July 1 will mark a dozen years since Croatia joined the the European Union (EU), the most recent country to do so. In the years after Croatia’s accession, the bloc’s eastern enlargement process stalled almost entirely. The EU’s enthusiasm for admitting new members waned, driven by rising anti-EU sentiment within member states and fears that further expansion could strain the bloc’s already burdened consensus-based decision-making. Meanwhile, democratic backsliding and disputes between candidate countries further undermined their cases for accession.

Then in 2022, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine revived the geopolitical imperative for enlargement in Brussels by highlighting Europe’s vulnerability to “gray zones.” Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia swiftly advanced along their accession paths, and hopes were somewhat revived in the six countries of the Western Balkans.

While Montenegro is the most advanced in accession negotiations today, Albania is also capitalizing on this new enlargement momentum. On May 11, Albania held parliamentary elections in which the Socialist Party, led by Prime Minister Edi Rama, won its fourth consecutive mandate, promising EU membership by 2030. After gaining EU candidate status in 2013 and waiting over a decade for the next formal step, Albania and the EU have been on an unprecedented roll since October 2024. Over the span of several months, the EU opened four clusters of negotiation chapters with Albania—covering twenty-four out of thirty-three chapters—and may open the remaining ones by the end of June. The opening of chapters signals that Albania has met initial EU benchmarks in those policy areas and will now negotiate to close the chapters—which aim to align Albanian laws, institutions, and practices with EU law.

The prevailing narrative among EU leaders, including European Council President António Costa, is that Albania and Montenegro are now leading the race to become the EU’s next member states. Both Albanian and EU officials have set 2027 as the target year to conclude the technical accession talks, paving the way for a membership vote. In May, that ambitious goal received a boost from French President Emmanuel Macron—once a skeptic of enlargement—who called it “realistic” during a visit to Tirana.  

Albania is moving fast, but will face headwinds

Several factors explain why Albania and Montenegro are pulling ahead of everyone else. To begin with, both are NATO members and—unlike Russia-friendly Serbia—are fully aligned with the EU’s Common and Foreign Security Policy. Albania, in particular, is seen as a reliable pro-Western security anchor in a volatile region where ethnic Albanians dominate in neighboring Kosovo and are a politically significant bloc in NATO members North Macedonia and Montenegro. Unlike Kosovo, which remains unrecognized by five EU member states, and North Macedonia, which is blocked by Bulgaria over historical disputes, Albania faces no such bilateral hurdles to its accession path from EU members—aside from intermittent tensions with neighboring Greece over ethnic Greek property rights and maritime borders.

Yet perhaps the main driver of Albania’s recent progress has been its sweeping EU- and US-sponsored reforms in the justice sector. Over nearly a decade, Albania has overhauled its judicial institutions and established new bodies, such as the Special Structure Against Corruption and Organised Crime (SPAK). While corruption remains high, the reformed institutions have shaken the culture of impunity that has plagued the country since the fall of communism. High-profile indictments—ranging from former presidents and prime ministers to powerful mayors—have started to build a credible track record in the fight against corruption and are helping to restore public trust in the rule of law. Yet SPAK’s results need to be sustained, and political commitment to the rule of law will increasingly be tested the deeper that investigations go.

Albania’s democracy also remains fragile and polarized. While the most recent parliamentary elections improved on earlier contests from an administrative standpoint, the political playing field continues to be uneven in favor of the ruling party. Corruption, the stifling effect of politics on media freedoms, the strength of organized crime, and weak administrative capacity—all persistent problems—could hinder the adoption of EU standards. 

Most importantly, the geopolitical mood in European capitals could easily shift away from its current support for enlargement. While Rama has secured strong political backing from major countries such as France and Italy, it is not clear whether it will receive support from the new government in Germany, which is not striking equally enthusiastic tones. The German government’s coalition agreement ties enlargement to necessary internal EU institutional reforms, which means that the EU must first ensure it can operate effectively before allowing other countries in. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and his Christian Democrats seem to favor intermediate integration models—such as having the Western Balkans join the European Economic Area, or layering the EU into concentric circles of states with varying degrees of integration.

What’s more, getting EU governments to support accession is one thing; getting the support of EU members’ parliaments to ratify accession is another. European public opinion remains wary of enlargement in several countries.

Race to the top

The prospect of Albania and Montenegro joining the EU ahead of their neighbors also raises pressing regional questions. With the rapid pace at which Albania is opening negotiation chapters, it has effectively leapfrogged over the region’s largest country, Serbia, whose accession talks have remained frozen since 2021.

For the Western Balkans, EU enlargement has functioned not only as a tool for political transformation but also for peacebuilding. The EU has long pursued a strategy of integrating the region as a group, using accession as leverage to foster regional stability, set up bilateral formats to resolve bilateral disputes—such as the Kosovo–Serbia dialogue on normalization of relations—and promote cooperation through initiatives like the Common Regional Market.

Critics may warn that Albania and Montenegro advancing alone could reinforce Serbia’s narrative of marginalization, fuel anti-EU sentiment, and undermine frameworks for regional cooperation—especially given Serbia’s pivotal role and the size of its population. But the long-standing Serbia-centric approach to enlargement—which posits that the region cannot move forward without accommodating Serbia due to its power and influence over other countries—has not worked. Rather, it has merely emboldened Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić to wield even greater de facto veto power and leverage over regional countries and their EU trajectory, even as he slips deeper into authoritarianism, sustains close ties with Russia, and has helped erode support for EU accession among Serbians.

The EU—and Serbia itself—might be better served by fostering a merit-based “race to the top” that either rewards or fails Montenegro and Albania depending on how they deliver on reforms. Demonstrating that EU enlargement remains a real and attainable goal could create the kind of positive societal pressure the region has desperately needed and could incentivize other EU candidate countries to seize this historic window of opportunity by embracing an agenda of reforms.

Agon Maliqi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is a political and foreign policy analyst from Pristina, Kosovo.  

***

The Western Balkans stands at the nexus of many of Europe’s critical challenges. Some, if not all, of the countries of the region may soon join the European Union and shape the bloc’s ability to become a more effective geopolitical player. At the same time, longstanding disputes in the region, coupled with institutional weaknesses, will continue to pose problems and present a security vulnerability for NATO that could be exploited by Russia or China. The region is also a transit route for westward migration, a source of critical raw materials, and an important node in energy and trade routes. The BalkansForward column will explore the key strategic dynamics in the region and how they intersect with broader European and transatlantic goals.

The post Are Albania and Montenegro on the fast track to EU membership? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Ukraine is currently fighting for national survival against Russia’s ongoing invasion. Once this battle is won, the most important challenge facing the country will be judicial reform. If Ukraine is to emerge in the postwar years as a stable and prosperous European democracy, the process of recovery and renewal must be based on the firm foundations of a strong justice system. This is not a mere slogan; it is an absolute necessity.

Judicial reform is the key to the country’s entire future economic development. Investors will not come to Ukraine if contracts cannot be enforced or if property rights can be bought and sold through corruption. That is the message Ukraine’s international partners have been repeating consistently for many years. With the massive task of postwar rebuilding looming on the horizon, this message is now arguably truer than ever.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Once the war ends, Ukraine can expect to receive unprecedented international support as foreign governments seek to participate in what promises to be Europe’s largest reconstruction initiative since the years following World War II. While donor funding from partner countries is likely to be very significant, this will not be nearly enough to cover the estimated rebuilding price tag of around half a trillion US dollars. Instead, much of this money must come from the private sector. However, unless Ukraine has a transparent, reliable, and efficient justice system, private capital will stay away.

If Ukraine hopes to become a success story, it needs courts that can settle disputes fairly, whatever the issue. If legal cases are tainted by bias or drag on for years, this will serve as a major red flag to all potential investors. For this reason, Ukraine’s courts should be recognized as a key element of the country’s infrastructure that is every bit as vital to national recovery as roads or power lines. After all, the justice system serves as the legal framework that makes it possible to build everything else.

