July 1 will mark a dozen years since Croatia joined the the European Union (EU), the most recent country to do so. In the years after Croatia’s accession, the bloc’s eastern enlargement process stalled almost entirely. The EU’s enthusiasm for admitting new members waned, driven by rising anti-EU sentiment within member states and fears that further expansion could strain the bloc’s already burdened consensus-based decision-making. Meanwhile, democratic backsliding and disputes between candidate countries further undermined their cases for accession.

Then in 2022, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine revived the geopolitical imperative for enlargement in Brussels by highlighting Europe’s vulnerability to “gray zones.” Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia swiftly advanced along their accession paths, and hopes were somewhat revived in the six countries of the Western Balkans.

While Montenegro is the most advanced in accession negotiations today, Albania is also capitalizing on this new enlargement momentum. On May 11, Albania held parliamentary elections in which the Socialist Party, led by Prime Minister Edi Rama, won its fourth consecutive mandate, promising EU membership by 2030. After gaining EU candidate status in 2013 and waiting over a decade for the next formal step, Albania and the EU have been on an unprecedented roll since October 2024. Over the span of several months, the EU opened four clusters of negotiation chapters with Albania—covering twenty-four out of thirty-three chapters—and may open the remaining ones by the end of June. The opening of chapters signals that Albania has met initial EU benchmarks in those policy areas and will now negotiate to close the chapters—which aim to align Albanian laws, institutions, and practices with EU law.

The prevailing narrative among EU leaders, including European Council President António Costa, is that Albania and Montenegro are now leading the race to become the EU’s next member states. Both Albanian and EU officials have set 2027 as the target year to conclude the technical accession talks, paving the way for a membership vote. In May, that ambitious goal received a boost from French President Emmanuel Macron—once a skeptic of enlargement—who called it “realistic” during a visit to Tirana.  

Albania is moving fast, but will face headwinds

Several factors explain why Albania and Montenegro are pulling ahead of everyone else. To begin with, both are NATO members and—unlike Russia-friendly Serbia—are fully aligned with the EU’s Common and Foreign Security Policy. Albania, in particular, is seen as a reliable pro-Western security anchor in a volatile region where ethnic Albanians dominate in neighboring Kosovo and are a politically significant bloc in NATO members North Macedonia and Montenegro. Unlike Kosovo, which remains unrecognized by five EU member states, and North Macedonia, which is blocked by Bulgaria over historical disputes, Albania faces no such bilateral hurdles to its accession path from EU members—aside from intermittent tensions with neighboring Greece over ethnic Greek property rights and maritime borders.

Yet perhaps the main driver of Albania’s recent progress has been its sweeping EU- and US-sponsored reforms in the justice sector. Over nearly a decade, Albania has overhauled its judicial institutions and established new bodies, such as the Special Structure Against Corruption and Organised Crime (SPAK). While corruption remains high, the reformed institutions have shaken the culture of impunity that has plagued the country since the fall of communism. High-profile indictments—ranging from former presidents and prime ministers to powerful mayors—have started to build a credible track record in the fight against corruption and are helping to restore public trust in the rule of law. Yet SPAK’s results need to be sustained, and political commitment to the rule of law will increasingly be tested the deeper that investigations go.

Albania’s democracy also remains fragile and polarized. While the most recent parliamentary elections improved on earlier contests from an administrative standpoint, the political playing field continues to be uneven in favor of the ruling party. Corruption, the stifling effect of politics on media freedoms, the strength of organized crime, and weak administrative capacity—all persistent problems—could hinder the adoption of EU standards. 

Most importantly, the geopolitical mood in European capitals could easily shift away from its current support for enlargement. While Rama has secured strong political backing from major countries such as France and Italy, it is not clear whether it will receive support from the new government in Germany, which is not striking equally enthusiastic tones. The German government’s coalition agreement ties enlargement to necessary internal EU institutional reforms, which means that the EU must first ensure it can operate effectively before allowing other countries in. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and his Christian Democrats seem to favor intermediate integration models—such as having the Western Balkans join the European Economic Area, or layering the EU into concentric circles of states with varying degrees of integration.

What’s more, getting EU governments to support accession is one thing; getting the support of EU members’ parliaments to ratify accession is another. European public opinion remains wary of enlargement in several countries.

Race to the top

The prospect of Albania and Montenegro joining the EU ahead of their neighbors also raises pressing regional questions. With the rapid pace at which Albania is opening negotiation chapters, it has effectively leapfrogged over the region’s largest country, Serbia, whose accession talks have remained frozen since 2021.

For the Western Balkans, EU enlargement has functioned not only as a tool for political transformation but also for peacebuilding. The EU has long pursued a strategy of integrating the region as a group, using accession as leverage to foster regional stability, set up bilateral formats to resolve bilateral disputes—such as the Kosovo–Serbia dialogue on normalization of relations—and promote cooperation through initiatives like the Common Regional Market.

Critics may warn that Albania and Montenegro advancing alone could reinforce Serbia’s narrative of marginalization, fuel anti-EU sentiment, and undermine frameworks for regional cooperation—especially given Serbia’s pivotal role and the size of its population. But the long-standing Serbia-centric approach to enlargement—which posits that the region cannot move forward without accommodating Serbia due to its power and influence over other countries—has not worked. Rather, it has merely emboldened Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić to wield even greater de facto veto power and leverage over regional countries and their EU trajectory, even as he slips deeper into authoritarianism, sustains close ties with Russia, and has helped erode support for EU accession among Serbians.

The EU—and Serbia itself—might be better served by fostering a merit-based “race to the top” that either rewards or fails Montenegro and Albania depending on how they deliver on reforms. Demonstrating that EU enlargement remains a real and attainable goal could create the kind of positive societal pressure the region has desperately needed and could incentivize other EU candidate countries to seize this historic window of opportunity by embracing an agenda of reforms.

Agon Maliqi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is a political and foreign policy analyst from Pristina, Kosovo.  

***

The Western Balkans stands at the nexus of many of Europe’s critical challenges. Some, if not all, of the countries of the region may soon join the European Union and shape the bloc’s ability to become a more effective geopolitical player. At the same time, longstanding disputes in the region, coupled with institutional weaknesses, will continue to pose problems and present a security vulnerability for NATO that could be exploited by Russia or China. The region is also a transit route for westward migration, a source of critical raw materials, and an important node in energy and trade routes. The BalkansForward column will explore the key strategic dynamics in the region and how they intersect with broader European and transatlantic goals.

The post Are Albania and Montenegro on the fast track to EU membership? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine is currently fighting for national survival against Russia’s ongoing invasion. Once this battle is won, the most important challenge facing the country will be judicial reform. If Ukraine is to emerge in the postwar years as a stable and prosperous European democracy, the process of recovery and renewal must be based on the firm foundations of a strong justice system. This is not a mere slogan; it is an absolute necessity.

Judicial reform is the key to the country’s entire future economic development. Investors will not come to Ukraine if contracts cannot be enforced or if property rights can be bought and sold through corruption. That is the message Ukraine’s international partners have been repeating consistently for many years. With the massive task of postwar rebuilding looming on the horizon, this message is now arguably truer than ever.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Once the war ends, Ukraine can expect to receive unprecedented international support as foreign governments seek to participate in what promises to be Europe’s largest reconstruction initiative since the years following World War II. While donor funding from partner countries is likely to be very significant, this will not be nearly enough to cover the estimated rebuilding price tag of around half a trillion US dollars. Instead, much of this money must come from the private sector. However, unless Ukraine has a transparent, reliable, and efficient justice system, private capital will stay away.

If Ukraine hopes to become a success story, it needs courts that can settle disputes fairly, whatever the issue. If legal cases are tainted by bias or drag on for years, this will serve as a major red flag to all potential investors. For this reason, Ukraine’s courts should be recognized as a key element of the country’s infrastructure that is every bit as vital to national recovery as roads or power lines. After all, the justice system serves as the legal framework that makes it possible to build everything else.

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Despite the ongoing war, Ukraine has made real progress in recent years toward meaningful judicial reform. This has included the reform of key institutions like the High Court of Justice, along with the launch of new processes to improve the selection of Constitutional Court judges. It is now crucial to build on this momentum.

Judicial reform must be deep, deliberate, and closely tied to Ukraine’s European future. With this in mind, it is important to maintain the current dialogue with the Venice Commission and use its recommendations to shape genuine change. One of the most effective tools to help achieve this change is the participation of international experts. Their role is not to control the process, but rather to help ensure fairness, transparency, and accountability.

As Ukraine looks to create the conditions for national reconstruction, one judicial reform initiative currently being backed by the Ukrainian parliament is the creation of specialized courts to handle issues like land rights and construction disputes. These courts could help speed up vital cases and take pressure off the existing judicial system.

Work is also continuing toward greater digitalization within the justice system, from electronic courts to online case tracking. Much more can be done in this direction. Other tech savvy countries such as Estonia and Singapore are currently leading the way in digital justice. Ukraine can build something just as bold using tools like blockchain and AI. The expanded use of technology can improve the efficiency of Ukraine’s courts, while also boosting trust levels and leading to greater transparency.

Creating a fully functioning and internationally credible justice system is the necessary starting point for everything else Ukrainians want to achieve, from economic strength and prosperity to the rule of law and a greater sense of national security. It can encourage investors to bet on Ukraine, and can help persuade Ukrainians currently living abroad to return home. Ultimately, judicial reform can serve as a national anchor confirming Ukraine’s place in the heart of Europe.

Amid the horror and the trauma of Russia’s ongoing invasion, Ukrainians now have a once-in-a-generation opportunity to achieve transformational change in the country’s justice system. We must not miss this chance.

Oleksandr Vasiuk is a member of the Ukrainian parliament for the Servant of the People party and head of the Ukraine-USA Strategic Partnership cross-party association.

Further reading

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Judicial reform must be at the heart of Ukraine’s postwar recovery appeared first on Atlantic Council.

So far, the Taliban has adopted more than two hundred decrees targeting women and girls. The bans and restrictions affect all aspects of life—from banning girls’ education past the seventh grade and limiting women’s employment to curtailing their freedom of movement and social engagement. To implement these decrees, Taliban authorities exercise broad discretionary powers to interpret and enforce the law, relying on a range of extrajudicial methods such as physical coercion, social control, and public intimidation.

In effect, the Taliban regime has employed the instruments of lawmaking and law enforcement to establish a system of control and oppression of women that amounts to gender apartheid. The system was reinforced with the adoption of the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice Law on August 21, 2024. While women’s rights and freedoms were already curtailed by earlier Taliban decrees, the adoption and implementation of this law has had far-reaching consequences, stripping women of even more basic rights and personal autonomy and exacerbating their economic dependence and social isolation.

To combat the Taliban’s institutionalization of gender apartheid in Afghanistan, international actors and civil society groups should document both the regime’s human rights abuses and the system of lawmaking and law enforcement that produces them. Documentation strategies should be geared toward supporting ongoing cases at international courts and catalyzing further accountability processes. An international investigative mechanism, modeled on the United Nations’ (UN) International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism for Syria (IIIM), can help to hold the Taliban accountable for implementing gender apartheid and the specific rules and tools they use to maintain that system.

From constitutional order to rule by executive fiat

Prior to the Taliban takeover, the legitimacy and legality of the Afghan state were vested in the 2004 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, which served as the supreme law of the country for seventeen years.

The Constitution was preceded by a Constitutional Loya Jirga or “grand council,” held in 2003, and was approved by consensus in January 2004. It provided an overarching legal framework for the relationship between the Afghan government and Afghan citizens and stipulated a set of constitutional principles and rights, such as separation of powers, due process of law, freedom from persecution, and freedom of expression.

In the new order created by the Taliban, by contrast, there is no constitution or equivalent supreme law. Laws and regulations are issued by the Taliban’s leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, by his leadership council, and by a host of public officials and religious authorities in an ad hoc manner. Sometimes they take the form of written decrees, such as the “Virtue and Vice” law, but often they are only issued verbally. For example, officials from the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice set the law in declarations and conference speeches, while clerics do so in sermons—bypassing any formal process of lawmaking and ignoring basic requirements that laws must be general, prospective, clear, and stable.

Lawmaking and law enforcement as instruments of control and oppression

In the absence of a constitutional framework that anchors the legal order, regulates the exercise of state power, and protects the rights of citizens, Taliban law draws on a range of other sources. They include extremist religious ideology rooted in a rigid—and contested—interpretation of Sharia law, which has been influenced by the Deobandi school of thought, as well as patriarchal tribal norms and practices.

These sources inform and justify the system of control and oppression of women that has emerged and expanded under Taliban rule, which includes bans and restrictions on women’s education, employment, and a range of fundamental rights and freedoms. While the system is built on a multiplicity of verbal and written decrees and directives, the Taliban is aware that its effectiveness depends on more systematic codification and consolidation. This may explain the broad remit of the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice Law, which, inter alia:

• Bans women from travelling without a male guardian and denies them access to parks, gyms, and other public spaces.
• Requires women to cover their faces and bodies in public; for example, Article 13(8) stipulates: “If an adult woman leaves her home for an essential need, she must cover her voice, face, and body.”
• Declares that women’s voices are awrah (private), which means that women should not be heard in public.

The law’s sweeping, vague language gives the Taliban broad discretionary powers to interpret its provisions, creating ample space for abuses. Article 17, for example, requires media outlets to adhere to religious guidelines, prohibiting any content that may be deemed contrary to Sharia law, without clarifying what that means in practice. Taliban forces are tasked with ensuring compliance with the law—especially by women—and violations are punished with warnings, fines, flogging, and imprisonment. Article 17 gives them broad surveillance and enforcement powers: “Taliban forces are present in markets, streets, universities, offices, and public transportation to ensure that people, particularly women, comply with the imposed laws.”

Such provisions of the “Virtue and Vice” law have further strengthened the core characteristics of law enforcement under the Taliban. An array of authorities—Taliban officials and forces, imams, and other religious figures—are exercising broad discretionary powers to enforce a growing number of vaguely defined rules in arbitrary ways, free from due process constraints and safeguards such as judicial review. Any attempt to resist or circumvent the regime’s bans and restrictions is met with a brutal response, often involving punishment on the spot. Human rights groups have publicized several cases of female activists being detained, disappeared, or killed for protesting Taliban laws. They have documented cases of women getting arrested for secretly teaching young girls and have reported on women being flogged for minor infringements and entire families being ostracized or punished for resisting Taliban edicts. The “Virtue and Vice” law reinforced this brutal system of arbitrary law enforcement with new written edicts that Taliban authorities could use to justify human rights abuses.

Pushing back on gender apartheid: Documentation and accountability strategies

Afghan women are already living in a system of pervasive control and oppression that is best described as gender apartheid. Left unchecked, the Taliban will further institutionalize and entrench that system, making it even more difficult to challenge and reverse in the future. International actors—including international organizations, concerned states, human rights groups, and Afghans in the diaspora—must take appropriate steps to prevent that outcome.

Documentation and accountability strategies offer a path forward. Documenting human rights abuses is critical but given their widespread and systematic character, it must be complimented with documentation of Taliban lawmaking and law enforcement—the rules and practices that produce these abuses. And it must involve structural investigations to show how egregious abuses of power and human rights violations are not byproducts of the system of gender apartheid in Afghanistan but are rather its very means and ends, central to maintaining the system.

Building robust documentation can support ongoing accountability processes and initiatives, such as the case against the Taliban at the International Criminal Court for gender persecution as a crime against humanity. It can also strengthen an anticipated case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In January, Germany, the Netherlands, Australia, and Canada announced that they intend to sue the Taliban at the ICJ for gross violations of women’s rights, invoking the interjurisdictional clause of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.

The experiences of other countries affected by widespread and systematic repression and human rights abuses suggest that documentation efforts can open other, potentially unforeseen pathways to accountability—when such efforts are scaled up and institutionalized. Afghanistan needs an international investigative mechanism modeled on the IIIM for Syria. The Syrian IIIM was established by the UN General Assembly—bypassing the Security Council—and has contributed to a spike in universal jurisdiction prosecutions of Syrian offenders for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

An IIIM for Afghanistan can serve both as a catalyst and repository for gender apartheid documentation. It can also help build structural investigations and prepare criminal cases for prosecution when jurisdictions are able and willing to take up such cases in the future. This would create a vital resource and build momentum for the growing movement to criminalize gender apartheid in international law and ensure that its architects are held to account.

Wesna Saidy is a poet and researcher with a degree in law and political science, focusing on human rights and gender justice in Afghanistan. She is a fellow at the Civic Engagement Project focusing on documentation.

Iavor Rangelov, PhD, is a research fellow at the London School of Economics and has extensive experience with documentation, justice, and accountability strategies in the Balkans, Central Asia, East Africa, the Middle East and Latin America.

This article is part of the Inside the Taliban’s Gender Apartheid series, a joint project of the Civic Engagement Project and the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project.

The post How the Taliban is using law for gender apartheid, and how to push back appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While international attention focuses on the US-led effort to initiate peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, Moscow is dramatically escalating its aerial attacks on Ukrainian civilians. During the first twenty-four days of April, for example, UN officials verified 848 civilian casualties due to Russian bombardments, representing a forty-six percent increase over the same period in 2024.

Russia’s aerial offensive is a daily feature of the war that aims to terrorize the civilian population and render large parts of Ukraine unlivable. By bombing cities and energy infrastructure, the Kremlin hopes to force millions of Ukrainians to flee the country and break the will of the remaining residents to resist. Any future peace deal that sidelines this reality and fails to hold Russia to account would erode international law and set a disastrous precedent for future armed conflicts.

For the past one and a half years, the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School and the International Partnership for Human Rights have documented and analyzed Russia’s aerial attacks in Ukraine. This research is based on extensive fieldwork, witness interviews, open-source intelligence, and forensic analysis.

After reviewing hundreds of Russian drone and missile strikes, researchers narrowed the focus down to twenty-two key attacks and identified two patterns that illuminate their impact: Attacks on energy infrastructure and on densely populated areas. The legal memorandum resulting from this work concludes that Russia’s bombing campaign amounts to the crimes against humanity of extermination and persecution.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

For three consecutive winters, Russia has bombed Ukraine’s energy infrastructure in a bid to deprive the civilian population of access to heating and electricity at a time when the days are short and temperatures are typically well below freezing. These attacks have had a devastating impact on the Ukrainian power grid, with around half of Ukraine’s entire prewar energy-generating capacity destroyed by summer 2024.

As well as targeted attacks on civilian infrastructure, Russia has also launched waves of drones and missiles at Ukrainian towns and cities throughout the invasion, causing widespread destruction and loss of life. There have been a number of particularly deadly attacks in recent weeks, including a ballistic missile strike on a playground in Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s hometown, Kryvyi Rih, that killed eighteen people including nine children. On Palm Sunday one week before Easter, Russia launched a targeted strike on Sumy city center as civilians made their way to church, leaving thirty-five dead.

In addition to killing and injuring civilians, Russian aerial attacks also create untenable living conditions for the wider civilian population. They leave people traumatized and fuel intense feelings of insecurity, while disrupting access to heating, power, water, healthcare, and other essential resources.

While estimating the true toll of these attacks is challenging, the number of displaced Ukrainians indicates the sheer scale of the humanitarian crisis. According to UN data from February 2025, Russian’s invasion has forced 10.6 million people to relocate, with 6.9 million recorded as refugees living outside Ukraine. Meanwhile, around 12.7 million Ukrainians are in need of humanitarian assistance, including nearly two million children.

Russia systematically and deliberately deprives civilians of objects essential to their survival and inflicts conditions of life calculated to bring about their destruction, which constitutes the crime against humanity of extermination. Statements by Russian officials, such as calls for Ukrainians to be left to “freeze and rot,” corroborate this conclusion.

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Russia’s aerial terror campaign, as well as the Kremlin’s actions in the occupied regions of Ukraine, have intentionally deprived Ukrainians of their fundamental rights to life, health, education, and culture, thus constituting the crime against humanity of persecution. The crime of persecution requires special discriminatory intent to target Ukrainians as a distinct group. This intent can be seen in Moscow’s branding of Ukrainians as “Nazis” who must be “destroyed.” such language underscores that Russia is attacking the very existence of Ukrainians. Targeted Russian attacks on educational and cultural facilities across Ukraine are further evidence of this intent.

Additionally, throughout the regions of Ukraine currently under Kremlin control, the Russian occupation authorities are reportedly enforcing russification policies that aim to extinguish any trace of Ukrainian national identity or statehood. Thousands of Ukrainian children have been deported to Russia and subjected to anti-Ukrainian indoctrination. The International Criminal Court in The Hague has issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin in relation to the large-scale deportation of Ukrainian children.

Holding Russia accountable for the ongoing air offensive against Ukraine is particularly important as this form of prohibited total war, where everything and anything including vital infrastructure and civilian populations are targeted to achieve victory, looks set to return. Technological advances are transforming the modern battlefield to essentially include entire countries and their civilian populations. Against this backdrop, Russia’s use of long-range drones and missiles to terrorize Ukrainian civilians is likely a taste of things to come.

To date, no international tribunal has held individual perpetrators responsible for international crimes resulting from unlawful aerial attacks. The International Criminal Court has taken an important initial step by issuing arrest warrants against four senior Russian officials for their roles in attacking Ukrainian civilians and energy infrastructure, but further measures are needed.

Failure to hold Russia accountable today will fuel tomorrow’s wars and embolden Putin’s fellow autocrats to embrace similar tactics against civilian populations. It is vital to make sure long-term security is not sacrificed in order to reach some kind of compromise with the Kremlin to end the bloodshed in Ukraine. By focusing on accountability for Russia’s aerial attacks, the international community can set a meaningful precedent that could help protect civilians around the world for years to come.

Anastasiya Donets leads the Ukraine Legal Team at the International Partnership for Human Rights, an independent non-governmental organization. She was previously an assistant professor in the International Law Department at Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University in Kharkiv. Susan H. Farbstein is a clinical professor of law at Harvard Law School, where she directs the International Human Rights Clinic.

Further reading

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How much longer will Putin be allowed to continue stalling for time?

By Peter Dickinson

President Trump has made a legitimate effort to broker a generous peace, but the time has now come to acknowledge that Putin is not negotiating in good faith and will only respond to the language of strength, writes Peter Dickinson.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Russia’s aerial attacks on Ukrainian civilians must not go unpunished appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Many Ukrainian civil society representatives stress that peace must be more than a mere pause in fighting. Temporary ceasefires may lead to periods of relative calm, but unless the root causes of the war are addressed and justice is delivered, the conflict will merely be frozen and not resolved. Similarly frozen conflicts in Moldova and Georgia offer cautionary tales of how such outcomes can serve Russian interests. These unresolved disputes have allowed Moscow to destabilize its neighbors for decades while maintaining strategic leverage and control.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

In order to avoid the geopolitical uncertainties and internal instability of a frozen conflict, Ukrainian sovereignty must remain non-negotiable. This means rejecting any potential peace deal built on territorial concessions, restrictions on the size of Ukraine’s military, or limitations on the country’s ability to form international alliances.

Instead, Ukraine needs concrete and comprehensive security guarantees from the country’s partners. With this in mind, many civil society representatives warn against repeating the mistakes of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which saw Ukraine surrender its nuclear arsenal in exchange for toothless security assurances that failed to prevent Russia’s invasion.

Ukraine’s future security also depends on a strong military. Many women within the country’s civil society have sought to communicate this to their colleagues in the international feminist movement, which has often traditionally championed disarmament and non-violent conflict resolution. They stress that a durable peace cannot come at the expense of security or Ukraine’s fundamental right to exist.

Speaking during a recent visit to the United States, Ukrainian human rights lawyer and Nobel Peace Prize recipient Oleksandra Matviichuk emphasized that safeguarding Ukrainian sovereignty is about much more than protecting the country’s physical borders and also involves millions of human lives. Ukrainians living under Russian occupation are currently enduring the kidnapping of children, forced deportations, prison camps, sexual violence, widespread human rights abuses, and the methodical erosion of civil liberties. These are not isolated crimes. Instead, Russia is accused of seeking to systematically erase Ukrainian national identity in a campaign that many believe amounts to genocide.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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Ukrainian civil society leaders have stressed the need for broad inclusion in peace negotiations and post-war recovery processes. Their calls are backed by the experience of peace initiatives elsewhere. Research indicates that peace efforts are up to 64 percent less likely to fail in instances when civil society representatives are invited to participate in talks. This has been the case in places like Northern Ireland and South Africa, where a combination of official diplomacy and civil society dialogue helped forge lasting peace.

Excluding Ukrainian civil society from peace efforts could undermine the human dimension of the process and remove accountability from the equation. While defining what justice should look like at the local, national, and international levels will be an ongoing discussion requiring the involvement of diverse stakeholders, Ukrainian civil society activists emphasize that justice must remain at the heart of any peace agreement.

Demands for accountability are widespread throughout Ukrainian society. More than 70,000 war crimes have been documented since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, including a large number of cases involving conflict-related sexual violence. Civil society activists have been at the forefront of efforts to secure justice for war crimes while also working for the protection of displaced people and the return of abducted Ukrainian children. Their demands include ensuring that the perpetrators of war crimes do not enjoy immunity, and that frozen Russian assets be directed toward rebuilding Ukraine and supporting victims.

Many Ukrainian civil society leaders believe the pursuit of justice in response to the crimes committed during Russia’s invasion is not only a national priority. Instead, they say Russia’s actions elsewhere from Syria to Africa reflect a wider pattern of impunity and argue that addressing this problem is a global imperative. As Oleksandra Matviichuk bluntly puts it, “Unpunished evil grows.”

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is a watershed moment in modern history that has directly undermined the foundations of the existing international order. Ukrainian activists recognize the scale of the challenge this represents, but argue that international law must be revitalized rather than being abandoned entirely. They see this moment as a critical test for the global community. How the world responds to Russia’s alleged war crimes will set precedents that extend far beyond Ukraine’s borders. Failure to act decisively now will not only undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty, but also embolden authoritarian regimes everywhere.

Ana Lejava is a Policy Officer at the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security at Georgetown University.

Further reading

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France Germany

UkraineAlert May 6, 2025

The shadow of 1930s appeasement hangs over US-led peace talks

By Oleksandr Merezhko

As the world prepares to mark the eightieth anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany, the shadow of events leading up to World War II hangs over efforts to end Russia’s current invasion of Ukraine, writes Oleksandr Merezhko.

Conflict European Union

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Ukraine’s vibrant civil society wants to be heard during peace talks appeared first on Atlantic Council.

• “Some historians have compared the flux of ideas and connections today to the turmoil of the Renaissance and Reformation five centuries ago, but on a much larger scale. And those eras were followed by the Thirty Years’ War, which killed a third of the population of Germany. Today, the world is richer and riskier than ever before.

• I am sometimes asked whether I am optimistic or pessimistic about the future of the United States. I reply, ‘Guardedly optimistic.’ The United States has many problems—polarization, inequality, loss of trust, mass shootings, deaths of despair from drugs and suicide—just to name a few that make headlines. There is a case for pessimism. At the same time, we Americans have survived worse periods in the 1890s, 1930s, and 1960s. For all its flaws, the United States is an innovative and resilient society that, in the past, has been able to recreate and reinvent itself. Maybe Generation Z can do it again. I hope so.”

Below, members of the Atlantic Council community reflect on the impact Nye made on both our work and the wider world.

Click below to jump to an expert reflection:

Matthew Kroenig: “In a dangerous and turbulent time in global affairs, he remained an optimist”

Chuck Hagel: “He brought clarity to so many complicated issues”

Jan Lodal: He “changed our language to better communicate important diplomatic concepts”

Paula Dobriansky: “His policy advice and brilliant ideas will endure”

Daniel Fried: “He acted and advocated in the best American tradition of wanting to apply US might in the service of right”

“In a dangerous and turbulent time in global affairs, he remained an optimist”

Just recently, our CEO Fred Kempe applied the “Joe Nye rule” as a guide to the Atlantic Council’s geostrategy work. He advised that our regular, private Strategy Consortium convenings bring together the caliber of strategic thinkers who will entice people like Joe Nye to remain engaged.

We are deeply saddened to learn of Nye’s passing and that his participation in our convenings will no longer be possible. He was a longstanding Atlantic Council board director and a regular participant in our private Strategy Consortium meetings for many years, most recently in December 2024 on the topic of anticipating a future Trump administration national security strategy. He also contributed to our strategy work in other ways, authoring forwards for our Atlantic Council Strategy Papers series and articles for our website.

He was a towering intellect and a resolute and courteous commentator on global affairs. He brought penetrating insights to our meetings and did not shy away from expressing disagreement, but always in a generous way, intending only to elevate the discussion and improve the quality of the work.

In a dangerous and turbulent time in global affairs, he remained an optimist about American power, alliances, and global engagement. Even though he is no longer with us, Nye’s strategic clarity, civility, and optimism will continue to inspire the Atlantic Council.

—Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Council’s director of studies. 

“He brought clarity to so many complicated issues”

We have lost an exceptional human being. He brought clarity to so many complicated issues over the years. We all learned from him and benefitted from his wisdom and knowledge and unpretentious style. He’ll be missed by many.

—Chuck Hagel is a member of the Atlantic Council international advisory board, a former US secretary of defense, and a former US senator from Nebraska.

He “changed our language to better communicate important diplomatic concepts”

Joe’s contributions to his students, his family, and world peace and security were unparalleled. His impact will be felt indefinitely. 

Joe was also a magnificent personal friend and colleague. We survived numerous hikes to the top of the mountains in Aspen after the exhilarating discussions he had organized for the Aspen Strategy Group. He asked me to take over the group when he had to step down, which I was honored to do. I then imposed on him to join my team as assistant secretary for international security affairs under Bill Perry in the Clinton administration. He was the best ever in that storied office. 

Joe actually changed our language to better communicate important diplomatic concepts—”soft power” being perhaps the most memorable. He was a devoted husband to his dear wife, Molly, and a great art dealer from whom we obtained twelve paintings that grace our walls and remind us daily of Joe. We will miss him greatly. 

—Jan Lodal is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council, a former principal deputy under secretary of defense for policy, and a former senior staff member of the National Security Council.

“His policy advice and brilliant ideas will endure”

Joe Nye was an extraordinary scholar, intellect, professor, and public servant. He was a prolific writer whose books, articles, and op-eds advanced innovative ideas and provided cogent analyses of complex national security issues. Described as a “towering figure in international affairs,” he produced writings that have had a profound impact on policymakers both at home and abroad. He was widely known for having conceived the “soft power” approach in US foreign policy, which promotes American power through influence, persuasion, and diplomacy.

Joe’s service at the Pentagon as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs and as chair of the National Intelligence Council was distinguished and results-driven. During his tenure at the State Department as deputy to the under secretary for security assistance, science, and technology, he chaired the consequential National Security Council interagency group on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

I have long admired Joe’s achievements in foreign policy and public service. On a more personal level, I was also proud to have been his colleague and friend. He touched my life in so many ways. While at Harvard for my master’s and Ph.D. degrees, Joe was not only my professor there, but a wonderful mentor. One of his many admirable qualities that I loved was his desire to have a good lively policy debate. He always brought opposing points of view into a discussion and relished a vibrant exchange of opinions. His calm demeanor in the midst of bureaucratic squabbles or crises was exemplary.

I will miss him terribly, but I am gratified that his policy advice and brilliant ideas will endure. He was indeed a giant in international affairs and leaves a remarkable legacy.

—Paula J. Dobriansky is the vice chair of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a former US under secretary of state for global affairs.

“He acted and advocated in the best American tradition of wanting to apply US might in the service of right”

Joe Nye was the rare combination of government foreign policy practitioner with political thinker and public scholar of the first order. He has been called a “neo-liberal.” But that term, like its twin “neo-conservative,” is more of an epithet than a useful guide. Roughly put, Nye believed that the rules-based international system that the United States created and led for three generations after World War II was a good thing—that it had more potential to generate prosperity, avoid world war, and advance American values and thus American interests than the competition. Because the competition in the twentieth century was fascism and communism, Nye’s judgment was a sure thing.

But Nye’s optimistic view now seems eclipsed by the dark neo-nationalism espoused by many in the United States and indeed across Europe. When some in the Trump administration, including US President Donald Trump, call for seizing Greenland, they seem to argue that only physical control of (and raw power over) territory can secure US interests, that there is no place for cooperation between nations to achieve goals that benefit both. That’s not a new view; it’s a mere repackaging of old European, great-power imperialism that brought disaster in its time and could bring disaster in ours. Such thinking would reduce the United States to a mere grasping, greedy superpower, a larger version of Vladimir Putin’s Russia, seeking to dominate through force and fear.

Nye’s views are now, more than ever, worth considering. He was no naif about the need for power in the international arena. But he acted and advocated in the best American tradition of wanting to apply US might in the service of right. When he spoke of such things, he meant it: artful, creative, committed, and realistic in the best sense. What a compelling and inspiring legacy he leaves behind.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

The post The father of ‘soft power,’ a supreme intellect, and an eternal optimist: The Atlantic Council remembers Joseph Nye appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ending the war between Russia and Ukraine has been Donald Trump’s top foreign policy priority throughout the first hundred days of his new administration. This has led to mixed results. The US leader has won praise for initiating the first meaningful talks since the early months of the Russian invasion, but he has also been accused of adopting an overly Kremlin-friendly approach to negotiations that has seen the US consistently pressure Ukraine while offering Russia a series of concessions.

The eagerness of the new US administration to reach some kind of settlement comes as no surprise. During the 2024 presidential election campaign, Trump vowed to broker a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine as soon as possible. Since returning to the White House in January, he has sought to distance himself from the current confrontation with the Kremlin, and has repeatedly expressed enthusiasm for normalizing relations with Moscow.

This dramatic shift in US foreign policy is sparking considerable alarm in Kyiv and other European capitals. Concerns are now mounting that if Ukraine is forced to accept a pro-Putin peace deal, the country would be unlikely to survive much longer as an independent state. This would represent an historic victory for Putin’s Russia, with profound geopolitical repercussions that would be felt far beyond the borders of Ukraine.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

In Russia itself, a successful peace deal would vindicate the entire invasion of Ukraine and further consolidate the country’s ongoing transition toward a fully totalitarian model of government. Today’s militarization of Russian society would intensify, with imperial propaganda dominating the national information space and defense spending rising to unprecedented levels. Unpopular aspects of the current war such as heavy battlefield losses and sanctions-related shortages would soon be forgotten as triumphant Russians embraced a new era of imperial expansionism.

Others would draw very different conclusions from a Russian victory in Ukraine. The failure of the existing international order to prevent the invasion and occupation of a major European country would send shock waves around the world and mark the dawn of a dangerous new era defined by the principle that might is right. This would soon lead to sharp increases in defense budgets as nations rushed to rearm in order to avoid suffering the same fate as Ukraine.

Russia’s frequent use of nuclear blackmail during the invasion of Ukraine would be particularly consequential. The Kremlin’s readiness to engage in nuclear saber-rattling would convince many countries that in order to be truly safe, they must acquire nukes of their own. In such a scenario, the existing nuclear nonproliferation architecture would collapse and be replaced by a nuclear arms race that would significantly increase the potential for a future nuclear war.

For Putin, a successful outcome in Ukraine would be a stepping stone toward even more ambitious foreign policy adventures. He would almost certainly seek to continue reasserting Russian dominance across the former USSR, with his next targets likely to include Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and the countries of Central Asia. He may also seek to go further into Central Europe. Confronted by a demoralized and weakened West, Putin would surely be tempted to escalate his campaign of aggression against front line nations like Finland or the Baltic states in order to expose the emptiness of NATO’s collective security guarantees and discredit the alliance.

An emboldened Russia would also seek to increase its military and economic presence in other regions of the world including the Arctic, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. With sanctions no longer in place and Russia increasingly viewed as a geopolitical winner, potential allies would flock to Moscow. In this new reality, Putin’s current authoritarian alliance with China, Iran, and North Korea would serve as the basis for a far larger anti-Western grouping.

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Any settlement that leaves Ukraine partitioned, isolated, and disarmed will not bring peace. On the contrary, it would signal the start of a new stage in the country’s agony marked by the slow bleeding of territory, population, and sovereignty. Step by step, an abandoned Ukraine would gradually be absorbed into Putin’s new Russian Empire. This would place Europe’s second-largest army under Russian control, while also providing the Kremlin with vast additional industrial and agricultural wealth to fuel Putin’s expansionist agenda.

Meanwhile, Europe would lose its Ukrainian shield at a time when the continent is already facing up to the reality of a drastically reduced US commitment to transatlantic security. While European leaders are now urgently addressing the need to rearm, few would currently be confident in their ability to withstand a determined Russian offensive. Without Ukraine’s battle-hardened million-strong army to protect them, the countries of Europe would represent an extremely inviting target that Putin may be unable to resist.

After more than three years of relentless horror and destruction, nobody wants peace more than the Ukrainians themselves. But most Ukrainians also recognize that a bad peace will mean no peace at all. Handing Russia victory in Ukraine may temporarily create the illusion of peace, but in fact it would merely set the stage for a dangerous new era of international insecurity marked by militarization, authoritarianism, nuclear proliferation, and wars of aggression.

Elena Davlikanova is a fellow at CEPA. Lesia Ogryzko is director of the Sahaidachny Security Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Mar 25, 2025

Ukraine’s growing military strength is an underrated factor in peace talks

By Serhii Kuzan

Any discussion on the future course of the war against Russia and the terms of any peace deal must take into account the fact that Ukraine is a now major military power in its own right, writes Serhii Kuzan.

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UkraineAlert Apr 22, 2025

Putin’s cynical Easter ceasefire stunt backfires as Zelenskyy calls his bluff

By Peter Dickinson

Vladimir Putin’s surprise Easter ceasefire announcement was clearly a cynical stunt, but it did inadvertently serve an important purpose by underlining the simple fact that Russia can end the war whenever it chooses, writes Peter Dickinson.

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Putin’s Arctic ambitions: Russia eyes natural resources and shipping routes

By Bohdan Ustymenko

Russia’s plans to expand its influence in the Arctic region and dominate the Northern Sea Route together with China pose serious security challenges for the international community, writes Bohdan Ustymenko.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post A pro-Putin peace deal in Ukraine would destabilize the entire world appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Note: This article was updated on April 23 to reflect Dodik’s attempted arrest.

Milorad Dodik has dominated politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s (BiH) Republika Srpska entity for most of the past two decades. But a court ruling earlier this year has put his political future in question, and the response to his legal troubles has instigated perhaps the greatest institutional crisis in BiH since the end of the Bosnian War in 1995.

In late February, a BiH state court sentenced Dodik to one year in prison and a six-year ban on holding public office for defying the decisions of the Office of the High Representative, the international body overseeing the implementation of the postwar Dayton Accords. If this sentence is enforced by a second-instance ruling expected later this year, then Dodik—who has been sanctioned repeatedly by the United States and United Kingdom for corruption—would no longer hold any formal power.

As is often the case with strongmen who equate their personal destiny with that of their people, Dodik framed the verdict as an enemy attack on the Republika Srpska, and he doubled down on secessionism. The Republika Srpska assembly passed laws blocking state-level institutions from operating within the entity and approved a draft constitution claiming the Republika Srpska’s right to self-determination. Ethnic Serbs were invited to abandon several state-level institutions, while a Republika Srpska army and judiciary were also announced. Then in early March, it was revealed that since December, Dodik had also been under investigation in a second case on charges of attacks against the country’s constitutional order. His failure to appear for questioning led to the issuance of a warrant for his arrest.

While BiH’s constitutional court has suspended the Republika Srpska’s separatist laws, the legal and political quagmire exposed the difficulty that BiH institutions face in exercising their authority in the Republika Srpska. Dodik threatened that his security team and the Republika Srpska police would clash with any BiH agency willing to arrest him. On April 23, BiH special police reportedly attempted to arrest Dodik during a visit to East Sarajevo, but were deterred by heavily armed Republika Srpska police units.

This crisis has also exposed the lack of unity in the European Union (EU) on how to handle Dodik. He still enjoys the strong backing of countries such as Hungary, which reportedly even sent special police units to extract him in case of an arrest. Despite the harsh condemnation of his actions by Western officials and the hardening of sanctions against him by Germany and Austria, many in the West still worry that his arrest could trigger a broader security crisis in the Balkans and would prefer to see Dodik make a more orderly exit from office.

Yet by crossing these major red lines for regional security and openly challenging the authority of the BiH government, Dodik has also exposed his weakness and desperation. With a possible dead end in sight for his secessionist threats, Dodik’s main external backers might already view him as more of a liability than an asset.

Who would follow Dodik down the rabbit hole?

This latest episode is merely the most extreme case of a consistent pattern: Dodik instigates a crisis to extract personal concessions from domestic and international actors. In this case, he is stoking a constitutional crisis, likely in the hopes of winning concessions on his legal troubles and keeping himself in power. His saber-rattling counts on Western fears (as evident in dramatic media headlines) that he will push BiH and the Balkans back into war if he does not have his way. While an attempt at Republika Srpska secession would almost certainly lead to a regional conflict, the number of actors who have already shown they are not willing or capable of supporting Dodik down this rabbit hole indicates, at least for now, that his threats lack credibility.  

This includes first and foremost Bosnian Serbs, many of whom share Dodik’s secessionist goals, but may not view the dismantling of state-level institutions, let alone a new war under current circumstances, as serving the interests of the Republika Srpska. There was reportedly no enthusiasm for Dodik’s calls to leave state-level jobs in the entity, while Bosnian Serb opposition parties also denounced the move as self-serving.

The experience of Serbs in northern Kosovo provides a cautionary tale that Bosnian Serbs may be heeding now. In April 2023, northern Kosovo Serbs boycotted local elections, which resulted in Albanian candidates winning with a miniscule turnout of less than 3.5 percent. Only a year ago, it was Dodik himself who warned that a boycott of BiH institutions could lead to a similar scenario for Bosnian Serbs.

Dodik’s gambit also rested on foreign-policy miscalculations. His hopes that the Trump administration would shift US Balkans policy in his secessionist direction were rebuffed by Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s clear condemnation of his actions in March. Russia certainly continues to have an interest in turning the region into a new hotspot to distract Western attention and resources from Ukraine. Dodik himself appeared in Moscow on April 1, and he was given a reception with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Yet there are clear limits to what Russia can do to support the secessionist movement, especially if Dodik’s key backer and neighbor Serbia does not greenlight it.

How Serbia’s leader sees the situation

The leverage that this situation has given to Serbian President Aleksandar Vučiċ illustrates why he has been Dodik’s key backer and enabler over the past decade. Much like the case of Kosovo’s Serbs, Dodik’s troublemaking has been a useful tool for Vučiċ to fuel nationalist narratives at home while maintaining plausible deniability and an image of “constructiveness” in his relations with the West.

Dodik’s political fate may now be a bargaining chip in the hands of Vučiċ, who leads a country drifting toward authoritarianism and who constantly hedges and negotiates with the West on problems he creates. Considering Vučiċ’s own difficult domestic situation, with a large-scale and enduring student protest movement that has threatened his power and shattered his image abroad, it would not be a surprise if he sacrifices a distressed and expended asset like Dodik to the West to further his own goals. If Dodik were to lose Vučiċ’s backing, he would be unable to continue paralyzing Bosnian institutions with his secessionist threats and may have to respect the final court sentence or seek exile in Moscow or Budapest.

The West seems to be done buying Dodik’s threats of regional instability and largely appears determined to see him leave office, whether that means his arrest or resignation and exile. But while Dodik leaving office would be good for BiH and deterrence against Republika Srpska secessionism in the short term, the West is not adopting the same attitude toward his enablers in Belgrade and Budapest.

In defiance of the EU, Vučiċ recently stated that he would join the World War II victory parade in Moscow on May 9 and invited Russia’s Federal Security Service, or FSB, to “investigate” claims that sonic weapons were used against Serbian student protesters (of course, no foul play was found). This most recent foreign-policy signaling by Vučiċ illustrates that while Dodik’s political future seems grim, the underlying conditions behind his troublemaking in Moscow and Belgrade will remain undeterred, waiting for more opportune moments.

Agon Maliqi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is a political and foreign policy analyst from Pristina, Kosovo.  

***

The Western Balkans stands at the nexus of many of Europe’s critical challenges. Some, if not all, of the countries of the region may soon join the European Union and shape the bloc’s ability to become a more effective geopolitical player. At the same time, longstanding disputes in the region, coupled with institutional weaknesses, will continue to pose problems and present a security vulnerability for NATO that could be exploited by Russia or China. The region is also a transit route for westward migration, a source of critical raw materials, and an important node in energy and trade routes. The BalkansForward column will explore the key strategic dynamics in the region and how they intersect with broader European and transatlantic goals.

The post What’s at stake for Bosnia and Herzegovina as Milorad Dodik faces a political reckoning? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare, Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, explores Bosnia and Herzegovina’s fragile political landscape, as the country nears the 30th anniversary of the Dayton Agreement. With separatist pressures rising and youth fleeing the country, is silent abandonment more dangerous than loud secession?

