Conflict - Atlantic Council

Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

Donald Trump’s talk of peace through strength succeeded in generating considerable optimism during the early months of 2025, but it is now time to acknowledge that this was largely based on wishful thinking. Since Trump returned to the White House, the Russians have significantly escalated their air war against Ukraine’s civilian population. On the battlefield, Putin’s troops are now engaged in the early stages of what promises to be a major summer offensive. Meanwhile, Kremlin officials continue make maximalist demands at the negotiating table that no Ukrainian government could accept. These are not the actions of a country seeking a pathway to peace.

In both words and deeds, Putin is sending unambiguous signals that he has no interest whatsoever in ending his invasion and remains determined to achieve the complete subjugation of Ukraine. This uncompromising stance will not change unless Western leaders can convince Putin that the most likely alternative to a negotiated peace is not an historic Russian triumph but a disastrous Russian defeat.

The steps needed to bring about this change and create the conditions to end the war are no secret. Sanctions measures against Russia must be tightened and expanded to starve the Kremlin war machine of funding and weaken the domestic foundations of Putin’s regime. Countries that currently help Moscow bypass international sanctions must be targeted with far greater vigor. In parallel, Western military aid to Ukraine must be dramatically increased, with an emphasis on providing long-range weapons and financing Ukraine’s rapidly growing domestic defense industry.

All this will require a degree of political will that is currently lacking. It would also be expensive. Indeed, during this week’s G7 summit, Trump balked at the idea of imposing new sanctions, saying they would “cost us a lot of money.” This is dangerously shortsighted. Trump and other G7 leaders need to urgently recognize that if Putin is allowed to succeed in Ukraine, the cost of stopping him will skyrocket.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

In parallel, wartime Ukraine has continued to make progress in combating corruption. When Russia’s invasion of Ukraine first began in 2014, Ukraine was ranked 142 of 180 countries in Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perceptions Index. In the most recent edition, Ukraine had climbed to the 105 position.

Rising Ukrainian patriotism has helped fuel this progress in the fight against corruption. EU accession demands and IMF conditions have been equally important. Ukraine has gone through eight quarterly reviews of its four-year IMF program. It has done so on time and with flying colors. The same has been true of each EU assessment.

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As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Looking ahead, three critical factors are necessary for wartime Ukraine’s future economic progress. First of all, Ukraine needs about $42 billion a year in external budget financing, or just over 20 percent of annual GDP, to finance its budget deficit. The country did not receive sufficient financing in 2022 because EU partners failed to deliver promised sums. This drove up Ukraine’s inflation rate to 27 percent at the end of 2022. The Ukrainian budget was fully financed in 2023 and 2024, driving down inflation to 5 percent. The budget will be fully financed this year.

The second factor is maritime trade via Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. Shipping from Odesa and neighboring Ukrainian ports to global markets has been almost unimpeded since September 2023 after Ukraine took out much of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The vast majority of Ukraine’s exports are commodities such as agricultural goods, steel, and iron ore, which are only profitable with cheap naval transportation, so keeping sea lanes open is vital.

The third crucial factor for wartime Ukraine’s economic prospects is a steady supply of electricity. Russian bombing of Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure disrupted the power supply significantly in 2024, which was one of the main reasons for the country’s deteriorating economic performance.

Ukraine’s economic position looks set to worsen this year. In the first four months of 2025, economic growth was only 1.1 percent, while inflation had risen to 15.9 percent by May. The main cause of rising inflation is a shortage of labor. The national bank will presumably need to hike its current interest rate of 15.5 percent, which will further depress growth. After three years of war, Ukraine’s economy is showing increasing signs of exhaustion. The country has entered stagflation, which is to be expected.

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Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

Russia’s current economic situation is surprisingly similar to Ukraine’s, although almost all trade between Russia and Ukraine has ceased. After two years of around 4 percent economic growth in 2023 and 2024, Russia is expecting growth of merely 1.5 percent this year, while official inflation is 10 percent. Since October 2024, the Central Bank of Russia has maintained an interest rate of 21 percent while complaining about stagflation.

The Russian and Ukrainian economies are both suffering from their extreme focus on the military sector. Including Western support, Ukraine’s military expenditure amounts to about $100 billion a year, which is no less than 50 percent of Ukraine’s GDP, with 30 percent coming from the Ukrainian budget in 2024. Meanwhile, Russia’s 2025 military expenditure is supposed to be $170 billion or 8 percent of GDP. Unlike the Ukrainians, the Russians complain about the scale of military spending. This makes sense. The Ukrainians are fighting an existential war, while Russia’s war is only existential for Putin.

Contrary to common perceptions, Russia does not have an overwhelming advantage over Ukraine in terms of military expenditure or supplies. Russia does spend significantly more than Ukraine, but much of this is in reality stolen by politicians, generals, and Putin’s friends. Furthermore, Western sanctions impede the Russian military’s ability to innovate. In contrast, Ukraine benefits from innovation because its economy is so much freer, with hundreds of startups thriving in areas such as drone production.

Russia is now entering a fiscal crunch. Its federal expenditures in 2024 amounted to 20 percent of GDP and are likely to stay at that level in 2025, of which 41 percent goes to military and security. However, the Kremlin has financed its budget deficit of about 2 percent of GDP with its national welfare fund, which is expected to run out by the end of the current year. As a result, Russia will likely be forced to reduce its public expenditures by one-tenth.

Low oil prices could add considerably to Russia’s mounting economic woes and force a further reduction in the country’s public expenditures. However, Israel’s attack on Iran may now help Putin to stay financially afloat by driving the price of oil higher.

Economically, this is a balanced war of attrition at present. Ukraine’s Western partners have the potential to turn the tables on Russia if they choose to do so. Ukraine has successfully built up a major innovative arms industry. What is missing is not arms but funds. The West needs to double Ukraine’s military budget from today’s annual total of $100 billion to $200 billion. They can do this without using their own funds if they agree to seize approximately $200 billion in frozen Russian assets currently held in Euroclear Bank in Belgium. This could enable Ukraine to outspend Russia and achieve victory through a combination of more firepower, greater technology, and superior morale.

Anders Åslund is the author of “Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy.”

Speakers

Helima Croft
Board Director, Atlantic Council; Managing Director and Global Head of Commodity Strategy and MENA Research, RBC Capital Markets

Brett McGurk
Distinguished Fellow, N7 Initiative, Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs, Atlantic Council

Moderator

William F. Wechsler
Senior Director, Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs, Atlantic Council

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

WILLIAM F. WECHSLER: Thank you for—once again, for everyone being here, being part of this discussion. It’s quite important. And it comes at, of course, an absolutely critical moment for those of us who’ve spent our lives caring about the geopolitics and stability/security of the Middle East.

So we’re going to have a thirty-minute discussion here with two of the most well-positioned people to give us their views on what’s going on now and what we should expect.

From my own point of view, I just want to lead off by saying I see four real scenarios going forward: a great scenario, a good scenario, a bad scenario, and a terrible scenario. The great one is that the military objectives in the current campaign are met and the Iranian regime is not able to pose the kind of existential threat to the region that it—of the Iranian people taking matters into their own hands. A good scenario is that the Iranian regime comes back to the Trump administration and wants to do a deal on eliminating their enrichment of their nuclear program. A bad scenario is the military objectives are not met and Iran goes nuclear. And a terrible one is that the region is in war, which could involve the United States.

So the two people that I have here discuss are Brett McGurk, who has joined the Atlantic Council recently as a distinguished fellow working our Middle East Programs and our N7 Initiative, a joint partnership of the Atlantic Council and Jeffrey M. Talpins Foundation; and Helima Croft, the head of commodities at RBC Global and the head of the Middle East there as well.

We’re going to talk about security and energy issues here today. Let me start with you, Brett. Tell us what—you know, as we sit here the people in the Trump administration are gathering at some point today in the Situation Room to talk about what the options are for the United States to advance the good scenarios I talked about and minimize the risk of the lower scenarios. You’ve spent more time in that Situation Room than anybody I know talking about these issues. What would you be telling the president today?

BRETT MCGURK: Well—is this working? OK. Well, thank you, and congratulations, Atlantic Council, Landon, and everyone setting this up, and it’s great to hear from Dr. Sultan this morning. And, Fred, great to see you.

I caveat comments on what’s happening to say if anyone tells you they know exactly where this is heading or making kind of bold predictions they don’t know what they’re talking about. This is truly a completely unprecedented situation.

It flows out of the events of October 7th. I’m happy to kind of talk about the broader strategic context but you asked a specific question so let me get to it. If I was in the Situation Room right now I think, from the White House perspective, we have three immediate objectives.

Number one, obviously, we want to protect Americans and we want to help defend Israel. That is, like, first priority. So making sure we’re surging defense interceptors, everything. I’ve dealt with that an awful lot in the last year when I was in the White House. That’s number one.

Number two, try to contain this to Israel and Iran. Avoid a broader regional escalation. I think that’s actually a very achievable objective. So far I think that’s going fairly well—something we dealt with every day, every hour, from October 7th on.

I don’t know how many predictions of uncontrollable regional war there have been since October 7th. There has not been an uncontrollable regional war because of what the United States has done, frankly, consistently day by day, hour by hour, month by month.

Number three, I think you want to be working with the Israelis to ensure a focus on their declared objectives and avoid a mission creep scenario. Their declared objectives are dismantlement of the nuclear program and the missile program.

So those are kind of the three immediate objectives. But on the third one it’s very important because we know an awful lot about this. The Iran nuclear program has been a vexing challenge across administrations and the Rubicon here has been crossed, and I think we’ll mention that one of the worst outcomes would be this kind of ends with the main enrichment facility in Fordow intact.

And let me say a little bit about that because there’s a lot of focus about what is Israel doing, why. But Iran has made a series of fateful strategic miscalculations from October 7th on. It decided after October 7th to basically support a multifront war against Israel, and I lived through this and watched the whole thing.

They turned on Hezbollah to open a northern front. They turned on the Houthis to open a southern front. They supplied the militias in Iraq and Syria to open additional fronts. They directly attacked Israel twice in April and October. That is—October 7th miscalculations.

What happened? Hezbollah was basically knocked out. You have a new government in Lebanon. The Assad regime collapsed. You have a new government in Syria. We had a ceasefire in Gaza and hostages coming out. I’m hopeful we can still get back to a ceasefire there. You had the militias in Iraq declaring a ceasefire, relations in the Gulf very strong, and Iran in its weakest position since October 7th. So that’s kind of where things were left.

On the nuclear side, Iran continued to escalate its program. And just last week the IAEA came out with its comprehensive report that was asked for last year and found flagrant—what was their word?—egregious failure of Iran to live up to its nuclear commitments and focused a lot on Fordow.

In Fordow right now, buried into a mountain, there are ten cascades of very advanced IR-6 centrifuges. That cannot be left intact. And I think the way the White House sees this, and the policy right now as I read it, is the White House offered a deal to Iran about six weeks ago. I don’t know every detail. It’s described as a very fair deal. But that would basically give the world confidence that Iran is not and will not ever move towards a nuclear weapon.

And Iran not only did not really respond to that. It actually escalated its nuclear program in the face of this, including just last week saying they’re going to feed fuel into the cascades in Fordow and actually open a new underground enrichment facility. So Iran has just made these series of miscalculations. And I used to lead this channel in Oman with the Iranians and told them repeatedly, if you keep this up, it’s inevitable, inevitable, somebody will take care of this problem. And that’s kind of where we are.

So right now Iran has a choice. I mean, Abbas Araghchi, the foreign minister of Iran, can call Steve Witkoff, President Trump’s envoy, and say, you know, I kind of—I looked at the offer you put down six weeks ago. Actually, it’s pretty good. I think we’re going to take it. And I think this crisis would be over. Or they could not do that, looking at the possibility of a US strike on Fordow. I’m just saying that as an analyst.

But in any case, to Will’s four scenarios, this has to end without Iran’s nuclear-enrichment program intact. And hopefully that can end diplomatically. That option is still available. There’s still an off-ramp. Or the military campaign is now joined. The Israelis have a lot of options. And the US has a big option when it comes to Fordow.

WILLIAM F. WECHSLER: Thank you very much for that, Brett.

Helima, I want to talk—to turn to the energy markets. The energy markets have—don’t seem to have built in the risk that—of some of the scenarios that—of some of the scenarios that I and Brett were talking about. Can you help us understand why that is, what Iran could do that would change the markets’ views, and then how OPEC and others would react and the United States would react to that?

HELIMA CROFT: Great. Thank you so much. And Fred, thank you so much for convening us again. And Dr. Sultan, what an extraordinary open to the conference today.

As you mentioned, Will, I think the market is very sanguine about the risks entailed in any type of escalation in the Middle East at this moment. I think a lot of it goes back to the Russia-Ukraine war. There had been this expectation right away—remember what oil prices did right after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. We shot up. We were running to $130. Analysts were talking about potentially $200-a-barrel price of oil. There was an expectation that we could see three million barrels of Russian oil off the market.

And when that did not materialize, I think a lot of market participants were like, we have overplayed this risk. A number of prominent investors were burned betting on a Russian supply disruption. And they were like, I’m no longer going to price in risk of disruption. You can tell me about it, but I want to see it before I start pricing this in. And we have a situation right now in the market where we are well-supplied. You know, US production has been strong. Production out of countries like the United Arab Emirates, the investments that ADNOC has made in expanding spare capacity, means that we have ample supply on the market right now.

But the question is, Will, and we talked about this, if we were to see even a repeat of what we saw in 2019, if we saw attacks on tankers—remember, in 2019, after we reimposed maximum-pressure sanctions in May, we did have tankers hit off the coast of Fujairah. They were not sunk, but they were damaged. We had drone attacks on key pipelines over that summer, including the east-west pipeline. And then in September we had the attack on Abqaiq, the world’s largest oil-processing facility.

And to some extent because that did not yield sustained disruption—and, well, we talked about that. You know, was this a ceiling of Iran’s disruptive capabilities in 2019? Could they have done far more damage to Abqaiq if they had chosen to do so? But a lot of market participants were, like, we’ve seen the worst out of this. And if it did not yield a sustained disruption in 2019 when Abqaiq was hit, I really don’t need to be worried about it now unless it actually happens.

Now, people would say, the risk is potentially low. I’ve heard many experts say the risk of this spilling over into energy is low. But it’s not zero. And if you did have a situation—even last night—where’s my friend Amena Bakr? We were back and forth, you know, on our, you know, texts last night, because we had two tankers or three tankers on fire last night. And our immediate concern was, is this a repeat of 2019? Have those tankers been struck. Is Iran seeking to internationalize the cost of this conflict? Now it turns out there was a collision. It does not look like they were actually struck by a missile or a mine. But the concern was there right away.

So if we were to see some type of incident—we’ve already seen domestic energy infrastructure targeted. We’ve already seen South Pars struck. We’ve seen attacks on the important Haifa Refinery in Israel. We’ve had oil depots struck in Iran. All domestic. All kind of warning shots. But, again, I don’t think the market would be prepared for the export infrastructure being struck. And, again, that may never happen. And the Iranians may judge that the cost of doing so is too high. The Israelis may decide not in their interest to defund Iran by attacking Kharg Island, which would take off 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports.

But, again, the risk isn’t zero. And if you were to have something—even though we’re sitting at seventy-five dollars today—if you were to have just a repeat of anything we saw in 2019, we would move materially higher. Now, the question about OPEC, I don’t think OPEC is looking to add barrels to the market this time because of this situation. They are already unwinding a voluntary cut. We expect more rolling OPEC barrels on the market. But OPEC has made it pretty clear, they’re not going to fill a gap in the market until one emerges. So I would not expect, for example, a preemptive surge of a million-plus barrels, unless we see clear evidence of a supply disruption.

WILLIAM F. WECHSLER: Thank you very much. So the implications of that is, because the risk isn’t built into the markets today, if we do have this, the market impact would be much larger than it would be. And it would be a—would be a shock.

HELIMA CROFT: I think the market is taking it as a—I think energy markets—based on everything Brett said, like, you know, we’ve had this war in the Middle East that has not disrupted energy supplies to date. Again, the clearest one was what happened with Russia [and] Ukraine, where people were really thinking, are we going to do to Russia what we did to Iran in terms of secondary sanctions? I mean, we did a lot of work, though, to prevent a Russian disruption. Again, massive releases from the SPR, carveouts in terms of energy sanctions. We did price caps after the Europeans went forward with the sixth package of sanctions, which banned the import of seaborne oil into Europe and did a services ban. There was an active effort by the White House to ensure that the market would be well supplied. So—but I think the message or the takeaway, from many market participants is, call me when there is a disruption. You tell me there’s a lot of risk, but I’m waiting to see it materialize.

WILLIAM F. WECHSLER: Thank you very much for that.

Brett, I want to come back to you. You know, the issue, as you alluded to, Fordow, Fordow, Fordow. That’s the question. That is—that’s what’s going to be on the mind of President Trump. You served President Trump in his—in his first term. You’ve been in the Oval Office with him. He’s made absolutely clear over a long period of time that he doesn’t want a war with Iran. What’s different now? What would cause him, in your mind, to make that decision? And what are ways that events could unfold that would make it more likely?

BRETT MCGURK: I’d say, first, look, nobody wants—I think no president wants to order a military strike anywhere, frankly. I mean, I’ve been around four presidents. It’s, like, the most difficult decision. And anybody with the experience over the last twenty years, and if you spend time in Iraq like I did and others, like, you better go at such a decision with heady analysis, prudence, calculation, thinking through every unintended consequence.

The issue with Fordow—and I’m just going to—a lot of you know this. But it was a secret underground facility found by intelligence, announced to the world in 2009. The JCPOA had a lot of problems. It did say no enrichment at Fordow until 2030. After the JCPOA—US left the JCPOA, Iran started installing centrifuges in Fordow. And they eventually put in ten cascades of the IR-6s, which are the most advanced. And they started enriching to 60 percent uranium grade, which can spin up very fast to weapons grade. And you just read the IAEA report from last week.

This is a huge national security challenge. And I think the hope was that it could be dealt with through a deal. I mean, frankly, we in the—in the Biden administration had worked on this knowing that this year, 2025, is the year to deal with this problem, because there’s a deadline. The deadline, again, under the JCPOA, a provision its critics like is called snapback. Snapback means any member of that deal who’s still a member, basically France and the UK, can go to the UN Security Council and say, all international sanctions on Iran snapback. And they can do that until October of this year, when that expires under the JCPOA. So this is always the year to deal with this problem. And the hope, again, still, is that it can be dealt with diplomatically.

Now, the military option has had massive risk to it. Some of them—and being around this issue over the years I’m not revealing anything that’s not known—Hezbollah. Hezbollah had 150,000 to 200,000 missiles and rockets hanging over Israel. Any military strike into Iran, you risk Hezbollah unleashing those missiles on Israel. No longer a threat. Very significant. Hezbollah, even after the start of Israel’s military operation, has said: We want nothing to do with this. Second, air defense. Iran has pretty good air defense. Russian air defense systems, S-300s. There’s the risk of a pilot being taken down. That’s a big risk. That’s no longer there. Israel has complete air supremacy over Iran, which is an extraordinary thing. And that changes the entire calculation. Third, Iran has what it has. It has proxies. It has terrorism. It has missiles and rockets. And we know all that.

So the window of availability for a military option is now very open. And then how do you use that? Do you use that to try to get a deal, which I can actually see the administration doing? And if you say, if that—if that negotiation fails, then we have to be prepared to actually do the strike. And I think you do have to back it up. And around town if you say that, it’s, like, well, that means you’re going to lead. Look what happened in the Iraq War. This is not an Iraq War scenario. We invaded Iraq in 2003 with 130,000 troops, very small force, to overthrow a government and install an entirely new system.

I mean, that—talk about ends and means gap and unintended consequences? This is—and I’m not discounting the seriousness of this—but this is a military operation that has been planned, trained on, for, like, going back ten or fifteen years. And so it is available to the president. And the Pentagon’s job is to make it available and discuss it, if the president chooses to do it. And right now, it’s available as a backstop to diplomacy. And, again, anyone talking to Abbas Araghchi, he should call Steve Witkoff tomorrow, or right now, and say, you know what? I re-looked at the deal you put down. It’s pretty good. Let’s actually get together and do it. That’s the way out of this.

And being through the crisis since October 7th, I mean, this—sometimes it’s—I can get—frustrated is not the right word. But there are ways out of these problems. And right now, there could be a—we want a ceasefire in Gaza. Ceasefire in Gaza, if Hamas releases ten hostages, you have a sixty-day ceasefire in Gaza. Israel signed up to that. The US has signed up to it. It’s there. Iran right now—this crisis can end if Iran accepts the deal on the table. Or, I think, the military option becomes very viable.

And given where we are, the worst case here would be to leave Iran with that Fordow and ten cascades intact. So it’s a deal or it’s a military strike. I mean, I just—I think that is where we’re heading, and the events over the last twenty-four hours, I think, made that pretty clear. And that’s probably being discussed right down the street right now.

WILLIAM F. WECHSLER: You know, I’ve been briefed that we got about—that Iran at the current op tempo and the current projections of Israeli taking launchers off the battlefield that there’s about a—about a week, at least, more runway of these current level of operations continue. Of course, Iran also has by my count about three thousand short-range weapons that don’t threaten Israel but threaten our friends in the Gulf if things get—things get a lot worse.

My question to you, Helima, is in the scenario that Brett was just talking about, about the United States taking a strike on the—on the nuclear facility in Fordow, what’s that implication to the energy markets? And then what does the US do if the energy markets go a little haywire?

HELIMA CROFT: Well, I mean, certainly I think that, you know, US action against Fordow you would see, you know, a little pop in prices. But again, I think given the sort of bias of the market—I would say the recency bias of the market to say if it’s not an energy facility let’s take a pause, I think the real question would be in an endgame scenario for the Iranian government, again, A, what would come after—we talk about regime change, but who’s going to emerge to run that country? But the concern would be, I think, from the people who watch energy markets, who have spent time in the Middle East, who have been to places right after attacks have happened is, would you see proxy groups?

Like, would you see potentially risk to—we’ve talked about Straits of Hormuz, but I always think about, like, risks to Basra. I think about the risk to Iraq’s four-million-plus production because of Iranian-backed militias that operate very close to those facilities. So we would be watching, you know, what would happen in terms of, obviously, tankers. We would look to what would happen to—who are—where is the sort of soft security underbelly in terms of the energy system in the Middle East? And again, I would be concerned about risks to Iraq. I’d be concerned about risks to other countries’ energy facilities where they may not have taken the necessary steps to fortify those facilities.

So I don’t think the risk is—I do not think it is tail risk in a regime that feels its days are numbered, that they are not going to at least try to impose economic cost on the West and the rest of the world.

WILLIAM F. WECHSLER: Well, thank you very much.

In just the brief amount of time that we have left, let me—let me ask each of you to leave us with a thought that we haven’t talked about and, frankly, if it’s possible, that you think most people aren’t talking about enough. Like, what should we be thinking about that most people aren’t? Let me start with you, Brett.

BRETT MCGURK: Man. Right now I think what we’re all thinking about is what we should be thinking about, which is what is going to happen in the next week. And it is—you talk about a decisive historical period; we’ve living in it. We’re living in it.

And I—and I think the potential for a Middle East—I’m looking at a lot of friends here in the audience—the potential for this region is just enormous. It is enormous. I though the president’s trip was the right thing to do, very successful. What’s happening in UAE is extraordinary, Saudi Arabia, throughout the Gulf—everything that was just talked about in this panel.

And Iran has been a huge problem in this region for decades. And what has happened to Hezbollah and Iranian networks and Iran since October 7th sets conditions for a much more peaceful, integrated Middle East that we all want. And Iran is a spoiler to that; there’s just no question about it. So what’s going to happen here in the next week, I think, or so is potentially quite decisive.

And if we were here two years ago, and the question was hypothetically what if Israel launches a massive air attack on Iran, like, tomorrow—what would happen—I think Helima would have said it’s going to be all-out Middle East war, and energy markets, and everything else you can imagine. And actually, it’s happening right now. Israel controls the skies of Iran.

I mean, this is like—you know, and I just have to say I am proud of what the United States of America has done since October 7th, not without controversy. And these are hard calls, and they should be scrutinized. But I am proud of what we have done to reduce the risks of an all-out Middle East conflict, to significantly weaken Iran and all of these networks that threaten so many people, and to set the conditions for a far more peaceful, prosperous, integrated Middle East region.

With that said, there are going to be spoilers around and terrorist groups around and extremists around, many of them funded and supported by Iran. But an Iran without the sword of Damocles of a nuclear-threshold state is a much different problem. And here we are with potential to actually resolve that, at least for a significant period of time.

And I will just finish. I hope—I hope Iran finds a way to take a deal, the deal that the US has put on the table. And if not, I think there’s no other way.

So I have to answer that question, Will, by what should we be thinking about? It’s what’s happening right now. I don’t know what else—at least that’s what I’m thinking about.

HELIMA CROFT: I will be super fast.

To echo what you pointed out about the enormous progress that we’ve seen in the Middle East—I mean, it started by the UAE with the incredible economic transformation and diversification program. I mean, Dr. Sultan, I think your portfolio speaks to everything you do in that country, just even beyond energy. And you look at the other countries, Saudi Arabia. You think about what Kuwait is trying to do, taking enormous steps to diversify their economies, to future-proof their societies. And it’s predicated on a stable security environment.

And so I do think that we should be sanguine about what’s at stake if we do not find a solution that enables, you know, a stable, prosperous Middle East. And having a stable security environment is so important for the millions of young people in the region whose futures really rest on everything that these governments are trying to undertake.

WILLIAM F. WECHSLER: Thank you very much. I think you actually hit on what I was hoping you would hit on, which is not only the risks of the region but the potential of the region is what we also need to be thinking about deeply right now.

With that, I want to say thank you very much to our panelists here for a really fascinating discussion on the issues of the day. Thank you all for listening to us.

Watch the full event

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Twenty questions (and expert answers) on the Israel-Iran war

Atlantic Council experts — Mon, 16 Jun 2025 20:57:15 +0000

A decades-old conflict between Israel and Iran that was never quite “cold” is rapidly heating up. In the days since the first Israeli attacks against the Iranian nuclear program and military leadership, more than two hundred people have been killed in Iran and at least two dozen have died in Israel. The escalating war raises all sorts of questions, from military mechanics to humanitarian efforts to Washington diplomacy and the global energy supply. Below, the Atlantic Council’s authorities on the Middle East unpack this increasingly volatile moment for the region. Read on for expert responses to twenty pressing questions on this emerging war.

1. What was the Israeli calculus in launching Friday’s strikes against Iran?

Israel recognized a golden opportunity to seize Iranian weakness, following the collapse of is proxy “Axis of Resistance” led by Hezbollah along with Israel’s operational achievements of its October 2024 attack on Iran, when Israel destroyed Tehran’s strategic air defense system. The fact that the path to Iran was open to the Israeli Air Force was a significant factor in the decision to launch the attack, especially as Iran was advancing dangerously in its enrichment program. In addition, Israel recently received intelligence that Iran had resumed its “weapons group” activity in pursuit of a nuclear weapon. The combination of a country on the verge of military enrichment and an active weapons group was too dangerous in the eyes of Israel, which sought to exploit the operational window of opportunity and attack Iran as soon as it received the green light from US President Donald Trump.

—Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He previously served for twenty-five years in a variety of command positions units in Israel Defense Intelligence, including as the head of the Iran branch in the Research and Analysis Division.

2. How effective has Israel been in dismantling Iran’s nuclear capabilities?

First, the Israeli operation’s objective was not defined as a complete destruction of Iran’s nuclear program. Even before its Friday attack, it was clear that Israel has a relatively limited ability to destroy nuclear capabilities without active participation from the United States. Israel can, however, significantly delay Iran’s nuclear program (by at least a year), mainly by striking facilities—starting with Natanz—assassinating nuclear scientists who represent a key bottleneck in the program, and damaging additional sites. Nevertheless, without striking the enrichment facility at Fordow, which likely would require US participation, Iran’s nuclear program cannot be destroyed, only significantly delayed.

As for Iran’s willingness to move forward with its nuclear program, the attack may, paradoxically, encourage Iran to break out toward a nuclear weapon. Nevertheless, making such a decision at this time, especially in view of the intensive Israeli Air Force activity over Iran and Israel’s deep intelligence penetration into Iran’s nuclear program, would be extremely dangerous for Iran and might even motivate Washington to directly join the campaign. Therefore, Iran may prefer to avoid a nuclear breakout—at least at this stage—and instead consider this option in the future.

—Raz Zimmt is a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies and the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University. He is also a veteran Iran watcher in the Israeli Defense Forces. Follow him on X: @RZimmt.

3. How forcefully has Tehran responded, and what has the impact been?

Ultra Orthodox jews look at an impacted site following missile attack from Iran on Israel, in Bnei Brak, Israel June 16, 2025. REUTERS/Miro Maman TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY

I think we are seeing that Iran’s bark is worse than its bite. Israel’s military and intelligence superiority over the Islamic Republic has overwhelmed and severely weakened the regime through decapitations, degradation of its armed forces, and damage to its nuclear program. Iran cannot compete with the surgical and lethal precision with which Israel is mounting its campaign. Israel’s leadership likely factored in the damage to the home front when making the decision to strike Iran so aggressively, and that speaks to the confidence the Israeli defense establishment has in its ability to manage and counter Iranian retaliation.

The one area I am most concerned about is the prospect of Tehran activating contingency operations targeting Israeli and Jewish interests abroad via terrorism. Iran may also consider targeting the energy interests of US partners in the Arab world as a means of extracting economic pain for these Israeli attacks. Tehran may likewise turn to cyberattacks against critical infrastructure. But in the end, Iran will face supply constraints, and we’re already seeing missiles being lobbed at Israel in more limited quantities, likely to preserve capacity.

—Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI). His research specialties include Iranian leadership dynamics, Iran’s military and security services, and Iran’s proxy and partner network. He is on X @JasonMBrodsky.

4. What are the the environmental and health concerns from attacks on nuclear facilities?

Attacks on nuclear facilities carry the grave threat of significant impacts on health and the environment. In its June 13 statement following Israel’s launch of strikes on Iran, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) noted that “at present, the competent Iranian authorities have confirmed that the Natanz enrichment site has been impacted and that there are no elevated radiation levels.” On June 14, the IAEA said there was also no change in offsite radiation at the Esfahan site, where four buildings, including a uranium conversion facility and a fuel plate fabrication plant, had been hit in the attacks from Israel.

—Jennifer T. Gordon is the director of the Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative and the Daniel B. Poneman chair for nuclear energy policy at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

5. How has the IAEA responded, and are there restrictions around striking nuclear facilities under international law?

The IAEA has responded to Israel’s attacks on Iranian nuclear sites by reiterating its stance that “nuclear facilities must never be attacked regardless of the context or circumstances.” The IAEA’s General Conference has published resolutions noting that “any armed attack on and threat against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter, international law and the Statute of the Agency.” Whether Iran’s nuclear facilities were devoted solely to peaceful use is unclear, but regardless, attacks against any type of nuclear facility set a dangerous precedent and make it increasingly difficult to pull back from conflict.

—Jennifer T. Gordon

6. How aligned, or not, are Washington and Jerusalem?

Trump’s administration and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government are closely aligned on goals, but less aligned on means. They both share the goals of wanting to prevent the Islamic Republic from ever having a nuclear weapon. They share the goal of Hamas being permanently removed from power in Gaza, and for Hezbollah to have far less power in Lebanon than it does now.

On means, Trump wanted to avoid war—he wants to be a peace-through-strength president, and he has people talking in one ear about supporting Israel and the other about staying clear of Middle East wars. Netanyahu sees a narrow window to eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat and does not believe that the Iranian regime will ever agree to the kind of deal Trump wants. For Netanyahu, war now was the only option.

The other important dynamic is that both Trump and Netanyahu believe they have a unique destiny to lead their nations at this hour—but both leaders face a public that is deeply divided about the wisdom of their policy choices. Both are gamblers and will double down when they are convinced they are right. It is inconceivable, therefore, that Trump would ever pressure Netanyahu to end the war short of what it will take to assure Israel’s security.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow with the Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

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By Danny Citrinowicz

Negotiations between the United States and Iran have displayed a significant divide between Washington and it’s ally Israel.

Iran Israel

7. Has the conflict tanked the likelihood of achieving a US nuclear deal with Iran?

The nuclear negotiations between the United States and Iran seemed to have reached an impasse prior to the launch of Israeli strikes, with Washington insisting that Iran must give up enrichment and Tehran, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, insisting that Iran would never give this up. The breadth of Israeli military strikes against Iran, spanning key parts of its nuclear infrastructure, senior military officials and nuclear scientists, ballistic missile stockpiles, and more recently energy infrastructure, probably are read in Iran as aimed at regime change, and make it more likely that Tehran will consider a nuclear breakout rather than a compromise in negotiations. That said, Iran may believe it can exploit Trump’s public calls for an end to the fighting and a return to the negotiating table by hinting at concessions that would get the United States to press Israel to stand down, at least temporarily. So a nuclear deal seems remote—but an Iranian negotiating ploy to try to ensure regime survival could be in the cards.

—Alan Pino is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and a former US national intelligence officer for the Near East.

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Beyond the bomb: Ideology as the engine of Iran’s nuclear doctrine

By Marjan Keypour Greenblatt

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Iran Middle East

8. Has Washington’s force posture in the Middle East shifted since Friday, and what does this tell us about potential US involvement?

Since Thursday, the Pentagon has approved significant force posture changes for US Central Command (CENTCOM). These changes include a large deployment of KC-135/KC-46 aerial refueling tankers. Depending on the numbers of tankers involved, this could be one of the largest peacetime tanker movements in history. The USS Harry S. Truman carrier strike group’s deployment was extended in the Middle East. Also, the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group is moving to the CENTCOM region for overlapping carrier presence. European Command has the USS Thomas Hudner (DDG-116) now repositioned in the Eastern Mediterranean to contribute air defense support to Israel.

These publicly observable movements may not be the only force posture additions in the Middle East. What these changes portend is that the United States is giving itself flexible military options. This means that Washington can contribute to Israel’s operational tempo of attacks through air-to-air refueling. The United States can also increase its ability to respond through any ground-based US Air Force fighters as well as the aircraft from two carrier strike groups. Finally, this means the United States is increasing its defensive presence to contribute to the air defense of Israel.

—Daniel E. Mouton is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He served on the National Security Council from 2021 to 2023 as the director for defense and political-military policy for the Middle East and North Africa.

9. What does the response of Iran’s regional proxies tell us?

Iran’s regional proxies have been significantly weakened. Hamas has been decimated. Hezbollah has been badly degraded to the point where there have been public reports about its wariness of getting drawn into this conflict between Israel and Iran. Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria is gone. The Houthis retain a capability to strike Israel, but are not a strategic threat. The Iraqi Shiite militias also have resources. But the Islamic Republic’s proxy and partner network is a shell of its former self.

—Jason M. Brodsky

10. How could this impact Palestinians in Gaza?

The prevalent fear in Gaza is that an Israel-Iran war will distract from the already significantly dimmed light on the ongoing starvation and slaughter of civilians in the Palestinian enclave. There is also concern that war may lead to even more impunity and an escalation of Israeli bombardment in Gaza. Some people in Gaza that I’ve spoken with are terrified at the level of chaos the Iran strikes could bring—namely, the potential of this conflict spreading further across the region such that it will result in an even more prolonged war inside Gaza. However, some believe, or maybe hope, that this will help at least end this phase of the nightmare, although they don’t really know exactly what an “end” looks like.

—Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA).

Hamas undoubtedly imagines that an Israeli-Iranian war may strategically relieve some of the pressure on the Islamist group in the Gaza Strip, as the Israeli military reallocates intelligence and kinetic strike capabilities to the new theater.

Still, Israel will likely maintain a steady tempo of bombardment and ground operations against suspected Hamas targets in Gaza, as it has since the initiation of hostilities with Tehran. The new war is unlikely to prove beneficial to Hamas in any tactical or geostrategic way. In fact, in the medium term, Hamas’s regional posture will be further degraded by the weakening of its chief backer and supporter in Tehran.

Many Palestinians in Gaza have been subtly or even openly gloating about Iran’s woes, holding Tehran directly responsible for the destruction of their lives through Hamas and the network of anti-Israel terror organizations that served it. Though it may have limited tactical impact in the near term, the weakening or possible collapse of the Iranian regime will be a positive development for the prospects of Gaza’s rejuvenation and regeneration after the war, as well as peace between Palestinians and Israelis.

—Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib leads Realign For Palestine, an Atlantic Council project that challenges entrenched narratives in the Israel and Palestine discourse.

11. Could this war benefit or harm Russia, and how is Moscow navigating both sides?

Russia could potentially benefit from the Israel-Iran conflict, by US attention and support being redirected from Ukraine to Israel, and by the rise in oil prices which provide Moscow with greater resources to fund its war against Ukraine. If the Israel-Iran conflict ends quickly, though, these benefits may not last long. The recent phone call between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, in which both called for an end to the Israel-Iran conflict, also furthers Putin’s aim of increasing Russian cooperation with Washington despite the war in Ukraine continuing.

But, as some Russian commentators have noted, the Israel-Iran conflict also involves the risk of regime collapse in Iran. Like in Syria, this would mean the downfall of a longstanding government that had cooperated closely with Moscow, and Russia having to compete with others for influence with the new authorities emerging in Iran afterward, whatever they might be. With Russia preoccupied by its war against Ukraine, however, Putin would not be in a strong position to do this.

Thus, while the Israel-Iran conflict provides some benefits to Russia, it also poses serious risks for it as well. Putin’s calls to end the Israel-Iran conflict through diplomatic means, then, undoubtedly reflect what he really wants to see happen. Yet even if the conflict does end through (as Putin wants) joint Russian-American mediation efforts, it could result in Iran being more cooperative with the United States than it has been in the past.

—Mark N. Katz is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, and a professor emeritus of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government.

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The new “comprehensive partnership agreement” between Moscow and Tehran is the latest example of greater coordination among the “axis of aggressors.”

China Conflict

12. Could this war benefit or harm China, and how is Beijing navigating both sides?

China condemned Israel’s attack and has called on both sides to de-escalate. Nevertheless, Beijing almost certainly sees an opportunity to promote itself as a responsible actor, and even a potential mediator, in the crisis. A wider, regional conflict would raise China’s risk-to-benefit calculus as it would threaten its regional economic, namely energy, interests. As such, China would welcome Washington reining in Israel and resuming talks with Iran. China will also be quick to amplify US failings, real or not, if the situation deteriorates as part of its broader campaign to undermine the United States’ global position and influence.

—Gabriel “Gabo” Alvarado is a former nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. He currently works at Nisos.

13. What weapons have Israel and Iran deployed so far?

From June 13-16, Israel flew F-35I, F-15I, and F-16 aircraft to conduct hundreds of airstrikes using GBU-28 bunker busters, Rampage missiles, and precision munitions against Iranian nuclear facilities, military leadership, and critical infrastructure. Iran retaliated with hundreds of ballistic missiles from its arsenal. Iran‘s attacks include Fattah hypersonic missiles, Khorramshahr ballistic missiles, and other missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to target Israel in “Operation Severe Punishment.”

—Daniel E. Mouton

14. What are the nuclear counter-proliferation implications of the conflict?

The counter-proliferation implications of this conflict are noteworthy. The IAEA on June 12 declared Iran non-compliant with Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations for the first time in twenty years. Iran responded by announcing a third uranium enrichment site and threatening NPT withdrawal. While Israel may have destroyed Natanz’s above-ground enrichment plant, the crisis runs the risk of paradoxically accelerating proliferation risks. If this conflict does not fully eliminate the current and future threat of Iranian proliferation, Iran’s irreversible knowledge of the enrichment cycle means that it can simply rebuild and do so with a greater desire to succeed next time.

—Daniel E. Mouton

15. What Iranian oil and gas facilities has Israel targeted, and does this have an impact on the wider fallout?

Israel appears to have successfully hit two natural gas processing facilities in Phase Fourteen of the South Pars gas field, forcing Iran to suspend operations there. Iran’s natural gas production is consumed domestically due to significant sanctions on exporting natural gas. Israeli strikes also hit a major fuel depot and an oil refinery near Tehran. These are significant hits because Iran’s energy situation was already precarious, with parts of the country experiencing planned blackouts due to electricity shortages. Without consistent access to fuel, Iranians living in Tehran cannot evacuate. If Israel takes out additional domestic energy sites around Iran, the potential for the country to simply fall apart is very high. Without fuel, food cannot be transported to cities. Without electricity and running water, illness will proliferate and people will die.

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At the same time, Israel has not gone after oil production facilities or Kharg Island, where 90 percent of Iran’s crude oil and condensate exports are loaded onto tankers. This leaves Iran’s role in the global oil market relatively unchanged, keeping China satisfied and oil prices under control. If Israel does attack Iran’s oil production or export sites, the entire paradigm will change. As senior official Javad Larijani recently said, if Iran’s oil facilities are severely damaged, Tehran won’t let any country in the region use its own oil.

—Ellen R. Wald is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center and the president of Transversal Consulting.

16. What is the Strait of Hormuz, and why does it matter if Tehran closes it?

Most oil market watchers think this conflict is a direct threat to the Strait of Hormuz, a very narrow waterway that leads out of the Persian Gulf. Oil tankers loading oil from Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, parts of the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Iran must pass through this chokepoint to exit the Gulf. Approximately 20 percent of the world’s seaborne crude oil exports travel through the Strait of Hormuz. It is very narrow, rocky, and only deep enough for oil tankers to navigate in certain places. The current traffic patterns for the Strait have ships traveling through Iranian waters to enter and exit the Gulf.

Iran may be able to block ships using ships and missiles launched from the shore, though this would only be temporary as the traffic pattern can be rerouted around Iranian waters. It would take some time, and there would be a period of dislocation during which oil prices would spike, but it could be done. However, Iran will only directly threaten the security of ships in the Persian Gulf if it has nothing to lose. Since Iran continues to export oil and condensate, and needs to continue to do so to fund its operations, it is extremely unlikely that it will take action to hamper or halt any ship traffic into or out of the Persian Gulf.

—Ellen R. Wald

17. What dynamics is the Iranian regime grappling with domestically, and how will this impact the conflict?

At this stage, the Iranian regime appears to be maintaining its unity, resolve, and stability, and is closing ranks in the face of an external threat. The anger of the Iranian public, whose hostility toward the regime is well known, has grown due to the authorities’ failure to provide security and protect their people. Nevertheless, it seems that at this moment, the public’s attitude is influenced largely by images of civilians injured and damage to residential neighborhoods in Tehran from Israeli Air Force attacks. This could contribute (at least for now) to a strengthening of national solidarity and a rally-around-the-flag effect. Nevertheless, the continued Israeli military efforts may, over time, weaken the regime’s security, intelligence, and governmental structures, as well as its ability to deal with internal challenges, which could, in the future, pave the way for undermining its stability.

—Raz Zimmt

18. How is the Iranian public responding?

With the caveat that my sources are limited, I’m seeing a range of responses from the Iranian people. Regime supporters, who are now a small minority, are predictably outraged at Israel and support the Islamic Republic’s retaliatory strikes. Most Iranians at this point oppose their regime, and there’s little love lost for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) leaders whom Israel killed. However, many Iranians are expressing sorrow for the innocent civilians killed in the Israeli strikes, particularly those who died when Israel struck residential apartment buildings in Tehran. For Iranians who lived through the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the strikes have also stirred up traumatic memories of bombs raining down on Tehran during that war.

A woman carries her child following the Israeli strikes on Iran, in Tehran, Iran, June 15, 2025. Amir Kholousi/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS ATTENTION EDITORS – THIS PICTURE WAS PROVIDED BY A THIRD PARTY TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY

It’s important to note that a lot of Iranians, including those who oppose their government, have complicated feelings about the country’s nuclear program. Many feel that Iran has a right like any other country to have a nuclear program for energy purposes. Yet the idea of developing a nuclear weapon is controversial, with many opposing nuclear weapons for a variety of reasons. The Iranian people also overwhelmingly do not want war. The majority at this point want to see the end of the Islamic Republic and its replacement with a democratic system grounded in human rights and peace.

Mostly, I’ve seen the Iranian people express a lot of anger at their own government for the current situation. They’ve pointed out how there was no warning from the government, no air raid sirens or any other alert, before the Israeli strikes hit. Instead, the strikes hit residential buildings in the early hours of the morning as the people inside slept, oblivious to the danger headed toward them. The public is angry, but not surprised, that the Islamic Republic did not protect its own people. They’ve suffered a lot already, and they are fearful, worried, and angry that many more innocent Iranians are likely to suffer in the conflict to come, especially if things escalate into all-out war.

—Kelly J. Shannon is a historian and visiting scholar at the Institute for Middle East Studies at George Washington University. She is also a member of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project Working Group.

19. How is the Israeli public responding?

Most of the Israeli public supports the government’s action and sees the launch of strikes as necessary considering the claims that Iran is dangerously close to a nuclear bomb. Meanwhile the public is giving credit to the government in the campaign, despite the severe casualties on the Israeli home front.

—Danny Citrinowicz

20. Where do we go from here?

Israel’s broad-based assault on Iran’s nuclear and governmental infrastructure and Tehran’s massive missile barrages against Israeli civilians have raised the stakes sky-high for both countries, making it hard to engineer a cease-fire. Israeli officials continue to say that they have many more targets to strike, as they broaden their campaign beyond nuclear installations, top military officials, ballistic missile launch pads, and stockpiles to Iran’s energy infrastructure and government buildings in Tehran.

When asked by an interviewer if Israel is seeking regime change in Iran, Netanyahu said that regime change could be the result of Israel’s actions because “the Iran regime is very weak.” Israel, at a minimum, wants to do enough damage to Iran’s nuclear program that Tehran cannot reconstitute it for the foreseeable future or race to get a nuclear weapon.

Iranian leaders seem to calculate they must continue to show they can inflict punishment on Israel or risk further losing credibility in the eyes of Iranians and perhaps face significant unrest from their population, many of whom have turned against the ruling clerics.

Trump may be the wild card here depending on whether he wants to let the two sides “fight it out,” or if he decides to press Israel to wind down its attacks and Iran to return to nuclear negotiations. Given that a nuclear deal in which Iran gives up enrichment is unlikely, even if a temporary halt to the fighting is achieved, Israel will keep Iran in its crosshairs and conflict between the two countries will dominate Trump’s Middle East agenda for the forseeable future.

—Alan Pino

The post Twenty questions (and expert answers) on the Israel-Iran war appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How the US can reduce the risk of wider war in the Middle East

Caroline Zier — Mon, 16 Jun 2025 19:45:01 +0000

Israel has again demonstrated an uncanny ability to rewrite the regional playbook with a multi-pronged, multi-day attack on Iran’s nuclear program, air defenses, and military leadership. The first phase of attacks in particular—strikes at the heart of Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, the decapitation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Quds Force leadership, and nuclear scientists—caused many to marvel at the boldness of David against Goliath.

As the Trump administration navigates this chapter, the key will be to contain and defuse the situation as the regional players sort through the changed landscape. De-escalation in the near term is not a foregone conclusion. It will require heavy lifting from the US military, which remains indispensable in times of crisis.

Details of the battle damage are still emerging, and Israel, Iran, and the United States do not yet fully know what these attacks mean for Iran’s defensive and counter-strike capabilities. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s objectives may not be static: As he sees additional opportunities to set back Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, his campaign may expand and go on far longer, as was the case in the operations against Hamas and Hezbollah. Iran may be on its back foot, but it will likely be compelled to respond with its remaining capabilities, as it began to do over the weekend with its waves of missile strikes across Israel.

Usually, the United States has greater leverage and sway with its allies and partners than its adversaries, born from the military, economic, and diplomatic threads that each ally can pull to compel the other toward an outcome. In this friendly tug-of-war over national interests, the heavyweight United States pulls toward its preferred outcomes. However, in the unique case of Israel, the smaller partner may outpace US efforts to de-escalate if additional deliberate steps are not taken.

Washington does have some leverage over a weakened Tehran. Iran does not want an all-out war with the United States. For this reason, Iran has historically relied on its proxy network of Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and Shia militia groups for indirect and small-scale attacks on US forces and interests. This helps explain why Israel wants to link arms with the United States now, signaling to Iran that an attack on Israel is an attack on the United States. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Iranian officials have played along, stating that the United States is complicit. That may be directed toward Iranian domestic audiences—and a warning for the United States to rein in Israel.

Regardless of Iranian intent, the situation requires the US military to be in position to defend and respond to Iranian aggression. How then should the White House manage this spiral of escalation to avoid a wider regional war? Five initial steps are needed.

1. Set the theater to defend US forces and Israel

The United States should continue to set the theater for Iranian responses—and it should telegraph how it is doing so. Ballistic missile defense-capable destroyers in the Eastern Mediterranean, more interceptors for air defense systems across the region, and additional air power in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean island Diego Garcia will position the US military for defending US forces and Israel, as well as providing options to strike Iran if necessary. Forces that have been deployed for extended periods should be backfilled with ready forces, and additional units can be placed on prepare-to-deploy orders. The force movements and heightened alert status, combined with clear messaging, can communicate to Iran that the price of attacking the United States is extraordinarily high, particularly given Iran’s significantly degraded proxy network and air defenses. Internally, there should be a conditions-based approach to redeploying the forces once the situation settles down.

The United States must also continue to help defend Israel itself, which is the clearest path to stabilizing the region. Surging additional US capabilities into the theater may embolden Israel to launch additional strikes on Iran, but the greater risk is not being in position to defend against attacks on US forces and blunt Iran’s subsequent attacks on Israel.

2. Move from authorized departures to ordered departures

The White House should accelerate what it put in motion through voluntary departures from State Department facilities last week by moving to ordered departures at those same locations. Temporarily reducing the number of nonemergency personnel and dependents can reduce the demands on US forces to defend and evacuate those locations later. It also signals to the region that the price of escalation is a diminished US presence, which many US partners do not want, and it provides an incentive for these partners to work toward de-escalation.

3. Refresh the plans for noncombatant evacuations (NEOs) from Israel and Jordan

The NEO plans have been refreshed repeatedly since October 7, 2023, though the in-extremis conditions that would precipitate large-scale evacuations have never been met. These worst-case scenario plans should be dusted off again, and US government officials should discuss internally what the trip wires would be to execute the NEOs, such as commercial airports losing functionality. The United States should also discuss NEO plans with allies and partners, who often expect assistance with their evacuations but too often do not communicate their assumptions about US assistance until late in the game.

4. Prepare to strike Iran if Iran attacks the United States

The United States will need to strike forcefully if Iran does attack US forces or bases. To that end, the US military should refresh and expand response options that would exploit Iran’s newest vulnerabilities, such as military sites that are now without adequate air defenses or exposed headquarters that serve as nerve centers for IRGC operations. The Trump administration can choose how and when it responds, and some of the steps taken to set the theater for defense will help facilitate going on the offensive.

5. Pace the crises across time and space

Any administration can only juggle a handful of crises at any given time. The Trump administration should consider which departments have comparative advantages in navigating which crises, given the finite bandwidth of senior leaders and high-demand US forces. The US military is uniquely and singularly manned, trained, and equipped to reduce the chance of a larger regional war that could have devastating human and economic costs for the United States—and the entire region. The White House should therefore prioritize de-escalating quickly in order to focus on other theaters and priorities.

With steady, cool-headed leadership at this heated moment, the United States can reduce the possibility of a wider regional war that could spin out of control.

Caroline Zier is a nonresident senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She has over fifteen years of experience in national security and defense at the Department of Defense, most recently serving as the deputy chief of staff to former Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin.

The post How the US can reduce the risk of wider war in the Middle East appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig quoted in Time on Israel’s strikes on Iran

ssherry — Mon, 16 Jun 2025 15:14:31 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

On June 13, Matthew Kroenig, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director, was quoted in Time on the motivations behind the airstrikes Israel directed at Iranian nuclear sites, as well as its military leaders and scientists.

This really was done as a last resort. They were out of time. The best estimates were that Iran’s dash time to one bomb’s worth of weapons grade material was down to about a week.

Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig quoted in Time on Israel’s strikes on Iran appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kroenig quoted in the Wall Street Journal on Trump’s potential framing of Israel’s strikes on Iran

ssherry — Sat, 14 Jun 2025 20:15:00 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

On June 13, Matthew Kroenig, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director, was quoted in the Wall Street Journal on how President Trump may choose to present Israel’s strikes on Iranian military and nuclear installations, as well as its military leadership, in light of his “peacemaker” pledge.

I think he can go to the traditional Reaganites and say, “Peace through strength, we’re not letting evil regimes build nuclear weapons”…But he can also go to the MAGA folks and say, “No Americans were killed, we didn’t do this, and allies are stepping up and taking care of security threats for us.”

Matthew Kroenig

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig quoted in the Wall Street Journal on Trump’s potential framing of Israel’s strikes on Iran appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Assessing the fallout from Israel’s extraordinary attack on Iran

Atlantic Council — Fri, 13 Jun 2025 17:43:10 +0000

GET UP TO SPEED

The Natanz nuclear site severely damaged. Dozens of Iranian military leaders and nuclear scientists killed. A region on a knife’s edge. Israel’s extraordinary military operation against Iran early Friday in the Middle East marks another major turning point for a region that has been experiencing dizzying upheaval since Hamas’s attack against Israel on October 7, 2023. As Iran responded with a wave of drones and Israel continued to hit military and nuclear sites on Friday, we turned to our experts to assess the fallout.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION BROUGHT TO YOU BY

Daniel B. Shapiro (@DanielBShapiro): Distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and former US ambassador to Israel
Kirsten Fontenrose: Nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and former senior director for the Gulf at the US National Security Council
Shalom Lipner (@shalomlipner): Jerusalem-based nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and former advisor to seven Israeli prime ministers
William Wechsler (@WillWechsler): Senior director of the Council’s Middle East Programs and former US deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and combatting terrorism

Attack mode

With these strikes, “Israel demonstrated its full penetration of Iran, and ability to wreak havoc across the Iranian system,” Dan tells us. “Iran has never looked weaker, and its ability to respond meaningfully will be tested.”
Recent reassurances by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to political leaders that the country’s “air defenses could withstand an Israeli strike” may have led Iran to conclude that it could slow-walk nuclear negotiations beyond US President Donald Trump’s two-month deadline, Kirsten notes. That, in turn, may have led Israel to conclude that it was time to strike. “The generals behind those white lies were the first targets” of Israel’s operation, she points out.
Filing from Jerusalem, Shalom says Israeli leaders appear to have authorized the operation after concluding that Iran “was on the threshold of a dangerous breakthrough in its efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability.”
Israel “took advantage of a rapidly shrinking window for military action, before relevant Iranian infrastructure became too advanced or well-protected,” Shalom adds. The widespread assumption that Israel wouldn’t make any military moves until after this weekend’s scheduled US-Iranian talks in Oman also “narrowed the opportunity for any element of surprise.”

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Tehran’s next moves

In the hours after Israel’s attack, Iran fired more than one hundred drones toward Israel, though the Israel Defense Forces said it was able to intercept many of them. That won’t be the last word. “Iran’s reaction likely will include both direct attacks on Israel and retaliation via its remaining proxy groups,” Will predicts, though “the obedience of some of those proxies is in question,” particularly amid reports that Hezbollah will not jump into the fight.
While the first round of Israeli strikes appears to have caused significant damage to the Natanz nuclear facility, that’s not the only place where Iran was enriching uranium. “Iran will now be supremely motivated to sprint to a nuclear breakout at hardened, underground facilities,” Dan warns.
Kirsten is keeping a close eye on the region’s Arab states, which have been subject to “tug-of-war diplomacy” between the United States, which would like them to once again help defend against Iranian retaliation, and Iran, which would prefer they look the other way.
Shooting down Iranian projectiles that cross their airspace “is such a no-brainer that the United States would likely conclude that any munitions not reported or mitigated by Arab states were intentionally ignored,” Kirsten says. “Neither the United States nor its Arab partners want that kind of tension to arise.”

Wartime Washington

On Thursday night in Washington, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued a statement making clear that Israel was acting unilaterally and the United States was “not involved.” By Friday morning, however, Trump was telling ABC News that Israel’s strike was “excellent” and warning Iran that there is “more to come.”
The United States could be pulled into the war via attacks by Iran or its proxy forces on US personnel in the region, Will tells us. Alternatively, if Israel’s attacks against Iranian nuclear facilities prove ineffective and instead “provide Tehran with an excuse to race toward developing nuclear weapons, then US officials may conclude that their only option is to use military force to prevent this worst-case scenario.”
Such a decision could “split [Trump’s] advisers and political base, amid accusations, and perhaps his own misgivings” that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “is attempting to drag him into war,” Dan observes. In any case, “Trump’s dream of a diplomatic resolution that ends Iranian [nuclear] enrichment appears dead.”
Given “his strong objection to the US becoming involved in another war in the Middle East,” it would be “deeply ironic” for Trump to be drawn into another presidency-defining conflict, Will says. “At times like these, there is no substitute for Washington exercising decisive leadership, rather than waiting to be at the mercy of decisions made by others.”

The post Assessing the fallout from Israel’s extraordinary attack on Iran appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Experts react: Israel just attacked Iran’s military and nuclear sites. What’s next?

Atlantic Council experts — Fri, 13 Jun 2025 03:07:04 +0000

It’s just the beginning. Early on Friday morning in the Middle East, Israeli jets carried out dozens of strikes against nuclear and military sites in Iran. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called it “a targeted military operation to roll back the Iranian threat to Israel’s very survival,” adding that the operation would continue “for as many days at it takes to remove this threat.” Israel’s closest ally was quick to distance itself from the strike, with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio saying that the United States was “not involved.” As reports of the damage rolled in, the commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Hossein Salami, was listed among those killed in the strikes, according to Iranian state media.

Israel’s operation came as US-Iranian negotiations on Iran’s advancing nuclear program seemed to have reached an impasse and just after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concluded that Tehran was in breach of its nuclear nonproliferation obligations. So how might Iranian forces respond? What will this mean for Israel, Iran’s nuclear program, the US-Israel relationship, and a region already experiencing great upheaval? Below, Atlantic Council experts shed light on what happened and what to expect next.

This article will be updated as additional expert contributions come in.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Jonathan Panikoff: Four questions that could shape the Middle East’s future

Daniel B. Shapiro: Iran has never looked weaker

Shalom Lipner: Iran will seek to exact a heavy toll on both Israel and the United States

Landon Derentz: Sometimes you keep oil prices low for a reason

Matt Kroenig: An inevitability that will quickly de-escalate

Richard LeBaron: The US is getting dragged into a war it doesn’t want

Diana Rayes: Civilians are likely to be hit hardest in a prolonged regional conflict

R. Clarke Cooper: Iran apparently was given two choices

Daniel E. Mouton: This move will likely exacerbate Israel-US tensions

Kirsten Fontenrose: Will Arab states help defend against Iranian retaliation, or look the other way?

Mark N. Katz: Russia is not coming to Iran’s rescue

Perrihan Al-Riffai: This conflict threatens an already fragile global economy

Ellen Wald: Oil prices spike despite minimal material risk

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: How will strikes impact Israel’s war in Gaza?

Ariel Ezrahi: Netanyahu lacks the trust of his people to carry out this war

Nicholas Blanford: Hezbollah is likely to express restraint

Sarah Zaaimi: Jerusalem prepares for the long haul

Thomas Warrick: It’s not too soon to think about the postwar plan

Rachel Whitlark: Israel likely achieved its goal of setting back Iran’s nuclear program

Emily Milliken: Israel’s strike could unravel the US cease-fire with the Houthis

Joze Pelayo: Trump should work with Gulf countries on a diplomatic response

Yaseen Rashed: Israel is taking a major risk with its Begin Doctrine

Four questions that could shape the Middle East’s future

The questions after Israel’s sweeping strikes against Iran’s military and nuclear sites outnumber the answers. In particular, there are four key questions whose answers will help determine the trajectory of the Middle East and perhaps beyond—not only over the coming weeks, but potentially for the coming years:

1. What is the scale of Israeli military operations in Iran?

Israel’s focus now is on Iran’s nuclear facilities, as well as undermining Iran’s command and control and military leadership, with the goal of trying to mitigate the intensity of Israel’s response (which started last night with Tehran launching one hundred drones). The Israelis are going to continue strikes for at least the coming days. The expectation is that they will go after key Iranian nuclear infrastructure to delay Iran’s timeline to a nuclear bomb, even if Israel on its own cannot fully eliminate Iran’s pathway to one.