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Despite the ongoing war, Ukraine has made real progress in recent years toward meaningful judicial reform. This has included the reform of key institutions like the High Court of Justice, along with the launch of new processes to improve the selection of Constitutional Court judges. It is now crucial to build on this momentum.

Judicial reform must be deep, deliberate, and closely tied to Ukraine’s European future. With this in mind, it is important to maintain the current dialogue with the Venice Commission and use its recommendations to shape genuine change. One of the most effective tools to help achieve this change is the participation of international experts. Their role is not to control the process, but rather to help ensure fairness, transparency, and accountability.

As Ukraine looks to create the conditions for national reconstruction, one judicial reform initiative currently being backed by the Ukrainian parliament is the creation of specialized courts to handle issues like land rights and construction disputes. These courts could help speed up vital cases and take pressure off the existing judicial system.

Work is also continuing toward greater digitalization within the justice system, from electronic courts to online case tracking. Much more can be done in this direction. Other tech savvy countries such as Estonia and Singapore are currently leading the way in digital justice. Ukraine can build something just as bold using tools like blockchain and AI. The expanded use of technology can improve the efficiency of Ukraine’s courts, while also boosting trust levels and leading to greater transparency.

Creating a fully functioning and internationally credible justice system is the necessary starting point for everything else Ukrainians want to achieve, from economic strength and prosperity to the rule of law and a greater sense of national security. It can encourage investors to bet on Ukraine, and can help persuade Ukrainians currently living abroad to return home. Ultimately, judicial reform can serve as a national anchor confirming Ukraine’s place in the heart of Europe.

Amid the horror and the trauma of Russia’s ongoing invasion, Ukrainians now have a once-in-a-generation opportunity to achieve transformational change in the country’s justice system. We must not miss this chance.

Oleksandr Vasiuk is a member of the Ukrainian parliament for the Servant of the People party and head of the Ukraine-USA Strategic Partnership cross-party association.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 8, 2025

Russia’s coming summer offensive could be deadliest of the entire war

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As the US-led peace initiative continues to falter, the unfolding summer campaigning season in Ukraine promises to be among the bloodiest of the entire war, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

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Putin aims to destroy Ukraine and has zero interest in a compromise peace

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Russia’s ongoing campaign to destroy Ukraine as a state and as a nation is taking place in front of the watching world and makes a complete mockery of US-led efforts to broker some kind of compromise peace, writes Peter Dickinson.

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Drone superpower: Ukrainian wartime innovation offers lessons for NATO

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Today’s Ukraine is now a drone superpower with an innovative domestic defense industry that can provide its NATO allies with important lessons in the realities of twenty-first century warfare, writes David Kirichenko.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Judicial reform must be at the heart of Ukraine’s postwar recovery appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The European Union (EU) Growth Plan for the Western Balkans aims to integrate the region into the EU single market, enhance regional cooperation, implement significant governance and rule of law reforms, and boost EU financial support. In doing so, the EU seeks to foster economic development, political stability, and security in the region amid rising geopolitical tensions, while accelerating the Western Balkans’ EU accession process.

The Growth Plan holds substantial potential to reinvigorate the enlargement process and counter the stagnation felt by both the EU and the region. Strong points include:

• Tangible benefits before full accession: Providing stronger incentives for reform.
• Active involvement of regional governments: Increasing buy-in from local leaders, who must submit their own reform agendas.
• Enhanced economic integration, greater access to the EU market, increased EU funding, and reforms to governance and the rule of law: Stimulating investment, promoting economic growth, and raising living standards.

These improvements would bring the Western Balkans closer to the economic success seen in the Central and Eastern European countries in the EU over the past two decades. Moreover, fostering deeper regional cooperation will not only deliver an economic boost but also contribute to political normalization. If successful, the plan will bolster the EU’s political influence in the region, countering the impact of external actors and encouraging much-needed nearshoring investment from EU firms.

However, the plan faces several challenges:

• Enforceability: Although conditionality is rigorous, with disbursement of funds tied to strict conditions to prevent misuse, there are concerns regarding its enforceability. The European Court of Auditors has already raised reservations.
• Quantity: Additionally, the financial support offered is significantly lower than what EU member states in Southeast Europe receive. The reforms required for fund access and single market integration are substantial and will demand significant political will and institutional capacity—both of which have been lacking in the region at times over the past two decades.

The success of the growth plan will largely depend on its implementation. The EU must ensure rigorous enforcement of conditionality, reward positive reform steps, and increase funding for countries making progress. Civil society in the Western Balkans should be engaged as much as possible to foster broader support and transparency. The EU should also leverage the plan to align with its broader geopolitical and geoeconomic interests, particularly in strengthening its strategic autonomy. Additionally, the Growth Plan should be fully integrated with the EU’s competitiveness, green, and digital transition agendas. For their part, Western Balkans leaders should seize the increased agency provided by the plan. They must take ownership of the reforms they propose, participate actively in EU meetings, and design their reform agendas to deliver better living standards and deeper EU integration for their populations.

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The post The European Union Growth Plan for the Western Balkans: A reality test for EU enlargement appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The new Syrian leadership and its supporters have pushed for sanctions relief to help rebuild from the rubble of more than a decade of civil war—accompanied by promises of establishing a more free and tolerant Syria. But skepticism remains regarding al-Sharaa’s past links to al-Qaeda and communal massacres against minority groups that have taken place since he came to power.  

How will the removal of US sanctions affect Syria’s economy and future US-Syria relations? And what are the wider implications for the region? Our experts offer their insights below.  

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Qutaiba Idlbi: This is an opportunity to secure a long-term US strategic victory in the region 

Kirsten Fontenrose: Watch for a Saudi-Syria deal, Russia’s renewed presence, and Iran’s next moves

Daniel B. Shapiro: Trump is making a smart gamble, Congress should back him up

Sarah Zaaimi: A US carte blanche to al-Sharaa may lead to sectarian backsliding

Thomas S. Warrick: Trump has made clear that he is listening to Arab leaders

Amany Qaddour: Now is the time to move beyond politicizing aid

Alan Pino: A clear signal to Iran

Kimberly Donovan: Lifting the complex Syrian sanctions regime will require careful strategy

Celeste Kmiotek: Bashar al-Assad must be held accountable\

Maia Nikoladze: This move aligns US Syria sanctions policy with the EU and UK 

Ömer Özkizilcik: This represents a diplomatic success for Saudi Arabia and Turkey

Sinan Hatahet: Engagement must go beyond sanctions relief

Diana Rayes: A critical reprieve for Syrians everywhere   

Elise Baker: Now is the time to establish the Syria Victims Fund

Lize de Kruijf: Without meaningful financial support, the US risks ceding influence in Syria 

This is an opportunity to secure a long-term US strategic victory in the region

Trump’s decision to lift US sanctions on Syria is a pivotal shift that could define his legacy in the Middle East. The move signals an opportunity to secure a long-term US victory in Syria by stabilizing the region, countering rivals such as Russia and China, and opening economic opportunities for US businesses. 

Trump has long portrayed himself as a dealmaker, and his record on Syria supports that image. Unlike the Obama and Biden administrations, Trump responded decisively to al-Assad’s chemical weapon attacks in 2017 and 2018, launched airstrikes to deter further atrocities, and cooperated with Turkey in 2020 to halt the Assad regime’s and Russia’s assault on Idlib. He also signed the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, which crippled the Assad regime financially, leading to its fall last December. Now, however, those same sanctions are undermining the prospects of Syria’s new post-Assad regime government, which is attempting to rebuild and distance itself from Iranian and Russian influence. 

The current sanctions are weakening a new government that seeks US and Gulf support. If these sanctions were to stay in place, Syria’s economy would remain in free fall, making it increasingly reliant on Russia, China, and Iran. This would open the door to renewed extremism, regional instability, and the resurgence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Lifting sanctions will allow US companies to compete with Chinese firms for contracts in Syria’s expected $400 billion reconstruction effort. It will also enable Trump to leverage Gulf funding, create jobs in both Syria and the United States, and demonstrate Washington’s role as a stabilizing force. A prosperous Syria would reduce refugee flows, weaken Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and eliminate Syria as a threat to Israel—a country with which the new Syrian leadership seeks peaceful relations. 