Joined by Adnan Ćerimagić, Senior Analyst for the Western Balkans at the European Stability Initiative based in Berlin, the conversation delves into:

• The implications of Milorad Dodik’s conviction and continued political activity;

• The EU’s and NATO’s stances on Bosnia’s sovereignty and why EUFOR will not get involved in a potential arrest of Dodik;

• Legal actions against Republika Srpska leadership and questions over the constitutional changes and international enforcement; and

• The future of the Office of the High Representative and the so-called Bonn Powers in Bosnia.

With tensions high and regional implications looming, this episode asks the urgent question: What will it take for Europe—and the West writ large—to finally draw a line in the sand?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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The post From Dayton to Dodik, what’s at stake in Bosnia? | A Debrief with Adnan Ćerimagić appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The first round of Ecuador’s presidential election in February revealed two competing visions for managing this unprecedented crisis. The second round on April 13 promises to crystallize these approaches. 

Incumbent President Daniel Noboa champions a technocratic approach pairing economic liberalization with tough security policies—a vision that resonates with urban middle-class voters, who see his business acumen as crucial for modernizing the state’s response to organized crime. His challenger, former Assemblywoman Luisa González, advocates for a return to state-led development, combining expanded social programs with institutional reform over militarization. Her platform has found particular traction among rural and lower-income Ecuadorians, who fondly recall the era of former President Rafael Correa, who advocated for social spending and poverty-reduction initiatives. Yet beneath the electoral rhetoric, a more fundamental question looms: Can either candidate’s vision effectively counter the growing control of criminal networks over Ecuador’s youth?

A laboratory for criminal innovation

Situated between Colombia and Peru—the world’s largest cocaine producers—Ecuador has become a battleground where foreign mafias collaborate with local gangs to control strategic trafficking routes. The interplay of porous borders, entrenched corruption, economic fragility tied to converting its currency to the US dollar, and ineffective security policies has created fertile ground for these transnational criminal enterprises to expand their influence. Yet, Guayaquil’s crisis transcends its role as a trafficking hub. The city has become a laboratory for criminal innovation where organized crime groups have transformed from simple drug trafficking operations into sophisticated political actors. They provide security, economic opportunity, and social belonging to marginalized communities—services the state has failed to deliver.

The mechanisms of this transformation merit close attention from policymakers across the Americas. Criminal organizations in Guayaquil have mastered a strategy increasingly visible throughout Latin America: exploiting the corrosive combination of weak rule of law, endemic corruption, and profound socioeconomic inequality to establish parallel governance structures and weave themselves into the social fabric of everyday life. Through Guayaquil’s port infrastructure, these groups now control an estimated 80 percent of Ecuador’s illegal drug exports, concealing cocaine in expedited shipments of perishable goods such as tea and bananas. 

More significantly, they have developed sophisticated recruitment networks that target children as young as eight years old. Durán, just across the river from Guayaquil, is known grimly as the “school of assassins,” where children are groomed through a ruthless drug dealer-to-assassin pipeline. The human cost of this transformation is visible in daily life. The country’s energy crisis has plunged already precarious neighborhoods into prolonged darkness over the course of the past year, with rolling blackouts stretching up to fourteen hours per day. For residents of these fragile communities, the outages have rendered their daily lives into a de facto siege, trapping them indoors as fears of assault, kidnapping, extortion, or falling victim to stray bullets loom large.  

Guayaquil’s experience offers crucial lessons about the speed with which criminal organizations can fill governance vacuums. The city’s crisis also exemplifies a broader regional challenge: How can Latin American democracies rebuild state legitimacy while confronting immediate security threats? The answer may determine not just Ecuador’s future but also the trajectory of democratic governance across the region.

A generation under siege

The systematic recruitment of youth into organized crime in Ecuador is part of a disturbing trend across Latin America. Between 2019 and 2023, killings of children and adolescents in Ecuador rose by 640 percent, culminating in at least 770 deaths of minors in 2023. This trajectory mirrors broader patterns in the region, where homicide is the leading cause of death for youth aged ten to nineteen. In Rio de Janeiro, the number of children aged ten to twelve who entered drug trafficking doubled between 2006 and 2017, and an estimated six out of ten members of criminal groups in Ecuador are under the age of nineteen, highlighting an accelerating shift toward younger recruitment across criminal organizations.

The weaponization of educational spaces, a strategy perfected by criminal groups from Medellín to Ciudad Juárez, has found fertile ground in Guayaquil’s most insecure neighborhoods. Students find themselves at the epicenter of this violence, coerced into participation under threat of harm to themselves or their families—sometimes by classmates already ensnared in criminal enterprises. Teachers face constant intimidation and, in extreme cases, have been killed for challenging these incursions—a pattern documented across Latin America’s urban peripheries. In one northern community of Guayaquil, law enforcement estimates that as many as 16 percent of students are linked to gangs.

Criminal organizations across the region have refined their recruitment strategies to exploit socioeconomic vulnerabilities. In Guayaquil, as in Colombia’s Comuna 13 and Mexico’s working-class barrios, criminal groups entice youth from financially unstable families through promises of income, protection, and social status—an understandably appealing alternative to fear, isolation, and economic despair. The tactics are remarkably consistent: houses acquired through forcible eviction are handed over to adolescent members as rewards, peer networks and family members already engaged in criminal activities normalize gang affiliation, and younger children are lured with material incentives such as video games and toys. Girls face particular risks, including sexual exploitation and forced relationships with gang leaders—a gendered dimension of recruitment widely documented in Latin American countries.

Ecuador’s prison crisis—marked by persistent overcrowding and eruptions of violence—further exemplifies a broader regional pattern, in which overcrowded penitentiaries serve as command centers for criminal enterprises. Young offenders enter a prison ecosystem where gang affiliation becomes a matter of survival rather than choice and then return to their communities with strengthened criminal networks.

The crisis in education infrastructure compounds these challenges. Public schools face chronic challenges, from crumbling infrastructure to pervasive sexual violence, further eroding their role as ostensible safe spaces and sanctuaries of learning. When Noboa declared an “internal armed conflict” in early 2024 and the Ministry of Education suspended in-person attendance for Ecuador’s 4.3 million students, the country joined its regional neighbors in seeing education systems buckle under security pressures. The statistics are stark across Latin America: in Honduras, 90 percent of teachers report gang targeting of their schools; in Guatemala, 60 percent of students report fearing school attendance; and criminal groups treated the COVID-19 pandemic as a recruitment windfall, directly targeting students who were forced out of the classroom.

Breaking this cycle requires solutions that address both immediate security needs and underlying structural inequities—including strengthening school infrastructure, implementing socio-emotional learning programs, and supporting youth looking for a way out of gang membership by providing viable pathways to resilience and opportunity—a challenge that has largely eluded policymakers across the region.

A crisis of trust and legitimacy

In Ecuador and many other Latin American countries, the military and police forces play an important role in taking on criminal gangs. At the same time, an overreliance on force can cause its own problems.  

For example, the December 2024 murder of four Afro-Ecuadorian boys by military forces in Guayaquil crystallized for many in Ecuador how state violence and impunity can shatter community trust. When the children—aged eleven to fifteen—disappeared, authorities initially blamed gang violence. But CCTV footage later revealed military personnel forcing the boys into a patrol vehicle. One managed to call his father and reported that they had been beaten and their clothes removed; the father appealed to the police to no avail. Seventeen days later, the children’s charred remains were found in a rural swamp. Amid the outrage and grief of the citizen response, the government arrested sixteen soldiers for the forced disappearance of the boys and promised a complete and transparent investigation.

Like similar cases in Latin America, this event highlights how militarized responses to instability can exacerbate the very governance problems they aim to address. Human Rights Watch and Ecuador’s Permanent Committee for the Defense of Human Rights describe the murders as part of “systematic disappearances” that have escalated since security forces were deployed to combat gang violence. In Guayaquil’s periphery, residents report police planting drugs on youth to meet arrest quotas, while documented cases show officers passing informants’ identities to criminal groups—leading to deadly reprisals. 

In a cruel paradox, the snake begins to eat its tail: the breakdown in trust erects barriers to—and compromises the effectiveness of—the very institutions and programs attempting to rebuild public confidence, further entrenching community isolation. Residents retreat from public spaces and curtail social activities, fearing surveillance by both criminal groups and corrupt security forces. Community gatherings evaporate, parents keep children indoors, and local markets empty—accelerating the breakdown of social cohesion that once helped neighborhoods resist criminal influence. 

The withdrawal of adults from community spaces then results in a mentorship vacuum. Even successful intervention programs struggle to overcome this trust deficit. International nongovernmental organizations, development agencies, and civil society organizations find their work complicated by community suspicions, while those who manage to navigate gang checkpoints often see their efforts disrupted by violence or lack of institutional support. In an environment where state institutions have lost their moral authority, it is unsurprising that many of the young people weighing their options come to view gang membership as rational self-preservation.

Yet, amid this deterioration, community-based initiatives anchored by respected local leaders have demonstrated the power of persistent engagement in leading social repair. The Guayas Community Network of Defenders, comprising eighty trained community leaders, has developed successful initiatives ranging from food-security management to human-rights education. In Guayaquil’s most vulnerable sectors, the Social Youth Movement—a coalition of more than three hundred young people from marginalized communities—has mobilized through “artivism” and political advocacy to combat structural violence while creating leadership opportunities for youth typically targeted by gangs. Their success in areas such as comprehensive sexual education reform demonstrates how organized youth movements can channel their energy toward constructive social change. Meanwhile, community groups such as the Socio Vivienda collective have successfully organized to defend housing rights and resist displacement, even in neighborhoods heavily affected by criminal violence. 

While these grassroots movements remain modest in scale, their successes contrast with the ineffectiveness of short-term interventions. The main challenge is expanding these local initiatives while operating in an environment where fear and mistrust run deep. As long as Guayaquil’s authorities fail to hold themselves accountable for institutional abuses, each betrayal of public trust hands another victory to criminal groups seeking to capture youth loyalty. 

A generation in the balance

The battle for Ecuador’s democratic future will ultimately be won or lost in marginalized communities where criminal networks have become de facto providers of what the state has failed to deliver—however perverse their methods. Ecuador’s precipitous descent from being hailed as an “earthly paradise” to earning the nickname “Guaya Kill”—a grim rebranding of its once-thriving port city—offers sobering lessons about the fragility of democratic institutions in an era of sophisticated transnational crime. The transformation of Guayaquil’s youth recruitment crisis—from a peripheral security concern to an existential threat to state legitimacy in just five years—reveals how quickly criminal organizations can exploit institutional weaknesses to establish parallel governance structures. As El Salvador’s iron-fist security policies gain admirers across Latin America, Salvadorian President Nayib Bukele’s strong public support threatens to normalize the false choice between democratic values and citizen safety. 

Countering this trend demands a coordinated international response that transcends traditional security assistance. 

First, multilateral development banks should prioritize funding for proven community initiatives, particularly those offering comprehensive youth services that combine education, job training, and psychosocial support. 

Second, regional cooperation needs to strengthen civil society networks that can maintain consistent community engagement even during periods of political transition. 

Third, international donors should establish dedicated funding streams for local organizations with demonstrated track records of youth intervention while also supporting knowledge-sharing networks across Latin America’s most affected cities.

Fourth, international support must help bridge the gap between immediate security needs and long-term institutional rebuilding. This means funding parallel tracks: robust investment in prevention and reintegration programming and careful support for security sector reform that prioritizes community trust-building over militarization. Successful regional models exist: the aftermath of Colombia’s “false positives” scandal offers valuable lessons in institutional reform. Like its Andean neighbor, Ecuador’s state-civil society rift must be healed, notwithstanding its politically fragmented terrain.  

With all eyes fixed on presidential politics, the daily lived experiences of residents on the margins of Guayaquil reveal a stark truth: a hasty embrace of militarization has diverted resources from the vital social infrastructure and economic opportunities that could offer young people genuine alternatives to criminal networks. Time is running out for a holistic approach to security that balances suppression with structural transformation. As organized crime groups demonstrate an unprecedented ability to adapt and evolve their recruitment strategies, the window for corrective action narrows—and nothing short of an entire generation hangs in the balance.

Erin McFee is the founder and president of the Corioli Institute.

The post Cradle of violence: How criminal networks are winning Ecuador’s youth and threatening Latin America’s future appeared first on Atlantic Council.

So far, efforts to hold the perpetrators legally accountable for more than a decade of crimes dating back to the onset of Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 have proved insufficient. It should now be apparent that Ukraine and the country’s partners need to seek new approaches in order to deliver meaningful justice to victims and end the cycle of Russian impunity.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Ukraine’s domestic legal system has been overwhelmed by the scale and the gravity of the war crimes allegations against Russia. For example, since the onset of the full-scale invasion in 2022, more than 156,000 investigations into potential war crimes have been opened. As of March 2025, only around 150 verdicts had been reached, mostly in absentia.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague has taken some bold steps to help secure justice for Ukraine, most notably charging Russian President Vladimir Putin for his involvement in the mass abduction of Ukrainian children. While this is certainly welcome, the ICC can only be expected to handle a small number of cases involving the most senior Russian officials.

Meanwhile, recent US cuts to international assistance threaten to impact existing efforts to hold Russia responsible for alleged war crimes in Ukraine. This has underlined the need to explore alternative formats that can help Kyiv overcome existing gaps in capacity-building.

One possibility would be to broaden the mandate of a proposed special tribunal to prosecute Russia’s leadership for the crime of aggression. Ukraine and its partners recently agreed to establish a tribunal in hybrid format with international and domestic components operating under the auspices of the Council of Europe.

While there is significant international support for efforts to put Russia’s military and political leaders on trial for the crime of aggression, the potentially political nature of this charge has raised some concerns. Expanding the mandate of a future tribunal to include other serious crimes could help garner more support and address any reservations regarding political legitimacy.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

Another possibility would be to expand international partnerships within Ukraine’s domestic legal system to enhance its ability to address alleged Russian war crimes. This hybrid approach would build on existing practice that has seen a number of countries providing investigators, prosecutors, forensic specialists, and other experts in recent years.

Foreign investigators and prosecutors could be formally inserted into specialized units at the investigative and prosecutorial level to work alongside their Ukrainian colleagues. This would significantly increase capacity, while also potentially improving the quality of investigative efforts. Further down the line, it may prove possible to introduce foreign judges in a similar manner.

This approach could draw on past experience and current international efforts, including those related to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Central African Republic (CAR). If tailored to meet the specific requirements of the Ukrainian justice system, this could serve as an improvement over the well-meaning but somewhat scattershot efforts of Ukraine’s partners to date.

Some skeptics have suggested that any new justice mechanisms for Ukraine would compete with the ICC in terms of jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Advocates counter that new mechanisms could in fact coexist with the ICC, complementing rather duplicating the work being done in The Hague.

ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan has voiced support for the work of the CAR Special Criminal Court and recently endorsed the idea of a hybrid mechanism for the Democratic Republic of Congo. If applied effectively, this approach could make it possible for Ukraine to prosecute the kind of mid-level perpetrators who are beyond the mandate of the ICC.

Adopting new approaches to the issue of accountability for alleged war crimes committed during the Russian invasion of Ukraine can bring hope for justice and lay the foundations for a sustainable peace. A strengthened Ukrainian justice system could also play an important role in the country’s postwar progress on the path toward EU membership and further Western integration.

Nadia Volkova is the founder and head of the Ukrainian Legal Advisory Group (ULAG). Eric Witte is an independent international justice consultant who has worked at the International Criminal Court and Special Court for Sierra Leone. Arie Mora is an advocacy manager at the Ukrainian Legal Advisory Group (ULAG).

Further reading

UkraineAlert Mar 25, 2025

Ukraine’s growing military strength is an underrated factor in peace talks

By Serhii Kuzan

Any discussion on the future course of the war against Russia and the terms of any peace deal must take into account the fact that Ukraine is a now major military power in its own right, writes Serhii Kuzan.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Mar 20, 2025

Putin is ruthlessly erasing Ukrainian identity in Russian-occupied Ukraine

By Peter Dickinson

Kremlin dictator Vladimir Putin is pursuing policies in Russian-occupied Ukraine that almost certainly meet the definition of ethnic cleansing and may qualify as genocide, writes Peter Dickinson.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Apr 3, 2025

The West must stop seeking Putin’s permission for peace in Ukraine

By Alyona Getmanchuk

If Western leaders are serious about achieving a lasting peace in Europe, they must move decisively to provide Ukraine with security guarantees without worrying whether Putin will agree or not, writes Alyona Getmanchuk.

Conflict European Union

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Ukrainian victims of war crimes need new approaches to justice appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The March 19 report by the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine found that “the enforced disappearances against civilians were perpetrated pursuant to a coordinated state policy and amount to crimes against humanity.” The report details a climate of lawlessness throughout Russian-occupied Ukraine, with anyone viewed as a potential threat to the occupation authorities liable to be detained before disappearing into a network of detention facilities in the occupied regions or deported to the Russian Federation.

Similar evidence of mass detentions was uncovered throughout all the regions of Ukraine currently under Kremlin control, indicating what UN officials referred to as a “systematic attack against the civilian population.” Victims included local officials, journalists, civic activists, military veterans, and religious leaders. While exact figures are unknown, the UN report states that large numbers of Ukrainian civilians have been targeted in a “widespread and systematic manner.”

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The war crimes accusations leveled against the Russian authorities in occupied Ukraine extend far beyond the detentions highlighted by UN investigators. The most widely publicized charges relate to the mass abduction and ideological indoctrination of vulnerable Ukrainian children. Russia is believed to have kidnapped tens of thousands of young Ukrainians and placed them in camps or foster homes, where they are often subjected to brainwashing programs designed to rob them of their Ukrainian identity and transform them into Russians. In March 2023, the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin for his role in these mass abductions.

Throughout Russian-occupied Ukraine, the authorities are working methodically to remove all symbols of Ukrainian statehood and erase any traces of Ukrainian national identity. The Ukrainian language has been suppressed along with Ukrainian literature, history, and cultural heritage. Schools now teach a Kremlin-approved curriculum that glorifies Russian imperialism while demonizing Ukraine. Any parents who attempt to resist the indoctrination of their children risk losing custody.

Ukrainians living under Russian occupation are being pressured into accepting Russian citizenship. Those who refuse to take Russian passports are denied access to basic services such as healthcare and pensions, and are unable to register their property with the occupation authorities. This so-called passportization campaign recently entered a new phase, with the Kremlin announcing that anyone who fails to acquire Russian citizenship within the next six months will be subject to potential deportation from their own homes.

Eurasia Center events

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

Fears over the future fate of Ukrainians in occupied regions of the country were heightened recently by US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff’s apparent endorsement of sham referendums staged by the Kremlin in 2022 to justify the seizure of Ukrainian lands. “There have been referendums where the overwhelming majority of the people have indicated that they want to be under Russian rule,” he told Tucker Carlson in an interview that set off alarm bells across Europe.

The furor over Witkoff’s comments was hardly surprising. Russia’s fig leaf referendums in occupied Ukraine had been roundly rejected at the time by the vast majority of the international community, including many of Russia’s traditional supporters. “The United States will never recognize these illegal attempts to seize territory that does not belong to Russia,” the US State Department declared.

The September 2022 ballots lacked even a basic semblance of legitimacy, with voting taking place at gunpoint. Indeed, in many instances, the captive population were visited in their homes by election officials accompanied by armed soldiers. Such Kafkaesque scenes are nothing new for the Kremlin, which has been staging similarly farcical “referendums” to justify acts of international aggression since the Stalin era. Prior to Witkoff, however, no senior Western official had attempted to offer their stamp of approval.

The new UN report detailing Russian crimes against humanity in occupied Ukraine is particularly timely. Peace talks initiated by US President Donald Trump in recent weeks have focused largely on the possible partition of Ukraine, with negotiating teams working to determine potential boundaries. But while Trump talks of “dividing up the lands,” millions of lives are also at stake. It is therefore crucial to highlight the horrors unfolding in Russian-occupied Ukraine and the crimes being committed by the Kremlin. While it may not be militarily feasible to liberate these regions at present, safeguarding the basic human rights of Ukrainian residents living under Russian occupation should be an important aspect of any negotiated settlement.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Mar 20, 2025

Trump’s energy sector ceasefire could be good news for Putin’s war machine

By David Kirichenko 

Russian dictator Vladimir Putin has backed US President Donald Trump’s proposal for a partial ceasefire on energy sector attacks, but this may be a strategic step rather than an indication of his readiness to end the invasion of Ukraine, writes David Kirichenko.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert Mar 25, 2025

Ukraine’s growing military strength is an underrated factor in peace talks

By Serhii Kuzan

Any discussion on the future course of the war against Russia and the terms of any peace deal must take into account the fact that Ukraine is a now major military power in its own right, writes Serhii Kuzan.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Mar 26, 2025

If Trump wants peace in Ukraine, he must increase the pressure on Putin

By Doug Klain

Weeks after Ukraine backed a US proposal for an unconditional ceasefire, Russia continues to stall and push for further concessions. If Trump wants to secure peace, he must increase the pressure on Putin, writes Doug Klain.

Conflict Defense Technologies

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post UN report: Russia is guilty of crimes against humanity in occupied Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

“They’re kicking me out of my home. I have two kids. Nowhere to go. I live in Mikrorayon,” she said, her voice breaking under desperation. She was referring to one of countless Cold War–era housing blocks built by successive regimes across the Soviet nations. Behind her, frantic voices clashed.

I knew that sound well. It was the sound of fear.

This was not unusual. As the director of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s (RFE/RL) Turkmen Service, locally known as Azatlyk, I often received such calls—cries for help in a country where independent journalism is considered a threat. 

Turkmenistan, like many of the authoritarian regimes RFE/RL has covered, was built on the iron grip of a single ruler. Dissent was crushed, voices silenced, and truth distorted. RFE/RL was for many the only major source of news free from government manipulation.

The woman on the phone, whom I will call Maya, was a young widow with two children, the youngest just six months old. That night, city officials had come to demolish her home under the national leader’s so-called “beautification” campaign in the capital city Ashgabat.

When she saw the municipal workers approaching her home, she slammed the door shut, pressed her back against it, and, in that moment of desperation, reached for the only thing she believed could bring hope and protection: RFE/RL.

After gathering details, we did the only thing we could: We made a call to the local municipality. It was a simple act of journalism. We asked why a young widow with children was being thrown onto the streets in freezing temperatures.

That call was enough. The officials withdrew—not out of mercy, but out of fear. It was fear that the leader of the nation might catch wind of the story—that, as in many similar cases, he might view it as a stain on his image and make those responsible pay the price.

This is the power of RFE/RL. It is not just a news organization, but a shield for those whose own governments have abandoned them. In Turkmenistan, as in many of the places the organization serves, there are no fair and impartial courts to turn to, no free press to expose wrongdoing, no way for many citizens to hold power accountable. Without RFE/RL, Maya’s story would never have been heard. And she would have been just another forgotten casualty of authoritarian rule.

In recent days, however, the Trump administration has raised the specter of a world without RFE/RL. On March 15, the US Agency for Global Media terminated the funding grant for RFE/RL, endangering the organization’s ability to provide journalism for millions of people who would struggle otherwise to get access to news that is not controlled by an authoritarian government.

What’s the price of truth?

The recent decision to cut funding for RFE/RL along with its sister networks—Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, the Middle East Broadcasting Networks, and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting—is not just a financial cutback. It is a major blow to the millions who rely on it. 

For decades, these networks have signaled that the United States has not turned its back on those living under the rule of autocrats and radical extremists. They have served as a voice for the silenced, a bridge connecting the oppressed to the world beyond their borders.

RFE/RL’s annual budget was $142 million in fiscal year 2024. That is slightly less than the cost of three Apache helicopters, the same type of aircraft that was lost in large numbers over two decades of war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, with little lasting progress to show for it. 

With that single investment, RFE/RL reaches nearly 47 million people each week, broadcasting in twenty-seven local languages across regions spanning from Russia to the Balkans, from Iran to Central Asia, and all the countries in between. 

In the tribal regions of Pakistan, where the Taliban’s grip remains strong, the alternative to RFE/RL’s Pashto-language Mashaal Radio is what locals call “Mullah Radio”—an extremist-run broadcast spewing radical propaganda.

After Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service exposed war crimes while Russian state media flooded the airwaves with propaganda. Now, as Russia tightens its grip on Central Asia and China expands its influence in the region, RFE/RL remains an important line of defense against a rising tide of disinformation.

Hope, even in darkness

When I first joined RFE/RL in 2003, it had already been the lifeline for millions behind the Iron Curtain for over half a century. I remember when former Czech President Václav Havel visited RFE/RL headquarters. He spoke of growing up under communism, of listening to RFE/RL in secret, and of how those broadcasts carried the hope that one day freedom would come.

Havel wasn’t alone. Generations of dissidents, reformers, and ordinary citizens across Eastern Europe and Central Asia have similar stories. They drew strength from the words they heard in the media outlet’s broadcasts.. And when the Iron Curtain finally fell, they didn’t just see journalists at RFE/RL—they saw the voices that had never abandoned them.

Now, if the voice of RFE/RL and its sister networks is silenced, then what will fill the void? Chinese state media? Russian disinformation? The Taliban’s “Mullah Radio?” These forces have long pursued this outcome—weaponizing intimidation, censorship, harassment, and violence. Yet so far they have failed. The leaders of Iran, China, Russia, and Belarus are likely cheering the position in which these channels now find themselves. With no counterbalance, the propaganda of these regimes could go unchecked.

This outcome also would contradict the Trump administration’s own stated commitment to free speech, depriving millions of access to independent journalism. In many of its broadcast regions, RFE/RL remains one of the last sources, if not the only source, of truth.

History has shown that when free media disappears, oppression often takes its place.

For Maya, and for the millions like her, RFE/RL must endure.

Muhammad Tahir is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former RFE/RL executive who dedicated eighteen years to advancing independent journalism and press freedom in some of the world’s most restrictive environments.

The post A light in the darkness: Why RFE/RL matters now more than ever appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Access to credit plays a crucial role for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which account for 90 percent of businesses globally and generate over 50 percent of employment. However, barriers such as high collateral requirements, discriminatory lending practices, and borrower discouragement—especially among women-led firms—hinder their growth. Evidence from firm-level data in the World Bank Enterprise Surveys and the Atlantic Council’s Freedom Index reveals a strong link between freedom—spanning economic, legal, and political dimensions—and borrower discouragement. In high-freedom environments, borrower discouragement rates drop to 17 percent, while they reach nearly 48 percent in low-freedom settings.

Among these dimensions, legal freedom stands out as the most influential. Strong legal frameworks that protect property rights, enforce contracts, and combat corruption instill confidence in entrepreneurs and encourage credit-seeking behavior. The impact of these factors is particularly significant for SMEs and women-led businesses in low- and middle-income countries, where financial systems remain underdeveloped. Economic deregulation and transparent financial markets improve access to credit, while gender-sensitive policies—such as targeted financial education and credit guarantees—help mitigate the systemic biases that female entrepreneurs encounter.

Global case studies of successful policy interventions offer valuable lessons. New Zealand’s robust property rights framework, Singapore’s pro-business environment, and Kenya’s M-Pesa platform illustrate how strategic reforms can empower entrepreneurs and bridge credit gaps. These initiatives demonstrate that fostering freedom reduces borrower discouragement and drives inclusive economic growth.

Fellow

Jérémie Bertrand

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Freedom and Prosperity Center

Economy & Business English

Staff

Nina Dannaoui-Johnson

Deputy Director

Freedom and Prosperity Center

Africa Human Rights

Staff

Annie (Yu-Lin) Lee

Program Assistant

Freedom and Prosperity Center

East Asia Rule of Law

Fellow

Caroline Perrin

Nonresident Fellow

Freedom and Prosperity Center

Economy & Business English

Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

Report Mar 15, 2024

Attracting foreign direct investments

By Jérémie Bertrand, Joseph Lemoine, Dan Negrea, and Caroline Perrin

Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a pivotal objective for countries seeking to bolster their economic development and global competitiveness. By delving into the relationship between freedom and FDI using the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes and examining institutional mechanisms to influence investment, we shed light on the dynamics that determine a country’s attractiveness to foreign investors.

Economy & Business Freedom and Prosperity

Report Sep 23, 2024

How Zimbabwe can achieve its vision of prosperity

By Nina Dannaoui, Joseph Lemoine, William Mortenson, James Storen

Empowering women and attracting foreign investment will be critical in helping Zimbabwe make its vision of prosperity a reality.

Africa Economy & Business

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

Learn more

The post How greater freedom empowers entrepreneurs and expands access to credit appeared first on Atlantic Council.

There is no doubt that the global geopolitical context became more unstable in 2024. The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East seem to have brought the world closer to large-scale open conflict. Other ongoing conflicts around the world, including the civil wars in Sudan, Myanmar, and Yemen, rarely make the daily news, at least in Western media.  

The “super-election year” has led to important political changes in several nations. Among developed countries, we have seen a notable trend of incumbents struggling or losing elections. In the United States, Donald Trump made a historical political comeback to the presidency. In the United Kingdom, the Labour Party regained power after fourteen years and five different Conservative prime ministers. Among many, incumbents in France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan all lost ground in elections held in 2024. In the developing world, some countries have experienced dramatic transformations, such as Bangladesh (covered in detail in this volume), while in others the electoral results have debilitated the incumbent government’s majority (India and South Africa among many others).  

Global instability is combined today with a series of concerning governance trends incubated in the last decade. The most worrying is the global decline of political freedom since 2013. This process has been well documented in the academic literature, and has recently been the prominent focus of research for policy-oriented international organizations and think tanks around the world. The Freedom and Prosperity Indexes produced by the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center, which serve as the quantitative background of the country cases analyzed in this volume, clearly illustrate the generalized tendency toward autocratization that affects all regions. As portrayed in Figure 1, the global average of the political subindex has suffered constant erosion since 2013, and is today at a twenty-four-year low. All of its constitutive components have decreased in recent times, but most severely political rights and civil liberties.  

Figure 1. Erosion of political freedom since 2012 (global average)

Source: Freedom and Prosperity Indexes, Atlantic Council (2024).

In this turbulent context, the fight for freedom and democracy is crucial and must be waged on every front. This battle is always costly and uncertain. Historical cases, but also very recent episodes covered in this volume, such as those in Bangladesh and Venezuela, show us that national populations bear the largest burden, but external factors are also instrumental. In addition to international pressure and support to domestic agents of change, rigorous analysis and research based on objective data, showing the beneficial effects of liberty in the long run, are crucial instruments.  

The Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center wants to serve as a catalyst of such endeavors, particularly through its annual Atlas: Freedom and Prosperity Around the World, of which the present volume is the second edition. This 2025 Atlas features sixteen country studies, offering insights from renowned scholars and practitioners on their nations’ journeys toward freedom and prosperity. It includes timely analyses of countries experiencing dramatic events that may become pivotal in their histories, such as Bangladesh, Georgia, and Venezuela.  

The chapters clearly support the conclusion reached in cross-country studies of a causal positive relation between freedom and prosperity. At the same time, the chapters also highlight the specificities and particular characteristics of each country’s institutional evolution. The Freedom Index’s comprehensive approach allows for a disaggregated analysis of different dimensions (political, economic, and legal subindexes) and components (political rights, trade openness, corruption, etc.) of the institutional architecture of a country, which has proven extremely useful to understand the interlinkages, mechanisms, and complementarities between them in the context of each country covered in this volume. This introductory chapter tries to situate these country-specific insights in the broader economics and political science academic literature on the relationship between distinct institutional dimensions and economic development.  

Countries around the world differ substantially in terms of institutional attributes. Using the conceptual framework of the Freedom Index, which differentiates between three institutional dimensions—political freedom, economic freedom, and the rule of law—we show that there exists a high level of heterogeneity across countries in terms of their progress in each of these. And looking at the historical evolution of these institutional dimensions, we observe that not all countries have followed the same path.  

Knowing that these dimensions are not perfectly correlated, we examine the relationships and interactions between them. Do these institutional dimensions substitute for or complement each other? Is any one of them a necessary condition for the others? Is a particular chronology of institutional development more likely to produce fast-growing prosperity?  

In this chapter we focus on four hypotheses proposed in the academic literature: (1) the claim that the rule of law may be a necessary condition for economic and political freedom; (2) the debate on the primacy of democratization or stateness; (3) the discussion on whether democracy fosters or hampers economic freedom; and (4) the hypothesis that economic freedom may be a necessary condition for political freedom.  

To end this overview, we provide a brief summary of each chapter included in this volume, focusing on how the mechanisms explained here have operated in the politico-economic evolution of each country. The chapters highlight the need for a deeper understanding of the specific channels through which free institutions foster integral and sustained development and, eventually, prosperity. In the words of 2024 winners of the Nobel Prize in Economics, Daron Acemoglu, James Robinson, and Simon Johnson, further research should be carried out on “how democracy alters economic incentives and organizations and to pinpoint what aspects of democratic institutions are more conducive to economic success.” 

The many different paths to freedom 

Douglass North defined institutions as “humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interactions.” Modern societies rely on a complex mix of these institutions—like democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and property rights—which often overlap and can be difficult to clearly define. They are debated and interpreted in different ways, and there is no universal agreement on their precise definition.¹

To better understand how institutions influence development, we take a functional approach. Rather than getting stuck in theoretical debates, we use a flexible framework to explore how different sets of institutions function in real-world contexts.  

The Freedom Index created by the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center is a novel attempt in this direction. The Freedom Index is based on the idea that a country’s institutional architecture rests on three pillars: political, legal, and economic. The set of institutions forming each of these can be assessed based on the level of freedom they grant to individuals. We break the Index down into three subindexes—political, economic, and legal—which relate to the ideas of democracy, market economy, and the rule of law.  

The political subindex reflects a country’s institutional framework for the selection of those holding executive political power and the limits and controls imposed on the exercise of power. The legal subindex is based on how far citizens and government officials are bound and abide by the law. The economic subindex captures the degree to which scarce resources are allocated by personal choices coordinated by markets rather than centralized planning directed by the political process. 

Each subindex is formed by several components. The underlying theoretical conceptualizations and the measures used to quantify them are grounded in the academic literature in political science, law, and economics, as discussed in previous reports. Using this framework, the Freedom Index provides a rigorous quantitative assessment of each dimension and its constituent components for 164 countries, from 1995 to 2023, and allows us to address the question of their interlinkages and relations.  

Looking at the scores for the most recent year in the sample (2023), the simple correlations between dimensions for all countries covered by the indexes is relatively high, ranging between 0.68 and 0.8, as shown in the first column of Table 1 below. Nonetheless, this result is heavily influenced by the most institutionally developed countries, which receive very high scores in all threesubindexes.  

If we limit our analysis to non-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, as in column 2, the correlations fall significantly, as low as 0.52 for the correlation between political and economic subindexes. Other subgroups, such as the Sub-Saharan African region (column 3), or the countries with relatively less political freedom (column 4), also present far from perfect correlations between the three subindexes.  

These basic results evidence that countries do not necessarily have similar scores in all three sub- indexes, and that these can be fairly uneven. This perception is reinforced when we descend to the component level of the Freedom Index. The correlations between the components of different subindexes are many times below 0.5. Figure 2 shows the scatter plot between political rights versus bureaucracy and corruption for 126 non-OECD countries. As is clearly shown, we can find very different combinations of these two components across countries. The political rights score barely explains 7.6 percent of the variation in the bureaucracy and corruption score. This means that the remaining 92.4 percent of the variation is due to other factors. Some notable cases of great disparities between the scores include United Arab Emirates, Nigeria, and Singapore.  

Table 1. Correlations between dimensions of freedom

Notes: Pearson’s correlation. Number of countries included in each column is shown in parentheses.
Low political freedom refers to countries with a score in the political subindex in 2023 below the median.

Figure 2. Political rights vs bureaucracy and corruption (Non-OECD Countries)

Source: Freedom and Prosperity Indexes, Atlantic Council (2024).

We can further theorize about the evolution of the three dimensions of freedom by looking at how these have changed across time within countries. An in-depth analysis of this topic is beyond the scope of this essay, but we can gain insights with the example of two Sub-Saharan African countries.  

Rwanda and Nigeria had almost identical scores in the Freedom Index in 1995: thirty-nine and forty respectively. Both have experienced substantial increases, reaching a very similar level by 2023 (53.1 and 53.9). Yet the evolution of the three subindexes shows stark differences between the two countries. Progress in the former has been driven by sustained increases in the economic and legal subindexes, while political freedom barely changed. Meanwhile, Nigeria’s improvement is single-handedly explained by a sharp increase in the political subindex in 1999, capturing the country’s democratic transition, whereas the legal and economic subindexes have fluctuated and do not show significant improvement.  

Rwanda and Nigeria exemplify two very different paths of institutional progress that reflect the historical experience of several other countries. Rwanda’s path, based on law and order and economic freedom but limited political freedom, reminds us of South Korea and Spain before their respective democratic transitions. Nigeria’s “democratization first” path is similar to that taken by many Latin American countries in the second half of the last century, which led the third wave of democratization, despite low levels of state capacity and not fully open and developed market economies. 

Figure 3. Evolution of freedom dimensions, Rwanda and Nigeria

Source: Freedom and Prosperity Indexes, Atlantic Council (2024).

The interconnections among dimensions of freedom 

The evidence shows that the three dimensions of freedom develop unevenly over time and in different parts of the world. This highlights the importance of understanding how these dimensions are connected, whether they support each other or can replace one another, and how they work together to influence overall prosperity.  

Most quantitative measures of institutions implicitly assume that the different components can simply substitute for each other.² However, there are several potential complementarities between institutions.³ Understanding how these complementarities function is crucial, especially when assessing the impact of free institutions on economic performance and overall prosperity. Here we raise four questions about these connections. Empirical testing of these questions will follow in future research. 

Is the rule of law a necessary condition for political and economic freedom? 

The legal subindex measures the rule of law in formal terms, in line with scholars such as L. Fuller or J. Raz. If operating perfectly, the rule of law guarantees that political and economic freedom are effectively upheld, and can thus exert their effects on economic variables. Intuitively, the rule of law is then seen as a container into which substantive freedoms and rights are poured. Severe defects in the establishment of the rule of law, such as widespread corruption, inefficient bureaucracies, or a judiciary that does not ensure that executive power complies with the law, then represent holes and cracks in the receptacle that allow freedom to leak away.  

The idea expresses the distinction between de jure and de facto recognition of rights and freedoms. The enshrinement of individual civil or political rights in a written Constitution—such as freedom of expression, voting rights, and equality before the law—has little value if these are not effectively enforced and respected by the general population and, most importantly, by those in public office. Similarly, if the law recognizes property rights and generally allows private economic transactions and free competition, but the state apparatus does not adequately limit theft or demands bribes, the potential for economic freedom is limited. Additionally, if the state routinely expropriates property without proper compensation, it will hinder the development of a competitive market environment and its associated economic efficiency gains. 

What comes first, stateness or democratization?  

There are different theories on the temporal sequence in which different institutions are built within a country, and whether the order matters for economic outcomes. A prominent one is the “stateness first” argument, which claims that developing state capacity before democratization produces better long-term economic results than democratization processes in weak capacity environments.⁴ Here, state capacity means a formal notion of the rule of law in which a country is able to establish an efficient state apparatus in the Weberian sense,⁵ capable of enforcing and implementing policies and regulations within the territory through an impartial and effective bureaucracy.  

In this view, premature democratization is likely to produce clientelistic and patronage dynamics, generating inefficient allocations of resources, reduced productivity, lower quality of public services, increased uncertainty, and overall diminished economic activity. In the worst case, it may be a recipe for internal conflict and violence. Only until a state has solved its problem of credible enforcement, in the terminology of D’Arcy and Nistotskaya, can the benefits of democratization be fully realized. 

Despite its prevalence, especially in policy circles, the stateness first argument is not free of critique. On theoretical grounds, it is not clear whether autocratic or democratic governments face better incentives to invest in state capacity. Democracies, by providing a higher degree of legitimacy to political power and the legal system it enacts, can facilitate legal enforcement and compliance by the general population. Moreover, democratic accountability can incentivize leaders to invest in an administrative apparatus that ensures the efficient delivery and provision of public goods. Autocratic leaders, to the contrary, may prefer to underinvest in state capacity in order to secure personal control of public resources and limit the contestation capacity of the population. 

Recent evidence shows little support for the idea that countries with high state capacity perform better upon democratization than those that democratize under low capacity levels. Additionally, there is evidence of a positive and significant relation between democracy and growth in the context of weak capacity states in Sub-Saharan Africa. 

Does democracy hamper or foster economic freedom? 

The question of whether democracies or autocracies are more conducive to liberalization and the promotion of economic freedom has received different answers. The arguments pivot around three main ideas. First, some have argued that democratic building blocks such as separation of powers and the system of checks and balances limit the opportunities of political power to expropriate private resources, and thus better secure property. In this sense, the same democratic institutions that protect individual civil and political rights also serve as a safeguard of property and contract enforcement. In contrast, an autocratic ruler, not bound by any constraints on his or her authority, represents a permanent threat to private property.  

The second idea relates to the time horizon of policies in democracies versus autocracies. Liberalization, especially openness to trade and financial flows, can produce intense labor and production reallocations in the short run, which can entail layoffs and other costs before the benefits of such policies are materialized. Whether democracies are better equipped than autocracies to bear the short-run costs of liberalization is not clear. On the one hand, democratic leaders have the legitimacy provided by popular support to implement their proposed policies. But on the other hand, incentives to ensure their reelection may deter them from inflicting short-run costs on the elector- ate. For non-democratic leaders, the length of time they expect to stay in power determines the level of incentives to promote economic liberalization. In unstable autocracies, the ruler is likely to try to seize resources in the short run, before he or she loses power. Instead, stable autocracies may favor economic liberalization in order to increase aggregate output and thus the base of potential taxation rents in the future.  

Finally, it has been argued that the relation between regime type and economic freedom depends on mediating factors, especially the distribution of income or wealth. The proposition seems particularly related to the dimension of economic freedom that deals with the size of government in terms of taxation and spending. In highly unequal countries, democratization is likely to generate increasing levels of redistributive taxation and thus harm measures of economic freedom. Similarly, high levels of inequality in wealth and capital may induce voters to favor stricter labor regulations or restrict capital mobility. Recent empirical evidence seems to suggest that, in democracies, economic freedom tends to decrease when the level of inequality is high.⁶

Is economic freedom necessary for political freedom?  

Nobel laureates Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman posited that politically free societies must also be economically free, so economic freedom is a necessary condition for political freedom and democracy. Hayek warned that Western democracies faced a potential slippery slope toward authoritarianism after World War II, if the central governmental management of the economy required by the war effort were to be maintained or expanded. Once the state is given power over economic decisions, Hayek said, it is only a matter of time before the centrally decided plan differs from the preferences of at least some individuals. The government will need to use its coercive power to limit individual choices and rights. It may also constrain freedom of speech if used to confront or oppose governmental action. Additionally, the government might force individuals into certain occupations or locations, ultimately leading to a totalitarian state. Therefore, he concludes that only within a capitalist system is democracy possible. Friedman asserted that there was no historical example of a society that has enjoyed a high level of political freedom without something close to a market economy. 

Neither Hayek nor Friedman argued that economic freedom always sustains political freedom. They saw the former as a necessary but not sufficient condition for the latter. The hypothesis seems to be supported by empirical evidence. Yet, the claim that heavy government intervention in economic affairs inevitably leads to political servitude is contradicted by the experience of some Western countries. This is particularly evident in the Nordic European countries during the second half of the twentieth century. The combination of high levels of political freedom with large government intervention in the economy has proved not only possible, but has led this group to become some of the most prosperous societies of the world today.  

A possible explanation may relate to the discussion about the size of government and economic performance. Government taxation and spending arguably reduce economic freedom, but can nonetheless generate positive aggregate economic effects if social benefits exceed the unavoidable distortionary costs. Political freedom, by favoring free public debate and discussion, may thus help identify those public policies with positive net payoffs, and discard those that generate aggregate inefficiencies, allowing for a stable association of democracy and significant government economic involvement. 

Looking for answers around the world 

Having reviewed some potential relationships between the three dimensions of freedom, the final section of this overview provides a brief summary of each country chapter, with a focus on whether such mechanisms have operated in each country’s institutional evolution in the last three decades or are likely to do so in the foreseeable future. 

Some common ideas emerge. First, there is substantial divergence between written norms and implementation of those norms, especially in the developing and least developed countries. This limits the potential effects of institutional reform on economic growth and overall prosperity. Second, democratic erosion and instability are often the consequence of severe defects in the rule of law, in particular political corruption and inefficient bureaucracies. Third, for most authors, the most urgent area for reform in their countries is the one with the weakest performance—their “weakest link.” This highlights the significant complementarities between institutional dimensions, suggesting that balanced development across all areas is essential for prosperity.  

Ignacio P. Campomanes is a nonresident fellow at the Navarra Center for International Development (University of Navarra, Spain) and a senior adviser at the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center. Campomanes holds a BA in economics and a BA in law from Carlos III University in Spain, MA degrees in economics from Complutense University of Madrid and the University of Minnesota, and a PhD in economics from the University of Minnesota.  