But is the scale of the attacks to come so large and diverse that Israel’s end goal is not only crippling Iran’s nuclear program but fomenting regime change? The targets Israel chooses will help determine the answer to that question, but a warning is also warranted. For years, many in Israel have insisted that regime change in Iran would prompt a new and better day—that nothing could be worse than the current theocratic regime. Iran is indeed led by a terrible autocracy that has undermined the growth of the country and tremendously hurt its own people. But history tells us it can always be worse. What is likely to follow a theocratic Iranian government is not democracy but Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–istan. Such a government is likely, at least initially, to be much more hardline than the current one. In such a case, Israel might find itself in a perpetual, ongoing, and far more intense war that is no longer in the shadows, as it has been for years.

Continue reading here:

New Atlanticist

Jun 13, 2025

After Israel’s strikes on Iran, these four questions could determine the Middle East’s future

By Jonathan Panikoff

The trajectory of the Middle East could be determined by how just a few critical questions are answered the coming days and weeks.

Iran Israel

—Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council.

Iran has never looked weaker

Israel’s stunning, multifaceted strike against Iranian nuclear, ballistic missile, and regime leadership targets has thrown much into chaos: Iran’s ability to project power, Trump’s nuclear diplomacy, and US-Israel regional coordination.

Israel’s strikes lay bare the depth of Iran’s miscalculation following Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack against Israel. Tehran’s Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah, and its key regional ally, the Assad regime in Syria, lie in ruins. Iran’s own state-to-state attacks against Israel in April and October 2024 produced little damage, while Iran suffered significantly from Israel’s October response.

Now, with that taboo also in the dustbin of history, Israel demonstrated its full penetration of Iran, and ability to wreak havoc across the Iranian system. Iran has never looked weaker, and its ability to respond meaningfully will be tested.

But the story does not end here. Israel pledges additional attacks, but Iran will now be supremely motivated to sprint to a nuclear breakout at hardened, underground facilities. The United States will surely assist Israel with defense against any Iranian retaliation. But Trump’s dream of a diplomatic resolution that ends Iranian enrichment appears dead. More likely, the US president will be faced with a decision on whether to use the United States’ unique capabilities to destroy Tehran’s underground nuclear facilities and prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon. The decision will split his advisers and political base, amid accusations, and perhaps his own misgivings, that Netanyahu is attempting to drag him into war.

The repercussions on trust and coordination in the US-Israel relationship could be long lasting, with implications for future rounds of conflict with Iran, negotiations on the next US-Israel military assistance agreement, and the wind-down to the war in Gaza. An ‘America first’ president, and an ‘Israel first’ prime minister, who have each made fateful decisions with minimal consultation or taking each other’s interests into account, will coexist uneasily for as many more months and years as they both serve.

—Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He served as US ambassador to Israel from 2011 to 2017, and most recently as deputy assistant secretary of defense for Middle East policy. He also previously served as the director of the Atlantic Council’s N7 Initiative.

Iran will seek to exact a heavy toll on both Israel and the United States

JERUSALEM—Years of speculation over the possibility of an Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities ended at approximately 3:30 a.m. (Israel time) on Friday when first reports of explosions in Tehran began to circulate.

The timing of the Israeli operation—which was authorized after Israel’s leadership concluded that the Islamic Republic was on the threshold of a dangerous breakthrough in its efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability—took advantage of a rapidly shrinking window for military action, before relevant Iranian infrastructure became too advanced or well-protected. Trump’s declaration on Thursday that “I don’t want to say [an attack] is imminent,” together with expectations that Israel would stand down until (at least) after this weekend’s planned US-Iran talks in Oman, narrowed the opportunity for any element of surprise.

Israel’s initial targets have covered a wide spectrum, including, reportedly, multiple nuclear and other installations, as well as senior IRGC commanders and nuclear scientists. Israel’s intent is not only to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program, but also to undermine its potential to inflict retaliatory harm on Israel and defend against subsequent waves of Israel’s offensive.

The degree of Israeli coordination with the Trump administration will be pivotal to how this crisis unfolds. Rubio’s cryptic statement that “Israel advised us that they believe this action was necessary for its self-defense” does not clarify the extent of US (dis)agreement with that determination, or exactly what prior warning Israel may have supplied to the White House. Notwithstanding, and despite Rubio’s clarification that “we are not involved in strikes against Iran,” Iranian threats to exact a heavy price from both Israel and the United States will thrust the latter into the eye of the storm. Forthcoming decisions by the White House on the contours of US engagement will have a direct impact on Israel’s ability to persist with this campaign.

—Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative who previously worked in foreign policy and public diplomacy during his time at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem, where he served in the administration of seven consecutive Israeli premiers.

Sometimes you keep oil prices low for a reason

The Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure may be reverberating across global energy markets, but the tremors are far more restrained than the stakes might have suggested. Brent crude rose more than 10 percent, yet the per-barrel price remains below eighty dollars, well short of crisis levels. The moment underscores how strategic foresight in energy policy can shape the contours of geopolitical risk in the world’s most volatile corridors.

While headlines are focused on missiles and centrifuges, a quieter story lies in the market conditions that made such a strike politically viable. Israel’s actions benefited from the political leeway made possible by Trump’s efforts to “bring down the cost of oil.” It’s not to say the strike wouldn’t have happened otherwise, but—as shown during Trump’s first term—when energy markets can shield consumers from the worst effects of a supply disruption, policymakers have far greater latitude to escalate.

In 2018, Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal and impose “maximum pressure” was rooted in a belief that oil markets could absorb the shock. Internal White House analysis forecasted only modest price increases, with US production gains and global spare capacity acting as a buffer. Crucially, while the Strait of Hormuz has long symbolized energy risk, it was—and remains—unlikely to be closed. Iran needs the revenue. This gave the Trump administration confidence to confront Iran without fear of major energy disruption.

Israel’s strike today reinforces that view, operating in an energy environment shaped by the same strategic logic. Oil doesn’t need to stay cheap forever—just long enough to change the geopolitical equation. Trump’s push to keep prices low may have done more than remake global energy flows—it may have helped lay the groundwork for a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

—Landon Derentz is senior director and Morningstar Chair for Global Energy Security at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center. He previously served as director for energy at the White House National Security Council and director for Middle Eastern and African affairs at the US Department of Energy.

An inevitability that will quickly de-escalate

As I wrote more than a decade ago, this was inevitable.

There were only three possible outcomes in the decades-long battle over Tehran’s nuclear aspirations: allow Iran to go nuclear, negotiate a permanent deal, or military action. A nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable. A permanent deal is highly unlikely—as former US President Barack Obama’s 2015 nuclear deal proved. So, military action is the only viable option left.

There are three key facilities for Iran’s nuclear opponents to destroy: Isfahan, Natanz, and Fordow. A US strike would have been more effective as it could have meaningfully degraded all of Iran’s key nuclear facilities, while Israel can destroy the above-ground facilities. The underground facilities are difficult, but don’t count Israel out. No one would have predicted it could take out Hezbollah with walkie talkies last year. Did Israel conduct commando raids or other creative attacks on the underground facilities? If so, this will meaningfully set back Iran’s nuclear program.

As for the question of likely retaliation—Iran has few good options. Its Hamas and Hezbollah proxies are degraded, and Israel’s Iron Dome can demonstrably defend against missile and drone attacks. Iran is also afraid of a wider war, though those fears are misguided. This will de-escalate quickly, like Trump’s strike on Qassem Soleimani during his first term. The key questions are: What will happen in the coming weeks and months? Does Iran rebuild? Does Israel mow the grass? Or does Iran decide that it is not worth it to spend decades, and billions of dollars, and only have a pile of rubble to show for it?

—Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Council’s director of studies.

The US is getting dragged into a war it doesn’t want

Israel’s attack on Iranian nuclear and military facilities was in direct defiance of Trump’s call for caution and negotiation. The United States has been seeking a negotiated solution—one that was not supported by Netanyahu’s government.

The question now is not whether, but how, the United States will be dragged into a war it doesn’t want, and that Gulf states fear. Iranian retaliation directly against Israel will not translate into non-involvement from Washington, as Israel will then be drawn into a spiral of retaliation and counter-retaliation—requiring US military supplies, intelligence support, and diplomatic cover.

So far, there is no evidence that Gulf states looked the other way as Israel used their airspace for the attacks, and this won’t be very difficult to confirm or deny.

Then the question becomes how to protect US troops in the region and how to come to the aid of Guif friends. Given the Trump administration’s close ties to the Gulf, as well as Trump’s personal admiration for certain Gulf leaders, the region will expect the US administration to provide any help they request.

—Richard LeBaron is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is a former US ambassador to Kuwait and a former deputy chief of mission at the US embassy in Israel.

Civilians are likely to be hit hardest in a prolonged regional conflict

Just as corners of the Middle East were experiencing some semblance of stability, such as in parts of Syria and Lebanon, this latest escalation has the potential to reverse the region’s recent fragile gains. Beyond the immediate political and military consequences, the most profound impacts will be felt by civilians, particularly those already in humanitarian crises.

A prolonged disruption in regional commerce and air travel, alongside rising fuel and food prices, will hit displaced populations, host communities, and those living under the poverty line the hardest. In Syria, where around 90 percent of the population lives in poverty, any shock to commodity prices or aid delivery will be devastating. In Lebanon and Jordan, already overstretched in hosting among the world’s highest refugee populations, the economic fallout may further strain public services and deepen social tensions.

Meanwhile, the risk of environmental damage or public health crises from military action, including oil spills, water contamination, or infrastructure damage, could pose grave risks to civilians in both the Gulf and Iran. These are not theoretical concerns—they are real threats to food security, access to care, and basic human dignity for millions.

The United States has a responsibility to act in ways that reduce harm, avoid a full-scale regional war, and protect civilian lives. That means using its leverage not to escalate but to contain the conflict, pressing all parties, including allies, to prioritize diplomacy over devastation. Failure to do so will not only ignite another war in the region, but it will also exacerbate existing circumstances for fragile communities across the region.

—Diana Rayes is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Iran apparently was given two choices

The Israeli preemptive strike is likely to disrupt Iran’s immediate capacity to develop a nuclear weapons program. However, it remains uncertain whether such an action will effectively deter the Iranian regime’s nuclear ambitions.

The Iranian regime appears to have been given two choices: abandon its nuclear aspirations or face a lack of intervention from the Trump administration if Israel decided to strike Iranian nuclear facilities.

Israel may have advocated for an earlier attack window, while the United States likely attempted to apply diplomatic measures. When diplomacy failed, the United States understandably announced an ordered departure for US embassy staff in Baghdad, while other US diplomatic posts in the region were placed on stand-by for ordered departure.

Regardless of when the Trump administration became aware that the Israeli strike was imminent, questions remain: Will this unilateral action by Israel sufficiently deter Iran’s nuclear ambitions? How might the regime in Tehran respond? And how will the United States and the Gulf states seek to contain further conflict in the region?

What is immediately clear is that economic and security conditions in the Middle East have become more volatile. 

—R. Clarke Cooper is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and is the founder and president of Guard Hill House, LLC. He previously served as assistant secretary for political-military affairs at the US Department of State.

This move will likely exacerbate Israel-US tensions

The start of what is likely to be a multi-day series of Israeli strikes across Iran is an unprecedented exchange in a long history of attacks between the regional rivals. Most importantly, Israel is going alone against Iran. In previous instances, the United States and Israel maintained regular communication and a coordinated defense posture. This coordination was spectacularly successful in the defense of Israel—including in both April and October 2024, which saw unbelievably low casualties and damage in light of the hundreds of missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles fired against Israel.

This time is different. Trump’s pursuit of Iran nuclear negotiations has created skepticism in Israel. The unilateral nature of US negotiations and the removal of the Trump administration’s pro-Israel proponents, such as former National Security Advisor Mike Waltz and former Deputy Special Presidential Envoy Morgan Ortagus, could have only escalated this tension with Israel. These moves came alongside Trump’s avoidance of an Israel stop during his recent visit to the Middle East, as well as Netanyahu’s Oval Office visit in April, where he left empty handed on both tariff relief and Iran.

The beginning of unilateral Israeli strikes is a sign that the country feels that it must take action to ensure its own security. Regardless of what led Israel to take this step, it is likely to further exacerbate any preexisting tensions between Israel and the United States.

Finally, Iran will now feel obligated to respond. Depending on the degree of damage that Israel has inflicted, Iran may respond in a way that broadens the conflict and creates collateral damage elsewhere in the region. How this will end is an unknown, but as has been the case in the past, a speedier ending is likely to depend on the United States.

—Daniel E. Mouton is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He served on the National Security Council from 2021 to 2023 as the director for defense and political-military policy for the Middle East and North Africa for Coordinator Brett McGurk.

Will Arab states help defend against Iranian retaliation, or look the other way?

Among the many lessons to be drawn from this operation is one about the importance of speaking truth to power. The IRGC makes a practice of minimizing its vulnerabilities in reports to senior leadership. Leaked IRGC documents from the past several years revealed overstatements of capability and omissions of setbacks, perhaps intended to deflect questions about the bang for the buck in their budget. Recently the IRGC was reassuring political leadership that its air defenses could withstand an Israeli strike. This may have contributed to Tehran’s decision to refrain from making a deal with the United States before Trump’s two-month timeline elapsed. This resulted in Israel’s assessment that diplomacy has failed and strikes were necessary. The generals behind those white lies were the first targets.

But now comes the expected retaliation. And the big question is: Will the states in the Middle East participate in Israel’s defense as before? As nuclear talks went nowhere, both Iran and the United States wanted to know, leading to tug-of-war diplomacy in the Arab world.

The United States wants Arab states to turn on missile and drone detection and mitigation systems and look out for munitions launched from Iran toward Israel, while Iran wants Arab states to consider looking the other way if it stages retaliatory strikes that cross Arab airspace. Arab states have a logical reason to rebuff Iran’s request. Munitions flown into a country’s airspace without coordination with its capital are violations of sovereignty and a threat to its people and infrastructure. Taking them down is such a no-brainer that the United States would likely conclude that any munitions not reported or mitigated by Arab states were intentionally ignored. Neither the United States nor its Arab partners want that kind of tension to arise.

—Kirsten Fontenrose is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She was previously the senior director for the Gulf at the National Security Council.

Russia is not coming to Iran’s rescue

Just as on previous occasions when Israeli forces attacked Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran itself, Moscow does not seem willing to defend its ally in Tehran. The Russian statement issued Friday was critical of Israel but gave no indication that Russia will take concrete actions against it or in support of Iran. Instead, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs called for all parties to exercise restraint and prevent further escalation. Most remarkably, the last sentence of the statement noted that “we would like to remind you of the US’s readiness to hold another round of negotiations with Iran on the Iranian nuclear program in Oman.” In other words, Moscow itself seems to be calling on the Trump administration to resolve the situation instead of promoting Russia for the lead role in this.

Moscow’s less than fulsome support (so far) for Iran must be causing renewed doubts in Tehran about what Iran is getting from Moscow in return for Iranian support to its war against Ukraine. On the other hand, there is nobody else Iran can turn to who would give it greater support in responding to Israel. Despite Iran’s threats about targeting American forces in the Gulf region, working with the Trump administration may be Iran’s best hope for restraining Israel. The Russian Foreign Ministry itself seems to be suggesting this.

—Mark N. Katz is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and professor emeritus of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government.

This conflict threatens an already fragile global economy

Israel’s attack on Iran’s nuclear and military sites—resulting in the death of senior IRGC commanders—sparked immediate volatility in global energy markets. Brent crude jumped up as much as 14 percent intraday, briefly peaking at $78.50 before settling around $75, marking the sharpest spike since early 2022. While previous shocks during the Israel-Gaza war faded due to resilient oil infrastructure and global oversupply, this escalation is different: an oil exporter is now under direct attack.

Markets are pricing in a heightened geopolitical risk premium, especially amid Iran’s threat to disrupt oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz, which carries nearly 20 percent of global crude. If Iran’s oil infrastructure is damaged or tanker routes are disrupted, Brent could surge to $120–$130 per barrel. Though OPEC+ could ease some pressure, market uncertainty remains high.

At the same time, US tariff policies are weighing on global demand. The International Monetary Fund forecasts a 0.5 percent drop in global growth in 2025 due to ongoing trade tensions. This could counteract some of the supply-driven price spikes. However, if the United States joins the conflict—especially if nuclear talks collapse—the risk of sustained stagflation rises, threatening an already fragile global economy.

—Perrihan Al-Riffai is a nonresident senior fellow with the empowerME Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East.

Oil prices spike despite minimal material risk

As Israeli jets attacked targets across Iran early Friday morning in the Middle East, oil futures started rising. Oil benchmarks initially rose 6 percent, then 9 percent and up to 11 percent as the scope of the attacks widened. Oil prices generally spike in response to any conflict in the Middle East, even when neither of the parties involved are major oil suppliers. In this case, Iran is a significant oil supplier, Israel is not.

The reality is that the supply of oil from the Persian Gulf (about 20 percent of global seaborne oil shipments) is not materially at risk after Israel’s strikes, and it is unlikely to come under threat from Iran. That’s because of a few reasons: One, Israel isn’t targeting Iran’s oil production and export sites, so Iran derives no net benefit if it prevents Saudi, Emirati, Kuwaiti, Iraqi, Qatari or Bahraini oil from leaving the Persian Gulf. Two, should Tehran attempt to block Arab oil exports, its own oil exports would, in turn, be blocked. Iran can only benefit from stopping others from exporting if Tehran has no capacity to export oil itself. And three, Iran can’t stop traffic through the Strait of Hormuz for any significant amount of time because sea traffic can be rerouted around Iranian waters if necessary.

China, which purchases most of Iran’s crude oil, does not want to see the flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf impeded. While China doesn’t have the naval capacity in the Persian Gulf to ensure this, it has become such a significant trading partner of Iran’s, that Iran cannot afford to see its trade with China disrupted. China is Iran’s largest customer and a significant customer of oil from Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries. China will use the full weight of its economic power to ensure that oil from all Persian Gulf exporters to Asia is not disrupted.

Due to the severity of this attack, and the paradigm shift in diplomatic and nuclear relations that will result, oil prices may not retreat as quickly as they have after previous attacks. Much depends on when, how and against whom Iran retaliates. Regardless, it is important to remember that this is not the oil market of the 1990s and early 2000s. The market is well supplied from a variety of producers, with plenty of spare capacity should the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) choose to employ it. The United States is not beholden to foreign oil producers and its foreign policy should reflect that.

—Ellen Wald, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center and the president of Transversal Consulting. She is the author of “Saudi, Inc.: The Arabian Kingdom’s Pursuit of Profit and Power,” a book on the history and strategy of Aramco and Saudi Arabia.

How will strikes impact Israel’s war in Gaza?

The large-scale and devastating Israeli strikes against the Islamic Republic of Iran have opened a new chapter in the post-October 7 Middle East world. In addition to the kinetic damage that they have caused, the strikes are a clear indication that Tehran was proceeding with acquiring enough technology and materials to procure a nuclear weapon, which would have changed the entirety of the Middle East’s security and geopolitical architecture.

Critically, there is the question of how these strikes impact Israel’s war in Gaza against Hamas and factions that are supported by the IRGC. Will Israel assassinate the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) leadership in Tehran, along with other terror operatives? Will the attacks distract from Gaza, or provide the Israeli military with an opportunity to expand its assault on the Strip without international scrutiny?

Another dimension of the Iranian ladder of escalation is what happens in the West Bank, which is under the fragile control of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Israeli military occupation. Does the IRGC have assets in the West Bank that it can activate to sow some chaos against the PA, in hopes of starting skirmishes with the Israel Defense Forces? Are there assets inside Israel who could engage in a targeted terror attack?

Regardless of the rhetoric, and while this is a serious escalation, it is unlikely, at least for now, that the wave of Israeli airstrikes will result in a massive, global, or even regional war like many have been warning for years. This is due to the fact that Arab countries, the United States, and even Israel want to be measured and deploy strategies to avoid a regional conflagration that leads to massive death and destruction.

—Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib leads Realign For Palestine, an Atlantic Council project that challenges entrenched narratives in the Israel and Palestine discourse.

Netanyahu lacks the trust of his people to carry out this war

The Iranian regime is a group of dead men walking. Iran’s reign of terror both internally and externally has been a destructive and destabilizing force since the Islamic Revolution, supporting terrorist groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. Diplomatic efforts over the years to stall Iran’s race to obtain nuclear weapons have not been a resounding success so far. Hence the recent Israeli attack does not come as a surprise.

That said, millions of Israelis distrust Netanyahu’s motivations and actions, whether as a peacetime or especially as a wartime prime minister. The Gaza war is a case in point. He appears to be prime minister bent on saving his own skin, aka saving his extreme right coalition to avoid facing trial for corruption and being held accountable for his government’s failure in connection with the October 7 attacks. He has done so at the clear expense of his country’s national security and democracy, as there is consensus among Israel’s security top brass and indeed the country that as prime minister Netanyahu needs to take responsibility. Netanyahu’s relations with Trump, the European Union, and most of the Middle East are at an all-time low, and there is unprecedented polarization within Israel stemming from Netanyahu’s divisive and inciting policies. This is not encouraging, to say the least, in this situation.

One only hopes that the United States, working with its sensible Middle Eastern allies such as the United Arab Emirates, will help to bring a sensible outcome to this explosive time.

—Ariel Ezrahi is a senior nonresident fellow at the Middle East Programs, the architect of the Gas for Gaza project, and the head of the Energy Transition Sub-Committee for MENA2050. He also works in the climate finance space.

Hezbollah is likely to express restraint

With Israel launching an unprecedented wave of attacks against Iran’s nuclear facilities and related assets, many eyes are turning toward Lebanon to see if Hezbollah will respond on behalf of its patron. For now, however, Hezbollah is likely to adopt a policy of restraint, and the Iranians may not call upon its proxy to strike back.

Until the recent fourteen-month war between Hezbollah and Israel, the Lebanese group was seen as a vital component of Iran’s deterrence architecture against the possibility of an attack on Iran’s nuclear program and on the regime itself. However, even before the latest war between Hezbollah and Israel, there were no guarantees that if Iran was struck by Israel, the United States, or a combination of the two that Tehran would call upon Hezbollah to respond with a punishing barrage of precision-guided missiles against targets across Israel.

That decision—whether or not to trigger a Hezbollah response—would have likely been based on the scale of the damage in Iran, and whether it posed an existential threat to the regime. If the Iranians calculated that the attack was survivable, then a Hezbollah response would be unnecessary and potentially counterproductive. Instead, Hezbollah would be held in reserve for the day the Iranians really needed it. That same calculus applies now, but with the added factor that Hezbollah’s military capabilities have been so degraded by the recent war that it no longer poses the same level of threat toward Israel. In addition, there is a strong sentiment of anger and frustration within the rank and file against Iran for, as they perceive it, letting Hezbollah down during the recent war by refusing to allow it to employ the full gamut of its military might to inflict real pain on the Israeli home front.

That mood of resentment may have been on subtle display during the recent visit to Beirut by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who reportedly held a frosty meeting with Hezbollah leader Sheikh Naim Qassem, and was accompanied by two relatively junior party lawmakers while paying his respects to the tomb of late Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah.

For now, domestic calculations will likely help stay Hezbollah’s hand. However, that restraint could falter if the Israeli strikes against Iran continue and pose a direct threat to the regime.

—Nicholas Blanford is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, covering the politics and security affairs of Lebanon and Syria.

Jerusalem prepares for the long haul

JERUSALEM—Despite the early signs of an imminent strike, with US regional embassies and military facilities evacuating a number of their staff, our plane landed in busy and bustling Ben Gurion airport undeterred by the news of a potential pre-emptive attack on Iranian nuclear facilities and leadership.

Just hours ago, senior experts and a US official at a Jerusalem dinner seemed optimistic that nothing out of the ordinary would occur and that the week’s developments represented a mere tactical escalation amid important nuclear talks. Analysts familiar with Israeli politics jokingly noted that if anything serious were to happen between Iran and Israel, it would need to be after next week due to Netanyahu’s son’s upcoming wedding. We later came to understand that the United States might have overestimated its capacity to deter their Israeli counterparts.

At 3:00 a.m. the peaceful Jerusalem ancient city walls were suddenly disturbed by piercing alarms calling everyone to take shelter in the nearest safe space. Our security team informed us that Israel had initiated a unilateral strike on Iran and that the United States was given a heads up about the events of the night. Sources reported that the Israeli war cabinet was gathering to discuss a Gaza cease-fire and hostage deal, and were surprised to discover that it was a briefing on the attacks. Some of them were sworn in writing to secrecy.

As we stand now, the mood in Israel is dug in for a long-haul operation to disable the capabilities of what they call the “head of the octopus,” after cutting many of its tentacles in Gaza, Beirut, and Damascus last year. Israel called thousands of its reservists back to duty, and Jerusalem is preparing for a potentially consequential retaliation from Tehran, as initial reports reveal substantial losses among the Iranian military leadership and nuclear scientists.

The Mullah regime’s response might not come immediately, as we witnessed with the 2024 events. Tehran will have to rally its defense systems after being drastically diminished, and now also face a crisis of leadership amid tonight’s high-level targets.

The United States, however, clearly tried to distance itself from the attacks and focused on prioritizing the safety and security of US facilities and personnel in the Middle East, although signaling a deadlock in US-Iranian nuclear talks. President Donald Trump is faced today with a crucial dilemma of either further decoupling from Israel and confirming US isolationism, or seizing a moment of weakness among Iran and its proxies by supporting Israeli ambitions to annihilate an enemy at the source.

—Sarah Zaaimi is a resident senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs. She is also the center’s deputy director for communications, overseeing strategic communications, editorial agenda, media relations, and social and digital marketing efforts.

It’s not too soon to think about the postwar plan

Israel’s strikes against Iranian command, nuclear, and military sites were not a warning shot. They were intended to start a change as decisive against the Iranian regime as Israel’s 2024 campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Importantly, Israel has no postwar plan for Iran beyond ending an existential nuclear threat. Israel should have thought this through months ago, but it really needs to think now about its post-war strategy. Regime change will not happen after an aerial campaign, no matter how effective. However much the IRGC was weakened by Israel’s strikes, including the reported death of senior IRGC military leaders, Tehran is still strong and coherent enough to prevent a popular “color” revolution. Regime change efforts from the United States and others elsewhere in the world should be a cautionary example of how hard this would be.

Israel is going to have to sustain a homeland defense strategy and keep striking nuclear, missile, and drone facilities in Iran. It also needs to develop, or work with the United States to develop, a workable strategy that gets Iran to end its nuclear threat to Israel. This will not be easy, and it will involve serious tradeoffs by Israel’s leaders, including how to end the war in Gaza on terms that will keep Hamas from coming back into power while giving the Palestinians a path toward reconstruction, dignity, and peace.

The best thing the United States can do now is to redouble its efforts to get a durable peace between Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza. Such a peace will require greater contributions by the United States, Arab allies, and Israel than anyone has been willing to make until now.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security.

Israel likely achieved its goal of setting back Iran’s nuclear program

Early reporting suggests that the ongoing Israeli attack against Iran, Operation Rising Lion, has multiple, complementary goals. Israel appears to be aiming to cripple Iranian nuclear capacity and degrade Iranian retaliatory capabilities. To achieve these ends, Israel is conducting a combined air and intelligence operation to target nuclear installations, ballistic missile and air-defense sites, and key personnel in both the nuclear and military command structures.

We can understand this multipronged effort as targeting multiple threats to Israel’s security. First, successive Israeli prime ministers have described an Iranian adversary armed with nuclear weapons as an existential threat to Israel. As Netanyahu described in a video statement as the attacks were underway, the operation targeted both the Natanz enrichment facility (among others) and leading Iranian nuclear scientists. Targeting both the facilities and the key scientists should degrade and delay Iran’s ability to develop nuclear weapons. Second, Israel also sought to limit Iranian retaliatory capabilities by attacking ballistic missile and drone installations, as well as key individuals in the military command structure, including General Hossein Salami, the chief of the IRGC, and Gholam Ali Rashid, the deputy commander of the Iranian armed forces. There may be a third, larger goal beyond degrading Iran’s nuclear and retaliatory capacity: regime decapitation. Indeed, beyond targeting the nuclear infrastructure, the expansive attacks against the military forces and the IRGC could be suggestive of a larger regime-level goal.

Especially as events continue to unfold, it is difficult to determine operational success. Nevertheless, we can expect Israeli leaders to define success as delaying Iran’s ability to produce weapons-grade uranium or advance to nuclear weapons, which Israel is likely to have achieved through damaging and destroying critical nuclear infrastructure and killing senior scientists. Further, to the extent that an eventual Iranian retaliation is limited because of Israel’s attack on key military sites and personnel or blunted by Israel’s own defenses, such developments may signify another layer of success. Of course, it is difficult to know exactly what an Iranian attack might have looked like had Israel not targeted key military facilities during this strike and earlier attacks on Iranian air defenses in 2024.

—Rachel Whitlark is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense program in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Israel’s strike could unravel the US cease-fire with the Houthis

Israeli strikes on Iran risk provoking a response from Yemen’s Houthi rebels and potentially upending last month’s bilateral cease-fire agreement between the United States and the Houthis. While the Trump administration made it clear that the strike was a unilateral action by Israel, the Houthis could perceive the United States as complicit, as the rebels often conflate Israeli and US actions in their public messaging. Adding to those concerns, earlier this week a Houthi source threatened to retaliate if the United States or Israel struck Iran, following reports that American nonessential personnel and family members were being evacuated throughout the Middle East.

Moreover, the Houthis have been playing a more prominent role in Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” since the October 7 attacks, particularly as other proxies such as Hamas and Hezbollah faced leadership losses and setbacks. For the group, renewed confrontation could be an opportunity to reinforce its position within Iran’s network of allies and proxies and claim a major propaganda win—even if it means the end of the cease-fire with the United States.

While the Trump administration’s “Operation Rough Rider” imposed meaningful damage on the group, the Houthis have proven their resilience and ability to adapt in the face of continued strikes. They may also calculate that the Trump administration’s decision to pursue a cease-fire is a sign of limited appetite to re-engage in Yemen, especially given that “Operation Rough Rider” cost more than one billion dollars in a month and failed to degrade the Houthis, who have continued strikes on Israeli territory.

—Emily Milliken is the associate director of media and communications for the N7 Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Trump should work with Gulf countries on a diplomatic response

Gulf States—mainly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar—have no appetite for a regional war that involves Iran and would rather not be put in a place to choose between Israel and Iran. Their economic visions hinge on regional stability and on striking a balance to protect their interests, both economic and political. While their emerging role as mediators has enhanced their geopolitical role and diplomatic leverage, that role—now at risk—depends on stability for trust-building purposes when dealing with an actor like Iran.

Under the Trump administration, Gulf states have taken the front seat in driving the new regional order. However, Israel’s strikes, following the IAEA’s strongest rebuke in twenty years and Iran’s announcement of a third uranium site, seem to have temporarily disrupted the Gulf capitals’ preferred approach for diplomacy and placed them now in the crossfire for retaliation.

The Trump administration must rally its Gulf allies for an emergency meeting to coordinate a response aimed at preserving any diplomatic gains made so far. Oman, as a trusted intermediary, could be in a good place to lower the temperature and lobby Tehran against attacking Gulf capitals and US assets in the region—especially since Washington had no role in the attack. While this escalation carries serious risks, Israel’s attacks seem to have focused on the IRGC, which is responsible for continuously pursuing a destabilizing influence across the Levant and the Gulf and targeting US service members—making the IRGC a legitimate target. However, failure to deescalate would risk a broader regional conflict, the collapse of the Gulf-led peace process, the destabilization of global energy markets, and further disruption of key navigation routes in the Red Sea.

—Joze Pelayo is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

Israel is taking a major risk with its Begin Doctrine

Israel’s launch of strikes on Iran demonstrates a continued invocation of its Begin Doctrine—its long-standing policy of pre-emptively striking nuclear facilities and weapons of mass destruction. Named after Israel’s former Prime Minister Menachem Begin, the doctrine was first created in 1981 during Operation Opera when Israel destroyed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor near Baghdad in a targeted attack.

Similar to Netanyahu today, Begin carried out the strike without US approval. Many feared an escalation if former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein were to retaliate, however, at the time, Saddam was already embroiled in a war with Iran and could not afford to respond.

Israel applied the doctrine again in 2007 when it covertly destroyed Syria’s Al-Kibar reactor in an operation it did not publicly acknowledge until 2018. Responding to the strike, then-President Bashar al-Assad denied the existence of the site entirely to avoid domestic and regional pressure to retaliate.

Now, for the third time, Israel appears to be invoking the doctrine, this time against Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile infrastructure, again without Washington. But unlike prior episodes, Iran is expected to retaliate, and likely with far greater intensity than previous strikes in April and October 2024—especially if Iran’s regional proxies join its retaliation to overwhelm Israel’s Iron Dome.

All eyes now turn to Muscat, where US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff is still scheduled to meet with Iranian negotiators this weekend in what could be the final round of nuclear talks. The outlook for any deal appears bleak following the strikes. Should negotiations collapse, the region could face an escalation unlike anything seen in decades.

—Yaseen Rashed is the assistant director of media and communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs and a Libya researcher.

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Ukraine is shaping the future of drone warfare at sea as well as on land

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 12 Jun 2025 21:16:01 +0000

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is redefining military doctrine in ways not witnessed since the advent of air power and nuclear weapons in the first half of the twentieth century. For more than three years, both countries have been locked in a daily race to innovate that is leading to the increasing dominance of unmanned systems. This unprecedented drone war is being fought on the battlefields of Ukraine, deep inside Russia, and at sea. While Russia’s far greater resources favor Moscow, Ukraine’s sophisticated tech scene and vibrant startup culture are helping Kyiv to punch well above its weight.

Ukraine’s spectacular June 1 drone attacks on Vladimir Putin’s strategic bomber fleet at airbases across Russia made global headlines and have led to widespread claims that Kyiv has managed to “rewrite the rules of war.” However, Ukraine’s most remarkable accomplishments in the field of drone warfare have arguably been achieved thousands of miles to the south in the Black Sea.

Ukrainian Defense Intelligence Chief Kyrylo Budanov recently showcased the latest addition to the country’s expanding naval drone fleet, the Magura V7 unmanned marine vehicle. This domestically produced naval drone is armed with a pair of anti-aircraft missiles and is reportedly capable of operating at sea for days at a time while hunting Russian warplanes. According to Ukrainian officials, the Magura V7 has already proven itself in combat by shooting down two Russian Su-30 fighter jets over the Black Sea in early May. Budanov described the operation as an “historic moment.” It is believed to be the first ever instance of military jets being downed by unmanned naval platforms.

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Last month’s destruction of two Russian warplanes was the latest in a series of remarkable maritime breakthroughs that have allowed Ukraine to gain the upper hand in the Battle of the Black Sea. When the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine began more than three years ago, few would have believed such a turn of events was possible. At the time, the war at sea was widely viewed as a foregone conclusion. After all, Ukraine had no conventional navy to speak of, while Russia could call on the considerable might of the country’s aged but nonetheless formidable Black Sea Fleet.

This disparity was on display during a famous incident that took place on the very first day of the invasion. On the morning of February 24, 2022, the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the Moskva missile cruiser, loomed up to Ukraine’s Snake Island and ordered the tiny Ukrainian garrison to surrender. “Russian warship, go f*** yourself,” came the iconic response. While this message of defiance captured the global imagination and became an unofficial slogan for the entire Ukrainian war effort, the incident also served to underline the apparent mismatch between the maritime capabilities of the two adversaries.

During the initial weeks of the war, Russian control of the Black Sea remained uncontested, with Ukrainian attention focused firmly on preventing amphibious landings along the country’s southern coastline. But even at this precarious point, Ukrainian commanders had their own offensive ambitions and would soon send a powerful signal that they were capable of fighting back at sea as well as on land. In April 2022, the Ukrainian Navy launched a bold missile attack on the Moskva, securing two direct hits and sinking the Russian flagship. The attack sent shock waves around the world and sparked fury among Kremlin officials. Little did they know that this was just the first of many stunning Russian naval defeats that would transform the military situation in the Black Sea.

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Since the sinking of the Moskva, Ukraine has used a combination of domestically developed naval drones and cruise missiles provided by Kyiv’s French and British partners to decimate Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Ukrainian Navy officials claim they have managed to damage or destroy around one-third of Putin’s entire fleet, while forcing the remaining Russian warships to retreat from occupied Crimea to the relative safety of ports in Russia itself. This has severely limited the Russian Navy’s ability to operate in the Black Sea. By spring 2024, Britain’s Defense Ministry declared that the Russian Black Sea Fleet had become “functionally inactive.”

Ukraine’s stunning success in the Battle of the Black Sea has yet to receive the international attention it deserves. By breaking the Russian naval blockade of Ukraine’s seaports, it has allowed Kyiv to resume maritime exports and secure a vital economic lifeline.

Crucially, the Russian Navy’s humiliating retreat from Crimea has also made a complete mockery of the Kremlin’s so-called red lines and has demonstrated the emptiness of Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling. The Russian dictator has long championed the seizure of Crimea as his crowning achievement, and has repeatedly hinted that he is willing to use nuclear weapons in defense of his conquests. But when confronted by the harsh military realities of Ukraine’s deadly naval drones, he withdraw the bulk of Russia’s fleet from Crimea with barely a murmur.

The Battle of the Black Sea is far from over, of course. While Ukraine develops groundbreaking new naval drones capable of hitting warplanes as well as warships, Russia continues to bombard Ukrainian seaports and targets merchant shipping carrying Ukrainian exports to global markets. The Russian Navy is also producing marine drones of its own, and is adopting defensive measures to protect the remainder of the Black Sea Fleet. Nevertheless, Kyiv’s Black Sea innovations are a reminder that Ukraine is an increasingly formidable military power in its own right and is shaping the future of drone warfare at sea as well as on land.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Putin’s peace plan is a blueprint for the end of Ukrainian statehood

Tetiana Kotelnykova — Thu, 12 Jun 2025 20:06:24 +0000

The memorandum presented by the Russian Federation during recent bilateral talks with Ukraine in Istanbul was described by Kremlin officials as a constructive step toward a possible peace agreement. However, the demands outlined in the document tell an altogether different story. Russia’s memorandum makes clear that Moscow does not seek peaceful coexistence with an independent and sovereign Ukraine. Instead, the Kremlin’s goal evidently remains the systematic dismantling of Ukrainian statehood.

One of the key demands detailed in the Russian memorandum is the requirement for Ukraine’s complete withdrawal from four Ukrainian provinces that Moscow claims as its own but has so far been unable to fully occupy. For Kyiv, this would mean abandoning dozens of towns and cities along with millions of Ukrainians to the horrors of indefinite Russian occupation. It would also dramatically weaken Ukraine’s defenses and leave the rest of the country dangerously exposed to further Russian aggression.

Handing over the city of Kherson and the surrounding region would be particularly disastrous for Ukraine’s future national security. This would grant Russia a foothold across the Dnipro River in the western half of Ukraine, placing Odesa and the country’s other Black Sea ports in immediate danger. The loss of Zaporizhzhia, one of Ukraine’s largest cities with a prewar population of around seven hundred thousand, is similarly unthinkable.

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Territorial concessions are only one part of Russia’s comprehensive plan to undermine Ukrainian statehood. The memorandum presented in Istanbul calls for strict limits to be imposed on the size of Ukraine’s military along with restrictions on the categories of weapons the country is allowed to possess. Ukraine would also be banned from joining any military alliances or concluding bilateral security agreements with other nations. This would transform Ukraine into a disarmed and internationally isolated buffer state with no means to defend itself, leaving it entirely at Putin’s mercy.

Beyond the battlefield, Russia’s memorandum proposes a series of sweeping changes to Ukraine’s internal political and cultural landscape that would allow Moscow to reestablish its dominance over the country. Key demands include official status for the Russian language, the reinstatement of the Russian Orthodox Church’s legal privileges, and a wholesale rewriting of Ukrainian history in line with Kremlin narratives.

One of the most sinister aspects of the Russian peace proposal is the call for a complete ban on all so-called “nationalist” Ukrainian political parties. This rather vague wording is open to interpretation and could easily be used to silence Ukrainian politicians opposed to Russian influence. Given the Kremlin’s long record of labeling anything that contracts Russian imperial orthodoxies as “extremist” or “fascist,” the idea of outlawing “nationalist” political parties represents an obvious threat to Ukraine’s sovereignty and the country’s democratic political system.

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Moscow’s memorandum was presented at a time when Russia is escalating its invasion of Ukraine. In recent months, Russian drone and missile attacks on Ukrainian cities have increased significantly, leading to a sharp rise in the number of killed and wounded civilians. Along the front lines of the war, the Russian military is currently engaged in what most analysts believe are the early stages of a major summer offensive that seeks to break Ukrainian resistance. Russian troops are advancing in the east and have recently crossed the border in northern Ukraine to open a new front in the Sumy region.

The Ukrainian authorities cannot accept the punishing terms being proposed by Russia. Indeed, no sovereign state could do so and expect to survive. The real question is how the international community will respond. Russia’s memorandum is a blueprint for the end of Ukrainian statehood and the return of the country to Kremlin control. It makes a complete mockery of recent US-led calls for a compromise peace, and demonstrates beyond any reasonable doubt that Russia has no interest in ending the invasion.

This should be enough to persuade Western leaders that progress toward peace will only be possible if they increase the pressure on Putin. At present, the Russian leader clearly believes he is winning and is confident of outlasting the West in Ukraine. In order to change this calculus and force a rethink in Moscow, Kyiv’s partners must impose tougher sanctions on Russia while boosting military support for Ukraine. In other words, they must speak to Putin in the language of strength, which remains the only language he truly understands.

Russia’s recent memorandum sends an unambiguous signal that Moscow is undeterred by the current Western stance and remains fully committed to its maximalist goal of erasing Ukraine as a state and as a nation. If Western leaders wish to avoid this catastrophic outcome, they must convince Putin that the alternative to a negotiated peace is a Russian defeat.

Tetiana Kotelnykova is a graduate student at Yale University specializing in European and Russian Studies with a focus on conflict, postwar recovery, and regional geopolitics. She is the founder of Brave Generation, a New York-based nonprofit organization that supports young Ukrainians affected by war and invests in the next generation of Ukrainian leadership. She also leads the Ukrainian Recovery Youth Global Initiative.

—Olga Khakova is the deputy director for European energy security at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

***

The proposal is a welcome one to put an end to the questions about the restarting of the pipelines. The proposed rules would ban any EU operator from doing direct or indirect transactions for Nord Stream 1 or 2, making the operation of the pipelines impossible. More importantly, the proposal would end any rumors or quiet discussions around the future of the pipeline and shows the seriousness, at least in the Commission, around achieving energy independence from Russia. “There is no return to the past,” von der Leyen declared during Tuesday’s announcement.

—Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

***

After nearly two static decades of Germany’s Gazpromphilic foreign policy, and statements emerging in recent weeks from German politicians from the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) indicating openness to a revival of Nord Stream, today’s EU announcement of Nord Stream sanctions is nothing short of astonishing. That’s because it amounts to a de facto approval by new German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. Since assuming the Chancellery, Merz has taken steps toward a true Zeitenwende that were lacking in Germany since that political approach to Russia had been first announced by his predecessor Olaf Scholz, with Merz stating clearly and resolutely in late May that under his leadership, the German government will “do everything to ensure that Nord Stream 2 cannot be put back into operation.”

Merz doubled down on this rhetoric while sitting next to US President Donald Trump in the Oval Office last week, declaring Nord Stream to have been “a mistake.” Saying this next to Trump is especially important given recent reports that a US-based investor has sought to lobby the Trump administration to drop sanctions on Nord Stream to allow for American ownership of the pipelines. According to the investor, this move is an attempt to supposedly achieve the “de-Russification” of the projects—despite the logical incoherence of how such infrastructure could ever be truly “de-Russified” if it were still delivering Russian gas.

If the EU is able to successfully get this sanctions package through the gauntlet of member state ratification—no small task with the likes of Hungary and Slovakia waiting in the wings to go to bat for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s energy interests in Brussels—it will be a major step toward finally ending Russia’s energy grip over European political and security interests.

—Benjamin L. Schmitt is a senior fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Kleinman Center for Energy Policy and Perry World House.

2. How much would lowering the oil price cap from $60 to $45 hurt Russia’s economy?

That depends on how effectively the new price cap would be enforced and where the general price of crude would fluctuate. The impact would probably be significant but not as big as it would be if the United States could find a way to limit third-country purchases of Russian oil, either through US Senator Lindsey Graham’s bill or in another (and more practical) form.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

***

Russia still relies on revenue from oil exports, so lowering the price cap could negatively affect how much money they can bring in. However, the price cap has been very difficult to enforce. In response to the price cap, Russia developed an expansive shadow fleet to export its oil, which created an additional challenge for Western sanctions enforcement authorities.

That said, lowering the price cap would be welcome considering the price of Brent Crude as of today, $67.24 per barrel, which is very close to the $60 price cap. When the price cap first went into effect in 2022, the price of oil was over $100 per barrel. Reducing the price cap is an acknowledgement that oil prices have dropped considerably since it was first introduced and reflects a commitment to restrict Russia’s ability to generate revenue.

—Kimberly Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. She previously served in the federal government for fifteen years, most recently as the acting associate director of the Treasury Department Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s Intelligence Division.

3. What else is in this sanctions package?

The most interesting aspect of this package is the “transaction ban” on “financial operators in third countries that finance trade to Russia, in circumvention of sanctions.” That sounds a lot like secondary sanctions, which historically have been controversial in the EU. If this passes, it could significantly strengthen EU sanctions by extending their reach.

—Kimberly Donovan

4. What are the chances of this proposal moving forward?

It’s worth keeping in mind that this is still just a proposal, and there is a long way to go before it is finalized. These sanctions proposals require the unanimous support of the EU’s twenty-seven member states, which, in and of itself, is no simple process of negotiations. The proposal will likely face two immediate hurdles from the likes of Hungary and Slovakia, whose respective leaders have delayed or played spoiler on the previous efforts for political leverage until their demands were met. However, the fact that there have been seventeen successful rounds of sanctions in the past suggests that solutions, however messy, incomplete, or last-minute, are possible. There is an important transatlantic angle as well. The EU wants to move together with the United States on Russia. So European holdouts will certainly not want to be seen as roadblocks should the Trump administration decide, for example, to push for further sanctions on Russia.

—Jörn Fleck

***

I don’t know how much has been vetted with Hungary nor what kind of pressure the Commission is prepared to put on Budapest if it attempts to block the proposal. But the Commission seems serious about ramping up pressure and announcing steps before the G7 Summit, where they will have a chance to obtain Japanese and Canadian support, and thus to present the United States with some decisions.

—Daniel Fried 

***

Brussels seems optimistic that the eighteenth sanctions package will pass. However, aspects of the sanctions package will need G7 support. This includes the proposal to reduce the price cap, which is why the Commission understandably announced the proposal in advance of G7 meetings this coming weekend in Canada. Further, support from Washington or lack thereof could sway how countries such as Hungary and Slovakia vote on the sanctions package.

—Kimberly Donovan

5. How might Washington react to this proposal?

That is a big question, and I can’t give a reliable answer. The European leaders at the G7 will have a chance to convince Trump that it is his own plan to end the war that the EU is backing, and that the United States ought to go all in to that end and agree to pressure Russia. But Trump, despite edging up toward imposing additional costs on Russia, has not yet done so, despite multiple opportunities and provocations from Putin.

—Daniel Fried 

***

It’s unclear how Trump himself will react to the proposal. But what the US president should see in this proposal is a Europe that is a willing and serious partner. The administration has made clear that it expects Europe to step up for its own security and for Ukraine’s. This is part of Europe’s response to do just that. European leaders have been united on pushing for action on Russia given Moscow’s continued intransigence on cease-fire talks and devastating attacks on Ukraine. This proposal is another indication that Europe is putting real ideas on the table to boost US and Ukrainian leverage with Putin.

—Jörn Fleck

***

Members of Congress may welcome this package, as the spirit is consistent with the bill Graham introduced to get Putin to the negotiating table. However, we’ll have to wait and see how Trump reacts considering the stalled cease-fire talks and escalating violence on the battlefield.

—Kimberly Donovan

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Modern Ukraine’s national journey can be traced on Kyiv’s central square

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 10 Jun 2025 21:18:16 +0000

Ancient Kyiv is drenched in more than a millennium of history and boasts a dizzying array of cathedrals, monasteries, and palaces dating back hundreds of years. However, the location most intricately associated with modern Ukraine’s national journey is far younger than any of these venerable landmarks and carried no particular spiritual significance until the very recent past.

Located in the geographical center of Kyiv, Independence Square is known to locals and foreign guests alike by its Ukrainian-language name, Maidan Nezalezhnosti, or simply Maidan. Over the past three decades, Maidan has undergone a dramatic transformation that has seen it emerge from Ukraine’s post-Soviet identity crisis via two popular uprisings to become the sacred ground zero of a nation forged in the crucible of revolution and war.

Today, Maidan is an obligatory point of pilgrimage on the itinerary of all visitors to the Ukrainian capital. People come to Maidan in order to honor those who have died in the fight against Russia’s invasion, or just to soak up the atmosphere of an iconic location that has witnessed some of the most consequential political events of the twenty-first century.

It was not always this way. When the modern square first began to take shape in the nineteenth century, it was a relative backwater in an elegant and aged city where the center of gravity remained firmly fixed elsewhere. Tellingly, when Ukrainian officials gathered in Kyiv on January 22, 1919, to publicly sign the unification act between the Ukrainian People’s Republic and the West Ukrainian People’s Republic, they chose to stage this historic event on Sophia Square rather than Maidan.

As Kyiv rose from the ashes following World War II, the square became more architecturally impressive and gained in logistical importance, but it continued to lack the aura attached to the city’s true heirlooms. Instead, Maidan remained a fairly identikit Soviet public space noted for its large fountains and even larger Lenin monument.

Maidan first became associated with political activism during the dying days of the Soviet Empire in 1990 when it hosted a two-week student protest dubbed the Revolution on Granite that played a significant part in Ukraine’s independence struggle. At the time, it was known as October Revolution Square. Maidan would receive its current name on August 26, 1991, two days after the Ukrainian declaration of independence, but it would be many years before the square began to earn its current reputation as a genuine symbol of Ukrainian statehood.

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During the first decade or so of Ukrainian independence, Maidan was anything but inspiring. The square remained largely empty, with no monuments or memorials to celebrate the newly independent state. Instead, the cult of communism was replaced by crass commercialism. On the spot once occupied by Lenin, a giant TV screen was installed broadcasting an eclectic mix of adverts, pop videos, cage fights, and catwalk shows. Taxi drivers would line up nearby and watch absentmindedly while waiting for new fares.

High above Maidan, the skyline was dominated by the Hotel Moscow. In 2001, the Ukrainian authorities finally decided that this branding was probably inappropriate for a country looking to shake off the shackles of empire, and the hotel name was duly changed from Moscow to Ukraine. Likewise, a colossal Soviet hammer and sickle was allowed to loom large over Maidan until 2003, when it was belatedly removed from the facade of the Trade Union building. The continued prominence of the Soviet crest made a mockery of Independence Square and spoke volumes about the often ambiguous attitudes toward Ukrainian statehood that characterized the early post-Soviet period.

The first big turning point in Maidan’s transformation came following Ukraine’s November 2004 presidential election. Amid massive public anger over a crude Kremlin-backed bid to steal the vote, huge crowds flooded into Kyiv from across the country and congregated on Maidan, establishing a tent city and a round-the-clock presence. This protest movement lasted for over two months and came to be known as the Orange Revolution. Millions of Ukrainians participated. They eventually succeeded in overturning the rigged election and forcing a rerun which was won by the opposition candidate, representing a watershed moment in modern Ukrainian history.

Maidan itself was synonymous with the Orange Revolution and occupied a central position in the mythology that grew up around it. From that moment on, Maidan became not just a place but also an event. To stage a Maidan meant to organize a grassroots protest and hold power to account. This was a particularly terrifying concept for the neighboring Russian authorities. Dread of a Moscow Maidan soon began to haunt the Kremlin, feeding Putin’s obsession with Ukraine and laying the foundations for the horrors that were to follow. The Russian propaganda machine promptly adopted Maidan as a buzzword signifying wicked foreign plots, and continues to use it two decades later without any need for further explanation.

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Nine years after the Orange Revolution, Maidan would be the scene of a second Ukrainian revolution. This time, the spark came when Ukraine’s pro-Kremlin president, Viktor Yanukovych, pulled out of a long anticipated EU association agreement and unleashed the riot police against students who objected to this drastic geopolitical U-turn. Once again, millions of Ukrainians flocked to the capital and gathered on Maidan. This time, though, it would not be bloodless.

With strong backing from Russia, the Ukrainian authorities took a hard line approach to the protests, leading to weeks of running battles on Maidan and in the surrounding streets. The nadir came in late February 2014, when dozens of protesters were shot and killed in the city center. This Maidan massacre brought down the Yanukovych regime. With his support base evaporating, the disgraced Ukrainian president fled to Russia. Days later, Putin responded by invading Crimea. Russia’s war to extinguish Ukrainian statehood had begun.

The tragic events of February 2014 had a profound impact on Ukraine’s collective psyche and served to consecrate Maidan in the national imagination. Up until that point, the square had regularly hosted public holidays, pop concerts, and Christmas fairs. In the aftermath of the killings, such events were moved to other locations in the Ukrainian capital. Maidan itself would now be reserved for the most somber and significant occasions in the life of the nation, such as the funerals of soldiers, vigils for Ukrainians held captive in Russia, and memorials marking important Ukrainian anniversaries.

Since 2022, Maidan’s transformation has gained further momentum amid the shock and trauma of Russia’s full-scale invasion. During the initial stages of the war, people began planting flags on the square in memory of fallen soldiers. This impromptu memorial has since expanded organically to become a sea of flags and portraits commemorating those who have lost their lives in the defense of Ukraine. It is an authentic grassroots tribute that is entirely in keeping with the spirit of Maidan.

As Russia’s invasion has unfolded, Maidan’s role as the principal site for wartime mourning and reverence has served to confirm the square’s position at the heart of modern Ukraine’s national story. There could hardly be a more fitting location. After all, Vladimir Putin launched the current war because he viewed the emergence of an independent Ukraine as an intolerable threat to his own authoritarian regime and a potential catalyst for the next stage in Russia’s long retreat from empire.

Maidan embodies Putin’s darkest fears. The Russian dictator’s goal remains the destruction of Ukraine as a state and as a nation, but he is acutely aware that the country is slipping inexorably out of the Kremlin orbit. This is nowhere more evident than on Kyiv’s central square, which has become the ultimate symbol of Ukraine’s escape from empire and embrace of an independent identity.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Ukrainian innovations are redefining the role of drones in modern war

Vitaliy Nabukhotny — Tue, 10 Jun 2025 20:34:16 +0000

Ukraine’s audacious recent drone strikes on Vladimir Putin’s bomber fleet at airbases across Russia have generated global headlines and fueled a lively debate over the implications of the attack. Many have hailed this highly successful Ukrainian operation as a watershed moment in military history, leading to claims in some quarters that Ukraine is now “redefining modern warfare.”

This international attention is understandable. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is widely recognized as the world’s first drone war, with Ukrainian innovation playing a key role in defining the role of drones in twenty-first century military operations. But while most analysis tends to focus on spectacular attacks like the recent decimation of Russia’s strategic bomber fleet, the Ukrainian military is actually using drones for a far wider variety of functions. Ukraine’s drone experience is unprecedented and provides a range of important lessons for military commanders around the world.

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The primary role of drones in modern warfare is as weapons. Over the past three years, first person view (FPV) drones have become a ubiquitous feature of the contemporary battlefield and are believed to be responsible for the vast majority of Russian and Ukrainian casualties. This is changing the way the war is fought. Any vehicles operating close to the front lines must now rely on jamming devices, with many also favoring the additional protection of so-called “cope cage” coverings to shield against drone attacks. With larger groups of infantry deemed too vulnerable to drone strikes, attacks are typically carried out by small groups, often using highly mobile transport such as motorbikes or buggies.

Ukraine has also pioneered the use of drones and accompanying software to perform surveillance tasks mapping out the battlefield and providing real-time situational awareness of enemy deployments. This reconnaissance capability is not new in itself, but has undergone significant upgrades in recent years. Accurate and up-to-date information allows commanders to make informed decisions quickly, improving the effectiveness of military operations.

Beyond the battlefield, Ukraine has also transformed international understanding of drone warfare at sea. Since 2022, Ukrainian naval drones have succeeded in sinking or damaging around one-third of Russia’s entire Black Sea Fleet, forcing the remainder of Putin’s warships to retreat from Russian-occupied Crimea to the relative safety of Russia’s own Black Sea ports. Most recently, Ukraine claimed to have used naval drones to shoot down two Russian warplanes over the Black Sea.

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In addition to strike and surveillance functions, Ukraine has also employed drones in logistical roles. The Ukrainian army uses both aerial and ground-based unmanned systems to deliver ammunition, food, medicine, and other supplies to troops operating in dangerous or inaccessible areas, thereby reducing the need to expose personnel to hostile environments. Drone-based solutions can also potentially facilitate the evacuation of the wounded when manned rescue is deemed to be too risky.

One of the most creative Ukrainian uses of drones on the battlefield has been to help take surrendering Russian soldiers prisoner. This method reduces the need for physical engagement with enemy troops and therefore limits the risks to the Ukrainian side. Drones are used to give instructions using printed messages or via loudspeakers to guide enemy soldiers and indicate safe directions that will allow them to surrender without coming under fire.

Ukrainian unmanned systems are also playing an important role in efforts to document Russian war crimes. Drones are able to record the time, location, and nature of potential crimes, along with the identity of the perpetrators in some cases. Over the past three years, Ukrainian drones have captured evidence of potential war crimes including the execution of unarmed POWs and attacks on civilians. This footage can be used in future prosecutions and increases the chances that those responsible for war crimes in Ukraine will be held accountable.

The growing role of drones in warfare creates a range of challenges in terms of the accepted norms governing military operations. With this in mind, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence has drawn up and issued internal guidelines for drone operators and legal teams to ensure adherence to the laws of armed conflict. These guidelines incorporate real-world combat scenarios to help drone operators understand how to treat categories such as medical personnel, retreating enemy troops, and those engaged in the evacuation of the wounded. This initiative is a step toward establishing broader global standards for responsible drone warfare.

Ukraine’s unique experience of drone warfare offers valuable insights that will shape military doctrines for many years to come, while also helping to define international standards for the use of drones in a military context. It is already clear that drones are transforming the battlefield in ways the evoke the twentieth century rise of air power. As drone technologies continue to advance, Ukraine is likely to remain a key player in this new wave of military innovation.

Vitaliy Nabukhotny is a human rights lawyer and external legal advisor to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence’s Legal Department.

China is carrying out ‘dress rehearsals’ to take Taiwan. Here’s how the US should respond.

Adam Kozloski — Mon, 09 Jun 2025 20:40:52 +0000

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In a recent speech at the 2025 Shangri-la Dialogue, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth told the audience that China’s attempt to conquer Taiwan by force “could be imminent.” The possibility of such a rapid escalation stems from China’s increased military activity around Taiwan, which has made distinguishing exercises from true military action nearly impossible. According to Admiral Samuel Paparo, the commander of US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), Chinese military pressure on Taiwan has reached a “rapid boil.” How rapid? In his April testimony before the Congressional Armed Services Committees, Paparo said there has been a 300 percent annual increase in Chinese military pressure against Taiwan. He later noted that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is “stretching their legs” to meet President Xi Jinping’s 2027 military readiness goal of being capable of taking Taiwan by force.

