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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

Russia’s current economic situation is surprisingly similar to Ukraine’s, although almost all trade between Russia and Ukraine has ceased. After two years of around 4 percent economic growth in 2023 and 2024, Russia is expecting growth of merely 1.5 percent this year, while official inflation is 10 percent. Since October 2024, the Central Bank of Russia has maintained an interest rate of 21 percent while complaining about stagflation.

The Russian and Ukrainian economies are both suffering from their extreme focus on the military sector. Including Western support, Ukraine’s military expenditure amounts to about $100 billion a year, which is no less than 50 percent of Ukraine’s GDP, with 30 percent coming from the Ukrainian budget in 2024. Meanwhile, Russia’s 2025 military expenditure is supposed to be $170 billion or 8 percent of GDP. Unlike the Ukrainians, the Russians complain about the scale of military spending. This makes sense. The Ukrainians are fighting an existential war, while Russia’s war is only existential for Putin.

Contrary to common perceptions, Russia does not have an overwhelming advantage over Ukraine in terms of military expenditure or supplies. Russia does spend significantly more than Ukraine, but much of this is in reality stolen by politicians, generals, and Putin’s friends. Furthermore, Western sanctions impede the Russian military’s ability to innovate. In contrast, Ukraine benefits from innovation because its economy is so much freer, with hundreds of startups thriving in areas such as drone production.

Russia is now entering a fiscal crunch. Its federal expenditures in 2024 amounted to 20 percent of GDP and are likely to stay at that level in 2025, of which 41 percent goes to military and security. However, the Kremlin has financed its budget deficit of about 2 percent of GDP with its national welfare fund, which is expected to run out by the end of the current year. As a result, Russia will likely be forced to reduce its public expenditures by one-tenth.

Low oil prices could add considerably to Russia’s mounting economic woes and force a further reduction in the country’s public expenditures. However, Israel’s attack on Iran may now help Putin to stay financially afloat by driving the price of oil higher.

Economically, this is a balanced war of attrition at present. Ukraine’s Western partners have the potential to turn the tables on Russia if they choose to do so. Ukraine has successfully built up a major innovative arms industry. What is missing is not arms but funds. The West needs to double Ukraine’s military budget from today’s annual total of $100 billion to $200 billion. They can do this without using their own funds if they agree to seize approximately $200 billion in frozen Russian assets currently held in Euroclear Bank in Belgium. This could enable Ukraine to outspend Russia and achieve victory through a combination of more firepower, greater technology, and superior morale.

Anders Åslund is the author of “Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy.”

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Last month’s destruction of two Russian warplanes was the latest in a series of remarkable maritime breakthroughs that have allowed Ukraine to gain the upper hand in the Battle of the Black Sea. When the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine began more than three years ago, few would have believed such a turn of events was possible. At the time, the war at sea was widely viewed as a foregone conclusion. After all, Ukraine had no conventional navy to speak of, while Russia could call on the considerable might of the country’s aged but nonetheless formidable Black Sea Fleet.

This disparity was on display during a famous incident that took place on the very first day of the invasion. On the morning of February 24, 2022, the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the Moskva missile cruiser, loomed up to Ukraine’s Snake Island and ordered the tiny Ukrainian garrison to surrender. “Russian warship, go f*** yourself,” came the iconic response. While this message of defiance captured the global imagination and became an unofficial slogan for the entire Ukrainian war effort, the incident also served to underline the apparent mismatch between the maritime capabilities of the two adversaries.

During the initial weeks of the war, Russian control of the Black Sea remained uncontested, with Ukrainian attention focused firmly on preventing amphibious landings along the country’s southern coastline. But even at this precarious point, Ukrainian commanders had their own offensive ambitions and would soon send a powerful signal that they were capable of fighting back at sea as well as on land. In April 2022, the Ukrainian Navy launched a bold missile attack on the Moskva, securing two direct hits and sinking the Russian flagship. The attack sent shock waves around the world and sparked fury among Kremlin officials. Little did they know that this was just the first of many stunning Russian naval defeats that would transform the military situation in the Black Sea.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

Since the sinking of the Moskva, Ukraine has used a combination of domestically developed naval drones and cruise missiles provided by Kyiv’s French and British partners to decimate Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Ukrainian Navy officials claim they have managed to damage or destroy around one-third of Putin’s entire fleet, while forcing the remaining Russian warships to retreat from occupied Crimea to the relative safety of ports in Russia itself. This has severely limited the Russian Navy’s ability to operate in the Black Sea. By spring 2024, Britain’s Defense Ministry declared that the Russian Black Sea Fleet had become “functionally inactive.”

Ukraine’s stunning success in the Battle of the Black Sea has yet to receive the international attention it deserves. By breaking the Russian naval blockade of Ukraine’s seaports, it has allowed Kyiv to resume maritime exports and secure a vital economic lifeline.

Crucially, the Russian Navy’s humiliating retreat from Crimea has also made a complete mockery of the Kremlin’s so-called red lines and has demonstrated the emptiness of Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling. The Russian dictator has long championed the seizure of Crimea as his crowning achievement, and has repeatedly hinted that he is willing to use nuclear weapons in defense of his conquests. But when confronted by the harsh military realities of Ukraine’s deadly naval drones, he withdraw the bulk of Russia’s fleet from Crimea with barely a murmur.

The Battle of the Black Sea is far from over, of course. While Ukraine develops groundbreaking new naval drones capable of hitting warplanes as well as warships, Russia continues to bombard Ukrainian seaports and targets merchant shipping carrying Ukrainian exports to global markets. The Russian Navy is also producing marine drones of its own, and is adopting defensive measures to protect the remainder of the Black Sea Fleet. Nevertheless, Kyiv’s Black Sea innovations are a reminder that Ukraine is an increasingly formidable military power in its own right and is shaping the future of drone warfare at sea as well as on land.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The primary role of drones in modern warfare is as weapons. Over the past three years, first person view (FPV) drones have become a ubiquitous feature of the contemporary battlefield and are believed to be responsible for the vast majority of Russian and Ukrainian casualties. This is changing the way the war is fought. Any vehicles operating close to the front lines must now rely on jamming devices, with many also favoring the additional protection of so-called “cope cage” coverings to shield against drone attacks. With larger groups of infantry deemed too vulnerable to drone strikes, attacks are typically carried out by small groups, often using highly mobile transport such as motorbikes or buggies.

Ukraine has also pioneered the use of drones and accompanying software to perform surveillance tasks mapping out the battlefield and providing real-time situational awareness of enemy deployments. This reconnaissance capability is not new in itself, but has undergone significant upgrades in recent years. Accurate and up-to-date information allows commanders to make informed decisions quickly, improving the effectiveness of military operations.

Beyond the battlefield, Ukraine has also transformed international understanding of drone warfare at sea. Since 2022, Ukrainian naval drones have succeeded in sinking or damaging around one-third of Russia’s entire Black Sea Fleet, forcing the remainder of Putin’s warships to retreat from Russian-occupied Crimea to the relative safety of Russia’s own Black Sea ports. Most recently, Ukraine claimed to have used naval drones to shoot down two Russian warplanes over the Black Sea.

Eurasia Center events

Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

In addition to strike and surveillance functions, Ukraine has also employed drones in logistical roles. The Ukrainian army uses both aerial and ground-based unmanned systems to deliver ammunition, food, medicine, and other supplies to troops operating in dangerous or inaccessible areas, thereby reducing the need to expose personnel to hostile environments. Drone-based solutions can also potentially facilitate the evacuation of the wounded when manned rescue is deemed to be too risky.

One of the most creative Ukrainian uses of drones on the battlefield has been to help take surrendering Russian soldiers prisoner. This method reduces the need for physical engagement with enemy troops and therefore limits the risks to the Ukrainian side. Drones are used to give instructions using printed messages or via loudspeakers to guide enemy soldiers and indicate safe directions that will allow them to surrender without coming under fire.

Ukrainian unmanned systems are also playing an important role in efforts to document Russian war crimes. Drones are able to record the time, location, and nature of potential crimes, along with the identity of the perpetrators in some cases. Over the past three years, Ukrainian drones have captured evidence of potential war crimes including the execution of unarmed POWs and attacks on civilians. This footage can be used in future prosecutions and increases the chances that those responsible for war crimes in Ukraine will be held accountable.

The growing role of drones in warfare creates a range of challenges in terms of the accepted norms governing military operations. With this in mind, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence has drawn up and issued internal guidelines for drone operators and legal teams to ensure adherence to the laws of armed conflict. These guidelines incorporate real-world combat scenarios to help drone operators understand how to treat categories such as medical personnel, retreating enemy troops, and those engaged in the evacuation of the wounded. This initiative is a step toward establishing broader global standards for responsible drone warfare.

Ukraine’s unique experience of drone warfare offers valuable insights that will shape military doctrines for many years to come, while also helping to define international standards for the use of drones in a military context. It is already clear that drones are transforming the battlefield in ways the evoke the twentieth century rise of air power. As drone technologies continue to advance, Ukraine is likely to remain a key player in this new wave of military innovation.

Vitaliy Nabukhotny is a human rights lawyer and external legal advisor to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence’s Legal Department.

What explains this contrast? Leading NATO allies (France, Germany, Italy, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States) diverge from one another because they face different threats and levels of threat perception. These differences explain each ally’s major defense decisions (defense spending, military structure, and military posture) as well as the ally’s role in and relationship to NATO. I explore this issue more deeply in my forthcoming book on NATO, drawing from ninety-eight interviews with current and former policymakers.

NATO allies’ different threat perceptions can explain much of the current crisis within the Alliance, and they provide the backdrop for what could be a contentious summit.

The United States: China trumps Europe

The Trump administration sees China as the most significant state security threat to US interests. The 2025 Annual Threat Assessment says that “China stands out as the actor most capable of threatening US interests globally.” The administration’s Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance reportedly focuses on the threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan as one of two priorities for the Pentagon, along with combating drug cartels.

The Trump administration has cited the threat from China to explain its European security policy. Hegseth said in February that the United States could not remain the primary guarantor of European security, telling allied military leaders in Brussels: “The US is prioritizing deterring war with China in the Pacific, recognizing the reality of scarcity, and making the resourcing tradeoffs to ensure deterrence does not fail.” The Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance reportedly concludes that because of the focus on China, European allies must do more for their own defense.

This view of China can also explain the Trump administration’s policy toward Greenland, an autonomous territory of NATO ally Denmark. Melting sea ice means that Greenland’s location will be critical for those seeking to control Artic sea lanes and it is home to large quantities of rare-earth minerals. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has stressed that the United States would not use force to seize Greenland but only to protect it from encroachment by China.

This can also explain Trump’s significant, though inconsistent, turn toward Russia. Some have argued that the Trump administration is attempting a “reverse Kissinger,” aligning with Russia to weaken its ties to China. The Trump administration may even be turning toward Russia to pressure NATO allies into taking more responsibility for their own defense, as Victoria Coates, a former deputy national security advisor in Trump’s first term, has argued. Even though Trump has criticized Russian President Vladimir Putin, it is reasonable for European leaders to fear that a grand bargain between Washington and Moscow remains a distinct possibility.

Europe: Divided by diverse levels of threat

Europe is unable to defend itself without the United States. Europe lacks integrated air and missile defense, long-range precision strike, transport aircraft, as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. European allies are struggling to recruit, train, and equip sufficient troops for NATO’s new force model—doing so in the next decade without the United States would most likely be a bridge too far.

But even faced with these challenges, not every European NATO ally has shown the same level of urgency when it comes to increasing defense spending. The reason is that leading European allies face different threats and levels of threat, limiting the incentives of some allies to act.

The overwhelming consensus among Italian officials, for example, is that instability in the wider Mediterranean is the most important security threat facing the country. Because addressing this threat does not primarily entail military means, Italy has not felt an urgent need to increase defense spending in response to Trump’s policies. While Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni announced in April that Italy would spend 2 percent of its GDP on defense this year (up from 1.5 percent in 2024), no new funding has been allocated for this yet. What’s more, reporting suggests that the government could reach the 2 percent benchmark largely through accounting changes, such as including its Coast Guard in defense spending.

Meanwhile, from strategy documents and official statements, it is clear that Poland, Germany, France, and Britain all view Russia as their greatest security threat. However, they each have different levels of threat perception, which informs the differing approaches they have taken toward military spending.

Poland provides the starkest contrast with Italy. Warsaw plans to spend 4.7 percent of GDP on defense this year, up from 4.1 percent last year. Poland’s level of defense spending makes sense given the intensity of the threat it faces from Moscow and its proximity to Russia. Poland’s view is that only a US-led NATO can provide collective defense against the threat from Russia, so it is focused on pushing allies to comply with US demands to keep Washington committed to European security.

Concern that the United States could shift away has also led Germany to spend more on defense. Following Germany’s February election, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz led a successful effort to revise Germany’s constitution to allow borrowing above 1 percent of GDP for defense spending. On April 9, Merz announced a coalition agreement with the Social Democrats, which included a pledge to ramp up defense spending “significantly” to fulfill Germany’s NATO commitments. Germany views any US moves to withdraw from Europe with alarm, and Merz continues to insist that Germany and Europe do more to keep the United States engaged in NATO. Last month, Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul said Germany will “follow” Trump’s demand that allies spend at least 5 percent of GDP on defense.

France’s independent nuclear arsenal gives it an added degree of security against the threat from Russia. While France has used the Trump administration’s statements to push for European defense independence, Paris has not reacted with urgency in terms of its own defense spending. French President Emmanuel Macron has called for a new NATO spending target of 3 percent of GDP on defense but has not proposed a new figure for French defense spending (currently at 2.1 percent of GDP).

While Britain’s nuclear arsenal would normally provide it with an extra measure of security against Russia, the United Kingdom relies on the United States for its nuclear submarines. As such, the British government has doubled down on its relationship with the United States. British officials have embraced Trump’s criticism of allies who underspend on defense, and Foreign Secretary David Lammy has called for a NATO that is “stronger, fairer, and more lethal.” Just prior to Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s visit to the United States in February, the British government announced that Britain will spend 2.6 percent of GDP on defense by 2028, up from 2.3 percent this year.

Preserving a mutually beneficial relationship

The United States’ greater focus on China and push for Europeans to take more responsibility for their defense are likely irreversible trends. But the NATO Summit in The Hague later this month provides an opportunity for the United States and its European allies to reaffirm their commitments to the Alliance amid these shifting dynamics.

First, the Trump administration should use the summit to work with its European allies on a phased and structured exchange of responsibility for European security over the next decade. Under such a plan, the United States would work with European allies to develop defense capabilities they do not currently have while maintaining the commitment of the US nuclear deterrent.

Second, Trump should take the opportunity to reassure European allies. He should affirm that the United States would come to the aid of any NATO ally that is attacked. Trump should also state plainly that his administration will work with Denmark to bolster the defense of Greenland and that it does not intend to acquire the island by force.

Third, European countries should use the summit to announce further commitments on defense spending. Following through on such commitments will entail costly domestic tradeoffs. The present moment requires courage: European leaders must make the case that significantly more defense spending is necessary because of the threat Russia poses and the United States’ turn toward the Indo-Pacific. Italy’s government in particular will have a challenging task. Because Italians are focused on threats from the Mediterranean, officials in Rome will have to make the case that Russia’s threat to European security matters for Italy. European governments like Italy’s can also make a compelling case that spending more on defense may boost overall economic growth.

If NATO allies take these steps at this year’s summit, they can help build a future Europe more capable of defending itself and an Alliance that better serves both US and European interests.

Jason Davidson is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is also a professor of political science and international affairs and director of the Security and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Mary Washington in Fredericksburg, Virginia.

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Stephen Rodriguez Joins AI+Expo Panel on Government Procurement Reform

clee — Wed, 04 Jun 2025 16:23:08 +0000

On June 3, Stephen Rodriguez, Senior Advisor at Forward Defense and Director of the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare, joined a panel at the AI+Expo to discuss “Reindustrializing America via Government Procurement Reform.”

He was joined by Eric Lofgren, Staff Member, U.S. House Armed Services Committee; Scott Friedman, Vice President of Government Affairs at Altana Technologies; and Mike Manazir, Vice President, Federal at Hadrian.

Fellow

Stephen Rodriguez

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The UK Strategic Defence Review lays out an ambitious roadmap for reform. Will the government deliver?

AM Sir Christopher Harper, KBE, RAF (Ret.) — Wed, 04 Jun 2025 15:06:10 +0000

By publishing its long-awaited Strategic Defence Review (SDR) on Monday, the United Kingdom has taken a positive step toward the reinvigoration and reform of its defense posture. Recognizing the perilous nature of the geostrategic scene, drawing lessons from the war in Ukraine, and seeking to enhance its leading role in NATO, the review is rigorous, thoughtful, and compelling; it offers one of the more realistic assessments of the United Kingdom’s security posture in recent memory. Its success, however, will hinge on funding and follow-through.

The SDR was written independently by Lord George Robertson, a former UK defense secretary and NATO secretary general; General Sir Richard Barrons, a former commander of the UK Joint Forces Command; and Fiona Hill, a foreign policy expert and former senior director for Europe and Russia at the US National Security Council. It benefits from the authors’ deep expertise and freedom to speak frankly.

In my assessment as a former Royal Air Force senior officer and director general of the NATO headquarters International Military Staff, I find the review blunt and refreshingly free of political gloss while still being infused with strategic depth. It offers a sobering analysis of the threats Britain faces and a coherent and comprehensive plan to deal with them.

If the UK media coverage of the review is anything to go by, then it has already been successful in promoting a national debate on the severity of the strategic risks the United Kingdom and its allies face. One of the review’s core aims is to foster a “total defence” culture, an understanding that security is not the sole preserve of the armed forces but a collective national responsibility.

No more “hollowing out”

British Prime Minister Keir Starmer echoed this whole-of-society message in a speech he delivered in Glasgow on Monday to launch the SDR. In the speech, he warned that the United Kingdom must prepare for a dangerous decade ahead. The United Kingdom would become, he said, “a battle-ready, armor-clad nation, with the strongest alliances and the most advanced capabilities, equipped for the decades to come.” Indeed, the review is laced throughout with the concept of “NATO first” and the United Kingdom’s aspiration to play a leading role in the Alliance.

On capabilities, the review outlines a serious agenda for restoring UK military strength after years of “hollowing out.” Among the most significant commitments is the acceleration of the United Kingdom’s sovereign nuclear warhead program (at a cost of £15 billion) to ensure that the country maintains an independent and credible deterrent. This is paired with equally serious investment in conventional capabilities, including the commitments to produce seven thousand long-range and cruise missiles and to construct six new munitions factories.

The SDR further calls for the United Kingdom to become a leading technology-enabled defense power, with an integrated force that deters, fights, and wins through constant innovation at wartime pace. To achieve that, it proposes a “three Is” model: integrated (rather than joint) forces, which are innovation-led and backed by industry. It emphasizes that greater attention must be given to the space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains. It also proposes making the army ten times more lethal by 2035 by exploiting autonomous systems and a “digital targeting web,” all informed by lessons learned from the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

The government has also pledged £1.5 billion for the modernization and refurbishment of military living accommodations. This, together with a move to take a whole-force, skills-based approach to workforce planning, would constitute long-overdue investments that could begin to address the current crisis surrounding the recruitment and retention of personnel.

None of the review’s recommendations reflect a marginal upgrade. Striking the appropriate balance between mass, speed, and resilience has returned to relevance alongside the need to reinvigorate stockpiles, munitions manufacturing, autonomous systems, and the United Kingdom’s technological edge. As demonstrated by the war in Ukraine, all these factors will increasingly define combat effectiveness. The SDR further recognizes the need to radically transform defense procurement processes and practice. For Britain to remain a serious military power, addressing these issues is both overdue and essential.

Finding the funding

Crucially, all sixty-two of the SDR’s recommendations have been accepted by the UK government—an indication, at least on paper, of genuine resolve.

And yet, despite the soundness of the review and the seriousness of its ambitions, an inevitable question mark remains over how these recommendations will be funded.

The government’s pledge to raise defense spending to 2.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) by 2027 is a step in the right direction. This review is unique in recent British history for being accompanied by increases rather than cuts in the budget. But this is still only a step. The longer-term ambition to reach 3 percent of GDP is not backed by binding Treasury policy or formal financial commitment. Moreover, it seems to hinge on a “defence dividend” of economic growth from a revitalized defense industrial base. Such an aspiration is not enough. In the face of a deteriorating strategic environment, Alliance members are likely to demand a minimum of 3.5 percent of GDP expenditure on defense at the upcoming NATO Summit in The Hague, which could lead to the United Kingdom falling behind the level of spending expected of a leading NATO power. Effective deterrence depends on credibility—and credibility hinges not on promises but on funded and delivered capabilities.

This financial dimension is especially critical in light of shifting US priorities. While the United States is unlikely to totally withdraw from NATO, there is a looming sense that Washington’s focus is inexorably moving away from Europe and toward the Indo-Pacific. Successive US administrations—regardless of party—have made clear that they expect European allies to carry more of the burden for their own defense. This has been brought into stark relief by the current US administration. A more self-reliant and militarily capable Europe is, therefore, no longer a theoretical objective—it is a strategic necessity.

For Britain, this means more than incremental increases in spending. It means making hard political choices and long-term industrial commitments now. The SDR lays out what needs to be done. The government has signaled its agreement. The next step—the most important one—will be putting money behind this critical endeavor.

Air Marshal Sir Christopher Harper is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served in the Royal Air Force, including as the UK military representative to NATO and the EU in Brussels and as director general of the NATO headquarters International Military Staff.

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2024 in the rear view

Rich Outzen — Mon, 02 Jun 2025 14:00:00 +0000

2024 brought a host of developments and changes in the security and defense environment facing the United States, Turkey, and their NATO partners. Some of these dynamics were political and geopolitical in nature, some operational, others military and technical. As the Defense Journal assesses and describes the state of the Alliance in 2025 for its readers, a brief retrospective on the year just passed and its impact provides a part of the necessary context.

Geopolitical shaping events

Momentous geopolitical events since our winter issue have included the advent of Donald Trump’s second term as US president, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, and the apparent revelation in Europe that conventional military defense is a sovereign responsibility that cannot be outsourced in perpetuity. These events have had significant implications for the security of NATO, Turkey, and the United States.

Trump’s return has had several immediate effects on the United States (and thus the global) security environment. His approach narrows the US global mission from maintaining a liberal world order to pursuing US national interests, while adopting a tone of strategic ambiguity toward both rivals and allies. He has simultaneously directed reform of the US military to reemphasize combat readiness and lethality while minimizing social or ideological programs. As commander in chief, Trump has directed US soldiers to conduct counterterror strikes in places like Somalia and Yemen even as his negotiators seek to defuse conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and elsewhere.

The fall of Bashar al-Assad after an eleven-day rebel offensive reshaped the strategic map of the Middle East. Iran lost a valuable strategic position in its multidimensional “resistance” against Israel and Western influence. Russia lost its sunk investment in Assad and a degree of its influence in the Middle East. Turkey has gained greater stability on its southern border, close defense and intelligence ties with the new Syrian authorities, and prospects for expanded regional trade and a leading role in Syrian reconstruction. The challenges of stabilizing Syria, and tensions between Israel and Turkey stemming from their respective threat perceptions, have no immediate or apparent solution, and will require deft diplomacy to manage.

Shifts that might have attracted more attention in other times were easy to miss, but still noteworthy in terms of global security. China and Russia took steps to bolster the military junta in Myanmar that is teetering on the edge of collapse against a rebel coalition. Battles between the Sudanese army (backed by Egypt, Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia) and the antigovernment Rapid Support Forces (supported by Russia and the United Arab Emirates) have shifted decisively in favor of the army, though not yet presaging an end to the civil war. The war in Ukraine grinds on amid serious attempts by Trump to forge a ceasefire. Early 2025 continues to be an era of persistent conflict and great power competition, but one with dramatic developments that will echo throughout this and future years.

Strategic alliance development

International patterns of alliance and armament over the past half-year have reflected the weight of geopolitical changes noted above. Deep and effective US support to Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression has led to a tighter convergence of what has been referred to as the axis of upheaval, with China, Iran, and North Korea sending weapons, supplies, and even soldiers to aid the Russian war effort. A dozen or more other countries have provided diplomatic support to Moscow, but these three have become critical suppliers of weapons and cash for the Kremlin. This is a trend that began before 2024, but has only accelerated in recent months.

The global arms market continues to shift in other significant ways. The United States in 2024 cemented its leading position in arms exports, accounting for 43 percent of global exports. Russian exports have sharply decreased as domestic production has been consumed by the ongoing war in Ukraine. Italy and Turkey have more than doubled their national shares of global exports over the past several years (2 percent to 4.8 percent for Italy and 0.8 percent to 1.7 percent for Turkey). Five Turkish defense firms rank among the one hundred largest in the world—and a sixth, Baykar, would almost certainly be high on the list if all of its sales data were publicly released. Only the United States, China, Germany, and the United Kingdom match or exceed this number. Of particular note has been the continued rise in demand for Turkish armaments from Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar.

Europe, for its part, has shown signs of finally getting serious about developing its own conventional military deterrent vis-à-vis Russia—or at least talking about doing so. Shocked by Trump’s heavy-handed conditionality on future aid to Ukraine, Brussels and its member states have drawn up plans for massive new defense spending and other deterrent steps—if taxpayers and military-age youth prove willing. Yet the European Union’s initial formulation of deterrence against Russia independent of Washington and without integrating Turkish geography, military capabilities, and strategic resources does not inspire confidence, especially given the long years needed to restore defense industrial capacity even assuming consistent commitment. European firms and national leaders would do well to welcome Turkish contributions to European defense planning and resourcing both in NATO and in EU planning by following through on plans to sell Ankara Eurofighters and encouraging more collaboration like that between Italy’s Leonardo and Turkey’s Baykar.

While the past half year has demonstrated volatility at the geopolitical and political levels, it has brought multipolarity and diffusion of power at the strategic level. This has played out in the evolution of alliances and the flow of arms and trade more broadly. In mid-2024 dualistic constructs (autocracy versus democracy, the US-led Alliance against an axis of evil) retained some utility. The current environment is messier, with issue-specific coalitions and transactional diplomacy creating a kaleidoscope of rivals, partners, and targets that, for now at least, deny predictable patterns and lead some to question the credibility of the international system’s most potent actor.

Operational trends

As geopolitics and alliances continue to evolve, so, too, does war in operational terms. In a world with ongoing “hot wars” in Ukraine, the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere, several discernible trends can be identified. These include diminishing returns for artillery as seen in Ukraine, failure to achieve military victory through ground maneuver forces for Russia and Israel, and the fragility of lightly armed proxy forces in various theaters.

Russia since 2022 has compensated for shortcomings in its infantry, armor, and air forces through reliance on superior tube and rocket artillery, exacting a heavy toll on Ukrainian defenders in the process. Yet in late 2024, losses among Russian artillery units rose as Ukrainian drone tactics and counterbattery fire became more effective. While Russia still outproduces NATO in artillery ammunition and continues to fire it at prodigious rates, its advantage is decreasing in relative terms.

Russia has continued to advance at high cost to try and consolidate control over the nearly 20 percent of Ukrainian territory it occupies, but has failed to end the war via ground maneuver after three years. The difficulty of ending wars through ground maneuver even against inferior opponents can also be seen in Gaza, where operations which have continued for eighteen months are not yet meeting the stated war goals of military and political leaders. Both the Russian and Israeli campaigns reflect the historical difficulty of reconciling the political nature of conflict termination with the operational conduct of wars, and a resultant tendency for destructive wars to yield stalemate when that task remains incomplete.

The recent period produced impressive operational results in other cases, notably Israel’s campaign against Iran’s regional proxy network and the Sudanese army’s efforts to regain control of the national capital region from the insurgent Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia. In late 2024 Israel crippled Lebanese Hezbollah and struck Iranian-supported militia targets in Syria and Iraq during an audacious campaign involving air strikes, ground maneuver, and exploding cellphones. Between November 2024 and March 2025 the Sudanese Army routed the RSF from Khartoum and other areas in central Sudan. The RSF had been supported by a number of foreign sponsors, including the United Arab Emirates and several other regional countries, but ultimately failed to achieve local or regional legitimacy—as had the Iranian proxy groups in Lebanon and Syria, and arguably in Iraq and Yemen as well. The past several months have badly undermined the notion popular over the past decade that proxy wars can effectively “enable intervention on the cheap.”

Military technical developments on the horizon

Over the past several months sixth-generation fighter aircraft have moved from concept to reality. China flew two prototypes in December 2024, one produced by Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group and the other by AVIC Shenyang Aircraft. US prototypes for a Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) aircraft have been under evaluation since 2020, but in March 2025 the Boeing F-47 was officially selected as the program’s platform. A half-dozen other countries have done some sixth-generation work—integrating advanced stealth, artificial intelligence, manned-unmanned teaming, and other advanced technologies—though even for those with the deepest pockets, fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft will be mainstays for the foreseeable future.

Artificial intelligence is a growing element in military planning and readiness. While the United States and many of its allies have endorsed the Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy, many potential adversaries and rivals have not. Military applications for AI focus at present on information processing, threat identification, and decision-making, areas in which the United States has relative advantage. The Department of Defense’s Defense Innovation Unit is implementing a project, Thunderforge, to deploy such capabilities to headquarters in Asia and Europe. The military services each have designated units to test concepts and systems related to AI in the field. The drive to develop effective defenses against small unmanned aerial systems (UAS) has gained urgency with the continued broad proliferation of cheap, easy-to-use, lethal UAS around the world. The December 2024 Department of Defense adoption of a classified strategy to accelerate counter-UAS development signals the rising criticality of the need for cost-effective and combat-effective counters to the cheap and plentiful threat. This is an area ripe for technical development and fielding in the near future.

Adaptive Alliance

The shifting dynamics at all these levels—geopolitical, strategic, operational, and technical—shape the contours of defense and security challenges for the United States and its NATO allies. These are certainly challenging times, yet the Alliance has endured for over seven decades through other chaotic and difficult periods because the basic value proposition of mutual defense among the members remains sound. Secretary General Mark Rutte strikes the right tone with his assessment that “there is no alternative to NATO” for either the United States or its partners, and that despite frictions related to burden sharing, domestic politics, and sometimes divergent national interest, NATO’s summit in The Hague in late June will show the Alliance evolving rather than dissolving.

Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Turkey with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on X @RichOutzen.

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Q&A with Haluk Bayraktar

Atlantic Council Turkey Programs — Mon, 02 Jun 2025 14:00:00 +0000

Haluk Bayraktar is the CEO of Baykar, an autonomous technology company based in Turkey. He began his tenure at Baykar in 2004 as an engineering manager, when Baykar’s autonomous technology efforts were still nascent, and has been involved in every aspect of the business’s growth into a leading firm in the Turkish defense sector: project management, logistics, and business development. Baykar’s pioneering role in the rise of the Turkish drone industry makes Bayraktar a fascinating and well-informed observer on security and alliance dynamics affecting Turkey, NATO, and the region.

This interview has been lightly edited for style.

Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY (DJ): Thanks for taking the time to talk with us. Let’s start with developments of common interest to readers in Turkey, the United States, and Europe. Following the industrial and technology cooperation deal with Italian defense and aerospace group Leonardo, what’s next for Baykar in the Western market?

Bayraktar: Baykar has become the world’s biggest drone maker, with thirty-eight international partners now—from Europe and NATO to the Turkic countries, Africa, and the Middle East. Among NATO allies, we have partnered with Poland, Romania, Kosovo, Croatia, and of course, Turkey’s military, law enforcement, and disaster relief agencies. Turkey is a NATO ally, so all our products and technologies follow the technical standards and military specifications of the West and are entirely compatible with Western systems. The Western market is critical for us.

As for Leonardo, we are on the path to establishing a joint venture (JV). They are a major player in Europe, and their work areas are highly compatible with ours—a lot of synergies and complementarity. We were already working with them, integrating payloads and systems with our products: This has become a very strong bond or marriage. A JV is a great opportunity/potential to bring robust, field-proven systems to a broader market. Baykar has drones all around the world, including tactical and strategic platforms. Leonardo produces critical subsystems with great potential for Europe and broader markets where they have a presence, including South America and elsewhere, but Europe is our main focus. In Europe, there is no other mature alternative to what we have.

DJ: What differentiates your approach to manned technology? What is the key to your value proposition?

Bayraktar: We are a tech developer but not just tech. It’s about tech but also about ways to use that technology—about operational employment. Our approach centers on reliability, safety, and robustness. Our experience brings lots of feedback from various areas, which makes our products even more robust. So, we combine technology with real-world experience. Our fleet now exceeds 300,000 flight hours per year, so there is a lot to analyze. Our systems offer the highest performance-to-cost across the market. They are the most adaptable with continuous innovation, and they are equipped with the most advanced technology. In the defense sector, there are huge manufacturing capacity challenges everywhere, whereas there has been a great buildup in Turkey in the last twenty-five years. Over just twenty years, we’ve gone from roughly seventy to over 3,000 companies in the sector, with thousands of products. It’s a great ecosystem with important internal synergies. Baykar has established mass production capacity for unmanned systems. Our Istanbul base is the biggest facility of its kind in the world. So, potential customers know we can deliver quickly. We produce 250 Bayraktar TB2 [unmanned combat aerial vehicles] per year, fifty Akinci [high-altitude, long-endurance] UCAVs per year, and we’re ramping up to support larger capacity as the Bayraktar TB3 UCAV and the Kizilelma unmanned fighter jet move from development to production.

DJ: What is your conceptual and defense technological approach to Kizilelma? Do you see it as a loyal wingman to the fifth-generation Kaan fighter or a pathway to replace Kaan in the future?

Bayraktar: Kaan is a national manned fighter program, funded by the government. Kizilelma is Baykar’s own design and project. It is our final target on the unmanned family of products—a fighter with both subsonic and supersonic capabilities. We do not envision it as a loyal wingman, though it can work as an integrated adjunct in theory, if one were to couple it and use it with manned fighters in risky environments. US President Donald Trump recently introduced the American F-47 as a mothership controlling other fighters, and the consortium developing [the Global Combat Air Program involving Italy, the United Kingdom, and Japan] conceived it in similar fashion. But we envision Kizilelma as operating on its own with a fleet control system. As a company, we don’t develop manned systems. We exclusively invest in drones. That is our focus. Kizilelma is an aircraft with aggressive maneuvering, autonomous operation, and controls that can be flown by few operators. It completed its first flight in 2022, and we see that as a revolution. Bayraktar TB3 has the capability to take off and land on short-runway aircraft carriers. Kizilelma will have this feature too.

Fighter pilots stationed at aircraft carriers have to fly every single day and complete a certain number of sorties annually to stay current. That’s perhaps fifty training flights per day. By contrast, unmanned platforms do not require as much effort or so many daily landings to be certified for carriers. Moreover, Kizilelma will integrate artificial intelligence to assist with delegation of command and other operational aspects.

DJ: How do you view the F-35 debate in the United States, especially Elon Musk’s view that manned aircraft are not the best path forward?

Bayraktar: There are about 13,000 manned fighters worldwide right now–Russian, Chinese, US, and other systems combined. We believe that all those platforms will eventually be converted to unmanned systems, even though one cannot prove that point just yet. But when you look at the field, it’s clearly headed in that direction. To be clear, they may not be replaced one for one. It may be more like three to five unmanned platforms to replace each manned fighter. Unmanned systems will be everywhere, and it will be a crowded airspace—not just unmanned fighters but smaller first-person view drones and loitering munitions. They will be everywhere, and every country will need the ability to build and use these things. For nations to defend themselves in this century, this is a necessary capability—much like the ability to produce bullets.

DJ: Turkey has shown great agility in what has been termed “drone diplomacy,” or complementing regional policy initiatives with defense sales. What is the nature of public/private partnership in Turkish drone diplomacy?

Bayraktar: Overall, the major players in the Turkish defense ecosystem are still government-owned institutional firms. The private sector is smaller but dynamic and growing. Of course, I think that the private sector’s dynamism is preferable. SAHA is the industry group representing the smaller and midsize firms that comprise most of our private sector, and I am currently serving as the chairman.

Still, the system operates similarly for public and private firms. Anyone wishing to export applies to the Ministry of National Defense, which in turn coordinates with the Foreign Ministry and the intelligence community to issue an export license. It is the government’s decision at the end of the day. The government doesn’t promote private-sector firms per se. The Defense Industry Agency (SSB) has foreign relationships and partnerships, and they generally favor government-affiliated companies. One of the objectives of SAHA has been to help small and medium-sized companies become more visible. Our annual exhibition helps smaller players. Baykar is an example of successful growth: We’ve gone from five employees in 2004 to over 6,000 today. We know how important it is to become more visible, and we support other firms doing that. We try to make it easier for the newcomers. That is my responsibility as SAHA chairman.

My view is that European countries are better at using governmental influence to promote national commercial products. Baykar’s products promote themselves through their unique utility as well as aggressive marketing and social media presence. The Turkish government doesn’t subsidize sales, although other countries may. But we don’t rely on public credit or government grants. This is unique to Baykar: We’ve developed an unmanned fighter with the company’s own money. At the end of the day, since companies are required to receive a permit to export, the government plays an important role. The higher levels [of government officials] do talk about it and the firms need approval. The government spending environment matters greatly for domestic firms, too. And while Turkey spent 4.5 percent of its [gross domestic product] on defense before 2000, that number has remained close to 2 percent for two decades now. It was just in the last two years that it approached 3 percent.

The bottom line is that drone diplomacy is a reality and the Bayraktar TB2, in particular, has proven that. But the government doesn’t lead: market demand leads, the company follows, and the government supports.

DJ: Can you talk a little bit about the price/performance balance for Baykar systems?

Bayraktar: The Bayraktar TB2 is a very good example for price/performance balance. The initial purchase price or acquisition cost is one factor, but the life cycle, including maintenance and durability, has to be considered as well because reliability affects long-term costs. Let’s say you procure an alternative to Bayraktar TB2 for half the price. In reality, this is not an advantage if this “alternative” has double the crash rate. So, Bayraktar TB2 has a reliability advantage because you don’t face as many crashes and the cost consideration changes.

Unmanned systems represent a new niche in the defense ecosystem. Aerospace is conservative, especially for manned systems: extensive certifications and regulations serve to protect human life. But unmanned [aerial] vehicles are a different paradigm—you can add new sensors, new technology, and new operational approaches rapidly. An example is the fact that manned systems still use mechanical gyros, whereas the technologically advanced UAVs are currently using even cheaper MEMS [i.e., microelectromechanical system) sensors, fiber-optic alternatives with high-end software systems. You can easily innovate in the unmanned realm with the latest technology, whereas you need to be conservative in the manned domain because you need to make sure that each new step complies with the certification and safety standards of manned aviation. You can qualify unmanned systems with very high-end software—even AI software—and hardware much more quickly.

Baykar has a price advantage because we are vertically integrated. We have strong in-house avionics, power systems, and ground element design. This allows us to tailor critical subsystems and enable attractive pricing with high-end capability. The TB2, with a six-unit ground system and everything, still costs less than a manned platform. Our TB2 fleet recently passed the one-million-hour milestone, so our operating cost is just several hundred dollars per hour—compared to a minimum of $20,000 per hour for a single manned F-16. When you can mass produce, availability and reliability turn into a potent combination. Additionally, customers benefit from the rapid in-service schedule compared to a manned system. A country can field a full UAV system with trained people within a year, providing a very quick and affordable defense capability compared to a manned system, which is a multiyear exercise.

DJ: You mentioned thirty-eight international partners earlier. Ukraine was one of your earliest: Have you been able to apply lessons from that partnership with newer programs, such as those with the Gulf countries?

Bayraktar: Ukraine was Baykar’s first export customer. Our cooperation with Ukraine opened up the strategic level of cooperation for us. We had been working with them since 2011, but things moved rapidly after 2014. In 2014, no one else would sell them armed drones. We didn’t yet have a mature system, but we agreed to help. They were in need, huge need, and searching. That was more than ten years ago. They couldn’t get what they wanted elsewhere either, so they came to Turkey. President Erdoğan’s leadership mattered at that point, as he considered Ukraine a neighbor and friend in need. With the government’s support, we supplied armed drones starting in 2019—the order was placed in 2018. They were very happy and this was very important. President Zelensky visited in August 2019 after taking office. At his request, we agreed to build a factory in Ukraine. He acquired more systems, and we discussed an offset-type obligation. I told them: “You have very good engines. Maybe we can figure out a way to use your engines on our platforms.” So, we created effective cooperation with Motor Sich and others. In a sense, Turkey and Ukraine are complementary countries. When the war escalated in 2022, we did our best to support Ukraine. You may remember the European crowd-sourcing campaigns for Europeans to buy TB2s on Ukraine’s behalf, but we never accepted the money. We donated the platforms, giving up over $110 million in income that we chose not to generate. We are not war profiteers. We delivered all Bayraktar TB2s free of charge as part of those campaigns and the campaign funds were used for humanitarian aid and other pressing needs to support Ukraine.

Haluk Bayraktar is the CEO of Baykar, an autonomous technology company based in Turkey. Follow him on X at @haluk.

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Murray in Sky News on UK’s Strategic Defence Review

Atlantic Council — Mon, 02 Jun 2025 14:00:00 +0000

On June 2, Rob Murray, non-resident senior fellow at Forward Defense and the Transatlantic Security Initiative, appeared on Sky News to offer his insights on the UK’s Strategic Defence Review. Murray emphasized the importance of re-drawing financial architectures and increasing credit flow into supply chains to effectively finance the Review’s ambitious armament procurement goals.

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The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

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How NATO’s eastern flank is setting the standard for collective defense

Justina Budginaite-Froehly — Fri, 30 May 2025 16:04:21 +0000

“I am glad to be in Vilnius today,” said German Chancellor Friedrich Merz on May 22. “Because it is right here, in Lithuania, where we are taking the defense of NATO’s eastern flank into our own hands.”

Merz was in Vilnius to formally inaugurate the 45^th Armored Brigade in Lithuania, which will embed German combat power at the heart of Baltic defense. Germany will implement a phased deployment—it sent advanced elements in early 2024 and formally activated the brigade on April 1. The brigade is expected to reach full combat readiness by 2027. Once complete, this will offer Lithuania and its neighbors a sustained, high-end deterrent anchored in the NATO framework.

But it’s not just Germany that is helping bolster the defenses of NATO’s strategically exposed eastern flank. The eastern flank countries themselves are implementing concrete measures to overcome Europe’s entrenched defense fragmentation. Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland—all located along the eastern border of both NATO and the European Union (EU) with mainland Russia, its Kaliningrad exclave, and Belarus—are emerging as leaders in bolstering regional defense integration, the benefits of which could extend throughout Europe. This shift is especially significant amid growing transatlantic tensions and renewed calls from the United States for Europe to assume greater responsibility for its own security and conventional defense.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, these countries have aligned their border protection efforts by integrating their counter-mobility measures. They have initiated the process of cooperatively developing deep-strike capabilities. They have also started the procurement process for German weapon systems, introduced the German defense industry to the region, and will soon host the first-ever permanently deployed German brigade. All these initiatives show that Europe’s defense efforts are well-positioned to grow together and consolidate from the epicenter in the northeast of the continent. By anchoring their defense planning in regional realities, the eastern flank countries are demonstrating that regional coordination, backed by political determination, can transform exposed vulnerabilities into strategic assets that enhance deterrence and operational readiness.

Integrating counter-mobility systems

Faced with growing geostrategic pressure along their borders with Russia and Belarus, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland have taken decisive, coordinated steps to reinforce border protection and defense. Increasingly aligned in their strategic approach, these countries are developing integrated fortification systems that form a continuous defensive line along the eastern border of NATO and the EU.

Two major initiatives launched in 2024—the Baltic Defense Line covering Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and Poland’s East Shield—share the common goal of strengthening deterrence and denying adversaries access to NATO and EU territory. These efforts include expanding existing forested areas, deepening drainage ditches, building engineering depots to store physical barriers such as “dragons’ teeth,” “hedgehogs,” “Spanish horse,” and solid concrete road barriers, as well as installing anti-tank landmines and mine-laying equipment. There are also plans for developing reinforcements with drone and anti-drone technologies. The overall goal is to ensure the two defense initiatives’ integrity, especially as they converge at the Suwałki Gap, a security chokepoint and the primary axis for NATO’s land reinforcement to the Baltic states.

Finland’s accession to NATO added 1,340 kilometers to the Alliance’s border with Russia. Unlike the more exposed terrain of the Baltic states and Poland, Finland’s border region is naturally defensive, dominated by forests, lakes, and wetlands, which would complicate a large-scale Russian ground incursion. Accordingly, Finland has chosen not to build physical fortifications along the border.

However, to reinforce deterrence and secure vulnerable segments, Finland aligned itself with the regional consensus by withdrawing from the Ottawa Convention banning the use of anti-personnel landmines. This means the eastern flank countries can jointly deploy and stockpile anti-personnel landmines as a shared border defense tool against Russia. Both Russia and Ukraine have used anti-personnel landmines in Ukraine.

The regional integration of border defense has triggered broader EU interest. Following Baltic and Polish calls for a collective response, the European Council’s conclusions on European defense, released on March 6, recognized the importance of EU border defense. The EU’s White Paper on Defense, published in late March, endorsed the idea of creating an “Eastern Border Shield” and in April, the European Parliament passed a resolution recognizing the East Shield and the Baltic Defense Line as flagship projects for common security. This momentum must now translate into concrete EU support—and funding—for transforming the eastern flank countries’ national efforts into a unified, layered European border defense architecture.

Coordinated development of deep strike capabilities

The Baltic states, Poland, and Finland are also integrating their long-range firepower into a regional deep-strike architecture, which significantly raises the threshold for aggression along the eastern flank of NATO and the EU.

Since Russia launched its full-scale war against Ukraine in 2022, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have each contracted High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) launchers and committed to trilateral cooperation with the United States on HIMARS integration, personnel training, system maintenance, and service. Embedding HIMARS into a joint operational concept will allow the Baltic states to conduct combined live-fire exercises and harmonize sustainment through shared maintenance, training, and logistics chains. Estonia’s six launchers, delivered in April, now reach well beyond four hundred kilometers. Lithuania’s eight launchers, due to arrive by 2026, will achieve a similar reach. Latvia is set to receive six launchers in 2027, which will complete the Baltic deep-strike firewall.

This Baltic cluster is dovetailing with Poland’s even larger “Homar-A” deep-strike program, under which some 486 additional HIMARS variants will be mounted on Polish Jelcz trucks and integrated into Poland’s Topaz command system. Together, Poland and the Baltic states are planning a joint logistics hub to manage munitions stockpiles, spare parts, and forward displacement. They are also planning to exercise joint targeting and coordinate fire support across borders.

Finland has opted to upgrade its M270 multiple-launch rocket systems rather than buy HIMARS. The upgrade, approved in 2023, allows Finnish M270s to fire the same munitions as their Baltic neighbors. This technical alignment transforms Finland’s forces into a seamless fourth pillar of the regional deep-strike ensemble, enabling integrated planning, data‐sharing, and cross-border reinforcement exercises.

By integrating US-provided launchers, coordinated doctrine, shared logistics, and interoperable fire-control standards, the five eastern flank nations are establishing a continuous, multi-tiered long-range fire network that spans from Finland to Poland. This network helps project deterrence and complicate adversary planning, solidifying a new level of collective defense integration on the eastern flank.

Regional consolidation with German weapon systems

The eastern flank countries have also deepened their partnerships with German weapon manufacturers. Lithuania is aligning its force modernization with the German brigade’s forward posture in the Baltics. In December, Lithuania’s defense ministry signed a €950 million contract with for forty-four Leopard 2 A8 main battle tanks—its first indigenous tank battalion—which will arrive through 2030, alongside an expanded fleet of twenty-seven additional Boxer “Vilkas” infantry fighting vehicles, which will arrive by 2029. Finland and Poland likewise use Leopard 2 variants, creating a shared main battle tank backbone across the eastern flank.

In the air defense domain, Estonia and Latvia will each field three IRIS-T surface-launched missile batteries this year, while Lithuania has bolstered its two national advanced surface-to-air missile systems (NASAMS) batteries (initially deployed in 2020) with additional systems due to arrive in 2026. To underpin sustained operations, German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall’s new NATO-standard 155 mm ammunition plant in Lithuania, scheduled to be online by mid-2026, will produce tens of thousands of shells annually, significantly enhancing regional munitions resilience.

In the defense innovation field, Lithuanian laser technology firm Aktyvus Photonics has partnered with German drone manufacturer Quantum Systems, having signed a memorandum of understanding on strategic collaboration in unmanned systems this month. Together, they will codevelop and field-test unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with laser capabilities, aiming to expedite deployment timelines and establish a standard for next-generation, networked unmanned systems in NATO’s eastern defenses.

Beyond procurement, production, and innovation, Lithuania has also positioned itself as a regional arms maintenance hub: Through the establishment of Lithuania Defense Services—a joint venture between Rheinmetall Landsysteme and French-German defense manufacturer KNDS—it provides repair, overhaul, and upgrade services for German vehicle platforms, including Boxer Vilkas IFVs, PzH 2000 howitzers, the Leopard main battle tank family, and tactical logistics vehicles.

Collectively, these deployments, procurements, and industrial partnerships do more than fill capability gaps: They forge a contiguous eastern flank defense ecosystem. By standardizing on German platforms, harmonizing training and logistics, co-locating production and repair facilities, and co-training under unified command structures, Finland, the Baltic states, and Poland, together with Germany, can achieve unprecedented interoperability and strategic depth. These initiatives are transforming NATO’s eastern flank into a seamless, multi-domain bulwark.

Strategic depth through regional alignment

The eastern flank’s transformation from a collection of fragmented national postures into a cohesive, multi-domain defense network exemplifies how sustained regional integration can overcome long-standing capability gaps. By aligning border defense, harmonizing long-range fires, and embedding German heavy armor and sustainment infrastructure, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are creating a continuous belt of deterrence that leverages shared doctrine, logistics, and industry. This holistic approach raises the cost of aggression and sets a new standard for European collective defense: one where interoperability and joint capacity-building replace duplication and dependency, anchoring strategic depth at NATO’s most exposed frontier.

Justina Budginaite-Froehly, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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Fiber optic drones could play decisive role in Russia’s summer offensive

David Kirichenko — Thu, 29 May 2025 18:48:59 +0000

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than three years ago, the war in Ukraine has been shaped by a technological arms race as both countries have struggled to achieve an innovative edge on the battlefield. While Ukraine’s dynamic tech sector and less cumbersome bureaucracy initially gave it the advantage, Russia may now be gaining the upper hand.

The weapon that is turning the tide in Russia’s favor is the rather humble-looking fiber optic drone. This variation on the first-person view (FPV) drones that have dominated the skies above the battlefield since 2022 may appear inconspicuous at first glance, but it is having a major impact on the front lines of the war and is expected to play a crucial role in Russia’s unfolding summer offensive.

As the name suggests, fiber optic drones are controlled by wire-thin cables linked to operators. Crucially, this makes them immune to the jamming systems that have become near-ubiquitous in the Russian and Ukrainian armies due to the rapid evolution of drone warfare. Thanks to their data-transporting cables, fiber optic drones benefit from improved video quality and can also operate at lower altitudes than their wireless counterparts, but it is their invulnerability to electronic jamming that makes them such a potentially game-changing weapon.

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There are some drawbacks to this kind of drone. Key problems include limited range and a tendency to become entangled in obstacles such as trees and pylons. Nevertheless, there is mounting recognition on both sides of the front lines and among international military observers that fiber optic drones are now indispensable. In a recent report, the BBC called these drones “the terrifying new weapon changing the war in Ukraine.” Meanwhile, the Washington Post noted that Moscow’s focus on fiber optic drones represents “the first time Russia has surpassed Ukraine in front-line drone technology since the full-scale invasion in 2022.”

The combat effectiveness of fiber optic drones became increasingly apparent amid heavy fighting in Russia’s Kursk region during the early months of 2025. Russia’s campaign to push Ukrainian forces out of the Kursk region used large numbers of fiber optic drones to attack Ukraine’s flanks, cut supply lines, and cripple Ukrainian logistics. This eventually forced Ukrainian troops to retreat, ending an extended incursion into Russian territory that had been hugely embarrassing for Vladimir Putin. Ukrainian troops who fought in Kursk later reported that the only thing capable of stopping fiber optic drones was bad weather.