Annie (Yu-Lin) Lee is the program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center. Previously, Lee served as a research assistant at Academia Sinica, Taiwan’s national research institute, where she focused on US policy toward Taiwan and China. Her work has been featured by the American Political Science Association, the US-China Perception Monitor, the Carter Center, and the Atlantic Council. She holds a BA in diplomacy from National Chengchi University in Taiwan.  

Joseph Lemoine is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center. Previously, he was a private sector specialist at the World Bank. Lemoine has advised governments on policy reforms that help boost entrepreneurship and shared prosperity, primarily in Africa and the Middle East. 

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Almost a year since his election, President Bassirou Diomaye Faye now has a clear mandate to carry out reforms, following his party’s resounding victory in November’s legislative elections. He must now turn his focus to continuing along the democratic track, lifting the constraints associated with credit rationing and leveraging commodity-based industrialization, and setting Senegal up for robust economic growth and welfare improvements.

By the end of the presidential election early last year, outgoing President Macky Sall—who had attempted to postpone the election, a move that led to deadly protests—congratulated Faye, calling the elections the “victory of Senegalese democracy.” Such a victory is important for Senegal, as democracy (contrary to what Chirac suggested) is not a luxury but a necessity for national reconciliation, the legitimacy of national institutions, and, ultimately, shared prosperity.

The presidential election was a victory not only for Senegal’s democracy but for democracy globally, rekindling confidence internationally in a system of government that has come under strain in Africa, especially in West Africa, where military coups have surged. That boost in confidence comes as people in even Western democracies grow dissatisfied with how democracy works in their countries. For example, an Ipsos poll in 2023 conducted across seven Western countries (including France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) found that most respondents believed the economy is rigged to the advantage of the rich and powerful and that “radical change” is needed to improve the political system.

In that poll, 70 percent of American respondents and 73 percent of French respondents—whose countries are seeing rising political polarization—said they believe that the state of democracy has declined in their countries in recent years. Moreover, the 2024 Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index ranked both the United States and France as “flawed democracies.”

While massive amounts of campaign financing are considered a prerequisite (and perhaps the most important attribute) for winning an election, Senegal’s presidential election was a reminder that conviction and ideas still matter. Faye—who secured 54.28 percent of the vote as an independent after his party was banned—defeated candidates who had far more financial firepower and ample time to rally support on their campaign trails. Despite being released from prison just a little over a week before the presidential election, Faye’s message and program were in sync with people’s aspirations and garnered broad-based support at the ballot box.

Faye promised to improve the living conditions in Senegal. For too long, the country has contended with widespread poverty, especially in rural areas where as many as 57 percent of people are considered poor. Furthermore, Senegalese youth continue to face high unemployment. The informal economy—which is generally associated with low productivity and endemic poverty—has become a major piece of the economy, accounting for nearly 37 percent of Senegal’s gross domestic product (GDP). Recently, the rising cost of living and income inequality have exacerbated Senegal’s socioeconomic challenges. Inflation has proven particularly sticky and is eroding household purchasing power. Amid these challenges, increasing numbers of Senegalese migrants are risking their lives to sail the seas en route to Europe in search of better opportunities.

Faye has also promised to fight corruption, promote good governance, and strengthen the rule of law and democratic institutions. For years, a “strongman” culture across Africa has enabled collusion between politicians and multinational companies, which has weakened agency and popular ownership of policies to undermine economic opportunity and exacerbate income inequality. This is especially the case in countries rich in natural resources, which are more vulnerable to corruption due to the significant revenues generated by resource exploitation, management, and trade.

Departing from the norm, Faye declared his assets in the lead-up to the presidential election. Upon becoming president, he announced he would conduct an audit of Senegal’s oil, gas, and mining sectors to rebalance them in the national interest. These moves establish baselines against which the people of Senegal can assess the president’s work toward tackling corruption and enhancing efficiency in the allocation of resources, with an ultimate goal of achieving more inclusive growth and shared prosperity in the country.

These are important steps in the right direction. Improving welfare for the Senegalese people requires a fundamental transformation of the economy. Expectations in Senegal are high following the discovery of major oil and gas reserves a few years ago. There are similarly high expectations for Africa as a whole. Despite its immense natural-resource wealth, the continent has, over the last several decades, become the world’s epicenter of poverty: Africa has the largest share of extreme poverty rates globally and is home to twenty-three of the world’s poorest twenty-eight countries.

This starkly contrasts with Nordic countries and the Gulf states, which have successfully leveraged their natural-resource wealth to boost prosperity in a span of a few decades. This contrast is partly due to the fact that rather than processing its own natural resources, Africa instead largely exports them overseas, increasing the prevalence of macroeconomic shocks and the risk of poor governance—both of which adversely affect the investment climate and heighten growth volatility.

But Senegal, arguably a latecomer to the hydrocarbon world, can learn from other African countries’ management (and mismanagement) of natural resources.  

Considering the experience of the most successful oil-rich countries, Faye should look to alter the structure of value chains to retain more production and refining processes locally. If Senegal can nurture these industries, it will set up the country for commodity-based industrialization that expands employment opportunities, enhances technology transfer, and accelerates integration into the global economy. This will help Senegal avoid a deterioration in commodity terms of trade, which is fueling internal and external imbalances. Last October, Moody’s downgraded Senegal’s long-term credit rating, citing a significantly weaker fiscal and debt position.

There are mechanisms and conditions in Africa that would help Faye in localizing natural-resource production and refining processes. The African Continental Free Trade Area’s rules of origin (which prioritize made-in-Africa goods) should help catalyze the production of intermediate and manufactured goods and the development of robust regional value chains. The scale of the continental market should help Senegal offset the potential losses of international trade associated with expanding protectionist barriers in a geopolitically fractured world.

The rise of globally competitive African businesses necessitates large-scale, long-term investment, so reforming the banking system will also be important. Affordable patient capital is particularly critical in Senegal, where domestic credit to the private sector remains very low (31.3 percent of GDP, versus 126.8 percent in Norway) and overwhelmingly short term. According to a report by the Central Bank of West African States, more than 80 percent of loans issued in 2022 had a maturity within less than two years.

Faye has an opportunity to achieve the systemic change he promised. Democracy has provided a path to greater ownership of policies that equalize access to opportunities and raise living standards in Senegal and more generally across Africa, a continent rich in resources and where the people are no longer prepared to accept intergenerational poverty as an inevitability. But democracy must not be regarded as an end; it must be seen as a means to greater security and prosperity. Thus, Faye must actively use the opportunity provided by the rekindling flame of democracy to usher in a new era—one that yields huge democratic and economic dividends.

Hippolyte Fofack, a former chief economist at the African Export-Import Bank, is a fellow with the Sustainable Development Solutions Network at Columbia University, a research associate at Harvard University, a distinguished fellow at the Global Federation of Competitiveness Councils, and a fellow at the African Academy of Sciences.

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As the host country, the Netherlands is responsible for ensuring the operational independence of the Court. Under the “Headquarters Agreement” between the ICC and the Netherlands, the country must cooperate with the ICC and ensure its business continuity. However, the new US sanctions targeting ICC personnel could severely disrupt the Court’s operations—particularly if Dutch banks suspend financial services to the ICC out of fear of violating US sanctions.

In response, the Dutch government has engaged in discussions with Dutch banks to explore under what conditions they would continue processing transactions for the ICC under these new sanctions. Reports indicate that the banks are seeking substantial guarantees to maintain their business with the Court.

One proposed solution is invoking the European Union (EU)’s “blocking statute”, which prevents EU-based businesses from complying with US sanctions that have extraterritorial reach. This statute allows EU companies to resist US laws that conflict with European legal protections and provide a framework for seeking compensation if harmed by US sanctions. The blocking statute was notably used in 2018 when the EU sought to bypass US sanctions on Iran following the US withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal. However, applying this legislation to protect the ICC would be an unprecedented use of this tool and likely come with unique challenges.

Nevertheless, various parties have expressed an ardent desire for the EU to invoke the blocking statute. The President of the ICC, Judge Tomoko Akane, has stressed that the EU blocking statute is one of the Court’s most essential tools for surviving any sanctions, urging, “to preserve the Court you must act now.” Dutch Justice Minister, David van Weel, also noted that “the Netherlands is too small” to protect banks on its own and that this issue needs to be addressed at a European level. In response, the Dutch Cabinet, following direction from Parliament, has agreed to advocate for the statute’s activation at the European level.

Given the EU’s longstanding support for the ICC, it is reasonable to assume that the EU will seek to protect the ICC in some form. There are a few less “nuclear” alternatives it may encourage first. Dutch banks could minimize their exposure to the ICC by restricting their services to a minimum—only holding cash and processing basic transactions for the ICC—or ICC servicing could be consolidated with one smaller bank. However, if the situation escalates, the EU may be forced to invoke the blocking statute, particularly if the US Senate revisits the previously blocked “Illegitimate Court Counter Act.” This bill sought to expand sanctions on the ICC to include not just those who “directly engaged in” unfavorable investigations but also those who “otherwise aided” the Court. While this bill was narrowly blocked due to concerns over its potential negative impact on American businesses, Democratic Minority Leader Senator Chuck Schumer indicated that a revised bipartisan version could be “very possible”.

It is therefore worth exploring what the blocking statute scenario would look like, because while it offers a strong legal defense, it may not be a panacea. Even if invoked, it could prove difficult to fully block all US sanctions, particularly when third-party countries and multinational companies with operations in both the US and the EU are involved.

The Netherlands, with its robust financial sector, faces a unique challenge, as several Dutch banks —such as ING, Rabobank, and ABN AMRO—are deeply integrated into the US financial system. While the blocking statute would shield Dutch banks operating within the EU from US sanctions, those with operations in the US remain subject to US law. This creates a dual compliance challenge: Dutch banks must balance their operations in the EU (protected by the statute) with their US operations (still subject to US sanctions).

Whichever way they turn, these banks will face unpleasant consequences. Complying with US sanctions could undermine the ICC’s financial operations, potentially halting essential payments to the Court. Additionally, compliance with US sanctions could expose these banks to long-term reputational risks, as they may be seen as aligning with US policy against the ICC, an institution widely supported by the international community. On the other hand, refusing to comply could lead to penalties or the loss of access to the US financial system. Dutch banks will need to navigate this conflict carefully, weighing the risks of becoming entangled in a geopolitical standoff.

As this situation unfolds, much remains uncertain. However, one thing is clear: US sanctions on the ICC have the potential to create significant diplomatic and economic tensions within the longstanding US-EU alliance, with the Netherlands caught in the middle. How the EU, the Netherlands, and Dutch banks respond will likely shape the future of the ICC and may have lasting implications for international diplomacy and the future of international law.

Lize de Kruijf is a project assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Economic Statecraft Initiative.

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This approach seems tailored to appeal to US President Donald Trump, who has since spoken favorably about the potential economic upside of a thaw with Russia. However, it remains to be seen whether foreign companies will be eager to return to Russia, given the experience of the past three years. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, more than a thousand international companies have exited the Russian market. Others have had their assets seized. Companies mulling renewed operations in Russia will have to weigh up the potential profits again a lack of property rights and other risks that could end up costing shareholders.

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With few exceptions, international companies that left Russia in the aftermath of the full-scale invasion walked away from subsidiaries worth millions or billions of dollars. It is safe to assume that the majority had to write down most, if not all, of the value of their investments in Russia. Some companies managed to sell assets, often to Kremlin cronies at knock-down prices. A few retained an equity interest in the hopes of an eventual rebound in the market. Virtually nobody emerged unscathed.

Companies left Russia in the aftermath of the invasion for a variety of motives. To their credit, some simply found it morally indefensible to remain there while Russia’s tanks rolled across international borders and its troops committed war crimes in Ukraine. Many businesses were less concerned about the morality of continuing to operate in Russia, but were nevertheless sensitive to guilt by association and possible damage to their reputation. Others weighed the benefits of staying in Russia against the cost of complying with international sanctions.

The companies that left Russia for moral reasons are unlikely to go back in the foreseeable future. This is also the case for companies seeking to safeguard their brand reputations. However, when the pickings seem rich, some may jump at the opportunity or bottom fish for low-priced assets. If another reset in US-Russian relations comes about, the United States government might provide inducements for a resumption of bilateral business ties, such as export credit guarantees, political risk insurance, and official backing for equity participation in major projects.

Taking another chance on Russia might seem appealing to some. After all, memories can be short in the business world. It is easy to imagine a new wave of corporate titans overlooking the lessons that a previous generation of expat CEOs learned during the last period of enthusiasm for expansion into Russia. Before proceeding, however, they would be well advised to study the current realities. Today’s Russia is not the country of Boris Yeltsin, who saw the West as a partner. It is not even the Russia of the early 2000s, before Vladimir Putin had fully consolidated his grip on power and completed the transition from fledgling democracy to authoritarian regime. After twenty-five years of Putin’s rule, the Kremlin now dominates all aspects of Russian life, including the country’s business climate.

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As a diplomat and business executive in Moscow in the 1990s and 2000s, and later as head of the US-Russia Business Council, I had a front row seat to the evolution of Russia from a centralized, state-controlled economy into a free market with a vibrant private sector, followed by its devolution into an oligarch-controlled system that more closely resembled a organized crime syndicate than a developed economy. During this period, I encountered a wide range of investors seeking advice or support in coping with the predatory conduct of Russian business partners or the Russian state.

Back then, there was a tendency to attribute most of the problems facing international companies in Russia to the growing pains of an economy emerging from communism. However, the signs of institutionalized corruption gradually became undeniable, including the imprisonment of business leaders and the seizure of companies by state-linked groups. These issues have not gone away; in many cases, the challenges have become even greater.

If a peace agreement is forthcoming, senior executives in Europe and North America will have to assess whether the potential profits from renewing operations in Russia are worth the many risks this would involve. Will major international oil and gas companies that previously invested in Russia want to return to a country where the state must hold a majority stake in any project, and where they are required to sell their gas to a state monopoly? Will any investor want to be at the mercy of the Russian judicial system?

The non-Russian staff of international companies may also not be entirely safe living and working in Putin’s Russia. In recent years, the Kremlin has been accused of arresting numerous foreign nationals on dubious charges in order to use them as bargaining chips in negotiations for the release of Russian criminals and spies being held in Europe and the United States. Any businesses that choose to send staff to Russia will be well aware that they cannot count on the rule of law if their employees become pawns in Moscow’s geopolitical games.

The Kremlin’s efforts to entice Trump with the prospect of mutually beneficial business cooperation make sense. Russia certainly has much to offer, including a vast domestic market and access to unrivaled natural resource wealth. However, it would be naive to expect individual companies to immediately rush back to Russia in light of the very real concerns that exist over the rule of law and the overbearing influence of the Kremlin on the country’s business environment.

Edward Verona is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center covering Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe.

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In a statement, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stressed the historical significance of the moment. “When Russia chose to roll its tanks over Ukraine’s borders, breaking the UN Charter, it committed one of the gravest violations: The Crime of Aggression. Now, justice is coming,” she commented.

Russia stands accused of committing a vast array of crimes in Ukraine. Russians have allegedly engaged in the systematic targeting of Ukrainian civilians with the bombardment of civilian homes, infrastructure, churches, and schools. Alleged Russian crimes also include rape, torture, mass trafficking of adults and children, forcible disappearances, and the execution of surrendering Ukrainian soldiers.

The perpetrators who committed and abetted each of these individual crimes must face legal accountability. However, this month’s progress in the quest to establish an international tribunal is aimed at filling another glaring gap in legal accountability. Presently, the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague is authorized to prosecute Russian nationals for the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, but it is unable to hold Russia’s leaders accountable for the decision to launch the invasion.

This inability to prosecute Russian leaders for the crime of aggression is a significant problem. After all, the attempt by Vladimir Putin and other Russian leaders to subjugate Ukraine is a test case with profound consequences for the future of international security. The outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine will reveal whether citizens of all countries can expect to live securely within their recognized borders without threat of invasion, occupation, and annexation.

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Enshrined in the United Nations Charter as “territorial integrity” and “state sovereignty,” the principles challenged by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have stood the test of time since World War II. In the past, even when allegations were levied that a country was violating these principles, there was never any serious question that such rules protecting a country’s borders existed.

These basic rules serve as the cornerstone of today’s international security architecture. They quietly uphold every existing diplomatic, economic, and military arrangement in the world, shaping the environment around us in ways that few notice and almost everybody takes for granted. If Russia is allowed to claim victory or even succeed in holding any of Ukraine’s recognized territory, the entire world will face a shift toward a dark new period in international relations governed by the principle of “might makes right.” A global arms race will likely follow.

Russia’s invasion and attempted illegal annexation of five Ukrainian provinces in a war of conquest is widely recognized by the international community as a crime of aggression. In March 2022, for example, a United Nations General Assembly resolution supported by an overwhelming 141-5 majority condemned Russia’s “aggression against Ukraine in violation of the Charter of the United Nations.”

Critically, the crime of aggression is a leadership crime. Those prosecuted must be military or political leaders. This has fueled speculation that figures like Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior officials in the Russian Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs could potentially be charged. It remains unlikely that any high-ranking Russians could be forced to stand trial in person, but even prosecutions in absentia could have serious repercussions for Russia itself and for the future framework of international security.

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Significant questions remain about the legal format of a possible tribunal, as different options including a fully international tribunal or a so-called hybrid tribunal established under Ukrainian law would face different limitations. The United States has not yet prioritized support for an international tribunal. Instead, Europe is currently playing a leading role in the push for justice. The proposed legal framework will now be scrutinized closely to see if it precludes the prosecution of key leaders while they remain in office, including Russia’s head of state and other senior Kremlin officials.

Additional issues include the financing of any future tribunal and its location. Presently, The Hague appears to be the most likely option as it hosts the ICC, the International Court of Justice, and the International Center for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression, which was established by Eurojust (the European Union’s judicial cooperation agency) in 2023.

This month’s agreement on the framework for a potential tribunal was welcomed in Kyiv. The Ukrainian authorities have proven adept at leveraging international legal mechanisms to pursue justice and accountability for Russian crimes ever since Moscow first invaded Ukraine in 2014. Legal scholars have extolled Ukrainian legal efforts as exemplars of post-colonial nations securing their due rights through such institutions and “countering imperialism through international law.”

Beyond the real legal importance of this progress toward a tribunal for Russian crimes against Ukraine, an accompanying narrative corrective is no less significant. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is not a faraway “border issue,” but rather a direct assault on the US-led system of international rules. It is therefore a direct referendum of US credibility on the world stage. Senior officials in the Trump administration have recently framed Russia’s invasion as an issue in which “both sides” must make concessions. Recognizing the one-sided nature of Russian criminal aggression reminds of the many sacrifices Ukraine and Ukrainians have already made in the fight to uphold the core principles underpinning international relations.

Recent announcements regarding a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression should serve as a reminder to US leaders that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine remains the world’s most documented war. Too much evidence exists in the public record to deny the reality of Russian crimes. Legal battles to hold Russia accountable will result in multiple highly detailed timelines of crimes committed by Russia in Ukraine. Failure to bring Russia to justice for these crimes could pose serious challenges to the future of international security and to US President Donald Trump’s own historical legacy.

Kristina Hook is assistant professor of conflict management at Kennesaw State University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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Evolution of freedom

In order to adequately assess Peru’s performance in the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes, it is important to note the extremely difficult situation in the country during the late 1980s and early 1990s, immediately before the period covered by the Indexes. The extreme episode of hyperinflation that began in 1988 and peaked in 1990, with an annual inflation rate above 7,000 percent, and the intensification of the internal violent conflict generated by the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), a Maoist guerrilla group, are two examples of the challenges Peru faced in the decade before 1995. The Freedom Index coverage begins in the middle of Alberto Fujimori’s presidency, once most of his economic reforms were already in place, and when some of his authoritarian tendencies were evident. Thus, the economic subindex score in 1995 is relatively high compared to the regional average, while the political subindex is significantly lower, thirty points below the mean for Latin America. The return to free elections in 2001 is reflected in the large jump in the political subindex in that year. 

Before discussing the Freedom Index evolution, it must be noted that many of its constituent components reflect the country’s written laws, not their actual implementation and enforcement. The potential gap between the situation de jure versus de facto is a typical issue with many indexes that try to assess politico-institutional variables, and it is often more pronounced in emerging and developing countries. This is crucial because we should expect institutional reforms to produce significant effects on prosperity only when they are effectively implemented. Peru is probably one of the clearest examples of this difficulty, with a set of written laws and regulations comparable to the most advanced countries of the world, but a level of implementation and enforcement that is far from such standards. Therefore, the picture portrayed by the Freedom Index may be too generous, especially in components such as women’s economic freedom and judicial independence and effectiveness. With this important caution in mind, it is possible to analyze the Peruvian experience as captured by the three different freedom subindexes. 

The economic subindex level and trend since 1995 are explained by two main factors. First, Peru’s relatively high score compared to the regional average at the beginning of the period is the product of the large body of economic reforms implemented in the 1990s, in particular in terms of trade and f inancial openness. In the last thirty years, Peru has had very low tariffs on imports, including no tariffs on capital goods, and has entered into a number of free trade agreements worldwide. Moreover, it has imposed very limited restrictions on capital movement within and across borders. From a purely de jure perspective, capital account openness in Peru is comparable to the most open countries of the world. The Chinn-Ito index of financial openness has assigned the highest possible score to Peru since 1997, and the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World Index gives the country a perfect score in its financial openness sub-area since the year 2000. However, Peru loses points due to the regulatory uncertainty and bureaucratic burdens that create constraints on investors, especially foreign investors; these barriers are considered in the investment freedom component. Reflecting a large increase in regulatory uncertainty during the election period of 2006, the investment freedom score abruptly fell twenty points, recovering in subsequent years as investors’ fears of strong government intervention in private sector affairs ultimately did not materialize. 

Second, the overall positive trend since 1995, with a total increase of more than ten points in the 1995–2023 period, is to a great extent driven by the thirty-point improvement in the component measuring women’s economic opportunities. This is a good example of the legislation–practice gap. It would be hard to find a specific legal norm that includes any form of discriminatory treatment based on gender, especially in economic matters. But the actual situation is not so optimistic. Think for example about the so-called “child penalty,” the impact in terms of labor outcomes when a worker has a child. Forty-one percent of women in Peru quit their jobs when becoming mothers, while men barely see any change in their labor force participation. Moreover, recent research shows that only 51 percent of working age women participate in the labor market, and there is also a 25 percent pay gap with men.

The property rights component remains at very low levels. This is largely explained by significant problems with land titling, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and corruption in the judicial system; all of which translate into significant constraints for safeguarding and formalizing property ownership. The lack of clarity on property rights regarding land ownership disincentivizes investment and severely limits the ability of small enterprises, particularly in rural areas, to access credit, as land cannot be used as collateral for loans. 

My impression regarding economic reforms in Peru is that, since the late 1990s, progress has been slow and limited. The various administrations since 2000 have not managed to implement a new wave of comprehensive structural reforms that could serve as an engine of sustained growth. There have been reforms, but they have been partial or hindered by significant implementation challenges. Fortunately, sound macroeconomic policies have been maintained in the last two decades providing economic and financial stability. But while macroeconomic stability is certainly necessary, it is not sufficient to drive sustainable growth. The period of Peru’s highest economic growth, from 2004 to 2014, was clearly facilitated by the global commodity boom, as the country is a significant producer of copper and other raw materials. However, when external growth engines slowed, the inaction of several governments in implementing essential economic structural reforms left the country without the much-needed internal drivers for sustained growth. 

Turning now to the political side, I am skeptical about the very favorable assessment of the political system illustrated by the political subindex and its four components. Although declining in recent years, Peru’s political subindex is at a similar level to the average of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, scoring around ninety out of one hundred since the end of Fujimori’s presidency. This does not capture the actual functioning of the Peruvian political system, which is far from that of well-established liberal democracies in Europe and North America, or even the most advanced countries of Latin America such as Chile or Costa Rica. 

Source: Freedom and Prosperity Indexes, Atlantic Council (2024).

One of the most evident recent political problems in Peru is the lack of a deep-rooted party system. With few well-established political parties, the political spectrum is plagued with small and not very institutionalized political parties that appear and disappear in every electoral cycle, whose leaders often lack political experience and are prone to populist rhetoric and tactics. This political fragmentation is making it extremely hard for any government to pass substantial legislation or implement its policy agenda. A good example of the extremely dysfunctional political environment is the evident weaponization of the Constitution during the last decade, regarding the respective powers of the presidency and parliament. The Constitution enables Congress to denounce the president as incompetent and remove him from office, and also grants the president the power to dissolve Congress, under certain circumstances. Although this system was intended to create a balance between the legislative and executive branches, it has been used recklessly since 2016, leading to Peru having six different presidents in eight years, with only one of them staying in power for more than two years. To some extent, these developments are reflected in the decline in the legislative constraints on the executive component. 

The general citizenry is very aware of the political situation of the country. Public opinion is strongly negative toward politicians and political parties. Recent waves of the Latinobarometer opinion survey clearly show that Peruvians are among the populations that have least confidence in the potential economic and development benefits of a free political system. This is worrying; once citizens become skeptical about the capacity of democratic institutions to deliver for all, the road to populism and authoritarianism is paved. 

In the legal subindex, the judicial independence and effectiveness component faces the same criticism. The sharp rise in this component’s score, along with the improvement in the clarity of the law component, drive the clear discontinuity observed in the year 2000, which virtually closes the gap with the rest of the region. In the last twenty years, the legal subindex score for Peru has been relatively close to that of neighboring countries such as Colombia, and the gap with respect to the top performers in the region is moderate. However, I have doubts about whether this captures the real situation regarding enforcement of the law. A comparison with the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicator’s (WGI) rule of law measure can be enlightening here, as the latter captures to a much greater extent the actual enforcement of the law. Figure 1 compares Peru to Chile and Costa Rica. The difference between Peru and Costa Rica is substantial, with Costa Rica’s score around twice Peru’s for all years since 2000. The gap with Chile is even wider. Figure 2 shows a similar picture when looking at another related variable of the WGI, namely government effectiveness. That is, when using a measure of actual practice and enforcement of the law, Peru falls considerably behind the top scorers of the region, not to mention developed countries in Europe or North America. 

Finally, the prevalence of informal labor and production relations in Peru is among the highest in the region, with some estimates reaching close to 70 percent of the total labor force. The World Bank estimates that the share of gross domestic product (GDP) contributed by informal production is around 50 to 70 percent higher in Peru than Mexico or Colombia, which are by no means the region’s best performers in Evolution of Prosperity this metric. The improvement captured in the informality component from the early 2000s is most likely a by-product of the commodity boom, a period of high economic growth that benefited employment and workers’ formalization, although some labor market reforms also supported this outcome. Nonetheless, informality is still a pressing issue for Peru, and a strong constraint on the future development of the country. 

Evolution of prosperity

The poor quality and effectiveness of Peruvian institutions stand in sharp contrast to the relatively stable macroeconomic situation in the country, and the favorable perception of Peru’s economic performance and prospects among the international community. This is a paradox, as similar levels of political instability have produced very volatile macroeconomic environments in other emerging market economies, plagued with sudden stops in financial f lows, high levels of inflation, and default episodes. Many commentators attribute Peru’s macroeconomic stability to the deep scars the hyperinflation of 1988–90 left among the population and the political elites. The dramatic consequences of this event, with empty stores, lack of basic goods and services, and a rapidly impoverished middle class, are very much embedded in the citizens’ minds, and avoiding its repetition has been an absolute priority for all subsequent governments. 

This fear has generated an implicit consensus, and politicians across the ideological spectrum have left management of the macroeconomic situation out of the political debate. The functioning of the Central Reserve Bank of Peru is the paradigmatic case of this arrangement, as illustrated by the fact that the Bank’s chairman has held this position since 2006, under eight different presidents. As a consequence, Peru’s macroeconomic performance in the last twenty-five years has been truly impressive, with a very credible commitment to a low inflation target, low levels of public debt to GDP (around 33 percent in 2023) and controlled government deficits, which granted the country’s public debt the investment grade in 2007. 

The evolution of the Prosperity Index reflects this situation, showing an increase of almost fifteen points in the 1995–2019 period, eliminating the gap with the rest of the region. The income component largely follows the same pattern as the overall index. Nonetheless, a careful analysis of this trend reveals an evident slowdown of economic growth, especially since the end of the commodity boom. In my view, this stagnation is the direct consequence of a combination of weak institutional quality and a f lawed political environment. As a result, it is likely to persist unless a new and comprehensive reform process is undertaken. 

The inequality component shows an impressive improvement in the last two decades, but it is important to take into account the really low level of this indicator in the early 2000s. The commodity boom undoubtedly helped reduce income inequality by pulling large numbers of workers into the formal sector and expanding the middle class. Although poverty- and inequality-reducing policies are in place across the country, and have played a role in supporting reductions in inequality, the limited capacity of many sub-national governments often means inefficient implementation and inadequate provision and quality of public services. As a result, regional inequality is a pressing problem in Peru. For example, according to a recent report by the World Bank, although more than half of urban households have access to piped water, sanitation, electricity and the internet, only 6 percent of rural households have access to these four services. Regional inequalities are also seen. For instance, residents in Loreto, a region in the Amazon, have eight hours a day of water access, in comparison with the country average of almost eighteen hours. There is extensive research showing that regional inequality is a serious issue, and some regions are noticeably being left behind.

I am somewhat critical of the education component, which is based on measurements of “quantity” of education, such as the expected and mean years of schooling, but does not take “quality” into account. The period of rapid growth enabled an increase in the government’s education budget, resulting in a significant rise in the percentage of children completing elementary, primary, and secondary education. However, while there have been advances, the quality of education remains a serious concern. For example, Peru was in the lowest quartile of the PISA global rankings. In the most recent PISA results, almost no students in Peru were top performers in mathematics, and only 34 percent attained at least a basic level of proficiency in mathematics, significantly less than the average across OECD countries (69 percent).¹An educational reform introduced in 2012, building on the reform of 2007, aimed to improve teacher quality and student learning outcomes. A key goal was to transition from a system that allows hiring and promotion of teachers based on political connections to one based on merit. A major obstacle, however, has been political. The teachers’ union protested against elements of the reform, such as evaluations that could lead to job losses for underperforming teachers. The insufficient educational quality in Peru is a major constraint on long-term growth, as it limits the accumulation of human capital, essential for sustained economic progress. Many graduates lack the skills necessary to succeed in the labor market and are limited to low-paying jobs in the informal sector. 

There is also a lack of quality measures in the health component. In particular, the indicator does not capture the large deficiencies in health infrastructure and the resulting shortcomings in patient care. For instance, studies conducted before the COVID-19 pandemic revealed that more than half of the establishments offering primary healthcare lacked a single doctor and were staffed only by nurses or technicians. The pandemic exposed serious deficiencies with the healthcare system, with devastating consequences. Peru reported the highest number of deaths per million inhabitants globally. Unsurprisingly, the country’s health score fell twice as much as the average for the region. 

The very significant improvement in the environment component is almost exclusively driven by one of the variables used in its construction, namely the share of the population with access to clean cooking technologies, which has increased from 40 percent to more than 85 percent in the 2000–20 period. This is certainly good news, but there is still significant room for improvement in both indoor and outdoor air quality, as well as other environmental challenges. Examples of environmental challenges include illegal mining, especially in the Madre de Dios region, which leads to deforestation, mercury contamination and loss of biodiversity. Water contamination from untreated sewage and industrial waste is another major issue and there is a lack of effective waste disposal in many cities, contributing to plastic pollution, especially in urban areas along the coast. In addition, Peru is highly vulnerable to natural disasters exacerbated by climate change, such as extreme weather events and rising sea levels that affect the coastal area and fishing. 

As reflected in the relatively low score assigned to the minorities component, protection against discrimination based on gender, race, sexual orientation, and other characteristics is relatively weak in Peru, falling significantly below the regional The Path Forward average, with the gap widening in recent years. Although there have been improvements, cultural and social norms continue to limit advances on this front. Another pressing issue is gender-based violence. A recent World Bank report highlights that the institutions responsible for protecting women and girls, including the police, the judiciary, and health providers, do not effectively protect them from abuse. Consequently, there is widespread mistrust among women toward government institutions in Peru. 

The path forward

Peru’s prospects for prosperity are at a critical juncture. The previous discussion highlights that deficiencies in the capacity of the state to deliver public goods and services, including ensuring security and enforcement of the law, significantly constrain the country’s potential for regaining economic growth and overall prosperity. The weakness of institutions and governance, reflected in excessive bureaucracy, corruption, and a weak and inefficient judiciary, hampers domestic and foreign private sector investment. While maintaining a stable macroeconomic framework is key, it is not sufficient to provide the certainty and security investors need for long-term and productive investments. 

A major challenge in implementing state reforms is political fragmentation, which prevents reaching consensus. Currently, ten political parties are represented in Congress and the number of parties may rise in the lead-up to the April 2026 presidential elections. This fragmentation is partially explained by weak legal requirements for forming political parties, which allow small groups to establish a party. The decline of traditional World Bank, Rising Strong: Peru Poverty and Equity Assessment. parties, such as Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, and Acción Popular, has left a vacuum. This decline is another reflection of the population’s mistrust in institutions, which fuels the rise of new political movements, often led by charismatic but inexperienced leaders seeking to capitalize on widespread discontent. 

How can much-needed pro-growth and inclusive structural reforms occur in this fragmented context? Fortunately, there is a promising opportunity for Peru in the coming decade: the green transition. Peru is rich in copper, lithium and other natural resources that are essential for clean energy technologies, which can position it as a crucial partner for the rest of the world. Additionally, its diverse geography provides significant renewable energy potential, especially in hydropower, solar and wind, which can reduce dependence on fossil fuels, create jobs, attract foreign investment, and improve energy security. 

I am hopeful that recognizing the potential benefits of a comprehensive green transition strategy—such as growth, poverty reduction and equity improvements—can catalyze consensus even in a fragmented and polarized political climate. The increasing global push for environmental initiatives, along with efforts in other Latin American countries, could incentivize policy actions in Peru. If even partial consensus around this agenda is achieved, three areas of reform must be prioritized. 

First, major investments in infrastructure and other projects are necessary to support the green transition. Improving the public sector’s capacity to execute these projects requires a systematic effort to build the technical capacity of subnational governments. This includes providing technical assistance and facilitating the hiring of trained personnel, including from abroad. Ideally, a comprehensive reform of subnational governments would involve consolidation of local and even regional governments, as some are currently too small to function efficiently. Yet while this reform needs to remain a long-term goal to improve efficiency, in the short term, in the context of high political polarization, this type of proposal could be weaponized, further increasing resistance to reform. 

Second, to develop value chains related to the green transition—such as green manufacturing, renewable energy and eco-tourism—it is essential to facilitate the formalization of firms and workers. This requires significant labor market reform. Liliana Rojas-Suarez Currently, the very high costs of hiring, firing, and non-wage labor costs, above the region’s average, reduce incentives for firms to hire workers and for small and medium-sized firms to formalize. A more f lexible labor market would allow Peru to compete globally in emerging industries linked to the green transition. 

Third, human capital development is crucial. The workforce needs to be equipped with the necessary technical skills to meet the demands of the green transition. Given the pace of technological change, workers must not only be prepared for current jobs but also possess the ability to adapt and learn. That means that serious improvements in the education and health systems are necessary. This will require sustained efforts across multiple government administrations to bear fruit. 

Notwithstanding, if political consensus is achieved around the goal of advancing Peru’s role in the green transition, there is hope that political parties can form a common front to improve the quality of Peru’s future labor force. Sustained prosperity will then follow. 

Liliana Rojas-Suarez is the director of the Latin American Initiative and a senior fellow at the Center for Global Development. Rojas-Suarez also serves as president of the Latin American Committee on Macroeconomic and Financial Issues. Rojas-Suarez has held senior roles in the private sector and at multilateral organizations, including Deutsche Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Inter-American Development Bank. In 2022, Forbes named her one of the fifty most influential women in Peru. 

The Atlantic Council and its staff, fellows, and directors generate their own ideas and programming, consistent with the Council’s mission, their related body of work, and the independent records of the participating team members. The Council as an organization does not adopt or advocate positions on particular matters. The Council’s publications always represent the views of the author(s) rather than those of the institution.

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Evolution of freedom

Since 1995, Georgia has gone through a series of waves of reform, which are clearly reflected in the upward trend of the Freedom Index, at least until 2018. Nonetheless, I would point to two important caveats that might curb this optimistic view. First, there are significant differences between the three subindexes, as well as among their components, with the legal subindex clearly showing a lower score than the economic and political subindexes. This is probably a subtle image of the second caveat: the clear divergence between the country’s institutional framework as it appears on paper and in practice. Georgian written laws and regulations are comparable to those of the most developed countries of Europe or North America. There are always areas where improvement is possible. Still, on paper, we (Georgia) seem to be a democratic state with all necessary institutions, the balance of power, and fundamental principles of human rights protection. However, implementing our legal norms and regulations is far from complete. Therefore, some components of the Freedom Index may not present a realistic view of the actual situation experienced by most citizens in the country. Analyzing the three subindexes in detail corroborates this general concern.

Improvements in trade and economic freedoms mainly drive the positive evolution of the economic subindex, and this does capture a real advancement. We have signed free trade agreements with all major regional players, like the European Union, China, Russia, and Turkey. Our trade relations and policies are fairly free and flexible. Georgia has undoubtedly benefited from this economic openness, boosting the economy and income per capita. The acceleration of economic freedoms over the past decade is also due to the increased respect for property rights, as previously, the country had experienced severe problems in this regard, with waves of mass property dispossession.

However, developments around Anaklia deep sea port in 2019 have shaken Western investors’ confidence in Georgia. In August 2019, the US construction and development company and founder of the Anaklia Development Consortium (ADC), the Conti Group, announced it was leaving the consortium. ADC has accused the government of sabotaging the project, which received major support from Georgia’s strategic partner, the United States, and the European Union. Overall, the ADC’s departure marked a significant setback for Georgia’s infrastructure ambitions. The port was intended to boost Georgia’s economic and strategic standing as a major transit hub.

The component measuring women’s economic freedom also seems to have improved significantly, at least since 2005, but this is an excellent example of the gap between the de jure and de facto situations. On paper, Georgian legislation ensures a high level of gender equality on any economic issues, such as employment rights, ownership of assets, the establishment of legal entities, etc. However, the proportion of women is deficient when looking at top business positions or the state apparatus. Also, the gender salary gap is substantial and does not seem to be closing. Again, there is no legal standing for this reality; this is not because of a failure of the law to uphold women’s economic opportunities; it is a symptom of the patriarchal nature of Georgian society.

The score for property rights is notably lower compared to the other components because it captures actual property protection, especially against arbitrary public expropriation, a severe problem in Georgia prior to 2012. The data series shows well the gradual deterioration of the situation until 2012, when the government or its proxies were constantly—and arbitrarily—seizing private property. One of the ways this occurred was that individuals were imprisoned for a crime, and they would then buy their way out of prison by handing over their property to the state. This culture became widespread and led to extremely high numbers of incarcerations. According to the International Centre for Prison Studies, by 2012, Georgia had the highest prison population in Europe and the fourth highest in the world. In 2011, it also recorded one of the highest death rates in prisons. In 2012, the new government led by the Georgian Dream Coalition sharply amended the situation, and the component may not fully reflect the substantial improvement in property rights protection since then.

Both the political and legal subindexes illustrate well the two major episodes of institutional liberalization in Georgia, following the 2003 Rose Revolution and the 2012 change of government.

Since 2018, the country has been experiencing a dramatic institutional regression that is only slightly observable in the political subindex and not yet visible in the legal subindex components. The improvement shown in the legal subindex is perhaps the most misleading signal in the data presented here. No institution in the country needs reform more than the judiciary, and the general population and international community clearly perceive this. The deficiencies of the judicial system are the product of a selection process that is non-transparent and entirely arbitrary, which has allowed this crucial pillar of the state to be administered by a significantly small elite of judges for almost two decades. The High Council of Justice, the agency in charge of appointing judges, has been controlled by the same people since 2007, recurrently reappointing themselves to different high administrative positions. It is hard to agree with the sustained improvement shown in the judicial independence component when the interests of the ruling party and the judicial system are so closely intertwined, and the line between them is completely blurred.

A clear example of this behavior is the episode that occurred on July 22, 2024, when the judiciary unlawfully interfered with the constitutional authority of the president by suspending the appointment of a Supreme Council of Justice member. According to the Constitution of Georgia, the president has full and exclusive authority to appoint a member of the Supreme Council of Justice without anybody’s consent or consultation. However, the judiciary clearly views even a single dissenting voice as an intolerable threat to its clannish rule. Its interference with the constitutional powers of the president is not only illegal; it undermines the constitutional principle of separation of power.

Finally, the political subindex only mildly shows the degradation of the situation in the last few years, but the negative turn starting in 2018 is evident in all four components. Regarding civil and political rights, the data do not yet reflect the passing of recent laws on foreign agents and LGBT rights, which will certainly further reduce Georgia’s score in terms of civil liberties. Similarly, several amendments were passed to electoral legislation, reducing the opposition’s and civil society’s capacity to monitor and contest the government. Last, the fact that no reactionary reforms have been passed in relation to the power and capacity of parliament masks the fact that legislative constraints on the executive become fictional when the same political party runs virtually all institutions of the state. Today, barely any officials – just the president and one small-city mayor in a mountainous region of Georgia – are not part of the ruling party. Thus, there is no effective control of the executive nor any real checks and balances within the state apparatus. As this report was under development, parliamentary elections in Georgia produced an even more hostile and polarized environment, with all major opposition parties, civil society monitoring organizations, and international observers claiming major fraud. The judicial branch is by no means a safeguard of individual rights, so Georgia is rapidly and effectively falling into one-party rule, which is concerning and not fully captured in the Index.

Evolution of prosperity

The evident catch-up process concerning the rest of Europe observed in the Prosperity Index is mainly driven by the strong performance of the income and education components. Georgia has had a period of fast growth, but this would be somewhat expected given its low level at the beginning of the period of analysis. Coming from a socialist economic environment, the liberalizing economic reforms mentioned above surely produced a boost in economic growth. Even accounting for inflation and purchasing power parity, the Georgian economy has clearly closed the gap with the most developed European countries.

The Index also captures the impressive increase in years of schooling, placing the country among the top performers worldwide in the education component. However, it is essential to note that the situation is very different in terms of quality. We are not anywhere close to the best educational systems in the world, as evidenced by standardized tests such as the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), where Georgia falls significantly below the OECD average.

At least two components of the Prosperity Index—inequality and minority rights—may not accurately reflect the reality experienced by Georgians. Growth in income per capita can indeed advance the situation of the middle class, and this has probably been the case in Georgia, explaining the improvement in the inequality component measured by the Gini coefficient. However, the differences between regions within the country, as well as between urban and rural areas, are very sizeable. Parts of the country still rely on a barter economy, and this is most likely not captured adequately. Regarding the treatment of minorities, the positive trend of this component does not reflect the situation of several minority groups, such as the LGBTQ+ community, which has been discriminated against and disadvantaged intentionally and will likely suffer even larger stigmatization given the new legislation passed by the parliament framed as “Protection of Family Values.” Sadly, the government ignores the abuse and discrimination not only when it comes to employment, for example, but also the highly violent cases of physical assault and harassment. In recent years, Georgia witnessed several instances of violent attacks against LGBTQ+ civil society organizations, as well as individuals and politicians who champion minority rights. Most of those attacks were large in scale and well organized. One of the most outrageous instances of brutality that shocked Georgia was the murder of 37-year-old transgender model Kesaria Abramidze on September 18. Coincidentally, this hate crime happened the day after anti-LGBTQ legislation was passed. Brutality was widely displayed on the streets of the capital city, Tbilisi, during the attacks of July 5, 2021, when Tbilisi Pride was violently disrupted by far-right groups, leaving 53 media workers who were covering the events injured and one dead. Anti-LGBTQ+ protesters also raided offices belonging to the NGO Tbilisi Pride and Shame Movement, which organized the event. This was not an exceptional event. Virtually every time the queer community comes out in public, they are pushed back into the social periphery by crowds led by far-right activists. It is also true that virtually every time, the police and state fail to protect LGBTQ+ people, control the mob, arrest their leaders, or bring them to justice. There is a dominant perception that the authorities are collaborating with violent groups. 

The only possible explanation for any increase in the minority component since 1995 may be found in the efforts made in the educational system to integrate ethnic minorities through a common language and other inclusive educational policies. Those efforts notwithstanding, a disturbing downturn in minority rights was visible from 2021–22. Despite some improvement since then, the decline will likely become apparent again in the coming years because of the way the ruling party and its proxies control all public spaces and opportunities and fight differences. This will inevitably reduce fair access to public jobs and business opportunities for those not politically aligned with them.