As China’s increasing operational tempo has reduced the United States’ ability to distinguish military action from an exercise, US Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) has revealed reduced capacity and greater cracks in the United States’ sustainment strategy. This combination of reduced warning and response poses serious risks to the United States’ ability to deter a forceful resolution across the Taiwan Strait, a key objective of the Trump administration.

‘Dress rehearsals for forced unification’

While China’s 300 percent increase in pressure is alarming, this development unfortunately reflects a broader, consistent trend of escalating PLA activities, including persistent crossings of the Taiwan Strait’s median line. According to data from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, PLA sorties across the median line in the Taiwan Strait, the Taiwanese-declared dividing line between Taiwan and China, have increased from 953 incidents in 2021 to 3,070 in 2024.

Taiwan, with a leaner force, must either dedicate an increasing number of resources toward incursion responses or cede the declared dividing line to the PLA, allowing PLA forces to move even closer to Taiwanese territory unchallenged, reducing warning time. The PLA’s efforts are also a deliberate attempt by Beijing to cognitively shift Taiwan’s perception of actions in the strait, creating “the new normal” of military activity in its immediate vicinity, which could reduce reaction time in a real invasion.

Paparo underscored the seriousness of this escalation in his recent testimony, stating: “These are not just exercises—they are dress rehearsals for forced unification.” Earlier this year, he went even further on the record, warning that the increased operational tempo has brought INDOPACOM “very close to that [point] where on a daily basis the fig leaf of an exercise could very well hide operational warning.”

Placing forward forces

The erosion of operational warning time means INDOPACOM and US decision makers could have less time—and less certainty—to respond if China initiates military action against Taiwan. As the PLA continues to degrade US and Taiwanese abilities to detect tactical and operational indicators of conflict, China’s geographic advantage across the Pacific becomes even more acute.

According to the US Seventh Fleet, forward-deployed forces cuts an average of seventeen days in transit time, compared with continentally-based forces. While exact times are dependent on individual capabilities and other conditions, most conventional options for sea-based transport are slower and vulnerable to China’s expanding anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) envelope. Airlift options to support Taiwan with asymmetric capabilities, such as Patriot batteries or Harpoon missiles to destroy high-value targets, are similarly constrained by the sheer scale of the Pacific and limited US airlift capacity.

Paparo’s April testimony highlighted these logistical realities. He revealed that it took seventy-three flights to rapidly move a single Patriot battalion from United States Forces Korea’s area of operations to US Central Command. Furthermore, TRANSCOM has revealed to the Congressional Armed Services Committees that the C-5M “Supergalaxy,” a critical aircraft for airlift operations, had a reduced mission-capable rate of 46 percent in 2024, a 6 percent decrease from 2023. Even assuming efficiency improvements, there remain significant geographic constraints on how quickly the United States can surge critical defensive systems across theaters with its current airlift capabilities.

Moreover, Paparo’s admission—coupled with his direct warning that “lift requirements must be paid attention to”—amounts to a direct appeal for Congress to shore up TRANSCOM’s resources. The current situation not only strains INDOPACOM’s ability to support Taiwan if US policymakers choose to intervene, but it also risks undermining the defense of US forces and territories in the region. Moving critical assets westward—from the continental United States to Hawaii, from Hawaii to Guam, and onward to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—will face time and lift constraints, as well as the active interference of PLA forces once conflict begins. The enemy gets a vote—and it is unlikely that the PLA would allow US or allied air and sea lift into the theater unopposed once hostilities are underway. This makes the window between when China has decided to initiate conflict and when conflict actually begins critical.

As operational warning time continues to erode—and with TRANSCOM investments years away from fully materializing—INDOPACOM must increasingly rely on forces already positioned west of the International Date Line (IDL) for both deterrence and, if necessary, combat operations against Chinese military aggression. TRANSCOM’s revelation that 85 percent of the United States’ combat power remains in the lower forty-eight states indicates that much more work needs to be done in placing forces forward.

Three next steps for the Trump administration

Given these growing challenges, US policymakers must urgently consider three steps to strengthen forward presence and responsiveness in the Indo-Pacific.

1. Increase US military presence in partner nations through SOFAs

Hegseth recently declared that improving the United States’ forward defense posture is the first action that the Trump administration will take in strengthening deterrence. In order to ensure this action, the Department of Defense and the Department of State should leverage the frameworks of existing Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) to expand the US military presence west of the IDL. While SOFAs primarily govern the legal status of US forces abroad, supplementary agreements, implementing arrangements, and diplomatic notes provide the flexibility to adjust troop levels and operational footprints.

Some groundwork for such expansions has already been laid. Under the Trump administration, the Department of Defense announced plans to add additional personnel to US Forces Japan (USFJ) to transition it from an administrative headquarters to a war-fighting command, although these initial moves appear focused only on the USFJ headquarters staff itself. Nevertheless, they suggest an emerging willingness by Tokyo to consider hosting additional operational forces.

Other allies, such as Australia, South Korea, and the Philippines, offer additional opportunities for expanded presence through rotational deployments, pre-positioning of equipment, and basing initiatives. Opportunities to flex the most capable and necessary US assets, like the recent inaugural deployment of NMESIS, the Marine Corps mobile anti-ship missile system, to the Luzon Strait during an exercise with the Philippines, is one such example. Deploying US F-35 aircraft to the Korea Peninsula, potentially permanently, is another. Building on these relationships will be crucial to ensuring sufficient warfighting capability in theater for deterrence and crisis response.

2. Increase the tempo of US campaigning in the Indo-Pacific

Campaigning, or the use of “normal and routine military activities in conditions short of conflict to achieve strategic objectives,” has long served as an effective way to temporarily increase US force presence in critical regions. As Paparo has emphasized, regular and visible military campaigning in the Indo-Pacific remains essential to maintain credible deterrence and operational readiness.

As China accelerates its operational tempo around the Taiwan Strait, the Trump administration should consider adopting a policy of proportional response, increasing US campaigning activities in line with PLA escalations. A proportional approach would degrade China’s understanding of US operational patterns—complicating Beijing’s planning—and ensure that combat-capable forces are present west of the IDL when and where they are needed most.

However, sustaining a higher operational tempo will require significant diplomatic engagement and substantial logistical and financial resources, in addition to wear on the warfighters themselves. Despite these factors, a nonlinear 300 percent increase in Chinese military pressure over the past year demands a bold response. US President Donald Trump’s proposed one-trillion-dollar defense budget should prioritize funding for increased campaigning in the Indo-Pacific, recognizing that higher operational tempo directly improves both US lethality and readiness—two core criteria for strengthening deterrence under this administration.

One example of how increased campaigning enhances lethality is through its training value for both US and partner-nation forces. Campaigning-based exercises allow US warfighters to refine tactics, integrate new systems, and adapt to austere or degraded operational environments. Simultaneously, joint training with allies and partners strengthens the integration of weapon systems and military forces, reinforces defense diplomacy, and enhances collective deterrence across the region.

3. Increase US military presence in COFA nations

The recently renegotiated 2024 Compacts of Free Association (COFA) with Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands reaffirm the United States’ responsibility to defend these nations and preserve exclusive access for US military forces. These agreements provide an opportunity to strengthen forward posture across the central and western Pacific.

Through the COFA structure, the Department of Defense should prioritize developing additional operational sites within the Freely Associated States (FAS). Pre-positioning forces, enhancing distributed basing, and expanding logistics hubs across the FAS would enable more flexible and resilient warfighting capabilities in proximity to the Taiwan Strait. The relatively permissive legal frameworks of the COFA agreements—coupled with the geographic advantage of the islands—make the FAS ideal locations for expanded US presence, including forces capable of dispersal and sustainment under contested conditions.

The so-called “Guam Cluster”—which includes the FAS—is the cornerstone of US defense architecture west of the IDL, and it is critical to sustainment in a future crisis. The United States should continue to invest political and military capital into reinforcing US access and capabilities in the FAS to deter Chinese aggression.

Dark clouds continue to gather on the Indo-Pacific horizon as the PLA modernizes and Xi continues to signal his ambition to unify the Taiwan Strait by any means necessary. In this environment, the credibility of US deterrence depends on the visible presence of capable military forces west of the IDL and their ability to respond with sufficient force. Lethality and visible presence matter.

As the Trump administration has acknowledged, credible deterrence—and, if necessary, victory—against China requires the active forward presence of combat-ready forces. Increasing US force posture in the Indo-Pacific through expanded presence agreements, intensified campaigning, and investment in the FAS will ensure the United States remains postured to respond swiftly and decisively to aggression.

Adam Kozloski is a nonresident senior fellow at the N7 Initiative in the Middle East Programs and at the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The Tiger Project, an Atlantic Council effort, develops new insights and actionable recommendations for the United States, as well as its allies and partners, to deter and counter aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Explore our collection of work, including expert commentary, multimedia content, and in-depth analysis, on strategic defense and deterrence issues in the region.

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“Yes, really”: American private military companies (back) in Gaza

Alia Brahimi — Mon, 09 Jun 2025 19:22:18 +0000

In Season 2, Episode 11 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi is joined by international lawyer and former senior UN human rights official Craig Mokhiber to discuss Israel’s militarization of aid in Gaza and how US private military companies (PMC) and individual contractors could be held legally liable for their association with violations occurring in the Gaza Strip.

Craig offers his assessment of why the Israeli-led Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) was established, its rejection by the UN and the international aid community for weaponising hunger, as well as the international laws it is breaching. He describes the cruelties and dangers inhering in this new aid system and outlines how individuals, including PMC employees, may be held legally accountable for their participation in the GHF and their association with the IDF’s wider alleged war crimes.

“This is not an aid operation. It is an extension of the unlawful Israeli occupation and its plans for the ethnic cleansing of Gaza.”

Craig Mokhiber, international lawyer and former senior UN human rights official

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About the podcast

Guns for Hire podcast is a production of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative. Taking Libya as its starting point, it explores the causes and implications of the growing use of mercenaries in armed conflict.

The podcast features guests from many walks of life, from ethicists and historians to former mercenary fighters. It seeks to understand what the normalization of contract warfare tells us about the world we currently live in, the future of the international system, and what war could look like in the coming decades.

A German leader’s D-Day lesson for Trump

Frederick Kempe — Sun, 08 Jun 2025 12:00:00 +0000

Set aside for the moment the mud wrestling between the world’s most powerful and richest men, Donald Trump and Elon Musk. This weekend, let’s focus on an insufficiently noticed exchange that goes more to the heart of the United States’ enduring and endangered purpose.

On the eve of the eighty-first anniversary of D-Day, the Allied invasion at Normandy that marked the beginning of Europe’s liberation from Adolf Hitler, newly elected German Chancellor Friedrich Merz brought a message to the White House that no American should ignore.

Merz made reference to the anniversary, in the context of Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, as marking a day “when the Americans once ended a war in Europe.”

Caught off-guard, the US president quipped that D-Day wasn’t a pleasant day for Germany.

“Well, in the long run, Mr. President,” Merz replied calmly, “this was the liberation of my country from Nazi dictatorship.”

Trump paused to digest what he’d just heard, a good German thanking Americans for defeating a criminal one, then he answered, “That’s true. That’s true.”

What came next was the most significant message US allies could send to the Trump administration as another criminal regime tests allied resolve.

“And we know what we owe you,” Merz went on. “But this is the reason why I’m saying that America is, again, in a very strong position to do something on this war and ending this war.” Merz asked Trump to talk about what they could do jointly “for more pressure on Russia,” placing the war’s blame unambiguously where it belongs.

It’s worth calling out that Merz-Trump exchange, which came in the twenty-seventh minute of their Oval Office session with reporters, after Trump comments on his travel ban, prospects for a China trade deal, his relationship with his erstwhile adviser Musk, and the presidential protocol of when to use an autopen signature.

Given the Ukraine war’s gravity and Merz’s reference to World War II, Trump’s comments that followed must have been disconcerting to Merz. The German chancellor was well enough rehearsed not to show it. When asked by a reporter when he would impose more sanctions on Russia, Trump talked about his over two-hour conversation with Putin, during which he compared the war to “two young children fighting like crazy . . . Sometimes you’re better off letting them fight for a while and then pulling them apart.”

With nearly a million and a half casualties already in this schoolyard brawl, a reporter asked Merz whether he agreed with the analogy.

Merz was at his best. He said both Germany and the United States agree on how terrible war is, and both are looking for ways to stop it soon. “And I told the president before we came in,” said Merz, “that he is the key person in the world who can really do that now by putting pressure on Russia.”

As Merz spoke of the children Russia has kidnapped from Ukraine, Trump described disturbing satellite pictures of the war—“bodies, arms, heads, legs all over the place. You’ve never seen anything like it. It’s so ridiculous.” Merz then added, “And this is only by Russian weapons against Ukraine. This had never happened with [Ukrainian] weapons against Russia, never . . . So, this is the difference, and that’s the reason why we are trying to do more on Russia.”

In the past two weeks, Trump has appeared to be losing patience with Putin, suggesting that he knows Putin is playing him for time and wondering whether Putin’s relentless attacks on civilians demonstrate that the Russian president has “gone absolutely CRAZY.” Beyond that, Trump has been quoted as calling Ukraine’s drone attacks last weekend on Russian strategic bombers “badass.”

All that history will remember, however, is whether Trump was the US president who contributed to Putin’s defeat and brought Ukraine a lasting peace—or whether he stood by as Putin escalates further, targeting civilians and their infrastructure. In all the news noise of a typical Trump administration week, it is worth listening closer to the German chancellor’s D-Day appeal that it will take much more US pressure on Russia to end this European war.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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Russian hybrid warfare: Ukraine’s success offers lessons for Europe

Maksym Beznosiuk — Thu, 05 Jun 2025 21:39:11 +0000

As Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine continues, the Kremlin is also rapidly escalating its hybrid war against Europe. Intelligence officials from a number of European countries are now raising the alarm and warning that Russian operations are growing in number and becoming bolder, with potential targets including transport hubs and critical infrastructure.

The Kremlin employs hybrid warfare tactics to remain below the threshold that would trigger a unified and potentially overwhelming European response. This has led to a surge in sabotage, cyberattacks, political interference, and disinformation campaigns across Europe, with a particular emphasis on countries closer to Russia.

Moscow’s hybrid war against Europe mirrors the tactics used by the Kremlin in Ukraine following the start of Russia’s invasion in 2014. Ukraine’s response to the often unprecedented challenges posed by Russian hybrid warfare offers important lessons for Kyiv’s European partners.

The Ukrainian experience highlights the gravity of the hybrid threat and the importance of an integrated response. The overall message to Western policymakers is clear: Moscow views hybrid warfare as an important Russian foreign policy tool and will continue expanding its campaign. Europe cannot afford to wait for Russian hybrid attacks to escalate further before building the advanced capabilities required to counter this threat.

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There have been growing reports of Russian hybrid war-style attacks across the EU since the onset of Russian aggression against Ukraine eleven years ago. This trend gained significant additional momentum following the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Typical incidents include cyberattacks targeting infrastructure, sabotage including arson attacks, and attempts to disrupt military aid destined for Ukraine. Moscow is also accused of investing billions of dollars in sophisticated social media campaigns to influence the outcome of elections across Europe. The Kremlin’s hybrid operations are concentrated in central and eastern Europe, with Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states among the primary targets.

None of this is new to Ukraine. For more than a decade, Ukrainians have been learning to cope with the full range of Russia’s hybrid warfare toolbox. Russia’s attack on Ukraine began in February 2014 when Russian soldiers without insignias took control of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula in a lightning operation that was accompanied by a massive wave of targeted disinformation.

Russia’s subsequent efforts to destabilize and subjugate the rest of Ukraine have involved a combination of conventional military aggression, sabotage, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and support for pro-Russian actors in Ukraine. Thanks to this prolonged exposure to Russian hybrid warfare, Ukraine has been able to develop countermeasures that have helped build resilience and reduce the impact of Russia’s hybrid operations.

Ukraine’s response has been a collaborative effort involving the Ukrainian government, civil society, and the private sector. In the cyber sphere, efforts to improve Ukraine’s digital security have played a key role, with the launch of the country’s popular Diia platform and the establishment of the Ministry of Digital Transformation helping to drive important digital governance reforms.

This has enhanced Ukraine’s ability to maintain public services amid acts of cyber aggression and has improved engagement with the population. Ukraine’s progress in the digital sphere has been recognized internationally, with the country climbing from the 102 spot to fifth position in the UN’s annual Online Services Index in the seven years between 2018 and 2025.

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Ukraine’s coordination structures, such as the Center for Strategic Communications and the Ministry of Digital Transformation, enable swift and well-coordinated responses across government, media, and digital channels. This offers a number of advantages in a hybrid war setting. For example, it allows the Ukrainian government to synchronize positions with proactive narrative-setting when countering the Kremlin’s disinformation campaigns.

Ukraine has also benefited from a decentralized approach involving digital volunteers, civil society, and public-private partnerships. A wide range of civic tech groups and open-source investigators are active in Ukraine detecting and countering Russian disinformation. These measures have made it possible to expose Russian narratives efficiently, coordinate messaging across government and civil society, and maintain coherence during military operations.

Since 2014, Ukraine has been able to reduce Russia’s overwhelming initial advantages on the information front of the hybrid war. While Russian disinformation tactics continue to evolve and remain a major aspect of the ongoing invasion, Ukraine has managed to increasingly leverage information to shape international opinion and influence diplomatic outcomes.

At present, the European response to Russia’s hybrid war lacks the institutional agility and coordination between public sector and civil society that is evident in Ukraine. Instead, the EU and NATO have developed a number of parallel structures such as NATO’s Joint Intelligence and Security Division and the EU’s East StratCom Task Force. While these agencies continue to make meaningful contributions to the fight back against Russian hybrid warfare, they have yet to demonstrate the kind of real-time operational coordination that has served Ukraine so well.

Ukraine’s model for combating Russian hybrid warfare can’t be replicated in full, but it could serve as a practical reference point for building more adaptive and integrated responses across the West. Given Ukraine’s unique experience, it might make sense to establish a trilateral consultative framework together with the EU and NATO to enable rapid hybrid threat evaluations and coordinate responses.

Ukraine’s long record of countering Russian hybrid warfare has also highlighted the role of civil society. Kyiv’s European partners should consider increasing support for initiatives such as investigative journalism, fact-checking platforms, and technical watchdogs that can serve as support elements in a broader European defense ecosystem. In an environment where information is increasingly weaponized, Ukraine’s experience has also underlined the need to embed media literacy into the education system to ensure European citizens are able to consume information critically and are less vulnerable to Russian propaganda.

Maksym Beznosiuk is a strategic policy specialist and director of UAinFocus, an independent platform connecting Ukrainian and international experts around key Ukrainian issues.

Trump’s Russia policy must be rooted in realism

Agnia Grigas — Thu, 05 Jun 2025 20:50:06 +0000

US President Donald Trump has recently changed his tone toward Russian president Vladimir Putin, suggesting that he has “gone crazy” and is “playing with fire.” This highlights the ongoing difficulties of negotiating with the Kremlin. While the Trump administration broadly favors a realist approach to international relations, a more pragmatic assessment of Russia’s capabilities and objectives could better equip the US to achieve its stated goal of bringing the war in Ukraine to an end.

Almost three months ago, Ukraine accepted a US proposal for a thirty-day unconditional ceasefire. So far, Russia has refused to do likewise. Instead, the Kremlin continues to demand a series of preconditions. Meanwhile, Russia has intensified its missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian civilian targets. When Trump recently backed Putin’s proposal for direct negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, the Russian leader then boycotted the subsequent Istanbul talks, sending only a lower-level delegation.

Within the Trump administration, key figures such as Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth have all articulated their support for a realist view of international relations. This implies sidestepping abstract ideological objectives and focusing on tangible power factors such as economic size, population, geography, and military strength.

The realist viewpoint is reflected in Hegseth’s assertion that Ukraine returning to its pre-2014 borders is “unrealistic.” It can also be seen in Trump’s statements that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy “does not have the cards” in negotiations with Russia, an assertion that seems far less certain in the wake of Ukraine’s successful recent strikes on Russia’s long-distance bombers.

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Some advocates of foreign policy realism argue that the US should seek to accommodate Russia, even at Ukraine’s expense. However, this approach tends to exaggerate Russia’s strengths, while underestimating the importance of the Kremlin’s imperial objectives and the relevant fact that Russian national security doctrine identifies the US as its principal adversary. A more comprehensive realist analysis of Russia reveals that, despite its assertiveness, Moscow’s power is in fact often overstated, while its appetite for compromise is limited.

Compared to the United States, Europe, and NATO, Russia simply does not “hold the cards,” to use Trump’s phrase. Its $2 trillion economy ranks outside the world’s top ten, trailing behind the US, China, Germany, Japan, India, and others. Although Russia has weathered sanctions, the prolonged war since 2022 has left its economy overextended and vulnerable.

The Russian population of 145 million is shrinking and ranks ninth globally, far behind the US and the collective European Union. Militarily, Russia’s large conventional forces have under-performed during the invasion of Ukraine while sustaining heavy losses. Russia’s $146 billion military budget, though substantial relative to neighboring states, pales in comparison to the $968 billion US budget in 2023, or even the collective defense spending of EU member states.

Russia remains a formidable nuclear power and frequently reminds the international community of this fact. Since the very first days of the Ukraine invasion in February 2022, Putin and other Kremlin officials have engaged in regular nuclear saber-rattling. But while Russia is the only nuclear power to make such threats, Putin has repeatedly failed to act when his red lines have been crossed by the Ukrainians, and has been publicly warned by his Chinese allies not to cross the nuclear threshold.

Since 2022, Russia has lost much of its energy leverage and is no longer Europe’s key energy supplier. Meanwhile, the United States has consolidated its position as a leading global energy exporter, particularly in liquefied natural gas (LNG). This is enabling Europe to diversify away from Russia while starving the Kremlin of vital revenue and geopolitical influence.

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In realist terms, Russia’s power surpasses that of its immediate smaller neighbors but falls well short of the US or the European Union as a whole. Countries in Northern, Central, and Eastern Europe view Putin’s ambitions through a realist lens based on centuries of painful experience with Russian imperialism. They understand that Putin’s current goal of reasserting Moscow’s dominance over the territories of the former Soviet Union and Russian Empire is deeply rooted in the Kremlin’s perception of Russian national interests.

President Trump should not fall into the same trap as his predecessors. Past US administrations, from George W. Bush onward, have sought to normalize relations with Moscow but have consistently underestimated Russia’s enduring imperialist objectives. In 2001, Bush famously called Putin “trustworthy” and said he has been able to “get a sense of his soul.” And yet before the end of Bush’s second term, Putin had become increasingly hostile to the West and had invaded Georgia. US President Barack Obama then pursued a “reset” in relations with Russia, only for Putin to invade Ukraine in 2014.

US President Joe Biden initially adopted a similarly optimistic stance toward Moscow, emphasizing the importance of predictable relations with Russia. In May 2021, Biden canceled sanctions on the Kremlin’s Nord Stream II gas pipeline. The following month, he met Putin in Geneva for a bilateral summit that was widely viewed as a further concession to the Russian leader. Less than a year later, Putin launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Looking back, it is clear that US policy toward Russia has often been shaped by the optimism of incoming administrations rather than a sober, realist understanding of Moscow’s longstanding ambitions. A deeper grasp of Russia’s objectives and capabilities could help the Trump administration, alongside European leaders, to negotiate a ceasefire in Ukraine and achieve a durable peace. Approaching the Kremlin from a position of strength, through the implementation of new sanctions on Russia and sustained military support for Ukraine, would be essential tools in securing that peace.

Agnia Grigas is senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and author of “Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire.”

The UK Strategic Defence Review lays out an ambitious roadmap for reform. Will the government deliver?

AM Sir Christopher Harper, KBE, RAF (Ret.) — Wed, 04 Jun 2025 15:06:10 +0000

By publishing its long-awaited Strategic Defence Review (SDR) on Monday, the United Kingdom has taken a positive step toward the reinvigoration and reform of its defense posture. Recognizing the perilous nature of the geostrategic scene, drawing lessons from the war in Ukraine, and seeking to enhance its leading role in NATO, the review is rigorous, thoughtful, and compelling; it offers one of the more realistic assessments of the United Kingdom’s security posture in recent memory. Its success, however, will hinge on funding and follow-through.

The SDR was written independently by Lord George Robertson, a former UK defense secretary and NATO secretary general; General Sir Richard Barrons, a former commander of the UK Joint Forces Command; and Fiona Hill, a foreign policy expert and former senior director for Europe and Russia at the US National Security Council. It benefits from the authors’ deep expertise and freedom to speak frankly.

In my assessment as a former Royal Air Force senior officer and director general of the NATO headquarters International Military Staff, I find the review blunt and refreshingly free of political gloss while still being infused with strategic depth. It offers a sobering analysis of the threats Britain faces and a coherent and comprehensive plan to deal with them.

If the UK media coverage of the review is anything to go by, then it has already been successful in promoting a national debate on the severity of the strategic risks the United Kingdom and its allies face. One of the review’s core aims is to foster a “total defence” culture, an understanding that security is not the sole preserve of the armed forces but a collective national responsibility.

No more “hollowing out”

British Prime Minister Keir Starmer echoed this whole-of-society message in a speech he delivered in Glasgow on Monday to launch the SDR. In the speech, he warned that the United Kingdom must prepare for a dangerous decade ahead. The United Kingdom would become, he said, “a battle-ready, armor-clad nation, with the strongest alliances and the most advanced capabilities, equipped for the decades to come.” Indeed, the review is laced throughout with the concept of “NATO first” and the United Kingdom’s aspiration to play a leading role in the Alliance.

On capabilities, the review outlines a serious agenda for restoring UK military strength after years of “hollowing out.” Among the most significant commitments is the acceleration of the United Kingdom’s sovereign nuclear warhead program (at a cost of £15 billion) to ensure that the country maintains an independent and credible deterrent. This is paired with equally serious investment in conventional capabilities, including the commitments to produce seven thousand long-range and cruise missiles and to construct six new munitions factories.

The SDR further calls for the United Kingdom to become a leading technology-enabled defense power, with an integrated force that deters, fights, and wins through constant innovation at wartime pace. To achieve that, it proposes a “three Is” model: integrated (rather than joint) forces, which are innovation-led and backed by industry. It emphasizes that greater attention must be given to the space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains. It also proposes making the army ten times more lethal by 2035 by exploiting autonomous systems and a “digital targeting web,” all informed by lessons learned from the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

The government has also pledged £1.5 billion for the modernization and refurbishment of military living accommodations. This, together with a move to take a whole-force, skills-based approach to workforce planning, would constitute long-overdue investments that could begin to address the current crisis surrounding the recruitment and retention of personnel.

None of the review’s recommendations reflect a marginal upgrade. Striking the appropriate balance between mass, speed, and resilience has returned to relevance alongside the need to reinvigorate stockpiles, munitions manufacturing, autonomous systems, and the United Kingdom’s technological edge. As demonstrated by the war in Ukraine, all these factors will increasingly define combat effectiveness. The SDR further recognizes the need to radically transform defense procurement processes and practice. For Britain to remain a serious military power, addressing these issues is both overdue and essential.

Finding the funding

Crucially, all sixty-two of the SDR’s recommendations have been accepted by the UK government—an indication, at least on paper, of genuine resolve.

And yet, despite the soundness of the review and the seriousness of its ambitions, an inevitable question mark remains over how these recommendations will be funded.

The government’s pledge to raise defense spending to 2.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) by 2027 is a step in the right direction. This review is unique in recent British history for being accompanied by increases rather than cuts in the budget. But this is still only a step. The longer-term ambition to reach 3 percent of GDP is not backed by binding Treasury policy or formal financial commitment. Moreover, it seems to hinge on a “defence dividend” of economic growth from a revitalized defense industrial base. Such an aspiration is not enough. In the face of a deteriorating strategic environment, Alliance members are likely to demand a minimum of 3.5 percent of GDP expenditure on defense at the upcoming NATO Summit in The Hague, which could lead to the United Kingdom falling behind the level of spending expected of a leading NATO power. Effective deterrence depends on credibility—and credibility hinges not on promises but on funded and delivered capabilities.

This financial dimension is especially critical in light of shifting US priorities. While the United States is unlikely to totally withdraw from NATO, there is a looming sense that Washington’s focus is inexorably moving away from Europe and toward the Indo-Pacific. Successive US administrations—regardless of party—have made clear that they expect European allies to carry more of the burden for their own defense. This has been brought into stark relief by the current US administration. A more self-reliant and militarily capable Europe is, therefore, no longer a theoretical objective—it is a strategic necessity.

For Britain, this means more than incremental increases in spending. It means making hard political choices and long-term industrial commitments now. The SDR lays out what needs to be done. The government has signaled its agreement. The next step—the most important one—will be putting money behind this critical endeavor.

Air Marshal Sir Christopher Harper is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served in the Royal Air Force, including as the UK military representative to NATO and the EU in Brussels and as director general of the NATO headquarters International Military Staff.

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Putin’s punitive peace terms are a call for Ukraine’s complete capitulation

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 03 Jun 2025 21:42:17 +0000

Russian and Ukrainian delegations failed to achieve any meaningful breakthroughs when they met for peace talks in Istanbul on Monday. The event was not a complete waste of time, however. Aside from agreeing on another welcome round of prisoner swaps, the two sides also exchanged peace proposals that confirmed the complete lack of middle ground for any kind of meaningful compromise to end the fighting.

While Ukraine’s proposal laid out a fairly pragmatic vision based on battlefield realities and security concerns, Russia presented punitive peace terms that would reestablish Kremlin control over Kyiv and doom the postwar Ukrainian state to a slow but inevitable death. This uncompromising Russian position should serve as a wake-call for anyone who still believes Putin is negotiating in good faith. In reality, the Russian dictator is more determined than ever to destroy Ukraine, and is merely exploiting US-led peace talks in order to strengthen his hand and divide the West.

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The demands unveiled by the Russian delegation this week in Istanbul came as no surprise and closely mirrored the conditions outlined on numerous prior occasions by Putin and other Kremlin leaders. Nevertheless, at a time when US President Donald Trump is publicly pressing for progress toward peace, the Russian decision to deliver such a maximalist memorandum sent a clear message of defiance to Washington DC.

As expected, Moscow reiterated its call for Ukraine to withdraw completely from four Ukrainian provinces that Russia currently claims as its own but has been unable to fully occupy. This would oblige the Ukrainian authorities to hand over a number of major cities and condemn millions of their compatriots to indefinite Russian occupation. Kyiv would also be expected to officially cede these regions together with Crimea, paving the way for international recognition of Russia’s conquests.

This crushing territorial settlement is only one aspect of Russia’s vision for the comprehensive dismantling of Ukrainian statehood. In line with Putin’s peace terms, Ukraine would be forced to accept limitations on the size of its army and on the categories of weapons it is allowed to possess. The country would be also be barred from joining any military blocs or concluding alliances with foreign nations. It does not take much imagination to guess what Putin has in mind for Ukraine once it has been successfully disarmed and internationally isolated.

Nor is that all. The Kremlin’s conditions actually go much further and aim to transform Ukraine from within in ways that would erase Ukrainian identity along with the country’s political independence. Moscow’s memorandum called on Ukraine to grant Russian the status of official state language, reinstate the privileges of the Russian Orthodox Church, and adopt a Kremlin-friendly version of Ukrainian history. Meanwhile, all so-called “nationalist” Ukrainian political parties would be banned, paving the way for the installation of a puppet regime in Kyiv.

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On the morning after this week’s bilateral meeting, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev confirmed the true objective of Russia’s participation in peace talks. “The Istanbul talks are not for striking a compromise peace on someone else’s delusional terms,” commented Medvedev, who currently serves as deputy chairman of Russia’s powerful National Security Council. Instead, Medvedev stated that Russia’s goal was to secure victory and ensure “the complete destruction of the neo-Nazi regime,” which is widely recognized as Kremlin code for the Ukrainian state. “That’s what the Russian memorandum published yesterday is about,” he noted.

Medvedev’s frank appraisal of the Russian position won him sarcastic praise from US Senator Lindsey Graham. “Congratulations to Mr. Medvedev for a rare moment of honesty coming from the Russian propaganda machine,” commented Trump ally Graham. “I appreciate you making it clear to the world that Putin and Russia are not remotely interested in peace.”

It is hard to argue with Graham’s assessment. For the past few months, Putin has gone out of his way to demonstrate that he has absolutely no intention of ending the war. While Ukraine has accepted a US proposal for an unconditional ceasefire, Putin has repeatedly refused to do so. Instead, he has engaged in transparent stalling tactics that make a mockery of the entire peace process.

Away from the negotiating table, Putin has dramatically increased drone and missile attacks on Ukrainian cities, killing and wounding hundreds of civilians. On the battlefield, his armies are currently engaged in the early stages what is shaping up to be one of the biggest Russian offensives of the entire war. These are not the actions of a man who seeks peace.

After this week’s fresh confirmation of Moscow’s undiminished imperial ambitions in Ukraine, it is now surely time to abandon any lingering delusions and accept that the Russian dictator will not stop until he is stopped. Putin believes he is on a messianic mission to extinguish Ukrainian statehood and revive the Russian Empire. He currently thinks he is winning this historic struggle and will not be swayed by Trump’s comparatively trivial talk of tariffs and trade deals.

The only thing that can change Putin’s mind is Western strength. As long as Putin is confident of eventual victory, he will continue. But if the alternative to a peace deal is a potentially crushing defeat, he may reconsider. To achieve this change, Western leaders must demonstrate a degree of collective resolve that has often been absent over the past three years. They must sanction Russia to the max and arm Ukraine to the teeth. This will require considerable political will and good old-fashioned courage in Western capitals. Ukraine will do the rest.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

After Ukraine’s innovative airbase attacks, nowhere in Russia is safe

David Kirichenko — Tue, 03 Jun 2025 20:55:58 +0000

Ukraine carried out one of the most audacious operations in modern military history on June 1, using swarms of smuggled drones to strike four Russian airbases simultaneously and destroy a significant portion of Putin’s bomber fleet. While the full extent of the damage remains disputed, open source evidence has already confirmed that Russia lost at least ten strategic bombers and possibly many more.

The attack highlighted Ukraine’s innovative use of military technologies and confirmed the country’s status as a world leader in the rapidly evolving art of drone warfare. Crucially, it also underlined Kyiv’s ability to conduct complex offensive operations deep inside Russia. This will force the Kremlin to radically rethink its domestic security stance, which could lead to the diversion of resources away from the invasion of Ukraine.

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According to Ukrainian sources, preparations for Operation Spider’s Web had been underway since late 2023. Ukraine was able to move a series of modified cargo containers into Russia along with more than one hundred first-person view (FPV) drones. The containers were then loaded with the drones and mounted on lorries before being moved into position close to Russian airbases. On Sunday morning, the green light was given and the drones were remotely activated, emerging from their containers to strike nearby Russian bombers.

The bombers targeted in these drone attacks play a key role in Russia’s air war and are regularly used to launch cruise missiles at Ukrainian cities. While Ukraine’s June 1 success will not bring this bombing campaign to an end, it may help save Ukrainian lives by reducing the number of available planes and forcing Russia to disperse its remaining strategic bombers to locations further away from Ukraine.

While any reduction on Russia’s ability to bomb Ukrainian civilians is welcome, the impact of Ukraine’s airbase attacks on the future course of the war is likely to be far more profound. Sunday’s Ukrainian strikes at locations across Russia have transformed the situation on Putin’s home front. Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than three years ago, Russians have grown accustomed to viewing the war as something that is taking place far away. That sense of security has now been shattered.

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This was not the first time Ukraine has struck deep inside Russia. For much of the war, Ukraine has been using its growing fleet of long-range drones to target Russian military bases and the country’s oil and gas industry. Russian Air Force hubs such as the Engels airbase in Saratov Oblast have been hit multiple times.

Ukraine’s attacks have gained momentum as the country’s long-range drone fleet has evolved and as Kyiv has developed its own missile capabilities. This mounting proficiency has not gone unnoticed internationally. Indeed, China reportedly asked Ukraine to refrain from attacking Moscow during the recent Victory Day parade on May 9, as Beijing was apparently unsure whether the Russians themselves could provide sufficient protection for the visiting Chinese leader.

Sunday’s operation represents a new stage in Ukraine’s efforts to bring Putin’s invasion home to Russia. By deploying large numbers of drones surreptitiously across the Russian Federation and activating them remotely, Ukraine demonstrated an ability to strike anywhere without warning. The consequences of this are potentially far-reaching. Russia must now increase security at every single military base, military-industrial site, command center, and transport hub throughout the country.

In addition to ramping up defensive measures around military infrastructure, Russia must also introduce further checks at the country’s borders and closely monitor all activity along endless highways stretching from Europe’s eastern frontier to the Pacific Ocean. This is a logistical nightmare. For example, thanks to Ukraine’s attack, all cargo containers must now be treated with suspicion. There are already reports of bottlenecks emerging at locations across Russia as alarmed officials inspect lorries in the hunt for more Ukrainian drones.

Given the colossal size of the Russian Federation, addressing the threat posed by Ukraine’s Trojan Horse tactics is a truly Herculean task. Russia’s vastness has traditionally been viewed as one of the country’s greatest strengths. The new form of warfare being pioneered by Ukraine could now turn this size into a major weakness. US President Donald Trump has repeatedly stated that Ukraine does not “have any cards” in its war with Russia, but Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy may just have played the ace of drones.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Q&A with Dov Zakheim

Atlantic Council Turkey Programs — Mon, 02 Jun 2025 14:00:00 +0000

The Defense Journal of the Atlantic Council in Turkey recently interviewed former US Undersecretary of Defense Dov Zakheim, a longtime observer of US foreign and national security policy, regarding recent tensions between US allies Israel and Turkey. Those tensions have received extensive media coverage, including the remarks of both President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during the latter’s April 7 visit to the White House—which featured Trump expressing optimism that tensions were manageable and that he might play a mediating role.

This interview has been lightly edited for style.

DJ: Thank you for your time in speaking with us. Israel and Turkey have had alternating close and tense relations for decades but maintained discrete contacts throughout the cyclical ups and downs. Are they still talking?

Zakheim: It’s hard to know because if they are talking it’s probably through intelligence channels, which get reported the least. My guess is that they probably are, if only to deconflict over Syria. There was a report commissioned by Prime Minister Netanyahu that said tensions over Syria could create a dangerous situation. Regional press reported a conclusion that the countries “could go to war,” but that’s not what the report said—just that the tensions were potentially quite serious. Turkish hard-right commentators from MHP [Milli Hareket Partisi, the National Movement Party, of Turkish nationalist] and HUDA PAR [Hür Dava Partisi, the Independent Cause Party, of Kurdish Islamist] have pretty much said the same thing; even President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has said similar things. The tensions are worse than what happened after the Mavi Marmara incident in some ways¹. The military and security establishments in both countries tend to be more realists and to seek de-escalation, though; so, they are probably still talking.

DJ: After the very tense period between 2009–2014, President Barack Obama and later Trump worked to ameliorate Turkey-Israel tensions, leading to a rapprochement of sorts. This contributed to a softening of tensions over time. Without US involvement, the two countries pursued a diplomatic reconciliation in 2023 that was interrupted by the Hamas attacks of October 7 and the Israeli response. Do the two countries need the United States as a mediator or are they better off together proceeding at their own pace and modalities?

Zakheim: Trump has offered to mediate between Israel and Turkey so as to improve their relationship. But Washington might be too distracted by the president’s other priorities. President Trump has focused on de-escalating the situation in Gaza, which could indirectly benefit Israel-Turkish tensions stemming in part from the conflict there. In addition, the Trump administration also has Ukraine, tariffs and trade, and a lot of things competing for the attention of the president and his key advisers. It is not surprising that Netanyahu raised Syria with President Trump, because Israelis take a different view of what’s going on there and are concerned about the Turkish role: They are not comfortable with what they see as growth in Turkish influence there. Discontent in Jerusalem can’t be ignored, though it appears that President Trump’s initial response was balanced and that Netanyahu didn’t get the backing for his position that he might have wanted.

DJ: Syria is a unique challenge between Israel and Turkey now because it essentially makes them neighbors—tense and distrustful neighbors—not just countries in the same region. How do both countries meet their minimum interests in Syria?

Zakheim: It shouldn’t be zero-sum between these two, because there are other players in the equation. The Iranians are still present in Syria to a degree, and the Russians of course hope to keep air and naval bases [there]. Israelis are divided as to whether it is good or bad for Russia to stay or go. It appears Netanyahu thinks it may not be a bad thing to use the Russians to balance Turkish influence. Then there is the question of Damascus, the transitional government, itself. Some think they haven’t really evolved from their roots in al-Qaeda, while others say Damascus—especially transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa—have been signaling moderation and reaching out to the West because they know that they need Western support. Where there are many players, a modus vivendi is possible, especially if Sharaa wants to move toward the West more than the Assad regime did. There is great fluidity in Syria now. The Kurdish factor still has to play out as well and the success or degree of their reintegration affects Ankara’s positioning. Abdullah Öcalan may want to disarm the movement he founded, the PKK [Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan, or Kurdish Workers’ Party], but it is possible that parts of the movement in Iraq or Syria do not². With so many possibilities, Jerusalem and Ankara both would do well to show flexibility.

DJ: Is Syria without Assad better for Israel than Syria with Assad?

Zakheim: I think it will very much depend on where the Syrian government goes. We haven’t heard the same sort of vitriol out of Damascus as under Assad, despite Israel taking more territory and conducting air attacks. It may be that the Israel-Syria border becomes a quiet border like it was under Hafez al-Assad as opposed to the more dangerous border that became the norm under Bashar and his backers, Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Bashar was a slimy figure to the Turks as well: He lied to Ankara and was problematic for Israel. It may well be that a government that proceeds the way al-Sharaa says he wants to go could be a plus for both Israel and Turkey.

DJ: How much of the current Turkey-Israel tension do you see as structural or systemic, and how much personal (i.e., a product of the combative Netanyahu-Erdoğan relationship)?

Zakheim: There is no doubt that the personalities don’t line up very well. For comparison, though, we can look at the relationship between Netanyahu and former President Joe Biden—they were not fond of one another, but the two countries remained close. It was Erdoğan who patched things up gradually with Netanyahu over a decade. Erdoğan is a realist, and he knows very well that Israel has a number of things to offer and is an important market. Remember that Turkey is developing a very high-tech military and other industries, and there are many areas where they might partner with Israel. There was over $1 billion in bilateral trade that has now been cut off—though some still comes through third countries. The fact remains that Erdoğan is a pragmatist. If Gaza is somehow settled, that is a way for trade relations to be restored, and these two countries are potentially very important partners for trade and security cooperation.

Overall, despite the ups and downs there is a degree of complementarity. Both leaders are survivors and have pragmatist streaks. Gaza is a place where the United States can clearly play a major role in reconciling interests. If there is reconstruction, Turkish companies, especially in infrastructure, can have a role. A Turkish constructive role in stabilizing Gaza could be a new pivot point. It is true that Erdoğan plays to his base, but both he and Netanyahu remain less vitriolic about “the other” country in the equation than the hardliners in their own coalitions.

Dov S. Zakheim is a member of the Atlantic Council Board of Directors. He was US undersecretary of defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer from 2001-04. He is a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and senior fellow at the CNA Corporation.

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The Atlantic Council in Turkey aims to promote and strengthen transatlantic engagement with the region by providing a high-level forum and pursuing programming to address the most important issues on energy, economics, security, and defense.

1 The Mavi Marmara incident involved Israeli Navy interdiction of civilian ships trying to break a blockade of Gaza, which resulted in the death of nine Turkish activists and ended with a 2013 apology by Netanyahu.

2 On May 12^th 2025, following a congress of PKK leadership, the organization announced a decision to disarm and dissolve organizationally. The impacts of this decision on the ground in Iraq and Syria remain to be seen, as noted in the interview.

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Transatlantic relations and a region in flux

Atlantic Council Turkey Program — Mon, 02 Jun 2025 14:00:00 +0000

Foreword

Dramatic events altered the geopolitical landscape, affecting Turkey, the United States, and NATO in late 2024 and early 2025. The election of Donald Trump as the forty seventh president of America, a ceasefire in Gaza after months of showdown between Israel and Iran’s Axis of Resistance, and the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria have challenged many assumptions and regional political-military considerations. The fifth issue of the Defense Journal assesses key dynamics as we enter a new era. The Defense Journal team examines the rise of the hyperwar concept via military applications of artificial intelligence and the frontier of development for robotic systems. We also look at trends in key US policy concerns in the region to the south of Turkey, including Israel and Syria. If the first months of the second Trump administration are any indication, rapid change and a high tempo in US foreign policy decisions affecting Washington, Ankara, and their shared interests across several regions is the new normal. The Editorial Team hopes you find these contributions interesting and useful.

Rich Outzen and Can Kasapoglu, Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY Co-managing editors

Articles

2024 in the rear view

By Rich Outzen

Hyperwar, artificial intelligence, and Homo sapien

By Can Kasapoğlu

Turkish-American defense and energy partnerships suit the new transatlantic landscape

By Greg Bloom

Q&A with Dov Zakheim

By Atlantic Council Turkey Program

In Syria’s fragile transition there’s a glimmer of a more stable Middle East

By Charles Lister

Q&A with Haluk Bayraktar

By Atlantic Council Turkey Program

Why the Middle Corridor matters amid a geopolitical resorting

By Karel Valansi

Honorary advisory board

The Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY‘s honorary advisory board provides vision and direction for the journal. We are honored to have Atlantic Council board directors Gen. Wesley K. Clark, former commander of US European Command; Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky, former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs; Gen. James L. Jones, former national security advisor to the President of the United States; Franklin D. Kramer, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute, former US Ambassador to NATO; and Dov S. Zakheim, former Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer for the Department of Defense.

Gen. Wesley K. Clark

Chairman and CEO of Wesley K. Clark & Associates & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO

Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky, Ph.D.

Senior Fellow at Harvard University JFK Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs; Board Director, Atlantic Council; former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs (2001-2009)

Gen. James L. Jones

President, Jones Group International and Executive Chairman Emeritus, Atlantic Council; former National Security Advisor to the President of the United States

Franklin D. Kramer

Distinguished Fellow & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Assistant Secretary of Defense

Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute

CEO, Cambridge Global Advisors & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Permanent Representative to NATO

Dov S. Zakheim

Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Senior Fellow, CNA Corporation; Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Under Secretary of Defense

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2024 in the rear view

Rich Outzen — Mon, 02 Jun 2025 14:00:00 +0000

2024 brought a host of developments and changes in the security and defense environment facing the United States, Turkey, and their NATO partners. Some of these dynamics were political and geopolitical in nature, some operational, others military and technical. As the Defense Journal assesses and describes the state of the Alliance in 2025 for its readers, a brief retrospective on the year just passed and its impact provides a part of the necessary context.

Geopolitical shaping events

Momentous geopolitical events since our winter issue have included the advent of Donald Trump’s second term as US president, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, and the apparent revelation in Europe that conventional military defense is a sovereign responsibility that cannot be outsourced in perpetuity. These events have had significant implications for the security of NATO, Turkey, and the United States.

Trump’s return has had several immediate effects on the United States (and thus the global) security environment. His approach narrows the US global mission from maintaining a liberal world order to pursuing US national interests, while adopting a tone of strategic ambiguity toward both rivals and allies. He has simultaneously directed reform of the US military to reemphasize combat readiness and lethality while minimizing social or ideological programs. As commander in chief, Trump has directed US soldiers to conduct counterterror strikes in places like Somalia and Yemen even as his negotiators seek to defuse conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and elsewhere.

The fall of Bashar al-Assad after an eleven-day rebel offensive reshaped the strategic map of the Middle East. Iran lost a valuable strategic position in its multidimensional “resistance” against Israel and Western influence. Russia lost its sunk investment in Assad and a degree of its influence in the Middle East. Turkey has gained greater stability on its southern border, close defense and intelligence ties with the new Syrian authorities, and prospects for expanded regional trade and a leading role in Syrian reconstruction. The challenges of stabilizing Syria, and tensions between Israel and Turkey stemming from their respective threat perceptions, have no immediate or apparent solution, and will require deft diplomacy to manage.

Shifts that might have attracted more attention in other times were easy to miss, but still noteworthy in terms of global security. China and Russia took steps to bolster the military junta in Myanmar that is teetering on the edge of collapse against a rebel coalition. Battles between the Sudanese army (backed by Egypt, Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia) and the antigovernment Rapid Support Forces (supported by Russia and the United Arab Emirates) have shifted decisively in favor of the army, though not yet presaging an end to the civil war. The war in Ukraine grinds on amid serious attempts by Trump to forge a ceasefire. Early 2025 continues to be an era of persistent conflict and great power competition, but one with dramatic developments that will echo throughout this and future years.

Strategic alliance development

International patterns of alliance and armament over the past half-year have reflected the weight of geopolitical changes noted above. Deep and effective US support to Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression has led to a tighter convergence of what has been referred to as the axis of upheaval, with China, Iran, and North Korea sending weapons, supplies, and even soldiers to aid the Russian war effort. A dozen or more other countries have provided diplomatic support to Moscow, but these three have become critical suppliers of weapons and cash for the Kremlin. This is a trend that began before 2024, but has only accelerated in recent months.

The global arms market continues to shift in other significant ways. The United States in 2024 cemented its leading position in arms exports, accounting for 43 percent of global exports. Russian exports have sharply decreased as domestic production has been consumed by the ongoing war in Ukraine. Italy and Turkey have more than doubled their national shares of global exports over the past several years (2 percent to 4.8 percent for Italy and 0.8 percent to 1.7 percent for Turkey). Five Turkish defense firms rank among the one hundred largest in the world—and a sixth, Baykar, would almost certainly be high on the list if all of its sales data were publicly released. Only the United States, China, Germany, and the United Kingdom match or exceed this number. Of particular note has been the continued rise in demand for Turkish armaments from Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar.

Europe, for its part, has shown signs of finally getting serious about developing its own conventional military deterrent vis-à-vis Russia—or at least talking about doing so. Shocked by Trump’s heavy-handed conditionality on future aid to Ukraine, Brussels and its member states have drawn up plans for massive new defense spending and other deterrent steps—if taxpayers and military-age youth prove willing. Yet the European Union’s initial formulation of deterrence against Russia independent of Washington and without integrating Turkish geography, military capabilities, and strategic resources does not inspire confidence, especially given the long years needed to restore defense industrial capacity even assuming consistent commitment. European firms and national leaders would do well to welcome Turkish contributions to European defense planning and resourcing both in NATO and in EU planning by following through on plans to sell Ankara Eurofighters and encouraging more collaboration like that between Italy’s Leonardo and Turkey’s Baykar.

While the past half year has demonstrated volatility at the geopolitical and political levels, it has brought multipolarity and diffusion of power at the strategic level. This has played out in the evolution of alliances and the flow of arms and trade more broadly. In mid-2024 dualistic constructs (autocracy versus democracy, the US-led Alliance against an axis of evil) retained some utility. The current environment is messier, with issue-specific coalitions and transactional diplomacy creating a kaleidoscope of rivals, partners, and targets that, for now at least, deny predictable patterns and lead some to question the credibility of the international system’s most potent actor.

Operational trends

As geopolitics and alliances continue to evolve, so, too, does war in operational terms. In a world with ongoing “hot wars” in Ukraine, the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere, several discernible trends can be identified. These include diminishing returns for artillery as seen in Ukraine, failure to achieve military victory through ground maneuver forces for Russia and Israel, and the fragility of lightly armed proxy forces in various theaters.

Russia since 2022 has compensated for shortcomings in its infantry, armor, and air forces through reliance on superior tube and rocket artillery, exacting a heavy toll on Ukrainian defenders in the process. Yet in late 2024, losses among Russian artillery units rose as Ukrainian drone tactics and counterbattery fire became more effective. While Russia still outproduces NATO in artillery ammunition and continues to fire it at prodigious rates, its advantage is decreasing in relative terms.

Russia has continued to advance at high cost to try and consolidate control over the nearly 20 percent of Ukrainian territory it occupies, but has failed to end the war via ground maneuver after three years. The difficulty of ending wars through ground maneuver even against inferior opponents can also be seen in Gaza, where operations which have continued for eighteen months are not yet meeting the stated war goals of military and political leaders. Both the Russian and Israeli campaigns reflect the historical difficulty of reconciling the political nature of conflict termination with the operational conduct of wars, and a resultant tendency for destructive wars to yield stalemate when that task remains incomplete.

The recent period produced impressive operational results in other cases, notably Israel’s campaign against Iran’s regional proxy network and the Sudanese army’s efforts to regain control of the national capital region from the insurgent Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia. In late 2024 Israel crippled Lebanese Hezbollah and struck Iranian-supported militia targets in Syria and Iraq during an audacious campaign involving air strikes, ground maneuver, and exploding cellphones. Between November 2024 and March 2025 the Sudanese Army routed the RSF from Khartoum and other areas in central Sudan. The RSF had been supported by a number of foreign sponsors, including the United Arab Emirates and several other regional countries, but ultimately failed to achieve local or regional legitimacy—as had the Iranian proxy groups in Lebanon and Syria, and arguably in Iraq and Yemen as well. The past several months have badly undermined the notion popular over the past decade that proxy wars can effectively “enable intervention on the cheap.”

Military technical developments on the horizon

Over the past several months sixth-generation fighter aircraft have moved from concept to reality. China flew two prototypes in December 2024, one produced by Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group and the other by AVIC Shenyang Aircraft. US prototypes for a Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) aircraft have been under evaluation since 2020, but in March 2025 the Boeing F-47 was officially selected as the program’s platform. A half-dozen other countries have done some sixth-generation work—integrating advanced stealth, artificial intelligence, manned-unmanned teaming, and other advanced technologies—though even for those with the deepest pockets, fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft will be mainstays for the foreseeable future.

Artificial intelligence is a growing element in military planning and readiness. While the United States and many of its allies have endorsed the Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy, many potential adversaries and rivals have not. Military applications for AI focus at present on information processing, threat identification, and decision-making, areas in which the United States has relative advantage. The Department of Defense’s Defense Innovation Unit is implementing a project, Thunderforge, to deploy such capabilities to headquarters in Asia and Europe. The military services each have designated units to test concepts and systems related to AI in the field. The drive to develop effective defenses against small unmanned aerial systems (UAS) has gained urgency with the continued broad proliferation of cheap, easy-to-use, lethal UAS around the world. The December 2024 Department of Defense adoption of a classified strategy to accelerate counter-UAS development signals the rising criticality of the need for cost-effective and combat-effective counters to the cheap and plentiful threat. This is an area ripe for technical development and fielding in the near future.

Adaptive Alliance

The shifting dynamics at all these levels—geopolitical, strategic, operational, and technical—shape the contours of defense and security challenges for the United States and its NATO allies. These are certainly challenging times, yet the Alliance has endured for over seven decades through other chaotic and difficult periods because the basic value proposition of mutual defense among the members remains sound. Secretary General Mark Rutte strikes the right tone with his assessment that “there is no alternative to NATO” for either the United States or its partners, and that despite frictions related to burden sharing, domestic politics, and sometimes divergent national interest, NATO’s summit in The Hague in late June will show the Alliance evolving rather than dissolving.

Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Turkey with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on X @RichOutzen.

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Dispatch from Kyiv: Ukraine’s daring drone attack gives Trump leverage against Putin

John E. Herbst — Mon, 02 Jun 2025 03:26:24 +0000

KYIV—It was a surprising and devastating attack that some hysterical Russian war bloggers are calling the country’s Pearl Harbor. But the assault on Pearl Harbor occurred when there was no war between Japan and the United States.

Having spent the last four nights in a bomb shelter in Odesa and Kyiv as the Kremlin continues its massive missile and drone attacks on Ukraine’s cities, in a war of aggression that Moscow launched, I can assure you that Ukraine had every right to do what it did on June 1: Strike strategic bombers at five bases across the breadth of Russia.

In contrast to Moscow’s targeting of Ukrainian civilians and infrastructure, Ukraine committed no war crime or breach of international law in destroying those Russian planes, which are regularly used against civilians.

Rather than recalling the Pearl Harbor attack, the complexity and boldness of Ukraine’s “Operation Spiderweb”—which involved smuggling drones into Russian regions from Murmansk to Irkutsk, and launching them against advanced Russian Tu-95 and Tu-22 bombers and A-50 intelligence planes—rivals the now legendary Israeli intelligence operation against Hezbollah fighters’ pagers last year. It has underscored once again that ingenuity along with determination are Ukraine’s strategic advantages in stopping Moscow’s war of aggression.

According to media reports, as many as forty planes have been hit. The Security Service of Ukraine—which planned and executed the operation—claims that the attack destroyed 34 percent of Russia’s strategic bombers capable of carrying cruise missiles. Russian defense sources say that while some planes were on fire as a result of the attack, no real damage was done. Some Russian war bloggers, however, are writing as if the damage was major, and video evidence on social media show the destruction of at least some planes.

Whatever the number of destroyed planes, it is safe to conclude that Moscow will be more cautious about the basing of its remaining bombers, as it was last year when Ukrainian drones began to target Russian military assets. This will further reduce the role of Russian bombers in attacking Ukraine’s front lines, infrastructure, and cities. Of course, Moscow still has plenty of missiles and drones to continue its murderous campaign against civilian targets in Ukraine. But Operation Spiderweb revealed how vulnerable Russia is to unconventional Ukrainian attacks. This has been a major feature of the war evident in Ukraine’s successful 2022 counteroffensive, sweeping of the Russian navy from the central and western Black Sea, and Kursk offensive last year.

It is also important to note that the Tu-95s and Tu-22s are capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Their loss could weaken the aerial component of Moscow’s nuclear triad, which also has ground (missiles) and sea (submarines) components. Moscow considers the United States its principal adversary. As US Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard noted in this year’s national intelligence assessment, Russia, like China, is an adversary of the United States. As with Ukraine’s chewing up of Russia’s conventional military in the war, this operation proves another Ukrainian contribution to US security.

Beyond the battlefield, the impact of this operation is perhaps even more significant. It is a strong counter to the dubious “common wisdom” that the war is moving inevitably in Moscow’s favor. This same assumption explains why Russian President Vladimir Putin has rejected numerous proposals for a cease-fire by US President Donald Trump, and why he has refused to send a paper with the Kremlin’s terms for a cease-fire to Ukraine before the June 2 peace talks in Istanbul that he proposed. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy correctly described that proposal as a stalling tactic, but against the backdrop of this daring operation finally announced that Ukraine would attend the talks. At this point, Moscow is not talking about boycotting them.

Most observers expect some form of Kremlin response to the Ukrainian attack. While some unhinged Russian war bloggers are calling for the use of a tactical nuclear weapon, it is more likely that Moscow will respond along current operational lines—for example, by conducting even more massive air attacks. While the destruction of the planes is a serious blow against Russia’s air force and Putin’s own prestige, it does not compare in importance to the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the fall of 2022. When it comes to Putin’s calculations in this war, nuclear weapons are principally a rhetorical tool to intimidate Western leaders from backing Ukraine more firmly.

A key question is how the Trump administration will respond to this operation. Several hours after the news broke, the only word from the White House was that Kyiv did not let it know of the operation in advance. The attack occurred just days after the visit of Senators Lindsey Graham and Richard Blumenthal to Ukraine, where they announced that the Senate will move ahead this coming week on their long-awaited bill to impose major additional sanctions against Russia.

Trump has been coming under increasing criticism for his reluctance to put real pressure on Putin for the Russian president’s failure to accept cease-fire terms proposed by Washington and accepted by Kyiv. Will Trump let the sanctions bill—which has eighty-two co-sponsors—pass the Senate? He could call Putin, point to Ukraine’s latest military accomplishment as one more reason to accept Trump’s compromise solution for a cease-fire, and note that political pressure in Washington to take more action against Russia is growing. (The US president can also point to Ukraine’s effective operation, which flummoxed Russian air defenses, as one more reason the United States needs his proposed Golden Dome missile defense system, which Ukraine could be a uniquely capable partner in building.)