The new Syrian government is not without flaws, but it has made pragmatic moves. It started reintegrating territories with the Syrian Democratic Forces, cracked down on drug trafficking, made efforts aimed at protecting minorities, and distanced itself from Hezbollah and Iranian forces. These steps show a willingness to cooperate with the West and align with its goal of regional stability. If Trump follows through, he could secure a rare bipartisan win, outmaneuver Russia, and reshape the future of Syria in a way that serves US interests and regional peace. 

—Qutaiba Idlbi is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs where he leads the Council’s work on Syria. 

Watch for a Saudi-Syria deal, Russia’s renewed presence, and Iran’s next moves

I am hearing that the lifting of US sanctions on Syria took some members of Trump’s own administration by surprise. Since January, Syria has been a counterterrorism file, not a political one. Al-Sharaa received a list of milestones from the US administration this spring, and meeting these would have meant a gradual rollback of sanctions. So this sudden lifting must feel like a new lease on life for the Syrian ruler.

But this sudden decision to lift sanctions should not be interpreted as a sign that the United States is making Syria a priority. In fact, it indicates the opposite. Both Saudi leader Mohammad bin Salman and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will have had to promise Trump that they will hold al-Sharaa accountable and will shoulder the burden of reconstruction. The United States has never colonized or invaded Syria, and the United States committed a lot of manpower and funding into supporting opposition to al-Assad under the first Trump administration. It is hard to make an argument that the United States has any obligation to fund Syria’s reconstruction. That responsibility will fall to those who pressed Trump to lift sanctions. 

Going forward, there are three things to watch:   

One, watch for Saudi Arabia’s deal with al-Sharaa. He will owe them big time for making this happen. (Erdogan will argue that he is owed as well, having greased the skids on a phone call with Trump just before his meetings in Riyadh.) Expect Saudi Arabia to require that foreign fighters be ejected from senior government roles and demand that Iran is kept out of Syria. Look for Saudi companies to be granted the contracts to undertake reconstruction projects in Syria, an easy give for al-Sharaa and a no-brainer in this situation. 

Two, for Europe especially, watch Russia. Moscow may find it easier to establish its interests in Syria now. Saudi Arabia and Israel will see a Russian presence as a way of counterbalancing Turkey’s influence in Syria.

Three, watch for shifts in Iran’s foreign policy. Syria is now proof that Trump will in fact lift sanctions under certain conditions—if your leadership promises to change its stripes and favored foreign partners vouch for you. Expect to see a charm offensive by Tehran.

— Kirsten Fontenrose is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. Previously, she was the senior director for the Gulf at the National Security Council during the first Trump administration, leading the development of US policy toward nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Yemen, Egypt, and Jordan.

Trump is making a smart gamble

Trump’s announcement that he will provide sanctions relief to Syria is a gamble, but it is the right one. The collapse of the Assad regime, whose brutality, misrule, and collaboration with malevolent regional actors destroyed Syria, has given long-suffering Syrians a chance to build a different future. 

The road to recovery will not be an easy one. Many are rightly suspicious of Syria’s new acting president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and others in his Hayat Tahrir al-Sham movement, due to their violent jihadist past. As one cannot look inside another’s soul, it is unknown if they have truly shed their extremist ideology amid a rebranding since coming to power in December. 

What can be judged are actions. So far, al-Sharaa has said and done many of things Western and Arab nations have called for. He is making efforts to be inclusive, including appointing women and minorities into his cabinet. He says strict Sharia law will not be imposed. He has begun negotiations with the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces on their peaceful integration into Syrian national institutions. He claims to want Syria to pose no threat to any of its neighbors, including Israel, and he wants to keep Iran from re-establishing influence in Syria. He is aligning himself with moderate Arab states and US partners like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 

These words and actions must be tested and verified over time. But to have any chance to succeed in stabilizing Syria, the new government needs resources to make the economy function. Reconstruction and resettlement of refugees, not to mention restoring services disrupted by years of civil war, will be expensive. Without a significant measure of US sanctions relief, none of this is possible. It would nearly guarantee Syria’s descent back into chaos and provide fertile ground for extremists. 

Congress should work with Trump on crafting sanctions relief such that, if necessary, sanctions can be restored. But Trump is right to seize this opportunity. 

—Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. From 2022 to 2023, he was the Director of the N7 Initiative. He has previously served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East and as US ambassador to Israel.

A US carte blanche to al-Sharaa may lead to sectarian backsliding 

Lifting sanctions presents a tremendous opportunity to revitalize the Syrian economy and provide a genuine chance for the al-Sharaa government to implement the vision for social unity it has advocated since December. However, the United States should make sure not to give carte blanche to the new Syrian regime and lose all of its leverage over a ruler who has only recently self-reformed from a dangerous radical ideology, especially when it comes to managing ethnic and religious diversity. 

Al-Sharaa has publicly and repeatedly pledged to build a nation for all Syrians, regardless of their identities. He also appointed a Christian woman to his newly announced government and welcomed a delegation of Jewish religious officials to return for the first time since their synagogue was closed back in the 1990s. Still, his first five months in power have also been marked by violent confrontations with certain religious minorities and the ascension to power of foreign fighters with questionable pasts. Back in March, over one thousand Alawites were killed in a violent crackdown on the minority’s stronghold on the Syrian coast. Meanwhile, the Druze remain divided, and many refuse to turn in their arms, fearing the escalation of sectarian tensions. 

Similarly, many other sects remain anxious about their future, including Christians and Twelver Shia, who saw the lowering of the Sayeda Zainab flag—a revered pilgrimage site on the outskirts of Damascus—as a sign of the prevalence of a monochrome orthodox version of Islam. Another worrying signal was the sweeping authority provided to the presidency in the new Syrian constitution, which also excluded mention of minority rights and societal diversity, making Islam the only supreme law of the land. 

Al-Sharaa and his entourage have a historic chance to start anew and build a plural and inclusive Syria for all its citizens. Until then, Washington and its allies should continue monitoring the state of minorities in this complex sociocultural context and signal to the new lords of the land that lifting sanctions is a provisional chance and not an unconditional license to lead Damascus into another sectarian spiral.   

—Sarah Zaaimi is a resident senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs, focusing on minorities and cultural hybridity. She is also the center’s deputy director for media and communications. 

Trump has made clear that he is listening to Arab leaders 

No one can say that Trump does not listen to Arab leaders—clearly, he does. Arab leaders were united in telling Trump and his administration that the United States should lift sanctions against Syria to help move the country toward peace with all its neighbors. 

Officials in the Trump administration had different views on how to respond to al-Sharaa’s statements calling for peace with Syria’s neighbors and openness to the West. But no one expected Trump to announce the lifting of sanctions on this trip. As recently as April 25, a senior administration official said that the new Syrian government needed to combat terrorism, prevent Iran from regaining influence in Syria, expel foreign fighters from Syria’s government and security apparatus, destroy all chemical weapons, adopt nonaggression policies toward all neighboring countries, and clear up the fate of missing American Austin Tice. “We will consider sanctions relief, provided the interim authorities take demonstrable steps in the directions that I have articulated,” he said. “We want Syria to have a second chance.” 

On March 20, I and other US experts on the Middle East called for Syria to express interest in joining the Abraham Accords. I think that al-Sharaa’s April 19 offer to discuss joining the Abraham Accords did exactly what it needed to do: It broke through to get Trump’s attention. 

Trump is now willing to give Syria a second chance. Sanctions against terrorist groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which brought al-Sharaa to power (with support from Turkey), are likely to remain in place. Syria needs to make substantive progress on sidelining extremists within al-Sharaa’s ranks and engaging in serious talks (either direct or indirect) with Israel that could eventually lead to joining the Abraham Accords. Trump could change his mind tomorrow, but for now, it is clear Trump is listening. 