It is certainly true that substantial effort has been put into improving the healthcare system in the last couple of decades, and this is observed in the rise in the health indicator score. Most of it has been directed to primary care, children’s health, childbirth, pregnancy, and so on, and not so much to advanced medical care such as surgery or the treatment of serious conditions. This is why those Georgians who can afford to do so go abroad to get quality care for serious illnesses. According to the data from the Georgian statistics department, the number of citizens of Georgia going to foreign countries for medical care doubled in 2023. This explains why the healthcare gap with the rest of Europe persists.

COVID-19 provides a good example of this gap. At first, it is surprising that the data seem to show that the COVID-19 pandemic hit Georgia harder than the rest of Europe, as the country’s robust primary healthcare system should have allowed it to cope with the crisis relatively well. However, the problem was mismanagement and the absence of a structured, systematic approach. Georgia was doing well as long as the government maintained a state of emergency—run jointly by police and the military. Rules were as rigid as in any democracy across the globe. However, as the economy was suffering and people slowly started disobeying the rules, the government understood the need for change and eased the restrictions. This is where major shortcomings of governance presented themselves, and the number of infections started to grow dramatically. The COVID-19 crisis showed all the deficiencies of the governance system in Georgia. The state can manage the most difficult situations, provided it can do so with a draconian response based on police rule, but when you need a nuanced, rules-based approach with basic freedoms for citizens guaranteed, the government fails every time. Democracies are truly tested during a crisis, and the best test is to see whether policies remain balanced while dealing with the emergency. This is where Georgia fails every time.

The path forward

Georgia stands at a critical crossroads. One of the most significant risks Georgia faces is the ongoing influence of Russia, which exerts considerable power through economic, political, and military channels. Russian-backed hybrid threats present ongoing dangers that could undermine the Georgian government and disrupt reform efforts. Political polarization and governance challenges constitute another major hurdle. The political climate in Georgia is often plagued by fierce rivalries and divisions, hindering the passage of essential reforms and destabilizing governance. Without a shared vision among political parties, advancements in critical areas such as judicial reform, anti-corruption initiatives, and economic policy risk stagnation. The absence of political consensus diminishes the government’s strength and undermines public confidence in democratic institutions. To achieve greater freedom, a concerted effort is needed to build multiparty agreement on vital reforms and nurture a political culture prioritizing national interests over individual party agendas.

Economic inequality and emigration threaten Georgia’s progress. Despite economic growth, high unemployment, regional disparities, and limited opportunities push many young Georgians to seek work abroad. To sustain a robust economy and reduce emigration, addressing these inequalities, investing in regional development, and creating jobs for youth are essential.

Georgia must urgently reform its judiciary. An independent judiciary is vital for attracting foreign investment and building public trust. However, the judiciary faces corruption and political interference, obstructing economic and democratic growth. Legal reforms that ensure fair and transparent processes could restore public confidence and improve the business environment, making Georgia a more appealing investment destination.

As the majority of the population is predominantly asking for practical steps to bring Georgia closer to the EU and eventual membership, nondemocratic moves and decisions of the government stand as an impediment to this popular demand. This path forward will hinge on Georgia’s ability to integrate more closely with Western institutions, manage regional security risks, and drive economic modernization. Several key drivers of change will shape the country’s progress toward freedom and prosperity. Still, significant challenges—such as Russian influence, the authoritarian nature of the government, political polarization, and social inequality—could impede progress. By addressing these obstacles and embracing transformative reforms, Georgia can lay the groundwork for a resilient, prosperous, and democratic future.

Georgia’s drive for European integration is a significant factor in its future growth. The populace’s strong pro-European stance serves as a primary catalyst for change. Important milestones, like visa-free travel within the EU for Georgians and free trade agreements, represent advancement and inspire citizens’ hopes for EU membership. These successes also provide clear leverage for the government to sustain current benefits and advance even more.

Economic modernization is a crucial factor. Georgia’s economy has traditionally relied on agriculture and low-value exports, heavily dependent on the Russian market, which risks vulnerability to disruptions. Future development needs to shift toward services, tourism, technology, and trade for sustained growth. Investing in infrastructure—roads, ports, telecommunications—and achieving energy independence through renewables can enhance economic resilience and reduce reliance on external energy. Digital reforms and a focus on tech startups provide new opportunities, particularly for youth, while increased foreign investment may boost economic vitality. However, these changes require political stability, a favorable business environment, and better governance.

Regional security and stability are crucial for Georgia’s future. The South Caucasus is geopolitically sensitive, and prone to conflicts. For sustainable development, Georgia must ensure a peaceful environment domestically and with neighbours like Turkey and Azerbaijan. Partnerships with the EU and NATO are essential for countering security threats and fostering a stable regional investment climate.

Georgia’s vibrant civil society drives democratic progress. Citizens push for transparency and reforms through NGOs and grassroots movements. Increased civic engagement pressures the government to implement meaningful changes. Support for independent media ensures an informed citizenry to hold officials accountable. Civic education for youth encourages engagement, creating a more participatory political landscape.

Georgia’s future freedom and prosperity depend on leveraging European integration, driving economic modernization, unifying the country, and strengthening civil society. By fostering resilience, diversifying its economy, and ensuring political stability, Georgia can achieve growth, and greater freedom. Although the journey is complex, sustained commitment could position Georgia as a model of democratic resilience and economic innovation in the region.

Tinatin Khidasheli is head of Civic IDEA, a Georgian think tank countering Soviet legacy and Russian propaganda while advancing Georgia’s defense policies. Author of the first Georgian language book on hybrid warfare, Khidasheli teaches at Caucasus University, Georgian Institute of Public Administration, and Ilia University. Formerly Georgia’s first female defense minister, Khidasheli also chaired the Parliamentary Committee for European Integration. She holds an LLM from Tbilisi State University, and an MA in science from Central European University.

The Atlantic Council and its staff, fellows, and directors generate their own ideas and programming, consistent with the Council’s mission, their related body of work, and the independent records of the participating team members. The Council as an organization does not adopt or advocate positions on particular matters. The Council’s publications always represent the views of the author(s) rather than those of the institution.

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For more context and to make sense of all the competing arguments, we turned to our experts on China and technology. 

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Graham Brookie: The Supreme Court’s decision will shape global tech competition

Shelly Hahn: To China, algorithms are a national interest 

Kenton Thibaut: The US data security problem is bigger than TikTok

Caroline Costello: If you’re interested in protecting civil society, you should be concerned about TikTok

Mark Scott: Worries around TikTok’s data collection and security apply to all social media giants

Matt Geraci: US data privacy laws are not up to the task 

Emerson T. Brooking: If TikTok was a tool of Chinese foreign interference, someone forgot to tell China

Samantha Wong: The national security risks will remain whether TikTok is banned or not

Konstantinos Komaitis: A TikTok ban would be a direct attack on the open and global internet

Kitsch Liao: ByteDance’s First Amendment argument is a distraction from its refusal to divest

The Supreme Court’s decision will shape global tech competition 

The United States Supreme Court is set to start 2025 with a blockbuster case on a tight timeline with significant domestic tech and geopolitical ramifications.  

The law in question in the case of TikTok v. Garland—the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act—was passed by Congress in April 2024 with widespread bipartisan support: a 352–65 vote in the House and 79–18 in the Senate. US President Joe Biden signed the bill into law, giving him the authority to force TikTok’s divestiture from its Chinese parent company or be banned from the United States. The Department of Justice set a deadline of January 19—forcing this dramatic showdown. The Supreme Court will proceed in hearing the case on January 10 despite Trump’s request to delay until after his inauguration and the fact that the high court typically defers to its two co-equal branches of government on matters of national security.  

The Atlantic Council previously published an in-depth technical analysis of whether the threats of legal control, data access, algorithmic tampering, or broad influence efforts by the Chinese government are unique or singularly focused on TikTok. The threat of legal control proved to be real and ongoing. The other potential risks remain considerable with loopholes not specific to TikTok, such as the sheer amount of Americans’ data for sale on the open market or the litany of US-owned platforms the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has used to perpetrate influence efforts. Chinese ownership of TikTok is undoubtedly a core strength in its global approach to “discourse power.” The key questions remain whether a Chinese company’s ownership of such a popular social media platform poses unique national security risks to the United States, whether banning such a popular app violates the rights of the company or the app’s US users, and how China may react or force ByteDance to react. Beyond TikTok v. Garland, any outcome will shape global tech competition from the global reach of digital platforms to broader tech governance. If new evidence is surfaced, it will shape both. 

—Graham Brookie is the vice president of technology programs and founding director of the Digital Forensic Research Lab at the Atlantic Council. 

To China, algorithms are a national interest

The TikTok saga highlights Beijing’s strategy of using private companies to exert influence globally, while restricting foreign companies’ operations within China. 

Beijing views algorithms as critical tools to exert national power, with Chinese leader Xi Jinping emphasizing the importance of artificial intelligence in military and economic power competition. As TikTok has gained market clout, the Chinese government has taken a more assertive stance on its technologies, especially content recommendation algorithms. Since 2020, China has implemented measures to protect its technological assets, including adding algorithms to the restricted list  of technologies from export in August 2020, and passing the “Export Control Law” in October 2020, which governs the sale of these technologies to foreign buyers. China now strongly opposes any forced sale of TikTok, asserting its legal authority to veto such transactions. 

Beijing has railed against the United States’ enforcement actions against TikTok, using abusive and inflammatory rhetoric to paint those actions as a violation of international norms. Chinese officials have called these actions “an act of bullying” (Xinhua editorial), “an abuse of national power” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokeswoman Mao Ning), and “hypocritical and double standards” (Xinhua editorial). They have warned of potential consequences for the global economic order. 

That is interesting rhetoric given that Beijing would not allow a US or other foreign company to operate similarly in China. China maintains a restrictive environment for foreign media and technology companies, blocking most foreign social media platforms, search engines, and news outlets. When probed about this disparity, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson claimed that “China’s policy on overseas social media is completely incomparable to the US’ attitude towards TikTok . . . as long as foreign media companies comply with the requirements of Chinese laws and regulations, all foreign media platforms and news agencies are welcomed.” In reality, these laws give the CCP firm control over data flows and information within its borders. 

Beijing’s robust defense of TikTok and its underlying technology underscores China’s growing confidence in its tech sector and its willingness to challenge what it perceives as unfair treatment in the global marketplace. 

—Shelly Hahn is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. 

The US data security problem is bigger than TikTok 

There is no doubt that People’s Republic of China (PRC) state entities see the value in collecting data on Americans for intelligence purposes. However, the proposed actions on TikTok leave open serious questions on how effectively a ban or divestment would protect Americans’ data from exfiltration.

The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab previously conducted a technical, policy, and legal analysis of the stated national security risks posed by TikTok. Our research found that TikTok can be said to present a unique risk in terms of its Chinese ownership, in that the PRC’s National Intelligence Law does give the government broad leeway to potentially compel the company to grant it access to TikTok’s data, including on Americans. In addition, even under the circumstances of outside control of TikTok’s data storage, it would be almost impossible to know if Chinese intelligence authorities somehow maintained a backdoor into these data streams.

At the same time, however, we found that TikTok’s data collection practices on Americans are not outside what is commonly practiced by social media companies, including Meta, X, and others. More importantly, the data that TikTok can provide on Americans pales in comparison to what the Chinese government has accessed through both its illegal hacking activities and what is available legally on the open market through US-based third-party data brokers.  

In fact, a report from Duke University’s Sanford School of Public Policy found that via data brokers, it is “not difficult to obtain sensitive data about active-duty members of the military, their families, and veterans, including non-public, individually identified, and sensitive data, such as health data, financial data, and information about religious practices,” noting that location data was also available for purchase. A narrow, national-security oriented focus on TikTok to address potential threats to the US data ecosystem risks overlooking much broader security vulnerabilities and thus undermines more effective policy solutions. That is to say, while there is much about TikTok’s data gathering and privacy policy to side-eye, the challenge is far wider than TikTok alone and requires a more wide-ranging policy solution to address. 

—Kenton Thibaut is a senior resident China fellow at the Digital Forensic Research Lab of the Atlantic Council’s Technology Programs. 

If you’re interested in protecting civil society, you should be concerned about TikTok 

The debate surrounding TikTok is about a tool that empowers China to extend its high-tech surveillance state beyond its own borders. While it’s true that other social media platforms engage in similar surveillance, other platforms are not beholden to the government of a foreign adversary. 

TikTok’s owner, ByteDance, is a Chinese company. In China, the CCP has absolute control over companies. In China’s authoritarian system, the party is always above the law, but the CCP took the extraordinary step of enshrining this capability into law, likely to make very clear to Chinese companies exactly what they should expect. Article 7 of the National Intelligence Law of 2017 states that “all organizations and citizens shall support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence efforts,” meaning the government has the right to secretly demand TikTok user data, and the company must share it. 

When defending against these allegations, TikTok has insisted that it stores all US user data in the United States, but the company has also acknowledged that nevertheless, China-based employees can still access US user data, and those same employees must obey any and all edicts from the CCP. In fact, thanks to leaked audio from internal meetings, we now know that China-based employees have repeatedly done so. This includes two cases in which a China-based team at TikTok planned to use the app to monitor the location of specific US citizens.  

Chinese intelligence services have a well-documented history of harassing and intimidating human rights activists and journalists on US soil. Even if you don’t mind the PRC surveilling you, and even if you don’t care about US-China competition, if you’re interested in protecting civil society, you should be concerned about TikTok. 

There is one important caveat, though. As demonstrated in a report from the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, foreign adversaries can also buy this data from brokers that rely on US-based companies surveilling their users. In fact, US-based companies have been accused of using targeted surveillance against civil society, as in the cases of Uber and Meta reportedly tracking the location of journalists reporting on their apps. TikTok is just one piece of a broader data security vulnerability perpetuated by US platforms. 

—Caroline Costello is a program assistant at the Global China Hub. 

Worries around TikTok’s data collection and security apply to all social media giants

Central to concerns around TikTok is how the app collects, stores, and uses information it gathers on users. The fear, according to US officials, is that such data may be weaponized by Beijing, though no evidence of such activity has yet to be proven. Based on a review of TikTok’s privacy policy and external analysis, the social media platform does collect a lot of information on users if they give the company permission. That includes information on individuals’ exact location, their phone numbers and those of their contacts, people’s other social media accounts, and detailed information about individuals’ devices (often used by marketers to target specific demographics). 

That may sound creepy. But TikTok’s data collection practices are no different than those of US social media giants, which similarly gather as much information as possible on their users to tailor these firms’ advertising offerings. That also includes in-app web browsers built into the likes of Instagram and X that allow these companies to collect just as much information on people’s web habits—so long as they are surfing the internet from within these social media networks. 

So would forcing TikTok off of US app stores make Americans’ data more private and secure? The short answer is no. While US officials have raised concerns about how Americans’ data may be accessed by Chinese government officials via TikTok, such personal information—from people’s phone numbers and home addresses to internet activity to consumer purchasing history—is already available commercially, via so-called domestic data brokers. The outgoing Biden administration tried to tackle that problem with the Protecting Americans’ Data from Foreign Adversaries Act and prohibitions placed on these data brokers from transferring such sensitive data to foreign adversaries like China. 

Yet, in reality, the lack of comprehensive federal privacy legislation means that Americans’ data—no matter what eventually happens with the potential TikTok ban or sale—remains significantly more at risk compared to their counterparts in other Western countries. State-based laws, particularly those in California and Virginia, have provided a modest degree of greater control for people in how companies gather and use their personal information. But the removal of TikTok from US app stores, which have similarly set baseline levels of privacy protections for users, will not make Americans’ overall data either more private or more secure. 

 —Mark Scott is senior resident fellow at the Democracy + Tech Initiative within the Atlantic Council Technology Programs. 

US data privacy laws are not up to the task 

The absence of common-sense data privacy laws in the United States created an environment that allowed TikTok to become a security risk. Removing TikTok from app stores will not change this. As a 2022 Consumer Reports investigation revealed, TikTok uses many of the same data harvesting techniques employed by companies like Meta and Google for targeting ads. They also concluded that claims by TikTok and others that data is used solely for advertising cannot be verified by consumers or privacy researchers. 

The Cambridge Analytica scandal, which involved unauthorized data collection from millions of Facebook users for targeted political ads, remains fresh in the minds of Americans who are skeptical about the stated reasons for removing TikTok. Although the Federal Trade Commission forced new privacy restrictions on Facebook, the scandal has not led to national legislation like the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that could be applied to all companies, including TikTok. Despite this, various US states have endeavored to draft their own laws since the scandal. Yet, companies like Meta, Google, and Amazon often attempt to thwart these efforts through lobbying.  

Regulatory changes are essential to mitigate data security threats from Beijing. However, US tech companies seem to lack enthusiasm for supporting new data protections, and Congress has struggled to make progress. Nearly all the major US tech companies have been fined for violating the European Union’s GDPR (including Amazon, Google, Meta, and Twitter/X), so clearly this is an area that needs improvement. Companies are not ideal self-regulators. TikTok adds another layer given that it must answer to an authoritarian regime and thus poses even larger risks when allowed to operate in an unregulated environment. 

TikTok’s popularity, data collection practices, and Chinese ownership create a unique national security challenge requiring careful consideration. Tech companies should work with the US government to improve data privacy protections, rather than targeting TikTok under the guise of national security while simultaneously perpetuating a harmful regulatory status quo. 

—Matt Geraci is an associate director at the Global China Hub. 

If TikTok was a tool of Chinese foreign interference, someone forgot to tell China 

It’s true that the push for TikTok’s divestment from ByteDance is deeply rooted in fears of Chinese information manipulation. In a March 2024 House Committee on Energy and Commerce report on the forced divestment measure, the committee cited China’s potential use of TikTok to “push misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda on the American public.”  

It’s also true that these fears were never substantiated. The CCP’s propaganda strategy—its quest for “discourse power”—has always been premised on the incremental manipulation of information across many different platforms at the same time. The idea that Beijing built a shiny red button to turn TikTok into a tool of mass brainwashing never accorded with reality.  

Indeed, so far it appears that only a single fake CCP-adjacent TikTok account sought to influence the 2024 US election. Ironically, far more CCP accounts on other platforms sought to stir resentment about a potential TikTok ban. By contrast, Russia—which has had no unique claim to TikTok—extensively used the service for the purposes of information manipulation. In December 2023, the Digital Forensic Research Lab and the BBC uncovered a massive Russian campaign that used artificial intelligence to instrumentalize more than 12,800 accounts to undermine Ukraine.  

Perhaps the CCP was just subtly tweaking the TikTok algorithm to achieve its goals? But this is also unlikely. One of the few available independent studies of TikTok content policy suggests that the platform may have actually reduced the salience of certain hashtags in line with the wishes of US lawmakers. The bizarre nature of some of the material that goes viral on TikTok is explained by the tastes of TikTok’s Millennial- and Gen Z-majority user base, not a global conspiracy. TikTok has repeatedly failed the American people in the realm of transparency and public accountability. So has every US-based social media platform.  

—Emerson T. Brooking is director of strategy and resident senior fellow at the Digital Forensic Research Lab. 

The national security risks will remain whether TikTok is banned or not 

Last February, Biden issued a much-needed executive order limiting the sale of sensitive personal US data or US government-related data to “countries of concern,” including China, to prevent them from “engag[ing] in espionage, influence, kinetic or cyber operations or to identify other potential strategic advantage over the United States.” This is supported by additional legislation, such as the Protecting Americans’ Data from Foreign Adversaries Act of 2024 and the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, both aimed at protecting sensitive US data from being accessed by “foreign adversary nations.” 

However, these new measures are not foolproof. The executive order only targets data brokers from “countries of concern,” and the bill doesn’t address data. One way China can easily circumvent these laws is by purchasing data from companies in third-party countries that obtained it through domestic data brokers that sold the data without knowledge of the final recipient or its intended use. Essentially, if TikTok was a US company, China would still be able to purchase personal US data from TikTok through third-country entities.  

Furthermore, China could easily access any sensitive, critical data through hacking US infrastructure. China is constantly investing and building up its offensive cyber ecosystem to train Chinese hackers to target and acquire critical US intelligence. Although the ban on TikTok would prevent Chinese firms from easily accessing US data, China has the resources to access this sensitive information illegally and is not afraid to implement these illicit operations if it feels the need to do so.  

Ultimately, the TikTok ban addresses only a small aspect of a much larger issue. Even if TikTok were banned or became a US-owned company, the core national security risks would remain. The United States should instead implement broader legislation aimed at strengthening domestic cybersecurity infrastructure and closing any third-party loopholes that could undermine existing protective laws. 

—Samantha Wong is a program assistant with the Global China Hub. 

A TikTok ban would be a direct attack on the open and global internet

In the conversation about whether the United States should or should not ban TikTok, there is one parameter that no one is mentioning: what will this mean for the internet? The answer is straightforward. If the United States proceeds with banning TikTok, such a move will be nothing short of a direct attack on the open and global internet.  

The internet is based on a decentralized architecture, which means that there is no center of control. The value of the open internet is that networks should be able to connect without any restrictions. The internet was not designed so that only specific networks could connect; rather, any network should be able to connect as long as it is willing to abide by certain rules—the internet’s open standards and protocols. Banning TikTok will affect how networks get to interconnect. 

 At the same time, a potential ban will also affect the internet’s global reach and integrity. The whole idea of the internet is that no entity should inspect or modify packets carried through different networks beyond what might be necessary to route the packet as advertised. This is an expectation that users have no matter where they are in the world, and it will not be met should the ban take effect.  

The United States has historically and unequivocally been a strong supporter of the open and global internet. In fact, for more than two decades, the United States has been at the forefront of pushing back at attempts by authoritarian governments to centralize internet control. A TikTok ban will be a setback to all these years of effort and will legitimize the narrative by other authoritarian states that the internet should be subject to government control and management. It will also weaken the United States’ position globally, especially at the United Nations, where conversations about the future of internet governance are currently taking place. 

 —Konstantinos Komaitis is a resident senior fellow and Global Democracy and Technology lead with the Democracy + Tech Initiative. 

ByteDance’s First Amendment argument is a distraction from its refusal to divest

ByteDance has yet to provide a rationale commensurate with freedom of speech or national security regarding why TikTok cannot be a US company without ties to the Chinese Communist party-state. Yet, on January 10, the nation will focus on the US Supreme Court’s hearing for the “TikTok ban,” highlighting First Amendment concerns. 

This is a distraction. The government has already successfully argued in court against TikTok on both national security and data collection grounds. ByteDance has sidestepped the national security argument by pointing to the lack of public evidence and argued that TikTok’s data collection practices are the same as those of other platforms. TikTok, however, failed to argue against its intent to endanger US national security, and it’s a point that bears reiterating.  

A series of reports from 2019 to 2021 detailed TikTok’s extreme security risks, including that the app allowed remote downloading and execution of binary files, essentially acting like a pre-installed backdoor ready for payload delivery. This sets it apart from other social media platforms and established its intent to harm. A “black hat” hacker would usually have to compromise a target’s devices through phishing or other means before it can achieve what TikTok pre-installed for its users. A Washington, DC court ruling also stressed TikTok’s continued malicious intent to abuse data collected from US citizens, even after the establishment of TikTok US Data Security.   

Until TikTok’s cord with the PRC is cut, it will continue to test the waters and find legal and illegal means to endanger US national security, as it clearly possesses both the intent and capability to do so.  

The essence of security is to make it harder for an adversary to do you harm. Just because China can obtain US user data through other ways doesn’t mean we should let them do so through TikTok. Deterrence through cost imposition is a foundational concept in international security, and the “cost,” be it through financial means or legal risks should China decide to furnish data through other social media giants operating within the United States, is very real. 

—Kitsch Liao is an associate director at the Global China Hub. 

The post Your expert guide to the debate over banning TikTok  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The implications of such a shameful peace for Ukrainian statehood would be catastrophic. Nor would the damage be contained within Ukraine’s violated borders. On the contrary, the consequences of abandoning Ukraine would reverberate around the world for many years to come, undermining the foundations of international security.

If it happens, the fall of Ukraine may not be immediately apparent. Indeed, it could even be temporarily disguised by face-saving talk of pragmatism and compromise. However, a demilitarized, partitioned, and internationally isolated postwar Ukraine without credible security guarantees would have little chance of surviving for long. Behind the diplomatic platitudes, it would be painfully obvious that Ukraine was now completely at Putin’s mercy. In such circumstances, a new Russian invasion would be merely a matter of time.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The spirit of the 1938 Munich Agreement looms large over prospective US-brokered peace talks between Russia and Ukraine. With pressure mounting on Ukraine to make concessions to the aggressor, it is hardly surprising that many are comparing the current situation to the ugly deal between Western leaders and Nazi Germany that sealed the fate of Czechoslovakia and paved the war for World War II. Just as British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain returned from Munich brandishing Hitler’s worthless signature and declaring “peace for our time,” critics now fear that similar efforts to appease Putin will set the stage for further Russian aggression.

Ukraine’s demise as an independent state would confirm the failure of the existing international security architecture. In its place, we would enter a new era of international affairs dominated by a handful of Great Powers seeking to establish their own spheres of influence, with smaller countries reduced to the role of buffer states. A climate of insecurity would initially take root from the Baltic to the Balkans, and would soon spread to the wider world.

The collapse of the rules-based international order would inevitably undermine the credibility of the West. Meanwhile, authoritarian regimes such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea would be significantly strengthened. Moscow would almost certainly escalate its ongoing hybrid war against the democratic world, and may seek further territorial gains in Central Asia, the Caucasus, or Eastern Europe. Autocrats in Beijing, Tehran, and beyond would draw the logical conclusions from Putin’s victory in Ukraine and embrace expansionist foreign policies of their own.

With the sanctity of international borders no longer assured, countries around the world would scramble to rearm. Crucially, Russia’s successful use of nuclear blackmail against Ukraine would convince many nations to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. This would lead to a nuclear arms race that would rapidly escalate, undoing decades of non-proliferation efforts. With dozens of countries aspiring to nuclear status, the chances of a nuclear war would rise dramatically, as would the potential for nukes to fall into the hands of rogue actors.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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Today’s international security crisis did not arise overnight. The security climate has been steadily deteriorating since 2014, when Russia first seized the Crimean peninsula and invaded eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. The inadequate international response to these watershed acts of Russian aggression was interpreted in Moscow as a green light to go further, creating the conditions for the full-scale invasion of 2022 and setting the stage for what has become the largest European war since World War II.

If Western leaders now choose to sacrifice Ukraine in a misguided bid to placate Putin, the shift from a rules-based international order to the law of the geopolitical jungle will be complete. This transition will be extremely expensive, with countries around the world forced to dramatically increase defense budgets to levels that dwarf the current cost of military support for Ukraine.

None of this is inevitable, of course. It is still entirely possible to secure a just peace for Ukraine that would deter the Russia-led axis of autocrats and revive faith in a rules-based system of international relations. However, this would require a degree of resolve and political will that few Western leaders have been prepared to demonstrate since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. For almost three years, the Western response has been marked by excessive caution and a crippling fear of escalation that have only served to embolden the Kremlin.

Putin is clearly counting on continued Western weakness as he looks to break Ukrainian resistance in a grinding war of attrition. He is now more confident than ever of victory and has little interest in negotiating anything other than the terms of Ukraine’s surrender. This is the unfavorable reality that will confront Donald Trump when he returns to the White House later this month. Unless he and other Western leaders insist on pursuing peace through strength, Ukraine will have little chance of survival and the wider world will face a Hobbesian future of instability and aggression.

Victor Liakh is the CEO of the East Europe Foundation.

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Ukrainian defense tech companies will be focusing on domestic missile production, drone swarms, and AI technologies in 2025 as Ukraine seeks to remain one step ahead of Russia in the race to innovate, writes Nataliia Kushnerska.

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Five things Russia’s invasion has taught the world about Ukraine

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Vladimir Putin’s brutal invasion of Ukraine has thrust the country into the global spotlight and transformed international perceptions of Ukraine in ways that will resonate for decades to come, writes Peter Dickinson.

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Putin begins 2025 confident of victory as war of attrition takes toll on Ukraine

By Mykola Bielieskov

Donald Trump has vowed to end Russia’s invasion of Ukraine but Vladimir Putin begins 2025 more confident of victory than ever and with little interest in a negotiated peace deal, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

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The post Abandoning Ukraine would plunge the entire world into an era of instability appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Evolution of freedom

Since 1995¹, Venezuela’s overall Freedom Index score has significantly declined, with a decrease of more than twenty-eight points. Initially, the country’s freedom score was just 1.4 points below the Latin America & the Caribbean regional average, but its scores on all three subindexes have declined and the gap between Venezuela and the regional average now exceed thirty points. The national statistical system has faced a significant setback, with data either disappearing or remaining outdated. Venezuela has outperformed the region on only one indicator—women’s economic freedom, with a significant increase of thirty-five points since 1971, and over eighteen points since 1995, making this evolution a consistent trend in the society.

Venezuela’s poor performance in the twenty-first century can be attributed to the political and ideological project known as “socialism of the twenty-first century,” which aimed to dismantle the institutional framework established during the democratic period, 1958–1998, and replace it with a system rooted in socialist ethics and production mode, with a geopolitical scope, and where individual freedom is no longer a value.

Its economic subindex improved by over eight points from 1995 to 2000, driven by trade freedom, but has since declined. The most significant driver of the decline has been the erosion of property rights, with 1,423 documented cases of expropriations, interventions, occupations, and confiscations . Additionally, the “land rescues” under the 2001 Land Law resulted in the seizure of five million hectares, equivalent to 5 percent of Venezuela’s territory, according to the National Land Institute. From 2014 to 2019, the Organic Law on Fair Prices, enforced by the National Superintendence for the Defense of Socioeconomic Rights, led to 149,811 actions, including inspections, closures, and fines. As a result, the economy stagnated, supply chains were dismantled, and the violation of property rights exacerbated uncertainty, heightened risk perception, discouraged investment, stifled job creation, and deepened poverty.

Since 2020, a series of pseudo-privatizations have occurred, under the Anti-Blockade Law, which allows the suspension of legal provisions, the use of exceptional contracting mechanisms, and the classifying of actions as secret or confidential. Alongside this, an indeterminate number of affected companies and assets have been returned without transparency, and have not adhered to the basic standards of reparation or property rights restitution.

The socialist model currently guiding Venezuela’s policies is marked by excessive populism and state intervention. Economic activity and entrepreneurship are severely hampered by widespread government interference, inconsistent regulatory enforcement, and a heavy bureaucratic burden. The lack of transparency in government decision making, the shrinking of market size, and entrenched cronyism have resulted in a market with little competition and virtually no freedom for investment.

The government’s lack of transparency and accountability and a setback in the official statistical system have been other key factors in undermining economic freedom, making it difficult to base decisions on reliable information and fueling misinformation. This issue is particularly evident in the erosion of information related to the national budget and its management, with clear political intent, allowing the executive between 2006 and 2012, the discretionary and opaque management of large public funds for social programs known as “Misiones,” which failed to produce positive social outcomes.

At the same time, political freedom in Venezuela has drastically declined, with a nearly fifty-five-point drop since 1995 in the political subindex. Initially, Venezuela outperformed the regional average by twelve points but now lags by more than forty points, with the gap widening after 1999. Electoral performance has steadily worsened, with sharp declines between 2012–13 and 2016–17. The presidential election on July 28, 2024, particularly exposed the subordination of the electoral and judiciary branches to the executive, disregarding the popular will and eroding the integrity of elections as a means of democratic alternation.

Legislative checks on the executive have collapsed by 85 points since 1995. Although there was an apparent improvement between 2014–2016, when the democratic opposition won a qualified majority in the National Assembly, this progress was undone by a Supreme Court decision loyal to the executive, followed by the establishment of a Constituent Assembly that stripped the National Assembly of its powers. The situation seemed to offer some hope in 2018–2019, with the emergence of an interim presidency and mounting international pressure and sanctions on the regime. However, the anticipated political change toward greater freedom never materialized.

The rule of law, as measured by the legal subindex, has eroded, with the score dropping dropped by over twenty-five points in Venezuela since 1995. Initially, scores were above the regional average, but this trend reversed in 1998, leading to the country’s current position below that average. Judicial independence and effectiveness have sharply deteriorated, with significant declines between 1997–2000 and 2003–05, after which they have remained consistently low.

The main drivers for the decline in the rule of law during this century are a) the consolidation of executive supremacy, enabled by the expansion of presidential powers in the 1999 Constitution and the frequent use of decrees and special powers through enabling laws; b) the increasing role of the military in controlling and implementing government policies; and c) the rise in corruption and lack of transparency, bypassing legal accountability standards. The decline has been further compounded by a 73 percent drop in judicial independence between 1995 and 2017. These elements have eroded democratic governance and undermined institutional integrity.

In 2019, the UN Human Rights Council established an Independent International Fact-Finding Mission to investigate human rights violations in Venezuela since 2014. Its latest report issued in September 2024 focused on the post-electoral crisis following the presidential elections of July 28, 2024. The report highlighted a significant intensification of the state’s repressive apparatus, documenting serious human rights violations, including brutal crackdowns on protests, which resulted in twenty-five deaths, hundreds of injuries, and thousands of arrests, including 158 minors. The report detailed arbitrary detentions, forced disappearances, torture, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, including sexual and gender-based violence, all of which escalated during this period. Additionally, the report noted an increase in harassment and judicial persecution of journalists, nongovernmental organizations, and key civil society actors. This repression worsened following the approval of the Law on the Supervision, Regularization, Action, and Financing of Non-Governmental and Related Organizations (August 2024), which imposed severe restrictions on the operations of these organizations.

Evolution of prosperity

Since 1995, Venezuela’s Prosperity Index score has experienced significant fluctuations, while the regional average has generally improved. Between 2003 and 2012, Venezuela saw a period of growth, followed by a sharp decline, placing it among the lowest-ranked countries in terms of prosperity. This decline demonstrates how undermining the institutional framework that safeguards individual freedom, freedom of expression, and political and economic liberty can devastate a society’s prosperity and the quality of life of its citizens.

The perception of progress in income per capita during the positive period was largely driven by an oil price boom that was managed wastefully. Even before oil prices reversed, the country was left impoverished, with a destroyed middle class, crippling debt, and a lack of basic services such as water, sanitation, electricity, transportation, and telecommunications, as well as of public goods like security, healthcare, and education. Furthermore, Venezuela lost nearly a quarter of its population to migration. Today, its prosperity has fallen below early 2000 levels, reaching a state of low prosperity.

Between 2013 and 2021, Venezuela’s economy contracted by more than 75 percent (as measured by GDP). Despite apparent recovery rates in recent years, the economy remains far too small to meet the population’s needs, and without a robust institutional framework ensuring transparent and fair rules, sustainable growth and improved quality of life remain elusive. Since 2008, Venezuela has suffered from double-digit inflation year-over-year, reaching hyperinflation between 2016 and 2019, which would be overcome by a process of dollarization.

Given the lack of updated and verifiable official economic data², the World Bank in 2021 unclassified Venezuela, which previously classed as an upper-middle-income country. For the size of the economy at that time, Venezuela could have been classified as a low-income country.

Official socioeconomic data is scarce and irregular, so it is thanks to the National Survey of Living Conditions (ENCOVI) conducted by well-reputed Venezuelan universities that we know that in 2021, 94.5 percent of the population lived in poverty, with extreme poverty affecting two-thirds of the households, due to the combined effects of a collapsed economy and the COVID-19 pandemic. Those figures improved by 2023 when extreme poverty dropped to 59.1 percent and multidimensional poverty to 58 percent, but in rural areas, both indicators remained over 70 percent, so the population is still struggling. This starkly contrasts with the year 2000, when seventy percent of the population belonged to the middle class, and fewer than 25 percent lived in poverty.

The education system has become increasingly substandard, with significant deterioration since 2013. However, the true extent of this decline is difficult to assess due to the manipulation, absence, or lack of updated official statistics, which can lead to misleading information being reported to multilateral organizations. The education crisis is marked by crumbling public school infrastructure, a shortage of underpaid teachers, inadequate educational coverage, high student dropout rates, and a significant reduction in both the reach and consistency of the school feeding program. This downward trend extends to university education, where enrollment dropped by 24 percent between 2008 and 2018, and by 60 percent in the country’s major universities from 2012 to 2024. According to the 2023 ENCOVI report, only 60 percent of students regularly attend school with some degree of normality, while 40 percent have irregular attendance.

The decline in educational quality is further highlighted by an Early Grades Reading Assessment test, where third grade students achieved, on average, only 57.3 percent correct answers. Additionally, seventy-five percent of students scored below 76 percent, with just 25 percent achieving between 76 percent and 100 percent correct answers, underscoring the significant gaps in learning outcomes. The situation deteriorated further during the COVID-19 pandemic, as schools were unprepared for virtual learning. The post-pandemic period brought additional challenges, with many schools being looted, resulting in the loss of supplies, furniture, and electrical wiring and damage to infrastructure. Compounding the crisis is the government’s response to teachers’ demands, which has involved threats, harassment, and surveillance. This hostile environment, coupled with poor working conditions and restricted freedom of speech, has driven many educators to quit their jobs or leave the country altogether, exacerbating the already fragile state of the education system.

In contrast to the improving health outcomes in much of Latin America, Venezuela’s health performance has stagnated and deteriorated. Once outperforming the regional average, the country fell behind in 2009 and is now more than three points below the regional mean. Various indicators reflect the decline in the overall health of the Venezuelan population during the twenty-first century. Life expectancy dropped from around seventy-three to seventy-two years, while the infant mortality rate increased from 17.9 per 1,000 live births in 2000 to 21.1 per 1,000 by 2017. Maternal mortality surged to 125 per 100,000 live births by 2015³. By 2020, nearly one-third of Venezuelans were food insecure, and the 2017 ENCOVI survey found that 64.3 percent of the population had lost weight due to food shortages. Additionally, once-controlled communicable diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, and diphtheria resurfaced, with malaria cases rising from 35,500 in 2009 to over 400,000 by 2017. By 2018, over 80 percent of hospitals reported shortages of basic medicines, and many healthcare facilities lacked electricity and clean water.

This situation stems from a combination of factors: lack of investment in public services worsening healthcare; infrastructure collapsing due to corruption, poor maintenance, and a lack of new investments; ineffective public policies; the exodus of healthcare workers and skilled professionals because of low salaries and poor working conditions; widespread shortages of food and medicine; rising poverty; and persistent inflation and hyperinflation. These issues result from the model imposed at the beginning of the century, which dismantled the institutional framework, curtailing liberty and economic opportunities.

Additionally, Venezuela has experienced significant environmental degradation, jeopardizing the prospects for future generations. The massive and uncontrolled exploitation of the Orinoco Mining Arc, which encroaches on Indigenous territories and Areas Under Special Administration Regime with government knowledge and authorization, has drawn serious concerns from social, environmental, and human rights organizations since 2016 regarding its harmful implications for Indigenous communities and biodiversity. This mining project has led to significant destruction in the Amazon region in Venezuela, with illegal mining operations deforesting 1,000 hectares of Canaima National Park and damaging 2,227 hectares in Yapacana National Park. Moreover, mercury pollution has affected the Ventuari, Caura, Caroní, Cuyuní, and Orinoco rivers.

Petróleos de Venezuela, the national oil company, has also neglected environmental and safety protocols, increasing accidents, including spills in sensitive ecosystems such as the Orinoco River and Lake Maracaibo. The Global Gas Flaring Tracker from the World Bank indicates that Venezuela’s flaring intensity quadrupled between 2012 and 2021, with the amount of gas flared in 2022 exceeding the amount of gas recovered for productive purposes. This practice contributes to higher emissions of harmful gases, placing Venezuela fifth globally in gas flaring.

Several indicators highlight the environmental harm in Venezuela. Global Forest Watch tracks increased deforestation, the Living Planet Index reveals a decline in biodiversity, the Water Quality Index assesses levels of water pollution, and the Environmental Performance Index (EPI), and the Global Carbon Atlas, reflects the environmental stress caused by fossil fuel extraction and energy mismanagement. The Air Quality Index (EPI-Yale) indicates issues related to inadequate industrial regulation and vehicular emissions, the Waste Management Index (EPI) shows a decline in waste management capacity, with improper disposal of solid and hazardous waste, and the Environmental Vulnerability Index highlights high vulnerability due to poor natural resource management. These indicators collectively demonstrate the country’s ecological deterioration across multiple dimensions. This troubling environmental situation stems from a lack of rule of law, corruption, and influence peddling, leading to the indiscriminate depletion of natural resources and the contamination of the environment to the detriment of future generations.

The path forward

Venezuela’s current situation is critical: Citing the nation’s institutional and social fragility, the International Monetary Fund placed it on its List of Fragile and Conflict-Affected States. The International Monetary Fund has alluded to a government that is either unable or unwilling to fulfill essential state functions such as providing security, justice, and basic services to the majority of its population, with weak institutions, nonexistent governance, and high poverty levels.

This crisis is the result of nearly twenty-five years of the socialism of the twenty-first century model, which has eroded the progress made in the previous century. From the outset, various levels and forms of resistance to this model have emerged, yet the regime has maintained its grip on power through various means, increasingly revealing its authoritarian nature over time. Despite these challenges, the population has demonstrated remarkable resilience, remaining active and committed to pursuing political change that could reverse the current situation by leveraging its available natural, human, and financial resources.

Thus, this moment can be seen as a crossroads, a tipping point, a moment of bifurcation, with the potential to shape the future. The political driver at play will serve as the catalyst for two vastly different scenarios.

1) Scenario 1: Oppression and poverty. This scenario envisions the end of Venezuela’s liberal democratic republic model, resulting in the entrenchment of tyranny and the subordination of all powers to the executive. Venezuela could become a significant node in the multidimensional networks of illegality.

If the popular will, as expressed in the 2024 presidential elections, is disregarded, the country may plunge deeper into a society marked by diminished freedom and prosperity. Venezuela is unlikely to reintegrate into global financial flows, facing obstacles in renegotiating its debt with multilateral organizations and receiving the necessary support to address its complex humanitarian crisis.

In this context, recurrent macroeconomic imbalances are expected, leading to increased economic volatility and a shortened investment horizon, which would elevate risk premiums. Maintaining policies to stabilize the exchange rate and control inflation would become increasingly difficult, with restrictions on credit and foreign currency inflows. That will widen the gap between official and parallel exchange rates, fostering the debasement of the national currency and deepening dollarization.

To manage these macroeconomic challenges, fiscal and parafiscal pressures on the private sector would intensify, making production less profitable and riskier, promoting informal economic activity, reducing domestic supply, and reigniting inflationary pressures.

The prevailing situation would hinder the ability to address social needs, exacerbating poverty and exclusion. As popular dissatisfaction rises, the government is likely to respond with increased repression, leading to a heightened militarization of public spaces and severe human rights violations. This dynamic would contribute to the further erosion or outright extinction of the rule of law, undermining freedoms of expression and association, as well as civil, political, and economic rights.

Such conditions would foster opacity in public fund management, heightening corruption and enabling arbitrary public policies and decision-making processes. An ongoing source of income may come from continued licenses for oil resource exploitation or from actors unconcerned about the reputational risks of engaging with a sanctioned state, which would likely result in lower prices for oil sales.

In this tyrannical scenario, characterized by a lack of freedom and a bleak future, a significant new wave of migration could emerge, predominantly involving very low-income groups. This influx would put pressure on neighboring and destination countries, potentially fueling anti-migration policies and discriminatory attitudes.
The consolidation of a tyrannical regime would facilitate the exploitation of Venezuela’s valuable natural resources to support illicit networks, transforming the country into a hub of regional, hemispheric, and global instability.

2) Scenario 2: Freedom and prosperity. This scenario envisions the reestablishment of Venezuela as a liberal democratic republic, anchored in Western values of freedom, individual dignity, and prosperity. Under this vision, Venezuela could reclaim its stabilizing role in the western hemisphere.

If the democratic alternative—which won the presidential elections on July 28, 2024 and transparently demonstrated its results to the world—gets into power, it will pave the way for a positive future. This could not only enhance freedoms and respect for political, civil, and human rights but also improve the quality of life and spur economic growth.

The recovery would be guided by a proposed plan called Venezuela: Land of Grace—Freedom, Democracy, and Prosperity, advanced by the team supporting the political leader Maria Corina Machado, and built on three foundational pillars: (a) free development of individuals: recognizing the intrinsic dignity and creative potential of free individuals; (b) a state at the service of the citizen: protecting life, liberty, and property, ensuring access to justice and public security through independent branches of government, with a focus on efficiency, transparency, and public-private partnerships in managing services as well as education, healthcare, and security; and (c) free market economy: unlocking the country’s potential by transforming its abundant resources into wealth through citizens’ efforts, fostering entrepreneurship, and stimulating economic growth.

With these pillars in place, a myriad of opportunities could arise to restore citizens’ quality of life in an ambiance of freedom and peace. A robust institutional framework and a stable macroeconomic environment could attract investments across various productive sectors, enhancing domestic supply, creating jobs, and improving living conditions for households. Full support from multilateral organizations, following the renegotiation of defaulted external debt, could guide the nation toward overcoming the humanitarian crisis and significantly reducing poverty levels.

