³⁶² Continued funding for this work is a necessity, alongside its coordination with the SDA, ultimately fielding a constellation of discriminating space sensors that will result in the need to shoot fewer interceptors. The Pentagon must conduct development and demonstration activities during FYs 2025-30 to allow for initial operational capability in the 2032–35 timeframe. Upon successfully demonstrating discriminating space sensors, the DOD should, as soon as possible, supplement the missile defense space architecture with DSS. This capability will be a force multiplier, making each GBI/NGI and perhaps even SM-3 more effective and potentially reducing the wastage of costly interceptors.

Both sensor types (tracking and discriminating sensor capabilities) would provide significant multi-mission capability in support of other DOD missions, such as space domain awareness and counterspace, and their designs should keep those ancillary benefits in mind. These sensors should also be resilient. This study does not advocate eliminating terrestrial based sensors; rather, this section suggests adding space-based sensors to provide global “birth to death” coverage as well as additional phenomenology and redundancy while aiding in tracking and discrimination capability.

A counterargument to LEO-based space sensors is sometimes raised pertaining to the vulnerabilities of LEO-based sensors to anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities. The most recent arguments in this vein have centered on the revelation of Russia developing a nuclear detonation device on a LEO satellite.³⁶³ All sensors, whether space-based, ground-based, ship-based, or airborne, have unique location vulnerabilities. Space-based sensors could have increased robustness against nuclear threats incorporated into their design, albeit at a cost. Additionally, the space-based tracking constellation could switch to alternative orbits, such as medium-Earth orbit (MEO).

Space-based kill assessment

The MDA has deployed a demonstration constellation of Space-based Kill Assessment (SKA) satellites to provide confirmation of successful intercept in space. In its FY 2025 budget, the MDA is continuing to fund the integration of SKA into the overall missile defense system. This work should continue, with the goal of providing a credible capability for mid-course assessment to support kill confirmation sufficient to preclude the need for a second shot that creates interceptor wastage.

In summary, a robust space-based sensor system would provide a global stand-alone capability to support intercept when viewing by terrestrial-based systems is not feasible and provide an additional phenomenology for more robust tracking and discrimination capability. The MDA first demonstrated this potential in 2013, when an Aegis missile intercepted an MRBM with an SM-3 Block IA missile using a cue from only two Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) demonstration satellites that detected the target before the onboard SPY-1 radar could detect it, exhibiting a launch-on-remote capability.³⁶⁴ Launch-on-remote capability provides cueing from an off-board sensor to enable expanded battlespace and could allow for earlier intercepts facilitating layered defense. If the quality of the track is precise enough, space-based systems can enable the kill chain all the way to the end game with an engage-on-remote capability, eliminating the need for a land-based radar at all for SM-3 intercept.

Command and control

Future command-and-control improvements should continue the integration of the architectures described above. The DOD should immediately begin modifications to the C2BMC to integrate GMD with an Aegis underlayer for homeland defense. The DOD should continue work on the integration of the Army’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS) with the US BMDS, as well as Navy systems to ensure a fully integrated air and missile defense architecture for homeland defense, including cruise missile defense and missile defeat, to better use extant capabilities from the MDA, the services, and other government organizations. The MDA should continue to invest robustly in measures to protect the C2BMC against potential cyber, electronic warfare (EW) and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) threats.

Beyond ballistic missile defense, the DOD should pursue all needed upgrades to ensure that the C2BMC system can process data quickly enough to respond to and destroy an incoming hypersonic threat. The MDA should also assess and integrate additional Space Force sensor capabilities that enhance defense against ballistic and hypersonic glide threat weapons. The DOD should also consider the integration of the C2BMC with the Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) for a fully netted missile defense system architecture, including cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic missile defense. Lastly, DOD should consider the incorporation of tracking data from airborne sensors (e.g., fighters) into the ballistic missile defense portion of the architecture. Ultimately, the vision would be a single command-and-control network that would enable the choice of all useable/available sensors with all useable and available interceptors and that fully integrates IAMD capabilities across the DOD.

Interceptors

Terminal phase

Following this paper’s recommendation to protect critical nuclear command-and-control sites, the DOD should consider terminal defense systems as part of a layered capability, including THAAD (against ballistic missiles), SM-6, and/or Patriot systems (against cruise missiles or HGVs). The key to preferential defense is enemy uncertainty about what the United States is defending and to what degree. The Aegis Vertical Launch System (VLS) is inherently ready to integrate SM-3, SM-6, and GPI to provide defense against cruise and hypersonic missiles but would require non-recurring engineering funding for this integration. It is important to note that both Aegis and THAAD have proven capable of intercepting IRBMs and those of shorter ranges. Testing these systems to prove an intercontinental-class ballistic threat defense option would increase their deterrent effect. But for true confidence in this expanded capability, they will need to be evolved and tested extensively in this role to give pause to an adversary and confidence to American citizens.

Sailors remove an expended canister from the guided-missile destroyer USS Benfold’s Aegis Vertical Launch System (VLS) while the vessel is docked at Santa Rita, Guam, September 29, 2016. Source: Chidi Amadi/US Navy.

Terminal defense interceptors must be equipped with the appropriate tracking sensors and command and control to provide the firing solution for the interceptors. For THAAD, this would be the TPY-2 radar, and for Patriot the AN/MPQ-65 radar (or the Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor, LTAMDS, in the future). SM-3 and SM-6 will require a SPY radar for cueing, but, in the long term, could possibly leverage a space-based sensor for engage-on-remote capability. Any of these interceptors could receive modifications to use other sensors for potential launch-on-remote or even engage-on-remote capability if time, finances, or technology do not permit integration in VLS/Aegis-based regional defensive infrastructure.

Midcourse phase

The DOD should continue to fully fund the development of the NGI and begin fielding it as soon as possible. Under current plans, twenty new NGIs will supplement the existing GBI architecture. The NGIs will have improved reliability over GBI and will also have multiple kill vehicles within each interceptor, reducing the number of interceptors needed to confidently defeat a threat with complex countermeasures. The planned emplacement of the first twenty NGIs is at Alaska’s Fort Greely.

The MDA could place additional NGIs at the California site or initiate an East Coast site for more robust defense against North Korean (or Iranian) threats, which, moreover, would enhance defense against limited threats originating from Russia or China. In 2019, the DOD identified Fort Drum in New York as an optimum location for a third site.³⁶⁵ For added survivability or, perhaps, to reduce cost, follow-on NGI designs might focus on making them transportable rather than silo based. These options would require engineering trade assessment in studies to determine the cost/performance trade of geographic diversity versus funding additional GBI/NGIs or other architecture options.

The DOD should also begin funding procurement of land- and/or sea-based Aegis radar systems supported by SM-3 interceptors to serve as an underlayer to the GMD system for intercepting in late midcourse. Ideally, this would include five total sites with three covering the contiguous United States and one each for Alaska and Hawaii that would follow from lessons learned as the DOD completes the system in Guam. This underlayer could defeat threat missiles not taken out by GBI/NGI or if the GBI/NGI interceptors have been exhausted.

In 2020, the success of a modified SM-3 IIA intercept test against an ICBM-class target demonstrated the feasibility of this opportunity.³⁶⁶ Aegis ship-based SM-3 IIA interceptors could immediately serve during a crisis to expand the number of interceptors protecting the United States. The Army, in the mid-term, should build land-based Aegis systems, like Europe’s Aegis Ashore sites that each field twenty-four SM-3 missiles, to provide a permanent second layer and eliminate the need to pull Navy assets for homeland missile defense. Regardless of whether by land or by sea, Aegis-based missile defense has the added benefit of being fully integrated to support surface defense against all missile types, whether surface-skimming cruise missiles or ultra-long-range ballistic missiles. While there is no estimate for how US industry could support the radar stations’ construction, a recent study by Sen. Roger Wicker’s (R-MS) office concluded that SM-3 IIA production could increase to thirty-six missiles per year.³⁶⁷ In making architecture decisions, policymakers must consider the opportunity cost for new options and system-level tradeoffs.

Boost/Ascent phase

Intercept in the boost and ascent phases has significant advantages, and can be best accomplished through SBIs or non-kinetic interception capabilities.

Space-Based Interceptors (SBI)

Space-based defenses should be the primary focus for next-generation missile defense. SBI could provide on-demand global coverage of missile launches with multiple opportunities to intercept threat missiles as they transit through space, and it offers the only feasible option for defeating missiles even earlier, during boost/ascent. Early intercept could deny the adversary the use of countermeasures or force early release, thus reducing their effectiveness. SBI would also provide a larger defensive footprint and supports a shoot-assess-shoot (S-A-S) firing doctrine. SBIs could provide boost and post-boost access in places where terrestrial weapons would have geographic constraints. The option to engage threats during the boost/ascent phase also offers the huge efficiency gain of an intercept before the missile can dispense countermeasures or, if it has them, multiple or even maneuvering warheads. This capability would also enable defense against direct-ascent antisatellite threats.

A space-based layer of interceptors could work synergistically with land- or sea-based defenses to provide a robust, highly effective, and layered missile defense. In the past, SBI has been deemed too expensive, but recent advances in the miniaturization of components and decreased launch costs make SBI a much more attractive option. Of course, this capability must also be proven with realistic testing.

This is not a “Battlestar Galactica” concept; rather, this would employ a limited number of SBIs that could achieve defense against a limited threat. Since SBIs would be in constant motion and spread around the globe, even deploying hundreds of SBIs would only enable a handful to be in position to defend against a few dozen attacking missiles or warheads. However, this natural limitation also offers a unique benefit: self-healing. The remaining SBIs could easily disperse to fill the hole left by the consumed SBIs, albeit at a slightly lower density than before.

An SBI testbed demonstration should begin as soon as possible. A nearer-term capability demonstration might begin by putting NGI kill vehicles in orbit with a small engagement booster, but ultimately, the kill vehicle weight would need further reductions for a viable SBI constellation. In the long term, compact megawatt-class lasers may have a role in defense operations in space. These concepts could also support other multi-mission functions.

Another option under consideration over the years is the development of an air-launched weapon that could engage threat missiles early in their trajectory. Prior assessments by the MDA and others concluded that air-launched weapons would require a very high-speed interceptor and close proximity to the launch site.³⁶⁸

Non-kinetic capabilities

More sophisticated threats challenge current US longer-range interceptors, while the proliferation of missiles that can be intercepted may exhaust and/or saturate current US systems. As the projected number of threats continues to increase, there is an ever-growing need for non-kinetic capabilities to supplement the kinetic interceptor inventory. The DOD should consider funding the development and fielding of non-kinetic capabilities, such as directed energy or high-power microwave (HPM), as a complement to kinetic kill concepts. These technologies’ integration within the missile defense command-and-control architecture must receive funding as well.

Directed-energy weapons offer the potential of deep magazines, rapid reload, and low cost per shot to mitigate saturation. If directed-energy weapons were used to destroy threat missiles in the boost phase or early in midcourse, they could reduce the number of midcourse or terminal kinetic interceptors needed to destroy the adversary’s remaining missiles. This could increase the likelihood of successfully countering the threat and would also complicate the enemy’s attack calculus by creating uncertainty. The military services and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (OUSD[R&E]) are moving to rapidly develop and deploy directed-energy capabilities to counter uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV) and cruise missile threats against ships, aircraft, and bases. For example, the Army is now testing laser weapons in the 300-kilowatt range.

The DOD should leverage the rapid advances that have been occurring to develop and demonstrate the capability to defeat ballistic missile threats with directed-energy weapons. For missile defense missions, the need exists for megawatt-class capability, and investments should focus on reducing size and weight, increasing laser efficiency, and executing a robust lethality experimentation and analysis effort. Diode-pumped alkali laser (DPAL) technology, in particular, offers the potential to achieve megawatt capability in an air or space-based platform due to its shorter wavelength for a more focused beam and higher efficiencies. While DPAL technology is less mature than other solid-state concepts, investments in the technology should continue and play a part in the trade space for future high-power directed-energy concepts.

It is worth noting that the MDA and its predecessor organizations since the Reagan administration have explored airborne directed energy. The Airborne Laser (ABL), initiated under the US Air Force, then transferred to the MDA in 2002, and had several successful showings of beam control and atmospheric compensation alongside demonstrations of shootdowns of airborne and ballistic targets. However, the high operational costs and complexities, such as power generation and cooling, led to the program’s cancelation in 2011. Concepts currently explored include higher efficiency and shorter wavelength lasers. This, along with the rapid advances in higher power, atmospheric compensation, and beam control, suggest that the timing is right to reinvest in directed energy as a complement to kinetic weapons for defeating large raids in a robust and cost-effective manner. An incremental approach to achieve this would begin with using lasers for sensing and midcourse tracking, working up to an ability to address shorter-range threats, such as UAVs, and spiraling successes into capabilities for longer-range threats such as ballistic missiles once the technology and concepts of operation (CONOPS) evolve. In 2024, the MDA stated that its current approach is to do just this, first focusing on using low-powered lasers for tracking and working toward higher-powered systems for intercepts.³⁶⁹

Additions for defense against hypersonic glide weapons

The DOD must robustly fund defense against hypersonic weapons. For terminal defense, Patriot has some capability as demonstrated in the war in Ukraine.³⁷⁰ The SM-6 can also provide terminal defense capability against hypersonic glide weapons. The MDA has begun development of the GPI for defense against hypersonic weapons in the glide phase. According to the MDA’s FY 2024 budget request, this capability will not field until the 2035 timeframe. Based on conversations with defense industry, the study author found that, although the actual schedule has funding limitations, the capability could accelerate to have an initial operational capability in the late 2020s timeframe.

In the FY 2024 NDAA, Congress mandated that GPI achieve initial operational capability by the end of 2029 and full operational capability by 2032. Given Russia’s and China’s rapid fielding of hypersonic weapons, the DOD should accelerate this deployment plan for GPI to the end of the 2020s. It will only be a matter of time before North Korea has a credible hypersonic weapon program. The GPI would ideally, by design, work in a layered defense fashion with SM-6 as a terminal backup capability deployed within a VLS at sea, in harbor, or on land. If GPI cannot be accelerated, then the MDA should consider assessing other options, such as leveraging existing systems and using them in new ways (like the Strategic Capabilities Office [SCO] approach), for a nearer-term capability for intercepting hypersonic weapons prior to the terminal phase.

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 133 tests two containerized SM-6 missile launchers in Ronne, Denmark, September 20, 2023. Source: Andrew Waters/Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 133.

For future hypersonic defense, the MDA should consider extending the range of GPI by adding a larger booster not limited by the Aegis VLS size constraints (e.g., a new launcher). This would allow for a longer-range defense, longer engagement timelines, and additional layered defense options. Air-launched hypersonic defense weapons should also be studied and developed, if proven feasible and cost-effective. Of course, if feasible, airborne lasers should also become part of the option space for hypersonic defense.

Missile defeat

The 2022 MDR calls for interceptor-based approaches as part of comprehensive missile defeat. John Plumb, then the assistant secretary of defense for space policy, provided the following definition of missile defeat: “It is a full-spectrum approach to prevent and defeat adversary missiles in all domains and along all timelines through a mix of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities such as passive defense and electronic warfare.”³⁷¹ The details of missile defeat concepts are beyond this paper’s scope, but it should be pursued as a complement to kinetic defense options.

Technology investment

This discussion would not be complete without emphasizing the need for the MDA to get back into the technology business. The MDA’s technology budget has been dismal over the past four to five years (in FY 2024 MDA’s science and technology budget was at a historical low, below 1 percent of its Total Obligational Authority [TOA]). Incremental improvements alone cannot defeat a rapidly evolving threat. A high-priority technology investment should begin proving out the discriminating space sensor concept on orbit and rapidly fielding the capability, per the SDA model. Getting back into the technology business means the MDA should pursue an SBI testbed demonstration, along with increased investments in directed energy, and more robust funding for advanced discrimination techniques, as well as technological investments in lighter-weight, lower-cost interceptors to make kinetic interceptor options more affordable.

Conclusion: Investment priorities

As suggested by this study, defeating a threat with surging capability and capacity requires a new strategy based on layering defenses along with significant changes to the missile defense architecture. The DOD should place an increased emphasis on robust and global sensing capability, integrated command and control, and layered interceptor architectures that expand the battlespace, enabling flexible firing doctrines such as “shoot-assess-shoot” and enlarging defended areas. The DOD must also begin placing heavier emphasis on investing in future, revolutionary capabilities, such as space sensors, SBI, and non-kinetic options, to outpace adversary capability development.

The recommendations listed are a “menu” of options for the incoming administration to deliberate, bearing in mind funding considerations. While fully pricing out the recommendations is beyond this study’s scope, the MDA would require a significant increase in funding to field these capabilities in the timeframes described above. Increasing the percentage of the defense budget devoted to homeland defense from the current one-third of one percent to a full one percent would certainly go a long way to accomplishing these goals.

To address the rapidly evolving threat, priority should be placed on space-based tracking and discriminating sensors (HBTSS follow-on and DSS), investing in an SBI test bed, and funding the SM-3 IIA underlayer as quickly as possible.
The MDA must also invest robustly in measures to protect the C2BMC, sensors and interceptors against potential cyber, EW and EMP threats. The development of GPI must accelerate as directed by Congress.
If North Korean ICBM capacity projections warrant it, a third interceptor site on the East Coast and additional NGI purchases beyond the initial planned twenty should be pursued.
After that, other options in the menu should be considered to strengthen ballistic missile defenses based on further study. All these options must be assessed in detailed engineering trade studies to determine the cost/performance trades and system-level benefits compared to other architecture options.

“Breaking The Glass”

Homeland defense emergency option for improving defenses by 2030

Given the accelerating pace of air and missile threats of all types to the US homeland, allies, and deployed forces, it is worth exploring gap-filler options with adaptable capabilities in the next five years or less. The United States should consider a serious, concentrated effort to integrate existing air and missile defense assets (including missile defeat) to better utilize what already exists to protect the US homeland and critical infrastructure. The result would be a fully integrated air and missile defense and defeat architecture with significant capacity and resilience by 2030, with two-year incremental capability improvements after that. The initial organizing principle should be “any sensor and any shooter that can be used against any air and missile threats,” integrating all systems together into a “system of systems” with a mosaic (or kill web) approach. The DOD’s JADC2 effort could serve as a starting point for an overarching survivable and resilient network that enables this integration work. This effort would knit together existing RF and IR sensors, interceptors, and non-kinetic effectors to more efficiently use what already exists or is in development. This work would need implementation outside the usual DOD requirements and acquisition process and focus on rapid prototyping and fielding over the five-year period, with warfighter involvement from the start.

Congress has noted this need. The Senate’s FY 2025 NDAA language directed the DOD to create a holistic “system of systems” Joint IAMD Command and Control architecture to protect the US homeland against limited strikes on critical infrastructure and other important targets

Section ten: Cruise missile defense of the homeland

Non-nuclear strategic attack

Notwithstanding the shortfalls in ballistic missile defense and the still-emergent hypersonic defense needs, one of the most under-resourced areas of US homeland missile defense has been that which could defend against long-range cruise missile and aerial attacks. Despite receiving some attention in recent years, meaningful cruise missile defense capability for the homeland is far from being realized.

One principal challenge for cruise missile defense has been at the conceptual level. Air and cruise missile threats to the homeland have, to a large degree, been seen as a lesser included threat to the larger problem of nuclear deterrence from major powers. In the past, cruise missiles were largely the province of major military powers. While aerodynamics was not especially challenging, other requirements, such as over-the-horizon guidance and reliability, previously impeded cruise missile proliferation.

The perceived salience of the cruise missile threat has now begun to change. Even Iran has demonstrated significant long-range cruise missile capability in its April 14, 2024 attack on Israel, even if most of those missiles were eliminated before they could reach their targets. The garden variety subsonic cruise missile is now one of the most frequent threats to Ukraine from Russia.

Recognition in the policy world has been slow in coming for what should have been a more prominent part of the missile defense discussion, but not for lack of warning from senior military officials. In 2015, Adm. James Winnefeld, then-vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, remarked, “You might ask, if we choose to not invest the enormous resources that would be required to defend against a massive Russian ICBM attack coming over the North Pole, then why on earth would we care about cruise missile defense in the homeland?”³⁷²

He did so by emphasizing that, in his view, the need for cruise missile defense was becoming even more important than regional ballistic missile defense. That comment was especially notable, inasmuch as the Obama administration had conspicuously prioritized regional ballistic missile defense just five years earlier, in its 2010 BMDR.³⁷³

The answer to the question posed by Winnefeld—why defend against cruise missiles, if not ICBMs—lies in a recognition of the problem of non-nuclear strategic attack. It was not always so, however. The cancellation of the Nike missile programs in the 1960s had a certain logic: if the United States was not going to defend against nuclear-armed ICBMs from the Soviet Union, why would it make sense to defend against nuclear-armed bombers? The difference relative to today, however, is the appearance of non-nuclear aerial threats of various kinds. The decline of air defenses across the continental United States was felt on September 11, 2001.

The proliferation of reliable, precision-guided aerial threats—from UAVs to cruise missiles of various kinds—has changed the threat calculus. To consider how an adversary might use such threats against the United States, one need only consider how frequently the United States first reaches for cruise missiles in regional conflicts. Whether with the Trump administration sending fifty-nine Tomahawks into Syria to punish Bashar Al Assad, or the Biden administration doing the same to Houthis in Yemen after months of attacks, the low-flying, reliable, and accurate cruise missile is frequently the missile of choice.

The likely targets in the US homeland for such threats arguably include command and control, power generation, and military forces themselves. In 2019, Gen. Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, then-commander of USNORTHCOM and NORAD, noted that Russia “has only recently developed and deployed capabilities to threaten us below the nuclear threshold … and its new generation of air- and sea-launched cruise missiles feature significantly greater standoff ranges and accuracy than their predecessors, allowing them to strike North America from well outside NORAD radar coverage.”³⁷⁴

His successor, VanHerck, similarly described how Russia and China might employ these “below the nuclear threshold” capabilities to constrain US options and “limit [the] decision space for our senior leaders by holding national critical infrastructure at risk, disrupting and delaying our ability to project power from the homeland, and undermining our will to intervene in a regional crisis.”³⁷⁵

In particular, Russia possesses ALCMs with an “extended range that enables Russian bombers flying well outside NORAD radar coverage—and in some cases from inside Russian airspace—to threaten targets throughout North America.”³⁷⁶

The specter of holding at risk conventional power projection stands as a major threat to the ability of the United States to service its broad deterrence and defense goals short of nuclear employment. An adversary may well and reasonably calculate that, even in the absence of an NFU policy pledge, the United States is unlikely to escalate first with nuclear weapons. A non-nuclear strategic attack targeting only US military forces, or the means to project them, could reasonably be seen as an action beneath the nuclear threshold. The 2023 Strategic Posture Commission, by referencing the challenge of “coercive” missile threats, appears to have adopted at least part of this concept.³⁷⁷

The near-total lack of cruise missile defense for the homeland (CMD-H) presents a deterrence problem. US adversaries may wish to employ a blunting strategy, or a strategy of deterrence by denial, so as to thwart the United States being even able to project power globally in aid of, say, an ally in the Indo-Pacific. The multi-billion-dollar effort to defend the military forces on Guam—itself both US territory and the home of forward operating bases—has been a microcosm of the problem. The long-term efforts to pursue what US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) calls the 360-degree defense for Guam has certainly included significant attention to cruise missile and aerial threats—the “360-degree” phrase is a specific reference to the sort of complex, multi-azimuth attack structure for which cruise missiles are perhaps best suited.

These threat developments and the specter of non-nuclear strategic attacks reverse the priority of defenses. The sort of aerial and cruise missile threats that have previously been regarded as “regional problems” have now become a homeland problem as well. As others have noted, North America is a region, too.³⁷⁸

A renaissance for air defense

Another challenge for cruise missile defense is the perception that it is hopelessly expensive and difficult. As regions for missile defense go, North America is not a small one. How is it possible to defend everything from threats that are by nature unpredictable in their flight path and trajectory?

The answer is that it is not. Wisdom begins with recognizing that the United States cannot defend everything, and indeed it does not have to. Unlike the threat of nuclear blackmail, the logic of a non-nuclear strategic attack suggests high-value military or economic targets an adversary would hold at risk or incapacitate—not everything of value in the country. Attempting to defend everything is self-defeating, spreading defenses thin instead of prioritizing a thicker defense for certain key areas and assets.

Nevertheless, the approach to defending every acre of North America has been the approach of some in the past. The Congressional Budget Office’s 2021 report, National Cruise Missile Defense: Issues and Alternatives, took such an approach.³⁷⁹ As a result, its recommended architectures were prohibitively expensive, ranging between $77 billion and $466 billion (in 2021 dollars).