Trump could convey the message that if Putin cannot bring himself to accept a cease-fire, significant new sanctions are coming. That would be a clever way to leverage Ukraine’s battlefield success to achieve Trump’s own goal: a durable peace in Ukraine.

John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

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UN probe: Russia’s ‘human safari’ in Ukraine is a crime against humanity

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 29 May 2025 21:46:50 +0000

Russia is guilty of committing crimes against humanity in southern Ukraine’s Kherson region, according to a new report by the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine. The report comes following an extensive investigation into a campaign of Russian drone strikes on Ukrainian civilians over a ten-month period beginning in July 2024, with the probe focusing on an area of southern Ukraine stretching more than 100 kilometers along the right bank of the Dnipro River around the city of Kherson.

Members of the UN Commission determined that Russia was engaged in the deliberate targeting of civilians and concluded that the drone attacks were “widespread, systematic, and conducted as part of a coordinated state policy.” The report detailed how civilians were targeted “in various circumstances, mainly when they were outdoors, both on foot or while using any type of vehicles,” and noted that on a number of occasions ambulances had been struck by drones in an apparent bid to prevent them from reaching victims and providing vital medical assistance.

During the ten-month period covered by the United Nations probe, Russian drones killed almost 150 Ukrainian civilians in and around Kherson, while leaving hundreds more injured. The constant threat of attack has created a pervasive climate of fear throughout the region, with people afraid to leave their homes. Terrified locals say they feel hunted and refer to the drone attacks as a “human safari.”

In addition to daily drone strikes, Russia has sought to maximize the psychological pressure on residents of the Kherson region via social media channels. UN investigators reported that video footage of drone attacks on Ukrainian civilians is regularly disseminated on Russian Telegram channels, some of which have thousands of subscribers. This video footage shows drone strikes along with the resulting deaths and destruction in the style of video games, often accompanied by background music. Meanwhile, menacing messages posted on Telegram call on Ukrainians to flee the region. “Get out of the city before the leaves fall, you who are destined to die,” read one message quoted in the UN report.

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This is not the first time UN investigators have accused Russia of committing crimes against humanity in Ukraine. A March 2025 UN report reached a similar conclusion regarding the Kremlin’s large-scale program of detentions and deportations targeting Ukrainians living under Russian occupation. “The evidence gathered led the Commission to conclude that the enforced disappearances against civilians were perpetrated pursuant to a coordinated state policy and amount to crimes against humanity,” the report stated.

Meanwhile, the International Criminal Court in The Hague has issued a number of arrest warrants for senior Russian officials in relation to alleged war crimes committed in Ukraine including the targeted bombing of civilians and critical civilian infrastructure. The most high-profile ICC arrest warrant is for Vladimir Putin himself, who is wanted for his alleged involvement in the mass abduction of Ukrainian children.

At least 20,000 Ukrainian children are believed to have been kidnapped since the start of the full-scale invasion and taken to Russia, where they are subjected to indoctrination to rob them of their Ukrainian heritage and impose a Russian national identity. The nature and scale of these mass abductions may qualify as an act of genocide according to the 1948 United Nations Genocide Convention.

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Russia’s deadly “human safari” drone campaign against the civilian population in southern Ukraine’s Kherson region is part of the Kremlin’s strategy to make the area unlivable. The city of Kherson was occupied by the advancing Russian army during the first days of the full-scale invasion and was officially annexed by Russia in September 2022. However, Kherson and the surrounding area were liberated by the Ukrainian military soon after. The scenes of joy that accompanied the liberation of Kherson were deeply humiliating for Putin, who had personally proclaimed the city to be “forever” Russian just weeks earlier.

This setback forced Putin’s invading army to retreat across the Dnipro River, creating a major physical obstacle for the Russian invasion and limiting the occupied zone of Ukraine to the eastern half of the country. Nevertheless, Moscow continues to insist that Kherson and the surrounding region are now part of the Russian Federation and must be handed over within the framework of a future peace deal.

Ukraine has completely ruled out any such concessions. This is hardly surprising. While some temporary territorial compromises may prove possible during peace negotiations, Ukraine’s stance on Kherson is unlikely to change. After all, allowing the renewed Russian occupation of Kherson would be suicidal for Kyiv. It would present Russia with a priceless foothold across the Dnipro River that could be used as a gateway to seize Ukraine’s Black Sea ports and complete the conquest of the country.

For now, Russia appears to have little chance of seizing Kherson militarily or of acquiring the city at the negotiating table. Instead, Moscow seems to be intent on terrorizing local residents and forcing them to flee. Putin claims that the population of the Kherson region are Russians, but he has no qualms about his soldiers using drones to hunt and kill them mercilessly. This tells you all you need to know about Putin’s cynical posturing as the protector of the Russian people in Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The Israeli public square is a bubbling cauldron, with multiple challenges—foreign and domestic—negatively impacting the prospects of Netanyahu’s majority. His government has demonstrated remarkable resilience over these past twenty months of multifront warfare, rebounding relatively quickly after October 7, 2023, to put Israel’s enemies (including Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon) on the defensive. However, the pressing need to make strategic decisions is exposing fissures that now threaten the stability of Netanyahu’s governing coalition.

Netanyahu’s next moves on Gaza and Iran—two theaters of operation where he appears increasingly misaligned with the Trump administration—could exacerbate those pressures, compelling him to choose between the support of the United States and that of his key coalition partners. More immediately, a potential revolt within the ranks of his government, whose ultra-Orthodox members have issued an ultimatum that they will bolt unless their demands for a military draft exemption are met next week, could create a cascade that triggers early elections. Adding to this volatility, Netanyahu’s cross-examination by the prosecution in his corruption trials will begin next week.

2. How do current divisions compare with pre-October 7 divisions in Israeli politics?

The horrors of October 7 had a chilling effect on the Israeli population, instantly sidelining the disputes—most prominent among them, issues relating to plans for an overhaul of the judiciary—that had paralyzed the country, with precedence shifting to the critical functions of national defense and rehabilitation. Israelis mobilized to meet those tasks, with civil society often filling vacuums in service left by a crippled bureaucracy.

With the passage of time, however, as many crises have since been downgraded or become routine, a “new normal” has created space for pre-October 7 divisions to resurge with a vengeance. This has been most evident in the resumption of divisive government initiatives to circumscribe the mandate of the courts and to assert absolute control over senior appointments. After more than eighteen months of combat, many in Israel believe that when Israelis do ultimately return to the polls, a fault line will be apparent. On one side will be those who have contributed tangibly to the war effort, with many spending hundreds of days on Israel Defense Force reserve duty. On the other side will be those who have evaded such responsibilities.

3. What does this mean for Netanyahu’s government?

In this state of affairs, an embattled Netanyahu is maneuvering to keep his coalition afloat, requiring him to keep its various components satisfied—notwithstanding assessments that most of them have no viable alternative to his leadership. To that end, the prime minister has rejected all solutions for Gaza that would enable Hamas to remain in the territory and, in the interim, to have a hand in administering the distribution of humanitarian aid. Netanyahu’s support for a lenient conscription bill fits into this category as well.

The success of his juggling act is far from guaranteed, however. His government has faced growing pushback from the international community—including, but not limited to, arrest warrants by the International Criminal Court; consideration of targeted sanctions by the United Kingdom, France, and Canada; and a review of the European Union’s association agreement with Israel. This has compounded the stakes of his gambit, possibly exacting an untenable cost for Israel that could encourage a shift in course.

4. What does this mean for US-Israel relations?

Mounting criticism from many of Israel’s traditional friends has only heightened its reliance on Washington. Not only does the United States continue to provide the overwhelming bulk of diplomatic and military assistance afforded to Israel, but Trump administration officials are also playing the lead role in ongoing mediation with Israel’s adversaries. Reportedly, however, Netanyahu has been flustered by a series of events that suggest that Trump’s objectives could actually imperil Israel’s situation.

Emerging details of negotiations that Steve Witkoff, the Trump’s Middle East envoy, has been conducting with Hamas and Iran have been a cause of concern in Jerusalem. Similar consternation was manifest when an end to US hostilities with the Houthis exempted Israel, and when the United States extended its embrace to the new Syrian regime. Netanyahu has repeatedly dispatched messengers to present Israel’s case before administration principals, but the differences between their approaches are unmistakable and could spark a wider breach in the bilateral relationship at an extremely precarious juncture.

5. How might this impact what comes next in the war?

The United States holds most of the cards in this scenario, as well as the agency to deploy them. If Witkoff produces a deal with Hamas that meets Trump’s minimum expectations, Netanyahu will have little choice but to overcome his reservations and accept its terms—and hope that he can persuade enough of his coalition to do likewise. The other, more dangerous option would be to risk running afoul of the White House and being subjected to a similar Oval Office reception as the presidents of Ukraine and South Africa, something which would broadcast Israel’s new vulnerability to the world.

Netanyahu is walking on even more fragile eggshells regarding Iran. Trump has stated that it “would be inappropriate” for Israel to attack Iran “right now because we’re very close to a solution.” The possibility of just such a strike—especially if Israel were to determine that Iran’s path to a nuclear weapon was imminent and unimpeded—cannot be ruled out unequivocally. In that event, however, and in its aftermath, a rupture with Trump could have disastrous consequences for Israel.

Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow for Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. From 1990 to 2016, he served seven consecutive premiers at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem.

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Judicial reform must be at the heart of Ukraine’s postwar recovery

Oleksandr Vasiuk — Thu, 29 May 2025 19:22:49 +0000

Whenever the topic of Ukraine’s reconstruction arises, most people tend to think of physical infrastructure such as roads, bridges, homes, and hospitals. But real national recovery does not start with bricks and concrete. It begins with trust. And there is no better test of trustworthiness than the rule of law.

Ukraine is currently fighting for national survival against Russia’s ongoing invasion. Once this battle is won, the most important challenge facing the country will be judicial reform. If Ukraine is to emerge in the postwar years as a stable and prosperous European democracy, the process of recovery and renewal must be based on the firm foundations of a strong justice system. This is not a mere slogan; it is an absolute necessity.

Judicial reform is the key to the country’s entire future economic development. Investors will not come to Ukraine if contracts cannot be enforced or if property rights can be bought and sold through corruption. That is the message Ukraine’s international partners have been repeating consistently for many years. With the massive task of postwar rebuilding looming on the horizon, this message is now arguably truer than ever.

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Once the war ends, Ukraine can expect to receive unprecedented international support as foreign governments seek to participate in what promises to be Europe’s largest reconstruction initiative since the years following World War II. While donor funding from partner countries is likely to be very significant, this will not be nearly enough to cover the estimated rebuilding price tag of around half a trillion US dollars. Instead, much of this money must come from the private sector. However, unless Ukraine has a transparent, reliable, and efficient justice system, private capital will stay away.

If Ukraine hopes to become a success story, it needs courts that can settle disputes fairly, whatever the issue. If legal cases are tainted by bias or drag on for years, this will serve as a major red flag to all potential investors. For this reason, Ukraine’s courts should be recognized as a key element of the country’s infrastructure that is every bit as vital to national recovery as roads or power lines. After all, the justice system serves as the legal framework that makes it possible to build everything else.

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Despite the ongoing war, Ukraine has made real progress in recent years toward meaningful judicial reform. This has included the reform of key institutions like the High Court of Justice, along with the launch of new processes to improve the selection of Constitutional Court judges. It is now crucial to build on this momentum.

Judicial reform must be deep, deliberate, and closely tied to Ukraine’s European future. With this in mind, it is important to maintain the current dialogue with the Venice Commission and use its recommendations to shape genuine change. One of the most effective tools to help achieve this change is the participation of international experts. Their role is not to control the process, but rather to help ensure fairness, transparency, and accountability.

As Ukraine looks to create the conditions for national reconstruction, one judicial reform initiative currently being backed by the Ukrainian parliament is the creation of specialized courts to handle issues like land rights and construction disputes. These courts could help speed up vital cases and take pressure off the existing judicial system.

Work is also continuing toward greater digitalization within the justice system, from electronic courts to online case tracking. Much more can be done in this direction. Other tech savvy countries such as Estonia and Singapore are currently leading the way in digital justice. Ukraine can build something just as bold using tools like blockchain and AI. The expanded use of technology can improve the efficiency of Ukraine’s courts, while also boosting trust levels and leading to greater transparency.

Creating a fully functioning and internationally credible justice system is the necessary starting point for everything else Ukrainians want to achieve, from economic strength and prosperity to the rule of law and a greater sense of national security. It can encourage investors to bet on Ukraine, and can help persuade Ukrainians currently living abroad to return home. Ultimately, judicial reform can serve as a national anchor confirming Ukraine’s place in the heart of Europe.

Amid the horror and the trauma of Russia’s ongoing invasion, Ukrainians now have a once-in-a-generation opportunity to achieve transformational change in the country’s justice system. We must not miss this chance.

Oleksandr Vasiuk is a member of the Ukrainian parliament for the Servant of the People party and head of the Ukraine-USA Strategic Partnership cross-party association.

There is simply no magic formula, no concession, and no grand bargain that would satisfy the Kremlin’s maximalist and eliminationist goals. Moscow wants to end Ukraine’s sovereignty, nationhood, and statehood. Ukraine wants to continue to exist as an independent sovereign state. Given this, no compromise is possible. Any Kabuki negotiations or Potemkin cease-fire would be meaningless and treated by the Kremlin as nothing more than a strategic pause and an opportunity for sanctions relief.

“Russian imperialism will not be neutralized by negotiations, compromises, or concessions,” Andreas Umland, an analyst at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies and an associate professor at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, wrote on May 22.

Following his latest call with Trump, Putin said he wanted any settlement to address what he called the “root causes of the crisis.” That choice of phrase was no accident. The Kremlin leader used a similar formulation when addressing the issue of ending the war during a joint press conference with Belarusian strongman Alyaksandr Lukashenka in March.

Putin’s repeated use of the term “root cause” is a tell. For the Kremlin leader, the root cause of the war is the very existence of Ukraine as a sovereign state, which he has long seen as anathema. At the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest, Putin made this clear when he told then US President George W. Bush that “Ukraine is not even a state.” Putin has also repeatedly referred to Ukraine as “little Russia,” a Tsarist-era term to describe Ukrainian lands.

For Putin and the Kremlin elite, Russian colonial dominance of Ukraine is an ideological issue that is not subject to negotiation. The Kremlin cannot be persuaded, it can only be defeated.

Russia’s game: decouple the war from relations with Washington

If anyone doubts Russia’s intentions, then recent remarks by Vladimir Medinsky, one of Putin’s court ideologists and the Kremlin’s chief representative at recent talks in Istanbul, should put them to rest. “Russia,” Medinsky told the Ukrainian delegation, “is prepared to fight forever.” He added, in reference to the Northern War of 1700-1721, which elevated Russia to the status of an empire, “we fought Sweden for twenty-one years. How long are you ready to fight?”

But with the front line largely static and Russia making miniscule gains with high casualties, forever may turn out to be a very long time and have a very steep cost.

According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), in the first four months of 2025, Russia advanced just 1,627 square kilometers on the front in eastern Ukraine while suffering 160,600 casualties. That’s a staggeringly high ninety-nine casualties for every square kilometer of territory. ISW also estimates that “at this rate of advance, it would take Russian forces approximately 3.9 years to seize the remainder of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts,” the four regions Putin has claimed to have annexed. Moreover, according to ISW, it would take nearly a century to seize all of Ukraine save its Western border regions at a cost of nearly fifty million casualties—which is roughly one third Russia’s current population.

The economics of the war are also not trending in Moscow’s favor. As Charles Lichfield, deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center wrote in February, “while Moscow has found ways to mitigate the impact of [Western sanctions], growing deficits, unsustainable subsidies, and the rising cost of debt servicing” are putting severe strain on the Russian economy.

Additionally, a widely circulated report by Craig Kennedy of Harvard University’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies suggests that the “surprising resilience” that the media and analysts have been seeing in the Russian economy is largely a mirage. According to Kennedy’s research, published earlier this year, the war is largely being financed by concessionary off-the-books loans to defense contractors at well below market interest rates. Simply put, this is not sustainable over the long term.

Given this, the Kremlin’s goal vis-à-vis the United States is to decouple the war from Russia-US relations, normalize relations between Moscow and Washington, and get sanctions relief. In a speech in late February, Putin said that Moscow “would be happy to cooperate with any foreign partners, including American companies” to secure rare-earth-minerals deals. Putin added that lifting sanctions could lead to a profitable new economic relationship between the United States and Russia, particularly in the energy sector.

Putin, of course, wants an economic rapprochement without ending his quest to conquer Ukraine. Russia has continued to pound Ukrainian cities with aerial assaults, resulting in mass civilian casualties even as he seeks to entice Washington economically.

And for his part, Trump appears open to the idea. Following his most recent call with Putin, the US president indicated a desire to establish normal economic relations with Moscow. This would be a grave error, as it would throw Putin a lifeline to continue his war of aggression.

Fortunately, there does appear to be pushback in Washington. The Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025, which would expand existing penalties on Russia, was introduced in the US Senate by South Carolina Republican Lindsey Graham and Connecticut Democrat Richard Blumenthal and has more than eighty cosponsors.

Europe’s moment and Ukraine’s resolve

For its part, the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom have already moved ahead with their own new package of sanctions enacted on May 20, a day after the latest Trump-Putin call. Brussels and London are also pledging to increase military assistance to Ukraine to make up for any shortfall resulting from a US cutoff.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and the EU’s top diplomat, Kaja Kallas, all seem to understand that this could be Europe’s moment. But one of the biggest wildcards going forward is whether Europe can overcome its internal divisions—mainly opposition from Hungary and Slovakia—and surge arms to Ukraine.

Which brings us to Ukraine itself—and here the calculations are simple. As the Ukrainian political scientist Anton Shekhovtsov wrote earlier this week, “Ukraine’s choices are to fight back and risk being killed, or to surrender and be killed. By fighting back, Ukraine has a chance; by surrendering, it has none—making surrender not a viable option.”

And for Ukraine, as always, necessity has become the mother of invention. Faced with a potential shortfall in weapons, Kyiv has created a vibrant domestic arms industry focusing on drone warfare.

“In just three years, Ukraine’s military has evolved from defending itself with leftover Soviet weapons to pioneering a new kind of warfare,” the Ukrainian war correspondent Nataliya Gumenyuk writes in the Atlantic.

“Fortunately for Ukraine, American weapons are not the only factor that has rebalanced the battlefield in the past three years. Starting in 2024, Ukrainian-made drones definitively changed the way both sides waged war. For Ukraine, the adjustment was not just tactical, but a broader, doctrinal evolution in how its military fights.”

Gumenyuk concludes by noting that “as Ukraine’s partners speak of peace deals and security guarantees, Ukraine’s armed forces are adapting in every way they can to continue carrying out their mission . . . They cannot afford the luxury of counting on American commitments or Russian concessions, because for most Ukrainians, what matters above all is physical safety. And the only force protecting human lives in Ukraine is the Ukrainian military.”

So here we are, after three years of war and four months of failed diplomacy to end it. This war will be decided on the battlefield. It is for the United States and Europe to decide whether they are prepared to help Ukraine win it.

Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Eurasia Center, an assistant professor of practice at the University of Texas-Arlington, and host of The Power Vertical Podcast.

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Fiber optic drones could play decisive role in Russia’s summer offensive

David Kirichenko — Thu, 29 May 2025 18:48:59 +0000

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than three years ago, the war in Ukraine has been shaped by a technological arms race as both countries have struggled to achieve an innovative edge on the battlefield. While Ukraine’s dynamic tech sector and less cumbersome bureaucracy initially gave it the advantage, Russia may now be gaining the upper hand.

The weapon that is turning the tide in Russia’s favor is the rather humble-looking fiber optic drone. This variation on the first-person view (FPV) drones that have dominated the skies above the battlefield since 2022 may appear inconspicuous at first glance, but it is having a major impact on the front lines of the war and is expected to play a crucial role in Russia’s unfolding summer offensive.

As the name suggests, fiber optic drones are controlled by wire-thin cables linked to operators. Crucially, this makes them immune to the jamming systems that have become near-ubiquitous in the Russian and Ukrainian armies due to the rapid evolution of drone warfare. Thanks to their data-transporting cables, fiber optic drones benefit from improved video quality and can also operate at lower altitudes than their wireless counterparts, but it is their invulnerability to electronic jamming that makes them such a potentially game-changing weapon.

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There are some drawbacks to this kind of drone. Key problems include limited range and a tendency to become entangled in obstacles such as trees and pylons. Nevertheless, there is mounting recognition on both sides of the front lines and among international military observers that fiber optic drones are now indispensable. In a recent report, the BBC called these drones “the terrifying new weapon changing the war in Ukraine.” Meanwhile, the Washington Post noted that Moscow’s focus on fiber optic drones represents “the first time Russia has surpassed Ukraine in front-line drone technology since the full-scale invasion in 2022.”

The combat effectiveness of fiber optic drones became increasingly apparent amid heavy fighting in Russia’s Kursk region during the early months of 2025. Russia’s campaign to push Ukrainian forces out of the Kursk region used large numbers of fiber optic drones to attack Ukraine’s flanks, cut supply lines, and cripple Ukrainian logistics. This eventually forced Ukrainian troops to retreat, ending an extended incursion into Russian territory that had been hugely embarrassing for Vladimir Putin. Ukrainian troops who fought in Kursk later reported that the only thing capable of stopping fiber optic drones was bad weather.

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The technology behind fiber optic drones is no secret and is available to Ukraine as well as Russia. However, as is so often the case, Moscow benefits from weight of numbers and is looking to exploit its strengths. While Ukraine has experimented with a wide variety of drones produced by hundreds of different startup-style defense companies, Russia has concentrated its vast resources on the mass production of a relatively small number of specific weapons categories including fiber optic drones and shahed kamikaze drones. Moscow’s strategy is to focus on volume with the goal of overwhelming Ukraine’s defenses. Russia has also benefited from close ties with China, which is a key drone producer and ranks among the world’s leading suppliers of fiber optic cables.

Ukraine’s front line military commanders and the country’s tech sector developers recognize the growing importance of fiber optic drones and are now rapidly increasing production. However, they are currently lagging far behind Russia and have much work to do before they can catch up. It is a race Ukraine cannot afford to lose. One of the country’s largest drone manufacturers recently warned that if the current trajectory continues, Kyiv will soon be unable to defend against the sheer scale of Russia’s mass production.

Increased foreign investment in Ukraine’s defense industry could help close the gap. By financing the development and production of fiber optic drones, Ukraine’s international partners can put the country’s defenses on a firmer footing and enable the Ukrainian military to address the threat posed by Russia’s cable-connected drones. This trend has already been underway for some time, with more and more partner countries allocating funds for Ukrainian defense sector production. The challenge now is to channel this financing specifically toward fiber optic drones.

Time may not be on Ukraine’s side. The Russian army is currently in the early stages of a summer offensive that promises to be one of the largest and most ambitious of the entire war, with fighting already intensifying at various points along the front lines. If Putin’s commanders can implement the fiber optic drone tactics that proved so successful in the Kursk region, they may be able to finally overcome Ukraine’s dogged defenses and achieve a long-awaited breakthrough. In a war defined by attrition and innovation, Ukraine must now come up with urgent solutions to counter Russia’s fiber optic drone fleet.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

Dispatch from Dayton: What Trump can learn about ending war

Frederick Kempe — Wed, 28 May 2025 22:30:00 +0000

DAYTON, Ohio—US President Donald Trump could learn a lot about how to best end Russia’s murderous war on Ukraine, now into its fourth year, from the US experience here thirty years ago in negotiating what became known as the Dayton Peace Accords.

If Trump wants to stop Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war, and he has made that an administration priority, then he should reflect on what it took to finally stop Serbian President Slobodan Milošević in 1995—after nearly four years of killing and more than 100,000 dead, including the massacre at Srebrenica, Europe’s worst genocide since the Holocaust.

A deal required relentless US diplomatic engagement backed by a demonstrated military threat and carried out alongside unified European allies. It also took twenty-one days of intensive negotiations in Dayton—not involving then US President Bill Clinton until the end—while all parties were cloistered from media and outside influences at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base.

Marking the Dayton anniversary, Ohio Congressman Mike Turner brought the NATO Parliamentary Assembly here last week, gathering delegates from the thirty-two allies as well as from partner countries. They joined leaders from the Western Balkans, assorted experts, and even the Sarajevo Philharmonic, which performed for participants in a giant hangar stocked with presidential aircraft in the National Museum of the US Air Force.

Though I came to commemorate history, I left having interrogated its architects. My aim was to gain clues that might help the Trump administration in its still-fruitless quest for an end to Russia’s war on Ukraine.

It would be easy to discount the lessons for Ukraine and Russia now, where the stakes are so much higher, from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia then. Nuclear-armed Russia has two hundred times the land mass of Serbia and more than twenty times its population. And Ukraine, with its pre-war population of forty million and France-sized territory, is more than ten times larger in geographic size and population than Bosnia-Herzegovina. In my view, that makes the lessons only more compelling.

The first lesson? “Peace agreements are extremely rare,” former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt, the European Union’s special representative at the talks thirty years ago, said in a session of former officials that I moderated. “In modern European history, there are only two really: Dayton and the Good Friday Agreement,” which in 1998 ended a thirty-year conflict in Northern Ireland known as “the Troubles.”

Both were forged in the aftermath of horrific violence, which is also the case in Ukraine. Yet both also required something that is still lacking today: determined, focused, and creative US leadership in lockstep with European partners. Both also succeeded through disciplined diplomacy, military leverage, and the unglamorous work of compromise.

Beyond that, winning peace in Dayton demanded US credibility but not neutrality. At Dayton, the United States was not an impartial mediator but rather a focused powerbroker, using whatever muscle was necessary to shape the outcome. No lasting deal can reward Putin’s aggression, just as Dayton didn’t knuckle under to reward Milošević.

Another lesson is that building peace is as crucial as ending war. Dayton and Belfast were both followed by years of international engagement, economic aid, and security commitments. Peace might have collapsed had those efforts not continued.

Most importantly, the United States led but did not go it alone. Peace that endures requires multilateral support. Dayton hasn’t worked perfectly, but without the European Union and NATO it wouldn’t have worked at all. “Only when the international actors can get together with a uniform message and policy can results be achieved,” said Bildt, who is also an Atlantic Council International Advisory Board member. “There was success in Dayton, yes. But it should also be said that there was massive failure prior to Dayton due to disagreements across the Atlantic, disagreements in Europe, and disagreements in the United States.”

US General Wesley Clark, who at the time was the military right hand to Richard Holbrooke, the chief US negotiator, took away a different lesson: “Don’t be timid,” Clark, a member of the Atlantic Council Board of Directors, said to the NATO parliamentarians. “We are going to have to be unified. And we are going to have to be forceful enough to convince Putin he will not win. Right now, he thinks he’s winning.”

In a slap across the face of Trump’s efforts to broker peace, Putin from last Friday to Sunday launched what Ukrainian officials called the largest combined aerial assault of the conflict, including some nine hundred drones and dozens of missiles of various types. That prompted a frustrated Trump to write on Truth Social about Putin that “something has happened to him. He has gone absolutely CRAZY!” The US president added that “missiles and drones are being shot into Cities in Ukraine, for no reason whatsoever.”

The problem is that there’s nothing crazy about Putin’s calculations, and his reasons are obvious. He’s trying to wear down Ukraine and its partners, and he’s betting that he has more staying power. He sees US military and diplomatic support in retreat, European efforts as insufficient, and Ukraine as weary. Trump has belatedly acknowledged that Putin has been “tapping” him along.

With all that in mind, Washington will have to try far harder now than it did then to change a murderous despot’s mind—or resign itself to accepting Putin’s ongoing war and its ambition to redraw the European map.

Until Washington stood up to Milošević in 1995, Clark said, the Serb leader thought he could pull the wool over Europe’s eyes with his small army overrunning Bosnia. When he bid farewell to Milošević at the end of the talks, Clark remembers the Balkan leader saying, “We Serbs never had a chance against your NATO, your airplanes, your missiles.”

Speaking with me at the same NATO session, Christopher R. Hill, who was part of the Holbrooke delegation in Dayton, added another important lesson—that the parties must be ready to end the war. “I am not sure Russia is ready for peace,” he said. “They should be, but they don’t seem to be. I think until they are, we have got to help Ukraine because a hundred years from now . . . our grandchildren, our great-grandchildren, will be thinking about what we did to deal with this crisis.”

The Dayton Accords were not perfect, but they were proof of what US leadership can achieve when properly applied. Speaking in Bosnia-Herzegovina shortly after the agreement was finalized, the then US president explained why the United States had chosen to lead, rather than cut and run from the European conflict.

“Around the world, people look to America not just because of our size and strength but because of what we stand for and what we’re willing to stand against,” Clinton said. “And though it imposes extra burdens on us, people trust us to help them share in the blessings of peace. We can’t be everywhere . . . But where we can make a difference, where our values and our interests are at stake, we must act.”

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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Hammes speaks about China’s maritime expansion on Midrats podcast

kwinzerwilks — Wed, 28 May 2025 15:13:53 +0000

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On May 5, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow T.X. Hammes was a guest on the Midrats podcast. The episode, titled “China’s Overseas Bases & the Transition to War,” discusses how China continues to expand its ownership, access, and control of ports globally while simultaneously building the world’s largest navy and diverse set of military capabilities to defeat the US military in the Indo-Pacific.

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Russia is extinguishing all traces of Ukrainian identity in occupied Ukraine

Kateryna Odarchenko — Tue, 27 May 2025 20:39:21 +0000

In recent months, US-led efforts to initiate a Russia-Ukraine peace process have focused primarily on the issue of potential Ukrainian territorial concessions. But as negotiating teams discuss technical details and draw lines on maps, almost no attention is being paid to the desperate plight of the millions of Ukrainians currently living under Russian occupation.

Throughout occupied Ukraine, the Russian authorities are seeking to consolidate their control by eradicating all traces of Ukrainian statehood and national identity while imposing a reign of terror on the civilian population. If these Russian occupation policies are allowed to pass unchallenged in the international arena, it will set a disastrous precedent for the use of force against civilians and the weaponization of national identity in other contested regions globally.

From the very first days of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, it was clear that Russia intended to entrench itself firmly in occupied regions of Ukraine. Russian troops often arrived armed with lists of local community leaders including elected officials, journalists, activists, religious figures, and military veterans. Those who refused to cooperate were likely to be detained before disappearing into a vast network of Russian prisons and camps.

Ukrainian detainees are being systematically subjected to torture and other human rights abuses, according to an international investigation led by the French group Forbidden Stories together with thirteen media outlets including Britain’s Guardian newspaper, the Washington Post, and Le Monde. While it is not possible to calculate exactly how many Ukrainian civilians have been abducted in the occupied regions, UN officials have concluded that the large scale and systematic nature of the disappearances qualifies as a crime against humanity.

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Those who remain in areas of Ukraine under Kremlin control face a regime of forced russification encompassing everything from language and the media to education and religion. Place names have been changed to reflect the new Russian realities, with the curriculum in local schools transformed in line with the Kremlin’s anti-Ukrainian imperial dogmas. Parents who attempt to shield their children from classroom indoctrination are being threatened with loss of custody.

Ukrainian residents in the occupied regions of the country have also come under increasing pressure from the Kremlin to accept Russian citizenship. Anyone who refuses to take a Russian passport risks losing access to a range of essential services including healthcare. They also face restrictions on property rights along with the ability to run a business and use banking services.

This passport campaign has intensified significantly in recent months, with Russian President Vladimir Putin issuing a decree announcing that Ukrainians living under Russian occupation have until September 2025 to accept Russian citizenship or face possible deportation from their own homes. Understandably, Moscow’s ruthless tactics are proving difficult to resist. Kremlin officials claim that by March 2025, Russian passports had been issued to approximately 3.5 million people in occupied Ukraine.

Moscow is accused of engaging in religious persecution throughout the occupied regions, with all Christian denominations other that the Kremlin-linked Russian Orthodox Church facing various degrees of restrictive measures and oppression. Ukrainian Foreign Ministry officials stated in spring 2025 that the Russian occupation authorities have killed dozens of clergy members over the past three years while damaging or destroying hundreds of churches.

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Russia has been careful to prevent information about conditions in occupied Ukraine from reaching the outside world. All independent media sources have been shut down throughout the occupied regions, and have been replaced by new Kremlin-controlled outlets. Individual journalists have frequently been among those targeted for oppressive measures including physical abuse and imprisonment.

One of the few reporters to shed light on the horrors unfolding in Russian-occupied Ukraine was Ukrainian journalist Viktoriia Roshchyna, who visited areas under occupation on multiple occasions before being captured by the Russian authorities in summer 2023. Roshchyna died after a year in Russian captivity. When her body was returned to Ukraine in early 2025, it showed signs of torture.

From a military standpoint, it may not currently be feasible to liberate all of the Ukrainian regions held by Moscow. Nevertheless, the crimes being committed by the Kremlin in occupied Ukraine are unprecedented in modern European history and cannot be ignored.

It is vital that the human rights of Ukrainians living under Russian occupation feature prominently in any peace process. This includes the rights of those currently being held in Russian jails. Ukraine’s Western partners must maintain or increase sanctions pressure, while also expanding support for Ukrainian civil society and raising awareness about Russia’s actions among international audiences.

Looking ahead, longer term investments are also needed to help document war crimes and support Ukrainian victims of the Russian occupation. Ultimately, the most meaningful response to Russia’s campaign against Ukrainian identity is to make sure Ukraine is in a position to not only survive but thrive as an independent European nation.

Kateryna Odarchenko is a partner at SIC Group Ukraine.

British ambassador to the US: The UK must ‘become less dependent on America, while remaining inseparably linked’

Peter Mandelson — Tue, 27 May 2025 19:40:18 +0000

On May 27, Peter Mandelson, the British ambassador to the United States, spoke at this year’s edition of the Atlantic Council’s Christopher J. Makins Lecture, a series exploring the state of the Atlantic partnership and its future direction. The below is adapted from his opening speech, entitled “Renewing the Transatlantic Alliance: Peace Through Strength in a New Age of Great Power Rivalry.”

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British Ambassador to the United States The Rt Hon Lord Mandelson speaks at the 2025 Christopher J. Makins lecture to discuss the significance of the transatlantic relationship during this unprecedented geopolitical period.

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Eighty years ago this month, the streets of Britain, America, and allied nations erupted in celebration at the fall of fascism in Europe.

For me personally, it’s a source of enormous pride that my grandfather, Herbert Morrison, served as home secretary in Winston Churchill’s wartime coalition.

He also served as deputy prime minister in Clement Attlee’s transformative postwar government in Britain. That government didn’t just support the formation of NATO to counter Soviet expansionism—they were the co-architects of it.

Amidst Cold War tensions and economic upheaval, Britain and America advanced from allies to integrated strategic partners at the dawn of the nuclear age, our scientists having joined forces in the Manhattan Project to create the advantage we had at the beginning of this age.

It was Western unity which ultimately ended the Cold War peacefully and demonstrated resilience to new threats, including the 9/11 attacks, where NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time.

Over eight decades, the foundations of collective defense have remained steadfast whilst the transatlantic relationship has continuously evolved and adapted to counter new challenges.

Today, I want to talk about the profound challenge we face in a new age of great power rivalry, a period characterized by political volatility, by economic mercantilism, and geopolitical competition.

We are witnessing the end of an era of hyper-globalization where we assumed that economic integration had made wars almost obsolete.

The logic seemed compelling: Mutual interests, integrated global supply chains, and shared economic stakes created too much to lose from warfare. History seemed to point only in one direction.

And those comfortable assumptions have been shattered.

We now see the rise of modern mercantilism, where nations prefer to prioritize national economic strength and autonomy in many respects.

States are intervening and playing a more protectionist role in managing trade and directing industrial policy to become ever more self-sufficient and localized.

I’m not declaring globalization dead, but it is being radically reconfigured around us.

China’s export-driven growth strategy flooded the global market with state-subsidized products, undercut Western manufacturing, and hollowed out industry.

The social disruption of rapid technological change, where, if you take media as an example, we have moved suddenly from decades of information flowing to people through established news organizations to a future where you only see “news” online that is curated to what you want to know, or what the algorithm—and those behind it—decides you want to know. And then there’s the backlash against globalization’s uneven distribution of benefits.

You can produce many different numbers to show the widening wealth disparities in the West over the past thirty years, but I would choose a simple one: GDP per capita in the United States has grown about 60 percent to 70 percent in real terms, but real median household income growth has been about 20 percent to 25 percent. The typical American household has not done as well as the booming US economy would suggest. A similar story holds true across all our countries in the West.

This has posed profound challenges to culture, place, and society—which too many of us over the past decades, frankly, have ignored. From the American Midwest to the coastal towns of England, a hands-off approach left many places adrift from the success stories of global cities such as London and New York.

And in a world which has often felt dominated by the exponential rise of social media, a sense of grievance—and of difference between us and them—has been amplified.

So yes, I credit President Trump’s acute political instincts in identifying the anxieties gripping not only millions of Americans, but also far more pervasive global trends: Economic stagnation, a sense of irreversible decline, the lost promise of meaningful work for so many people. These are the giants now that we must confront head-on.

So, where do we go next?

It is in no one’s interest—certainly not those of close allies—that each country pursues a wholly individualized path, which leads to accelerated economic fragmentation.

But if we are serious about rebuilding confidence in the international system, if we wish to maintain a set of common rules and standards—a shared economic and security commons in between us—we need to devote an enormous amount of energy and goodwill to preserve, sustain, and deepen the alliances which exist between like-minded countries.

For the UK and the rest of Europe, we must reboot the transatlantic alliance—indeed, a boot up the proverbial backside is needed now—to deliver peace through strength across three interconnected domains: military, economic, and technological.

For my generation, the twentieth-century gains in peace and prosperity were thought of as a European peace dividend.

I now recognize it as an urgent bill, that peace dividend: An urgent bill for decades of defense underinvestment—a payment that is long overdue.

We have lived in a fantasy created by the US security guarantee, complacent that a friendly heavyweight across the water would be always there when the going gets tough.

We meet in the shadow of Russia’s barbaric invasion of Ukraine, now in its fourth year.

The UK strongly supports President Trump’s initiative to bring this terrible war to an end. And we are working together with partners to secure a just and lasting peace.

The Ukraine conflict has served as a brutal wake-up call. State-on-state war has returned to Europe. Adversaries are using nuclear rhetoric to influence decision-making, and we are seeing regular attacks on European infrastructure beneath the threshold of warfare.

It is crystal clear that European defense must step up and rebalance for our collective security. Actually, I think President Trump is doing Europe a favor by confronting us with this reality.

The United States is the UK’s closest defense and security ally. We must become less dependent on America, while remaining inseparably linked to America—a distinction that I underline of critical importance. Yes, less dependent, but still inseparably linked.

Ukraine is just one flashpoint of many amid growing global instability. Even the US does not have limitless resources.

This is precisely why Britain must step up in providing for European security and why we have committed to the biggest sustained increase in defense spending since the Cold War.

We will become NATO’s fastest-innovating nation, ensuring our military forces have the technological and military capabilities to secure long-term strategic advantage, not just spending more, but spending better.

Of course, this all needs to be grounded in intelligent and effective strategic choices, not merely increased expenditure. Efficiency and innovation to renew our defense manufacturing bases must drive every pound, every dollar, and every euro that we invest.

And we will double down on our alliances. In defense, we will always be NATO first but not NATO only—and this is particularly true of the UK’s focus on the Indo-Pacific, as well as our new security partnership with Europe.

One good example is AUKUS, the trilateral security partnership with Australia and America, which will deliver advanced nuclear-powered submarines and catalyze technology sharing on other advanced capabilities.

Turning to the theme of economic strength, Britain now enjoys something that has eluded us for far too long: a government with both unity of purpose and longevity.

This government’s mandate and President Trump’s will both last for the next four years—providing huge opportunities for collaboration between us.

We are both pro-business and pro-trade in Britain, and committed to innovation, not as empty slogans but as practical imperatives.

This UK government is committed to creating the best investment environment with a regulatory reset that makes us the most competitive in Europe—that’s our aim.

One of the reasons we were able to close the first trade deal of the Trump administration is that our strong economic relationship between our countries is fair, balanced, and reciprocal. But also because, frankly, we are a businesslike nation with pragmatic instincts.

One of the great backhanded insults in British history was when Napoleon Bonaparte dismissed us as a mere “nation of shopkeepers.” He was right: Commerce is the lifeblood which flows through our veins, and that is one reason why we British and American cousins remain so close.

And that is also one reason why I see the current deal as the beginning of a new chapter as well as an end, in a sense, in itself. There is scope for an even more transformative stage in our long partnership. And I believe that centers on technology.

So let me address technological strength as the third. We face a clear, shared threat. There is nothing in this world I fear more than China winning the race for technological dominance in the coming decades.

China represents a far more dynamic and formidable strategic rival than the Soviet Union ever was: economically sophisticated, highly innovative, and strategically patient.

The United Kingdom and United States are the only two Western nations with trillion-dollar technology ecosystems combined with unparalleled talent and research capabilities in our universities and corporations.

We must combine forces, in my view, to drive the scientific breakthroughs that will define this century, and AI should be the spearpoint of that collaboration.

Artificial intelligence stands as the next great foundational technology. Through its power, we can rapidly make progress across so many frontiers of science: quantum, synthetic biology, medicine, nuclear fusion.

Rather than stifling these transformative technologies through excessive regulation, our two governments must unleash their immense potential for human benefit and Western advantage.

Let me say this in conclusion. In his immortal Iron Curtain speech, delivered in Missouri, Churchill spoke eloquently about the primacy of American power and its awesome responsibility to future generations.

Today, we face our own historical inflection point.

No one should doubt that we face accelerating global competition in which it is strongly in our interests to expand the perimeter of our alliances while deepening the transatlantic partnership at its core.

So our diplomacy must be more urgent, more agile, and more creative. We must deepen the political and military alliances which defined our past successes but also create new partnerships—borne in and of technology—which will redefine our future. The stakes could not be higher. The opportunities, actually, could not be greater. And I am confident that our two countries will indeed rise together to meet those challenges.

Peter Mandelson is the British ambassador to the United States.

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Russia’s summer offensive could spark a new humanitarian crisis in Ukraine

Viktor Liakh, Melinda Haring — Tue, 27 May 2025 19:34:22 +0000

As the Russian army gears up for a major summer offensive, Ukraine could soon be facing its most serious humanitarian crisis since the initial phase of the full-scale invasion more than three years ago. If the West does not act swiftly by sending military aid, tightening sanctions, and reaffirming its long-term commitment to Ukraine, the unfolding crisis could overwhelm Kyiv and undermine the Ukrainian war effort.

Current Russian troop movements and battlefield dynamics indicate that the coming summer offensive may be one of the largest and most ambitious of the entire war. If successful, this campaign could allow Russian troops to push the front line tens of kilometers forward into Ukrainian-held territory and overrun parts of Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk provinces.

The cities of Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, and Kramatorsk are high on the list of likely targets. They have all experienced significant damage and large-scale displacement as a result of Russian bombardment. If these cities and others in the surrounding area fall to the Russians in the coming months, the wider region could become depopulated as large numbers of people flee the fighting.

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Based on current trends and previous displacement waves, at least two hundred thousand Ukrainian civilians living close to the current front lines of the war could be forced to leave their homes by fall 2025. This is not speculation; it is informed by experience gained during Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Since the beginning of the invasion in February 2022, Ukrainian organizations have been on the front lines of the humanitarian response. They have provided essential aid, temporary housing, psychological support, and ongoing reintegration counselling to help Ukrainians displaced by Russia’s invasion rebuild dignity and restart their lives.

Ukraine’s civil society has worked wonders over the past three years but cannot realistically hope to absorb another 200,000 diplaced people without international support. The situation is even more alarming due to the recent closure of USAID, which was a major player in the humanitarian response to Russia’s invasion. With Putin’s troops already advancing, Ukraine’s Western partners must not ignore the looming danger.

According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), more than 3.6 million people remained internally displaced within Ukraine as of early 2025. Most are women, children, and elderly individuals. Many have already been forced to flee multiple times. This population of displaced people may soon become considerably larger.

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Compounding the crisis, European governments are beginning to phase out temporary support programs for Ukrainians. While the EU recently agreed to extend temporary protection through 2026, enforcement is sometimes patchy. Meanwhile, there are indications across Europe that resettlement fatigue is growing.

In the UK and US, political rhetoric on the topic of Ukrainian refugees has shifted ominously. Most recently, reports emerged that the Trump administration is exploring options to repatriate Ukrainians who entered the United States following the start of the full-scale Russian invasion.

If these trends continue, millions of Ukrainians could find themselves trapped between advancing Russian forces and a closing window of international asylum. While Ukrainians in the east of the country flee Putin’s invading army, many Ukrainian refugees may be forced to return home with uncertain prospects.

If the overstretched Ukrainian military is unable to contain Russia’s summer offensive, the fallout will reverberate far beyond Ukraine’s borders. The displacement of at least 200,000 more civilians would severely strain humanitarian corridors, destabilize border regions, and sow chaos in Ukrainian cities already struggling to absorb previous waves of refugees.

Ukraine’s Western partners still have time to prevent this, but they must act with a sense of urgency. While the Trump administration has been clear that it does not plan to provide Ukraine with further military aid, it should continue sharing intelligence with the Ukrainians while confirming its readiness to sell arms to Kyiv. Europe must speed up the delivery of promised weapons and should expand supplies significantly to improve Ukraine’s position on the battlefield.

In parallel, European countries should take steps to provide reassurance and protect the legal status of Ukrainian refugees. Donor organizations can help by strengthening partnerships with Ukrainian civil society groups that have demonstrated agility, transparency, and high levels of local trust.

The next phase of Russia’s invasion is not just being fought on the front lines of the war. It is taking place across the country in bomb shelters, train stations, and temporary accommodations. Russia is trying to break Ukrainian resistance by making large parts of Ukraine unlivable and destabilizing the country. Ukraine’s partners can do much to counter these efforts, but they must act now before the military and humanitarian situation deteriorates further.

Viktor Liakh is president of the East Europe Foundation. Melinda Haring is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a senior advisor at Razom for Ukraine.

Do Trump’s criticisms of Putin mark a turning point in his Russia policy?

John E. Herbst — Tue, 27 May 2025 18:04:35 +0000

This is part of a series of regular assessments of the efforts, spearheaded by the Trump administration, to achieve a negotiated end to Russia’s war on Ukraine. Read previous entries here and here.

What’s new?

On May 25, US President Donald Trump issued a blistering criticism of Russia’s massive and dayslong bombardment of Kyiv, Odesa, and other Ukrainian cities. Trump’s language was blunt and directed squarely at Russian President Vladimir Putin. In an impromptu discussion with reporters, Trump said of Putin: “I’ve known him a long time, always gotten along with him, but he’s sending rockets into cities and killing people, and I don’t like it at all. We’re in the middle of talking and he’s sending rockets into Kyiv and other cities. I don’t like it at all.” He also spoke about imposing additional sanctions on Russia.

Trump followed up this statement with a strongly worded Truth Social post, in which he said that Putin “has gone absolutely CRAZY! . . . I’ve always said that he wants ALL of Ukraine, not just a piece of it, and maybe that’s proving to be right, but if he does, it will lead to the downfall of Russia!”

What does it mean?

These developments have led some observers to ask whether, after weeks of expressing frustration but ultimately accommodating Kremlin obstructionism, the Trump administration is about to take a tough stand. This was the strongest of several statements Trump has made against Putin over the past two months as it has become obvious, even to members of the administration who have sought to end support for Ukraine, that Putin has no interest in accepting Trump’s approach to achieving a negotiated end to the war. Trump made similar remarks in late April and early May, both suggesting that he would impose additional sanctions on Russia.

But there’s the rub. Trump’s criticism of Russian strikes on Ukrainian cities and Kremlin nay-saying in the peace talks has not led to new sanctions. And just last week, after his long phone call with Putin, who once more refused US terms for a cease-fire, Trump heralded the Kremlin call for continuing direct Russia-Ukraine talks. It is therefore no surprise that Putin doubled down with massive air strikes in Ukraine.

Putin no doubt takes solace that in the Truth Social post that labeled him “CRAZY,” Trump also slammed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy for “talking the way he does. Everything out of his mouth causes problems, I don’t like it, and it better stop.” At this point, Putin reads Trump, like other Western leaders since Russia’s 2008 war in Georgia, as unwilling to take strong action against aggression.

Is Putin right? Yes, Trump has vacillated over the past three months, treating Zelenskyy’s understandable public reservations about White House wavering more harshly than Putin’s active obstruction of US objectives. Trump has also taken substantial criticism from friendly editorial pages, such as the New York Post and the Wall Street Journal, as well as from at least some Republicans in Congress. On Monday, Republican Representative Don Bacon and Republican Senator Chuck Grassley both publicly called on Trump to take further action against Russia.

What to watch next

What’s more, momentum is building to move the Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025—introduced by Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) and now cosponsored by eighty-one senators. According to well-connected Republicans, the White House saw value in the presentation of the bill in April as a way of subtly putting pressure on the Kremlin, but it did not want any movement toward passage at that time. In the wake of recent developments, I am hearing that the Trump administration is mulling giving Republican senators the option of voting their conscience. With more than eighty cosponsors, that means the bill would pass easily.

This step cannot be taken for granted, and it is a sign that Putin’s aggressive posture—which prompted even US Vice President JD Vance to remark earlier this month that Russia was asking for too much—may finally prompt Trump to take more vigorous action. Indeed, Putin continued his vicious air campaign on Monday night, prompting another Truth Social post on Tuesday where Trump focused only on Putin, saying that the Russian leader is “playing with fire.”

While it remains to be seen whether actions will follow from Trump’s tougher rhetoric, Zelenskyy could help himself and Ukraine by taking a page from Putin’s playbook and controlling his urge to criticize White House policy. Responding to Trump’s strong criticism of Russia’s belligerence, Putin called Trump overly emotional but still thanked him for his peace efforts. Even justified criticism of US policy by the Ukrainian president diverts Trump’s attention from the real problem.

John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

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Sapuppo quoted by Kyiv Independent on Putin’s ‘root causes’ claims

Mercedes Sapuppo — Tue, 27 May 2025 01:15:00 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

On May 26, Mercedes Sapuppo, assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, was quoted in the Kyiv Independent on the “root causes” claimed by Russia for Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine.

It’s very clear that the root cause for (Putin), really, is just Ukraine’s existence. This should make it clear to Western leaders that any agreements to end the war need to be very forward-looking when it comes to security guarantees.

Mercedes Sapuppo

Staff

Mercedes Sapuppo

Assistant Director

Eurasia Center

Belarus Civil Society

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Can the EU leverage economic pressure to broker a Gaza cease-fire?

Lize de Kruijf — Fri, 23 May 2025 13:05:12 +0000

The ongoing Israel-Gaza war has evolved into a highly politically complex and dire humanitarian conflict. With thousands of civilian casualties reported, the majority in Gaza, international calls for a cease-fire are intensifying. Efforts to broker a resolution have largely centered on US-led diplomacy, with most recent efforts including White House envoy Steve Witkoff’s new proposal aimed at securing a cease-fire and hostage release. Yet negotiations remain deadlocked following the collapse of a truce in March over Israeli demands for Hamas to disarm and for its leaders to go into exile. Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, a key mediator, described the talks in Doha as hampered by “fundamental differences between parties.”

As diplomatic efforts falter, attention is turning to economic statecraft—the strategic use of trade and economic leverage to influence state behavior. The European Union (EU) and United States are Israel’s largest and second-largest trading partners, and any economic pressure they apply could have severe consequences for Israel’s economy. Already facing tariffs from the US, Israel may soon encounter additional pressure from the EU, which is considering its own economic measures.

In Europe, growing humanitarian concerns about the scale of destruction in Gaza have prompted calls to reevaluate the best strategy to manage the conflict. Notably, the humanitarian blockade and high-profile incidents, such as the deaths of fifteen aid workers during an Israeli special forces operation in Rafah—an event Israel attributed to “professional failures”—have intensified pressure for a more impactful response. There is a growing sentiment that new tools may be needed to influence the trajectory of the conflict.

Recently, Dutch Foreign Minister Casper Veldkamp called on the EU to investigate Israel’s compliance with Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, which ties trade relations to respect for human rights and democratic principles. Veldkamp argued that, “The blockade violates international humanitarian law. You have the right to defend yourself, but the proportions now seem completely lost. We are drawing a line in the sand.”

Although Veldkamp faced domestic political backlash for his move, support across Europe appears to be growing. On May 20, the governments of the United Kingdom (UK), France, and Canada issued a joint statement urging Israel to halt its renewed offensive in Gaza. While reaffirming Israel’s right to defend itself, the statement described the current escalation as “wholly disproportionate.” In tandem, the UK suspended talks on expanding a free-trade agreement with Israel and announced additional sanctions on extremist Israeli settlers in the West Bank.

Crucially, the majority of EU foreign ministers backed the Dutch proposal to review the EU-Israel Association Agreement. Their choice signals a potential turning point: the first serious momentum behind reevaluating a trade framework that underpins diplomatic and economic ties. Should the EU find Israel in breach of Article 2, it could suspend parts of the agreement or enact targeted economic penalties.

The implications are substantial. The EU is Israel’s largest trading partner, accounting for 32 percent of Israel’s total trade in goods as of 2024, amounting to $48.25 billion. Services trade added another $29 billion, while bilateral foreign direct investment stands at over $134.8 billion. This underscores a deeply integrated economic relationship.

Despite the ongoing conflict, Israel has so far managed to maintain some level of macroeconomic stability. Debt levels are within sustainable bounds, credit worthiness remains intact, and the economy has continued to grow (albeit slowly). However, the economic toll of war is has been straining certain sectors disproportionately. The tech industry continues to grow, partially due to defense contracts, but construction has largely halted, agricultural sectors have lost critical labor, and tourism has plummeted. While gross domestic product growth has not entirely contracted, it slowed to around 1 percent in 2024. This was a significant drop from 6.5 percent in 2022, with the deceleration primarily driven by reduced exports. In response, the Israeli government has implemented budget adjustments that include cuts to domestic welfare programs—historically an area of generous spending—as it works to offset growing wartime expenditures.

Compounding these challenges, Prime Minister Netanyahu recently announced plans to eliminate Israel’s trade surplus with the United States—its second-largest trading partner—which amounted to $7.4 billion in 2024. While the move is framed as a gesture toward economic rebalancing and strengthening bilateral ties, it may carry domestic economic consequences. Efforts to narrow this surplus—especially in a climate of shifting global trade patterns and economic uncertainty—could dampen Israeli export growth and further expose the economy to external shocks.

The potential suspension or downgrading of EU-Israel trade ties would add significant pressure. Given the scale and interdependence of EU-Israel trade, such a move could affect Israel’s economic resilience and, by extension, its ability to sustain long-term military operations in Gaza.

While no approach guarantees a swift end to such a deeply entrenched conflict, economic statecraft presents a credible alternative to stalled diplomatic channels. Unlike traditional negotiations, which often falter due to uncompromising demands or ideological impasses, economic levers could alter the cost-benefit calculus of continued hostilities. A concerted and coordinated effort by major economic partners could incentivize compromise, creating a window for diplomacy to succeed.

The EU’s evolving posture may represent a strategic recalibration—one that leverages economic influence to encourage de-escalation while remaining anchored in international law and human rights norms. Whether this shift can yield tangible results remains to be seen, but it marks an important recognition: that intractable conflicts may require not just moral outrage or political pressure, but a strategic application of economic power.

Lize de Kruijf is a project assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Economic Statecraft Initiative.

EconoGraphics Feb 27, 2025

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Russia Sanctions Database

By Kimberly Donovan, Maia Nikoladze, Lize de Kruijf

The Atlantic Council’s Russia Sanctions Database tracks the level of coordination among Western allies in sanctioning Russian entities, individuals, vessels, and aircraft, and shows where gaps still remain.

Eastern Europe Economic Sanctions

Economic Statecraft Initiative

Housed within the GeoEconomics Center, the Economic Statecraft Initiative (ESI) publishes leading-edge research and analysis on sanctions and the use of economic power to achieve foreign policy objectives and protect national security interests.

Learn More

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Europe is striking back at Russia’s shadow fleet. Here’s what to know about the latest EU and UK sanctions.

Atlantic Council experts — Wed, 21 May 2025 22:00:06 +0000

Brussels and London are ratcheting up pressure on Moscow—without Washington. On Tuesday, the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom approved scores of new sanctions against Russia, including the EU more than doubling the number of oil tankers and other vessels listed as part of the “shadow fleet” covertly trading Russian oil and gas. The EU package—the seventeenth since Russia’s war against Ukraine began—also adds new sanctions on individuals and companies, including the Russian oil giant Surgutneftegas. “This round of sanctions on Russia is the most wide-sweeping since the start of the war,” EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said. Below, Atlantic Council experts shine a light on the sanctions and what they reveal about Europe’s faceoff with Russia.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Rachel Rizzo: Europe is no longer waiting for the United States to act

Elisabeth Braw: Spotlight who is replenishing Russia’s shadow fleet, too

Aleksander Cwalina: There is still more the EU can do to tighten the screws to Russia

Olga Khakova: If Trump also goes after the shadow fleet, it could bring Putin to the table

Sanctions are a powerful, yet slow-burning tool

The EU’s seventeenth package is a welcome addition to the extensive sanctions the Group of Seven-plus (G7+) coalition maintain on Russia in response to Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine. The latest package further brings EU sanctions in line with US and UK designations on Russian oil producers including Surgutneftegas, as well as the ongoing strategy to target Russia’s illicit oil trade using shadow fleet vessels.

The extent and timing of this latest sanctions package demonstrate Europe’s resolve to maintain economic pressure on Russia, and they are a clear signal that Europe maintains strong economic leverage in potential negotiations with Russia to end the war.

It’s hard not to notice that the sanctions were announced the day after US President Donald Trump spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin and posted on social media that “Russia wants to do largescale TRADE with the United States when this catastrophic ‘bloodbath’ is over, and I agree.” There is growing concern about a potential divergence in US and EU foreign policy, and the latest EU package is a strong reminder that EU sanctions could remain in place even if Washington decides to ease its sanctions or open avenues for trade and finance with Moscow.

That said, EU sanctions require renewal every six months and need consensus by all twenty-seven members. If the United States does not maintain economic pressure on Russia, then there is concern that Hungary may break with the bloc and veto EU sanctions on Russia’s economy when they are up for renewal in July.

Sanctions are a powerful, yet slow-burning tool. The multilateral sanctions that G7+ coalition partners levied against Russia are finally having the intended effect. Russia’s economy is struggling, interest rates and inflation remain high, Russia is drawing down on its National Welfare Fund, and the country is in a wartime economy. This is why Moscow’s primary demand from the Black Sea cease-fire talks was lifting sanctions.

To get a better and bigger deal with Russia over the war in Ukraine, it would be in Washington’s best interest to not only engage its European allies in negotiations, but also to join them in issuing additional sanctions to deny Moscow the opportunity to gain leverage at the negotiation table.

Europe is no longer waiting for the United States to act

The latest round of EU sanctions against Russia highlights the EU’s willingness to do something it hasn’t yet done since February 2022: take ownership over the outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine. The United States has always been in the driver’s seat, with the Biden administration both shaping and leading the West’s response to the war. The re-election of Trump brought an almost 180-degree shift in the US approach, with a much more conciliatory tone toward Russia emanating from the White House, along with a hope that Trump’s dealmaking skills could get both sides to the table for a cease-fire. That approach has yet to bear fruit.

This is where the EU’s pressure becomes important. It highlights the bloc’s willingness to act independently of the United States and use its own tools to get Russia to the table without waiting for the United States to provide political cover. With European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen leading the charge, the hope is that the EU stays united on the sanctions front for the foreseeable future, squeezing Russia’s war machine (and its broader economy) to the point where Putin has no other choice than to stop the war.

—Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. Her research focuses on European security, NATO, and the transatlantic relationship.

Spotlight who is replenishing Russia’s shadow fleet, too

Every sanction helps reduce the shadow fleet’s activities, and the EU’s diligent efforts to identify shadow vessels are to be saluted. The EU should be especially proud of its latest package, which includes sanctions against an extraordinary 189 shadow vessels and some of the ships’ owners. The latter is especially important, since the owners do their best to operate in the shadows and are extremely hard to trace.