Venezuela could emerge as an energy hub due to its vast reserves of hydrocarbons and renewable energy resources, bolstered by private investments, reclaiming its status as a major player in oil and gas production and refining, and resuming its role as reliable supplier within the western hemisphere. In this scenario, Venezuela could contribute to reducing global geopolitical tensions, combating illegality, and promoting freedom and peace.

Sary Levy-Carciente is a research scientist at the Adam Smith Center for Economic Freedom, Florida International University; former president of the National Academy of Economic Sciences (Venezuela); and dean of the faculty of Economic and Social Sciences (Central University of Venezuela). LevyCarciente is a Fullbright fellow at the Center for Polymer Studies, Boston University; and visiting researcher at the Department of Economics, UMASS. Levy-Carciente is the author of the International Property Rights Index (Property Rights Alliance) and the Index of Bureaucracy (Florida International University).

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The post Venezuela’s 2024 stolen election compounds challenges to stability and democratic renewal appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As Venezuela continues to grapple with a deep political and economic crisis, the international community is at a critical juncture in shaping its response. The stolen presidential election of July 28 marked a watershed moment, signaling the country’s further descent into authoritarianism under Nicolás Maduro’s regime. In this context, policymakers in the United States and other countries are likely to continue to impose sanctions against political, military, and economic elites as a means of seeking to exert pressure without worsening the humanitarian situation. 

With over eight million Venezuelans displaced by the crisis, US and other international policymakers are cautious about the unintended consequences of tightening existing oil and financial sanctions. Although the outgoing Biden administration at one point said it was evaluating whether to rescind privately issued specific licenses that authorize energy companies to maintain a foothold in the country, it has not done so, partly out of an interest in preventing the worsening of economic conditions. Instead, the Biden administration prioritized sanctions against individuals responsible for Venezuela’s deteriorating human rights situation. On September 12, the Biden administration sanctioned sixteen government-linked individuals, including leaders of the National Electoral Council who oversaw the stolen election, and members of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice who validated the fraudulent results. Biden’s Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the goal of the individual sanctions is to “promote accountability” for those undermining democracy in Venezuela. Three months later, Canada’s foreign ministry announced it would add five of these same individuals to their sanctions list for fraudulently declaring Maduro the winner of the July election. The US added an additional 21 individuals to the sanctions list in November 2024. Following Maduro’s illegitimate inauguration in January 2025, the US, Canada, and the EU all announced additional sanctions on regime officials and affiliates.

This interest in targeted sanctions is likely to continue under the second Trump administration, given that Trump’s first term saw heated internal debate over the potential impact of broader economic sanctions on Venezuela’s migration crisis. Indeed, the use of individual sanctions accelerated under President-elect Trump’s first presidential term even as he oversaw the imposition of broader sectoral sanctions targeting Venezuela’s links to the international oil and financial markets. 

With Trump returning to the Oval Office, here’s what policymakers should know about the use of individual sanctions—and what can make Venezuela sanctions policy more effective.

The sticks: A history of the Venezuela sanctions regime

From 2009 to 2015, Venezuela-related sanctions were few and primarily targeted kingpin leaders involved in drug trafficking and financial support for Hezbollah. In March 2015, Executive Order 13692 created the country-specific sanctions regime on Venezuela. Seven military officials were initially sanctioned for their involvement in stifling protests. This program allowed the United States government to sanction individuals involved in human rights abuses, corruption, or the undermining of democratic processes. In November 2018, Executive Order 13850 created a new Venezuela-related sanctions program under which the United States could freeze assets and prevent actors from conducting corrupt transactions with the Venezuelan government to move money. In August 2019, Executive Order 13884 blocked Venezuelan government assets and enabled sanctions on actors assisting the Venezuelan government, and an initial seven military officials were sanctioned for their involvement in actions undermining democratic processes. 

This graph does not include sanctions issued by the United States on January 10, the date of Maduro’s illegitimate re-inauguration.

The Obama administration sanctioned seventeen individuals, including the first seven military officials sanctioned under the Venezuela-specific sanctions regime. After Trump took office in January of 2017, the number of individual sanctions increased dramatically, with forty-one issued in 2017 alone. The administration issued twenty individual sanctions in 2018, forty-nine in 2019, and twenty-five in 2020. (These numbers do not include individuals who were sanctioned and later delisted). Under the Trump administration, some of the sanctions targeted Venezuelan access to the US dollar and to international financing, and therefore Venezuela’s ability to reconcile its sovereign debt. The Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” strategy took off in 2019, which saw the imposition of over 180 Venezuela-related sanctions, including the forty-nine targeting individuals. That year also saw the first implementation of sectoral sanctions on industries including oil, gold, finance, defense, and security.

This shifted under US President Joe Biden. Until September 2024, Biden had not added a single Venezuelan national to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list since taking office. However, after the July 28 stolen presidential election, the government-backed National Electoral Council declared incumbent Nicolás Maduro the winner, despite opposition candidate Edmundo González emerging as the clear victor following the opposition’s independent collection and publication of over 80 percent of the official actas, electoral vote tallies produced by each voting center. Roughly a month and a half after the election, the United States announced new sanctions on sixteen individuals, for obstructing the elections and intensifying post-election repression, ultimately forcing Gonzalez to flee the country. Two more rounds of sanctions were announced in November 2024 and January 2025.

The carrots: When and why individual sanctions have been lifted

The Biden administration largely opted for a different approach than the first Trump administration, seeming to prefer carrots over sticks. On multiple occasions, Biden took Venezuelan nationals off the list. 

In December 2021, the administration announced it would no longer designate the former Colombian guerrilla movement, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), as a terrorist group. As part of a package of ninety-two FARC-linked delistings, the Treasury Department lifted sanctions on five Venezuelans including Ramón Rodríguez Chacín, a military officer and former Venezuelan minister of interior who worked as a go-between between the FARC rebels and the Venezuelan government.

In June 2022, the Treasury Department announced that it had lifted the sanctions on Carlos Erik Malpica Flores, a former national treasurer and vice president of Venezuela’s state-owned oil company PDVSA. Malpica Flores is also the nephew of current Venezuelan first lady Cilia Flores, and his delisting was reportedly part of an effort to induce the Venezuelan government to restart negotiations with the opposition—and indeed, days later opposition and government representatives met in Oslo. In November 2022, two other nephews of Flores, known as the “narcosobrinos” due to their involvement in transnational drug trafficking operations, were released as part of a prisoner swap that included the release of ex-officials of Citgo, the US-based subsidiary of PDVSA. 

In July 2023, the Treasury removed Carlos Rotondaro, former board president of the Venezuelan Institute of Social Security (IVSS), from the SDN list. Sanctioned for “economic mismanagement and acts of corruption,” Rotondaro was reportedly delisted for providing information to the United States on financial movements made by the family of Haiman El Troudi, former Minister of Planning and Development and Minister of Public Works.

These delistings fit with the Biden administration’s broader reticence toward announcing new sanctions on Venezuela. Rather than rolling out new sectoral sanctions, the Biden White House sought to incentivize a democratic opening by issuing licenses to US and Western oil companies to operate in the country despite broader oil and financial sanctions, in exchange for a series of agreements between the government and the democratic opposition that led to the July 28 election. 

Biden was not alone in attempting to use sanctions relief to incentivize change in Venezuela. Even as the first Trump administration ramped up the use of individual sanctions, it also offered sanctions relief to individuals who “take concrete and meaningful actions to restore democratic order, refuse to take part in human rights abuses and speak out against abuses committed by the government, and combat corruption in Venezuela.” As part of this strategy, the Trump administration lifted sanctions in two cases. In March 2019, the Treasury delisted the wives of Raúl Gorrín and Gustavo Perdomo, two regime-linked businessmen who reportedly tried to work as middlemen between Washington and Caracas. According to press accounts, Gorrín worked to support a failed attempt to overthrow Maduro in April of that year, and Treasury’s removal of his wife and the wife of his business partner from the sanctions list was a decision made in exchange for his support for the coup.

In May 2019, after the uprising failed, the United States delisted Manuel Cristopher Figuera, former Director General of Venezuela’s National Intelligence Service (SEBIN). Figuera had taken part in the coup attempt and fled the country when it failed. In its press release, the Treasury Department stated that the move “demonstrates that U.S. sanctions need not be permanent and are intended to bring about a positive change of behavior.”

Who’s on the list?

The United States has rescinded the visas of almost two thousand Venezuelans and currently sanctions 202 Venezuela-linked individuals on the SDN list (as of January 13, 2025). Of these 202, eighty-one have been sanctioned primarily for their current or former roles with Venezuelan security and intelligence outfits. Nine have worked in the military counterintelligence branch known by its Spanish-language acronym DGCIM, eleven have worked in the intelligence branch (SEBIN), thirty have worked in the national armed forces (FANB), twenty-six have worked for the national guard (GNB), and seven have worked for the national police (PNB). Some of these individuals have worked for multiple branches of the security or counterintelligence service. 

The United States also has a history of sanctioning key Venezuelan political officials. Maduro has been sanctioned since 2017, and his wife and son have been sanctioned since 2018 and 2017, respectively. Attorney General Tarek William Saab was sanctioned in 2017. Vice President Delcy Rodríguez and her brother, Communications Minister Jorge Rodríguez, Former National Assembly President Diosdado Cabello and his wife and brother, and Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez were all sanctioned in 2018.

Beyond key officials of the Venezuelan government and their affiliates, the United States has also sanctioned several economic and financial elites linked to operations with the government or the state-owned oil and natural gas company. Veronica Esparza Garcia, Joaquin Leal Jimenez, and Olga Maria Zepeda Esparza were sanctioned in 2020 for “operating a sanctions-evasion scheme benefitting the illegitimate Maduro regime and PDVSA.” In early 2021, Alessandro Bazzoni, an Italian citizen, Francisco Javier D’Agostino, a dual Spanish-Venezuelan citizen, and Philipp Paul Vartan Apikian, a Swiss citizen, were sanctioned for their ties to “a network attempting to evade United States sanctions on Venezuela’s oil sector.” Apikian and his company, Swissoil, were removed from the sanctions list in June 2023. Bazzoni and D’Agostino were removed in January 2025.

Additionally, as of September 2024, eleven individuals connected to Venezuela have been sanctioned under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act and classified as “specially designated narcotics traffickers.” The sanctions connected with this particular designation are separate from the Venezuela-specific sanctions programs created by executive order but have been perceived by observers as connected to the US-led pressure campaign. 

Coordinating sanctions with allies

This graph does not include sanctions issued by all three countries on January 10, the date of Maduro’s illegitimate re-inauguration.

The United States, with its current list of 202 designees, is not the only government that has sanctioned individuals related to Venezuela. Canada currently sanctions 115, and the European Union (EU) sanctions sixty-nine. Of the 202 US-sanctioned individuals, Canada sanctions eighty-three of the same individuals, while the EU sanctions fifty-eight. Forty-eight individuals are currently sanctioned by all three parties. Most of these were sanctioned by the United States months or years before they were sanctioned by Canada and the EU. These include high-level officials such as Delcy Rodríguez, Tarek William Saab, and Diosdado Cabello. However, it is notable that the EU has not placed individual sanctions on Maduro himself. Neither Canada nor the EU has placed sanctions on any individuals sanctioned by the United States that we have classified as economic elites. 

Of the thirty-two people that Canada sanctions that the United States does not, a number are judicial officials such as magistrates and individuals associated with repressive acts. All except for one were sanctioned between 2017 and 2019. The eleven individuals sanctioned by the EU that are not sanctioned by the United States include people known to have committed human rights violations and officials contributing to the erosion of democracy and democratic institutions. Most of these were sanctioned between 2020 and 2021.

How effective are individual sanctions?

Individual sanctions can allow decisionmakers in Washington to signal a policy stance and provide a degree of accountability, which may be useful to victims of Venezuela’s authoritarianism. Listed individuals are unable to travel to the United States and they cannot operate directly in broader financial systems. There is an argument to be made that this makes the target’s life uncomfortable or at least more difficult, whether the sanctions involve freezing assets, limiting their mobility, or restricting business operations. Individual sanctions may also serve as a measure of justice for human rights victims. However, in Venezuela so far there is little evidence that being added to the individual sanctions list encourages defection. Only one case of a sanctioned official defecting exists (Manuel Christopher Figuera). Other key individuals who have defected, such as former Oil Minister Rafael Ramírez and former Prosecutor General Luisa Ortega Díaz, were never sanctioned by the United States (although Ramírez was sanctioned by Canada).

One way to tighten the strategy for individual sanctions involves targeting more overseas assets of Venezuelans who have contributed to political and economic destabilization, and those of their family members and associates. While some of the assets of more prominent Venezuelans have been seized, a number of Venezuelan officials still own properties in Miami and other US cities, Latin America, and Europe. According to a 2022 joint investigation by Armando.Info and El Nuevo Herald, at least 718 companies in Florida are owned by current or former Venezuelan officials, including over two hundred that are owned by members of the military. Most of these owners have not been sanctioned. While an SDN designation implies that all US properties and financial assets of the individual will be frozen, some sanctioned officials continue to have access to large financial networks through assets held by family members or affiliates who are not sanctioned. Ramping up the targeting of the asset networks of current or former affiliates of the dictatorship could potentially create more room for those affiliates to consider the value of remaining loyal to Maduro, while avoiding harming the Venezuelan people.

The key question lies in how international actors can sanction individuals in a way that pulls the regime apart instead of consolidating it. Maduro has honored some of those sanctioned with replicas of independence leader Simón Bolívar’s sword. After the most recent wave of sanctions, government officials have painted being sanctioned as a badge of honor, a sign of loyalty to the revolution. According to Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López, being sanctioned is a recognition of officials’ “morale, physical and professional integrity, and their leadership.”

One way to mitigate this is to follow sanctions announcements with targeted, discrete, and strategic communication with sanctioned individuals on the steps needed to get off the list, as occurred in the case of Manuel Christopher Figuera. Similar communication could occur with individuals the government is considering sanctioning, as may have been the case with Ortega Díaz. Coordinating more closely with multiple countries to impose parallel individual sanctions on individuals can help the international community to align on sanctions priorities. This may include advising interested international allies on the creation of their own legal sanctions frameworks. 

But sanctions should not be the only manner of engagement with regime affiliates. The goal should always be to identify and engage those most likely to support democratic reform from the inside. This means empowering moderate elements within Chavismo and isolating hardliners to maintain the potential for a peaceful, democratic solution.

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. 

Lucie Kneip is a program assistant at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. 

The authors would like to thank Brennan Rhodes for his research support in contributing to this piece. 

Jul 24, 2024

Venezuela Solutions Group

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s Venezuela Solutions Group is a diverse group of experts and practitioners from Venezuela, the United States, Latin America, and Europe, brought together to advance the conversation on how to reach a peaceful, democratic, and negotiated solution to the crisis in the South American country. The group comprises former government officials, civil society leaders, private sector leaders, humanitarian voices, economists, and leading experts on Venezuela who work to promote debate and propose actionable and concrete policy recommendations in order to advance policy innovation in addressing the situation in Venezuela. 

Memo to… Jul 24, 2024

Memo to the president: Seizing the opportunity for a democratic solution in Venezuela

By Geoff Ramsey, Jason Marczak, Brian Fonseca, and Eduardo Gamarra

Venezuelans head to the polls for a presidential election July 28. Whether incumbent Nicolás Maduro or opposition candidate Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia is declared the victor, the United States and its partners have a major opportunity to bring all parties together to negotiate a power-sharing agreement and restore the economically devastated country’s democratic institutions.

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The post Recalibrating the use of individual sanctions in Venezuela  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Gulf countries publicly cited regional tensions and the growing role of non-Arab states in Syria as reasons for normalization. Saudi Arabia was the latest to reopen its embassy in Damascus in September 2024, following similar moves by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain in December 2018, ostensibly to “reduce Iranian influence,” according to Robert Ford, a former US ambassador to Syria. (By contrast, Qatar maintained a staunchly critical stance toward the Assad regime, refusing to normalize ties.)

Assad was welcomed back into the Arab League last year, attending a summit in Saudi Arabia. And the UAE even reportedly joined the United States in negotiations aimed at securing US sanctions relief in return for Assad curbing Iran’s arms smuggling through Syria.

With Assad having fled to Moscow after the stunning and rapid fall of his regime this month, Gulf states that had supported Assad are now left empty-handed. But the turn of events offers these countries, which rarely act as a bloc, an immense opportunity to join forces and wield significant influence—both political and financial—over Syria’s future while adapting to Turkey’s rising prominence in the country.

The Gulf’s friendly overtures

Shortly after Assad’s December 8 fall, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Oman resumed their diplomatic activities in Damascus, and they were in turn thanked by the new Syrian government’s Department of Political Affairs in a December 12 statement. This statement followed meetings the new leadership held with the ambassadors from these countries, as well as Qatar. Also on December 12, Bahrain—which headed the Arab League this year—expressed its support for the transition via a letter to the new leadership in Syria. On December 14, the Arab Ministerial Contact Committee on Syria (which includes Arab, Western, and Turkish diplomats) highlighted Arab support for Syria’s political transition under the interim authorities. 

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia expressed the “strongest support” for Syria’s people after the fall of Assad’s government, commending measures taken by the new leadership in Damascus to protect Syria’s minorities and promote stability. A Saudi delegation headed by an advisor from the Saudi Royal Court met with Syria’s new leader on December 22, amid reports that Saudi Arabia will start supplying oil to Damascus. A good indicator that Saudi Arabia is serious about cooperating with Syria’s transition is that the kingdom is already cooperating at the highest level with the most influential outside player in Syria—one that is rapidly ascendant in the region—Turkey.

The UAE, which started the normalization process with Assad in the Gulf, was the last Gulf country to publicly signal positive engagement with Syria’s new administration, marked by a phone call between the respective foreign ministers on December 23. It remains to be seen whether Abu Dhabi will cautiously move to fully and publicly support the new administration in Damascus by sending humanitarian or financial aid to the country in the upcoming weeks, as neighboring Qatar has already done. On December 14, Anwar Gargash, diplomatic advisor to the UAE’s president, expressed optimism about the new leadership’s language on unity. Gargash also strongly emphasized the need to remain on guard given the new leadership’s ties to Islamist factions. He also wrote in an X post that the Arab Ministerial Contact Committee on Syria’s meeting “reflected a positive Arab approach to support our brothers in the path of political and peaceful transition” in Syria.

These moves across the Gulf add up to a positive signal that the countries that normalized with Assad are likely to deal pragmatically with the realities of the new Syria.

Turkey’s rising influence

As the country with the strongest relationship with Syria’s new leadership, Turkey is likely to hold ample leverage over Syria’s future—and even the region, given its increasingly assertive role across the Middle East and North Africa. Turkey’s gains in Syria bolster its standing vis-à-vis Iran in other areas such as the South Caucasus, where Turkey maintains close cooperation with Azerbaijan while Iran has close ties with Armenia. However, Ankara should not shoulder the role of reconstruction and state-building in Syria alone. Collaborating with the Arab states of the Gulf could bring both legitimacy and essential financial resources to Syria’s reconstruction efforts.

Among the Gulf states, Qatar is likely to wield the most influence over the new leadership in Damascus, having played a central role in facilitating talks between foreign ministers from Arab states, Turkey, Russia, and Iran during the Doha Forum that ultimately determined Assad’s fate. In meetings in Doha with Atlantic Council experts (myself included) just hours after the fall of Assad had been announced on December 8, senior Qatari national security figures expressed an air of vindication for their refusal to normalize with the Assad regime. Notably, Qatar was the only country in the Gulf already hosting the Syrian National Coalition, which it recognized as Syria’s sole legitimate representative.

The Trump administration’s opportunity

The fall of Assad represents a massive setback for Iran, and Gulf states must seize this moment as an unparalleled opportunity to reinforce the Arab role in Syria’s future. By pressuring and guiding the new leadership in Syria to form an inclusive government, Gulf countries can safeguard their interests while minimizing the risks of renewed instability that threaten the entire region.

The Trump administration also has a key role to play. As the new Syrian government faces the daunting and costly task of reconstruction, regional and international support will be indispensable to ensure that Syria does not fail again and destabilize the region. President-elect Donald Trump should lead the way alongside Turkey and the Arab Gulf states in pooling the funds required for Syria’s reconstruction and transitional governance, which would also strike a decisive strategic blow to Iran’s presence in Syria. Such assistance should be tied to clear conditions that would guarantee stability and an inclusive political process to build something better than what Syrians endured under Assad.

The fall of the Assad regime will have profound consequences for the region in the years ahead. And the United States and Gulf states have new leverage—both financial and diplomatic—to shape what those consequences will be. Any new administration in Damascus is likely eager to get Washington’s approval at the earliest possible moment to solidify its international legitimacy. That gives the United States and its Gulf allies the chance to positively impact the new political process in the country—and to secure any necessary changes from Syria’s new leadership—if it strays off course.

Joze Pelayo is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

The post What role will the Gulf states play in shaping the new Syria? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

For minorities, between reassurance and skepticism

From the outset, the new authorities demonstrated a conscious effort to signal a departure from the divisive practices of their predecessors. In Aleppo, HTS contacted prominent Christian leaders and clergy across various denominations to repair strained relations and foster a sense of security. These meetings were not superficial; they included discussions on tangible grievances, such as the injustices faced by Christians in Jisr al-Shughur a year prior. Some of these grievances have since been addressed mainly through accountability and restoring properties to their rightful owners, an unprecedented move that underscores the leadership’s understanding of the need for inclusivity, albeit carefully managed.

Similar gestures were made towards the Druze community in Idlib Governate’s Jabal al-Summaq area, where HTS leadership engaged with representatives to rebuild trust and ensure that their communities were not targeted. Additionally, on December 17, leaders held dialogues with prominent figures from the Druze community in Suwayda and Jabal al-Arab, sending assurances of safety and future inclusion. For the Ismailis of Salamiyah, the transition of power was remarkably smooth, as the town surrendered without violence. This cooperative handover reflects longstanding tensions between the Ismaili community and the Assad regime, which had marginalized them over the years.

However, the situation remains more nuanced with the Alawite community. The new government refrained from delivering targeted reassurances to the Alawites, instead embedding its messages of justice and reconciliation within broader declarations. The new authorities emphasized that no one would face retribution without due process and clear evidence of wrongdoing. The deployment of rebel forces in Latakia and its surrounding mountains occurred without notable violence, with explicit orders to safeguard public property and prevent retaliatory attacks. Such actions suggest an effort to mitigate fears of collective punishment among Alawites—a community burdened with its historical association with the Assad regime.

Still, there are lingering anxieties within minority communities. The Alawites, in particular, remain wary of the new leaders’ promises, balancing a cautious optimism with deep-seated concerns about potential reprisals. In response, some within the community have distanced themselves publicly from Assad, framing the current transition as an opportunity for a fresh start and a shared national future. Whether the new authorities can translate these gestures into meaningful inclusion will depend on their willingness to integrate minority representatives into future governance structures and decision-making processes.

For women, between pragmatism and policy gaps

The evolving role of women in Syria is shaped by societal necessity and practical realities. Syria’s protracted conflict has led to significant demographic shifts: countless men have been killed, displaced, or forced into exile due to military conscription, economic hardship, or combat involvement. As a result, women now bear much responsibility for sustaining households, working in various sectors, and managing day-to-day economic activities.

In urban centers and rural areas alike, women have maintained an active presence in the public sphere. Notably, no widespread attempts have been made to impose restrictive dress codes or curtail women’s mobility, in stark contrast to the fears many harbored when HTS first rose to prominence. Women freely participated in public celebrations across towns and villages, underscoring the relative ease with which they navigated public spaces under the new leadership.

However, women need to achieve meaningful political inclusion. While women are visible in mid-level administrative roles in the transitional government, there has yet to be any effort to appoint them to senior leadership positions or ministries. This mirrors a broader trend in conservative governance structures where women’s participation is often limited to symbolic roles. The new government’s failure to include women in decision-making risks alienating a critical population segment and undermining its claims of inclusivity.

Moving forward, the new leadership must recognize that empowering women is not merely a concession to international pressure but a practical necessity for rebuilding Syria. Women’s inclusion in governance, education, and economic development will be critical for addressing Syria’s demographic and financial challenges. The government can indicate its commitment to inclusivity with concrete steps, such as appointing women to leadership roles, supporting women-led initiatives, and ensuring equal access to education and employment.

Drafting a constitution

Despite the positive gestures made toward minorities and women, Syria’s new government under HTS leader Ahmed al-Shara faces structural and institutional challenges that threaten to undermine these early gains. Effective governance is not simply a matter of security or symbolic inclusivity; it requires building functioning institutions that deliver services, mediate disputes, and foster participation from all segments of society.

The need to integrate the experiences and expertise of Syria’s technocratic and bureaucratic workforce is at the heart of this challenge. The structure of Syria’s public administration going back decades included representation from various sects and backgrounds and significant contributions from women. Often overlooked in political narratives, this workforce remains vital to the country’s reconstruction and future success. The new government’s ability to retain and mobilize these experienced individuals within its evolving institutions will determine the effectiveness of its governance.

However, there are signs of tension between ideological considerations and practical governance. While Shara has shown a degree of pragmatism, particularly in dealing with local communities, the transitional government’s structures remain centralized and hierarchical, with power concentrated in a small leadership circle. This limits opportunities for inclusive decision-making and reinforces perceptions of exclusion among minorities and women.

To foster genuine participation, the new government must decentralize aspects of its governance, empower local councils, and integrate representatives from underrepresented groups. Decentralization has been a demand in many post-conflict contexts, allowing communities to manage their affairs while preserving national cohesion. In Syria, where local dynamics vary significantly across regions, such an approach would not only address the concerns of minorities and women but also strengthen the new authorities’ legitimacy.

The drafting of a new constitution presents both an opportunity and a challenge. On one hand, it offers a chance to codify the principles of inclusivity, justice, and representation essential for Syria’s long-term stability. On the other hand, the process is fraught with risks, particularly in a polarized environment where trust remains fragile. Minority communities and women must sit at the table during this process, ensuring their voices are heard and their rights are protected.

A constitution that explicitly guarantees the rights of minorities and women will strengthen the new government’s domestic legitimacy and address longstanding grievances that have fueled instability. It will provide a legal foundation for Syria’s governance, creating a framework that transcends political factions and ensures continuity in protecting vulnerable communities.

The test ahead

Syria is at a crossroads. The departure of the Assad regime has created a unique opportunity to redefine the relationship between the state and its people. The actions taken by Shara thus far—reaching out to minorities, refraining from imposing restrictive norms on women, and prioritizing internal legitimacy—reflect a pragmatic shift in HTS’s governance approach. However, these actions remain tentative and incomplete.

The true test lies in the new authorities’ ability to institutionalize these early gestures through concrete policies and legal frameworks. A new constitution that guarantees the rights of minorities and women will serve as a foundation for Syria’s future, ensuring that these rights are not contingent on political or ideological changes. Similarly, meaningful political inclusion—by appointing women and minority representatives to leadership roles—will signal a genuine commitment to shared governance.

For the Syrian people, the stakes are clear. After years of conflict and division, there is an opportunity to build a more inclusive and just future that reflects the resilience, diversity, and aspirations of all Syrians. The leaders of the new government face a critical choice: they can either embrace this opportunity and chart a path toward stability and legitimacy or retreat into exclusionary practices that risk perpetuating the very divisions they seek to overcome.

Sinan Hatahet is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the vice president for investment and social impact at the Syrian Forum.

The post What will minority and women’s rights look like in the new Syria? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s EU aspirations first began to take shape in the aftermath of the country’s 2004 Orange Revolution. However, the European Union initially showed little sign of sharing this Ukrainian enthusiasm for closer ties. Instead, it took nine years for Brussels and Kyiv to agree on the terms of an Association Agreement that aimed to take the relationship forward to the next level.

When the Association Agreement was finally ready to sign in late 2013, Russia intervened and pressured Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych to pull out. This led to protests in Kyiv, which then spiraled into a popular uprising following heavy-handed efforts to disperse students rallying in support of EU integration. The Revolution of Dignity, as it came to be known, reached a bloody climax in February 2014 with the murder of dozens of protesters in central Kyiv. In the aftermath of the killings, Yanukovych fled to Russia.

Yanukovych’s successor, Petro Poroshenko, signed the EU Association Agreement months later. By then, Putin had already decided to intervene militarily, seizing control of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula and sparking a war in eastern Ukraine. This was the start of an undeclared Russian war against Ukraine that would eventually lead to the full-scale invasion of 2022.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

As Russian troops approached Kyiv during the opening days of the invasion in February 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy officially applied for EU membership. This gesture underlined the historical significance of the country’s European choice at a time when Moscow was openly attempting to force Ukraine permanently back into the Kremlin orbit.

Amid the horrors of Europe’s largest invasion since World War II, EU officials and individual member states also recognized the importance of Ukraine’s European integration. In June 2022, Ukraine was granted EU candidate status. This was followed in late 2023 by a decision to start membership accession negotiations, with talks beginning in June 2024.

The dramatic progress made since 2022 has led to growing confidence in Ukraine that EU membership is a realistic goal for the country. It is certainly a popular option. The number of Ukrainians who back joining the EU has been rising steadily since the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, with recent polls consistently indicating that more than three-quarters of Ukrainians would like to see the country as part of the EU.

This overwhelming public support means there is unlikely to be any shortage of political will in Kyiv to adopt the policies that will bring Ukraine closer to achieving EU membership. Nevertheless, the pathway forward is complex and demanding. Effective governance reforms, particularly in the fight against corruption, are essential for Ukraine’s EU aspirations. Aligning with EU legal standards across 35 policy areas including taxation, energy, and judicial reform will also require a monumental effort.

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Ukraine will be hoping for an accelerated period of EU integration progress when Poland takes on the six-month rotating presidency of the European Council in January 2025. This follows on from a Hungarian presidency that brought few benefits for Ukraine, and should create favorable conditions for constructive engagement on key reform issues.

Looking ahead, Ukraine’s EU bid is likely to encounter additional obstacles and headwinds as the prospect of membership draws nearer. Ukraine’s agricultural prowess in particular is set to present both opportunities and challenges. Ukraine is already a major exporter of agricultural products to the EU. If the country is able to join the single market and eliminate existing barriers including tariffs and quotas, this would potentially overwhelm European markets.

Increased Ukrainian grain exports to the EU since 2022 have already become a controversial issue in many EU member states, sparking protests and border blockades. This opposition will only grow in the coming few years, with EU farmers pressing their governments to act in their interests and prevent Ukraine from achieving unrestricted access.

Labor flows of Ukrainian workers may also create some concerns among existing EU members. While millions of Ukrainians are already living and working in the EU including many with refugee status, membership could lead to an influx similar to the large number of Poles who moved to other EU member states following Poland’s 2004 EU accession. To address these concerns, transition periods may be necessary.

How soon could Ukraine achieve EU membership? EU Ambassador to Ukraine Katarína Mathernová has expressed confidence that Ukraine could join by the end of the decade. This was echoed by EU Commissioner for Enlargement Oliver Varhelyi, who stated in October that Ukraine could potentially secure membership by 2029 if it completes the necessary reforms.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has underscored the nation’s determination to achieve fast-track integration. While there is strong support for Ukraine’s membership bid in most EU capitals, the accession process is rigorous and requires unanimous approval. Further progress is likely in 2025, but the road to full membership remains long and challenging.

Kateryna Odarchenko is a partner at SIC Group Ukraine.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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After gaining its independence from restrictive and authoritarian French rule, Syria suffered through a series of short-lived and unstable regimes, endured more than fifty years of brutal Assad family rule, and finally devolved into civil war. Syria is divided by competing ethnic and sectarian communities, creating barriers to the coalition building that could foster greater stability outside authoritarian rule. If, however, an Islamist coalition led by HTS can consolidate power in this environment, it would represent a massive transformation in a nation that has long been cursed with instability and portend significant implications for the region. 

Broken promises and a divided nation

The Syrian Arab Republic, as it exists today, is largely based on territorial boundaries established during the French mandate, which lasted from 1920 to 1946. The British and French—anticipating an Ottoman defeat in World War I and eager to absorb the spoils into their respective colonial empires—divided Syria between them: a French northern Syria and a British southern Syria, breaking wartime promises to the Arabs to promote their independence if they revolted against Ottoman rule during the war. France further subdivided its area, managing Lebanon—with much of northern Syria’s Mediterranean coastline—as a separate mandate and ceding another portion of the coast around the city of Iskenderun to the newly independent Republic of Turkey. 

The borders drawn by the European powers before and during the Syria mandate not only divided ethnic and sectarian communities but also institutionalized and exacerbated existing divisions. The Sunni majority, which makes up more than two-thirds of the state’s population, was composed of multiple ethnicities including Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, and others. A third of the country’s population was composed of Christians, Shia, and Alawi Muslims, as well as smaller Druze and Jewish communities, among others. 

Further, the Arab centers of culture, learning, and nationalist ferment—cities such as Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad—all ended up in different countries. The artificial boundaries ignored historical, cultural, and social ties, setting the stage for many of the conflicts and identity struggles that have continued to shape the region in the present era.

France did little to build the state institutions necessary for the constricted Syrian republic to manage its affairs after gaining independence in 1946. The new state went on to have twenty-one governments in the following twenty-four years, when Hafez al-Assad assumed power in an intra-regime coup in 1970.

Decades of suppression

Although Hafez introduced a level of stability previously unknown in Syria, he established one of the most authoritarian states in the region. His minority regime—dominated by the schismatic Alawi sect of Islam—severely circumscribed the role of Sunni Muslims, which comprised most of Syria’s population, in politics and the security services. A 1982 challenge by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was met with brutal crackdowns, which resulted in an estimated tens of thousands killed and forced the organization into exile. 

The elder Assad’s suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood set the script for his son Bashar al-Assad’s later effort to quash the demonstrations that began the 2011 Syrian uprising: declaring all opposition elements to be Islamic extremists and mobilizing state security resources to destroy them. Although radical Islamists, including al-Qaeda elements and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) would ultimately conduct their own struggles against the regime, the initial popular uprising was not ideological, and it was Assad’s overreaction that turned it into a civil conflict that would engulf the entire country.

It was Hafez’s effort to protect the Alawis from a vengeful communal reorganization after his death that led him to install his son in the presidency. Notably, Bashar was not Hafez’s first choice for succession. Years of preparing his oldest son Basil came to naught when he was killed in a car accident, putting the ophthalmologist Bashar in line to assume the presidency upon Hafez’s death in 2000. Despite talk of political and economic liberalization, the younger Assad’s regime was ruthless and kleptocratic. It was that ruthlessness that would ultimately lead to demonstrations, civil war, and the regime’s undoing. The Assad government’s brutal crackdown against children who had painted anti-regime graffiti in 2011 in the southern city of Daraa, who were subjected to torture and abuse, was one of the incidents of oppression that sparked the almost fourteen-year civil war that would ultimately result in Assad’s ouster.

Russia, Iran, and the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah had fought on behalf of the regime earlier in the war. But when HTS launched its offensive in November, each of these allies couldn’t respond fast enough, as they had all been weakened by other conflicts and had fewer resources to dedicate to the Assad regime. Bashar and his family are now living in asylum in Russia, as Moscow negotiates with HTS to retain its military bases in Syria.

International implications

Whether the Islamist coalition led by HTS can consolidate power over the country has significant regional implications. If it does, Tehran will have lost a stalwart ally and a link in its land bridge to Lebanon’s Shia community. The elder Assad, contemptuous of former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, had gone so far as to support Iran in the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq war, and Syria could always be relied upon to support Iranian regional policies. With a Syrian government no longer friendly toward Iran, Tehran’s ability to support Hezbollah would become far more complicated.

Israel, which has attacked Syria for being a conduit of Iranian support to Hezbollah in Lebanon, may find that radical Sunni Islamists are just as dangerous and just as committed to Israel’s destruction as Hezbollah’s Shia. Both Israel’s respective borders with Lebanon and Syria are each approximately fifty miles long, but there is no United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution, however poorly executed, mandating a buffer zone along the border area in Syria as UN Security Council Resolution 1701 does in Lebanon. Finally, it is worth remembering that only the United States recognizes Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, which is internationally recognized as Syrian territory captured in the Arab-Israeli war in 1967. In fact, UN Security Council Resolution 497 explicitly states that Israel’s “decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction, and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights is null and void and without international legal effect.”

Turkey, under the regime of the Islamist Justice and Development Party of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, known to have close ties to global Islamist establishments, would presumably benefit from a relationship with the new regime, as it has long supported elements of the Syrian opposition and demonstrated long-standing disquiet about Assad remaining in power. Ankara will seek to remain involved in Syria to repatriate the millions of Syrian refugees it currently hosts and to combat the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), an organization it considers a dangerous terrorist group because of its links to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is designated as a terrorist organization by both Turkey and the United States.

The United States’ principal Arab partners—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—have all taken hostile stands against Islamists since the Arab Spring uprisings of 2010-11, and the new Syrian regime may struggle to gain acceptance or support from other Arab states. Qatar, however, has often been accused of supporting Islamist groups considered beyond the pale by its Arab neighbors, and Doha may see an opportunity to make its mark on the region by buttressing the new HTS-led regime.

Minority rights

While it would be inaccurate to assert that the Syrian Arab Republic, as carved by European colonial powers, never had a chance at stability, both European rulers and Syrian leaders share great responsibility for the mess in which the country finds itself. Neither contributed to the evolution of functioning institutions that are essential for stability. Without a new national identity in the constricted Syrian republic, ineffectual Sunni Arab-dominated governments and communal tensions combined to promote instability and, ultimately, a strongman dictatorship in the form of Alawi minority rule. 

Now, in the aftermath of Assad’s ouster, both internal divisions among Syrians and external interests in shaping the country’s future threaten to render the current moment a lull in the civil war rather than its conclusion. Although the emerging HTS-dominated government has yet to consolidate its authority, it would be highly unexpected if—as a Sunni Islamist government—it were to guarantee the civil rights of Twelver Shias, Alawis, Druze, and other groups generally considered schismatic and which are often discriminated against among Sunni-majority communities.

There are many flavors of Islamists in Syria, both within and outside the HTS coalition, including pockets of ISIS. Elements of the Syrian military may yet reinvent themselves into an insurgency, as happened next door in Iraq after the fall of Hussein’s Baathist regime in 2003. Minorities, particularly Alawis, may elect to fight to protect their future from perceived Sunni animus. Syrian Kurds, long disenfranchised by the outgoing regime, are armed and have demonstrated resilience against other armed groups.

Finally, although the United States is mostly steering clear of direct involvement in Syria’s transition, Russia, Iran, and Turkey all have major interests in attempting to shape the country’s trajectory in their favor.

Given Syria’s long history of sectarian divisions, the presence of multiple armed factions in the country, and external powers’ competing interests in shaping the aftermath of the Assad regime’s downfall, the swift triumph of HTS and its allies may prove to be merely the end of a phase of the Syrian civil war rather than the end of the conflict.

Amir Asmar is an adjunct professor of Middle East issues at the National Intelligence University. He was previously a senior executive and Middle East and terrorism analyst in the US Department of Defense.

The views expressed are the author’s and do not imply endorsement from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or any other US Government agency.

The post The fall of the Assad regime is just the beginning of Syria’s quest for stability appeared first on Atlantic Council.

1. Why was Yoon impeached?

Yoon was impeached by the National Assembly on December 14 for his unconstitutional attempt to impose martial law. Yoon had declared martial law on December 3, citing the need to protect South Korea from “North Korean communist forces” and “anti-state forces,” as well as to “rebuild and protect” the nation from “falling into ruin.” He accused the opposition party of attempting to undermine democracy by impeaching his cabinet members and blocking budget plans. His decision appears to have been influenced by right-wing YouTube channels that propagated conspiracy theories, exaggerating perceived threats to his administration. The impeachment underscores the effectiveness of democratic checks and balances, as Yoon’s misguided and authoritarian decision was ultimately overturned through parliamentary action.

—Sungmin Cho is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Impeachment is a rare occurrence in the United States, with only three presidents having faced the process in nearly two-and-a-half centuries. Conversely, South Korea has seen three presidents face impeachment in just twenty years, with several others leaving office in less-than-ideal circumstances. 

Nor is martial law unknown in South Korea. The country experienced it under the control of Park Chung-hee in the 1970s. Then, the South Korean people fought with blood, sweat, and tears to institute a true democracy. It’s under this context, with martial law in the living memory of many in the country, that South Korea was galvanized to call for impeachment for an already massively unpopular Yoon. South Koreans are very protective of their democracy, and Yoon’s attempt at martial law drew comparisons to the authoritarian Park Chung-hee government, especially since Yoon’s first move after the martial law declaration was seemingly to block the National Assembly from voting to end it. This move was undoubtedly one step too far for the South Korean public and the calls for impeachment were a statement from the population that they will not take a threat to the democratic process lightly. 

—Lauren D. Gilbert is a deputy director with the Atlantic Council’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative.

2. What is the potential removal process?

After the National Assembly impeached Yoon, his powers were immediately suspended, and the prime minister assumed the role of acting president. The impeachment case will now be reviewed by the Constitutional Court, which has up to 180 days to decide if Yoon violated the Constitution or laws to a degree warranting removal. In former President Park Geun-hye’s impeachment case that began in late 2016, the Constitutional Court took ninety-two days to reach a decision. Both Yoon and the National Assembly will present arguments, evidence, and witnesses in a trial-like process before the judges of the Constitutional Court. If upheld, Yoon will be formally removed from office, triggering a presidential election within sixty days; if rejected, he will be reinstated. Throughout this period, public opinion and political debates will intensify as the nation awaits the court’s final decision.

—Sungmin Cho

Now that Yoon is facing impeachment, the Constitutional Court has 180 days to decide, and the vote requires at least six of the full court’s nine judges to vote yes for impeachment. However, at present, the court only has six judges, with three seats on the court left vacant. This is leading to a debate over how and when the court should proceed. Some say that the vote should go through with the six current judges, while others say the vacant seats must be filled first. 

There is also debate over whether the judges should be appointed by the National Assembly or whether Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, who has taken over the presidency during the impeachment process, has the right to appoint the three judges. Further complicating matters, the court has several other impeachment cases still awaiting its decision, adding to the oversaturation of the Constitutional Court. While we await the decision on how they will proceed with the appointment (or not) of the three vacant seats, there is still the possibility that Yoon’s impeachment will be overturned. There is a precedent for this. Former president Roh Moo-hyun’s impeachment was overturned in 2004, although unlike Yoon, Roh had the public’s support.

—Lauren D. Gilbert

3. What does this mean for South Korea’s relations with Japan?

In the immediate term, Japan and South Korea will broadly continue to communicate and coordinate along the lines forged over the past two-and-a-half years. However, South Korea and also to some extent Japan will have limited political capital to undertake any new measures to strengthen the relationship. Instead, Tokyo and Seoul are focusing on making both their bilateral relations and the trilateral security framework with Washington resilient and long-lasting to minimize the effects of political revisions in the future.

Japan is concerned about who will take the presidency in South Korea if the impeachment is upheld. The political momentum gained by progressives in Seoul is raising concerns about a reversal of the progress made in Japan-South Korea relations in recent years. On the plus side, however, Japan and South Korea have rebuilt ties and worked on the strategic and operational mechanisms and procedures of close coordination, setting a strong precedent for the future.  

—Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative.

4. What does this mean for relations with Washington and trilateral security cooperation with the US and Japan?

In the near term, the acting president, Han, is already moving to ensure continued alliance coordination between Seoul and Washington. Key meetings and working-level coordination are likely to return to some semblance of normalcy, as the institutional memory and mechanisms of the alliance are strong. However, in practical terms, the timing of this political crisis will make it challenging to have high-level strategic coordination or make progress on key alliance issues in 2025. South Korea will have only an acting president when US President-elect Donald Trump takes office in January. And depending on how long the Constitutional Court takes to decide the impeachment case, it could be as long as eight months from now before a new president is elected. We also cannot rule out a prolonged period of uncertainty followed by Yoon’s return to office, in a much-weakened and tenuous position, in the event the court does not uphold the impeachment.

—Markus Garlauskas is the director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative and a former national intelligence officer for North Korea.

5. What can we expect from North Korea right now?

North Korea appears to have been laying the groundwork for a renewed military confrontation with South Korea for some time now, and it could initiate that confrontation at a particularly inopportune moment for the alliance. Pyongyang’s silence so far suggests that North Korea will wait for the outcome of the Constitutional Court’s decision and the election of a new president in South Korea before moving to take advantage of the situation, however. North Korea likely recognizes that pursuing a confrontation with Han, the interim president, could simply strengthen the position of South Korean conservatives inclined to take a harder line against North Korea. Meanwhile, before pushing too far, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is likely to want some time to probe Trump’s new position. 