—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security. 

Now is the time to move beyond politicizing aid

What a monumental shift for Syria—one of the most significant since the December fall of the Assad regime.  

Having just returned recently from the country, I could clearly see that the humanitarian situation has stagnated. The Trump administration’s massive US Agency for International Development (USAID) cuts—amid already dwindling funds for Syria—have had a catastrophic impact. The soul-crushing sight of destroyed buildings across the country as a result of the regime’s brutality was still visible in so many of the previously besieged areas like Douma and Harista of Eastern Ghouta. The Assad regime’s deprivation, oppression, and collective punishment of millions has left the country in a state of decay.  

In my view as a humanitarian and public health practitioner, sanctions have been one of the most critical hindrances to early recovery. Syria’s health sector is decimated after over a decade of destruction to critical civilian infrastructure like hospitals and clinics—not to mention schools and marketplaces— from aerial attacks by the regime and its allies.  

As long as sanctions are in place against the new government in Syria, the recovery of the country is impossible, and civilians will continue to the pay the price, just as they did under the Assad regime. Beyond the need for Syria’s early recovery and reconstruction from a physical infrastructure standpoint, the country needs to heal. This is an opportune moment to capitalize on this shift. The politicization of aid throughout the entirety of conflict has translated to the suffering of millions. Now is the time to move beyond that politicization of aid and recovery efforts and give Syrians the chance to start the healing process. Lifting sanctions will allow for that and bring Syria back from being a pariah state. 

—Amany Qaddour is a nonresident senior fellow for the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She is also the director of the 501(c)(3) humanitarian nongovernmental organization Syria Relief & Development. 

A clear signal to Iran

Trump’s decision to lift economic sanctions on Syria provides a needed lifeline to Syria’s struggling economy, aligns Washington’s Syria policy with that of regional Arab powers, and pointedly signals a determination to prevent Iran from rebuilding its presence and influence in this key country. 

Popular unrest—including increasing criticism of al-Sharaa and his new government—has been growing in Syria over the poor economy and living conditions as the country attempts to recover from over a decade of civil war. The lifting of US sanctions opens the way for an infusion of regional and international aid, investment, and expertise to help the al-Sharaa government begin rebuilding the country and heading off the political instability that could otherwise arise. 

Removing sanctions also shows US support for efforts by Washington’s Arab partners in the Gulf, Egypt, and Jordan to reintegrate Syria into the moderate Arab fold after decades of alignment with Iran.  The controversy over the invitation of al-Sharaa to the Arab Summit in Baghdad because of his and his follower’s past ties to al-Qaeda makes clear that Syrian reintegration will need to proceed slowly, based on a demonstrated commitment to eschew all ties to terrorism and apply equal justice to all minorities in Syria. 

Finally, Trump’s decision to lift sanctions on Syria puts down a marker that Washington is not only determined to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, but to check Iranian efforts to try to restore its badly weakened resistance axis aimed at threatening Israel and wider reigonal domination. 
 
—Alan Pino is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. 

Lifting the complex Syrian sanctions regime will require careful strategy

Trump’s announcement in Riyadh that the United States will end sanctions on Syria is a major foreign policy shift. Lifting sanctions on Syria is complicated and will require strategy to determine which sanctions to pull down and when, as well as what measures implement to enable the snap-back of sanctions should the situation in Syria deteriorate. 

Syria has been on the US state sponsor of terrorism list since 1979 and is subject to sanctions and export controls pursuant to numerous executive orders and legislation for a range of issues including human rights abuses, smuggling Iranian oil, and supporting terrorist groups. A further complicating factor is that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which overthrew the Assad regime, is leading the interim Syrian government. HTS, formerly known as al-Nusrah Front and once al-Qaeda’s arm in Syria, is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, Canada, and other governments. HTS is also designated as a terrorist group by the United Nations (UN), a designation that all UN member states must comply with, including the United States. The UN designation of HTS and al-Sharaa include an asset freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo. 

Trump’s announcement is a welcome shift in US foreign policy. The Syrian government and the Syrian people will need sanctions lifted to have a chance of rebuilding the country. This is a delicate and complicated situation on top of a complex sanctions regime. To move forward with this shift in foreign policy, as a next step, the United States will need to consider which sanctions it is willing to lift on Syria to meet specific goals and it will need to start engaging with the United Nations to consider if and how sanctions should be lifted on HTS. 

—Kimberly Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. She previously served in the federal government for fifteen years, most recently as the acting associate director of the Treasury Department Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s Intelligence Division. 

Bashar al-Assad must be held accountable 

Trump’s removal of sanctions on Syria is a welcome development. As many organizations have argued, while the sanctions were a tool meant to influence Bashar al-Assad and his regime, they instead became a tool “to punish the Syrian people and hinder reconstruction, humanitarian aid, and prospects of economic recovery.” 

However, from the information available, it is unclear how the United States will approach targeted sanctions designating individuals and entities for human rights abuses under executive orders related to Syria (as opposed to broad-based sectoral sanctions). While these designations, too, must be lifted when an individual no longer meets the relevant criteria, this does not mean that Washington should embrace impunity. Namely, the US must not allow al-Assad and his allies who have been designated for serious violations of human rights to walk away without consequences. While al-Assad may have fled Syria, he has yet to provide redress for a “horrifying catalogue of human rights violations that caused untold human suffering on a vast scale.” 

Lifting targeted sanctions could allow al-Assad, for example, to enter the United States, to access previously frozen US assets, and to engage in transactions involving the US dollar. Instead, Washington could pursue targeted designations under other relevant programs, such as the Global Magnitsky program for serious human rights abuse. The Trump administration could additionally use this moment as an opportunity to re-commit Washington to pursuing domestic criminal accountability for atrocities in Syria and other accountability avenues.  

—Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

This move aligns US Syria sanctions policy with the EU and UK

Trump’s announcement on lifting Syria sanctions is a surprising and welcome alignment of Washington’s sanctions strategy with that of the European Union (EU) and United Kingdom. European officials have been calling on Washington to remove sanctions on Syria because multinational companies and large banks will not enter the Syrian market as long as US secondary sanctions remain in place.  

While the specifics of the US sanctions removal plan are yet unknown, Washington should use the EU and UK sanctions-lifting playbook. In February, the European Council announced that the EU would lift sectoral sanctions on Syria’s energy and transport sectors, delist four Syrian banks, and ease restrictions on the Syrian central bank. However, EU sanctions against the Assad regime, the chemical weapons sector, and the illicit drug trade, as well as sectoral measures on arms trade and dual-use goods, will remain in place. Last month, the United Kingdom followed suit and lifted sanctions on the Syrian central bank and twenty-three other entities. Like the EU, the United Kingdom still maintains sanctions on members of the Assad regime and those involved in the illicit drug trade.  

Washington should replicate the EU’s and United Kingdom’s gradual approach to lifting sanctions. This means starting with the finance and energy sectors to create a favorable environment for multinational companies to enter the Syrian market. At the same time, the United States should promote the dollarization of the Syrian economy, provide financial assistance, and help the Syrian government establish regulatory oversight to prevent the diversion of funds from reconstruction efforts. 

—Maia Nikoladze is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Economic Statecraft Initiative within the GeoEconomics Center. 

This represents a diplomatic success for Saudi Arabia and Turkey

Trump’s decision to lift all sanctions on Syria carries profound significance for the Syrian people. It offers them a genuine opportunity to rebuild their country and begin the process of recovery. While the sanctions were originally enacted with the intent of protecting civilians and deterring the Assad regime from further war crimes, over time—especially following al-Assad’s fall—they became a major hindrance, primarily harming ordinary Syrians. 

Yet, beyond its humanitarian implications, this move also marks a geopolitical win for the United States. By removing sanctions, Washington enables its allies to invest in Syria, preventing Damascus’s potential reliance on China and Russia, both of which could potentially circumvent sanctions to gain influence. This declaration by Trump should not merely be viewed as a lifting of punitive measures; it is also the first step toward formally recognizing the interim Syrian authorities as the legitimate government of Syria. 