However, the shadow fleet’s main characteristic remains in place: the fact that it can be constantly replenished. It can be replenished because there are ship owners willing to sell their retirement-age ships into the shadow fleet. In fact, doing so is commercially advantageous for them: Retiring old vessels involves paying for them to be scrapped, while selling them into the shadow fleet brings in money—a lot of it.

Unfortunately, a few shipowners, including in Western countries, undermine sanctions against Russia by selling their ships into the shadow fleet. Perhaps even worse, by doing so, they willingly create risks on the high seas, because shadow vessels pose hazards to other vessels, to the maritime environment, and to coastal states. Publishing their names would send a strong message.

—Elisabeth Braw is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

There is still more the EU can do to tighten the screws to Russia

On the sidelines of the G7 finance ministers’ meetings in Banff, Canada, this week, the United States opposed language in a joint statement that included “further support” for Ukraine. The United States also expressed reluctance to describe the Russian full-scale invasion of the country as “illegal,” further distancing Washington from its G7 counterparts. This follows a concerning trend as Trump has talked about Washington stepping back in peace talks and eventually restarting US trade with Russia.

In contrast, the European Commission pushed forward and adopted its seventeenth sanctions package against Russia, underlining European Union unity and clarity. The package closed some remaining loopholes that allow Russia to fund its war machine and access key Western technology for military use. In doing so, it reiterated EU solidarity with Ukraine.

The package was received well in Kyiv, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy calling the newest round of sanctions “strong” and saying that they will limit Moscow’s ability to continue its invasion.

However, more can be done to tighten the screws on Russia.

Kyiv and its European allies are already discussing how to raise the stakes in a harsher eighteenth EU sanctions package if Moscow does not make serious efforts toward a cease-fire. This would most likely target the Russian banking and energy sectors and aim to further limit the Russian shadow fleet that Moscow uses to evade maritime trade restrictions. The EU and its partners should continue to target these industries. The bloc should also seriously consider seizing assets from sanctioned individuals in the EU for Ukraine and implementing secondary sanctions that limit third-party purchasing of Russian oil—both steps recommended by Kyiv.

As European leaders are becoming increasingly frustrated with Washington’s stalling and Putin’s faux negotiations and maximalist demands, the EU should lead by example and take bold steps to continue aiding Ukraine and putting pressure on Russia.

—Aleksander Cwalina is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

If Trump also goes after the shadow fleet, it could bring Putin to the table

Putin’s strategy of buying time with deceitful “peace” promises is shown to be failing in the face of the new EU and UK sanctions, as funding for Moscow’s war starts to run out.

The shadow fleet carries more than 60 percent of Russian oil exports, according to a recent estimate, and the new sanctions will help strengthen enforcement of the price-caps mechanism on Russian oil. Currently, there are some discussions at the G7 level on lowering the price cap for the next sanctions package. But lowering the price cap will only impact Russia if it is enforced. Otherwise, Russia will continue to send large quantities of its oil through the shadow fleet, ensuring it continues to rake in profits.

In addition to curtailing Russia’s oil profits, the shadow fleet sanctions protect European coastlines from the potential environmental damage and sabotage that the Russian shadow fleet could cause. Europe is achieving this by refusing the provision of services, insurance, and port access to these metal-scrap grade ships.

The United States has already sanctioned 183 vessels. Now, Trump has an opportunity to forge his legacy as a peacemaker by joining the EU and UK sanctions on 342 vessels to bring Putin to the negotiating table. Moscow will only take US pressure seriously if it is implemented with decisiveness and strength—something the Trump administration has demonstrated effectively in tough negotiations with other nations.

—Olga Khakova is the deputy director for European energy security at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

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Putin aims to destroy Ukraine and has zero interest in a compromise peace

Peter Dickinson — Wed, 21 May 2025 20:51:25 +0000

US President Donald Trump came away from Monday’s phone call with Vladimir Putin expressing confidence that the Russian leader wants peace, but few others appear to share this optimism. Many senior Western figures were reportedly unimpressed by Putin’s vague references to a “memorandum on a possible peace agreement” and believe he is still engaging in stalling tactics. “Putin is clearly playing for time. Unfortunately we have to say Putin is not really interested in peace,” commented German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius.

Trump’s latest call to Putin also prompted fresh questions over the US leader’s handling of the faltering peace process. Britain’s The Economist pondered Trump’s “strange reluctance to get tough with Putin,” while Washington Post columnist Max Boot led a chorus of voices accusing the Kremlin strongman of manipulating his American counterpart. “While Trump’s lack of success in peacemaking might not doom Ukraine, it certainly dispels the president’s pretensions to being a world-class deal maker,” argued Boot. “Putin is playing him for a fool, and Trump doesn’t even seem to realize it.”

The mood was very different in Moscow, with the Kremlin-controlled media trumpeting the call as a significant success for Russian diplomacy. In his daily press review, BBC correspondent Steve Rosenberg reported that many of Russia’s leading news outlets were “crowing” over the contents of the Trump-Putin conversation. “It looks like Russia has won the latest round of global poker,” commented one newspaper. “Donald Trump’s stance couldn’t be more advantageous to Moscow,” observed another.

It is no surprise to see mounting unease in Western capitals over the US push to end the Russia-Ukraine War. Since Trump first initiated peace talks in February, Ukraine has agreed to an unconditional ceasefire and signaled its readiness to make major territorial concessions. In contrast, Russia has consistently rejected calls for a ceasefire while proposing new conditions of its own and creating various obstacles to any meaningful progress. At one point, Putin even claimed that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy lacked the legitimacy to sign off on a peace deal and suggested placing Ukraine under United Nations administration.

Recent diplomatic developments have further underlined Russia’s reluctance to end the war. When the leaders of Britain, France, Germany, and Poland delivered a ceasefire ultimatum to Putin in early May, the Russian ruler responded by calling for the first bilateral talks with Ukraine since spring 2022. However, Putin then chose not to attend the bilateral meeting in Istanbul that he himself had proposed, preferring instead to send a low-level delegation. This was widely interpreted as a “slap in the face” for Ukraine and the collective West.

Putin’s representatives during last week’s negotiations in Istanbul sought to emphasize Moscow’s unwillingness to compromise, calling on Kyiv to officially cede four entire provinces to Russia including a number of major Ukrainian cities that the Kremlin has so far been unable to seize militarily. If Ukraine refuses to do so, they warned, Russia will increase its demands to include six Ukrainian provinces. “We fought Sweden for twenty-one years. How long are you ready to fight?” the head of the Russian delegation reportedly commented, in reference to the eighteenth century Great Northern War. “Maybe some of those sitting here at this table will lose more of their loved ones. Russia is prepared to fight forever.”

While Putin rarely makes such thinly veiled threats, he continues to insist that any settlement must focus on eliminating what he refers to as the “root causes” of the war. This is generally understood to mean Ukraine’s international neutrality and disarmament, along with the reestablishment of Russia’s former imperial dominance in every sphere of Ukrainian public life, from language and education to national memory and religion. Any Ukrainian leader who agreed to such terms would be signing their country’s death sentence.

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Trump’s efforts to talk up the prospects of a negotiated peace and his attempts to entice Putin with commercial incentives suggest a fundamentally flawed understanding of Russia’s war aims in Ukraine. The US leader seems to sincerely believe that Putin can be persuaded to end his invasion by the promise of limited territorial gains and future economic prosperity. In reality, nothing could be further from the truth.

Putin is not fighting for Ukrainian land; he is fighting for Ukraine itself. He views the current war in the broadest of possible historical terms and sees the destruction of the Ukrainian state as a sacred mission that will define his entire reign and shape Russia’s future for decades to come. It is ludicrous to suggest that he could be swayed from this messianic vision by mundane talk of trade deals and sanctions relief.

Putin’s thirst for historical revenge can be traced back to his traumatic experience during the collapse of the Soviet Union. While Putin did not personally face the grinding poverty that millions of his compatriots endured in the 1990s, Russia’s national fall from grace nevertheless made a profound impression on him. Ever since, he has been haunted by fears of a further imperial collapse and driven by a determination to reverse the verdict of 1991. This has fueled his revanchist brand of Russian nationalism, and helps to explain his otherwise inexplicable obsession with Ukraine.

Throughout his reign, Putin has made no secret of his bitter resentment over the breakup of the USSR, which he has called “the greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century” and “the disintegration of historical Russia.” Crucially, he views Ukraine as a central and indivisible part of this fabled “historical Russia.” Indeed, the Ukrainian capital Kyiv occupies pride of place in his imperial mythology as “the mother of all Russian cities.”

To Putin, the emergence of an independent Ukraine is a symbol of Russia’s post-Soviet humiliation and a potential catalyst for the next stage in his country’s retreat from empire. According to this twisted imperial logic, if a province as quintessentially Russian as Ukraine is allowed to break away and establish itself as a modern European democracy, the entire Russian Federation will be in danger of disintegrating. Likewise, Putin is convinced that if Ukraine can be returned to its rightful place within Greater Russia, the injustice of 1991 will be undone and Russia will resume its position among the world’s Great Powers.

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Putin has been attempting to force Ukraine back into the Kremlin orbit ever since the 2004 Orange Revolution, which he personally helped spark by clumsily intervening in Ukraine’s presidential election. The violence of these efforts has escalated in direct proportion to the strengthening of modern Ukraine’s own national identity. At first, Putin pursued his imperial goals in Ukraine through control of the country’s political, business, cultural, and religious elites. When this failed, he ordered the 2014 invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Once it became apparent that even this partial occupation of the country would not derail Ukraine’s national consolidation, Putin made the fateful decision to launch the full-scale invasion of February 2022.

The rising tide of Russian aggression against Ukraine has been accompanied by ever more extreme anti-Ukrainian rhetoric. For years, Putin has publicly insisted that Ukrainians are Russians (“one people”). On the eve of the current invasion, he published an entire essay denying Ukraine’s right to exist. Putin and other senior Kremlin officials have repeatedly labeled Ukraine as an artificial country built on stolen Russian land, a Nazi invention, and an intolerable “anti-Russia” created for the purpose of undermining Russia itself. Ukrainians who insist on their own national identity are typically portrayed as traitors undeserving of sympathy or mercy.

This dehumanizing propaganda has laid the ideological foundations for the crimes that are currently being committed by the occupying Russian army in Ukraine. Wherever the Kremlin is able to establish control, Ukrainian patriots and community leaders are routinely detained and incarcerated in a vast network of prisons and camps. While the number of victims remains unknown, UN officials have concluded that the large scale and systematic nature of the disappearances qualifies as a crime against humanity. Those who remain are subjected to a reign of terror and forced to accept Russian citizenship while submitting their children to indoctrination. Meanwhile, all traces of Ukrainian national identity, culture, and statehood are being ruthlessly erased. Many experts believe these actions qualify as genocide.

Putin is understandably happy to exploit the Trump administration’s enthusiasm for peace talks. This allows him to buy time, divide the West, and reduce the flow of weapons to Ukraine. But it is already abundantly clear that he has no real interest in ending his invasion. Indeed, he dare not stop. Any peace deal that secures Ukraine’s survival as an independent state would be viewed in Moscow as a major defeat. Rather than taking his place alongside Stalin, Peter the Great, and Ivan the Terrible as one of Russia’s greatest rulers, Putin would be remembered in Russian history as the man who lost Ukraine. He would rather fight on indefinitely than accept such a fate.

Trump deserves considerable credit for seizing the initiative and attempting to end the war between Russia and Ukraine. At the same time, his current approach is obviously not working. The time has now come to stop seeking compromises with the Kremlin and start speaking to Putin in the language of strength. This means tightening sanctions on Russia and targeting the many countries that continue to fuel Putin’s war machine. Above all, it means significantly increasing military aid to Kyiv and boosting Ukraine’s ability to defeat Russia on the battlefield. Putin has staked his entire reign on the destruction of Ukraine. He will not back down unless forced to do so. Peace will only come when Ukraine is too strong to be subjugated.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The new agreement between Kyiv and Washington differs greatly from classic concession deals as Ukraine retains full ownership of national natural resources while the Reconstruction Investment Fund will be under joint management. Unlike more traditional trade deals or resource acquisitions, this is a strategic agreement that combines commercial objectives with geopolitical interests, making it a textbook example of economic statecraft. By establishing military aid as a form of capital investment, the United States is securing a long-term stake in Ukraine’s security and the management of the country’s resources.

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The minerals deal with Ukraine offers a number of obvious potential advantages for the United States. Crucially, it ensures preferential access to rare and highly valued natural resources like lithium and titanium, thereby reducing dependency on China. This is a strategic win for Washington with the possibility of significant long-term geopolitical implications. The deal also creates a framework for further US military aid to be treated as an investment via the Reconstruction Investment Fund, providing opportunities for the United States to benefit economically from continued support for Ukraine.

By signing a long-term resource-sharing agreement, the United States is also sending an important signal to Moscow about its commitment to Ukraine. Any US investments in line with the minerals deal will involve a significant American financial and physical presence in Ukraine, including in areas that are close to the current front lines of the war. Advocates of the deal believe this could help deter further Russian aggression. Kremlin officials are also doubtless aware that around forty percent of Ukraine’s critical mineral reserves are located in regions currently under Russian occupation.

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There are fears that the mineral deal makes Ukraine too dependent on the United States and leaves the country unable to manage its own resources independently. Some critics have even argued that it is a form of dependency theory in action, with Ukraine’s mineral wealth set to primarily fuel the needs of US industry rather than building up the country’s domestic economy. However, advocates argue that Ukraine was able to negotiate favorable terms that create a credible partnership, while also potentially securing valuable geopolitical benefits.

The agreement provides the US with a form of priority access but not exclusivity. Specifically, the US is granted the right to be informed about investment opportunities in critical minerals and to negotiate purchase rights under market conditions. However, the framework of the agreement explicitly respects Ukraine’s commitments to the EU, ensuring that European companies can still compete for resource access.

In terms of implementation, it is important to keep practical challenges in mind. The identification, mining, and processing of mineral resources is not a short-term business with immediate payoffs. On the contrary, it could take between one and two decades to fully develop many of Ukraine’s most potentially profitable mines. Without a sustainable peace, it will be very difficult to secure the investment necessary to access Ukraine’s resources. Without investment, the Reconstruction Investment Fund risks becoming an empty gesture rather than an economic powerhouse.

The minerals deal has the potential to shift the dynamics of the war while shaping the US-Ukrainian relationship for years to come. The United States is not only investing in resources, it is also investing in influence. Viewed from Washington, the agreement is less about producing quick payoffs and more about allowing President Trump to make a statement to US citizens and to the Russians. For Ukraine, the minerals deal provides a boost to bilateral relations and creates opportunities for a new economic partnership. America’s strategic rivals will be watching closely to see how this partnership now develops.

Svitlana Kovalchuk is Executive Director at Yalta European Strategy (YES).

How to prevent Ukraine’s booming defense sector from fueling global insecurity

Vitaliy Goncharuk — Tue, 20 May 2025 20:18:47 +0000

Following the 1991 Soviet collapse, newly independent Ukraine inherited the second-largest defense arsenal in Europe from the USSR. As a result, the country soon emerged as one of the biggest arms exporters to Africa and the Middle East, significantly influencing conflicts in those regions. With the Ukrainian defense sector now experiencing years of unprecedented growth in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion, it is important to prevent Ukraine’s innovative military technologies from fueling a new wave of international instability.

Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, hundreds of companies have sprung up in Ukraine producing defense tech equipment for the country’s war effort. Growth has been largely driven by private initiatives led by civilians with no prior experience in the defense industry. This has led to a startup culture that does not require much investment capital, with most of the products developed since 2022 based on existing open source software and hardware platforms. Data leaks are a significant issue, as the vast majority of the people involved in this improvised defense sector have not undergone the kind of security checks typical of the defense industry elsewhere.

While there is currently no end in sight to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it is already apparent that in the postwar period, the large number of Ukrainian defense sector companies that have appeared since 2022 will face a significant drop in demand. Indeed, even in today’s wartime conditions, many companies are already lobbying for the relaxation of export restrictions while arguing that the Ukrainian state is unable to place sufficient orders.

If these companies are forced to close, skilled professionals will seek employment abroad. This could lead to the leakage of knowledge and technologies. Meanwhile, with NATO countries likely to be focused on their own defense industries and strategic priorities, it is reasonable to assume that many Ukrainian defense sector companies will concentrate on exporting to more volatile regions. The potentially destabilizing impact of these trends is obvious. It is therefore vital to adopt effective measures to limit the spread of Ukrainian defense sector technologies, data, and finished products along with skilled developers, engineers, and operators to potential conflict zones around the world.

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Ukraine’s defense sector innovations fall into two categories. The first includes innovations that are easily replicated using readily available technologies. The second category features more complex systems requiring skilled professionals. It makes little sense to focus regulatory efforts on the first category. Instead, preventing proliferation is more effectively managed through intelligence operations and security measures. Preventative efforts should focus on those innovations that are more complex in both development and deployment.

Efforts to prevent Ukrainian defense technologies from fueling conflicts around the world will depend to a significant degree on enforcement. While Ukraine has made some progress in combating corruption over the past decade, this remains a major issue, particularly in the country’s dramatically expanded defense sector. A successful approach to limiting the spread of Ukrainian defense tech know-how should therefore incorporate a combination of positive and negative incentives.

Positive incentives can include opening up NATO markets to Ukrainian companies and supporting their efforts to comply with NATO standards. This would likely encourage a broader culture of compliance throughout the Ukrainian defense tech sector as companies sought to access the world’s most lucrative client base.

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Creating the conditions for the acquisition of Ukrainian companies by major international defense industry players could help to encourage a responsible corporate culture among Ukrainian companies while bolstering the country’s position globally. Likewise, enhanced access to funding and a simplified route to work visas and citizenship in the EU and US would help attract and retain talent. This would further strengthen Ukraine’s defense sector and encourage corporate compliance.

Professional organizations also have a potential role to play. Promoting the development of robust industry and professional associations for Ukrainians in the defense sector would encourage collaboration, knowledge sharing, and the establishment of industry standards, which could further propel innovation and growth within Ukraine’s defense industry, while creating a climate more conducive to regulation. Regulatory measures could include enhanced access to Western defense markets, with strict penalties for non-compliance.

Targeted export controls are another important measure. By establishing robust controls over critical components such as processors and specialized equipment, Ukraine can limit the availability of these technologies in regions with high conflict potential. Enhanced monitoring mechanisms should be implemented to track the transfer of technologies and the movement of skilled personnel. International cooperation is also crucial. Ukraine should look to work closely with global partners to synchronize regulatory standards and enforcement strategies, thereby reducing the challenges presented by regions with weak legal mechanisms.

Ukraine is now recognized internationally as a leading defense tech innovator in areas including AI solutions, cyber security, and drone warfare. There is huge global appetite for such technologies, but unregulated distribution could have disastrous consequences for international security. By combining enforceable regulatory measures with strategic incentives, it is possible to reduce the risks associated with the spread of Ukraine’s wartime innovations, while simultaneously maintaining an environment that supports ongoing innovation and growth in a controlled and secure manner.

Vitaliy Goncharuk is a US-based tech entrepreneur with Ukrainian roots who previously served as Chairman of the Artificial Intelligence Committee of Ukraine from 2019 to 2022.

Putin continues to thwart Trump’s goal of achieving a cease-fire

John E. Herbst — Tue, 20 May 2025 17:10:35 +0000

This is part of a series of regular assessments of the efforts, spearheaded by the Trump administration, to achieve a negotiated end to Russia’s war on Ukraine. Read the previous entry in the series here.

Both the Kremlin and the White House statements on the two-hour May 19 phone call between presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin suggest that the results were meager—and Trump may be backing off some of his tough rhetoric on Putin. On Truth Social, Trump said: “Russia and Ukraine will immediately start negotiations toward a Ceasefire and, more importantly, an END to the War. The conditions for that will be negotiated between the two parties, as it can only be, because they know details of a negotiation that nobody else would be aware of.”

For his part, Putin labeled the conversation “informative and helpful,” but he also said that the “root cause of the issue” must be addressed. That means Ukraine must agree to the draconian terms that Russian negotiator Vladimir Medinsky recently set down in Istanbul, such as the demilitarization of Ukraine and Ukrainian troop withdrawals from Ukrainian territory Russia has “annexed” but does not occupy. In short, this represents zero movement toward ending the fighting since the Ukraine-Russia talks last week in Istanbul.

“I believe it went very well,” Trump said of the call with Putin on Monday. Trump’s positive characterization of the exchange is odd because last week, when Putin chose not to show up at the talks in Istanbul that he had proposed—talks that Trump encouraged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to attend—Trump justified Putin’s capriciousness by saying that, of course Putin did not show up because he, Trump, was not there. The US president asserted that “Nothing’s going to happen until Putin and I get together, okay?” In preparation for the call with Putin this week, Trump wrote on Truth Social: “THE SUBJECTS OF THE CALL WILL BE, STOPPING THE ‘BLOODBATH’ THAT IS KILLING, ON AVERAGE, MORE THAN 5000 RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN SOLDIERS A WEEK, AND TRADE.”

Yet at the end of that call, Trump was upbeat about the resumption of Russian-Ukrainian talks, and he was silent on the need for him to meet with Putin. This outcome is no surprise because Putin continues to thwart Trump’s stated goal of achieving an immediate end to the shooting. Putin underscored this Sunday night with the launch of the largest drone attack on Ukraine—over two hundred drones—since the start of the invasion.

In the days ahead of the call, US Vice President JD Vance and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted that if progress toward peace does not actually appear, the United States could “walk away” from the talks. This is a way of putting pressure on the parties. Without explanation, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt said that the administration is frustrated with both sides, even though, as Vance said earlier this month, it is Russia that is asking for too much.

Meanwhile, Zelenskyy and his European partners in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and elsewhere are proceeding with their efforts to place additional sanctions on Moscow, an effort that would be more effective at moving the Kremlin toward an actual cease-fire if Trump worked with this group. At the moment, White House policy does not reflect the view of 61 percent of the American public that the administration’s policy is weak on Putin.

Despite the tentativeness of recent White House policy, it cannot be ruled out that Trump will make good on his promise to achieve a durable peace by putting ample pressure on the party obstructing that outcome. But for now, it is hard to escape the conclusion that Trump blinked.

John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

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A remarkable week for a rising Turkey

Frederick Kempe — Sat, 17 May 2025 12:00:00 +0000

Geography is destiny.

The quote is sometimes attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte, but it might as well also be the working motto of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

This past week, Erdoğan strung together a trio of geopolitical wins that underscored his success in leveraging his country’s size, military capability, and—perhaps most of all—geographic position to achieve outsize influence.

Erdoğan did this despite facing some of the biggest political protests he has weathered in years following the imprisonment of his political rival, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu. It’s no wonder Erdoğan is harnessing international gains to shore up his domestic position.

The first victory was US President Donald Trump’s decision to lift sanctions on Syria’s new government. Turkey played a catalytic role in the December ouster of Bashar al-Assad, Erdoğan’s nemesis who had ruled Syria since 2000, when he succeeded his father. It was fitting that Trump included Erdoğan by phone in his meeting this week in Riyadh with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa.

Second, the Kurdish militant group known as the PKK announced this week that it will disband and end its armed struggle after months of Turkish backchannel diplomacy. There’s still a risk that the PKK could fragment into smaller groups that attack Turkey, but for now, the development is a win for the country’s security.

Third, Istanbul played host to the first direct peace talks between Ukrainian and Russian officials since March 2022, with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio also flying in from a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in the Turkish town of Antalya. Russian President Vladimir Putin was a no-show, which kept Trump from traveling to Turkey as well, and the two-hour meeting appears to have been fruitless. Yet it underscored Erdoğan’s ability to navigate both Moscow and Kyiv even while providing Ukraine with armed drones.

For years, some Western officials and analysts have dismissed Erdoğan as a populist authoritarian whose inflation-ridden economy was troubled and whose geopolitical ambitions were fantasy. But it now rings truer when Erdoğan says, as he did in December, “Turkey is bigger than Turkey. As a nation, we cannot limit our horizon to 782,000 square kilometers.”

None of this week’s wins are permanent. The jury is out on whether Syria’s new leadership can hold the country together. The PKK peace is fragile. Ukraine-Russia talks still don’t seem to be going anywhere. And other pressing questions remain unresolved, such as whether Erdoğan will be able to successfully manage relations with Israel given Israeli security concerns about the expanded Turkish military presence in Syria. However all that turns out, Erdoğan’s focus remains on protecting both his legacy and longevity after more than twenty years as prime minister and then president.

We might be a long way from a Pax Turcica. For now, however, Erdoğan and Turkey have gained relevance as an indispensable player from the Black Sea to the Levant, and from Central Asia to Europe, where the Turkish military will play a crucial role if Europe is to have the wherewithal to provide for Ukraine’s security—and its own.

What I’m reading

With doubts growing within NATO about the US nuclear umbrella, French President Emmanuel Macron specified three conditions for extending the protection of France’s nuclear weapons to European allies. We’ll keep monitoring the Trump transatlantic fallout.

“How do you know the day that you become old?” legendary investor Warren Buffett this week asked the Wall Street Journal as he announced he was stepping back at age ninety-four (for him, it was at age ninety).

We interrupt this report for an inflection point in US baseball, my non-geopolitical passion. Call me old-fashioned, but I hope the Hall of Fame won’t ever induct baseball’s all-time hits leader Pete Rose, who passed away last September, given his gambling on baseball. That said, I wish he’d lived to see Major League Baseball lift its banishment of “Charlie Hustle” from the game.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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To achieve his goal of a durable peace, Trump must turn up the pressure on Putin

John E. Herbst — Fri, 16 May 2025 22:29:48 +0000

This is the first in a series of regular assessments of the efforts, spearheaded by the Trump administration, to achieve a negotiated end to Russia’s war on Ukraine.

The results are now in from the first direct talks between Russia and Ukraine since the revelations of Russian atrocities in the Ukrainian cities of Bucha and Irpin three years ago. And one thing is clear: It remains Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aim to seize more territory so that he can achieve effective political control over Ukraine.

The talks were productive in the important but limited sense that the sides agreed to each exchange one thousand prisoners of war. But the parties took no steps toward an eventual end to the hostilities, as the Kremlin negotiators insisted that Ukrainian troops withdraw from areas of Ukraine that Moscow has “annexed.”

This is just the latest twist on the roller coaster that is the negotiating process to end Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The Trump administration’s approach to a negotiated peace has required compromise from both Ukraine and Russia. Ukraine was asked to accept de facto Kremlin control of Ukrainian territory that Russia currently occupies and to put its aspirations for NATO membership on hold. Washington has asked Russia to accept the presence of European troops in Ukraine as a peacekeeping force and ongoing Western arms supplies to Kyiv to deter future Russian aggression. Ukraine has largely accepted these terms; Russia has not. Ukraine agreed without objection to the mid-March general cease-fire that the United States proposed, as well as the naval cease-fire in late March. Russia rejected both. Each side agreed to a cease-fire involving energy installations that same month, but Moscow violated it within hours.

The Trump administration’s approach through late April was hobbled by its unwillingness to put pressure on Moscow for rejecting the general and naval cease-fires, which contrasted with the severe pressure the US administration put on Ukraine after the difficult Oval Office meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on February 28. When Moscow refused the United States’ proposal for a naval cease-fire, the White House’s approach was to offer Russia more carrots, which prompted substantial criticism from Trump-friendly newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal and the New York Post, as well as from some Republicans on Capitol Hill. This tendency continued in late April as the White House proposed the truly damaging concession of recognizing Russian control of Crimea.

All of this changed—at least for the moment—when the United States and Ukraine inked the critical minerals deal on April 30. The deal included a paragraph in which, for the first time, the Trump administration mentioned the possibility of new US weapons going to Ukraine. It was no coincidence that at the same time, the White House separately approved two modest shipments of weapons to Ukraine. While the Trump administration did not stress this point publicly, the approval of the weapons shipments clearly complicated Putin’s efforts to take more Ukrainian land. It is worth noting that in response to criticism of its weak approach toward the Kremlin, the Trump administration has been talking for weeks about putting new sanctions on Russia. So far, however, it has not acted on these threats.

At the same time, Zelenskyy has been continuing to leverage his relationships with key European allies. He hit paydirt last weekend when the leaders of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Poland joined him in Kyiv to demand that Russia agree to a general cease-fire by May 12, threatening new sanctions if the Kremlin did not agree. Those leaders also called US President Donald Trump during their meeting and sought his support. He did not discourage them.

As circumstances grew unfavorable for him, Putin parried with a proposal for direct talks between Russia and Ukraine in Istanbul—a bid to delay progress on a cease-fire, avoid sanctions, and split Trump from the Europeans. At first, the gamble seemed to pay off. Zelenskyy immediately denounced the idea as a Russian stalling tactic and said Ukraine would not participate. But Trump reacted quickly as well; while skeptical that Russia wanted peace, he called on Zelenskyy to engage. Demonstrating his diplomatic nimbleness, Zelenskyy swiftly changed his mind and announced his intention to got to Istanbul.

This prompted a change of position in Moscow, with Putin announcing that he would not participate in the talks and Russian media criticizing the very concept of these talks—without mentioning that they were Putin’s idea. While Putin did not split off the Trump administration from Europe, his gambit did block the plans of Ukraine, Poland, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany to impose sanctions against Russia this week. And the instincts of the Trump team made that possible. After encouraging Zelenskyy to go to Turkey to negotiate, Trump provided cover for Putin’s cynical decision not to attend the talks. Trump said it was natural for Putin not to attend since, he, Trump, would not be there.

On Thursday, Trump declared that there will be no real progress toward peace until he and Putin sit down together. Trump may well be right about that—but only if he makes clear that if the Kremlin continues to reject reasonable compromises, the United States will send major new arms supplies to Ukraine and levy additional economic sanctions against Russia.

John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

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Trump can cement his Middle East successes by calling Putin’s bluff

Frederick Kempe — Thu, 15 May 2025 22:55:04 +0000

This week has been vintage Donald Trump: disruptive, transactional, and unafraid to defy convention. From a geopolitical standpoint, the US president’s trip to the Middle East could prove to be one of the most significant of his two terms in office. That depends, however, on whether Trump now follows up with a decisive move against Russia’s Vladimir Putin.

Here’s how to look at this historic opportunity.

Trump’s surprise decision to lift US sanctions on post-Assad Syria should be seen in combination with his administration’s less-ballyhooed move to remove curbs on the sale of advanced artificial intelligence (AI) semiconductor chips to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia. Both are smart moves of underappreciated consequence on a global chessboard.

First, let’s talk Syria.

Trump had nothing to do with the December 8 fall of dictator Bashar al-Assad, which came in the final days of the Biden administration, ending fifty years of repressive Assad family rule. For Trump, it also marked an unanticipated geopolitical inflection point, whose origins I explained here a few days later. It was a powerful setback to Iranian leaders and Putin, who had saved the Assad regime through direct military intervention since 2015.

By lifting sanctions now in such high-profile fashion in Riyadh, Trump has seized high diplomatic ground at low cost. He rewarded both Middle Eastern and European allies—particularly the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey—who had urged him to make the move. At the same time, he can slam the door on any Russian attempt to regain regional influence.

Moscow spent years propping up the Assad regime, but it collapsed anyway, in no small part because Russia moved military assets from Syria to support its Ukraine war. Russia didn’t just lose a client in al-Assad; it also lost global standing by giving up a Middle East foothold through which it exercised regional influence. Trump should follow up by proposing a regional security pact excluding Russia and China—and building upon his Abraham Accords.

Now, let’s talk artificial intelligence.

What do advanced computer chips have to do with Syrian sanctions relief? If the Syria move is about checkmating Russia, then the chip move is about outmaneuvering China. Do both at the same time, and you frustrate the “no limits partnership” that Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping declared in opposition to Washington back in February 2022.

President Joe Biden’s move late in his administration to limit UAE and Saudi access to the United States’ most advanced chips via the “AI Diffusion Rule” was designed to limit the technology’s proliferation to China. But in the region it was perceived as a slap in the face of countries willing to invest tens of billions of dollars in American AI companies and their infrastructure. A Gulf official told me some colleagues in his country wondered whether they had made the right bet as they confronted US restrictions, even as DeepSeek raised concerns that China over time could match or surpass US capabilities.

Both Trump moves are calculated gambles with sound logic behind them.

Regarding Syria, Trump has reckoned it’s worth taking a chance on the new leadership in Damascus and giving it a “fresh start.” That’s even though new President Ahmed al-Sharaa, who led the offensive against Assad, was designated by the United States as a terrorist alongside his Hayat Tahrir al-Sham movement, given their historic ties to al-Qaeda. Al-Sharaa renounced his ties to al-Qaeda in 2016 and now commits that his regime will be inclusive and respect all his country’s religious and ethnic sects.

The jury is out—but a good outcome is more likely with Washington involved.

Regarding artificial intelligence, Trump is betting that the Emiratis and Saudis will protect cutting-edge US technology from leaking to China, as the Biden administration feared. What he’s gained in return are arguably the deepest-pocketed investors in the world—who at the same time hope to maintain close ties to Beijing, their largest fossil fuel customer.

With an accelerating tech race this uncertain and with the stakes so high, give Trump credit for deciding rather than dithering.

A third news story this week may seem unrelated—that of the first direct peace talks between Ukrainian and Russian officials in Istanbul—but it’s not. Trump has expressed concern that Putin may be “tapping [him] along.” That’s a welcome, if belated, sign that he and his administration recognize that they are being played by a wily adversary who believes all of Ukraine will fall to him if he can buy time and neutralize US support for Kyiv.

It’s time to call Putin’s bluff amid his failure to engage seriously in peace talks that would preserve Ukraine’s sovereignty, security, and freedom to join Western institutions. Good next moves would be more sanctions against Russia, more weapons for Ukraine, and a backstop for European military support for Ukrainian security guarantees.

A Putin failure in Ukraine, coming on the heels of his Syria failure, would be a geopolitical triumph of historic consequence and perhaps even worth a Nobel Peace Prize for Trump, something I wrote about late last year.

Not long after I wrote that, a Middle East official told me that by upending the geopolitical chessboard, Trump has the opportunity to achieve unanticipated gains, particularly in great power politics. The danger, he said, was that Trump pays too little attention to the secondary consequences of his decisions. The economic cost of his “liberation day” tariffs, and his decision to back off their most extreme version, underscored both this Trump peril and his ability to self-correct.

If Trump will now also self-correct on Russia, he can again confound his critics, showing that he can be disruptive, transactional, convention-defying, and geopolitically shrewd, all at the same time. Trump shouldn’t miss this historic opportunity.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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Russia’s aerial attacks on Ukrainian civilians must not go unpunished

Anastasiya Donets, Susan H. Farbstein — Thu, 15 May 2025 21:41:38 +0000

Editor’s note: This article was updated on May 16, 2025, to include additional context about different types of crimes against humanity.

While international attention focuses on the US-led effort to initiate peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, Moscow is dramatically escalating its aerial attacks on Ukrainian civilians. During the first twenty-four days of April, for example, UN officials verified 848 civilian casualties due to Russian bombardments, representing a forty-six percent increase over the same period in 2024.

Russia’s aerial offensive is a daily feature of the war that aims to terrorize the civilian population and render large parts of Ukraine unlivable. By bombing cities and energy infrastructure, the Kremlin hopes to force millions of Ukrainians to flee the country and break the will of the remaining residents to resist. Any future peace deal that sidelines this reality and fails to hold Russia to account would erode international law and set a disastrous precedent for future armed conflicts.

For the past one and a half years, the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School and the International Partnership for Human Rights have documented and analyzed Russia’s aerial attacks in Ukraine. This research is based on extensive fieldwork, witness interviews, open-source intelligence, and forensic analysis.

After reviewing hundreds of Russian drone and missile strikes, researchers narrowed the focus down to twenty-two key attacks and identified two patterns that illuminate their impact: Attacks on energy infrastructure and on densely populated areas. The legal memorandum resulting from this work concludes that Russia’s bombing campaign amounts to the crimes against humanity of extermination and persecution.

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For three consecutive winters, Russia has bombed Ukraine’s energy infrastructure in a bid to deprive the civilian population of access to heating and electricity at a time when the days are short and temperatures are typically well below freezing. These attacks have had a devastating impact on the Ukrainian power grid, with around half of Ukraine’s entire prewar energy-generating capacity destroyed by summer 2024.

As well as targeted attacks on civilian infrastructure, Russia has also launched waves of drones and missiles at Ukrainian towns and cities throughout the invasion, causing widespread destruction and loss of life. There have been a number of particularly deadly attacks in recent weeks, including a ballistic missile strike on a playground in Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s hometown, Kryvyi Rih, that killed eighteen people including nine children. On Palm Sunday one week before Easter, Russia launched a targeted strike on Sumy city center as civilians made their way to church, leaving thirty-five dead.

In addition to killing and injuring civilians, Russian aerial attacks also create untenable living conditions for the wider civilian population. They leave people traumatized and fuel intense feelings of insecurity, while disrupting access to heating, power, water, healthcare, and other essential resources.

While estimating the true toll of these attacks is challenging, the number of displaced Ukrainians indicates the sheer scale of the humanitarian crisis. According to UN data from February 2025, Russian’s invasion has forced 10.6 million people to relocate, with 6.9 million recorded as refugees living outside Ukraine. Meanwhile, around 12.7 million Ukrainians are in need of humanitarian assistance, including nearly two million children.

Russia systematically and deliberately deprives civilians of objects essential to their survival and inflicts conditions of life calculated to bring about their destruction, which constitutes the crime against humanity of extermination. Statements by Russian officials, such as calls for Ukrainians to be left to “freeze and rot,” corroborate this conclusion.

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Russia’s aerial terror campaign, as well as the Kremlin’s actions in the occupied regions of Ukraine, have intentionally deprived Ukrainians of their fundamental rights to life, health, education, and culture, thus constituting the crime against humanity of persecution. The crime of persecution requires special discriminatory intent to target Ukrainians as a distinct group. This intent can be seen in Moscow’s branding of Ukrainians as “Nazis” who must be “destroyed.” such language underscores that Russia is attacking the very existence of Ukrainians. Targeted Russian attacks on educational and cultural facilities across Ukraine are further evidence of this intent.

Additionally, throughout the regions of Ukraine currently under Kremlin control, the Russian occupation authorities are reportedly enforcing russification policies that aim to extinguish any trace of Ukrainian national identity or statehood. Thousands of Ukrainian children have been deported to Russia and subjected to anti-Ukrainian indoctrination. The International Criminal Court in The Hague has issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin in relation to the large-scale deportation of Ukrainian children.

Holding Russia accountable for the ongoing air offensive against Ukraine is particularly important as this form of prohibited total war, where everything and anything including vital infrastructure and civilian populations are targeted to achieve victory, looks set to return. Technological advances are transforming the modern battlefield to essentially include entire countries and their civilian populations. Against this backdrop, Russia’s use of long-range drones and missiles to terrorize Ukrainian civilians is likely a taste of things to come.

To date, no international tribunal has held individual perpetrators responsible for international crimes resulting from unlawful aerial attacks. The International Criminal Court has taken an important initial step by issuing arrest warrants against four senior Russian officials for their roles in attacking Ukrainian civilians and energy infrastructure, but further measures are needed.

Failure to hold Russia accountable today will fuel tomorrow’s wars and embolden Putin’s fellow autocrats to embrace similar tactics against civilian populations. It is vital to make sure long-term security is not sacrificed in order to reach some kind of compromise with the Kremlin to end the bloodshed in Ukraine. By focusing on accountability for Russia’s aerial attacks, the international community can set a meaningful precedent that could help protect civilians around the world for years to come.

Anastasiya Donets leads the Ukraine Legal Team at the International Partnership for Human Rights, an independent non-governmental organization. She was previously an assistant professor in the International Law Department at Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University in Kharkiv. Susan H. Farbstein is a clinical professor of law at Harvard Law School, where she directs the International Human Rights Clinic.

Ukraine’s vibrant civil society wants to be heard during peace talks

Ana Lejava — Thu, 15 May 2025 20:31:22 +0000

As US-led efforts to broker a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine struggle to gain momentum, debate continues over what a viable future settlement could look like. While officials in Moscow, Washington, Brussels, and Kyiv discuss technicalities and potential concessions, members of Ukraine’s vibrant civil society are also attempting to define the contours of a lasting and meaningful peace.

Many Ukrainian civil society representatives stress that peace must be more than a mere pause in fighting. Temporary ceasefires may lead to periods of relative calm, but unless the root causes of the war are addressed and justice is delivered, the conflict will merely be frozen and not resolved. Similarly frozen conflicts in Moldova and Georgia offer cautionary tales of how such outcomes can serve Russian interests. These unresolved disputes have allowed Moscow to destabilize its neighbors for decades while maintaining strategic leverage and control.

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In order to avoid the geopolitical uncertainties and internal instability of a frozen conflict, Ukrainian sovereignty must remain non-negotiable. This means rejecting any potential peace deal built on territorial concessions, restrictions on the size of Ukraine’s military, or limitations on the country’s ability to form international alliances.

Instead, Ukraine needs concrete and comprehensive security guarantees from the country’s partners. With this in mind, many civil society representatives warn against repeating the mistakes of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which saw Ukraine surrender its nuclear arsenal in exchange for toothless security assurances that failed to prevent Russia’s invasion.

Ukraine’s future security also depends on a strong military. Many women within the country’s civil society have sought to communicate this to their colleagues in the international feminist movement, which has often traditionally championed disarmament and non-violent conflict resolution. They stress that a durable peace cannot come at the expense of security or Ukraine’s fundamental right to exist.

Speaking during a recent visit to the United States, Ukrainian human rights lawyer and Nobel Peace Prize recipient Oleksandra Matviichuk emphasized that safeguarding Ukrainian sovereignty is about much more than protecting the country’s physical borders and also involves millions of human lives. Ukrainians living under Russian occupation are currently enduring the kidnapping of children, forced deportations, prison camps, sexual violence, widespread human rights abuses, and the methodical erosion of civil liberties. These are not isolated crimes. Instead, Russia is accused of seeking to systematically erase Ukrainian national identity in a campaign that many believe amounts to genocide.

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Ukrainian civil society leaders have stressed the need for broad inclusion in peace negotiations and post-war recovery processes. Their calls are backed by the experience of peace initiatives elsewhere. Research indicates that peace efforts are up to 64 percent less likely to fail in instances when civil society representatives are invited to participate in talks. This has been the case in places like Northern Ireland and South Africa, where a combination of official diplomacy and civil society dialogue helped forge lasting peace.

Excluding Ukrainian civil society from peace efforts could undermine the human dimension of the process and remove accountability from the equation. While defining what justice should look like at the local, national, and international levels will be an ongoing discussion requiring the involvement of diverse stakeholders, Ukrainian civil society activists emphasize that justice must remain at the heart of any peace agreement.

Demands for accountability are widespread throughout Ukrainian society. More than 70,000 war crimes have been documented since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, including a large number of cases involving conflict-related sexual violence. Civil society activists have been at the forefront of efforts to secure justice for war crimes while also working for the protection of displaced people and the return of abducted Ukrainian children. Their demands include ensuring that the perpetrators of war crimes do not enjoy immunity, and that frozen Russian assets be directed toward rebuilding Ukraine and supporting victims.

Many Ukrainian civil society leaders believe the pursuit of justice in response to the crimes committed during Russia’s invasion is not only a national priority. Instead, they say Russia’s actions elsewhere from Syria to Africa reflect a wider pattern of impunity and argue that addressing this problem is a global imperative. As Oleksandra Matviichuk bluntly puts it, “Unpunished evil grows.”

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is a watershed moment in modern history that has directly undermined the foundations of the existing international order. Ukrainian activists recognize the scale of the challenge this represents, but argue that international law must be revitalized rather than being abandoned entirely. They see this moment as a critical test for the global community. How the world responds to Russia’s alleged war crimes will set precedents that extend far beyond Ukraine’s borders. Failure to act decisively now will not only undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty, but also embolden authoritarian regimes everywhere.

Ana Lejava is a Policy Officer at the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security at Georgetown University.

Inside Latvia’s race against time to build deterrence against Russia

Armands Astukevičs and Hans Binnendijk — Wed, 14 May 2025 14:51:29 +0000

This project, a collaboration between the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and the Latvia-based Centre for East European Policy Studies, aims to advance understanding of Latvia’s defense and security policies, with an emphasis on resilience-building strategies. Latvia’s measures offer lessons for other frontline states, and demonstrate an increasing willingness to prioritize defense in an uncertain geopolitical environment. Read the other articles in this series here and here.

Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine has laid bare Moscow’s neo-imperial ambitions and the direct threat it poses to its so-called near-abroad. For NATO frontline states such as Latvia, the security landscape has fundamentally changed over the past three years. While Russian forces are currently taking staggering losses in Ukraine, necessitating a period of force reconstitution, Russia’s military could be rebuilt and ready to invade a Baltic state in as few as three years, according to estimates from some Western intelligence agencies.

Other factors complicate the picture further. On the positive side, the accession of Finland and Sweden to the Alliance, growing defense capabilities in neighboring Estonia and Lithuania, and Poland’s significant defense investments, all provide Latvia with a strengthened collective defense posture in the Baltic Sea region. However, this has occurred amid growing uncertainty regarding the United States’ long-term commitment to European security. Critical US enablers and rapid reinforcements cannot be taken for granted to the same degree as in the past. While the US nuclear umbrella remains extended so far, the erosion of trust is noticeable, creating potential vulnerabilities that the Kremlin might seek to test.

The stakes could not be higher. For Latvia and its Baltic neighbors, Russian aggression represents an existential threat. At the same time, a Russian attack on NATO’s eastern flank would quickly reverberate across the entire Alliance.

In response to these threats and changing security dynamics, Latvia should pursue three fundamental and interconnected strategic goals:

First, demonstrate political will: Latvia must demonstrate to allies in Washington and across Europe that it is maximizing its own defense capabilities and resilience, shouldering its share of the burden, and signaling unwavering commitment. It must then use that demonstration to harness the power of the Alliance for its national defense. Latvia’s defense budget hovered around 1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2014 when Russia first invaded Crimea. Its defense budget this year is set at about 3.65 percent, with announced plans to push it to 5 percent of GDP soon. Latvia needs to make up for lost time.
Second, generate sufficient capabilities: Riga needs to generate sufficient domestic defensive capabilities, integrated with NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroup, to realistically hold a defensive line against aggression long enough for decisive allied reinforcements to arrive. It needs to achieve a degree of deterrence by denial. This will require a significant Latvian military buildup.
Third, enhance societal resilience: Latvia must also project an undeniable national will, making it clear to Moscow that any aggression would face fierce, protracted, whole-of-society, and costly resistance. There can be no perception of Latvia as an easy target.

Achieving these goals demands immediate, focused action in Latvia, as well as a rallying of Riga’s NATO allies.

National defense priorities

Latvia should begin by making its comprehensive defense concept a nationwide reality. The 2018 adoption of this framework, which called for integrating civilian elements into national security, is its vital strength. Through this whole-of-society approach, Latvia has demonstrated ingenuity and cooperation. For example, Latvia’s municipalities and state companies collaborate to support armed forces mobility and counter-mobility efforts. Another example is the involvement of hunters in the national defense system—as a patriotic and armed part of society that can be integrated with the National Guard and tasked with support assignments. While these efforts are commendable, more must be done to ensure that civilian agencies, businesses, and citizens are actively integrated into national resilience and defense planning through practical taskings and drills. As comprehensive defense evolves into the reality of society, it demonstrates credible national will, complicates adversary planning, and builds the societal backbone needed to withstand pressure and deter aggression, including hybrid attacks from Russia.

Latvia must also maintain momentum and keep military modernization on track. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Latvia has significantly increased investment in conventional war-fighting capabilities. Riga’s commitment to acquiring advanced systems such as HIMARS rocket launchers, IRIS-T air-to-air missiles, and coastal defense missiles sends a vital message: the country is serious about bolstering deterrence by denial. However, acquiring advanced hardware is only part of the equation; Latvia must also ensure that these systems can be effectively commanded, supplied, and maintained during high-intensity conflict. This necessitates trained personnel and critical support elements, including robust command-and-control, resilient logistics, sufficient ammunition stockpiles, and effective maintenance infrastructure. Not all equipment needs to be expensive or high-tech. Land mines along the border that would channel an attack and swarms of low-cost drones can have dramatic results on the battlefield. Perhaps most important, Latvia must ensure that it can sustain combat operations beyond the initial phase, proving it possesses the national endurance required to hold the line until allied reinforcements arrive.

National resilience also requires forging a cohesive fighting force from diverse sources of manpower. In 2023, Latvia introduced a mandatory conscription policy called State Defense Service (SDS) to bolster recruitment. This policy of mandatory eleven-month service has shown early signs of success. Latvia is planning to enlist four thousand new recruits annually by 2028, and 40 percent of the 2024 intake opted for professional careers after their mandatory service. However, given Latvia’s demographics, active service alone cannot generate sufficient manpower; it must be complemented by a ready and responsive reserve system—one that currently requires significant overhaul. With SDS providing a new input stream, the reserve system must be adapted to effectively integrate these personnel and grow combat power over the long term. Latvia could add significantly to its manpower mobilization by combining professionals, the Home Guard, and SDS graduates, as well as by implementing dedicated reservist training and early military education. Current military plans envision 31,000 troops by 2029, plus an equally large reserve contingent thereafter. While this objective is sound, the current timeline appears misaligned with the potential speed of Russian force reconstitution. Latvia must confront substantial constraints, including the need for adequate infrastructure, qualified instructors, and innovative policies to drive recruitment and conduct training at the required scale and speed.

Furthermore, physical defenses require turning the Baltic Defense Line from a concept to a concrete plan. A fortified line across the Baltics, leveraging naturally difficult terrain, is a clear-headed and necessary response to the Russian threat. Correctly executed, it could effectively impede a potential incursion, buying time for national counteractions and allied mobilization. Fast-tracking construction, funding, and policy decisions will be crucial for realizing this critical barrier. Critically, forces must train to fight effectively from these prepared positions, integrating them fully into national and regional operational plans.

Finally, Latvia must ensure that it has the infrastructure to support military mobility and to provide host nation support. Latvia’s defense fundamentally relies on NATO allies arriving quickly and in force, requiring substantial investment in mobility infrastructure and support elements. Latvia must therefore proactively invest in and expand the critical infrastructure needed to receive, stage, and sustain large-scale allied forces. Short-term priorities include accelerating projects like the Liepāja military port and enhancing airfield capacity at Lielvārde airbase and Riga International Airport. Accelerating Rail Baltica’s military utility is also crucial, as it could fundamentally alter the capacity and speed of NATO reinforcements into the region.

Rallying allied support

While Latvia shoulders these critical domestic responsibilities, its security ultimately rests on robust collective defense and the tangible commitment of its allies. Latvia must advocate for specific actions from its NATO partners, recognizing that the window before Russia potentially reconstitutes its offensive capabilities is short. This diplomatic push requires urgency and clarity.

The place to begin is in Washington. All three Baltic states and Poland have essentially accepted US President Donald Trump’s challenge for allies to spend 5 percent of GDP on defense. This should be presented in a high-profile fashion to Trump during the NATO Summit in June. As part of this presentation, Latvia should urge Trump to continue hosting US forces in the Baltic region on a rotational basis and to augment those rotations with high-impact capabilities such as air and missile defense assets.

To deter Russia, NATO must strengthen its forward defense posture on the ground. Latvia should continue advocating for transforming the Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroup on its territory into a combat-credible forward defense force that expands on the full-time brigade and integrates it with national defense structures that match adversary military capabilities. Enhancing this forward defense by securing broader participation, particularly from a nuclear-armed European ally, would send a strong deterrent signal to Moscow.

This enhanced forward presence must be embedded within deeper, more integrated regional defense planning. Latvia, working closely with its neighbors, should champion the development of genuinely interlocking, all-domain defense plans within an enhanced Nordic-Baltic-Poland framework. This necessitates moving beyond interoperability exercises toward shared operational concepts and assigned responsibilities. This will help forge a more cohesive and resilient defense architecture in NATO’s northeast as part of the Alliance’s broader reinforcement strategy. Consequently, Latvia must be a vocal proponent of the regular, rigorous exercising and continuous streamlining of the supreme allied commander Europe’s reinforcement plans for the Baltic region. Identifying and resolving friction points, especially cross-border military mobility bottlenecks and logistical hurdles, requires sustained, collaborative effort with those allies designated to reinforce the region in a crisis.

Minimizing the time required for those reinforcements to arrive necessitates a concerted push to maximize the pre-positioning of allied military equipment and essential stocks within Latvia and the region. Reducing the lift requirement during a crisis by having equipment already in theater dramatically shortens response timelines, directly bolstering deterrence by showcasing NATO’s capacity for rapid, large-scale reaction.

Lastly, building on a deep-seated relationship, the Baltic states must treat strengthening security cooperation with Ukraine as a long-term strategic imperative. Currently, Kyiv’s resolute defense delivers immediate dividends by tying down significant Russian forces and offering invaluable, hard-earned combat lessons. For the Baltic states, a battle-hardened ally such as Ukraine can be a substantial security and defense contributor to the region. If Russia were to test NATO’s defense capabilities on its eastern flank, the prospect of Ukraine joining the fight would dramatically expand Moscow’s theater of operations.

Latvia has a brief respite as Russian troops are worn down in Ukraine, but it will take little time for Russia to reconstitute its conventional forces. Latvia must use this window to create a more favorable defense environment. At home, it must rapidly build up its defense capacity and resilience. Abroad, it needs to assure a continued US commitment to its defense, generate a greater NATO forward presence on its soil, and deepen regional integration. It also needs to refine reinforcement mechanisms and maximize pre-positioning. Convincing allies to commit the necessary political will and resources before Russia regains its strength is the most critical security task facing Riga and its regional partners.

Armands Astukevičs is a researcher at the Centre for East European Policy Studies. His primary research focuses on the Baltic states’ defense and security, as well as the foreign and security policies of Russia and Belarus. Previously, he worked on policy analysis and planning at the Latvian Ministry of Defence, focusing on crisis management and comprehensive national defence issues.

Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served in several senior US government positions, including special assistant to the president for defense policy, principal deputy director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, and director of the Institute for National Security Studies.

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Drone superpower: Ukrainian wartime innovation offers lessons for NATO

David Kirichenko — Tue, 13 May 2025 21:10:46 +0000

Ever since the onset of Russian aggression against Ukraine eleven years ago, military training has been a core element of Western support for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. As Moscow’s invasion has escalated into the largest European war since World War II, the relationship between Ukraine and the country’s partners has become much more of a two-way street. While Ukrainian troops continue to train with Western instructors, it is now increasingly apparent that NATO also has a lot to learn from Ukraine.

The Ukrainian military has evolved dramatically during the past three years of full-scale war against Russia to become the largest and most effective fighting force in Europe. Innovation has played a key role in this process, with Ukraine relying on the country’s vibrant tech sector and traditionally strong defense industry to counter Russia’s overwhelming advantages in terms of both manpower and firepower. This has resulted in an army capable of developing and implementing the latest military technologies at speeds that are unmatched by any Western countries with their far more bureaucratic procurement cycles.

Ukraine’s innovative approach to defense is most immediately obvious in the country’s ability to produce and deploy a wide variety of drones. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, the experience of the Ukrainian army has underlined the growing dominance of drones on the modern battlefield, and has redefined our understanding of drone warfare in ways that will shape military doctrines around the world for many years to come.

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The most important tools in Ukraine’s unmanned arsenal are the country’s growing fleet of First Person View (FPV) drones. These drones in many ways function as the infantry of drone warfare. They have become a central pillar of Ukraine’s war effort, inflicting up to 80 percent of Russian battlefield casualties and making it possible to hold the line even when Ukrainian troops have found themselves starved of artillery shells.

Ukrainian production of FPV drones has mushroomed in recent years, with domestic companies also gradually moving away from an initial reliance on imported components. By early 2025, Ukraine was reportedly producing 200,000 FPV drones per month. Cheap to manufacture, they are capable of destroying tanks and other military equipment worth millions of dollars.

Russia is also relentlessly adapting to technological changes on the battlefield, creating a daily race to innovate that runs in parallel to the actual fighting on the front lines of the war. The dominance of FPV drones has led to a variety of countermeasures, ranging from the widespread use of netting and so-called “cope cages,” to increasingly sophisticated electronic blocking and the jamming of signals. In response, both Russia and Ukraine are turning to fiber optic drones that are not susceptible to jamming technologies.

As the full-scale war approaches a fourth summer, the evolution of drone tactics continues. Over the past year, Ukraine has sought to establish a 15-kilometer kill zone patrolled by drones along the front lines of the conflict, making it extremely challenging to concentrate troops for major offensive operations. The strength of Ukraine’s so-called “drone wall” defenses will be severely tested in the coming few months by Russia’s ongoing offensive. Building on Ukraine’s experience, NATO is reportedly exploring the idea of creating a “drone wall” of its own on the alliance’s eastern flank.

Beyond the front lines, Ukraine has developed an expanding fleet of long-range drones capable of striking targets deep inside Russia. This has made it possible to carry out a wide range of attacks on Russian military bases, ammunition storage facilities, air defenses, and Putin’s economically vital but vulnerable oil and gas industry. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has called the country’s growing long range capabilities “a clear and effective guarantee of Ukraine’s security.”

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Ukrainian drone innovations are also transforming naval warfare. During the first two years of the war, Ukraine used marine drones to target Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, sinking or damaging multiple warships and forcing the remainder to retreat from Russian-occupied Crimea. This remarkable success made it possible to lift the naval blockade on Ukrainian ports and reopen commercial maritime routes, providing Kyiv with a vital economic lifeline.

More recently, Ukraine has begun using naval drones as launch platforms for missiles and smaller unmanned systems. The results have been spectacular. In January 2025, missile-armed Ukrainian naval drones reportedly destroyed several Russian helicopters over the Black Sea. In another world first, Ukrainian officials announced in early May that they had shot down two Russian fighter jets using marine drones equipped with anti-aircraft missile systems.

Ukrainian military planners are now working on a range of unmanned ground systems as they look to take drone warfare to the next level. With support from the country’s government-backed defense tech cluster Brave1, work is underway to develop dozens of robotic models capable of performing a variety of combat and logistical tasks. In December 2024, Ukrainian forces claimed to have made history by conducting the world’s first fully unmanned assault on Russian positions using ground-based robotic systems and FPV drones.

Speaking in April 2025, Ukraine’s former commander in chief Valeriy Zaluzhniy underlined how his country’s use of new technologies was transforming the battlefield. “The Russian-Ukrainian War has completely changed the nature of warfare,” he commented. Zaluzhniy predicted that the wars of the future would be won by countries that focus their resources on the development of drones, electronic warfare, and artificial intelligence. “It is obvious that victory on the battlefield now depends entirely on the ability to outpace the enemy in technological development,” he noted.

Western leaders and military commanders are clearly taking note of the remarkable progress made by the Ukrainian Armed Forces since 2022. Many are now incorporating Ukraine’s unique battlefield experience into their own programs, while NATO members including Britain and Denmark are reportedly already receiving training in drone warfare from Ukrainian military instructors. This is likely to be just the beginning, as more countries seek to benefit from Ukrainian expertise.

For many years, it has been customary to view Ukraine as being almost entirely dependent on Western aid and know-how for its survival. This was always an oversimplification; it is now hopelessly outdated. In reality, today’s Ukraine is a drone superpower with an innovative domestic defense industry that can provide its NATO allies with important lessons in the realities of twenty-first century warfare.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

While there are no immediate solutions to the crisis in Haiti, there are several tangible steps the United States can take to ameliorate the suffering of the Haitian people and help facilitate the country’s recovery. Failing to do so risks allowing the crisis to not only worsen, but spill over into the United States and throughout the region.

Ripple effects

The paramount consequence of Haiti’s potential collapse into a failed state would be the devastating loss of life and the shattered futures of hundreds of thousands of Haitians. But this fallout would not be contained within the country’s borders—the United States and the broader Caribbean Basin will inevitably feel the ripple effects of the crisis as well.