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The technology behind fiber optic drones is no secret and is available to Ukraine as well as Russia. However, as is so often the case, Moscow benefits from weight of numbers and is looking to exploit its strengths. While Ukraine has experimented with a wide variety of drones produced by hundreds of different startup-style defense companies, Russia has concentrated its vast resources on the mass production of a relatively small number of specific weapons categories including fiber optic drones and shahed kamikaze drones. Moscow’s strategy is to focus on volume with the goal of overwhelming Ukraine’s defenses. Russia has also benefited from close ties with China, which is a key drone producer and ranks among the world’s leading suppliers of fiber optic cables.

Ukraine’s front line military commanders and the country’s tech sector developers recognize the growing importance of fiber optic drones and are now rapidly increasing production. However, they are currently lagging far behind Russia and have much work to do before they can catch up. It is a race Ukraine cannot afford to lose. One of the country’s largest drone manufacturers recently warned that if the current trajectory continues, Kyiv will soon be unable to defend against the sheer scale of Russia’s mass production.

Increased foreign investment in Ukraine’s defense industry could help close the gap. By financing the development and production of fiber optic drones, Ukraine’s international partners can put the country’s defenses on a firmer footing and enable the Ukrainian military to address the threat posed by Russia’s cable-connected drones. This trend has already been underway for some time, with more and more partner countries allocating funds for Ukrainian defense sector production. The challenge now is to channel this financing specifically toward fiber optic drones.

Time may not be on Ukraine’s side. The Russian army is currently in the early stages of a summer offensive that promises to be one of the largest and most ambitious of the entire war, with fighting already intensifying at various points along the front lines. If Putin’s commanders can implement the fiber optic drone tactics that proved so successful in the Kursk region, they may be able to finally overcome Ukraine’s dogged defenses and achieve a long-awaited breakthrough. In a war defined by attrition and innovation, Ukraine must now come up with urgent solutions to counter Russia’s fiber optic drone fleet.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

The Rt Hon Lord Mandelson on Britain in an enduring transatlantic relationship

British Ambassador to the United States The Rt Hon Lord Mandelson speaks at the 2025 Christopher J. Makins lecture to discuss the significance of the transatlantic relationship during this unprecedented geopolitical period.

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Eighty years ago this month, the streets of Britain, America, and allied nations erupted in celebration at the fall of fascism in Europe.

For me personally, it’s a source of enormous pride that my grandfather, Herbert Morrison, served as home secretary in Winston Churchill’s wartime coalition.

He also served as deputy prime minister in Clement Attlee’s transformative postwar government in Britain. That government didn’t just support the formation of NATO to counter Soviet expansionism—they were the co-architects of it.

Amidst Cold War tensions and economic upheaval, Britain and America advanced from allies to integrated strategic partners at the dawn of the nuclear age, our scientists having joined forces in the Manhattan Project to create the advantage we had at the beginning of this age.

It was Western unity which ultimately ended the Cold War peacefully and demonstrated resilience to new threats, including the 9/11 attacks, where NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time.

Over eight decades, the foundations of collective defense have remained steadfast whilst the transatlantic relationship has continuously evolved and adapted to counter new challenges.

Today, I want to talk about the profound challenge we face in a new age of great power rivalry, a period characterized by political volatility, by economic mercantilism, and geopolitical competition.

We are witnessing the end of an era of hyper-globalization where we assumed that economic integration had made wars almost obsolete.

The logic seemed compelling: Mutual interests, integrated global supply chains, and shared economic stakes created too much to lose from warfare. History seemed to point only in one direction.

And those comfortable assumptions have been shattered.

We now see the rise of modern mercantilism, where nations prefer to prioritize national economic strength and autonomy in many respects.

States are intervening and playing a more protectionist role in managing trade and directing industrial policy to become ever more self-sufficient and localized.

I’m not declaring globalization dead, but it is being radically reconfigured around us.

China’s export-driven growth strategy flooded the global market with state-subsidized products, undercut Western manufacturing, and hollowed out industry.

The social disruption of rapid technological change, where, if you take media as an example, we have moved suddenly from decades of information flowing to people through established news organizations to a future where you only see “news” online that is curated to what you want to know, or what the algorithm—and those behind it—decides you want to know. And then there’s the backlash against globalization’s uneven distribution of benefits.

You can produce many different numbers to show the widening wealth disparities in the West over the past thirty years, but I would choose a simple one: GDP per capita in the United States has grown about 60 percent to 70 percent in real terms, but real median household income growth has been about 20 percent to 25 percent. The typical American household has not done as well as the booming US economy would suggest. A similar story holds true across all our countries in the West.

This has posed profound challenges to culture, place, and society—which too many of us over the past decades, frankly, have ignored. From the American Midwest to the coastal towns of England, a hands-off approach left many places adrift from the success stories of global cities such as London and New York.

And in a world which has often felt dominated by the exponential rise of social media, a sense of grievance—and of difference between us and them—has been amplified.

So yes, I credit President Trump’s acute political instincts in identifying the anxieties gripping not only millions of Americans, but also far more pervasive global trends: Economic stagnation, a sense of irreversible decline, the lost promise of meaningful work for so many people. These are the giants now that we must confront head-on.

So, where do we go next?

It is in no one’s interest—certainly not those of close allies—that each country pursues a wholly individualized path, which leads to accelerated economic fragmentation.

But if we are serious about rebuilding confidence in the international system, if we wish to maintain a set of common rules and standards—a shared economic and security commons in between us—we need to devote an enormous amount of energy and goodwill to preserve, sustain, and deepen the alliances which exist between like-minded countries.

For the UK and the rest of Europe, we must reboot the transatlantic alliance—indeed, a boot up the proverbial backside is needed now—to deliver peace through strength across three interconnected domains: military, economic, and technological.

For my generation, the twentieth-century gains in peace and prosperity were thought of as a European peace dividend.

I now recognize it as an urgent bill, that peace dividend: An urgent bill for decades of defense underinvestment—a payment that is long overdue.

We have lived in a fantasy created by the US security guarantee, complacent that a friendly heavyweight across the water would be always there when the going gets tough.

We meet in the shadow of Russia’s barbaric invasion of Ukraine, now in its fourth year.

The UK strongly supports President Trump’s initiative to bring this terrible war to an end. And we are working together with partners to secure a just and lasting peace.

The Ukraine conflict has served as a brutal wake-up call. State-on-state war has returned to Europe. Adversaries are using nuclear rhetoric to influence decision-making, and we are seeing regular attacks on European infrastructure beneath the threshold of warfare.

It is crystal clear that European defense must step up and rebalance for our collective security. Actually, I think President Trump is doing Europe a favor by confronting us with this reality.

The United States is the UK’s closest defense and security ally. We must become less dependent on America, while remaining inseparably linked to America—a distinction that I underline of critical importance. Yes, less dependent, but still inseparably linked.

Ukraine is just one flashpoint of many amid growing global instability. Even the US does not have limitless resources.

This is precisely why Britain must step up in providing for European security and why we have committed to the biggest sustained increase in defense spending since the Cold War.

We will become NATO’s fastest-innovating nation, ensuring our military forces have the technological and military capabilities to secure long-term strategic advantage, not just spending more, but spending better.

Of course, this all needs to be grounded in intelligent and effective strategic choices, not merely increased expenditure. Efficiency and innovation to renew our defense manufacturing bases must drive every pound, every dollar, and every euro that we invest.

And we will double down on our alliances. In defense, we will always be NATO first but not NATO only—and this is particularly true of the UK’s focus on the Indo-Pacific, as well as our new security partnership with Europe.

One good example is AUKUS, the trilateral security partnership with Australia and America, which will deliver advanced nuclear-powered submarines and catalyze technology sharing on other advanced capabilities.

Turning to the theme of economic strength, Britain now enjoys something that has eluded us for far too long: a government with both unity of purpose and longevity.

This government’s mandate and President Trump’s will both last for the next four years—providing huge opportunities for collaboration between us.

We are both pro-business and pro-trade in Britain, and committed to innovation, not as empty slogans but as practical imperatives.

This UK government is committed to creating the best investment environment with a regulatory reset that makes us the most competitive in Europe—that’s our aim.

One of the reasons we were able to close the first trade deal of the Trump administration is that our strong economic relationship between our countries is fair, balanced, and reciprocal. But also because, frankly, we are a businesslike nation with pragmatic instincts.

One of the great backhanded insults in British history was when Napoleon Bonaparte dismissed us as a mere “nation of shopkeepers.” He was right: Commerce is the lifeblood which flows through our veins, and that is one reason why we British and American cousins remain so close.

And that is also one reason why I see the current deal as the beginning of a new chapter as well as an end, in a sense, in itself. There is scope for an even more transformative stage in our long partnership. And I believe that centers on technology.

So let me address technological strength as the third. We face a clear, shared threat. There is nothing in this world I fear more than China winning the race for technological dominance in the coming decades.

China represents a far more dynamic and formidable strategic rival than the Soviet Union ever was: economically sophisticated, highly innovative, and strategically patient.

The United Kingdom and United States are the only two Western nations with trillion-dollar technology ecosystems combined with unparalleled talent and research capabilities in our universities and corporations.

We must combine forces, in my view, to drive the scientific breakthroughs that will define this century, and AI should be the spearpoint of that collaboration.

Artificial intelligence stands as the next great foundational technology. Through its power, we can rapidly make progress across so many frontiers of science: quantum, synthetic biology, medicine, nuclear fusion.

Rather than stifling these transformative technologies through excessive regulation, our two governments must unleash their immense potential for human benefit and Western advantage.

Let me say this in conclusion. In his immortal Iron Curtain speech, delivered in Missouri, Churchill spoke eloquently about the primacy of American power and its awesome responsibility to future generations.

Today, we face our own historical inflection point.

No one should doubt that we face accelerating global competition in which it is strongly in our interests to expand the perimeter of our alliances while deepening the transatlantic partnership at its core.

So our diplomacy must be more urgent, more agile, and more creative. We must deepen the political and military alliances which defined our past successes but also create new partnerships—borne in and of technology—which will redefine our future. The stakes could not be higher. The opportunities, actually, could not be greater. And I am confident that our two countries will indeed rise together to meet those challenges.

Peter Mandelson is the British ambassador to the United States.

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How to prevent Ukraine’s booming defense sector from fueling global insecurity

Vitaliy Goncharuk — Tue, 20 May 2025 20:18:47 +0000

Following the 1991 Soviet collapse, newly independent Ukraine inherited the second-largest defense arsenal in Europe from the USSR. As a result, the country soon emerged as one of the biggest arms exporters to Africa and the Middle East, significantly influencing conflicts in those regions. With the Ukrainian defense sector now experiencing years of unprecedented growth in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion, it is important to prevent Ukraine’s innovative military technologies from fueling a new wave of international instability.

Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, hundreds of companies have sprung up in Ukraine producing defense tech equipment for the country’s war effort. Growth has been largely driven by private initiatives led by civilians with no prior experience in the defense industry. This has led to a startup culture that does not require much investment capital, with most of the products developed since 2022 based on existing open source software and hardware platforms. Data leaks are a significant issue, as the vast majority of the people involved in this improvised defense sector have not undergone the kind of security checks typical of the defense industry elsewhere.

While there is currently no end in sight to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it is already apparent that in the postwar period, the large number of Ukrainian defense sector companies that have appeared since 2022 will face a significant drop in demand. Indeed, even in today’s wartime conditions, many companies are already lobbying for the relaxation of export restrictions while arguing that the Ukrainian state is unable to place sufficient orders.

If these companies are forced to close, skilled professionals will seek employment abroad. This could lead to the leakage of knowledge and technologies. Meanwhile, with NATO countries likely to be focused on their own defense industries and strategic priorities, it is reasonable to assume that many Ukrainian defense sector companies will concentrate on exporting to more volatile regions. The potentially destabilizing impact of these trends is obvious. It is therefore vital to adopt effective measures to limit the spread of Ukrainian defense sector technologies, data, and finished products along with skilled developers, engineers, and operators to potential conflict zones around the world.

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Ukraine’s defense sector innovations fall into two categories. The first includes innovations that are easily replicated using readily available technologies. The second category features more complex systems requiring skilled professionals. It makes little sense to focus regulatory efforts on the first category. Instead, preventing proliferation is more effectively managed through intelligence operations and security measures. Preventative efforts should focus on those innovations that are more complex in both development and deployment.

Efforts to prevent Ukrainian defense technologies from fueling conflicts around the world will depend to a significant degree on enforcement. While Ukraine has made some progress in combating corruption over the past decade, this remains a major issue, particularly in the country’s dramatically expanded defense sector. A successful approach to limiting the spread of Ukrainian defense tech know-how should therefore incorporate a combination of positive and negative incentives.

Positive incentives can include opening up NATO markets to Ukrainian companies and supporting their efforts to comply with NATO standards. This would likely encourage a broader culture of compliance throughout the Ukrainian defense tech sector as companies sought to access the world’s most lucrative client base.

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Creating the conditions for the acquisition of Ukrainian companies by major international defense industry players could help to encourage a responsible corporate culture among Ukrainian companies while bolstering the country’s position globally. Likewise, enhanced access to funding and a simplified route to work visas and citizenship in the EU and US would help attract and retain talent. This would further strengthen Ukraine’s defense sector and encourage corporate compliance.

Professional organizations also have a potential role to play. Promoting the development of robust industry and professional associations for Ukrainians in the defense sector would encourage collaboration, knowledge sharing, and the establishment of industry standards, which could further propel innovation and growth within Ukraine’s defense industry, while creating a climate more conducive to regulation. Regulatory measures could include enhanced access to Western defense markets, with strict penalties for non-compliance.

Targeted export controls are another important measure. By establishing robust controls over critical components such as processors and specialized equipment, Ukraine can limit the availability of these technologies in regions with high conflict potential. Enhanced monitoring mechanisms should be implemented to track the transfer of technologies and the movement of skilled personnel. International cooperation is also crucial. Ukraine should look to work closely with global partners to synchronize regulatory standards and enforcement strategies, thereby reducing the challenges presented by regions with weak legal mechanisms.

Ukraine is now recognized internationally as a leading defense tech innovator in areas including AI solutions, cyber security, and drone warfare. There is huge global appetite for such technologies, but unregulated distribution could have disastrous consequences for international security. By combining enforceable regulatory measures with strategic incentives, it is possible to reduce the risks associated with the spread of Ukraine’s wartime innovations, while simultaneously maintaining an environment that supports ongoing innovation and growth in a controlled and secure manner.

Vitaliy Goncharuk is a US-based tech entrepreneur with Ukrainian roots who previously served as Chairman of the Artificial Intelligence Committee of Ukraine from 2019 to 2022.

For all the political difficulties, this is a time for both the EU and the United Kingdom to be bold.

The second, and most urgent, prospective agreement is a security and defense pact, which would open the way to the United Kingdom’s participation in EU-backed military spending. This agreement would allow Britain to take part in joint procurement for military capabilities alongside the bloc’s member states and to enable EU countries to purchase British-made military equipment as part of the new €150 billion European instrument to ramp up defense spending.

As one of Europe’s leading miliary powers, Britain is essential to achieving the continent’s aim of taking the primary role of defending itself in the wake of the Trump administration’s stated desire to reduce the United States’ commitment to defending Europe. In February, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer pledged that Britain would increase its defense spending to 2.5 percent of its gross domestic product by 2027 and to 3 percent during the next parliament.

European fears about Russian aggression and US withdrawal from the continent have increased the pressure for decisive action on defense and security, and the EU-UK pact would represent a welcome step toward developing the continent’s defense industrial base and enhancing effective military cooperation.

The third item on the summit’s agenda is to agree to a “common understanding” on a range of issues concerning the trade and economic relationship between Britain and the EU. Current UK-EU trade arrangements are governed by the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) signed by the two sides in late 2020.

For all the fanfare associated with the economic deal the United Kingdom signed with the United States on May 8, the EU remains Britain’s single largest trading partner by far. Boosting economic ties weakened by Brexit could bring desperately needed dividends for both sides, even if it doesn’t produce the growth that would come from Britain rejoining the European single market, a policy Starmer promised not to pursue on the campaign trail.

The TCA is subject to a joint review next year, and both the United Kingdom and EU have bilateral issues they want to amend. The United Kingdom is keen to negotiate an agreement to reduce border checks on agricultural products and secure a mutual recognition agreement for professional qualifications to help open up markets for UK service exporters.

On the EU side, there are calls from France and others to support EU fishing rights in UK waters and a European Commission proposal to create a youth mobility scheme, which would allow young people from across Europe to work and travel freely between the United Kingdom and the EU.

Some of these issues will require political risks and trade-offs from both sides. Starmer’s popularity has slumped since he was elected last summer, and Brexiteers in the United Kingdom will be ready to accuse him of compromising on the outcome of Britian’s referendum to leave the European Union.

This domestic pressure has become more intense after local elections in England earlier this month that represented a heavy defeat for the governing Labour Party and a significant victory for the populist right-wing party, Reform UK, led by the arch Brexit champion Nigel Farage.

There will be pressure on European governments, too, not to compromise the principles of the EU single market for a deal on defense and security. And there remain concerns in European capitals about Britain’s long-term commitment to closer ties with a club it chose to leave nine years ago.

Yet, for all the political difficulties, this is a time for both the EU and the United Kingdom to be bold. Squabbles about fishing or veterinary checks cannot be allowed to undermine the vital steps that must be taken to confront the economic and security threats facing Britain and the EU today.

Europe has always been stronger when the United Kingdom and its continental neighbors are united. Next week’s summit can mark a modest but important step forward for UK-EU relations and demonstrate that the friction and pain of the last decade can be replaced by a new partnership with mutual benefits.

Ed Owen is a nonresident fellow of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and a former UK government adviser.

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Inside Latvia’s race against time to build deterrence against Russia

Armands Astukevičs and Hans Binnendijk — Wed, 14 May 2025 14:51:29 +0000

This project, a collaboration between the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and the Latvia-based Centre for East European Policy Studies, aims to advance understanding of Latvia’s defense and security policies, with an emphasis on resilience-building strategies. Latvia’s measures offer lessons for other frontline states, and demonstrate an increasing willingness to prioritize defense in an uncertain geopolitical environment. Read the other articles in this series here and here.

Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine has laid bare Moscow’s neo-imperial ambitions and the direct threat it poses to its so-called near-abroad. For NATO frontline states such as Latvia, the security landscape has fundamentally changed over the past three years. While Russian forces are currently taking staggering losses in Ukraine, necessitating a period of force reconstitution, Russia’s military could be rebuilt and ready to invade a Baltic state in as few as three years, according to estimates from some Western intelligence agencies.

Other factors complicate the picture further. On the positive side, the accession of Finland and Sweden to the Alliance, growing defense capabilities in neighboring Estonia and Lithuania, and Poland’s significant defense investments, all provide Latvia with a strengthened collective defense posture in the Baltic Sea region. However, this has occurred amid growing uncertainty regarding the United States’ long-term commitment to European security. Critical US enablers and rapid reinforcements cannot be taken for granted to the same degree as in the past. While the US nuclear umbrella remains extended so far, the erosion of trust is noticeable, creating potential vulnerabilities that the Kremlin might seek to test.

The stakes could not be higher. For Latvia and its Baltic neighbors, Russian aggression represents an existential threat. At the same time, a Russian attack on NATO’s eastern flank would quickly reverberate across the entire Alliance.

In response to these threats and changing security dynamics, Latvia should pursue three fundamental and interconnected strategic goals:

First, demonstrate political will: Latvia must demonstrate to allies in Washington and across Europe that it is maximizing its own defense capabilities and resilience, shouldering its share of the burden, and signaling unwavering commitment. It must then use that demonstration to harness the power of the Alliance for its national defense. Latvia’s defense budget hovered around 1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2014 when Russia first invaded Crimea. Its defense budget this year is set at about 3.65 percent, with announced plans to push it to 5 percent of GDP soon. Latvia needs to make up for lost time.
Second, generate sufficient capabilities: Riga needs to generate sufficient domestic defensive capabilities, integrated with NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroup, to realistically hold a defensive line against aggression long enough for decisive allied reinforcements to arrive. It needs to achieve a degree of deterrence by denial. This will require a significant Latvian military buildup.
Third, enhance societal resilience: Latvia must also project an undeniable national will, making it clear to Moscow that any aggression would face fierce, protracted, whole-of-society, and costly resistance. There can be no perception of Latvia as an easy target.

Achieving these goals demands immediate, focused action in Latvia, as well as a rallying of Riga’s NATO allies.

National defense priorities

Latvia should begin by making its comprehensive defense concept a nationwide reality. The 2018 adoption of this framework, which called for integrating civilian elements into national security, is its vital strength. Through this whole-of-society approach, Latvia has demonstrated ingenuity and cooperation. For example, Latvia’s municipalities and state companies collaborate to support armed forces mobility and counter-mobility efforts. Another example is the involvement of hunters in the national defense system—as a patriotic and armed part of society that can be integrated with the National Guard and tasked with support assignments. While these efforts are commendable, more must be done to ensure that civilian agencies, businesses, and citizens are actively integrated into national resilience and defense planning through practical taskings and drills. As comprehensive defense evolves into the reality of society, it demonstrates credible national will, complicates adversary planning, and builds the societal backbone needed to withstand pressure and deter aggression, including hybrid attacks from Russia.

Latvia must also maintain momentum and keep military modernization on track. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Latvia has significantly increased investment in conventional war-fighting capabilities. Riga’s commitment to acquiring advanced systems such as HIMARS rocket launchers, IRIS-T air-to-air missiles, and coastal defense missiles sends a vital message: the country is serious about bolstering deterrence by denial. However, acquiring advanced hardware is only part of the equation; Latvia must also ensure that these systems can be effectively commanded, supplied, and maintained during high-intensity conflict. This necessitates trained personnel and critical support elements, including robust command-and-control, resilient logistics, sufficient ammunition stockpiles, and effective maintenance infrastructure. Not all equipment needs to be expensive or high-tech. Land mines along the border that would channel an attack and swarms of low-cost drones can have dramatic results on the battlefield. Perhaps most important, Latvia must ensure that it can sustain combat operations beyond the initial phase, proving it possesses the national endurance required to hold the line until allied reinforcements arrive.

National resilience also requires forging a cohesive fighting force from diverse sources of manpower. In 2023, Latvia introduced a mandatory conscription policy called State Defense Service (SDS) to bolster recruitment. This policy of mandatory eleven-month service has shown early signs of success. Latvia is planning to enlist four thousand new recruits annually by 2028, and 40 percent of the 2024 intake opted for professional careers after their mandatory service. However, given Latvia’s demographics, active service alone cannot generate sufficient manpower; it must be complemented by a ready and responsive reserve system—one that currently requires significant overhaul. With SDS providing a new input stream, the reserve system must be adapted to effectively integrate these personnel and grow combat power over the long term. Latvia could add significantly to its manpower mobilization by combining professionals, the Home Guard, and SDS graduates, as well as by implementing dedicated reservist training and early military education. Current military plans envision 31,000 troops by 2029, plus an equally large reserve contingent thereafter. While this objective is sound, the current timeline appears misaligned with the potential speed of Russian force reconstitution. Latvia must confront substantial constraints, including the need for adequate infrastructure, qualified instructors, and innovative policies to drive recruitment and conduct training at the required scale and speed.

Furthermore, physical defenses require turning the Baltic Defense Line from a concept to a concrete plan. A fortified line across the Baltics, leveraging naturally difficult terrain, is a clear-headed and necessary response to the Russian threat. Correctly executed, it could effectively impede a potential incursion, buying time for national counteractions and allied mobilization. Fast-tracking construction, funding, and policy decisions will be crucial for realizing this critical barrier. Critically, forces must train to fight effectively from these prepared positions, integrating them fully into national and regional operational plans.

Finally, Latvia must ensure that it has the infrastructure to support military mobility and to provide host nation support. Latvia’s defense fundamentally relies on NATO allies arriving quickly and in force, requiring substantial investment in mobility infrastructure and support elements. Latvia must therefore proactively invest in and expand the critical infrastructure needed to receive, stage, and sustain large-scale allied forces. Short-term priorities include accelerating projects like the Liepāja military port and enhancing airfield capacity at Lielvārde airbase and Riga International Airport. Accelerating Rail Baltica’s military utility is also crucial, as it could fundamentally alter the capacity and speed of NATO reinforcements into the region.

Rallying allied support

While Latvia shoulders these critical domestic responsibilities, its security ultimately rests on robust collective defense and the tangible commitment of its allies. Latvia must advocate for specific actions from its NATO partners, recognizing that the window before Russia potentially reconstitutes its offensive capabilities is short. This diplomatic push requires urgency and clarity.

The place to begin is in Washington. All three Baltic states and Poland have essentially accepted US President Donald Trump’s challenge for allies to spend 5 percent of GDP on defense. This should be presented in a high-profile fashion to Trump during the NATO Summit in June. As part of this presentation, Latvia should urge Trump to continue hosting US forces in the Baltic region on a rotational basis and to augment those rotations with high-impact capabilities such as air and missile defense assets.

To deter Russia, NATO must strengthen its forward defense posture on the ground. Latvia should continue advocating for transforming the Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroup on its territory into a combat-credible forward defense force that expands on the full-time brigade and integrates it with national defense structures that match adversary military capabilities. Enhancing this forward defense by securing broader participation, particularly from a nuclear-armed European ally, would send a strong deterrent signal to Moscow.

This enhanced forward presence must be embedded within deeper, more integrated regional defense planning. Latvia, working closely with its neighbors, should champion the development of genuinely interlocking, all-domain defense plans within an enhanced Nordic-Baltic-Poland framework. This necessitates moving beyond interoperability exercises toward shared operational concepts and assigned responsibilities. This will help forge a more cohesive and resilient defense architecture in NATO’s northeast as part of the Alliance’s broader reinforcement strategy. Consequently, Latvia must be a vocal proponent of the regular, rigorous exercising and continuous streamlining of the supreme allied commander Europe’s reinforcement plans for the Baltic region. Identifying and resolving friction points, especially cross-border military mobility bottlenecks and logistical hurdles, requires sustained, collaborative effort with those allies designated to reinforce the region in a crisis.

Minimizing the time required for those reinforcements to arrive necessitates a concerted push to maximize the pre-positioning of allied military equipment and essential stocks within Latvia and the region. Reducing the lift requirement during a crisis by having equipment already in theater dramatically shortens response timelines, directly bolstering deterrence by showcasing NATO’s capacity for rapid, large-scale reaction.

Lastly, building on a deep-seated relationship, the Baltic states must treat strengthening security cooperation with Ukraine as a long-term strategic imperative. Currently, Kyiv’s resolute defense delivers immediate dividends by tying down significant Russian forces and offering invaluable, hard-earned combat lessons. For the Baltic states, a battle-hardened ally such as Ukraine can be a substantial security and defense contributor to the region. If Russia were to test NATO’s defense capabilities on its eastern flank, the prospect of Ukraine joining the fight would dramatically expand Moscow’s theater of operations.

Latvia has a brief respite as Russian troops are worn down in Ukraine, but it will take little time for Russia to reconstitute its conventional forces. Latvia must use this window to create a more favorable defense environment. At home, it must rapidly build up its defense capacity and resilience. Abroad, it needs to assure a continued US commitment to its defense, generate a greater NATO forward presence on its soil, and deepen regional integration. It also needs to refine reinforcement mechanisms and maximize pre-positioning. Convincing allies to commit the necessary political will and resources before Russia regains its strength is the most critical security task facing Riga and its regional partners.

Armands Astukevičs is a researcher at the Centre for East European Policy Studies. His primary research focuses on the Baltic states’ defense and security, as well as the foreign and security policies of Russia and Belarus. Previously, he worked on policy analysis and planning at the Latvian Ministry of Defence, focusing on crisis management and comprehensive national defence issues.

Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served in several senior US government positions, including special assistant to the president for defense policy, principal deputy director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, and director of the Institute for National Security Studies.

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Drone superpower: Ukrainian wartime innovation offers lessons for NATO

David Kirichenko — Tue, 13 May 2025 21:10:46 +0000

Ever since the onset of Russian aggression against Ukraine eleven years ago, military training has been a core element of Western support for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. As Moscow’s invasion has escalated into the largest European war since World War II, the relationship between Ukraine and the country’s partners has become much more of a two-way street. While Ukrainian troops continue to train with Western instructors, it is now increasingly apparent that NATO also has a lot to learn from Ukraine.

The Ukrainian military has evolved dramatically during the past three years of full-scale war against Russia to become the largest and most effective fighting force in Europe. Innovation has played a key role in this process, with Ukraine relying on the country’s vibrant tech sector and traditionally strong defense industry to counter Russia’s overwhelming advantages in terms of both manpower and firepower. This has resulted in an army capable of developing and implementing the latest military technologies at speeds that are unmatched by any Western countries with their far more bureaucratic procurement cycles.

Ukraine’s innovative approach to defense is most immediately obvious in the country’s ability to produce and deploy a wide variety of drones. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, the experience of the Ukrainian army has underlined the growing dominance of drones on the modern battlefield, and has redefined our understanding of drone warfare in ways that will shape military doctrines around the world for many years to come.

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The most important tools in Ukraine’s unmanned arsenal are the country’s growing fleet of First Person View (FPV) drones. These drones in many ways function as the infantry of drone warfare. They have become a central pillar of Ukraine’s war effort, inflicting up to 80 percent of Russian battlefield casualties and making it possible to hold the line even when Ukrainian troops have found themselves starved of artillery shells.

Ukrainian production of FPV drones has mushroomed in recent years, with domestic companies also gradually moving away from an initial reliance on imported components. By early 2025, Ukraine was reportedly producing 200,000 FPV drones per month. Cheap to manufacture, they are capable of destroying tanks and other military equipment worth millions of dollars.

Russia is also relentlessly adapting to technological changes on the battlefield, creating a daily race to innovate that runs in parallel to the actual fighting on the front lines of the war. The dominance of FPV drones has led to a variety of countermeasures, ranging from the widespread use of netting and so-called “cope cages,” to increasingly sophisticated electronic blocking and the jamming of signals. In response, both Russia and Ukraine are turning to fiber optic drones that are not susceptible to jamming technologies.

As the full-scale war approaches a fourth summer, the evolution of drone tactics continues. Over the past year, Ukraine has sought to establish a 15-kilometer kill zone patrolled by drones along the front lines of the conflict, making it extremely challenging to concentrate troops for major offensive operations. The strength of Ukraine’s so-called “drone wall” defenses will be severely tested in the coming few months by Russia’s ongoing offensive. Building on Ukraine’s experience, NATO is reportedly exploring the idea of creating a “drone wall” of its own on the alliance’s eastern flank.

Beyond the front lines, Ukraine has developed an expanding fleet of long-range drones capable of striking targets deep inside Russia. This has made it possible to carry out a wide range of attacks on Russian military bases, ammunition storage facilities, air defenses, and Putin’s economically vital but vulnerable oil and gas industry. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has called the country’s growing long range capabilities “a clear and effective guarantee of Ukraine’s security.”

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Ukrainian drone innovations are also transforming naval warfare. During the first two years of the war, Ukraine used marine drones to target Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, sinking or damaging multiple warships and forcing the remainder to retreat from Russian-occupied Crimea. This remarkable success made it possible to lift the naval blockade on Ukrainian ports and reopen commercial maritime routes, providing Kyiv with a vital economic lifeline.

More recently, Ukraine has begun using naval drones as launch platforms for missiles and smaller unmanned systems. The results have been spectacular. In January 2025, missile-armed Ukrainian naval drones reportedly destroyed several Russian helicopters over the Black Sea. In another world first, Ukrainian officials announced in early May that they had shot down two Russian fighter jets using marine drones equipped with anti-aircraft missile systems.

Ukrainian military planners are now working on a range of unmanned ground systems as they look to take drone warfare to the next level. With support from the country’s government-backed defense tech cluster Brave1, work is underway to develop dozens of robotic models capable of performing a variety of combat and logistical tasks. In December 2024, Ukrainian forces claimed to have made history by conducting the world’s first fully unmanned assault on Russian positions using ground-based robotic systems and FPV drones.

Speaking in April 2025, Ukraine’s former commander in chief Valeriy Zaluzhniy underlined how his country’s use of new technologies was transforming the battlefield. “The Russian-Ukrainian War has completely changed the nature of warfare,” he commented. Zaluzhniy predicted that the wars of the future would be won by countries that focus their resources on the development of drones, electronic warfare, and artificial intelligence. “It is obvious that victory on the battlefield now depends entirely on the ability to outpace the enemy in technological development,” he noted.

Western leaders and military commanders are clearly taking note of the remarkable progress made by the Ukrainian Armed Forces since 2022. Many are now incorporating Ukraine’s unique battlefield experience into their own programs, while NATO members including Britain and Denmark are reportedly already receiving training in drone warfare from Ukrainian military instructors. This is likely to be just the beginning, as more countries seek to benefit from Ukrainian expertise.

For many years, it has been customary to view Ukraine as being almost entirely dependent on Western aid and know-how for its survival. This was always an oversimplification; it is now hopelessly outdated. In reality, today’s Ukraine is a drone superpower with an innovative domestic defense industry that can provide its NATO allies with important lessons in the realities of twenty-first century warfare.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Forward Defense’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare aims to digitally transform the armed forces for success in future battlefields. Comprised of a distinguished group of subject-matter and industry commissioners, the Commission has developed a framework to enhance US and allied forces through emergent digital capabilities.

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Hinote and Parker in Breaking Defense on the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare

Atlantic Council — Fri, 02 May 2025 16:00:00 +0000

On May 2, Breaking Defense published an article by retired Lt Gen Clinton Hinote and Nathan Parker, Commissioners on Forward Defense‘s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare, emphasizing the urgent need for the Department of Defense to prioritize agile, testable software development practices. Drawing on findings from the Commission’s final report, the authors argue that software is now a decisive element in military advantage and call for immediate cultural and institutional shifts within the Pentagon to meet this strategic imperative.

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To fund US military modernization, Congress needs to pass on-time annual defense budgets

Jongsun Kim — Tue, 29 Apr 2025 20:26:53 +0000

On April 7, US President Donald Trump and US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth made clear their ambitions: a one-trillion-dollar budget by fiscal year (FY) 2026 to fund a modern, agile, and globally competitive military. This is an ambitious goal, but if current funding trends hold, that future is far from guaranteed. Despite ongoing threats and bold declarations from the White House and the Pentagon, defense modernization is being squeezed by flat budgets, rising personnel costs, and a Congress that for more than a quarter century has failed to deliver predictable, on-time annual appropriations, which are essential for sustained military investment.

Look at what happened as recently as last month. In early March, Congress passed the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2025, a stopgap measure that locks the Pentagon into last year’s funding levels with only a modest $6.1 billion—or 0.7 percent—increase in defense funding, bringing the total to $892.5 billion. However, after accounting for inflation and rising personnel costs, this amounts to a cut in real terms. The total also falls more than $2.5 billion short of the Biden administration’s earlier $895.2 billion request for FY 2025.

Trump and Hegseth have floated a one-trillion-dollar topline for FY 2026, with congressional Republicans backing projections that hit that mark by 2031. But projections alone won’t modernize the force. The longer Congress relies on continuing resolutions, the further the Pentagon is likely to drift from the trillion-dollar goal.

Talk big, fund small

The biggest casualty of flat budgets is modernization. Of the $6.1 billion increase under the FY 2025 continuing resolution, more than $5.6 billion is consumed by rising personnel costs—including a 4.5 percent military pay raise and a 10 percent bump for junior enlisted. While these expenses are core to sustaining force readiness and quality of life for junior enlisted military personnel, they leave scant room for investment in next-generation weapon systems, shipbuilding, and advanced technology—all of which are needed to counter and deter future global threats.

Moreover, modernization and procurement budgets took hits in the latest continuing resolution—down $7.1 billion and $4.6 billion, respectively, compared to FY 2024. This isn’t a future-proofing strategy. It’s triage. And it reinforces a hard truth: the Pentagon is being forced to choose between readiness now and capabilities tomorrow.

As a result of this approach by Congress, a chasm has emerged between what the Pentagon says it needs and what Congress has been able to fund. Even with increased flexibilities granted under this continuing resolution, including fewer restrictions on program-level spending, the Pentagon cannot modernize on cruise control without deliberate and sustained investment. Without real growth in the defense topline, any flexibility becomes a license to reshuffle limited dollars, not expand capabilities.

Strategic signals, budget headwinds

Additionally, the Trump administration’s early moves—deployments to the southern border and near the Panama Canal, counter-narcotics operations, and a reorientation of posture toward homeland defense and regional security initiatives—highlight a shift in defense priorities. But these actions are being underwritten by a budget that isn’t built for strategic transformation.

This spring, the Trump administration’s FY 2026 request is expected to better reflect the new administration’s priorities, since the current budget was mostly shaped by the previous administration and major changes take time to fully appear. One key area to watch is its proposed $50 billion reallocation plan, redirecting funds from “noncritical” areas toward defense programs such as nuclear modernization, missile defense, drone technology, autonomous weapons, and cybersecurity. The Trump administration likely considers these activities necessary to bolster border security and strengthen US military capabilities in response to perceived threats to the homeland.

Regardless of the merits of using defense dollars and personnel for homeland security efforts, without a significant increase in overall funding, the administration will face tough choices between delivering on these priorities and meeting modernization and readiness goals.

The path forward: Congress holds the key

None of this is sustainable without a timely and predictable appropriations process. Even after making tough trade-offs, the Department of Defense cannot sustain modernization, support military pay raises, and reinvigorate domestic policy initiatives without meaningful real-term growth in its overall budget topline.

While continuing resolutions offer short-term stability, they erode long-term planning and procurement. They lock in outdated funding priorities, stall new projects and procurement efforts before they begin, and limit the Defense Department’s capacity to invest in multi-year efforts that benefit from future financial predictability. When the Department of Defense has to begin the fiscal year without an annual appropriations bill in place, it can lead to training disruptions due to uncertainty over available resources, as well as deferred equipment and facility maintenance, which can cause backlogs and increase long-term costs. It can also cause delays in awarding new contracts, affecting industrial base stability and workforce planning. Continuing resolutions also lead to cost inefficiencies from operating under constrained funding and require higher costs to “catch up” later. These stopgap measures also risk a gradual degradation of military readiness from the inability to execute planned operations, training, and maintenance. Even omnibus bills, often seen as a compromise, fall short of the predictability and purchasing power that full-year appropriations—enacted before the start of a fiscal year—offer. Relying on omnibus bills creates uncertainty for long-term modernization efforts and reduces the Defense Department’s ability to plan, start contracts, and invest early in the fiscal year.

The Pentagon needs more than authority and increased flexibility—it needs actual dollars. Timely appropriations passed by Congress are essential to making that possible. Yet persistent delays have become the norm rather than the exception. Without consistent, meaningful, and sustained funding, modernization will remain an ambition rather than a battlefield reality. The one-trillion-dollar vision for the defense budget may serve short-term political goals, but absent decisive and urgent action by Congress, the numbers won’t add up.

One important step Congress can take each year is to pass the annual defense appropriations bill on time, fulfilling its constitutional duty to fund essential government programs and defense functions that serve the national interest. A timely and focused appropriations bill would restore predictability to the budget process and enhance the capacity of the defense industrial base. It would also give military leaders the certainty they need to plan, build, and make more effective long-term investments across administrations.

Congress holds the keys. The question is whether it has the political will to turn them.

Jongsun A. Kim is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a former deputy comptroller for budget and appropriations affairs at the Department of Defense.

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The United States needs a victory plan for the Indo-Pacific

Brian Kerg — Tue, 29 Apr 2025 13:00:00 +0000

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The United States desperately needs to plan for a long war in the Indo-Pacific region.

A troubling gap exists between US industrial capacity and the production requirements to sustain and win a war with China. While such assessments generally focus on shipbuilding due to the maritime focus of conflict scenarios, the same disparity exists in military platforms across all domains of warfare, such as aircraft, armor, ground-based air defense systems, and others. Defense analysis on these myriad gaps is abundant, but most evaluations are piecemeal in nature, focusing only on a single platform or domain, rather than taking a holistic approach to the problem.

This disjointed assessment is compounded by the lack of a rigorous analysis of the wartime manpower requirements to operate new platforms. Producing the ships, aircraft, and fighting vehicles to sustain a war against China—which would almost certainly be protracted—isn’t enough. The platforms must also be manned and supported. A guided missile destroyer, for example, requires a crew of more than three hundred sailors. A single squadron of F-35B Joint Strike Fighters requires hundreds of maintainers, air controllers, fuelers, and other support personnel to remain operational. And while opening phases of a war with China would predominantly be an air and maritime fight involving ships, aircraft, and precision munitions, a long conflict fought for years would likely require nearly one hundred divisions of ground and amphibious forces from the US Army and Marine Corps.

Generating the personnel to man such a force would almost certainly require a draft—and getting the numbers right is itself a complex challenge that demands a delicate touch. The skill sets required for the force must be balanced against the domestic workforce’s nonmilitary needs. Skilled laborers and trained knowledge workers will be needed in abundance to sustain the production of a US war machine. In short, properly planning a national mobilization for a long war with China is a daunting task that has not yet been engaged in detail by the national security community. Developing even a “plan to plan” for mobilization can be overwhelming. Where should analysts start? Thankfully, history provides a road map.

Lessons forged in war

In the final months leading up to the United States’ involvement in World War II, senior US policymakers noted a similar disparity between military-industrial capacity and the requirements to mobilize the nation for a war with Germany. After identifying US objectives in such a war and the combat power of the enemy, planners calculated the number of US combat divisions required to fight and win. This, in turn, enabled estimates of matériel production and the skilled laborers needed for military manufacturing. Comparing this to existing, peacetime US industry, its labor force, and its draftable population, a program was written for scaling up production while executing a military draft. The result was the Victory Program, which forecasted the military forces, their missions, and matériel requirements the United States would need to defeat Germany with uncanny precision.

Quite simply, the United States needs a modern victory plan for a war against China in the Indo-Pacific. Like its predecessor, this plan must account for all requirements to win a protracted war and tap into all forms of power available to the United States. For this plan to serve as an effective deterrent, the plan and its rigor should be clearly communicated to key leaders within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). While the scope of such a document would be wide and deep, the following considerations are essential.

Good strategy starts with clear objectives

With the WWII Victory Program, lead planners first took care to determine the nature of the problem they were trying to solve. This enabled the identification of a national policy objective, facilitating the development of an appropriate military strategy. It was only then that planners were postured to estimate the military forces needed to pursue that strategy and reach the determined objective. The Victory Program took as its core assumption that US policy, should it be pulled into the war, would be to eliminate totalitarianism from Europe and deny imperial Japan control of the western Pacific. All other planning flowed to support this core objective and anticipated US participation in a long, global conflict.

In planning for a long war with China, US planners must frame the problem appropriately. Too often, national security practitioners frame war-games and exercises as short, decisive conflicts focused primarily around Taiwan and in the “first island chain.” But wars between great powers are rarely short affairs and instead tend to expand horizontally while grinding on for years. The hot wars raging today in Ukraine and the Middle East bear testament to this brutal reality.

As such, a victory plan for a war against China demands framing the problem in terms of a global war, with several theaters and multiple adversaries, focused on destroying the military capabilities of the CCP and its cobelligerents wherever they may be encountered. The Victory Program was careful to consider the “potential enemies” of the United States in its calculations, and a modern victory plan must similarly consider horizontal escalation and simultaneous fights against forces from Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Sea power is essential—but not sufficient

The Victory Program was focused on building the army that the United States would need, and it consequently assessed the number and types of US Army divisions needed to fight per the plan’s strategy. This task was also scoped in terms of three key missions, described as hemispheric defense, defending outlying possessions, and overseas task forces. An Indo-Pacific victory plan would similarly need to identify the right forces for the right missions.

While defeating the CCP’s island-landing campaign against Taiwan will be one mission, hemispheric defense, regional air defense, theater sustainment, and other global missions will also inform US force structure. Premier naval and amphibious forces will certainly be required as more regionally focused war-games suggest, but the military will also need forces capable of achieving dominance in all domains and against other probable enemies of the United States.

At the same time, the types of forces and platforms needed will shift depending on the phase of the war, enemy action, and the level of support from allies and partners. For example, missile defense will see more demand so long as the enemy maintains robust long-range strike capabilities, but this may change if the enemy’s precision munitions begin to dwindle and its ability to replenish its magazines is denied. Similarly, naval forces might be the nation’s priority at the beginning of the war, but ground forces that can seize, hold, and defend terrain may become a greater requirement later in the war.

Achieving economic and industrial balance

Generating such forces doesn’t just happen. In preparation for World War II, a balance had to be sought to avoid undercutting the industrial and farming base to keep the nation in the fight and on its feet, while also conducting a draft of unprecedented scale to fill out the formations needed to win. Notably, the first round of this draft occurred well before the United States was itself involved in the hostilities raging in Europe and the Pacific.

Similarly, the formations required for an Indo-Pacific victory plan could only be filled by a large draft. Additionally, the warfighting platforms, munitions, and other matériel needed for a protracted struggle can only be produced by an informational and industrial base manned by a critical mass of skilled workers. This poses the risk that indiscriminate drafting could strip the work force of the skilled workers essential to matérial production.

Planners must identify the key industrial bases the government needs to mobilize and in turn determine which skilled workers should be retained to support these bases, to avoid impairing US war-making potential. Deliberate thought must be put into determining whether an individual is more valuable to the war effort with a rifle in hand or on the production line for munitions, ships, aircraft, and other essential matérial.

Open discourse as a deterrent

While such a planning effort is critical should a war occur, it offers its greatest deterrent value if the CCP is aware of its existence.

The gaps in US readiness for a protracted war are many, known, and widely discussed within US policy circles. While such open discourse is a key strength of the US system and enables more honest assessments of gaps and in turn a path for improvement, it could also exaggerate CCP assessments of its own capability and will vis-à-vis the United States. Put another way, the frequent and grim assessments by the United States of its warfighting shortfalls could feed into China’s own campaign of public opinion warfare, and inflate China’s confidence in its ability to win.

The deterrent effect of any capability or redline is muted if the adversary is ignorant of its existence. The rigor and utility of a new US victory plan for the Indo-Pacific region should not be a hand of cards held close to the vest, but laid out on the table to demonstrate US resolve and long-term commitment to such a struggle should it break out. In this way, the plan could help tip the scales of deterrence and prevent such a war from breaking out at all.

Writing the victory plan

The US national security establishment remains focused on planning for a short, sharp war with China conducted around Taiwan in the first island chain. But such a war between two great powers, like so many before, will almost certainly become a long war of attrition. In planning for such a conflict, the United States needs a new victory plan. In writing this, planners should look to the Victory Program of World War II as a model. This process began with problem framing at the global scale, enabled estimates of the forces needed to win, and maintained the industrial base and work force needed for matériel production. In following this process, the United States could develop a credible plan to win a protracted war in the Indo-Pacific region. And in strategically communicating this plan to China, the United States may prevent such a catastrophic war from occurring in the first place.

Lieutenant Colonel Brian Kerg is an active-duty US Marine Corps operational planner and a nonresident fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is also a 2025 nonresident fellow with the Irregular Warfare Initiative, a 501(c)3 partnered with Princeton’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project and the Modern War Institute at West Point.

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent the positions or opinions of the US Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or any part of the US government.

The Tiger Project, an Atlantic Council effort, develops new insights and actionable recommendations for the United States, as well as its allies and partners, to deter and counter aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Explore our collection of work, including expert commentary, multimedia content, and in-depth analysis, on strategic defense and deterrence issues in the region.

Ukraine’s innovative army can help Europe defend itself against Russia

David Kirichenko — Thu, 24 Apr 2025 21:39:48 +0000

When Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he cited Ukraine’s “demilitarization” as one of his two key war aims. He has not yet succeeded in achieving this goal, to put it mildly. Rather than disarming Ukraine, Putin’s invasion has actually transformed the country into one of Europe’s most formidable military powers.

The emergence of the Ukrainian army as a serious international fighting force can be traced back to the beginning of Russia’s invasion in 2014. At the time, decades of neglect and corruption had left Ukraine virtually defenseless. With the country’s existence under threat, a program of military modernization was rapidly adopted. During the following years, the Ukrainian Armed Forces expanded dramatically and implemented a series of far-reaching reforms in line with NATO standards.

Following the full-scale Russian invasion of February 2022, the transformation of the Ukrainian military entered a new phase. The number of men and women in uniform swelled to around one million, making the Ukrainian army by far the largest in Europe. They have been backed by a domestic defense industry that has grown by orders of magnitude over the past three years and now accounts for around 40 percent of Ukraine’s military needs.

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For today’s Ukraine, a strong domestic defense sector is now a matter of national survival. During the initial stages of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian authorities relied heavily on military aid from the country’s partners. This support helped enable Ukraine’s early victories but was also often subject to prolonged delays that left Kyiv vulnerable to changing political priorities in various Western capitals.

The need for greater military self-sufficiency has been underlined in recent months by the return of US President Donald Trump to the White House. The new US leader has made clear that he does not intend to maintain United States military support for Ukraine, and plans instead to downgrade the overall American commitment to European security. This shift in US policy has confirmed the wisdom of Ukraine’s earlier decision to prioritize the expansion of the country’s domestic defense industry.

Ukraine’s growing military capabilities owe much to a defense tech revolution that has been underway in the country since 2022. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion, hundreds of Ukrainian companies have begun producing innovative new technologies for the military ranging from software to combat drones. By focusing on relatively simple and affordable defense tech solutions, Ukraine has been able to close the gap on Russia despite Moscow’s often overwhelming advantages in terms of manpower, firepower, and resources.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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More than three years since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, it is now clear that wartime necessity has transformed Ukraine into perhaps the most agile and experimental military ecosystem in the world. Whereas Western arms procurement cycles typically span several years, Ukraine can translate ideas into operational weapons within the space of just a few months. This has helped establish Ukraine as a global leader in drone warfare. The country’s use of inexpensive FPV drones is increasingly defining the modern battlefield and now accounts for approximately 80 percent of all Russian casualties.

Ukraine’s domestic drone production capacity is growing at a remarkable rate. According to the country’s Deputy Defense Minister Ivan Havryliuk, Ukrainian forces are currently receiving approximately 200,000 drones per month, a tenfold increase on the figure from just one year ago. Kyiv is also making rapid progress in the development of numerous other cutting edge military technologies including robotic systems, marine drones, and cruise missiles.

Ukraine’s dramatically expanded armed forces and groundbreaking defense tech sector make the country an indispensable partner for Europe. After decades of reliance on US security support, European leaders currently find themselves confronted with the new political realities of an isolationist United States and an expansionist Russia. In this uncertain environment, it makes good sense for Europe to upgrade its support for the Ukrainian army while deepening collaboration with Ukrainian defense tech companies.

European investment in the Ukrainian defense industry is already on the rise, both in terms of government donor funds and private sector investment. This trend looks set to intensify in the coming months as Ukrainians and their European partners increasingly acknowledge that their collective future security depends on closer cooperation. Russia’s invasion has forced Ukraine to become a major military power and a leading defense tech innovator. This status looks set to guarantee the country a position at the heart of Europe’s security architecture for many years to come.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

In July 2024, the Atlantic Council Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security published “Toward resilience: An action plan for Taiwan in the face of PRC aggression.” The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) followed with its “Strengthening Resilience in Taiwan” report in December 2024. These two reports provide an accurate assessment of the challenges of creating societal resilience and share policy recommendations for the Taiwan Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee. However, additional perspectives—especially across social, technological, and economic dimensions—can help expand Taiwan’s approach to societal resilience.

Preparing for crisis—without spreading fear

Organizing the necessary stakeholders around a shared framework with a clearly defined and understood vision was the easy part. However, as with all large bureaucracies, Taiwan’s resilience committee faces significant challenges in getting both the government and other actors to accept and implement difficult trade-offs. These trade-offs require people, departments, and various parts of Taiwanese society to give up money, power, or influence in order to achieve the necessary reforms and make them sustainable for the long term.

A key pitfall for Taiwan was failing to persuade its people, in plain language, why it needed to create the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee in the first place. Taiwan’s resilience ultimately hinges on the public understanding that the PRC can, and might, use its full suite of tools and capabilities against the island, should Xi Jinping conclude that a takeover is otherwise unattainable. The government needs to explain how everyday citizens can prepare in the event of that type of crisis. As demonstrated by Taiwan’s response to multiple natural disasters, its government is a global leader in terms of orienting local and national efforts to recover and quickly return to a pre-disaster state. However, the resilience committee has the challenging task of learning how to balance preparing Taiwan for manmade emergencies, such as a maritime blockade or military invasion, without unnecessarily creating a sense of panic.