The necessary alternative is to adopt a policy of preferential defense, if not for specific points, then for broad areas. Winnefeld further noted in 2015, “We probably can’t protect the entire country from cruise missiles, without breaking the bank, but there are important areas in this country that we need to make sure are defended from that kind of an attack.”³⁸⁰ By contrast to the GAO study, a 2022 report found that robust defense of five large prioritized areas might cost approximately $32 billion (in 2023 dollars) to acquire, operate, and sustain over 20 years.

As seen in Ukraine, air defense against cruise missiles is as eminently a soluble problem as it is urgent. The possibility of defense of critical areas depends, however, on a much different architecture and capabilities than that of homeland ballistic missile defense. Just as the characteristics of ICBMs—long-range, exo-atmospheric flight, and a predictable trajectory—dictate the shape of defense design, so too, the characteristics of cruise missiles dictate a different design altogether. Cruise missile defense is a species of air defense. The need to detect, control, and engage are similar, but the nature and location of the sensors and the interceptors are quite different.

To be sure, the 2019 MDR highlighted the rise of near-peer cruise missiles and other threats and directed senior defense officials to name an organization for cruise missile defense acquisition authority. Despite years of studies by NORAD/USNORTHCOM and the MDA, the pace of implementation has been glacial. That designation was finally made in July 2022, when Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks named the Air Force as executive agent for CMD-H.³⁸¹

Since then, the Air Force has conducted several studies and analyses of alternatives. Initial efforts toward long-range OTHRs showed initial promise, but the US Air Force has recently slowed their procurement and could be reevaluating the concept altogether.³⁸² The benefit of OTHRs is significant, however, and the benefit of long-lead early warning time of incoming noncooperative aerial threats should not be underestimated. Additional sensors will also be required closer in, to complete the fire-control loop, whether they be ground- or tower-based radars, or other advanced forms of passive sensors. Ukraine has deployed a national acoustic sensor network to listen for the distinctive sound of Iranian Shahed cruise missiles. Similar area-wide surveillance will be necessary for the defense of North America as well.

In terms of effectors, the Ukraine conflict has also shown what works. The Army’s Patriot family and the ground-launched AIM-120s for the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) are both capable of cruise missile defense. The Army’s IFPC Enduring Shield launcher, carrying ground-launched AIM-9Xs and soon to have a second missile optimized for supersonic cruise missiles, is also quite relevant to this threat set.³⁸³

The centrality of cruise missile threats

As Iran’s April 14, 2024 attacks on Israel showed, the present and future of missile threats will be one of complex and structured attacks. Within the missile threat spectrum, cruise missiles lie at the center, between UAVs and more complex hypersonic flight.

Despite numerous warnings from military officials and combatant commanders over the years and despite the numerous, ongoing examples of real-world employment against the homelands of Ukraine and Israel, the movement on cruise missile defense for the US homeland has been anemic. Its prioritization is necessary for the defense of Guam, but also for the defense of North America. Near-term needs to realize sensor coverage for domain awareness are of high priority, but these must be followed by the fielding of ground-based air defenses to significantly improve the coverage of the National Capital Region and other critical areas. The threat gets a vote, and it has voted. Cruise missile and aerial defense capabilities will represent a critical component of any homeland missile defense architecture.

Figure 5: Conception of homeland cruise missile defense
Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies
PAD = Prioritized area defenses (includes medium-range surface-to-air interceptors and a second interceptor layer with Aegis-type interceptors, linked to sensor towers and other available sensors).
OTHR = Over the horizon radar

Section eleven: Russian and Chinese strategic missile defense: Doctrine, capabilities, and development

Introduction

When considering the future of US homeland missile defense, it is essential to understand the development of Russian and Chinese air and missile defenses which Moscow and Beijing could use to defend their respective homelands. This is true for three reasons. First, Russia’s and China’s extensive development of homeland missile defenses gives lie, to an extent, to their contention that US missile defenses are uniquely destabilizing. Second, numerically extensive Russian and Chinese missile defenses could alter the strategic-forces balance with the United States if not accounted for in US strategic forces policy. And finally, Russian and Chinese missile defenses could require qualitative improvements in US strategic forces to penetrate these defenses. (While important, this third factor is beyond the scope of this study.)

A primary point of contention in the homeland missile defense debate has been the reaction of the United States’ main nuclear-armed strategic rivals, Russia and China. Critics have argued that US defenses against ICBMs and SLBMs could generate arms races or engender fears of a US preemptive first strike.³⁸⁴ Russian and Chinese officials have complained that US ballistic missile defenses undermine the efficacy of their states’ nuclear deterrents and therefore their security.³⁸⁵

The report argues that Russian and Chinese behavior, including the buildup of their strategic missile defenses, is a more important data point than these statements. Russia and China are hard at work developing their own strategic missile defense systems. There is a need for a better understanding of both countries’ missile defense programs, to fully appreciate the strategic consequences.³⁸⁶

This section examines for each—Russia and China—the history, doctrine, and current and developmental capabilities of these states’ strategic missile defenses. The section compares the missile defense architectures of the United States with both of its competitors, it then assesses the operational use cases of these defenses and their implications for strategic balance. The section concludes that these missile defenses complicate US conventional and limited nuclear operations—the same outcome which the United States could impose through enhanced US homeland missile defenses.

Russia

Strategic missile defense history and contemporary doctrine

The defense of the homeland against strategic air and missile attack has featured heavily in Russian military planning and doctrine since the early Cold War. This focus likely emerged from the experience of German mass air attacks in World War II, then continued into the twenty-first century due to a perceived US advantage in the air and space domains.³⁸⁷ During the 1950s and 1960s, the USSR sought to defend its airspace against US strategic bombers by deploying hundreds of surface-to-air (SAM) missile batteries. Later, with the advent of ICBMs, the USSR developed a missile defense system around Moscow. The Soviet Union’s primary goals for strategic defenses were to protect party leadership, prevent a decapitation of nuclear command and control, and limit damage in a strategic exchange.³⁸⁸ It also likely saw a need to compete with the United States for technological reputational advantage, especially after the highly public announcement by the Reagan administration of the SDI in 1983.³⁸⁹

Since 1991, after observing US air campaigns, Russian doctrine has emphasized defense against complex air and space threats, especially a massed aircraft and missile attack by the United States and NATO that would incapacitate Russian military and civilian leadership.³⁹⁰ To integrate air and space capabilities, then-Russian President Dimitry Medvedev created the Aerospace Defense Forces in 2011, which was ultimately merged with the Russian Air Force in 2015 to form the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS).

Moscow’s thinking on missile defense prioritizes protecting Russian leadership, critical command and control, and nuclear forces, with ballistic missile defense capabilities being a critical component. In the Russian Defense Ministry journal Military Thought, Mikhail Kumakshev and Aleksandr Kravtsov write: “The main direction of further development of the missile defenses of the Russian Federation is the creation of a layered system covering not only the high levels of leadership, but also the positions of the strategic nuclear forces.”³⁹¹ Furthermore, the Russian Ministry of Defense has officially stated that:

The main purpose of the missile defense system is to deter threats of use of missile weapons against Russia and to ensure the protection of state and military facilities, groups of troops, administrative and industrial centers, environmentally hazardous facilities and the civilian population from missile attacks.³⁹²

Within this expansive definition, the relative priority is on civil-military leadership. Furthermore, the DOD assesses that “Russia is developing a layered missile defense to enhance its anti-access/area denial capabilities, preserve its nuclear deterrent, and ensure regime survival.”³⁹³ Defending political leadership and nuclear forces from US and NATO strikes are clearly the primary roles for missile defenses, and missile defenses could also help Russia defend against possible future contingencies involving Iran, China, North Korea, or even non-state actors.³⁹⁴

The Soviet Union’s ballistic missile defense development began with the experimental “System A,” developed and tested between 1957 and 1961.³⁹⁵ The System A experiments led to the deployment of the Soviet Union’s first early warning radar network and influenced the decision to develop the A-35 ABM system designed to protect Moscow. The A-35 system became operational fitfully, with various phases completed between 1967 and 1972; however, ultimately, it did not live up to the expectations of Soviet leaders, perhaps influencing Moscow’s decision to sign the 1972 ABM Treaty.³⁹⁶

In 1989, the A-35 system was upgraded and replaced with the A-135 system, which was based around the Don-2N radar; sixty-eight short-range, endo-atmospheric 53T6 “Gazelle” interceptors; and sixteen 51T6 “Gorgon” long-range, exo-atmospheric interceptors, both armed with nuclear warheads.³⁹⁷ These warheads were likely enhanced-radiation weapons, or neutron bombs, designed to use the radiation from their detonations to cause nearby incoming warheads to undergo partial fission and fail to detonate. In 1985, before the deployment of the A-135 system, Soviet official Vitalii Leonidovich Kataev described its capability as providing protection from “1–2 modern ICBMs and up to 35 Pershing 2-type intermediate-range missiles.”³⁹⁸ Kataev also described a planned A-235 follow-on system, which would be effective against eight to twelve ICBMs. The use of enhanced-radiation weapons for ballistic missile defense suggests that this system was primarily for the protection of military and political leadership in the city’s center, given that these systems’ detonations could spread dangerous radiation across much of the countryside and outskirts of Moscow itself.³⁹⁹

In the 1980s, concerned about increasingly accurate US ICBMs and intermediate-range weapons, the Soviet Union also experimented with terminal defenses to increase missile silo survivability. These terminal defenses involved launching a canister of metal balls or rods above the silos to disrupt an incoming RV.⁴⁰⁰ These projects, alternatively referred to as “Sambo,” “Mozyr,” or “Active Defense Complex,” ended shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, but the Russian government may be considering development of a similar capability.⁴⁰¹ In the 1980s and 1990s, Moscow also continued to upgrade its national SAM network, including deploying the S-300 (SA-10) air defense system, with some early versions having limited terminal defense capabilities against MRBMs.⁴⁰² Moscow’s approach to building missile defenses evinces a tendency to deploy systems with initially limited capabilities that could be upgraded over time or abandoned if progress proved unfeasible.⁴⁰³ As discussed below, this pattern appears to continue, either by design or due to limitations of Russian defense industry.

A Russian S-300 air defense system at the 2009 Moscow Victory Day Parade rehearsal, Red Square, April 28, 2009. Source: Vitaly V. Kuzmin.

Current capabilities and future development

Today, Russia deploys several systems that can provide layered missile defense across its territory. The A-135 system deployed around Moscow is currently Russia’s only system specifically designed to defend against ICBMs. The system has at its center the Don-2N radar, which receives data from Russia’s wider early warning system and provides targeting data for the sixty-eight silo-based 53T6 “Gazelle” endo-atmospheric interceptors, emplaced at five sites around Moscow.⁴⁰⁴ As noted previously, the system originally had both endo- and exo-atmospheric interceptors; however, the sixteen 51T6 “Gorgon” exo-atmospheric interceptors were retired between 2006 and 2007.⁴⁰⁵ The Gazelle interceptors were, until recently, equipped exclusively with nuclear warheads.

Russian combat crews of the 9th Anti-missile Defense Division conducting training with the Don-2N radar near Moscow, January 24, 2018. Source: Mil.ru

According to interviews with current and retired high-ranking Russian missile defenders, Russia is embarking on an overhaul of the entire A-135 system.⁴⁰⁶ This redesigned system has been referred to as A-235 and, while it is unclear if this structure is still reflective of current Russian planning, it was described as including a long-, medium-and short-range interceptor.⁴⁰⁷

If the range reported for these interceptors is to be believed, then they could provide some capability to defend the Russian ICBM sites of the 28th Rocket Division headquartered in Kozelsk and the 54th Rocket Division in Teykovo (some 200 km southwest and northeast of Moscow, respectively).⁴⁰⁸

Russia is reportedly developing the long-range exo-atmospheric midcourse defense component of the A-235 system, which will succeed the 51T6.⁴⁰⁹ While it is unclear what systems will specifically fill that role, the PL-19 “Nudol” direct-ascent ASAT weapon, which Russia tested in November of 2021, may become the basis of the eventual interceptor.⁴¹⁰ In the 2021 test, the Nudol impacted a defunct Soviet satellite at an altitude of around 480 km, placing it within the range described for the A-235 exo-atmospheric interceptor.⁴¹¹ There is also evidence of a program for a midcourse interceptor referred to as “Aerostat,” being developed by the same company, Almaz-Antey, but with a different subcontractor than the Nudol.⁴¹²

The other recent development in Russian missile defenses is the first deployment of the S-500 missile system in 2021 to defend the Moscow area.⁴¹³ The S-500 is Russia’s latest mobile air and missile defense system, and is designed to target IRBMs, early warning aircraft, and satellites in low-Earth orbit.⁴¹⁴ In February 2024, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced a successful test of the weapon against an ICBM-representative hypersonic target.⁴¹⁵ The system was previously tested at a range of 481 km and has a claimed flight ceiling of 100–200 km, which may indicate that it fills the medium-range role envisioned for the A-235 project.⁴¹⁶ As currently deployed, it will complement the A-135 system and, in the future, could provide regional terminal ICBM defense across Russia or form the basis of a future sea-based missile defense capability.⁴¹⁷ The S-500 is designed to use the new 77N6 family of interceptors that likely have a kinetic energy hit-to-kill warhead, which is more effective against ballistic missile targets than the blast-fragmentation warheads of interceptors used by the S-400 and S-300s.⁴¹⁸ However, the first operational version of the S-500 reportedly has reduced capabilities, and the further ten units which were slated for production in 2022 have not yet been delivered.⁴¹⁹

Members of the Russian defense industry are already discussing a planned upgrade, the S-550, which will be solely optimized for missile defense and be more capable against ICBMs.⁴²⁰ Despite setbacks to the S-500, there have been several proposals for a national mobile nonstrategic missile defense system composed of S-500s, S-400s, and S-300VMs to protect cities and industrial centers from regional missile attacks.⁴²¹ Another notable Russian strategic capability is “Peresvet,” a mobile, high-powered laser system designed to blind imaging satellites in orbit. Peresvet’s emplacements near mobile ICBM bases, such as the one at Teykovo, suggest that the Kremlin intends the system to inhibit the targeting of those missiles.⁴²² Peresvet could also potentially have uses preventing adversaries from tracking mobile ballistic missile defense systems, like the S-500.

Russia fields a number of systems, including the S-400 as well as the S-300 PMU-2 and S-300VM variants, that have some capability against MRBMs but are primarily designed to defend against airbreathing cruise missiles, aircraft, and SRBMs.⁴²³ The VKS had an estimated 584 S-300 launchers of various types and over 248 S-400 launchers in inventory before the 2022 re-invasion of Ukraine.⁴²⁴ Furthermore, the S-300F variant integrates into many Russian Navy surface combatants, with newer ships equipped with the “Redut” air defense system that shares the same 9M96E interceptors with fragmentation warheads as the S-400.⁴²⁵

Despite a mixed record in Ukraine and severe resource constraints due to sanctions, Russia is moving to develop more advanced missile defense systems and modernize existing ones. Key metrics for assessing Russian progress will be further development of a midcourse interceptor, confirmation of a hit-to-kill capability for the existing Moscow defense system, or wider deployment of the S-500.

China

Strategic missile defense history and contemporary doctrine

Despite only recently beginning to deploy missile defenses, China’s interest in the technology dates to the 1960s. In 1964, Mao Zedong ordered the commencement of Project 640, an effort to develop the technology necessary for a ballistic missile defense system, including research into kinetic kill vehicles, high-powered lasers, as well as early warning and tracking radars.⁴²⁶ This research may have been prompted by observation of US and Soviet missile defense developments, as well as a fear that the United States might consider a preemptive attack to eliminate China’s nascent nuclear deterrent.⁴²⁷ Early Chinese nuclear planners worried about the survivability of their forces and the credibility of their retaliatory capabilities, a theme that would persist into the twenty-first century.⁴²⁸ Project 640, hampered by technological challenges and the upheaval of the Cultural Revolution, ultimately ended without deploying any operational systems.⁴²⁹ However, the project laid the groundwork for future Chinese missile defense and ASAT capabilities.

The announcement of the SDI by Reagan in 1983 prompted renewed Chinese research into missile defense, and particularly space-based technology, under Project 863 launched by then-Chinese President Deng Xiaoping.⁴³⁰ From this point, Chinese missile defense technology research occurred in parallel with its development of counterspace capabilities designed to neutralize systems like the SDI. In the mid-1990s, the Central Military Commission initiated a ten-year program to develop an indigenous missile defense capability, including interceptors and early warning satellites.⁴³¹

A Chinese DF-21A transporter erector vehicle on display at the Beijing Military Museum, August 1, 2007. Source: Max Smith.

Compared to sources on Russian missile defense, there is less public information on Chinese missile defense doctrine; however, inferences are possible. China has strong incentives to develop nonstrategic air and missile defenses to help defend its airspace from hostile attacks and allow it to project power into the Pacific. However, China’s interest in strategic ballistic missile defense and its associated technologies likely stems from several related objectives. Bruce MacDonald and Charles Ferguson published a 2015 study, for which they interviewed Chinese experts and officials, proposing the following possible PRC rationales for developing ballistic missile defense:⁴³²

Enhancing the progress of, and providing international legitimacy for, its ASAT weapons program.
Providing limited defenses of key objects such as political leadership, command and control, and nuclear forces against preemptive attack by the United States and possibly Russia.
Providing a more robust defense against Indian intermediate-range and ICBM-class missiles.
Gaining further understanding of the nature and vulnerabilities of US BMD technology and operations.
Demonstrating international technological achievement and competitiveness.

Over the past decades, China developed ASATs, including kinetic interceptors, to prevail in a possible conflict with the United States.⁴³³ The technology for kinetic ASAT weapons overlaps significantly with strategic ballistic missile defense, as both capabilities involve intercepting high-speed objects at various altitudes outside the Earth’s atmosphere.⁴³⁴ Strategic ballistic missile defense development may be a natural offshoot of China’s efforts to enhance its ASAT capability or capitalize on its research investments. However, Chinese and Russian destructive ASAT testing has drawn international condemnation and provided the United States an avenue to push for limitations and bans on such systems.⁴³⁵ Therefore, ballistic missile defense may serve as a useful cover for tests of would-be ASAT systems. For example, in 2014, China conducted what it claimed was a missile intercept test; however, the US Department of State later assessed that it was intended as an ASAT test.⁴³⁶ China’s incentive to misrepresent makes it difficult to categorize claimed Chinese ballistic missile defense tests or determine whether systems in development are primarily intended for ballistic missile defense or ASAT roles.

China may also be interested in strategic ballistic missile defense as one solution to long-standing concerns about its resilience to a first strike by the United States or Russia and the growing sophistication of India’s nuclear arsenal. While a defense against the United States or Russia would be very limited for the foreseeable future, China may view it as beneficial for complicating a possible strike on Beijing or its ICBM silos.⁴³⁷ Chinese nuclear forces expert Tong Zhao has suggested that one explanation for the relatively dense arrangement of China’s newly constructed ICBM silos could be to facilitate a possible area defense for those weapons.⁴³⁸ Other possible targets to defend might include military command-and-control locations during an ongoing conflict or critical infrastructure, such as the Three Gorges Dam.⁴³⁹

China may wish to develop strategic ballistic missile defense as part of a broader technology development strategy beyond the immediate benefits of a ballistic missile defense capability. Given its outspoken concern over US missile defense capabilities on strategic stability and interest in defeating them, China may hope to gain a greater understanding of how to conduct ballistic missile defense operations and the limitations of the technology through its own research and development.⁴⁴⁰ Chinese experts have argued that, as long-range strike missiles become increasingly sophisticated and proliferated, it is necessary for China to be competitive in all areas of advanced air and missile defense technology.⁴⁴¹ As such, achieving an ICBM midcourse intercept capability would be a strong signal of Chinese military technology parity with the United States.

Finally, Chinese development of the necessary sensor architecture for ballistic missile defense could complement its interest in the capability to adopt a launch-on-warning (LOW) nuclear posture.⁴⁴² The ability to detect and accurately characterize an incoming missile attack is a prerequisite of both a launch on warning (LOW) posture and a strategic BMD capability. As noted below, China is actively expanding its number of ground-based large, phased-array radars and has recently launched satellites for missile detection. In MacDonald and Ferguson’s study, they noted that “a Chinese move to deploy early warning satellites would be a significant indicator of greater interest in BMD deployment.”⁴⁴³ If China does deploy strategic ballistic missile defense, it will be notable which PLA branch is responsible for its operation—the PLA Strategic Support Force, which is responsible for counterspace capabilities, or the PLAAF, which operates China’s ground-based air defense.⁴⁴⁴

Current capabilities and future development

Since 2010, China has been actively developing a ground-based midcourse interceptor, with the first tests occurring in 2010, 2013, and 2014. While these early tests may have been primarily oriented around ASAT capabilities, China’s latest interceptor, designated the Dong Neng-3 (DN-3), has undergone recent successful BMD tests in 2018, 2021, and 2023.⁴⁴⁵ The DN-3 is a hit-to-kill interceptor that has been used to intercept a target DF-21 MRBM and has been compared to the US SM-3.⁴⁴⁶ It has yet to be tested against an ICBM-class target, but the DOD assesses that the DN-3 will “form the upper-layer of a multi-tiered missile defense.”⁴⁴⁷ The DN-3 may be a variant of earlier Chinese ASAT weapons (sometimes referred to as DN-1 and DN-2).⁴⁴⁸ China has also tested the HQ-19, a kinetic interceptor derived from the HQ-9, which has the capability to intercept ballistic missiles with a range of 3,000 km in their midcourse and terminal flight stage and has been called “roughly analogous to the US [THAAD] system.”⁴⁴⁹ The HQ-19 has not yet publicly been deployed and is presumed not to have the capability to defeat an ICBM-class target; however, it could possibly be adapted to do so.⁴⁵⁰ Notably, China has also expressed interest in purchasing the S-500 system from Russia, which would likely be complementary to the HQ-19.⁴⁵¹ Furthermore, the PLAN is reportedly planning to develop the HQ-26, a midcourse interceptor designed to defend against IRBMs, to be installed on its Type 055 destroyers.⁴⁵²

China is moving quickly to develop various types of missile defense technology including strategic ballistic missile defense. The defining feature of its ballistic missile defense development, however, is its overlap with ASAT testing, an area which likely is a greater priority than missile defense.⁴⁵³ One of the key enablers of China’s progress is its ability to rely on Russian technology and expertise both in developing its interceptors and sensor architecture. While China has made large strides in exo-atmospheric interception with hit-to-kill technology, it still must develop a robust sensing and data processing system as well as trained personnel to create a true capability.

Implications and conclusion

Comparison with US capabilities

US ballistic missile defense capabilities remain more advanced than those of Russia or China. While both Russia and China are developing the capabilities for midcourse interception of ICBMs, only the United States deploys both the interceptors and sensors to achieve a degree of ballistic missile defense coverage over its entire territory in the form of the GMD system. Furthermore, only the United States maintains a sea-based midcourse defense and missile tracking capability through the Aegis BMD system. Both Russia and China, however, are actively pursuing parity. China is continuing tests for midcourse interception capability, and Russia has development plans for a similar system. Both countries also aim to match the US THAAD system with the Russian S-500 system and Chinese HQ-19 designed for high-altitude terminal defense. The United States, Russia, and China are also all carrying out programs to update their early warning and tracking capabilities. The United States is embarking on an ambitious plan to modernize its space-based tracking for a wide variety of threats, such as HGVs.⁴⁵⁴ Russia is also recapitalizing its space-based early warning satellites and ground-based radars but faces serious resource and sanction constraints. China is moving quickly to improve its early warning system but is still far from a comprehensive architecture.

The United States, unlike Russia and China, does not deploy significant ground-based defenses on its homeland territory, aside from the GMD system. Other than a THAAD deployment on Guam and cruise missile defense of the national capital area, the United States typically does not deploy terminal defenses near domestic military facilities or critical infrastructure.⁴⁵⁵ In contrast, both Russia and China deploy a larger number and wider variety of ground-based area air and missile defense systems than the United States. Russia has deployed the S-400 and S-300 systems at military facilities, including those in Kaliningrad, Belarus, Crimea, and the Arctic Circle. China deploys several varieties of air and missile defense systems around Beijing and near military facilities, including basing the HQ-9 at its contested border with India and on artificial islands in the South China Sea.⁴⁵⁶

Strategic and operational use cases

Ground-based air defenses remain central to Russian and Chinese military thought. Unlike the United States, Russia and China have historically relied on SAMs for homeland defense. Russia and China have clear incentives to develop advanced nonstrategic air and missile defense systems such as the S-400 and HQ-9. These systems are primarily aimed at denying US, allied, and partner aircraft operations or cruise missile strikes on Russian or Chinese territory.⁴⁵⁷ As the United States begins to develop longer-range conventional ballistic missiles over the next decade, such as the Precision Strike Missile, the ability of Russian and Chinese systems to defeat these threats will become increasingly operationally relevant. Furthermore, Russia and China likely view US conventional precision-strike capabilities as having strategic deterrence implications. The United States has previously signaled that it would consider responding to limited nuclear escalation with a massed conventional precision-strike campaign.⁴⁵⁸ Russia and China may fear that, under various scenarios, US conventional munitions could target their political and military leadership, command-and-control systems, and/or nuclear forces.⁴⁵⁹ Therefore, systems that might be referred to as nonstrategic or tactical could have strategic significance.