Regionally, the end of sanctions represents a diplomatic success for Saudi Arabia and Turkey. As the principal supporters of the new Syrian government, both nations worked in tandem to persuade the Trump administration to shift its stance—initially marked by hesitation—toward greater engagement with Syria’s new leadership. Their coordinated diplomatic efforts played a pivotal role in shaping this policy reversal. 

This shared success could also pave the way for deeper regional collaboration between Riyadh and Ankara, highlighting the potential of US allies in the region when they act in concert. Syria is slowly but steadily turning from a regional conflict zone into a zone of regional cooperation. 

—Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is an Ankara-based analyst of Turkish foreign policy, counterterrorism, and military affairs. 

Engagement must go beyond sanctions relief

Washington’s decision to lift its sanctions on Syria emerges within a geopolitical context marked by unprecedented regional alignment around the newly formed Syrian government, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa. This government has uniquely achieved consensus among historically divergent regional powers, long characterized by strategic competition over regional hegemony. Al-Sharaa’s administration has been credited with fostering this consensus through a national vision, closely aligned with regional objectives aimed at overall stability, collective benefit, and cooperation, rather than the zero-sum dynamics that al-Assad used to impose on his direct and indirect neighborhood. 

However, two regional actors remain notably wary despite the broader regional consensus. Iran—an ally of the ousted Assad regime—views the consolidation of authority by the current government in Damascus as potentially adverse, perceiving it as a direct challenge to its strategic and security interests in the Levant. Israel, similarly, remains skeptical due to ongoing security concerns and its direct military involvement within Syrian territory. 

From a practical standpoint, lifting sanctions must be matched by corresponding bureaucratic agility. This includes swift administrative measures that enable Syrian public and private institutions to comply with international legal frameworks effectively. The cessation of sanctions should not only be a political gesture but also a procedural and institutional reality. To achieve this, regional governments alongside European and US counterparts, must proactively facilitate knowledge transfer, reduce procedural hurdles, and accelerate essential reforms. Such reforms represent a fundamental prerequisite to ensuring that the lifting of sanctions translates into tangible economic and political progress for Syria. 

—Sinan Hatahet is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the vice president for investment and social impact at the Syrian Forum. 

A critical reprieve for Syrians everywhere

This policy shift has already brought what feels like a collective sigh of relief for a population weighed down by a humanitarian and development crisis. Today, the majority of Syrians live below the poverty line. More than 3.7 million children in Syria are out of school—including over half of school-age children. Only 57 percent of the country’s hospitals, including only 37 percent of primary health care facilities, are fully operational Despite widespread need, humanitarian aid is lacking—largely exacerbated the Trump administration’s now-dropped sanctions and its enduring foreign aid cuts.   

Sanctions relief is a critical first step in stabilizing essential systems, particularly the health sector, which the Syrian government has identified as a national priority. It will help restore access to essential medicines, supplies, and equipment. This shift will also unlock broader international investment, encouraging governments and private sector actors to reengage in Syria as a key regional player. Infrastructure firms, pharmaceutical companies, and development partners that have long been on standby now have an opportunity to support early recovery and rebuild systems that sustain daily life. 

This policy change is also seismic for Syrians who have been displaced for decades around the world. Supporting early recovery efforts through sanctions relief will enable safe and voluntary returns while contributing to broader regional stability, and countries hosting Syrian refugees should follow Trump’s lead.  

—Diana Rayes is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She is currently a postdoctoral associate at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. 

Now is the time to establish the Syria Victims Fund

With the downfall of the Assad regime, sanctions imposed “to deprive the regime of the resources it needs to continue violence against civilians and to pressure the Syrian regime to allow for a democratic transition as the Syrian people demand” are no longer appropriate, and are in fact hindering much needed rebuilding and recovery in Syria. But lifting sanctions alone is not enough. 

Over the past fourteen years, the United States and other Western countries have been profiting from enforcing sanctions against Syria. Where companies and individuals have violated Syria sanctions, the United States and other countries have taken enforcement action, levying fines, penalties, and forfeitures in response. The proceeds are then directed to domestic purposes, with none of the recovery benefitting Syrians. 

Now is the time to change this policy. Syria is finally ready for rebuilding and recovery, refugees are returning, and victim and survivor communities are beginning to heal. In addition to lifting sanctions on Syria, the United States and other countries should direct the proceeds from their past and future sanctions enforcement to benefit the Syrian people and help victim and survivor communities recover. This can be done by listening to the calls from Syrian civil society and establishing an intergovernmental Syria Victims Fund, which the European Parliament has endorsed. 

—Elise Baker is a senior staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project. She provides legal support to the project, which seeks to include legal tools in foreign policy, with a focus on prevention and accountability efforts for atrocity crimes, human-rights violations, terrorism, and corruption offenses. 

Without meaningful financial support, the US risks ceding influence in Syria 

The United States lifting sanctions on Syria is a necessary first step, but it is not enough to unlock the meaningful foreign investment that Syria needs for its recovery and reconstruction. After years of conflict and isolation, Syria needs more than an open economy—it must rebuild trust and demonstrate long-term stability. Investors will not return simply because sanctions have been lifted—they need assurances of stability, legal protections, and clear signals from the international community. 

Private investors often follow the lead of governments and multilateral institutions. Countries that receive significant foreign aid post-conflict also tend to attract more private capital. Europe and the United Nations have begun developing a positive economic statecraft approach, pledging billions in grants and concessional loans to support Syria’s recovery. However, the United States has yet to commit financial support this year, citing expectations that others will shoulder the burden. This creates a leadership vacuum and leaves space for geopolitical rivals to step in. 

Countries including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Russia, and China have already begun doing so, rapidly expanding their influence in Syria through investments in oil, gas, infrastructure, reconstruction projects, and paying off Syria’s World Bank debt. In exchange for financial support, they are gaining access to strategic sectors that will shape Syria’s future—and the broader dynamics of the region. If the United States is absent from Syria’s recovery, its risks ceding long-term influence to adversaries.  

Reconstruction is not only a humanitarian imperative—it is a strategic opportunity. The lifting of sanctions opens a door, but a coordinated positive economic statecraft response—including tools like World Bank risk guarantees and US development finance—is necessary to ensure Syria’s recovery aligns with broader international interests.

—Lize de Kruijf  is a project assistant with the Economic Statecraft Initiative.

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With Trump now scheduled to visit Saudi Arabia next month, the issue of normalization is certain to be on the agenda. There are three reasons why Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s principal decisionmaker, should make full Palestinian statehood part of the asking price for normalizing relations with Israel. First, many Saudis and other Arabs throughout the region may look askance at bin Salman if he were to be seen as ignoring the Palestinians’ plight. Second, if he pulls it off, he will have succeeded where other, more celebrated Arab leaders failed. And finally, the longer the issue remains unresolved, the more it will continue to impede progress on Saudi and regional priorities.

Then and now

Before the Gaza war began in October 2023, Riyadh may have been close to an agreement on official diplomatic relations with Israel without the precondition of a Palestinian state. But Israel’s punishing assault on the Gaza Strip, after Hamas’s rampage through southern Israel on October 7, 2023, seems to have changed Saudi thinking. Speaking at an Arab League summit last year, bin Salman called the Israeli military campaign in Gaza “genocide.” And in a speech in September, he indicated that Saudi Arabia would not establish relations with Israel without the creation of a Palestinian state.

Although Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has sought diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia in an effort to develop contacts across the Muslim world, he remains staunchly opposed to a Palestinian state. In 2021, Netanyahu described the Abraham Accords—Israel’s normalization agreements with Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Sudan, and Morocco—as enabling Israel to replace “the old and dangerous doctrine of territories in exchange for peace and brought peace in exchange for peace, without giving up a single inch.” 