This May, a television miniseries titled Zero Day is set to air in Taiwan, depicting a “fictional” scenario of a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) invasion of the island. The entertainment industry has always been most effective in helping people visualize a possibility that resonates with them in a way that the most well-written and brilliant policy papers cannot. As the old saying goes, a picture is worth a thousand words; a more modern version could say a viral video is worth a thousand tweets and re-tweets. The Zero Day trailer has already increased awareness and captured people’s imaginations in a way that official government messaging efforts are unlikely to achieve. The goal is not for people to conclude there’s no point in resistance, but to spur action toward resilience efforts now.

Taiwan should capitalize on the moment and create communications channels for local and provincial townships, facilitated by a fireside chat-style format, to have a greater voice on what is effective and resonates. The national government must be prepared to provide tailored support across the five key areas, even when such support is redundant and expensive at first. It must create an environment for any local government to communicate, improve infrastructure, increase civil preparedness, and support its constituents across a range of emergencies and disasters. Some will use whole-of-society resilience as another means to get funding, but the reality is that there will be improvements that meet resilience goals. This will gain long-term support for resilience efforts if everyday people understand what could happen and see their feedback result in tangible benefits.

From technological edge to strategic advantage

On a recent Bloomberg Odd Lots podcast, Shyam Sankar, the chief technology officer (CTO) of US software giant Palantir, described what his company’s product is and what it delivers to customers. In plain, non-technical language, Sankar said the product is an artificial intelligence (AI) decision-making platform to inform better and faster decisions.

Few countries already possess the technology foundation and expertise to rapidly create and scale the types of advanced technology cited by Sankar. Whether Taiwan develops its own version of Palantir or adopts existing technology, the Taiwan resilience committee should consider taking the calculated risk of trusting AI-driven platforms. Doing so could significantly enhance its decision-making processes, thereby maximizing the efficient use of its limited people, assets, and resources in countering the full spectrum of China’s coercive tools.

It is difficult to truly replicate quality in-person training or support for social welfare and medical care. But imagine being able to wear a headset or set up another interface for increasingly sophisticated virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR) systems to provide civilians, first responders, and military personnel with more effective training programs and with more realistic scenarios. These systems could also help people stay connected to the government during a crisis and provide immediate medical information in potentially demanding situations in which physical care might not be possible. VR and AR systems offer an additional benefit in their ability to connect anyone around the world and to leverage the latest training and information without the limitations of budget, policy, and travel restrictions.

Three-dimensional (3D) printing could be equally important in supporting Taiwan’s resilience efforts. The ability to print critical parts and components could alleviate the need for large storage locations, which must be maintained and can become easy targets for sabotage or kinetic attacks. Because Taiwan has a unique and harsh climate that makes food production and storage difficult even in normal conditions, it should consider developing food stockpiles that are resilient to humidity and heat and can sustain the population for longer periods. Other critical areas for advanced technology development are portable and modular water-purification systems, which could provide water security in the event that critical infrastructure is damaged or disrupted. Lastly, Taiwan is already making progress toward redundant and resilient off-island communications. Still, much more needs to be developed to survive sophisticated jamming of all communications.

How Taiwan’s tech giants could help deter China

Most economists and financial analysts would agree that the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) is the flagship company driving the global technology sector. Building on this foundation, Taiwan should leverage its world-class strengths in manufacturing, supply chain management, and technological innovation to directly support the efforts of the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee.

The idea of commercial companies supporting governmental demands and requirements is not new. In the same podcast mentioned earlier, Sankar shared that well-known commercial US companies such as Chrysler and General Mills used to be dual-purpose companies that produced military hardware. Due to its expertise in production-line milling equipment, General Mills manufactured torpedoes. Sankar further noted that Chinese prime contractors today derive only 27 percent of their revenue from the PLA, with the remainder coming from commercial sales. To strengthen its resilience, the Taiwanese government should consider additional tax incentives and subsidies to encourage tech giants like Foxconn to manufacture advanced technologies—supporting both national security efforts and positioning these companies for dual commercial and government purposes.

On June 13, 2024, New York Times (NYT) columnist Ross Douthat interviewed Vice President J. D. Vance for an opinion piece titled “What J. D. Vance Believes.” In the interview, Vance referred to “the most important lesson of World War II, that we seem to have forgotten: that military power is downstream of industrial power. We are still, right now, the world’s military superpower, largely because of our industrial might from the ’80s and ’90s. But China is a more powerful country industrially than we are, which means they will have a more powerful military in 20 years.” Against this background, Taiwanese technology companies—working in concert with Korean and Japanese companies—could provide a trusted partner network for global supply chain demands and facilitate decoupling from China, especially for highly specialized components such as drone camera lenses, batteries, and control boards. Taiwan should aim to replicate the strategic dominance achieved by TSMC in semiconductors—this time by becoming indispensable for global supply chain demands. Such an effort would unlock the full potential of Taiwan’s economic power and directly contribute to the deterrence it hopes to achieve with its resilience and defense reforms.

A Herculean feat

Tsai and Lai should be commended for their whole-of-government efforts to bolster Taiwan’s societal resilience against the onslaught of Chinese coercion. Creating new government structures, managing internal power and budgetary struggles, balancing responsibilities across various branches of government, and navigating opposition politics is a Herculean feat—and those are only the domestic challenges. None of these efforts will be effective or sustainable if everyday Taiwanese citizens do not believe they are necessary or that the scenarios being prepared for are a real possibility. Adopting a bottom-up approach—not the preferred method in Asia—may be the key to building momentum for Taiwan’s resilience effort. Asking any government bureaucracy to trust advanced technology such as AI is a significant leap of faith, but the potential benefits of integrating these systems could give Taiwan the elusive asymmetric edge needed to deter and delay China’s party-driven decision-making. Lastly, Taiwan is extremely proud of its world-class technology industries that drive the global economy today—but that success was built on decades of government support. Now, Taiwan’s industries must help support their government’s resilience efforts by expanding beyond commercial purposes. They should evolve into dual-purpose companies, serving both civilian and defense needs, and become trusted partners in securing global supply chains, especially for the US defense and technology sector. A renewed focus on its people, advanced technology, and economic strategy could help Taiwan deter Chinese coercion—something that military and defense reforms alone have been unable to achieve.

About the author

Marvin J. Park is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is a national security professional with experience in national-level policymaking, intelligence matters, and military operations throughout the Asia Pacific, especially Taiwan, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Park served on the National Security Council as the director for Taiwan affairs from 2023 to 2024. He retired in 2025 as a US Navy captain with over twenty-five years of experience.

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The Indo-Pacific Security Initiative (IPSI) informs and shapes the strategies, plans, and policies of the United States and its allies and partners to address the most important rising security challenges in the Indo-Pacific, including China’s growing threat to the international order and North Korea’s destabilizing nuclear weapons advancements. IPSI produces innovative analysis, conducts tabletop exercises, hosts public and private convenings, and engages with US, allied, and partner governments, militaries, media, other key private and public-sector stakeholders, and publics.

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Dispatch from Vilnius: A NATO ally in Russia’s shadow won’t let history repeat itself

James Hursch — Thu, 24 Apr 2025 15:54:38 +0000

VILNIUS—“Never again!” We heard these words often from Lithuanians of all ages on a recent one-week Atlantic Council study trip to Lithuania. We heard them from people early in their careers, military officers, and the most senior officials in the government, all of whom recounted stories of what living in the Soviet Union had been like for their parents or grandparents from the annexation of Lithuania at the end of World War II until independence was regained in the early 1990s. They were stories of imprisonment, torture, and exile to Siberia.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, Lithuania, a small NATO ally of about three million people, has taken seriously the threat of a more aggressive and revanchist Moscow led by Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Russian leader has called the dissolution of the Soviet Union one of the greatest tragedies of history and has dedicated his regime to reasserting Russia’s dominance in the former Soviet space.

Amid US calls for Europe to take more responsibility for its own defense, Lithuania has been investing in its military.

We visited the borders with both Belarus and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. At the former, Lithuanian border guards told us of many cases of so-called “hybrid warfare” by the oppressive Belarusian regime, including pushing South and Central Asian migrants across the border and using drones and balloons to smuggle cheap Belarusian cigarettes into Lithuania. In Kaliningrad, Russia has built a heavily militarized province. Looking across the border bridge, which is now only open to pedestrian traffic, we saw a dark and foreboding city very different from the modern and free Lithuanian side.

Amid US calls for Europe to take more responsibility for its own defense, Lithuania has been investing in its military. Vilnius will increase its defense spending to 5 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) in 2026, competing with Poland for the highest percentage of GDP spent on defense by a NATO country and far above the current level of US defense spending as a proportion of GDP.

In the past few years, Lithuania has spent billions of dollars on new weapons systems, including from the United States. It has also built modern infrastructure for its own forces, for a German brigade expected to deploy in the next few years, and for a relatively small US rotational force in the country. It has taken the lead in constructing a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal at the port city of Klaipėda that has allowed the Baltic states and new NATO ally Finland to end their dependence on Russian natural gas and import LNG from elsewhere. Last year, half of the gas imported at this terminal came from the United States. Lithuania has also provided more assistance for Ukraine’s fight for freedom than one might expect. On our trip to the far corners of the country, we saw many signs that Lithuanians support Ukraine’s own “never again” fight.

But Lithuania is a small country with a relatively flat landscape, which does not lend itself to fighting a potentially reconstituted Russian military in a few years. Lithuanians need a strong NATO to deter the threat and make it clear to Putin that the country is not low-hanging fruit, ripe for the Kremlin to pick off. Lithuanians welcome the Germans and others who are eager to help with deterrence, but they know that only the United States and a physical US presence in the country can truly deter Russia. The Lithuanians are trying to show they deserve that support.

When then NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg spoke to a joint session of Congress in 2019, he said that the point of NATO is that “it’s good to have friends.” It’s good for the United States as it faces the challenges of the twenty-first century, he explained, and it’s good for US allies. “We are stronger and safer when we stand together,” he said. Stoltenberg received a bipartisan standing ovation.

Six years later, the stakes are considerably higher, as Russia’s aggression has only become bolder. The United States is urging its friends to do more for themselves and strengthen their defenses. Lithuania, in its resolve to “never again” be dominated by Moscow, is seeking to do just that.

James A. Hursch is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. He previously served as the director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and as deputy defense advisor at the US Mission to NATO.

Note: The Atlantic Council delegation’s visit to Lithuania was sponsored by the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defense.

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Axios on the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare final report

Atlantic Council — Wed, 23 Apr 2025 16:00:00 +0000

On April 23, Colin Demarest of Axios published an article mentioning Forward Defense‘s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare report, highlighting how the report reflects growing pressure, both within and outside the Pentagon, to smartly adopt software. The piece suggests that Domino Data Lab’s recent $16.5 million dollar AI contract may be evidence that this pressure is beginning to yield results.

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National Defense reports on the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare final report

Atlantic Council — Tue, 22 Apr 2025 20:00:00 +0000

On April 22, Joanna Ye of National Defense published an article highlighting the key recommendations from Forward Defense’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare report. Entitled “Reforming Pentagon Software Practices Key to Countering Threats, Report Finds,” the article emphasizes the Commission’s hope that, by adopting its recommendations, the Department of Defense can enhance its capabilities and preserve the United States’ strategic advantage.

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Putin is attempting to intimidate Merz with yet more Russian red lines

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 17 Apr 2025 21:58:03 +0000

As Germany’s next chancellor Friedrich Merz prepares to boost support for Ukraine, the Kremlin is already seeking to deter him with intimidation tactics. Merz’s response to Moscow’s threats will reveal much about his ability to lead Europe at a time when the continent is attempting to confront the challenging new geopolitical realities of an expansionist Russia and an isolationist United States.

When Merz takes up his post in the coming weeks, his first big foreign policy decision will be whether to provide Ukraine with long-range Taurus missiles. Current German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has consistently refused to do so, but Merz has indicated that he will be prepared to give the green light for deliveries. This would potentially enable Ukraine to launch precision strikes against targets deep inside Russia.

The Kremlin is clearly anxious to prevent this from happening. Speaking in Moscow on April 17, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova warned that any decision to supply Ukraine with Taurus missiles would have serious consequences for Berlin, and would be viewed by Russia as direct German involvement in the war.

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It is no surprise to see Russia engaged in yet more saber-rattling. After all, this approach has served the Kremlin well throughout the full-scale war in Ukraine. From the very first days of Russia’s invasion, Putin has attempted to exploit Western fears of escalation by threatening to retaliate if Kyiv’s partners dare to cross arbitrary red lines set by Moscow limiting the scale of international support for Ukraine.

Russia’s threats have proved remarkably effective. They have helped fuel prolonged debates in Western capitals over each and every aspect of military aid for Ukraine, and have made many of Kyiv’s partners reluctant to provide the kinds of weapons that could lead to a decisive Ukrainian victory. Indeed, while the Russian army has struggled to advance on the battlefield, Putin’s ability to intimidate the West has been arguably his most important achievement of the entire war.

This success is all the more remarkable given how many times Putin’s bluff has been called. He began the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 by issuing thinly-veiled threats indicating that any Western attempts to interfere would be met by a nuclear response. When Western leaders ignored this and proceeded to arm Kyiv, Putin did nothing.

In September 2022, as he prepared to illegally annex four partially occupied regions of Ukraine, Putin famously announced his readiness to use nuclear weapons to defend his Ukrainian conquests. “I’m not bluffing,” he declared. When Ukraine completely disregarded this bluster and proceeded to liberate the strategically vital southern city of Kherson days later, Putin did not reach for his nuclear button. On the contrary, he ordered his defeated army to quietly retreat across the Dnipro river.

The Kremlin’s many bloodcurdling threats regarding the sanctity of Russian-occupied Crimea have proved similarly hollow. Since 2022, Moscow has sought to position the occupied Ukrainian peninsula as being beyond the boundaries of the current war. This has not prevented Ukraine from sinking or damaging around one-third of the entire Russian Black Sea Fleet, which has traditionally been based in Crimea. Putin has responded to this very personal humiliation in typically understated fashion by withdrawing the rest of his warships to the safety of Russia.

Remarkably, Putin even failed to react when Ukraine crossed the reddest of all red lines and invaded Russia itself in August 2024. Rather than declaring World War III or attempting to rally his compatriots against the foreign invader, Putin actively sought to downplay the significance of Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk region.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

The Russian Foreign Ministry’s recent warnings regarding the potential delivery of German missiles to Ukraine are eerily similar to the empty threats made by Putin last September as the US weighed up the possibility of allowing Ukraine to conduct long-range strikes inside Russia using American weapons. At the time, Putin stated that any lifting of restrictions would mean that Russia was “at war” with NATO. However, when the US then duly granted Ukraine permission to begin attacking Russian targets, there was no discernible change in Putin’s stance.

Russia’s saber-rattling over Taurus missiles represents an important early test for Germany’s next leader. As Chancellor, Merz will inherit a major war on Europe’s eastern frontier that is now in its fourth year and could potentially expand further into the heart of the continent. He is also well aware that Europeans can no longer rely on US military support, as they have done for generations.

Germany is the obvious candidate to lead Europe’s rearmament, but Merz must first demonstrate that he has the political will to match his country’s undoubted industrial capabilities. US President Joe Biden consistently sought to avoid escalation with Russia, while his successor Donald Trump seems more interested in building bridges with Vladimir Putin than containing the Kremlin. If Merz wants to lead the Western resistance to Putin’s imperial agenda, he can begin by rejecting Russia’s threats and delivering Taurus missiles to Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The Ukrainian army is now Europe’s most credible security guarantee

Pavlo Verkhniatskyi — Thu, 17 Apr 2025 21:22:52 +0000

Ever since the first months of Russia’s full-scale invasion in spring 2022, Kyiv has played host to a steady stream of visiting European officials eager to demonstrate their support for Ukraine. With the war now in its fourth year, there are growing signs that this relationship is evolving and becoming more balanced. While Kyiv continues to rely on European aid, it is increasingly clear that Ukraine also has much to offer and can play a major part in the future security of Europe.

Following his return to the White House in January, US President Donald Trump has initiated a dramatic shift in United States foreign policy that has left many in Europe unsure of the transatlantic alliance and keen to ramp up their own defense capabilities. This geopolitical instability is also encouraging European policymakers to rethink Ukraine’s role in the defense of the continent. With unparalleled combat experience and proven ability to scale up arms production at relatively low cost, Ukraine is in many ways the ideal partner for European countries as they confront the twin challenges of an expansionist Russia and an isolationist US.

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Ukraine’s defense industry has grown at a remarkably rapid rate since 2022 and is now capable of meeting approximately 40 percent of the country’s military needs. The segment that has attracted the most international attention so far is drone production, with Ukraine widely recognized as a global leader in drone warfare. It requires a careful approach in order to identify the few true gems from among the hundreds of Ukrainian companies currently producing over a million of drones per year, but the potential for groundbreaking advances in drone technologies is obvious.

In order to make the most of this potential, Ukraine must first safeguard its survival as an independent nation. Looking ahead, a key challenge for the Ukrainian authorities will be creating the kind of business climate that can enable the country’s emerging defense industry to prosper in a postwar environment that is likely to feature declining defense budgets.

At present, many Ukrainian defense sector companies are moving production to locations outside Ukraine due to a combination of factors including export bans and a lack of financing options inside the country. The most elegant solution to this problem is to promote more defense sector partnerships with Ukraine’s European allies.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

During the first few years of Russia’s full-scale invasion, security cooperation between Ukraine and the country’s partners was generally a one-way street, with weapons and ammunition flowing to Kyiv. More recently, a new model has emerged involving Western countries funding production at Ukrainian defense companies. This approach is efficient and strategically sound. It boosts Ukraine militarily and economically, while also taking advantage of the country’s strengths as a cost-effective and innovative arms producer. However, it lacks long-term appeal for Ukraine’s partners.

Establishing joint ventures between Ukrainian and European defense companies may be a more attractive and sustainable format. This would be a financially attractive way of fueling Europe’s rearmament, and would allow participating companies to build on a wide range of potential research and development synergies. Setting up production facilities in wartime Ukraine would clearly involve an element of risk, but this need not necessarily be a deal breaker if sensible security measures are implemented.

The scope for such joint ventures is huge. Indeed, it would make good sense to invest in specialized business and science parks providing the full range of related services and industry expertise. Initially, jointly produced equipment could be fast-tracked to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Further down the line, output could also be exported to partner countries and global markets. The growth of joint ventures would significantly improve Ukraine’s defensive potential and enhance the country’s ability to shield Europe from the Russian threat.

An ambitious European rearmament plan is currently taking shape that could significantly accelerate the integration of Ukraine’s defense industry. For this to happen, a number of regulatory and operational issues must first be resolved in Kyiv, Brussels, and various European capitals. While Ukraine can undoubtedly make a meaningful contribution to European security, the continent’s political complexities are particularly pronounced when it comes to defense budgets and procurement policies. It will require a degree of pragmatism to dismantle bureaucratic hurdles and overcome narrow national interests.

As European leaders adapt to radical shifts in the geopolitical landscape, Kyiv is ideally positioned to help the continent address its most pressing security needs. Ukraine’s army is by far the largest in Europe and has unique experience of modern warfare. It is backed by a domestic arms industry that is growing at a phenomenal rate while benefiting from an innovative startup culture that is transforming the twenty-first century battlefield. With sufficient international funding and technological cooperation, the Ukrainian defense sector can serve as a cornerstone of Europe’s security architecture for decades to come.

Pavlo Verkhniatskyi is managing partner of COSA, co-founder of Fincord-Polytech Science Park, and advisor to the Defense Group at the Ukraine Facility Platform.

Defense Acquisition University on the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare final report

Atlantic Council — Fri, 11 Apr 2025 19:00:00 +0000

On April 11, Defense Acquisition University (DAU) published an article entitled “Finding the Way on Software-Defined Warfare,” highlighting the enterprise-level challenges identified in Forward Defense‘s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare report, along with the report’s nine key recommendations. The article also explores how DAU supports the Commission’s proposals, particularly by providing training programs to cultivate software talent and by providing entry points for the acquisition workforce to stay informed on emerging developments.

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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Industrial integration for global defense resilience: Pathways for action

Abigail Rudolph, Steven Grundman — Fri, 11 Apr 2025 15:00:00 +0000

TO: The president of the United States and US policymakers

FROM: Abigail Rudolph and Steven Grundman

DATE: April 2025

SUBJECT: Industrial integration for global defense resilience: Pathways for action

In October 2024, the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program, in partnership with Beretta USA, convened defense industry representatives, government leaders, and subject-matter experts for a not-for-attribution workshop on implementing section 2.1.2.6 of the US National Defense Industrial Strategy (NDIS), “Engage Allies and Partners to Expand Global Defense Production and Increase Supply Chain Resilience.” The participants focused on the biggest barriers to achieving a more integrated defense-industrial ecosystem and wrestled with how the next administration in Washington could take fast action to overcome these obstacles. Informed by the deliberations of the workshop, this Atlantic Council Strategic Insights Memorandum identifies six priority actions the current administration can undertake to fulfill the ambitions of the NDIS in respect to section 2.1.2.6.

Introduction

The ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have exposed significant vulnerabilities in the industrial capacity and capabilities of the United States and its allies. A lack of speed, scale, and resilience in industrial production hampers the ability to sustain operations in these campaigns. Addressing these challenges is integral to achieving deterrence in today’s volatile security environment. The NDIS aims to correct these shortcomings by fostering a more resilient and agile defense-industrial ecosystem. Central to that strategy is the imperative of better integrating the defense industries of the United States and its allies and partners. This memorandum captures deliberations on the workshop’s four objectives, including

identify the key features of industrial readiness and capability;
explore the promise of better integrating the industries of the United States with those of its allies and partners;
characterize the most pressing challenges to integrating these nations’ defense-industrial resources; and
specify a small number of actions the next administration in Washington can quickly undertake to gain leverage on these challenges.

Strategic context

The NDIS “calls for sustained collaboration and cooperation between the entire U.S. government, private industry, and our Allies and partners abroad . . . [I]nternational allies and partners, each with their own robust defense industries, will continue to be a cornerstone of the DoD’s concept of Integrated Deterrence.”¹ A modern defense industrial base (DIB) that can keep pace with today’s volatile security environment is essential for the United States to deter and, if necessary, prevail in great-power conflict. However, the defense-industrial resources of the United States and its allies are significantly smaller than they were at the end of the Cold War, which provided the impetus for a great reduction of industrial capacity and a consolidation of companies. As a result, today’s defense industry has adopted a peacetime operating tempo that is ill-equipped to support more dynamic and competitive international-security and military-operating environments.

The preponderance of the US defense industry is optimized to address its customers’ acquisition practices, which have prioritized the development and production of small numbers of exquisite systems rather than weapons delivered at the scale and pace that current conflicts compel governments to require. The transition from an industrial structure optimized for post-Cold War buying preferences to the new imperatives of the age of digital technologies and great-power competition will involve substantial and wide-ranging changes, both to how governments acquire weapons and how industry is organized to deliver them. To accomplish this goal, the NDIS prioritized enhanced international cooperation among the United States, its allies and partners, and their respective defense-industrial resources.

The success of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG) in harnessing the weapons stockpiles and industrial arsenals of Kyiv’s partners suggests the great promise of integrating allies’ industrial capabilities. When Russia invaded Ukraine, the United States spearheaded the formation of the UDCG to manifest “the arsenal of Ukrainian democracy.”² Working together, the armaments directors of more than forty countries cooperating to support Ukraine have expanded global production of critical munitions; developed a common sustainment framework to enhance Ukraine’s capabilities in spares, maintenance, training, and industrial support; and facilitated partnerships with Ukrainian industry for co-production and co-sustainment activities. Although further efforts to strengthen and integrate the international defense-industrial base are needed, the UDCG offers valuable insights into what a major conflict requires from an industrial readiness standpoint.

Challenges

The work of better integrating US and allied defense-industrial capabilities faces a wide range of significant challenges, which the workshop bucketed into three categories.

Because defense-industrial resources are, sensibly enough, primarily organized by national priorities and prerogatives, they do not lend themselves easily to cross-border opportunities.
The business and regulatory systems for managing cross-border defense trade are inapt and inefficient.
Substantial deficits of talent and knowledge management impair the integration of different nations’ industrial resources.

The long tradition of governments organizing their defense-industrial resources with respect to the sovereign obligation of national security continues. While most Western companies, which occupy the advanced industries of the twenty-first century, operate by the global imperatives of commerce, defense companies do not. Instead, they operate primarily in response to the program plans and buying practices of their home markets, and export sales are regulated for compliance with foreign policy, national security, and national economic considerations. These considerations notwithstanding, billions of dollars of arms exports proceed. However, these same considerations confound integration upstream from the points of sale, largely foregoing the industrial efficiencies that would be afforded by co-development, co-production, and co-sustainment of systems between and among companies from more than one nation. This tradition operates at odds with national strategies, which, at their core, rely on coordination of defense policies and militaries among allies and partners.

Therefore, to fulfill these strategies, the business and regulatory systems that effect cross-border defense trade need to be optimized for integration. In practice, however, they are optimized to minimize risk in respect to the foreign policy, security, and political prerogatives of each national government. Most notably, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which regulates the export of defense goods and services from the United States, is unsuited to the aims of the NDIS with respect to integrating allies’ industrial capabilities. The export of arms needs to remain a discretionary instrument of US foreign and defense policy, but the administration of these controls too often fails to facilitate licenses that will better integrate industrial capabilities to effectively meet the needs of the warfighter and improve industrial integration efforts. For example, “buy America” preferences, which are expressed in law and regulation—and, more importantly, the culture of the Pentagon’s acquisition workforce—continue to impair integration.

Moreover, defense ministries and industries face vast knowledge and talent-management deficits, which impair cross-border industrial integration. In the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics fields most relevant to the defense industry, there is a significant gap between workforce needs and the availability of qualified professionals. This gap is compounded by high attrition rates in management, resulting in a breakdown of knowledge transfer from industry veterans to new arrivals.³The deficits within the US government are at least as great. Defense civil servants require better education in both market research and procurement strategies to effectively evaluate when allied or partner capabilities might offer advantages or simple complementarity compared with domestic performers.⁴ Until these gaps are filled, the transmission belt from policy prescriptions encouraging cross-border integration to practical action enacting these reforms will continue to fail.

These three challenges—the lack of a common economic market among allies and partners, the inapt regulation of cross-border trade, and the weak preparedness of those involved in procurement processes—framed the workshop’s discussions and provided impetus for the priorities this memorandum identifies. By tackling these key challenges, the United States and its allies and partners can enhance their collective defense efforts, align more effectively with strategic objectives, and ensure a more robust and integrated deterrence posture in an increasingly complex security environment.

Recommendations

Achieving the speed, scale, and resilience that the NDIS calls for will require a concerted effort of initiatives in Washington and coordination with the governments of its allies and partners. For a fast start toward achieving this ambition, the new administration should undertake the following actions.

Designate a focal point at the White House. The initiatives this office should lead include
1. reform of the Foreign Military Sales processes;
2. reauthorization of the Defense Production Act (see b) below); and
3. establishment of consultative bodies to formalize government-to-government coordination of industrial capabilities (see c) below).
Leverage the reauthorization of the Defense Production Act. Most provisions of the Defense Production Act (DPA) will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The need to reauthorize the DPA in 2025 presents a significant opportunity to leverage and expand its authorities to enhance international industrial cooperation. Congress and the new administration should consider provisions including
1. expanding the recipients of Title III financial assistance to companies in allied nations beyond the National Technology Industrial Base (e.g., the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia);
2. expanding the purposes of Title III financial assistance beyond end items to encompass critical infrastructure, industrial capacity, and training and education; and
3. giving standing and utility in Title I to the security of supply agreements between the United States and the more than two dozen governments that have committed to mutually assured security of supply for defense needs.⁵
Establish formal institutions to facilitate international industrial cooperation. Operationalize consultative bodies with European and Asian partners to facilitate the coordination of industrial capabilities among the United States and its allies.
1. In Europe, NATO presents itself as the obvious platform on which to build a consultative forum for coordination with that region’s allies and partners.
2. In Asia, the Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience (PIPIR) is the platform through which to coordinate with Asian partners.
Identify specific defense system needs to comprise an initial agenda of industrial capacity and capabilities that would benefit from international coordination and industrial integration. To focus attention while, at the same time, indicating the broad scope and application of such initiatives, we recommend choosing just three systems on which to focus this year—one system in development, another in production, and a sustainment program.
Establish career paths and educational curriculums for acquisition managers who focus on international cooperation and industrial integration.

Conclusion

Implementation of the NDIS is well under way, including with respect to Section 2.1.2.6. However, a clear sense remains of the high leverage provided to the overall strategy by integrating allies’ industrial capabilities, together with a focused agenda of executive office actions required to achieve that ambition. The purpose of this memorandum is to give a tailwind to the new administration’s attention to these opportunities.

About the authors

Staff

Abigail Rudolph

Program Assistant

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Fellow

Steven Grundman

Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Acknowledgements

The authors are grateful to the government officials, industry representatives, and think tank experts who lent their time and expertise to the workshop in support of this strategic insights memorandum. The Atlantic Council would like to thank its partner, Beretta USA, for supporting its work on this publication.

Explore the program

2 Lloyd J. Austin III, “’The Commons Defence’: Remarks by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III at the Reagan National Defense Forum,” US Department of Defense, December 7, 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/3989588/the-common-defence-remarks-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-at-the-re/.

1 “National Defense Industrial Strategy,” US Department of Defense, November 16, 2023, i, 24, https://www.dau.edu/sites/default/files/2024-02/2023%20NDIS_FINAL%20FOR%20PUBLICATION%201_0.pdf.

3 Brooke Weddle, et al., “The Talent Gap: The Value at Stake for Global Aerospace and Defense,” McKinsey & Company, July 17, 2024, https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/aerospace-and-defense/our-insights/the-talent-gap-the-value-at-stake-for-global-aerospace-and-defense.

4 James Hasik, “Friend-Sourcing Military Procurement: Technology Acquisition as Security Cooperation,” Atlantic Council, June 11, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/friend-sourcing-military-procurement/.

5 James Hasik, “The Security of Defense Trade with Allies: Enhancing Contact, Contracts, and Control in Supply Chains,” Atlantic Council, July 28, 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/the-security-of-defense-trade-with-allies/.

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Europeans are responding to Trump by rallying around the EU flag

Anna Wieslander and Louise Blomqvist — Tue, 08 Apr 2025 13:48:30 +0000

A subtle but powerful shift is taking place across Europe. Support for the European Union (EU) is surging, with the latest Eurobarometer survey, published on March 25, showing that 74 percent of citizens of EU member states believe their country has benefited from EU membership. This is the highest level of support for that belief since the question was first asked in 1983.

The “rally ‘round the flag” effect—a surge in public support for a government in times of international crisis—is a well-documented phenomenon in politics. In an increasingly unpredictable world, Europeans are now rallying around the EU flag in Brussels. This growing confidence in the EU as a political and economic actor matters—not just for Europeans, but also for Americans, who should recognize that Europeans have started to prepare for a world in which the United States is no longer a central part of the continent’s security.

The message from Europeans is clear: They still want allies. But at the same time, they are getting ready to stand on their own feet in an uncertain world.

Sweden offers a striking example. Historically, Sweden is a transatlantic-leaning country with deep cultural and political ties to the United States. And it has often maintained a cautious stance toward EU integration. Yet in this latest poll, 79 percent of Swedes say that EU membership has been good for the country. At the same time, a separate survey conducted the same month by Sweden’s largest newspaper, Dagens Nyheter, shows a dramatic shift in Swedish public opinion toward the United States. Only 10 percent of Swedes hold a positive view of the United States, down from 23 percent just two years ago. The shift correlates with US President Donald Trump’s return to office in January. A full 86 percent of Swedes express a negative opinion of him. This dislike is not just personal; Trump is seen as a symbol of a declining US commitment to democratic norms and multilateralism, which many Swedes value highly. A striking two-thirds of Swedes surveyed in the Dagens Nyheter poll say that the United States has lost its role as leader of the free world. This sentiment had already taken root before Trump’s April 2 announcement of major global tariffs, which included a 20 percent tariff on the EU.

Across Europe, 66 percent of respondents in the Eurobarometer poll say that the EU should play a stronger role in protecting citizens from global crises and security threats. Three out of four respondents want the EU to be equipped with more tools, financial or institutional, to tackle these challenges. That said, this surge in pro-EU sentiment is not uniform. In countries led by more Trump-friendly or Euroskeptic governments, such as Hungary and Slovakia, support for deeper EU integration remains more tempered. Yet even in these contexts, the broader shift is visible. In Hungary, where Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has long been critical of Brussels, an April 2024 Eurobarometer survey found that more than two thirds of Hungarians view EU membership as beneficial, marking an increase from previous years. In Slovakia, public frustration with Prime Minister Robert Fico’s pro-Russian stance has sparked mass demonstrations in the past few months, with tens of thousands protesting under the slogan “Slovakia is Europe” expressing their support for democratic values and closer ties to the EU and NATO. These developments suggest that even where political leadership leans Euroskeptic, citizens are increasingly looking to the EU to safeguard their security and sovereignty.

Europeans have started to prepare for a world in which the United States is no longer a central part of the continent’s security.

The EU has responded in unprecedented ways to the call from its citizens to step up on defense and security. In January, European Commissioner for Defense and Space Andrius Kubilius called for a “Big Bang” in European defense spending and policy changes to face the Russian threat. This was an uphill task, with frugal nations such as Sweden, Germany, and the Netherlands opposing initiatives to take out loans and raise debt ceilings, while other nations refused to make commitments to increase defense spending.

But with the push provided by the Trump administration’s clear signaling in recent weeks that Europe will become less of a US security priority, Kubilius got his wish. The ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 program, presented by the European Commission on March 18, outlines a new era in European security. It should not be understood merely as a short-term reaction to the Trump administration, but a necessary response to a changing global order—one in which the United States pivots to the Indo-Pacific while Europeans can no longer fully rely on US protection to counter the existential threat posed by Russia. As Kubilius put it in a speech on March 20: “450 million Europeans should not ask 340 million Americans to defend us from 140 million Russians who can’t even defeat 38 million Ukrainians.”

The ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 program marks a historic shift in EU defense policy, mobilizing up to €800 billion through a mix of new and adapted financial instruments. What sets this initiative apart is not just its ambition but how the funding is being unlocked. For the first time, the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact has been loosened to allow member states to undertake defense-related borrowing beyond national debt limits via the escape clause. The initiative also launched a new €150 billion joint-borrowing mechanism, comparable in scale to the EU’s COVID-19 pandemic recovery fund, to support collective procurement and help ramp up the defense industry, including cooperation with Ukraine.

In another radical departure from past practice, the European Investment Bank, which was previously prohibited from military financing, can now fund defense industries. These steps would have been politically impossible just a short while ago. Even Sweden, which has long been resistant to debt-financed EU initiatives, and other traditionally frugal countries are now prepared to take on loans to fund defense modernization. For example, Germany’s recent €100 billion national rearmament plan reflects a sea change in Berlin’s approach to military spending. These developments underscore that Europe is not merely responding to US disengagement but is building real capacity to act.

The tendency for the EU to integrate during crises is not new. For instance, the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in the pan-European procurement of vaccines and the first issuance of an EU eurobond. Still, it is remarkable that no EU government outright blocked the path toward greater defense integration, as far-right parties that are sympathetic to Trump hold power in Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, and the Netherlands. To be sure, European unity on defense is neither unanimous nor uncontested. Some governments remain wary of surrendering sovereignty over defense policy, and debates over funding mechanisms and the scope of joint procurement highlight enduring divisions among member states. These reservations underscore that while the trend is significant, it remains fragile and a range of questions on the implementation of further defense integration remain unsolved. Even so, this is a moment the United States should watch closely. The renewed push for a European Defense Union is a strategic counterweight to the uncertainty coming from Washington. Rather than retreating into nationalism or disengagement, Europeans are choosing to strengthen the EU as a geopolitical actor.

Anna Wieslander, PhD, is director for Northern Europe and head of the Atlantic Council Northern Europe Office in Stockholm.

Louise Blomqvist is a project assistant at the Northern Europe Office.

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Gen Kevin P. Chilton, USAF (ret.), featured on the Mitchell Institute’s Commander panel

Atlantic Council — Wed, 02 Apr 2025 19:17:19 +0000

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 31, Forward Defense distinguished fellow Kevin P. Chilton was featured on the Mitchell Institute’s panel, “Setting the Nuclear Deterrence Record Straight: Commanders’ Perspectives.” On the panel, he joined former US Strategic Command commanders Gen. Robert Kehler, USAF (Ret.), and Adm. Charles A. Richard, USN (Ret.), to discuss the realities of nuclear deterrence today. Additionally, the Mitchell Institute highlighted two of Chilton’s policy papers, “On U.S. Nuclear Deterrence” and “Defending the Record on U.S. Nuclear Deterrence.”

Fellow

Kevin P. Chilton

Distinguished Fellow

Cybersecurity Defense Industry

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Russian advance slows in March as Putin’s invasion loses momentum

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 01 Apr 2025 21:16:38 +0000

Russia’s Ukraine invasion continued to lose momentum in March 2025, with the Kremlin’s territorial gains reportedly falling for a fourth consecutive month. According to new data from the Institute for the Study of War, Russian forces captured 240 square kilometers of Ukrainian land throughout March, representing the smallest monthly total since the current wave of offensive operations began in summer 2024.

News of Russia’s slowing advance comes as Russian President Vladimir Putin claims that his invading army currently holds the “strategic initiative” along the entire front line of the war in Ukraine. “There are now reasons to believe we can finish off” the Ukrainian military, he told submarine crews last week during a visit to the north Russian port city of Murmansk.

While Putin predicts impending Russian victory, the evidence on the ground in Ukraine would seem to suggest otherwise. Far from being on the verge of crumbling, Ukraine’s defensive lines have strengthened significantly in recent months. As a result, advancing Russian forces continue to suffer heavy losses without achieving any meaningful breakthroughs.

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As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Ukrainian commanders are well aware that the recent lull in Russian battlefield gains may only be a temporary phenomenon as Putin’s army regroups following months of intense fighting. Officials and analysts in Kyiv are now warning that preparations are likely well underway for a major new Russian offensive that is expected to begin in the coming weeks and last until late in 2025.

Putin hopes this new campaign can help strengthen his position as negotiations intensify over a possible compromise settlement to end the war. Speaking last week in Paris, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy accused the Kremlin dictator of “dragging out talks and trying to get the United States stuck in endless and pointless discussions about fake conditions just to buy time and then try to grab more land.”

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Russia’s modest battlefield gains since the start of the current year provide important perspective at a time when international media coverage and Western commentaries often create the misleading impression that Ukraine’s position is hopeless. In reality, the Ukrainian army has stood up to the full might of the Russian military for more than three years and represents a formidable obstacle to Putin’s plans for the complete subjugation of the country.

Today’s Ukrainian army is by far the largest and most experienced force in Europe, and is backed by a rapidly expanding domestic defense industry that already accounts for around forty percent of Ukraine’s military needs. Since early 2022, Ukrainian troops have succeeded in liberating around half of all the territory occupied by Russia, and have won a string of famous victories in the Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson regions.

Over the past three years, Ukraine has also emerged as a technologically advanced drone warfare superpower. Ukrainian drone manufacturers now produce millions of drones each year and continue to innovate on a daily basis. This is having a huge impact on the battlefield, where drones now account for well over half of all Russian casualties.

At sea, marine drones have enabled Ukraine to sink or damage around one-third of Russia’s entire Black Sea Fleet. This has transformed the Battle of the Black Sea and forced the remainder of Russia’s warships to retreat from Crimea. Meanwhile, Ukrainian commanders are using the country’s expanding arsenal of long-range drones and domestically produced cruise missiles to bring Putin’s invasion home by striking military and energy industry infrastructure deep inside Russia.

The remarkable evolution of the Ukrainian Armed Forces since February 2022 should give pause to all those who insist that Ukraine “has no cards” to play in future negotiations. While Kyiv cannot realistically hope to match Russia’s overwhelming advantages in terms of manpower, firepower, funding, and industrial capacity, Ukraine is now a major military power in its own right and will not agree to any peace deal that leaves the continued existence of the country in doubt.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Adding to the problem is the slow feedback loop. It can take as long as 180 days to request and receive user feedback through formal exercises, or “touch points”—an eternity when it comes to the fast-paced, ever-changing landscape of military operations. Even after receiving feedback, the Project Management Offices often don’t prioritize updates or changes. They often seem to focus more on meeting cost and schedule metrics than on ensuring the system works well for its intended users. This leads to a software-development cycle in which changes and adjustments are often delayed, resulting in systems that miss the mark.

In response to these issues, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth further codified the value of the Software Acquisition Pathway (SWP) as the gold standard for software-intensive system procurement. While this may sound like a new initiative, organizations such as the Air Force’s Kessel Run have been championing this approach for more than three years. The SWP introduces a shift toward more agile and user-centered development practices. The pathway mandates regular engagement with the end-user community, emphasizes the integration of user metrics to gauge the system’s value, and ensures that the system aligns with mission needs.

However, despite its potential, the implementation of the SWP is still mired in bureaucracy, often stalling progress before it reaches the users who need it most, with only eighty-two out of more than two thousand programs currently leveraging the pathway.

To truly address the user experience challenge, Department of Defense programs should ingrain user-centered design practices into the culture of software acquisition and bring it into the development process from the very beginning. This requires a shift in how the Department of Defense develops software: Instead of making assumptions about what users need—or leveraging “user representatives,” who may not have the latest operational context—development processes should incorporate regular user interviews, ad hoc reviews, and feedback loops. Weekly user interviews and the ability to present mockups and prototypes allow developers to adjust features based on real-time feedback. It does not require a full two-week User Acceptance Testing or a full-scale exercise; rather, it takes a couple hours a week of a warfighter’s time to provide input to critical software. This is ultimately a more cost-effective and streamlined investment of time to make sure the “right” thing is built. This data-driven approach helps to ensure that the system evolves according to the needs of the end-users, rather than being locked into rigid design specifications that may no longer be relevant by the time the system is fielded.

One critical aspect of improving the software development process is the creation of balanced product teams and acquisition teams. When teams are aligned in their objectives and share a focus on the user, the development process becomes more streamlined, efficient, and effective. This alignment reduces the need for rework, saving time and resources, while also creating happier, more satisfied users, and ultimately increasing readiness and lethality. By ensuring that acquisition professionals understand the importance of delivering a product that works well for the end-user, the Pentagon can create systems that not only meet cost and schedule metrics but also provide real value to those who need them the most.

Iteration is key in any software development process, and the Department of Defense must embrace this reality. Agile practices—such as continuous testing, rapid prototyping, and user feedback—should be integrated at scale into the development lifecycle as often as possible. Instead, developers too often fall into what is called an “agile-scrum-fall” approach, in which the process may appear to be agile and may even have agile-like instances but is in fact largely sequential, rigid, and linear.

The more frequently software is updated and improved based on real-user input, the more likely it is to meet the mission requirements and provide the right tools for success. This process ensures that software is not a one-and-done development effort but an ongoing evolution that aligns with the dynamic nature of military operations.

Ultimately, the Department of Defense must make user experience a priority in its software-development efforts. Only by focusing on the real needs of the people who will use these systems every day can the US military build software that enhances mission readiness and improves the overall lethality of US forces.

As it moves forward, the Department of Defense should follow four principles to bring warfighter user experience to the forefront of its development efforts.

Implement continuous user engagement: Introduce regular, structured user interviews, prototype testing, and feedback loops throughout the development process. Investing in enterprise design software, such as Figma, enables the ability to quickly generate mock-ups and gain feedback without investing engineering hours in coding a solution. This ensures that user needs are consistently addressed and prioritized at every stage of development.

Reduce the bureaucratic bottleneck: Streamline the JCIDS requirements process to ensure that feedback from junior enlisted servicemembers and officers is taken into account early in the planning stages. This will help align system development with real-world operational needs.

Adopt agile and iterative development practices: Embrace continuous iteration, rapid prototyping, and real-time user feedback to ensure that software evolves to meet user needs and mission requirements over time. This will reduce the need for costly rework and improve the overall user experience.

Align product and acquisition teams: Ensure that product teams and acquisition teams are closely aligned, with a shared focus on delivering software that meets both mission requirements and user needs. This alignment will drive efficiency, reduce rework, and lead to happier, more satisfied end users.

Some may be tempted to view a focus on UX as a luxury at odds with the tough, make-do image the US military is famous for. But on the twenty-first-century battlefield, where tech is woven into all parts of fighting, nothing could be further from the truth. It can be the difference between life and death.

Hannah Hunt is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a distinguished technical fellow at MetroStar Systems. She was previously the chief of product at the Army Software Factory under Army Futures Command and chief of staff at the US Air Force’s Kessel Run.

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The EU just released a roadmap to defend Europe. Will member states follow it?

Petr Tůma — Tue, 01 Apr 2025 15:23:34 +0000

The US-led talks aiming to end the war in Ukraine and efforts by France and Britain to stand up a “reassurance force” to provide a security guarantee to Kyiv have dominated headlines in the past few weeks. So it would have been easy to overlook the March 19 publication of the European Commission’s Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030. But this White Paper bears attention, as it marks a significant milestone in the European Union’s (EU’s) ongoing efforts to strengthen its security.

In December, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen assigned Kaja Kallas, the EU’s top diplomat, and Andrius Kubilius, the first-ever commissioner for defense and space, to produce this document. The resulting text presents a roadmap for Europe to build up its defense capabilities in response to growing external security threats, including the possibility of Russian military aggression against EU territory. The White Paper also represents a direct reaction and message to the ongoing changes in Washington’s approach to European security under US President Donald Trump.

The White Paper adopts a five-year outlook, which is also the timeframe in which several European intelligence agencies have estimated Moscow would require to reconstitute its military capabilities such that it could conduct a large-scale attack on a NATO country. In the event of a cease-fire or peace agreement with Ukraine, Russia would almost certainly seek to accelerate its rearmament. Meanwhile, Europe faces uncertainty regarding the extent of continued US security assistance given Washington’s rapidly shifting foreign policy stances and priorities.

The White Paper calls for addressing critical capability gaps, fostering a competitive defense industry, strengthening military support for Ukraine, and securing relevant financial instruments and resources for defense. But whether the EU will be able to address these challenges in the five-year window the report outlines will depend on member states’ willingness to make the necessary financial commitments and their ability to navigate political divisions within the bloc.

Filling capability gaps

The document begins by diagnosing Europe’s severe defense shortcomings. It explicitly states that Europe is currently ill-equipped to respond adequately to contemporary security challenges.

Major capability gaps are identified in the following areas:

Air and missile defense
Artillery systems
Ammunition and missile production
Drones and counter-drone systems
Military mobility
Artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, cyber, and electronic warfare
Strategic enablers and critical infrastructure protection

It’s a big list, and to close these gaps the White Paper advocates for deeper collaboration among European nations on defense projects of common interest. It builds on EU reports from 2024 by former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö on civilian and military preparedness and by former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi on competitiveness, both of which highlighted inefficiencies and excessive costs resulting from a lack of coordination within the European defense industry.

So, what does this mean in practice? The White Paper specifically recommends harnessing “European economies of scale” and collaborative procurement to reduce costs, shorten delivery times, make demand more predictable for producers, and enhance interoperability.

A major question going forward, however, is how the EU’s efforts fit in with NATO. Importantly, capability building is an area in which EU collaboration can benefit the Alliance. EU countries share a single set of capabilities. If these capabilities are primarily defined by NATO, then the twenty-three EU member states that are also part of the Alliance would contribute to fulfilling them, including through EU instruments. For example, one of the major capacity building areas is military mobility, which particularly important for the EU countries that provide NATO host-nation support.

Strengthening the defense industry

In addition to capability gaps, the White Paper addresses structural weaknesses within the European defense industry, pinpointing fragmentation and underinvestment as major obstacles to achieving credible deterrence. Three years into the war in Ukraine, Europe remains unable to produce sufficient weapons and ammunition quickly. To remedy this, the document proposes creating a common European defense market, aggregating demand to increase predictability.

Another main focus is ensuring supply-chain security and reducing external dependencies. The commitment to collaboration is further reinforced by plans to simplify regulations. The European Commission pledged to launch a strategic dialogue with the defense industry and introduce the Defence Omnibus Simplification Proposal by June 2025. This act is intended to simplify the legal and administrative framework for procurements and industry cooperation. Excessive regulation has been a long-standing obstacle in this field, and streamlining administrative processes is overdue.

Prioritizing Ukraine

The White Paper states that Ukraine remains on the front line of European security and enhancing the EU’s defense requires continued military support to Kyiv. The report outlines what it calls a “Porcupine Strategy,” which is aimed at deterring further Russian aggression by equipping Ukraine with the necessary capabilities. This is the strongest security guarantee that Europe can provide to Kyiv.

The document highlights the following defense priorities for enhancing Europe’s military support for Ukraine:

Provision of large-caliber artillery ammunition (with a target of two million rounds in 2025)
Deployment of air defense systems
Enhanced drone capabilities
Continued military training

Despite Kallas’s initial ambition for a twenty billion euro military support package in 2025, her initiative has reportedly faced resistance from several member states, resulting in a more limited focus on ammunition supplies. This highlights the potential limitations that will complicate efforts to implement the plans outlined in the White Paper.

The document also calls for supporting Ukraine’s defense industry through direct contracts and closer integration with the European defense sector, including joint ventures. This effort should be further outlined in the forthcoming European Defence Industry Plan, expected within the next few months. Close cooperation with Ukraine in this domain is in Europe’s interest, as the bloc will benefit from Kyiv’s wartime experience and innovations. Such defense industry collaboration could also indirectly strengthen Ukraine’s EU membership prospects.

Securing new financial sources

Perhaps the most transformative element of the White Paper concerns defense financing. It builds upon the ReArm Europe Plan, unveiled by von der Leyen in early March.

The financial framework includes:

Joint EU loans backed by the EU budget, branded as SAFE (Security and Action for Europe), with an initial ceiling of €150 billion
An “escape clause” from the Stability and Growth Pact, allowing member states to exclude up to 1.5 percent of defense spending from national debt assessments
Relaxation of existing EU funding rules, mobilization of private capital, and adjustments to European Investment Bank regulations

The overarching ambition is to generate up to €800 billion in defense funding.

Success will depend on how seriously member states approach the offer. Some may take advantage of the relaxation of the escape clause to finance projects that are only superficially linked to military objectives. There is also some uncertainty surrounding the SAFE instrument, which aims to increase member states’ investments in defense via loans. Some capitals may secure better interest rates in domestic markets than those offered by the EU. Others may prefer different cooperation frameworks. Fiscally cautious governments might even exclude loans as an option on principle. A true embarrassment for the EU would arise if a substantial number of capitals considering SAFE were to withdraw due to the instrument’s byzantine rules.

From paper to practice

Since the White Paper is a European Commission initiative, it does not require formal approval from member states. However, its implementation will hinge on their willingness to support concrete instruments that will be built on the White Paper’s findings.

The first high-level discussions will take place at the upcoming EU Defense Ministers’ meeting on April 2-3, followed by the Foreign Affairs Council meeting on April 14. The goal is to secure agreement on key measures—such as SAFE and the Defence Omnibus Simplification Proposal—by June’s EU leaders’ summit.

A white paper, not a silver bullet

EU financial tools and incentives—aiming to generate €800 billion—certainly have the potential to move things forward, but they are not a silver bullet. A comprehensive response to the defense and security challenges Europe faces requires a multipronged approach to funding, with a majority of resources coming from member states. This will require significant increases in member states’ defense spending, likely beyond the currently discussed figure of 3 percent of each country’s gross domestic product. The mobilization of private capital should also be considered as part of this mix.

The success of the White Paper’s recommendations will also depend on the unity of the EU. Hungary, which has repeatedly blocked proposals for further military support to Ukraine, will not be the only obstacle to consensus on these initiatives. Take, for example, the prolonged discussions surrounding the upcoming European Defence Industry Plan, with the question of non-EU country participation emerging as a significant stumbling block. If increasing obstacles put EU security at greater risk, then one could expect a growing willingness to move forward instead in a “coalition of the willing,” which would further diminish the Commission’s coordination and support work.

Five years—the period in which a potential Russian threat to the EU could materialize—is a brief timeframe for Europe’s rearmament. For the sake of the EU and, in the more immediate term, of Ukraine, Europeans need to move from identifying the problems to acting on them. The White Paper is a good beginning, indicating a positive change in the mindset of EU policymakers, but the bloc must now translate this spirit into swift implementation.