Russia and China share many motivations for developing strategic ballistic missile defense systems but emphasize different applications in their approach. Russia’s A-135 system defense of Moscow likely has the primary goals of providing a degree of protection for political and military leadership in case of nuclear attack and also complicating US targeting of the Moscow region. However, once completed, the system’s planned modernization could also provide a degree of defense for several Russian ICBM bases in the region. Furthermore, systems like Peresvet and the S-500 can serve as protection for mobile ICBMs. These capabilities coincide with the overarching program of nuclear modernization that Russia is undertaking to increase the survivability and effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent. China may also see a role for strategic ballistic missile defense in defending its strategic forces and political leadership. China’s pursuit of the capability intertwines with its development of sophisticated ASAT capabilities. China may frequently label tests of ASATs as BMD efforts. Russia’s Nudol system has also been referred to as both an ASAT and ballistic missile defense system. In fact, most exo-atmospheric missile defense systems are at least theoretically usable as ASAT weapons, although the reverse is not always true. This dual functionality likely makes these systems a more attractive investment for Russia and China.

Most troublingly, missile defenses could backstop Russian or Chinese limited nuclear or nonnuclear strategic aggression against the United States or its allies and partners. While this option is not discussed explicitly in Russian or Chinese doctrine, in a conflict, either country might consider using nuclear weapons in a limited manner to coerce war termination and rely on missile defenses to deny a proportionately limited US response. In this case, Russia or China would gamble that the United States would be unwilling to consider a response that would be guaranteed to overcome any missile defenses as doing so would require using a large enough number of weapons to risk provoking a strategic exchange.⁴⁶⁰ (This, of course, is precisely the dilemma which this paper proposes that Washington attempt to impose on Moscow and Beijing.)

In conclusion, both Russia and China have far greater missile defense capabilities and ongoing development programs than are often acknowledged and are pursuing closer parity with the United States. Ballistic missile defense will likely become a feature of the strategic relationship between the three countries, which could have both positive and negative implications for US national security. Understanding Russian and Chinese reasons for developing this capability will yield insights into their broader defense priorities.

Section twelve: Conclusion and policy

The aim of this study is to determine if changes in the strategic environment and evolution in the long-range missile threat warrant a reconsideration of US homeland missile defense (HMD) policy. The current policy of staying ahead of the North Korean long-range ballistic missile threat while relying only on nuclear retaliation to deter Russian and Chinese ballistic missile threats is incoherent and no longer tenable given Russian and Chinese doctrine and capabilities for limited nuclear and conventional strikes against the homeland. Furthermore, it makes no sense to rule in defense against Russian and Chinese cruise missile strikes while ruling out defense against ballistic missiles.

To explain how the United States arrived at this point, one must appreciate the decades-long, sometimes emotional, debate over missile defenses—a debate that was set aside momentarily at the end of the Cold War, but which has resurfaced with the expansion of missile threats to the homeland and the return of great-power competition. The promise of a new relationship with Russia and China at the turn of the century reduced the urgency for missile defenses against those countries, while the expansion of regional nuclear threats from rogue states, such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, made homeland defenses against these more limited threats increasingly imperative. A compromise of convenience was forged on the faulty assumption that large-scale defenses were no longer needed, while defenses against countries such as North Korea were not only needed but also more feasible, given the low numbers and less sophisticated threat.

Today, the geopolitical landscape and threat picture is different, and one needs look no further than the Biden administration’s defense strategy documents and pronouncements to appreciate the implications for US HMD. Defending the nation is the priority, and missile defenses are a critical enabler of US grand strategy. Congress, too, has called attention to the growing vulnerability of the United States to new and expanding missile threats. Most recently, the Senate Armed Services Committee recommends a provision in the FY 2025 National Defense Authorization bill requiring the DOD “to develop a comprehensive integrated architecture for defending the United States against all forms of missile attacks.”⁴⁶¹ In its companion bill, the House Armed Services Committee recommends an additional GBI site on the East Coast of the United States to address the growing threat from North Korea and possibly Iran in the future.⁴⁶² Perhaps most significant are the calls from the congressionally mandated bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission and the Commission on the National Defense Strategy for the United States to enhance missile defense for the homeland and develop and field homeland IAMD capabilities that can deter and defeat coercive attacks by Russia and China.⁴⁶³

Russia and China have become major power rivals with competing interests and expanding nuclear arsenals, requiring the United States to deter two major nuclear powers at the same time. Russian and Chinese doctrine and forces, as discussed in this study, require the United States to think more clearly about deterring not only large-scale nuclear attacks against the United States but also more limited strikes—nuclear and conventional—against targets in the United States. Civilian and military officials talk quite openly and more frequently about this new threat to critical infrastructure meant to stymie US reinforcement of allies and break the will of a US leadership perhaps unwilling to take risks because of its near-total vulnerability to missile and other threats. Likewise, the United States must ensure the survivability of its nuclear forces against two major nuclear powers, guarding against a combined preemptive nuclear attack (however unlikely) while ensuring that US nuclear forces can endure a general nuclear war with one and at the same time deter the other from opportunistic aggression against a diminished and potentially devastated United States.

Furthermore, US nonproliferation strategies have failed to stem the growth of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and its ability to reach the United States with long-range ballistic missiles. US military leaders warn that the capacity of current missile defense systems may not be sufficient to pace the threat as North Korea develops solid fuel and multiple warheads for its mobile ICBMs. Programs are in place to modernize and expand the US GMD system starting in 2028—but will a total of sixty-four Next-Generation Interceptors suffice? This study argues that a truly layered defense and an expansion in the size of the GMD system will be necessary, while more advanced technology and space-based sensors will be needed to stay ahead. Critics will argue this has the makings of an arms race, but the United States can afford to compete and win against a country that has difficulty feeding its people. Failure to do so would have long-lasting consequences for a US grand strategy that depends on allies to defend US vital interests abroad. If allies were to perceive the United States as unwilling to defend itself against North Korean attacks, they may also start to wonder whether the United States would be willing to run risks on their behalf.

The argument

This study advances the following argument:

First, the requirement for homeland missile defense is clearly defined by the 2022 NDS, which designates defense of the homeland as the first priority, followed by deterring strategic attacks against the homeland.⁴⁶⁴ More to the point, the 2022 MDR provides that missile defenses “are critical to the top priority of defending the homeland and deterring attacks against the United States.”⁴⁶⁵
Second, the threat driving that requirement is growing. According to senior administration officials, Russia and China are “fielding more advanced offensive missiles—ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic—in greater numbers to not only deter [U.S.] involvement in a regional conflict but also to directly target the U.S. homeland. The scale and scope of these multi-dimensional threats present significant risks to the American people and the homeland.”⁴⁶⁶ The North Korean ICBM threat continues apace and may include missiles with multiple warheads in the future. Senior US military commanders are starting to fear that currently planned missile defense capabilities will not be able to maintain the advantageous US position against North Korea and potentially Iran.
Third, the strategy behind these threats is clear. Potential adversaries will seek to exploit vulnerabilities in the “American way of war” by posing threats to the US homeland “in an effort to jeopardize the U.S. military’s ability to project power and counter regional aggression.”⁴⁶⁷ These states’ intent also is to break the will of US political leaders who may be unwilling to fulfill commitments to allies if it means running extraordinary risks to the homeland.
Fourth, if left unaddressed, these threats to the homeland could significantly narrow US decision-making and curtail a president’s freedom of action during crisis and conflict. Adversaries know that the United States depends on its allies and partners to maintain its “global strategic advantage,” and that allies, in turn, depend on US security commitments.⁴⁶⁸ Russia and China hope to weaken US alliance ties by creating doubt about US security commitments in the minds of its allies. Allies, fearing a weakening of US commitment due to its increasing vulnerability to attack, could seek accommodation with challengers in their region or develop their own nuclear weapons to deter these threats.
Fifth, the objective or purpose of US homeland missile defense is not to create an impregnable missile shield for the American public, but rather to frustrate adversary strategies that rely on threatening missile attacks against the United States. Missile defense systems are meant to supplement the deterrence value provided by US nuclear forces and the prospect of an overwhelming conventional response to attacks against the homeland—not to replace deterrence by the threat of punishment. The objective of the missile defense system is to create enough doubt in the adversary’s mind about the prospect of a successful attack that the adversary concludes the strike is not worth the risk—this is especially effective when considered alongside fears of enormous consequences. In other words, a coercive attack would be futile and fatal.
Sixth, to solve the missile problem, the United States incorporates other military means in its comprehensive missile defense and defeat strategy. In addition to active defenses meant to intercept warheads after launch, the United States will employ means to stop an adversary from successfully launching its offensive missiles when possible. In this way, “offensive measures add credibility to our defensive efforts and reduce the possibility of continued attacks.”⁴⁶⁹ This comprehensive approach compensates for vulnerabilities and shortcomings in the missile defense architecture, so the United States need not rely only on active defenses.
Seventh, modest, though important, improvements to current homeland defenses are available over the next five years to address these threats if policymakers choose to do so. More advanced technologies for missile defense and defeat are on the horizon and could be exploited with sufficient funding. Increasing the funding for homeland missile defense—to a full one percent of the annual defense budget—may be sufficient to achieve the missile defense objectives discussed in this study.
Eighth, arguments against expanding US homeland missile defense because it could stoke an arms race with Russia and China need to be put in perspective. Not only are Russia and China pursuing their homeland air and missile defenses against limited US missile strikes (Russia deploys more homeland defense interceptors than the United States), but it is counterfactual to assume that US missile defenses will provoke an “action-reaction” arms race. Quite the opposite occurred. Following the US withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty in 2002, US and Russian nuclear arsenals declined by two-thirds. The New START Treaty, in effect since February 2011, took numbers even lower. Nevertheless, the United States should work with Russia and China to make its missile defense plans as transparent as possible. In the final analysis, policymakers must weigh the arms racing risks of deploying less-than-comprehensive defenses as outlined in this study with the consequences of the United States’ growing vulnerability to missile threats from small and major powers.
To summarize, the missile threat to the homeland is real and growing and, if left unaddressed, could seriously undermine US grand strategy and the very basis of national defense strategy. Since the objective of missile defense is to supplement and enhance deterrence by complicating the plans of the attacker—rather than comprehensive population protection—the defensive architecture does not need to be leak-proof. Rather, a layered architecture with certain key attributes, based on existing and future technology, can provide an affordable defense to restore the basis for US defense strategy while reassuring allies.

A change in policy

The principal recommendation of this study is to update US homeland missile defense policy to remove the false distinction between rogue state and major power missile threats and to eliminate sole reliance on nuclear retaliation to deter Russian and Chinese limited coercive missile attacks against the homeland. Improving the survivability of US nuclear forces and nuclear command and control also should be a policy objective. Likewise, the distinction between ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic glide threats no longer makes sense: If the United States is going to defend against Russian cruise missiles, then Washington should defend against Russian ballistic missiles and HGVs.

In fact, Congress updated the national missile defense policy in the FY 2024 NDAA along these lines. It is now the policy of the United States to deploy missile defense “systems that provide effective, layered missile defense capabilities to defeat increasingly complex missile threats in all phases of flight.”⁴⁷⁰ But a second clause in this policy, “to rely on nuclear deterrence to address more sophisticated and larger quantity near-peer intercontinental missile threats to the homeland of the United States,” creates some ambiguity, allowing an administration to forgo defenses against Russia and China.⁴⁷¹ This study emphasizes that a successful policy includes elements of both defense and deterrence: missile defense protection against rogue threats and limited/coercive strikes by Russia and China combined with the credible threat of nuclear retaliation.

The new policy must be explicit about the goals for homeland missile defense; which countries and threats to defend against; and the planned scope for deployment over a given period. The objective of homeland missile defense is not an impregnable missile defense shield for the country, but rather sufficient defenses to counter adversary missile threats of coercion—to enable US regional defense strategy—and defenses adequate to ensure the survivability and endurance of US nuclear retaliatory forces and nuclear command and control against any combination of adversaries. This requires some tailoring of the missile defense mission depending on the strategy objectives and missile capabilities of potential adversaries.

Accordingly, it should be US policy to:

Stay ahead of the North Korean long-range missile threat through a comprehensive strategy of layered missile defense combined with offensive measures to prevent launches before they occur.
Deploy a layered land, sea and space-based missile defense system to thwart Russian and Chinese coercive strikes (as well as unauthorized or accidental launches), sized to about one hundred Russian or Chinese warheads, delivered by about twenty missiles, including missiles armed with HGVs. The objective is not to replace nuclear deterrence provided by US nuclear forces, but to strengthen deterrence by invalidating Russian and Chinese limited coercive threats. Accordingly, a leak-proof defense against two hundred warheads is not necessary; instead, the United States requires a level of defense capability sufficient to convince an adversary (or create enough uncertainty) that its contemplated attack upon the United States will be both futile and fatal.
Enhance the survivability of US nuclear forces and nuclear command and control through a layered missile defense composed of GBIs, SM-3 block IIA missiles deployed on land and at sea, THAAD missiles for preferential terminal defense of US nuclear forces, and requisite defenses against cruise missiles.
Protect critical US civilian and military infrastructure against air- and sea-launched cruise missile attacks by Russia and China to the extent feasible and necessary to allow the United States to stay in the fight.
Continue research on next-generation missile defense capabilities to stay ahead of the threats, including improved space-based sensors, SBIs, and directed-energy capabilities.

Homeland defense system design

Far too much stress has been placed on the efficacy of the GMD system with its GBIs and radars for the defense of the homeland. Originally intended to be regularly upgraded after its initial deployment in 2004, the elements of today’s GMD system are regrettably based on outdated technologies. Moreover, the GMD system was never meant to stand alone against the threat—defenses in other phases of flight were contemplated to compensate for the GMD system’s shortcomings and to provide additional intercept opportunities as part of a layered defense.

Layering is essential to a successful missile defense architecture because it improves overall effectiveness by intercepting warheads during different phases of flight and with different interceptor missiles supported by a range of radars and sensors. Intercept at each layer “thins the herd” for the following layers. Attacking warheads containing countermeasures that may fool the defense in one layer may prove useless in another. Multiple layers greatly complicate the calculations of the attacker, while reducing the technical requirements for any given interceptor because it does not have to work perfectly or in all conditions and against all countermeasures.

Though layered missile defense has been a long-standing MDA mission, the homeland today is protected only by GBIs. The SM-3 and THAAD missiles can bolster homeland protection by providing additional shot opportunities against incoming warheads that penetrate the GBI defense, but these systems have not been integrated with the GMD system. Sensor support from satellites under development can substantially improve the viability of layered missile defense early in the next decade by helping to distinguish between real warheads and countermeasures. When viewed from the attacker’s perspective, a layered missile defense system presents a very difficult challenge that cannot be solved simply with increased numbers.

It is difficult in an unclassified study—without access to the threat picture and the performance characteristics of defensive systems—to offer specific recommendations on the number and types of sensors and interceptors required to pace the threat. Still, based on unclassified statements by current and former USNORTHCOM commanders, current plans will presumably not suffice. Sixty-four GBIs—of which twenty will be the modernized NGI variant—by 2032 should be just the start of a much broader deployment sized to the anticipated threat. To put this in context, the Clinton administration proposed (in the late 1990s) the deployment of one-to-two hundred GBIs to defend against a few dozen North Korean ICBMs.⁴⁷² Yet the United States now struggles to bring the total to sixty-four GBIs, and there are no plans to add additional layers to the defensive architecture.

A notional limited and layered homeland missile defense

Considerable rhetorical blood has been spilled over the phrase “limited missile defense,” made notable in the 1999 National Missile Defense Act, which declares that it is US policy to “deploy as soon as technologically possible a National Missile Defense (NMD) system capable of defending U.S. territory against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate).”⁴⁷³ Some advocates of missile defense have long viewed this language as a policy constraint against the development of more robust missile defenses systems, including those designed to defend against large Russian and Chinese attacks. The word “limited” has since been expunged from the statutory language.

President Ronald Reagan addresses the nation to announce the initiation of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), colloquially known as “Star Wars,” from the Oval Office, March 23, 1983. Source: Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

Yet “limited” is in the eye of the beholder (or presidential administration). The very first missile defense architecture based on Reagan’s 1983 SDI (the Phase I Strategic Defense System) called for a defense that could stop at least 30 percent of a limited first-wave Soviet attack comprising as many as five thousand warheads.⁴⁷⁴ The next major architecture, proposed by the George H.W. Bush administration in the early 1990s was known as Global Protection against Limited Strikes, the objective of which was to defend against up to two hundred Soviet warheads with ground- and space-based interceptors.⁴⁷⁵ Then, in the late 1990s, the Clinton administration proposed a limited system of one-to-two hundred GBIs to defend against a few dozen North Korean ICBMs.⁴⁷⁶ Today’s deployment of only forty-four GBIs has not been constrained by “policy,” but rather by technological challenges and a lack of funding commitment by successive administrations. There is nothing in current law that would prohibit the development or deployment of any of the concepts proposed in this study, especially if their design objective was only to defend against up to 100 attacking warheads.

A layered homeland defense system may be feasible within the five-year defense planning horizon based on existing technology (Figure 6). Deployments of NGI beginning in 2028 could be augmented earlier with the less expensive SM-3 IIA missile in a layered fashion to make the architecture more effective and affordable, while the deployment of THAAD missiles could provide an additional layer of protection for US nuclear retaliatory forces and command and control against Russian and Chinese missiles. Current production rates for SM-3 IIA and THAAD missiles, about twelve per year, are driven by funding constraints.⁴⁷⁷ According to industry sources and Congress, yearly production could double or even triple with appropriate funding.⁴⁷⁸

Figure 6: Concept for layered homeland ballistic missile defense
Source: Missile Defense Agency (2024).

In addition to adding an SM-3 and THAAD underlayer, the DOD should speed the fielding of the hypersonic boost tracking sensor system and accelerate research and development of the discriminating space sensor. These satellite sensors are critical to keep pace with the North Korean missile threat and may provide an opportunity for missile defense systems to defend against limited Russian and Chinese ballistic missile strikes.

The DOD also should make long-lead plans to expand NGI production early in the next decade. Additional long-range interceptors will be required beyond the sixty-four currently planned, especially if a third site on the East Coast is deemed necessary and the threat from North Korea and Iran continues to expand. Depending on when new technologies are available for homeland defense, replacing the existing forty-four GBIs may be advisable. Additional NGIs—when combined with new space-based sensors—could also help counter limited Russian and Chinese threats as part of a layered defense with the SM-3, THAAD, and a potential Glide-Phase Interceptor.

The recommended near-term steps are meant to be a bridge to follow-on technologies necessary to create a next-generation missile defense capability to defend the homeland.

The DOD must place more emphasis on investing in future, revolutionary capabilities, such as space sensors, SBIs, and non-kinetic options (such as lasers) to outpace adversary capability development. Another option that has been considered over the years is the development of an air-launched weapon that could engage threat missiles early in their trajectory, either with missiles or directed energy.

MDA also needs to get back into the technology business. The MDA’s technology budget has been dismal over the past four to five years (in FY 2024, the MDA’s S&T budget was at a historical low, below 1 percent of its TOA). Incremental improvements alone cannot defeat a rapidly evolving threat. A high-priority technology investment should begin proving out the discriminating space sensor concept on orbit and rapidly fielding the capability, per the SDA model. Getting back into the technology business means the MDA should pursue an SBI testbed demonstration, along with increased investments in directed energy, and more robust funding for advanced discrimination techniques, as well as technological investments in lighter-weight, lower-cost interceptors to make kinetic interceptor options more affordable.

Determining costs for a defensive architecture is beyond the scope of this study. Such a determination would depend significantly on classified threat predictions and the objective of the chosen defensive architecture. This is unsatisfying, but the intent of this study was to make a strategy-based case for expanded homeland missile defense and provide a sense for how current and future capabilities could be combined to provide the defensive benefits discussed herein. Nevertheless, some context could be helpful. According to the DOD, the cost for sixty-four NGIs would run approximately $7.0 billion, while the cost of the SM-3 IIA and THAAD missile in 2023—based on the current production rate—is about $23.7 million and $10 million, respectively.⁴⁷⁹

The MDA devotes about one-third of its approximately $10 billion annual budget to the homeland defense mission. See Figure 7. This amounts to about a third of one percent of the annual defense budget. Raising that figure to a full one percent would go a long way toward achieving the layered defense recommendations in this study and provide sufficient funding for advanced technology exploration.

Figure 7: Homeland defense mission budget
Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies (2024).
GMD = Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
LRDR – Long-Range Discrimination Radar
HDR-H = Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii
NGI = Next-Generation Interceptor
RKV = Redesigned Kill Vehicle
RDT&E = Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation.
SBX = Sea-Based X-band radar

Addressing Russian and Chinese concerns

The central concern or objection voiced by homeland missile defense critics is the fear of an arms race with Russia and China. Some critics can accept the strategic argument for homeland missile defense for reasons outlined in this study, yet still want assurances that expanded US homeland missile defenses will not make the United States less secure due to the Russian and Chinese response. That is a reasonable expectation, but regrettably hard to satisfy with any confidence.

Russia and China will react negatively to any expansion of US homeland missile defenses, even if intended only to address the North Korean missile threat. The extent of that reaction is unknowable, despite past rhetoric. If history is any guide, an arms race is not the guaranteed result. Russia could have expanded its nuclear forces when the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002, yet Moscow chose not to do so. Instead, the United States and Russia reduced their respective deployed strategic nuclear forces by some two-thirds. Some have argued that Russia’s new novel nuclear systems and China’s new ICBM silos are meant to hedge against future US missile defenses. Meanwhile, other experienced US diplomats reason that political, rather than strategic, imperatives explain these actions.⁴⁸⁰ In this regard, Russia and China have long expressed concern about US conventional precision strike weapons and other non-nuclear technologies that also could threaten their retaliatory forces. However, the United States has not deployed missile defense or these other systems in significant numbers in recent years, suggesting to some China experts “that additional factors lie behind Xi’s decision to embrace nuclear expansion.”⁴⁸¹ Rather than grow their nuclear forces, Russia and China could choose to expand their existing homeland defense coverage to a level comparable to future US deployments, putting them on an equal footing with the United States while avoiding an offensive arms race.

Russia’s and China’s vocal objections to US missile defenses often reflect strategic posturing rather than genuine security threats. Both nations have invested heavily in their missile defense systems and possess substantial offensive capabilities, suggesting their concerns are more about maintaining geopolitical influence than reacting to a direct threat. The frank answer is that one cannot know for certain how Russia and China will respond beyond the anticipated negative rhetoric. Nevertheless, the United States could consider sharing its intentions and missile defense plans in a more formal way with Russia and China. The United States could make it clear that its aim is not an impregnable defense intended to eliminate Russia’s and China’s assured second-strike capability and that US missile defense plans would be apparent and predictable based on the annual defense appropriations process. This effort could be combined with US-Russian talks aimed at replacing the New START Treaty when it expires in 2026. In the final analysis, policymakers must weigh the arms racing risks of deploying less-than-comprehensive defenses as outlined in this study with the consequences of the United States’ growing vulnerability to missile threats from small and major powers.

The politics of missile defense

Russian and Chinese criticism will not be the only stumbling block to pursuing the recommendations in this study. The challenges ahead to secure funding, develop and integrate new technology, and build congressional support are daunting. It is not by accident that twenty years after withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, the United States has only forty-four homeland defense interceptors to show for it. To be sure, senior leadership commitment and focus will be required by the president and, through him or her, the secretary of defense.

Costs will be significant, but a reasonable starting point for the efforts recommended herein is an additional $4–5 billion per year above the approximately $3 billion allocated for homeland missile defense within the MDA budget. Combined, this would amount to about one percent of the defense budget for the number-one national defense priority. Providing a layered defense over the next five years would not require developing new technology—only increased procurement and integration of interceptors, radars, and battle management systems currently in service. Procurement of additional THAAD and SM-3 missiles is feasible and should be pursued for both regional and homeland defense, as determined by the threat.⁴⁸² Additional long-lead funding to procure NGIs beyond the first twenty should be considered. Finally, additional funding for research and development of next-generation missile defense systems should be included, leading to deployment decisions toward the end of the decade.