A major thaw in relations is unlikely, even if South Koreans elect a progressive president inclined to engage Pyongyang, given Kim’s moves this year to reinforce the permanence of the division between North and South. Despite optimism in some quarters about the possibility of renewed Trump-Kim summitry in 2025, not much is likely to result. A lot has changed in the four years since Trump left office, and Kim’s position has solidified in ways that make it much less likely that he would be willing to offer major, meaningful concessions to Washington or Seoul.

—Markus Garlauskas

On the surface, North Korea’s response to the political crisis has been limited to domestic media commentary and has refrained from openly confronting South Korea so, perhaps to prove wrong Yoon’s claims about North Korean infiltration. At the same time, the political turmoil in South Korea is a prime situation for North Korea to carry out covert cognitive warfare—particularly through social media and other communication methods. In particular, Pyongyang would be piggybacking and boosting the criticisms in South Korea toward Yoon and the conservatives. 

For North Korea, such measures are essentially about investing in the return of the progressives to power, which North Korea could exploit to make South-North relations and circumstances on the peninsula more advantageous for Pyongyang. North Korea’s new official policy of recognizing South Korea as an “adversary” rather than a “partner for unification” was not only to bolster its militarily confrontational stance, but a means of hybrid warfare to apply further pressure on Seoul—particularly vis-à-vis the progressives. Hence for now, North Korea will likely see how the situation in South Korea plays out while also ensuring that it has the upper hand in dictating the direction of inter-Korean relations.

—Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi

The post The global ripple effects of South Korea’s political turmoil appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What are the next steps for Romania’s presidential race after this unprecedented ruling? And what are its implications for the country’s democracy? Our experts answer six burning questions below.

1. Why was the presidential election nullified?

This decision is historic and unprecedented. The Constitutional Court of Romania unanimously made the decision on the basis of Article 146 (f) of the Constitution concerning the legality and correctness of the presidential electoral process, with the court’s decision today stating that the “entire electoral process will be integrally redone.” The rollout of the decision was somewhat fumbled, as it became public while polling stations were already open for the diaspora in the second-round presidential election, and by the time the process was stopped, around 53,000 citizens abroad had already voted. 

This binding decision from the court comes on the heels of rapidly developing information concerning state-sponsored interference in the electoral process and Russian hybrid activities, as well as accusations of campaign finance violations. The court made its decision stating that the integrity of the vote had been affected, as one candidate skirted the law in his campaign and benefited from unfair promotion. Continued clear communication from the authorities will be critical to provide information to a society that is feeling tense and exhausted after weeks of elections.

—Anca Agachi is a defense policy analyst at the RAND Corporation and a nonresident fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

It’s never a good thing when an election is nullified. In this case, Romania’s Constitutional Court appears to have acted on the basis of information regarding Russian interference on behalf of Georgescu. Romanian society appears divided in its reaction, with even the liberal opposition leader, Elena Lasconi, Georgescu’s opponent in the presidential race, criticizing the decision. Demonstrations could follow in what seems to be a highly charged political environment. Romania’s December 1 parliamentary elections, however, are not affected by the decision. The new Parliament should be seated around December 21 and will be in a position to create a new government.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former assistant US Secretary of State for Europe.

The decision to annul the first round of Romania’s presidential election revolves around declassified documents from the country’s intelligence services that allege that a coordinated campaign promoted pro-Russian candidate Georgescu to unexpectedly garner the largest percentage of the vote on November 24. 

Those allegations, which have not been proven beyond what has been published by Romania’s security services, include a coordinated campaign across social media platforms such as Telegram, Facebook, and, most importantly, TikTok that gave would-be voters the assumption that Georgescu was a more prominent candidate than had been expected before the November 24 vote. Hashtags associated with the ultranationalist candidate gained significant visibility on TikTok in the days ahead of the first round vote, and the country’s authorities subsequently asked the European Commission to look into the irregularities under the bloc’s newly passed social media laws.

A lot remains uncertain. While the Atlantic Council’s own analysis of TikTok and Telegram found significant amounts of coordination to promote Georgescu to the widest online audience possible, much of this activity was completely legal under Romania’s election laws. Claims that online influencers were paid to champion the candidate’s causes—and did not disclose those payments under campaign financing rules—do fall into the category of potential illegal behavior.

It’s unclear whether social media significantly altered voters’ choices in this particular election. Repeated studies have demonstrated that people’s access to digital platforms like TikTok represent only a part of a wider media diet, including access to traditional media and discussions with friends and family, that contributes to how they eventually decide to vote. What we do know is there is clear evidence that Georgescu’s campaign was promoted heavily by often clandestine activity across multiple social media platforms in ways that, while opaque, were mostly legal, based on what has been disclosed by local authorities and via the Atlantic Council’s own analysis. 

—Mark Scott is senior resident fellow at the Digital Forensic Research Lab’s (DFRLab) Democracy + Tech Initiative within the Atlantic Council Technology Programs. He was previously the chief technology correspondent for Politico.

2. What does this incident tell us about the resilience of democracy in Romania?

We just experienced a near-miss in the heart of NATO. Romania, a NATO ally for two decades with a record of democratic integrity, almost had a presidential election stolen by foreign intervention. The good news is that Romania’s democracy proved itself to be sufficiently robust and resilient to prevent this interference from having a decisive impact—though the final outcome of the rescheduled elections will ultimately determine that. 

The alleged interference also underscores the power of social media, how vulnerable tech platforms are to manipulation, and how significant this can be to the future of democracy. Much thought and action is urgently needed to ensure that social media is channeled and structured so that it enhances the vibrancy of democracy rather than becoming a weapon to undermine it.  

—​​Ian Brzezinski is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy.

The next days, weeks, and months will be critical to ensuring that Romanian democracy has long-term prospects of not only survival, but recovery. This election season comes on the heels of massive structural challenges, such as endemic distrust in state institutions and socioeconomic issues, such as cost of living hikes and brain drain. Another major challenge for the country is corruption, which led to a sizable anti-system vote in both the presidential and parliamentary elections and provided a fertile ground for far-right parties and for malicious interference activities. 

On top of these structural challenges, there were issues with the authorities’ communication in the aftermath of the presidential election. The public experienced a whiplash in the Constitutional Court’s decisions as to whether the presidential election can proceed to the second round. The government’s communication was inconsistent concerning the fate of the presidential election, the role played by state-sponsored actors, and Russia’s role in influencing the process (including if and how these factors influenced the actual voting result). Meanwhile, jockeying among domestic political parties has created tension and deepened distrust in society. 

Notably, nongovernmental organizations, the media, and other civil society groups rose up to fill the void in an essential and constructive fashion. For instance, a media investigation uncovered links between the Kremlin and pro-Georgescu Romanian influencers. And it was civil society organizations that asked for the declassification of Supreme National Council of Defence documents pertaining to election interference. The information this kind of engagement has uncovered has been like oxygen to a society holding its breath.

—Anca Agachi

3. Who is in charge of managing this issue now, and what can we expect from the key players in the election and society at large? 

This will be a whole-of-government effort, likely spread across the newly elected (and fragmented) Parliament with responsibility over legislation and choosing the new prime minister, Iohannis (who will remain in power until a new president can take the oath of office following elections), relevant authorities with responsibilities for resilience and security, electoral authorities, and probably the judicial branch as well. 

Ideally, their focus will be on three things: 1) Build national unity in the face of far-right and anti-Euro-Atlantic forces. 2) Take action to inspect and secure critical vulnerabilities from further foreign interference. 3) Investigate the causes that led to this outcome, especially the details of the interference effort, potential collusion of those who may have benefited from it, and any responsibility of Romanian authorities in the slow identification of coordinated campaigns to influence the vote. 

Elected officials will play a critical role in communicating with the public regarding what lies ahead until the elections can be held again (likely in March), given the tension that exists in society already, massive gaps in information concerning this unprecedented decision, its implications for the country, and the challenges posed by foreign interference. However, as the entire presidential election process will be restarted, a lot of attention will be focused domestically on the repositioning of candidates and political blocs. 

—Anca Agachi

The new Parliament will support a new government. The current president may continue in office until his successor is elected but may also resign, in which case the new president of the Senate will become interim president.  One wild card is whether supporters of Georgescu will mount protests and whether these can attract widespread support.

—Daniel Fried

4. What sort of government will emerge when the new Parliament convenes on December 21?

While predictions are uncertain, the pro-European parties appear to have formed a coalition and have a majority of votes in the Parliament. That said, the parliamentary and presidential elections indicated a strong anti-incumbency trend in Romania.

—Daniel Fried

5. What can we expect next from Russia?

We can expect Russian denunciation and a wave of (feigned) outrage. The Kremlin appears to support political extremes in Romania, as elsewhere, promoting through statements and trolls a narrative of Western oppression and domination of Romania, hoping that Romanians forget the long record of Kremlin-imposed communist rule that kept Romania poor and autocratic for two generations.  

—Daniel Fried

6. What lessons should the United States and Europe take from this, and what should they do right now?

First, democratic resilience is an issue to be taken extremely seriously in Europe, not only because of what it means for domestic stability in transatlantic countries, but also given its implications for broader regional security and defense. Romania is a key NATO country in the southeast of the Alliance, and its internal political turmoil has broad implications for allied stability. Given the growth of far-right movements throughout Europe, the circumstances of this election should not be taken lightly. 

Second, renewed attention should be paid toward deepening and expanding the national and transatlantic toolbox available to respond to hybrid incidents in a broader context of transatlantic adaptation in the aftermath of Russia’s war in Ukraine. We expect information to come out in the next few weeks about what exactly happened in Romania’s case, but whatever the findings may be, it is clear that broader resilience and operational capacity in hybrid responses will be critical to transatlantic security.

—Anca Agachi

Russia seeks to strengthen extremist politics and promote a sense of threat throughout Europe, using a variety of methods including information manipulation, support for extremist politics, economic pressure, sabotage, threats, intimidation, and, in the case of Ukraine, war. Those in Europe who thought that Russian aggression had nothing to do with them have discovered their error. Russia has not created political fissures in European countries (or the United States) but seeks to exacerbate and exploit them. The solution lies in resisting Russian pressure while working to address those social and economic problems that give rise to vulnerabilities. This is not a new challenge but a current manifestation of an older one, and some perspective can help guide a common response.

—Daniel Fried

The post Romania annulled its presidential election results amid alleged Russian interference. What happens next? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The announcement of a freeze in the country’s EU membership bid coincided with a European Parliament resolution denouncing Georgia’s parliamentary election as “neither free nor fair” and calling for a rerun of the vote under international supervision. The resolution strongly condemned “Russia’s systematic interference in Georgia’s democratic processes,” and criticized policies implemented by the ruling Georgian Dream party as “incompatible with Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration.”

Opponents accuse the Georgian authorities of violating the Georgian Constitution, which mandates integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures. The decision to put the EU accession process on pause has sparked widespread anger and dismay throughout Georgian society, where a majority have long favored closer ties with Europe. Polls indicate that around 80 percent of Georgians support the country’s EU integration.

Protests erupted as soon as the decision to freeze EU talks was announced, with large numbers of people flocking to the center of the Georgian capital to defend against what many see as an attack on their country’s democratic system and European future. The authorities have reacted by ordering a hard line response that has included the use of water cannons and tear gas against protesters along with the arrest of prominent opposition figures and multiple incidents of heavy-handed policing. Security forces are accused of deliberately targeting journalists and attacking protesters seeking to record evidence of excesses.

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The protests currently taking place across Georgia are the latest episode in an extended period of anti-government unrest that began last year when the ruling Georgian Dream party attempted to pass Russian-style foreign agent legislation targeting civil society. Protests then resumed in the aftermath of the parliamentary election in October. Many in Tbilisi are now comparing current events to the April 1989 protests that were crushed by the Soviet authorities, sparking Georgia’s independence movement. There have also been widespread comparisons with Ukraine’s two post-Soviet Maidan revolutions in defense of the country’s fledgling democracy and European choice.

Some Georgian government officials are siding with the protesters, with hundreds signing an open letter condemning the suspension of EU accession talks. A number of Georgian ambassadors and senior officials including Deputy Foreign Minister Teimuraz Jandzhalia have resigned in protest. Meanwhile, schools and universities across the country have halted classes amid signs of a growing civil disobedience campaign.

The protests have also attracted considerable international support. In a November 29 statement, US Helsinki Commission leaders expressed solidarity with the Georgian people while condemning the government crackdown and declaring the Georgian authorities “illegitimate.” Other countries have issued similar statements or imposed sanctions measures on Georgian Dream officials linked to violence against protesters.

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The mounting confrontation in Georgia has potentially far-reaching implications for the wider region. Critics of the Georgian Dream authorities accuse the party of seeking to turn their country away from Euro-Atlantic integration and return Georgia to the Russian sphere of influence. They argue that Georgia is a key battleground in the struggle between the democratic world and the emerging axis of authoritarian nations led by Russia and China.

If Moscow is able to return Georgia to the Kremlin orbit, this could have grave consequences for neighboring Armenia, which has sought to deepen ties with the West amid disillusionment over Russia’s failure to support the country during its recent war with Azerbaijan. It would also send a powerful message to other countries looking to turn away from Moscow at a time when Russia is waging the largest European war since World War II in Ukraine over Kyiv’s European aspirations.

The Georgian Dream authorities reject accusations that they are steering the country away from Europe and back toward Moscow. During the recent parliamentary election campaign, they focused on messages of peace and stability while claiming to being shielding Georgia from Ukraine’s fate. However, the sheer scale of the current protests suggests that a large percentage of Georgians reject the idea of securing peace at the expense of their most basic human rights and democratic freedoms.

With the opposition movement gaining momentum, much may now depend on the role of the international community. Protest leaders will be hoping that the US, EU, and other Western countries impose tougher sanctions on Georgian Dream officials while increasing their support for Georgia’s independent media and civil society. As they mull their response to events in Georgia, Western officials will be well aware of the high stakes involved. The outcome of the protests will likely define Georgia’s future and shape the geopolitical climate in the southern Caucasus and beyond for years to come.

Ana Lejava is a policy associate at the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security.

Further reading

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Georgian protests escalate amid fears over mounting Russian influence appeared first on Atlantic Council.

For many years, Putin has publicly questioned the Ukrainian nation’s right to exist. He has repeatedly stated that he sees today’s independent Ukraine as an artificial state, and regards all those who disagree with this verdict as anti-Russian forces or outright Nazis. For more than a decade, he has sought to turn this toxic vision into reality via an escalating campaign of military aggression.

When Putin embarked on the latest stage of his campaign to destroy Ukraine in February 2022, he declared that the goals of his full-scale invasion were the “demilitarization” and denazification” of the country. During abortive spring 2022 peace negotiations in Istanbul, it became apparent that Russia’s interpretation of demilitarization would have left Ukraine disarmed and defenseless.

Putin’s representatives during the Istanbul talks called for the Ukrainian army to be drastically reduced to a minimal force of just 50,000 troops, with strict limits also placed on the amount of armor and types of missiles Ukraine could possess. Meanwhile, Russia would face no such restrictions. Crucially, the Kremlin demanded complete Ukrainian neutrality and insisted on retaining a veto over any international military aid to Kyiv in the event of renewed hostilities. These punishing terms leave little room for doubt that Putin’s intention was to place Ukraine completely at his mercy and in no position to resist the next stage of Russian aggression.

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The implications of “denazification” are even more ominous. Putin has long accused Ukraine of being a “Nazi state,” despite the fact that the country has a popularly elected Jewish president and no far-right politicians in government. In reality, “denazification” is Kremlin code for the complete eradication of a separate Ukrainian national identity. In other words, Putin pretends to be fighting fascism order to legitimize his criminal goal of a Ukraine without Ukrainians.

The grim consequences of Putin’s “denazification” policies are already evident throughout Russian-occupied Ukraine. In regions of the country currently under Kremlin control, all traces of Ukrainian statehood and national identity are being ruthlessly purged. Ukrainian children are forced to study a Kremlin curriculum that demonizes Ukraine while glorifying the invasion of their country. Adults must accept Russian citizenship if they wish to access basic services such as pensions and healthcare.

Anyone regarded as a potential threat to the Russian occupation authorities is at risk of deportation, abduction, torture, or execution. While it is impossible to determine exact figures, it is estimated that thousands of Ukrainian civilians have been detained since February 2022. In most cases, relatives of detainees have no way of knowing if they are still alive. Britain’s The Economist recently described conditions in Russian-occupied Ukraine as a “totalitarian hell.” It is a very specific vision of hell that has been designed to remove all traces of Ukraine and impose an imperial Russian identity.

The most obvious indication of Russia’s genocidal intent in Ukraine has been the mass deportation of Ukrainian children, with thousands abducted and transferred to a system of camps where they are subjected to indoctrination in order to rob them of their Ukrainian heritage and turn them into loyal Kremlin subjects. In March 2023, the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin in relation to these abductions. The UN’s 1948 Genocide Convention recognizes “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” as an act of genocide.

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Russia’s own actions since February 2022 have made a mockery of the arguments used by the Kremlin to justify the war. At the start of the full-scale invasion, Putin claimed to be defending the rights of Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the east of the country. However, the Russian army has since killed tens of thousands of predominantly Russian-speakers in eastern Ukraine, while reducing dozens of towns and cities across the region to rubble.

Likewise, Russia’s attempts to justify the attack on Ukraine by painting it as a response to NATO enlargement have been largely debunked by Putin himself. When neighboring Finland and Sweden responded to Russia’s invasion by announcing plans in spring 2022 to abandon decades of neutrality and join NATO, Putin was quick to declare that Russia had “no problem” with the move. This indifference was particularly striking as Finnish accession more than doubled Russia’s NATO border, while Swedish membership transformed the strategically vital Baltic Sea into a NATO lake.

Putin has since gone even further, withdrawing the bulk of Russian troops from the Finnish border and leaving it largely undefended. Based on Putin’s remarkably relaxed response to NATO’s recent Nordic enlargement, it seems safe to conclude that he does not in fact view the NATO alliance as a security threat to Russia itself, and has merely exploited the issue as a smokescreen for his own imperial ambitions in Ukraine.

As Donald Trump attempts to implement his campaign promise and end the war in Ukraine, he is likely to discover that his famed deal-making skills are no match for Putin’s single-minded obsession with the destruction of Ukraine. In words and deeds, Putin has repeatedly demonstrated his commitment to wiping Ukraine off the map. In such circumstances, any talk of a compromise settlement is dangerously delusional. Until Putin is forced to recognize Ukraine’s right to exist, any peace deals will be temporary and the threat of further Russian aggression will remain.

Yuliya Kazdobina is a senior fellow at the “Ukrainian Prism” Foreign Policy Council. This text is adapted from the “Pragmatic Dialogue with the West: Why it is Worth Supporting Ukraine” project undertaken with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. It represents the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the position of the International Renaissance Foundation.

Further reading

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Vladimir Putin does not want a peace deal. He wants to destroy Ukraine. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In October 2022, French cement company Lafarge S.A. and its Syrian subsidiary pleaded guilty to providing material support to terrorist organizations in Syria. Specifically, Lafarge admitted to paying bribes to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and al-Nusra Front (ANF) in 2013 and 2014 to keep a cement plant in northern Syria operational. Lafarge also purchased raw materials from ISIS-controlled suppliers, supplied cement to ISIS itself, and even paid the terrorist organization in exchange for edging out competing Turkish cement purveyors. Less than a month after the DOJ brought charges, Lafarge pleaded guilty and agreed to pay a $90.78 million fine and forfeit $687 million.

Syrians continue to suffer the consequences with minimal support

The Lafarge settlement marked a watershed moment for victims and survivors of international crimes in Syria—including those affected by ISIS’s and ANF’s crimes and those forced to live under the groups’ control. Lafarge lined the pockets of ISIS and ANF while these groups were victimizing the company’s own Syrian employees and otherwise perpetrating horrific atrocities across northern Syria—including the war crimes and crimes against humanity of enslavement, torture, rape, sexual slavery, displacement, and enforced disappearance. ISIS’s crimes in Syria include the killing of more than 5,043 individuals, thirty-two of whom died as a result of torture. Additionally, at least forty-seven individuals, among them sixteen children and ten women, lost their lives due to lack of food and medicine during sieges imposed by ISIS. To this day, the fate of 8,684 individuals forcibly disappeared by ISIS remains unknown. These atrocities represent just a fraction of the immense suffering that ISIS’s war crimes inflicted in Syria.

The victims of Lafarge’s activities have no avenues for legal remedy inside Syria and routinely face logistical, procedural, and jurisdictional hurdles to accessing justice abroad. Ongoing conflict and displacement, among other circumstances, further impede victims’ recovery. Since 2011, more than 113,000 people have been forcibly disappeared by various parties to the conflict, mostly by the Syrian regime, and more than 300,000 have been killed. Over the past thirteen years, the lives of Syrians have been devastated: The country has become the site of the largest displacement crisis in modern history, with more than thirteen million people—over 50 percent of the population—displaced. More than sixteen million Syrians are currently in need of humanitarian assistance. Among them are survivors and families of victims who require urgent medical, psychosocial, and financial support. Moreover, with a significant number of Syrian victims and their families now displaced to other countries, the challenges of securing legal status and access to essential documentation add an additional layer of hardship.

As aid to address the Syrian crisis continues to shrink, support for victims and their families to recover from violations has diminished, as has sustained support for the pursuit of justice and efforts to preserve the truth.

The Lafarge forfeiture offers a pathway to recovery

When the Lafarge forfeiture was announced, it presented a glimmer of hope that the DOJ would work to realize a “primary goal” of its Asset Forfeiture Program: returning forfeited assets to victims, as authorized under federal law. Two years later, however, the funds continue to sit within the US government’s Assets Forfeiture Fund. Syrian victims, including the victims of ISIS and ANF violations in Syria, have seen little, if any, benefit from Lafarge’s prosecution in the United States.

US Attorney General Merrick Garland enjoys broad discretion over the fate of the Lafarge forfeiture and could direct the funds to benefit victims of underlying violations in Syria, following DOJ precedent. Earlier this year, for example, the DOJ announced that the United States had transferred $500,000 in forfeited Russian funds to Estonia for the benefit of Ukraine. The funds were forfeited by Estonia-based company By Trade OU, which pleaded guilty to conspiring to illegally export a high-precision grinding machine system to Russia, where it could have been used by the Russian defense and nuclear industries. In sending the funds to Estonia, the DOJ exercised its authority under 18 U.S.C. § 981(i), which allows the attorney general to transfer forfeited funds to any foreign country which “participated directly or indirectly in the seizure or forfeiture.” Pursuant to an international sharing agreement with the United States, Estonia would use the transferred funds to benefit Ukraine.

The DOJ’s pursuit of “creative solutions to ensure the Ukrainian people can respond and rebuild” is commendable, and—given the exceptional circumstances—should also be applied to Syrian victims. The US government has itself condemned ISIS’s and ANF’s grave violations in Syria, which United Nations bodies have determined amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. It has also recognized ISIS’s genocide, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing targeting Yezidis, Christians, and Shia Muslims. Further, the US government has promoted justice and accountability for victims in Syria, acknowledged the lack of access within the country, and emphasized the need to pursue legal avenues elsewhere. As is the case for Ukraine, creative solutions are necessary to ensure that Syrian victims may recover and heal.

Three ways to act now

In neglecting to apply a victim-centered approach to use of the Lafarge forfeiture, the United States risks playing into the growing perception of a double standard in its treatment of the war in Ukraine in contrast to other conflicts and groups of victims. As the Biden administration’s term ends, there is still an opportunity to apply the precedent set for Ukraine and allocate the Lafarge forfeiture for the benefit of Syrian victims. But it must act at once. 

At least three potential avenues exist by which the attorney general—working quickly and within existing DOJ guidelines—could direct the funds to benefit affected communities.

First, the United States could send a portion of the Lafarge forfeiture to France, earmarked for disbursement into an eventual Syria Victims Fund. This would follow the pathway used in the transfer of Russian funds to Estonia for the benefit of Ukraine and support a recommendation from the European Parliament to establish a Syria Victims Fund through the European Union. 

Second, the United States and France could establish a bilateral fund to support victims of crimes in Syria, modeled after the US- and Swiss-established BOTA Foundation, which returned forfeited Kazakh assets to populations in need. 

Third, the DOJ could disburse the funds to the US Department of State to support accountability efforts and programming benefiting affected communities. The State Department and many other Western governments are already funding several programs to support victim groups and accountability programs in Syria and thus have extensive experience implementing and monitoring such projects.

The DOJ took laudable action in holding Lafarge accountable for its crimes. Now is the time to finish the job. The Biden administration has a fleeting opportunity to take meaningful action in determining the fate of the Lafarge forfeiture. In diverting the $687 million or even a portion of it to the underlying victims, the administration could heed the calls of Syrian, Yezidi, and international civil society and leave a positive mark on its legacy in the Middle East. Failure to do so risks raising further questions about the existence of a double standard in the US government’s treatment of different groups of victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity throughout the world.

Every moment of suffering for Syrian victims matters, and every day without support for recovery prolongs unnecessary pain.

Mohamad Katoub is a Syria community liaison consultant at the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

Alana Mitias is the assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project.

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This video is just the latest example of the Chinese government’s brutal treatment of Uyghurs. My colleague Alyssa Johnson and I have prepared a forthcoming report to the United Nations (UN) documenting an array of horrors, including deaths, torture, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, and the newly imposed illegal financial penalties on prisoners’ families as a form of extortion. Our report also details forced labor, transnational repression, continuous violations of reproductive rights, and assaults against human rights defenders, among other offenses. Our work bears witness to the dark history unfolding in our time.

In the face of genocide and grave human rights violations, the Uyghur people have demonstrated extraordinary courage, resilience, and an unwavering commitment to peace. From the brave survivors to families of those who fell victim to the camps, the Uyghur community stands as a testament to grace and unity in the most trying of times. Yet, despite their strength, the global community and the UN system have failed to protect them.

For nearly a decade, Uyghur advocates, myself included, have pushed the UN and governments across the world to address China’s crimes against humanity and genocide against the Uyghur people. After two years of engaging with China on its terms, on August 27 of this year, Volker Türk, the UN high commissioner for human rights, issued an update on the ongoing human rights crisis in Xinjiang. The update merely confirmed what was already known—that despite requests from the UN, the Chinese government has refused to allow authorities any meaningful access to the region. This statement builds on the 2022 landmark report by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which alleged that Chinese government policies targeting the Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples in Xinjiang may amount to crimes against humanity. The recommendations made in this report urged China to engage with and facilitate further visits by the OHCHR. However, in subsequent engagements with the UN and member states, the Chinese government has presented a deceitful image of its policies in Xinjiang, deliberately concealing the atrocity-torn region where Uyghurs and other ethnic groups remain in mass incarceration.

Today, after nearly nine years since China initiated its policy of mass detention of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, Beijing’s atrocities against the Uyghur people have entered an even darker phase. China is further escalating the use of its authoritarian penal system to imprison people, with at least half a million Uyghurs imprisoned as of 2022, according to the Chinese government’s own data (with 2022, 2023, and 2024 data missing due to public scrutiny indicating that the real numbers are much higher). In an August report that I co-authored with Min Kim for the Yale Genocide Studies Program, we conducted a statistical analysis of Uyghur imprisonment rates based on the Chinese government’s own data. Despite Uyghurs comprising less than 1 percent of China’s population, they account for 34 percent of the country’s incarcerations, marking the world’s highest rate of ethnic imprisonment. Our analysis estimates that, if left unchecked, China’s atrocities will strip 4.4 million years of life from my proud community.

An investigation by researcher Nyrola Elimä and journalist Ben Mauk, published in the New York Times in November, uncovered the alarming extent of China’s international reach, as it targets Uyghurs who have fled its oppressive regime. In cooperation with Thai authorities, the Chinese government has forcibly repatriated—in overt violation of international law—hundreds of Uyghurs who sought asylum in Thailand. The UN Refugee Commission failed them after their brave escape. Dozens died. Today, more than sixty Uyghurs remain detained in Thailand under dire conditions, awaiting an uncertain fate.

This situation calls for urgent international attention and action, as reports coming out of camps in Xinjiang are increasingly alarming. One such example is the Netherlands-based Uyghur activist Abdurehim Gheni, whose brothers, niece, and dozens of other relatives are in the camps. The Chinese government temporarily released Abdurehim’s father, Abdugheni Hudaberdi, to pressure him into refraining from testifying at an international tribunal hearing examining China’s human rights violations. When Abdurehim refused to comply with their request, his father was taken back to the camp, where he tragically passed away two months later in government custody. There is a saying in Uyghur that when someone passes away before they can see someone who they longed for, the person leaves this world with their eyes wide open. Abdurehim’s father left this world with his eyes open.

When thinking about such cases, my brother, Ekpar Asat—an award-winning entrepreneur and alumnus of the US State Department’s exchange program—comes to mind. He has been unjustly imprisoned for eight years and eight months. I can hardly fathom what he endures each second in that prison. But Ekpar is not alone; there are countless others like him languishing in those cells. This reality leaves me, and others who care about the Uyghurs, no room to dwell in pain—we must channel it into action.

When atrocities persist, they risk becoming tragedies that the world feels powerless to change. But the Chinese government’s crimes against the Uyghurs are not just tragic facts—they are deliberate acts of ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The world cannot remain passive. Above all, the UN has a responsibility to act on the recommendations it has put forward and to demand accountability.

The United States, too, will have a major role to play in ensuring accountability for China’s crimes against the Uyghur people. As the incoming US administration assembles its team of experts on China, I hope that the plight of Uyghurs will be placed at the center of US diplomacy with Beijing. At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Lima, Peru, last week, Chinese leader Xi Jinping outlined four red lines for the United States, one of which was democracy and human rights—a pointed message to the incoming Trump administration not to press Beijing on these issues. The United States must respond decisively: These red lines for Xi are the foundations of the United States’ core values that define its global leadership. Along with more decisive action from the UN, US leadership and initiative on China’s human rights violations against the Uyghur people will be essential to hold Beijing accountable for its crimes.

Rayhan Asat is a senior legal and policy adviser and China Project lead at the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project.

This article is dedicated to the legacy of the late Felice Gaer, a distinguished former UN expert and steadfast champion of the Uyghur people’s rights.

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On October 30, Transatlantic Security Initiative senior fellow Elisabeth Braw wrote an op-ed for Engelsberg Ideas discussing Germany’s commitment to protecting international legal norms in the Baltic Sea.

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Elisabeth Braw

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On July 19, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) released an Advisory Opinion (AO) on the Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Territory, Including East Jerusalem. This was issued in response to a 2022 United Nations General Assembly resolution requesting the AO to address Israel’s ongoing policies and practices in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), both in terms of the legal consequences and the effect they have on “the legal status of the occupation.” Ultimately, the court voted eleven to four that Israel’s occupation of the OPT is unlawful.

In arriving at that and other conclusions, the AO addressed a variety of Israel’s specific actions in the OPT, though it avoided addressing several issues, including Palestinian statehood. This built on a related 2004 AO on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The 2004 AO “set out the circumstances under which a state of occupation is established” but responded to a comparatively narrow question and was more limited in its findings.

While AOs have limitations, that does not detract from the significance of the 2024 AO’s findings. AOs are non-binding on states, unlike the ICJ’s contentious cases like South Africa v. Israel. Because of this, a state cannot bring a case against Israel or others if they do not comply with the holdings, and even if the ICJ had enforcement powers, there is nothing binding to enforce. However, AOs still have “law-making” power, setting expectations for international actors that develop into customary international law and confirming existing practices that already constitute customary international law—which is binding on all states.

Indeed, on September 18, the UN General Assembly adopted a draft by Palestine and “stem[ming] from” the AO. The resolution calls for, inter alia, “Israel to comply with international law and withdraw its military forces, immediately cease all new settlement activity, evacuate all settlers from occupied land, and dismantle parts of the separation wall it constructed inside the occupied West Bank.” The vote was “overwhelmingly” in favor of adoption, with 124 states voted in favor, fourteen voting against, and forty-three abstaining. While resolutions adopted by international organizations cannot create a rule of customary international law, they may provide evidence to determine the existence of customary international law or “contribute to its development.”

What did the Advisory Opinion find regarding Israel’s policies and practices?

In its written statement and comment and public hearing testimony, Palestine offered evidence and legal arguments of Israel’s violations of its obligations under international law. Israel submitted a written statement, which was comparatively brief—five pages to Palestine’s 371 pages—offering a limited view of its arguments. It noted, however, that it “consider[ed] the request for an advisory opinion made therein as contrary to the established legal framework governing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and an abuse of international law and the judicial process.” Still, the court considered Israel’s security concerns to be “common knowledge presumptively accessible to the judges” and took them into account in deliberations.

Because it was limited to addressing the General Assembly’s questions in the request, the AO did not address Israel’s conduct in the Gaza Strip in response to the October 7, 2023 attack. However, it made clear that the OPT includes the Gaza Strip despite the 2005 “disengagement.” It also added that the circumstances leading to its conclusion that Israel had the requisite control there were “even more so since” October 7.

In considering Israel’s policies and practices, the AO looked at Israel’s settlement policy and the questions of prolonged occupation, annexation, discriminatory legislation and measures, and self-determination.

First, regarding settlements, the court only considered the West Bank and East Jerusalem but noted that the settlement policy carried out in the Gaza Strip until 2005 “was not substantially different from” the current policies in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The court found Israel acted contrary to the obligations established in the Fourth Geneva Convention, which addresses the protection of civilian persons during war, and the Hague Regulations, which govern the laws and customs of war on land.

Namely, the transfer of settlers to the West Bank and East Jerusalem and “Israel’s maintenance of their presence,” and policies and practices, including “forcible evictions, extensive house demolitions, and restrictions on residence and movement,” are contrary to Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The confiscation of land for Israeli settlements at the detriment of the local Palestinian population is contrary to Articles 46, 52, and 55 of the Hague Regulations, and Israel’s exercise of its “regulatory authority as an occupying Power” is inconsistent with Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Israel’s failure to effectively prevent or punish and its use of, excessive use of force against Palestinians creates and maintains a “coercive environment” and is contrary to Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, as well as Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

Additionally, looking at relevant caselaw and UN documents, the court found that Israel’s use of the OPT’s natural resources—including diverting resources to its population and severely restricting Palestinians’ access to water—is inconsistent with its obligations “to respect the Palestinian people’s right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources.”

Turning to the question of annexation, the court first found that Israel’s policies and practices, such as “the maintenance and expansion of settlements, the construction of associated infrastructure, including the wall, the exploitation of natural resources, the proclamation of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, the comprehensive application of Israeli domestic law in East Jerusalem and its extensive application in the West Bank…amount to annexation of large parts” of the OPT. This is contrary to the prohibition of the use of force, reflected in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and elsewhere termed “acts of aggression,” and of forcible annexation.

Regarding discriminatory legislation and measures, the court first held that Israel’s “comprehensive restrictions” on Palestinians in the OPT “constitutes systemic discrimination based on, inter alia, race, religion or ethnic origin.” This violates Articles 2(1) and 26 of the ICCPR, Article 2(2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and Article 2 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). The court also found that Israel breached Article 3 of the CERD, which prohibits racial segregation and apartheid, noting a “near-complete separation,” both physically and juridically, “in the West Bank and East Jerusalem between the settler and Palestinian communities.” It did not specify whether it considers the situation to be racial segregation or apartheid, though several judges weighed in with separate opinions or declarations.

Finally, the court held that the “prolonged character of Israel’s unlawful policies and practices aggravates their violation of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.”

What did the Advisory Opinion conclude based on those findings?

Based on the above findings, the court looked at how Israel’s policies and practices affected the legal status of the occupation. Namely, it found that “the sustained abuse by Israel of its position as an occupying Power, through annexation and an assertion of permanent control over the Occupied Palestinian Territory and continued frustration of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, violates fundamental principles of international law and renders Israel’s presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory unlawful.”

The AO had seven substantive holdings, four of which applied exclusively to Israel’s obligations:

• Israel’s continued presence in the OPT is unlawful.
• Israel has an obligation to “bring an end to its unlawful presence” in the OPT “as rapidly as possible.”
• Israel has an obligation “to cease immediately all new settlement activities and to evacuate all settlers from” the OPT.
• Israel has an obligation to make reparation for the damage caused in the OPT.

The remaining three substantive holdings concern states or international organizations:

• States have an obligation not to recognize “the situation arising from” Israel’s unlawful presence in the OPT as legal and not to “render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by the continued presence” of Israel in the OPT.
• International organizations, including the UN, have an obligation not to recognize “the situation arising from” Israel’s unlawful presence in the OPT as legal.
• The UN, and especially the General Assembly and the Security Council, “should consider” what needs to be done to “bring to an end as rapidly as possible” Israel’s unlawful presence in the OPT.

The UN General Assembly resolution adopted on September 18 corresponds with these holdings while also adding additional conclusions. For example, it recognizes that Israel must be held accountable for violations of international law and calls upon states to take steps to ensure that their nationals “do not act in any way that would entail recognition or provide aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by Israel’s illegal presence” in the OPT, and to take steps “towards ceasing the importation of any products originating in the Israeli settlements, as well as the provision or transfer of arms, munitions and related equipment to Israel…in all cases where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that they may be used in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.”  

How does the Advisory Opinion apply to the accountability efforts related to the ongoing conflict in Gaza?

Because the AO is not binding and did not address Israel’s actions taken in response to the October 7 attack, it sits separately from accountability efforts related to the conflict, such as domestic proceedings, the ICJ contentious cases alleging genocide, and the International Criminal Court investigation and potential cases. However, the AO is still related to these cases. Namely, it confirms that the Gaza Strip was occupied at the time of the attack, meaning that Israel’s obligations as an occupying power applied continuously over that time.

What does the Advisory Opinion mean for the US and other states?

As noted above, because of the non-binding nature of AOs, a state cannot bring a case against another state for failing to comply with the holdings. Likewise, the court does not have jurisdiction over disputes involving the instruments it cited to establish the states’ obligations, such as the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States.

The AO may, however, open a narrow avenue for states other than Palestine (which the ICJ considers a “State entitled to appear before the Court”) to bring cases against Israel. For obligations erga omnes—i.e., obligations of such importance that a breach concerns the entire international community—states other than the victim state can bring cases before the ICJ, such as when South Africa and Gambia brought cases against Israel and Myanmar, respectively,  for alleged violations of the Genocide Convention. The AO reiterated that obligations arising from the right to self-determination and the prohibition of the use of force to acquire territory, that is, for annexation, are erga omnes—meaning that, like violations of the Genocide Convention, states other than those victimized could bring a case. However, the AO again did not attribute the obligations to a treaty over which it has jurisdiction to hear disputes.

The ICJ does have jurisdiction to hear disputes over the CERD, under which it found Israel breached Article 3. In August, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination published a report by the ad hoc Conciliation Commission in the State of Palestine v. Israel case which likewise found that Israel’s policies “may amount to a situation of apartheid if no action is taken by Israel to effectively address the issues raised.” Obligations under Article 3 related to apartheid may be considered erga omnes, and while the AO did not explicitly find the breach of Article 3 to be that of apartheid, it opened the door for a contentious case on the issue. However, Israel has a reservation related to Article 22 of the CERD, which governs the ICJ’s jurisdiction, requiring the approval of all parties before a dispute is referred. It’s, therefore, unlikely a dispute involving Israel related to the CERD could move forward at the ICJ.

Finally, the AO’s conclusions on international law on occupation and annexation offer guidance on how other situations should be viewed. This includes its conclusion that Israel maintained effective control over Gaza after 2005, offering definitive criteria by which comparable occupations—where a state maintains control even after its army has been withdrawn—can be evaluated. This minimizes the ability of governments to apply double standards.

For example, the AO held that “Israel’s security concerns [cannot] override the principle of the prohibition of the acquisition of territory by force.” This consideration, “defensive annexation,” has been used to distinguish the situation of Golan Heights, which Israel “seized” from Syria at the end of the 1967 Six-Day War and “unilaterally annexed” in 1981, from Crimea and other parts of Ukraine, which Russia purports to have “annexed.” The situations are comparable to annexations by force, but some argue that Golan Heights is legally distinct because it was annexed in a defensive war. Notably, according to a 2019 “Proclamation on Recognizing the Golan Heights as Part of the State of Israel,” the US considers the Golan Heights “part of” Israel instead of Israeli-occupied Syria but does not recognize Russian sovereignty over Crimea and other parts of Ukraine. The AO, therefore, weakens the US’s stance on the Golan Heights by rejecting the validity of defensive annexation. In doing so—and ensuring that more countries correctly identify occupied territories as such—it, in turn, helps ensure that occupied territories and those living under occupation receive the protections guaranteed under international law.

Why does this AO matter?

This AO is critical, first, in confirming the legal status of Israel’s occupation of the OPT, and especially Israel’s violations under international law. Second, as with all legal opinions, it helps clarify the relevant law and obligations, offering benchmarks by which parties’ actions can be measured. Even without enforcement power, reiterating what is expected of states and international organizations in response to occupations globally—that they recognize them as such and uphold the relevant obligations—will help minimize double standards and better support those living under occupation.  

Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council. The Strategic Litigation Project works on prevention and accountability efforts for atrocity crimes, human rights violations, and corruption offenses around the world.

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Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Daniel Fried: The US and EU need a plan for Georgian government repression

Leslie Shedd: As an election monitor, I saw Georgian Dream’s intimidation tactics up close

Brian Whitmore: This flawed election was just the opening bell in the opposition’s fight against Russian influence

Maia Nikoladze: The international community must question the legitimacy of this election

Laura Linderman: The elections were marred by intimidation and surveillance. Zourabichvili is right not to recognize them.

Andrew D’Anieri: In the election’s aftermath, Georgians’ civil liberties are at stake

The US and EU need a plan for Georgian government repression

Georgia’s authoritarian-minded ruling party Georgian Dream, led by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, has dubiously claimed victory in the country’s October 26 parliamentary elections, while the pro-democracy opposition has asserted fraud and the election-monitoring mission of the respected Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has cited extensive efforts to intimidate voters and manipulate the results. Tensions in the country are high, as are the chances of government repression to retain power. 

Credible exit polls published on October 26 (from Mtavari and Formula TV) gave Georgian Dream 41 percent and 42 percent percent of the vote, respectively. The official Georgian Central Election Commission announced on October 26 that Georgian Dream had won with about 54 percent, at odds with this credible exit polling.

The elections occurred against a background of mounting authoritarian threats and actions by the Georgian government, including threats to outlaw opposition parties and a law putting pressure on civil-society groups that receive foreign funding. 

Georgians have consistently and over many years expressed their desire to integrate with Europe and NATO. Russia has for years sought to undermine this option, using economic pressure, disinformation, and, in 2008, war. Russian propagandists have boasted that the October 26 elections marked a defeat for Western efforts to engineer “regime change” in Georgia. 

Georgia’s President Salome Zourabichvili, who has publicly supported the democratic opposition, condemned the elections on October 27, characterizing the official results as illegitimate and the product of Russian efforts to subordinate the country. She announced a public demonstration for the evening of October 28.

The Georgian government is likely to press ahead with its claims of victory. The opposition demonstration on Monday is likely to be huge. Violence, instigated by the authorities directly or through surrogates, could ensue.

The United States and Europe (not counting Hungary’s pro-Russian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who congratulated Georgian Dream even before the government announced the results and may visit Tbilisi on Monday) face a crucial set of decisions. The West must decide how to characterize these patently bad elections, how to respond to the ruling party’s repression (including the potential for a Belarus- or Venezuela-style scenario of retaining power through force), and how to support the Georgian people in both the immediate period ahead and the longer term. 

The United States has reportedly prepared sanctions against Georgian leaders, including Ivanishvili, which it will probably employ in the event of government-instigated violence or the government remaining committed to election fraud. The key variable will be whether Georgian society has the determination to resist, on a sustained basis, the imposition of authoritarian rule.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US assistant secretary of state for Europe.

As an election monitor, I saw Georgian Dream’s intimidation tactics up close

I traveled to Georgia to serve as one of the International Republican Institute’s short-term observers for the country’s parliamentary elections. As I witnessed first-hand, fears that the ruling party, Georgian Dream, would use aggressive and illegal tactics to secure a victory were realized.  

Leading up to the election, there was a systemic and pervasive intimidation campaign. One of the most common stories I heard was employers forcing employees to turn over their IDs to either prevent them from voting or so those IDs could be used to commit voter fraud.

On Election Day, rules limiting campaign materials and campaigning near polling stations were unabashedly ignored. The most glaring violation I saw was in the town of Tkibuli, where a large screen displayed a video of the Tbilisi mayor, a Georgian Dream member, giving a speech, his voice ringing out over the city’s loudspeaker system. In addition, at most of the polling stations I visited, groups of people hovered outside watching voters come and go, creating an air of surveillance. They were often large, intimidating-looking men, in groups of three or four, not talking but simply watching. 