Petr Tůma is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is a Czech career diplomat with expertise on Europe, the Middle East, and transatlantic relations. His views are his own.

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Air & Space Forces Magazine on the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare final report

Atlantic Council — Sat, 29 Mar 2025 03:30:00 +0000

On March 28, Air & Space Forces Magazine published an article by Shaun Waterman titled, “Experts: US Military Needs ‘Software Literate’ Workforce, Not Just Coders.” The piece highlights key recommendations from the final report of Forward Defense’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare and discussions from its public launch event on March 27.

The report emphasizes the need for a software-literate workforce—not coders, but individuals who can ask the right questions, understand software limitations, and interpret inputs and outputs. This workforce will be essential to truly adopting the Software Acquisition Pathway, which the report recommends modernizing and implementing to achieving both short-term and long-term success in the Pentagon.

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Chiang, Esper, and Fox published in DefenseNews and C4ISRNET on software-defined warfare

Atlantic Council — Fri, 28 Mar 2025 16:00:00 +0000

On March 28, Mung Chiang, Mark Esper, and Christine Fox published an op-ed highlighting key ideas from the final report of Forward Defense’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare. Entitled, “America’s arsenal of democracy needs a software renaissance,” the piece published in DefenseNews and C4ISRNET underscores the critical role of software in future conflicts, “the ability to collect, process and act on data faster than the adversary is critical in prevailing in future conflicts.”

The authors emphasize the Commission’s recommendations, including investing in artificial intelligence enablers, mandating the creation of enterprise data repositories, and shifting toward commercial software acquisition. They argue that by prioritizing data management and commercial software acquisition, the Department of Defense can achieve immediate improvements while laying the groundwork for long-term strategic success.

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ExecutiveGov reports on the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare final report

Atlantic Council — Fri, 28 Mar 2025 15:00:00 +0000

On March 28, Jane Edwards of ExecutiveGov published an article highlighting the key recommendations from the final report of Forward Defense’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare. Entitled, “Atlantic Council Calls for DOD to Advance Software-Defined Warfare,” the piece discusses the Commission’s suggestions that advanced software capabilities could elevate the Pentagon’s efficiency, effectiveness, and capacity.

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Breaking Defense reports on the Commission of Software-Defined Warfare final report

Atlantic Council — Thu, 27 Mar 2025 16:00:00 +0000

On March 27, Carly Welch of Breaking Defense published an article titled, “Experts warn Pentagon to embrace software-defined warfare to counter China’s military advantage.” The piece features key recommendations made in the final report of Forward Defense’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare, emphasizing the urgent need for the Department of Defense to modernize its approach to software and data management. Welch underscores the Commission’s concerns that without swift action, the US could risk losing its technological edge over China.

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Soofer featured in Brookings report titled, “An Iron Dome for America?”

Atlantic Council — Thu, 27 Mar 2025 14:29:27 +0000

On March 25, Forward Defense senior fellow Robert Soofer was quoted in a Brookings report entitled, “An Iron Dome for America?” The article features insights from Soofer’s recent report, “‘First, we will defend the homeland’: The case for homeland missile defense.” Brookings author Michael E. O’Hanlon argues that Soofer’s proposal offers a more realistic alternative to Trump’s ambitious “Golden Dome” vision, suggesting it “could protect against accidental, unauthorized, or ‘rogue state’ launches or limited strikes” while running “less risk of provoking an all-out arms race, given its limited capabilities.”

Former fellow

Robert Soofer

Former Senior Fellow

Forward Defense

Arms Control Defense Policy

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Inside Defense reports on the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare final report

Atlantic Council — Wed, 26 Mar 2025 20:30:00 +0000

On March 26, Theresa Maher of Inside Defense published an article highlighting the key recommendations from the final report of Forward Defense’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare. Entitled “Think tankers urge DOD to keep software procurement simple,” the article underscores the Commission’s call for a commercial-first mindset, improved data collection and sharing, and stronger collaboration between the Department of Defense (DoD) and congressional appropriation staffers.

With China outproducing the United States in military hardware, software has become essential to maintaining a competitive edge. Maher highlights the “Davidson Window,” the prediction that China may take military action against Taiwan by 2027, underscoring the urgency behind the Commission’s near-term recommendations. The report outlines how the Pentagon can leverage software practices to enhance and strengthen US defense strategies.

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Cartwright and Kandasamy in COTS Journal on the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare

Atlantic Council — Wed, 26 Mar 2025 20:00:00 +0000

On March 26, COTS Journal published an article by Gen James “Hoss” Cartwright, USMC (ret.) and Jags Kandasamy, Commissioners on Forward Defense’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare, highlighting key recommendations from the Commission’s final report. The piece explores enterprise software and operational software, outlining a strategic approach to their procurement and use. The authors urge the Department of Defense to adopt both software systems to enhance warfighter protection, ensure effective equipping, and improve battlefield safety.

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DefenseNews reports on Commission on Software-Defined Warfare final report

Atlantic Council — Wed, 26 Mar 2025 20:00:00 +0000

On March 26, Courtney Albon of DefenseNews published an article analyzing the defense industry’s response to Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s recent directive on software acquisition, highlighting Forward Defense‘s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare report as a key framework for understanding the broader reforms required. The piece, “In the wake of Hegseth’s software memo, experts eye further change,” details how military officials and industry executives have expressed “a mix of optimism and angst” about the mandate while calling for more comprehensive reforms.

The article underscores how the commission’s report identified workforce expertise as a critical need for the Pentagon and details its recommendation that Department of Defense (DoD) develop an “extensive, connected, layered and modular software-centric training program” to establish a foundational understanding of commercial best practices. The DefenseNews piece directly quotes from the commission’s findings, noting “While the DoD has taken steps to upskill its existing workforce for the digital age, a widely acknowledged software proficiency shortfall remains.”

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Exclusive on Atlantic Council Commission on Software-Defined Warfare final report published in Axios

Atlantic Council — Wed, 26 Mar 2025 14:00:00 +0000

On March 26, Colin Demarest, future of defense reporter at Axios, published an exclusive article on the Pentagon’s software-hardware balance and featured Forward Defense‘s Commision on Software-Defined Warfare report. The article, “Exclusive: The Pentagon’s software-hardware tug of war,” highlights the commission’s conclusions on the era of “software-defined warfare” and the urgent need for the US military to enhance its software capabilities to compete with China.

The piece examines key findings from the Atlantic Council report, which was the product of eighteen months of work and over seventy interviews. According to the article, the commission concluded that the US military is still anchored to an acquisition system “ill-suited to the rapid tempo of modern technological innovation,” putting the country “at significant risk.” The report emphasizes the Department of Defense’s lack of “sufficient software expertise” and recommends establishing a software cadre by recruiting dozens of specialists to be deployed across various defense departments.

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Ukraine’s growing military strength is an underrated factor in peace talks

Serhii Kuzan — Tue, 25 Mar 2025 21:06:03 +0000

Can Ukraine survive without US military aid? Could Kyiv’s European partners potentially fill the gap in weapons deliveries? Policymakers, analysts, and commentators around the world have been wrestling with these questions in recent weeks as they come to terms with US President Donald Trump’s foreign policy pivot away from Europe and his administration’s overtures toward Russia.

While the urgency and importance of this debate cannot be overstated, there has been a tendency to overlook Ukraine’s own agency and the country’s ability to defend itself. It is true that the Ukrainian war effort since 2022 has relied heavily on Western support, but Ukraine’s military has also evolved dramatically over the past three years to become by far Europe’s biggest and most effective fighting force.

Ukraine currently has approximately one million people in arms defending the country against Russia’s invasion. This makes the Ukrainian Armed Forces more than four times larger than Europe’s next biggest military. Ukraine’s troops are also battle-hardened and have unmatched knowledge of the twenty-first century battlefield. Indeed, in many areas, they are now setting the standards for others to follow.

Crucially, Ukraine’s army is backed by a highly innovative and rapidly expanding domestic military-industrial complex that is harnessing the excellence of Ukraine’s prewar tech sector and reviving long neglected Soviet era capabilities. Any discussion on the likely future course of the war against Russia and the terms of any peace deal must therefore take into account the fact that Ukraine is a now major military power in its own right.

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For the past year, international media coverage of Russia’s invasion has tended to create the impression that Putin’s army is slowly but surely grinding forward toward a costly but inevitable victory. The reality is less straightforward.

Russian troops reclaimed the battlefield initiative in early 2024 and have been advancing fairly steadily ever since, but they have only achieved relatively modest territorial gains while suffering record casualties. Analysts estimate that at the current pace, it would take Russia almost a century to complete the conquest of Ukraine.

Viewed from a broader perspective encompassing the entire full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s military performance becomes even more impressive. Since spring 2022, The Ukrainian Armed Forces have succeeded in liberating around half of all the territory seized by the Russian army, and have won a series of key battles in the Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson regions. Russia has been unable to capture and hold a single Ukrainian regional capital, and is still struggling to force Ukrainian troops out of Russia itself following Kyiv’s bold August 2024 cross-border incursion into the Kursk region.

Far beyond the battlefield, Ukraine has also overachieved. In the Black Sea, Ukrainian marine drones have revolutionized naval warfare and forced Putin to withdraw his fleet from Russian-occupied Crimea to the relative safety of Russian ports. Deep inside Russia, long-range Ukrainian drones strike at military assets, logistical hubs, and energy infrastructure with growing frequency.

Ukraine’s resilience owes much to the international military assistance the country has received. However, this support has often been subject to delays and has frequently fallen victim to political considerations that have cost Ukraine dearly. In order to minimize these vulnerabilities, the Ukrainian authorities have prioritized the development of the country’s domestic defense industry.

The results have been striking. In 2025, the overall capacity of Ukraine’s defense industry is expected to reach a new high of $35 billion, up from just $1 billion at the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion. While this capacity is not yet being fully utilized due to defense budget limitations, Ukraine now produces around one-third of all weapons, ammunition, and equipment used by the country’s armed forces. In critical areas such as drone production, the figure is now close to one hundred percent.

Meanwhile, Kyiv is encouraging international partners to invest in Ukrainian defense sector companies and finance weapons production in Ukraine. A number of countries have already responded by committing large sums and promoting joint projects within the Ukrainian defense industry. This trend is expected to gain pace during 2025 as the US pivot away from Europe fuels increased defense spending across the continent.

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Ukraine’s biggest defense industry success has been the development of the domestic drone manufacturing sector. On the eve of the full-scale invasion, the country boasted only a handful of drone producers. The sector has now mushroomed to include over 200 businesses producing millions of drones annually, with output expected to treble during the current year. In order to harness this rapidly growing strike potential and maximize battlefield impact, Ukraine last year established a special branch of the armed forces dedicated to drone warfare.

Ukraine’s emergence as a drone warfare superpower owes much to the country’s strong tech traditions and entrepreneurial spirit. Since 2022, Ukrainian drone developers have proved highly innovative and are now recognized internationally as world leaders in military drone technologies. “Foreign models are like Toyotas now, while Ukrainian drones are Mercedes. Ours are just leagues ahead,” one Ukrainian commander told Ukrainska Pravda recently.

Ukraine now has a formidable arsenal of drones for use on the battlefield, at sea, and for long-range attacks against targets across Russia. The country also has a growing collection of hybrid missile-drones and missiles. President Zelenskyy recently confirmed that Ukraine had carried out an attack with the domestically produced Long Neptune cruise missile for the first time, underlining the country’s growing potential to strike back at Russia. Further innovations are in the pipeline, with domestic missile production expected to increase in the coming months if Kyiv is able to secure the necessary additional funding.

The Ukrainian military still faces a range of major challenges. The biggest issue remains manpower shortages. So far, Kyiv has sought to address mobilization problems by updating training and offering recruits the opportunity to choose the unit they will serve in, but shortfalls persist. A new initiative aimed at potential recruits between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five was launched in February 2025, featuring attractive enlistment packages and one-year service contracts.

There is also no escaping the fact that Ukraine remains dependent on Western support in order to maintain the country’s war effort. While officials in Kyiv have spoken of increasing the share of domestically produced war materials to fifty percent, Ukraine cannot realistically expect to match Russia’s overwhelming advantages in manpower, firepower, industrial capacity, and financing without continued assistance from the West.

Despite these limitations, Ukraine’s growing military strength must be taken into consideration during coming negotiations over a potential compromise peace deal with Russia. While nobody in Kyiv would relish the grim prospect of fighting on without Western assistance, the country is far from defenseless and will not accept a bad peace that places Ukrainian statehood in jeopardy.

Russia made the mistake of underestimating Ukraine in 2022, and has since paid a terrible price. Three years on, there can be little doubt that the Ukrainian army is now the most powerful fighting force in Europe. This military reality will help shape the contours of any future peace deal. It should also guarantee Ukraine’s place at the heart of Europe’s changing security system as the continent adjusts to the new geopolitical realities of an isolationist United States and an expansionist Russia.

Serhii Kuzan is Chairman of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center (USCC). He formerly served as an adviser to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (2022-2023) and advisor to the Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council (2014).

Rodriguez, Shanahan, and Sweatt cut into the stakes and opportunities of software-defined warfare on All Quiet on the Second Front podcast

Atlantic Council — Mon, 24 Mar 2025 18:00:00 +0000

On March 24, Stephen Rodriguez, senior advisor at Forward Defense and director of FD’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare, was a featured guest alongside Lt Gen Jack Shanahan, a commissioner on the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare, on the podcast All Quiet on the Second Front, hosted by Tyler Sweatt, a commissioner on the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare. This episode, entitled “Software Defined Warfare with Lt. Gen. Jack Shanahan and Stephen Rodriguez,” shed light on the urgency of developing innovative strategies that will best prepare the DoD to navigate an increasingly software-driven defense landscape.

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As the US steps back in Europe, Central Europe must step up

Sona Muzikarova — Thu, 20 Mar 2025 22:18:35 +0000

Europe faces a geopolitical predicament, as the European Union’s (EU’s) summits in Brussels on March 6 and on Thursday laid bare. European capitals are preparing for US security disengagement, but each still needs to figure out what it must to do fill the expected void. This issue is especially acute for Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, which are nearest to Russian aggression and in many ways most reliant on US support at present.

There has been recent action at the EU level. The European Commission’s ambitious €800 billion defense mobilization plan, which was unveiled this month, coupled with its proposal for €150 billion in EU-backed loans, represents the most significant shift in European security posture since the Cold War. The bloc’s commitments came at the eleventh hour, after EU leaders rallied behind Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy following the Oval Office blowup on March 2. Yet even with the apparent US-Ukraine reconciliation in Jeddah on March 11, broader transatlantic fissures remain that should spur CCE countries to action.

Watching Kyiv and Washington

Washington’s pursuit of peace talks with Moscow, potentially without much regard for the fairness or longevity of the peace deal, compounds this pressure. The United States’ disengagement and US President Donald Trump’s overtures to Russian President Vladimir Putin, including a call on Tuesday, resurrect old ghosts for CEE countries, reviving existential anxieties about Western abandonment. Trump’s entertaining of the Russian leader’s demands for territorial concessions eerily echoes the 1938 Munich Agreement, when the United Kingdom readily abandoned Czechoslovakia to appease a revisionist power.

This US foreign policy pivot carries destabilizing consequences for Europe, Ukraine, and the broader post-Soviet region. That shift makes it imperative for European nations to rethink defense—it can no longer be viewed as a budgetary afterthought but must be treated as an industrial priority. CEE countries are well positioned to contribute significantly to this transformation despite their varying strategic alignments. But to do so, they must finally break their dependence on Russian energy and harness their manufacturing capabilities to strengthen Europe’s collective defense industrial base.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, CEE has flourished under the US security umbrella. NATO membership shielded these nations from their twentieth century fate, allowing democratic institutions to take root and market economies to modernize. But this era of stability is at severe risk.

If Ukraine is forced into an unfavorable settlement that surrenders territory to Moscow, neighboring countries will justifiably fear that they could be next as Washington reevaluates its commitments. Russia has insisted that NATO forces roll back from Eastern Europe for years, and Moscow reiterated this demand during US-Russia talks in Saudi Arabia in February. This raises concerns over what kind of concessions Trump might entertain to strike a quick deal with Russia. Once again, CEE finds itself wedged between an aggressive Russia and Western allies struggling to build credible defense capacity.

The danger of further fragmentation

The commitments EU leaders made this month in Brussels will mean little without concerted action to transform the bloc’s political ambitions into genuine military capabilities. Despite NATO membership, military vulnerability persists across CEE, with defense capacities currently insufficient without US backing.

For the CEE countries, the combination of a disengaging United States and an emboldened Russia presents three critical challenges: the growing divides in its strategic orientation, its continued dependence on Russian energy commodities, and the need to modernize its defenses.

The region remains politically fragmented. The Baltic states and Poland have led a robust response to Ukraine’s plight since 2022, while the governments of Hungary and Slovakia exhibit marked pro-Russian attitudes. At the EU summit this month, Hungary stood alone in opposing the security deal, while Slovakia attempted to leverage it to restart Russian gas flows. CEE’s incomplete energy transition and Slovakia and Hungary’s foot-dragging to break free from Moscow’s gas leverage continue to complicate security calculations for the continent.

These divisions reflect a deepening rift in the region’s strategic orientation—a division between the pro-European path championed by Warsaw and the Baltics, with their clear-eyed view of Russian revanchism, and members of the pro-Moscow camp led by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, whose authoritarian tendencies and energy dependencies make them convenient bedfellows with the Kremlin. This courtship of Moscow comes with a price tag: democratic backsliding at home and diminished credibility in Brussels.

How CEE can seize the moment

There is another way. CEE nations’ necessary efforts to bolster their security can also help the region build up its industrial capabilities and boost its economic competitiveness. For example, several CEE countries have in recent decades developed robust industrial supply chains with Germany, in particular with the German automotive industry. This German-CEE industrial cluster can play an outsized role in addressing security challenges, and it also provides a chance to boost the economies of all the nations involved.

In some ways, this has already started. Poland’s state-owned PGZ, for example, has partnered with Germany’s Rheinmetall to produce Leopard tanks in Poznań, Poland. The Czechoslovak Group has become a crucial supplier of artillery shells to Ukraine, increasing production fivefold since 2022, while Estonia’s Milrem Robotics is developing autonomous border surveillance systems as a part of the Baltic Defense Line.

At a time when German automakers and their CEE subsidiaries are cutting jobs to an extent not seen in a long time, the legacy automotive industry could be partly repurposed into state-of-the-art factories for unmanned aerial vehicles and conventional artillery. In some cases, this may require expanding existing industries or adapting existing production lines. In other cases, the scale of the challenge will be even greater, as it will involve sophisticated capabilities that must be rapidly developed.

Moreover, despite its strategic importance and clear industrial potential, the CEE defense revival faces additional hurdles, including fiscal management, skilled labor shortages, supply chain disruptions, political fragmentation, and policy uncertainty. The success of this continental rearmament will ultimately depend on sustained political will across multiple electoral cycles and supportive economic conditions.

The prospect of US security disengagement from Europe demands more than half-measures and hopeful rhetoric. The United States pulling back from Europe’s defense would leave a void that only European countries themselves can fill. CEE nations must also navigate their fragmented political posture against Moscow and transform defense from a budget line to an industrial priority. Europe’s eastern flank is even more exposed as the West’s security architecture is being redrawn. The question is whether it will be drawn by Europe or for it.

Soňa Muzikárová is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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Britain takes the lead as Europe seeks to boost support for Ukraine

Alina Hrytsenko — Tue, 18 Mar 2025 18:50:17 +0000

UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer hosted a virtual meeting of Western leaders on March 15 to discuss rapidly developing plans for a “coalition of the willing” to oversee the implementation of a possible peace deal between Russia and Ukraine. The event was the latest in a series initiated by Starmer as he looks to provide Ukraine with long-term security and reduce the threat of a renewed Russian invasion.

Earlier in March, the British PM and his team also reportedly worked extensively behind the scenes to repair the damage following Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s disastrous Oval Office meeting with US President Donald Trump and Vice-President JD Vance. These efforts helped prepare the ground for a US ceasefire proposal that was subsequently accepted by Ukraine in Saudi Arabia.

Starmer’s recent contributions underline Britain’s longstanding commitment to Ukraine. Since the eve of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than three years ago, the UK has consistently been at the forefront of efforts to boost Ukrainian resilience and oppose Russian aggression. With the future of US assistance to Ukraine now in question amid the Trump administration’s pivot away from Europe, Britain is taking the lead as the continent adapts to new security realities and seeks to prevent a Russian victory in Ukraine.

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Since the onset of Russia’s invasion in early 2022, the UK has been among Ukraine’s biggest backers. According to data from the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, British military aid up to the end of 2024 totaled $10.4 billion, putting the country in third place behind the United States and Germany among Ukraine’s international partners. Crucially, the UK has also often led by example in providing Ukraine with new categories of weapons including modern battle tanks and cruise missiles, paving the way for others to do likewise.

In addition to direct military aid, British support for Ukraine also extends to cooperation in areas including cybersecurity, intelligence, and countering hybrid threats. The UK continues to assist in the reform of the Ukrainian defense sector and provides training for Ukrainian military personnel. In the diplomatic arena, Britain advocates for tough sanctions measures against Russia and draws international attention to the Kremlin’s crimes in Ukraine.

This strategic support for Ukraine has enabled Britain to reassert its leadership position on the global stage following the country’s exit from the European Union. By supporting Ukraine, post-Brexit Britain has demonstrated that it remains a force in international affairs and a major contributor to European security. British support for the Ukrainian war effort has also made it possible to overcome Brexit-related tensions and build new partnerships with key European countries such as Germany, France, and Italy.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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British backing for Ukraine is about much more than mere power projection, of course. There is a broad cross-party consensus in Westminster that Europe’s collective security is inextricably linked to the outcome of the war in Ukraine. The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine has coincided with a particularly turbulent period in British politics, with four different prime ministers and a change in government since February 2022. Throughout all this, the country’s position on Ukraine has remained largely unchanged.

Ties between London and Kyiv are now poised to strengthen further. The exact nature and objectives of a potential international peacekeeping force for Ukraine are not yet clear, but if current plans proceed as anticipated, it seems all but certain that British troops will feature prominently in any deployment. This would deepen a bilateral relationship that looks set to be at the heart of Europe’s new security architecture in the coming years.

As Europe adjusts to the dramatic shifts in US foreign policy initiated by the Trump administration, Britain is playing an important role as a transatlantic intermediary, while also leading European efforts to bolster Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression. Almost ten years after the country voted to leave the EU, Britain is now once again proving itself indispensable to European security.

Alina Hrytsenko is co-founder of the Kyiv-based Research Solutions analytical network. She was previously a senior consultant at the National Institute for Strategic Studies.

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Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion just over three years ago, an improvised industry of defense tech startups has mushroomed in garages, workshops, and warehouses across Ukraine. This trend has benefited from the country’s vibrant prewar IT industry, with many existing IT businesses and tech entrepreneurs switching their focus in 2022 to support the Ukrainian army.

This has led to dramatic increases in the domestic production of key items such as surveillance and attack drones, with Ukrainian developers engaged in a relentless daily race to stay ahead of their Russian adversaries. Hundreds of Ukrainian companies are now engaged in drone manufacturing, compared to a mere handful in 2021. The Ukrainian government recently unveiled plans to purchase around 4.5 million first person view drones in 2025, more than doubling last year’s number. This is enhancing Ukraine’s reputation as a global defense tech hub and boosting the country’s efforts to reduce its reliance on military aid from the West.

Eurasia Center events

Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

Ukrainian drones are playing a key role in transforming the modern battlefield and are now responsible for around two-thirds of Russian losses, according to a recent report by the Royal United Services Institute. Ukraine’s progress has been so groundbreaking that leading Western defense companies are increasingly looking to learn from the country. For example, Silicon Valley companies are tapping into the know-how of Ukrainian drone makers, the Wall Street Journal reports.

The impact of Ukraine’s defense tech prowess is perhaps most evident in the Black Sea. At the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s navy was virtually nonexistent, while the dominance of the Russian Black Sea Fleet was taken for granted. Three years on, Ukraine has successfully leveraged low-cost, high-impact naval drones to offset Russia’s initial advantages and break the blockade of the country’s Black Sea ports.

Ukraine’s maritime drones have repeatedly proved their effectiveness, sinking or damaging numerous Russian warships and forcing Putin to withdraw the bulk of his fleet from Crimea to the safety of Russia itself. Despite the distances involved, Ukrainian naval drones are able to pose a threat to Russian shipping far from Crimea. In summer 2023, Ukraine launched a long-range drone attack that reportedly damaged a warship close the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, around six hundred kilometers from the nearest Ukrainian naval bases in the Odesa region.

Ukraine’s naval drone fleet continues to evolve at a rapid pace. In recent months, a new model equipped with missiles reportedly shot down a Russian helicopter over the Black Sea. Marine drones have also been developed as launch craft for aerial drones. Ukrainian officials claim these “miniature aircraft carriers” have already been used to hit Russian military targets in occupied Crimea and southern Ukraine. Looking ahead, the use of naval drones as platforms for aerial attacks could create opportunities for Ukraine to bypass Russian front line defenses and launch strikes from unexpected angles.

As Ukraine enters a fourth year of full-scale war against one of the world’s leading military powers, the need for continuous innovation on the battlefield and at sea remains critical. Ukraine’s remarkable success in the Battle for the Black Sea is an indication of what can be achieved when the Ukrainian military makes the most of the country’s innovative defense tech industry. Kyiv’s partners should take note of the key role being played by Ukrainian defense tech innovators and maximize their support for this strategically crucial sector.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

But without urgent reform, NATO risks eroding its credibility and failing to provide warfighters with the tools they need, when they need them. NATO must increase efficiency, maintain its technological edge, improve interoperability, and ensure its forces can fight as a cohesive Alliance.

The case for urgent reform

NATO’s capability development process is structurally misaligned with its operational needs. Here are four ways to reform the capability development and delivery process.

1. Prioritize speed and outcomes over process

NATO’s risk-averse, process-driven culture leads to excessive delays. Capabilities stall not due to technical challenges but because of bureaucratic approvals, redundant reviews, and slow decision-making. Even urgent capability needs must clear multiple layers of approval, leading to delays measured in years instead of months.

These delays hinder NATO’s ability to field critical technologies, such as artificial intelligence-enabled decision support, cyber defense tools, and space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—capabilities that adversaries are deploying at speed. By the time NATO makes a decision, the operational environment has often already shifted, making some investments obsolete before they are even employed.

NATO must replace its risk-averse, process-driven culture with one that rewards speed, effectiveness, and operational impact. Governance should focus on timely decision-making, with clear, enforceable timelines for capability approvals. NATO should also streamline redundant reviews and adopt commercial-sector best practices, such as rapid prototyping and iterative fielding.

2. Establish a single accountable authority

NATO’s Common-Funded Capability Development (CFCD) process is fragmented across multiple organizations. Therefore, no single entity is accountable for delivering capabilities from concept to fielding. This diffusion of responsibility creates inefficiencies and capability gaps that weaken NATO’s deterrence.

Although Allied Command Transformation’s deputy chief of staff for capability development (DCOS CD) informally coordinates efforts across NATO Headquarters and procurement agencies, the absence of authority to set deadlines, assign priorities, or enforce accountability hampers progress.

Recognizing this challenge, the DCOS CD has begun to strengthen the Capability Management Authority and refine the Strategic Portfolio Review to improve prioritization and coordination. These are positive steps, but they remain dependent on consensus-based decision-making and lack the enforcement mechanisms to accelerate delivery.

One solution is to establish a senior leader—such as an assistant secretary general for acquisition and capability delivery (ASG ACD)—to oversee CFCD execution. Supported by a directorate drawn from existing expertise, this leader would have the power to set priorities, enforce timelines, resolve disputes, and ensure capability gaps are closed on time. Such a role would institutionalize ongoing efforts, ensuring prioritization, sequencing, and execution occur under the necessary accountable and empowered authority to drive results.

3. Align capability development with national force planning

NATO’s CFCD process and the NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP) operate separately despite being inextricably linked. CFCD funds shared capabilities, while the NDPP ensures nations develop forces that meet collective requirements. When these processes are not aligned, capability gaps and interoperability challenges emerge.

The modernization of NATO’s Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) highlights this misalignment. For nearly a decade, NATO debated whether to sustain, replace, or transition away from AWACS. The Alliance Future Surveillance and Control initiative, launched in 2017, remained a study rather than a structured procurement effort. Meanwhile, CFCD decision-making lacked urgency, leaving allies uncertain about their role in NATO’s future surveillance and control capability. If CFCD investments do not align with NDPP-generated national capabilities, NATO risks funding systems that are incomplete or unable to integrate into broader force structures. The result? Delays, misaligned capabilities, and an Alliance less prepared to fight as a unified force.

To address this, NATO should institutionalize a formal mechanism to synchronize CFCD and NDPP decision-making. The Alliance has recently taken promising steps, such as reestablishing linkages through the introduction of ‘collective targets’ in the next version of NATO’s political guidance document, which is currently in development and slated for approval in 2027. However, deeper and more sustained alignment is necessary to prevent delays and ensure NATO’s investments integrate seamlessly with national force development.

4. Reform industry engagement and procurement agility

NATO’s rigid procurement processes prevent it from rapidly integrating cutting-edge technologies in artificial intelligence, cyber, and space. While adversaries exploit emerging capabilities, NATO remains bound by slow, inflexible acquisition rules.

To overcome these barriers, NATO must overhaul its approach to industry engagement and procurement. The pending Industry Engagement Strategy for Space is a step in the right direction, potentially bringing commercial space capabilities and technology to the Alliance, but further action is required. NATO should establish fast-track acquisition pathways, modeled on successful national defense programs, to accelerate the procurement of emerging technologies. Additionally, NATO Security Investment Program funding mechanisms must become more flexible, allowing for adaptive, needs-driven investments that keep pace with evolving threats.

NATO must act now

The urgency of reform cannot be overstated. NATO’s capability development system is not keeping pace with modern warfare. If the Alliance does not act decisively, its deterrence credibility and warfighting effectiveness will erode while adversaries accelerate their technological and military capabilities.

Reforming decision-making, empowering dedicated leadership, aligning CFCD with NDPP, and modernizing procurement are strategic imperatives. NATO’s ability to deter, respond, and prevail depends on fielding capabilities at the speed of operational need.

NATO must act now to remain ready, relevant, and dominant in the battlespace of tomorrow. Incremental change is no longer an option.

Lieutenant General (Ret.) David J. Julazadeh is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He most recently served at NATO’s Allied Command Transformation as the deputy chief of staff, capability development.

The post NATO’s capability development: A call for urgent reform appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The hypersonic imperative

Michael E. White — Wed, 12 Mar 2025 18:27:12 +0000

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Capabilities that are lethal, survivable, and responsive from long range, will be essential for the United States to achieve battlefield dominance in the highly contested battle space anticipated in any future conflict with major power adversaries. This is why the Department of Defense and Congress must prioritize the accelerated fielding of these capabilities.

Key points

China and Russia have seized an advantage in hypersonic capabilities, challenging the security of the US homeland and its forward bases, ultimately undermining deterrence of great-power war and eroding US assurance of its allies and partners.
Hypersonic vehicles fly and maneuver at greater than five times the speed of sound (Mach 5) and often much faster. Long-range hypersonic weapons offer the potential to strike fleeting targets deep within an adversary nation and avoid ever-more-sophisticated air and missile defenses.
The US Department of Defense and Congress must make the acceleration of current-generation hypersonic weapon and counter-hypersonic defense programs a national priority while investing in the next generation of affordable capabilities, including the underlying workforce, T&E, S&T, the supply chain, and the broader industrial base.

What are hypersonic capabilities?

As a general rule, hypersonic vehicles fly a significant portion of their trajectory at speeds in excess of five times the speed of sound (Mach 5, or about 3400 miles per hour at altitude). Note that many hypersonic vehicles fly at speeds well above Mach 5. The manned X-15 experimental hypersonic aircraft flew at just below Mach 7. Ballistic missiles reenter Earth’s atmosphere between Mach 10 and Mach 20, depending on their range. The space shuttles reentered from Earth orbit around Mach 25.

Urgent investment needed to address unacceptable asymmetry

There has been a recent focus on the development of long-range, hypersonic weapons that maneuver high within the atmosphere leveraging speed, a survivable altitude corridor, and lethality to change the dynamic on the battlefield. Unfortunately, potential US adversaries have seized the initiative to develop, field, and use this new class of weapons to help create an asymmetry that challenges US and allied battlefield dominance. The United States must not let that asymmetry persist.

<10 MINUTES	Time-to-target of a hypersonic missile at five-hundred-miles range
MACH 10+	Glide speed of most hypersonic glide vehicles
2021	The year China tested a global range hypersonic glide vehicle, alarming US observers
2018	Russia starts production of Avangard intercontinental range hypersonic nuclear armed glide vehicle
2023	USAF AARW development successfully completed without transitioning to production

Why are hypersonic capabilities important on the battlefield?

Hypersonic weapons can defeat heavily defended, high-value targets from long range within minutes. To deliver effects on a target at five hundred miles, a traditional subsonic cruise missile, such as the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) or Tomahawk, would take approximately one hour of flight time. Hypersonic cruise missiles can make that trip in less than ten minutes. A hypersonic glide vehicle can make the trip between Guam and the Taiwan straights in under 30 minutes. Additionally, these missiles cruise or glide above most air-defense systems and below most ballistic-missile-defense systems and are highly maneuverable. Hypersonic weapons, therefore, dramatically compress the timescale of relevance on the battlefield, are highly survivable, and have long range to ensure survivability of their launch platform.

The US ability to dominate the current and near-future battlefield has been significantly degraded by the current, and projected, asymmetry in hypersonic weapons

—Michael E. White, former principal director for hypersonics in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, Research and Engineering

What is the current posture in hypersonics?

Russia and China have aggressively pursued the development of long-range hypersonic weapons and have developed and fielded several types of hypersonic strike weapons that hold US theater land and sea bases at great risk. Furthermore, potential adversaries such as North Korea and Iran have reportedly developed and deployed hypersonic weapons. Russia has developed and deployed a nuclear-armed hypersonic weapon that holds the US mainland at risk from a highly survivable nuclear first strike. While the United States has made great progress developing a first generation of air-, land-, and sea-launched hypersonic strike weapons over the past five years, Washington has not yet fielded its first weapon. Most notably, the US Air Force decided not to field the Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW), a boost-glide hypersonic weapon, when it was ready at the end of 2023. Additionally, while there have now been two very successful flight tests, delays in fielding the Army Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) and Navy Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) weapons, originally scheduled to field in 2023 and 2025, respectively. As a result, the US ability to dominate the current and near-future battlefield has been significantly degraded by the current, and projected, asymmetry in hypersonic weapons.

The hypersonic imperative

To address the battlefield asymmetry that Washington currently faces in hypersonics, it is imperative that the United States

accelerate the fielding of recently matured air-, land-, and sea-launched weapons in numbers;
establish block upgrade programs that insert advanced capabilities in a timely manner;
prioritize cost-reduction initiatives to ensure the United States can affordably field the necessary capacity;
accelerate fielding of capability to defend against adversary hypersonic systems;
develop and mature next-generation weapon systems, including reusable hypersonic aircraft;
enhance hypersonic ground and flight test capability, modeling and
simulation (M&S), science and technology (S&T), and workforce initiatives;
energize the broad industrial base to instill affordability and innovation across the portfolio; and
work with allies to capture innovation and enable accelerated fielding of affordable capacity

Should the United States fail to improve its offensive hypersonic capabilities, Washington’s ability to penetrate adversary A2/AD nodes and manage escalation could degrade, making it more difficult to deter great-power war and manage intrawar deterrence. Failing to protect the United States from hypersonic weapons could allow adversaries to more effectively coerce the United States by threatening limited warning conventional strike against key civilian and military infrastructure, as well as attacking US forces deployed abroad.

Why now?

The United States must field and evolve hypersonic capabilities now as part of a comprehensive warfighting strategy to maintain its ability to dominate the battlefield against an increasingly capable set of adversaries. These adversaries have developed integrated capabilities to create a highly contested environment to defeat US and allied forces across all domains: air, land, sea, and space. This multi-domain threat must be addressed with a comprehensive and layered defeat strategy that leverages new offensive and defensive capabilities across kinetic and non-kinetic domains to attack and disable adversaries’ high-end systems before and after launch. Hypersonic strike weapons, launched from stand-off ranges that protect launch platforms, will be essential to allowing US and allied forces to defeat these systems with lethal, survivable effects in a timescale of relevance on a modern battlefield. This offensive capability must be coupled with effective, layered, kinetic, and non-kinetic defenses against adversary hypersonic and ballistic missile capabilities.

The Hypersonic Capabilities Task Force

To address these issues, the Atlantic Council has assembled a Hypersonic Capabilities Task Force to

benchmark US efforts in offensive and defensive hypersonic capabilities;
identify gaps in technology, policy, and procurement; and
recommend actionable solutions to ensure the United States remains at the forefront of hypersonic innovation.

The task force is co-chaired

Deborah Lee James, former secretary of the US Air Force; and
Ryan McCarthy, former secretary of the US Army

This task force is directed by

Stephen Rodriguez, senior advisor, Forward Defense, Atlantic Council

The task force author is

Michael White, former principal director for hypersonics in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, Research and Engineering

Task force members include

Jim Cooper, former congressman; former Chair of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee
Madelyn Creedon, former senior Defense Department and Energy Department leader;
Doug Lamborn, former congressman; former Chair of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee
GEN James McConville, USA (ret), former Army Chief of Staff; and
Whitney McNamara, Atlantic Council nonresident senior fellow.

Industry task force members include

Felipe Gomez del Campo, chief executive officer, Specter Aerospace;
Hank Holland, chairman and chief executive officer of Amaero International Ltd.;
Katrina Hornstein, hypersonic portfolio director at Ursa Major;
Michael Johns, senior vice president, Kratos Defense and Security Solutions;
Cameron McCord, co founder and chief executive officer of Nominal;
Chris Power, founder and chief executive officer of Hadrian;
Mark Rettig, vice president at GE Aerospace;
Ralph Sandfry, director for hypersonics and directed energy at Lockheed Martin;
Zach Shore, chief revenue officer at Hermeus; and
Brian Zimmerman, senior vice president at Booz Allen Hamilton.

Task force staff include

Mark J. Massa, deputy director, Forward Defense, Atlantic Council
Jonathan Rosenstein, program assistant, Forward Defense, Atlantic Council

Explore the program

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The EU must become a strategic player in defense—alongside NATO

Justina Budginaite-Froehly — Wed, 05 Mar 2025 20:12:28 +0000

Facing a revanchist Russia and an increasingly transactional United States, European countries should finally start working on several parallel tracks to strengthen the continent’s deterrence and defense. As European members of NATO discuss additional military contingents to mobilize to defend themselves with minimal or—some fear—no support from the United States, it also is crucial for the European Union (EU) to step up to bolster Europe’s defense. The EU’s action is urgently needed on cross-border issues that have a direct impact on the continent’s deterrence and defense posture but remain largely uncovered by NATO.

European countries lack vital logistical interoperability with infrastructural bottlenecks and regulatory inconsistencies hindering military mobility across the continent. They duplicate many military platforms but, at the same time, fail to acquire critical capabilities such as air defense. A still highly fragmented European defense technological and industrial base is protected by narrow national interests and is thus unable to address capability gaps, replenish dwindling arms stocks, and compete on the global level on defense innovation.

In the current extremely demanding times, a refined NATO-EU alignment on defense would provide a critically needed burden sharing to eliminate these vulnerabilities and prepare Europe to withstand potential contingencies.

The NATO-EU nexus

The recent public remarks by representatives of the Trump administration, who repeatedly claimed that Europe must take ownership of conventional security on the continent, mean that an effective burden sharing must be established between European NATO members and the EU to meet the challenge. Both organizations have complementary roles in defense to play, and despite the recent shockwaves that the emerging new transactional American foreign policy has sent to its allies in Europe, the requirement for complementarity in the NATO-EU defense effort remains crucial.

NATO has highly integrated structures and procedures and has developed regional defense plans, predetermined capability targets, and military standards. These assets are the result of decades-long work and would not be easy to replace anytime soon. The United States remains a crucial member of the Alliance, especially in such areas as command and control (C2), intelligence, and long-range strike that would be difficult to replace in the short and medium term.

Strategically vital EU and NATO eastern flank member states—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland—insist on their reliance on NATO as the primary security guarantor. So do the Nordic countries including the newest NATO members, Finland and Sweden.

However, the ongoing dynamics of the past several weeks show clearly that the modus operandi of NATO is about to change with the shifting role of the United States in it. Working through flexible formations of “coalitions of the willing” will most likely replace the rather bureaucratic and, therefore, slow-working methods of past decades. This is not the first time that NATO has undergone a transformation, which is a natural process in a changing world. Working toward the same goal of keeping the Euro-Atlantic area safe is what counts. A repeated assurance will be needed from the United States on this.

The EU, for its part, still lacks both formal competencies and a unified political ambition to step deeper into the defense planning and execution field. At its core, the EU is susceptible to singular member states’ malfunction, as seen in Hungary under Viktor Orbán and Slovakia under Robert Fico, who constantly put brakes on such otherwise widely supported processes as tightening sanctions on Russia. Russia puts enormous effort into expanding the malfunction to other EU members as well: The latest example is the for-now-failed attempt to install a pro-Russian president in Romania. To become autonomous in defense, as repeatedly demanded by France, the EU must first reform internally.

Russia’s main objective is to divide and weaken its most significant strategic rival, NATO. Any attempts to offer alternatives to the Alliance’s primacy in European defense would eventually play into Putin’s hands, undermining deterrence and putting the frontline EU countries at immediate risk. Russia’s continuous rejection of Ukraine’s membership in NATO is—although void—an indication that NATO retains its deterrence power. Allies on both sides of the Atlantic should continue working on this credible deterrence to stay in place—with the EU being an important partner in this regard.

The answer to the current situation is a stronger European pillar in NATO, with the EU bearing a larger and better aligned burden with the Alliance by internalizing and fully embracing its distinct and unique role in security and defense as a defense enabler. Through its budgetary and regulatory authority, the EU can and must ensure that the necessary conditions for implementing NATO’s defense plans in Europe are completely satisfied. This particularly applies to critical areas such as military mobility and defense industrial readiness.

The EU’s role in military mobility

It is alarming that despite their commitment since 2017 to improve military mobility across the EU, European countries still have insufficient cross-border logistical interoperability and face immense bureaucratic obstacles when preparing military convoys for transportation across the EU. Germany and the Baltic states are the two most obvious cases in this regard, both because of the challenges they face and the strategic roles they play.

Due to its central location in Europe, Germany is considered Europe’s key hub in military logistics. Germany is home to major NATO bases including the Headquarters Allied Air Command in Ramstein, the Airborne Warning and Control System’s main base of operation in Geilenkirchen, and the Strategic Air Lift Interim Solution base in Leipzig, among others. Its territory stretches between Europe’s main seaports—Rotterdam, Antwerp, and Hamburg, which are crucial for incoming allied military supplies and reinforcements—and NATO’s and EU’s eastern flank countries Poland and the Baltic states. Germany’s inland waterways—the Rhine and Danube—provide the north-south transportation corridor toward Romania. What stretches in between is Europe’s longest railway network, which, as of 2022, had a total length of 38,836 kilometers of railway lines.

From a military logistics perspective, railways are considered crucial because they allow the transport of numerous pieces of heavy military equipment in one load. However, because of many years of underinvestment and neglect, Germany’s railways, roads, and bridges are in dire shape and often technically incapable of handling such heavy transport. Shortages in special railway wagons, which often have to be supplied by commercial providers, add to the existing problem. Finally, there are immense bureaucratic hurdles remaining within the EU (and even among Germany’s federal states) when it comes to documentation and permits to be acquired before military cargo can move from one state to another.

Thus, the EU should increase its efforts to speed up Europe-wide infrastructure upgrades, increase the state-owned fleets of railway wagons for military transport, and take decisive steps to implement a “Military Schengen” regime. Based on the experience of the free movement of passengers and goods within the EU, this regime is crucial to minimize the paperwork—and thus valuable time—involved in moving troops and military equipment across the EU.

The Baltic states’ logistical accessibility is another key issue in implementing NATO’s defense plans in this strategically vital gateway region. Their railways are primarily of a wide Russian gauge (1,520 millimeters), which is incompatible with the European standard gauge (1,435 mm) rail tracks. Thus, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia remain better connected to Russia and Belarus than to their NATO and EU allies.

The RailBaltica project, designed to connect the Baltic capitals with Warsaw via an 870 km long European standard-gauge rail track, is facing significant cost overruns and delays. Now scheduled for completion by 2030, RailBaltica is crucial for the deterrence and defense of the Baltic states—especially considering potential obstacles in sending allied reinforcements and military supplies by ship through the congested Baltic Sea, given the substantial Russian military presence in the Kaliningrad exclave. The EU has already provided financial support for this project, but more assistance—and institutional clarity—is needed, particularly in terms of an EU-level centralized management oversight of this and other military mobility projects. After more than fifteen years of planning, the RailBaltica project, just like other infrastructural upgrades in the EU, must finally be prioritized politically, providing a necessary push and support to the implementing member states.

Europe needs a defense industrial revamp

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has exposed Europe’s dysfunctional defense industrial landscape. The issue involves three factors: the status quo situation (current capability gaps and insufficient ammunition stocks), demand-side shortcomings, and supply-side risks. Whereas NATO’s main—though not sole—instrument to address this issue is to increase the target for member states’ defense spending, the EU has signaled the ambition to employ a more comprehensive approach. What started with the European Defense Fund to finance joint research and development projects in defense is now to be expanded through the still-under-negotiation European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) to the areas of defense production and joint procurement. Action is urgently needed, but there is a risk of overstretching and losing focus on what really matters now and in the future.

What matters now is closing capability gaps, particularly in air defense, and filling Europe’s depleting ammunition stocks. It has been estimated that at the current production levels, Europe would need ten years to replenish its ammunition stocks in order to be prepared to defend itself. This timeline is far too long, considering German intelligence warnings about a potential Russian attack on European NATO member states by the end of this decade. While NATO sets its stockpile targets, the EU must utilize its regulatory powers and funding initiatives to push its member states to reach them.

Some short-term measures, such as the Act in Support of Ammunition Production, have already been implemented and are set to be transformed into long-term financing instruments through the EDIP. The proposal from the EU’s commissioner for defense and space, Andrius Kubilius, to implement mandatory ammunition stockpiles for EU member states, requiring them to meet NATO’s targets by 2030, would mirror similar EU measures in other critical areas, such as energy.

The discussion surrounding the increase of defense industrial production and joint procurement is closely tied to questions about potential adjustments to the current defense industrial supply and demand dynamics.

In terms of supply, the EU seeks to promote the purchase of arms manufactured by the European defense industry to strengthen and consolidate it while also avoiding restrictions on the use of weapons produced by foreign companies. Financial considerations are directly linked to this matter. Currently, the EU is divided into two main factions: one advocating for this European solution, and the other arguing that non-EU NATO allies—primarily the United States, UK, and Norway—who are major players in the defense industry, along with other key partners such as South Korea, should not be excluded from the EU’s funding mechanisms. On the demand side, the EU seeks to incentivize joint procurement by its member states to allow for bigger, cheaper, and more predictable orders, which would also lead to better standardization and interoperability of military equipment in use by the Europeans.

Keeping the non-EU NATO allies in the loop when contemplating new funding options is crucial for sustaining their commitment to Europe’s defense and accessing currently available off-the-shelf purchases of ammunition and legacy military platforms urgently needed in Europe in the short term. European countries such as Poland and the Baltic states are increasing their defense spending faster than any other European NATO member and are willing to spend the money on military platforms that meet three basic criteria—made by an allied country, proven to be of good quality, and available in the near future—making them eager buyers of US and South Korean production. Given their proximity to a potential future front line and their commitment to securing it for the sake of a free Europe, these choices should not be neglected in future EU funding schemes.

In the short term, instead of supply-side isolationism, demand-side corrections should be prioritized in the EU’s effort to play a more active role in strengthening the European defense technological and industrial base. With the EU’s support, favorable arrangements can be negotiated with foreign arms manufacturers, including fulfilling some parts of their contractual obligations in the EU, for example, in the areas of production, assembly, or servicing, and thus contributing to local economies, skill development, and sustainment of purchased arms’ life cycles locally while also securing the delivery of best quality, battlefield-proven military platforms for the European armed forces.

Thoughts on harsher supply-side interventions should be directed toward fostering the consolidation of emerging defense technology hubs in Europe. The defense industry is experiencing major tectonic shifts, with AI, drones, and robots entering the battlefield more rapidly than ever imagined. This is the area where the EU still has a chance to enter the global innovation race in defense and thus should focus on funding local defense and dual-use start-ups. It is high time to shift attention to niche technologies being developed in smaller EU member states, such as laser technologies in Lithuania and cyber technologies in Estonia, not to speak of the vast defense tech laboratory emerging in Ukraine, an EU candidate country. If properly funded, these EU-made technologies could soon bolster Europe’s deterrence and defense as crucial force multipliers.

Aligning NATO’s targets with EU defense initiatives

For the EU to embrace the role of a defense enabler means working out common NATO-EU mechanisms for transforming NATO’s targets into complementary EU defense initiatives in areas requiring increased cross-border European cooperation. Better interorganizational communication is crucial in this respect to avoid any potential duplication. At the same time, paying attention to non-EU allies’ involvement in EU defense industrial efforts is vital. The allied defense technological and industrial base must be interoperable across the Euro-Atlantic security area and should even look more proactively outward to provide a response to the growing strategic competition with the Russia-China-Iran-North Korea axis that—through involvement in Russia’s war against Ukraine—are also consolidating their military technological base.

The goal for both priority areas—military mobility and defense industrial revamp—is to scale up European rearmament, speed up allied deployment and reinforcements, and send a clear message to our strategic competitors: NATO and the EU are mutually reinforcing entities that aim to expand, not retreat. While a more far-reaching burden sharing with the United States on European defense is surely a huge challenge, it also is an opportunity for Europe to finally become a strategic player in defense.

About the author

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Justina Budginaite-Froehly

Europe Center Transatlantic Security Initiative

Defense Industry European Union

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The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

The post The EU must become a strategic player in defense—alongside NATO appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Grundman on Investor’s Business Daily on technological innovation in the defense sector

Atlantic Council — Wed, 05 Mar 2025 20:00:00 +0000

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

On March 5, Steven Grundman, senior fellow at Forward Defense, was featured on Investor’s Business Daily in a segment of their Growth Stories, “Palantir Is Shaking Up The Defense Sector. What Comes Next As The AI Revolution Heads To The Front Lines?” Grundman discusses how software is emerging as a key differentiator in military programs.

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Steven Grundman

Senior Fellow

Defense Industry Defense Policy

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Creamer published in the Small Wars Journal on US and allied readiness in a “multi-theater general war”

bgalicia — Wed, 05 Mar 2025 14:49:00 +0000

On March 5, Shawn Creamer, nonresident senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative and Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, was published in the Small Wars Journal on US under preparedness for large-scale conflict and the steps needed to strengthen defense and societal resilience. He argues that, as our adversaries are acting in a coordinated manner to build up capabilities, the US and its allies are failing to keep pace.

Peace is not the natural state of affairs, but it can be maintained through strength and preparedness.

Shawn Creamer

Fellow

Shawn Creamer

GeoStrategy Initiative Indo-Pacific Security Initiative

Security & Defense East Asia

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Europe has the resources to defend itself and back Ukraine against Russia

Agnia Grigas — Tue, 04 Mar 2025 21:32:50 +0000

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen unveiled an unprecedented $840 billion plan to increase EU defense spending on March 4 as the continent continues to grapple with the dramatic changes taking place in the international security landscape amid US President Donald Trump’s new foreign policy agenda. “Europe is ready to massively boost its defense spending,” she stated in Brussels, noting that this was necessary to back Ukraine against ongoing Russian aggression and also “to address the long-term need to take on much more responsibility for our own European security.”

EU leaders are expected to discuss the proposed package at an emergency meeting later this week, marking the latest in a flurry of recent summits held to bolster European security and expand support for Ukraine. This sense of urgency reflects mounting alarm in European capitals as the Trump administration signals its intention to reduce the United States commitment to Europe and announces a pause in military assistance to Ukraine. With faith in transatlantic unity now rapidly evaporating, Europe is waking up to a new geopolitical reality and recognizing that it must now be prepared to defend itself.