Congressional debate is to be expected. House Armed Services Committee Republicans want to go beyond the planned sixty-four homeland defense interceptors and SBIs as part of the solution, whereas some Democratic members appear to be wary of any significant expansion of homeland defenses for fear of starting an arms race with Russia and China. Moreover, there appears to be little appetite for additional significant missile defense funding in the appropriations process unless total defense spending receives a commensurate boost. It may be possible to distinguish between less controversial near-term efforts to build out layered defenses based on existing interceptor and radar technology, and those longer-term efforts for next-generation missile defense capabilities, such as directed energy and SBIs. Support for the former is more likely because it is less expensive and less fraught with missile defense ideology. It is too early to tell if the recommendations of the Strategic Posture Commission, to build defenses against the Russian and Chinese coercive/limited threat, will gain any traction, or whether opposition to defending against Russia and China will continue to hold influence.

Most importantly, the future course of US homeland missile defense will depend largely on the next president. One of the most consequential shifts in US missile defense policy occurred when Bush made the decision to withdraw the United States from the ABM Treaty and begin fielding GBIs in 2004 to address the rogue state ICBM threat. Today, the missile threat to the homeland is growing not just from North Korea, but also from Russia and China, which have military doctrines that include the threat of limited missile strikes against the US homeland. Considering these new threats and the priority to defend the homeland, the next administration will want to consider whether planned missile defense capabilities are sufficient to the task. The ability of the United States to assure its allies and deter, and if necessary, prevail in great-power conflict depends on it.

Acknowledgments

This study is the culmination of the collaborative efforts of numerous talented and dedicated individuals, without whom this work would not have been possible.

I want to begin by expressing my gratitude to the Smith Richardson Foundation for generously funding this effort and to the three peer reviewers who provided feedback on the initial proposal. Without the Foundation’s support, this study would not have been possible.

In the preparation of this report, I benefited from research and writing assistance on several of the major sections. Mark Massa was critical to the development of Sections Four, Five, and Six. Jonathan Rosenstein also contributed to Section Five, particularly the Iran section. Kari Anderson and Lt. Col. James McCue, USAF (ret.) played a leading role in drafting Sections Seven, Eight, and Nine, and contributing their deep technical expertise to the proposed missile defense architecture. The section on Russian and Chinese missile defense doctrine and capabilities, researched by Jacob Mezey, was an integral part of our research and was also issued independently as an Atlantic Council Issue Brief in 2024. Tom Karako was our thought leader on the role of cruise missile defense. Léonie Allard, Peppi DiBiaso, and Kenneth Harmon were involved throughout the research effort and contributed valuable ideas and feedback.

I am grateful to Matthew Kroenig and Clementine Starling-Daniels for their leadership of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and its Forward Defense program, which supported this project, and which house the Atlantic Council’s work on missile defense, nuclear deterrence, and strategic forces issues. Special recognition is owed to Mark Massa, Alyxandra Marine, Jonathan Rosenstein, and William M. Reicher for their research, editing, and design support.

I am further thankful to Ankit Panda, Tom Karako, and Trey Obering for their comprehensive peer review of this study. Their detailed feedback, constructive criticism, and thoughtful suggestions have enhanced the quality of the final work.

Finally, I want to extend my gratitude to all those who generously made themselves available for consultations on this project. Your willingness to share your expertise, experiences, and perspectives has added invaluable dimensions to this study.

To all those mentioned here and to the many others who supported this project in various ways, I offer my sincere thanks. Your collaboration and commitment have been vital in bringing this study to completion.

About the authors

Robert Soofer

Robert M. Soofer is a senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, where he leads its Nuclear Strategy Project. He is also an adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s Center for Security Studies, teaching courses in nuclear strategy, missile defense, and arms control. He serves as a consultant for the Sandia, Los Alamos, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories as well as the Institute for Defense Analyses.

Soofer was deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy from April 2017 to January 2021. In this capacity, he was codirector of the Nuclear Posture Review and Missile Defense Review and led their implementation; testified before Congress on nuclear and missile defense policy; led biannual nuclear staff talks with key allies; served as US representative to the NATO High Level Group for nuclear planning; and was the secretary of defense representative to the US-Russia nuclear arms control talks.

Previously, Soofer served for eight years as a professional staff member and Republican staff lead for the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the Senate Armed Services Committee and as strategic forces policy advisor to Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ), then the Republican whip. He also was military legislative assistant to former Senator Slade Gorton (R-WA) and professional staff member on the Senate Republican Policy Committee. He taught at the National War College for three years as professor of national-security policy and served for eight years in various policy and international-affairs positions with the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization/Missile Defense Agency. In 2003, he was called to active duty as a lieutenant commander in the Naval Reserve and assigned to the newly created Terrorist Threat Integration Center.

Soofer received his doctorate in international relations from the University of Southern California and is a graduate of the National War College. He was awarded the Department of Defense Exceptional Civilian Service Medal and Distinguished Public Service Medal and is the author of Missile Defenses and Western European Security (Greenwood Press, 1988).

Kari Anderson

Kari Anderson is a senior technical advisor at Mobius Consulting, LLC, where she provides technical solutions and development strategies to DOD customers. She is also serving as a consultant to the Army Science Board. From 2006 to 2017, she served as the chief architect for the Missile Defense Agency. Other assignments included program manager at the Office of Naval Research, systems engineer at the Naval Air Systems Command, and project engineer at the Naval Ordnance Station.

James McCue

Lieutenant Colonel James McCue is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security in the Forward Defense program. He was formerly a US Air Force SkillBridge fellow with the Forward Defense program.

Prior to his current role, McCue was the division chief supporting the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s liaison officers embedded within each combatant command headquarters. He completed a fellowship with the National Defense University, studying countering weapons of mass destruction, and with the Air Force Institute of Technology’s Nuclear Weapons Effects, Policy, and Planning graduate program. His previous assignments include detachment command, nuclear security instructor pilot and training development, and deployments with operational and staff advisory roles.

McCue received his commission in 2003 after graduating from the US Air Force Academy. His awards and decorations include the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Air Medal with ten devices, two Joint medals, and the Combat Action Medal.

Thomas Karako

Thomas Karako is a senior fellow with the International Security Program and the director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he arrived in 2014. His research focuses on national security, missile defense, nuclear deterrence, and public law. In 2010–2011, he was an American Political Science Association congressional fellow, working with the professional staff of the House Armed Services Committee and the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces on US strategic forces policy, nonproliferation, and NATO. Dr. Karako is also currently a fellow with the Institute for Politics and Strategy of Carnegie Mellon University. He received his PhD from Claremont Graduate University and his BA from the University of Dallas.

Mark J. Massa

Mark J. Massa is a deputy director in the Forward Defense practice of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. Massa has contributed to Forward Defense programs and research on nuclear security and arms control, space security, and the Future of DHS Project. Having supported the launch of Forward Defense as the Scowcroft Center’s newest practice area, he continues to carry out program administration in strategy, budgeting, business development, and event planning. His writing and commentary have appeared in The Hill, Defense News, RealClearDefense, The National Interest, CNBC, Sky News, and CTV News.

Massa earned his master of arts from Georgetown University’s security studies program. He received a bachelor of science in foreign service magna cum laude from Georgetown University with a degree in Science, Technology, and International Affairs. He was awarded honors in his major for a senior thesis on a theory of nuclear ballistic missile submarine strategy. He was elected to several honors societies, including Phi Beta Kappa (national), Pi Sigma Alpha (political science), and Pi Delta Phi (French).

Alyxandra Marine

Alyxandra Marine is an assistant director in the Forward Defense practice at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Marine contributes to Forward Defense programs and research on nuclear security, strategic studies, and defense strategy and policy. Prior to her work at the Atlantic Council, Marine worked as a researcher for a New York-based nonprofit aimed at bringing truth to political advertising, where she conducted research on foreign election interference. She also previously worked for the US Senate, where she provided research support on foreign relations and US fisheries policy.

Marine graduated with distinction from a dual degree program in international history, receiving an MA from Columbia University and an MSc from the London School of Economics and Political Science. Her thesis focused on the forward deployment of intermediate-range Jupiter ballistic missiles in Turkey, exploring the non-military and unconventional value of nuclear deployments within NATO and in a bilateral diplomatic context. While completing her graduate degrees, she conducted extensive research on the comparative nuclear policies during the global Cold War, US global economic and trade policy, and Cold War crises and inflection points, with a particular focus on de-escalation at moments with the potential for kinetic or nuclear warfare. She earned her BA with honors from New York University, where she dual-majored in history and political science, focusing on international environmental politics and the effects of the Cold War in the Middle East and East Asia.

Jonathan Rosenstein

Jonathan Rosenstein is a program assistant in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, where he supports work on nuclear strategy and space security. Before coming to the Atlantic Council, Rosenstein gained experience interning around Washington, DC, including at the House of Representatives, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, the Ronald Reagan Institute, and Civilian Research and Development Foundation (CRDF) Global.

Rosenstein is a recent graduate of the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs where he earned his master’s degree in security policy studies with a concentration in US National Security. Rosenstein completed his capstone project analyzing the defense relationships between the United States, Gulf countries, and China, proposing how the United States can adjust its policy to ensure its role as the region’s security guarantor in this era of strategic competition. Rosenstein and his group worked with the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs as a client. Previously, Rosenstein graduated from Tulane University, majoring in international relations and Middle East studies.

Former fellow

Robert Soofer

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Arms Control Defense Policy

Staff

Mark J. Massa

Deputy Director

Defense Policy National Security

Staff

Alyxandra Marine

Assistant Director

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Crisis Management Defense Policy

Staff

Jonathan Rosenstein

Program Assistant

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Nuclear Deterrence

Fellow

James McCue

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

National Security Nuclear Deterrence

1 US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, first in the conjunct release [AD1183539] with the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, October 27, 2022): 1, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF.

2 ”US Department of Defense, 2022 Missile Defense Review, third in the conjunct release [AD1183539] with the 2022 National Defense Strategy and the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, October 27, 2022): 1, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF.

3 Rep. Seth Moulton (D-MA) raised this concern at the April 19, 2023, House Armed Services Committee Hearing on the President’s Budget Request for FY 2024 missile defense activities.

4 US Department of Defense, 2022 Missile Defense Review, 6.

5 Keith Payne, “Deterrence via Mutual Vulnerability? Why Not Now,” Information Series, No. 536, National Institute for Public Policy, October 19, 2022, https://nipp.org/information_series/keith-b-payne-deterrence-via-mutual-vulnerability-why-not-now-no-536-october-19-2022/.

6 US Department of Defense, 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, second in the conjunct release [AD1183539] with the 2022 National Defense Strategy and the 2022 Missile Defense Review (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, October 27, 2022): 7, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF.

7 “Armed Services Committees Leadership Announces Selections for Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States,” US Senate Committee on Armed Services, press release, March 16, 2022, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/press-releases/armed-services-committees-leadership-announces-selections-for-commission-on-the-strategic-posture-of-the-united-states.

8 Madelyn R. Creedon (chair) et al., America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (Washington DC: US Strategic Posture Commission, October 2023), X, 72, 105, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/americas_strategic_posture_the_final_report_of_the_congressional_commission_on_the_strategic_posture_of_the_united_states.pdf.

9 Brad Roberts (chair) et al., China’s Emergence as a Second Nuclear Peer: Implications for US Nuclear Deterrence Strategy, Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Spring 2023), 52, 55, https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/CGSR_Two_Peer_230314.pdf.

10 Preferential limited missile defense for US strategic forces was considered during the Cold War.

11 US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2022 Annual Report to Congress (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, November 29, 2022): 81–82, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/29/2003122279/-1/-1/1/2022-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

12 US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 7.

13 US Department of Defense, 2022 Missile Defense Review, 5.

14 John Plumb, “Missile Defense in an Era of Strategic Competition” (prepared remarks by Assistant Secretary of Defenses for Space Policy John Plumb for the 16th Ronald Reagan Missile Defense Conference, April 16, 2024), US Department of Defense, https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/3743542/asd-space-policy-remarks-for-the-16th-ronald-reagan-missile-defense-conference/.

15 US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 4.

16 US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 2.

17 Plumb, “Missile Defense in an Era of Strategic Competition.”

18 Rose Gottemoeller, “Russia Is Updating Their Nuclear Weapons: What Does That Mean for the Rest of Us?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 29, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2020/01/russia-is-updating-their-nuclear-weapons-what-does-that-mean-for-the-rest-of-us?lang=en.

19 The Trump administration, in fact, had prepared a $3.5 billion five-year spending plan to integrate, test, and procure SM-3 and THAAD missiles and associated sensors but was set aside by the incoming administration. Robert M. Soofer, private papers (unclassified), “Layered Homeland Defense Summary, FY 2021–26.”

20 US Department of Defense, 2022 Missile Defense Review, 1.

21 Rep. Seth Moulton (D-MA) raised this concern at the April 19, 2023, House Armed Services Committee Hearing on the President’s Budget Request for FY 2024 missile defense activities.

22 US Department of Defense, 2022 Missile Defense Review, 6.

23 Payne, “Deterrence via mutual vulnerability? Why not now.”

24 US Department of Defense, 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, 7.

25 Jason Sherman, “NORTHCOM Nominee: U.S. Should Consider Means to Defeat Limited Russia, China ICBM Attack,” Inside Defense, July 26, 2023, https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/northcom-nominee-us-should-consider-means-defeat-limited-russia-china-icbm-attack.

26 US Department of Defense, 2022 Missile Defense Review, 6.

27 Full Committee Hearing: US Military Posture and National Security Challenges in North and South America, 118th Cong. (March 8, 2023) (testimony by Gen. Glen D. VanHerck, commander USNORTHCOM and NORAD), US House Armed Services Committee, https://www.congress.gov/118/chrg/CHRG-118hhrg52187/CHRG-118hhrg52187.pdf.

28 American Enterprise Institute, opening remarks by US Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth at the event: “Not Just an Air and Maritime Theater: The Army’s Role in the Indo-Pacific,” February 27, 2023, https://www.aei.org/events/not-just-an-air-and-maritime-theater-the-armys-role-in-the-indo-pacific/.

29 US House Armed Services Committee, Full Committee Hearing: U.S. Military Posture (VanHerck, 2023).

30 Roberts et al., China’s Emergence as a Second Nuclear Peer, 52, 55.

31 Preferential limited missile defense for US strategic forces was considered during the Cold War. See US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, MX Missile Basing, September 1981, https://ota.fas.org/reports/8116.pdf; and Report of the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces, April 1983, 9–10, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85M00364R001101620009-5.pdf.

32 Roberts et al., China’s Emergence as a Second Nuclear Peer, 70.

33 Creedon et al., America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report, X, 72, and 105.

34 “Chinese and Russian Missile Defense: Strategies and Capabilities,” US Department of Defense, fact sheet, July 28, 2020, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jul/28/2002466237/-1/-1/1/CHINESE_RUSSIAN_MISSILE_DEFENSE_FACT_SHEET.PDF.

35 US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2022), 81–82.

36 Bernard Brodie, From Crossbow to H-Bomb (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973), 305.

37 National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense, White House, National Security Presidential Directive, May 20, 2003, https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nspd/nspd-23-fs.htm.

38 US Department of Defense, 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2010), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/BMDR/BMDR_as_of_26JAN10_0630_for_web.pdf.

39 US Department of Defense, 2019 Missile Defense Review (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 2019), VII, 30, https://media.defense.gov/2019/jan/17/2002080666/-1/-1/1/2019-missile-defense-review.pdf.

40 US Department of Defense, 2019 Missile Defense Review, II, IV, 6.

41 Robert Soofer, “Is the United States Falling Behind the North Korean ICBM Threat? Congress Needs Answers,” Atlantic Council, April 11, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/is-the-united-states-falling-behind-the-north-korean-icbm-threat-congress-needs-answers/.

42 For a good history of Congress’s role in missile defense policy making, see Andrew Futter, Ballistic Missile Defense and US National Security Policy (New York: Routledge, 2013); and Amy Woolf, “National Missile Defense: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service report IB10034, April 28, 2000.

43 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-190, 231–32 (1991), https://www.congress.gov/bill/102nd-congress/house-bill/2100.

44 Futter, Ballistic Missile Defense, 80; Woolf, “National Missile Defense,” 2.

45 National Missile Defense Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-38 (1999), https://www.congress.gov/bill/106th-congress/house-bill/4#.

46 US Department of Defense, 2022 Missile Defense Review, 1; emphasis added.

47 US Department of Defense, 2022 Missile Defense Review, 1.

48 US Department of Defense, 2022 Missile Defense Review, 6; emphasis added.

49 US Department of Defense, 2022 Missile Defense Review, 6.

50 John D. Hill, “Written Statement of Mr. John D. Hill, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space and Missile Defense Policy, to the House Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee: ‘Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 Budget Request for Missile Defense and Missile Defeat Programs’” (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, April 12, 2024), 7, https://armedservices.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/republicans-armedservices.house.gov/files/04.12.24%20Hill%20Statement.pdf.

51 Plumb, “Missile Defense in an Era of Strategic Competition.”

52 US Department of Defense, 2022 Missile Defense Review, 1.

53 Plumb, “Missile Defense in an Era of Strategic Competition.”

54 US Department of Defense, 2022 Missile Defense Review, 6.

55 Executive Office of the President, “Statement of Administration Policy: H.R. 2670 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024” (Washington, DC: Office of Management and Budget, July 10, 2023), 4, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/H.R.-2670-NDAA.pdf.

56 Rep. Seth Moulton, “Opening Statement, FY24 Request for Missile Defense and Missile Defeat Programs,” House Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee, April 19, 2023, https://democrats-armedservices.house.gov/_cache/files/f/c/fc6ed1c1-eb1c-463f-ae0b-cfbe41a838db/23109AC8232766CF49F1BFB2D4487579.20230418-moulton-str-hearing-statement.pdf.

57 Moulton, “Opening Statement.”

58 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, Pub. L. No. 118-31, 1663 (2023), https://www.congress.gov/118/plaws/publ31/PLAW-118publ31.pdf.

59 NDAA FY 2024, Pub. L. No. 118-31, 1663.

60 Creedon et al., America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report, X, 72, and 105.

61 See reporting language in the Fiscal Year 2024 Defense Appropriations Act titled See reporting language in the Fiscal Year 2024 Defense Appropriations Act titled “Homeland Defense to Counter Advanced Missile Threats.” Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2024, S.2597, 118th Cong. (2024), https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-bill/2587#:~:text=This%20bill%20provides%20FY2024%20appropriations,included%20in%20other%20appropriations%20bills.

62 President Joe Biden, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, October 2022), 6, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf.

63 Biden, National Security Strategy, 7–8.

64 Biden, National Security Strategy, 7.

65 Biden, National Security Strategy, 11.

66 Kim Seung-Yeun, “Deeping Russia-NK Ties Reignite Debate over South Korea’s Nuclear Options,” Yonhap News Agency, June 26, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240626005000315. Note: The politician is Daegu Mayor Hong Joon-Pyo.

67 Soo-Hyang Choi and Kantaro Komiya, “North Korea Fires ICBM After Condemning US ‘War’ Moves,” Reuters, December 18, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-fires-ballistic-missile-south-korea-says-2023-12-17/.

68 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, September 30, 2001): 14, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/quadrennial/QDR2001.pdf?ver=AFts7axkH2zWUHncRd8yUg%3D%3D.

69 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 4, 2014): 13, https://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/docs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf.

70 US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 1.

71 US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 1.

72 US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 2.

73 US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 4.

74 US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 5.

75 US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 5.

76 Dontavian Harrison, “Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth’s American Enterprise Institute (AEI) Transcript (February 27, 2023),” US Army, March 3, 2023, https://www.army.mil/article/264524/secretary_of_the_army_christine_wormuths_american_enterprise_institute_aei_transcript_february_27_2023.

77 US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 7.

78 US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 9.

79 US Department of Defense, 2022 Missile Defense Review, 6.

80 US Department of Defense, 2022 Missile Defense Review, 5.

81 Hearing on US National Missile Defense Policy and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty [H.A.S.C. No. 106–33], US House Armed Services Committee (October 13, 1999) (testimony by Walter B. Slocombe, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy), 79, https://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has286000.000/has286000_0f.htm.

82 US Department of Defense, 2022 Missile Defense Review, 5.

83 Norman Augustine, in Ashton B. Carter and David E. Schwartz, Ballistic Missile Defense (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1984), 371–72.

84 Zbigniew Brzezinski, ed., Promise or Peril: The Strategic Defense Initiative (Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1986), 89–99.

85 Brzezinski, Promise or Peril, 65–66.

86 For examples of analyses along these lines see Creedon et al., America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report; Roberts et al., China’s Emergence as a Second Nuclear Peer; Heather Williams et al., Project Atom 2023: A Competitive Strategies Approach for U.S. Nuclear Posture through 2035, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 29, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/project-atom-2023.

87 US Department of Defense, 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, 12.

88 James M. Acton and Ankit Panda, “North Korea’s Doctrinal Shifts Are More Dangerous Than Missile Launches,” Foreign Policy, November 4, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/04/north-korea-nuclear-doctrine-more-dangerous-than-missile-launches/.

89 US Department of Defense, 2022 Missile Defense Review, 1.

90 Sarah Heintz, Michael Shurkin, and King Mallory, DPRK Sanctions: Countering DPRK Proliferation Activities, RAND, April 29, 2019, https://www.rand.org/pubs/tools/TL332.html.

91 Kelsey Davenport, “Russia Ends North Korean Sanctions Panel,” Arms Control Today, May 2024, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2024-05/news/russia-ends-north-korean-sanctions-panel.

92 “Statement of General Gregory M. Guillot, United States Air Force, Commander, United States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command,” US Senate Armed Services Committee, 118th Congress (March 14, 2024), https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/guillot_statement_31424.pdf.

93 See Alexis Lavi and Matthew Flug, “Failed North Korean Missile Tests: Faulty Engineering or a Covert US Offensive Plan?” The Diplomat, April 27, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/failed-north-korean-missile-tests-faulty-engineering-or-a-covert-us-offensive-plan/; William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “U.S. Strategy to Hobble North Korea Was Hidden in Plain Sight,” New York Times, March 4, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/04/world/asia/left-of-launch-missile-defense.html; David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Trump Inherits a Secret Cyberwar Against North Korean Missiles,” March 4, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/04/world/asia/north-korea-missile-program-sabotage.html.

94 Josh Smith, “South Korea Doubles Down on Risky ‘Kill Chain’ Plans to Counter North Korea Nuclear Threat,” Reuters, July 25, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/skorea-doubles-down-risky-kill-chain-plans-counter-nkorea-nuclear-threat-2022-07-26/.

95 Brian N. Wolford et al., “Recognizing the Increasing Importance of the US-ROK Alliance,” podcast transcript, “Decisive Point” podcast, US Army War College, May 20, 2024, https://media.defense.gov/2024/May/30/2003475800/-1/-1/0/DP-5-7-WOLFORD-TRANSCRIPT.PDF.

96 “U.S. Successfully Conducts SM-3 Block IIA Intercept Test Against an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Target,” US Department of Defense, press release, November 17, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2417334/us-successfully-conducts-sm-3-block-iia-intercept-test-against-an-intercontinen/.

97 US Department of Defense, 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, 5.

98 US Department of Defense, 2022 Missile Defense Review, 3.

99 US Department of Defense, 2022 Missile Defense Review, 3.

100 Mitch Shin, “North Korea Confirms Hwasong-17 ICBM Test,” The Diplomat, March 17, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/north-korea-confirms-hwasong-17-icbm-test/.

101 Mary Beth D. Nikitin, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs,” Congressional Research Service, December 19, 2023, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10472/29.

102 Victor Cha and Ellen Kim, “North Korea Warns with Fifth ICBM Test,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 19, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/north-korea-warns-fifth-icbm-test.

103 Alexander Ward, “North Korea Displays Enough ICBMs to Overwhelm U.S. Defense System against Them,” Politico, February 9, 2023, https://www.politico.com/news/2023/02/08/north-korea-missile-capability-icbms-00081993. It is possible that Pyongyang is intentionally inflating its apparent number of TELs, reminiscent of Soviet military parades in which heavy bombers would circle Moscow to inflate Western observers’ counts of their total strength. Ethan Jewell, “North Korea may Have More Mobile Launchers for Its ICBMs Than Previously Known,” NKNews, April 27, 2022, https://www.nknews.org/2022/04/north-korea-may-have-more-mobile-launchers-for-its-icbms-than-previously-known/.