We also witnessed the activities of what appeared to be fake observer organizations deployed to “monitor” the elections. In the small town of Satsire, I met a woman working for one roughly translated as the “Georgia Lawyers Barristers International Organization.” For an hour and a half, we observed her approaching voters and walking them to the side of an adjacent building where she couldn’t be seen. When we asked her what she was doing, she hurriedly walked away while a different man who had also been “monitoring” the station demanded we leave. Worse, inside every single station I visited I witnessed a small video camera pointed at the voting booths or at the ballot boxes. I was told they were set up by Georgian Dream or election officials, purportedly for security and to prevent ballot stuffing.

This all sent a very clear message: We are watching. 

—Leslie Shedd is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and the president of Rising Communications.

This flawed election was just the opening bell in the opposition’s fight against Russian influence

The battle for Georgian democracy is now headed for the streets, which is exactly where most observers have long expected it to end up. After an election marred by what international observers called vote buying, double voting, and voter intimidation, the ruling Georgia Dream party’s claim to have won a parliamentary majority lacks any legitimacy. In fact, it is absurd. Moreover, Zourabichvili’s refusal to recognize the result, and her call for street protests, fully and firmly aligns the largely ceremonial presidency, the only institution of the Georgian state that has not been captured by Russia, with Georgia’s pro-Western opposition. 

The battle lines are drawn. So what happens next? If Zourabichvili’s allegation that Georgia is the victim of a Russian special operation is correct—and few serious observers of the region doubt that this is the case—it stands to reason that the Kremlin and its Georgian proxies have a plan for the day after, as well. 

Georgia’s 2024 parliamentary election has entered its “Maidan” phase. There are three possible outcomes: This could lead to a redux of Georgia’s 2003 peaceful Rose Revolution in which street protests ousted a corrupt and authoritarian government. It could lead to a violent crackdown and suppression of the democratic opposition, with covert Russian assistance, as was the case in Belarus in 2020. Or it could provide the pretext for direct Russian intervention, as in Ukraine in 2014. More than two decades after Georgian civil society came of age in the Rose Revolution, the country is headed for another decisive round. This weekend’s deeply flawed election was just the opening bell.

—Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, an assistant professor of practice at the University of Texas-Arlington, and a founder and host of the Power Vertical Podcast.

The international community must question the legitimacy of this election

Georgia’s Central Election Commission (CEC), a government agency, reported that the ruling Georgian Dream has received about 54 percent of the votes so far. Opposition leaders have expressed concerns that CEC could be under pressure from the ruling party during these pivotal elections. Now CEC is under scrutiny from the public because of the widespread violations that took place in voting districts outside of big cities in Georgia, which have cast doubt on the legitimacy of these elections. 

It is indeed suspicious that in a country where 79 percent of the population supports EU membership, 54 percent would vote for a party that has been driving a wedge between Georgia and its Western partners, most recently by adopting the controversial foreign-agent law and offshore law. 

Before accepting the highly contested election results, the international community should question the legitimacy of the elections. 

Violations such as ballot stuffing and voter intimidation appear to have had what one watchdog group called “a significant impact on the election results.” Both Transparency International and the International Society for Fair Elections and Monitoring have reported that 10 percent or more of the votes were impacted by “systemic fraud” and “widespread rigging.” 

As the Georgian public and international observers navigate the challenging process to ensure that the Georgian people’s votes are accurately counted, Western policymakers should keep two things in mind:

1. The Georgian people are doing all they can to keep the country on a Western course, including by voting and volunteering to observe the elections, but they are not on a level playing field.

2. Pushing Georgia away from the West will only benefit the Russia-China-Iran axis, which could turn Georgia into an economic black hole if the Georgian government supports the evasion of sanctions and export controls. 

—Maia Nikoladze is an associate director at the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

The elections were marred by intimidation and surveillance. Zourabichvili is right not to recognize them.

The official CEC results of the Georgian parliamentary elections have raised significant concerns regarding the integrity of the electoral process.

As Georgian domestic observation organizations and international observers have noted, the elections were marred by manipulation of the results through the strategic use of intimidation, surveillance, and targeted interventions in vulnerable areas of the voting system. It strains credulity to believe that the Georgian Dream party would receive its highest numbers since the 2012 election after massive protests this spring over its foreign-agent law and amid high voter turnout.

Eoghan Murphy, head of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) ODIHR election-observation mission, concluded that the parliamentary elections were not “in line with international democratic principles.” Considering the typically restrained standards of the OSCE’s commentary on elections, the ODIHR statement was remarkably critical for a diplomatic organization and outlined evidence that supports many of the claims made by national organizations and international observers.

I echo Zourabichvili’s assertion that the elections were a “Russian special operation,” and she is right not to recognize the results. The people of Georgia deserve free and fair elections that are not marked by the kinds of irregularities that both national and international observers observed on Saturday.

—Laura Linderman is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a senior fellow and program manager at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at the American Foreign Policy Council.

In the election’s aftermath, Georgians’ civil liberties are at stake

This weekend’s parliamentary elections in Georgia went largely according to the grim forecasts of many experts. The ruling Georgian Dream party appears to have cheated, mainly through widespread voter intimidation, particularly in small cities and rural areas. The Georgian Dream-friendly electoral commission declared the ruling party the victor, opposition voters and parties credibly alleged electoral fraud, and Tbilisi looks set for mass street protests Monday evening. Things could get ugly if the government deploys the new crowd-control materiel it has bragged about or if it deploys thugs to beat up protesters as it did in May.

At stake in the aftermath of this disputed election is nothing less than Georgians’ civil liberties. Egged on by Ivanishvili, Georgian Dream has already passed laws to harass civil-society organizations and to largely criminalize homosexuality, both of which the party could use to stifle dissent and jail political opponents if it remains in power. Georgian Dream’s “foreign-agent law” and “LGBTQI+ propaganda law” are lifted directly from the Russian playbook. But the ruling party won’t stop there. Its leaders have pledged to pass legislation to ban opposition political parties and codify a Belarus-style one-party autocracy. Georgian Dream has so far made good on its goals of limiting the freedoms of its citizens. We should believe party leaders when they say this is just the beginning.

The United States should continue to support Georgians’ right to self-determination and free and fair elections. More importantly, the Biden administration should have a significant policy response ready should Georgian authorities resort to further violence against protesters or political opponents.

—Andrew D’Anieri is a resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

The post Experts React: Georgia just concluded a contested election, with the country’s future at stake. Now what? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Roshchyna, who worked as a staff reporter at Hromadske and as a freelance reporter for outlets including Ukrainska Pravda and Radio Free Europe, was renowned among colleagues for her integrity and personal courage. “She was a hardworking and brave reporter, sensitive to injustice,” commented former colleague Olga Tokariuk.

Roshchyna was best known for her reporting from behind the front lines in Russian-occupied Ukraine. She was first detained by Russian forces in March 2022 close to Mariupol. On that occasion, she was held for ten days before being released. Despite this experience, Roshchyna remained committed to raising awareness about conditions in Ukrainian regions under Kremlin control. She disappeared in summer 2023 while on a reporting trip to the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia region in southern Ukraine. Almost one year later, Kremlin officials confirmed that Roshchyna was in Russian custody.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

News of Roshchyna’s death sparked an outpouring of grief and anger in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called her death “a heavy blow.” Ukrainska Pravda chief editor Sevgil Musaieva led tributes from the journalistic community, decribing Roshchyna as “absolutely amazing” and recounting her commitment to reporting on the realities of life under Russian occupation.

Oksana Romaniuk, executive director of the Ukrainian Institute of Mass Information, said the circumstances of Roshchyna’s death “makes you worry about other journalists who are in captivity.” Ukraine’s 2022 Nobel Peace Prize winner Oleksandra Matviichuk called on international media watchdogs to demand answers from Russia over Roshchyna’s death. “What could have been done to make a young girl die?” she asked in one of many posts on Ukrainian social media mourning Roshchyna.

Members of the international community stressed the need to determine Russia’s role in the young Ukrainian journalist’s death. “We must honor her legacy by holding her captors accountable,” commented Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty CEO Steve Capus. National Press Club President Emily Wilkins called on the US to impose sanctions “against all Russian personnel involved.”

The European Union Delegation to Ukraine demanded a “thorough and independent investigation” into the circumstances of the journalist’s death in Russian detention. Meanwhile, US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Senator Cardin said Roshchyna’s death was “heartbreaking” and served as a reminder of her bravery “reporting the truth about Russia’s war on Ukraine.”

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According to the Russian authorities, Roshchyna died while being transferred to Moscow from a detention facility in Taganrog that is particularly notorious among Ukrainian human rights groups for the widespread mistreatment of Ukrainian prisoners. Ukrainian officials say they are now investigating her death as a war crime and an act of premeditated murder.

The death of Victoria Roshchyna in Russian custody highlights the dangers facing independent journalists attempting to cover the Russian invasion of Ukraine. According to Petro Yatsenko of the Ukrainian Coordination Center for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Roshchyna was one of at least twenty-five Ukrainian journalists being held by Russia.

While the details regarding Roshchyna’s death have yet to be determined, she was known to be in good health prior to her detention. The journalist is one of many Ukrainian prisoners to have died in Russian custody since the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022 amid reports of widespread human rights abuses. The vast majority of Ukrainians released in prisoner exchanges have recounted being subjected to torture by their Russian captors.

The US Department of State’s 2023 Human Rights Report confirmed Russia’s use of “systematic torture and abuse against thousands of captured Ukrainian military POWs and detained civilians.” In a September 2024 report, United Nations human rights officials stated that “torture has been used as a common and acceptable practice by Russian authorities” against Ukrainian detainees.

Over the past two and a half years, thousands of Ukrainian civilians have been abducted from Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine and imprisoned. Ukraine’s Media Initiative organization has compiled a list of 1,886 names, but the actual number of detainees is believed to be far higher. In the vast majority of cases, family members and colleagues have no information regarding the status of those being held by Russia.

Victoria Roshchyna was an inspirational figure to her colleagues in the media and a widely respected journalist who sought to give a voice to Ukrainian victims of Russian occupation. Her death serves as a chilling reminder of the war crimes currently being committed against the civilian population throughout Russian-occupied Ukraine.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Oct 15, 2024

As the US election nears, anxiety is mounting in Ukraine

By Kate Spencer

Few countries have more at stake in the coming US presidential election than Ukraine, which is heavily dependent on US aid to sustain its fight against Russia’s ongoing invasion, writes Kate Spencer.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Oct 15, 2024

Ukraine may allow drone exports in bid to support domestic producers

By Marcel Plichta

Ukraine may allow the export of drones in a bid to boost domestic production amid limited state procurement budgets and to prevent Ukrainian drone manufacturers from relocating abroad, writes Marcel Plichta.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Oct 22, 2024

Axis of Autocrats: North Korea’s escalating role in Russia’s Ukraine War

By Olena Tregub

North Korean troops are reportedly set to join the Russian invasion of Ukraine. If confirmed, this would represent the latest escalation in North Korea’s support for Vladimir Putin’s imperial aggression, writes Olena Tregub.

Conflict Defense Technologies

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Ukrainian journalist who exposed Russian occupation dies in Kremlin captivity appeared first on Atlantic Council.

1. What is the significance of the referendum vote?

The Moldovan pro-EU referendum passed, amending the constitution and making EU accession a constitutional goal. However, it’s not an inspiring victory, as many wished.

The narrow result is significant, but it doesn’t necessarily signal a decline in support for European integration. For more than fifteen years, polls have consistently shown a strong majority of Moldovans favor EU membership, making this narrow outcome unexpected.

The result was shaped by several factors, including the pro-European government’s performance, intense disinformation campaigns, and strategic voter manipulation. Pro-Russian forces used tactics such as promoting a “no” vote, encouraging a boycott, and pushing the “not now” narrative to confuse and discourage moderate pro-EU voters. Therefore, the referendum result isn’t an accurate barometer of support for EU integration; it’s more a consequence of disinformation and targeted strategies that exploited existing societal fears.

The narrow referendum result, however, is a setback for Sandu’s supporters, potentially weakening her position. She could face a tough runoff against a united pro-Moscow opposition.

—Victoria Olari, research associate for Moldova with the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab

2. Were Russia’s meddling efforts a success for Moscow?

Russia’s meddling efforts made a significant impact in the Moldovan election, but ultimately did not bring the Kremlin success. As Moldovans narrowly chose “yes” on the EU referendum, Russian leaders should be disappointed in their failed investment—they put millions of dollars into hybrid attacks on Moldova’s democracy and efforts to buy hundreds of thousands of votes against the referendum, but the referendum managed to pass.

It did so by an extremely narrow margin. The outcome came down to a difference of less than twelve thousand votes, so Russia may exploit this and the role the diaspora played in voting “yes” to challenge the results’ legitimacy. In fact, a Kremlin spokesman already hinted at this strategy on Monday. While Moscow was ultimately unsuccessful in swaying the vote against the referendum, the tight race for both the referendum and for Sandu heading into the runoff shows that the influence efforts likely did make an impact.

—Shelby Magid, deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center

3. With Sandu heading to a runoff, what do we know about her opponent, Alexandr Stoianoglo?

Stoianoglo is a former prosecutor general of Moldova, now backed by the pro-Russian Party of Socialists (PSRM). Originally from the autonomous territory of Gagauzia, Stoianoglo has a background in law and politics, with roles in prosecution and as a member of parliament. His time as prosecutor general (2019-2021) was marked by controversy, notably the release of businessman Veaceslav Platon, accused of major banking fraud, which led to public backlash and his dismissal by Sandu.

Although he presents himself as pro-European, Stoianoglo offers a pro-Russian alternative, backed by the PSRM, and promotes a traditionalist agenda centered on protecting Moldova’s sovereignty from Western influences. His candidacy has been strategically supported by the US-sanctioned pro-Russian oligarch Ilan Shor’s electoral bloc, which played cat-and-mouse with the authorities, deploying so-called “satellite” candidates to create confusion regarding its real intentions. This approach, previously tested in local elections, helped boost Stoianoglo’s unexpected performance in the first round, in which he earned about 26 percent of the vote to Sandu’s 42 percent, making him a significant challenger to Sandu in the runoff.

—Victoria Olari

4. What can we expect from Russia in the coming weeks?

In this weekend’s vote, the main focus of Russian meddling was on the referendum. Going into the runoff race for the presidential election, we can expect Russian efforts to consolidate its influence and disinformation efforts against Sandu and to back Stoianoglo. Russian information operations have played on Moldovans’ fears of facing Russian attacks like that against Ukraine, so Moscow may push the narrative that Sandu is leading Moldova in a dangerous direction, whereas Stoianoglo wants to balance foreign relations in a safer way. In addition to pushing this narrative, Russia could go so far as to target some of its kinetic attacks against Ukraine near the Ukraine-Moldova border to further stoke Moldovan fears of a Russian threat. We can also expect Moscow to use the network it has built through vote-buying to rally against Sandu in the coming weeks.

Russian malign efforts will not stop after the presidential runoff. As Moldova faces parliamentary elections next year, further Russian hybrid attacks and attempts to destabilize the country should be expected. In a speech on Monday, Sandu pointed to this future threat, saying that the parliamentary elections would be “one last battle” to fight along the road to EU membership.

In addition to massive disinformation efforts, Russia has tested other hybrid tactics that Moldova needs to continue to watch for and strengthen itself against. These tactics include Russian sabotage efforts, as Moldovan police recently announced they found hundreds of people were trained in Russia and the Balkans to create mass disorder and stage riots in Moldova, including through tactics to provoke law enforcement. While the plot was foiled ahead of this election, these tactics could still be employed later.

—Shelby Magid

5. What can and should Washington do right now?

Washington has been very active, along with the EU, in supporting Moldova’s democratic resilience and institutions in the lead-up to this critical election. Washington has been careful with messaging in support of Moldova’s democracy and in condemning Russian meddling. While the United States should continue to state its support for Moldovan democracy and Euro-Atlantic aspirations, this messaging must be handled delicately to avoid appearing to throw support behind a specific candidate and tip the scales in the election.

Washington should stay aligned with the EU in messaging about the election and should put out a strong high-level statement about the significant level of Russian interference and hybrid attacks to raise further awareness of Moscow’s malign influence.

In response to Sunday’s vote, White House national security spokesman John Kirby stated: “The United States remains a proud partner of Moldova, and we will continue to stand with them as they endeavor to continue to support to protect their democracy, and quite frankly, to reach the aspirations of the Moldovan people.” This is the right sentiment and approach, and the support for strengthening Moldova’s institutions and democracy must continue through the next year ahead of the parliamentary elections, with the full expectation Russia will meddle again with many of the same tactics it tested out on this election.

—Shelby Magid

The post Five questions (and expert answers) about Moldova’s elections appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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On September 27, two Chinese missile vessels chased Philippine civilian boats near the First Thomas Shoal, also known as Bulig Shoal, in an area of the South China Sea known as the West Philippine Sea. It is considered the first time that such ships chased civilian vessels during maritime patrols. The Philippine vessels, the BRP Datu Romapenet and BRP Datu Matanam Taradapit, which are under the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, were en route to Hasa-Hasa Shoal (also known as Half Moon Shoal) to provide food and other aide to Filipino fisherman in the area. The following day, September 28, a Chinese helicopter chased and flew close to the BRP Datu Romapenet during its resupply mission near Bombay Shoal, which is close to Palawan Province in the Philippines.

In the wake of China’s escalating coercive tactics against Philippine vessels, the United States must work with the Philippines and its other Indo-Pacific partners to publicize, counter, and deter China’s maritime aggression in the South China Sea.

A pattern of aggression

The September incidents fit a larger pattern of China’s aggressive tactics against Philippine vessels. In late August, some forty Chinese vessels from the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), Coast Guard (CCG), and China Maritime Militia (CMM) blocked passage in the South China Sea of a ship belonging to the Philippines’ Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Services. A CCG vessel then rammed and fired a water cannon at the ship, which was on a humanitarian mission to deliver supplies to Filipino fishermen.

The incident occurred near Sabina Shoal, also known as Escoda, which is less than ninety miles from the Philippines’ Palawan Province and well within the country’s exclusive economic zone. In the attack, the Philippine ship was damaged and failed to deliver its humanitarian cargo. It was the first recorded time that the PLAN has participated in the use of force against Philippine government vessels, a dangerous escalation on the part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 

Only two days later, CCG and PLAN warships maneuvered to block a Philippine supply mission to the BRP Teresa Magbanua, a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) patrol vessel anchored for months at Sabina Shoal. The PCG anchored the vessel there in April after Philippine officials discovered piles of crushed corals, leading Manila to suspect that Beijing plans to build it up into an outpost, like it has in other parts of the contested Spratly Islands.

On August 29, a CCG ship rammed the Teresa Magbanua three times in an attempt to dislodge it. The incident was the fifth in August alone and involved some forty Chinese ships, including PLAN, CCG, and CMM vessels. The Philippines was compelled to remove the Teresa Magbanua on September 16 because of bad weather, structural damage due to ramming incidents, and a lack of daily supplies. The crew needed to be medically evacuated and arrived at port in Palawan malnourished and dehydrated, some of them on stretchers with IVs attached. The Philippines’ National Maritime Council plans to replace the Teresa Magbanua with another ship at some point in the future.

Elements of PRC forces

According to Ray Powell of Sealight and the Gordian Knot Center for National Security, China employs four different kinds of forces in the South China Sea/West Philippine Sea. Each of these forces plays a part in China’s goal of gradually seizing possession of the maritime territory in what it views as its “10-dash line”—the perimeter of the entire South China Sea.

The first force is known as the “Spratly Backbone Fleet.” Think of it as the backbone of the PRC’s efforts. It includes hundreds of large fishing vessels manned by “patriotic” fishermen out of ports in Southern China. These fishermen act as enforcers, and the pay for their services often supplements their income from fishing. The crews of these vessels are at the cutting edge of the PRC’s “gray zone” tactics. For example, they sometimes lash several of their boats together at anchor to form semipermanent formations—a practice known as “rafting”—in and around the shoals within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone.

The second force is the CMM. Although some members of the CMM also work as fishermen, their primary role is to carry out missions under the authority of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The CCM currently consists of around 4,500 vessels, and the PLA uses the CMM to enforce its coercive policies of occupation and area denial in the waters of the West Philippine Sea/South China Sea.

Next is the CCG. An estimated 250 vessels currently make up the CCG, which has been referred to as “China’s second navy.” In recent months, most of the actions that China has carried out against Philippine vessels operating in the waters off the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone have involved the CCG. This includes the attack on small boats of the Philippine Navy during a resupply mission in Ayungin Reef (Second Thomas Shoal) in June, in which Chinese personnel used axes, long knives, tear gas, and batons to attack Philippine sailors and damage and disable Philippine naval vessels.

Last is the PLAN, China’s navy. PLAN ships have intimidated and deterred both Philippine fishing boats and naval vessels, as was the case in the incident in Sabina Shoal on August 25. The PLAN is by some measures the largest navy in the world, with some 680 ships, three aircraft carriers, 58 destroyers, and 54 frigates. At present, the PLAN is transitioning from being a so-called “green water” (or coastal) fleet to being a “blue water” fleet that can operate beyond the first island chain. 

What the PRC wants in the South China Sea

What is the PRC’s goal with these “gray zone” actions? First and foremost, China seeks to attain dominance over the entirety of its self-declared “10-dash line.” Achieving dominance requires China’s military and paramilitary organizations to gain complete operational control over the waters.

With complete control, China would be able to exploit the fisheries in the waters as well as resources in the seabed—and demand that commercial vessels seek China’s permission to traverse them. In the long term, the PRC likely wants to attain both actual control and international recognition of its control over parts of what is currently the Philippines and other littoral states.

All signs indicate that China’s authorities are absolutists in their territorial claims. The PRC regards “every square inch” of territory that it lays claim to as a nonnegotiable part of China. Although China may offer negotiations, it is unlikely ever to make actual concessions. This is illustrated by the dispute between Washington and Beijing over the militarization of China’s man-made islands in and around the Spratly Island chain. In September 2015, Chinese leader Xi Jinping assured then US President Barack Obama that “China does not intend to pursue militarization” of the Spratly Islands. Xi added that China’s outposts would not “target or impact any country.” Subsequently, however, China has violated this promise by pursuing the militarization of those disputed man-made outposts.

How the US and its allies should respond

China’s aspirations are unacceptable to Washington and Manila, not only from a strategic standpoint but also because they violate the existing rules-based international order. The United States and the Philippines, along with US defense allies Japan and Australia, must adopt the following five measures to blunt China’s ambitions and deter further aggression.

First, the US Coast Guard and the US Navy, in concert with Philippine vessels, should begin regular joint patrols of the maritime region of the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. While both the United States and the Philippines have been skeptical of this proposal in the past, it is time to send a clear message to Beijing that its recent acts of aggression will not stand.

Second, US and allied assets should be deployed to assist with future resupply voyages to the specific locations that have previously been targets of Chinese aggression.  

Third, PRC authorities should be notified of maritime actions by the United States and its allies, primarily as a means of de-escalation but also as part of a wider deterrence policy.

Fourth, the Philippines should continue its current policy of “assertive transparency,” the use of visual evidence to expose China’s illegal actions to the public. Philippine and sometimes foreign journalists have been aboard Philippine vessels when they have encountered illegal and aggressive actions by China. The United States, Japan, and Australia should support these efforts by encouraging greater participation of foreign journalists to report on the PRC’s actions.

Fifth, the United States and its allies should act, and be seen to act, collectively and in consultation with each other. Many eyes are on Russia’s war against Ukraine now, but Washington also needs to train more eyes on the Pacific. Consultations with Manila, Washington, Tokyo, and Canberra will demonstrate that these democracies are committed to protecting Philippine sovereignty in the West Philippine Sea/South China Sea. They will also send a message to China that its efforts to bully the Philippines will not be tolerated.

Elizabeth Freund Larus is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative.

James Rice taught in the law faculty at the National University of Malaysia (1989-1992) and in the department of philosophy at Lingnan University, Hong Kong (1992-2018). He currently lives in Vigan, Philippines.

The Tiger Project, an Atlantic Council effort, develops new insights and actionable recommendations for the United States, as well as its allies and partners, to deter and counter aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Explore our collection of work, including expert commentary, multimedia content, and in-depth analysis, on strategic defense and deterrence issues in the region.

The post How the US and the Philippines should counter Beijing’s aggression in the South China Sea appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian authorities have been vocal about the need to document Russian war crimes and bring the perpetrators to justice. Many of Kyiv’s partners have provided extensive backing for these efforts. Meanwhile, the International Criminal Court in The Hague has initiated investigative proceedings, and has issued a number of warrants for the arrest of senior Kremlin officials including Russian President Vladimir Putin on war crimes charges. This trend is welcome and must continue.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The pursuit of justice for Russian war crimes is not just a matter of upholding the law. It is a key component of Ukraine’s broader strategy to safeguard its sovereignty and rebuild its war-torn society. If Ukraine is unable to secure justice for the millions who have suffered as a direct result of Russia’s invasion, this could seriously weaken the legitimacy of the Ukrainian authorities and lead to the long-term destabilization of the country.

Crucially, enforcing accountability for atrocities will also send a powerful signal to Russia and the wider international community that war crimes will not be tolerated. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has sparked the largest European war since World War II, and has directly violated many of the core principles of international law. If the invasion ends in an ugly compromise that leaves Moscow unpunished, much of the progress made since 1945 will be undone.

Russia currently stands accused of war crimes in Ukraine including mass killings, deportations, torture, the systematic abduction of children, and the deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure. However, previous generations of Russians have faced very similar war crimes accusations without ever encountering legal consequences. This has helped foster a sense of impunity in modern Russian society that has paved the way for the atrocities currently taking place in Ukraine. Addressing Russian impunity must therefore be central to any meaningful peace process.

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Ukraine’s efforts to gather evidence of war crimes during the ongoing Russian invasion have been groundbreaking. Prosecutors, law enforcement officials, legal experts, and members of the country’s civil society have all made significant contributions. One particularly important development has been the use of DNA database technologies, with mobile DNA labs enabling forensic teams to operate in recently liberated areas of Ukraine. The physical evidence acquired during these investigations has made it possible to identify victims and could also be used in future prosecutions.

Ukraine’s efforts to hold Russia accountable have also been boosted by partnerships with a range of international legal experts and organizations. This cooperation could have consequences for international justice that extend far beyond Ukraine’s borders. The experience of investigating war crimes that has been acquired in Ukraine since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 can contribute to the broader objective of strengthening the international legal framework that underpins global security.

Continued international assistance in Ukraine’s quest for justice is an important element of the support Kyiv receives from its partners. By providing forensic expertise, legal guidance, and diplomatic backing, Western allies strengthen Ukraine’s efforts while emphasizing their own commitment to accountability for war crimes. This will help prevent the normalization of war crimes and other violations of international law. Failure to act decisively could embolden other actors globally, leading to the further erosion of the rules-based international order.

Looking ahead, the fight for justice must remain at the heart of efforts to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It is vital to pursue victory not only on the battlefield but also in the courtroom. This will require sustained international solidarity and political will at a time when there are growing signs of war-weariness and calls for a compromise that would allow Moscow to escape accountability. Anything less than justice for the victims of Russia’s invasion will invite further aggression from Russia itself and from other expansionist powers. This would be a costly blunder that would set the stage for a new era of international instability.

Kateryna Odarchenko is a partner at SIC Group Ukraine. Lesia Zaburanna is a member of the Ukrainian parliament with the Servant of the People Party and a member of the Ukrainian delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Sep 5, 2024

Too many still view Ukraine through the prism of Russian imperialism

By Olesya Khromeychuk

Far too many Western newspaper editors, academics, and cultural commentators continue to view Ukraine through the distorting lens of Russian imperialism, writes Olesya Khromeychuk.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Sep 26, 2024

Putin will keep escalating his nuclear blackmail until it stops working

By Peter Dickinson

More than two and half years since the start of Russia’s Ukraine invasion, it should now be abundantly clear that Vladimir Putin will continue escalating his nuclear blackmail until it stops working, writes Peter Dickinson.

Arms Control Conflict

UkraineAlert Sep 12, 2024

Concerns grow over possible Russian sabotage of undersea cables

By Aleksander Cwalina

The United States has recently detected indications of increased Russian military activity around key undersea cables, fueling concerns over a possible escalation in the Kremlin’s hybrid war against the west, writes Aleksander Cwalina.

Conflict Defense Policy

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Ending Russian impunity: Why Ukraine needs justice as well as security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Since taking power a quarter of a century ago, Vladimir Putin has transformed Russia into an increasingly ruthless and aggressive dictatorship. The warning signs were there from the very beginning, such as his December 2000 decision to reinstate the Stalin-era Soviet national anthem. Putin also embraced the pomp and pageantry of the Russian Empire, reflecting his goal of underlining the continuity in Russian history from Ivan the Terrible to Joseph Stalin.

During the early years of Putin’s reign, some of his government’s initial acts of oppression focused on the Russian media. Independent TV channels were taken under state control and satirical programs shut down. Efforts to dismantle Russia’s fledgling democracy also began almost immediately. The level of fraud during the first parliamentary elections of the Putin era took many by surprise. At the time, we could not imagine how farcical the entire process of Russian elections would soon become.

As Putin sought to strengthen his grip on power, the Kremlin initially targeted those accused of economic crimes. However, this was soon expanded to include political opponents and anyone deemed a potential threat to the regime. Within a few years, political repression had become one of the defining features of Putin’s rule.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Putin’s powerful propaganda machine has succeeded in convincing the majority of Russians to accept the return of authoritarianism. While public support for the regime is far less enthusiastic than the Kremlin likes to claim, most Russians have been persuaded to stay away from politics and ignore the increasingly oppressive climate in the country. At the same time, around 20 percent of the Russian population categorically disagree with the direction the country has taken since 2000. It is this group that Putin seeks to silence via policies targeting the most active elements.

The Kremlin is primarily concerned with two groups: Commentators and activists. Those who publicly criticize the regime pose a threat because the authorities have no response to their accusations other than oppression. Activists are viewed as even more dangerous as they remain ready to join protests and participate in elections. The courage, clarity, and selflessness they demonstrate has the power to resonate on a human level with far larger numbers of ordinary Russians, including millions who are otherwise disengaged from politics.

The Kremlin has developed a system for dealing with these troublesome elements. To begin with, they may receive a warning. They are then fined, deprived of civil rights, and declared foreign agents. If they still do not stop their activities or leave the country, they are likely to be jailed. In this manner, the Putin regime silences its opponents and prevents any opposition from gaining momentum.

The list of offenses that qualify as anti-regime activity also continues to expand. Any opinions on the invasion of Ukraine that differ from the official narrative are deemed worthy of jail time. There have also been instances of people being imprisoned for expressing generic anti-war sentiments such as “thou shalt not kill,” or for displaying the yellow and blue colors of the Ukrainian flag. In one recent case, a man was jailed for given the “wrong” answer to journalists surveying public opinion about the war in Ukraine.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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The Anti-War Committee, an organization created by well-known Russian political emigrants in cooperation with various anti-war organizations in Russia, has put together a list of one thousand names of Russian political prisoners whose cases are purely political in nature. But even this list is not complete.

There are currently believed to be around one and a half thousand political prisoners in Russia. Officially, they are incarcerated for offensives including discrediting the armed forces, supporting terrorism, and treason. In practice, this often means voicing opposition to the invasion of Ukraine or criticizing Putin and his policies. There may actually be many more political prisoners, as numerous activists have been jailed on criminal charges.

These figures do not compare to the scale of political oppression witnessed during the Stalin era, of course. The Putin regime has learned that targeted cases of persecution are sufficient to exercise control over the wider population. The quantity of people who have been frightened into silence is many thousands of times greater than the relatively small number of Russians currently being held as political prisoners.

The outlook for Russia’s current generation of political prisoners is bleak. They are completely at the mercy of their jailers and the regime. Many have died in prison. While the deaths of prominent figures such as Alexei Navalny have garnered international headlines, this has done little to deter the Kremlin. On the contrary, it is widely recognized that other political prisoners are at risk of suffering the same fate.

Most of Russia’s political prisoners understood the risks they were taking. They knew that by attending a peaceful protest or expressing their opposition to the invasion of Ukraine, they could lose their liberty permanently and might never return home. This makes their actions even more courageous. The international community must not tolerate the brutal oppression of people who voluntarily risked their lives for the freedom of others.

Many Russians are doing whatever we can to raise awareness about our country’s political prisoners. Others can also make valuable contributions. Every single reminder that there are brave people in today’s Russia who oppose Putin is important. If international political leaders can be encouraged to raise the issue, they may be able to save lives. And if an amnesty for political prisoners becomes a key demand for any future agreements with Putin, the number of lives saved could be in the thousands. Most of all, we must never forget those who are prepared to sacrifice everything for the values that many in the democratic world take for granted.

Leonid Gozman is a Russian politician, psychologist, and pro-democracy activist. He was declared a “foreign agent” by the Russian authorities in 2022 and arrested on political charges. He was able to leave the country before being sentenced in absentia to eight and a half years for his anti-war views.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Sep 1, 2024

Key Ukrainian front line city evacuates as Russian offensive gains pace

By Maria Avdeeva

Evacuation efforts are accelerating in Pokrovsk as Russian troops draw closer amid fears the city will soon become the latest in a growing list of Ukrainian urban centers reduced to rubble by Putin’s invading army, writes Maria Avdeeva.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Aug 21, 2024

Invasion? What invasion? Putin is downplaying Ukraine’s Kursk offensive

By Peter Dickinson

Vladimir Putin’s efforts to downplay Ukraine’s invasion of Russia have severely dented his strongman image and make a mockery of the West’s escalation fears, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Sep 24, 2024

There can be no sustainable peace in Europe without security for Ukraine

By Mykola Bielieskov

A compromise peace that rewards Putin with around 20 percent of Ukraine would only embolden Moscow and set the stage for further Russian aggression in Ukraine and beyond, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Defense Policy

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Russia’s political prisoners must not be forgotten appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Introduction
Honduras’s business climate in context
A roadmap to improving the business climate in Honduras
Conclusion
Acknowledgements
About the authors
Central America Task Force members

Introduction

Honduras, situated in the heart of Central America, stands at a pivotal juncture in its political, economic, and social development. The country has faced numerous challenges over the past decades, from political instability and economic volatility to social unrest and pervasive corruption. However, the political shift marked by the election of Xiomara Castro, the first female president of Honduras, raised expectations for long-awaited reforms.

Castro’s administration began with a focus to tackle corruption, improve governance and the investment climate, and address inequalities. Despite these initiatives, her reforms have faced various levels of success and resistance, with her pledge to establish the International Commission against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (CICIH) still unfulfilled.¹ Recent events have emphasized the urgency for President Castro to act against corruption. Her controversial decision to end the long-standing extradition treaty between Honduras and the US has sparked widespread debate within the country and internationally, weakening the fight against organized crime.² Castro’s stance has been further shaken by the release of a video that led to the resignation of her brother-in-law, who served as the Secretary of the National Congress, and her nephew, who held the position of Minister of Defense.³ As of early September, Castro is under pressure to resign amidst public demonstrations.⁴ This scandal has raised serious concerns both at home and abroad regarding the extent of corruption and the pervasive influence of drug networks in Honduras’s political sphere. These events highlight the necessity for effective measures to combat drug trafficking and regulate electoral campaign financing.

From a broader macroeconomic perspective, Honduras is intricately linked to the wider regional dynamics of Central America. As part of Northern Central America, alongside Guatemala and El Salvador, Central America’s second largest country also grapples with the intertwined issues of unemployment, poverty, violence, and migration. The sub-region faces common struggles against organized crime and corruption, which significantly impacts the economic and social fabric of each nation. Additionally, the Honduran economy’s heavy reliance on remittances —over a quarter of the gross domestic product⁵—primarily from the United States, introduces vulnerability to changes in domestic US policy and economic fluctuations. Compounding these challenges, climate change exacerbates natural disasters like hurricanes and droughts, further straining Honduras’ social conditions, economic resources, and infrastructure.

One of the most significant geopolitical shifts under Castro’s administration was the decision to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China. This move—not totally unexpected from Castro’s campaign⁶—was seen as a way to explore new opportunities for foreign investment, trade, and infrastructure development, potentially impacting Honduras’s economic landscape. However, it has also brought challenges, including putting at stake Honduras’s long-standing relationships with allies and partners in the Western Hemisphere, and ensuring that any new partnerships translate into tangible benefits for the Honduran population.

Additionally, Honduras continues to face severe energy challenges that impede economic growth and development. Frequent power rationing, driven by inadequate investment in transmission and distribution systems, coupled with the failure to increase grid capacity, highlights the urgent need for competitive tenders and investment in firm power generation. This investment is crucial not only for addressing current energy deficits, but also for unlocking the country’s future energy potential. Furthermore, significant fiscal challenges exacerbate the problem. The state-owned energy company, ENEE, accumulated a staggering overall debt of approximately $4.29 billion by May 2024,⁷with an estimated $75 million owed to the private sector.⁸ These financial issues are an additional strain to Honduras’s energy infrastructure and underscore the need for comprehensive reforms to stabilize the energy sector and the broader economy. Addressing these energy challenges is critical not only for promoting economic and fiscal stability but also for improving the overall quality of life for Hondurans.

While overcoming these domestic challenges remains crucial, Honduras is at a critical moment where global economic trends, such as nearshoring, offer promising opportunities for growth. As companies seek to relocate their manufacturing and services closer to North American markets, Honduras could potentially become a key player in regional supply chains. By leveraging its strategic location, improving infrastructure, enhancing workforce skills through education and vocational training, and providing legal certainty in-country, Honduras could be an attractive destination for nearshoring and foreign investments. Próspera has been held up as an example of this potential.A private city and special economic zone on Honduras’s Roatan Island, it was designed to operate under its own fiscal, regulatory, and legal framework. Próspera aimed to attract foreign direct investment and drive economic development,⁹though the future of Próspera and Próspera-like enterprises remains in “limbo” after Castro repealed, in her first days in office, the Special Economic Zone law.¹⁰ This move has raised concerns among international investors and US lawmakers, including Senators Cardin and Hagerty, who have emphasized the importance of respecting existing investments and maintaining a stable and predictable business environment in Honduras.¹¹

In this context, for over a year, members of the Atlantic Council’s Central America Task Force (CATF)—a nonpartisan, high-level group of leaders from government, business, and civil society mostly from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—set out to provide independent analysis and recommendations on how to accelerate business confidence in Honduras. This roadmap—the first of a two-part series by the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and DT Institute—focuses on pragmatic recommendations specifically tailored to Honduras, to assist in tackling corruption and strengthening business confidence. In close collaboration and through repeated consultations with the CATF, this brief explores core issues facing Honduras and outlines actionable recommendations for the public and private sectors to undertake to improve the country’s business climate.

Honduras’s business climate in context

Honduras possesses numerous attributes that appeal to both local and global investors, including its strategic proximity to US markets, favorable legal protections, and low tariffs facilitated by the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), abundant natural resources, and productive agricultural sectors. However, the investment landscape is marred by persistent uncertainties stemming from corruption, legal domestic and international inconsistencies, costly and unreliable energy supply, bureaucratic hurdles in licensing and permitting, and deteriorating infrastructure, all of which pose significant obstacles to enterprises across the spectrum. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Honduran real gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 4 percent in 2022—nearly identical to Guatemala’s 4.1 percent growth and 1.2 percentage points above neighboring El Salvador’s—and is estimated to grow by 3.6 percent by the end of 2024, marginally outperforming Guatemala, and El Salvador by 0.1 and 0.6 percent, respectively.¹²

President Castro’s administration has proposed an ambitious agenda for the “refoundation” of the country,¹³ purportedly targeting systemic corruption and advocating for the introduction of an inclusive economic framework. However, little progress or change has happened, mostly due to institutional uncertainties in the Legislative Branch, the rapid pace of legislative and regulatory changes, coupled with a narrative that often blames the private sector for societal woes¹⁴have fostered an atmosphere of unpredictability, resulting in diminished private investment and job opportunities.¹⁵

Lack of public-and private-sector coordination

While the Castro administration has publicly acknowledged the importance of foreign direct investment for generating opportunities, job creation, and economic expansion,¹⁶conflicting views within the government about the private sector’s contribution to national welfare have created uncertainty. This inconsistency has raised concerns among Honduran businesses regarding the administration’s commitment to fostering a stable and conducive investment environment. One example was the introduction of the Tax Justice Law bill, which was presented to Congress without consultation with the private sector. Introduced in April 2023, the reform bill sought to overhaul the tax system by introducing progressive tax principles, transitioning from territorial to worldwide income taxation, and eliminating the possibility of forgiving tax debts, among other reforms.¹⁷ The lack of dialogue with the business community for this proposal was seen as detrimental because it undermined the private sector’s confidence in the government’s willingness to collaborate on policies that directly affect their operations.
Additionally, the international investment community has echoed such uncertainty. The US State Department’s 2023 Investment Climate Statements on Honduras highlight that US businesses believe the administration’s policies have weakened Honduras’s appeal as an investment destination relative to its Central American neighbors.¹⁸ For instance, the repeal of the hourly employment law in April 2022, which eliminated flexible hiring practices essential for seasonal and part-time workers,¹⁹is one policy decision that raised concerns about the country’s attractiveness for investment. which raised concerns about potential expropriation risks if power-purchasing agreements could not be renegotiated, further damaged investor confidence. Although the government has renegotiated eighteen contracts,²⁰these are still “stuck” and pending approval from the National Congress. This reform has not only discouraged private investment but also limited the commercial sector’s ability to privately contract energy, leaving economic growth dependent on the pace and capacity of ENEE.

To address these issues, fostering a consistent and robust dialogue between the public and private sectors is essential. Such engagement would help harmonize policies, build mutual trust, and create a more stable and attractive investment environment in Honduras.

Cumbersome and costly regulatory environment

Honduras’s regulatory environment is characterized by complexity and inefficiency, creating challenges for businesses, and hindering economic growth. The country’s regulatory framework is often burdensome, with numerous bureaucratic procedures and regulations that businesses must navigate to operate legally. Starting a business in Honduras involves multiple steps, taking an average of forty-two days to complete, and incurs high costs equivalent to 28.1 percent of per capita GDP.²¹Additionally, obtaining business licenses and permits can be time-consuming and costly due to excessive red tape and administrative hurdles. Cumbersome customs procedures and trade regulations further exacerbate the challenges, impeding the smooth flow of goods and increasing business transaction costs.

These regulatory barriers contribute to a lack of competitiveness, stifling innovation and entrepreneurship while deterring foreign investment. Simplifying regulations, streamlining administrative processes, and enhancing transparency and accountability in regulatory enforcement are essential steps to alleviate the burden of the regulatory environment and foster a more conducive business climate in Honduras.

Issues with the rule of law

Honduras’s rule of law faces significant challenges marked by weak governance, widespread corruption, and limited access to justice. The country struggles with institutional fragility, where political interference often undermines the independence of the judiciary and law enforcement agencies. Corruption is pervasive across various sectors, hindering accountability and eroding public trust in government institutions. Furthermore, the recent denunciation of the extradition agreement between the US and Honduras is a major setback in the fight against drug trafficking.²²It undermines previous efforts to decrease high levels of violence, organized crime, and gang violence. It also poses significant threats to citizen security and the rule of law.

As mentioned in a previous Atlantic Council report, civil service reform and “debloating” the government payroll is essential to combat corruption.²³ Such reforms can help professionalize the public sector and create a merit-based system that rewards competence and performance. Reforms in civil service can attract top talent and establish a permanent core bureaucracy to ensure long-term continuity for institutional and economic policy, as well as insulate key government functions from undue political influence.

Despite facing challenges, ongoing efforts persist in addressing the fragility of the rule of law in Honduras. One notable initiative is the Justice, Human Rights, and Security Strengthening Activity (Unidos por la Justicia), launched by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) in 2016.²⁴ This project aims to enact institutional reforms, enhance access to justice and civil society, bolster law enforcement, and empower women to combat gender-based violence. Furthermore, the Biden administration committed US$4 billion²⁵over four years to combat crime, poverty, and corruption in Honduras, as well as in neighboring countries El Salvador and Guatemala, under a plan titled US Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America.²⁶ Since 2021, the root causes strategy has attempted to address the underlying drivers of irregular migration from Central America. The United States government assistance has been directed toward generating over 90,000 jobs and providing $179 million in financing for micro and small businesses. Additionally, investments totaling over $4 billion have been committed to strengthen economic security, enhance food security for over 275,000 individuals, and provide education and vocational training for thousands of youths,²⁷though it is important to note that many of these initiatives were already underway prior to the strategy’s launch. While this initiative has aimed to mitigate migration pressures, it has been criticized for its approach. A year after the strategy was launched, Marisa Limón Garza, deputy director at the Hope Border Institute, pointed out that while the administration has taken positive steps, outdated deterrence tactics and the lack of humanitarian approaches toward rising migration hinder broader reform efforts.²⁸ Furthermore, critics have expressed concerns that the strategy’s emphasis on financial aid lacks clear accountability mechanisms to address immigration pull factors directly, as well as measurable targets to ensure long-term results rather than mere temporary relief.²⁹

Infrastructure challenges

Honduras still lacks key elements of physical infrastructure to capitalize on opportunities for trade and investment. The country’s expensive and unreliable energy, inadequate public utilities, and e-government digital systems present some of the greatest obstacles to private-sector development and investment.