A humanitarian disaster of this scale would trigger a dramatic surge in migration to countries across the region, including to the US southern border. This coincides with the Trump administration’s revocation of Temporary Protected Status for 200,000 Haitian refugees, forcing deportations at a moment of maximum instability. The Dominican Republic, Haiti’s closest neighbor and a key US ally, would also face intensified pressure—both from refugee flows and the risk of cross-border violence. In the total absence of a functioning state, Haiti could become a staging ground for terrorist activity, drug markets, and transnational criminal networks already active in the region, further destabilizing the Caribbean Basin. With this level of insecurity just miles from the United States’ shores, the situation represents a five-alarm fire for US national security.

US foreign policy in Haiti has long been marked by intervention, mismanagement, and short-term fixes. Many experts fear that the designation of Haiti’s gangs as foreign terrorist organizations falls into the same pattern—failing to address the root causes of gang violence or consider the impact on civilians who rely on aid. And as the failure of the Kenyan Multinational Security Support mission to restore security to Haiti has made clear, even efforts with significant US backing have proved inadequate to the challenges of the moment. Past US interventions and policies toward Haiti have fueled suspicion among many Haitians and hopelessness among many US policymakers. Yet while the US government bears significant responsibility for this skepticism, it also possesses the influence to effect positive—even if incremental—change for Haiti.

How the US can help right now

The US government can take several steps in the near term to bring back a modicum of stability and prepare the nation for “the day after.” Many of the necessary policies already exist—they simply require reauthorization or targeted revisions to be effective.

Although Haiti is widely recognized as the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, the United States remains the largest market for its most profitable sector: textiles. Thanks to bipartisan legislation passed by Congress in 2006 and 2010, known as the HOPE and HELP acts, which established preferential trade terms for the sector, Haiti’s apparel exports to the United States surged from $231 million in 2001 to $994 million in 2021. Although the crisis has severely undermined textile production, these exports provide a resilient economic lifeline for what remains of Haiti’s formal economy. However, unless reauthorized, these trade preferences are set to expire in September. Rather than imposing tariffs that further destabilize Haiti’s fragile manufacturing sector, Congress should move quickly to preserve the near-shoring of US manufacturing imports by passing HR 1625—the Haiti Economic Lift Program Extension Act of 2025, sponsored by Representative Gregory Murphy (R-NC).

The withdrawal of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) raises many questions about the future of development organizations in Haiti, as hundreds of life-saving programs are put on indefinite hold. Several voices within the Haiti policy community note that the agency’s work, despite its best intentions, sometimes created an overreliance on foreign aid within Haitian institutions. Over a century of this dynamic led Haiti to become, in the words of Haiti expert Jake Johnston, an “aid state.”

In the wake of USAID’s departure, the United States has the opportunity to sculpt a more effective aid strategy that puts the onus of development work in the hands of an ever-resilient Haitian civil society, not just foreign contractors. This strategy proved successful in the implementation of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief program. And this approach serves as the foundation of the Global Fragility Act (GFA), a law passed by Congress during US President Donald Trump’s first term that prioritizes localization and reorients US foreign policy strategy in fragile states toward preventing conflict rather than reacting to it. Haiti was designated one of the GFA’s ten priority countries and the Biden administration made meaningful strides toward developing a strategy that prioritizes engagement with a broad range of trusted local partners. Renewing the GFA could build on this groundwork by channeling substantial resources into empowering local partners, thus fostering greater self-reliance within Haitian institutions. Representatives Sarah Jacobs (D-CA) and Michael McCaul (R-TX) have introduced a bill to reauthorize and strengthen the GFA. Yet despite the Trump administration’s support for aid localization, momentum for renewing this policy has faltered in both the legislative and executive branches, leaving its future in peril.

A whole-of-government approach

As Georges Fauriol, an expert on the Caribbean, has described US policy toward Haiti, “the challenge is not so much the absence of a strategy as its disaggregated character.” Whether it be the State Department, the Office of the US Trade Representative, or the Department of Defense’s US Southern Command, the US government possesses no shortage of entities that conduct Haiti policy—not to mention the influence of external interest groups such as those in the US Haitian diaspora.

Although working toward the same mission, these initiatives tend to operate in silos and do not come together to form a cohesive strategy for the long-term stability of the country. This dynamic was evident during the US response to Haiti’s devastating 2010 earthquake, as US Southern Command-led military relief operations and USAID disaster initiatives often struggled with unclear divisions of responsibility, resulting in operational inefficiencies. The GFA and policies such as the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative aim to establish a whole-of-government approach to address this issue. Rather than launching new initiatives for each emerging crisis, the Trump administration should also appoint a special envoy to coordinate and leverage existing Haiti policies within the various branches, helping to shape a more coherent foreign policy for the island and the broader region.

The severity of Haiti’s ongoing crisis makes envisioning “the day after” a challenge. Yet, for countless Haitians, whether living in Haiti or abroad, this vision is worth fighting for, just as it has been during past periods of turmoil. The United States has a strategic interest in advancing a Haiti policy focused on long-term stability rather than short-term fixes. No single policy or initiative will solve the security, humanitarian, and economic challenges that have engulfed Haiti for the past four years. But failing to act at all would further jeopardize the stability of Haiti, the United States, and the region as a whole.

Camilla Reitherman is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Millennium Leadership Program.

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Cole interviews US Marine Corps Major General Peter D. Huntley on MARSOC podcast

kwinzerwilks — Tue, 13 May 2025 19:20:50 +0000

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On April 25, Forward Defense nonresident senior fellow August Cole sat down with US Marine Corps Major General Peter D. Huntley, Commander of the Marine Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC), to discuss the command’s future pathways and the strategic challenges it faces today.

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August Cole

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Gazans fear famine amid Israel aid block: ‘I don’t want to be a number’

Arwa Damon — Mon, 12 May 2025 16:37:00 +0000

Humanitarian aid into Gaza is being blocked by a democratically elected nation state, Israel, and is fully supported by the world’s self-declared greatest democracy, the United States. Indeed, the imagery and stories coming from the Palestinian enclave leave one feeling like we exist in the realm of the inhumane absurd.

For more than two months now, nothing has entered Gaza. Not a single grain of rice or bag of flour. The only thing standing between Gaza’s 2.2 million starving people on the brink of famine and three thousand trucks packed with humanitarian aid is Israel.

“It’s a humanitarian catastrophe. Catastrophe on the true meaning of the world. We never could have ever imagined this.”

The voice note comes from one of the social workers assisting with the International Aid Network for Relief and Assistance, my non-profit organization that works in Gaza.

“We had been distributing rice, a serving of rice just to try to ease the hunger in the bellies of the children at the camps we work in,” she continues.

“But we had to stop now because there’s no rice left.”

I am not disclosing the names of those quoted, due to safety concerns in the aftermath of Israel’s targeting of humanitarian aid workers. Although even with the precaution of anonymity, one colleague remarked: “Israel knows who we all are anyway.”

It has been more than two months since Israel broke the ceasefire deal, resumed its bombing campaign of Gaza, and declared that no aid would enter the Strip. Well before the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks, Israel controlled everything that entered or exited Gaza, even at the Rafah crossing at its border with Egypt.

The Israeli cabinet has started deliberations on resuming aid operations but under a framework that would “by-pass Hamas”, which would perhaps make sense if Hamas controlled the aid, only it doesn’t.

I have been to Gaza four times since the launch of the war in Gaza, on humanitarian missions with INARA, and would have gone on my fifth mission in February had Israel not denied me entry. I am hardly the only one, there has in fact been a troubling increase in denials of humanitarians and medics on missions to Gaza over the last three months.

I have been to warehouses, out in the field on distributions, and in sector meetings. Israel has long maintained that humanitarian aid entering Gaza is “controlled by Hamas.” The humanitarian community has categorically stated over and over that Hamas does not control the aid, despite allegations that the militant group has stolen some of it. But it is worth noting that if Hamas has been stealing or hoarding aid, it’s not from humanitarian organizations’ warehouses or distribution points.

This framework and its mechanisms would see private security contractors, or the military, establish “Israeli hubs” for distribution. The United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) issued a statement on behalf of all its partners slamming this plan.

“It is dangerous, driving civilians into militarized zones to collect rations, threatening lives, including those of humanitarian workers, while further entrenching forced displacement,” UNOCHA said in a statement.

“Humanitarian action responds to people’s needs, wherever they are.”

Most of us have set up distribution points close to the communities we serve, or, similar to our work at INARA, we deliver directly into the camps we work with. The population of Gaza is not mobile. Cars and buses don’t function; there is no fuel. People have to walk or take donkey carts to get anywhere. It’s not logical to expect someone to walk hours to get to a set distribution point in an active military zone and then haul an up to fifty-kilogram food parcel back to their tent.

Even assuming that someone was able to get the food box back to their tent, what are they supposed to cook with? Gaza has gone without cooking gas for months People try to gather wood, some are even burning books and trash to light a fire to cook on, but they are often unable to source enough. This is why functional community kitchens is so critical, but we have no idea how or if they will even be supplied.

But this is not a battle space that is ruled by logic. Equally ludicrous is Israel’s claim that “there is plenty of food in Gaza.”

There isn’t. The World Food Program does not state that its warehouses are empty, bakeries do not shut down, and children do not claw at scraps of food at the bottom of a pot when food is plentiful. What has been distributed to community kitchens will be depleted in the next few days.

It is no secret that Israel has weaponized humanitarian aid to ostensibly pressure Hamas, and the government itself has stated that it’s basically enforcing a “starve or surrender” policy.

Rule 53 of International Humanitarian Law specifically states, “The use of starvation of the civilian population as a method of warfare is prohibited.”

Israel is countering this by citing Article 23, which states that consignments may be prevented if there are concerns they may not reach their intended target or benefit the enemy. This is again based on the false premise that Hamas controls the aid. If this were the case, aid organizations like ours would have been unable to deliver assistance when Israel was permitting entry. We especially would not have been able to deliver during the ceasefire, when Hamas re-emerged onto Gaza’s streets.

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There already is an International Criminal Court warrant, issued back in November of last year, for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, which includes among the alleged crimes “the war crime of starvation as a method of warfare.”

Last week, the International Court of Justice began its deliberations on Israel’s restrictions on aid and aid operations at the request of the UN General Assembly. The deliberations will likely take months. Israel boycotted the sessions and called the whole thing a “circus”.

Israel recently rejected a Hamas offer of a five-year deal that would see it cede political power, countering with a forty-five-day ceasefire proposal and the provision that Hamas agree to disarm, which Hamas in turn rejected.

While ceasefire talks sputter, Israel is doubling down. The government just approved a “conquest” plan to expand its operations in Gaza, calling up additional tens of thousands of reservists, and enraging the Israeli population, who are growing increasingly incensed with their government’s refusal to do what it takes to get back to a ceasefire that will see the remaining hostages released. Tens of thousands of Israelis have been demonstrating on a regular basis, demanding that their government not continue to endanger the hostages’ lives.

For Palestinians, time is running out— a warning that has been echoed at some of the highest ranks of international organizations, including the World Health Organization.

“We are breaking the bodies and minds of the children of Gaza. We are starving the children of Gaza. We are complicit,” Deputy Director General Michael Ryan told reporters at the WHO’s headquarters. “It’s an abomination .”

When I speak to Palestinians in Gaza, I hear the strain in their voices—the subtle tremors as they fight not to crack under mounting hunger after a year and a half of military bombardment.

“Arwa,” they say. “I don’t want to be a number.”

Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA), a nonprofit organization that focuses on building a network of logistical support and medical care to help children who need lifesaving or life-altering medical treatment in war-torn nations.

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A rising nuclear double-threat in East Asia: Insights from our Guardian Tiger I and II tabletop exercises

Markus Garlauskas, Lauren D. Gilbert, Kyoko Imai — Mon, 12 May 2025 12:00:00 +0000

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Guardian Tiger led me to realize that we need to rethink our operational and strategic Indo-Pacific posture. We have to be ready for a local fight to become a regional war with nuclear escalation and threats to the homeland. It’s scary, but we can’t assume it away. We could face China and North Korea simultaneously. Either of them could go nuclear before giving up.

—US government official, participant in the Guardian Tiger tabletop exercises, name withheld

A decade from now, the United States is very likely to face operational and strategic challenges in the Indo-Pacific even more complex and difficult than those it faces today. The nuclear capabilities of China and North Korea are growing rapidly, and the risk is increasing that a conflict with one would escalate horizontally to a regional conflict involving both.

By 2030, China will likely be a near peer to the United States in terms of strategic nuclear capabilities. Its amphibious, air, and strike capabilities could also dramatically improve its ability to project force to Taiwan and the surrounding region. China’s plans, intentions, and timeline for use of force against Taiwan remain topics of heated debate. However, in the next five to ten years, it is plausible that Beijing will consider conditions to be more favorable for a military resolution, even if it is not eager for a global war with the United States.

In this same period, North Korea is likely to field a wider range of more precise and effective nonnuclear escalatory options, as well as a robust, mobile, tactical nuclear-missile force—backed by a far more credible capability to retaliate against the region and the continental United States with thermonuclear weapons. These capabilities will provide Pyongyang with its own reasons to consider escalating its use of force against South Korea, though its aims will likely be far more limited than Beijing’s aims for Taiwan.

By 2030, it is unlikely that Beijing and Pyongyang will have developed enough trust to enable them to coordinate a campaign of aggression to achieve their goals. However, their individual interests and their common animosity toward the United States and its allies will give each of these potential US adversaries strong incentives to escalate—opportunistically or reactively—in the event the other initiates a conflict. In 2030, each of these potential adversaries will also have much stronger incentives and capabilities to threaten or conduct a limited nuclear attack in the event that either adversary initiates such a conflict.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un shakes hands with China’s President Xi Jinping during Xi’s visit to Pyongyang, North Korea, in this undated photo released on June 21, 2019, by North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). Source: KCNA via REUTERS.

Meanwhile, two key US allies in the Indo-Pacific—South Korea and Japan—are investing to develop far more powerful militaries by 2030. These allies’ military capabilities, as well as their diplomatic, informational, and economic influence, could help counter and deter growing threats. However, these allies will also have greater motivation and capability to act unilaterally if their own interests are threatened.

Considering these trends, US military and government leaders will face some tough challenges in the Indo-Pacific a decade from now. With these in mind, the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative (IPSI)—with the support of the Strategic Trends Research Initiative of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)—launched the Guardian Tiger tabletop exercise series to help prepare mid-level US government and military leaders for future key roles in addressing such threats. These initial Guardian Tiger exercises were also intended to develop analytic insights and actionable recommendations to help the United States start preparing for limited nuclear attacks by an adversary—work that is continuing today. This report summarizes and analyzes the first two Guardian Tiger exercises.

Key findings

If the United States is engaged in conflict with either China or North Korea, it might not be able to deter the other adversary from escalating that conflict or initiating a separate one. As a conflict with an initial adversary escalates, it may become necessary—and even strategically or operationally advantageous—to accept the risk of such simultaneous conflicts against multiple adversaries rather than remain hamstrung by the costs.
What it takes to prevent North Korea from escalating a conflict will differ significantly from what is required to prevent China from doing so. Credible threats of vertical escalation from Pyongyang, particularly threats of nuclear strikes, are likely to come early and often. Meanwhile, China has many strong incentives and non-nuclear options to escalate horizontally—across domains and geography, including in space, in the cyber domain, and against the US homeland—to disrupt Washington’s will and ability to support Taiwan. Each adversary’s distinct escalation pattern will require a tailored set of capabilities and approaches to anticipate, deter, and counter it.
War in the Indo-Pacific may start over one flashpoint, but it will quickly become about much more. A war beginning over Taiwan is likely to become about far more than the status of Taiwan itself, including China’s overall regional and global position post-war, as well as the US homeland’s safety. Meanwhile, an escalating South Korea-US conflict with North Korea will likely become about the future of the global nuclear order, the credibility of US extended deterrence, and the potential unification of the long-divided Korean peninsula—not just about restoring the armistice.
The United States should prepare for the possibility of a limited nuclear attack—with responses beyond just the threat of complete annihilation. The political and military choices necessary to better prepare for a limited nuclear strike, and to operate effectively in the aftermath, are hard. The tendency to avoid these hard choices may mean that the United States is left with no good conventional options if threats of disproportionate punishment fail to deter a limited nuclear attack. Meanwhile, US low-yield nuclear response capabilities are limited, potentially leaving only ineffective or excessive nuclear options in some circumstances.
Effective deterrence of war and of escalation during war in the Indo-Pacific will require the United States to simultaneously coordinate laterally and at multiple echelons, including prior to the outbreak of conflict. This would involve establishing stronger combined (multinational), joint (cross-military service), and interagency command and control, coordination, informational shaping, and planning mechanisms between the United States and its allies across multiple military commands and government agencies, in advance of a crisis.

Methodology

Each of the first two Guardian Tiger tabletop exercises presented participants with a distinct scenario set in the year 2030, featuring conditions likely to lead to simultaneous confrontations involving the Korean peninsula and the risk of limited nuclear use.

The scenario for the first exercise, Guardian Tiger I, was premised on North Korea initiating a limited conflict that escalated to chemical weapons use and included potential drivers for China’s involvement. The scenario for the second exercise, Guardian Tiger II, was based on a conflict initiated by Chinese aggression against Taiwan, with the potential for that conflict to spill over into Korea through several potential pathways.

Although not truly “free play” with unlimited scope for changes, the exercises were designed to allow for a considerable degree of latitude for participants—within the bounds of plausibility and some general guidance from facilitators playing the roles of national leaders. The North Korea cells during each exercise, in particular, chose actions that had not been anticipated during the design phase. This required the facilitation team to adjust the pathways for the development of the scenarios for the exercise.

The more than sixty participants included US government officials, military officers, and leading nongovernment experts. Participants were organized into a US (blue) team and a control team. The blue team consisted of three cells of up to a dozen members each, representing different echelons: a national interagency cell (approximating National Security Council mechanisms), a national defense and military cell (addressing considerations for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the joint staff, and relevant joint combatant commands), and a cell representing the US military based in the Korean theater. The control team included the exercise project staff, as well as smaller cells that simulated North Korean and Chinese senior leadership and represented allies that varied in each of the two scenarios.

Analysis: Two roads to war

The following sections summarize the starting conditions and flow of events for Guardian Tiger I and II. Note that these scenarios took place based on a set of assumed, projected conditions for the year 2030 and explicitly excluded direct Russian involvement, based on the rapidly changing North Korea-Russia relationship at the time they were designed.

One road to war: North Korea launches a limited attack on South Korea

The road to war leading to the conflict scenario for the first Guardian Tiger tabletop exercise is depicted in Figure 1. It began with North Korea conducting a limited attack on South Korean military forces that did not include any nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Submarine and missile attacks targeted South Korean vessels and aircraft in the Yellow Sea (known in South Korea as the West Sea), while North Korea launched precision missiles and rockets at South Korean marine bases in South Korea’s Northwest Islands. North Korea claimed that its actions were in response to South Korea’s violations of North Korean sovereignty, but the US Intelligence Community identified “time pressure” due to factors such as the growing South Korean and US capabilities and domestic political pressures as a major driver for Kim Jong-Un’s attack calculus.

South Korea responded unilaterally with counterstrikes on a range of North Korean military targets. North Korea then escalated further with chemical weapons strikes against two South Korean military facilities. Pyongyang warned that it would respond to US intervention or a US threat to its leadership or nuclear forces with nuclear escalation, in accordance with its September 2022 “Law and Policy” on nuclear weapons. Upon South Korea’s request for US support, the South Korea-US military committee—including each country’s Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff acting on orders from their respective Presidents—agreed that Combined Forces Command (CFC) should decisively defeat North Korea’s attack while deterring North Korean nuclear employment and Chinese military intervention. Beijing called for a ceasefire and withdrawal of forces from the conflict zone, while preparing its own military intervention.

Figure 1. Guardian Tiger I road to war: Visual summary

Timeline A: Turn one

In the first turn (Timeline A), South Korea focused on working in concert with the United States while signaling readiness for unilateral action if necessary. South Korea reached out to the United States to request military support and public messages to reinforce Washington’s extended deterrence commitment.

Washington agreed to strengthen its cooperation with South Korea, and CFC successfully conducted a bilateral strike on the North Korean chemical weapons site. The United States initiated a limited force flow into the theater, careful to avoid triggering further escalation, and offered intelligence support to South Korea and other regional allies in addition to preparing offensive and defensive cyber operations. The US approach focused heavily on diplomacy, including presidential engagement to reassure South Korea and Japan, as well as broader diplomacy condemning North Korea’s violation of South Korea’s sovereignty. Efforts to persuade China to assist in applying extreme pressure on North Korea, particularly through an energy cutoff, fell flat. The overall flow of the first day of Guardian Tiger I is depicted in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Guardian Tiger I, turns 1–3 (Timeline A)

Timeline A: Turn two

At the start of the second turn, North Korea ramped up its nuclear threats—including warning of a pre-delegation order for tactical nuclear employment and conducting a missile demonstration off South Korea’s west coast—while continuing to conduct limited attacks along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) with special operations forces (SOF) units and artillery. China began a limited intervention into North Korea with Pyongyang’s permission, deploying ground, naval, air, and air-defense assets in and around North Korea to constrain US-South Korea operations.

In spite of Chinese warnings against further US intervention, South Korea and the United States activated a combined counter-fire task force under CFC. Washington warned against any nuclear use and condemned North Korean nuclear threats, while emphasizing that active Chinese engagement in the conflict would result in serious economic, diplomatic, and military consequences. South Korea reacted to the increasing tension with concern and was particularly worried by Washington’s risk aversion and restraint. Unable to rely on US protection of its interests, South Korea executed a unilateral strike with sea-based missiles against the site of the North Korean missile demonstration launch and conducted precision artillery/multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) strikes on a North Korean divisional headquarters. South Korea also requested US assistance in monitoring North Korean launch sites to prepare to conduct preemptive strikes if necessary.

Timeline A: Turn three

In the third turn, North Korea escalated to a low-yield tactical nuclear demonstration, ostensibly targeted against a South Korean Navy destroyer in the Sea of Japan (referred to as the East Sea in Korea), while firing non-nuclear—but nuclear-capable—intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) over Japan. North Korean representatives privately reassured Beijing that Pyongyang’s intention was to refrain from further escalating the situation unless it was warranted. China urged de-escalation by all parties.

The blue team cells debated response options to this nuclear use, but no consensus emerged. The National Interagency cell suggested that both nuclear and non-nuclear options be presented to the president, but with the emphasis on non-nuclear options. The national defense and military cell proposed a “pulsed operation” against North Korea with advanced precision-strike assets, while assuring China and North Korea that Washington did not want to use nuclear weapons or end the Kim regime unless North Korea used nuclear weapons again. The US theater military cell proposed nuclear and conventional responses, such as a combined nuclear-conventional general offensive or a nuclear strike near Pyongyang. This timeline ended without adjudication of final results.

Timeline B: Turn one

To explore a different pathway of how the options available to the United States could be affected by a different command and control structure, Guardian Tiger I included an alternative scenario with a key change in how US forces in the region were commanded and controlled via the notional creation of a new US Northeast Asia Command (NEACOM), a four-star joint warfighting command falling under US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM).¹ The events of Timeline A’s second turn mark the beginning of Timeline B, so that in the first turn of Timeline B, China had already intervened and North Korea had warned of delegation of authorities for North Korean tactical nuclear weapons employment. With NEACOM providing different options to the United States, and with more time to consider the possibilities, the blue team took a different approach. The United States supported South Korea-US CFC counterfire operations and South Korea’s interdiction of North Korean threats to its Northwest Islands with targeting intelligence support and with standoff fires coordinated by NEACOM under the direction of and with the support of INDOPACOM. With NEACOM leading the planning, US and South Korean forces also prepared for a pulsed conventional strike to be executed by CFC, with NEACOM in support, against a wide range of North Korean strategic and operational targets.²This pulsed conventional strike was to be ready for execution on short notice if North Korea escalated further. Meanwhile, the secretary of defense traveled to Seoul and Tokyo to underscore alliance resolve.

At this time, the United States was also concerned about the implications of North Korean officals other than Kim Jong Un potentially having the authority to use nuclear weapons, given the warning from Pyongyang that there had been pre-delegation of release authority to unspecified North Korean commands. With this in mind, the United States undertook a technical operation to send messages via North Korea’s cell-phone system to North Korean elites that they would be held personally responsible for any nuclear use and should oppose it. Though the messages went to many elites, the North Korean regime quickly deactivated the cell-phone network. This quick-turn effort had unclear results and credibility because North Korean elites’ perceptions had not been shaped by an information campaign over time, while the deactivation of the cell-phone network could have proven an impediment to future US information operations even while it disrupted North Korean domestic activities.

Timeline B: Turn two

In the second turn of Timeline B, China deployed additional air and naval assets into North Korean territory. China conducted cyberattacks against South Korea and the United States but did not engage in combat with South Korean, US, or North Korean forces. Suffering military setbacks, North Korea chose to make good on its threats of tactical nuclear strikes by conducting a low-yield nuclear ballistic missile attack against the South Korea-US naval base at Chinhae on South Korea’s southeast coast. North Korea did not warn China beforehand and expected the presence of Chinese forces and assets to restrain US retaliation, thereby limiting the US counterattack to conventional means. The ostensible delegation of authority was more for strategic communications purposes, as the strike was directed and approved by the North Korean leader, but US leadership did not receive confirmation of that—adding an additional element of uncertainty into the blue team’s deliberations.

In response, US and South Korean forces executed a pulsed conventional strike against key high-value targets, but did not expect this to bring an end to the regime. The intensity, speed, extent, and effectiveness of the response surprised North Korean leadership, but Pyongyang considered the heavy damage sustained an acceptable cost given the stakes. Ultimately, despite exploration of several potential military options to continue the conflict, the United States and South Korea did not remain fixed on ousting the Kim regime by military force in the near term, and instead began negotiations to end the conflict with North Korea and avoid a war with China.

A second road to war: China attempts to seize Taiwan by force

The road to war for the second exercise, Guardian Tiger II, is summarized in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Guardian Tiger II road to war: Visual summary

The conflict in the scenario resulted from a Chinese ultimatum to Taipei, followed by an attempt to seize Taiwan by force. China’s multi-domain assault on Taiwan saw preparatory waves of joint fires and strikes on key control nodes, followed by multiple amphibious and airborne landings along Taiwan’s west coast. China’s ground and air campaign was accompanied by the imposition of a maritime exclusion zone (MEZ) and a near-total blockade around Taiwan to sever lines of communication through maritime and air interdiction operations. Finally, China initiated non-destructive cyberspace and space attacks against US regional military networks and satellites. Beijing also attempted to sway US allies to avoid becoming involved in the conflict, with mixed results. Seoul publicly condemned China’s aggression but refused to support Taiwan militarily or allow direct involvement of US Forces Korea (USFK) in the conflict. Beijing also dissuaded Manila from hosting additional US forces.

North Korea initiated a strategic messaging campaign that blamed Washington for starting the Taiwan conflict and attempted to split the South Korea-US alliance. North Korea warned South Korea against allowing itself to be dragged into a war by USFK, calling for Seoul to eject USFK. It also began transitioning to a semi-wartime state.

Turn one

All four turns of Guardian Tiger II are visually depicted in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Guardian Tiger II: Timeline summary

Turn one of Guardian Tiger II began with the faltering of China’s amphibious assault on Taiwan, driven by unexpectedly strong Taiwanese resistance and effective US strikes, which slowed offensive momentum. Only one amphibious Chinese lodgment was successful, with invasion forces suffering heavy losses and unsustainable munitions expenditures. This increased China’s incentives to escalate to maintain offensive momentum. Intense fighting continued between China and the US-led coalition, with heavy losses and munitions expenditures, which led the United States to consider pulling from USFK munitions stocks in South Korea.

Regionally, China conducted missile strikes against US airbases in Okinawa and western Japan, expanding the conflict horizontally in a bid to disrupt US combat power generation and reestablish offensive momentum against Taiwan. China declared an additional MEZ within the Yellow Sea, and threatened strikes against USFK bases unless South Korea restrained USFK involvement. China’s deterrence efforts against South Korea were successful, with USFK involvement and support to Taiwan ultimately constrained by mutual agreement between Seoul and Washington. North Korea also intensified its coercion attempts to eject USFK from South Korea, adding credibility to its threats by elevating military readiness posture to unprecedented levels.

The United States continued the flow of forces into the Taiwan theater and sought to halt China’s offensive momentum through standoff strikes. USFK leaders issued clear signals that USFK elements were not involved in the Taiwan conflict, in an effort to manage the threat of Chinese horizontal escalation.

South Korea prioritized deterring North Korea, and South Korean forces moved to maximum readiness posture short of war. CFC was activated, with some South Korean and USFK forces subordinated to it, and Republic of Korea Strategic Command (ROKSTRATCOM) was activated with key assets placed in readiness to deter further North Korean aggression. South Korea publicly and privately reiterated its expectation that USFK would remain focused on deterring North Korea, and that USFK munitions would not be pulled out for use in the Taiwan conflict. Japan conducted counterstrikes against Chinese forces launching missile strikes on US bases in Japan, which temporarily disrupted the Chinese strike campaign against Japan and fulfilled domestic expectations. Japan expanded its support to US operations, providing additional basing, munitions, logistics, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support.

Turn two

Turn two began with Chinese missile strikes overflying North Korean and South Korean airspace, successfully striking key US bases in mainland Japan. Beijing provided only Pyongyang advance notification of the overflight. China’s overflight strikes were motivated by practical concerns. Its more numerous and evasive short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), which are capable of overcoming missile defenses more effectively, can only strike many USFJ facilities when fired from northern China and passing over the Korean Peninsula, not from eastern and southern China. China postured assets for intervention in the vicinity of the Chinese-North Korean border and initiated key intelligence sharing with North Korea. Finally, Chinese cyber actors intensified attacks against regional military and civilian targets.

North Korea conducted a limited provocation campaign against South Korea, with the ultimate goal of coercing the removal of USFK from South Korea. North Korea conducted an SRBM demonstration launch into the Sea of Japan (known in South Korea as the East Sea) in an attempt to decouple US nuclear extended deterrence commitments from South Korea and create space for further demands. North Korea also initiated a unilateral regional campaign of cyberattacks against military networks in South Korea. Washington restated its nuclear declaratory policy in an effort to deter North Korean nuclear use. The North Korea cell perceived this as hollow bluster that proved to be more destabilizing than stabilizing.

US forces continued combat operations around Taiwan, with Washington authorizing direct attacks on the remaining lodgment. These efforts halted China’s offensive momentum. Washington authorized proportional cyberattacks on both North Korea and China. US F-35 fighters, including dual-capable (i.e. capable of carrying nuclear bombs) aircraft, were deployed across Japan; after-action reports from both the China and North Korea cells indicated this was a critical concern. Washington attempted to limit escalation by refraining from striking Chinese mainland forces. Notably, the China cell perceived US hesitancy to strike the Chinese mainland as indicative of the success of its robust nuclear deterrent.

South Korea invoked the mutual defense treaty with the United States to request immediate, full-scale military assistance, initiated a partial military mobilization, and activated ROKSTRATCOM assets. It conducted proportional cyber countermeasures against North Korea, which resulted in the shutdown of North Korean cyber connectivity to the outside world and some degradation of North Korean offensive cyber capabilities. This shutdown challenged the efficacy of South Korean information operations later in the exercise, illustrating the value of functioning communication channels. Japan expanded US basing, enabling the dispersal of F-35s and underscoring the bilateral coordination needed to enable their deterrent effect. Japan also initiated additional economic sanctions against China, while contributing additional forces to counterattacking Chinese forces on and around Taiwan.

Turn three

Turn three began with China’s threat of nuclear use to force a resolution to the Taiwan conflict, backed by credible increases to nuclear posture. China conducted additional strikes against mainland Japan, targeting Japanese capabilities critical to conducting strikes and defending against additional strikes. China shifted targeting strategy against Taiwan toward national infrastructure in an unsuccessful attempt to decrease national morale. Chinese cyber actors intensified offensive cyber operations, focusing on regional airports and seaports to interfere with US and allied force flows.

After initial hesitation, North Korea was emboldened to take much stronger action by the escalation of the conflict between China and the US-led coalition, and by the establishment of a China-North Korea military coordination center. As a result, North Korea escalated. It conducted SRBM strikes and SOF attacks using small unmanned aircraft systems against key USFK facilities. It also executed simultaneous SRBM and underground nuclear tests to reinforce its nuclear deterrent and test US extended deterrence commitments to South Korea.

US forces conducted standoff strikes against North Korean maritime and air infiltration platforms that enabled previous North Korean SOF strikes, degrading North Korea’s capacity to conduct follow-on attacks. Additionally, US forces struck North Korean missile delivery platforms, and increased intrusive ISR in order to find and track dispersed ground-based missile delivery platforms. In response to the shootdown of its ISR aircraft by China, South Korea led CFC US-South Korea air operations within China’s Yellow Sea MEZ, which resulted in US-South Korea fighter engagements with Chinese aircraft. South Korea executed additional retaliatory standoff strikes against North Korean SOF bases that facilitated previous attacks, degrading North Korea’s capacity to initiate further asymmetric attacks. Japan shifted ISR and ballistic missile defense assets to combat the threat of North Korean missile strikes, and additionally heightened cyber defenses, improving its defensive posture and ability to respond to further escalation.

Turn four

Turn four began with China’s increase in nuclear posture and its launch of a fractional orbit bombardment munition (presumably nuclear) into a polar orbit, providing an evasive, persistent deterrent to discourage further US and allied assistance to Taiwan. Chinese cyber actors intensified operations globally in order to slow US force flow and threaten further horizontal escalation. China invoked its treaty with North Korea to justify military intervention in Korea, while further enhancing bilateral military coordination and setting the stage for permissive deployment of Chinese forces into North Korea. Finally, China conducted anti-ship missile attacks against cargo ships near US west coast and Australian ports.

North Korea conducted a low-yield nuclear strike on a South Korean airbase in an attempt to disrupt air operations against North Korea, split the alliance, and deter further South Korea-US escalation. Separately, North Korea conducted an unarmed nuclear-capable IRBM demonstration, with four missiles impacting outside of territorial waters around Guam, in an attempt to give the United States pause without triggering additional retaliation. North Korea prepared ground forces along the DMZ, posturing its forces for large-scale conventional conflict.

The United States and South Korea agreed to initiate operations to end the North Korean regime in accordance with declaratory policy regarding a North Korean nuclear attack, with CFC forces conducting large-scale ground and air combat operations, as well as a combined strike against Kim Jong Un and senior regime leadership. The blue team, however, was well aware that this operation was risky and might not succeed due to limited US combat power and a lack of munitions available because of the Taiwan conflict—as well as due to North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and extensive Chinese support. To help mitigate the risks of this operation, South Korea initiated an information operations campaign to attempt to co-opt senior North Korean military elites with nuclear use authorities, but this would likely prove too little, too late.

The US team also considered conducting a low-yield nuclear strike against North Korean military forces in the vicinity of Kaesong Heights using a dual-capable aircraft, in an attempt to restore nuclear deterrence, hold North Korea accountable for its limited nuclear use, and halt the creation of a precedent that would allow for an adversary’s nuclear use without a nuclear response, but it was unclear if this would have been approved.

The exercise director adjudicated that South Korean and US presidents would approve a CFC counteroffensive to remove North Korea’s regime despite the risks, even if it was not clear whether a nuclear strike in the Kaesong Heights would be justified and supported. However, considering the military circumstances, the theater military cell was understandably not optimistic about the prospects for success of such a campaign, and the theater military cell overall expected that tactical nuclear exchanges would occur over the course of the campaign. The exercise director considered it likely that the CFC ground counteroffensive would operationally culminate on the approach to Pyongyang due to the Chinese military forces supporting North Korea, particularly with logistics, intelligence, and air defenses. Even in the event that CFC offensive momentum could be maintained or restored, it was likely that North Korea would conduct additional tactical nuclear strikes to stop the advance before Pyongyang could be seized or the regime removed, and it was questionable whether CFC would be sufficiently prepared to fight through these circumstances.

In this situation, it was also likely that the larger US-China war would continue to escalate. China would seize the opportunity to reinforce its attack on Taiwan while the United States committed combat power, munitions, and other resources against North Korea. This could lead to the fall of Taiwan. Regardless of the situation in Taiwan, horizontal escalation of the conflict to other areas, including China’s sea lines of communication, would likely continue. In these circumstances, given the other US and Chinese escalatory options available, and the clear mutual interest in avoiding a China-US nuclear war, it would be possible that tenuous nuclear deterrence could still hold. However, the risk of miscalculation and nuclear escalation between the United States and China would be high, particularly given the potential for multiple nuclear exchanges between North Korean and US forces if the South Korea-US alliance continued efforts to end the North Korean regime.

Findings and recommendations

The Guardian Tiger tabletop exercises explored challenging scenarios in which US-led forces might struggle to win, or even contain, simultaneous conflicts with China and North Korea. In such a future, traditional deterrence models could falter, and allies may act independently to protect their own interests. To address these risks, this chapter identifies the key findings of the exercises—and provides actionable recommendations to enhance strategic and operational preparedness:

Finding 1

If the United States is engaged in conflict with either China or North Korea, it might not be able to deter the other adversary from escalating the conflict or initiating a separate conflict. The risk of simultaneous conflicts with China and North Korea would compound the difficulties US and allied leaders would face when managing nuclear and other escalation risks in a conflict with either adversary. US allies’ competing views regarding China and North Korea further complicate this dynamic. Even if deterrence of a second potential adversary and assurance of allies could prevent simultaneous conflicts in the Indo-Pacific, such efforts would create strategic and operational costs that would hinder US and allied efforts to defeat the first aggressor. As a conflict with the initial adversary escalates, it may become necessary—and even strategically and/or operationally advantageous—to accept the risk of such simultaneous conflicts rather than remain hamstrung by these costs.
- If a US-China military conflict begins, the exercises suggest that the United States would likely find it difficult to balance the competing requirements of respecting South Korean and Japanese concerns, deterring North Korean opportunism, and refraining from actions that could trigger North Korean or Chinese preemption against USFK. In particular, although the United States might deploy a capability to the region to manage one adversary, it could easily be interpreted as a threat to the other.
- The exercise’s results suggest that, in an escalating conflict, the United States and its allies may unintentionally push Noth Korea and China to align. In particular, the exercises suggest that if South Korea-US responses to North Korean escalation appear likely to cause North Korea to collapse, Washington has little leverage to convince Beijing that it is not in its interest to intervene. Beijing sees grave risks from an imminent North Korean collapse, even if China is not at war with the United States, including North Korea’s absorption by South Korea, and/or a North Korea-initiated nuclear exchange. If a US-China conflict is already under way, Beijing is even more likely to see intervening as less risky than allowing North Korea’s defeat.

Recommendations

US military planners should update Indo-Pacific command and control arrangements to account for the high risk of simultaneous conflicts with North Korea and China. This should include a review of, and update to, the Unified Command Plan (UCP) specifically focused on ensuring that US command and control arrangements in the Indo-Pacific enable the ability to effectively fight simultaneously in the Korean theater of operations and in the vicinity of Taiwan.
The US defense community should work with South Korean and Japanese counterparts to better understand the interplay of responses to Chinese and North Korean conventional and nuclear aggression. Despite the political sensitivities at play, considerations of a simultaneous China-North Korea threat should appear regularly on agendas for bilateral and trilateral Track 1 and Track 1.5 dialogues, tabletop exercises, and similar events.
The US defense community and military commands should sponsor and conduct additional studies and wargaming related to US force and munitions requirements, as well as posture adjustments, to better address the risk of simultaneous conflicts with China and North Korea, including the potential role of the South Korean and Japanese militaries.

Finding 2

What it takes to prevent North Korea from escalating a conflict will be very different from what it takes to prevent China from doing so. The two countries’ differing escalation imperatives and capabilities will foster complex dilemmas for US and allied deterrence and response options in an Indo-Pacific conflict. Threats of vertical escalation from Pyongyang—particularly threats of tactical nuclear use—are likely to come early and often. Meanwhile, China has many incentives and non-nuclear options to escalate horizontally—across domains (land, maritime, air, space, cyber) and geography, including to the US homeland—to disrupt Washington’s will and capability to support Taiwan. Deterring and countering these different escalation patterns will each require focused capabilities and approaches. This will place competing demands on high-demand, low-density US capabilities like high-end intelligence collection platforms and long-range strike capabilities, while also making it harder to conduct coherent deterrence posturing and messaging.
- As observed in the tabletop exercises, managing vertical escalation in a conflict with North Korea is fraught with potential for miscalculation and alliance management challenges. North Korea has a long history of nuclear threats and signaling with nuclear-capable missiles, which could make it difficult for the United States and its allies to judge whether North Korea is actually about to launch a limited nuclear attack. Meanwhile, North Korea’s growing capability for tactical nuclear strikes makes a ground campaign into North Korea risky, particularly if these forces are not prepared to “fight through.”
- In contrast, the exercises suggested that China’s range of non-nuclear horizontal escalation options is more problematic for the United States to manage than deterring China from vertically escalating to nuclear use. China’s assertion of air and maritime superiority in the Yellow Sea, along with its projection of air defense and ground combat forces into North Korea, limited US and allied options. China’s capability, and likely willingness, to escalate in cyber and space domains—including in ways that affect the US economy and population—allowed the China cell in Guardian Tiger II to impose key costs and disruption on the US team with little risk.

Recommendations

The US military should visibly reinforce resilience of US bases in the Indo-Pacific against nuclear and non-nuclear attacks, also enhancing deterrence by denial against limited nuclear strikes. These bases should be required to routinely conduct and publicize rehearsals for such attacks, including training with prepositioned radiological detection and protective equipment.
The US defense community should lead interagency efforts to review and propose updates for all declaratory policy language and related statements regarding US responses to attacks with weapons of mass destruction and strategic attacks against the US homeland, including Guam. This review should propose how to reconcile the policy statement that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” with the operational and strategic requirements of preparing for a limited nuclear attack by an adversary, to ensure it does not result in a lack of either deterrent credibility or military readiness against such an attack.³

Finding 3

War in the Indo-Pacific may start over one flashpoint, but it will quickly become about much more. Escalation—both vertical and horizontal—in a conflict with China and/or North Korea is likely to cause rapid and major shifts in US priorities, attention, and end states, presuming the initial stage of a conflict is not quickly contained or resolved. A war over Taiwan is likely to become about far more than the status of Taiwan itself, including China’s overall regional and global position post-war and the US homeland’s safety. Meanwhile, an escalating South Korea-US conflict with North Korea is likely to become about the future of the global nuclear order, the credibility of US extended deterrence, and the potential unification of the long-divided Korean peninsula—not just about restoring the fragile armistice.
- At the outset of the conflict in both tabletop exercises, overriding US team goals were generally to support allies and partners, defeat the attack, deter further escalation, and return to the status quo. These priorities rapidly changed as the conflict dragged on and escalated, leaving US military forces and non-military elements of power ill-positioned to effectively support the new priorities in a timely manner. The exercises suggested that alliance and US domestic imperatives will rapidly overtake any potential impetus to return to the status quo, in favor of punishing the aggressors and responding to mushrooming threats facing US and allied homelands.
- In both exercises, a North Korean limited nuclear strike against a military target in South Korean territory immediately brought to the forefront the need for key considerations during the US response to a limited nuclear strike. This includes larger global ramifications, long-term precedent for extended nuclear deterrence, and implications for US alliances beyond the US declaratory policy—that any North Korean nuclear attack will lead to the end of the regime—or the operational and strategic needs of the moment. In Guardian Tiger I, having avoided a US-China war so far, and with Chinese forces inside North Korea, there was little appetite for a nuclear or ground offensive to remove the regime. In Guardian Tiger II, US-China conventional war had already begun, so North Korea’s nuclear attack triggered a US-South Korea ground counteroffensive to remove the regime, despite the risks.

Recommendations

US defense leadership should publicly and privately underscore the risk that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could lead to a broader regional conflict, even if Beijing and Washington seek to avoid one, as a means to foster allied preparedness and reinforce deterrence.
The US defense community, in cooperation with relevant combatant commands, should enhance awareness, resilience, and response measures for risk of Chinese non-nuclear strategic attacks on the US homeland in the event of a conflict to reduce the risk of strategic paralysis from such threats and to enable effective responses to such attack. The Department of Defense should support such efforts from the perspective of potential chemical and biological attacks.

Finding 4

The United States needs to prepare for the possibility of a limited nuclear attack—including preparing responses other than the threat of complete annihilation. The US and allied approach to counter the growing threat of limited nuclear attack by an adversary currently relies on deterrence by threat of massive punishment. This is a high-risk approach. For example, the United States’ current declaratory policy toward North Korea—that any use of a nuclear weapon will lead to the end of the North Korean regime—is likely to lack credibility by 2030. The tendency to avoid the hard political and military choices necessary to better absorb a limited nuclear strike, and to prepare to operate effectively in the aftermath, means there might be no good conventional options left if such threats of disproportionate punishment fail. Meanwhile, US low-yield nuclear response capabilities are being intentionally limited, meaning that available nuclear responses may be seen as ineffective or excessive.
- The exercises suggest that the threat of massive, regime-ending nuclear retaliation might not work, at least by the year 2030. The North Korea cell noted that, from its perspective, restatement of existing US declaratory policy for North Korea during the exercises was simultaneously provocative—by emphasizing regime change—and lacking in credibility. As noted above, the exercises showed some plausible scenarios in which the North Korean regime could use nuclear weapons and survive.
- These exercises provided further evidence of the strong tendency among the United States and its allies to avoid taking the actions necessary to better absorb a limited nuclear strike and to prepare to operate effectively in the aftermath of such a strike until it might be too late.

Recommendations

US defense and military planners working with their South Korean counterparts, should examine the operational and strategic implications of the South Korea-US declaratory policy on a North Korean nuclear attack. This should lead to renewed efforts to enhance the credibility to execute this policy and to bring an end to the North Korean regime—regardless of the potential for Chinese interference or North Korean nuclear retaliation. This should also lead to preparations for the possibility that this declaratory policy will fail to deter a North Korean limited nuclear attack. The United States should also consider this policy’s implications vis-à-vis Beijing.
The US Department of Defense should enhance preparations to quickly provide education, training, and analytic support to US forces and US allies in the Indo-Pacific to better enable preparations for low-yield nuclear weapons effects. Ideally, the United States should execute such activities pre-crisis as much as possible, moving quickly to expand these activities in the event that changing domestic political circumstances or crisis urgency on the part of an ally makes such expansion possible. Additional studies, exercises, wargames, and tabletop exercises should include US allies and focus specifically on possible limited nuclear attacks by adversaries in the Indo-Pacific.
The US defense community and military commands should train and equip US forces to fight and win despite tactical nuclear attacks, and should encourage allied counterparts to do so as well.

Finding 5

Effective integrated deterrence and escalation management in the Indo-Pacific will require the United States to simultaneously coordinate with allies and perform informational shaping at multiple echelons, and across multiple military commands and government agencies, prior to the outbreak of conflict. This would involve establishing stronger combined (multinational) command and control, coordination, and planning mechanisms between the United States and its allies in advance of a crisis that could lead to conflict, including both military and non-military organizations at multiple levels. Traditional top-down approaches and “wartime only” structures will be suboptimal given the speed at which situations could escalate. The Guardian Tiger exercises further demonstrated how difficult it is to coordinate such a top-down response in a timely manner, especially without sufficiently prepared mechanisms. Key US allies—particularly Japan and South Korea—will unilaterally use capabilities and send messages if they are not part of a better plan.
- The United States will not be able to conduct integrated deterrence and warfighting against China and/or North Korea without close allied coordination. At minimum, countering Chinese threats to Taiwan will require Japanese support, while South Korean forces are foundational for countering North Korea.
- Synchronizing military actions between allies to manage escalation requires close lateral coordination between allied militaries below top-level political coordination. The speed at which a conflict could develop and escalate means that multiple military and informational options may need to be offered in a bottom-up manner, while top-level guidance is developed simultaneously. The exercises further demonstrated the difficulties in alliance coordination, especially without good structures in place. South Korea-US-Japan operational coordination was particularly hamstrung in Guardian Tiger II due to the separation between CFC/USFK and USFJ.

Recommendations

US defense leadership should update the UCP to address the importance of enhanced capacity for bilateral and multilateral operational-level alliance military coordination in East Asia. This should include a capability for more robust operational coordination with the Japanese Self Defense Force than what is possible with the existing USFJ structure. Given the importance of varied basing options in the Indo-Pacific for a resilient posture in the face of attack, and the capabilities that Japan and South Korea can bring to bear, the ability of headquarters to coordinate with allies may be as important—or even more important—than their ability to command and control US-only joint operations.
US government organizations sponsoring integrated deterrence exercises, wargames, and tabletop exercises should ensure they include more robust methodology for depicting informational tools and aspects as part of integrated deterrence. This should include the simulation of US and allied targeting and effects of informational actions on sub-national audiences, as well as depictions of adversary information operations targeting such audiences.
US government organizations sponsoring integrated deterrence exercises, wargames, and tabletop exercises should ensure that these events represent multiple echelons of US and allied governments and military forces—ideally including allied personnel as participants—to enable the simulation of US-ally engagement at multiple echelons.

Acknowledgments

The principal investigator thanks the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), particularly the Strategic Trends team, for sponsorship, guidance, support, and resources for this study. Thanks also go to all the experts and stakeholders, inside and outside of government, who participated in the tabletop exercise and contributed their perspectives to enrich the analysis. Special appreciation goes to multiple members of the staffs of the Department of State, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the US Defense Intelligence Agency, Air Force Futures, the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), the South Korea-US Combined Forces Command, the US Forces Korea, and the 7th US Air Force for their willingness to repeatedly donate their time to inform this project with their invaluable personal perspectives.

The principal investigator would also like to give special thanks to co-authors Lauren Gilbert and Kyoko Imai, as well as current Indo-Pacific Security Initiative team members Emily Kim and Audrey Roh, along with former members Katherine Yusko and Emma Verges, for their key supporting roles in this project, as well as to project consultant Gregory Park for his contributions to the execution of the exercises and the drafting of the report. Thanks also go to Frederick Kempe, the Atlantic Council’s president and chief executive officer, as well as Gretchen Ehle, Nicholas O’Connell, and Caroline Simpson, without whose support the resources for this project would not have been possible. Lastly, the principal investigator would like to share his deepest appreciation for vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director Matthew Kroenig’s support and encouragement for this ambitious project from its very inception. This report is intended to live up to General Brent Scowcroft’s standard for rigorous, relevant, and nonpartisan analysis on national security issues.

This report reflects the analysis of the authors and does not necessarily represent the position of the DTRA or any other US government organization.

About the authors

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Markus Garlauskas

Director

Crisis Management Indo-Pacific

Staff

Lauren D. Gilbert

Deputy Director

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

East Asia Human Rights

Staff

Kyoko Imai

Associate Director

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Security & Defense Japanese

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The Indo-Pacific Security Initiative (IPSI) informs and shapes the strategies, plans, and policies of the United States and its allies and partners to address the most important rising security challenges in the Indo-Pacific, including China’s growing threat to the international order and North Korea’s destabilizing nuclear weapons advancements. IPSI produces innovative analysis, conducts tabletop exercises, hosts public and private convenings, and engages with US, allied, and partner governments, militaries, media, other key private and public-sector stakeholders, and publics.

Alex Plitsas: The world cannot afford to wait until the brink again

1 The starting conditions of Timeline B include a South Korean commander for CFC and a new Northeast Asia Command (NEACOM) over US Forces Korea (USFK) and US Forces Japan (USFJ), as a new four-star joint sub-unified command of US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM).

2 For more information on “pulsed” strikes, see “Air Force Future Operating Concept Executive Summary,” US Air Force, March 6, 2023, https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/2023SAF/Air_Force_Future_Operating_Concept_EXSUM_FINAL.pdf.

3 “Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races,” The White House, January 3, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/01/03/p5-statement-on-preventing-nuclear-war-and-avoiding-arms-races/#:~:text=We%20affirm%20that%20a%20nuclear,deter%20aggression%2C%20and%20prevent%20war.

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Experts react: India and Pakistan have agreed to a shaky cease-fire. Where does the region go from here?

Atlantic Council experts — Sun, 11 May 2025 01:27:00 +0000

The skies have gone quiet—mostly. India and Pakistan announced a sudden cease-fire on Saturday after four days of trading increasingly severe strikes, centered around the disputed area of Kashmir. Hours later, reports emerged of shots fired on both sides, raising the question of whether this fragile cease-fire will hold. And there are plenty more questions about this standoff between nuclear-armed neighbors: How did the possible truce happen? What role is the United States playing? Is there a path to long-term peace? With the fog of war still hovering over South Asia, our experts explore the answers below.

This post will be updated as the story develops and more expert reactions come in.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Srujan Palkar: The US should correct its strategic imbalance in South Asia

Shuja Nawaz: By focusing on water, extremism, and trade, the cease-fire can become an enduring peace

Rudabeh Shahid: What the cease-fire and its violations mean for South Asia’s non-nuclear states

Manal Fatima: India suffers a reputational blow, while the fate of Kashmiris remains perilous

The world cannot afford to wait until the brink again

The recent cease-fire between India and Pakistan marks a critical juncture in averting a potentially catastrophic escalation in South Asia. The decades-long rivalry, rooted in territorial disputes over Kashmir and fueled by mutual distrust, has repeatedly brought these nuclear-armed neighbors to the brink. This latest de-escalation, while fragile, underscores the urgent need for restraint and timely international intervention, both of which were dangerously absent as tensions spiraled.

The conflict had gone too far. Cross-border skirmishes, artillery exchanges, and inflammatory rhetoric intensified, with each side miscalculating the other’s resolve. India’s aggressive posturing, often tied to domestic political pressures, clashed with Pakistan’s defensive yet provocative responses. Both nations’ militaries, equipped with advanced weaponry and nuclear arsenals, risked missteps that could have triggered a broader conflict. The 2019 Balakot airstrike and subsequent retaliation demonstrated how quickly localized incidents can escalate, yet lessons from that crisis were poorly applied. Mismanagement was evident in the failure to prioritize diplomacy over brinkmanship, with both governments amplifying nationalist sentiments rather than seeking de-escalation.

World powers, particularly the United States, China, and the United Nations, were alarmingly slow to intervene. Their delayed response allowed the situation to fester, emboldening hardline factions and undermining moderates who sought dialogue. Global attention, distracted by other crises, underestimated the stakes of a potential India-Pakistan war, which could destabilize the region and disrupt global security. The cease-fire, brokered only after significant loss of life and economic strain, highlights the need for proactive international mediation.

This truce is not a solution but a reprieve. It averts immediate disaster, preserves economic stability, and opens a window for dialogue. However, without sustained global pressure and a commitment to address root causes like Kashmir, the cycle of escalation will persist. The world cannot afford to wait until the brink again.

 —Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the head of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project, and a former chief of sensitive activities for special operations and combating terrorism in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The US should correct its strategic imbalance in South Asia

Saturday’s cease-fire had a degree of US involvement. But India’s recent counterterrorism operations under Operation Sindoor, followed by retaliatory strikes and escalation, have exposed an imbalance in US policy toward South Asia. As negotiations continue in the coming weeks, there is one policy shift the United States could take that would ensure it builds trust with India while putting the onus on the Pakistani establishment to play its part in counterterrorism—and that is revoking Pakistan’s Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status.

Despite deepening ties with India—a key Indo-Pacific partner—the United States continues to extend MNNA status to Pakistan, a country whose military-intelligence apparatus has long tolerated, if not enabled, cross-border terrorism. The recent Pahalgam attack, timed with a high-level US visit, highlights a recurring pattern of militant violence during diplomatic moments—echoing the 2000 Chittisinghpura massacre on the eve of a visit by President Bill Clinton.

From New Delhi’s perspective, the MNNA designation for Pakistan—which India does not have—sends contradictory signals. While US policymakers express solidarity with India during crises, they continue to offer Pakistan privileged military status without conditioning it on measurable counterterrorism compliance. This undermines deterrence, weakens regional crisis management, and emboldens actors who operate outside the norms of accountability from Pakistani soil.

The original justification for Pakistan’s MNNA status—logistical cooperation during the US war in Afghanistan—has expired. Today, China is Pakistan’s primary defense partner, and US assistance has largely dried up. Revoking MNNA would rebalance Washington’s ties with Islamabad and recognize strategic realities. It would also reinforce India’s role as an independent regional security provider, not dependent on US largesse, while establishing that Washington will hinge its support on alignment with counterterrorism and regional stability goals.

—Srujan Palkar is the global India fellow at the Atlantic Council.

By focusing on water, extremism, and trade, the cease-fire can become an enduring peace

Now that both India and Pakistan have executed their military responses to each other’s real or perceived actions against the other in Kashmir, good sense has prevailed in the shape of a cease-fire. If the announcement holds, this stops the ratcheting up of hostilities that were putting both nuclear-armed rivals on a steep escalation ladder. Historically, both sides try to gain some tactical advantages by extending the cease-fire limits. And there are many trigger-happy local commanders on both sides of the line of control in Kashmir, which would explain reports of clashes in the hours after the cease-fire announcement.

I am hearing from Pakistani sources that the agreement to cease hostilities emerged after closed and direct talks between the directors general of military operations of both armies and representatives of the two national security advisors. It helped that in the case of Pakistan, the national security advisor, Lt. Gen. Asim Malik, was also the current director general of the Inter-Services Intelligence (likely preparing himself for that generally civilian role post-retirement in a few months). Helping the process to put the lid on this regional flashpoint was the behind-the-scenes encouragement of US President Donald Trump, his Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and possibly Saudi Arabia.

What next? Having raised domestic emotions to a high pitch, leaders on both sides will want to take a much-needed pause and then begin the process of what Rubio identified as the beginning of “talks on a broad set of issues at a neutral site.” It will be interesting to see what is considered a neutral site. The Gulf is one possibility.

Three main items should be on the agenda.

1. The Indus Basin Water Treaty

Front and center should be the discussion of the effects of climate change on both India and Pakistan and the need to update the Indus Basin Water Treaty, originally agreed upon with US help and under the aegis of the World Bank. That treaty, signed in 1960, took nine years of negotiation. Both countries have been dancing around the shared waters issue in the past. India recently unilaterally abrogated the treaty—a debatable action. Regardless, the Himalayan and Karakoram glaciers feeding their rivers are declining, and time is running out for measures to counteract that reality. Both nations will suffer the consequences of dying waterways. Moreover, the shared aquifers of the Indian and Pakistani Punjabs badly need recharging. The misuse of tubewells has dropped the water tables, and overwatering has produced waterlogging and salinity. Combined efforts to revive underground water resources will help fight climate change. Otherwise, agriculture will suffer, and the population may die of thirst. …

Read more from Shuja Nawaz, a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center, here:

New Atlanticist

May 10, 2025

By focusing on water, extremism, and trade, India and Pakistan can turn this cease-fire into an enduring peace

By Shuja Nawaz

Having raised domestic emotions to a high pitch, leaders on both sides will want to take a much-needed pause and then begin negotiations.

What the cease-fire and its violations mean for South Asia’s non-nuclear states

The recently brokered cease-fire between India and Pakistan, hailed just this morning as a sign of returning stability, was violated shortly thereafter—underscoring the fragility of such diplomatic pauses in South Asia. The shaky agreement, facilitated by the Trump administration, highlights a deeper regional truth: while the logic of Mutually Assured Destruction may avert full-scale war, it does little to halt the cycles of escalation driven by mistrust and historical grievance.

In a region marked by volatility and deep-seated animosity, cease-fires are never just about halting gunfire. They are signals of restraint, tactical pause, or strategic recalibration. Their violation carries meaning too: It hardens political rhetoric, narrows diplomatic space, and amplifies insecurity far beyond the Line of Control in Kashmir. For South Asia’s non-nuclear states, this renewed conflict is more than a bilateral affair. It is a regional stress test with asymmetric consequences.