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Throughout Europe, there is an acute awareness that the continent is not yet fully prepared to meet the threat posed by Vladimir Putin’s revanchist Russia. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the largest war in Europe since World War II, is currently in its fourth year. Meanwhile, the Kremlin continues to escalate its broader hybrid war against the West. There are now growing concerns that unless Russia can be stopped in Ukraine, Moscow will seek to exploit uncertainly over the US position in order to expand its campaign against a vulnerable Europe.

In this fast-evolving geopolitical environment, European leaders must find the political resolve to translate recent statements of intent into the kind of bold policies necessary to safeguard the continent’s security. This will also require considerable powers of persuasion in order to convince complacent European audiences that security is now a priority. The good news is that on paper at least, Europe possesses the resources to assert its strength and stand alone against Russia.

The economic disparity between the European Union and Russia is particularly striking. In 2024, the combined GDP of EU member states reached $19 trillion, dwarfing Russia’s approximately $2 trillion economy. According to IMF data from February 2025, Russia does not even rank among the world’s top ten economies, trailing behind the United States, China, Germany, Japan, India, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada, and Brazil. Although the Russian economy has withstood sanctions imposed in response to the invasion of Ukraine, the ongoing war has left it overextended.

In terms of population, the EU’s 449 million citizens significantly outnumber Russia’s 145 million. Moreover, Russia’s longstanding demographic crisis has worsened in recent years. Up to one million Russians are believed to have emigrated since 2022, representing the largest exodus since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Estimated Russian battlefield losses in Ukraine numbering hundreds of thousands are further undermining the country’s already deteriorating demographic outlook.

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Europe holds a significant edge over Russia in military spending. In 2024, EU nations collectively spent $457 billion on defense compared to Russia’s $146 billion defense budget. While Russia has moved its economy to a wartime footing and is set to continue increasing military spending, many European countries have recently committed to boosting their own defense budgets. There has long been reluctance among some NATO members to meet the alliance’s two percent target, but French President Emmanuel Macron and others are now calling on Europeans to dramatically increase annual defense spending to over three percent of GDP.

While Russia retains a strategic advantage in nuclear capabilities, the UK and France possess nuclear arsenals that can provide Europe with a credible deterrent. Europe has been steadily boosting military output since 2022, with share prices in European weapons producers surging to new highs in recent days in expectation of further investment in the continent’s defense industries. In terms of conventional military strength, the balance of power is more nuanced. Europe, including the UK, fields around 1.47 million active duty military personnel, according to Bruegel and SIPRI data from 2024. In comparison, Russia is reportedly working to expand its active duty force to 1.5 million troops.

In the realm of economic warfare, Russia faces significant constraints. Russian energy exports to Europe were once a key Kremlin tool but this leverage has significantly diminished since the onset of the Ukraine invasion. Instead, the United States has emerged as a key exporter of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), enabling European countries to diversify away from Russia. While Russian energy exports to Europe continue, the continent increasingly relies on US, Norwegian, and Algerian gas.

Given the overall balance of power between Europe and Russia, European leaders have ample reason to adopt a more resolute stance. By leveraging its economic strength, demographic advantage, and military potential, Europe can confidently counter Putin’s imperial ambitions and provide Ukraine with the support it needs to resist Russia’s invasion. The onus now is on European leaders to transform these strategic advantages into effective policies and actions. With sufficient political will, Europe can defend itself and back Ukraine against Russia.

Agnia Grigas is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and the author of The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas, Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire and other books.

Enter the Indo-Pacific Strategic Partnership for Accelerated Research and Knowledge in Defense (SPARK). Inspired by and drawing from the best practices of ongoing NATO innovation efforts—which Rob Murray, one of this article’s authors, created and oversaw for a time—SPARK is our proposed Indo-Pacific initiative to actualize AUKUS Pillar II with dedicated capital and procurement vehicles. If properly constructed, SPARK will rapidly cultivate government relationships, institutional knowledge, and public-private investment pathfinders—critical lifelines for a small business or start-up seeking to navigate the capital-intensive defense innovation landscape.

For SPARK to achieve its potential, it will require strong backing from a wide array of public and private actors to meet the unique demands of its strategic environment. Despite its current limitations, AUKUS Pillar II already carries the broad political and institutional support necessary to grow a new regional effort, making it an ideal initial tether for SPARK and a launchpad for expanded Pillar II engagement with Japan, South Korea, and other key security partners. This new construct will enable Pillar II to establish new structures and incentives for innovators across the Indo-Pacific and facilitate the vast technology talent and capital flows already present in the region.

Growing priority, piecemeal approach

Defense technology has become a central regional priority amid China’s rapid expansion of its nuclear forces, naval fleet, and munitions stockpiles, as well as its continued provocations in the South China Sea. In 2023, the Department of Defense spent over $1.2 billion on partner capacity-building efforts in the Indo-Pacific, nearly a third of its entire international security cooperation budget. That same year, the Pentagon’s Pacific Deterrence Initiative was funded at a record $9.1 billion—$3 billion more than the original request to Congress. Buttressed by record-high foreign military sales driven by the war in Ukraine, US armaments cooperation in the Indo-Pacific has expanded accordingly.

Yet, despite these efforts, the lack of a unified Indo-Pacific defense innovation framework has become increasingly apparent. While various US-led efforts—such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Minerals Security Partnership, and informal Chips 4 Alliance—are slowly addressing this gap, no comprehensive approach exists to rapidly enhance strategic technology acquisition and investment in the Indo-Pacific. The Pentagon’s defense innovation partnerships with Japan, Singapore, and India are all important stepping stones toward greater cooperation, but these bilateral “defense tech bridges” remain fragmented and limited in scope. AUKUS Pillar II, despite its potential for expansion, still limits the involvement of key regional leaders, further restricting its impact. Currently, Washington’s new Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience (PIPIR) seeks to unite the region’s national armaments directors, adopting a similar approach to the Ramstein Group established within NATO after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

While encouraging, PIPIR’s efforts may dissipate unless a means exists to channel this momentum into concrete investments in immediately fieldable capabilities, alongside the longer-term AUKUS submarine effort (Pillar I). At present, US efforts to invest in Pillar II—though regarded as Washington’s flagship defense industrial cooperation effort in the Indo-Pacific—may not be up to the task of scaling development and production. The 2024 National Defense Authorization Act allocated $25 million for “AUKUS innovation initiatives,” while the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2024 provided an additional $12.5 million for these initiatives, alongside $14.7 million for “AUKUS and coalition warfare” prize challenges. The President’s Budget Request for 2025 identified a further $79.8 million in research, development, test, and evaluation funds for AUKUS Pillar II—three times the 2024 budget. While these funds add some heft to the Pillar II project, the scale of investment needed to fully realize the transformative potential of these emerging technologies is vast, far exceeding current appropriations. To put these numbers in context, just in the first quarter of 2024, Alphabet, Apple, Microsoft, and Nvidia collectively spent $30 billion on research and development. Since 2021, the US defense technology sector has absorbed $130 billion in private venture capital. As it stands, AUKUS Pillar II lacks the sustained, comprehensive investment needed to fulfill its ambitious goals, risking significant delays in a climate where speed and scale increasingly determine success or failure. If the Indo-Pacific’s purse strings tighten permanently—after expanded military budgets are wasted on outdated or untested capabilities with few relevant uses—the United States may miss a critical opportunity for meaningful change. Failure to mobilize public and private networks around Pillar II now may risk a return to a more anemic, capital-scarce Indo-Pacific defense technology ecosystem—an outcome that SPARK could help arrest or entirely avoid.

Key priorities

To maximize its effectiveness, SPARK should serve as a catalyst for AUKUS Pillar II industry engagement, drawing on lessons from other alliance consortia—especially those with a proven record of fostering innovation. For instance, NATO’s Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) and its sister initiative, NATO Innovation Fund (NIF), launched in 2022 and 2023, respectively, offer a promising model for this new Indo-Pacific framework. DIANA, which became operational in June 2023, seeks to accelerate technology adoption through a network of accelerators and test sites, as well as mentorship and grant opportunities. Meanwhile, NIF was established to provide long-term investment in deep-technology start-ups. With its comprehensive approach toward innovation, the DIANA-NIF model—adapted to the unique requirements of the Indo-Pacific—could galvanize public-private collaboration and innovation across a range of allies and partners. In particular, SPARK should emulate a few key aspects of the DIANA-NIF efforts:

First, SPARK should establish overlapping networks of accelerators and test sites aimed at both low- and high-technology and information-readiness-level partners. As with DIANA, this network should not be overly restrictive, stretching across the AUKUS nations and extending to other important industrial partners in the Indo-Pacific—especially Japan, South Korea, Canada, New Zealand, Singapore, the Philippines, and India.

Second, SPARK should adopt a set of enhanced mechanisms for continuous engagement between the private sector and potential military end users. Like DIANA, SPARK should host regular prize challenges in critical technology areas. Successful applicants to these SPARK challenges would receive access to initial grant seed funding, mentorship, and complimentary facilities before undergoing a second round of reviews to secure additional funding for transition assistance across the acquisition valley of death. Moreover, SPARK should assign a military expert to all successful applicants to ensure frequent and formal end-user engagement as their capabilities progress from prototype to production (idea to impact). While DIANA has begun to bridge this servicemember-technologist gap in NATO, its companies still have infrequent exposure to live end-user feedback. SPARK can avoid this shortcoming by establishing a formalized network of postings for military test and evaluation personnel.

Third, SPARK should strengthen this support by establishing its own rapid acquisition vehicle, designed to provide companies in priority areas with targeted assistance to scale production. Through targeted transition assistance in the form of matching government funding and commercial investment, this vehicle would emulate recent enhancements to the Pentagon’s commercial and dual-use technology procurement efforts, led by organizations such as the Defense Innovation Unit, Strategic Capabilities Office, and Office of Strategic Capital. Along with service-level innovation units like the US Air Force’s AFWERX and US Navy’s Disruptive Capabilities Office, these improved acquisition pathfinders have proven effective in unlocking new technologies for the US military. By implementing a similar combination of activities in the AUKUS+ context, SPARK would help introduce the Indo-Pacific defense industrial base to new contracting models with built-in flexibilities to accommodate today’s rapid innovation cycles and the private sector’s focus on commercialization.

Fourth, SPARK should create an Indo-Pacific Trusted Capital Marketplace where vetted investors can engage defense and dual-use technology start-ups aligned with regional security priorities. The SPARK investment arm should consider a two-track financing approach, building on US efforts to invest in strategic technologies while combating adversarial capital. Track one, inspired by NIF but focused on debt rather than equity, should provide capital-intensive loans and loan-based guarantees (as opposed to equity financing) with long maturity timelines and highly favorable lending terms necessary for deep technology research and maturation. Given the paucity of deep-tech loan financing for national security, a more attractive set of investment mechanisms, backed by the capital and credit of the United States and key regional allies, would fill a crucial gap and complement wider venture capital efforts. Track two, similar to DIANA’s Allied Capital Community, is a new effort intended to fulfill short-term investments for late-stage prototype development. It would cater to “impatient capital” and quickly move projects to operational status.

Finally, SPARK should establish a Joint Interoperability Center of Excellence. Without an alliance architecture resembling NATO, Indo-Pacific countries struggle to achieve and maintain interoperability with the US military, much less with one another. A center of excellence focused on this exact issue would help define the functional and performance requirements of systems operating within an Indo-Pacific coalition across a variety of specific contingencies. By enabling industry to better understand and meet the demands that will be placed on dual-use systems, this center would ensure that companies with little experience working alongside the military can develop into effective partners quickly.

Road map for adoption

The war in Ukraine has underscored the critical importance of rapid technological adaptation and the swift deployment of advanced capabilities, particularly in electronic warfare. Ukraine’s efforts to counter sophisticated Russian electronic warfare tactics with innovative, quickly developed solutions demonstrate the need for a defense framework that can respond rapidly to immediate threats and foster long-term technological advancement. Drawing on these lessons, SPARK should prioritize the development and deployment of electronic warfare systems, unmanned platforms, and cyber defense tools to ensure that Indo-Pacific forces can swiftly adapt to an evolving security environment.

To achieve this parity, SPARK must balance the rapid deployment and production of existing technologies with the development of new innovations. Initial priorities should focus on immediately impactful technologies such as unmanned systems, cyber defense, and secure communications. Longer-term projects should cover game-changing technologies, such as responsible artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and advanced materials. SPARK should operate on three strategic tracks:

Rapid deployment track: Focus on quickly deploying mature technologies that are near operational readiness, ensuring they can be delivered to operators in the field as soon as possible.
Innovation track: Concentrate on developing early-stage technologies that require more time to mature but hold significant future potential. This track will drive sustained innovation and technological superiority.
Production track: Address the critical challenge of scaling production to meet urgent demands. This track will support and accelerate manufacturing capabilities, ensuring that new technologies can be produced at speed and scale.

Attracting private venture capital to SPARK will be crucial, particularly in aligning investment with mission-driven objectives rather than purely profit-maximizing strategies. The incentives for private capital should focus on profit optimization rather than profit maximization—emphasizing stable, long-term returns over short-term gains. Investors will be drawn to the opportunity to participate in projects with significant strategic importance, backed by government and military support, and the potential for steady, reliable returns over time.

To maximize effectiveness, SPARK should be structured as a cohesive entity that integrates research, development, testing, production, and investment under a unified governance framework. Unlike NATO’s DIANA-NIF model, where components function independently, SPARK’s unified structure will ensure seamless coordination across these tracks. It should be established as a regional consortium, open to Indo-Pacific nations beyond AUKUS, with a central management office overseeing operations. This office, potentially based in a neutral regional location, would enable rapid decision-making and coordination, supported by a rotating leadership structure and an advisory board comprising representatives from government, military, and industry sectors.

An Indo-Pacific SPARK would fulfill the glaring need for a unified innovation and technology acquisition framework in Washington’s most consequential arena of superpower industrial competition. A phased approach will be essential. In its first two years, through 2027, SPARK should focus on deploying mature technologies, enhancing production capabilities to meet immediate needs, and augmenting existing efforts such as the Replicator Initiative. Establishing accelerated production lines and leveraging private sector capacity will be critical in this phase. The subsequent phase will expand research and prototype development, guided by continuous feedback from end users. This integrated, multitrack strategy would ensure that SPARK can deliver immediate operational results while also securing long-term technological superiority, making it a cornerstone of regional security and technological collaboration tailored to the Indo-Pacific’s unique environment.

About the authors

Elliot Silverberg is the Director of Research at the Defense Innovation Board (DIB) in the US Department of Defense.

Jacob Sharpe is a Project Lead at the Defense Innovation Board (DIB) in the US Department of Defense.

Rob Murray is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense program and the Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The views expressed are the authors’ and do not represent those of any organization or affiliation.

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Murray on Bloomberg News on the Defence, Security, and Resilience Bank

Atlantic Council — Mon, 03 Mar 2025 20:00:00 +0000

On March 3, Rob Murray, non-resident senior fellow at Forward Defense, appeared on Bloomberg News to discuss the Defence, Security and Resilience (DSR) Bank. As the founder of DSR, Murray emphasized the need for a global multilateral financial institution dedicated to defense funding, addressing the critical gap that is believed to be threatening Western security.

Fellow

Rob Murray

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

The post Murray on Bloomberg News on the Defence, Security, and Resilience Bank appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Bakir joins Strait Talk to discuss Syria’s interest in KAAN

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:15:43 +0000

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Bakir quoted in AI-Monitor on Turkey and Italy’s interest in Qatar

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:14:23 +0000

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Kabawat quoted in New You Info on the future of Russian military bases in Syria

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:13:34 +0000

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Revitalizing the US defense industry is best done with European allies

James Hursch, Kristen Taylor — Mon, 24 Feb 2025 21:38:36 +0000

In 2024, NATO marked its seventy-fifth anniversary—celebrating an institution that shepherded the United States to victory in the Cold War and has augmented US global leadership in the decades since. However, at the recent Munich Security Conference, many questioned whether the transatlantic alliance had fractured beyond immediate repair following Vice President JD Vance’s stark message for Europe. In asserting that threats to European security emanated mainly from within Europe, rather than from Russia, Vance alienated key allies. This rhetoric, coupled with US President Donald Trump’s accusations that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is a “dictator” after locking both Europe and Ukraine out of negotiations with Russia, strikes directly at the heart of transatlantic values and interests.

Historically, the transatlantic alliance has been able to navigate tensions, even bitter ones, recognizing that allies are stronger when working together. And the United States still maintains an enduring interest in European stability. However, the international security environment is more volatile now than at any time since World War II. Adversaries are strengthening their cooperation and becoming more assertive. What’s more, a negotiated settlement in Ukraine that favors Russia could embolden Russian President Vladimir Putin to further his revanchist ambitions elsewhere in Europe.

Against this backdrop, the Alliance’s unity is vulnerable. Any daylight between the United States and its allies will be exploited by its adversaries. Not only does recent rhetoric undermine longstanding US policies, it also contradicts some of the strategic priorities laid out by the Trump administration. Notably, deepening these growing fissures within the Alliance is antithetical to the US goal of strengthening its defense industrial capacity. Vance’s vision for US-European relations failed to imagine the ways in which the United States is made stronger and more competitive by mobilizing the industrial and innovative might of its closest friends. By combining their efforts and sharing risks, the United States and Europe can revitalize their defense industrial bases at the speed necessary to confront today’s growing global threats.

The US defense industrial base is not keeping pace with current demand. Decisions made decades ago to consolidate the US defense industrial base and prioritize military kit for counterinsurgency efforts from the 1990s onward left the US defense industrial base unable to meet the demands associated with great power competition. This is evidenced by struggles to replenish stocks amid skyrocketing demand from allies and partners, with foreign military sales posting a record one hundred billion dollars in sales in 2024. While major US defense contractors have taken some steps to increase production, such as expanding shifts in manufacturing facilities, corporate boards have been risk-averse when it comes to investing in more physical plant, fearing that the currently hot demand signals might soon cool. As a result, delivery timelines for many major defense items have grown beyond five years. This is far too long in today’s dynamic technology and threat environment, and these slow timelines are causing some partners to look elsewhere for faster delivery of equipment, whereas in the past they turned to their first preference, the United States.

In Europe, the Trump administration gets two things right. Europe needs to play a greater role in its own security and raising defense expenditure benchmarks is a necessary step for European NATO allies to achieve this. However, European industry alone cannot match rising defense investments with the advanced and exquisite systems necessary to resource NATO’s defense plans. As opposed to the US situation, European defense industries are fractured along national lines and even more limited in overall capacity. While Europe is taking some steps to address these vulnerabilities, it cannot yet achieve results on its own.

There is no silver bullet to address the enervated transatlantic defense industrial bases, and the United States and Europe require different remedies to boost their respective industrial capacities. But abating these issues will take time. And time is a commodity that the Alliance does not have.

Instead, the transatlantic alliance must harness comparative advantages in industrial and innovative might in the short term to address these critical vulnerabilities. By finding ways to share risk and rewarding innovative startups that are willing to take risks, allies can create windfall effects that can begin to ameliorate production timelines, boost defense capacity, and improve the speed and scale with which they can deliver kit to their forces.

Already, there are nascent efforts to capitalize on industrial synergies, sharing risks across the ocean. For example, the Polish defense manufacturer PGZ will co-produce Javelin anti-tank weapons with US industry in Poland. The NATO Supply and Procurement Agency is also helping facilitate efforts among allies to co-produce Patriot missiles in Germany. Ultimately, these efforts should allow the US defense industry to develop creative solutions for domestic capacity constraints while also sharing risk across international partners, which makes it more palatable for industries to invest in new or upgraded manufacturing facilities. Looking ahead, these efforts need greater support to achieve meaningful results—and this often requires the removal of bureaucratic hurdles that inhibit shared defense industrial ambitions. One potential model for future initiatives to emulate, for example, is the careful and conditional amendment of some licensing requirements under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations among the countries in the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) partnership, which helped facilitate defense trade and cooperation. (Though, this example does require partners to build an export control regime that meets US standards and other venerable rules.)

Cooperative efforts, such as those in Poland and Germany, demonstrate a growing appetite on the part of Washington’s allies and partners to collaborate with the United States on its security priorities and to share risks in a way that bolsters the position of US industries (and those of the Alliance as a whole). This kind of cooperation is going to be necessary for the Trump administration to accomplish its goals of “expanding defense industrial base capacity on both sides of the Atlantic,” a priority emphasized in a call between US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte.

The past few weeks will undoubtedly be remembered as a tenuous time in the transatlantic relationship. However, it is important to note that this longstanding Alliance rests on more than just shared values. It also provides tangible economic and security benefits for the United States and Europe. Revitalizing defense industrial might—a shared goal on both sides of the Atlantic—is an opportunity to begin repairing the schism among allies while providing the necessary military capabilities to safeguard transatlantic security in the years ahead.

Kristen Taylor is an assistant director with the Transatlantic Security Initiative.

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Syria’s rebuilding is bringing US partners Turkey and Saudi Arabia closer together

Pınar Dost — Thu, 20 Feb 2025 17:55:14 +0000

Since Turkey ended a period of sharp tensions with several Gulf countries in 2021, Ankara has improved relations with all the countries in the region, and ties between Turkey and Saudi Arabia in particular have significantly improved. Ankara and Riyadh have put aside their past disputes and deepened their strategic relations.

Now, the rebuilding of post-Assad Syria offers an opportunity for Turkey and Saudi Arabia to deepen their relations further. After becoming Syria’s new de facto leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa visited Saudi Arabia and Turkey for his first two visits abroad. This is a testament to the important role both countries are expected to play in the new Syria.

Sharaa is likely attempting to show the new Syrian leadership’s intent to distance itself from Iran and attract the Saudi financial investment that Syria desperately needs.

Turkey had the upper hand in Syria following the overthrow of the Assad regime and was labeled by many analysts as the country likely to become the most influential in Syria’s future. However, contrary to the expectations of some observers, it has not used this position solely to increase its own influence. Instead, Turkey has pursued strong diplomacy with Gulf countries, the European Union, and the United States to engage them in Syria’s future to ensure security and stability in the region. For the reason behind this inclusiveness and the shared objective of the Turkish and Saudi policies on Syria, look to Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who said in December last year, “We do not want Iranian domination in the region, nor do we want Turkish or Arab domination.”

As the Turkish foreign minister’s statement suggests, Turkey can best achieve the goals of a prosperous postwar Syria and a stable region by cooperating and coordinating with the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia. Increasing engagement with Gulf countries would strengthen Turkey’s legitimacy regarding its involvement in Syria’s future while helping to ensure the necessary funds for Syria’s reconstruction.

What Syria has shown

During the Arab Spring, Turkey and Saudi Arabia had different approaches to the issue of political Islam. While Saudi Arabia viewed the Arab uprisings as a threat to regional stability, Turkey supported most of them. Despite these worries, Saudi Arabia supported the uprisings in Syria due to its opposition to Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and its goal of countering Iranian influence. However, unlike Turkey, Saudi Arabia supported groups within the Free Syrian Army that were not associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda, as well as secular and nationalist political figures who did not embrace political Islam. Gulf leaders have made no secret of their worries over the new Syrian leadership’s jihadist background and how its rise to power could mark a return of political Islam throughout the region.

Aware of these concerns, Turkey, following Assad’s downfall, has invited the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), to jointly invest in Syria’s future, as demonstrated by frequent meetings between the Turkish foreign minister and his Gulf counterparts. Turkey has sought to serve as an intermediary to help Syria’s new rulers develop their relations with Gulf countries. Saudi Arabia became one of the first Gulf countries to establish official relations with post-Assad Syria and, like Turkey, has called on the international community to lift sanctions on Syria.

Turkey and Saudi Arabia, the only Group of Twenty (G20) countries in the region and important partners of the United States, have a common interest in a stable and prosperous Syria and will seek to play a crucial role in its reconstruction, which is essential not just for Syria’s future but for the stability of the Middle East as a whole.

Both Turkey and Saudi Arabia would like to see a unified and stable Syria that isn’t a terrorist hub. They both also want to prevent Iran from regaining influence in Syria and Lebanon, and to counter Iran’s influence in Iraq. This can only be possible with an inclusive Syrian administration, in which all religions and ethnic groups in the country are represented. This inclusiveness is a goal shared by countries across the international community, including Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Both countries have an interest in ensuring that Syria is peaceful and able to recover economically, which will allow Syrian refugees living in Turkey and Saudi Arabia to safely return to their country.

Syria’s new rebuilding has shown Turkey and Saudi Arabia that they indeed have common interests that are worthy of cooperation. That has carved out an opportunity for Ankara and Riyadh to deepen their relations, particularly their defense ties, which are crucial for regional security.

The opportunity at hand

As part of Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, Riyadh aims to diversify its foreign defense suppliers and strengthen its own defense industry. Turkish-Saudi defense relations have significantly improved since the normalization of their relations in 2021, with Saudi Arabia accepting Turkey’s offers of technology sharing and giving opportunities for Saudi companies to participate in local production.

Turkey has been struggling for decades to get the defense equipment it has wanted from the United States and European countries due to official and unofficial embargoes and sanctions imposed on Ankara. These obstacles motivated the rise of Turkey’s domestic defense industry, which has emerged as the eleventh-largest arms exporter globally. In comparing the periods of 2014–2018 and 2019–2023, Turkey’s share of global arms exports grew 106 percent. Amid all this growth, Turkey has increased its arms exports to many Gulf Cooperation Council countries, including Saudi Arabia, the vast majority of which consists of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). Saudi Arabia is similarly motivated to reduce its dependence on the West for defense needs, stemming from its past difficulties in obtaining the desired equipment from Western partners. Thus, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have struck defense production and procurement deals, including one focused on co-producing the Turkish Bayraktar Akıncı, an armed UCAV. Such cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Turkish drone maker Baykar helps Riyadh not only boost its domestic defense-production capabilities but also deter Iran and counter the influence China has gained in the Middle East through its arm sales to the region.

But there are further opportunities for cooperation that are now emerging. Turkey expects to conclude an arms deal worth six billion dollars including the sale of warships, tanks, and missiles with Saudi Arabia. Turkey also could strike a deal regarding the sale of Turkish TF KAAN fighter jets to Saudi Arabia. Riyadh, which has been stuck in a prolonged discussion about acquiring F-35 fighter jets from the United States, expressed interest late last year in purchasing one hundred KAAN jets. Turkey had started to develop the fighter jet not only to replace its aging F-16 fleet but also to ensure it has access to needed equipment despite congressional holds on US arms sales and the US decision to remove Turkey from the F-35 joint strike fighter program in 2019. The first ten KAAN jets are expected to be delivered to Turkish air forces in 2028. Buying Turkish jets could also help Saudi Arabia develop its domestic defense industry, as the country can request that parts of the production line be located in Saudi Arabia.

Increasing defense cooperation via arms sales between Turkey and Gulf countries (such as Saudi Arabia) could alter the arms-supply dynamics in the region—and thus contribute to regional security and stability.

Why it matters for the Middle East—and the United States

If the United States is to further its strategic interests in regions likely to be deprioritized by the current administration, such as the Middle East, it will need to help cultivate regional gravitational centers by considering the needs of middle powers and working toward their integration. US partners, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, are among the most significant emerging middle powers in the region, and it is in Washington’s interests to bring together its most important regional partners to contain Iranian and Chinese military and economic influence.

Writing about a possible nuclear agreement between the United States and Iran, George Friedman once suggested the best way to balance Iran is the formation of a bloc between the Gulf countries (led by Saudi Arabia) and Israel; he added that this bloc could only succeed if it includes Turkey.

There are new obstacles standing in the way of the emergence of such a bloc, among them the October 7, 2023 attack and the subsequent Israel-Hamas war. However, the Turkey-Saudi Arabia convergence stands out as a strong step toward regional balance and containing Iranian influence.

Pınar Dost, PhD, is a nonresident fellow at Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a historian of international relations. She is also the former deputy director of Atlantic Council IN TURKEY. She is an associated researcher with the French Institute for Anatolian Studies. Follow her on LinkedIn.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Europe must prepare to defend itself in an increasingly multipolar world

Mykola Bielieskov — Wed, 12 Feb 2025 19:27:41 +0000

US President Donald Trump’s peace plan for Ukraine has yet to be made public, but it is already abundantly clear that he expects Europe to play a far bigger role in the continent’s future security and the fight against Russian aggression. With the United States now looking to scale back its transatlantic commitments at a time when an openly revisionist Russia is embracing an expansionist agenda, European leaders must urgently adjust to the new geopolitical realities and prioritize security.

The Trump administration has moved rapidly to underline its expectations regarding an increased European role in the continent’s defense. Just days after his inauguration, Trump used an appearance at the World Economic Forum to reiterate his call for European NATO members to increase defense spending to five percent of GDP.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio then spoke at length on the return of a multipolar world and how this will shape future United States security policy toward Europe. “I do think, long term, there’s a conversation to be had about whether the United States needs to be at the front end of securing the continent or as a backstop to securing the continent,” he commented in a January 30 appearance on The Megyn Kelly Show.

Trump’s national security adviser Mike Waltz has also indicated that the United States expects Europe to take greater responsibility for preventing further Russian aggression against Ukraine and securing a viable peace. “An underlying principle here is that the Europeans have to own this conflict going forward,” he said on NBC’s Meet the Press. “President Trump is going to end it. And then in terms of security guarantees, that is squarely going to be with the Europeans.”

The starkest message so far has come from US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. “Safeguarding European security must be an imperative for European members of NATO,” he told a February 12 meeting of Ukraine’s Western allies in Brussels. “Europe must provide the overwhelming share of future lethal and non-lethal aid to Ukraine.”

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The new US administration is not the first to signal a strategic shift away from Europe. This process has actually been underway since the end of the Cold War, and has remained the long-term goal of policymakers in Washington DC despite Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. While Trump’s messaging on the issue of European security has been characteristically direct, his position is actually very much in line with longstanding trends in United States foreign policy.

As the new transatlantic security relationship takes shape, European countries will be expected to make a far bigger commitment to financing the security of the continent. This will include providing the majority of military support for Ukraine. Europe’s defense industry is not yet in a position to meet this challenge, with only limited progress in the production of critical arms and equipment in the three years since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Key deficits include essential items such as air defense systems, precision guided munitions, multiple launch rocket systems, and armored infantry fighting vehicles.

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One practical solution to current shortfalls would be for European countries to procure more weapons, ammunition, and equipment for the Ukrainian war effort directly from the United States. However, this would spark an intense debate across the continent, with advocates of Europe’s long-term economic and security interests likely to encounter opposition from those prioritizing the more immediate need to support Ukraine.

Purchasing greater quantities of US arms would certainly help strengthen transatlantic security ties. This would serve as a strong incentive for the United States to maintain a high level of defense sector engagement with European partners. In fact, European countries are already purchasing more from the United States defense sector. Increased European spending was a key factor driving record US arms sales of $318.7 billion in 2024, as countries sought to replenish stocks sent to Ukraine and prepare for the possibility of further international instability.

The changing rhetoric coming out of European capitals in recent months suggests that Europe’s leaders are well aware of the new security realities and the necessity of dedicating considerably more resources to the task of arming themselves. Nevertheless, mounting talk of the need for greater European defense sector autonomy has yet to be matched by increases in military spending and arms manufacturing output. Indeed, a new report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies indicates that Russian military expenditure is currently higher than all European countries combined when calculated in purchasing power parity terms.

As the transatlantic security relationship evolves in the coming months, Europe will face growing pressure to safeguard the continent’s fragile security in a much more decisive manner. The EU is already preparing plans to encourage increased defense spending among member countries as officials in Brussels adapt to changing geopolitical realities. However, the real test of Europe’s determination to defend itself will be in Ukraine. US officials are now unambiguously signalling that Russia’s invasion is primarily a European security issue. Europe’s response to this will reveal much about the future role of the continent in an increasingly multipolar world.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently used his daily video address to emphasize the importance of his country’s air offensive. “I would like to thank all developers and producers of our long-range drones and missiles,” he said on January 26. “Everyone can see their effectiveness. Our weapons are bringing the war back to Russia and reducing Russia’s military potential.”

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Ukraine’s early 2025 bombing campaign owes much to advances made in the development of the country’s drone fleet. Speaking in January, Ukrainian officials claimed the military now has drone models capable of reaching targets located up to 2000 kilometers inside Russia. “Our main goal is to conduct strikes to hit logistics hubs in the rear, ammunition warehouses, and decrease our enemy’s pressure on the front,” commented a battalion commander of Ukraine’s 14th Unmanned Aerial Systems Regiment, which is focused specifically on long-range strikes.

In addition to drones, Ukraine’s air offensive is also utilizing the country’s growing missile arsenal. Since 2022, the Ukrainian authorities have revived the domestic missile industry following decades of stagnation as part of efforts to boost firepower and reduce reliance on Western arms supplies. This has resulted in the development of numerous new models including the Palianytsia, Peklo, Ruta, Neptune, and Sapsan missiles. However, scaling production remains a major challenge requiring significant investment, foreign partnerships, and secure manufacturing locations to evade Russian attacks.

A number of Western allies such as Britain and Denmark are already stepping up support for Kyiv’s missile program, which is seen as a cost-effective way of supporting the Ukrainian war effort. Deploying domestically produced Ukrainian missiles also reduces the risk of potential escalations from the use of Western-supplied weapons against targets inside Russia, a key concern among Kyiv’s partners. While this offers obvious advantages, progress is unlikely to be rapid. On the contrary, some experts believe Ukraine will need at least another year before it can increase missile production to levels that could pose a serious threat to Russia.

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Ukraine’s bombing campaign has a number of strategic goals. Most immediately, it disrupts the logistics of Russia’s invasion and increases the cumulative strain on supply chains while reducing the output of Putin’s defense industry. Attacks on energy infrastructure such as ports and refineries are designed to weaken a central pillar of Russia’s war economy, limiting the Kremlin’s ability to generate vital energy export revenues.

Airstrikes deep inside Russia also play a significant role in shaping perceptions of the war. For the Ukrainian public and international audiences, these attacks are convincing evidence of Ukraine’s mounting ability to strike back against Russia despite the Kremlin’s overwhelming advantages in both manpower and firepower. The lack of an emphatic response from Moscow is also further eroding notions of Russian red lines and encouraging Ukraine’s Western allies to overcome their fear of escalation.

Meanwhile, increasing Ukrainian drone and missile strikes are sparking public alarm in Russia and directly undermining the Kremlin’s painstaking efforts to shield ordinary Russians from the consequences of the invasion. Much like Ukraine’s ongoing incursion into Russia’s Kursk region, the attacks confirm that the war cannot be contained within the borders of Ukraine and will increasingly spread to Russia itself.

From a longer term perspective, officials in Kyiv hope Ukraine’s proven ability to strike targets deep inside Russia can strengthen the country’s position in possible negotiations and serve as a powerful deterrent against future Russian aggression. With this in mind, Zelenskyy has stated that Ukraine’s rapidly evolving drone and missile programs are “our arguments for a just peace.” In order for that argument to be truly persuasive, Ukraine will need to continue increasing the frequency of long-range drone strikes, while also significantly expanding the country’s domestic missile industry.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

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NATO chief: Cost of Russian victory in Ukraine would be ‘trillions not billions’

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 23 Jan 2025 22:14:45 +0000

NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte has warned alliance members that if the Russian invasion of Ukraine is allowed to succeed, the cost of reestablishing NATO’s international credibility would be measured in the trillions of dollars.

Speaking on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Rutte highlighted the economic argument for increased military spending in support of the Ukrainian war effort. “If Ukraine loses then to restore the deterrence of the rest of NATO again, it will be a much, much higher price than what we are contemplating at this moment in terms of ramping up our spending and ramping up our industrial production,” commented Rutte. “It will not be billions extra. It will be trillions extra.”

Underscoring his warning, the NATO chief conjured up images of Russian dictator Vladimir Putin and his authoritarian allies celebrating victory over the West. “If we get a bad deal, it would only mean that we will see the President of Russia high-fiving with the leaders from North Korea, Iran, and China. We cannot accept that. It would be a big, big geopolitical mistake.”

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Rutte’s alarming forecast comes as NATO leaders grapple with new US President Donald Trump’s calls for member states to increase defense spending from today’s two percent of GDP to five percent. Trump is also pushing for Europe to play a far more prominent role in the coalition of countries backing Ukraine. He argues that the Russian invasion is primarily a problem for European leaders to address, and has also long been critical of what he sees as the uneven security relationship between Europe and the United States.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has echoed Trump’s position on the need for dramatically increased European defense spending. In a strongly worded address to the World Economic Forum this week, he suggested that the continent was in danger of sliding into geopolitical irrelevance and must be able to defend itself. “All European countries must be willing to spend as much on security as is truly needed, not just as much as they’ve gotten used to during years of neglect. If it takes five percent of GDP to cover defense, then so be it,” the Ukrainian leader stated.

A number of senior European figures have already voiced their opposition to Trump’s vision for sharp rises in defense spending. While defense budgets across the continent have been growing in recent years against the backdrop of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, many NATO members are still struggling to meet the current two percent guidelines and see talk of a leap to five percent as wholly unrealistic.

European countries have also struggled to expand domestic military production in response to Russia’s invasion. During the initial stages of the war, existing stockpiles of weapons and equipment across Europe were sent to Ukraine. However, these reserves have now been largely exhausted. While Russia has managed to make the transition to a wartime economy, Europe’s defense sector is still unable to keep the Ukrainian military adequately supplied despite some progress.

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Critics of the Western response to Russia’s invasion say there is still no sense of urgency in many European capitals, despite the unprecedented security challenges presented by the continent’s largest armed conflict since World War II. Instead, decisions regarding weapons deliveries to Ukraine often remain subject to extended delays, while measures to boost Europe’s defense manufacturing capacity have frequently fallen victim to domestic politics or internal EU rivalries.

Europe’s hesitancy over defense spending is short-sighted, to say the least. As the NATO Secretary-General pointed out this week in Switzerland, the cost of supporting Ukraine’s defense will be dwarfed by the price of confronting a triumphant Russia if Putin is permitted to complete the conquest and subjugation of Ukraine.

Even if a victorious Russia did not immediately go further, Europe’s sense of security would be shattered and the balance of power on the continent transformed. Putin’s war machine would be greatly strengthened by the acquisition of Ukraine’s immense military strength, its vast industrial capacities, and the country’s natural resources. He would have Europe’s two largest armies under his control, and would be firmly established along the eastern borders of the European Union.

In such favorable circumstances, it is dangerously delusional to suggest that Putin might stop voluntarily or adopt a conciliatory approach toward the largely undefended nations of Europe. He has made no secret of his desire to reverse the verdict of 1991 and overturn the current world order. Victory in Ukraine would present Putin with a once in a lifetime opportunity to achieve these historic goals. Europe’s current levels of defense spending would be unlikely to deter him.

The debate over European defense budgets looks set to escalate during the coming months, with the new Trump administration and officials in Kyiv making the case for a radical rethink. Many across Europe will support them in principle, but past experience suggests that not all of these allies will have the requisite political will to act accordingly.

The importance of this debate cannot be overstated, with the outcome set to shape the course of the war in Ukraine and define the future of European security. For anyone who recognizes the threat posed by Putin’s Russia, the arguments for larger European defense budgets and expanded industrial production seem overwhelming. Supporting Ukraine today may be expensive, but it is a lot cheaper than facing an emboldened Russia tomorrow.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Hruby in Real Clear Defense: “Building a Future-Focused Industrial Strategy”

Atlantic Council — Wed, 22 Jan 2025 14:00:00 +0000

Original SOurce

On January 22, 2025, Africa Center senior advisor Aubrey Hruby published an article in Real Clear Defense, “Building a Future-Focused Industrial Strategy”.

“If we are to compete effectively in the new era of global economic rivalry—especially with China—we must develop an industrial policy that plays to our own strengths and builds on the unique dynamism of the U.S. private sector and capital markets.,” Hruby writes.

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Rodriguez and Geurts promote the need for rapid adoption of new defense software on Building the Base podcast

Atlantic Council — Mon, 20 Jan 2025 17:00:00 +0000

On January 20, Stephen Rodriguez, senior advisor at Forward Defense and director of FD’s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare was a featured guest on the podcast Building the Base, hosted by Hondo Geurts, commissioner on the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare. The episode, entitled “Looking Ahead: National Security in a New Administration with Nadia Schadlow and Stephen Rodriguez,” focused on the need for the Department of Defense to accelerate pathways to adoption of cutting-edge technologies, the crafting of an effective National Security Strategy, and the potential benefits of utilizing innovative technologies to reform the department. The Commission on Software-Defined Warfare’s upcoming final report was highlighted.

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Why Saudi Arabia is so keen on the Turkish KAAN

Ali Bakir — Sat, 18 Jan 2025 12:54:59 +0000

Just before the turn of the year, Saudi and Turkish officials engaged in a flurry of talks on defense cooperation. In one such conversation—which included Turkish defense industry representatives—Saudi Arabia reportedly indicated it intends to buy one hundred Turkish KAAN fighter jets.

But with Saudi Arabia previously keen on acquiring F-35 fighter jets from the United States, what has steered Riyadh toward Turkish technology?

Securing an upgrade

The KAAN is a Turkish fifth-generation, multi-role, stealth fighter aircraft developed by the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) and BAE Systems, which is based in London.

The project to develop the aircraft began in 2010, with the aim of replacing Turkey’s aging F-16 fleet and boosting Turkey’s autonomy, self-dependency, and overall military and national power. The urgency to develop this aircraft increased after Turkey was removed from the F-35 program in 2019. The KAAN made its maiden flight in February 2024.

Riyadh has expressed interest in acquiring F-35 fighter jets since 2017; however, the United States has not committed to the sale, and the situation has been prolonged. Riyadh is likely also feeling unsure about its ability to secure an F-35 deal considering the experiences of its neighbors. For example, while the Trump administration signed a multi-billion-dollar deal with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for F-35s in 2021 (as a reward for Abu Dhabi’s normalization with Israel in 2020), the UAE suspended talks over concerns with the Biden administration’s terms, citing “sovereign operational restrictions” and “technical requirements,” among other reasons. While some reports indicated that the UAE hopes to revive the deal with the incoming Trump administration, a UAE official said that Abu Dhabi does not expect to resume talks.

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Moreover, Saudi Arabia could be worried about its ability to secure the F-35 deal because the United States often prioritizes Israel, aiming to maintain its qualitative military edge over all regional powers. Additionally, such equipment typically comes with numerous strings attached to it, and the US Congress frequently impedes the sale of advanced military assets to other nations, including allies and partners. These factors have prompted some countries and regional powers to seek advanced weapons elsewhere, even though US military equipment is technologically superior.

As conveyed in Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 for the kingdom, Riyadh aims not only to purchase weapons but also to produce them, pursuing the necessary know-how and technology transfer to build its own defense industry. Regarding fighter jets, Saudi Arabia requested to join the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), a collaborative effort among Britain, Italy, and Japan to develop a sixth-generation stealth fighter jet to replace the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Mitsubishi F-2. The new jet is expected to be airborne by 2040.

While the United Kingdom and Italy support Saudi Arabia’s request to join GCAP, Japan has reportedly firmly opposed Riyadh’s membership in the project. Thus, the partnership has not yet been extended to Saudi Arabia. And on December 13—over a year after Saudi Arabia first submitted its request to join GCAP—BAE Systems, Italy’s Leonardo, and Japan Aircraft Industrial Enhancement reached an agreement on the venture, with each holding a 33.3 percent share in the new joint company developing the jet.

Riyadh’s extensive ties with China and amicable relations with Russia could explain why Japan would oppose Saudi Arabia’s inclusion. Accepting Saudi Arabia as a partner could raise questions regarding who has the authority to sell or block the sale of fighter jets to certain nations (including, for example, China and Russia). Furthermore, Japan’s opposition could be attributed to its concerns that incorporating Saudi Arabia would ultimately slow progress and delay timelines due to Riyadh’s need for technology transfers—especially given that Saudi Arabia currently lacks the necessary infrastructure and human resources for this project.

Although news about Saudi Arabia’s consideration of the Turkish KAAN first emerged last October, the finalization of the GCAP project may explain the resurgence of Saudi interest in the KAAN just a few days later. For the Saudis, timing is crucial. Unlike the GCAP, the Turkish jet has already taken to the air. Mass production is expected to begin in 2028, meaning that the KAAN project is likely at least ten years ahead of the GCAP. Even once the KAAN is operational, it is still possible to make updates to the jet incorporating sixth-generation technology, making it better aligned with Saudi Vision 2030 in terms of timelines and requirements.

Furthermore, the KAAN could appeal to Saudi Arabia because of uncertainty about Riyadh’s ability to acquire a GCAP jet should it remain excluded from the project. Japan’s opposition to Saudi Arabia’s involvement currently suggests that in the future, Tokyo could veto an attempt by Saudi Arabia to purchase the jet. Waiting over fifteen years to acquire new fighter jets only to face a potential veto would be an unwise move, especially considering two factors. First, Saudi Arabia’s ties with China are expected to strengthen if current trends persist, suggesting that a veto would become more likely. Second, it would be unwise because of Saudi Arabia’s desire to quickly establish a localized defense industry, diversify its military purchases, and acquire advanced fighter jets. In contrast to the GCAP countries, Turkey is already open to exporting the jet to allies and partners, including to Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Ukraine; the head of TAI predicts his company will deliver roughly 150 aircraft to such partner countries.

The thirty-thousand-foot view

By signaling its intention to acquire one hundred KAAN fighter jets, Saudi Arabia appears to be strengthening its strategic partnerships and elevating its geopolitical standing in the Middle East. This approach is particularly significant in light of shifting regional security dynamics, in which the need for a robust and independent defense posture has become increasingly critical. Through the diversification of its defense procurement strategies—and, ultimately, through enhancing its military capabilities, strengthening its deterrence, and fostering new strategic partnerships—Saudi Arabia is not only enhancing its military readiness but also asserting its influence in evolving regional geopolitics.

Moreover, by pursuing fighter jet acquisitions from Turkey, Saudi Arabia is strategically positioning itself to reduce its reliance on Western military hardware, including US military equipment. This shift is driven by complex political dynamics, especially with US restrictions on the sale of advanced fighters such as the F-35 and Washington’s prioritization of maintaining Israel’s qualitative military edge.

From 2015 to 2020, the Saudi Arabia-Turkey relationship experienced fluctuations due to unfavorable regional developments and differing ideological agendas. However, those factors began to shift after the normalization of ties following the Gulf Cooperation Council’s al-Ula declaration in 2021, marking the beginning of an unprecedented era of regional de-escalation and normalization efforts.

A notable indication of the evolving nature of defense cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Turkey is Riyadh’s procurement of the Turkish Akıncı unmanned combat aerial vehicle. While the exact value of the agreement has not been disclosed, it has been estimated at over three billion dollars. Baykar’s chief executive officer said it was “the biggest defense and aviation export contract” in Turkey’s history. If the KAAN deal is realized, it would represent a significant advancement that would cement the transformation of defense and security cooperation between Riyadh and Ankara.

Saudi Arabia is not only a global financial power but also one of the largest arms purchasers in the world. From the Turkish perspective, the Saudi purchase would provide a lucrative source of funding to expand the production line, helping expedite production and reduce the cost per unit (currently exceeding one hundred million dollars). This would be a double win for Riyadh because it would not only acquire the KAAN with no strings attached to the deal but also have an opportunity to request that parts of the production line be located in Saudi Arabia, expediting the expansion of its local defense industry.

For some time, Ankara has been seeking potential partners to join its flagship defense industry program. In July 2023, Azerbaijan became a partner in the development of the KAAN. Under the partnership, Baku’s financial resources from its oil and gas reserves help Turkey with the costs of production. Meanwhile, joint production creates job opportunities in Azerbaijan, facilitates technology transfer, and will help Baku replace its aging fighter jets with more modern ones.

Pakistan has also expressed interest in joining the KAAN program, and the two countries are reportedly in advanced discussions about such a possibility. On August 2, 2023, Turkish Deputy Defence Minister Celal Sami Tüfekçi revealed that nearly two hundred Pakistanis were already involved in the development of the KAAN. A nuclear power with a competent military, Pakistan boasts one of the largest air forces in the world. Like Turkey, Pakistan is seeking to replace its fourth-generation F-16 fighter jets with a fifth-generation alternative.

Additionally, there are reports that Russia and Ukraine have approached Turkey with joint production proposals. Malaysia has also been named as a potential partner for Turkey.

Ankara has created a trilateral mechanism that aims to elevate cooperation between Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan with a specific focus on political, economic, and defense and military ties. Similarly, Ankara has been working on cementing another trilateral mechanism—this one between Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia—for coordinating defense cooperation, boosting defense trade, facilitating technology transfer, and localizing the defense industry. The first meeting of the latter trilateral arrangement was held in Riyadh in August 2023, and several rounds of discussion have since taken place. In addition, there are various forms of bilateral defense cooperation shared between Turkey and Pakistan and also Saudi Arabia and Pakistan: For example, Pakistan has deployed troops to Saudi Arabia for various reasons, and the two countries conduct military exercises regularly.

For all these reasons, it makes sense that Saudi Arabia would have its eye on KAAN jets. But ultimately, whether the Saudis will acquire KAAN jets hinges on several factors, including the jet’s operational readiness and strategic value (gauged after its development is complete), the robustness of Saudi Arabia’s defense infrastructure, and evolving geopolitical dynamics within the region, which significantly influence defense collaborations. In addition, the Saudis typically take a long time to finalize such deals. Even if they do reach a decision, there is uncertainty regarding their commitment to it, especially if disagreements arise on other issues. In such cases, Riyadh tends to respond by halting or canceling all aspects of cooperation—political, economic, defense, and security—rather than engaging in dialogue to address the specific disagreement.

Thus, as regional powers navigate these complexities, they will likely need to take time before fully recalibrating their defense postures in response to a KAAN purchase. But this waiting period may provide opportunities for such regional powers and Saudi Arabia to work together to assess their strategic interests and align their defense strategies accordingly.

Ali Bakir is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

The post Why Saudi Arabia is so keen on the Turkish KAAN appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s escalating air attacks bring Putin’s invasion home to Russia

Maria Avdeeva — Thu, 16 Jan 2025 21:01:13 +0000

Ukraine launched what officials termed as the country’s “most massive” air attack of the war this week as Kyiv seeks to bring Putin’s invasion home to Russia. In the early hours of January 14, Ukrainian drones and missiles struck a series of strategic targets in multiple Russian regions including Bryansk, Saratov, Tula, and Tatarstan. The strikes at distances of up to 1000 kilometers from the Ukrainian border underscored Ukraine’s growing capacity to conduct long-range bombardments against high-value Russian targets.

This week’s attack was notable both for its scale and sophistication, with drones and missiles deployed in coordinated airstrikes that exploited the weaknesses of Russia’s air defenses. Representatives of Ukraine’s 14th Separate Regiment of Unmanned Aerial Systems confirmed that decoy drones were used to distract and overwhelm Russian air defenses, creating openings for missiles to hit primary targets. Once defenses were compromised, some targets were then struck by additional waves of long-range drones.

While Russian officials remain tight-lipped over the scale of the damage inflicted, media reports and open source data indicate that a range of military and industrial objects were hit. Targets included oil refineries and storage facilities, an airbase used for attacks against Ukraine, and various industrial plants involved in the production of materials critical for the Russian war effort.

These simultaneous strikes against multiple high-priority targets deep inside Russia highlight Ukraine’s ability to conduct increasingly complex long-range air operations. The attacks of January 14 required close coordination between Ukrainian drone and missile crews along with military intelligence and special operations units.

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Ukraine’s rapidly evolving drone industry is at the heart of the escalating air war inside Russia. Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion almost three years ago, Ukrainian drone production has increased dramatically, with hundreds of new companies from within Ukraine’s vibrant tech sector emerging to develop and manufacture a wide array of different drone models.

The Ukrainian authorities have sought to make the most of this potential, establishing the Brave1 platform in spring 2023 to streamline cooperation between the Ukrainian military, state organs, private sector developers, and investors. In summer 2024, Ukraine became the first country to establish a new branch of its military dedicated to drone warfare. The creation of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces underlined the country’s emphasis on innovation as Kyiv seeks to compensate for Russia’s often overwhelming advantages in terms of manpower, firepower, and other vital military resources.

In addition to an expanding arsenal of long-range strike drones, Ukraine is also working hard to develop domestic missile production. In recent months, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has showcased a number of new missiles as Kyiv looks to reduce its dependence on Western partners for the supply of missiles capable of hitting targets inside Russia.