Improving Honduras’s energy sector is crucial for reducing costs and enhancing reliability, which are vital for business operations. Chronic issues such as energy shortages and high costs persist, particularly in rural areas where electrification rates are lowest (more than one in four households lack access to electricity).³⁰ Daily blackouts are common; as of June 2023, the Honduran government started to implement scheduled blackouts to ration electricity throughout the country.³¹ In 2023, electricity losses were estimated to be as high as 37.7 percent of total production, increasing the National Electricity Company’s debt to approximately US$4.17 billion³² compared to US$3.4 billion in 2020.³³ Despite efforts to increase installed capacity and meet growing demand, transmission and distribution losses remain high due to theft and illegal connections. As a result of energy losses, many firms resort to owning generators to mitigate the effects of unreliable electricity supply. However, these generators contribute to operational costs and indicate shortcomings in the public utility’s service provision.

Furthermore, ENEE’s mounting debt to private generators has created significant challenges. The government’s failure to make payments has destabilized these companies financially, forcing them to seek additional financing to keep their operations running and continue supplying energy. Génesis Rodezno, Executive Director of the Honduran Association of Electric Power Producers (AHPEE), has highlighted that ENNE’s failure to pay on time increases the cost of credits provided by private banks, putting at risk the survival of these companies.³⁴ In turn, this financial instability threatens the country’s overall energy supply. Thus, addressing inefficiencies in the electricity sector is essential for promoting business growth and economic development in Honduras, requiring comprehensive reforms to enhance infrastructure, reduce losses, and improve service quality.

A lack of digital infrastructure has long impacted the country’s ability to partially or fully digitalize, leading to limited access to information and public services, particularly for people living in remote areas. According to the United Nations’ E-Government Development Index, Honduras ranks second to last in the Americas in terms of using information technologies to promote access and inclusion of its people.³⁵ These low levels of digitization result in a lack of transparency and accountability by impeding access to information, increasing the risk of errors, and limiting the ability to track government actions effectively, making it more difficult to detect and prevent corrupt practices. Importantly, a lack of digital infrastructure makes it more difficult for local and international businesses to access information, communicate with customers and suppliers, and conduct financial transactions. According to the UN Conference on Trade and Development’s B2C E-commerce Index, which measures an economy’s preparedness to support online shopping, Honduras ranks 98 out of 152 countries surveyed.³⁶

Human capital

Honduras faces significant challenges related to human capital, including limited access to quality education, skills gaps in the workforce, and elevated levels of informality. The country’s education system struggles with inadequate funding, infrastructure, and teacher training, resulting in low educational attainment levels and a lack of necessary skills in the workforce. This hinders productivity and innovation, limiting economic growth and development opportunities. Furthermore, a substantial portion of the workforce operates in the informal sector—which today accounts for a significant portion of the country’s economic activity, estimated at around 70 percent of total employment—lacking access to social protections and training opportunities, exacerbating inequalities, and perpetuating poverty. Additionally, brain drain remains a concern, with skilled workers often seeking opportunities abroad due to limited prospects and economic instability at home. Addressing these human capital challenges requires investment in education and vocational training programs, as well as policies to promote formal employment and create pathways for skills development and retention. By prioritizing human capital development, Honduras can unlock its potential for sustainable growth and prosperity.

Notwithstanding these five types of challenges, Honduras presents lucrative business prospects, attracting continued interest from multinational corporations.

A roadmap to improving the business climate in Honduras

The Central America Task Force set out to discuss and define how the United States can work with Honduras and other Northern Central American countries to accelerate business confidence and promote greater economic development and investments while best supporting Honduras in combating corruption and strengthening the rule of law. The Task Force’s recommendations pursue three broad objectives. First, they seek to improve public-private coordination to enhance investor confidence. Second, the recommendations identify areas where rule of law, judicial framework, and human capital can enhance Honduras’s business climate. Finally, the recommendations aim to position the United States to partner with an increasingly prosperous and capable Honduras to advance mutual economic and geopolitical interests.

Improving governance and the rule of law

Ensuring electoral integrity is an essential first step to strengthen political trust and ensure a level playing field for businesses. If former President Juan Orlando Hernandez’s trial taught Honduras anything, it was that the country needs to strengthen its laws around electoral procedures: US prosecutors allege that Hernandez took approximately US$1 million in bribes to finance both his 2013 and 2017 presidential campaigns.⁴⁰ In 2025, Honduras will hold general elections, underscoring the urgency of introducing regulations on party finances and new laws that would allow for cooperation agreements with individuals under criminal investigation. This practice to confront illicit campaign financing, which is commonly used in the United States, was a key factor in the successful prosecution of major corruption cases by the now-defunct International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG).⁴¹ By leveraging testimony from lower-level participants, CICIG was able to go after high-level corrupt individuals such as politicians, former military officials, and businesspeople, although there is controversy around the reach of the CICIG. Nevertheless, while CICIG was able to expose several criminal networks, its relative success was mixed as it often faced criticism for excessive zeal in criticizing judges and uneven management of its cases. While not a perfect instrument, CICIG stands as a potential model for countries struggling with entrenched corruption, and many lessons could be learned from its existence.

To solidify short-term wins into long-term gains in strengthening the rule of law, the Honduran government should continue to enact civil service reforms that promote transparency, accountability, and merit-based hiring practices. This could include the establishment of an independent civil service commission that oversees hiring, promotions, and dismissals. For example, the Special Law on the Organization and Functioning of the Nominating Board for the Proposal of Candidates for Magistrates of the Supreme Court of Justice, passed in July 2022, was a welcome reform that seeks to limit external interference in the selection of magistrates.⁴² The Honduran government should also invest in training and capacity building for civil servants with the help of USAID to ensure they have the skills and knowledge necessary to perform their duties effectively. Accumulating human capital and skills within the civil service is difficult, as only 20 percent of workers are part of career civil service while the remaining 80 percent are temporary contractors with high turnover rates.⁴³ Resuming the School of High Public Management project, created on 2018 by the Council of Ministers’ Decree PCM-19-2018, would be a positive step toward addressing this challenge. This initiative, which was supported by the Honduran government and the European Union, aimed to improve high-ranking public officials’ leadership skills, understanding of public administration and ability to optimize state resources.⁴⁴ By fostering a results-based management culture and promoting accountability, it could contribute to addressing the civil service’s existing challenges. Finally, the government should also provide incentives for civil servants to report corruption and protect whistleblowers from retaliation.

Finally, the growing awareness of responsible business conduct (RBC) in Honduras presents an opportunity to promote transparency and responsible practices within the private sector in the long term. Organizations like the Honduran Corporate Social Responsibility Foundation (FUNDAHRSE) are crucial in providing training and support to businesses, especially small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), to engage in responsible practices. FUNDAHRSE’s initiative, offering the “Corporate Social Responsibility Enterprise” seal, incentivizes exemplary conduct in areas such as health, education, environment, ethics, employment, and marketing. To further encourage RBC adoption, policymakers can collaborate with FUNDAHRSE to expand its reach and support programs that promote responsible business practices across all sectors. This partnership can enhance Honduras’s business climate, fostering trust and sustainability in the long term.

Improving public-and private-sector engagement, coordination, and policy development

Promoting consensus and coordination between the government, private sector, and civil society is essential for creating a stable and predictable investment climate in Honduras. Collaboration among stakeholders can help identify common goals, address concerns, and develop effective policies and strategies to promote economic growth and development.

The first step to achieving greater public- and private- sector engagement is to establish a public-private dialogue platform. This structured platform would promote periodic dialogue between public- and private-sector representatives and should be facilitated by the government in collaboration with business associations like the Consejo Hondureno de la Empresa Privada (COHEP), local commerce and industry chambers, and civil society organizations. The United States, through several agencies and the American Chambers of Commerce, should also participate as a representative of US businesses operating in Honduras.

The implementation of such a platform has been hindered by historical mistrust, bureaucratic inertia, and competing interests. Such dialogues have occurred in the past, oftentimes on an ad hoc basis, with the last one having occurred in early 2024 after demands from the country’s private sector.⁴⁵ To overcome these barriers and fragmented efforts to convene such dialogues, an institutionalized platform would provide a formal avenue for stakeholders to discuss key economic issues, exchange information, and address concerns openly and constructively. Importantly, this dialogue would serve as a forum for enhancing transparency and inclusivity in the policymaking process. For example, the Tax Justice bill in Honduras, first presented to Congress by President Castro’s administration, sounded the alarm among business leaders, who feared that it could discourage foreign investment.⁴⁶ Adding to the obstacles posed by the controversial legislation is Honduras’s withdrawal from the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which also threatens foreign investment.⁴⁷ A public-private dialogue would allow private-sector stakeholders to voice these concerns and find pathways to inform policies that would encourage rather than discourage domestic and foreign investors. By involving stakeholders in the decision-making process, the government can gain valuable insights, build support for reforms, and foster a sense of ownership over policy outcomes.

Through this dialogue, Honduran policymakers and private-sector leaders can establish a minimum common agenda aimed at accelerating the country’s economic development. Here, Honduras can replicate Guatemala’s “Guatemala Moving Forward” plan—an interagency and multisectoral cooperation agreement that establishes a roadmap to attract more foreign investment and improve conditions for the Guatemalan economy. Important to its success was political will across administrations (the plan was introduced under former President Alejandro Giammattei’s administration and later adopted by President Bernardo Arevalo). Here, the US government, through its Central America Forward initiative, has already introduced a Business-Enabling Action Plan as part of its lines of effort, which could narrow down some of the focus areas for the minimum common agenda to build from.

As part of the public-private dialogue’s mandate, the Honduran government, in collaboration with private-sector stakeholders, should establish a dedicated fund for financing development-project feasibility studies and economic landscape-mapping exercises. The fund should be governed by a board of directors comprising representatives across the government, private sector, and civil society, ensuring transparency and accountability in fund management. Feasibility studies and mapping exercises should be prioritized by their potential to drive economic growth, create jobs, and address key development challenges in Honduras. Here, international financial institutions and development banks can be crucial partners for raising capital and providing technical expertise. For example, the International Finance Corporation published in 2022 its Country Private Sector Diagnostic (CPSD) report for Honduras, which identified agribusiness, manufacturing, business process outsourcing (BPO), and digital financial services (DFS) for micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) as sectors where the business community, through government support, can unlock greater investment potential.⁴⁸ Doubling down on these studies, the fund would finance additional economic landscape studies like this one to identify areas for business climate improvement and delineate implementation schemes.

Streamlining government processes

Honduras faces significant challenges in its business environment, characterized by complex regulatory processes, bureaucratic inefficiencies, issues with public procurement, and barriers to entry for entrepreneurs. To foster economic growth and attract investment, Honduras must streamline government processes and enhance its regulatory environment.

First, the government, alongside business councils, should undertake a comprehensive review of the Honduran regulatory framework to identify redundant, outdated, or overly burdensome regulations that impede business operations. Honduras should, therefore, enhance transparency in government procedures and transactions. It should do so by widely implementing anonymous reporting channels, which have the potential to enhance the delivery of public services and increase responsiveness to citizen needs. This is especially crucial within the judicial system, where improving transparency can play a pivotal role in reducing impunity and enhancing overall judicial outcomes.

Additionally, the government should prioritize the modernization of regulatory processes through the adoption of digital technologies, automation, and online platforms to streamline administrative procedures and reduce bureaucratic red tape. Here, USAID can encourage the development of strategic blueprints for digital governance, electronic services, and cybersecurity, specifically. With the help of other development agencies, USAID can assist in policy formulation and enhancing institutional capabilities, including collaborating with donors like the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Government of South Korea on digital transformation initiatives to advance transparency and interoperability among government bodies; and facilitating knowledge sharing and the dissemination of successful practices with governments that have effectively implemented comprehensive digital transformation strategies, like Brazil.

Honduras must also strengthen its institutional capacity for public procurement. Such capacities must include the development of specialized procurement units in government agencies, the establishment of procurement training programs for procurement officials, and the recruitment and retention of qualified procurement staff, the government, and civil society. Additionally, the use of electronic procurement systems, online bidding, and e-procurement portals would help to streamline the procurement process, reduce the risk of fraud and corruption, and increase competition among suppliers. Lastly, an independent procurement oversight body that contemplates the development of a complaints and appeals mechanism and the implementation of anti-corruption measures in line with the broader anti-corruption agenda could help improve the perception of doing business in Honduras.

Addressing infrastructure challenges: energy, transport, and logistics

Infrastructure development is critical for supporting economic growth and attracting investment in Honduras. However, the country faces significant challenges, including inadequate transportation networks, unreliable energy supply, and lackluster digital infrastructure. Addressing these infrastructure deficits requires concerted efforts to invest in upgrading existing infrastructure and developing new projects to meet the needs of businesses and communities.

One area ripe for infrastructure investment is transportation networks, including roads, ports, and airports. Improving road connectivity within Honduras and its neighboring countries can reduce transportation costs, facilitate trade, and stimulate economic activity. For example, Honduran policymakers could prioritize investments in key transportation corridors such as the central, south, and west corridors which connect major urban centers and industrial zones. Additionally, upgrading ports and airports to handle increased trade volumes would complement these efforts by enhancing intraregional connectivity and supporting overall economic growth. Drawing inspiration from Colombia’s example, the 4G Road Infrastructure Program, which has been credited with boosting trade and reducing transportation costs, Honduras could adopt a similar model by engaging in public-private partnerships (PPPs) to finance and manage large-scale projects. Furthermore, upgrading critical infrastructure such as the Port of Cortés and the Ramón Villeda Morales International Airport would improve logistics initiatives and support Honduras’s growing trade needs.

Another critical infrastructure challenge is unreliable energy supply, which poses significant barriers to business operations and investment. Honduras has struggled with high electricity costs and frequent power outages, which negatively impact productivity and competitiveness. To address this issue, the government should implement comprehensive reforms in the energy sector, including promoting private-sector participation, diversifying energy sources, and enhancing grid reliability. On this last point, Honduras should invest in modernizing the electrical grid and its national energy company, ENEE, to improve reliability and reduce outages. This involves upgrading transmission and distribution infrastructure and integrating smart grid technologies. Notably, this has been a focus of the current government, which has allocated 16 percent of public investment- amounting to $232 million- towards these efforts.

In today’s digital age, robust digital infrastructure is crucial for economic development. Honduras lags in digital connectivity, which hampers business efficiency and access to global markets. Investing in digital infrastructure, including expanding broadband access, and enhancing mobile network coverage, is imperative. South Korea’s transformation into a global technology leader was driven by substantial investments in digital infrastructure and education. The country prioritized widespread high-speed internet access and fostered a culture of innovation. Honduras can take similar steps by collaborating with private telecom companies to expand broadband access, particularly in rural areas, and by promoting digital literacy programs to ensure the workforce can effectively utilize digital tools.

By prioritizing investments in transportation, energy, and digital infrastructure, Honduras can create a more conducive environment for business and attract greater investment. These infrastructure improvements are not just about physical assets; they lay the groundwork for enhancing human capital. With better connectivity, reliable energy, and access to digital resources, the Honduran workforce can gain the skills and knowledge necessary to thrive in a competitive global market.

Human capital development

Investing in human capital development is crucial for building a skilled workforce capable of driving economic growth and innovation. The future of Honduran business competitiveness is directly tied to the quality and skills of the current and incoming workforce. However, many entry-level employees lack essential skills for workplace success. The gap between private-sector demands and educational offerings has resulted in systems ill-prepared to meet evolving needs.

Solving this issue involves investing in education and vocational training programs to equip workers with the skills and knowledge needed to succeed in a rapidly evolving economy. This can be managed with a two-pronged approach. On the public-sector side, Honduras should better use the resources allocated toward its education⁴⁹sector to modernize school infrastructure, improve instructor quality and pay, and prepare students for their future endeavors. On the other hand, private-sector organizations, both domestic and foreign, should institutionalize partnerships with vocational training programs to outline the exact skills they are looking for in potential employees, so that training centers can better prepare their students. By prioritizing investments in education, capacity building, and digital-skills development, Honduras can lay the foundation for sustainable development and attract greater investment in key sectors, such as technology, agriculture, and renewable energy.

COVID-19 spurred a digital learning surge, yet national primary and secondary curricula lack digital literacy, a crucial skill for navigating online platforms safely and effectively. The Ministry of Education initiated the National Digital Education Transformation Program (PNTED) in 2020 to bridge the digital gap.⁵⁰ However, PNTED does not include strategies for digital literacy implementation in primary and secondary education. Here, the Ministry of Education should spearhead a campaign to embed digital literacy into the national curriculum. This inclusion can mitigate online risks, enhance economic prospects, and align with the PNTED goals. USAID and partners can aid the Ministry of Education by offering technical support, such as aligning digital literacy standards across education levels, enhancing monitoring capabilities for digital platforms, and integrating cybersafety training into the education curriculum. This concerted effort would ensure that students and educators are equipped with essential skills for the digital age.

Conclusion

While Honduras boasts attractive attributes for investors, such as proximity to US markets, persistent challenges hinder its business climate. Corruption, legal inconsistencies, energy supply issues, bureaucratic hurdles, and infrastructure deficiencies deter potential investments. Under President Xiomara Castro’s administration, recent decisions- such as ending the extradition treaty with the United States- have sparked debate about the country’s approach to tacking corruption and strengthening governance, which are key for fostering a more favorable business environment. This situation highlights the need for concrete action to restore confidence in the government’s commitment to reform.

To prevent further deterring investment, enhancing coordination between the public and private sectors is essential. Strengthening governance, improving infrastructure, enhancing human capital, and combating corruption are crucial. Implementing a public-private dialogue platform, streamlining regulations, and investing in education and vocational training can foster economic growth.

Additionally, addressing infrastructure deficits, promoting electoral integrity, and embracing responsible business conduct are essential steps. Collaboration with international partners, like the United States, can provide support and expertise in these endeavors. By addressing these challenges and implementing strategic reforms, Honduras can unlock its potential for sustainable growth and prosperity, attracting greater investment and fostering a conducive business environment.

While Honduras faces significant challenges, there are also immense opportunities for growth and development. By implementing the recommendations outlined in this brief, Honduras can enhance its business climate, attract greater investment, and pave the way for a prosperous future.

Acknowledgements

This roadmap is the first of two as part of the work of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s Central America Task Force (members listed below), a high-level group of policymakers, business leaders, and civil society from northern Central America that seeks to create a basis for consensus and galvanize support for strengthening the rule of law and mitigating corruption, increasing productivity and enabling sustainable economic development, and reducing conflict in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Thank you to Jason Marczak, vice president and senior director for the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, for his guidance on this publication, as well as the Atlantic Council’s editorial team. A special mention to Kelsey Page, associate director, communications and editorial at AALAC, and AALAC’s young global professional, Isabella Palacios, for helping bring this publication to the finish line. This publication was produced with the generous financial support of DT Institute. Thank you to DT Institute for their insights and collaboration.

Staff

María Fernanda Bozmoski

Director, Impact and Operations and Lead for Central America

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Northern Triangle

Former staff

Eva Lardizábal

Former Assistant Director

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Coronavirus Inclusive Growth

María Fernanda Bozmoski is deputy director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she leads the Center’s work on Mexico, USMCA, and Central America. Bozmoski has co-led the Center’s Central America Task Force, managed the Center’s trade portfolio, and programmed events in Asia for US policymakers. Before joining the Atlantic Council, Bozmoski worked at the Cato Institute, the Council of the Americas, and completed an externship at the Inter-American Dialogue. She speaks native Spanish, English, and French, fluent Italian, and near fluent Portuguese.

Eva Lardizábal was an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she focused on regional economic development and prosperity, Central America, and the rule of law. Lardizábal authored the center’s biweekly Aviso LatAm newsletter and frequently organized policy dialogues with high-level government officials, business leaders, and civil-society members across the United States and Latin America. Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, she worked at the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program and the Organization of American States. Originally from Honduras, Lardizábal holds a bachelor’s degree in political science and Latin American studies from the University of Pennsylvania.

El Salvador 
Co-chair: Johanna Hill* (Co-chair for El Salvador until her appointment to the WTO)
Maria Eugenia Brizuela de Avila, former minister of foreign affairs (1999–2004); nonresident senior fellow, Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, Atlantic Council
Ricardo Castaneda Ancheta, senior economist and country coordinator for El Salvador and Honduras, Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales (ICEFI)
Juan José Daboub, former minister of finance and chief of staff to the President, Republic of El Salvador; president, HUGE Business and Investment Council
Leonor Selva, executive director, Asociación Nacional de la Empresa Privada (ANEP)
Claudia Umaña, former president, Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social (FUSADES)

Guatemala
Co-chair: Maria Antonieta del Cid, representative for Central America (1999–2000; 2017–2019), International Monetary Fund; former president of the Bank of Guatemala (2006-2010); former minister of finance (2004-2006), Republic of Guatemala
Roberto Gutierrez, president, Fundación para el Desarrollo Integral de Programas Socioeconómicos (FUNDAP); president, Red Nacional de Grupos Gestores
Guillermo Montano, founder, Transactel, Telus International, Dollar City, and Panamerican Food Company; president, Asociación Guatemalteca de Exportadores (Agexport)
Maria Pacheco, president and founder, WAKAMI
Leticia Teleguario, former minister of Labor and Social Welfare (2016-2018), Republic of Guatemala; Special Advisor on Corporate and Inter-Agency Relationships, UN Women Guatemala
Juan Carlos Zapata, executive director, Fundación para el Desarrollo de Guatemala (FUNDESA)

Honduras
Co-chair: Jorge Ramón Hernández, former judge, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR); former ambassador of Honduras to the United States; Former Vice President of the Central Bank of Honduras, Republic of Honduras
Gabriela Castellanos, president, Consejo Nacional Anticorrupción (CNA)
Jaime Díaz Palacios, executive vice president, Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI)
Eduardo Facussé, president, Cortes Chamber of Commerce and Industries (CCIC)
Jacqueline Foglia, executive director, Consejo Nacional de Inversiones (CNI)
Mey Hung, corporate affairs manager for Guatemala and Honduras, Walmart

United States and International Community
Co-chair: Anne W. Patterson, former Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement; former US ambassador to El Salvador, US Department of State
Abby Daniell, director, Latin America, Canada and Caribbean Public Sector, Amazon Web Services (AWS)
Karim Lesina, executive vice president; chief external affairs officer, Millicom
Jason Marczak, vice president and senior director, Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, Atlantic Council
Maria Liliana Mor, director of strategic partnerships and development, ProMujer
Salvador Stadthagen, former ambassador of Nicaragua to the United States, Republic of Nicaragua

Issue Brief Mar 31, 2021

The role of the private sector in catalyzing inclusive economic opportunities in the Northern Triangle

By María Fernanda Bozmoski and Domingo Sadurní

As in every democratic country in the world, the private sector in Central America’s Northern Triangle (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador) has a central role in generating employment, driving economic growth, and spurring innovation. But in a region plagued by one of the highest levels of economic informality, weak government institutions, and pervasive corruption, private enterprises—both decades-old industry behemoths and newer startups—can have a more positive influence in steering the Northern Triangle toward inclusive and sustainable economic development.

Americas Entrepreneurship

Issue Brief May 26, 2021

Combatting corruption in the Northern Triangle: Prioritizing a whole-of-society approach

By María Fernanda Bozmoski, Carlos Hernández, Roberto Rubio and Domingo Sadurní

Public corruption and weak rule of law are arguably the most persistent and long-standing challenges for strengthening democratic institutions and sustaining inclusive economic development in the Northern Triangle. Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador have grappled with widespread corruption that has fueled mistrust in political and wealthy elites, eroded democratic norms, exacerbated poverty, widened social inequality, and contributed to the conditions that force migrants to leave their homes.

Corruption Inclusive Growth

Issue Brief Sep 1, 2021

Addressing instability in Central America: Restrictions on civil liberties, violence, and climate change

By María Fernanda Bozmoski, María Eugenia Brizuela de Avila, Domingo Sadurní

Citizens across Latin America and the Caribbean are rising up in protest. Political frustration and economic stagnation are fueling social discontent exacerbated by the continued COVID-19 pandemic and the slow health response. In Central America, restrictions on civil liberties, high rates of gender-based violence and extortion, and worsening climate change are compounding the lack of economic opportunities and pervasive corruption seen in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.

Climate Change & Climate Action Latin America

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

Learn more

The post Accelerating business confidence in northern Central America: A roadmap for Honduras appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Introduction
Guatemala’s business climate in context
A roadmap to improving the business climate in Guatemala
Additional actionable recommendations for combating corruption in Guatemala
Conclusion
Acknowledgements
About the author
Central America Task Force members

Introduction

The still-young presidency of Bernardo Arévalo could be an inflection point in Guatemala’s efforts to combat corruption—a deeply entrenched issue that has long hindered progress in the nation and in Central America in general. With the largest population and economy in the Central American isthmus, Guatemala’s political and economic stability is vital not only for its citizens but also for the United States and the western hemisphere writ large. Arévalo’s administration, now past the six-month mark, represents a unique opportunity for the creation and implementation of significant reforms across government and institutions to dismantle the corruption that has stifled development and eroded public trust in democracy, as well as to move forward with other most needed structural reforms.

The administration’s efforts are critical for creating a more predictable and attractive investment environment, which is essential for promoting faster economic growth, increasing productivity, creating more formal jobs and enhancing people’s living conditions. With a long track record of macroeconomic stability, together with a significant flow of remittances and a diversified economy, the country is on the brink to achieving investment-grade status, according to major credit rating agencies.¹ However, Guatemala’s weak institutional capabilities, which cannot be fixed overnight, have fostered distrust toward political institutions and among certain businesses and unions. This distrust, coupled with increased polarization has undermined democratic norms and hindered economic growth. Highlighting the severity of these issues, the 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International placed Guatemala in the bottom fourteenth percent globally.²

Amid this challenging backdrop, the Arévalo administration has made efforts to address corruption. As an example of this, in his first weeks in office, the President appointed a new anti-corruption czar, Santiago Palomo, to lead the efforts of the National Commission against Corruption.³ However, this commission has limited political power and cannot investigate crimes, as criminal investigation is an exclusive function of the Attorney General’s Office. In July, Palomo stepped down from his position in the commission to become the administration’s chief spokesperson, and Julio Flores was appointed as his successor. The mandate and reach of the commission, as well as additional executive branch efforts that could strengthen the nation’s rule of law, are particularly crucial as Guatemala faces increasing pressures from external factors, ranging from transnational organized crime, climate change, and natural disasters, which further complicate the fight against corruption.⁴

The Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, in partnership with the DT Institute, has developed this roadmap for Guatemala. This publication, informed by over a year of consultations with the Central America Task Force, emphasizes the urgent need for robust anti-corruption measures to restore confidence among national and international investors, and calls for other relevant structural reforms crucial for improving the business climate. It provides pragmatic, multisectoral, and multistakeholder recommendations to drive impactful reforms that strengthen the rule of law.

By implementing comprehensive reforms, combating corrupt practices in public bids and tenders, accelerating the digitalization agenda, and seizing opportunities generated by nearshoring, Arévalo’s Guatemala could be on the cusp of transformative change. If successful, these efforts, supported by international cooperation, could significantly curb corruption, enhance institutional resilience, reduce migration, and foster economic prosperity in the region.

Guatemala’s business climate in context

When compared to the rest of the Central American countries, Guatemala stands out to investors for the size of its economy, population, and proximity to the United States, as well for its macroeconomic stability and credit rating. The country is an attractive destination for national and international investors, and, like its neighbors, benefits from its proximity to the North American market and favorable trade agreements such as the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). Additionally, Guatemala’s growing tourism sector and the emerging tech scene in Guatemala City offer promising opportunities for economic diversification.

However, despite these advantages, significant challenges remain. While the country has experienced steady economic growth, as reported by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), this growth has not translated into meaningful reductions in poverty or decreased inequality. The World Bank notes that Guatemala’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 4.1 percent in 2022, with an expected growth rate of 3.5 percent by the end of 2024.⁵ Despite this growth, the country continues to grapple with high poverty rates, with over half of the population (55 percent) living below the poverty line as of 2023.⁶ The situation is further complicated by the prominence of the informal economy, which employs seven out of ten workers.⁷

These persistent issues are closely tied to Guatemala’s historically weak state capacity, which hampers progress in unlocking prosperity. Although the country’s tax revenue remains among the lowest in the region,⁸ the tax administration has significantly improved with technical assistance from the US government and multilateral organizations, resulting in increased tax collection and the identification of major tax fraud in recent years.⁹ However, important challenges remain with the prioritization and effectiveness of public spending.¹⁰ This inadequacy of public spending has severely impacted the government’s ability to provide essential services such as health and education and to invest in infrastructure. This deficiency contributes to high rates of child malnutrition and limited access to quality education, especially among indigenous and rural populations.

Additionally, another challenge for Guatemala is the inconsistent application of laws and regulations. The legal environment is often unpredictable, with uneven enforcement creating uncertainty for businesses. Furthermore, the slow judicial process, highlighted by the country’s difficulty in electing Supreme Court magistrates from 2014 to 2023¹¹ deters long-term investments and undermines the rule of law. However, in November 2023, Congress elected new magistrates to complete the 2019-2024 term, and now, new appointments for both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals are expected to take place in October, as that term ends. Despite these recent developments, establishing a stable and predictable legal framework remains crucial. The current administration must prioritize reforms that ensure consistent enforcement and strengthen the rule of law to build investor confidence and promote inclusive economic growth.

Another significant issue for businesses operating in the country, is Guatemala’s infrastructure deficit –particularly in transportation and energy. The country’s road network is underdeveloped, hampering logistics and trade efficiency. According to the World Bank, Guatemala ranks 134 of 141 in road connectivity.¹² Additionally, the energy sector faces rising demand, challenges in expanding new projects, and inadequate coverage in rural areas. For businesses and investors examining the Guatemalan landscape, while the business climate has become more favorable in recent years, several issues remain:

• Regulatory and bureaucratic hurdles: The regulatory environment is characterized by complexity and inefficiency, creating substantial barriers for businesses. According to the Ibero-American Index of Bureaucracy 2023, opening a small business in Guatemala requires an average of 4,870 hours, equivalent to 203 days to complete the necessary procedures with different state agencies.¹³ In contrast, in El Salvador, the other Central American country tracked by the index, the process takes significantly less time, with an average of 1,474 hours, or sixty-one days, to open a small business.¹⁴Additionally, trade regulations and customs procedures are cumbersome, impeding the smooth flow of goods and increasing transaction costs. These regulatory challenges hinder competitiveness, stifle innovation, and deter foreign investment. They also create openings for corruption. Streamlining administrative processes and enhancing transparency in regulatory enforcement are essential for creating a more conducive business climate.
• Infrastructure gaps: Guatemala’s inadequate infrastructure poses significant challenges for business and investors. The country’s road network is underdeveloped, with limited access to isolated regions. In addition, the country’s ports are struggling with operational inefficiency, with severe congestion resulting in vessel wait times of up to thirty days before they can unload at Puerto Quetzal and Puerto Santo Tomas.¹⁵ The energy sector, despite achieving competitive energy prices through a successful public bidding process,¹⁶is still slow with the generation of new projects due mostly to bureaucratic obstacles and community resistance to hydropower projects due to environmental and resource access concerns.¹⁷ The sector is further challenged by energy theft and targeted attacks on infrastructure, all of which destabilize the nation’s energy supply. Additionally, the lack of digital infrastructure limits access to information and public services, particularly in rural areas, further affecting transparency and accountability. Addressing these deficiencies in transportation, energy, and digital sectors is essential for fostering a more supportive environment for business activities and investment.

• Human capital development: Significant challenges in human capital development include limited and unequal access to quality education, skills gaps in the workforce, and high levels of informality.¹⁸ While education has become more accessible for Guatemalans, low literacy, poor retention, and disparities between rural and urban populations remain critical issues.¹⁹ These obstacles prevent the development of a skilled labor force. In addition, Guatemala’s investment in education, particularly in secondary education, remains among the lowest in the region, further exacerbating the gap in learning outcomes and skills development.International Monetary Fund. Western Hemisphere Dept.²⁰Additionally, a substantial portion of the workforce operates in the informal sector, characterized by unregulated working conditions and restricted access to social protections, thereby exacerbating inequality and perpetuating poverty.²¹ Addressing these challenges requires substantial investment in education and vocational training programs, as well as policies to promote formal employment and skills development.

A roadmap to improving the business climate in Guatemala

The Central America Task Force convened to discuss and define how the United States can work with Guatemala to accelerate business confidence and promote greater economic development and investments while supporting the country’s efforts in combating corruption and strengthening the rule of law. The Task Force’s recommendations are centered around four broad objectives: guaranteeing political stability, addressing regulatory and bureaucratic challenges, enhancing infrastructure and human capital development, and improving public- and private-sector engagement. The group also discussed the promise of nearshoring trends for Guatemala.

Improving political stability

Ensuring additional political stability is crucial for a predictable investment climate in Guatemala. The country’s recent history of political turbulence, particularly during the last presidential election in 2023, has led to uncertainty for businesses. Strengthening electoral integrity and transparency is essential to build citizen trust in the political system and increase foreign investors’ interest in the country.

To transform short-term gains into long-term rule of law improvements, the Guatemalan government should enact civil service reforms that promote transparency, accountability, and merit-based hiring practices. Establishing an independent civil service commission to oversee hiring, promotions, and dismissals can help reduce political interference and improve institutional integrity. Additionally, investing in training and capacity building for civil servants with the help of international partners like the US Agency for International Development (USAID) will ensure they have the necessary skills to perform their duties effectively.

Reducing regulatory and bureaucratic hurdles

To foster increased economic growth and attract investment, the government should undertake a comprehensive review of the regulatory framework to map out, identify, and eliminate redundant, outdated, or overly burdensome regulations. Simplifying regulatory processes and enhancing transparency will help reduce the costs and time associated with starting and operating a business.

Adopting digital technologies and automation to streamline administrative procedures can further reduce bureaucratic red tape. USAID and other development agencies can support Guatemala in developing strategic blueprints for digital governance, electronic services, and cybersecurity. By collaborating with donors like the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Guatemala can advance transparency and interoperability among government bodies and facilitate knowledge sharing with countries that have successfully implemented digital transformation strategies.

Enhancing infrastructure and human capital development

Addressing the challenge of increasing energy demand, ensuring the construction and operation of generation projects in the pipeline and the timely construction and maintenance of transmission lines to bring energy to strategic productive places and the rural areas are essential steps toward a more reliable energy supply. Digital infrastructure development is crucial for improving access to information and public services, especially in remote areas. Enhancing digital connectivity and promoting e-governance can improve transparency, accountability, and service delivery. International cooperation and investment in digital infrastructure will help Guatemala integrate more effectively into the global economy.

Concurrently, the nation needs to address human capital challenges as it works to unlock its economic potential. The country faces significant issues related to education, skills gaps, and high levels of informality in the workforce. Investing in education and vocational training programs will equip the workforce with the skills needed for productivity and innovation. Policies promoting formal employment and skills development are essential for reducing inequalities and fostering sustainable economic growth.

Improving public- and private-sector engagement

Promoting consensus building and coordination between the government, private sector, and civil society is essential for creating a stable investment climate. Establishing a continuous public-private dialogue platform to facilitate periodic discussions between public- and private-sector representatives—which can complement the US-led High Level Economic Dialogue (HLED)²² —can help address economic issues, facilitate information exchange, and develop effective policies. This national dialogue would enhance transparency, build mutual trust, and create a more inclusive policymaking process.

The Guatemala Moving Forward plan (Guatemala no se Detiene), a national plan dating to 2021, successfully attracted foreign investment through interagency and multisectoral cooperation. The plan includes an investment strategy to allocate $7.78 billion across one hundred infrastructure projects.²³ A renewed public-private dialogue can replicate this model to drive economic development. Establishing a dedicated fund for financing development project feasibility studies and economic landscape mapping exercises, governed by a board of representatives from government, the private sector, and civil society, would ensure transparency and accountability in fund management.

Additional actionable recommendations for combating corruption in Guatemala

Enhancing transparency and legal certainty

To combat corruption effectively, Guatemala must enhance transparency and legal certainty across all sectors. The Law for the Simplification of Requirements and Administrative Procedures²⁴ (Ley para la Simplificación de Trámites y Requisitos Administrativos), enacted in 2021, is a crucial step in this direction. As an anti-red tape law, it aims to streamline bureaucratic processes and reduce openings for corruption. As of September 1, the Ministry of Economy has transitioned to a fully electronic system for all processes and procedures. As of September 2024, close to 1,100 processes across government agencies are fully digital, and the remaining 103 remaining processes will be digitalized by the end of the year.²⁵ To complement this transition, the plan should also include training for government employees on new processes and procedures, regular audits to monitor compliance, and a public awareness campaign to inform citizens about the changes and how they can benefit from them.

Additionally, reforming laws governing the selection process for magistrates and judges across the judicial system is crucial. Strengthening this process will ensure that all judicial cases, including those related to corruption, are handled impartially and with greater efficiency, by ensuring that appointments are based on merit rather than political affiliations. Strengthening the legal framework around electoral processes, such as introducing stringent regulations on campaign financing and promoting greater transparency in electoral spending, will help minimize the influence of organized crime money in politics. Addressing political influences in the courts, particularly the Constitutional Court, is critical. Implementing measures such as random assignment of cases and independent oversight can help mitigate these influences.

Both publicizing and extending transparency measures are essential as well. The government should actively communicate the positive steps being taken through regular updates, transparency reports, and public forums. This will build trust and enhance credibility among citizens and foreign investors. Creating an online portal where citizens can access information about government projects, spending, and performance metrics can also contribute to greater transparency.

It is also critical to develop and implement robust governance models that incorporate digital tools to enhance transparency. These models should include mechanisms for regular audits, whistleblower protections, and public reporting. Digital tools, such as blockchain technology, can be used to create tamperproof records of transactions and decisions, making it easier to detect and prevent corruption. Furthermore, strengthening regulatory frameworks and ensuring harmonization and coordination across the Northern Central American countries will create a more unified and effective approach to combating corruption. This can be achieved by establishing a regional anti-corruption task force that shares best practices and coordinates efforts across borders. In this line, the northern Central American governments should re-consider the ratification of the Central American Apprehension Order Agreement, which would allow them to enforce judicial decisions from neighboring countries for specific crimes, streamlining cross-border law enforcement.

Strengthening public-private partnership laws is also essential. Clear guidelines and regulations should be developed to ensure transparency and accountability in collaborations between the public and private sectors. This includes mandatory disclosures of contracts, independent audits of projects, and strict penalties for breaches of conduct. Guatemala can draw from the experience of countries like Singapore or Dominican Republic, which has successfully implemented stringent public-private partnership frameworks that minimize corruption risks.

Digitalization initiatives

Standardizing and digitizing permits and processes will promote transparency and prevent undue interference. Creating a digital tool that standardizes permits and processes can significantly reduce opportunities for corruption. This tool should include features such as automated workflows, electronic signatures, and real-time tracking of applications. Developing a coordinated approach to digitalization across various government departments will ensure consistent application and reduce the potential for corruption. This can be achieved by establishing a central digital transformation office responsible for overseeing and coordinating all digital initiatives within the government.

Infrastructure and nearshoring initiatives

Ensuring that all infrastructure projects, especially large-scale ones like road construction and urban development, are subject to transparent bidding, execution, and monitoring processes is essential. This can be achieved by implementing an open contracting system, where all stages of the procurement process are made public. Independent oversight bodies should be established to monitor the implementation of projects and ensure compliance with transparency standards. Congress should approve important infrastructure initiatives such as a vehicle to undertake priority infrastructure projects and advance key reforms recommended in the IMF’s latest Article IV report. These include revising the public-private partnership law, enacting a new ports authority law, and passing additional legislation vital to enhancing competition and infrastructure development.²⁶

Positioning Guatemala to take advantage of nearshoring opportunities requires promoting a clear, corruption-free business environment and legal certainty. This can be done by creating special economic zones with streamlined regulations and robust anti-corruption measures, attracting foreign direct investment while ensuring transparency and accountability.

Educational shifts

Implementing training programs for public officials focused on ethics, anti-corruption practices, and transparency is crucial. These programs should be mandatory and include modules on the legal and ethical implications of corruption, as well as practical strategies for identifying and preventing corrupt practices. Educating the public on their rights and how to report corruption will empower citizens and create a culture of accountability. Public awareness campaigns, community workshops, and the integration of anti-corruption education into school curriculums can help achieve this.

Comprehensive civil-sector reform is necessary to support these initiatives. This includes revising civil service laws to promote merit-based hiring and promotions, establishing performance-based evaluations, and providing competitive salaries to reduce the temptation for corruption.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the fight against corruption in Guatemala is key to unlocking inclusive economic growth, enhancing public trust, and creating an attractive investment climate. Achieving this requires progress in implementing a digital agenda, strengthening institutions, increasing public capacities, and fostering public-private partnerships. By addressing these interconnected areas through comprehensive and coordinated efforts, Guatemala can create a more stable, transparent, and attractive environment for investment and development, paving the way for sustained economic growth and improved quality of life for its citizens.

Despite the challenges previously explored, Guatemala continues to offer substantial opportunities for investors. The country benefits from solid macroeconomic stability, making its economy one of the most resilient in the region against internal and external shocks. Its diverse economy, strategic location, and potential for growth in sectors such as agriculture, tourism, and technology provide a strong foundation for future development. With targeted reforms to address corruption, improve infrastructure, streamline regulations, and invest in human capital, Guatemala can enhance its business climate and achieve sustainable economic growth. By fostering a more transparent, efficient, and secure environment, the Arévalo administration can attract significant investment and drive long-term prosperity for the nation.

The private sector in Guatemala has the potential to drive inclusive economic opportunities, especially in sectors like agriculture, tourism, urban development, transportation, and technology. Previous work from the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and DT Institute emphasizes the need for public-private partnerships to foster economic growth and improve job opportunities. Strengthening the legal framework and ensuring transparency in public procurement processes are critical steps toward creating a more conducive business environment.

Acknowledgements

This roadmap is the second of two as part of the work of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s Central America Task Force (members listed below), a high-level group of policymakers, business leaders, and civil society members from northern Central America who seek to create a basis for consensus and galvanize support for strengthening the rule of law and mitigating corruption, increasing productivity and enabling sustainable economic development, and reducing conflict in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Thank you to Jason Marczak, vice president and senior director for the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center (AALAC), for his guidance on this publication, as well as Eva Lardizabal, former assistant director with AALAC, who was instrumental during the Task Force’s meetings. We also thank the Atlantic Council’s editorial team for their support throughout this process. A special mention of Kelsey Page, associate director, communications and editorial at AALAC, and AALAC’s young global professional, Isabella Palacios, for helping bring this publication to the finish line. This publication was produced with the generous financial support of DT Institute. Thank you to DT Institute for its insights and collaboration.

Staff

María Fernanda Bozmoski

Director, Impact and Operations and Lead for Central America

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Northern Triangle

María Fernanda Bozmoski is deputy director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she leads the Center’s work on Mexico, USMCA, and Central America. Bozmoski has co-led the Center’s Central America Task Force, managed the Center’s trade portfolio, and programmed events in Asia for US policymakers. Before joining the Atlantic Council, Bozmoski worked at the Cato Institute, the Council of the Americas, and completed an externship at the Inter-American Dialogue. She speaks native Spanish, English, and French, fluent Italian, and near fluent Portuguese.

El Salvador 
Co-chair: Johanna Hill* (Co-chair for El Salvador until her appointment to the WTO)
Maria Eugenia Brizuela de Avila, former minister of foreign affairs (1999–2004); nonresident senior fellow, Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, Atlantic Council
Ricardo Castaneda Ancheta, senior economist and country coordinator for El Salvador and Honduras, Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales (ICEFI)
Juan José Daboub, former minister of finance and chief of staff to the President, Republic of El Salvador; president, HUGE Business and Investment Council
Leonor Selva, executive director, Asociación Nacional de la Empresa Privada (ANEP)
Claudia Umaña, former president, Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social (FUSADES)

Guatemala
Co-chair: Maria Antonieta del Cid, representative for Central America (1999–2000; 2017–2019), International Monetary Fund; former president of the Bank of Guatemala (2006-2010); former minister of finance (2004-2006), Republic of Guatemala
Roberto Gutierrez, president, Fundación para el Desarrollo Integral de Programas Socioeconómicos (FUNDAP); president, Red Nacional de Grupos Gestores
Guillermo Montano, founder, Transactel, Telus International, Dollar City, and Panamerican Food Company; president, Asociación Guatemalteca de Exportadores (Agexport)
Maria Pacheco, president and founder, WAKAMI
Leticia Teleguario, former minister of Labor and Social Welfare (2016-2018), Republic of Guatemala; Special Advisor on Corporate and Inter-Agency Relationships, UN Women Guatemala
Juan Carlos Zapata, executive director, Fundación para el Desarrollo de Guatemala (FUNDESA)