Past failures

The term “pathway” to Palestinian statehood joins a variety of other phrases from past peace plans that included an unfulfilled Palestinian component. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat believed that he had secured “autonomy” for the Palestinians when he signed Cairo’s 1979 peace treaty with Israel. Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat believed he was gaining Palestinian “self-government” when he signed the 1993 Declaration of Principles. Jordanian King Hussein bin Talal agreed to the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty only after he was convinced the Palestinians had gained a “political horizon”—the derisory catchphrase of the Oslo process.

However, Palestinians’ autonomy, self-government, political horizon, independence, or peace with Israel never materialized; extremists on both sides undermined the deeply flawed Oslo process and subsequent negotiations. After 1994, further Israeli treaties with Arab countries did not materialize until the 2020 Abraham Accords, purchased for Israel by US concessions to the Arab signatories and conspicuously silent on the resolution of the Palestinian issue. Arab participants saw the Abraham Accords as a means to receive concrete US commitments.

When the UAE signed the first Abraham Accord in September 2020, it was primarily to gain participation in the US F-35 fighter program and access to US armed Reaper drones, over Israeli objections, as well as the understanding that Washington would prevent Israel from annexing portions of the West Bank, which Jerusalem was about to do. In exchange for their respective normalization deals with Israel, the United States recognized Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara and removed Sudan from its list of state sponsors of terrorism.

Saudi considerations

Saudi Arabia is now setting its own price for an agreement. However, bin Salman should take note of two features of past Arab agreements with Israel. First, Israel has never entered into any agreement that explicitly called for Palestinian statehood. In fact, some pro-Israel observers in Washington are trying to identify a “rhetorical formula” that would satisfy Saudi demands without committing Israel to a Palestinian state. Second, the United States, despite its stated desire for a resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, has never pressured Israel on Palestinian statehood, limiting itself to hollow rhetoric about supporting a two-state outcome.

Bin Salman reportedly told US leaders that he cares little for the Palestinians and does not want the issue to impede plans to diversify the Saudi economy or to discourage Iranian threats to his realm. However, the Gaza war—which has left over fifty thousand Palestinians dead, including tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians, televised in bloody detail by Al Jazeera, may have forced a change in bin Salman’s calculus about what is politically realistic. “Seventy percent of my population is younger than me,” the thirty-nine-year old crown prince reportedly told then US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in 2024. “For most of them, they never really knew much about the Palestinian issue. And so they’re being introduced to it for the first time through this conflict.” An Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS) poll conducted in Saudi Arabia and published in February 2024 indicates that the share of the Saudi population opposed to normalization with Israel grew from 38 percent in 2022 to 68 percent in 2024.

The Trump administration may insist that Saudi Arabia relax its demand for a Palestinian state prior to a normalization deal, possibly by emphasizing other benefits bin Salman can expect. Also, the administration may, as Trump attempted in his first term, designate Palestinian municipal control of islands of Palestinian communities on the West Bank as a “state” and demand that bin Salman accept it as such.

But if bin Salman makes peace with Israel without a Palestinian state that most of his citizens believe to be credible, any Israeli action against the Palestinians, or other Arabs, will be his to justify. For example, in Gaza, apart from the high casualty numbers, massive infrastructure destruction, and the dislocation of 90 percent of the strip’s population, a United Nations Human Rights Commission report published last month states that sexual violence has become “standard operating procedure toward Palestinians” in the Gaza conflict and is “committed either under explicit orders or with implicit encouragement by Israel’s top civilian and military leadership.” This is the very leadership with which bin Salman would be reaching a normalization agreement.

Additionally, Israeli violence directed at West Bank Palestinians is growing. This has included assaults from Israeli settlers, the destruction of property, and expulsions, not to mention Israeli military offensives, in which Palestinian civilians are the inevitable victims. Bin Salman would also have to contend with Saudi public opinion regarding Israel’s capture of more Syrian territory, its strikes against Lebanese territory after a cease-fire has been concluded, and the increasing discussion of ethnic cleansing of Palestinians.

At present, bin Salman can comfortably join his people, regional Arabs, and the international community in condemning reported Israeli violations of the norms of war and peace. While other Arab regimes have survived peace with Israel, they did so despite the wishes of their populations, not because they made a convincing case for peace. The political risks of normalization are also exemplified by the assassination of Sadat by Islamic extremists, in part because of his perceived betrayal of Arab and Islamic causes in signing a peace agreement with Israel.

In last year’s ACRPS poll, the majority of respondents from countries whose governments have already signed agreements with Israel—including Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and Sudan—oppose their countries’ normalization with Israel. Other Arab countries such as Oman and Qatar, which have informal ties to Israel, continue to refuse normalization until Israel ends its occupation of Palestinian territories.

Bin Salman may be drawn to the idea that he can achieve something that past regional leaders like Sadat, Hussein, and Arafat, as well as current Arab leaders such as Muhammad bin Zayed of the UAE failed to accomplish. Demanding a Palestinian state may also be a means to distinguish himself from the Arab signatories of the other Abraham Accords, all of whom prioritized their respective national ambitions and did not press for progress on the Palestinian issue. Bin Salman must also consider the ability of regional malefactors such as Iran and radical Islamists to exploit the unresolved Palestinian issue to impede political, security, and economic progress for Saudi Arabia and the region. The ongoing Houthi campaign of attacks against Red Sea shipping, for example, would not be happening without the Gaza war, itself an extension of the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Costs and benefits

While Israel has legitimate security concerns, its continued occupation of Palestinian territories, its war in Gaza, and growing violence in the West Bank are creating a pronounced line in the sand between nations that have peace treaties with Israel and those withholding formal relations. While there are Arab governments on both sides of this line, their publics, including the Saudi people, are overwhelmingly opposed to normalization with Israel.

Bin Salman needs to weigh popular Saudi and other Arab views, as well as the regional instability that the continued Palestinian-Israeli conflict engenders, against any benefits he anticipates from a formal peace with Israel. Then, he needs to decide on which side the kingdom benefits most. If he were to settle for equivocal language about a “pathway,” as opposed to an actual state, the history of Arab-Israeli peacemaking suggests bin Salman would join Sadat, Arafat, Hussein, and others who failed to use their diplomatic leverage to press for Palestinian statehood.

Amir Asmar is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. 

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Understandably, many have focused on his policy and posture toward the state of Israel.

His final address on Easter Sunday was a capstone in a track record of advocacy for peace between the Israelis and Palestinians, including strong and direct statements. “Dramatic and deplorable” is how he described the living conditions in Gaza. The brutal massacre of the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip by the Israeli Defense Forces, which came almost at the conclusion of his Pontificate, had quite publicly saddened and pained him in a deep way.

Pundits and commentators have been quick in pointing out the silence coming from the office of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu since his death. President Isaac Herzog delivered a few comments, nice and positive, even if not particularly warm. The relationship between the first modern non-European Pope and the state of Israel has been contentious indeed.

The vocal standing behind the Palestinian plight—including multiple sermons on Gaza and near-daily calls with Gaza’s Christian leaders through the war—was the success of Franciscan values over a part of the Catholic Church which would have preferred a more nuanced, if not entirely favorable, position towards Israel.

Further, influential personalities like Monsignor Pierbattista Pizzaballa, the patriarch of Jerusalem, who offered himself in exchange for Hamas’s Israeli hostages in the aftermath of October 7, are a living testament to Pope Francis’ posture of opposition to the occupation of the Arab lands in Palestine.

But his legacy in the Middle East extends beyond Palestine. Bergoglio exerted influence in quite a few areas across the region.

Pope Francis exercised pressure on the European powers regarding the tragedy of the civil war in Syria and the horrors unleashed by the Islamic State. The concurrent efforts by the Church to protect and save as many members of the Church of the Levant as possible are noticeable and much appreciated—albeit not always successful.

In the wider Levant, his stance was coherently against the extremists of the Islamic State, the Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood and other similar organizations—whom he always saw as a danger to his vision of brotherly intent to take care of the world’s marginalized.