This emphasis on domestic drone and missile production is part of a broader shift away from reliance on foreign military aid. It also reflects longstanding frustration in Ukraine over the reluctance of the country’s partners to authorize attacks inside Russia due to fears of possible retaliation from the Kremlin. While US President Joe Biden partially lifted restrictions on strikes against Russian targets in late 2024, President-elect Donald Trump has since been critical of the decision. This has added weight to arguments that Ukraine must rely on its own drones and missiles to strike back against Russia.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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The impact of Ukrainian airstrikes inside Russia goes far beyond disruption to military logistics, damage to oil refineries, and reductions in Russia’s military output. Together with the ongoing Ukrainian occupation of hundreds of square kilometers in Russia’s Kursk region, Ukraine’s air war is undermining the illusion of Putin’s invulnerability and eroding Russian confidence in the Kremlin’s ability to defend the country.

Since February 2022, the Putin regime has gone to great lengths to shield the Russian public from the consequences of the war in Ukraine while maintaining an air of normality. However, frequent footage on social media of burning Russian infrastructure and powerful Ukrainian airstrikes is now directly challenging Moscow’s tightly controlled narrative. This is causing a visible change in mood, with even leading regime propagandists such as Vladimir Solovyov now voicing their displeasure over the failure of Russia’s air defenses.

Growing signs of demoralization within Russia reflect the sobering realization that the country’s existing air defenses are unable to cope with Ukraine’s growing deep strike capabilities. For Kyiv, this represents an important window of opportunity. In all likelihood, Russia will eventually address the vulnerabilities of its vast military and industrial infrastructure to drone and missile attacks. However, if Ukraine can continue expanding the current air offensive in the coming months, it could succeed in striking a significant blow to the Russian war effort.

For now, Ukraine’s air attacks are sending a clear message to Moscow and to Kyiv’s own partners that the Ukrainian military is capable of escalating on its own terms and does not share Western concerns over so-called Russian red lines. Maintaining this momentum and securing the means to continue offensive strikes inside Russia will be paramount to determining not just the direction of the war, but also its eventual outcome.

Maria Avdeeva is a Ukrainian security analyst and strategic communication expert.

The transatlantic alliance, with all its oversights and shortcomings, has been a force for world peace and prosperity over the last seven decades—and it needs to cohere as China and Russia engage in a concerted effort to disrupt the rules governing international relations. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) aims to challenge American interests from the Arctic to the Antarctic and has strengthened its ties with Russia, Iran, and North Korea to weaken both American and European interests and values across the globe. Consequently, it is in the interest of the United States and its European allies, even amid differences of opinion, to double down on their proven partnership to forge a coordinated response against shared adversaries.

The CCP’s push to dominate manufacturing at every level of the global value chain represents a serious and growing economic threat to American and European free market interests. The sheer scale of China’s excess capacities threatens to undermine manufacturing and economic progress in both Europe and the United States, causing deindustrialization-level trauma to our industries—“China shocks.” At the same time, China seeks to build a technological edge in key emerging technologies, ranging from new energy technologies and robotics to quantum computing and artificial intelligence (AI).

Militarily, China’s material support to Russia has enabled Moscow to sustain its land war in Europe. The growing Sino-Russian defense cooperation may also provide valuable lessons and support to Beijing should it initiate a military conflict in the Indo-Pacific region. Against this background, the United States and Europe need a new shared agenda to counter Chinese economic mercantilism and strengthen transatlantic defense production and military capabilities to maintain an edge over the China-Russia military nexus. Aligning on a shared strategy to combat Sino-Russian convergence will serve the interests of both the United States and the European Union (EU) and help to preserve transatlantic security and prosperity.

With the world’s two largest economies and the highest levels of integration, the United States and the EU enhance their economic strength when aligned. The transatlantic integrated investment landscape boasts a total annual value in excess of $8.7 trillion—with more than $4 trillion of US investment in Europe and more than $3.4 trillion of European investment in the United States. The combined technological and industrial base remains strong in both traditional manufacturing—despite emerging threats from China—and in the development of new technologies including AI. As the largest and most innovative economic grouping in the world, the transatlantic economies should be harnessed to the transatlantic allies’ collective advantage against the shared global adversaries and rivals determined to drive a wedge between them.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen—amid political turmoil in leading European capitals (with the exception of Rome)—appears both to comprehend the gravity of threats arrayed against transatlantic interests and to commit to stronger relations with the United States. Her views on China, Russia, and Israel are arguably more like-minded to traditional US views than any other European leader. In Kaja Kallas, the EU’s foreign policy chief, she has an able emissary capable of forging a defining US-EU partnership, with significant respect garnered in Washington through her prior role as prime minister of Estonia. President-elect Trump and von der Leyen have a generational opportunity to cement the US-EU economic partnership on a par with that of NATO to constitute redoubtable twin pillars—economic and military—of a forward-looking transatlantic alliance.

This paper explores how the United States and EU can best meet this moment through enhanced strategic partnership. For a start, that partnership should focus on five reinforcing lines of effort representing a high convergence of national interests and comparative advantage. These include defense industrial production; energy security and transition; sectoral economic agreements; digital economy and advanced technology; and infrastructure and connectivity. Collectively, these five lines of effort will advance shared American and European interests in connecting free and open spaces around the globe—constricting the operational space of their adversaries to carry out their malign activities.

Transatlantic defense industrial capacity and capabilities

A just and swift resolution of Russia’s war on Ukraine that leaves Europe and NATO more resilient, resolute, and strong represents the highest of transatlantic priorities. While NATO members deliberate collective military capabilities and readiness as well as their coordinated support of Ukraine, the EU has a critical complementary role to play during and after the cessation of hostilities. Through its power of the purse and its ability to mesh the civilian and military dimensions of European preparedness, the EU is poised to play a transformative role in buttressing NATO capacities and commitments with overlapping benefits to defense and civil sectors of the economy. Both NATO and EU leaders have made clear that the goal is now to spend more and spend better. Where appropriate, institutional investments by the United States and the United Kingdom can complement the European efforts outlined below.

To complement NATO strategic posture along four broad lines of effort, the European Commission can:

Contribute to NATO demand outlays: First and foremost, the Commission can work with EU members of NATO to meet the $34 billion demand outlays represented in the recent NATO planning strategy. It may direct the commissioner for defense (a recently established role) to work with EU members of NATO for a coordinated approach to augment their present national defense investment commitments, which will be all the more important if plans proceed for NATO to raise the target from 2 percent of respective gross domestic product (GDP) to 3 percent or beyond in the near future. The commissioner is already mandated to produce a white paper within one hundred days to frame a new approach for the future of European defense, which will “identify investment needs to deliver full-spectrum European defence capabilities based on joint investments” to help member states to prepare for the “most extreme military contingencies.” The EU has a distinct comparative advantage in undertaking such continent-wide investments augmenting individual actions by NATO members.
Establish European security corridors: While work on military mobility corridors is already underway, EU investments directed at infrastructure connectivity and cohesion in Eastern Europe should be augmented to meet the dual needs of force mobilization and economic integration. NATO’s forward deployment posture necessitates efficient road and rail networks along its eastern front to expeditiously mobilize and move military assets from Finland to Romania. It also requires multiple transport corridors to the NATO front from the nearest strategic ports to ensure resilience and redundancy. A road-rail-energy-digital corridor from Constanta-Odessa on the Black Sea to Gdansk on the Baltic Sea connecting Casneau, Bucharest, Lviv, and Warsaw may hold the highest transformative defense, economic, and political impacts. Similar corridors from Trieste on the Adriatic to Gdansk and Constanta, respectively, would further magnify the defense and economic dividends across Eastern Europe. Additionally, the Danube River Transport Corridor may be prioritized as one of the primary European economic and security thoroughfares supporting NATO’s most vulnerable southeastern front along the Black Sea.
Commit to a transatlantic defense industrial base: The Ukraine conflict has unveiled the urgent need for transatlantic defense production to move into high gear to prepare for existing and probable future conflicts. The prospect of sustained higher defense spending in Europe provides the economic motivation needed to rebuild this industrial base. American and European defense industries are stepping up to the plate, but much more needs be done. Four areas of priority and pragmatism (not precluding others) stand out for immediate transatlantic joint investment and codevelopment:
1. Munitions readiness and supply: Russia’s war in Ukraine has laid bare transatlantic munitions reserves to sustain or support an extended land war. This deficiency requires urgent remediation to not only ensure that future NATO needs are addressed but to contribute to projected needs in the Indo-Pacific theater as well. As US and EU leaders take initiatives to secure and expand ammunition production capacities on both sides of the Atlantic, they should seize opportunities to build in coinvestment and codevelopment, particularly for long-range precision artillery. The EU’s defense industrial ambitions, building off the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) to increase ammunition production and including the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), should be quickly adopted and substantially expanded.
2. Air shield and next-generation interceptors: The conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have highlighted the need for a cutting-edge air-defense shield to withstand sustained and overwhelming drone and missile attacks. Coinvestment and codevelopment in such air-defense mechanisms and next-gen interceptors to protect Europe should be among the highest priorities to strengthen.
3. Undersea critical infrastructure security: Sabotage of natural gas pipelines and digital cables in the Baltic Sea and elsewhere have alerted transatlantic allies to the urgency of deploying a resilient security net to protect ever-important subsea infrastructure—particularly across the Atlantic, Mediterranean, North, Baltic, and Black seas. These challenges are mirrored in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in the South China Sea. Unmanned submersibles will play a pronounced role in subsea infrastructure security and present a significant opportunity for transatlantic coordination and codevelopment.
4. A Free North: Arctic-Nordic-Baltic security capabilities and readiness: Increased China-Russia activities and coordination in the fast-changing Arctic region have raised concern from Alaska to Finland. A shared commitment to a Free North by allied Arctic, Nordic, and Baltic nations to develop the requisite capabilities—with particular attention to ice cutters, submarines, and air force assets, among others—is highly warranted and ripe for enhanced investment and development.
Cosponsor future European troops preserving peace in Ukraine: It is possible that a resolution of the Russian war on Ukraine will require the presence of a European force to preserve the peace. Given the global commitments of the United States and increasing demands in the Indo-Pacific region, it is appropriate for Europe to muster the peacekeeping force along its eastern flank. NATO involvement and specifically US backup support will remain integral and indispensable in support of any such future European peacekeeping force. The EU may offer valuable financial and political support to such a European coalition of the willing. Improved NATO-EU collaboration will also be necessary to ensure properly aligned transatlantic support for Ukraine into the medium to long term.

Energy security and transition

Energy independence and resilience are imperative for transatlantic prosperity and security. Affordable access to energy is critical for economic competitiveness in the global marketplace, and energy security is a necessary condition for a credible transition to cleaner sources. Thanks to US innovation, North America has emerged as one of the world’s most important sources of oil and gas, enabling Europe to find alternatives to Russian energy after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. A relapse of European reliance on cheap Russian energy following cessation of Russian hostilities in Ukraine would be grossly negligent and require preparatory actions to deter future follies. And with nuclear, geothermal, hydrogen, wind, and solar energy poised to play increasingly important roles in meeting energy demand in the years ahead, there is no reason for the United States and Europe to become dependent on countries like China and Russia for critical inputs. We think it is the interests of both the United States and the EU to strive for close coordination to buttress transatlantic energy resilience and security. They should aim for substantial market share and comparative advantages over shared adversaries in old and new energy sources and technologies.

We envision four reinforcing lines of effort in such a US-EU energy security and transition pact:

Natural gas: Increased transatlantic coordination and investment is warranted to ensure greater American supply of natural gas to Europe at competitive and reasonable costs. This entails a US commitment of requisite supply to ensure European energy security and a corollary European commitment to build liquefied natural gas (LNG) import terminals with appropriate repurposed and new pipeline networks to receive US natural gas imports.
Nuclear energy: It would be imprudent to cede the nuclear energy industry to the purview of adversaries and rivals such as China and Russia. Transatlantic coordination and codevelopment of nuclear facilities and technologies should ensue, with particular attention to the development of small modular reactors (SMRs) and micro reactors. The United States and Europe enjoy a comparative edge over China and Russia in technology and market application for SMRs and micro reactors and can press their advantage. Smaller nuclear applications are being tested for a range of systems from space stations and data centers to container ships, among others.
Renewables: The United States and Europe must regain ground lost to China in global markets and supply chains for renewable energy equipment and manufacturing. Solar and wind energy represent growing portions in local energy portfolios across the world. Representatives of the once-thriving European wind-energy sector, for instance, have warned that it is unlikely to survive in the face of unfair Chinese competition. The US renewable industry is in a similar bind.
Future energy technology: The United States and Europe need to enhance their coordinated research and investment in developing future energy technology including fusion, hydrogen, and other areas where the US National Laboratories are engaged in pathbreaking research.

Sectoral economic agreements

Washington and Brussels increasingly face a shared set of economic challenges: revitalizing manufacturing in the face of predatory Chinese competition; protecting the integrity of technology and supply chains; and generating strong economic growth. A recent EU-commissioned report written by Mario Draghi highlighted the need for European strategic investments to address regulatory barriers to bolster its competitiveness.

As the global economy becomes more stratified along geopolitical lines, common sense and national interests will likely encourage the United States and Europe to coordinate their economic security measures for critical sectors of the world’s largest integrated economy. This engagement probably will involve a combination of derisking and targeted decoupling from economic systems that pose threats to transatlantic security and prosperity. As critical sectors such as semiconductors, steel and aluminum, critical minerals, and pharmaceuticals are of significant political and industry interest on both sides of the Atlantic, there is a need to come to a collective understanding.

Sectoral agreements offer rich opportunities for negotiations, usually providing many possible permutations and combinations to choose from, with scope for trade-offs across respective industrial priorities, and a means of aligning a wide range of tools to achieve targeted effects. They may constitute enhanced coordination across a mix of offensive and defensive measures to address China shocks and enhance collective economic security such as aligning industry standards, strengthening mutual access to one another’s procurement markets and subsidies, joint and coordinated investments and trade, coordinated application of tariffs, quotas, qualitative standards (cyber, data, labor rights, transparency), and other economic security tools (export controls, research security, secure supply chain rules). Additional complementarity is desirable in rules governing inbound and outbound investment screening in critical sectors as well as execution of broader export controls approaches.

Transatlantic coordination in the application of such tools in third-country markets is critical. Significant coordination on economic forensics on issues such as circumvention, transnational subsidies, and lengthening supply chains will be necessary as Chinese firms seek more creative ways to circumvent US and European efforts to protect their markets. From Central America to Southeast Asia, there is a real risk that poorly designed or coordinated transatlantic decoupling, derisking, and diversifying efforts may just result in more convoluted and veiled dependencies on China and its allies.

Any “defensive” agenda can be coupled with a positive offer to advance sectoral cooperation with other key partners, given that many of the production needs for a diversified and trustworthy supply chain will not be entirely located in the United States and Europe. This will require close alignment of development financing tools in areas such as digital infrastructure, as well as a wider use of sector-specific economic deals—such as those involving critical raw materials.

The United States and the EU have several options for the preferred forum in which to situate their sectoral agreements. It may be most expeditious to initiate them as bilateral arrangements that can later be expanded to include the Group of Seven and other member states of the Organization for Economic Co-ordination and Development (G7+).

Sectoral agreements hold high promise for advancing collective transatlantic interests and represent both a recognition of the inherent integrated nature of the transatlantic economies and an attempt to fortify critical sectors.

Digital economy and advanced technology standards

With AI and other technological advances poised to fundamentally transform business, government, education, and consumption, the United States and Europe both have a strategic interest in maintaining their individual and collective technical edge over their adversaries—while creating a joint regulatory environment that promotes Western technological development. The size of the transatlantic economy and the number of world-leading academic institutions and technology firms on both sides of the Atlantic are strategic advantages. Over the past several decades, the United States and Europe have been able to set rules and standards of economic interactions across the globe that prioritize transparency, accountability, individual liberty, and dignity. These transatlantic interests and values need to be equally and perhaps more urgently reflected in fast-evolving technologies like AI. The United States and Europe have an opportunity to coordinate to ensure they maintain a technical advantage over their adversaries and rivals and safeguard their ability to establish rules and standards for the future digital economy.

The ability to promote transatlantic interests and values in emerging digital technologies is fundamental to both US and European military defense capabilities, economic innovation, and global influence. Efforts must be intensified where progress is being made on transatlantic coordination in future technologies such as:

Artificial intelligence: On January 27, 2023, the United States and the EU signed an administrative arrangement to collaborate on research using AI, computing, and privacy-related technologies. The AI convention signed in Washington, Brussels, London, and elsewhere sends a strong signal for future collaboration, though there is much ground to cover to align US and EU regulations on AI.
Quantum computing: With recent breakthroughs in the United States and unconfirmed news of Chinese progress, it is in Europe’s interest to shift its low-key coordination with its transatlantic ally in this field into the high gear.
Biotech: China holds a slight edge over the United States and Europe in this field due to its sustained commitment and its significant investment in the sector. Europe boasts more biotech foundries than the United States, which makes it in Washington’s interest to engage with due haste with Europe and to include Japan, India, Israel, and the UK in forging a committed coalition to coordinate on biotech research, development, and manufacturing.

In addition to promoting new technologies, Washington and Brussels need to work together to protect the integrity of key existing communications and internet-connected technologies. The US government has recently imposed limits on Chinese telecommunications equipment, internet-connected vehicles, and other products. Meanwhile, the European Commission is considering developing standards for trusted suppliers of information communications technology (ICT) products. There is both a need and an opportunity for the transatlantic allies to facilitate, promote, and protect against existing technologies that rapidly reshape the global economic landscape including:

Space, cloud communications, and connectivity: American companies dominate global trusted cloud connectivity fueled by data centers connected by subsea fiber-optic cables. US-based Starlink and Blue Origin networks of low-orbit satellites are revolutionizing internet connectivity for areas once deemed remote. Cloud connectivity backed by satellite networks is ushering in a new era of global communications. The United States and Europe should coordinate in pressing their advantage against adversaries in global communication.
Electric vehicles and battery capacities: China enjoys early-mover advantage in electric car-battery technologies including the sourcing and processing of critical minerals. Coordinated US-Europe actions on market access and research and development are needed to not only protect transatlantic domestic markets but also prevent China from establishing dominance over the global EV market.

It is prudent for the United States and the EU to contextualize and subordinate their bilateral digital disagreements to their shared strategic objective of maintaining a collective technical edge over rivals and adversaries—not ceding any advantage to China or its allies. It is time to change the US-EU digital narrative from discord on digital regulations to shared rulemaking and standard setting for over-the-horizon technologies and digital governance. Through an updated and upgraded format of policy dialogue, US and EU policymakers can cement and advance Western leadership in the digital and tech spheres.

Infrastructure and connectivity

The United States and Europe have a generational opportunity to make common cause to promote and advance “free and open” spaces to serve the interests of the transatlantic community and nations around the globe. Throughout the twentieth century, the United States and Europe astounded the world through their accomplishments in connecting continents with awe-inspiring infrastructure. In the twenty-first century, when it comes to addressing the world’s seemingly insatiable demand for digital and physical connectivity, they appear to be playing catch up to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure Investments (PGII), led by the United States, and Europe’s Global Gateway initiative have thus far lacked in strategic coherence or impact and should be strengthened as a matter of urgency.

The free and open vision articulated by the Quad nations (India, Japan, Australia, and the United States) offers support to preserve the freedom of the seas, respect for territorial integrity including sovereign states’ respective jurisdictions over internal waters, territorial seas, contiguous zones, and exclusive economic zones, as well as safeguarding maritime infrastructure (including shipping ports, undersea cables and pipelines, oil and gas drilling and production operations) and maritime industries including fisheries. Additionally, free and open nations foster transparent investment and commerce respecting the rule of law and national sovereignty. In this sense, the free and open vision is applicable across all “commons” including space, air, maritime surface and subsurface, land, and cyberspace.

Connecting free and open spaces offers an organizing framework and strategic drive to the American and European efforts to promote quality infrastructure. Free and open spaces support increased security, expand regional stability, and promote economic growth. In particular, the greater the expansion of free and open spaces as paths of connectivity across the Eurasian landmass, the fewer opportunities for the disruptive and destabilizing behavior of Russia, Iran, and China to take root.

Several economic corridors are reemerging from Europe in all directions, promoting transport, supply chains, economic engagement, energy, and digital connectivity. Each one holds intrinsic value, but if woven together, they can transform and propel the EU economy and its larger neighborhood while also reinvigorating historic Indo-European trade and commerce. These corridors also offer attractive opportunities for US institutional investors. If developed to their full potential, they hold the promise of transforming the global landscape in a more economically sound and sustainable manner than the BRI. Five of these corridors stand out among the others for US-EU coordinated investment and support:

Free North: Changing weather patterns and increasing adversarial activities around the Arctic present an unprecedented opportunity for enhanced and expeditious coordination among the United States, Canada, Greenland, Iceland, and the Nordic and Baltic regions for improved connectivity, advancing economic commerce and security networks across the High North.
Coordinated connectivity across the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic seas: From Estonia to Greece, thirteen Eastern European nations have come together to advance transport, energy, and digital infrastructure across the region via the Three Seas Initiative. Greater engagement by Ukraine and Italy would lend additional economic heft to the enterprise. There are strong economic and military imperatives to promote a modern infrastructure network across the region to both advance NATO readiness and mobilization capabilities and further integrate Ukraine into the European Union.
Free and open Black Sea: It should be a transatlantic priority to enhance the capacity of the littoral states along the Black Sea to protect infrastructure, ensure freedom of commercial transit, counter adversarial actions to restrict access, and develop energy and maritime infrastructure. Additionally, the Danube River’s transport capabilities need to be optimally developed to ensure unfettered European water access to the Black Sea.
The Central Asia-Caucasus-Europe corridor: New leadership and energy at the heart of Central Asia is reinvigorating the region and its ambitions to establish strong digital and physical connections through Caucasus with Europe and beyond. Central Asia presents a large and valuable source of energy and critical minerals for the transatlantic community.
The India-Middle East-Europe economic corridor: At the 2023 G-20 Summit, the United States, the EU, Italy, Germany, France, India, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates agreed to raise Indo-Mediterranean trade to new heights. From the classic Greek and Roman era to the eighteencentury, India had driven Indo-Mediterranean commerce as one of the largest economies of the world. A rising, modern India and the rapidly transforming Gulf nations are once again driving the next chapter of Indo-Mediterranean trade, linking the Indo-Pacific to the Med-Atlantic.

A transatlantic coordinated initiative to link free and open spaces from the Arctic to the Indo-Pacific region would energize the European economy, expand investment and market opportunities for American industry, strengthen transatlantic security, and convey the image of a muscular transatlantic alliance and solidarity across the globe. The driving force needs to be private-sector capital and investment, in coordination with diplomatic and political engagement that eschews traditional foreign aid and development assistance in favor of more innovative, dynamic, and responsive public-private partnerships. This necessitates seamless coordination, interoperable procurement, and risk-mitigating procedures across American and European development finance institutions. On the American front, reauthorizing legislation for the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the Export Import Bank of the United States in 2025 may facilitate greater flexibility in partnering with European counterparts.

A way forward

The partnership between Washington and Brussels, while more recent in nature, has the potential to advance both American and European interests. However, it lacks the resilience of institutional familiarity and solidarity that Washington has enjoyed with the leading capitals of Europe—forged in the twentieth century through World War I, World War II, and the Cold War.

The twenty-first century geopolitical landscape calls for a more robust, more ambitious Washington- Brussels alliance of fitting scope, buttressed by expeditious institutional coordination and trust in cooperation. Chinese predatory economic activities antithetical to transatlantic economic interests act as a strong catalyst, revealing the urgent need for closer economic coordination between the United States and the EU. Effective structural arrangements for greater coordination and understanding is urgently warranted to counter shared threats posed by China and Russia.

The experience of the US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC), conceptualized during the first Trump administration and established during the Biden administration, is instructive in building more robust arrangements for coordination. American and European officials should consider broadening the coordination mechanisms to include more relevant agencies on both sides.

Optimally, the TTC should be elevated and expanded to become the US-EU Strategic Council with regular biannual leaders’ meetings accompanied by a “4+4” ministerial meeting including the US State, Defense, Treasury, and Commerce departments (plus the Office of the US Trade Representative, as appropriate) and their European Commission counterparts. Importantly, the major impetus of these meetings should be directed at closer coordination on world matters, in addition to smoothening bilateral matters. Under Trump, there may also be a greater opportunity to negotiate binding commitments, as he achieved with Japan during his first term.

The US Congress and the European Parliament may also similarly consider expanding the scope of their ongoing engagement, addressing pressing issues affecting collective national interests not just at the political level but across specialized committees including foreign affairs, technology, trade, finance, commerce, homeland security, and more. In the immediate future, the transatlantic community may consider establishing dedicated working groups to develop modalities for enhanced transatlantic coordination along the five lines of effort mentioned above.

The growing coordination and solidarity of the China-Russia nexus presents a necessary impetus for a reinvigorated, forward-looking transatlantic alliance with strong defense and economic pillars. The time is now for the United States and the EU to anchor the transatlantic alliance’s economic pillar—which spans energy, technology, infrastructure, and other core economic interests—to complement NATO on defense. The fortitude and resiliency of the future transatlantic alliance and its capacity to prevail over shared adversaries and rivals will depend, in no small measure, on the strength of the US-EU alliance.

This paper is informed by the US-EU Strategic Dialogue convened by the Atlantic Council in Brussels and Washington. The views represented are those of the authors, with special acknowledgment of the able assistance of Emma Nix, an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

About the authors

Kaush Arha is the president of the Free & Open Indo-Pacific Forum and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and the Krach Institute for Tech Diplomacy at Purdue.

Peter Harrell is a nonresident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Rodriguez featured in War on the Rocks on returns for defense tech limited partners

Atlantic Council — Mon, 13 Jan 2025 17:16:49 +0000

On January 8, Stephen Rodriguez, senior advisor at Forward Defense, provided commentary in a War on the Rocks piece entitled “In Brief: How Long Until Defense Tech Limited Partners See Returns?” Rodriguez offered that, “until major primes or service providers start acquiring venture capital fund portfolios, especially at enterprise values of $250 million or more, it will be at least a decade before limited partners are made under the current model.”

Fellow

Stephen Rodriguez

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

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Ukraine hopes robot army can counter Russia’s battlefield advantages

David Kirichenko — Thu, 09 Jan 2025 16:38:26 +0000

In December 2024, Ukrainian forces operating north of Kharkiv reportedly conducted their first ever attack on Russian positions using exclusively unmanned technologies. This landmark military operation, which featured a combination of machine gun-equipped ground drones and kamikaze aerial drones, underscored Ukraine’s increasingly sophisticated use of robotic systems, while also highlighting the evolving role being played by these technologies on the modern battlefield.

As Ukrainian commanders prepare for a fourth year of combat in Europe’s largest war since World War II, they are now hoping that their country’s growing arsenal of robotic systems can help counter Russia’s often overwhelming advantages in both manpower and firepower. “Ukrainian officials have repeatedly highlighted Ukraine’s efforts to utilize technological innovations and asymmetric strike capabilities to offset Ukraine’s manpower limitations in contrast with Russia’s willingness to accept unsustainable casualty rates for marginal territorial gains,” noted the Institute for the Study of War in late 2024.

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Ukraine’s emphasis on unmanned robotic systems certainly makes good sense. While overall Ukrainian casualties during the first three years of the full-scale invasion are thought to be significantly lower than Russian losses, Russia’s far larger population means Ukraine has little prospect of success in a grinding war of attrition. Over the past year, reports of Ukrainian mobilization challenges and personnel shortages have become more and more frequent, with desertion rates also reaching record highs.

With the Ukrainian military outnumbered and outgunned, defense tech innovations have played an important part in Kyiv’s war effort since 2022. Many of Ukraine’s key advances have come via the country’s vibrant startup sector, much of which pivoted to military projects in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion. In July 2024, the Associated Press reported that Ukraine had developed an ecosystem of laboratories to create a robot army, with around 250 defense startups active in secret locations “that typically look like rural car repair shops.”

The Ukrainian government has sought to support these grassroots efforts with the creation of initiatives like the BRAVE1 defense tech cluster, which was established in spring 2023 to streamline cooperation between the private sector, the state, and the Ukrainian military. In a move hailed by officials in Kyiv as a unique development, Ukraine launched a dedicated drone warfare branch of the country’s military in summer 2024. The establishment of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces demonstrated that Kyiv was preparing for “the war of the future, not the war of the past,” commented USF commander Colonel Vadym Sukharevskyi.

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Robotic systems alone cannot solve the Ukrainian military’s manpower shortages. At present, the focus is on developing technologies capable of performing a range of specific combat and logistical tasks. For example, Ukraine plans to deploy tens of thousands of robotic ground vehicles along the one thousand kilometer front line of the war during 2024. These systems will handle functions including mine-laying and de-mining, the delivery of ammunition and other supplies to troops in trenches, and the evacuation of wounded soldiers to rear positions where they can receive medical treatment.

Unmanned ground vehicles are seen by Ukrainian military planners as a particularly effective response to the ubiquity of reconnaissance and attack drones above the battlefield. With the entire front line area now under more or less constant surveillance, it can be extremely difficult for soldiers to move about above ground, and virtually impossible to travel in vehicles without electronic jamming devices. Robotic systems capable of operating in dangerous environments can go some way to addressing this problem, and can help make sure front line units are resupplied in a timely fashion.

The Ukrainian army’s use of robotic systems is already attracting consideration international attention. With new models typically undergoing testing in combat conditions, the cycle from development to deployment is often exceptionally dynamic, creating unprecedented opportunities for defense tech companies. Maintaining Ukraine’s current rapid pace of innovation is recognized as vital in order to remain one step ahead of Russia, which is also investing heavily in robotic systems and drones.

With Ukrainian efforts to implement AI technologies expected to advance in 2025, there are concerns that the fledgling robot armies currently taking shape on the battlefields of Ukraine could reduce the barriers to killing and dramatically escalate the potential for future conflicts. However, with their country fighting for survival, Ukrainian defense tech developers are primarily concerned with saving the lives of their compatriots and defeating Russia’s invasion.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Lithuania prioritizes defense spending amid growing Russian threat

Agnia Grigas — Thu, 02 Jan 2025 21:56:52 +0000

The entry of North Korean troops into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last November has highlighted the increasingly global nature of the war unleashed by Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2022. Meanwhile, Donald Trump’s US election victory has sent a strong signal to European leaders that they must prepare to invest more in their own defense, while also taking a lead in continued support for Ukraine.

Nobody is more acutely aware of these security realities than the new government in Lithuania, which took office in December 2024. Situated close to Russia on the eastern frontier of the democratic world, Lithuania is a member of both NATO and the European Union. The largest of the three Baltic states, it is on the front lines of the geopolitical struggle between the West and Putin’s resurgent brand of authoritarianism.

The Russian leader is not acting alone, of course. In December 2024, Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda warned of an “emerging axis of evil” including Russia, Belarus, China, Iran, and North Korea. The Lithuanian leader stressed the importance of a “united stance” among his Western counterparts in response to this growing authoritarian alliance.

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Strengthening national security will be among the top priorities for Lithuania’s new center-left government, which took shape in the final months of the past year following the country’s October 2024 parliamentary elections. The Lithuanian authorities have already raised military spending to above 3 percent of GDP in recent years; the new government is now promising the increase this figure to 3.5 or even 4 percent.

This would put Lithuania well ahead of most other NATO member states in terms of the country’s national defense budget. Nevertheless, Lithuania’s defense spending remains small in absolute and relative terms. While the current budget of just over 3 percent of GDP represents around 2.6 billion US dollars, Russia plans to commit 6.3 percent of GDP to defense in 2025, or approximately 126 billion US dollars.

Russia is also receiving considerable financial and material support from its authoritarian allies. Belarus served as a key base for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and has since begun hosting Russian nuclear weapons. China is propping up the Russian economy by purchasing Russian oil and gas, while Iran is providing Putin with large quantities of kamikaze drones that are used to attack Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure.

Russia’s most important partner is currently North Korea. Pyongyang first began supplying artillery shells to Moscow in late 2022. By October 2024, Western intelligence agencies were claiming that North Korea was providing half of all the shells being used by Russia in Ukraine. The Hermit Kingdom has also delivered significant quantities of ballistic missiles, and has reportedly sent more than ten thousand troops to join Putin’s invasion.

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With little sign that Russia has any intention of ending its Ukraine invasion, concerns are growing that an emboldened Putin may seek to go further. Lithuania’s location makes it an obvious potential Russian target. While the country is better prepared than many other NATO members to face this threat, much remains to be done.

While Lithuania’s defense budget is growing, far greater sums may be required. Research conducted in the second half of 2024 indicated that the Lithuanian government would need to quadruple defense spending in order to acquire sufficient weapons and establish the necessary infrastructure to repel a hypothetical Russian invasion for an initial 10-day period until NATO allies could fully deploy.

Lithuanian officials appear to understand the scale of the security challenges they now face. By late 2024, President Nausėda was arguing that the country must commit at least 5.5% of GDP to defense in the coming years. This will be a key task for Lithuania’s new Defense Minister Dovilė Šakalienė.

Most observers agree that creating a comprehensive national defense strategy and committing sufficient resources is the only way for Lithuania to deter the Kremlin. This will likely prove costly, but even the most expensive deterrence is far cheaper than dealing with the horrors of a Russian invasion.

Dr. Agnia Grigas is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and author of Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire.

Lord and Sweatt advocate for rapid adoption of cutting-edge defense software in DefenseNews

Atlantic Council — Mon, 16 Dec 2024 17:00:00 +0000

On December 16, Ellen Lord and Tyler Sweatt of Forward Defense‘s Commission on Software-Defined Warfare published an article in DefenseNews on how the US Defense Department and its allies ought to approach software-defined warfare and the urgent need for rapid adoption and delivery of cutting-edge defense software to empower the warfighter. They promoted the work of the Commission on Software-Defined Warfare and its forthcoming final report.

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Ukraine is expanding its long-range arsenal for deep strikes inside Russia

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 10 Dec 2024 22:16:46 +0000

Ukraine unveiled a new domestically-produced missile drone in early December which should significantly enhance the country’s ability to conduct airstrikes against targets deep inside Russia. Dubbed the “Peklo” (“Hell” in Ukrainian), this new addition to the Ukrainian arsenal has a reported range of 700 kilometers and can reach speeds of up to 700 kilometers per hour.

In a social media post showcasing the weapon, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the first batch of Peklo missile drones had already been delivered to the Ukrainian military and had proved its combat effectiveness. “The mission now is to scale up production and deployment,” he commented.

The Peklo is one of a number of long-range weapons currently being developed by Ukraine as the country seeks to boost its ability to strike targets inside Russia. Speaking in Kyiv on December 10, Zelenskyy announced that serial production of the long-range Palyanytsia missile drone was now underway, with trials of the new Ruta missile ongoing.

Meanwhile, a long-range version of Ukraine’s domestically produced Neptune cruise missile is expected to become operational in the near future. The Neptune is currently best known as the weapon used to sink the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, the Moskva, during the initial months of the Russian invasion in spring 2022.

In addition to these developments, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry recently announced plans to deliver more than 30,000 long-range attack drones in 2025, with production partially financed by international partners. Since the beginning of 2024, Ukraine has conducted an extensive air offensive against Russia’s energy industry and military infrastructure using long-range drones. With domestic output now reaching record levels, the coming year is likely to witness a sharp escalation in Ukrainian attacks.

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Ukraine’s efforts to expand the domestic production of long-range weapons reflect widespread frustration in Kyiv over restrictions imposed by the country’s Western partners on attacks inside Russia. For almost the entire war, Western leaders have prevented Ukraine from striking back against Russian targets due to concerns over possible retaliatory measures from the Kremlin. This has allowed Russia to launch attacks against Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure with impunity, while forcing Ukraine to effectively defend itself with one arm tied behind its back.

The United States and other partners recently relaxed these restrictions and authorized some categories of Ukrainian strikes inside Russia using Western weapons. However, a number of constraints are believed to remain in place. The missiles provided to Ukraine by the country’s Western allies also have a relatively modest maximum range of up to 300 kilometers, making them of limited use against a country as vast as Russia.

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Many in Kyiv believe an expanded long-range arsenal is essential in order to secure a viable peace with Russia. Advocates of increased long-range strikes argue that unless Ukraine is able to bring Putin’s invasion home to Russia, the Kremlin dictator will have little reason to seek a settlement. They believe that missile attacks can weaken Russia’s military potential while also starving Putin’s war machine of funding by targeting oil refineries and other elements of the country’s economically crucial but highly vulnerable energy industry.

Zelenskyy has repeatedly stressed the importance of being able to strike targets deep inside Russia, and has frequently pressed Ukraine’s allies to supply more long-range weapons. His recently presented victory plan reportedly contained one confidential segment proposing the delivery of US-made Tomahawk missiles with a range of almost 2,500 kilometers as part of a “non-nuclear deterrence package.” While this request was widely dismissed as unrealistic, it underlined the importance attached to long-range strike capabilities among officials in Kyiv as Ukrainian policymakers search for the tools to secure a lasting peace.

Recent increases in the production of long-range drones and missiles come as Ukraine seeks to revive the country’s long-neglected defense industry and reduce reliance on military aid. Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion almost three years ago, Ukraine has managed to dramatically increase domestic output in areas ranging from armored vehicles and artillery shells to electronic warfare equipment and naval drones. Much of this is being financed by Ukraine’s partners, who are being encouraged to place orders with Ukrainian producers.

As talk turns to the possibility of a peace deal once Donald Trump returns to the White House in January 2025, Ukrainians are taking nothing for granted and are preparing for a fourth year of Europe’s largest war since World War II. They hope that by enhancing their ability to strike back inside Russia, they will be able to increase the pressure on Vladimir Putin and strengthen their own position ahead of any negotiations.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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Ukraine’s entrepreneurial class can drive the country’s economic recovery

Anton Waschuk — Thu, 05 Dec 2024 14:35:43 +0000

As Ukraine endures the challenges of war, the country’s small and medium-sized businesses stand out as the key to future economic recovery. Quietly yet persistently, these businesses have weathered immense challenges, demonstrating resilience and ingenuity in the face of unprecedented disruption. They are not just vital contributors to today’s wartime Ukrainian economy, but can also serve as the engine that drives its revival and future growth.

The resourcefulness of Ukraine’s SME sector since February 2022 has been striking. By the end of 2023, more than three-quarters of SMEs that had suspended work at the start of the war had at least partially resumed their operations, reflecting the remarkable adaptability of the sector in crisis conditions. This ability to rebound is not just a testament to their determination; it also highlights the potential of Ukraine’s entrepreneurial class to drive the country’s economic transformation.

The Ukrainian authorities certainly seem to recognize the crucial role being played by SMEs. A national strategy for the development of the sector was approved in August 2024, while a range of individual programs have been unveiled to provide access to grants, affordable loans, and war risk insurance. Meanwhile, an SME Resilience Alliance was launched at the 2024 Ukraine Recovery Conference in Berlin, helping to further mobilize international support for Ukraine’s entrepreneurs. Private sector investments and individual international donor initiatives are also playing a pivotal role.

To fully realize the potential of Ukraine’s SME sector, partnerships with international private equity firms will be crucial. Such collaborations can help integrate Ukraine’s economy with Western markets, creating lasting economic ties and accelerating post-war recovery. By aligning with international private equity, Ukrainian SMEs can gain access to critical capital, global expertise, and expansive networks, enabling them to scale their operations and meet EU standards. These partnerships not only empower SMEs to grow but also deepen Ukraine’s economic connections with Western markets, fostering mutual benefits and laying the groundwork for sustainable, long-term economic recovery.

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Ukraine’s SMEs are now well positioned to act as engines for growth in several priority sectors of the economy that are essential for Ukraine’s recovery and successful EU integration. In the digital infrastructure domain, high-tech SMEs will play a critical role in building data centers, telecommunications networks, and energy-efficient systems.

Logistics and warehousing are key areas where expanding temperature-controlled facilities will enable Ukraine to meet EU trade standards. The construction materials and industrial production sectors hold immense potential, with SMEs poised to supply concrete, steel, glass, and eco-friendly materials necessary for rebuilding infrastructure. Given the scale of anticipated reconstruction work in Ukraine, the scope for growth and partnerships with experienced EU contractors in this segment of the SME sector is huge.

In the HR and education sectors of the Ukrainian economy, SMEs can help address the significant skills gap by training and recruiting over a million specialists needed across various industries. Similarly, healthcare modernization including clinics, hospices, and long-term care homes presents significant opportunities for Ukrainian entrepreneurs specializing in medical equipment, facility upgrades, and auxiliary services, ensuring the sector meets EU standards and serves the nation for decades to come.

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Even amid the trauma and destruction of Russia’s ongoing invasion, it is evident that the Ukrainian SME sector offers a remarkably wide range of opportunities. Looking ahead, it is possible to envision a time when Ukrainian SMEs are listed on global capital markets, providing new liquidity for business owners, creating pathways for Ukrainian citizens and state pension funds to invest in the country’s growth, and attracting the attention of emerging market investors.

Platforms such as the Warsaw Stock Exchange have already expressed interest in facilitating IPOs for Ukrainian SMEs. This development could potentially unlock billions of dollars in capital and help further integrate Ukrainian enterprises into the global economy.

The Ukrainian SME sector is poised to be at the forefront of efforts to create a modern, innovative, postwar economy. By continuing to adopt Western management practices, leveraging financial mechanisms such as private equity capital and public-private partnerships, and embracing international collaboration, SMEs can rebuild Ukraine’s economy and drive its transformation into a hub of technological advancement.

The importance of Ukraine’s entrepreneurs goes far beyond the valuable contributions they are already making to wartime economic resilience. With sufficient support from the Ukrainian authorities and the country’s partners, the SME sector can serve as the cornerstone of Ukraine’s integration into the European Union and its emergence as a competitive force on the global stage.

Anton Waschuk is Director of Innovation, Education, and Entrepreneurship at the Ukraine-Moldova American Enterprise Fund.

NATO in an evolving geopolitical landscape

Atlantic Council Turkey Programs — Tue, 03 Dec 2024 14:00:00 +0000

Foreword

The end of 2024 has brought significant changes to the security landscape for the United States, Turkey, and their partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine have escalated sharply, with Iran and Israel exchanging attacks, sustained warfare along multiple flashpoints the Middle East, and the introduction of North Korean troops into fighting near Kursk. Under the Siloviki rule of Soviet-remnant spy chiefs, Moscow shows no signs of backing off the expansionist strategy of restoring Russian control in post-Soviet space. Pyongyang and Tehran are now direct threats to European security. Meanwhile, wars and counter-terrorism campaigns in Africa and the Levant pose continuing challenges, and the risks of a major war in the Indo-Pacific remain high. All in all, while the world tumbles into escalating conflicts, hard power geopolitics and political-military issues have become more important than ever.

As the start of the second Trump Administration approaches and anti-Western forces tighten their coordination around the globe, the need for military readiness and closer coordination among NATO members grows to defend our homes, nations, and values. This issue of the Defense Journal provides assessments and analysis of how the Alliance is responding and adapting to this era of persistent conflict. We hope the articles here will broaden understanding of these pressing strategic matters!

Rich Outzen and Can Kasapoglu, Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY Co-managing editors

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Articles

How NATO learns and adapts to modern warfare

By Gen. Chris Badia

NATO exercises: The guarantee of Alliance security and test of readiness

By Uğur Tarçın

Political-military lessons for a NATO-Russia conflict

By Can Kasapoglu

How prepared is NATO?

By Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

Pacing scenarios

By Rich Outzen

The “other” US election and what it means for transatlantic security

By Rich Outzen

Honorary advisory board

The Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY‘s honorary advisory board provides vision and direction for the journal. We are honored to have Atlantic Council board directors Gen. Wesley K. Clark, former commander of US European Command; Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky, former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs; Gen. James L. Jones, former national security advisor to the President of the United States; Franklin D. Kramer, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute, former US Ambassador to NATO; and Dov S. Zakheim, former Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer for the Department of Defense.

Gen. Wesley K. Clark

Chairman and CEO of Wesley K. Clark & Associates & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO

Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky, Ph.D.

Senior Fellow at Harvard University JFK Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs; Board Director, Atlantic Council; former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs (2001-2009)

Gen. James L. Jones

President, Jones Group International and Executive Chairman Emeritus, Atlantic Council; former National Security Advisor to the President of the United States

Franklin D. Kramer

Distinguished Fellow & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Assistant Secretary of Defense

Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute

CEO, Cambridge Global Advisors & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Permanent Representative to NATO

Dov S. Zakheim

Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Senior Fellow, CNA Corporation; Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Under Secretary of Defense

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How prepared is NATO?

Richard D. Hooker, Jr. — Tue, 03 Dec 2024 14:00:00 +0000

How is NATO currently postured to deter and defend against the threat of Russian aggression on NATO territory? In response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Alliance has taken steps to strengthen deterrence and defence along its eastern flank, including the deployment of enhanced forward presence (EFP) battalion battlegroups to Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia, in addition to those already present in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. At the Madrid summit in March 2022, heads of state and government also expressed an intention to increase these formations to brigade size “when and where required.” In addition to the brigade combat team posted in Poland on a rotational basis, the United States deployed a second, along with a divisional headquarters and support troops, in Central and Eastern Europe for a total increase of some 20,000 troops. Allies have also continued to increase defense spending, with European members and Canada achieving an overall spend rate of 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) for the first time in 2024. Those states most threatened, including Poland, Romania, the Baltic states, and the Nordic nations, are well above 2 percent, while the accession of Finland and Sweden significantly enhance NATO’s defence posture in the east and north. Finally, allies agreed in Madrid to a new NATO Force Model designed to achieve higher readiness levels, while at the Vilnius Summit in 2023 approval was granted to prepare regional defense plans to further enhance Alliance security.

At the present time, Russian ground and air forces are fully committed in Ukraine and aggression against NATO member states appears unlikely. Accordingly, the measures cited above seem adequate. However, should Ukraine subside into yet another frozen conflict (as in Georgia and Moldova), the Russian military will rearm and reequip its formations. Putin has on many occasions made clear his intentions to recover territories formerly belonging to the Russian empire:

The concept of the “Russian World” allows Putin to regard any territories that were once ruled by or claimed to be ruled by a Russian regime as Russia’s “historical territories,” which include Poland and the Baltic states. Putin may elect to “protect” people the Kremlin describes as Russian “compatriots” in these claimed “historic territories” at the time of his choosing by replicating similar narratives he used to invade Ukraine.

Given repeated Russian aggression in Europe, and the reality of the largest conflict since 1945 right on NATO’s doorstep, the Alliance must take the Russian threat seriously. In the most likely case, a Russian invasion of the Baltic states in the next three to five years, how well is NATO positioned to respond?

Russian forces likely to participate in this scenario are a reconstituted 1^st Guards Tank Army, stationed in western Russia with three heavy divisions and two independent heavy brigades, supported by strong artillery, air defense, electronic warfare, and aviation contingents plus a Russian airborne division based in Pskov—just across the Estonian border. Unlike most NATO militaries, these formations possess significant combat experience. Their close proximity to the Baltic region, and the presence of a strong (and nuclear-armed) Kaliningrad garrison well in the rear of defending forces, provide strong advantages.

Here the current and projected level of readiness across NATO must give pause. So far, increased defense spending has not translated into marked increases in readiness. The Baltic states themselves field small militaries with no tanks or combat aircraft. Weak in air defense and artillery, they depend on rapid reinforcement from allies. Here, readiness and capability gaps limit the ability of NATO to respond. So far, NATO forces in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have not been increased to brigade strength. The NATO battlegroups posted in the three Baltic states, while important indicators of Alliance resolve, are trip-wire forces with limited combat power. To some extent, NATO airpower will be limited by the formidable air-defense bastions located in Kaliningrad and Saint Petersburg, while Russian anti-ship missiles based ashore in Kaliningrad and afloat with the Baltic Fleet will constrain NATO naval operations in the Baltic Sea.

While the United States might manage to deploy perhaps a single division to Estonia in thirty days, major powers like the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy cannot move ready forces in divisional strength there in less than sixty to ninety days—far too slow to affect the outcome. Close neighbors Poland, Sweden, and Finland possess competent militaries but lack power-projection capabilities and will be concerned to defend their own territory. (It is some 1,000 kilometers from Warsaw to Narva, Estonia.) Shortfalls in military mobility, theater air and missile defense, long-range fires, electronic warfare, and stocks of fuel, precision-guided munitions, and artillery ammunition are cause for concern. Given the high casualties seen in Ukraine, the lack of reserves across the Alliance are another serious vulnerability.

These disabilities are well known to both Russian and NATO planners. What can NATO do in the near term to address them?

The first step must be to upgrade NATO EFP forces in threatened areas from battalion to brigade strength, with appropriate enablers. Next, NATO should assist threatened states in upgrading their military forces, both in size and capability, to include tanks, artillery and air defense. Theater air and ballistic missile defense must assume high priority, as Russia will certainly attempt to interdict the arrival of NATO reinforcements. An urgent necessity is fielding effective counter-drone defenses at scale, a clear lesson from the conflict in Ukraine. Across the Alliance, member states must strive to improve readiness to meet the demanding timelines called for in the New Force Model—up to 100,000 troops “ready to move” in ten days. Military mobility has been flagged as a major concern for years; it must be tackled with urgency to remove bureaucratic obstacles and upgrade transportation infrastructure. “Below the line” capabilities such as ammunition, spare parts, fuel, and combat replacements require serious attention.

All of these will require sustained support in capitals from parliamentarians and heads of state and government. The economic and military capacity is there, along with strong political communities and institutions, and decades of collective cooperation in pursuit of shared interests and values. In question is the most valuable strategic commodity of all—the political will to build a stronger and more secure Europe. If that is present, effective deterrence and defense is assured.

Richard D. Hooker, Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council. He previously served as Dean of the NATO Defense College and as Special Assistant to the US President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia with the National Security Council.

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How NATO learns and adapts to modern warfare

General Chris Badia — Tue, 03 Dec 2024 14:00:00 +0000

Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have had strategic consequences far beyond the region, showcasing the complexities of modern conflicts, where conventional battles are intertwined with cyber warfare, information operations, and hybrid tactics.

No doubt, Russia’s actions have reshaped the global geopolitical landscape. Yet NATO’s capability to adapt has been central and the basis for its sustained relevance and success as an alliance since its founding in 1949. And now, seventy-five years later, NATO continues to lead in learning and evolving to address emerging challenges in the future operating environment.

As with past conflicts and Russia’s evolving war against Ukraine, NATO’s mechanisms for lessons learned and transformation serve as a critical means to adapt and prepare the Alliance to counter every aggression in the future.

But how does NATO, with thirty-two member nations, learn lessons? While NATO’s internal learning process is informed by its members and their own experiences, the situation in Ukraine now demands the ability to learn lessons from others’ experiences. In short, this external learning process is achieved by Alliance-wide lessons sharing and collecting through a dedicated NATO lessons-learned portal. These national observations and experiences are collected, evaluated, consolidated, and then transformed into actions to be applied in NATO’s activities to transform, adapt, and prepare for the future.

The organization’s military learning and adaptation process is strategically led by Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in the United States in Norfolk, Virginia, with a dedicated subordinate command as the Alliance’s center for enabling and supporting the NATO lessons-learned policy and capability: the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) in Lisbon, Portugal. By systematically collecting reports from open sources, partners, and allies, and sharing them in the NATO lessons-learned portal, all member nations can benefit. A dedicated analysis team gleans insights from the vast amount of data to enhance NATO’s understanding of Russia’s war against Ukraine, and thus, where applicable, inform and influence the development of new strategies, doctrines, and training programs. Recently, JALLC is also benefiting from inputs delivered by a Ukrainian nongovernmental organization focused on analysis and training.

NATO’s decision to establish the NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis Training and Evaluation Centre (JATEC) will soon play another crucial role in ensuring that NATO remains informed, agile, adaptable, and effective in addressing contemporary and future security challenges. JATEC thus represents a significant commitment by allies not only to improve the interoperability and effectiveness of Ukrainian forces but also to enhance the Alliance’s capability by learning and applying lessons.

The lessons-learned process is also supported by various national NATO-accredited Centres of Excellence (COE). These COEs, under the coordinating authority of ACT, specialize in various military areas of expertise, such as cyber defense, command and control, air power, medical support, etc.

Altogether, ACT with the JALLC in its overarching role, the contributions by the nations, and the NATO-accredited COEs with their specializations, create a comprehensive system for ensuring lessons are captured and disseminated to operational forces, fostering a culture of continuous improvement within NATO.