104 Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Request for Missile Defense and Missile Defeat Programs, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, 118th Congress, April 18, 2023, https://www.congress.gov/event/118th-congress/house-event/LC72450/text.

105 “North Korea’s Kim Calls for Boosting Missile Launch Vehicle Production -KCNA,” Reuters, January 4, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-koreas-kim-calls-boosting-missile-launch-vehicle-production-kcna-2024-01-04/.

106 Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “What is the Significance of North Korea’s Rail-Mobile Ballistic Missile Launcher?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 29, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-significance-north-koreas-rail-mobile-ballistic-missile-launcher.

107 Robert G. Joseph and Peppino A. DeBiaso, “Homeland Missile Defense: Responding to a Transformed Security Environment,” Journal of Policy and Strategy 4, no. 2 (2024): 37–51, https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Analysis-Joseph-DeBiaso-4.2.pdf.

108 Hans M. Kristensen et al., “North Korean Nuclear Weapons, 2024,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 80, no. 4 (2024): 251–71, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/00963402.2024.2365013?needAccess=true.

109 Nikitin, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs.”

110 Kim Tong-Hyung, “North Korean leader urges greater nuclear weapons production in response to a ‘new Cold War,’” Associated Press, September 28, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/north-korea-kim-cold-war-nuclear-72087705d2276860fbe4edd999930ba8.

111 Bruce W. Bennett et al., Countering the Risks of North Korean Nuclear Weapons, RAND, April 12, 2021, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA1015-1.html.

112 Kristensen et al., “North Korean Nuclear Weapons, 2024.”

113 Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea Says It Tested Multiple-Warhead Missile Technology,” New York Times, June 26, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/26/world/asia/north-korea-missile-test.html.

114 Markus Garlauskas, “Proactively Countering North Korea’s Advancing Nuclear Threat,” Atlantic Council, December 23, 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/proactively-countering-north-koreas-advancing-nuclear-threat/.

115 Hyung-Jin Kim, “Suspected North Korean Hypersonic Missile Exploded in Flight, South Korea Says,” Associated Press, June 26, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/north-korea-missile-launch-south-korea-2e5e567b5e556fa89093334501798712#.

116 Bruce W. Bennett, “Did North Korea Really Test a Hypersonic Missile?,” National Interest, April 9, 2024, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/did-north-korea-really-test-hypersonic-missile-210482.

117 A. B. Abrams, “North Korea’s New Hwasong-16B Hypersonic Glider Heralds a New Missile Era,” Diplomat, April 13, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/04/north-koreas-new-hwasong-16b-hypersonic-glider-heralds-a-new-missile-era/.

118 Missile Threat, “Pukguksong-1 (KN-11),” Missile Defense Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 29, 2016, last updated April 23, 2024, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kn-11/.

119 Peter Vincent Pry, North Korea: EMP Threat, North Korea’s Capabilities for Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, EMP Task Force on National and Homeland Security, June 6, 2021, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/trecms/pdf/AD1135779.pdf.

120 William Tobey, “The Effects of the War in Ukraine on NNSA Missions,” in The Inflection Point in the U.S. Nuclear Security Enterprise, Brad Roberts and William Tobey, eds., Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Office of National Security and International Studies, Los Alamos National Laboratory, (October 2023), 24, https://cgsr.llnl.gov/sites/cgsr/files/2024-08/CGSR-Inflection-OP-FullBook-10-04-2023-v4-Web.pdf.

121 US Department of Defense, 2022 Missile Defense Review, 6.

122 “U.S. Missile Defense Agency Selects Lockheed Martin To Provide Its Next Generation Interceptor,” Lockheed Martin Corporation, press release, April 15, 2024, https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2024-04-15-U-S-Missile-Defense-Agency-selects-Lockheed-Martin-to-provide-its-Next-Generation-Interceptor.

123 “Missile Defense: Next Generation Interceptor Program Should Take Steps to Reduce Risk and Improve Efficiency,” US Government Accountability Office, GAO-24-106315, June 26, 2024, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106315. The DOD had not responded to this assessment at the time of writing.

124 Vice Adm. Jon A. Hill and Michelle C. Atkinson, “Missile Defense Agency Officials Hold a Press Briefing on President Biden’s Fiscal 2024 Missile Defense Budget (Transcript),” US Department of Defense, March 14, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3328637/missile-defense-agency-officials-hold-a-press-briefing-on-president-bidens-fisc/.

125 “Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR),” Lockheed Martin Corporation, n.d., https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/long-range-discrimination-radar.html.

126 “Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA) Tracking Layer,” US Space Development Agency, October 2023, https://www.sda.mil/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Tracking-Layer-Fact-Sheet_FINAL_Oct-2023-1.pdf.

127 US Department of Defense, 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, 8.

128 US Department of Defense, 2022 Missile Defense Review, 6.

129 Choe Sang-Hun, “In a First, South Korea Declares Nuclear Weapons a Policy Option,” New York Times, January 12, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/12/world/asia/south-korea-nuclear-weapons.html.

130 Kim Seung-yeon, “Deepening Russia-N.K. Ties Reignite Debate over S. Korea’s Nuclear Options,” Yonhap News Agency, June 26, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240626005000315?section=features/features.

131 Lee Haye-ah, “PM Says S. Korea Not at Stage to Consider Nuclear Armament ‘for Now,’” Yonhap News Agency, June 26, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240626006100315.

132 Jesse Johnson, “State-Run Think Tank Makes Rare Call for Seoul to Consider Own Nukes,” Japan Times, June 25, 2024, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/06/25/asia-pacific/politics/south-korea-nuclear-weapons-think-tank/.

133 Yi Wonju, “DP Says PPP’s Calls for Nuclear Armament ‘Extremely Dangerous,’” Yonhap News Agency, June 26, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240626006000315.

134 Toby Dalton, Karl Friedhoff, and Lami Kim, Thinking Nuclear: South Korean Attitudes on Nuclear Weapons, Chicago Council on World Affairs, February 21, 2022, https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/thinking-nuclear-south-korean-attitudes-nuclear-weapons.

135

136 Washington Declaration,” White House, April 26, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/04/26/washington-declaration-2/.

137 US Mission Korea, “Joint Press Statement on the 3rd Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) Meeting,” US Embassy and Consulate in the Republic of Korea, press release, June 10, 2024, https://kr.usembassy.gov/061124-joint-press-statement-on-the-3rd-nuclear-consultative-group-ncg-meeting/.

138 Lee, “PM Says S. Korea Not at Stage to Consider Nuclear Armament ‘for Now.’”

139 Sayuri Romei, “Japan and the Nuclear Challenge in a New Era of Rising Tensions: Balancing Between Disarmament and Deterrence,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Studies 2, No. 3 (Fall 2019): 66–84, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/JIPA/journals/Volume-02_Issue-3/04-Romei.pdf.

140 Romei, “Japan and the Nuclear Challenge in a New Era of Rising Tensions.”

141 “North Korea Fires ICBM-Class Missile After Condemning ‘War’ Moves,” Reuters, December 18, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-says-it-conducted-hwasong-18-icbm-monday-yonhap-2023-12-18/.

142 Jingdong Yuan, “Japan’s New Military Policies: Origins and Implications,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, February 2, 2023, https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2023/japans-new-military-policies-origins-and-implications.

143 Yuki Tatsumi, Pamela Kennedy, and Kenji Nagayoshi, Japan’s Strategic Future and Implications for the US-Japan Alliance, Stimson Center, February 28, 2024, https://www.stimson.org/2024/japans-strategic-future-and-implications-for-the-us-japan-alliance/.

144 Tatsumi, Kennedy, and Nagayoshi, “Japan’s Strategic Future.”

145 US Department of State, “U.S.-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue,” Office of the Spokesperson, June 17, 2024, https://www.state.gov/u-s-japan-extended-deterrence-dialogue-3/.

146 “United States-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Ministerial Joint Press Statement,” US Department of Defense, press release, December 19, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3621235/united-states-japan-republic-of-korea-trilateral-ministerial-joint-press-statem/.

147 “The History of U.S. Decision-Making on Nuclear Weapons in Japan,” Federation of American Scientists, August 21, 2019, https://fas.org/publication/the-history-of-u-s-decision-making-on-nuclear-weapons-in-japan/.

148 Tatsumi, Kennedy, and Nagayoshi, “Japan’s Strategic Future.”

149 Tatsumi, Kennedy, and Nagayoshi, “Japan’s Strategic Future.”

150 Tatsumi, Kennedy, and Nagayoshi, “Japan’s Strategic Future.”

151 Anya L. Fink, “Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N),” Congressional Research Service, May 31, 2024, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12084.

152 Joseph and DeBiaso, “Homeland Missile Defense.”

153 Hearing on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs before the House Armed Services Committee – Subcommittee on Strategic Forces Hearing on Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Request for Missile Defense and Missile Defeat Programs, 118th Cong. (April 18, 2023), https://www.congress.gov/event/118th-congress/house-event/LC72450/text.

154 Jake Cordell, “Putin Submits Law on Suspending Nuclear Arms Treaty,” Reuters, February 21, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-we-will-still-observe-nuclear-warhead-limits-under-new-start-2023-02-21/.

155 Missile Threat, “DF-41 (Dong Feng-41 / CSS-X-20),” Missile Defense Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, last update April 23, 2024, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-41/.

156 Hans M. Kristensen et al., “Russian Nuclear Weapons 2024,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 80, no. 2 (2024): 118–45, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2024.2314437?src=recsys#d1e1879. Internal citations omitted.

157 See Matthew Kroenig, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

158 An attack on HBMD still serves some strategic utility by clarifying for policymakers the stakes of an incoming attack. The study discusses this benefit later.

159 To comply with New START limits, Russian SSBNs today do not likely carry this many warheads. If the United States and Russia do not reach a follow-on agreement to New START or voluntarily continue to comply with its limits, then Russian deployments could reach this number in 2026.

160 Kenneth Saltzman, “Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies,” Congressional Research Service, 2021, 9–10, accessed August 1, 2024, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44017/80.

161 Iran Military Power: Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance, Defense Intelligence Agency, August 2019, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Images/News/Military_Powers_Publications/Iran_Military_Power_LR.pdf; Iran Watch, “Table of Iran’s Missile Arsenal,” Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, February 22, 2024, https://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/weapon-program-background-report/table-irans-missile-arsenal

162 Jon Gambrell, “Iran Says Supreme Leader Limiting Ballistic Missile Range,” Associated Press, October 31, 2017, https://apnews.com/article/a9b9ff80f4424ce5be3a4a81e04dc8dc

163 Missile Threat, “Missiles of Iran,” Missile Threat Project, Missile Defense Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 14, 2018, last updated August 10, 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/iran/.

164 “Iran Bolsters Missile Capacity with Satellite Launches,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, January 29, 2024. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/01/29/iran-bolsters-missile-capacity-with-satellite-launches/.

165 Behnam Ben Taleblu, “Arsenal: Assessing the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, February 15, 2023, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/02/15/arsenal-assessing-the-islamic-republic-of-irans-ballistic-missile-program/.

166 Saltzman, “Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies.”

167 Creedon et al., America’s Strategic Posture, 10.

168 Ben Taleblu, “Arsenal: Assessing the Islamic Republic.”

169 Ben Taleblu, “Arsenal: Assessing the Islamic Republic.”

170 Ben Taleblu, “Arsenal: Assessing the Islamic Republic.”

171 “Iran’s Space Program: Timeline and Technology,” Rasanah, April 29, 2020, https://rasanah-iiis.org/english/monitoring-and-translation/reports/irans-space-program-timeline-and-technology/.

172 Jon Gambrell, “Iran Launches Three Satellites into Space,” Associated Press, January 28, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/iran-satellite-launch-us-ballistic-missiles-israel-hamas-74bcd3eb7e48a31be4f52b8d86d24721?taid=65b5f8f14d231b00014df5e1.

173 Gambrell, “Iran Launches Three Satellites”; Ben Taleblu, “Arsenal: Assessing the Islamic Republic.”

174 Ben Taleblu, “Arsenal: Assessing the Islamic Republic.”

175 Intel Lab (@TheIntelLab), “VHR Satellite Image from June 3rd,2022 bolsters …” X, June 4, 2022, 4:30 a.m., https://twitter.com/TheIntelLab/status/1533003243978215424.

176 Kenneth Saltzman, “Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies,” Congressional Research Service, 2021, 9-10, accessed August 1, 2024, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44017/80.

177 Ankit Panda, Kim Jong Un and the Bomb: Survival and Deterrence in North Korea (Oxford University Press, 2020), https://global.oup.com/academic/product/kim-jong-un-and-the-bomb-9780190060367?cc=us&lang=en&.

178 Iran Military Power, Defense Intelligence Agency, August 2019, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Images/News/Military_Powers_Publications/Iran_Military_Power_LR.pdf.

179 Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran Military Power.

180 Ben Taleblu, “Arsenal: Assessing the Islamic Republic.”

181 Creedon et al., America’s Strategic Posture, 10.

182 Farhad Rezaei, “Iran Could Decide to Build a Nuclear Weapon,” National Interest, February 26, 2024. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/iran-could-decide-build-nuclear-weapon-209616.

183 Ben Taleblu, “Arsenal: Assessing the Islamic Republic.”

184 Rezaei, “Iran Could Decide to Build a Nuclear Weapon.”

185 Eric Brewer, “Iran’s Evolving Nuclear Program and Implications for U.S. Policy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 15, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/irans-evolving-nuclear-program-and-implications-us-policy.

186 Brewer, “Iran’s Evolving Nuclear Program and Implications for U.S. Policy.”

187 Rezaei, “Iran Could Decide to Build a Nuclear Weapon.”

188 Rezaei, “Iran Could Decide to Build a Nuclear Weapon.”

189 Robert Soofer and Matthew Costlow, US Homeland Missile Defense: Room for Expanded Roles, Atlantic Council, November 15, 2023. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/us-homeland-missile-defense-room-for-expanded-roles/

190 Missile Threat, “Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) System,” Missile Defense Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, last updated July 26, 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/system/gmd/; Creedon et al., America’s Strategic Posture, 63, 103.

191 Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025, H.R. 8070, 118th Cong. (2024), https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/8070.

192 FY24 Defense Budget Request, House Armed Services Committee, 118th Cong. (2023) (statement of General Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20230329/115606/HHRG-118-AS00-Wstate-MilleyM-20230329.pdf.

193 National Research Council, “Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense,” Washington, DC, 2012, 85, https://nation.time.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2012/09/nrc-bmd-report-2012-09.pdf.

194 The Posture of US Northern Command and US Southern Command, House Armed Services Committee, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of USNORTHCOM Commander, General Charles Jacoby), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg86969/html/CHRG-113hhrg86969.htm.

195 “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, June 8, 2020, https://archive.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/international_safety/disarmament/-/asset_publisher/rp0fiUBmANaH/content/id/4152094.

196 Mark Trevelyan, “Putin’s Nuclear Warnings since Russia Invaded Ukraine,” Reuters, March 13, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putins-nuclear-warnings-since-russia-invaded-ukraine-2024-03-13/.

197 David E. Sanger, “Biden’s Armageddon Moment: When Nuclear Detonation Seemed Possible in Ukraine,” New York Times, March 9, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/09/us/politics/biden-nuclear-russia-ukraine.html; Max Seddon, “Why Vladimir Putin Toned down His Nuclear Rhetoric,” Financial Times, November 1, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/d98446ac-b56e-4f1d-bfa9-ebaed4e26884.

198 US Department of Defense, 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2018): 10, 35–36, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF; Gen. John E. Hyten, “U.S. Strategic Command Space and Missile Defense Symposium Remarks” (speech presented by General Hyten as commander of the US Strategic Command, August 7, 2018), https://www.stratcom.mil/Media/Speeches/Article/1600894/us-strategic-command-space-and-missile-defense-symposium-remarks/; Matthew Kroenig, A Strategy for Deterring Russian De-Escalation Strikes, Atlantic Council, April 24, 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/a-strategy-for-deterring-russian-de-escalation-strikes/. Some scholars dismiss the escalate to deescalate doctrine as alarmism or criticize the description as a dangerously incomplete way of understanding Russian strategy. The 2022 NPR did not describe Russian nuclear strategy in the same way. See Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “Myth 9: ‘Russian Nuclear Strategy Is Best Described as “Escalate to De-escalate,”’ Chatham House, September 22, 2022, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/07/myths-and-misconceptions-around-russian-military-intent/myth-9-russian-nuclear-strategy and David Johnson, Russia’s Conventional Precision Strike Capabilities, Regional Crises, and Nuclear Thresholds, Livermore Papers on Global Security, No. 3, Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (February 2018), 13, https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/Precision-Strike-Capabilities-report-v3-7.pdf. “It is also a mis-leading label in that it does not fully encompass Russia’s approach, which is better understood as a strategic deterrence, counter-escalation, and warfighting strategy.”

199 See Colin Kahl, “Nuclear Deterrence and National Security in a Decisive Decade,” in The Inflection Point in the U.S. Nuclear Security Enterprise, Brad Roberts and William Tobey, eds., Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Office of National Security and International Studies, Los Alamos National Laboratory (October 2023), 7, https://cgsr.llnl.gov/sites/cgsr/files/2024-08/CGSR-Inflection-OP-FullBook-10-04-2023-v4-Web.pdf.

200 Tobey, “The Effects of the War in Ukraine on NNSA Missions.”

201 Johnson, Russia’s Conventional Precision Strike Capabilities, 4.

202 Johnson, Russia’s Conventional Precision Strike Capabilities, 16.

203 Johnson, Russia’s Conventional Precision Strike Capabilities, 17; emphasis added.

204 Michael Kofman, “The Role of Nuclear Forces in Russian Maritime Strategy,” Russian Military Analysis, March 12, 2020, https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/2020/03/12/the-role-of-nuclear-forces-in-russian-maritime-strategy/. Cited in Bruce Sugden, “Nuclear Operations and Counter-Homeland Conventional Warfare: Navigating Between Nuclear Restraint and Escalation Risk,” Texas National Security Review 4, No. 4 (Fall 2021): 60–89, 75, https://tnsr.org/2021/10/nuclear-operations-and-counter-homeland-conventional-warfare-navigating-between-nuclear-restraint-and-escalation-risk/.

205 Jack Durkalec, Russian Net Assessment and the European Security Balance, Livermore Papers on Global Security, No. 13, Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (March 2024), 43, https://cgsr.llnl.gov/sites/cgsr/files/pubs/2024-08/CGSR_Livermore_Paper_13_Russian-Net-Assessment.pdf.

206 Durkalec, Russian Net Assessment, 74.

207 For further support to this assertion, see Michael Kofman et al., Russian Military Strategy: Core Tenets and Operational Concepts, Center for Naval Analyses, August 6, 2021, i, https://www.cna.org/reports/2021/08/Russian-Military-Strategy-Core-Tenets-and-Operational-Concepts.pdf, which assesses that Russian strategy calls for “a defensive offense that envisions persistent engagement of an opponent throughout the theater of military action, to include critical infrastructure in their homeland, executing strategic operations that affect an adversary’s ability or will to sustain the struggle.” Emphasis added.

208 Durkalec, Russian Net Assessment, 37.

209 Benjamin Jensen, “Crippling Civilian Infrastructure Has Long Been Part of Russian Generals’ Playbook—Putin Is Merely Expanding That Approach,” The Conversation, October 14, 2022, https://theconversation.com/crippling-civilian-infrastructure-has-long-been-part-of-russian-generals-playbook-putin-is-merely-expanding-that-approach-192226.

210 Durkalec, Russian Net Assessment, 100.

211 For more on Russian CBRN escalation, see Natasha Lander, Ryan Arick, and Christopher Skaluba, Conceptualizing Integrated Deterrence to Address Russian Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Escalation, Atlantic Council, October 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/continued-us-and-allied-integration-is-essential-to-deter-russian-cbrn-use/.

212 Tobey, “The Effects of the War in Ukraine on NNSA Missions.”

213 US Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge” (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 2018): 3, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.

214 US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 4.

215 US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 4.

216 US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 5.

217 “Advance Policy Questions for Lieutenant General Gregory M. Guillot, USAF Nominee for Commander, U.S. Northern Command, and Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command,” US Senate Armed Services Committee, 118th Cong. (2023), https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/guillot_apq_responses.pdf.

218 US Senate Armed Services Committee, “Statement of General Gregory M. Guillot” (March 14, 2024).

219 Theresa Hitchens, “NORTHCOM Nominee Backs a ‘Look at’ Potential Changes to Homeland Missile Defense Rules,” Breaking Defense, July 27, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/07/northcom-nominee-backs-look-at-potential-changes-to-homeland-missile-defense-rules/.

220 ”Creedon et al., America’s Strategic Posture, 63, 103.

221 Durkalec, Russian Net Assessment, 119.

222 Durkalec, Russian Net Assessment, 123.

223 Durkalec, Russian Net Assessment, 124.

224 Durkalec, Russian Net Assessment, 135–136.

225 Matthew Kroenig, Mark J. Massa, and Christian Trotti, “Russia’s Exotic Nuclear Weapons and Implications for the United States and NATO,” Atlantic Council, March 6, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/russias-exotic-nuclear-weapons-and-implications-for-the-united-states-and-nato/.

226 “Russia to Use SS-19 ICBMs as Carriers for Avangard Hypersonic Glide Vehicles—Source,” TASS, March 20, 2018, https://tass.com/defense/995167; “Missile Regiment near Orenburg Being Rearmed with Avangard System—Defense Ministry,” TASS, November 18, 2022, https://tass.com/defense/1539059.

227 US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 5.

228 US Department of Defense, 2022 Missile Defense Review, 3.

229 “Statement of General Glen D. VanHerck, United States Air Force, Commander, United States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command,” US Senate Armed Services Committee, 117th Cong. (March 24, 2022), 6, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/USNORTHCOM%20and%20NORAD%202022%20Posture%20Statement%20FINAL%20(SASC).pdf.

230 Durkalec, Russian Net Assessment, 74.

231 At the time of writing, most recently in July 2024. Oren Liebermann and Natasha Bertrand, “NORAD Intercepts Russian and Chinese Bombers Operating Together near Alaska in First Such Flight,” CNN, July 25, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/07/24/politics/norad-russian-chinese-bombers-alaska/index.html.

232 Missile Threat, “Kh-55 (AS-15),” Missile Defense Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, last updated April 23, 2024, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kh-55/; Missile Threat, “Kh-101 / Kh-102,” Missile Defense Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, last updated April 23, 2024, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kh-101-kh-102/.

233 US Senate Armed Services Committee, “Statement of General Glen D. VanHerck” (March 24, 2022), 6.

234 Like most ballistic missiles, this ALBM has a maximum speed of more than Mach 5, and as such the Kinzhal is often referred to as a hypersonic missile. “Kh-47M2 Kinzhal (Dagger) Russian Air-Launched Ballistic Missile,” US Army Training and Doctrine Command, n.d., https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG/Asset/Kh-47M2_Kinzhal_(Dagger)_Russian_Air-Launched_Ballistic_Missile.

235 “Russia Builds Test Facilities for Next-Gen PAK-DA Bomber: What’s Next?” Sputnik, December 12, 2023, https://sputnikglobe.com/20231215/russia-builds-test-facilities-for-next-gen-pak-da-bomber-whats-next-1115606302.html.

236 Durkalec, Russian Net Assessment, 126.

237 Missile Threat, “3M-14 Kalibr (SS-N-30A),” Missile Defense Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, last updated April 23, 2024, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ss-n-30a/.

238 Missile Threat, “RK-55 Granat (SS-N-21),” Missile Defense Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, last updated April 23, 2024, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ss-n-21/.

239 US Senate Armed Services Committee, “Statement of General Glen D. VanHerck” (March 24, 2022), 6–7.

240 “Russia Says It’s Completed Testing of Hypersonic Zircon Cruise Missile,” Reuters, June 1, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-its-completed-testing-hypersonic-zircon-cruise-missile-2022-06-01/; “Russia Uses Zircon Hypersonic Missile in Ukraine for First Time, Researchers Say,” Reuters, February 12, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-uses-zircon-hypersonic-missile-ukraine-first-time-researchers-say-2024-02-12/.

241 Missile Threat, “9M729 (SSC-8),” Missile Defense Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, last updated April 23, 2024, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ssc-8-novator-9m729/.

242 Roy Boone et al., The Challenge of Russia’s Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Western Air Supremacy as One Russian Justification for NSNW, National Strategic Research Institute, October 29, 2021, https://nsri.nebraska.edu/-/media/projects/nsri/docs/academic-publications/2021/october/The-Challenge-of-Russias-NSNW.pdf; Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris, “The B61 Family of Nuclear Bombs,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 70, no. 3 (November 2015): 79–84, doi:10.1177/0096340214531546.