He was widely liked in the Emirates, with whom Pope Bergoglio understood the importance of positive relationships despite the abysmal record of the small emirates confederation in human rights and respect for pluralism. He understood the potential for success in diplomacy, negotiation, and public support that could arise for the Church if it sided with the Emiratis and their projection of growing global influence.

To summarize, Pope Francis’ policy in the Middle East and North Africa has been characterized by a wise combination of value-based policies and convenient stances, in line with the scope of the objectives the Pope set for his pastoral mission. 

However, the region is very diverse: ethnically, socially, culturally, and, obviously, religiously. This diversity—despite the frequent skirmishes and conflicts it has played a hand in sowing—has always been understood as the wealth of the region.  Trying to find a common denominator in reactions to Pope Francis’s policies, let alone the expectations of the new Pontiff, is difficult to define without risk of distorting the varied perspectives from the diverse threads of the region’s canopy.

It is possible to say that, at the popular level, the importance of the Catholic Pope is not as significant as in other parts of the world. After all, there are very few Catholics left in the Middle East.

Moving forward, answering the question of who constitutes the ruling elites of the Middle East—namely, those who hold political power and, in some cases, represent religious authority—is crucial to understanding regional expectations of the new Pope. 

For the region’s ruling elites, the Church’s spiritual component matters less, and its influence holds significance only as a political force. In this respect, the Church and its 2.2 billion followers become a heavyweight geopolitical actor, and as such, they treat it.

And there are indeed secular movements at play, particularly with respect to a growing conservatism among Catholics in Western world powers like the United States.

In the West, there is an ascent of right-wing movements that Pope Francis fiercely fought against, including populism, Islamophobia, and xenophobia.  But these emerging movements may be more in line with some of the region’s ruling powers.

Regional leaders, building on alliances with the new administration in Washington, for example, may indeed hope for the election of a conservative Pope, who could become an ally in maintaining and defending the values that Middle Eastern elites share with conservatives in the West.

Karim Mezran is the director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council, focusing on the processes of change in North Africa. 

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Tariffs will not be the focus of this article, though they are rightly what nearly everyone is thinking about at the moment. The extensive tariff action taken by Trump this month spared the Gulf states from the highest new duties, but other Middle East and North African countries were hit with steep tariffs. The tariffs are likely to have two kinds of impacts. The first may take the form of collateral damage if there is reduced demand for oil due to a recession or slower global growth. The second impact could be on countries like Jordan, which may be hit with high tariffs it cannot absorb, and may potentially need to find new markets. For more analysis on the tariff impacts, check out insights from my Atlantic Council colleagues here.

Welcoming investment and business deals

President Trump’s transactional nature and desire for more investment in the United States play to the strengths of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The UAE has the fourth largest sovereign wealth fund in the world, behind Norway’s and two from China. Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) is the world’s sixth-largest sovereign wealth fund. With these financial resources, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have the means to make major investments, or at least promise them.

In January, during his first phone call with Trump after the inauguration, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman pledged $600 billion in investments and trade over four years. Soon afterwards, Trump said: “I’ll be asking the Crown Prince, who’s a fantastic guy, to round it out to around 1 trillion.” It remains unclear whether the Saudis will increase their pledge, especially at a time when low oil prices are constraining domestic spending at the heart of Riyadh’s Vision 2030 economic diversification efforts. It is also unclear whether the $600 billion pledged will be used to purchase US weapons, invest further in US companies or entities, such as the Professional Golfers’ Association of America (PGA), or something else.

The UAE had a similar strategy when Sheikh Tahnoon, the UAE National Security Advisor and brother of UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, visited Washington in March. During the visit, the UAE announced a $1.4 trillion investment pledge over ten years. The statement of planned investments does not list the dollar amount per item and includes partnerships with US companies on Artificial Intelligence, data centers, energy, and critical minerals. Some of these deals were previously announced.

One intriguing UAE investment promise is a new aluminum smelter in the United States, which would be “the first in thirty-five years” and would “nearly double US domestic aluminum production.” The United States is the UAE’s top buyer of aluminum, and the UAE is the second-largest supplier of aluminum to the United States. The twenty-five percent tariffs Trump imposed on aluminum in March could be behind the UAE’s decision to consider investing in a US-based smelter to avoid paying these new taxes. In Guinea, the UAE owns and operates a bauxite mine, which provides the raw material for aluminum, so presumably the UAE would import raw materials into the United States for use in the smelter. Given the new Trump tariffs, it is unclear if the smelter would be economically viable and would be pursued.

A key trade and investment issue to watch is whether the Trump administration classifies Saudi Arabia and the UAE as Tier One countries when it comes to high-tech chip purchases, which would give them essentially unlimited access, according to rules the Biden administration announced in January. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are currently in the Tier Two category, so they have more access to chips than countries like China in the lowest tier, but their access is still constrained. This was an issue Sheikh Tahnoon raised during his March visit to Washington, and Microsoft, which has partnered with both Saudi and Emirati entities, has called on the Trump administration to give these countries more access to chips. There is likely to be more industry and foreign government pressure on this front, especially as more restrictions are placed on China.

Related to the issue of chips’ access is whether the UAE and Saudi Arabia will hedge their technology bets and try to continue partnerships with China on AI and other high-tech projects. Or, will they choose or be pressured to keep China out of supply chains, hardware, and software that Washington sees as a national security threat, perhaps in exchange for more access to cutting-edge US chips?

Conflict mediation

In his first term, Trump chose Saudi Arabia for his first official visit as commander-in-chief. That landmark visit in 2017 delivered a $110 billion arms deal, which experts noted primarily consisted of previously agreed-upon sales. Before announcing he would attend the funeral of Pope Francis as his first foreign trip this term, Trump had planned to visit the Kingdom first during a regional trip this spring. As he explained in March, “I am going to Saudi Arabia. Normally, you would go to the UK first…I said I will go if you put up a trillion dollars to American companies…They agreed to do that. So I am gonna be going there.”

But this time around, the visit to Saudi Arabia is not just about financial investment. Another sort of deal-making is also taking place.

Saudi Arabia has taken on a new international diplomacy role by hosting several rounds of direct US-Russia talks, as well as meetings with Ukraine, in an attempt to help achieve a ceasefire. Riyadh has also offered to host a Trump-Putin meeting.

Saudi Arabia is well-placed to play this role as its leadership has both the trust of Trump personally—via significant financial ties to Trump’s businesses and family—as well as a solid rapport with Russia since the Kingdom has been a “fence sitter,” refusing to participate in United States and Europe-led efforts to isolate Russia in punishment for its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Saudi Arabia has also given humanitarian aid to Ukraine.

The Saudi approach to Russia is part of its preference to hedge its bets and prevent being pigeonholed into the United States-led camp to the extent possible. This suits the Kingdom’s economic and security interests, as it keeps its options open. Hosting talks between the United States, Russia, and Ukraine also helps raise Saudi Arabia’s global profile and cast it in a positive light as a peacemaker.

It is telling that Trump likewise plans to visit Qatar and the UAE on his first foreign trip of his second term. The UAE, like Saudi Arabia, has the financial means to make significant foreign investment in the United States. The UAE is also playing a global mediation role: it recently passed a letter from Trump to Iran’s Supreme Leader pushing for negotiations within two months. As for Qatar, it continues to play a key role working with the United States and Israel to seek a negotiated ceasefire in Gaza.

Keeping a lid on national security risks

Trump does not want the United States to get involved in long, faraway wars. Neither do the majority of Americans. However, many past US presidents have been forced to focus on the Middle East, whether they wanted to or not. The following list of hot spots underscores the policy challenges the Trump administration faces. So far, Trump and his team are simultaneously using and threatening force to try to keep a lid on conflict.