The basis of a successful alliance is a common understanding and principles, which are laid out in doctrines. Therefore, doctrine development is a critical component of NATO’s adaptation and transformation process. By continuously updating doctrine based on real-world experiences and lessons learned, NATO ensures that its operational principles remain robust and effective in the face of evolving threats. With regard to Russia’s war in Ukraine, Russia’s use of hybrid warfare tactics, which combine conventional military force with irregular tactics, and cyber and information operations, has prompted improvements in NATO doctrine governing how NATO shares intelligence and counters disinformation campaigns to strengthen NATO’s response toward hybrid warfare tactics.

Furthermore, lessons from Russia’s war against Ukraine underscore the importance of agile, integrated command and control systems capable of coordinating operations across multiple domains: land, sea, air, cyber, and space. NATO needs command and control structures that are flexible, resilient, and capable of rapid decision-making. Advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning are being leveraged to enhance shared situational awareness and streamline decision-making processes to maintain an advantage.

Lessons learned will be injected into NATO exercises and training to generate high-fidelity training scenarios allowing NATO forces to “train as they fight.” Besides improving interoperability, certifying NATO forces, and demonstrating NATO’s fighting credibility, NATO exercises also challenge training audiences to face operational dilemmas that reflect the complexities of modern warfare. JALLC reports summarizing lessons from the war in Ukraine are being used by the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) and Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) to update and improve NATO exercises. The increased use of drones, private-sector support for military operations, the battle for both cognitive and information superiority, sustainment, and civilian resilience are key features, which have already informed changes in NATO exercises to ensure that NATO forces are better prepared to operate in complex and dynamic environments.

ACT, as the strategic warfare development headquarters, also looks into the future. Studies focus on widely debated topics including, for example, the future operating environment and the future force structure. Other topics include the future of tanks and attack helicopters, small-drone warfare, vulnerabilities of fleets and ports to maritime drones, and the protection of critical infrastructures against long-range strikes.

NATO’s commitment and ability to continuously develop and improve ensures the Alliance’s enduring strength and cohesion. NATO is rapidly incorporating battlefield lessons into the transformation, adaptation, and preparation activities of the Alliance’s forces. ACT is key to this process, ensuring lessons reach operational forces at the speed of relevance.

General Chris Badia is NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation.

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Congressman Michael McCaul on why a deal with Russia on Ukraine must have ‘enforcement’

dhojnacki — Thu, 21 Nov 2024 19:00:12 +0000

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Congressman Michael McCaul on Russia and the authoritarian challenge

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—Congressman Michael McCaul, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, addresses the threat Russian aggression in Ukraine poses to US interests, highlighting Moscow’s expanding authoritarian alliances with North Korea, Iran, and China.

Europe & Eurasia Geopolitics & Energy Security Politics & Diplomacy Rule of Law

Speaker

Representative Michael McCaul (R-TX),
Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Committee

Moderator

Ambassador John E. Herbst
Senior Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council

Introduction

Frederick Kempe
President and CEO, Atlantic Council

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

FREDERICK KEMPE: Welcome to Atlantic Council Front Page, the Atlantic Council’s premier live platform for global leaders tackling today’s greatest challenges. I’m Fred Kempe. I’m president and CEO of the Atlantic Council.

We are delighted to welcome Congressman Michael McCaul, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, to the Atlantic Council. Even more, Mr. Chairman, we’re delighted to welcome you to the first Atlantic Council Front Page event in our new headquarters at 1400 L Street. And we hope all of you who are watching online will come visit us soon. And thank you to those who are here at the headquarters.

Chairman McCaul is currently serving his tenth term in Congress, representing Texas’s tenth district. In addition to serving as chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Congressman McCaul is the former chair of the House Committee on Homeland Security. He’s one of the nation’s strongest, most principled, and most consistent leaders on US foreign policy. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, he’s been a staunch advocate for supporting Ukraine’s victory and resistance against Russian aggression.

It’s wonderful to have the Ukrainian ambassador here today. I know the Moldovan ambassador is here as well. Thank you to both of you for being here. Chairman McCaul’s impact is evident in his committee leadership, through which he has introduced critical legislation, such as the REPO for Ukrainians Act, overseeing the markup and passage of many other critical bills, supporting Ukraine in condemning and deterring Russia’s aggression. And he has pushed for the passage of aid to Ukraine.

Russia’s aggression is augmented by its growing partnerships with autocratic nations that we’ve been calling the axis of aggressors—Iran, China, North Korea—whose increasing collaboration pose an existential threat not only to the Ukrainian people, but also to Ukraine’s neighbors, and the US and NATO. And this, of course, is underscored by ten thousand North Korean troops in Russia at the moment, threatening Ukraine. For this reason, we at the Atlantic Council will continue to advocate for strong measures to ensure that Ukraine prevails.

Our discussion today will be moderated by Ambassador John Herbst, former ambassador to Ukraine, former ambassador to Uzbekistan, and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, whose team and teams across the Atlantic Council have really taken a lead on this set of issues. For those in the audience and for those watching virtually, submit your questions to AskAC.org, and we’ll get to your questions later in the show.

I’m now honored to welcome Chairman McCaul and turn to Ambassador Herbst to start this important Atlantic Council Front Page—this inaugural Atlantic Council Front Page conversation in new headquarters—to you. So, John, over to you.

JOHN HERBST: Fred, thank you very much. And Chairman McCaul, thank you for being here. As Fred said, you’ve been staunch in defending American interests as we deal with an aggressive Russia, an aggressive China, and North Korea, and Iran.

OK. Moscow has been waging this war on Ukraine for ten years. Their big invasion began almost three years ago. The US has provided substantial military and economic support to Ukraine since the big invasion. What are the US interests in this war and why are we engaged?

MICHAEL MCCAUL: It’s great question. I get asked that quite a bit from my colleagues. I want to thank the Atlantic Council for inviting me. And your new facility is beautiful. And my good friend, the ambassador from Ukraine, we’ve been through a lot together the past couple—it’s vitally important. I have to remind some of my colleagues about history. The 1930s. A lot of parallels today between 1939 and today. A lot of them didn’t grow up in the Cold War. I did. And Russia was not our friend. They were our enemy, an adversary. They still are today. You call it an axis. I call it unholy alliance that Chairman Xi and Putin made at the Beijing Olympics, two weeks before the invasion into Ukraine.

We knew it would happen after Afghanistan fell. We saw the satellite imagery of the Russian Federation moving towards Ukraine. And we warned the world about that. And, you know, obviously it did happen. Why is it important, though? I believe, if you get into Putin’s head, that his legacy is very important. He envisions himself as, like, a Peter the Great. Restoration of the Russian Empire is important to him. He was in Berlin when the wall fell and thought that his leadership betrayed him. That would be Mr. Gorbachev and then Yeltsin. He has great animosity towards them. And he feels it’s his responsibility to reclaim what is rightly Russia’s.

Ukraine’s always been the breadbasket of Russia. It’s always been the prize of Russia. Stalin obviously exploited that. Eight million Ukrainians died. We had Chernobyl. We had the Budapest agreement that was then violated. Ukraine gave up its nuclear arsenal. No enforcement mechanism. Ukraine’s been the victim for quite some time. But I have to say, are we—is the United States’ posture in the world stronger or weaker if we allow Mr. Putin to invade and take over all of Ukraine? I think it’s weaker. We’re projecting weakness, not strength. That would invite more aggression from Mr. Putin. It also impacts Chairman Xi and his calculus, looking at Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific. Moldova would certainly fall within a day, as would Georgia.

And then, all of Eastern Europe would be under the threat and the dark cloud of Russian aggression. So therefore, if past is prologue, if we could have stopped Hitler in 1939 my dad wouldn’t have had to participate in that war. And I think the—I think the goals are similar in this case. And I think when you go to Ukraine they say, we’re fighting for you so you don’t have to fight this war. And I think that’s—there’s a lot of truth to that. They are fighting this conflict for us. And it’s our moral obligation and responsibility to stop aggression where it exists, to defend freedom and democracy against what is becoming now, between Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, a very formidable adversary alliance—or the unholy alliance, that I call it.

JOHN HERBST: Thank you. You know, you don’t need to just point to the past. Just remind those who don’t understand our interests here that every day Putin or someone in Moscow describes the US as Russia’s principal adversary and act that way.

You’ve already described what would happen if Russia succeeded—if Putin succeeded in Ukraine. You talked about it in terms of Europe. But you’ve mentioned, Fred mentioned, that anyone who could look at the geopolitical scene understands we do face increasing cooperation by our four foes, right? Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran.

Some people argue that China is our most dangerous adversary and they’re sure we should direct all of our geopolitical efforts to the Western Pacific. However, the leaders of Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea say if we want to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan make sure Putin loses in Ukraine. How do you see this?

MICHAEL MCCAUL: Well, don’t take my word for it. I met with the Japanese ambassador from Japan and the national security advisor. Every Asian country I talk to, whether it be Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Australia—you know, the Indo-Pacific region, they all see it the same way, that what happens in Ukraine impacts Chairman Xi’s calculus as to whether he will invade Taiwan.

I do think China is the greater threat, the great power competition. AI warfare, the Indo-China—Indo-Pacific conflict could result in when you look at a World War III analysis that is the one I worry the most about.

We have two hot zones and they’re all tied together. You can’t separate the ayatollah from Putin. Putin invited Hamas to the Kremlin right after October 7. The alliance between Xi and Putin is clear. North Korea has now sent ten thousand troops into the conflict.

So all these four dictators—we don’t choose our enemies. You know, they choose us and, you know, when I gave my closing argument on the floor it was do you want to be—think about this vote because it’s historical, and do you want to be remembered as Chamberlain or Churchill?

Because that, at the end of the day, is the decision that we had to make. There were a lot of courageous members that did the right thing. There were members who were afraid of their own shadows.

But you know what? We didn’t get the blowback that everybody said we were going to get when we went back home. In fact, more people say thank you for standing up against Putin and what he’s trying to do.

And so I don’t know if that answered all of your question but, again, I view them all in this together. You really can’t separate them. You can’t say, gee, I’m against communist China but I kind of like Putin and Russia because they’re allies.

JOHN HERBST: You’re right. And, you know, some folks who oppose our policy of supporting Ukraine are all in for supporting Israel, which is good, but then they deny the connection between Russia and Iran. And, of course, when the Israeli forces went into southern Lebanon they found huge stocks of Russian weapons controlled by Hezbollah.

OK. The Biden administration just lifted, finally, restrictions on abilities—Ukraine’s ability to use our ATACMS against targets in Russia, something which you have advocated for not just months but first you advocated for years that they get the ATACMS and then without restriction.

At this late date when many Russian military assets have been moved out of the range of these missiles and, again, these long strikes only go a hundred eighty miles, right—so they don’t go deep into Russia the way people say—what will be the impact of this decision?

MICHAEL MCCAUL: The impact—well, better late than never. I’ll take you back to the very beginning of the conflict.

JOHN HERBST: Please.

MICHAEL MCCAUL: My frustration with the administration has been the slow walking of these defense articles that we promised we would deliver to Ukraine and, yet, you know, it started with the Javelins, the Stingers, and the HIMARS. For those of you who don’t know it’s another launching—the missile. F-16s to tanks. Finally, the ATACMS. That’s the long-range artillery.

Look, I empathize with President Zelensky and the ambassador. They can’t really bite the hand that feeds them. So I become the advocate and say things that maybe they can’t say diplomatically. But it is do not tie our hands behind our back. That’s not a way to win a war. You’re either all in or you’re out. And I think history’s always taught us that. If we’re only halfway in this thing, you get into a stalemate. And if you get into a stalemate, Russia wins. So give them everything they need now—that was two years ago—to win this fight.

We were told it would be over in five days. The Ukrainians proved us wrong. And when I—the resilience of the Ukrainian soldiers, and the citizen soldiers, I should say, in the toughness of this fight is why I think the will and determination of the Ukrainians is far stronger than the cannon fodder that Russia puts on its frontlines, which is why I’m optimistic. I’ve always been optimistic about this conflict. But I have not been optimistic about the slowness of the weapons.

What we’ve seen now with the threat of ATACMS now is that Russia is now receding its weapons. These glide bombs were coming across. Most of this is in the Kursk region. That’s where the ten thousand North Koreans are. I got a briefing yesterday. That is where the strongest part of the fighting is, and that’s where the ATACMS will be used. And they will be very effective because it will not just be air defense; it will be—it will be projected strength across border at Russia so they will have to retreat.

Why is that important? You know, I know that the president-elect met with Putin and said please do not escalate. He has not taken the president-elect’s advice. In fact, what we’re seeing is almost a counteroffensive now. And Ukraine, I believe, needs these ATACMS because, if and when the moment happens where a ceasefire is declared and a negotiation takes place, Ukraine has to be in the strongest possible position with the most leverage to get the best negotiation at the table. Right now they’re not there because of the slowness of, you know, Jake Sullivan and the National Security Council in delivering these weapons. Now that they have the ATACMS, I hope—and Kursk is actually part of—was actually Russian. Putin does not like that at all. And so I think the more they can push the Russians out, the better the map’s going to look at the end of the day.

JOHN HERBST: There have been some critics, including from the Republican Party, who claim that this provision of this authority to the Ukrainians is going to make it harder for President Trump to succeed—or, incoming President Trump to succeed with his peace initiative. Any thoughts on that?

MICHAEL MCCAUL: I disagree. You know—

JOHN HERBST: Explain why, please.

MICHAEL MCCAUL: And maybe I’m in the minority in my party now; I don’t know. I always ask the question, what would Reagan do? To my Republican colleagues, what would Ronald Reagan do, the guy that brought down the Soviet Union? And now we have these pro-Putin Russian-loving people. I don’t understand it.

I think just the contrary: because the ATACMS can be used, the better leverage at the table Ukraine will have in the negotiating process. Without the ATACMS, they wouldn’t have that position of leverage. Better late than never. I wish it was sooner.

But if you look at the real leadership in the House on national security, it is the three national security committees. So the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, Mike Turner, agrees with me; and the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Mike Rogers. They call us the three Mikes. And then we have Mike Johnson, the speaker.

So I remember talking to Mike Johnson the eve before he made his heroic decision to move forward with Ukraine aid. And I said, you know, at the end of the day, it’s not your district; it’s not even the United States; it’s the world that your decision will impact. And I said: Mr. Speaker, you want to be on the right side of history. And that’s what I appealed—history will judge us at this moment in time, and what side of history do you want to be judged on? And I truly believe that we’re on the right side.

JOHN HERBST: You’ve mentioned that Putin wants to, in effect, restore Moscow’s control over the entire post-Soviet space and you even say the entire space of the Warsaw Pact, which takes care of a bunch of NATO—new NATO members. If that’s true—and I think it is, with you—then it would seem to me the only way President Trump could have a peace agreement which ensures Ukraine’s survival—which he said is important to the United States, whereas others in his party have not said that—is to give Ukraine leverage. Would you agree with that?

MICHAEL MCCAUL: I agree. You know, let’s go—what was Putin’s goal? It was to divide and weaken NATO. Just the opposite occurred. It’s now more united than it’s ever been. And it’s stronger than it’s—with the accession of Sweden and Finland, two great superpowers, if you will, in terms of military, the strength they bring to NATO is phenomenal. So now Putin is seeing that what he did is actually not working the way he had planned. I would say that he is the one losing, not Ukraine. But we can’t allow Ukraine to fall.

I think President Trump’s right about this. I still believe he has voices in his head—in his ear, like myself, like Mr. Waltz, who is on my committee, like, you know, Rubio, like Mike Pompeo, and Robert O’Brien, and likeminded, you know, people, probably more back from the Reagan era, that we can’t afford to lose this fight. And it’s vital to our national interests, because if Ukraine falls Taiwan is next. And that would be World War III.

JOHN HERBST: If you want peace, prepare for war.

MICHAEL MCCAUL: Project strength. Reagan, it’s an axiom that’s historically correct. You project strength to get peace. Project weakness, you invite conflict, aggression, and war.

JOHN HERBST: OK. Thank you.

Coming back to the peace initiative, which President-elect Trump keeps discussing. While the key elements of the plan are obviously not public, we have certain indications. For example, Ukraine making some territorial compromise, perhaps a demilitarized zone between Russian and Ukrainian troops, perhaps in that zone European forces, perhaps arming Ukraine substantially so Russia doesn’t dare attack after this peace agreement. Almost every voice we’ve heard from Russia has essentially rejected these things. How do you see this negotiation playing out, given these circumstances?

MICHAEL MCCAUL: I think it’d be very difficult. I know that President-elect Trump envisions himself as the great negotiator. I think Putin is a very, very smart, clever man. Don’t ever underestimate him. Once KGB, always. He wants all of Ukraine. That’s rightfully his, in his mind. It is rightfully part of Russia. It’s a breadbasket. I find it very hard to negotiate that. And, by the same token, very difficult for President Zelensky to acquiesce the Donbas and Crimea without having a revolution on his hands, after everything they’ve gone through. So I think this negotiation is not going to be easy. I think it’d be very, very hard on both sides.

But whatever—if a negotiation is finalized, my strongest advice is to put teeth into the agreement and put an enforcement mechanism. As you know, the greatest sin and weakness of the Budapest agreement, which took all the deterrence away from Ukraine to give up all their nuclear weapons, had no enforcement mechanism. So that when they gave all their weapons up, what happened after that? Then Russia moved into the Donbas in Crimea, with no enforcement. And we betrayed Ukraine. The world stage, NATO betrayed Ukraine at that moment. So if ever a negotiation is entered into again, you have to have enforcement.

JOHN HERBST: Good. OK.

You mentioned NATO. Obviously, the great peace that we’ve enjoyed since the end of World War II, no great-power war, perhaps is due to NATO more than anything else, and American power properly applied globally. NATO is the core as we face, as you call them, the unholy alliance. But what we’ve seen over the past six and seven months is, A, a much larger Russian sabotage campaign in NATO countries in Europe. But also, if we believe the Wall Street Journal, they were going to put bombs on DHL planes coming here and coming to Canada. That’s one. That’s been going on since April, say. And over the last two and a half months we’ve seen fairly regular violations of NATO airspace, Russian missiles and drones on their way to deliver their packages to Ukraine. NATO has done nothing against either of these provocations. What should NATO do? What should the incoming administration do about this?

MICHAEL MCCAUL: I think strong warnings that if you continue this behavior, you’ll invoke Article Five of the NATO doctrine. You can’t continue to violate NATO airspace. You can’t threaten with bombs. You can’t threaten with tactical nukes. If you do—first of all, tactical nukes, that’s a red line for China. So you’re going to lose your biggest ally. But secondly, you are getting dangerously close to invoking Article Five, that will bring the full weight and power of that. The one thing that the president-elect did tell Putin was not to escalate, which he didn’t do. But we have a very strong military presence in Europe. And you know this. A tactical nuke would—again, China would abandon. And who knows where the radioactive cloud would—it’s got two directions it can go. It can go into Russia and kill his own people, or it can go west and into Poland, which I would argue would be a violation of article—it would invoke Article Five.

JOHN HERBST: You mentioned possible use of nukes. One thing Putin has done well, as he’s waged this revisionist campaign against us in our interests, since at least the cyberattack on Estonia in ’07 and the war on Georgia in ’08, has been to read Western leaders. And he’s found them wanting. Well, from his standpoint, amenable to his aggression, because they’re weak. It seems clear that one of the reasons why the administration, the current administration, has been slow in giving Ukraine the arms it needs and the permission to use those arms has been the fear of Putin’s nuclear threats, even though we passed six or seven Russian red lines. We’re now hearing similar arguments coming from parts of not the incoming administration, but parts of the incoming party. Why this weird synergy between the weak—one clear weakness in the Biden administration and people who want to make America strong again?

MICHAEL MCCAUL: I find it very strange. I can’t explain it. I suppose there’s an isolationist wing within my party that possibly existed in the 1930s. And they were on the wrong side of history. When I saw the refugees coming out of Ukraine into Poland—the mothers and children and their fathers were left to fight the war—I said, this is like 1939, you know, all over again. I asked this very question of the analysts yesterday in a different setting. But I can tell you that their analysis is, this is bluster. It’s been bluster from day one. That they know the consequences of using a tactical nuke.

And quite frankly, from a military standpoint, it doesn’t—it wouldn’t do the damage that other weapons could do. But the damage it would incur to Russia would be face—they would lose face in the process, they would lose allies, and they could potentially invoke Article Five. And for all those reasons, I just don’t—that’s why I just don’t think they would do it. They will continue their cyberattacks. So the more you put Russia on the doorstep of Eastern Europe, the more you’re going to see threats to Europe.

Europe is almost like two different Europes. You got Eastern Europe and Western. And I’ll put the UK in a different category. But if you look at Germany, the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, I asked the ambassador at the time, why do you want to have a pipeline from Russia that’s going to make you dependent on Russian energy? Well, we want Russia to be more of a trading partner. And we feel—there was also a bit of consciousness, guilt about World War II. And we saw how well Nord Stream 2 worked.

So if you talk to Eastern Europe, they’re very hardline against Russia, whereas Western Europe is a little—to your point—leadership is a little weaker. And it’s because they’re not on the front line. And the UK is in a different spot. I think they’re very much our ally in this fight. And I—you know, I passed AUKUS in the Congress, which unifies Australia, the UK, and the United States in an alignment to counter China in the Indo-Pacific.

JOHN HERBST: We’ve got three minutes before audience questions, but there’s one large issue we have to raise. You talk about history. And, you know, the Spanish Civil War was kind of the preview of World War II in Europe. And you might say that Russia’s aggression in Ukraine could be a preview of a great-power war to come. And one thing our military has learned from this war is how equipment intensive a great-power war would be. The US has not paid nearly enough attention to ramping up its arms production. Even since the big invasion, the steps forward have been relatively slow. How do you see this playing out? Are we going to get serious about returning the arsenal of democracy into operation?

MICHAEL MCCAUL: I love that term, “arsenal of democracy.” If I go home and say, you know, the biggest threat to the United States is our defense industrial base, they don’t know what I’m talking about. But if I say the “arsenal of democracy,” they understand that. And that is our greatest threat and weakness.

And it’s not because of the weapons going into Ukraine. Those are older weapons. A lot of them are Russian from Eastern Europe.

I’ll give you an example. I sign off on all foreign military weapons sales. We promised Taiwan five years ago twenty weapons systems. They bought them. It’s not like we’re financing it; they actually paid for them. Only half of those weapons systems now have gone into Taiwan.

Now, that’s indicative of a global problem. And we need to change the way our procurement process works at the DOD, but we also need to change our defense contractors to be more agile and flexible with cost—not cost-plus, but fixed, you know, contracts.

A good example—I’m not going to—I’m not trying to favor one over the other, but Anduril is a very innovative company that anticipates what the customer wants, and they build it, and the customer buys it. When I was in Australia, there was the Ghost Shark. It’s about twenty-five, thirty feet. It’s a platform—AI, unmanned, electric, so there’s no signature—and it can develop sea mines, torpedoes, drones, and missiles all from one platform, either underwater or on the surface. How many of those would secure the Taiwan Strait, I asked? Probably six to eight.

JOHN HERBST: Interesting.

MICHAEL MCCAUL: And I said, how much do they cost? Ten to twenty million.

Now, that may sound a lot—like a lot of money to you all, but that’s—as you know, Ambassador, that’s—and imagine, this is President Xi’s greatest fear, is AUKUS, because the beast of the ocean, the nuclear subs, are rotating in. And now he knows that we’re on the verge of AI weapons systems like this that could go all throughout the Pacific.

JOHN HERBST: OK. Thank you.

One more quick question here. Some naïve individuals who don’t understand the Russian threat to the United States say, well, because China is the larger threat and we have a limited supply of weapons, we need to send them all to the Western Pacific. Your thoughts? They don’t talk—they talk about increasing production.

MICHAEL MCCAUL: They’re all in it together. When I gave my closing argument on the emergency wartime supplemental, I had a picture. There they were, all four, as a picture—Putin, and Chairman Xi, and the ayatollah, and Kim Jong-un, all at the same party. They are the same party, actually, and they’re all in it together. You cannot separate them. What happens in Ukraine will forecast the Indo-Pacific.

Why I worry about the Indo-Pacific even more so is that imagine Taiwan invasion and 90 percent of our advanced semiconductor manufacturing goes under, the tailspin that would create economically—which is why I introduced and passed, you know, the CHIPS Act. But what else will happen—let’s say a miscalculation in the Philippines, where I just came back, where the Chinese warships are violating Philippine territorial waters and the Chinese yell at us in Mandarin to go back—turn around, go home, Yankee, right? So—but imagine a miscalculation. We have a defense agreement with the Philippines. That would escalate into, my God, the United States and the Philippines are at war with China.

Who’s going to join China? Who are the allies of China? Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Against the United States, Australia, UK, Japan, South Korea, Philippines. That would be the World War III scenario.

JOHN HERBST: And we’ve been making progress—am I—am I wrong?—with NATO, getting them to engage in the Pacific.

MICHAEL MCCAUL: Right. And you know, the national security advisor from Japan calls it we need a new NATO. Well, some in my party don’t like that word. But there’s an alliance.

And I will credit this administration for the treaty between—who would think Japan and the Philippines and South Korea would ever enter into a defense agreement? Now Vietnam is on the verge, and Indonesia, and Australia. And you know, when I’m over in the island nations, you know what they tell me? China, they’re not doing themselves any favors; they are creating more enemies than anything else because of their aggression. They see the threat from China and they are fearful and they want to stick together, you know, in this alliance—whatever you want to call it.

JOHN HERBST: As long as we’re strong that works really nicely.

MICHAEL MCCAUL: And it’s the will—if I could end with that, the will of the American people is going to be key, right? So we have an agreement with the Philippines that we are really mandated to oblige ourselves.

Taiwan is different, and some people will say why do we care about an island off the coast of China—why is Taiwan important. Well, it’s the aggression that would come after that. But if they don’t care about freedom and democracy, like, when I was growing up under Reagan and they don’t seem to care about freedom and democracy as much, but I can tell them it’s going to hit your pocketbook.

You won’t be able to drive your car. You won’t have semiconductor chips because 90 percent of those are manufactured in Taiwan, and you will have an economic tailspin.

JOHN HERBST: OK. I’m scrolling through the questions. I’ll take a question from anonymous because it’s most relevant to what you’ve just been discussing.

Given the administration—the incoming administration’s interest in this peace negotiation, some worry about what that—the terms of that settlement might be and the process to get there. How can Congress, which has demonstrated large bipartisan support for aiding Ukraine, ensure Ukraine continues to receive resources necessary to defend itself?

MICHAEL MCCAUL: Well, Mr. Meeks and I are from different parties but we’re very unified and that’s the only way this works.

You’ll have fringes on the left and the right that will never vote for Ukraine but it’s the members in the middle, the sensible center—I’m kind of more center right than more center left—that will bring this coalition together.

I’ve never seen—and it was really the work of myself with the speaker and Mr. Meeks with Hakeem Jeffries to get a rule passed on Ukraine required us to get sixty or more Democrats to vote for a Republican rule.

Now, that’s unheard of but it happened in Ukraine on that vote, and that’s the only way. In our committee we try to be bipartisan and when we’re not we disagree civilly. But we don’t want to be divided because it’s always stronger as one nation, one voice. Our adversaries listen.

When we’re divided as a committee or a nation our adversaries and enemies see weakness. So this is, like, incredibly important that we stick together on this.

JOHN HERBST: Amen. OK.

We have a question from Sangmin Lee from Radio Free Asia: How can the US respond or how should the US respond to the North Korean troops in Russia fighting Ukrainians? And maybe heading into—

MICHAEL MCCAUL: Well, the ATACMS.

JOHN HERBST: Right. That’s a good thing.

MICHAEL MCCAUL: Right. And the ATACMS will hit them hard.

Now, these are kind of their special forces but the ATACMS can hit them. It was interesting. We got a report that one of their own drones, actually, they didn’t know how to use it. It landed on them and blew up a lot of North Koreans.

Not to celebrate anyone’s departure but, you know, they’re not fully integrated with the Russians. They don’t speak the same language. They’re not trained. I think—and always try to see the light in a dark situation—this is creating a division between Russia and China because China they don’t like the fact that now North Korea is putting troops in there.

Why are they doing it? Because they want Russia to help them against this UN, you know, denuclearization agreement that the UN’s pushing for with North Korea. That’s precisely why they’re putting those troops in there. And they’re getting money.

JOHN HERBST: Do you think that North Korea is getting help with missile technology from Moscow?

MICHAEL MCCAUL: Yes, and I would also say but for China—Russian military was decimated but for China they were resuscitated and they rebuilt their military because of China.

And I have told this administration and Mr. Sullivan—National Security Council—please apply secondary sanctions on China because they are rebuilding the Russian military and they—if I could elaborate.

JOHN HERBST: Please.

MICHAEL MCCAUL: Two very strong sanctions I put—wrote into including ATACMS, I didn’t say “may be delivered”—“shall be delivered,” mandatory language, because I knew that they wouldn’t do it unless Congress mandated the ATACMS. And then, even though we mandate, they said, well, we’re not going to let them use it, you know, in these areas. You know, that’s gotten better, but what I—the other thing—two things we did was on Iran.

You know, China’s buying Iranian oil to the tune of about one hundred billion dollars. What’s that doing? That’s funding their terror operations in the Middle East. But what else are they doing? They’re sending their drones and missiles that they used—that they fired into Israel, same ones—they’re shipping those to Russia that then Russia uses to kill Ukrainians. Well, those sanctions were allowed to expire. So I put them back into the Emergency Wartime Supplemental. But they’re not being enforced. Why in the world are we not enforcing sanctions that would dry up Iran’s funding and prohibit weapon sales that kill Israelis and kill Ukrainians?

JOHN HERBST: Amen. OK. I have a question from Laura Kelly on the Hill.

You’re stepping down from the chairmanship. What advice do you have for whomever takes your place?

MICHAEL MCCAUL: God help you. I feel—our rules—we get term limited. But the rules actually were to my benefit. I’m one of the rare members that’s actually chaired two important committees—Homeland Security, at a very dangerous time after 9/11, and now Foreign Affairs as I see the world’s on fire. I wasn’t a direct cause and effect for these things, but I just happened to chair at a very critical time. So I’m liberated from the shackles of management. But I will not be bound—I will be—actually, have a little bit of freedom to speak my own mind.

I think the chair is going to be bound by whatever comes out of the White House. And while I certainly support most of those ideas, I will have some freedom and flexibility to speak my own mind and to try to influence and persuade people. And I think I will be given a role. And I never thought of myself as an older person, but as a sort of—maybe not senior statesman, but maybe a little bit older statesman in the Congress that my colleagues will listen to, that I can provide leadership to, in a different role. And I’ll have more time to do things like this. I’ll have more time to write. And I’m very much looking forward to, you know, this new role in the next Congress.

JOHN HERBST: Well, your voice certainly carries.

MICHAEL MCCAUL: Thank you.

JOHN HERBST: We have several questions on Georgia, one about the obviously imperfect, if not fraudulent, election. Two, about the intent, it seems, by the current leader in Georgia to push the country closer to Moscow. And basically all asking, what can and should the United States do to prevent an end to democracy in Georgia, and an end to an ally to the West in the Caucasus?

MICHAEL MCCAUL: It’s a huge issue. In fact, Leslie Shedd, my comms director, went over and was one of the election watchers. You know, they’re mandated to vote in Georgia. Maybe that’s not a bad idea here. You get fined if you don’t vote. Now, how can you explain—why would they elect a pro-Russian president? Fraud probably is part of it. But there’s also a sentiment in Georgia that we don’t want to poke the bear, literally.

Like, you know, if we have someone that’s sort of friendly to Moscow, they’re not going to annex us. They’ll give us some space. I’m not justifying that thinking. I think that’s their sort of thinking as they’re on the doorstep of an invasion, which would certainly happen if Ukraine fell. And I really feel for the people Moldova. They know that they are going to be the first victim to fall if Ukraine falls. But democracy is under threat, everywhere Russia—all the borders of Russia, there’s a threat to democracy.

JOHN HERBST: OK, last question, from Doug Klain with Razom.

The Biden administration has pledged to make full use of available drawdown authority by the end of its term. There are reports that some, or more than some, of military systems won’t arrive until well into the next year, into the new administration. What does President Biden do—what can he do to fix this while he has two months in office?

MICHAEL MCCAUL: I think—now, I actually agree with pulling down the drawdown authority and utilizing that now so that no one can take that away. And I mean, that was the intent and will of Congress. So, just like the weapons were, give it to Ukraine. Don’t hold it back.

Personally, I know that loans is a big issue, but you know, World War II we had Lend-Lease, and we forgave a lot of loans to the UK. And I think we’ll do the same thing, you know, with Ukraine.

And then I think there will be an intense debate—I can’t lie about this, or certainly want to be honest that there will be a very intense debate in the new Congress. Now, this is getting into the weeds of how Congress—either we’ll have a CR, continuing resolution, at the end of the year, which is terrible for the military; or we’ll have a full spending—a minibus or omnibus. Either way, that’ll happen either in December or—March 1, that would be the length of the CR. And that’s when the debate on additional funding, you know, for Ukraine, you know, will come up.

We can’t afford to lose this fight. And NATO in many respects, I think, is stronger today because of the 2 percent that President Trump mandated. But they’re also very strong—we went to the NATO conference. What was Putin’s response to that? He fired a—intentionally fired a missile and hit a children’s hospital the day before the NATO conference, shot across the bow.

JOHN HERBST: Correct.

MICHAEL MCCAUL: That shows you how evil this man is.

JOHN HERBST: And no response from NATO or the United States to that provocation.

MICHAEL MCCAUL: No response, and I—shameful. I think NATO and the will of NATO in Europe is in many respects stronger on Ukraine than the United States is.

JOHN HERBST: Yes.

Well, I think our time is up. It’s been a real pleasure having this conversation with you, Mr. Chairman. And we’ll be happy to invite you back when you have—are freed of those responsibilities. OK. Thank you very much.

MICHAEL MCCAUL: Thanks for your service, too.

Watch the full event

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Soofer quoted in Breaking Defense on the production timeline for the sub-launched cruise missile

Atlantic Council — Mon, 18 Nov 2024 16:47:44 +0000

On November 15, Forward Defense Senior Fellow Rob Soofer was quoted in an article for Breaking Defense on the challenges to producing the nuclear submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N). The article, written by Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., discusses the production base that will be required to produce the SLCM-N, a system that was almost cancelled by the Biden administration, without compromising hypersonic weapon development or ballistic missile modernization efforts. Soofer argues for the next administration to develop and produce the SLCM-N quickly, saying that “If you’re going to tell President Trump it’s going to take you 10 years to make a new missile, he’s going to go ballistic — pardon the pun… He’s going to say, ‘We’re going to need another option.'” Soofer believes the timeline should take five years at most, and that the process can be expedited by modifying non-nuclear systems currently in use. “We have a missile, a Tomahawk missile, that has been upgraded continuously to the Block V. It’s got the range that we need,” Soofer expressed. “I guarantee you that the labs can put a nuclear warhead on that.”

Former fellow

Robert Soofer

Former Senior Fellow

Forward Defense

Arms Control Defense Policy

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Europe’s new industrial plan faces formidable obstacles

Andrei Covatariu — Thu, 14 Nov 2024 13:00:31 +0000

Employing 30 million people and accounting for more than 80 percent of the bloc’s exports, the industrial sector is an economic cornerstone of the European Union (EU). But European industry faces fundamental challenges. The EU’s industrial behemoth was fueled by cheap energy imports, which are no longer available to it. Now, the bloc’s decarbonization mission also relies on imported technologies.

Maintaining economic competitiveness is a pressing issue for Ursula von der Leyen as she begins her second term as president of the European Commission. President von der Leyen has promised to put forward a new Clean Industrial Deal in the first one hundred days of the new mandate to “channel investment in infrastructure and industry, in particular for energy-intensive sectors.” But energy supply challenges and geopolitical hurdles risk undermining plans to restore Europe’s industrial competitiveness.

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The roots of Europe’s industrial crisis

The state of European industry is nuanced, but the trends are increasingly alarming.

The European Union’s share of the global industrial sector, measured by gross value added, decreased from 21 percent in 2000 to 14.5 percent in 2021, numbers similar to the United States’. Manufacturing still accounts for 15 percent of the bloc’s gross domestic product (GDP). But amid the impacts of COVID-19 and the 2022 energy crisis, the EU industrial sector has lost 850,000 jobs since 2019.

Experts question the EU’s preparedness for increasingly strategic industrial activities, such as defense, clean energy technologies, and chips. Moreover, the bloc’s reliance on imported energy commodities and technologies leaves its industrial sector vulnerable to external shocks. This vulnerability was exposed during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as the Kremlin took advantage of the EU’s reliance on Russia for 43 percent of its natural gas imports.

By contrast, the EU’s industrial competitors benefit from cheaper energy. The United States enjoys abundant oil and gas and is producing at world-record levels—a trend that the incoming Trump administration would like to continue—and is witnessing a boom in renewable generation. China continues to use domestic coal while increasing imports of Russia’s price-capped oil.

The International Energy Agency estimates that electricity prices for the European Union’s energy-intensive industries were double those in China and the United States in 2023, making it almost impossible for Europe to compete due to high energy costs in production. Complex regulatory frameworks, lengthy permitting processes, expensive labor, and limited innovation are also weakening the EU’s competitiveness.

How the Clean Industrial Deal can help

The stakes are high for European industry. Europe has been proactive in addressing its energy supply vulnerabilities, developing important initiatives such as the Net Zero Industry Act and Critical Raw Materials Act. Now, the Clean Industrial Deal provides the opportunity to address key energy-related competitiveness challenges.

First, the proposal needs to address vulnerabilities in the energy supply chain. This starts with diversifying the sourcing for critical raw materials needed for domestic clean energy production—many of which Europe is reliant on China for.

Despite low public support for such projects, de-risking supply chains should involve domestic mining and processing—which may happen in Germany, the Czech Republic, and Sweden, as well as in a still-controversial mining project in EU candidate state Serbia. But Europe cannot be fully self-sufficient in critical raw materials, and must also enhance supply chain cooperation with the United States and partners in the Global South. Nevertheless, the lead times required to source sufficient critical raw materials domestically or from like-minded partners are considerable. For now, the majority of EU demand will likely continue to be met by imports from China.

In addition, Europe’s industrial transition requires electrification to reduce energy consumption and thus costs. To do this, the EU needs to strengthen the backbone of its energy system: the power grid. This requires investment, accelerated permitting processes, and dynamic regulation that can reduce uncertainty for grid developers, investors, and operators.

As emphasized by former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta in his Much more than a market report issued this spring, the EU’s internal fragmentation also poses a threat to industrial efficiency. Harmonizing regulations across member states and finalizing the EU’s single market are crucial steps toward creating a more predictable business environment, fostering investment, and encouraging innovation. Coordinated public spending at the EU level, particularly on large-scale projects like cross-border energy infrastructure, is essential.

Enhancing existing external strategic partnerships should also be foundational to the EU’s industrial plans. This includes collaboration on protecting energy infrastructure from physical and digital threats, securing access to critical raw materials, and coordinating climate efforts at the multilateral level.

What could go wrong?

The geopolitics of energy will play a significant role in shaping the EU’s industrial revival plan.

On the one hand, the EU’s approach to managing its reliance on China for cleantech needs to assess the costs and benefits of de-risking. Europe’s aspirations to expand its clean manufacturing sector could potentially backfire—if Europe makes progress in developing domestic clean manufacturing it will gradually acquire fewer technologies from China, which might hedge this risk by cutting off access or increasing prices for EU-bound exports. By doing so, China could weaken Europe’s financial capacity for investing in its industrial sector—keeping the continent reliant on imports. China’s 2023 export restrictions on gallium and germanium could be a sign of such a risk.

It is often overlooked that EU exports to China have increased more than sevenfold over the last two decades, and China is the EU’s third-largest external market, after the United States and the United Kingdom. A trade war would be damaging to both sides.

On the other hand, the Clean Industrial Deal comes as US elections have concluded, raising concerns on whether the EU and the United States will pursue a clean industrial partnership or potentially move toward rivalry. The transatlantic partnership plays a crucial role in the EU’s ability to stabilize its exposure to energy commodities, as demonstrated by Europe’s increased US LNG imports since 2022.

For the United States, this cooperation is also of great benefit, not only for fostering exports in LNG, critical raw materials, and nuclear energy technology, but also for finding synergies in research and development and for reinforcing geopolitical stability. However, potential trade barriers, such as the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), may heighten the risk of a trade war. The future of this partnership could significantly influence global economic and security dynamics.

Much depends on what will happen in the new Commission’s first one hundred days—on both sides of the Atlantic.

Andrei Covatariu is a Brussels-based energy expert. He is a senior research associate at Energy Policy Group (EPG) and a research fellow at the Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE). This article reflects his personal opinion.

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Stephen Rodriguez in Defense News on shipbuilding

ayoung — Fri, 08 Nov 2024 21:47:00 +0000

On November 8, Stephen Rodriguez, senior advisor at Forward Defense, published a piece in Defense News entitled “The US Navy is at risk of losing vital shipbuilding skills.” Rodriguez reflects on the state of the maritime defense industrial base and its struggles recruiting and retaining a skilled workforce to meet the challenges of increased demand. He highlights the work of the Navy and non-governmental actors to level-up the maritime defense industrial base workforce, noting, “if we work together, locally and nationally – across government, businesses and community – we can boost the American economy through a resurgence of manufacturing.”

Fellow

Stephen Rodriguez

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

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Michta for RealClearDefense on how the Pentagon must re-strategize weapon procurement

gmatchett — Wed, 06 Nov 2024 14:17:38 +0000

Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

On November 4, Director and Senior Fellow of the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative Dr. Andrew Michta published an article or RealClearDefense on the lessons learned from the war in Ukraine and how Pentagon planners and defense contractors should re-strategize its approach to weapons and munitions procurement. He pointed out that the most sophisticated long-range precision fire or AI assisted systems will not decide the battle when Vilnius is just under twenty miles from the border of Belarus. The United States and NATO allies must design and manufacture weapons that it can deploy in large numbers and munitions that will be available in large quantities in the event of war, similar to the Replicator initiative to field thousands of low-cost attritable autonomous systems across warfighting domains.

Staff

Andrew A. Michta

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Central Europe Eastern Europe

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Michael Groen writes op-ed about US “innovation power” in the Cipher Brief

abassoli — Tue, 05 Nov 2024 15:04:44 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

On November 1, [Retired/Former] US Marine Corps Lieutenant General Michael Groen, non-resident senior fellow at Forward Defense, authored an op-ed for the Cipher Brief detailing the risk of US defeat in the competition for “innovation power.” In the op-ed, Groen argues that “innovation power” is a crucial feature of US economic and national security, but over-regulatory agendas pose a serious risk to American competitiveness.

Fellow

Michael Groen

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Defense Technologies

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Russia’s economy is overheating but Putin cannot change course

Alexander Mertens — Thu, 31 Oct 2024 13:07:49 +0000

Russia’s Central Bank raised its key policy rate to 21 percent in late October as the Russian authorities struggle to manage a wartime economy that is in danger of overheating due to a combination of factors including rising inflation, sanctions pressure, and record defense sector spending. While Kremlin officials and many international analysts insist that the Russian economy remains in remarkably good shape, the country’s longer term economic outlook is becoming increasingly precarious.

Despite frequent predictions of impending economic meltdown, there is currently little sign that the Russian economy is in immediate danger. At the same time, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine appears to have placed Vladimir Putin in an unenviable economic position. If the war continues for an extended period and is accompanied by factors including increased sanctions, inefficient military leadership, and pervasive corruption, this could plunge Russia into a severe economic recession.

Ending the conflict also presents economic risks. Russia’s unprecedented military spending since 2022 has enriched elites and boosted domestic demand, overheating the economy. If the war ends, this fiscal stimulus will cease, potentially causing a significant drop in real incomes for much of the population. This could lead to heightened social tensions and undermine the stability of the ruling regime.

Vladimir Putin frequently claims that Western sanctions have been counterproductive and often uses his public addresses to boast of Russia’s wartime economic performance. Official data broadly supports this narrative, with Russia reporting strong GDP growth in 2023 and during the first half of the current year.

A range of factors are fueling the current growth of the Russian economy, with military expenditure perhaps the single most important driver. The Russian authorities allocated around six percent of GDP for the military in 2024, representing the highest total since the Cold War. Further increases are planned for 2025. Nor does this cover all war-related costs. Significant additional spending is required to fund a range of defense-related industries and to finance the occupation of Ukrainian regions currently under Kremlin control.

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Despite the outward appearance of stability, Russia’s wartime economy faces mounting challenges. Russia’s National Welfare Fund is steadily dwindling, while export revenues have gradually declined during 2024 as a result of tightening sanctions and constraints on resource extraction caused by limited access to modern technologies.

Economists are now warning that the Russian economy is in danger of overheating, largely as a result of unprecedented military spending. Meanwhile, Russia’s low unemployment rate of around 2.5 percent is more indicative of a severe labor shortage than a healthy economy. The problems caused by this lack of workforce add to the challenges created by sanctions-related restrictions on access to Western equipment, exacerbating Russia’s technological deficit.

Inflation currently poses the single greatest threat to Putin’s wartime economy, and was a key factor behind the recent decision to hike the country’s key interest rate. Russia’s Central Bank aims to reduce inflation to around four percent in 2025, but this may not be a realistic target. Indeed, official inflation data from the Kremlin may actually underestimate the rising cost of living for ordinary Russians.

Over the past year, even official Russian government bodies such as Rosstat have cautiously acknowledged negative economic trends such as rising inflation, labor shortages, and declining activity in some sectors of the economy. Taken together, these negative factors are likely to contribute to a period of slower growth, if not stagnation.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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The impact of Western sanctions on the Russian economy remains hotly debated. While the sanctions imposed in response to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine have yet to produce the kind of economic crisis that many analysts were anticipating in early 2022, the effectiveness of these measures remains difficult to quantify and should not be dismissed. Tellingly, while Putin insists sanctions have not hurt Russia, the lifting of all sanctions remains a key Kremlin demand.

Sanctions have clearly complicated the situation for Russian exports and for the import of technologies. However, Russia has been able to find numerous ways of bypassing or otherwise mitigating the effects of many restrictions. Russia’s economically vital energy exports have been redirected from the West to the Global South, with a shadow fleet of tankers playing a crucial role in this process.

Similarly, Russia has been able to continue accessing military technologies and equipment by importing via third party countries including China. This has created some inconvenience and led to rising costs, but it has prevented sanctions from achieving the desired goal of isolating the Russian economy and depriving Putin’s war machine of essential components.

A number of additional factors have further blunted the impact of sanctions. These include slow implementation and the continued existence of multiple loopholes. Restrictions on capital transfers have also played into the Kremlin’s hands, keeping wealth within Russia.

Many Russians have clearly benefited financially from the war. Military contracts have proved particularly lucrative for the country’s business elite, while the departure of Western companies has created vacant niches for Russian companies to fill.

Ordinary Russian citizens have been able to earn unprecedented sums of money by enlisting in the military, with the families of soldiers killed or wounded in Ukraine receiving substantial payments. Those working in factories servicing the war effort have also seen salaries increase as much as five times amid surging demand and labor scarcity. Overall, the invasion of Ukraine has enabled millions of Russians to pull themselves out of poverty.

The economic benefits enjoyed by a wide range of social groups in Russia as a result of the war have helped foster pro-war sentiment and bolster support for the Putin regime. Ending the invasion of Ukraine would therefore potentially weaken the position of the authorities and fuel instability. This creates further incentives to continue the war.

The current state of the Russian economy is far from critical but it does present Putin with a dilemma. He currently appears intent on continuing the war indefinitely while hoping to outlast the West and exhaust Ukraine. Alternatively, he could seek to move toward a settlement of some kind. However, there is a very real danger that either option could end up plunging Russia into a serious economic crisis.

If Putin opts to maintain his uncompromising push for an historic victory in Ukraine, it is not clear that Russia has the resources to wage a prolonged war on the present scale. In this scenario, current warning signs such as rising inflation and labor shortages could eventually become major problems. If he seeks a settlement and withdraws the Keynesian crutch of today’s vastly inflated military spending, the economic repercussions could be dire. The Russian economy is not yet close to collapse, but it is increasingly dependent on wartime conditions and faces growing risks of overheating.

Alexander Mertens is professor of finance at National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and professor of economics and finance at Kyiv’s International Institute of Business. With special thanks to Oleksiy Zagorodnyuk for his help with data research and analysis.

The consequences are pronounced when compared to a single-buyer market like the United States. The EU’s top seventeen armament corporations earned an average of $4.5 billion in revenue in 2022 and comprised half of Europe’s defense industrial activity, which is dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises. Meanwhile, the top seventeen US firms earned an average of $15.3 billion and a collective $261 billion—double the size of the entire EDTIB. Those US firms were capable of more global mergers and acquisitions, which are crucial for scaling defense innovations, comprising $19 billion in global activity compared to Europe’s $6 billion, led by France ($2.9 billion).

Efforts to rectify this imbalance are gaining steam. The European Commission proposed a European Defence Industrial Program (EDIP) in March 2024, which includes proposals such as a European Military Sales mechanism aided by a centralized “catalogue” of European-made defense articles. Former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi’s September EU competitiveness report added another idea that deserves attention: a “Defence Industry Authority” that can procure equipment on behalf of member states.

Some EU member states have already voiced skepticism of some of Draghi’s plans and may possess limited appetite to move beyond intergovernmental defense cooperation, such as through Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF). However, these institutions fail to consolidate demand signals necessary to scale production.

Current institutions can’t fix Europe’s productive capacity

Given EU treaty restrictions on the Common Security and Defense Policy, EU defense cooperation has solidified around supporting dual-use research and development (R&D) projects and voluntary joint procurement, primarily via the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the EDF, an eight-billion-euro instrument to support collaborative R&D investment.

However, the EDA and EDF are insufficient to deal with the challenges at hand. EDA participants commit to jointly procure 35 percent of their military equipment acquisitions, allocate 20 percent of their defense expenditures on investments (acquisitions and R&D), and allocate 2 percent of defense expenditure to R&D. Despite these promises, several notable players, like Germany, failed to meet the 20 percent defense investment benchmark until 2024, and it remains unclear whether this spending will be sustained. Only about 18 percent of procurements in 2021 were collaborative—seven billion euros off target—and just two countries spent more than 2 percent of defense expenditures on R&D.

This free-riding problem stems from the EDA being a club with small carrots and no sticks. The EDF was created to subsidize collaborative R&D among EDA members, but this inducement is dwarfed by R&D investments from member states (9.5 billion euros in 2022, compared to EDF’s 1.2 billion euros) and the United States ($120 billion). The EDF also doesn’t steer production decisions from companies. Of the top twenty-five corporate recipients, EDF funds only corresponded to an average 2.57 percent of their 2022 sales revenue.

Even if the EDF received more funding, an integration impasse persists through member states’ political investments in national champions. Collaborative development projects in multinational consortia—such as those negotiated within PESCO—often stall over disputes on workshare, value chain specialization, intellectual property sharing, maintenance rights, and state subsidies. Multinational defense collaboration has progressed in cutting-edge capabilities where companies have less skin in the game. But conventional equipment—the sort most essential to closing Europe’s readiness gaps—remains too controversial to include.

Current EU institutions don’t meaningfully affect corporate investments in productive capacity or overcome parochial interests within national procurement decisions. Despite facing heavy political inertia, the Europeans must update the institutional logic behind defense cooperation.

Treat a ‘twenty-eighth buyer’ seriously

Draghi did not detail his vision for a centralized procurer in his September report, but this demand-side intervention could achieve what joint procurement programs intend. There are three models that make sense for a European procurer, characterized by a difference in scale.

The first model builds upon the Structured European Armament Program proposal in the EDIP, which allows multinational defense consortia to delegate to a procurement agent. However, instead of potentially several agents, the EU should adopt one interlocutor within the EDA between industry and member states. Although it cannot spend any euros itself, it could be given preferential agency to negotiate contracts in strategic sectors, open contracts to other member states through framework agreements, and directly procure on behalf of member states. This replicates the logic of the AggregateEU platform, which coordinates EU gas purchases to bargain for lower prices.

The second model would augment the procurer into a “twenty-eighth buyer” that could purchase additional defense articles of European interest, such as those identified through PESCO, gaps in the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense, or an R&D revamp through the European Defence Projects of Common Interest, another EDIP proposal. This would increase demand signals to incentivize overproduction and build an EDA-managed stockpile that could be tapped for resale to member states through a European Military Sales mechanism, arms exports to allies, or an agreed-upon crisis distribution framework.