243 Durkalec, Russian Net Assessment, 100.

244 Durkalec, Russian Net Assessment, 102.

245 Durkalec, Russian Net Assessment, 108; Kylie Atwood, “China Is Giving Russia Significant Support to Expand Weapons Manufacturing as Ukraine War Continues, US Officials Say,” CNN, April 12, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/04/12/politics/china-russia-support-weapons-manufacturing/index.html.

246 In Their Own Words: Science of Military Strategy 2020, (translation and publication of Xiao Tianliang et al., eds., Science of Military Strategy (Revised in 2020), PLA National Defense University), China Aerospace Studies Institute (January 2022), 129, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Translations/2022-01-26%202020%20Science%20of%20Military%20Strategy.pdf.

247 China Aerospace Studies Institute, In Their Own Words: Science of Military Strategy, 128. For an explanation of the inclusion of compellence in Chinese concepts of deterrence, see Dean Cheng, “Chinese Views on Deterrence,” Joint Forces Quarterly 60 (2011): 92-94, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-60/jfq-60_92-94_Cheng.pdf?ver=7wdLUCDzUSCAYlOp45xFuQ%3D%3D and Michael Clarke, “Understanding China’s Approach to Deterrence,” The Diplomat, January 9, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/01/understanding-chinas-approach-to-deterrence/. “China conceives of and practices deterrence in a distinct manner that combines dissuasive and compellent forms of coercion.”

248 China Aerospace Studies Institute, In Their Own Words: Science of Military Strategy, 138.

249 Jeffrey Engstrom, Systems Confrontation and System Destruction Warfare: How the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Seeks to Wage Modern Warfare, RAND, February 1, 2018, iii, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1708.html.

250 China Aerospace Studies Institute, In Their Own Words: Science of Military Strategy, 187.

251 China Aerospace Studies Institute, In Their Own Words: Science of Military Strategy, 139.

252 US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2023 Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, October 19, 2023): 95, 106, https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

253 US Department of Defense, 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, 11.

254 US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2023), 94.

255 US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2023), 112.

256 US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2023), 99.

257 US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2023), 105.

258 See Matthew Kroenig, Deliberate Nuclear Use in a War over Taiwan: Scenarios and Considerations for the United States, Atlantic Council, November 30, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/deliberate-nuclear-use-in-a-war-over-taiwan-scenarios-and-considerations-for-the-united-states/; Gregory Weaver, “The Role of Nuclear Weapons in a Taiwan Crisis,” Atlantic Council, November 22, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/the-role-of-nuclear-weapons-in-a-taiwan-crisis/.

259 US Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy,” 3.

260 US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 5.

261 US Senate Armed Services Committee, “Statement of General Gregory M. Guillot” (March 14, 2024).

262 Creedon et al., America’s Strategic Posture, 64, 104.

263 US Senate Armed Services Committee, “Statement of General Glen D. VanHerck” (March 24, 2022), 7.

264 US Senate Armed Services Committee, “Advance Policy Questions for Lieutenant General Gregory M. Guillot” (2023).

265 Harrison, “Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth’s American Enterprise Institute (AEI) Transcript.”

266 US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2023), 96.

267 Luke Caggiano, “China Deploys New Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles,” Arms Control Today, May 2023, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-05/news/china-deploys-new-submarine-launched-ballistic-missiles.

268 US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2023), 98.

269 Bruce Sugden, “China’s Conventional Strikes Against the U.S. Homeland,” Center for International Maritime Security, June 25, 2014, https://cimsec.org/china-conventional-strike-us/.

270 The Second Artillery Corps operated the PLA’s long-range, ground-based missiles before the creation of the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) in 2015. Roderick Lee, “A Case for China’s Pursuit of Conventionally Armed ICBMs,” The Diplomat, November 17, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/11/a-case-for-chinas-pursuit-of-conventionally-armed-icbms/.

271 US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2023), VI, 67.

272 Missile Threat, “DF-26,” Missile Defense Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, last updated April 23, 2024, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/dong-feng-26-df-26/.

273 US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2023), 67.

274 US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2023), 67.

275 Kelley M. Sayler, “Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, updated February 9, 2024, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45811.

276 Theresa Hitchens, “It’s a FOBS, Space Force’s Saltzman Confirms Amid Chinese Weapons Test Confusion,” Breaking Defense, November 29, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/11/its-a-fobs-space-forces-saltzman-confirms-amid-chinese-weapons-test-confusion/.

277 US Senate Armed Services Committee, “Statement of General Glen D. VanHerck” (March 24, 2022), 7.

278 Timothy Wright, “Is China Gliding Toward a FOBS Capability?” International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 22, 2021, https://www.iiss.org/en/online-analysis/online-analysis/2021/10/is-china-gliding-toward-a-fobs-capability/.

279 US Senate Armed Services Committee, “Statement of General Glen D. VanHerck” (March 24, 2022), 7.

280 US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2023), 63.

281 US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2023), 92; emphasis added.

282 US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2023), 63.

283 US Senate Armed Services Committee, “Statement of General Glen D. VanHerck” (March 24, 2022), 8. It is also notable that Chinese bombers would likely need to transit Russian airspace to reach most targets in the contiguous United States.

284 US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2023), 108.

285 US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2023), 92.

286 US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2023), V.

287 US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2023), 56.

288 US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2023), 57.

289 Michael R. Gordon and Nancy A. Youssef, “Russia and China Sent Large Naval Patrol Near Alaska,” Wall Street Journal, updated August 6, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-and-china-sent-large-naval-patrol-near-alaska-127de28b.

290 US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2023), 92.

291 US Senate Armed Services Committee, “Statement of General Glen D. VanHerck” (March 24, 2022), 8.

292 Ken Moriyasu, “China Expanding Ways to Target Continental U.S., Pentagon Report Says,” Nikkei Asia, October 19, 2023, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/US-China-tensions/China-expanding-ways-to-target-continental-U.S.-Pentagon-report-says.

293 T.X. Hammes, “Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict,” National Defense University Strategic Forum, June 2012, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF-278.pdf.

294 US Department of Defense, 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, XIII.

295 US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 9.

296 US Department of Defense, 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, 8.

297 “An Interview with General Glen D. VanHerck, USAF, Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM),” Information Series, Conversations on National Security, no. 574, National Institute for Public Policy, February 1, 2024, https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/IS-574.pdf.

298 Sugden, “Nuclear Operations and Counter-Homeland Conventional Warfare,” 70, 71.

299 Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” International Security 40, no. 2 (2015): 7–50, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00215; Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Dangerous Confidence? Chinese Views on Nuclear Escalation,” International Security 44, no. 2 (Fall 2019): 61–109, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00359. Cited in Sugden, “Nuclear Operations,” 77.

300 Durkalec, Russian Net Assessment, 36.

301 Durkalec, Russian Net Assessment, 41.

302 Durkalec, Russian Net Assessment, 148.

303 Johnson, Russia’s Conventional Precision Strike Capabilities, 74.

304 Ottawa Sanders, Mark J. Massa, and Alyxandra Marine, The Impact of the Evolving Sino-Russian Relationship on Chinese Military Modernization and the Implications for Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, Atlantic Council, (unpublished manuscript, May 2022).

305 US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 8.

306 US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 9.

307 US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, (2022). Notably, the 2023 edition of this annual report to Congress estimates one thousand warheads by 2030 without making a 2035 estimate, perhaps reflecting the uncertainty of projecting China’s buildup so many years in the future.

308 Report on the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States – 2020 Specified in Section 491(a) of Title 10 U.S.C., US Department of Defense, November 30, 2020, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/NCB/21-F-0591_2020_Report_of_the_Nuclear_Employement_Strategy_of_the_United_States.pdf.

309 Following the report of a study group convened by the Center for Global Security Research at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, on which the principal investigator served as a member, this study uses the “two nuclear peer” shorthand for the situation likely to face the United States in the 2030s, should the PRC achieve its planned nuclear buildup. See Roberts et al., China’s Emergence as a Second Nuclear Peer.

310 Brent Scowcroft (chair) et al., Report of the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces (April 6, 1983): 15, HathiTrust digital release of the University of Minnesota archived December 10, 1990 copy [U.S. – G.P.O. – D- 295], https://web.mit.edu/chemistry/deutch/policy/1983-ReportPresCommStrategic.pdf.

311 Risks to the submarine leg are speculated to include quantum sensing, large-scale use of uncrewed underwater vehicles, artificial intelligence, and other emerging technologies. See Sebastian Brixey-Williams, “Prospects for Game-Changers in Submarine-Detection Technology,” The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, August 22, 2022, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/prospects-for-game-changers-in-submarine-detection-technology/; Rose Gottemoeller, “The Standstill Conundrum: The Advent of Second-Strike Vulnerability and Options to Address It,” Texas National Security Review 4, no. 4 (Fall 2021): 115–124, http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/17496. The 2018 NPR made hedging against such technical risk a purpose of US nuclear strategy; the 2022 NPR removed this as an explicit goal.

312 Comment made in a non-for-attribution workshop in support of this paper. In response to the 2P problem, some have argued that the United States cannot afford to maintain nuclear counterforce as its exclusive nuclear-targeting doctrine. See Keir Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “US Strategy and Force Posture for an Era of Nuclear Tripolarity,” Atlantic Council, May 1, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/us-strategy-and-force-posture-for-an-era-of-nuclear-tripolarity/. The present author disagrees. See Keith B. Payne et al., “The Rejection of Intentional Population Targeting for ‘Tripolar’ Deterrence,” RealClearDefense, September 26, 2023, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/09/27/the_rejection_of_intentional_population_targeting_for_tripolar_deterrence_982200.html.

313 There are gradations and variations to each of these scenarios. For instance, the United States could need to deter Russia while in a nuclear conflict with both China and North Korea. Or the United States could face gradually escalating limited nuclear exchanges with both Russia and China. While spelling out each of the particular permutations of strategic simultaneity is beyond the scope of this paper, these two scenarios are the most stressing and a baseline for grappling with the two-nuclear-peer problem and its attendant implications for US homeland missile defense.

314 Creedon et al., America’s Strategic Posture, 33, 97.

315 Soviet Forces and Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict through the Late 1990s, National Intelligence Estimate 11-3/8-87W, Central Intelligence Agency, July 1987, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000802749.pdf.

316 “Putin Says Russia Could Adopt US Preemptive Strike Concept,” Associated Press, December 9, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/putin-moscow-strikes-united-states-government-russia-95f1436d23b94fcbc05f1c2242472d5c.

317 Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States Specified in Section 491 of 10 U.S.C., US Department of Defense, June 12, 2013, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA590745.pdf; US Department of Defense, Report on the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States (November 2020).

318 Assuming an average of roughly two-on-one targeting.

319 Creedon et al., America’s Strategic Posture, 33.

320 Roberts et al., China’s Emergence as a Second Nuclear Peer, 52.

321 Robert M. Gates, “The Dysfunctional Superpower: Can a Divided America Deter China and Russia?” Foreign Affairs, September 29, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/robert-gates-america-china-russia-dysfunctional-superpower.

322 Liebermann and Bertrand, “NORAD Intercepts Russian and Chinese Bombers Operating Together.”

323 US Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing on the Nomination of General Anthony Cotton to be Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, September 15, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Videos/videoid/857452/?dvpsearch=army%252b.

324 “An Interview with Robert Taylor, U.S. Strategic Command/J8,” Journal of Policy and Strategy 3, no. 1 (2023): 79–84, https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Interview.pdf.

325 “Open/Closed: To Receive Testimony on United States Strategic Command and United States Space Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2023 and the Future Years Defense Program,” US Senate Armed Services Committee, March 8, 2022, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/-to-receive-testimony-on-united-states-strategic-command-and-united-states-space-command-in-review-of-the-defense-authorization-request-for-fiscal-year-2023-and-the-future-years-defense-program.

326 Hans M. Kristensen et al., “United States Nuclear Weapons, 2024,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 80, no. 3 (2024): 182–208, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2024.2339170; Agile Combat Employment, Air Force Doctrine Note 1-21, December 1, 2021, https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/Force%20Management/AFDN_1-21_ACE.pdf.

327 US House Armed Services Committee, House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces Holds Hearing on Strategic Forces Posture (Congressional Transcript: March 8, 2023, Revised Final), Congressional Quarterly, March 10, 2023, https://www.spacecom.mil/Portals/57/House%20Armed%20Services%20Subcommittee%20on%20Strategic%20Forces%20Holds%20Hearing%20on%20Strategic%20Forces%20Posture%208%20Mar%2023.pdf.

328 Don Bacon (@RepDonBacon), “With the growing alliance between Russia and China, along with the development of nuclear weapons that can hit the U.S. within 15 minutes, it is my steadfast …” X, October 22, 2024, 8:52 a.m., https://x.com/RepDonBacon/status/1848709024205971619.

329 President Richard Nixon, “United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s,” February 25, 1971, https://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/richard-milhous-nixon/united-states-foreign-policy-for-the-1970s/ch14_p3.php.

330 Vera Bergengruen, “How the U.S. Rallied to Defend Israel From Iran’s Massive Attack,” Time Magazine, April 15, 2024, https://time.com/6966758/how-the-u-s-rallied-to-defend-israel-from-irans-massive-attack/.

331 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles,” Federation of American Scientists, October 25, 1998, https://nuke.fas.org/intro/missile/icbm.htm.

332 Christopher McFadden, “What Is an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile and How Does It Work?” Interesting Engineering, January 4, 2024, https://interestingengineering.com/innovation/what-is-an-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-and-how-does-it-work.

333 Missile Threat, “LGM-118 Peacekeeper (MX),” Missile Defense Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, last updated April 23, 2024, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/lgm-118-peacekeeper-mx/; Missile Threat, “Trident D5,” Missile Defense Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, last updated April 23, 2024, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/trident/.

334 Missile Threat, “DF-31 (Dong Feng-31 / CSS-10),” Missile Defense Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, last updated April 23, 2024, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-31/; Missile Threat, “DF-41 (Dong Feng-41 / CSS-X-20),” Missile Defense Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, last updated April 23, 2024, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-41/.

335 The United States contemplated a conventionally armed Trident D-5 missile to hold at risk terrorist and other fleeting targets. The program proved too controversial for the US Congress, which canceled the effort. “U.S. Hypersonic Weapons and Alternatives,” Congressional Budget Office, last updated January 2023. https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2023-01/58255-hypersonic.pdf.

336 See Kosta Tsipis and Penny Janeway, “Review of U.S. Military Research and Development,” Program in Science and Technology for International Security Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1984, https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/bunn_tech_of_ballastic_missle_reentry_vehicles.pdf; Akshai Vikram, “Russia’s New Nuclear Weapons: Understanding Avangard, Kinzhal, and Tsirkon,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2, 2021, https://nuclearnetwork.csis.org/russias-new-nuclear-weapons-understanding-avangard-kinzhal-and-tsirkon/.

337 See “The Navy’s Newest, Most Advanced Warships Will All Soon Have One Thing in Common — The SPY-6 Radar,” Breaking Defense, September 28, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/09/the-navys-newest-most-advanced-warships-will-all-soon-have-one-thing-in-common-the-spy-6-radar/.

338 Statement of Vice Admiral Jon A. Hill, USN, Director, Missile Defense Agency before the House Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee,” US House Armed Services Committee, 118th Congress (May 9, 2023) https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hill%20Written%20Testimony%20-%2005.09.23%20SASC-SF%20Missile%20Defense%20Hearing.pdf.

339 Ian Williams et al., “Boost-Phase Missile Defense: Interrogating the Assumptions (Appendix 5: Historical Overview of Boost-Phase Missile Defense Efforts),” Missile Defense Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies ( June 24, 2022), 62–68, https://www.csis.org/analysis/boost-phase-missile-defense.

340 Director of Operational Test and Evaluation Report FY 2014 Annual Report, (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, January 2015): 311–12, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA623438.pdf.

341 Lieutenant General Heath A. Collins, USAF Director, Missile Defense Agency Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee,” US Senate Armed Services Committee, 118th Cong. (May 8, 2024), https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/collins_statement.pdf.

342 PAC-3 MSE Overview,” Lockheed Martin, https://f35.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/mfc/documents/pac-3/24-09790-iamd-pac-3-mse-partner-ppt–updates_r2.pdf.

343 Jen Judson, “How Patriot Proved Itself in Ukraine and Secured a Fresh Future,” Defense News, April 9, 2024, https://www.defensenews.com/land/2024/04/09/how-patriot-proved-itself-in-ukraine-and-secured-a-fresh-future/.

344 “Missile Interceptors by Cost,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, updated February 2024, https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-defense-systems-2/missile-defense-systems/missile-interceptors-by-cost/.

345 There are many reasons that the GMD might be incapable or undesirable for a second shot such as non-conducive threat missile trajectory or technical failure during GBI engagement, such as low launch reliability where the shortcoming would not likely translate to the SM-3 likelihood of a successful intercept.

346 If the SSPK for the GBI is 55 percent, as some scholars presume, and there is neither interference between kill vehicles nor common failure modes then there is better than an 80 percent chance of successful intercept for a three GBI salvo defensive engagement.

347 As the report explains later, three SM-3 IIA sites can cover the entire continental United States.

348 David Choi, “North Korean Parade Showed off Record Number of ICBMs, Analysts Say,” Stars and Stripes, February 9, 2023, https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/2023-02-09/north-korea-icbm-military-parade-9085022.html.

349 Nassim N. Taleb, Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (New York: Random House, 2014).

350 US Department of Defense, 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, 17.

351 US Department of Defense, 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, 30.

352 Missile Threat, “Standard Missile-3 (SM-3): SM-3 Block IIB,” Missile Defense Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, last updated March 9, 2023, https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/sm-3/#:~:text=The%20Pentagon%20cancelled%20plans%20for%20an%20additional%20Block%20IIB%20version%20in%202013.&text=The%20Block%20IIB%20interceptor%20would,intercept%20intercontinental%2Drange%20ballistic%20missiles.

353 US Department of Defense, 2019 Missile Defense Review, 61.

354 US Department of Defense, 2019 Missile Defense Review, 21.

355 Budget Estimates Overview: Fiscal Year (FY) 2021, Missile Defense Agency, 2020, 9, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/budget_justification/pdfs/01_Operation_and_Maintenance/O_M_VOL_1_PART_1/MDA_OP-5.pdf.

356 “U.S. Successfully Conducts SM-3 Block IIA Intercept Test Against an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Target,” US Department of Defense, press release, November 17, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2417334/.

357 “Missile Defense: Fiscal Year 2020 Delivery and Testing Progressed, but Annual Goals Unmet,” US Government Accountability Office, April 2021, 24, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-314.pdf

358 “A New Layer of Homeland Defense: In a Test, Standard Missile-3 Destroys Its First Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Target,” Raytheon, November 19, 2020, https://www.rtx.com/raytheon/news/2020/11/19/new-layer-homeland-defense.

359 Steve Lambakis, Space Sensors and Missile Defense, National Institute for Public Policy, August 2023, https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Space-Sensors-2023.pdf.

360 Courtney Albon, “Missile Defense Agency Eyes Discriminating Space Sensor Launch by 2029,” Defense News, August 19, 2024, https://www.defensenews.com/space/2024/08/19/missile-defense-agency-eyes-discriminating-space-sensor-launch-by-2029/.

361 “SDA Capability Roadmap,” Space Development Agency, March 2024, https://www.sda.mil/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/SDA-Tech-Roadmap_Wide-v2.0-1.pdf; “Space Development Agency Makes Awards to Build 54 Tranche 2 Tracking Layer Satellites,” Space Development Agency, January 16, 2024, https://www.sda.mil/space-development-agency-makes-awards-to-build-54-tranche-2-tracking-layer-satellites/.

362 Albon, “Missile Defense Agency Eyes Discriminating Space Sensor.”

363 Steve Trimble, “May 20 – June 2, 2024: What Is Cosmos 2553,” Aviation Week, May 20, 2024, 14.

364 Tamir Eschle, “SM-3 Relies on Space-Based Tracking to Intercept a Ballistic Missile Target,” Defense Update, February 13, 2013, https://defense-update.com/20130213_sm-3-relies-on-space-based-tracking-to-intercept-a-ballistic-missile-target.html.

365 Loren Thompson, “Why The U.S. Needs A Third Site For National Missile Defense,” Forbes, January 16, 2024, https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2024/01/16/why-the-us-needs-a-third-site-for-national-missile-defense/.

366 “U.S. Successfully Conducts SM-3 Block IIA Intercept Test Against an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Target,” US Department of Defense, press release, November 17, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2417334/us-successfully-conducts-sm-3-block-iia-intercept-test-against-an-intercontinen/.

367 Sen. Roger Wicker, “21st Century Peace Through Strength: A Generational Investment in the U.S. Military,” Office of Senator Roger Wicker, 2024, 14, https://www.wicker.senate.gov/services/files/BC957888-0A93-432F-A49E-6202768A9CE0.

368 “Science and Technology Issues of Early Intercept Ballistic Missile Defense Feasibility,” Defense Science Board, September 2011, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA552472.

369 Theresa Hitchens, “Missile Defense Agency Has New Hope for Airborne Lasers,” Breaking Defense, June 17, 2024, https://breakingdefense.com/2024/06/missile-defense-agency-has-new-hope-for-airborne-lasers/.

370 Marc Santora, Eric Schmitt, and John Ismay, “Ukraine Claims It Shot Down Russia’s Most Sophisticated Missile for First Time,” New York Times, May 6, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/06/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war-patriot.html.

371 Plumb, “Missile Defense in an Era of Strategic Competition.”

372 Adm. James A. Winnefeld, Jr., “Missile Defense and U.S. National Security” (speech presented by Admiral Winnefeld as vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 19, 2015) Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://www.csis.org/events/missile-defense-and-us-national-security.

373 US Department of Defense, 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review.

374 “Statement of General Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, United States Air Force, Commander, United States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command,” US House Armed Services Committee,” 116th Cong. (February 26, 2019), 3, 6, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/OShaughnessy_02-26-19.pdf.

375 “Statement of General Glen D. VanHerck, United States Air Force, Commander, United States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command,” US House Armed Service Committee, 117th Cong. (March 8, 2022), 3, https://www.congress.gov/117/meeting/house/114486/witnesses/HHRG-117-AS00-Wstate-VanHerckG-20220308.pdf.

376 US House Armed Service Committee, “Statement of General Glen D. VanHerck” (March 8, 2022), 6.

377 Creedon et al., America’s Strategic Posture, 66.

378 Karako et al, North America is a Region, Too: An Integrated, Phased, and Affordable Approach to Air and Missile Defense for the Homeland, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/north-america-region-too.

379 David Arthur and Michael Bennett, National Cruise Missile Defense: Issues and Alternatives, Congressional Budget Office, 2021, 3. https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2021-02/56950-CMD.pdf.

380 Winnefeld, Jr., “Missile Defense and National Security.”

381 Jason Sherman, “Hicks Breaks Bureaucratic Logjam, Taps Air Force to Lead Homeland Cruise Missile Defense,” Inside Defense, August 1, 2022, https://insidedefense.com/insider/free-story-hicks-taps-air-force-lead-homeland-cmd.

382 Jason Sherman, “DOD Eyes 2028 Completion for New OTHR in Construction Solicitation, a One-Year Delay,” Inside Defense, August 23, 2023, https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/dod-eyes-2028-completion-new-othr-construction-solicitation-one-year-delay.

383 Jason Sherman, “Air Force, Army Readying FY-26 New-Start Proposal: Domestic Cruise Missile Defense Capability,” Inside Defense, April 15, 2024, https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/air-force-army-readying-fy-26-new-start-proposal-domestic-cruise-missile-defense.

384 Leah Matchett, “Debating Missile Defense: Tracking the Congressional Record,” Arms Control Association, March 2021, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-03/features/debating-missile-defense-tracking-congressional-record.

385 For a Russian view see: “Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov’s Opening Remarks at a Briefing at the Rossiya Segodnya International Information Agency on Arms Control and Strategic Stability,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, February 11, 2021, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1415641. For Chinese responses see: Jing-dong Yuan, “Chinese Responses to U.S. Missile Defenses: Implications for Arms Control and Regional Security,” Nonproliferation Review, Spring 2023, https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/101yuan.pdf.

386 One excellent recent treatment of the issue is conjoined papers in Tong Zhao and Dmitry Stefanovich, Missile Defense and the Strategic Relationship among the United States, Russia, and China (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2023).

387 Victor Gobarev, “The Early Development of Russia’s Ballistic Missile Defense System,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 14, no. 2 (2001): 29–48, https://doi.org/10.1080/13518040108430478.