In Bangladesh, where an interim government has replaced Sheikh Hasina’s long-standing pro-India administration, anti-India sentiment has intensified further. The recent protests, which have successfully pressured the interim government to ban the Awami League under the country’s Anti-Terrorism Act, are now also inflected with broader regional anger. India’s posture during and after the cease-fire may be seen as coercive, deepening the backlash and weakening Dhaka’s willingness to align with New Delhi on strategic matters.

Sri Lanka, navigating domestic fragility and a delicate geopolitical balance, will attempt to remain neutral. Yet neutrality is not invisibility. Muslim communities in the country remain attuned to wider Islamophobic narratives, and Indian pressure may provoke political ripples. Meanwhile, China’s deepening footprint in Colombo further constrains Sri Lanka’s room for maneuver.

Nepal’s balancing act between India and China might also come under strain. Heavily reliant on Indian trade and remittances, India may grow increasingly wary of Kathmandu’s neutrality, especially amid heightened security anxieties. In this environment, Nepal’s neutrality could be interpreted as disloyalty, thereby placing the landlocked country in an increasingly untenable position.

Bhutan, while closely tied to India through the 1949 Treaty of Friendship, is not insulated either. Bhutan may again face increased Chinese pressure along its contested border, particularly if India redirects strategic focus northward—just as it did during the Doklam standoff in 2017.

The Maldives, too, might face growing pressure. As India reasserts its strategic role in the Indian Ocean, Malé’s policy of hedging between New Delhi and Beijing becomes harder to sustain. Domestic political undercurrents, including Islamist sentiment, may complicate Malé’s ability to respond to Indian pressure without facing internal pushback.

Above all, the shaky cease-fire underscores the chronic dysfunction of South Asia’s regional institutions. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) remains paralyzed, thereby lacking any mechanism for mediation, de-escalation, or collective response. Non-nuclear South Asian countries remain vulnerable to the centrifugal pull of India-Pakistan tensions, without a regional forum to cushion the fallout.

For the United States, the original cease-fire may have seemed like a diplomatic win. Saturday night’s violations, however, reveal the limits of transactional diplomacy. More significantly, it reflects a broader regional transformation: A more assertive regional posture by India will be perceived by non-nuclear neighbors as encroaching on their strategic autonomy—prompting deeper engagement with China as a counterbalance.

The real challenge is no longer merely avoiding the next crisis. It is about envisioning a regional order where diplomacy is consistent, non-nuclear South Asian states are not treated as collateral, and cooperation—not coercion—defines the regional norm.

—Rudabeh Shahid is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. 

India suffers a reputational blow, while the fate of Kashmiris remains perilous

Saturday’s US-mediated cease-fire between India and Pakistan is a welcome development after a tense week that brought South Asia alarmingly close to a broader military confrontation. This recent exchange revealed not only the heightened lethality of modern warfare between the two nuclear-armed neighbors, far surpassing past skirmishes, but also reinforced a recurring pattern in contemporary conflicts—the emergence of social media as a significant new front. With widespread misinformation circulating, the narrative war was self-evident. Against this backdrop, Pakistan lifted its fifteen-month ban on X, while India ordered the takedown of over eight thousand X accounts for allegedly spreading disinformation.

However, this pause also invites deeper scrutiny into the outcomes of the past few days. India’s decision to launch airstrikes based on unproven allegations of Pakistani involvement in the tragic April 22 Pahalgam massacre naturally raises questions about their effectiveness. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s India, eager to assert its role as a rising global power, arguably emerges from this crisis with a dented posture. Reports confirm the loss of at least two Indian military aircraft, including a French Rafale reportedly brought down by Pakistan’s Chinese-made J-10. Analysts have viewed the downing of the Rafale by a comparatively lower-cost Chinese aircraft as a blow to India’s defense credibility and a sign of tactical underperformance. Additionally, while some Indian media outlets circulated lists of terrorists allegedly killed in the initial strikes under Operation Sindoor—individuals linked to Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba—the unclear results of the operation make it difficult to ascertain New Delhi’s actual achievements and the effectiveness of these measures in realizing its intended goals.

Interestingly, Pakistan’s government finds itself on a relatively stronger footing. It has been under considerable scrutiny in recent months, particularly following the contentious 2024 general elections, or reasons including its handling of unrest in Balochistan and Balochi human rights activists, and its dealings with internal opposition. The external threat appeared to unify fractured political forces domestically. Amid this, the Pakistani Supreme Court’s controversial decision to allow civilians accused in the May 9, 2023 riots to be tried in military courts simply faded into the background as nationalist fervor dominated the country’s political atmosphere.

On the international/diplomatic front, Islamabad also appears to hold an advantage over New Delhi, which seems displeased with the Trump administration’s tone in mediations, viewing it as unfairly equating Pakistan with India. Further, Trump’s commitment to work with both countries “to see if … a solution can be arrived at concerning Kashmir” aligned more with Islamabad’s preference for international involvement rather than New Delhi’s desire to keep it a bilateral matter.

However, the fate of Kashmiris still hangs perilously between the two countries. While the ceasefire may have halted the immediate escalation toward all-out war, unrest in the disputed territory and the deeper conflict persist. For Kashmiris, caught between militants, military crackdowns, and political repression, the reality remains largely unchanged. In fact, there is a potential for an increase in the crackdown that followed the April terrorist attack by the Indian government, and within the ambiguous category of “suspected” terrorists, many may be unjustly targeted.

—Manal Fatima is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

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Russia’s coming summer offensive could be deadliest of the entire war

Mykola Bielieskov — Thu, 08 May 2025 15:08:20 +0000

As the US-led peace initiative continues to falter, the unfolding summer campaigning season in Ukraine promises to be among the bloodiest of the entire war. In the coming months, Russia is hoping to build on more than a year of gradual advances to achieve breakthroughs on the eastern front, while Ukraine aims to demonstrate to the country’s partners that it is capable of stopping Putin’s war machine and holding the line.

While the Kremlin insists it is ready for peace, developments on the battlefield tell a different story. According to Britain’s Ministry of Defense, Russia is intensifying its offensive operations and sustained approximately 160,000 casualties during the first four months of the current year, the highest total for this period since the start of the full-scale invasion. If this trend continues during the coming fighting season, 2025 will be the deadliest year of the war in terms of Russian losses.

Russia’s strategy continues to rely on costly frontal assaults, but the nature of these attacks is steadily evolving. Russian troops now increasingly employ motorbikes and other improvised vehicles to advance in small groups and infiltrate Ukraine’s defensive lines. These assaults are backed by strike drones, glide bombs, and artillery, making it difficult for Ukraine to direct reinforcements to hot spots or provide medical and engineering support. The end goal is to force Ukrainian tactical withdrawals and inch further forward.

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Ukraine’s defensive strategy is focused primarily on attrition. This includes remote mining to channel advancing Russian troops into kill zones, along with the extensive use of traditional artillery. Ukraine’s expanding drone army is also playing a crucial role, making it possible to target Russian units at depths of up to 15 kilometers behind the line of contact.

By increasing drone coverage along the front lines, Ukrainian commanders aim to hamper the logistics of Putin’s invasion force and significantly reduce the potential for future Russian advances. This approach is being dubbed the “drone wall,” and may well come to play a far biggest role in efforts to freeze the front lines. However, Russia is also rapidly innovating to address Ukraine’s growing drone capabilities, leading to a relentless technological contest that runs in parallel to the fighting on the battlefield.

As the Russian army currently holds the initiative and is advancing at various points along the front lines of the war, Putin’s commanders can choose from a range of potential locations as they look to identify geographical priorities for their summer offensive.

At present, Russia is expanding a foothold in northeastern Ukraine’s Sumy region after largely pushing Ukrainian formations out of Russia’s Kursk region. There have also been recent localized Russian advances in the Kharkiv region. However, the main thrust over the next few months is expected to come in eastern Ukraine, where Russia has concentrated forces in the Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka sectors. Success in these sectors could create the conditions for the occupation of the entire Donetsk region, which remains Russia’s most immediate political objective.

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While Putin is under no pressure on the home front, he will be keen to achieve some kind of meaningful breakthrough in the coming months in order to demonstrate to domestic and international audiences that the Russian army is capable to achieving victory in Ukraine. He recently stated that Russia has “sufficient strength and resources to take the war in Ukraine to its logical conclusion,” but the fact remains that his army has failed to capture and hold a single Ukrainian regional capital in more than three years of brutal warfare.

For war-weary Ukraine, the coming summer campaign will be a major test of endurance. If Ukrainian forces are able to prevent any significant Russian advances despite dwindling supplies of US military aid, it would serve as a powerful argument for pro-Ukrainian politicians in Europe and the United States. This would likely lead to strengthened support for the Ukrainian war effort, and could help convince skeptics in the Trump White House to adopt a firmer stance toward Russia.

The Ukrainian authorities have already accepted a US proposal for an unconditional 30-day ceasefire and remain ready to pursue a sustainable peace settlement. But with Russia showing little sign of following suit, Ukraine faces another long summer of brutal fighting.

The Kremlin’s current negotiating position would leave postwar Ukraine partitioned, isolated, and defenseless. Any peace on such terms would almost certainly mean the end of Ukrainian statehood. Instead, Ukraine must continue to defend itself while hoping that Russia’s ability to sustain heavy losses declines faster than the West’s collective commitment to stopping Putin.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

Putin’s parade cynically exploits WWII to justify his own criminal invasion

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 08 May 2025 02:13:09 +0000

Dozens of foreign leaders are expected in Moscow on May 9 for the largest international event in the Russian capital since Vladimir Putin launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine more than three years ago. Officially, they are gathering for a military parade to mark eighty years since the World War II victory over Nazi Germany, but it is already apparent that the shadow of Russia’s current war in Ukraine will loom large over the entire spectacle.

The guest list for Friday’s Victory Day parade on Red Square reflects the dramatic geopolitical realignments that have taken place since 2022, and underlines the widening rift between Putin’s Russia and the democratic world. Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, Putin’s showpiece annual parade had been attended by many Western leaders including US President George W. Bush. This year, however, the guest of honor will be Chinese President Xi Jinping. He will be joined by the Brazilian president along with a host of Central Asian and African leaders. The sole representative from the European Union will be Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico.

Visiting dignitaries will be treated to a bold demonstration of modern Russia’s military might. The mood is expected to be far detached from the kind of somber tones more typically associated with World War II memorials elsewhere. Friday’s parade has been been carefully choreographed to emphasize Russian strength while projecting Putin’s supreme confidence in eventual victory over Ukraine.

The link to today’s war will be hammered home by the participation of numerous Russian military units accused of committing war crimes in Ukraine. Putin may also choose to surround himself with alleged war criminals from the ranks of his invading army, as he did last year. In his official address, it will be genuinely shocking if Putin does not attempt to draw direct parallels between the struggle against Nazi Germany and his own ongoing war in neighboring Ukraine.

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Even without the involvement of Russian troops fresh from the front lines of the current war, it would be virtually impossible to separate Putin’s parade from the Kremlin propaganda justifying the invasion of Ukraine. Ever since Russia first set out to subjugate Ukraine more than ten years ago, the Kremlin has portrayed its escalating invasion as a continuation of the World War II fight against Germany, with Ukrainians cast in the role of modern-day successors to the Nazis. Despite an almost complete lack of evidence to support these absurd and obscene claims, the “Nazi Ukraine” narrative continues to resonate among a Russia population that has been utterly saturated in an extreme form of World War II mythology that often borders on religious fanaticism.

From the very first years of his reign, Putin has sought to place the Soviet Union’s World War II experience at the very heart of modern Russia’s national identity. For the Kremlin, this emphasis on the immense suffering and ultimate triumph of the Soviet war effort has served as the ideal ideological antidote to the horrors of Stalinism and the humiliations of the Soviet collapse. It has proved a highly effective strategy, helping to rebuild Russia’s battered national pride and giving new meaning to the country’s twentieth century totalitarian trauma.

Putin’s war cult has centered around Victory Day, which has emerged over the past 25 years as by far the most important holiday on the Russian calendar. Many outside observers assume Victory Day always enjoyed similar prominence, but that is not the case. In fact, Stalin himself discouraged commemorations and made May 9 a working day in 1947. It remained so until the mid-1960s, when Victory Day was declared a public holiday. Nevertheless, there was none of the pomp and fanfare currently associated with the anniversary of the Nazi surrender. In the 46 years between the end of World War II and the fall of the Soviet Union, Moscow hosted a grand total of just four Victory Day parades.

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Putin’s cynical exploitation of World War II has also shaped Russian rhetoric on the international stage. This has been most immediately apparent in relation to Ukraine, which Kremlin propaganda has consistently portrayed as a Nazi state. Russia’s lurid claims have proved remarkably resistant to reality, with even the 2019 election of Jewish candidate Volodymyr Zelenskyy as president of Ukraine failing to force a change in tactics. Instead, Putin and other leading Kremlin officials have resorted to ever more ridiculous mental gymnastics as they have struggled to explain how a supposedly Nazi country could elect a Jewish leader. In one particularly notorious incident during the first months of the invasion, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov dismissed Zelenskyy’s Jewish roots by declaring that Adolf Hitler also had “Jewish blood.”

When Putin announced the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on the fateful morning of February 24, 2022, it came as no surprise that he identified “denazification” as one his two key war aims. The true meaning of this chilling phrase has since become abundantly clear; “denazification” is actually Kremlin code for “de-Ukrainianization,” and reflects Putin’s end goal of a Ukraine without Ukrainians.

In areas of Ukraine that have fallen under Kremlin control since the start of the invasion, the occupation authorities are systematically wiping out all traces of Ukrainian history, culture, and national identity. Thousands of children have been abducted and subjected to indoctrination in a bid to rob them of their Ukrainian nationality, while anyone seen as potentially loyal to Ukraine has been detained and dispatched to a vast network of prisons where torture is reportedly routine. Europe has not witnessed atrocities on this scale since World War II.

For decades, most European countries have marked the end of World War II with solemn memorial services while collectively vowing “never again.” Under Putin, Russians have come to embrace an altogether more menacing form of militant remembrance accompanied by the unofficial slogan “we can repeat it.”

Putin has already succeeded in weaponizing the memory of World War II to consolidate his grip on power, garner domestic support for his expansionist foreign policy, and dehumanize his enemies. He is now poised to use this week’s Victory Day parade in Moscow to legitimize the criminal invasion of Ukraine among his foreign guests and place it in the same context as the fight against Hitler. This is staggeringly disrespectful. It is also historically illiterate. If anyone today is guilty of echoing the crimes of the Nazis, it is Putin himself.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Arnold Punaro

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Srujan Palkar: These strikes follow a predictable pattern—and a water treaty could provide an off-ramp

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Experts react: India just launched airstrikes against Pakistan. What’s next?

Atlantic Council experts — Wed, 07 May 2025 02:55:01 +0000

Is this the end, or just the beginning? India conducted missile strikes against what it described as “terrorist infrastructure” in Pakistan and the Pakistan-administered parts of Kashmir in the early hours of Wednesday. The Indian government said the strikes were a response to a terrorist attack in Pahalgam in Indian-controlled Kashmir in April that killed twenty-six mostly Indian civilians, which the Indian government has blamed on the Pakistani government. The Indian operation, which hit at least five different locations, none of which were military sites, came amid concern that weeks of heightened tensions between the two nations could escalate into a war. Pakistan responded with artillery fire and claimed to have shot down a handful of Indian fighter jets. Where does this clash between nuclear-armed powers go from here? And how will the confrontation shape the two countries’ long-running dispute over Kashmir? We reached out to our experts for clarity in the fog of this emerging conflict.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Shuja Nawaz: Further escalation is possible in this combustible conflict

Michael Kugelman: The Gulf states are well placed to provide much-needed mediation

Manal Fatima: Ordinary Kashmiris continue to bear the brunt of these tensions

Atman Trivedi: The question is not if Pakistan will retaliate, but when and how

Alex Plitsas: Escalation appears unlikely after calibrated strikes

Rudabeh Shahid: India-Pakistan tensions will cause spillover problems across the region

These strikes follow a predictable pattern—and a water treaty could provide an off-ramp

This is not a surprise attack. In such military operations, predictability and patterns are important. India has upheld its reputation for reliability while preparing the world by briefing diplomats from Group of Twenty (G20) countries and others. The surgical 2016 strikes in response to the killing of nineteen Indian soldiers, the 2019 Balakot airstrike in response to the killing of forty Indian paramilitary personnel, and now Operation Sindoor, in response to a targeted, religiously motivated terrorist attack killing twenty-six men, follow a strategy that India has showcased since 2001. (In 2001, Operation Parakram, in response to terrorist attacks on the Indian parliament, lasted ten months in the form of a military standoff, the second since both countries tested nuclear weapons in 1998. It did not result in wider war.)

The Indian Defense Ministry’s statement immediately following the strikes assures non-escalatory intentions. Given this reliable history and a two-week diplomatic blitz following the terrorist attack, a further, immediate escalation or mobilization from India is unlikely.  

The Pakistani leadership’s responses declaring that Indian actions constitute an act of war are also part of the pattern. Pakistan’s former foreign minister and its current defense minister have admitted to previous Pakistani involvement in funding extremist groups, and Pakistan must be transparent if it is to prove that it is not training terrorists or arming them with deadly military-grade weapons such as the AK-47s and M4 rifles used in the terrorist attacks.

India too ought to remain transparent and communicative with the global diplomatic community, while continuing its approach of counterterrorism. It should not take the bait of the terrorist attacks or of Pakistani leadership, and should instead play to its tactical, economic, and diplomatic advantages. In the long run, that will prove to be the most effective way to protect against further terrorist threats to the lives of Indian citizens and preserving Kashmir’s path to peace.

The United States, for its part, must push for transparency and dialogue. A key method of dialogue could be the renegotiation of the Indus Water Treaty, which was signed in 1960 and does not take into account modern climate and technological changes. Indian peacetime requests for renegotiations went unanswered. The treaty does not have an exit clause or renegotiation mechanism, and as such the parties need to be willing to converse. Water, instead of a source of tension, can be a source of conversation.

—Srujan Palkar is the global India fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Further escalation is possible in this combustible conflict

After deliberating and planning, India has attacked several sites inside Pakistan and in Pakistan-administered Kashmir (Azad Jammu and Kashmir), while claiming it chose to avoid military targets. Pakistan has a policy of “quid pro quo plus.” So expect a tougher response inside India and Indian-administered Kashmir, perhaps using standoff air-to-air weapons. Unlike in 2019, chances are that Pakistan may also target the launch or control centers responsible for the Indian missile attack. It has built up its electronic warfare capacity over the years.

The escalation ladder is steep. And, as in the past, captive local media and jingoistic politicians across the spectrum are baying for blood.

The world doesn’t need another flashpoint where both sides possess nuclear weapons, and standoff air and drone attacks could easily lead to the use of heavier weapons.

Sadly, the United States seems to have little clue about how to handle this situation. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s calls to leaders in both countries didn’t stop escalation. Is it time for China to play a positive role?

—Shuja Nawaz is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

The Gulf states are well placed to provide much-needed mediation

India and Pakistan are experiencing their most serious crisis in several decades. The airstrikes that India carried out in Pakistan early Wednesday morning represented some of the most high-intensity and large-scale military activities that India has deployed there since 1971. A muscular Pakistani response is all but inevitable. Unlike the last two military crises between India and Pakistan, in 2016 and 2019, there is a strong likelihood of additional hostilities—and greater escalation risks—beyond an initial strike and counterstrike. This is no small matter given that India and Pakistan are both nuclear-armed states.

International mediation is of the essence to ensure the current confrontation doesn’t reach a point where nuclear escalation risks come into play. While there’s a strong international consensus in favor of de-escalation, few countries have the deep relationships and leverage to be effective mediators in this dangerous crisis. The United States has previously played the role of mediator, including during the 2019 India-Pakistan crisis under the first Trump administration. But the Arab Gulf states—especially Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—may be best placed to intervene. They all have deep ties to both New Delhi and Islamabad. They’re also key suppliers of fuel and other assistance to Pakistan. And there is at least one precedent: In 2021, the UAE helped mediate an India-Pakistan border truce—an accord that kept bilateral ties relatively stable until the events of recent weeks.

Careful diplomacy from trusted interlocutors can help bring the two sides back from the brink. But given the scale of hostilities up to this point and the mood in each capital—and across the Indian and Pakistani publics—it won’t be easy.

—Michael Kugelman is a South Asia analyst and the writer of Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief.

Ordinary Kashmiris continue to bear the brunt of these tensions

India’s airstrikes, launched amid Pakistan’s call for an evidence-based inquiry into the April 22 Pahalgam terrorist attack that killed twenty-six civilians, underscore the fragile and volatile dynamics of the region’s security environment. The response was anticipated, shaped by domestic pressure on the hyper-nationalist government in New Delhi and a long-standing precedent, including the 2019 Pulwama attack, which similarly escalated into cross-border hostilities. This cyclical exchange of strikes, rhetoric, and retaliations is not new. However, this very familiarity underscores a disappointing failure to learn from past mistakes.

In the immediate aftermath of the Pahalgam attacks, both governments reverted to entrenched narratives: India pointed to Pakistan’s record of harboring insurgent groups, and Pakistan alleged that the attack was a false-flag operation. This mutual blame game reflects a deeper strategic paralysis, an inability or unwillingness to address the root causes of the conflict.

At the center of this confrontation are the people of Kashmir. In recent days, Kashmiris have faced harassment and physical assaults in parts of Indian-administered Kashmir, reportedly targeted in retaliation for the Pahalgam attack. These incidents, compounding decades of political repression and securitized control in the region, highlight how ordinary Kashmiris continue to bear the brunt of both state and societal backlash amid renewed India-Pakistan tensions.

Strategically, a full-scale war serves neither side. Pakistan’s military strength would be offset by economic precarity, and military action would harm the country’s focus on attracting foreign investment. India, which is positioning itself as an emerging global economic power, cannot afford instability. In a nuclear neighborhood, the costs of escalation, whether accidental or intentional, are simply incalculable.

The United States has so far been very engaged on the issue in a neutral manner. Rubio has engaged both New Delhi and Islamabad in recent days, indicating that Washington would urge for de-escalation. “I just hope it ends very quickly,” US President Donald Trump said Tuesday evening in Washington. The administration should apply all possible pressure to make sure of it. Further, a broader diplomatic push that includes behind-the-scenes efforts by the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and others with regional influence is essential. This brinkmanship endangers regional economic endeavors and threatens both countries’ security. Regional prosperity is dependent on sustained peace, which is not possible with the persistent specter of a confrontation between two nuclear-armed states.

—Manal Fatima is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

The question is not if Pakistan will retaliate, but when and how

The latest confrontation between India and Pakistan provides a stark reminder that the nuclear-armed nations have recently grown all-too-comfortable flexing their military muscle. India characterized its military strikes as measured and restrained. Nevertheless, the decision to target purported terrorist camps deep inside Pakistan, well beyond the disputed Kashmir region, will likely be interpreted by Pakistan’s generals as a significant escalation.

The question now is not whether Pakistan will respond, but when and how. Earlier this week, Pakistani Ambassador to Russia Muhammad Khalid Jamali threatened to use the country’s “full spectrum of power” in reply to an Indian military strike. Pakistan’s “quid pro quo plus” defense strategy is intended to inflict greater damage in retaliation than it first suffers, to deter Indian military action in the first instance. Pakistan’s powerful chief of army staff, Asim Munir, is a wild card, known to indulge in provocative rhetoric about Kashmir. He may prioritize ideological convictions over pragmatism. Meanwhile, China’s heightened involvement in and around South Asia, highlighted by its growing military and economic ties with Pakistan, introduces additional risks. The region finds itself at a moment where miscalculation, accidents, or plain bad luck could conspire to produce a major conflict.

In the past, the United States and other countries have used quiet diplomacy to help defuse regional crises. In the first Trump administration, for instance, senior US officials worked the phones to help de-escalate tensions in South Asia. Six years later, Washington and like-minded partners are distracted and inward-focused.

The dangerous mood on South Asia’s streets, fueled by jingoistic media outlets that border on hysteria, is hardly conducive to disciplined and careful crisis management. Cooler heads may yet prevail, but not before the region edges closer to war.

—Atman Trivedi is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and a partner at Albright Stonebridge Group.

Escalation appears unlikely after calibrated strikes

India’s “Operation Sindoor” is a limited counterterrorism operation targeting nine terrorist camps in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. The strikes were a direct response to the April 22, 2025, Pahalgam attack in Indian-administered Kashmir, where militants from the Resistance Front (TRF), allegedly linked to Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, killed twenty-six civilians, mostly Indian tourists. India’s Ministry of Defense described the operation as “focused, measured, and non-escalatory,” emphasizing that it struck only terrorist infrastructure, such as training camps in Muzaffarabad and Kotli, and avoided Pakistani military or government facilities. However, Pakistan denied that the strikes hit terrorist targets, claiming that they hit civilian areas. Indian forces used precision missiles, and aircraft did not cross into Pakistani airspace, signaling restraint meant to prevent broader conflict. 

India’s actions aimed to neutralize immediate threats while minimizing the risk of escalation. By publicly framing the strikes as counterterrorism-focused and avoiding sovereign Pakistani targets, New Delhi sought to limit retaliatory pressure on Islamabad. Pakistan condemned the strikes, alleging civilian casualties. In response, there have been reports of clashes along the line of control with artillery and small arms fire being exchanged by both sides with unconfirmed reports of limited civilian casualties. The operation’s design mirrors India’s 2016 and 2019 strikes, which targeted militants without triggering full-scale war, suggesting a pattern of calibrated responses.

Despite heightened tensions, including prior diplomatic and economic measures like trade suspensions and airspace closures, escalation appears unlikely. Both nations, aware of their nuclear capabilities and under international pressure from the United States and United Nations, have incentives to avoid war. Diplomatic channels, including back-channel communications, remain open, and historical precedents show both sides can de-escalate after limited actions. While the situation in Kashmir remains volatile, India’s restrained approach and Pakistan’s cautious rhetoric suggest a mutual interest in containing the crisis.

India-Pakistan tensions will cause spillover problems across the region

As non-nuclear members of the South Asia Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) surrounding India, countries such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives would find themselves increasingly constrained in a scenario of India-Pakistan escalation over Kashmir—a development that would further entrench the paralysis of regional cooperation under SAARC.

If tensions between the two nuclear-armed neighbors escalate, the geopolitical and domestic consequences for these smaller South Asian states will be complex. Most exposed is Bangladesh, where the recent regime change has removed Sheikh Hasina’s pro-India administration and installed an interim government navigating a deeply polarized landscape. Anti-India sentiment is running high, fueled by perceptions of Indian interference and growing frustration at India for hosting the former Bangladeshi prime minister. The interim leadership, lacking a political mandate, will face acute pressure from sections of civil society to adopt a more assertively nationalist, possibly anti-India, stance. At the same time, India is likely to increase expectations of diplomatic alignment, leaving Dhaka in a highly precarious position.

In Sri Lanka, the government is likely to maintain a cautious neutrality while quietly accommodating India’s regional security posture. However, an intensification of the Kashmir conflict could create unrest within Sri Lanka’s Muslim communities, particularly if the issue is framed as part of a broader crackdown on Muslim populations. These internal dynamics could destabilize a government already managing economic fragility.

Nepal would attempt to preserve its balancing act between India and China, but India may view Nepal’s neutrality with suspicion. Recent bilateral tensions, including territorial disputes and Kathmandu’s assertion of greater sovereignty, make it vulnerable to diplomatic pressure. Nepal’s large labor force in India also adds an element of economic dependency that could be leveraged.

Bhutan is most likely to align quietly with India, given its close strategic ties, but any Indian military distraction could embolden Chinese activity along the contested northern border. 

The Maldives, meanwhile, will face rising Islamist sentiment at home if Kashmir becomes a rallying point. At the strategic level, increased Indian Ocean militarization will reduce space for Malé’s hedging strategy.

Overall, a Kashmir flashpoint would harden regional alignments, reduce strategic autonomy, and raise the domestic political costs of neutrality for South Asian non-nuclear states.

This, in turn, would have implications for US Indo-Pacific strategy. Washington views India as a cornerstone of its regional balancing efforts against China, particularly through platforms such as the Quad. A protracted India-Pakistan crisis would not only divert India’s strategic focus away from the maritime Indo-Pacific and toward its western land borders, but also constrain its ability to act as a net security provider in the region.

—Rudabeh Shahid is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

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Lipner quoted in Kathinmerini on the state of the Gaza ceasefire

Atlantic Council — Tue, 06 May 2025 14:55:02 +0000

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Lipner quoted in The Straits Times on Israel and the United States relations under Trump

Atlantic Council — Tue, 06 May 2025 14:54:48 +0000

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Samaan joins Channel News Asia on the future of the Gaza ceasefire

Atlantic Council — Tue, 06 May 2025 14:53:15 +0000

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Plitsas quoted in The Washington Examiner on Gaza ceasefire negotiations

Atlantic Council — Tue, 06 May 2025 14:52:36 +0000

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Sales joins Fox News to discuss the Isael-Hamas ceasefire deal

Atlantic Council — Tue, 06 May 2025 14:52:26 +0000

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Panikoff quoted in The Independent on Trump and Biden’s efforts to secure a Gaza ceasefire

Atlantic Council — Tue, 06 May 2025 14:48:38 +0000

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Alkhatib joins the New Arab to discuss the Israel-Hamas ceasefire and the future of Gaza

Atlantic Council — Tue, 06 May 2025 14:48:23 +0000

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Alkhatib joins Sky News to discuss Hamas control over Gaza

Atlantic Council — Tue, 06 May 2025 14:48:18 +0000

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Alkhatib joins ABC Radio National to discuss Hamas control of Gaza

Atlantic Council — Tue, 06 May 2025 14:48:14 +0000

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Alkhatib quoted in Algemeiner to discuss on Hamas human rights violations against Palestinians

Atlantic Council — Tue, 06 May 2025 14:46:01 +0000

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Alkhatib quoted in Reuters to discuss how Gaza checkpoints will be staffed by armed American contractors

Atlantic Council — Tue, 06 May 2025 14:45:55 +0000

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Alkhatib quoted in The Times to discuss how Gaza ceasefire can inspire Muslims and Jews to unite against hate

Atlantic Council — Tue, 06 May 2025 14:43:33 +0000

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Warrick joins Al-Araby News to discuss how Washington should address the situation in the West Bank

Atlantic Council — Tue, 06 May 2025 14:41:51 +0000

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Warrick joins Al Jazeera to discuss Trump’s comments on relocating people out of Gaza

Atlantic Council — Tue, 06 May 2025 14:41:06 +0000

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Gavito joins Channel 4 News to discuss the four Israeli hostages freed by Hamas in exchange for 200 Palestinian prisoners

Atlantic Council — Tue, 06 May 2025 14:40:42 +0000

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Damon joins CBC to discuss the life-saving infrastructure in northern Gaza that has been decimated

Atlantic Council — Tue, 06 May 2025 14:40:15 +0000

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Damon quoted in News Nation on children in Gaza

Atlantic Council — Tue, 06 May 2025 14:39:47 +0000

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Plitsas joins Scripss News to discuss adversaries’ weapons capabilities in the Middle East

Atlantic Council — Tue, 06 May 2025 14:39:25 +0000

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Citrinowicz joins Ynet News to discuss Iranian proxy strategy

Atlantic Council — Tue, 06 May 2025 14:39:08 +0000

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Putin is escalating the war in Ukraine. He will not stop until he is stopped.

Alyona Nevmerzhytska — Tue, 06 May 2025 14:37:12 +0000

Almost two months ago, Ukraine agreed to a United States proposal for an unconditional 30-day ceasefire. Russia still refuses to do likewise. Instead, Putin continues to engage in stalling tactics while escalating the war.

Since US-led peace talks began in February, Russia has carried out some of the deadliest attacks of the entire invasion targeting Ukrainian civilians. These have included a ballistic missile strike on a playground in Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s hometown, Kryvyi Rih, that killed 18 people including 9 children. On Palm Sunday, Russia launched targeted strike on Sumy city center as civilians made their way to church, leaving 35 dead.

Some of these attacks have made international headlines. Many more have not. Every single day, the population in front line Ukrainian cities like Kharkiv in the east and Kherson in the south face relentless Russian bombardment. At night, millions of Ukrainians are forced to seek shelter as Russia launches wave after wave of missiles and drones at targets across the country.

As Russia intensifies its air offensive against Ukraine’s civilian population, the death toll is rising. According to UN officials, the number of Ukrainian casualties has spiked recently. During the first 24 days of April, 848 civilians were killed or wounded, representing a 46 percent increase on the same period one year ago.

Meanwhile, Russia is also escalating its offensive operations on the battlefield as Putin’s commanders seek to wear down Ukrainian resistance and achieve a breakthrough. This is leading to mounting Russian losses. The UK Ministry of Defense reports that in the first four months of 2025, Russia suffered approximately 160,000 casualties. If the current rate of attrition persists, this will become the costliest year of the war for Putin’s invading army.

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Despite extensive evidence of Russia’s intention to escalate the invasion, the United States continues to pursue a vision of peace through compromise. Since talks began, the Trump administration has offered the Kremlin a range of concessions while pressuring Ukraine to back down on key issues such as the country’s NATO ambitions. A recent US peace proposal indicated that President Trump may even be prepared to officially recognize Russia’s 2014 seizure of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula.

The tone of American diplomacy has shifted noticeably since Trump returned to the White House, with US officials now seeking to avoid any direct condemnation of Russia. In line with this new strategy, the United States has sided with Moscow on a number of occasions to vote against UN resolutions critical of the Kremlin. The US has also stepped back from international efforts to hold Russia accountable for alleged war crimes committed in Ukraine, defunding one flagship program and exiting another.

The Trump administration’s conciliatory approach toward Russia does not appear to be working. Far from offering concessions of his own, Putin has responded to the new US administration’s peace initiative by doubling down on his maximalist war aims. The Kremlin dictator insists on international recognition for Russia’s claims to Ukrainian territory, and demands that any peace deal must leave Ukraine disarmed and internationally isolated.

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The current lack of progress toward peace should come as no surprise. After all, the experience of the past two decades has demonstrated that there is nothing more likely to provoke Putin than weakness. When the West chose not to punish Russia for the 2008 invasion of Georgia, this paved the way for the 2014 invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. The underwhelming Western response to Putin’s initial assault on Ukrainian sovereignty then set the stage for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Russian’s sense of impunity is now a crucial factor fueling the largest European invasion since World War II. While Putin is always ready to engage in diplomatic maneuvers, his evasive actions in recent months confirm that he has no real interest in a compromise peace. Instead, he is more confident than ever that he can outlast the West in Ukraine and achieve his objectives.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a watershed event in world history that will define the future of international security for decades to come. If Western leaders allow Russia to continue bombing civilians and destroying the foundations of international law without consequence, a ruthless new world order will emerge and will be defined by the principle that might makes right. Putin and his authoritarian colleagues in China, Iran, and North Korea will dominate the global stage and will rewrite the rules to suit their expansionist agendas. No country will be secure.

Today, Ukrainians are paying the price for the West’s reluctance to confront Russia. If Putin is not stopped in Ukraine, many other countries will also count the cost of this failure.

Alyona Nevmerzhytska is CEO of hromadske.ua.

Warrick joins the BBC to discuss fighting between the SDF and SNA

Atlantic Council — Tue, 06 May 2025 14:23:12 +0000

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The shadow of 1930s appeasement hangs over US-led peace talks

Oleksandr Merezhko — Tue, 06 May 2025 13:10:47 +0000

As the world prepares to mark the eightieth anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany, the shadow of events leading up to World War II hangs over efforts to end Russia’s current invasion of Ukraine. In order to avoid the horrors of another global conflict, Western leaders must apply the lessons learned from the struggle against twentieth century totalitarianism.

US President Donald Trump’s efforts to initiate peace talks between Russia and Ukraine reflect a commendable desire to end the war. Nevertheless, after more than three months of Russian stalling tactics and empty promises, it should now be abundantly clear that attempting to negotiate a meaningful compromise with Vladimir Putin was a mistake.

Since the current peace process began in early February, the Russian ruler has refused to join Ukraine in backing a US proposal for an unconditional ceasefire. Instead, Putin continues to insist on maximalist goals that reflect his undiminished determination to erase Ukrainian statehood and subjugate the Ukrainian people.

Putin’s demands include the comprehensive disarmament of the Ukrainian military and the reestablishment of Russian dominance in all spheres of Ukrainian public life (euphemistically called “denazification” by the Kremlin), along with official international recognition for Russia’s territorial gains and an end to all military support for Kyiv. If implemented, Putin’s terms would leave Ukraine partitioned, isolated, and defenseless. This is not a negotiating position; it is a call for Kyiv’s capitulation.

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While Russia’s ultimate objectives remain unchanged, there is a very real danger that Putin may seek to exploit Trump’s evident ambition to settle the Ukraine issue as soon as possible. He could do so by agreeing to a temporary ceasefire that would lead to a pause in hostilities, while creating the conditions to complete the conquest of Ukraine following the end of Trump’s presidency. This would allow Putin to lift sanctions, rebuild the Russian army, and destabilize Ukraine from within.

In order to secure Kremlin backing, a ceasefire deal would need to hand Putin the semblance of victory while denying Ukraine any genuine and reliable security guarantees. Alarmingly, reports indicate that current US peace proposals go a long way toward meeting these conditions.

Crucially, the United States is reportedly prepared to officially recognize the Russian seizure of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula. This has led to inevitable comparisons with the 1938 Munich Agreement, which saw Britain and France hand Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland over to Nazi Germany in the hope that this would satisfy Adolf Hitler. Instead, the shameful deal struck in Munich encouraged the Nazi dictator to escalate his territorial demands. Less than a year later, World War II began.

The appeasement policies of the 1930s have long been condemned for enabling the rise of Hitler. Attempts to appease Putin have produced strikingly similar results. After Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, Western efforts to downplay the war and resume “business as usual” only served to embolden the Kremlin. When Russia’s 2014 invasions of Crimea and eastern Ukraine again failed to produce a resolute Western response, Putin interpreted this as a tactic green light to go further. This paved the way for the full-scale invasion of 2022.

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It should now be obvious to any objective observer that the continued appeasement of Putin will further fuel his imperial ambitions. This would be potentially fatal for Ukraine itself. It would also be disastrous for the future of international security.

Putin’s revisionist agenda is not limited to Ukraine. He openly speaks of establishing a new world order and frequently laments the fall of the Russian Empire, which at its peak included more than a dozen currently independent nations beyond Ukraine, from Finland and Poland in the west to the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. If Putin is allowed to succeed in Ukraine, it is delusional to think he will simply stop. On the contrary, abandoning Ukraine to Russia would dramatically increase the chances of a far larger conflict in the coming years.

In order to prevent this nightmare scenario from materializing, the West must demonstrate maximum unity and an uncompromising commitment to Ukraine’s survival as an independent state. Putin interprets any talk of compromise as a sign of weakness. The only language he truly understands is the language of strength.

The most effective deterrent remains Ukrainian membership of NATO. Unsurprisingly, Putin has worked hard to prevent this from happening. He has employed nuclear blackmail to intimidate the West, and has spent years spreading false narratives about an alleged NATO security threat to Russia itself.

Putin’s objections to Ukrainian NATO membership do not stand up to scrutiny. Notably, he has been unable to explain why he went to war over Ukraine’s distant hopes of joining NATO but did nothing to oppose Finland’s recent NATO accession, despite the fact that Finnish membership of the alliance more than doubled Russia’s NATO borders overnight. Indeed, Russia already shares borders with six NATO member states and leaves these frontiers largely unguarded. Putin’s real problem is evidently with Ukrainian independence and not NATO enlargement.

Bringing Ukraine into NATO would serve as a powerful barrier to future Russian invasions and would dramatically reduce the likelihood of a major European war without undermining Russian national security. However, this would require a degree of political will on the part of the United States and major European powers including Britain, France, and Germany that is currently absent. Unless that changes, Western leaders must come up with a credible alternative to NATO membership that will guarantee Ukraine’s long-term security.

Nobody wants peace more than the Ukrainian people. But Ukrainians also recognize that well-meaning efforts to compromise with the Putin regime will only encourage further Russian aggression. Similar policies aiming to accommodate and appease Hitler led directly to World War II. If Western leaders wish to prevent a repeat of this catastrophic outcome, they must stop offering the Kremlin concessions and demonstrate the kind of resolve that Russia respects.

Oleksandr Merezhko is a member of the Ukrainian Parliament for the Servant of the People Party and Chair of the Ukrainian Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee.

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Claims of North Korean troops participating in Russia’s war against Ukraine first began to circulate in October 2024. However, the Kremlin initially denied the North Korean presence, with Russian officials remaining tight-lipped on the subject until late April.

Moscow and Pyongyang appear to have coordinated their recent statements, indicating that both partners felt the time was now right to confirm the involvement of North Korean forces in Russia’s war. Official confirmation came as Putin proclaimed the defeat of Ukrainian forces in Russia’s Kursk region, where the bulk of North Korean soldiers are believed to have been deployed.

Moscow’s decision to confirm the presence of North Korean soldiers after months of denials could prove damaging to the Kremlin’s credibility at a time when questions are already being asked over Russia’s commitment to US-led peace talks to end the war in Ukraine. In recent days, US President Donald Trump has signaled his mounting frustration with Putin’s apparent stalling tactics, and has suggested that the Russian leader may be “tapping” him along.

The appearance of North Korean troops alongside their Russian counterparts on the front lines of the war against Ukraine represents the latest stage in a deepening military alliance between the two countries. North Korea has been supplying Russia with significant quantities of military aid since the early stages of the war in 2022. Deliveries have included millions of artillery shells as well as ballistic missiles, which have been used to devastating effect against Ukrainian cities.

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North Korea’s direct participation in the war against Ukraine is a watershed moment in modern European history. It is also widely seen an indication of the Russian army’s mounting recruitment issues.

While the Kremlin still has vast untapped reserves of available manpower to call upon, Putin is thought to be deeply reluctant to conduct a new mobilization due to fears of a possible domestic backlash inside Russia. This is making it increasingly challenging to replenish the depleted ranks of his invading army amid continued heavy losses.

For much of the war, Putin has relied on a combination of recruits drawn from Russia’s prison population and volunteer soldiers attracted by generous financial incentives that are typically many times higher than average Russian salaries. However, with the Russian army now reportedly averaging over a thousand casualties per day, it is becoming more difficult to find sufficient manpower to maintain the momentum of offensive operations in Ukraine.

So far, the North Korean contingent has seen action inside the Russian Federation itself amid fierce battles to push Ukrainian forces out of Russia’s Kursk region. However, with their participation now publicly confirmed by both Moscow and Pyongyang, officials in Kyiv are voicing concerns that North Korean troops could soon be redeployed to Ukrainian territory. This would represent a dangerous international escalation with unpredictable consequences for the wider region.

North Korea has now firmly established itself as one of the Kremlin’s most important allies in the invasion of Ukraine. Pyongyang’s involvement began with the supply of artillery shells and has expanded to include ballistic missiles and large numbers of combat troops. This comprehensive military support is enabling Russia to sustain the current war effort.

Ukraine’s allies are still searching for a suitable reaction to the expanding North Korean military presence on Europe’s eastern frontier. Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has called for the strengthening of sanctions against Russia and North Korea, while also warning that the Koreans are gaining valuable experience of modern warfare in Ukraine that could have grave implications for international security. In the absence of an overwhelming Western response, it seems safe to assume that North Korea’s involvement in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will continue to deepen.

Olivia Yanchik is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Cautious optimism in Kyiv as Ukraine reacts to landmark US minerals deal

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 01 May 2025 14:49:44 +0000

There was a sense of cautious optimism in Kyiv on Thursday morning as Ukrainians reacted to news that a long-awaited natural resources agreement with the United States had finally been signed. While the details of the minerals deal are still being digested, many have already noted that the key terms of the agreement are now far more favorable for Ukraine than earlier drafts, which some Ukrainian critics had likened to “colonial” exploitation.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy first raised the prospect of a minerals-sharing agreement between Ukraine and the United States in late 2024 as he sought to engage with Donald Trump in the run-up to America’s presidential vote. The idea gained further momentum following Trump’s election victory, but a planned signing ceremony was abandoned in late February following a disastrous Oval Office meeting between Trump and Zelenskyy.

When talks resumed in early spring, leaked details indicated a hardening of the American position, with US officials insisting on extensive control over Ukrainian assets and seeking to use revenues to repay aid provided to Ukraine during the first three years of Russia’s full-scale invasion. However, following weeks of exhaustive negotiations, the most contentious conditions have now been removed, resulting in a more forward-looking document that sets the stage for a potential deepening in the strategic partnership between Kyiv and Washington.

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Ukraine’s Minister of Economy Yulia Svyrydenko, who traveled to the US to sign the minerals deal on Wednesday evening following intense last-minute discussions over the fine print of the agreement, emphasized that Ukraine would retain ownership and control over its natural resources. She noted that the final wording “provides mutually beneficial conditions” for both countries, and praised the deal as “an agreement that reaffirms the United States commitment to Ukraine’s security, recovery, and reconstruction.”

Back in Kyiv, many saw the signing primarily as an opportunity to improve relations with the Trump White House following a turbulent few months that has seen the US President employ harsh rhetoric toward Ukraine while repeatedly blaming the country for Russia’s invasion. “Ukraine held the line. Despite enormous pressure, every overreaching demand from the other side was dropped. The final deal looks fair,” commented Kyiv School of Economics president Tymofiy Mylovanov. “It’s a major political and diplomatic win for Ukraine and the US that gives Trump a domestic political boost. That will translate, I expect, into a more positive attitude toward Ukraine.”

There was also much praise for the Ukrainian negotiating team and their ability to accommodate US interests while addressing Kyiv’s concerns. “This final version is significantly fairer and more mutually beneficial than earlier drafts,” stated Olena Tregub, who serves as executive director of Ukraine’s Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (NAKO). “To me, the minerals agreement is a clear win-win. It’s a well-negotiated, balanced deal that reflects both strategic vision and professionalism.”

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Many members of the Ukrainian parliament adopted a pragmatic view of the landmark minerals deal. “It seems like Trump was putting pressure on us in an attempt to get a victory during his first hundred days in office,” commented Oleksandr Merezhko, a lawmaker representing President Zelenskyy’s Servant of the People party who chairs the Ukrainian parliament’s foreign affairs committee. “The devil is in the details. But politically there are upsides. We have improved relations with Trump, for whom the deal is a win.”

Fellow Ukrainian member of parliament Inna Sovsun, who represents the opposition Golos party, underlined the unprecedented challenges Ukraine faced during negotiations as the country sought to broker a fair deal with a crucial ally while fighting for national survival. “We weren’t choosing between good and bad, we were choosing between bad and worse. What we got is better than the initial offer,” she noted.

While the general mood in Kyiv was relatively upbeat following the news from Washington, Sovsun stressed that the new natural resources agreement with the United States falls far short of the security guarantees that Ukraine is seeking in order to safeguard the country’s future and prevent further Russian aggression. “A true end to the war can only happen if the US provides significantly more weapons to Ukraine, is willing to apply greater sanctions pressure on Russia, or ideally both. If neither happens, it’s hard to expect the war to end.”

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Putin announces ceasefire to protect Moscow parade from Ukrainian attack

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 29 Apr 2025 21:26:01 +0000

Russian President Vladimir Putin has just announced his second unilateral ceasefire in a matter of days, but this emerging trend does not reflect any sincere desire for peace. On the contrary, Putin’s brazen new ceasefire gambit suggests a man emboldened by Western weakness who is now more confident than ever that he can continue to game the US-led peace process without seriously disrupting his invasion of Ukraine.

In early March, Ukraine agreed to an American proposal for an unconditional ceasefire. Almost two months later, Russia still refuses to follow suit. As a result, many observers are drawing the obvious conclusion that Russia rather than Ukraine is the primary obstacle to peace. In an apparent bid to counter this growing consensus and distract attention from Russia’s reluctance to end the war, Putin has recently begun declaring his own brief ceasefires. His first step was to announce a surprise 30-hour Easter truce during traditional Orthodox religious festivities in Russia and Ukraine. Putin is now proposing a three-day break in hostilities to mark Victory Day on May 9.

The timing of Putin’s latest truce is particularly interesting. Critics note that his Victory Day ceasefire coincides with a major military parade in Moscow to mark the eightieth anniversary of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. Putin is expected to host a number of high-ranking foreign dignitaries at the event, including the leaders of China, Brazil, and India. Needless to say, it would be hugely embarrassing for the Kremlin dictator if his propaganda parade was overshadowed by Ukrainian airstrikes in Moscow or elsewhere in Russia.

Many have already noted the cynicism of Putin’s proposal. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reacted by reaffirming his commitment to an unconditional 30-day ceasefire while accusing the Kremlin of trying to “manipulate the world” and “deceive the United States” with empty ceasefire stunts. “We value human lives, not parades,” he stated. Officials in Brussels were similarly critical of the Kremlin. “Russia could stop the killing and the bombing at any time, so there’s absolutely no need to wait until May 8,” commented European Commission spokesperson Anita Hipper. Meanwhile, the Trump White House responded by emphasizing the need for a “permanent ceasefire.”

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Putin’s shamelessly self-serving call for a Victory Day ceasefire says much about his opportunistic approach toward the faltering peace process initiated by the United States in early 2025. Much like the 30-hour lull in fighting initiated by Putin over the Easter holiday, the three-day truce proposed this week is far too short to have any meaningful impact on negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. However, it does allow the Russian ruler to pose as peacemaker while continuing his invasion.

Putin’s headline-grabbing truces are also an important part of his stalling tactics as he seeks to drag out peace talks indefinitely without exhausting US President Donald Trump’s patience or closing the door on a potential broader thaw in bilateral relations with the United States. It is no coincidence that both of Putin’s recent ceasefire announcements have come in the immediate aftermath of critical comments from Trump indicating that the US leader is growing tired of Russian excuses. Indeed, news of the Victory Day truce emerged just hours after Trump had questioned Russia’s willingness to end the war and commented that he feared Putin was “tapping me along.”

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While Putin engages in dubious peace gestures, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has recently provided a far more realistic view of the Kremlin’s war aims and continued commitment to the conquest Ukraine. In an interview with Brazilian newspaper O Globo that was published on the same day as Putin’s Victory Day ceasefire announcement, Lavrov listed Russia’s conditions ahead of possible negotiations with Ukraine. These included international recognition of Russia’s right to five partially occupied Ukrainian provinces, the removal of all sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014, guarantees over Ukrainian neutrality, and the reduction of Ukraine’s army to a skeleton force.

Crucially, Moscow also insists on Ukraine’s “denazification,” which is recognized as Kremlin code for the comprehensive “de-Ukrainianization” of the country and the reestablishment of Russian dominance in all spheres of public life. If implemented, these punishing Russian terms would not lead to a sustainable peace. Instead, they would serve as an act of capitulation, setting the stage for the final destruction of Ukraine as a state and as a nation.

All this is a very long way from the Trump administration’s frequent assertions that both sides must be willing to compromise if they wish to achieve a viable settlement. While Ukraine has repeatedly backed calls for an unconditional ceasefire and has accepted the need for temporary territorial concessions, Russia continues to pursue maximalist goals that no Ukrainian government could possibly accept.

During the first hundred days of his presidency, Trump has sought to advance the peace process by pressuring Ukraine while offering Russia a wide range of incentives to engage. It should now be abundantly clear that this uneven approach has backfired. Far from persuading Putin to offer concessions of his own, Trump’s appeasement policies have convinced the Kremlin to escalate its demands further. We have now reached the point where Putin believes he can personally pause the war to host a military parade on Red Square before resuming his invasion three days later. This absurd situation makes a complete mockery of Trump’s peace efforts and threatens to leave him looking foolish.

If Trump is serious about bringing Russia to the negotiating table, he must first demonstrate a readiness to impose crippling costs on the Kremlin. The current US strategy toward Russia can be characterized as all carrots and no sticks. This is useless against a regime that only understands the language of strength and regards any attempts at compromise as signs of weakness. It also gravely underestimates the high stakes underpinning Russia’s invasion. Putin views the war in Ukraine as an historic mission to reverse the imperial collapse of 1991 and return Russia to its rightful place as a global superpower. He will not abandon this mission unless the alternative is defeat.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Kyiv accuses China of deepening involvement in Russia’s Ukraine war

Katherine Spencer — Tue, 29 Apr 2025 20:43:29 +0000

As US-led efforts continue to broker a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine, Kyiv has recently accused China of deepening its involvement in Moscow’s invasion. The claims leveled at Beijing are not the first of their kind since the start of the full-scale invasion and add an extra dimension of geopolitical complexity to the ongoing negotiations.

In early April, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that two Chinese nationals had been captured while fighting alongside the Russian military in eastern Ukraine. Although the presence of foreign fighters within the ranks of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invading army is not new, officials in Kyiv claim that more than 150 Chinese mercenaries have been recruited by Russia. China has called the allegations “totally unfounded.”

While there is no evidence linking Russia’s Chinese troops to Beijing, many have suggested the Chinese authorities must be aware that their nationals are participating in a foreign war. Some have pointed to widespread Russian military recruitment adverts circulating across China’s heavily censored social media space, and have suggested that the presence of these videos indicates a degree of tacit official approval, at the very least.

US officials do not believe the recently captured fighters have direct ties to the Chinese government, Reuters reports. However, there are mounting concerns in Washington and other Western capitals over reports that Beijing is sending army officers to observe the Russian invasion of Ukraine in a bid to learn tactical lessons from the war. This could provide the Chinese military with important insights into drone warfare and the rapidly changing nature of the modern battlefield.

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In a further indication of growing frustration in Kyiv over China’s alleged support for Russia’s invasion, Zelenskyy recently accused Chinese citizens of working at a Russian manufacturing plant producing drones for the war in Ukraine. In the past month, the Ukrainian authorities have also imposed sanctions on three Chinese companies for alleged involvement in the production of Iskander ballistic missiles, which Russia often uses in the war against Ukraine.

The most serious Ukrainian allegations came in the middle of April, when Zelenskyy claimed that China was now supplying weapons and gunpowder to Russia. This was the first time the Ukrainian leader had openly accused Beijing of providing Moscow with direct military assistance. Although, last fall US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell had also suggested that China was providing Russia with technology that was “not dual-use capabilities,” contributing directly to Russia’s war production.

Claims of expanding Chinese involvement in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine do not come as a complete surprise. After all, China has long been seen as one of the Kremlin’s key allies and has emerged over the past decade as Moscow’s most important economic partner.

On the eve of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, China and Russia declared a “no limits” partnership. Over the past three years, the two countries have repeatedly underlined their shared geopolitical vision, which includes a commitment to ending the era of US dominance and ushering in a new multipolar world order. These strengthening ties have been further highlighted by a number of bilateral summit meetings between the Russian and Chinese leaders.

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Despite its close relations with Moscow, China has officially adopted a neutral stance toward Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This has included refraining from any overt gestures of support and publicly backing calls for peace. Nevertheless, Beijing has faced accusations of enabling the Russian war effort in important ways through the provision of restricted items including sanctioned components and dual-use technologies used in the production of missiles, tanks, and aircraft. By providing the vast majority of these exports to Russia, US officials believe that China has helped Russia greatly boost its arsenal and ramp up military production.

US officials have also alleged that China is providing Russia with geospatial intelligence to aid the invasion of Ukraine.

Claims of growing Chinese involvement are fueling speculation that this could lead to a possible international escalation in Russia’s war against Ukraine. There is also alarm over what Russia may be providing in exchange for Chinese support. US officials have alleged that China is receiving unprecedented access to highly sophisticated Russian defense technologies. The US Congress has also suggested that the Kremlin could be providing China with critical knowledge about the vulnerabilities of Western weapons systems based on combat experience acquired in Ukraine.

While Beijing has denied providing any material support for Moscow’s war, there is no question that the geopolitical partnership between China and Russia has reached new levels against the backdrop of the conflict.

With the United States now looking to reduce its involvement in European security, opportunities may soon emerge for China to play a greater role in peace efforts to end the war. However, Beijing would first need to align its actions with its words to convince Kyiv that it is a plausible peacemaker rather than a Russian ally.

Katherine Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Editor’s note: This article was updated on April 30, 2025, to clarify that reports of Chinese support for Russia’s war effort have been persistent before Kyiv’s recent accusations.

Wargaming the Middle East: How Iran might reshape its Hezbollah proxy playbook

Maayan Dagan and Luke Wagner — Tue, 29 Apr 2025 16:42:00 +0000

In March 2025, the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council hosted a War Game to explore how Iran will shape the future of its proxy strategy, particularly its relationship with Hezbollah. Participants included representatives from various Washington, DC-based think tanks.

The War Game included five groups: Iran, Hezbollah, the US, Israel, and the rest of the world, which comprised experts on Syria, Russia, China, and Turkey. The rest of the world group played a crucial role in the game, representing the global community’s interests and potential actions in response to recent developments in the Middle East.

Setting the stage for the War Game

The War Game began with an overview of the current situation in the region, setting the stage for the discussions. Iran is in its weakest position in years, following Israeli attacks on its territory and the damage inflicted on Hezbollah, which significantly diminished Iran’s capabilities, especially along its border with Israel. Years of investment in Hezbollah now appear to have been largely wasted.

Hezbollah remains operational and retains some of its capabilities, although it has suffered significant losses. After the collapse of the Assad regime, Iran’s ability to transfer military supplies and aid to Hezbollah through Syria, which was Iran’s largest logistical hub and the main way of supporting the organization, is now diminished.

It was equally important to consider that Iran is facing a financial crisis, which is likely to deepen under the Trump administration’s efforts to weaken both Iran and its allies. Additionally, during the broader Middle East conflict, Iran came to understand that while the Houthis and Shiite militias in Iraq are effective in frustrating Israel, they increasingly resist Tehran’s authority.

The central question guiding the war game was: Given these developments, is Iran’s proxy strategy still relevant and effective, or should it be reconsidered?

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Approaches to rebuilding Hezbollah

The first dilemma that arose was whether Iran should invest money and resources in rebuilding Hezbollah, given the country’s financial crisis and US sanctions. The Iranian group, in a strategic move agreed upon by the Hezbollah group, quickly decided that Iran’s proxy strategy was not the top priority at this time. Instead, Iran’s primary focus was on internal stability and maintaining the regime. Iran’s financial constraints drove this decision, the need to allocate resources to domestic issues, Hezbollah’s failure during the war with Israel, and the realization that Hezbollah would not be a key player in any near-future conflict between Iran and the West. Consequently, the Hezbollah group sought alternative sources of funding beyond Iran, including Africa, the Gulf, drug trafficking, self-financing, and donations. Moreover, the Iran group decided not to provoke any actions, especially further significant Israeli strikes on Hezbollah, that could jeopardize Hezbollah’s long-term survival. Instead, it concluded that the best course of action for now was to lay low and quietly provide Hezbollah with financial support to rebuild gradually.

In this situation, the Hezbollah group faced a dilemma regarding whether it should participate in an Iranian response to a possible Western attack on Iran. However, the Iranian and Hezbollah groups agreed that such involvement was not feasible now. Alternatively, within both the Hezbollah and Iranian groups, there was consensus that Hezbollah needed first to rebuild its position in Lebanon’s domestic arena.

To achieve this, the Hezbollah group decided to mobilize public opinion against the new leadership in Lebanon for failing to rebuild the country after the war. At the same time, Hezbollah positions itself as a provider of aid and services. It also decided to secure funding from Iran to regain public trust and strengthen Hezbollah’s position ahead of Lebanon’s upcoming elections and to use the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon as an opportunity to rebuild. And lastly, it pursued the reestablishment of military deterrence against Israel to prevent further Israeli strikes on Hezbollah targets in Lebanon, while ensuring some stability and quiet for the Lebanese population.

On the Israeli side, the group decided that while it did not want to get directly involved in Lebanon, it also could not allow another security threat to emerge along its northern border. Therefore, it resolved to continue striking Hezbollah targets in response to ceasefire violations.