For sufficient buying power, the European buyer should aim to spend at least the difference between predicted member state joint procurements and the 40 percent target in the EDIP. For example, a European buyer would have had to spend 11.5 billion euros in 2021 to achieve this. Efficiency gains from this level of joint procurement can decrease costs of equipment investment by 30 percent, or thirteen billion euros in 2021—indirectly balancing EU spending through increased productivity.

The third model is similar to the second, but the twenty-eighth buyer would scale threefold into a European “super-customer,” outspending the next largest defense investor (currently equal to Germany’s 137.6 billion euros from January 2020 to July 2024). Fit for treating defense as a public good, the European buyer’s demand signals could make targeted investments within the EDTIB, prioritizing projects that integrate supply chains or support recent mergers. The EDA, which has sought coherence with NATO planning processes, could anchor the EDTIB’s productive trajectory in a transatlantic division of labor.

Models two and three would require substantial resources, either from the next Multiannual Financial Framework or an extraordinary fund financed through Eurobonds—which could be partially repaid through equipment resales and value-added taxes on added EDTIB productivity gains. But model one could be implemented tomorrow without added resources, giving the EDA time to build institutional capacity for large-scale procurement. Although this would be unprecedented, member states have begun breaking the EU’s defense taboo, granting it unprecedented powers to jointly procure 155mm ammunition on behalf of member states and directly distribute grants to boost ammunition production.

The decisive question is political will. Germany and the Netherlands have hesitated to finance defense investments through Eurobonds or shift power to Brussels. But only a European procurer can provide the institutional reform to overcome intra- and intergovernmental paralysis and invest at scale.

Thomas Goldstein is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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The US needs a stronger defense industrial base. Option contracts can help.

Michael Hogan — Mon, 28 Oct 2024 16:14:02 +0000

How many missiles would the United States need in a conflict in the Indo-Pacific? How much ammunition? Perhaps most important, by how much do current stockpiles fall short of what would be needed in a war?

The first-ever US National Defense Industrial Strategy, published in 2022, sparked important discussions on these and other questions about the US defense industrial base. These questions in turn resulted in improvements across the strategy’s four strategic priorities: resilient supply chains, workforce readiness, flexible acquisition, and economic deterrence. Despite these improvements, however, a significant gap remains in producing the quantitative difference between peacetime stockpile requirements and the acute, continuous, and probable long-term demand needs during wartime.

Consider a hypothetical conflict with China in the Pacific. War games estimate that the United States could expend more than five thousand long-range missiles within the first few weeks of engagement. At the same time, several analysts and government agencies have highlighted the difficulty of replenishing weapons currently used in Ukraine—a much smaller-scale conflict compared to what should be anticipated in a war with China.

There are two ways to deal with this challenge: (1) enabling production in advance to stockpile and preposition equipment; and (2) replenishing materiel and stockpiles after hostilities have begun. However, the latter strategy often overlooks the complex challenge of rapidly increasing production to meet wartime demands, which could leave the United States vulnerable in the early stages of conflict.

Although the US government has begun investing in bolstering the defense industrial base, the current contracting system lacks the flexibility needed to transition from low demand to a rapid ramp-up of production to replenish depleted stockpiles. To address this issue, the United States should adopt an option contract model for armament procurement. This model involves the government paying a premium on current orders bought at the peacetime stockpile level with the option—but not the obligation—to purchase a significantly larger amount within a fixed timeframe, providing the defense industrial base with the necessary funds to develop and maintain rapid replenishment capabilities in the event of a conflict.

What are option contracts?

Like options in the stock market, an option contract grants the buyer—in this case, the US government—the right to purchase arms and ammunition at a preset price at a later date. If the government opts not to exercise this option, typically because peace prevails, the contractor retains the premium. This premium serves as a financial investment in future rapid replenishment capability and a continued steady demand signal for the industry, encouraging readiness and innovation without requiring the government to maintain unnecessary and wasteful stockpiles.

How this would work in practice

To illustrate why option contracts would be an improvement over the current model of US armament procurement, take the case of Tomahawk missiles. A February 2023 Center for Strategic and International Studies report estimated that the United States would expend four hundred Tomahawk missiles in the first three weeks of a full-scale conflict with China. In 2022, the US Navy procured 154 Tomahawks to be bought over a three-year period, translating to an annual production rate of about fifty missiles. This rate is orders of magnitude lower than what would be required to replenish expenditures during a full-scale conflict.

Applying the proposed option contract model to this scenario, the Navy would pay a premium on its annual order of fifty missiles, with the option to purchase an additional four hundred missiles within a single year if needed. The contractor would use the premium to invest in the capacity to scale up production, ensuring that the company can meet the full contract requirements on short notice if the need arose. This approach not only provides the contractor with the capital to enhance its production infrastructure and an incentive to maintain overcapacity, but also ensures that the United States has a ready supply of crucial munitions in times of need.

There are four main benefits of the option contract model:

Enhanced production readiness: By providing a financial incentive upfront, the option contract model enables defense contractors to invest in infrastructure and workforce improvements as a reserve that can be rapidly scaled up in response to a crisis.
Improved flexibility: This model allows the US government to lock in production capacity without committing to immediate full-scale procurement, balancing budget constraints with strategic readiness. This also helps meet small increases in demand in the event of smaller-scale conflicts.
Stimulated industry investment: The premium paid on option contracts signals sustained demand, encouraging defense contractors to prioritize and invest in production capabilities and innovation, rather than stock buybacks or similar programs that benefit shareholders at the expense of the government.
Mitigated risk: This approach hedges geopolitical risk, ensuring necessary arms and ammunition are available in short order during critical, unforeseen contingencies.

At the same time, several challenges must be addressed:

Potential for rising costs: The premium paid for option contracts will increase procurement costs. Military programs are generally under-resourced in the constrained budget environment, so the rising procurement costs could lead to lower peacetime stockpile levels. If the increased capacity is never utilized, the premium paid may be viewed as government waste. However, the money spent on training the workforce and expanding capacity may be partially recouped by savings in follow-on contracts. A detailed cost-benefit analysis is essential to ensure that the increased expenditure aligns with strategic needs and budgetary constraints.
Difficulties negotiating contracts: Establishing effective option contracts requires careful negotiation to define terms, production capabilities, and performance metrics, ensuring that both the government and contractors meet their obligations. The military-industrial base has not utilized these types of contracts in the past. This unfamiliarity could add time to complete what are currently straightforward contracts.
Limits to industry capacity: Not all defense contractors have the capacity to scale up production rapidly, especially with “exquisite” weapon systems, which often involve high-end technology, are difficult and expensive to produce at scale, and require numerous subcontractors to complete. It is crucial, therefore, to assess the capability of industry partners and ensure that they can meet the demands of an option contract. There would need to be a requirement for the contractor to demonstrate the ability to surge its production to ensure good-faith use of the premium.

The option contract model represents a viable solution to address the current shortcomings in the US defense industrial base for some munitions. By incentivizing contractors with upfront premiums, this approach can enhance production readiness, flexibility, and industry investment, ultimately ensuring that the United States is better prepared to meet the demands of future conflicts.

Michael Hogan is the 2024-2025 senior US Navy fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the views or policy of the US Defense Department, the Department of the Navy, or the US government.

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North Korean troops could help Putin avoid a risky Russian mobilization

Olivia Yanchik — Thu, 24 Oct 2024 20:53:19 +0000

North Korea has sent troops to Russia, United States Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin confirmed on October 23. Austin is the latest senior Western official to raise the alarm over the deployment of North Korean soldiers to Russia amid fears that the Hermit Kingdom is poised to participate directly in Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was the first to warn that Russia was about to be reinforced by large numbers of North Korean troops. South Korea has since confirmed Zelenskyy’s claims. In recent days, Britain’s ambassador to the UN said it was “highly likely” Pyongyang has agreed to send combat troops in support of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

If North Korean troops do appear on the Ukrainian battlefield in the coming weeks, it would be the latest in a series of milestones marking Pyongyang’s expanding support for Putin’s Ukraine invasion. North Korea has reportedly been supplying Russia with artillery shells since the first year of the war, and began delivering ballistic missiles to Moscow in late 2023. In October 2024, intelligence sources claimed that North Korea was now providing half of all shells being used by Russia in Ukraine.

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The presence of North Korean soldiers in Ukraine would risk transforming the largest European invasion since World War II into a truly global conflict. It would also serve to highlight the mounting manpower challenges Vladimir Putin faces as he looks to maintain a war of attrition amid staggering Russian losses.

When Putin first took the decision to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, he seems to have genuinely believed his troops would not encounter any serious resistance and would instead be welcomed as liberators. This proved to be a massive miscalculation.

Since the start of the invasion, the Russian army has sustained extremely heavy casualties in Ukraine, and has been forced to retreat from around half of the territories seized during the initial stage of the war. According to US officials, more than six hundred thousand Russian troops had been killed or wounded by October 2024, with September ranking as the deadliest month of the entire campaign.

Russia’s losses are in large part due to the Kremlin’s reliance on so-called “human wave” tactics. This extremely costly but effective approach involves successive waves of Russian troops gradually edging forward across the battlefield while relying on superior numbers to overwhelm Ukrainian defensive positions. This has allowed Russia to achieve small but visible front line advances in eastern Ukraine throughout 2024. At the same time, it has led to daily losses that regularly exceed one thousand dead or wounded soldiers.

In recent months, there have been growing signs that Russia is struggling to maintain the supply of fresh soldiers to the front lines. The most striking indication of Putin’s troop shortages came in early August, when Ukraine launched an offensive into Russia’s Kursk region and encountered threadbare border defenses manned by conscript troops. Almost three months on, the Ukrainian army continues to occupy hundreds of square kilometers of Russian territory.

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The Kremlin is exploring a range of different avenues as it seeks to replenish the depleted ranks of the Russian army. Initial steps included expanding the draft age and recruiting directly from Russia’s prison population. More recently, the Russian authorities have sought to attract new recruits with promises of generous monthly salaries and bumper one-time enlistment payments. These dramatically increased bounties point to growing difficulties in attracting enough volunteer fighters to replace combat losses suffered in Ukraine.

This does not mean that Russia is about to run out of potential soldiers, of course. In reality, Putin still has vast untapped reserves of manpower among the Russian population that he can potentially turn to if required. For now, though, he appears deeply reluctant to launch a second mobilization of the war for fear of destabilizing the home front inside Russia.

Putin announced Russia’s first partial mobilization since World War II in September 2022 at a time when his armies were retreating in Ukraine. The 2022 mobilization was an effective short-term solution, boosting the Russian military with an additional three hundred thousand troops. Crucially, however, it also proved deeply unpopular with the Russian public, sparking domestic protests and fueling a wave of migration as hundreds of thousands of military age men fled the country. With a record number of Russians already reportedly seeking asylum in the West in order to avoid military service, the Kremlin is understandably unwilling to gamble on a new mobilization unless absolutely necessary.

This may help to explain why we are now seeing reports of North Korean troops preparing to join the Russian attack on Ukraine. By turning to his North Korean partners for fresh soldiers, Putin hopes to plug the gaps in his decimated military without running the risk of mobilizing his own population.

In the coming weeks, Putin will be watching carefully to see how Western leaders react to the arrival of North Korean troops in Ukraine. If the West fails to impose appropriate costs for this first instance of direct foreign intervention in Russia’s invasion, a disastrous precedent will be set and far larger numbers of North Korean soldiers may soon be on their way to fight in Europe.

Olivia Yanchik is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Find the Guns For Hire podcast on the app of your choice

About the podcast

Guns for Hire podcast is a production of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative. Taking Libya as its starting point, it explores the causes and implications of the growing use of mercenaries in armed conflict.

The podcast features guests from many walks of life, from ethicists and historians to former mercenary fighters. It seeks to understand what the normalization of contract warfare tells us about the world we currently live in, the future of the international system, and what war could look like in the coming decades.

Soofer published in The National Interest on homeland missile defense

Atlantic Council — Fri, 18 Oct 2024 21:11:15 +0000

On October 16, Forward Defense Senior Fellow Rob Soofer published an article in The National Interest with co-author Dr. Peppino DeBiaso titled “A Homeland Missile Defense Agenda for the Next President.” The article, an excerpt from an upcoming report on US homeland missile defense co-authored by Dr. Soofer, advises the next US President that there is “no time to waste in restoring a credible missile defense.” The article discusses increasing missile threats from North Korea, Russia, and China—and perhaps soon Iran— highlighting both the opportunities and risks from emerging capabilities and technologies, such as UAVs, hypersonic weapons, and high-energy compact lasers.

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Robert Soofer

Former Senior Fellow

Forward Defense

Arms Control Defense Policy

Public Event Wed, October 16, 2024 • 8:00 am ET

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In a war against China, the US could quickly exhaust its weapons. A new Indo-Pacific defense initiative might be the answer.

Adam Kozloski — Thu, 17 Oct 2024 13:23:11 +0000

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What would happen if China launched a barrage of ballistic missiles at US forces in the Indo-Pacific? China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has invested extensively in its standoff capabilities and in a high-intensity conflict would be capable of inflicting severe damage on US and allied forces. Even if the United States is successful in winning such a war, this scenario runs the risk of a Pyrrhic victory for US forces, in which they are victorious but at the cost of being unable to contest a future conflict.

The most significant reason for this risk is sustainment—specifically, the speed at which US capabilities are replaced after use. This vulnerability is apparent across all theaters of conflict, however the Pacific Ocean makes timely resupply exceptionally difficult. On October 1, the US Navy, in supporting Israel’s air and missile defense, launched a dozen counter-ballistic missiles, including SM3 interceptors. The US Department of Defense has proposed to cease production on the workhorse block of these missiles in fiscal year 2025, while output on the more advanced variant remains stagnant at a dozen missiles per year. It is possible that with this single engagement, the United States exhausted a significant portion of its global stockpile of advanced interceptors. This poses an alarming reality of how munition depletion impacts not only the prosecution of war but overall allied deterrence against opportunistic actors such as China, North Korea, or Russia in starting a conflict.

In the past, the United States has relied on its qualitative edge for its war-fighting systems. However, continued Chinese theft is eroding this advantage. As a result, near-peer Chinese capabilities now drastically outnumber US systems forcing a reckoning that requires strategic rebalancing to maintain credible deterrence. The United States can help mitigate these short- and medium-term challenges by taking advantage of its most significant strategic asset: the depth of its alliances and partnerships.

What is PIPIR?

Enter PIPIR—the Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience—a new multinational initiative launched in June to strengthen “defense industrial resilience to promote security, economic security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.” If it reaches its potential, PIPIR can enable the United States and its partners to mitigate the risk of a Pyrrhic victory. Though still in its early stages, PIPIR has already drawn comparisons to the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, which coordinates the pooling of resources for the multinational delivery of critical weapon systems to Ukraine. If a parallel effort is based in Asia, it could enable faster provisioning of resources to Taiwan, the Philippines, South Korea, or even the United States if a war breaks out. This effort, by providing credible benefits to sustainment helps restore deterrence as China continues to modernize its military forces to reach world-class status by 2049.

For the United States, PIPIR also provides a unique benefit, as many Indo-Pacific partners are US military hardware and software customers and regularly train with US forces, ensuring familiarity with variants of US systems. The effort could also be a valuable forum to coordinate the various bilateral co-production efforts emerging across the region. These include possible co-production of artillery pieces with South Korea; missile and rocket systems, including Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, with Australia; hypersonic missile interceptors with Japan; and drones with Taiwan.

On October 7, PIPIR took its next step forward with an inaugural meeting based on the thirteen-country signed statement of principles for Indo-Pacific Defense Industrial Base Collaboration, which includes European partners. The meeting resulted in the creation of four institutionalized work streams: sustainment, production, supply chain resilience, and policy and optimization. Now that these nations have decided to pursue these important issues, PIPIR should work to integrate the appropriate existing bilateral and multilateral efforts with these work streams. If done effectively, such integration could dramatically boost the sustainment and production capabilities of the United States and its partners.

Avoiding the tyranny of distance

In addition to providing the United States and its partners with more options for sustainment, PIPIR, as a regional initiative, can support Washington’s strategic goals of mitigating war-time risk through its distributed logistics and basing model—a key objective of the United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). In March, the then-INDOPACOM commander, Admiral John C. Aquilino, testified before the US Senate that “deterrence depends on the ability of the Joint Force to act quickly and decisively, which requires an increasingly flexible and distributed force posture and logistics network.” While pre-positioned stockpiles are a critical unilateral way of reducing the burden of resupply in a hot conflict, they are not a cure-all for INDOPACOM’s logistical challenges. Pre-positioned stockpiles are targetable by adversaries and cannot, in a truly distributed force posture, be of sufficient size for the duration of a hot conflict. Moreover, the larger the stockpiles and a force’s reliance on them, the more damage their destruction would cause to its readiness.

Here, co-production and the possible value of PIPIR to coordinate can genuinely shine by providing supplies that US forces could be capable of using beyond their existing regional stockpiles. Further, coproduction in the region could reduce the lag time from production to delivery from weeks to days. Such cooperation would significantly mitigate the United States’ tyranny of distance challenge in parts of the Indo-Pacific and offset China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) advantages.

Three steps to success

To be effective, PIPIR should next focus on three important objectives: account for current capabilities and shortfalls, standardize critical weapon systems among participants, and receive assurances or private commitments for using such produced systems in a crisis.

Resource and capability awareness: To begin, PIPIR should have each participant look hard at its defense production capacity and, importantly, the projected exportable capacity not already committed. This caveat is essential as, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, producers in Asia have already begun committing their resources to the fight. For example, in a two-part deal between the United States, South Korea, and Ukraine, Seoul agreed to provide 300,000 155 mm artillery shells to the United States to backfill its stockpiles with an equivalent amount supplied to Ukraine. However, with a current annual capacity of 200,000 155 mm shells, South Korea can’t provide any additional 155 mm capacity for partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific while also supporting Ukraine, which requires a whopping 75,000 shells a month. Indeed, public reports have found that South Korea may not have enough shells for more than a week of hot conflict with North Korea.

One must accept that the arms market is truly global, and with hot conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, Asian defense producers have not been idle. What was once excess capacity has already been dedicated to clients in these other regions. After completing an honest capability assessment of free capacity, PIPIR participants should consider leveraging funding to enhance the production of allies and partners for specific weapon systems. While such investments, if by the United States, would be made outside the US job market, the impacts on the sustainment of such production are well worth the investment. However, there remain strong political barriers to allocating taxpayer funds to defense industrial base investments abroad. Such a mechanism would have to be used sparingly and in cases where the benefit for sustainment outweighs the political backlash against the investment.

Champion standardization: PIPIR should emulate the commitments of the NATO industrial capacity expansion pledge toward standardization among key participants and systems. While NATO has the benefit of being an alliance-based effort, the long-term presence of the United States and the extensive foreign military sales to the region provide an opportunity to establish and expand the use of NATO standardization agreements to the Indo-Pacific. We have already seen examples of STANAGS with key regional allies such as the South Korea And Japan. Moreover, standardization does not have to be a monolithic effort. Instead, partner countries should identify critical systems that are most likely to require sustainment, such as missile and artillery capabilities, and focus on these systems first.

Ensure commitment to supply: PIPIR’s value is maximized in times of crisis when sustainment challenges add survivability and expenditure rates to the logistics equation. To ensure the effectiveness of PIPIR, the United States should work to develop security of supply agreements exclusive to PIPIR across partners that are willing to work on co-production and standardization. These agreements must come with clarity on the sequencing and preferential status of these agreements concerning other regional allies such as NATO. They should provide sufficient incentives to ensure participation. The United States should work with partners to identify situations in which partners are willing to support the US military’s sustainment and situations in which they will not accept the risks during a crisis.

Today, it’s still too early to tell if PIPIR has the potential to parallel or even surpass the efforts of the Ukraine Defense Contract Group. Apt diplomacy and consistent US leadership will be paramount to success. News that the Department of Defense’s most senior acquisition official, William A. LaPlante, chaired PIPIR’s inaugural meeting is a meaningful symbol that the United States is committed to seeing the initiative succeed.

At the same time, the opaque nature of which countries are participating in PIPIR points to China’s long shadow in the region. Regional partners will have to carefully balance economic interests with national security when working to expand defense industrial base cooperation. If the United States can prioritize the aforementioned recommendations and successfully navigate the discretion that PIPIR requires, then it can enable this new initiative to provide a strategic impact to improve allied deterrence and sustainment—ultimately saving American lives and treasure.

Adam Kozloski is a nonresident senior fellow at the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and at the N7 Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

The post In a war against China, the US could quickly exhaust its weapons. A new Indo-Pacific defense initiative might be the answer. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Inside the Navy’s plan to improve its readiness for conflict, with Admiral Lisa Franchetti

Katherine Walla — Wed, 16 Oct 2024 22:24:16 +0000

Watch the full event

A conversation with Admiral Lisa Franchetti on the Navy’s 2024 Navigation Plan

Join the Chief of Naval Operations as she discusses her Navigation Plan for America’s Warfighting Navy.

Defense Policy Maritime Security

Speaker

Admiral Lisa Franchetti
Chief of Naval Operations, US Navy

Moderator

Dan Lamothe
National Security Writer, the Washington Post

Introduction

General James L. Jones
Executive Chairman Emeritus, Atlantic Council

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

GENERAL JAMES L. JONES: Good morning, everybody. And welcome to today’s event with Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Lisa Franchetti—chief of naval operations of the world’s finest Navy, I might add—to discuss her 2024 Navigation Plan for America’s Warfighting [Navy].

My name is Jim Jones, and I serve as executive chairman emeritus here at the Atlantic Council and as chairman of the Scowcroft Center. So, on behalf of the Scowcroft Center and the Atlantic Council, as well as its Forward Defense Program, I would like to welcome you to this exciting fourth installment of our 2024 Commander Series.

As we all know, since its origin the United States has relied on her Navy to maintain global maritime dominance, ensuring freedom of navigation, the ability to project US power across the globe and played a critical role in the nation’s strategic deterrent capabilities. As we continue into this era of strategic competition with peer or near-peer adversaries, potential adversaries, namely China and Russia, and the threat landscape evolves, the Navy faces many challenges, and its capabilities are stretched across the world.

The Navy, and I might add the Marine Corps—you’re not going to get away with a commandant introducing you without mentioning the Marine Corps—but the Navy and her Marines must be ready for the possibility of war in the near future. But beyond that, it will need to continue to enhance its long-term advantage to deter future aggression and ensure a major contribution to global stability. A critical component in the effectiveness of this strategy will be leveraging technological innovation to maintain a ready and modern force. The Navy will need to invest in newer platforms, newer weapon systems, and embrace robotic and autonomous systems as well.

The key advantage that the United States holds over its adversaries is the strong alliance network the US maintains. The Navy must continue to strengthen these relationships, to enhance collective security, deter adversarial aggression by improving interoperability with joint and allied forces. With so many threats looming on the not-so-distant horizon, it is also imperative that the Navy has a forward-thinking strategic vision that leverages all the advantages the United States holds, and enables the readiness to respond in competition, crisis, and conflict if necessary.

And so today, we’re extremely fortunate to be joined by the 33rd Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Lisa Franchetti, who will discuss her recently published Navigation Plan for America’s Warfighting Navy. This is her strategic guidance for the US fleet during her tenure. A native of Pittsford, New York, Admiral Franchetti is a graduate of the Medill School of Journalism and was commissioned through Northwestern University NROTC program in 1985. She earned her Surface Warfare qualification on the USS Shenandoah, went on to command at all levels, including Naval Reserve, Central Point, Oregon, USS Ross, Destroyer Squadron 21, US Naval Forces Korea, Carrier Strike Group 9 and 15, the US Sixth Fleet in Italy, and Striking and Support Forces NATO in Portugal.

In addition to command, she has worked across the Navy and the joint force with emphasis on strategy, international engagement, and interagency collaboration, serving as the director Strategy, Plans, and Policy, J-5, and most recently as the vice chief of naval operations. As chief of naval operations, Admiral Franchetti is responsible for the command, use of resources, and operational efficiency of the naval operating forces and the Navy’s shore activities assigned by the secretary of the navy.

Admiral Franchetti, we look forward to hearing from you today, and we’re very grateful for your presence here. After the admiral’s keynote remarks, she will be joined by Dan Lamothe for a moderated discussion. Dan has held a long career as a journalist and has written extensively about the armed forces for more than fifteen years. Since 2014, he has been covering the United States military and the Pentagon for The Washington Post. Dan, thank you very much for joining us today.

I would also like to thank everyone attending this conversation with the admiral, whether in person or virtually. [Convenings] such [as] these are integral to the Atlantic Council’s [Scowcroft] Center for Strategy and Security, which works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and her allies and partners. Consistent with that mission, Forward Defense generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, her allies, and partners. Its work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources of the United States needed to deter and, if necessary, prevail in any future conflict.

I would like to extend a special thanks to Saab Corporation and Michael Anderson, who, unfortunately, couldn’t be here today but is usually in attendance. Saab and the Atlantic Council launched the Commander Series back in 2009. The vision was to establish a flagship speakers forum for senior military and defense leaders to discuss the most important security challenges, both now and in the future. Over the years, the program has become one of the Council’s main institutions. And we’re thankful to Saab for their continued support and collaborations. Before I turn it over to Admiral Franchetti for her keynote remarks, I’d like to remind everybody that this event is public and on the record. Thank you all for joining the Atlantic Council for what I know will be a captivating conversation.

Admiral Franchetti, without any further ado, the floor is yours. Welcome.

LISA FRANCHETTI: Well, thank you, General Jones, for your kind introduction and warm welcome. And I also want to thank the Atlantic Council for letting me be part of the Commander Series. It’s an incredible opportunity. And I’m very excited to have the opportunity to speak with all of you today.

So, as General Jones just mentioned, I recently released my Navigation Plan for America’s Warfighting Navy, which is my overarching strategic guidance to the Navy to make our nation’s fleet more ready for potential conflict with the PRC by 2027, while also enhancing our Navy’s long-term warfighting advantage. But before I talk a little bit more about that, I want to talk about the why—the why behind the NAVPLAN, and what your navy is doing all around the world to protect our nation’s security and prosperity, to deter any would-be adversary, and to always be ready to fight and win decisively, if called to do so.

As you all know, our Navy—our nation is and always has been a maritime nation. Seventy percent of our planet is made up of water. Eighty percent of the world’s population lives within two hundred kilometers of the coastline. Ninety percent of the global economy moves by sea. And 95 percent of international communications and about ten trillion dollars of financial transactions transit via undersea fiber optic cables every single day. In the United States alone, seaborn trade carries more tonnage in value than any other mode of transportation each year, generating about $5.4 trillion annually and supporting thirty-one million American jobs. And when our access to the sea is impacted, so too is our economy, our national security, and really our way of life.

And I could think about a lot of different examples over the past years that demonstrate that intimate connection. Just think back to the impacts of COVID-19, the grounding of the Ever Given in the Suez Canal, and now Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, and even the port strikes on the east and west coast—gulf coast just a few weeks ago. It’s really clear that the seas are the lifeblood of our nation. And since the days of the Revolutionary War, as General Jones pointed out, our Navy and our Marine Corps team has protected and guaranteed our access to that sea. And on Sunday, we just celebrated our 249th birthday.

I think the events of this year and the actions taken by your Navy-Marine Corps team in the Indo-Pacific, in the Mediterranean, in the Red Sea, and beyond really underscore the enduring importance of American naval power throughout our nation’s history. With an average of about 110 ships and seventy thousand sailors and Marines deployed on any given day, the Navy-Marine Corps team is operating forward, defending our homeland, and keeping open the sea lines of communication that fuel our economy. In the Indo-Pacific right now, the USS George Washington Carrier Strike Group and the America Amphibious Readiness Group, with the 31st MEU embarked, are working alongside allies and partners to sustain a free and open regional order and enhance our collective interoperability.

In the Baltic, the Atlantic, the high north, and the Mediterranean, our navies continue to work alongside NATO and other partner navies to defend NATO and to support Ukraine as they defend their country and their democracy, to further deter Russian aggression, and to ensure that Russia’s continued unjustified and horrific invasion of the sovereign nation of Ukraine is a strategic failure. And in the eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the western Indian Ocean, our naval forces—including aircraft carrier strike groups, amphibious readiness groups, submarines and multiple destroyers—working alongside allies and partners, are containing the Israel-Hamas conflict, deterring others, especially Iran and its proxies, from escalating hostilities into regional war, and continuing to support Israel’s defense.

Over the last few weeks, more American destroyers—the Bulkeley, the Frank E. Petersen, Michael Murphy, and the Cole—have joined about a dozen other naval assets over the last year in knocking down Iranian and Houthi-launched ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones in defense of the rules-based international order, in defense of innocent civilian mariners, and in defense of Israel. The ability of our forces to seamlessly operate in any theater speaks to the value our Navy has provided to our nation for the last 249 years.

We operate in a unique domain. It’s a domain that knows no boundaries. It’s a domain that transcends lines that are drawn on a map, and one in which the Navy provides agile, flexible options and decision space to our nation’s leaders every single day. I could not be more proud of that Navy team. It’s the active and reserve sailors. It’s our civilians. And it’s our families. There’s no other Navy in the world that can operate at this scale. No other Navy in the world can train, deploy, and sustain such a lethal, globally deployed, combat credible force at the pace, the scale, and the tempo that we do.

And while all that we have achieved these past 249 years has filled me with confidence, I know that we cannot take our foot off the gas, because there’s no doubt that our nation is at an inflection point in history. We are facing a changing and challenging security environment, a changing character of war, and real challenges in ship, submarine, aircraft, construction and maintenance, munitions production, recruiting, and infrastructure maintenance. All while acknowledging the industrial and budgetary constraints complicating our efforts to address these challenges.

I’ve already talked a little bit about the security environment, but I want to expand on how that’s changed a little bit more. As we are seeing, the rules-based international order that we have upheld, protected, and defended for over three-quarters of a century is under threat, in every ocean. The People’s Republic of China is our pacing challenge and presents a complex, multi-domain and multi-axis threat. I am eyes wide open that the challenge posed by the PRC to our Navy goes well beyond just the size of the PLAN fleet.

It includes gray zone and economic campaigns, expansion of dual-use infrastructure like airfields and ports, and dual-use forces like the Chinese maritime militia, and a growing nuclear arsenal. It’s backed by a massive defense industrial base, which is on a wartime footing and includes the world’s largest shipbuilding capacity. The growing capabilities, capacity, and reach of the PRC military, along with its increasingly aggressive behavior in the East and South China Seas, underscore what Chairman Xi has told his forces, that they should be ready for war by 2027.

The PRC is not our only competitor. Russia continues to be an acute threat. Iran, a stabling actor in the Middle East. And we are seeing increasing alignment of these competitors, the PRC, Russia, Iran, North Korea, violent extremist organizations, and globally sponsored terrorist organizations like Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, ISIS-K, and more. In addition to this dynamic security environment, we’re also facing a changing character of war, with advancements in battlefield innovation and cheaper, more accessible technology available to state and nonstate actors alike. We’re all learning a great deal from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the continued Houthi ballistic missile, cruise missile, and drone attacks in the Red Sea.

To get after all these challenges, I would love to have the resources and the industrial base capacity to just expand the size of our force overnight. And I acknowledge the need for a larger, more lethal force. But it’s no secret to any of you that we are facing financial and industrial headwinds at getting, what I like to call, more players on the field. Our budget falls short of the 3 to 5 percent increase above inflation needed to support the Navy’s growth. And we’ve had continuing resolutions for fourteen of the past fifteen years, which stifle our momentum and slow any progress in delivering the warfighting capability and capacity needed to meet the needs of today and tomorrow.

And while we’re investing significant resources to address our industrial base challenges, change will not happen overnight. We cannot manifest a bigger Navy—a bigger traditional Navy in just a few short years. So as I came into this position, I took all of this in—the changing security environment, the changing character of war, and our own challenges—and that is what provided the context that framed my Navigation Plan. It’s a plan that lays out where we need to go to make our Navy more ready for potential conflict anytime and anywhere. As the CNO who will be at the helm into 2027, I am compelled to do more, and do more faster, to ensure that our Navy is more ready. I can’t stand still as we work to secure long-term investments for our force.

And so my Navigation Plan essentially parks these known challenges in a box. I’m still going to work on them, but they’re not the only thing I’m going to think about. And it helps me set a course to make strategic gains in the fastest time possible with the resources I can influence. It builds on America’s Warfighting Navy, a document that I released in January that lays out my priorities of warfighting, warfighters, and the foundation that supports them. And the NAVPLAN continues where my predecessor’s 2022 NAVPLAN left off. It lays out my plan to raise our fleet’s baseline level of readiness and put more players on the field—platforms that are ready with the requisite capabilities, weapons, and sustainment, and people that are ready with the right mindset, skills, tools, and training.

And it does that really in two ways. First, by implementing what I call Project 33, seven key areas in which we need to accelerate, areas where I will invest my personal time and resources and put my thumb on the scale to urgently move the needle, with 2027 as our North Star. And second, by expanding the Navy’s contribution to the joint warfighting ecosystem. This is all about building enduring warfighting advantage by investing in key capabilities and creating the layered effects that the Navy can contribute across all domains, to those of the joint force and those of our allies and partners. This is fundamental to my vision of how we will deter and, if necessary, fight and win our future wars.

So, going back to the first I’d like to briefly just touch on these seven equally important Project 33 targets, as they align to my priorities of warfighting, warfighters, and the foundation that supports them.

Under warfighting, my first target is readying our platforms.

The second target is operationalizing robotic and autonomous systems.

My third target is fighting from the Maritime Operations Center. That’s our command and control nerve center and it will help synchronize how we deliver effects as a Navy and as a broader joint and combined force.

Under the warfighters’ bucket, my fourth target is recruiting and retaining talented people.

My fifth target is delivering the quality of service that our sailors and their families deserve.

My sixth target is investing in warfighter competency, making our live virtual constructive training as reliable, realistic, and as relevant as possible.

And finally in the foundation bucket, my seventh target is restoring the critical infrastructure that generates, sustains, and postures our force to fight, prioritizing the Pacific theater.

Together, these seven targets—really, stretch goals—they represent my plan to make strategic gains in the fastest time possible with the resources I can influence. I know that moving out with purpose and urgency on these targets will deter the PRC and any other potential adversary, and make us even more ready to fight and win decisively should that deterrence fail.

I’d like to end with just a few comments about the joint warfighting ecosystem I mentioned before because my Navigation Plan is critical to expanding our Navy’s contribution to it. I know that our Navy will never fight alone, so we are laser-focused on developing and integrating key Navy capabilities with those of our joint teammates and of our allies and partners, because it’s the aggregate effects that we deliver collectively that will matter.

The joint warfighting ecosystem is all about pooling and creating those aggregate effects. It’s a system in which a capability enables and then is enabled by each of its participants. It’s on display in the Middle East right now, and I know it’s one that Admiral Paparo will leverage in the Indo-Pacific.

Achieving these objectives in my Navigation Plan is an all-hands-on-deck effort where everyone has a role to play—industry, Congress, academia, our joint teammates, our allies and partners, and of course our sailors and our civilians. So I would like to thank all of you here for your interest in our Navy, and I would like to thank you for all that you have done to support our Navy team and will continue to do in the future to support America’s warfighting Navy.

I have a clock in my office that tells me that there are 807 days left until 1 January 2027. There is no time to waste, and your Navy is ready to get after it. Thank you very much, and I look forward to discussion today. Thank you.

Dan.

DAN LAMOTHE: All right. Good morning, everyone.

LISA FRANCHETTI: Good morning.

DAN LAMOTHE: Thank you for your time today, ma’am.

You just spent several minutes articulating your plan. I know you must have spent a lot of time planning that. This town often sees plans that run into headwinds, run into real-life events. Can you walk us through a bit what you think you can do to make this plan durable, make this happen, kind of clear-eyed, noting the headwinds, the budgetary constraints, and other things like that?

LISA FRANCHETTI: Yeah. Well, thank you. And again, thanks for the chance to talk a little bit about the plan today.

You know, I think this plan is a little bit different from some of the plans that we have had in the past, and I worked to make sure that it would be durable and it would stick. And I really spent about the last year working on this plan alongside all of our four-star commanders, our fleet commanders, our type commanders to really get after what are the things that we need to do and what we do we need to do to think, act, and operate differently to stay ahead of the challenges that we have with the resources that we can influence right now.

And so when you look at the plan, it’s very focused—I would say it’s different in a few ways from previous plans.

First, it’s focused on 2027. It’s focused on the PRC. So I’ve set my priorities, my sight. It’s narrowly focused on getting after those challenges.

The other thing is that it really builds on Navigation Plan 2022, in which we had about eighteen different areas which we were really focused on and a lot of structure was put in place with single accountable individuals to drive progress in each one of those areas. I took a look, I took a fix, and I said, all right, here’s where we are based on NAVPLAN 2022, and here are seven areas where I think we can really put our foot on the gas and accelerate our progress in those to be real gamechangers in what we need to be able to do in the future.

I think the last thing I would say what’s different about it is that it does have this single accountable individual responsible for each one of the targets that we’re trying to get after. And what we’ve found through our perform-to-plan and naval sustainment systems, processes have been put in place, if you have a stretch goal, a single accountable individual, and a cadence of accountability, that drives success.

And the Navigation Plan will change my focus. It changes where I go, what I visit, what reports I get, what meetings I go to. And so my personal attention will be on these Project 33 goals as well as building the capabilities I talk about as the key capabilities for warfighting advantage that will get us where we need to be in the future.

DAN LAMOTHE: OK. One of your stated goals is boosting surge readiness to 80 percent. I know talking to a lot of analysts in this town, they raise concerns whether real-life events, physics, other things would really challenge this. And I know you’ve raised previously the aircraft as a kind of parallel. Do you see 80 percent as aspirational, achievable, both? And I guess, how do you put your foot on the gas with that?

LISA FRANCHETTI: Thanks. This is one of the most important—all seven are equally important, but you know, I’ve long said that we need to get more players on the field. There’s a lot of ways to do that. You know, one is to buy new ones. One is to get them in and out of maintenance on time, which is—that’s why I put this goal in here. One is to use what you have differently.

I am focused on this, because the aviation example is really illustrative of what we know we can achieve. So in 2018, Secretary Mattis challenged our aviation community to get F/A-18 readiness up from 50 percent readiness/availability to 80 percent. And over the process of these—the last couple of years, and now six years on, we’ve been able to sustain 80 percent readiness in the F/A-18s because of the processes that we put in place, data-driven, daily drumbeats of accountability to make sure that we understood what the readiness was, what the barriers were to achieving that readiness, and moving forward.

They’ve been able to scale that now through other type model series, and we’ve expanded it to the submarine force and also the surface force. So it’s a stretch goal, but I am committed and the team is committed to going after that stretch goal. So we are putting all those—we have, actually, all those processes in place now, and I’m really looking forward to that.

I will just give another example, a metric in surface that might be useful. So, you know, on-time completion of maintenance availabilities is really important. So if you think back in 2022 we had about 27 percent completion on time, 2023 we moved it up into the 30 percents, and this year we’ll be up to 67 percent. So we put in a lot of procedures to be able to plan maintenance availabilities early in a surface, a submarine, and aviation, making sure we understand what parts we need, having available pool of parts, investing in those parts so they can be there on time; planning our stuff—maintenance availabilities at least six months ahead of time and locking them in to let industry know what’s coming and also get those parts on order. Those are some of the things we’re doing.

So these are stretch goals, but I am confident that we’re going to work hard to get after them. And if we don’t make exactly 80 percent, we’re going to be farther along the road than we would be if I hadn’t set such an ambitious goal.

DAN LAMOTHE: OK.

LISA FRANCHETTI: And I will say all the communities are locked hands on these goals, so we are all committed to working together to get after them.

DAN LAMOTHE: A lot of discussions about the future of the Navy tend to focus on ship numbers. I heard in your comments there you kind of addressed that head on. To what do you—what degree do you consider that construct limiting, and to what degree do you consider that construct necessary? You know, I—there’s a pragmatic aspect to this, but numbers are numbers, and I’m sure that’s something that you get an earful on a lot as well.

LISA FRANCHETTI: Certainly. Well, I fully acknowledge that we need a larger, more lethal Navy. You know, we have multiple assessments that say that we need to have a larger Navy, and I really want to work closely, you know, with Congress, with industry to be able to deliver that Navy that we need. And that’s a really important thing.

But the size of the Navy is not the only thing that matters. I think if you look at that future warfighting ecosystem, it’s really about the effects you can deliver with that Navy from a widely dispersed, disaggregated force integrated with all of the other forces of our joint force, whether it’s cyber, space, Air Force, Army, Marines. You can definitely envision a different type of warfighting environment where all of those effects are layered together, and that is really how we’re going to beat any adversary.

So, to me, it’s both. We need to focus on getting the fleet that we need with the capabilities we need, but we also need to understand how we’re going to better integrate them with the joint force and alongside our allies and partners. And really, how do we build that interoperability from the ground up with allies and partners through both weapons systems but also exercises, and make sure that we can really plug and play, plug and fight any time that we need to be able to do that?

DAN LAMOTHE: OK. Thank you.

Let’s talk some current ops and maybe tie it back to the plan a bit. The Navy’s been extremely busy in the Red Sea and other parts of the Middle East over the last year. You know, I think a lot of us are tracking ship movements and things like that on a level that, you know, is not always common. What is the service learning as a result as seemingly almost daily sailors are knocking, you know, munitions out of the sky? And how long do you think the service can keep this up? It seems to me that there would be concern as this stretches on on magazine depth and also on just, you know, as you’re trying to pivot elsewhere this seemingly doesn’t go away.

LISA FRANCHETTI: Well, first, I couldn’t be more proud of our Navy and Marine Corps team that’s out there. As I said earlier, you know, from day one we’ve been there to deter further escalation. And you know, I’m very proud of all of our ships—working alongside allies and partners, I would add—there in the Red Sea and in the—in the Indian Ocean to really uphold that rules-based international order.

I think we’re learning a lot by being in the Red Sea. First, the value of allies and partners. And again, all of these exercises and training that we do all around the world, that’s enabled us to work together to get after this challenge.

I would say a few other things. First, that our sailors are confident in their weapons system. And that’s really a testament to the development of these weapons systems over the last many years, but also to the training, the certification, all of the work we do to get our sailors, our ships, our aircraft, everything ready to go before they head into harm’s way. And our systems have performed as designed. So, again, it’s a real testament to the designers, the engineers, and now our people who are able to employ them effectively.

I think the other thing that we’re learning is that we’ve been able to observe all of the different engagements, everything that the Houthis have used, all of their Iranian-supplied weapons systems, and we’ve been able to look at their tactics that they’re using. We’ve been able to use data and extract that information from our weapons systems, bring that back here to the US in a matter of hours. And getting that to our engineers; to our warfighting development centers where they develop tactics, techniques, and procedures; this has been really a gamechangers because then all the experts can work together, understand what’s going on. As tactics evolve, then we can introduce different tactics, adjustments to radars, whatever it is we need to do to be able to get after that.

I’ll just give a small example. When I was out visiting one of our ships, I got to promote a fire controlman second class to first class. And he was a technician who worked with a gun weapons system, and he had an idea about how he could make the gun more effective against Houthi threats. And he wrote up his idea, he sent it back to the technical authorities, they validated it, and they put it out the rest of the fleet because it was a better way to use the gun and more effective. And so we got to put technology into the hands of a warfighter; we got him to think about how to think, act, and operate differently; and he was really a pioneer in innovating there on the battlefield.

I always like to say in Ukraine they innovate on the battlefield every single day. They take what they have and they use it differently. We need to be able to do the same. So I think that’s another lesson that we’ve learned there.

DAN LAMOTHE: OK.

LISA FRANCHETTI: And to your last point about, you know, are we concerned about our sustainability to be there, of course, our job is to be there, and that is what we train our people to do. So I’m very proud to be able to do that mission. And we’re continuing to work, again, to invest in the munitions as I talk about the foundation—munitions, bases, infrastructure—all those things we need to generate and sustain the force, committed to getting after that.

DAN LAMOTHE: All right.

And I think we have just time for one more question. We’ve seen the Abraham Lincoln Strike Group extended. We’ve seen the Marine Expeditionary Unit extended along with the ARG. As we see this extend, you know, it occurs to me we don’t necessarily have a follow-on ARG new behind it. To what degree are you concerned about being able to sustain the tempo out there?

LISA FRANCHETTI: Well, as you know, we train, deploy, and certify all of our forces to be able to meet the requirements that are set forth, you know, by the secretary. We’re a globally deployed force, and I think that’s one of the greatest things about the flexibility of our Navy. We can generate the forces, we can send them where they need to go, and allow the secretary to be able to move them between the different theaters to get after the missions that we have. So I’m confident in our ability to do that.

I am very focused on readiness for all of our ships. You know, when you think about in the big picture what are my priorities, first, Columbia, our number-one acquisition priority. But after that, readiness, capability, and then capacity. I’m really focused on readiness and getting after all of these maintenance challenges that have caused some of the delays in the past, whether it’s in our amphibious force or in any one of our platforms. So, again, that’s how we’re going to get after this. And that’s why that’s a key part of our Navigation Plan.

DAN LAMOTHE: OK. Thank you all for your time today. I’d ask you to remain seated so that the admiral can depart for another meeting.

LISA FRANCHETTI: Thank you very much.

DAN LAMOTHE: All right.

LISA FRANCHETTI: Thank you.

DAN LAMOTHE: Thank you.

LISA FRANCHETTI: Oh, thanks. That was fun.

DAN LAMOTHE: Thank you.

Watch the full event

The post Inside the Navy’s plan to improve its readiness for conflict, with Admiral Lisa Franchetti appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine may allow drone exports in bid to support domestic producers

Marcel Plichta — Tue, 15 Oct 2024 21:12:28 +0000

Ukraine is reportedly considering lifting restrictions on the export of drones as the country seeks to strengthen domestic drone production. The Ukrainian drone manufacturing industry has expanded rapidly since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion and is now operating at well below its potential capacity due to a lack of government funding. Supporters of the export initiative believe foreign sales could generate much needed revenues and fuel the further development of Ukraine’s drone industry, while also preventing an exodus of cash-strapped Ukrainian drone makers.

There is little doubt that in the long run, Ukraine will become a major drone exporter. After all, Ukrainian drones are tested in battle and are highly sought after internationally. Nevertheless, some have been surprised by the timing of recent suggestions that Ukrainian companies should be allowed to export drones as the country fights for survival against Russia’s ongoing invasion.

There are a number of economic arguments in favor of drone exports. At a time of acute economic distress, exports could prove extremely profitable for drone manufacturers. Ukrainian MP Oleksandr Marikovskyi, who heads the Ukrainian parliament’s economic subcommittee investigating drone export regulations, believes exports could generate up to $20 billion. If export markets remain off limits, there is a danger that a significant portion of Ukraine’s domestic drone producers will be forced to relocate abroad or close down entirely.

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There is unlikely to be any shortage of potential international buyers for Ukrainian drones, which have demonstrated their effectiveness throughout the war with Russia. Meanwhile, many NATO countries are cautious about the acquisition of drones manufactured in China, while other major drone producers have a range of restrictions in place that limit foreign sales. This could create additional opportunities for Ukrainian companies.

Crucially, exporting drones to international markets might actually make it easier for Ukraine’s drone producers to deliver more drones to the Ukrainian military. Ukrainian drone production has increased so much over the past two-and-a-half years that it has now far outstripped the Ukrainian government’s procurement potential. In other words, Ukrainian drone manufacturers are capable of producing significantly more drones than the state can currently purchase.

Opening up export markets could help solve this problem. Enabling exports would allow Ukrainian drone companies to operate closer to capacity, making it possible to scale up production and reduce the cost of individual drones for all customers, including the Ukrainian state. This is a key reason why many Ukrainian producers see exports as the most sensible solution to the current challenges facing the industry.

Eurasia Center events

Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

While the arguments in favor of lifting export restrictions appear strong, any steps to allow the sale of drones to foreign clients during wartime would be seen by many as controversial. If the Ukrainian authorities do opt to allow exports, they will need to determine which categories can be sold abroad and in what quantities. The needs of the Ukrainian military will naturally remain the number one priority. With this in mind, it may make sense to create some kind of centralized mechanism to regulate international sales in order to streamline the process and enhance transparency.

Ukraine would also have to take steps to monitor where the country’s drones end up. Any potential misuse of Ukrainian drones would likely be very high profile and could raise serious concerns among the country’s partners. Exporting drones internationally would also increase the risk of Russia acquiring and examining Ukrainian technologies.

Permitting the export of Ukrainian drones would be a complex process with a number of potential pitfalls. At the same time, Ukrainian officials and the country’s drone manufacturers currently appear to have few other options as they look to boost domestic production while faced with limited state funding.

Exports could help Ukraine’s drone industry continue to grow at a time when the country’s future hinges on staying one step ahead of Russia in the defense tech arms race. If Ukraine decides to allow drone exports, the process must be thoroughly thought out and carefully implemented in order to safeguard all-important drone deliveries to the Ukrainian military.

Marcel Plichta is a PhD candidate at the University of St Andrews and former analyst at the US Department of Defense. He has written on the use of drones in the Russian invasion of Ukraine for the Atlantic Council, the Telegraph, and the Spectator.

AI and data

The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence and Canadian Department of National Defence have formalized an agreement with the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to collaborate on AI and cybersecurity systems. The partnership strengthens ties among the three nations while promoting efficiency by reducing redundant research through shared information and technology. Key areas of focus include advancing defense-related AI, ensuring trustworthy AI, and addressing ethical and safety concerns in defense applications.

Autonomous systems

The government of Ukraine is leaning towards removing a wartime ban on the export of drones. Drones have become a central feature of the conflict in Ukraine, and the country’s defense industry has responded to the need for several types of drones by building a strong drone production capacity. However, the government of Ukraine cannot afford to buy the number of domestically built drones this industry is producing. But enabling exports could help stimulate investment in this industry and offer an opportunity for drone companies to sell what has become excess capacity.

Platforms and weapons systems

Anduril Industries has unveiled three variants of the Barracuda air-breathing cruise missile. According to Anduril Chief Strategy Officer Chris Brose, the missile’s components can be taken “apart like Lego blocks,” allowing for swift customization and upgrades. Anduril Industries has said that the missile has autonomous behaviors and other software-defined capabilities that make it capable of various missions and scalable.

In addition, Iran has reportedly been seen with a Chinese laser directed-energy weapon designed to “dazzle” or destroy drones. Images said to show the system in Iran first surfaced on October 4. Analysts speculated that the system could have been deployed to enhance security during a prominent public sermon by Khamenei. The speculation about the system arose as tensions across the region increased, particularly between Israel and Iran.

Space

In France, the Defense Innovation Agency and Directorate General of Armament unveiled plans for a space surveillance program involving the deployment of two maneuverable CubeSats in low-Earth orbit. These satellites will be responsible for spacecraft detection, characterization, and targeting. The program, known as Toutatis, expects to launch the satellites in the next two years in an effort to restore deterrence by increasing awareness of threats to French space assets and providing a maneuverable capability to discourage disruptive activities from adversaries.

Manufacturing, industry, and supply chain

In September, the European Commission released an in-depth report on the future of European competitiveness. To reinvigorate Europe’s defense-industrial base, the report calls for the establishment of a centralized EU Defence Industry Authority that performs defense procurement on behalf of EU countries (as part of the effort to aggregate demand) and recommends a “buy European” approach to defense procurement, reducing dependence on foreign suppliers—including the United States.

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

The post A new democratic partnership and a new authoritarian collaboration each put defense technology front and center appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Cross-Strait and Beyond seminar on US-Taiwan defense co-production featured in Aviation Week

ylee — Wed, 09 Oct 2024 17:41:15 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

On October 8, our Cross-Strait and Beyond seminar on fostering US-Taiwan defense co-production was featured in Aviation Week. The article outlined the event’s panel discussion, which highlighted how co-production could address mutual security concerns in the Indo-Pacific, particularly amid China’s military expansion efforts. Key topics included the potential for joint production of drones and the strategic importance of improving the US-Taiwan defense partnership to counter Chinese influence. Issues such as export licensing, protecting intellectual property, and managing Chinese retaliation were also addressed as significant challenges for moving forward with co-production efforts.

Staff

Markus Garlauskas

Director

Crisis Management Indo-Pacific

Fellow

Steven R. Rudder