388 Sayre Stevens, “Ballistic Missile Defense in the Soviet Union,” Current History 84, no. 504 (1985): 313–316, https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.1985.84.504.313.

389 Stevens, “Ballistic Missile Defense in the Soviet Union.”

390 Michael Kofman et al., Russian Military Strategy: Core Tenets and Operational Concepts, Center for Naval Analyses, August 2021, 56, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/pdf/Russian-Military-Strategy-Core-Tenets-and-Operational-Concepts.pdf.

391 Mikhail N. Kumakshev and Aleksandr V. Kravtsov, “ПРОТИВОРАКЕТНАЯ ОБОРОНА КАК СОСТАВЛЯЮЩАЯ СИСТЕМЫ СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКОГО СДЕРЖИВАНИЯ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ” [Missile defense as a component of the strategic deterrent of the Russian Federation], Военное Мысль [Military Thought] 12 (December 2021): 21–26.

392 Soviet Military Power 1990, US Department of Defense, 1990, 56–59, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA229299.pdf, cited in: Peppino DeBiaso, “Russia and Missile Defense: Toward an Integrated Approach,” National Institute for Public Policy Information Series, No. 512 (2022): 4, https://nipp.org/information_series/peppino-debiaso-russia-and-missile-defense-toward-an-integrated-approach-no-512-january-18-2022/#_edn7.

393 US Department of Defense, “Chinese and Russian Missile Defense: Strategies and Capabilities.”

394 Jana Honkova, Current Developments in Russia’s Ballistic Missile Defense, George C. Marshall Institute, April 2013, https://web.archive.org/web/20140426201121/httpc://missilethreat.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Russian-BMD-April-13.pdf.

395 Gobarev, “The Early Development of Russia’s Ballistic Missile Defense System,” 33.

396 Gobarev, “The Early Development of Russia’s Ballistic Missile Defense System,” 33.

397 Honkova, Current Developments in Russia’s Ballistic Missile Defense.

398 Pavel Podvig, “Very Modest Expectations: Performance of Moscow Missile Defense,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (blog), October 23, 2012, https://russianforces.org/blog/2012/10/very_modest_expectations_sovie.shtml.

399 Jim Garamone, “Missile Defense Becomes Part of Great Power Competition,” DOD News, July 28, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2291331/missile-defense-becomes-part-of-great-power-competition.

400 “ОКР Мозырь/Изделие 171/Камчатская ПРО” [R&D Mozyr/Product 171/Kamchatka missile defense], Military Russia, November 15, 2011, http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-604.html; BDM Federal Inc., “Soviet Intentions 1965–1985 Volume II: Soviet Post-Cold War Testimonial Evidence,” National Security Archive, eds. John G. Hines, Ellis M. Mishulovich, and John F. Shull, George Washington University, September 22, 1995, accessed August 4, 2023, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb285/vol%20II%20Kalashnikov.PDF.

401 Alexey Mikhailov and Dmitry Balburov, “Последний рубеж ПРО вооружат стрелами и шариками” [The last line of BMD will be armed with arrows and pellets], Izvestia, December 11, 2012, https://iz.ru/news/541076.

402 DeBiaso, “Russia and Missile Defense.”

403 Stevens, “Ballistic Missile Defense in the Soviet Union.”

404 Sean O’Connor, Russian/Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, Air Power Australia, December 12, 2009, updated April 2012, https://ausairpower.net/APA-Rus-ABM-Systems.html#mozTocId700952.

405 Honkova, Current Developments in Russia’s Ballistic Missile Defense.

406 Vadim Matveyev, “New Missile Defences Being Developed,” Russia Beyond, February 3, 2016, https://www.rbth.com/economics/defence/2016/02/03/new-missile-defences-being-developed_564505.

407 Matveyev, “New Missile Defences Being Developed.”

408 Kristensen and Korda, “Russian Nuclear Weapons 2022.”

409 Garamone, “Missile Defense Becomes Part of Great Power Competition.”

410 Ankit Panda, “Russia Conducts New Test of ‘Nudol’ Anti-Satellite System,” The Diplomat, April 2, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/russia-conducts-new-test-of-nudol-anti-satellite-system/.

411 Ankit Panda, “The Dangerous Fallout of Russia’s Anti-Satellite Missile Test,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 17, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/11/17/dangerous-fallout-of-russia-s-anti-satellite-missile-test-pub-85804.

412 Bart Hendrickx, “Aerostat: A Russian Long-Range Anti-Ballistic Missile System with Possible Counterspace Capabilities,” Space Review, October 11, 2021, https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4262/1.

413 “First Regiment of S-500 Air Defense Systems to Defend Moscow—Source,” TASS, October 12, 2021, https://tass.com/defense/1348691.

414 Missile Threat, “S-500 Prometheus,” Missile Defense Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, last updated July 1, 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/s-500-prometheus/.

415 “ВС РФ протестировали С-500 на способность сбивать гиперзвуковые цели” [The Russian Armed Forces tested the S-500’s ability to shoot down hypersonic targets], Izvestia, February 27, 2024, https://iz.ru/1656259/2024-02-27/vs-rf-protestirovali-s-500-na-sposobnost-sbivat-giperzvukovye-tceli.

416 Miko V. Vranic, “Russia Begins Series Production of S-500 Air-Defence System,” Janes, April 27, 2022, https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-news/weapons/russia-begins-series-production-of-s-500-air-defence-system.

417 Yuri Smityuk, “New-Generation Missile Destroyer under Development in Russia,” TASS, October 21, 2014, https://web.archive.org/web/20141024041212/http://en.itar-tass.com/russia/755539.

418 Missile Threat, “S-500 Prometheus”; Zhao and Stefanovich, Missile Defense.

419 Maxim Starchak, “Where is Russia’s S-500 air defense system?” Defense News, October 5, 2023, https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2023/10/05/where-is-russias-s-500-air-defense-system/.

420 “Источники Раскрыли Особенности Новой Зенитной Ракетной Системы С-550” [Sources Reveal Features of New Anti-Air Missile System], РИА Новости [RIA Novosti], November 13, 2021, https://ria.ru/20211113/s-550-1758871100.html.

421 Zhao and Stefanovich, Missile Defense.

422 Bart Hendrickx, “Peresvet: A Russian Mobile Laser System to Dazzle Enemy Satellites,” Space Review, June 15, 2020, https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3967/1.

423 Garamone, “Missile Defense Becomes Part of Great Power Competition.”

424 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (London: Routledge, 2022), 201, https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2022/.

425 Honkova, Current Developments in Russia’s Ballistic Missile Defense.

426 Brad Roberts, China and Ballistic Missile Defense: 1955 to 2002 and Beyond, Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2003, https://nuke.fas.org/guide/china/doctrine/bmd.pdf.

427 William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle:’ The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960–64,” International Security 25, no. 3 (Winter 2000/01), https://doi.org/10.1162/016228800560525.

428 Wu Riqiang, “No Stability without Limits on Missile Defense,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 24, 2014, https://thebulletin.org/roundtable_entry/no-stability-without-limits-on-missile-defense/.

429 Roberts, China and Ballistic Missile Defense.

430 Qiang Zhi and Margaret M. Pearson, “China’s Hybrid Adaptive Bureaucracy: The Case of the 863 Program for Science and Technology,” Governance 30, no. 3 (2017): 407–424, https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12245.

431 Mark A. Stokes, “Chinese Ballistic Missile Forces in an Age of Global Missile Defense,” Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2002, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep11959.8.pdf.

432 Bruce W. MacDonald and Charles D. Ferguson, Understanding the Dragon Shield: Likelihood and Implications of Chinese Strategic Ballistic Missile Defense, Federation of American Scientists, September 30, 2015, 43, https://uploads.fas.org/2015/09/DragonShieldreport_FINAL.pdf.

433 US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China: (2023), 98–99.

434 Ashton B. Carter, “The Relationship of ASAT and BMD Systems,” Daedalus 114, no. 2 (Spring 1985): 171–189, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20024984.

435 Heather Foye and Gabriela Rosa Hernández, “UN First Committee Calls for ASAT Test Ban,” Arms Control Association, December 2022, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-12/news/un-first-committee-calls-asat-test-ban.

436 Frank A. Rose, “Ballistic Missile Defense and Strategic Stability in East Asia,” (remarks by Frank A. Rose as assistant secretary of the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance to the Federation of American Scientists, February 20, 2015), US Department of State, https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2015/237746.htm.

437 MacDonald and Ferguson, Understanding the Dragon Shield, 23–25.

438 Tong Zhao, “Managing the Impact of Missile Defense on U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” in Tong Zhao and Dmitry Stefanovich, Missile Defense and the Strategic Relationship among the United States, Russia, and China (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2023), 11.

439 Wan Yung-Kui, “Can the Chinese Armed Forces Successfully Protect the Three-Gorges Dam?” Hong Kong Tangai, no. 31, October 15, 1993, 72–80, cited in Roberts, China and Ballistic Missile Defense.

440 MacDonald and Ferguson, Understanding the Dragon Shield, 23.

441 陈翔 [Chen Xiang], 董立勇 [Dong Liyong], and 于宁宇 [Yu Ningyu], “美军导弹防御拦截武器发展趋势分析” [Analysis of the development trend of U.S. military missile defense interceptor weapons], 军事文摘 [Military Digest], no. 23 (2020): 44–47. Cited in Zhao, “Managing the Impact.”

442 US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2023), 112.

443 MacDonald and Ferguson, Understanding the Dragon Shield, 4.

444 US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2023). After the writing of this report, the SSF was split into several constituent parts. The point stands.

445 “China says conducted mid-course missile interception test,” AP, April 15, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/china-interceptor-missile-test-defense-c77ae53a43f5e74bc48c4be45e46af80.

446 Ankit Panda, “Revealed: The Details of China’s Latest Hit-To-Kill Interceptor Test,” The Diplomat, February 21, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/revealed-the-details-of-chinas-latest-hit-to-kill-interceptor-test/.

447 US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2023).

448 Jennifer DiMascio, “China May Have Operational ASAT Program, Reports Say,” Aviation Week, March 31, 2020, https://aviationweek.com/shows-events/space-symposium/china-may-have-operational-asat-program-reports-say.

449 Hearing on China’s Nuclear Forces before the before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 117th Cong. (June 10, 2021) (testimony by Phillip C. Saunders, director Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defense University), https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-06/Phillip_Saunders_Testimony.pdf.

450 Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, and Eliana Johns, “Chinese Nuclear Weapons 2023,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 79, no. 2 (2023): 108–133, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2178713.

451 “India, China may be first buyers of Russia’s latest S-500 air defense system,” TASS, November 2, 2021, https://tass.com/defense/1356905.

452 Thomas Corbett and Peter W. Singer, “China’s Big New Warship Is Missing an Important New Weapon,” Defense One, January 23, 2023, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2023/01/chinas-big-new-warship-missing-important-new-weapon/382082/.

453 MacDonald and Ferguson, Understanding the Dragon Shield, 23.

454 Masao Dahlgren and Tom Karako, Getting on Track: Space and Airborne Sensors for Hypersonic Missile Defense, Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 18, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/getting-track-space-and-airborne-sensors-hypersonic-missile-defense.

455 Trevor Wild, “THAAD Battery in Guam Successfully Completes Table VIII Evaluation,” US Army, March 21, 2024, https://www.army.mil/article/274693/thaad_battery_in_guam_successfully_completes_table_viii_evaluation.

456 Jenevieve Molenda, “Chinese HQ-9 SAMs No Longer Visible on Woody Island,” CSIS, June 11, 2018, https://missilethreat.csis.org/chinese-hq-9-sams-no-longer-visible-on-woody-island.

457 Kofman et al., Russian Military Strategy.

458 Edward Helmore, “Petraeus: US Would Destroy Russia’s Troops if Putin Uses Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine,” Guardian, October 2, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/02/us-russia-putin-ukraine-war-david-petraeus; Matthew Kroenig, “Memo to the President: How to Deter Russian Nuclear Use in Ukraine—and Respond if Deterrence Fails,” Atlantic Council, October 2, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/memo-to-the-president/memo-to-the-president-how-to-deter-russian-nuclear-use-in-ukraine-and-respond-if-deterrence-fails/.

459 US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2022), 158.

460 Sanders, Massa, and Marine, The Impact of the Evolving Sino-Russian Relationship.

461 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025, S. 4638 at 849, 118th Cong. (2024), https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-bill/4638.

462 H.R. 8070 at 1055 (2024).

463 Creedon et al., America’s Strategic Posture; Jane Harman (chair) et al., Report of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy, Commission on the National Defense Strategy, July 2024, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/nds_commission_final_report.pdf.

464 US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 7.

465 US Department of Defense, 2022 Missile Defense Review, 5.

466 Plumb, “Missile Defense in an Era of Strategic Competition.”

467 US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 4.

468 US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy, 2.

469 Plumb, “Missile Defense in an Era of Strategic Competition.”

470 NDAA FY 2024, Pub. L. No. 118-31; emphasis added.

471 NDAA FY 2024, Pub. L. No. 118-31; 31 U.S.C. 137 § 136 (2023); emphasis added.

472 James M. Lindsay and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Defending America: The Case for Limited National Missile Defense (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001).

473 National Missile Defense Act of 1999, Pub. L. 106-38, 113 Stat. 205 (1999); emphasis added.

474 Steven A. Hildreth, The Strategic Defense Initiative: Issues for Phase I Deployment, CRS Issue Brief, Congressional Research Service, 1990, 4, cited in Baker Spring, For Strategic Defense: A New Strategy For the New Global Situation, Heritage Foundation, April 18, 1991, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/strategic-defense-new-strategy-the-new-global-situation.

475 Patty-Jane Geller and Jack Kraemer, 40 Years After Reagan, Neglected U.S. Missile Defense Is Dangerously Obsolete, Heritage Foundation, March 23, 2023, https://www.heritage.org/missile-defense/commentary/40-years-after-reagan-neglected-us-missile-defense-dangerously-obsolete.

476 “National Missile Defense,” White House Archives, last updated September 1, 2000, https://clintonwhitehouse5.archives.gov/WH/new/html/Wed_Oct_4_141122_2000.html.

477 Andrew Feickert, The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) System, Congressional Research Service, last updated July 18, 2024, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12645.

478 Wicker, “21st Century Peace Through Strength,” 14.

479 Missile Defense Agency, “Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 Budget Estimates: Defense-Wide Justification Book Volume 2b of 2” (Washington DC: US Department of Defense, March 2024): 91–156, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2025/budget_justification/pdfs/02_Procurement/PROC_MDA_VOL2B_PB_2025.pdf.

480 Gottemoeller, “Russia Is Updating Their Nuclear Weapons: What Does That Mean.”

481 Tong Zhao, “The Real Motives for China’s Nuclear Expansion,” Foreign Affairs Magazine, May 3, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/real-motives-chinas-nuclear-expansion.

482 The Trump administration, in fact, had prepared a $3.5 billion five-year spending plan to integrate, test, and procure SM-3 and THAAD missiles and associated sensors but was set aside by the incoming administration (Robert M. Soofer, private papers (unclassified), “Layered Homeland Defense Summary, FY21–26”).

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Lithuania prioritizes defense spending amid growing Russian threat

Agnia Grigas — Thu, 02 Jan 2025 21:56:52 +0000

The entry of North Korean troops into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last November has highlighted the increasingly global nature of the war unleashed by Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2022. Meanwhile, Donald Trump’s US election victory has sent a strong signal to European leaders that they must prepare to invest more in their own defense, while also taking a lead in continued support for Ukraine.

Nobody is more acutely aware of these security realities than the new government in Lithuania, which took office in December 2024. Situated close to Russia on the eastern frontier of the democratic world, Lithuania is a member of both NATO and the European Union. The largest of the three Baltic states, it is on the front lines of the geopolitical struggle between the West and Putin’s resurgent brand of authoritarianism.

The Russian leader is not acting alone, of course. In December 2024, Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda warned of an “emerging axis of evil” including Russia, Belarus, China, Iran, and North Korea. The Lithuanian leader stressed the importance of a “united stance” among his Western counterparts in response to this growing authoritarian alliance.

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Strengthening national security will be among the top priorities for Lithuania’s new center-left government, which took shape in the final months of the past year following the country’s October 2024 parliamentary elections. The Lithuanian authorities have already raised military spending to above 3 percent of GDP in recent years; the new government is now promising the increase this figure to 3.5 or even 4 percent.

This would put Lithuania well ahead of most other NATO member states in terms of the country’s national defense budget. Nevertheless, Lithuania’s defense spending remains small in absolute and relative terms. While the current budget of just over 3 percent of GDP represents around 2.6 billion US dollars, Russia plans to commit 6.3 percent of GDP to defense in 2025, or approximately 126 billion US dollars.

Russia is also receiving considerable financial and material support from its authoritarian allies. Belarus served as a key base for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and has since begun hosting Russian nuclear weapons. China is propping up the Russian economy by purchasing Russian oil and gas, while Iran is providing Putin with large quantities of kamikaze drones that are used to attack Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure.

Russia’s most important partner is currently North Korea. Pyongyang first began supplying artillery shells to Moscow in late 2022. By October 2024, Western intelligence agencies were claiming that North Korea was providing half of all the shells being used by Russia in Ukraine. The Hermit Kingdom has also delivered significant quantities of ballistic missiles, and has reportedly sent more than ten thousand troops to join Putin’s invasion.

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With little sign that Russia has any intention of ending its Ukraine invasion, concerns are growing that an emboldened Putin may seek to go further. Lithuania’s location makes it an obvious potential Russian target. While the country is better prepared than many other NATO members to face this threat, much remains to be done.

While Lithuania’s defense budget is growing, far greater sums may be required. Research conducted in the second half of 2024 indicated that the Lithuanian government would need to quadruple defense spending in order to acquire sufficient weapons and establish the necessary infrastructure to repel a hypothetical Russian invasion for an initial 10-day period until NATO allies could fully deploy.

Lithuanian officials appear to understand the scale of the security challenges they now face. By late 2024, President Nausėda was arguing that the country must commit at least 5.5% of GDP to defense in the coming years. This will be a key task for Lithuania’s new Defense Minister Dovilė Šakalienė.

Most observers agree that creating a comprehensive national defense strategy and committing sufficient resources is the only way for Lithuania to deter the Kremlin. This will likely prove costly, but even the most expensive deterrence is far cheaper than dealing with the horrors of a Russian invasion.

Dr. Agnia Grigas is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and author of Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire.

Missiles, AI, and drone swarms: Ukraine’s 2025 defense tech priorities

Nataliia Kushnerska — Thu, 02 Jan 2025 21:24:22 +0000

The experience of the past three years has underlined the critical importance of technological innovation for the Ukrainian war effort as the country seeks to overcome the material advantages enjoyed by Russia in key areas including manpower, equipment, firepower, and funding. While this emphasis on innovation cannot completely even up the odds, defense tech solutions are helping Ukraine to minimize the impact of the enemy’s far greater resources.

During the coming year, Ukraine must remain one step ahead of Russia in the race to innovate. Much will depend on the rapidly expanding ecosystem of Ukrainian defense tech companies that has emerged since the onset of the full-scale invasion. The Russian army in Ukraine has already been confronted by numerous examples of game-changing tools developed by Ukrainian defense tech talent. It is vital that this trend continues.

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One particularly important category is interceptor drones. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is widely acknowledged as the world’s first large-scale drone war. Since February 2022, drone technologies have evolved at a remarkable rate. As attack and reconnaissance drones have become more and more ubiquitous above the battlefield, the need for effective interceptor drones has become increasingly apparent.

In April 2024, Ukraine launched a competition to identify the most effective interceptor drone solutions, with dozens of Ukrainian drone manufacturers participating. One of these models is already credited with around twenty confirmed hits on enemy spy drones and is now being used by Ukrainian drone units on the Kursk, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia fronts.

Ukrainian drone producers have also managed to develop effective domestic alternatives to widely used Chinese drone models. This is a significant step forward. While Chinese drones have proved important workhorses of the drone war, their prominence has left Ukraine dangerously dependent on imports and vulnerable to possible disruption in supply chains. Domestically produced alternatives allow the Ukrainian military to reduce this reliance on China.

Ukraine’s efforts to integrate artificial intelligence (AI) technologies advanced in 2024, with the development of drones capable of locking onto targets identified by operators during the final phase of flight prior to impact. This helped neutralize Russian electronic warfare jamming technologies, which typically seek to disrupt the connection between drones and operators. Ukrainian developers are now working on the next stage in the evolution of AI-driven drones. The goal is to produce a new generation of drones that utilize artificial intelligence not only at the final targeting stage, but throughout their flight.

2024 was also the year when Ukraine brought Putin’s invasion home to Russia and made the enemy realize that their domestic front was no longer safe from attack. This was made possible thanks to a growing arsenal of long-range strike drones developed by Ukrainian manufacturers with ranges in excess of one thousand kilometers. Further long-range drone innovations are expected in 2025.

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The defense tech advances of the past year have had a significant impact on the Ukrainian war effort. However, it is important to underline that in modern warfare, the innovation contest is a constant struggle that requires a high degree of creativity, consistency, and coordination. With new technologies appearing on the battlefield on an almost daily basis, any delays in the chain from development to deployment can prove deadly.

Nobody can predict exactly what defense tech challenges may emerge during the coming months. Nevertheless, it is already possible to identify a number of strategic priorities for the Ukrainian military in 2025.

Ukraine’s domestic missile program gained pace in 2024 and is poised to play a far greater role in the war during the coming year. Producing missiles domestically allows Ukraine to attack targets inside Russia at a time when some of the country’s Western partners remain reluctant to authorize strikes for fear of escalation. Many of the breakthroughs achieved in this direction have already been made public. In 2025, Russia may be surprised to learn exactly how far Ukraine’s domestic missile production has advanced.

As the nature of drone warfare becomes ever more sophisticated, the tactics employed by drone forces are also evolving. Ukraine’s drone units are already beginning to move beyond the initial concept of “one drone, one operator,” and will be looking to transition toward more widespread use of drone swarm technologies in 2025. From a military perspective, it is critical for Ukraine to outpace the enemy in the deployment of this next generation technology.

Anti-drone defenses will also be a 2025 priority. Almost every single day, Ukraine is attacked by large numbers of Russian Shahed drones that frequently damage civilian targets including residential buildings and energy infrastructure. Russian drone production is rapidly increasing, with regular upgrades to drone design making these weapons difficult to counter. This will likely remain a major challenge for Ukrainian air defense teams and for the country’s defense tech industry throughout the coming year.

Nataliia Kushnerska is Head of Ukraine’s Brave1 defense tech cluster.

Five things Russia’s invasion has taught the world about Ukraine

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 19 Dec 2024 22:31:29 +0000

The war unleashed by Russia almost three years ago in Ukraine is rightly recognized as one of the great crimes of the twenty-first century. Understandably, little attention has been paid so far to the impact the conflict is having on Ukraine’s international image. And yet amid the trauma and horror of Russia’s invasion, there are growing signs that the unprecedented media spotlight on Ukraine since 2022 is gradually helping to transform global perceptions of the country. As a result, Ukraine is now finally emerging from a prolonged period of international obscurity that has hindered the country’s progress for centuries.

International ignorance of Ukraine has been a feature since long before the country regained independence in 1991. Following the Soviet collapse, little was done to address this lack of outside awareness or strengthen Ukraine’s national brand in the global arena. This low profile helped set the stage for Russia’s disinformation efforts, with foreign audiences often prepared to believe all manner of outlandish lies about a country that was otherwise unknown to them. Thanks to the recent media focus on Ukraine, Kremlin propagandists are now finding that their distortions are not so readily accepted. This is an ongoing process, but it is already possible to identify a number of important facts about Ukraine that have taken root in the international consciousness since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

1. Ukraine is not Russia

The fact that Ukraine is not Russia may seem insultingly obvious when viewed from a Ukrainian perspective, but in reality this was the fundamental image problem facing the country in 2022. Indeed, it is no coincidence that on the eve of the full-scale invasion, Vladimir Putin published an entire essay denying the legitimacy of a separate Ukrainian state on the grounds that Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”).

Putin did not invent this narrative of Ukraine denial himself. His predecessors have been insisting that Ukraine is an inalienable part of Russia since at least the eighteenth century, and have ruthlessly manipulated the historical record to support their arguments. Throughout the Tsarist and Soviet eras, anyone attempting to counter this Great Russian narrative or highlight Ukraine’s long statehood struggle was treated as a dangerous heretic subject to the harshest of punishments.