A major dilemma for both the Hezbollah and Iranian groups was how to transfer money and resources into Lebanon, given restrictions at airports and potential crackdowns on smuggling by the new Syrian government. The Hezbollah group considered fueling the insurgency in coastal Syria to create a corridor for the flow of weapons and resources into Lebanon. In response, the Syrian and Lebanese groups decided to form a joint border task force to curb Hezbollah’s cross-border activity, including material and weapons smuggling.

The approach to Iran’s nuclear program: Negotiation or attack?

Discussions quickly shifted away from Hezbollah’s future and toward Iran’s broader strategic position. While the Iranian group acknowledged that the country was in its weakest position in years, some positive aspects emerged, most notably, the possibility of Trump negotiating and signing a new agreement with Tehran.

The US and Israeli groups debated whether to pursue a negotiated nuclear deal with Iran or to conduct preemptive strikes to destroy Tehran’s nuclear capacity. They agreed to prioritize diplomacy as “Plan A”, but if Iran appeared unwilling to negotiate, the US would authorize “Plan B”, preemptive strikes. Additionally, the US group decided it would approve military action if Iran escalated its uranium enrichment to ninety percent. As a result, the US and Israeli groups collaborated on planning a potential attack.

The Iranian group signaled that a deal was possible, aiming to ease Western pressure, maintain stability, and improve its domestic economic and political situation. Given the tensions with the West, the Iranian group also sought to regain control over Hezbollah to ensure the group’s survival and prevent any unexpected actions that could destabilize Iran’s position.

The US group pushed for a broader agreement that extended beyond Iran’s nuclear program to include its missile program and proxy activities. However, while the Iranian group was unwilling to accept more restrictive terms than those in the JCPOA, it was open to starting with nuclear discussions, which were considered the most pressing issue, before broadening the scope of talks. The group also insisted that the United States demonstrate good faith—perhaps by easing sanctions or lifting other restrictions— to help restore some trust in the negotiation process. This demand stemmed from the US unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA during the first Trump administration, despite Iran’s compliance with the agreement. Iran was hesitant to negotiate from a position of weakness or under coercive conditions, especially with a US administration it sees as historically untrustworthy, even beyond its general distrust of the United States. Alongside their cooperation on Iran’s nuclear issue, the US and Israeli groups also discussed the possibility of signing a security agreement.

Another key concern for the Iranian group was how to maintain the support of China and Russia amid its current challenges.

Conclusions regarding other key actors in the region

The Russian group faced a dilemma: Whether to strengthen ties with the US or to continue deepening its relationship with Iran, as the Iranian group desired. Ultimately, Russia concluded that it was satisfied with its existing position and relationships, particularly with the US, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Israel. Therefore, it sought to avoid actions that could jeopardize these ties, especially with the Trump administration.

The Syrian group opposed Iran’s presence in Syria, and the Syrian, Israeli, US, and even Iranian groups quickly agreed that it was not in their interest to maintain Iran’s military presence in Syrian territory.

The China group reaffirmed that China’s primary regional interest lies in strengthening ties with the Gulf rather than with Iran, and the Middle East as a whole is not a top priority for Beijing.

Maayan Dagan is a visiting research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Luke Wagner is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs.

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Ukraine’s innovative army can help Europe defend itself against Russia

David Kirichenko — Thu, 24 Apr 2025 21:39:48 +0000

When Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he cited Ukraine’s “demilitarization” as one of his two key war aims. He has not yet succeeded in achieving this goal, to put it mildly. Rather than disarming Ukraine, Putin’s invasion has actually transformed the country into one of Europe’s most formidable military powers.

The emergence of the Ukrainian army as a serious international fighting force can be traced back to the beginning of Russia’s invasion in 2014. At the time, decades of neglect and corruption had left Ukraine virtually defenseless. With the country’s existence under threat, a program of military modernization was rapidly adopted. During the following years, the Ukrainian Armed Forces expanded dramatically and implemented a series of far-reaching reforms in line with NATO standards.

Following the full-scale Russian invasion of February 2022, the transformation of the Ukrainian military entered a new phase. The number of men and women in uniform swelled to around one million, making the Ukrainian army by far the largest in Europe. They have been backed by a domestic defense industry that has grown by orders of magnitude over the past three years and now accounts for around 40 percent of Ukraine’s military needs.

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For today’s Ukraine, a strong domestic defense sector is now a matter of national survival. During the initial stages of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian authorities relied heavily on military aid from the country’s partners. This support helped enable Ukraine’s early victories but was also often subject to prolonged delays that left Kyiv vulnerable to changing political priorities in various Western capitals.

The need for greater military self-sufficiency has been underlined in recent months by the return of US President Donald Trump to the White House. The new US leader has made clear that he does not intend to maintain United States military support for Ukraine, and plans instead to downgrade the overall American commitment to European security. This shift in US policy has confirmed the wisdom of Ukraine’s earlier decision to prioritize the expansion of the country’s domestic defense industry.

Ukraine’s growing military capabilities owe much to a defense tech revolution that has been underway in the country since 2022. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion, hundreds of Ukrainian companies have begun producing innovative new technologies for the military ranging from software to combat drones. By focusing on relatively simple and affordable defense tech solutions, Ukraine has been able to close the gap on Russia despite Moscow’s often overwhelming advantages in terms of manpower, firepower, and resources.

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More than three years since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, it is now clear that wartime necessity has transformed Ukraine into perhaps the most agile and experimental military ecosystem in the world. Whereas Western arms procurement cycles typically span several years, Ukraine can translate ideas into operational weapons within the space of just a few months. This has helped establish Ukraine as a global leader in drone warfare. The country’s use of inexpensive FPV drones is increasingly defining the modern battlefield and now accounts for approximately 80 percent of all Russian casualties.

Ukraine’s domestic drone production capacity is growing at a remarkable rate. According to the country’s Deputy Defense Minister Ivan Havryliuk, Ukrainian forces are currently receiving approximately 200,000 drones per month, a tenfold increase on the figure from just one year ago. Kyiv is also making rapid progress in the development of numerous other cutting edge military technologies including robotic systems, marine drones, and cruise missiles.

Ukraine’s dramatically expanded armed forces and groundbreaking defense tech sector make the country an indispensable partner for Europe. After decades of reliance on US security support, European leaders currently find themselves confronted with the new political realities of an isolationist United States and an expansionist Russia. In this uncertain environment, it makes good sense for Europe to upgrade its support for the Ukrainian army while deepening collaboration with Ukrainian defense tech companies.

European investment in the Ukrainian defense industry is already on the rise, both in terms of government donor funds and private sector investment. This trend looks set to intensify in the coming months as Ukrainians and their European partners increasingly acknowledge that their collective future security depends on closer cooperation. Russia’s invasion has forced Ukraine to become a major military power and a leading defense tech innovator. This status looks set to guarantee the country a position at the heart of Europe’s security architecture for many years to come.

David Kirichenko is an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

A pro-Putin peace deal in Ukraine would destabilize the entire world

Elena Davlikanova, Lesia Ogryzko — Thu, 24 Apr 2025 20:41:09 +0000

US President Donald Trump launched a fresh attack against Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on April 23, accusing him of obstructing peace negotiations and prolonging the war with Russia. Trump’s comments came after Zelenskyy rejected the idea of ceding Crimea to Russia as part of a US-brokered plan that some skeptics say would reward the Kremlin and grant Moscow most of its objectives while offering Ukraine little in return.

Ending the war between Russia and Ukraine has been Donald Trump’s top foreign policy priority throughout the first hundred days of his new administration. This has led to mixed results. The US leader has won praise for initiating the first meaningful talks since the early months of the Russian invasion, but he has also been accused of adopting an overly Kremlin-friendly approach to negotiations that has seen the US consistently pressure Ukraine while offering Russia a series of concessions.

The eagerness of the new US administration to reach some kind of settlement comes as no surprise. During the 2024 presidential election campaign, Trump vowed to broker a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine as soon as possible. Since returning to the White House in January, he has sought to distance himself from the current confrontation with the Kremlin, and has repeatedly expressed enthusiasm for normalizing relations with Moscow.

This dramatic shift in US foreign policy is sparking considerable alarm in Kyiv and other European capitals. Concerns are now mounting that if Ukraine is forced to accept a pro-Putin peace deal, the country would be unlikely to survive much longer as an independent state. This would represent an historic victory for Putin’s Russia, with profound geopolitical repercussions that would be felt far beyond the borders of Ukraine.

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In Russia itself, a successful peace deal would vindicate the entire invasion of Ukraine and further consolidate the country’s ongoing transition toward a fully totalitarian model of government. Today’s militarization of Russian society would intensify, with imperial propaganda dominating the national information space and defense spending rising to unprecedented levels. Unpopular aspects of the current war such as heavy battlefield losses and sanctions-related shortages would soon be forgotten as triumphant Russians embraced a new era of imperial expansionism.

Others would draw very different conclusions from a Russian victory in Ukraine. The failure of the existing international order to prevent the invasion and occupation of a major European country would send shock waves around the world and mark the dawn of a dangerous new era defined by the principle that might is right. This would soon lead to sharp increases in defense budgets as nations rushed to rearm in order to avoid suffering the same fate as Ukraine.

Russia’s frequent use of nuclear blackmail during the invasion of Ukraine would be particularly consequential. The Kremlin’s readiness to engage in nuclear saber-rattling would convince many countries that in order to be truly safe, they must acquire nukes of their own. In such a scenario, the existing nuclear nonproliferation architecture would collapse and be replaced by a nuclear arms race that would significantly increase the potential for a future nuclear war.

For Putin, a successful outcome in Ukraine would be a stepping stone toward even more ambitious foreign policy adventures. He would almost certainly seek to continue reasserting Russian dominance across the former USSR, with his next targets likely to include Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and the countries of Central Asia. He may also seek to go further into Central Europe. Confronted by a demoralized and weakened West, Putin would surely be tempted to escalate his campaign of aggression against front line nations like Finland or the Baltic states in order to expose the emptiness of NATO’s collective security guarantees and discredit the alliance.

An emboldened Russia would also seek to increase its military and economic presence in other regions of the world including the Arctic, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. With sanctions no longer in place and Russia increasingly viewed as a geopolitical winner, potential allies would flock to Moscow. In this new reality, Putin’s current authoritarian alliance with China, Iran, and North Korea would serve as the basis for a far larger anti-Western grouping.

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Any settlement that leaves Ukraine partitioned, isolated, and disarmed will not bring peace. On the contrary, it would signal the start of a new stage in the country’s agony marked by the slow bleeding of territory, population, and sovereignty. Step by step, an abandoned Ukraine would gradually be absorbed into Putin’s new Russian Empire. This would place Europe’s second-largest army under Russian control, while also providing the Kremlin with vast additional industrial and agricultural wealth to fuel Putin’s expansionist agenda.

Meanwhile, Europe would lose its Ukrainian shield at a time when the continent is already facing up to the reality of a drastically reduced US commitment to transatlantic security. While European leaders are now urgently addressing the need to rearm, few would currently be confident in their ability to withstand a determined Russian offensive. Without Ukraine’s battle-hardened million-strong army to protect them, the countries of Europe would represent an extremely inviting target that Putin may be unable to resist.

After more than three years of relentless horror and destruction, nobody wants peace more than the Ukrainians themselves. But most Ukrainians also recognize that a bad peace will mean no peace at all. Handing Russia victory in Ukraine may temporarily create the illusion of peace, but in fact it would merely set the stage for a dangerous new era of international insecurity marked by militarization, authoritarianism, nuclear proliferation, and wars of aggression.

Elena Davlikanova is a fellow at CEPA. Lesia Ogryzko is director of the Sahaidachny Security Center.

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If the goal of Putin’s Easter ceasefire gambit was to position Ukraine as the main obstacle to peace, it appears to have backfired. Far from rejecting Russia’s last minute ceasefire proposal, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy quickly agreed. “If Russia is now suddenly ready to truly engage in a format of full and unconditional silence, Ukraine will act accordingly, mirroring Russia’s actions,” he commented in a social media post outlining Ukraine’s position.

Crucially, Zelenskyy also called Putin’s bluff by issuing his own counter-proposal to significantly extend the ceasefire. “If a complete ceasefire truly takes hold, Ukraine proposes extending it beyond Easter Day. This will reveal Russia’s true intentions, because 30 hours is enough to make headlines, but not for genuine confidence-building measures. Thirty days could give peace a chance,” the Ukrainian leader commented.

Zelenskyy has since expanded on his call for a more comprehensive ceasefire agreement. On Easter Day, he said Russia and Ukraine should both implement a month-long pause on all missile and drone attacks against civilian infrastructure. Putin has not yet provided a definite answer to Zelenskyy’s proposal, but he has suggested that he may be open to bilateral talks with Ukraine on the issue. It is far from certain whether this dialogue will lead to any meaningful action, but the Ukrainian leader has already succeeded in demonstrating his constructive approach to the peace process.

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These recent developments come at a key moment in the Trump administration’s efforts to broker a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine and bring Europe’s largest invasion since World War II to an end. Ukraine agreed to a US proposal for an unconditional ceasefire on March 11, but Russia has yet to do likewise. Instead, Moscow has sought to secure multiple further concessions and has been accused of attempting to drag out talks indefinitely.

Putin’s efforts to obstruct negotiations have placed Trump in an uncomfortable position and have led to widespread suggestions that the US leader is being played by the Kremlin dictator. Matters first came to a head in late March when Putin publicly questioned Zelenskyy’s political legitimacy and said Ukraine should be placed under temporary United Nations administration in order to elect what the Russian ruler called a more “competent” government. Trump responded by saying he was “pissed off” and “very angry” about Putin’s comments.

Throughout April, the chorus of international criticism over Russia’s bad faith approach to negotiations has grown steadily louder, as have demands for Trump to respond accordingly. The US leader is now evidently running out of patience and is threatening to walk away from peace talks altogether. With American officials demanding progress in a matter of days rather than weeks, we should soon have a better picture of the prospects for a breakthrough toward a sustainable settlement. For now, there is little indication that Russia has any interest in ending the invasion of Ukraine.

Vladimir Putin’s surprise Easter ceasefire announcement was clearly a cynical stunt, but it did inadvertently serve an important purpose by underlining the simple fact that Russia can end the war whenever it chooses. With faltering peace talks now approaching a critical juncture, the significance of this basic point cannot be overstated. As many people have observed over the past three years, if Russia stops fighting, there will be no more war. If Ukraine stops fighting, there will be no more Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

US-led peace talks hampered by Trump’s reluctance to pressure Putin

Olivia Yanchik — Tue, 22 Apr 2025 21:20:14 +0000

During the 2024 election campaign, US President Donald Trump famously vowed to end the Russian war on Ukraine “in 24 hours.” Three months into his presidency, the US leader now appears to be rapidly losing patience with a faltering peace process that is showing few signs of progress. Trump stated on April 18 that he wanted a ceasefire agreement in place quickly and would “take a pass” if Moscow or Kyiv “make it very difficult” to reach a peace deal.

Trump’s latest comments reflect mounting US frustration. Speaking on the same day in Paris, United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned that the US may soon “move on” from efforts to broker a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine if there is no progress in the coming days. “We are now reaching a point where we need to decide whether this is even possible or not,” Rubio told reporters.

It is not difficult to see why the Trump White House is feeling discouraged. While Ukraine agreed to a US proposal for an unconditional 30-day ceasefire on March 11, Russia has so far refused to follow suit. Instead, the Kremlin has offered a long list of excuses and additional conditions. This has led to accusations that Russian President Vladimir Putin has no real interest in peace and is deliberately engaging in stalling tactics in a bid to drag out negotiations and continue the war until he has political control of Ukraine.

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Critics of Trump say he has been too reluctant to pressure Putin and has done little to convince the Kremlin dictator that the time has come to abandon his invasion. They claim Trump has consistently signaled his readiness to offer Russia concessions while adopting a noticeably tougher stance toward Ukraine. This has included multiple statements blaming Ukraine for Russia’s invasion.

Since the very early stages of Trump’s peace initiative, the US has ruled out the prospect of Ukraine joining NATO. This was recently underlined by US envoy General Keith Kellogg, who confirmed that NATO membership for Ukraine was “off the table.” Kellogg’s comments were welcomed by the Kremlin. “Of course, this is something that causes us satisfaction and coincides with our position,” noted Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov.

The US has also made clear that it expects Europe to play a leading role in any peace settlement, including the provision of security guarantees for Ukraine to prevent any future repeat of Russia’s current invasion. This is part of a broader foreign policy transition that looks set to see the United States reduce its historic commitment to European security in order to focus more on Asia.

After taking office in January, Trump threatened to target Putin’s energy sector and extended some existing sanctions, but he has so far chosen not to impose any additional economic measures against Moscow. When Trump unveiled landmark new tariffs in early April, Russia was one of the few major economies not on the list.

US officials said the decision not to impose tariffs was because bilateral trade had already effectively stopped due to sanctions imposed following Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, trade with Russia is greater than trade with a number of countries subject to the new tariffs. Meanwhile, Trump and other US officials have frequently talked up the prospect for greater economic cooperation between Russia and the United States.

In the diplomatic arena, the Trump White House has sought to avoid direct criticism of Russia in favor of more neutral messaging that prioritizes the need for peace. This approach has seen the United States siding with Moscow at the United Nations and voting against UN resolutions condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine. US officials also reportedly refused to back a statement by the G7 group of nations condemning Russia’s recent Palm Sunday attack on the Ukrainian city of Sumy, which killed dozens of civilians.

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The Kremlin has responded approvingly to the dramatic recent shift in the United States approach toward Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In early March, Russian officials noted that US foreign policy now “largely coincides with our vision.” However, while Putin has good reason to welcome the Trump administration’s stance on Ukraine, he has so far shown little interest in reciprocating by offering any concessions of his own. Far from it, in fact. Since the start of bilateral talks with the United States in February, the Russian military has significantly increased its bombing campaign against Ukrainian cities. In recent weeks, Russian forces have launched a major new spring offensive in Ukraine.

The Kremlin’s negotiating position in ongoing US-led talks is similarly hard line and reflects Russia’s continued commitment to ending Ukrainian independence. Moscow’s demands include official recognition of Russian control over four partially occupied Ukrainian provinces, a complete end to all Western military support for Kyiv, and the drastic reduction of the Ukrainian army to a mere skeleton force, apparently with the intention of leaving Ukraine defenseless against a future phase of Russia’s invasion.

Russia’s uncompromising current approach reflects Putin’s conviction that he can eventually outlast the West in Ukraine, and that by saying no, he will push Trump to offer more concessions. So far, Putin’s logic appears to be working. Trump’s efforts to win over the Kremlin seem to have convinced many in Moscow that they are now firmly on track to secure an historic victory and have no reason to offer any meaningful concessions. If Trump is serious about achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine, he must demonstrate that he is prepared to turn up the pressure on Putin and increase the costs of continuing the invasion.

Olivia Yanchik is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Putin is attempting to intimidate Merz with yet more Russian red lines

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 17 Apr 2025 21:58:03 +0000

As Germany’s next chancellor Friedrich Merz prepares to boost support for Ukraine, the Kremlin is already seeking to deter him with intimidation tactics. Merz’s response to Moscow’s threats will reveal much about his ability to lead Europe at a time when the continent is attempting to confront the challenging new geopolitical realities of an expansionist Russia and an isolationist United States.

When Merz takes up his post in the coming weeks, his first big foreign policy decision will be whether to provide Ukraine with long-range Taurus missiles. Current German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has consistently refused to do so, but Merz has indicated that he will be prepared to give the green light for deliveries. This would potentially enable Ukraine to launch precision strikes against targets deep inside Russia.

The Kremlin is clearly anxious to prevent this from happening. Speaking in Moscow on April 17, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova warned that any decision to supply Ukraine with Taurus missiles would have serious consequences for Berlin, and would be viewed by Russia as direct German involvement in the war.

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It is no surprise to see Russia engaged in yet more saber-rattling. After all, this approach has served the Kremlin well throughout the full-scale war in Ukraine. From the very first days of Russia’s invasion, Putin has attempted to exploit Western fears of escalation by threatening to retaliate if Kyiv’s partners dare to cross arbitrary red lines set by Moscow limiting the scale of international support for Ukraine.

Russia’s threats have proved remarkably effective. They have helped fuel prolonged debates in Western capitals over each and every aspect of military aid for Ukraine, and have made many of Kyiv’s partners reluctant to provide the kinds of weapons that could lead to a decisive Ukrainian victory. Indeed, while the Russian army has struggled to advance on the battlefield, Putin’s ability to intimidate the West has been arguably his most important achievement of the entire war.

This success is all the more remarkable given how many times Putin’s bluff has been called. He began the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 by issuing thinly-veiled threats indicating that any Western attempts to interfere would be met by a nuclear response. When Western leaders ignored this and proceeded to arm Kyiv, Putin did nothing.

In September 2022, as he prepared to illegally annex four partially occupied regions of Ukraine, Putin famously announced his readiness to use nuclear weapons to defend his Ukrainian conquests. “I’m not bluffing,” he declared. When Ukraine completely disregarded this bluster and proceeded to liberate the strategically vital southern city of Kherson days later, Putin did not reach for his nuclear button. On the contrary, he ordered his defeated army to quietly retreat across the Dnipro river.

The Kremlin’s many bloodcurdling threats regarding the sanctity of Russian-occupied Crimea have proved similarly hollow. Since 2022, Moscow has sought to position the occupied Ukrainian peninsula as being beyond the boundaries of the current war. This has not prevented Ukraine from sinking or damaging around one-third of the entire Russian Black Sea Fleet, which has traditionally been based in Crimea. Putin has responded to this very personal humiliation in typically understated fashion by withdrawing the rest of his warships to the safety of Russia.

Remarkably, Putin even failed to react when Ukraine crossed the reddest of all red lines and invaded Russia itself in August 2024. Rather than declaring World War III or attempting to rally his compatriots against the foreign invader, Putin actively sought to downplay the significance of Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk region.

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The Russian Foreign Ministry’s recent warnings regarding the potential delivery of German missiles to Ukraine are eerily similar to the empty threats made by Putin last September as the US weighed up the possibility of allowing Ukraine to conduct long-range strikes inside Russia using American weapons. At the time, Putin stated that any lifting of restrictions would mean that Russia was “at war” with NATO. However, when the US then duly granted Ukraine permission to begin attacking Russian targets, there was no discernible change in Putin’s stance.

Russia’s saber-rattling over Taurus missiles represents an important early test for Germany’s next leader. As Chancellor, Merz will inherit a major war on Europe’s eastern frontier that is now in its fourth year and could potentially expand further into the heart of the continent. He is also well aware that Europeans can no longer rely on US military support, as they have done for generations.

Germany is the obvious candidate to lead Europe’s rearmament, but Merz must first demonstrate that he has the political will to match his country’s undoubted industrial capabilities. US President Joe Biden consistently sought to avoid escalation with Russia, while his successor Donald Trump seems more interested in building bridges with Vladimir Putin than containing the Kremlin. If Merz wants to lead the Western resistance to Putin’s imperial agenda, he can begin by rejecting Russia’s threats and delivering Taurus missiles to Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The Ukrainian army is now Europe’s most credible security guarantee

Pavlo Verkhniatskyi — Thu, 17 Apr 2025 21:22:52 +0000

Ever since the first months of Russia’s full-scale invasion in spring 2022, Kyiv has played host to a steady stream of visiting European officials eager to demonstrate their support for Ukraine. With the war now in its fourth year, there are growing signs that this relationship is evolving and becoming more balanced. While Kyiv continues to rely on European aid, it is increasingly clear that Ukraine also has much to offer and can play a major part in the future security of Europe.

Following his return to the White House in January, US President Donald Trump has initiated a dramatic shift in United States foreign policy that has left many in Europe unsure of the transatlantic alliance and keen to ramp up their own defense capabilities. This geopolitical instability is also encouraging European policymakers to rethink Ukraine’s role in the defense of the continent. With unparalleled combat experience and proven ability to scale up arms production at relatively low cost, Ukraine is in many ways the ideal partner for European countries as they confront the twin challenges of an expansionist Russia and an isolationist US.

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Ukraine’s defense industry has grown at a remarkably rapid rate since 2022 and is now capable of meeting approximately 40 percent of the country’s military needs. The segment that has attracted the most international attention so far is drone production, with Ukraine widely recognized as a global leader in drone warfare. It requires a careful approach in order to identify the few true gems from among the hundreds of Ukrainian companies currently producing over a million of drones per year, but the potential for groundbreaking advances in drone technologies is obvious.

In order to make the most of this potential, Ukraine must first safeguard its survival as an independent nation. Looking ahead, a key challenge for the Ukrainian authorities will be creating the kind of business climate that can enable the country’s emerging defense industry to prosper in a postwar environment that is likely to feature declining defense budgets.

At present, many Ukrainian defense sector companies are moving production to locations outside Ukraine due to a combination of factors including export bans and a lack of financing options inside the country. The most elegant solution to this problem is to promote more defense sector partnerships with Ukraine’s European allies.

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During the first few years of Russia’s full-scale invasion, security cooperation between Ukraine and the country’s partners was generally a one-way street, with weapons and ammunition flowing to Kyiv. More recently, a new model has emerged involving Western countries funding production at Ukrainian defense companies. This approach is efficient and strategically sound. It boosts Ukraine militarily and economically, while also taking advantage of the country’s strengths as a cost-effective and innovative arms producer. However, it lacks long-term appeal for Ukraine’s partners.

Establishing joint ventures between Ukrainian and European defense companies may be a more attractive and sustainable format. This would be a financially attractive way of fueling Europe’s rearmament, and would allow participating companies to build on a wide range of potential research and development synergies. Setting up production facilities in wartime Ukraine would clearly involve an element of risk, but this need not necessarily be a deal breaker if sensible security measures are implemented.

The scope for such joint ventures is huge. Indeed, it would make good sense to invest in specialized business and science parks providing the full range of related services and industry expertise. Initially, jointly produced equipment could be fast-tracked to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Further down the line, output could also be exported to partner countries and global markets. The growth of joint ventures would significantly improve Ukraine’s defensive potential and enhance the country’s ability to shield Europe from the Russian threat.

An ambitious European rearmament plan is currently taking shape that could significantly accelerate the integration of Ukraine’s defense industry. For this to happen, a number of regulatory and operational issues must first be resolved in Kyiv, Brussels, and various European capitals. While Ukraine can undoubtedly make a meaningful contribution to European security, the continent’s political complexities are particularly pronounced when it comes to defense budgets and procurement policies. It will require a degree of pragmatism to dismantle bureaucratic hurdles and overcome narrow national interests.

As European leaders adapt to radical shifts in the geopolitical landscape, Kyiv is ideally positioned to help the continent address its most pressing security needs. Ukraine’s army is by far the largest in Europe and has unique experience of modern warfare. It is backed by a domestic arms industry that is growing at a phenomenal rate while benefiting from an innovative startup culture that is transforming the twenty-first century battlefield. With sufficient international funding and technological cooperation, the Ukrainian defense sector can serve as a cornerstone of Europe’s security architecture for decades to come.

Pavlo Verkhniatskyi is managing partner of COSA, co-founder of Fincord-Polytech Science Park, and advisor to the Defense Group at the Ukraine Facility Platform.

US funding cuts create openings for Russian disinformation in Ukraine

Muhammad Tahir — Tue, 15 Apr 2025 21:14:02 +0000

Cut the cameras. Slash the salaries. Cancel the investigations. That’s the reality facing Ukraine’s independent media, which serves as a vital firewall against Kremlin disinformation, as the US freezes nearly all support.

Since January 2025, the United States has quietly suspended 90 percent of its development funding for Ukraine, including the grants that kept most of the country’s independent newsrooms alive. Whether channeled directly through USAID or via partners, that funding has disappeared. The move to cut financial support comes as Moscow is intensifying its disinformation efforts.

In Mykolaiv, a strategic port city in Ukraine’s south, NikVesti is on the brink. With 4.5 million visits in 2024, it has been a cornerstone of independent local wartime reporting. Now, after losing a fifth of its budget through the loss of US funding, the newsroom is running on fumes. “We’re burning through our final reserves,” co-founder Oleh Dereniuha commented. “If funding doesn’t return, it will be difficult to make it past April.”

Further south in Kherson, Vgoru, one of only three independent outlets still operating in the region, has lost 80% of its US funding. Freelancers are gone and investigative projects have been shelved. “No one else is reporting from here,” said editor Ilona Korotitsyna. “Without us, they’ll only hear Russia.”

In Sumy, a northeastern Ukrainian city facing relentless Russian bombardment from across the nearby border, independent outlet Cykr is barely hanging on. “Sixty percent of our budget came from USAID,” said editor Dmytro Tyschenko. The site has enough funding to last a month. “After that,” he warned, “we’re bracing for a flood of unchecked Russian propaganda to fill the vacuum.”

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Since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in 2022, the US has delivered more than $37 billion in development aid to Ukraine. With the domestic Ukrainian media market in a state of wartime collapse, the vast majority of outlets have survived almost entirely on international grants, most of them from the US.

Outlets like NikVesti, Vgoru, and Cykr are among the 90 percent of independent Ukrainian media that relied on this funding to report the facts under extraordinary conditions of bombardment, blackouts, and occupation. Beyond exposing Russian disinformation, journalists working for these outlets have investigated corruption, documented Russian strikes and their aftermath, and held the Ukrainian authorities to account, often at considerable personal risk.

There are now mounting concerns that Russia will seek to exploit emerging gaps in Ukraine’s information space created by US funding cuts. With far fewer credible sources able to report on local news stories across Ukraine, Kremlin disinformation will become much harder to counter.

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A recent disinformation operation in the Sumy region offered a glimpse of the kinds of tactics Moscow is likely to employ. In early April, Russian-linked Telegram channels began promoting fake messaging attributed to the Sumy City Council’s Health Department claiming that a mysterious disease had broken out among Ukrainian soldiers. They warned civilians to avoid contact with troops returning from the front.

This is a typical Russian disinformation operation, with fake news wrapped in official-looking packaging and seeded online in order to sow panic. The goal isn’t just to mislead, however. Russia also aims to undermine faith in the information space altogether. And with credible independent Ukrainian media outlets unable to operate, that task becomes significantly easier.

Allowing Ukraine’s independent media to fall silent in the middle of a war would have serious strategic consequences. Without independent journalism, Ukraine not only loses its first line of defense against Russian disinformation. It also loses the transparency and accountability that are vital for the future of the country’s democracy.

The Ukrainian outlets and journalists hit by recent US funding cuts are not just waiting for a bailout. They are launching membership programs, pitching donors, trimming operations, and testing new formats. Some are turning to diaspora networks. Others are banking on European funding. So far, these efforts are proving slow and insufficient.

“We’re doing everything we can. In a region where the local business market is nonexistent, we’re reaching out to European partners, applying for every grant we can find,” said Vgoru’s Korotitsyna. “But EU funding is slow, and the competition is fierce. We need support now, not six months down the line, or we won’t be around to receive it.”

Muhammad Tahir is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former journalist with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. He has reported extensively across the CIS, South Asia, and the Middle East.

Russian missile strikes on Ukrainian civilians cast shadow over peace talks

Mercedes Sapuppo — Tue, 15 Apr 2025 20:36:03 +0000

As Ukrainians made their way to church on the morning of April 13 to attend Palm Sunday services, two Russian ballistic missiles struck the city center in Sumy, killing at least 35 people and wounding more than 100. This Palm Sunday bombardment was the deadliest Russian attack so far this year. It was part of an escalating recent trend of Russian airstrikes targeting Ukrainian civilians that is casting doubt over the viability of US-led peace talks initiated by President Trump.

The attack in Sumy came just over a week after a similarly devastating strike on a residential district in the southern Ukrainian city of Kryvyi Rih that killed 19 people including nine children. The missile struck close to a playground in the early evening when the area was busy with children and families. According to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the attack was “the deadliest single strike harming children which the Office has verified since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022.”

The Russian missile strikes on Kryvyi Rih and Sumy share a number of characteristics. Both attacks targeted civilian areas of major Ukrainian cities and took place at times when large numbers of people were likely to be present. Both reportedly involved the use of cluster ammunition designed to maximize casualties. “The use of an explosive weapon with wide area effects by the Russian Federation in a densely populated area, and without any apparent military presence, demonstrates a reckless disregard for civilian life,” commented UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk following the Kryvyi Rih attack.

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In addition to these ballistic missile strikes on heavily populated civilian areas, Russia has also recently escalated drone attacks across Ukraine. In the month following the first meeting between Kremlin and White House officials in Saudi Arabia, the number of Russian drones targeting Ukraine surged by more than 50 percent. Analysis by Britain’s Telegraph newspaper found that Russia launched an average of 101 drones per day in the period prior to the initial February talks in Riyadh, compared to 154 afterward.

Russia’s increased bombardment of Ukraine and deadly missile attacks on Ukrainian cities are casting a long shadow over the Trump administration’s efforts to broker a peace deal and end the largest European invasion since World War II. Many view Russia’s actions as an indirect but unmistakable snub to Trump’s peacemaker efforts. Others have also suggested that Kryvyi Rih may have been selected as a target due to the city’s status as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s hometown, in order to send a chilling message of Russian impunity and underline Ukraine’s vulnerability to further such attacks.

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Trump has so far refused to criticize Russia directly for the recent spate of bombing attacks that have left dozens of Ukrainian civilians dead. Instead, he somehow concluded that the recent Palm Sunday strike in Sumy may have been a “mistake.”

Elsewhere in the US and across Europe, there has been widespread condemnation. “Putin’s Russia keeps bombing cities and murdering citizens. It is their strategy to wear down Ukraine. We shouldn’t agree to reward these war crimes with any Ukraine territory,” commented GOP Representative Don Bacon. Fellow Republican Michael McCaul said the Palm Sunday attack was “beyond the pale” and served as further confirmation that Russia has no intention of ending the war. “While Ukraine has accepted President Trump’s ceasefire proposal, Putin continues to show he is more interested in bloodshed than in peace,” stated McCaul.

Across the Atlantic, French President Emmanuel Macron responded to the Palm Sunday attack by emphasizing the “blatant disregard for human lives, international law, and the diplomatic efforts of President Trump.” Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni echoed Macron, condemning “this unacceptable violence, which goes against all real engagement in favor of peace.” British Prime Minister Keir Starmer slammed Russia’s “horrific attacks” and noted that while Zelenskyy had shown his commitment to peace by backing an unconditional ceasefire, “Putin must now also agree to a full and immediate ceasefire without conditions.”

Such calls are unlikely to resonate in Moscow unless the entire US approach to the peace process changes significantly. During the first few months of Trump’s peace initiative, the US has offered Russia a series of concessions, for instance the Black Sea ceasefire proposal, while very publicly applying pressure to Ukraine. So far, this appears to have hardened Putin’s conviction that he can ultimately outlast the West in Ukraine. With existing US aid commitments to Ukraine set to run out in the coming months and no indication that the Trump administration will sanction further support, it is easy to understand why Putin is in no hurry to seek peace.

While Trump remains reluctant to condemn Putin, there are indications that he may finally be growing tired of the Kremlin dictator’s stalling tactics and will soon run out of patience. Trump has recently said he is “very angry” and “pissed off” with Putin over the lack of progress toward peace, and has called on him to “get moving” toward a ceasefire agreement. If Trump is serious about getting Putin’s attention, he will need to follow through on earlier threats and increase the economic pressure on Russia via sanctions and tariffs measures against Putin’s energy industry. Anything less will be interpreted by the Kremlin as a tacit green light to continue escalating attacks on Ukraine’s civilian population as Putin seeks to break the country’s resistance.

Mercedes Sapuppo is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Weakened by Israel, Hezbollah turns to spin games to hold support

David Daoud — Tue, 15 Apr 2025 13:56:55 +0000

In the aftermath of the collapse of the Israel-Hamas cease-fire in Gaza, fears of renewed fighting to Israel’s north sparked after it came under anonymous rocket fire from south Lebanon. Hezbollah, the Iran-backed militants in Lebanon, denied involvement and has neither restarted its attacks on Israel nor is it threatening to do so. In a far cry from the group’s late 2023 bellicosity, Hezbollah’s condemnation of Israel’s renewed “aggression” on the Gaza Strip implored the “United Nations, Security Council, and human rights organizations” to halt the renewed fighting through diplomatic and popular pressure.

The group’s more cautious posturing demonstrates Hezbollah knows it’s in no condition to fight.

This reality presents Hezbollah with a dilemma. Meaningfully responding to either Israel’s renewed military effort in Gaza or its continued attacks in Lebanon would invite war upon Lebanon again, mooting its quest for reconstruction aid and risking heightened Lebanese, and more critically Shia, dissatisfaction. But acquiescence, though it may currently be the more prudent choice for the group, also carries the risk of exposing its weakness and inability to confront the Israelis. This, too, risks siphoning Shia support.

To navigate this dilemma, Hezbollah is falling back on propaganda organs to spin its difficult situation positively.

Impact of war with Israel

During the year-long war, Israel decimated large parts of the group’s arsenal and wiped out its best military commanders and top political leadership. Both Bashar al-Assad’s downfall in Syria and US President Donald Trump’s rise in Washington have severely restricted Hezbollah’s paths to regeneration. Meanwhile, within Lebanon, the group must now contend with a population and politicians restive from an unnecessary war and calling for Hezbollah’s disarmament—rumblings that, if they spread into its Shia base, could threaten the group’s demise.

Squeezed as it is, Hezbollah is not currently aiming to rebuild enough strength to fight Israel nor to dominate Lebanon outright. Instead, the group is focused on the more achievable goal of navigating its current—largely self-imposed—predicament and surviving. Retaining its massive support among Lebanese Shias will prove critical to this objective, deterring any potential hostile moves by Hezbollah’s political opponents or the Lebanese government.

But retaining its supporters will depend on Hezbollah securing the reconstruction of the Shia community’s homes and properties destroyed in the recent war with Israel. The group will also need to demonstrate to its base that it maintains the ability to deter Israel and defeat it in battle—an image Hezbollah cultivated over decades and which acts as the basis of much of its popular support.

While both tasks will pose challenges for the group, the latter will be more difficult. Back in November, the Israelis forced Hezbollah to abandon its promise to continue attacking Israel until a cease-fire was achieved in the Gaza Strip, just two months after Hezbollah’s late Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah had directly challenged Jerusalem to try to make his group back down. Hezbollah’s inaction as the fighting resumes in the Palestinian enclave undoubtedly highlights this capitulation—especially coupled with the group’s passivity while Israel’s air force continues to regularly target Hezbollah assets and kill its operatives and commanders with impunity throughout Lebanon.

Spinning the narrative: Hezobllah’s save-face

Hezbollah’s face-saving narrative rests, first and foremost, in its claim of victory over Israel in the recent war. This is based on three assertions.

The first assertion seeks to demonstrate that Hezbollah had to initiate attacks against Israel on October 8, 2023. The group thus claims it was preempting an imminent and unprovoked Israeli invasion of Lebanon. At once, this exonerates Hezbollah from provoking an unnecessary war with the Israelis over a foreign conflict amid near-total Lebanese economic collapse and paints Israel as the aggressor. Having thus positioned itself once again as Lebanon’s defender, the group’s narrative then heavily exaggerates both the odds confronting Hezbollah and Israel’s war goals—claiming the Israelis, with unlimited US and European backing, sought to utterly destroy Hezbollah, reach Beirut, and dominate Lebanon. Israel’s failure to achieve those goals is then taken as proof of the group’s success.

From there, Hezbollah claims its decision to agree to a unilateral cease-fire came “from a position of strength,” in Secretary-General Naim Qassem’s words—a concession to the requests of the Lebanese state, to spare the Lebanese people further suffering at the hands of the “murderous” Israelis, rather than caving to Israel’s military pressure. Qassem has thus repeatedly stressed that it was only natural for Hezbollah to accept the November 27, 2024, Lebanon-Israel cease-fire deal because it never sought to start a war.

“We opened a support front,” he said in a recent interview, “but support fronts don’t lead to war . . . that was an Israeli decision,” inverting the role of aggressor and victim.

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While that portion of Hezbollah’s narrative is meant to neatly package past events, the group has also developed an elaborate explanation for its persistent hold of fire despite continued Israeli operations. On Lebanon, the group insists it is motivated by the same sense of national responsibility that led it to accept the cease-fire deal, and not weakness. National responsibility, Hezbollah’s officials claim, now demands the group give diplomacy and the Lebanese State the chance to deal with the Israeli threat—while caveating with threats that its patience is not infinite.

As its inaction relates to the Palestinians, Hezbollah’s narrative has endlessly emphasized the group’s sacrifices to date on behalf of the “resistance” and the people in Gaza. During and after the war, the group stressed that its south Lebanon support front had bogged the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) down, slowing its advance in the Gaza Strip and blunting the worst impact of its war effort—even as Hezbollah somewhat contradictorily insisted that Israel was exterminating Gaza’s population.

In any case, Hezbollah insisted that agreeing to the November 27, 2024 cease-fire deal only meant the group would—in Qassem’s words—continue to “support Palestine in different forms” rather than stop altogether. Hezbollah did this in past years by arming and training militant groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad operating inside Israel to carry out their own attacks or by facilitating operations against the Israelis by the Lebanon-based franchises of these groups. This allowed Hezbollah to maintain pressure on Israel, bleed out the IDF, and demonstrate its continued commitment to the Palestinian cause, while also maintaining enough plausible deniability to avoid proportionate Israeli retribution.

But now Hezbollah’s direct link to Palestinian groups in Israel has been cut off both by Assad’s downfall in Syria and the IDF’s continued occupation of five strategic points in south Lebanon. Meanwhile, unless diplomatic pressure can halt their strikes in Lebanon, the Israelis are set on aggressively enforcing new rules of engagement with Hezbollah that would deprive the group of its old ability to hide behind anonymous actors or third parties. In recent weeks alone, Israel responded forcefully to anonymous rocket fire from Hezbollah-controlled areas of south Lebanon and assassinated high-ranking Hezbollah commander Hassan Ali Badeer in Beirut on claims he helped Hamas plan a mass-casualty attack against Israelis abroad.

Despite these odds, Hezbollah still possesses the one advantage that has given its narratives traction in the past. The group, after all, is seeking to convince an audience that is half converted, in a broad sense, and half held captive by fear of the organization—rather than the buy-in of skeptics or open adversaries. But it is premature to rule on Hezbollah’s chances of success this time. Facts are, after all, unforgiving by their very nature. This time, the harsh reality—that Israel decisively defeated and critically weakened the group—may be too obvious and overwhelming for Hezbollah’s sophisticated propaganda organs to claim that the “Party of God” has once again emerged victorious.

David Daoud is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, focusing on Hezbollah, Israel, and Lebanon issues. Follow him on X: @DavidADaoud.

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Ukrainian victims of war crimes need new approaches to justice

Nadia Volkova, Eric Witte, Arie Mora — Thu, 10 Apr 2025 20:13:34 +0000

In recent months, international media coverage of Russia’s Ukraine invasion has focused primarily on the Trump administration’s efforts to end the fighting and broker a peace deal. But even as negotiations get tentatively underway, Russia continues to bomb Ukraine’s civilian population on a daily basis. Regular missile and drone attacks represent only a small portion of the crimes Russia stands accused of committing in Ukraine.

So far, efforts to hold the perpetrators legally accountable for more than a decade of crimes dating back to the onset of Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 have proved insufficient. It should now be apparent that Ukraine and the country’s partners need to seek new approaches in order to deliver meaningful justice to victims and end the cycle of Russian impunity.

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Ukraine’s domestic legal system has been overwhelmed by the scale and the gravity of the war crimes allegations against Russia. For example, since the onset of the full-scale invasion in 2022, more than 156,000 investigations into potential war crimes have been opened. As of March 2025, only around 150 verdicts had been reached, mostly in absentia.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague has taken some bold steps to help secure justice for Ukraine, most notably charging Russian President Vladimir Putin for his involvement in the mass abduction of Ukrainian children. While this is certainly welcome, the ICC can only be expected to handle a small number of cases involving the most senior Russian officials.

Meanwhile, recent US cuts to international assistance threaten to impact existing efforts to hold Russia responsible for alleged war crimes in Ukraine. This has underlined the need to explore alternative formats that can help Kyiv overcome existing gaps in capacity-building.

One possibility would be to broaden the mandate of a proposed special tribunal to prosecute Russia’s leadership for the crime of aggression. Ukraine and its partners recently agreed to establish a tribunal in hybrid format with international and domestic components operating under the auspices of the Council of Europe.

While there is significant international support for efforts to put Russia’s military and political leaders on trial for the crime of aggression, the potentially political nature of this charge has raised some concerns. Expanding the mandate of a future tribunal to include other serious crimes could help garner more support and address any reservations regarding political legitimacy.

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Another possibility would be to expand international partnerships within Ukraine’s domestic legal system to enhance its ability to address alleged Russian war crimes. This hybrid approach would build on existing practice that has seen a number of countries providing investigators, prosecutors, forensic specialists, and other experts in recent years.

Foreign investigators and prosecutors could be formally inserted into specialized units at the investigative and prosecutorial level to work alongside their Ukrainian colleagues. This would significantly increase capacity, while also potentially improving the quality of investigative efforts. Further down the line, it may prove possible to introduce foreign judges in a similar manner.

This approach could draw on past experience and current international efforts, including those related to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Central African Republic (CAR). If tailored to meet the specific requirements of the Ukrainian justice system, this could serve as an improvement over the well-meaning but somewhat scattershot efforts of Ukraine’s partners to date.

Some skeptics have suggested that any new justice mechanisms for Ukraine would compete with the ICC in terms of jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Advocates counter that new mechanisms could in fact coexist with the ICC, complementing rather duplicating the work being done in The Hague.

ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan has voiced support for the work of the CAR Special Criminal Court and recently endorsed the idea of a hybrid mechanism for the Democratic Republic of Congo. If applied effectively, this approach could make it possible for Ukraine to prosecute the kind of mid-level perpetrators who are beyond the mandate of the ICC.

Adopting new approaches to the issue of accountability for alleged war crimes committed during the Russian invasion of Ukraine can bring hope for justice and lay the foundations for a sustainable peace. A strengthened Ukrainian justice system could also play an important role in the country’s postwar progress on the path toward EU membership and further Western integration.

Nadia Volkova is the founder and head of the Ukrainian Legal Advisory Group (ULAG). Eric Witte is an independent international justice consultant who has worked at the International Criminal Court and Special Court for Sierra Leone. Arie Mora is an advocacy manager at the Ukrainian Legal Advisory Group (ULAG).

Clearly, the cost of long wars is extraordinarily high. In every respect, long wars should be an unwelcome result, not an outcome to be acquiesced. The Army especially cannot afford to mischaracterize the inevitability of long war. Acceptance of protraction as an inevitability is to surrender the United States’ best way to win militarily against China, which is to fight and win the first battle of any war. Appearing to accept that the United States will not win the first battle in a US-China war could also fatally undermine deterrence by signaling a lack of confidence in US capabilities. Winning in a future contest and strengthening deterrence means making decisions now: real choices must be made regarding forward posture, organizational structure, training, and modernization to create a battlefield system that leverages US advantages.

Of course, wars become long when they aren’t concluded promptly. That seemingly tautological outcome is often due to a failure to identify war objectives and to align warfighting means properly. Or maybe, as game theory suggests, long wars are caused by information asymmetries. Whatever the reason, long wars are a recurring feature of the international state system, and not one to encourage. There isn’t space in this short essay to fully parse “long” war from “total” war, but it is a fair assumption in an era of all-domain contests that the longer a war protracts, the more total it will become, and the more awful the butcher’s bill. In every respect, the longer the war the more it becomes a widening conflagration and a losing hand for the United States. The present dalliance with protraction can only lead to expenses the United States cannot afford, and strategic ends it cannot determine. Because the United States doesn’t have many good ways to escape long wars once they become, well, long, the best approach is to plan and resource its armed forces to win at the onset of conflict.

Today neither the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) nor the United States is seeking the elimination of the other party. Hence, today’s immediate war-waging problem is not one of preparing for an existential fight between the United States and China. Whether the flashpoint is the South China Sea, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, or Taiwan, the military problem to solve is not how to eliminate China as a great power but to defeat its armed forces. In other words, the challenge is how to fight and win a regional, limited war against a nuclear-armed great power—that is, a short war. In the Pacific, such a war with China is the kind the United States is most likely to confront, and one that it can win.

There is no doubt that the historical record of war is not encouraging. In the Western military tradition, even the names of long-ago conflicts are suggestive of drawn-out carnage. The details of the Hundred Years’ War (1337–1453) between England and France and the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1634), which caused prolonged bloodshed between most of the powers of Europe, might be distant cultural memories, but their costs and consequences were felt for centuries thereafter.

Closer to home, the United States’ own military history features winning decisive battles, but America’s record of winning at the onset of conflict is inconsistent. In the Asia-Pacific theater, the US Army’s comprehensive defeat after Pearl Harbor and through the first half of 1942 as American forces were swept out of the Philippines is perhaps the twentieth century’s most noteworthy example of the costs of unpreparedness.

Of course, the United States’ adversaries face the same challenge regarding first battles. The Japanese failed to compel the United States in World War II despite their early victories. For instance, they won the battle of Pearl Harbor but not as decisively as they could have—as Admiral Chester Nimitz himself pointed out. The timing of the attack meant that the US carrier fleet escaped unscathed, while the narrowly focused and short raid also failed to destroy the submarine base and the vast stockpiles of fuel at Pearl Harbor. Carriers, submarines, and fuel proved critical to enabling the US counteroffensive in the months and years that followed. They attacked without enough force to deliver an irrevocable battlefield outcome. The same became true on the Korean Peninsula. The US Army’s performance in June 1950 in the form of Task Force Smith was a tragic defeat, yet North Korea’s invasion ultimately failed. Again, the opening blow was insufficient and long war ensued. All of which is to say that winning early is not a panacea. But readying armed forces to win early, and decisively, is still better than submitting to attritional wars of protraction.

The Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) is deserving of further consideration as a template for future conflict in the Pacific. While that war resulted in large numbers of casualties and demanded mass mobilization by each side to equip their armed forces, it also featured sustained campaigns of maneuver and military initiative, especially by Japan on both land and sea that led to the war’s termination in nineteen months. Longish wars admittedly happen frequently, but it is also true that decisive battles occur regularly. The fact remains that being ready to wage a decisive first battle is the best outcome.

Against China specifically, a short, regional, and limited war is how US armed forces avoid nuclear escalation and global, all-domain conflict that can be enormously damaging to each nation’s key infrastructure. It is in such damage to state cyber, space, and communication assets that real escalatory risk resides. Thus, the logic of each side’s objectives converges on a short, sharp war as the best way to settle a conflict if deterrence fails.

An opening campaign can be won by maneuver on and from the ground, enabled by on-time and on-target fires. Maneuver, which is simply the requirement to seize and hold ground, is the only way to obtain the battlefield ends that can lead to diplomacy and, ultimately, a return to civil order. The United States was swept out of the Pacific in 1942 because its garrisons could not maneuver and lacked strike capabilities that could destroy, or at least damage, invading Japanese forces. Even its largest concentration of forces in the Philippines lacked the depth to evict the Japanese. The result was three more years of savage killing and serious destruction to the Japanese homeland before the war ended. This is not the kind of future war the United States want to fight. While its adversaries in the Pacific have changed, the topography and the populations concentrated near and on mainland Asia remain. If war in the Pacific comes, this is where it will be waged.

It is important to highlight that it has become conventional wisdom in US policy and strategy circles that a future war in the Pacific will be primarily a naval and air conflict. That has not been the case historically, as demonstrated by the Boxer Rebellion, Philippine Insurrection, World War II (in which more than twenty US divisions deployed), Korean War, and Vietnam War. Nor will it be so in a future war. Ground forces in the Pacific create operational advantage by influencing or controlling a series of sustained and protected positions, as ground forces are more difficult to target than, for example, large naval surface combatants. This undermines the adversary’s decision space and morale. US Army forces can pursue positions of advantage primarily through offense, but positional advantage applies to both offense and defense. In terms of defense, positional advantage allows US land forces to defend key terrain over large areas. Against a peer adversary, mastery of positional advantage is essential.

Positions of advantage can be physical or non-physical. Physical or geographic positions of advantage in the Indo-Pacific include maritime chokepoints (such as the Sunda and Lombok straits), major political-economic centers (such as Seoul; Taipei; and Makati, Philippines), and major transportation hubs (such as Shinjuku City, Tokyo; and Makassar, Indonesia). Non-physical positions of advantage might include adversary leadership’s confidence in its information systems or the connectedness a population feels with its defense forces.

From these positions, Army forces provide the collection, command and control, protection, and sustainment to enable operational endurance. This is critical to maneuvering and attacking from multiple ranges and directions against the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which benefits from shorter lines of operation. When Army forces are integrated with the Joint Force, the PLA (or any adversary) will lose both time and space, which denies the enemy’s maneuver and also protects populations, land resources, and borders.

Likewise, land-based effects into other domains provide a suite of tools to integrate into the Joint Force’s kill chains from the onset of conflict. This includes short-, medium-, and long-range precision fires to strike adversary formations across the depth of the battlefield. Army forces provide tailorable, theater-level command posts for integrating and synchronizing joint and combined military actions across the battle space. A war in the Pacific cannot be conceived, nor will it be waged, in terms of a straight line penciled on a map from Hawaii to any part of the Pacific, whether that be North Korea, Taiwan, or the South China Sea.

The United States must train, equip, and posture both the Army and Joint Forces as an operational system that enables ground-gaining fires and maneuver. The PLA’s leadership certainly understands this. Mao Zedong spoke and wrote extensively about protracted war. In the years following Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931, Mao developed an extensive theory about China’s fight to expel Japan. It is worth noting that he considered a protracted conflict inevitable because of the disparities in China’s and Japan’s war-waging capabilities at the onset of the conflict. But the war-winning phase of the conflict was one of “quick-decision offensive warfare” characterized by “mobile warfare.” He recognized the key feature of how a war is won is the maneuver of friendly forces to compel an adversary so that it has no other choice, or only worse choices, and must yield to avoid obliteration.

Winning early and winning on land is the responsibility of the US Army, and it is the Army that must lead the Joint Force by building and sustaining a first-win operational warfighting system. It is time for Army leaders to make needed decisions. The key components of winning early from the land include the following:

Forward access and presence: The warfighting-campaigning-wargaming approach being undertaken by US Army Pacific (USARPAC) to build habitual land-power access and combined-arms proficiency is a template that is working. A robust experimentation program of testing and evaluation of both concepts and technologies adopted by the entire Army will improve interoperability with partners and allow the United States to expose gaps in its capabilities that it can then solve.
Highly trained forces: There is no substitute for tactical units that are ready to fight. Individual soldier skills and expert collective task performance are bedrocks of small-unit readiness. The US Army excels at this already. But integrating all arms both operationally and tactically remains problematic and merits further organizational solutions. More Army units should be trained in the Pacific theater under combat-like conditions, including with US Joint Forces as well as partner armies they will fight alongside.
Focused, dynamic sustainment: The Army must possess all kinds of supply in forward-stationed packages that can be distributed in greater quantities and more channels than they are today. Army Prepositioned Stocks must be thoroughly reformed. They must be tailored to the force packages that the Army and Joint Forces plan to deploy in the opening days of a conflict. Redundant and resilient ways and means of medical and personnel support must likewise be built and rehearsed.
Strategic deployment: Rapid deployment of land forces over long distances is remarkably challenging, and the throughput of Army forces that can move from home station is not sufficient today. It is therefore imperative that Mobilization Force Generation Installations be made much more ready. Present deployment timelines are too long, and the reserve components are not sufficiently aligned to overseas contingency missions. It should be a principle that every Army organization in a war plan must be able to deploy to its assigned position in a forward theater within six months of receiving its order. Any Army unit that cannot get out the door in that time frame should be considered for restructuring, assignment to a different Army component, or elimination from the force structure.
All-range fires convergence: The Army’s Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs) should become the template for future Army Corps and divisional designs. The MDTFs should no longer be viewed as experiments foremost. Instead, they point to how Multi-Domain Operations, the Army’s new doctrine, will be executed. Yet the Army is reluctant to change its structure. It must do so and do it aggressively and comprehensively.
Globally integrated plans: Major operational war plans against China and other state actors must be integrated across Combatant Commands (COCOMs) and services from inception. In 2018–2019, the Joint Staff led such planning, but indifference from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and COCOMs caused the plans to be abandoned. The Department of Defense’s Unified Command Plan leads to a regionally focused department whose subordinate echelons resist globally integrated US capabilities. Short of congressionally supported COCOM reform, globally integrated plans are the only way to fight and win.
Divesting: The Army’s Mobile Protected Firepower system (M10 Booker) is a head-scratcher. The Army’s attempt to brand it as a tank for the infantry is a clumsy attempt to obfuscate the fact that the Service is fielding an unneeded weapon. In real terms, the M10 is simply a “light” tank that is not light and sub-optimizes both protection and firepower. There is no requirement for a forty-plus-ton tank in any significant operational plan that the long-serving Abrams cannot perform. The Booker is simply an unnecessary and expensive platform. The Army must make choices to save both people and dollars; this is an easy trade. Eliminating outmoded unmanned aerial systems (UAS) is another obvious opportunity to harvest savings from legacy force structure.

It is imperative that military planners and decision-makers keep their eyes on building battlefield warfighting systems that can fight and win a short war, especially on the land, to achieve national policy ends in the shortest time possible. Fighting and winning a short war saves both lives and treasure. An Army and a Joint Force that are unready to fight and win tonight make a self-imposed long war nearly a fait accompli. Planners should not accept that only surrender or protracted war are the United States’ fate in the Pacific or anywhere else. They should build forward-postured, trained, ready, rehearsed, equipped, and dynamically sustained forces as the best way to win and deter at the lowest cost. Doing so is not easy, but the cost of failing to do so will be much higher. Ultimately, the best way to deter the start of what could become a long war could be to visibly improve the ability to fight a short one.

About the author

Major General Bradley Gericke, US Army (ret.), is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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Putin’s Arctic ambitions: Russia eyes natural resources and shipping routes

Bohdan Ustymenko — Wed, 09 Apr 2025 14:24:55 +0000

US President Donald Trump’s desire to acquire Greenland from Denmark has recently helped to highlight the growing geopolitical importance of the Arctic region in international affairs. As global temperatures rise and polar icecaps melt, increased access to Arctic resources and trade routes look set to make the region and major focus of international competition in the coming decades.

Since the Trump White House and the Kremlin began negotiations in February 2025 to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine, potential cooperation between the United States and Russia in the Arctic has been high on the agenda. However, the US will face stiff competition from China in this arena, with Arctic initiatives occupying an important place at the heart of the strengthening strategic relationship between Beijing and Moscow.

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Maritime strategy has long played a significant role in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s thinking as he works to expand Moscow’s influence on the international stage. In August 2024, Putin ordered the establishment of a Russian maritime collegium headed by his close personal ally and advisor Nikolai Patrushev, who formerly led Russia’s FSB security service and the country’s National Security Council.

The recent creation of a maritime collegium comes at a time when Russia is accused of engaging in a wide range of hostile naval acts including the sabotage of undersea cables in the Baltic Sea along with surveillance activities off the coast of Britain and other NATO member states. Unsurprisingly, one of the stated goals of the new collegium is to help secure Russia’s national interests in the Arctic.

Russia’s Arctic ambitions are similarly evident in the country’s current maritime doctrine. Russian control over the Northern Sea Route, which runs through Arctic waters along Russia’s northern coast and serves as the shortest shipping route between Europe and the Pacific, is vital for the Kremlin’s plans. With this in mind, Putin is currently prioritizing an enlarged and modernized military presence in the Arctic region including enhanced naval capabilities.

Moscow sees the Northern Sea Route as part of Russia’s national transport infrastructure and has sought to control access for shipping from other nations. This is particularly controversial as the Northern Sea Route covers a vast area that is expected to become increasingly navigable in the coming years due to changing environmental conditions. Some of the areas currently claimed by the Kremlin are situated well beyond the territorial waters of the Russian Federation.

Critics have argued that Russia’s efforts to restrict access to the Northern Sea Route directly violate the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, while Russia is a signatory of the convention and ratified its commitments to UNCLOS in 1997, Kremlin officials say the terms are not applicable to Russia’s maritime claims in the Arctic region.

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