For generations, Russia was able to impose its imperial propaganda on international audiences, with Ukrainians silenced and Ukraine misleadingly portrayed as an intrinsic part of Russia’s own historical heartlands. It was therefore understandable that when an independent Ukraine appeared on the map in 1991, many had trouble distinguishing it from Russia. This created much confusion and went some way to legitimizing subsequent Russian attempts to reassert its authority over Ukraine.

The full-scale invasion has changed all that. Since February 2022, international perceptions of the relationship between Russia and Ukraine have undergone a radical transformation as global audiences have witnessed the ferocity of the Russian attack and the determination of Ukraine’s national defense. The war unleashed by Vladimir Putin has killed hundreds of thousands and shattered millions of lives; it has also finally buried the Kremlin myth of Russians and Ukrainians as “one people.” As the invasion approaches the three-year mark, it is now safe to say that anyone who continues to insist on the indivisibility of Russia and Ukraine is either acting in bad faith, or is so stunningly ignorant that their opinion can be disregarded.

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2. Ukraine is huge

Prewar Ukraine’s low international profile encouraged many to imagine the country as an obscure and irrelevant statelet whose fate mattered little to the wider world. Meanwhile, very few people seemed to appreciate that Ukraine was in fact the largest country wholly in Europe. That is no longer the case. Throughout the past three years, the map of Ukraine has featured relentlessly in the international press. Even casual observers have grown familiar with the outline of the country, and cannot have failed to notice how large it looms over its European neighbors.

Media coverage of battlefield developments has also helped to emphasize the sheer size of Ukraine. Despite regular war reports of major offensives and record advances, the overall picture of the front lines has changed little since the first year of the war, underlining the comparative vastness of Ukraine. While Ukraine may still appear small when compared to Russia, it is a huge country by European standards. Growing awareness of this fact is helping to shape perceptions of Ukraine’s geopolitical significance.

3. Ukraine is an agricultural superpower

Prior to 2022, Ukraine was probably best known to many around the world as the site of the Chornobyl disaster. Associations with the world’s worst nuclear accident were particularly unfortunate as Ukraine is anything but a radioactive wasteland. In reality, the country’s real claim to fame is as the breadbasket of Europe. Ukraine’s fabled black soil is among the most fertile land in the entire world, making much of the country a giant garden of agrarian abundance.

Since 2022, Russia’s invasion has helped educate international audiences about Ukraine’s crucial role in global food security. Extensive media coverage of Russia’s Black Sea naval blockade has highlighted the importance of Ukrainian agricultural exports, with disruption caused by Moscow’s interference leading to famine fears in Africa and price hikes on basic foodstuffs throughout the West. Growing awareness of Ukraine’s status as an agricultural superpower has undermined Kremlin efforts to portray the ongoing invasion as a strictly local affair, and has mobilized international opposition to the war.

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4. Ukraine is an innovation hub

For decades, international perceptions of Ukraine were plagued by lazy cliches depicting the country as a terminally corrupt backwater on the vodka-soaked fringes of Eastern Europe. These deeply unflattering caricatures of Ukrainian stagnation were always misleading. They are now also hopelessly outdated. Since 2022, Ukraine has demonstrated that it is a sophisticated high tech nation capable of more than holding its own in the most technologically advanced war the world has ever seen. Ukraine’s ability to develop, deploy, and update its own domestically-produced weapons systems on an almost daily basis has done much to debunk the negative stereotypes of old and establish the country’s reputation as a leading innovation hub.

Ukrainian defense tech companies have been responsible for a string of particularly innovative battlefield solutions that have caught the eye of global defense industry giants and helped Ukraine even up the odds against the country’s far larger and wealthier enemy. For example, ground-breaking Ukrainian marine drones have turned the tide in the Battle of the Black Sea and forced Russia’s entire fleet to retreat from Crimea, while Ukrainian long-range drones routinely strike targets deep inside Russia. As a result, “Made in Ukraine” is now recognized as a stamp of quality throughout the international security sector. This image transformation is already attracting international investors and will shape Ukraine’s economic development for decades to come, with the country’s defense industry and broader tech sector set to be in high demand.

5. Ukraine is united

The full-scale invasion has seriously undermined longstanding Russian efforts to portray Ukraine as a country irrevocably split along geographical and ideological lines. The narrative of a divided Ukraine has been a mainstay of Kremlin propaganda since the Soviet era, and has been central to the disinformation that has accompanied the escalating Russian aggression of the past two decades. For many years, this crude oversimplification of Ukraine’s regional complexities proved superficially persuasive among international audiences, but it has been decisively debunked by Ukraine’s united response to Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Ukrainians across the country have overwhelmingly rallied in opposition to the invading Russians, with residents in supposedly “pro-Russian” cities such as Odesa and Kharkiv proving no less determined to defend themselves and their homes. This is not to say that regional diversity is no longer a feature in today’s Ukraine, of course. On the contrary, Ukraine remains just as subject to regional differences as any other large European nation. However, the Russian invasion has shattered the myth of a terminally divided Ukraine and proved beyond any reasonable doubt that the vast majority of Ukrainians bitterly oppose the idea of a Russian reunion.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Lord and Sweatt advocate for rapid adoption of cutting-edge defense software in DefenseNews

Atlantic Council — Mon, 16 Dec 2024 17:00:00 +0000

On December 16, Ellen Lord and Tyler Sweatt of Forward Defense‘s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare published an article in DefenseNews on how the US Defense Department and its allies ought to approach software-defined warfare and the urgent need for rapid adoption and delivery of cutting-edge defense software to empower the warfighter. They promoted the work of the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare and its forthcoming final report.

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Ukraine is expanding its long-range arsenal for deep strikes inside Russia

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 10 Dec 2024 22:16:46 +0000

Ukraine unveiled a new domestically-produced missile drone in early December which should significantly enhance the country’s ability to conduct airstrikes against targets deep inside Russia. Dubbed the “Peklo” (“Hell” in Ukrainian), this new addition to the Ukrainian arsenal has a reported range of 700 kilometers and can reach speeds of up to 700 kilometers per hour.

In a social media post showcasing the weapon, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the first batch of Peklo missile drones had already been delivered to the Ukrainian military and had proved its combat effectiveness. “The mission now is to scale up production and deployment,” he commented.

The Peklo is one of a number of long-range weapons currently being developed by Ukraine as the country seeks to boost its ability to strike targets inside Russia. Speaking in Kyiv on December 10, Zelenskyy announced that serial production of the long-range Palyanytsia missile drone was now underway, with trials of the new Ruta missile ongoing.

Meanwhile, a long-range version of Ukraine’s domestically produced Neptune cruise missile is expected to become operational in the near future. The Neptune is currently best known as the weapon used to sink the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, the Moskva, during the initial months of the Russian invasion in spring 2022.

In addition to these developments, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry recently announced plans to deliver more than 30,000 long-range attack drones in 2025, with production partially financed by international partners. Since the beginning of 2024, Ukraine has conducted an extensive air offensive against Russia’s energy industry and military infrastructure using long-range drones. With domestic output now reaching record levels, the coming year is likely to witness a sharp escalation in Ukrainian attacks.

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Ukraine’s efforts to expand the domestic production of long-range weapons reflect widespread frustration in Kyiv over restrictions imposed by the country’s Western partners on attacks inside Russia. For almost the entire war, Western leaders have prevented Ukraine from striking back against Russian targets due to concerns over possible retaliatory measures from the Kremlin. This has allowed Russia to launch attacks against Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure with impunity, while forcing Ukraine to effectively defend itself with one arm tied behind its back.

The United States and other partners recently relaxed these restrictions and authorized some categories of Ukrainian strikes inside Russia using Western weapons. However, a number of constraints are believed to remain in place. The missiles provided to Ukraine by the country’s Western allies also have a relatively modest maximum range of up to 300 kilometers, making them of limited use against a country as vast as Russia.

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Many in Kyiv believe an expanded long-range arsenal is essential in order to secure a viable peace with Russia. Advocates of increased long-range strikes argue that unless Ukraine is able to bring Putin’s invasion home to Russia, the Kremlin dictator will have little reason to seek a settlement. They believe that missile attacks can weaken Russia’s military potential while also starving Putin’s war machine of funding by targeting oil refineries and other elements of the country’s economically crucial but highly vulnerable energy industry.

Zelenskyy has repeatedly stressed the importance of being able to strike targets deep inside Russia, and has frequently pressed Ukraine’s allies to supply more long-range weapons. His recently presented victory plan reportedly contained one confidential segment proposing the delivery of US-made Tomahawk missiles with a range of almost 2,500 kilometers as part of a “non-nuclear deterrence package.” While this request was widely dismissed as unrealistic, it underlined the importance attached to long-range strike capabilities among officials in Kyiv as Ukrainian policymakers search for the tools to secure a lasting peace.

Recent increases in the production of long-range drones and missiles come as Ukraine seeks to revive the country’s long-neglected defense industry and reduce reliance on military aid. Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion almost three years ago, Ukraine has managed to dramatically increase domestic output in areas ranging from armored vehicles and artillery shells to electronic warfare equipment and naval drones. Much of this is being financed by Ukraine’s partners, who are being encouraged to place orders with Ukrainian producers.

As talk turns to the possibility of a peace deal once Donald Trump returns to the White House in January 2025, Ukrainians are taking nothing for granted and are preparing for a fourth year of Europe’s largest war since World War II. They hope that by enhancing their ability to strike back inside Russia, they will be able to increase the pressure on Vladimir Putin and strengthen their own position ahead of any negotiations.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Rich Outzen and Can Kasapoglu, Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY Co-managing editors

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Articles

How NATO learns and adapts to modern warfare

By Gen. Chris Badia

NATO exercises: The guarantee of Alliance security and test of readiness

By Uğur Tarçın

Political-military lessons for a NATO-Russia conflict

By Can Kasapoglu

How prepared is NATO?

By Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

Pacing scenarios

By Rich Outzen

The “other” US election and what it means for transatlantic security

By Rich Outzen

Honorary advisory board

Gen. Wesley K. Clark

Chairman and CEO of Wesley K. Clark & Associates & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO

Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky, Ph.D.

Senior Fellow at Harvard University JFK Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs; Board Director, Atlantic Council; former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs (2001-2009)

Gen. James L. Jones

President, Jones Group International and Executive Chairman Emeritus, Atlantic Council; former National Security Advisor to the President of the United States

Franklin D. Kramer

Distinguished Fellow & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Assistant Secretary of Defense

Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute

CEO, Cambridge Global Advisors & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Permanent Representative to NATO

Dov S. Zakheim

Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Senior Fellow, CNA Corporation; Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Under Secretary of Defense

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The post NATO in an evolving geopolitical landscape appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Political-military lessons for a NATO-Russia conflict

Can Kasapoglu — Tue, 03 Dec 2024 14:00:00 +0000

In Putin’s consideration, there is no Ukrainian nation in Europe. The Ukrainians and Russians are nothing but one people under neo-Muscovy, as are the unlucky Belarusians. Russian writings, notably, consider the war in Ukraine a quarrel between NATO—“the collective West” in their very own parlance, to be precise—and Russia. Ukraine, therefore, just happens to be the battlefield within this holy war of the Russian military renaissance. In essence, however, the Russian campaign is an overall effort to eradicate the Ukrainian identity. A detailed revisit of the Russian regime in occupied areas, as well as the case of abducted Ukrainian children, reveals a genocidal intention toward the Ukrainians as a people.

In reality, the geopolitical roots of the unfolding conflict in Ukraine hail from the Cold War showdown between Soviet expansionism into Europe and NATO efforts to defend the free world. The war, unchecked, will not likely end in Kyiv. The Kremlin’s imperialist views apply to any former Eastern bloc nation with a historical background of being oppressed or colonized by the Russian military, be it in imperial times or the Soviet era. This article offers three chief lessons to prepare for and win a potential war between NATO and Russia.

1. The West cannot contain Russian aggression with mere diplomatic naiveté

Reciting simple and major facts offers a practical way to explain complex political-military agendas. Any scenario involving a Russia-NATO escalation demands such an approach to clear the dust that keeps the core problem area murky and hard to grasp.

The contemporary Russian Federation, ruled by the last generation of the Soviet intelligence elite, dubbed the siloviki, is a highly militarized and expansionist state. At present, Russian defense economics is on a pronounced war footing. The nation’s defense spending as a portion of its gross domestic product exceeds 6 percent and remains sustainable. Production rates for principal warfighting equipment, such as heavy armor and artillery ammunition, dwarf those of many NATO member states. Moreover, in each conscription round, which occurs twice a year, Moscow drafts massive manpower into its military ranks, outnumbering most standing NATO armed forces.

The ruling elite has reclaimed their traditional grip on power following the Second Russo-Chechen War in the late 1990s, which massacred thousands of Chechens to keep the Russian foothold in the Caucasus following the Soviet collapse. Since then, the Kremlin invaded Georgia and Ukraine and used its military capabilities overseas to keep the Baathist dictatorship of Syria in power. The Syrian campaign unfolded against the backdrop of Bashar al-Assad’s war crimes and involved systematic use of chemical warfare in combat operations.

On the heels of the invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has fielded a robust tactical nuclear deterrent in Europe. The Belarusian Iskander missile-system crews have been trained for nuclear delivery. With Russian help, Minsk has refurbished the Su-25 attack aircraft and Su-24 frontline bombers in the Belarusian Air Force’s arsenal for nuclear certifications. Moreover, Belarus has been hosting Russian MiG-31K interceptor aircraft, certified to carry nuclear-capable Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, which could pound Ukrainian civilians. Overall, Russia has turned Belarus into a garrison satellite state at NATO’s east.

President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, a career KGB officer himself, publicly depicted the collapse of the Soviet empire as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.” During the late Cold War years, Putin was a liaison to the notorious East German secret police, the Stasi, which strongly shaped his worldview. Given that, diplomatic outreach is of minimal use in reasoning with Moscow. The seventy-one-year-old former spy does not accept sovereign nations in the former Soviet space.

The Obama administration’s failed “reset” of relations with Russia, which came after the invasion of Georgia in 2008, speaks volumes. Five years after receiving a reset button as a symbolic diplomatic move, Russia invaded Crimea and illegally annexed Crimea. Less than fifteen years after the reset, Russian tanks rolled in and troops committed atrocities in Bucha and Irpin. Had it not been for the Ukrainian resistance at the Hostomel Airport at the overture of the war, as well as President Volodymyr Zelensky’s famous “I need ammunition, not a ride” rhetoric shunning evacuation plans, this paper would have probably discussed Putin’s Ukraine. Thanks to the Ukrainian defensive grit that bought time for the Western military assistance to arrive while Kyiv stabilized the front, “Ukraine Rus” has never materialized. Nonetheless, a stumbled invasion has not altered the geopolitical calculus ruling Russia. The threat has never been that imminent since the fiercest days of the Cold War.

2. Avoiding a catastrophe: Recapturing the Baltic states is a nonstarter

If the war plagued Europe, the most critical question would boil down to where the belligerents would fight. If the tiny Baltic states were to be invaded by Russia, even as briefly as for a few weeks, they might be wiped off the face of the Earth. NATO cannot afford to pursue a military policy centered on recapturing territory following a Russian coup de mainin allied territory. NATO needs to cement forward defense that aims to repel, not expel, Russian military presence.

Occupied Ukraine showcased that even a brief exposure to Russian invasion leads to mass ethnic cleansing. The massacres in Bucha and Irpin took place within the first two months of the 2022 campaign. Worse, the case of abducted Ukrainian children still haunts the Ukrainian civilian population. A typical Russian combat operation ends up with population centers decimated into rubble due to heavy missile and drone salvos.

In a Baltic scenario, a NATO counteroffensive effort to liberate Baltic territory would prove more demanding compared to defensive combat operations to deny a potential Russian incursion. This is why the NATO Force Model, planned to take thirty to 180 days to mobilize a 500,000-strong warfighting deterrent in Europe, could not save the day for Baltic members.

Moreover, NATO’s strategic command structure cannot today effectively verify the combat readiness of the allied militaries to levy a 500,000-strong war machine within 180 days from the start of hostilities. Most allied nations’ standing armed forces lack the combat readiness and warfighting experience that would be so valuable in an Article V showdown. Finally, the ability of NATO’s existing operational-level command structure to run large-scale combat operations, especially in the changing context, is highly debatable.

3. NATO would not face a stand-alone Russia but an authoritarian axis

The most important geopolitical lesson from the Russo-Ukrainian War is the visible rise of a hostile axis. In the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine, the Kremlin has help. The Islamic Republic of Iran, China under communist party rule, and North Korea ruled by the iron-fist of Kim Jong Un generously provided the Kremlin with military aid.

Pyongyang recently sent thousands of combat troops to augment Russian manpower. Moreover, North Korea is the prime artillery ammunition supplier of Russia, overtaking the entire Western artillery transfers to Ukraine.

The Islamic Republic is the chief source of low-cost kamikaze drones employed by the Russian military. The Revolutionary Guards have established a drone warfare plant in Alabuga, Tatarstan. Open-source intelligence suggests very high production rates for its joint arms production with Russia. Ukraine witnessed a growing number of Shahed loitering munitions each month. Worse, the Shahed baseline is getting more capable with different variants entering into play, ranging from thermobaric warhead configurations to stealthy coatings.

Last but not least, China is a critical enabler of the Russian war effort. With sanctions getting tougher, China looms large as it provides machine tools, ball bearings, and semiconductors—crucial inputs for Russia’s war effort. According to the United Nations COMTRADE database, Beijing’s exports to Russia was around US$110.94 billion in 2023. Open-source intelligence data showcases the exponential growth of China’s average monthly export to Russia of high-priority dual-use items, which can be used in various weapons manufacturing processes. In 2023 alone, Beijing exported some 90 percent of the Russian imports of goods falling under the Group of Seven’s high-priority export control list for the Russian Federation. For decades, Russia’s defense technological and industrial base, like the rest of the country’s industries, has been dependent on foreign supplies to operate machine tools. Since the invasion, machine tools alone accounted for almost 40 percent of the annual rise in Chinese dual-use exports—if not more.

Chinese nitrocellulose exports to Russia remain another very critical issue to monitor. Since Putin’s Ukraine campaign, China’s nitrocellulose transfers to Russia have drastically grown. While Beijing exported slightly more than 700 tons of nitrocellulose to Russia in 2023, the amount nearly doubled to more than 1,300 tons in 2024.

Conclusion: Skip the si vis pacem part—NATO needs to foster para bellum

Political-military trends suggest that the probability of war between NATO and Russia now towers over the prospects of peace in the coming years. In particular, should the Russian war machine succeed in Ukraine via its ongoing war of attrition, the Kremlin’s anticipated next step would be tearing and wearing the Article V guarantees of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, which form the casus foederis backbone of NATO.

Without a counterbalancing military alliance in Europe, one that is thoroughly backed by the United States, there is almost nothing standing between Putin’s Russia and Europe.

Can Kasapoglu is a non-resident senior fellow at Hudson Institute. Follow him on X @ckasapoglu1.

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The post Political-military lessons for a NATO-Russia conflict appeared first on Atlantic Council.

NATO exercises: The guarantee of Alliance security and test of readiness

Uğur Tarçın — Tue, 03 Dec 2024 14:00:00 +0000

Since its establishment in 1949, NATO has been dedicated to securing lasting peace in Europe and across the transatlantic region, based on individual liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. As of 2024, NATO has expanded its membership to thirty-two countries, covering an area that represents 16.63 percent of the world’s habitable land and 12.13 percent of the global population. To maintain this peace, NATO must ensure effective deterrence, enhance its capabilities, utilize resources efficiently, and remain a combat-ready force.

Achieving combat readiness is a comprehensive process that involves several key components:

Training and education: Regular drills and exercises, specialized training, and continuous education on the latest technology, tactics, and global security developments.
Logistical preparation: Efficient supply chain management, maintenance and upkeep of equipment, and rapid deployment capabilities.
Technological readiness: Modernization of equipment and robust cybersecurity measures to maintain operational integrity.
Intelligence and surveillance: Accurate and timely intelligence, supported by robust surveillance systems and networks.
Strategic planning: Effective scenario planning and flexible strategies.
Physical and mental preparedness: Ensuring physical conditioning and mental resilience.
Interoperability and coordination: Conducting joint operations and fostering allied cooperation.
Leadership and command structure: Maintaining strong leadership and a clear command structure.

In this article, I will strategically examine NATO exercises within the field of training and education.

While war games and military exercises simulate real scenarios, they differ in execution. Military exercises involve actual troops and equipment, focusing on replicating wartime decisions for training purposes. In contrast, war games use simulations with artificial players and models to explore potential decisions and outcomes.

Exercises serve various purposes, including testing tactics, demonstrating deterrence, and ensuring forces are prepared for combat. They also verify the readiness of units before deployment.

NATO held its first military exercise in 1951 to develop a unified military force under centralized command. Since then, NATO has conducted thousands of exercises across various domains, particularly during the Cold War. Notable exercises include the REFORGER (Return of Forces to Germany) series, which tested the rapid deployment of North American troops to Europe, with the last major exercise being REFORGER 88, involving 125,000 personnel.

NATO’s rapid reaction forces have evolved since the creation of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF) in 1960, which played a crucial role in deterrence and defense during the Cold War. Subsequently, NATO expanded its mission to include crisis response, reflecting the evolving security environment.

In 2002, the AMF was restructured into the NATO Response Force (NRF), which continues to be integral to NATO’s strategy, ensuring readiness and adaptability through operational exercises.

Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, NATO significantly increased its collective defense exercises and further enhanced its defense plans.

Now, let us explore NATO and member exercises conducted in 2024 to gain some insights:

Steadfast Defender 24: NATO’s largest military exercise held from January to May 2024, showcased the enduring unity between Europe and North America, reflecting the shared commitment to safeguarding over one billion people for the past seventy-five years. The exercise involved over 90,000 troops from all thirty-two NATO members and was conducted in two main phases: securing the Atlantic region and rapidly moving troops across Europe, from the High North to Central and Eastern Europe. This exercise demonstrated NATO’s ability to respond swiftly to emerging threats and highlighted the Alliance’s readiness and collective defense capabilities.
Coalition Warrior Interoperability Exercise (CWIX): An annual NATO exercise celebrating its twenty-fifth anniversary in 2024, CWIX enhances the readiness and resilience of command-and-control capabilities and IT services. Hosted at NATO’s Joint Force Training Centre in Poland, CWIX 2024 involved over 2,500 participants and tested more than 26,000 cases across 480 capabilities, from emerging technologies to proven tools. CWIX plays a crucial role in ensuring interoperability among NATO forces.
EFES 2024: The largest joint military exercise conducted by the Turkish Armed Forces, held from April 25 to May 31, 2024, took place in two phases: a computer-assisted command post phase in Istanbul and a live-fire phase in Izmir. With participation from forty-five nations and nearly 11,000 military personnel, EFES 2024 demonstrated significant international military collaboration and commitment. Participants included nine NATO members, sixteen NATO partners, fifteen African Union countries, two Latin American nations, one Middle Eastern nation, one other European nation, and one Asian nation, highlighting its importance in regional and global security.
Baltic Operations 2024, Ramstein Legacy 24, and other exercises also involved members and partners.

Based on the exercises, three separate reports, analyses, and the ongoing Ukraine-Russia war since 2022, we can conclude that although NATO has made substantial progress in areas such as defense spending, forward defense, high-readiness forces, command and control, and collective defense exercises, as well as integrating new members, the alliance is prepared for immediate combat but may not be fully equipped for a protracted war. Therefore, what are our short- and mid-term solutions to address the vulnerabilities?”

Drawing from my NATO and national experience, as well as academic research, I offer the following recommendations for improving exercises to strengthen deterrence:

Address and overcome key lessons learned in meetings at all levels, from the chair of the NATO Military Committee (CMC), supreme allied commander Europe (SACEUR), and supreme allied commander transformation (SACT), down to component commanders, chiefs of staff, mentors, and directors of centers of excellence.
Designate mentors/senior fellows with academic and combat experience to NATO institutions, such as the NATO Defense College and NATO School.
Develop more effective leadership training at all levels to ensure quick and accurate decision-making.
Enhance response plans for various conflict scenarios, including asymmetric and future challenges, to improve forces’ readiness for unforeseen situations.
Test physical and psychological training to ensure troops manage combat demands and stresses.
Improve national resilience and interoperability across all domains through joint, allied, and live-fire exercises and operations.
Ensure that the southern region also is included in exercises.

Lastly, to guarantee alliance security, we must prepare our troops without hesitation, with combat readiness listed as a top priority.

Uğur Tarçın is a retired Turkish Lieutenant General. He served in Italy, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Belgium, the USA, and İzmir, throughout his NATO career. Currently, he teaches at Marmara University and SAHA ISTANBUL Academy.

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