Iran: As of this writing, the Trump administration has held two rounds of negotiations with the Iranians, with plans for more. However, within Trump’s senior team, there are competing views about whether Iran’s nuclear program should be completely dismantled (as US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio have called for) or subject to a “verification program” (as Trump’s top negotiator, Steve Witkoff, has said). Moreover, looming over the efforts to achieve a nuclear deal is the US president’s threat that if one is not achieved, there will “be bombing the likes of which they [the Iranians] have never seen before.” Which approach will win out: negotiations, or military action (with or without Israeli support)? Iran has signaled openness to indirect talks hosted by Oman but has also threatened to pursue nuclear weapons if attacked by the United States. So far, there is no talk of including the issue of Iran’s support for groups such as the Houthis and Hezbollah in the negotiations.

The Houthis: Will the Trump administration’s new military campaign succeed in ending the Houthis’ capability and desire to attack targets in the Red Sea? Or will this military operation drag on at great cost to the United States, yielding no change in Houthi behavior? The United States has used over two hundred million dollars in munitions in just three weeks, and some military planners are worried that the amount of weapons being used is cutting into supplies that could be needed for other global contingencies. The Houthis have survived several other military campaigns by the Saudis, Emiratis, and the United States over the years, and they enjoy significant asymmetric advantages such as cheap, two thousand dollar drones and geography that allows them to quickly disperse and hide in Yemen’s mountainous terrain, especially since many of their weapons are easy to move. On the other hand, if the US campaign begins to succeed or cause real pain to the Houthis, will they seek to pressure the United States by attacking Saudi Arabia or the UAE?

Israel-Gaza: Before coming into office, Trump and his team pushed hard for a ceasefire alongside former president Joe Biden’s outgoing administration, and they achieved one. However, there now seems to be less focus on ending the devastating conflict. Trump’s threat in February to Hamas to release the hostages or “all hell is going to break out” has, in practice, meant Israel restarting the war and blocking humanitarian aid from entering Gaza. Without an alternative to Hamas rule, the militant group may hang on and continue to fight as an insurgency, replenishing its ranks by recruiting desperate people. The Israeli Defense Forces could potentially be mired in Gaza for months if not years, and the remaining living hostages may die if there is no ceasefire. Some experts also warn that the IDF may face a morale crisis, with some reservists already refusing to serve because they do not support the war. Although the conflict in Gaza is not likely to spill over to other parts of the region, if the war grinds on over the short and medium term, this likely would prevent a normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel, which would thwart a key foreign policy achievement desired by the Trump administration.

Stefanie Hausheer Ali is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs and a senior director at international affairs consulting firm Rice, Hadley, Gates & Manuel LLC.

* The information in this article represents the views and opinions of the author and does not necessarily represent the views or opinions of Rice, Hadley, Gates & Manuel LLC. 

The post One hundred days of Trump’s Middle East policy: money, mediation, and military force appeared first on Atlantic Council.

For months, economists and analysts warned of this trajectory. Their forecasts were not based on abstract models but on daily observations: rising inflation, widening budget shortfalls, and the quiet disappearance of public oversight.

The Central Bank of Libya (CBL), long reticent, has now joined that chorus with a rare and public statement. Its warnings are stark: In 2024, the Government of National Unity spent over 109 billion Libyan dinars (LYD), while the parallel government in the east accrued more than forty-nine billion in off-budget obligations. Neither figure reflects coordination or restraint—just the actions of officials either ignorant of or indifferent to the consequences of unchecked spending.

Bracing for financial chaos

Both ledgers lay bare the scale of state capture and fiscal chaos. Alongside these warnings, the CBL also amended the official exchange rate, raising it to 5.48 LYD to the dollar while retaining its fifteen percent surcharge on foreign currency purchases. Framed as a technical adjustment, the move is a stopgap—an attempt to accommodate political excess within a shrinking monetary space. It underscores a deeper truth: Libya’s financial institutions are no longer guiding the economy. They are bracing against its unraveling.

Superficially, Libya still functions. Oil, at least in practice, is still exported. Salaries, though often late, are eventually deposited in the accounts of the country’s bloated public-sector employees.

But beneath the surface, the economy is disassembling. The black-market exchange rate has climbed to 7.8 LYD to the dollar within forty-eight hours of the CBL’s decree, a warranted vote of no confidence in Libya’s fiscal and monetary custodians. Institutions that once stabilized the system—through budgetary checks, revenue cycle audits, regulated foreign exchange, or centralized oversight—have been hollowed out or deactivated. What remains is an economy run on improvisation, backroom deals, and political convenience.

Looking back, the architecture of corruption has evolved in stages. First came the scramble for what Muammar Gaddafi had monopolized the allocation of: budget lines, salary schemes, and procurement deals. Later, transitional authorities waged fights over who wrote those allocations—to control the institutions and the budget pens. Today, that logic has culminated in the complete distortion of the allocation process itself. Libya’s economic crisis is no longer just about who benefits. It is about how benefit is manufactured.

An innovative system of corruption

Over the past several years, opaque and improvised mechanisms have steadily replaced formal revenue channels. At first, these workarounds were viewed as a tolerable compromise—a necessary price for preserving a fragile calm and avoiding renewed conflict. But what was once seen as a temporary accommodation has metastasized into a full-blown system of economic governance, one in which accountability is absent and discretion is unchecked. Crude-for-fuel barter deals, once framed as a pragmatic workaround, have become routine, sidestepping the national budget and brokered through opaque channels with no public oversight. They routinely bypass the national budget entirely and were often negotiated through informal brokers with transnational networks and no public scrutiny. Though the National Oil Corporation (NOC) has pledged to end crude-for-fuel swaps by March 2025, these deals are already being eclipsed by more elaborate and opaque arrangements—the latest evolution in Libya’s system of innovative corruption.

One of the most illustrative examples is Arkenu, a Benghazi-based company originally established for geological research but now repurposed as a vehicle for shadow oil exports. According to the United Nations Panel of Experts, Arkenu is operated by actors aligned with Libyan National Army (LNA) Commander Khalifa Haftar and serves as a financial conduit for eastern military and political interests. In 2024 alone, Arkenu independently exported approximately $460 million worth of crude oil under a GNU-approved deal, absent any transparent bidding, auditing, or publication of terms. As of 2025, it remains active—continuing to lift crude monthly from the National Oil Corporation—and sits at the center of an emerging system in which state-linked assets are repurposed to fund political actors outside formal channels.

The role of armed groups

Meanwhile, armed groups have entrenched themselves deeper into the infrastructure of Libya’s energy economy. In both east and west, militias have embedded themselves in utilities such as the General Electric Company of Libya (GECOL), where operational choices are influenced more by kleptocratic leverage than by institutional standards. Between 2022 and 2024, an estimated 1.125 million tons of diesel—allocated theoretically for power generation—were illicitly exported from Benghazi’s old harbor. These exports were facilitated through inflated supply requests issued via GECOL, the obstruction of audits, and threats of violence against oversight bodies.

The NOC, too, has been drawn into this vortex. Crony contracting has allowed politically connected firms to secure procurement deals and operational privileges, eroding the firewall between national resource management and elite patronage. This dynamic accelerated following the 2022 appointment of Farhat Bengdara as NOC chairman in a power-sharing arrangement between the GNU and eastern authorities. Though intended to ease executive tensions, the move entrenched political influence over the corporation’s operations. Bengdara’s abrupt resignation in early 2025 did not reverse this trajectory. Instead, his tenure left a lasting imprint: a politicized NOC, increasingly leveraged for factional gain rather than safeguarding Libya’s oil wealth.

This erosion of institutional neutrality has a fiscal analog in Libya’s monetary policy, where political imperatives now override sound economic management. At the core of the dysfunction lies the unchecked expansion of the money supply. Independent estimates suggest that the volume of money in circulation now exceeds 170 billion LYD—a level of liquidity that far outpaces productive output or revenue generation. But the deeper concern lies not in the quantity itself, but in how much of it has been manufactured ex nihilo.

Digital monetary creation—the injection of funds into the economy without any corresponding revenue or production—has become the fallback of a political order unwilling to curb spending or enforce discipline. The predictable result has been a cascading erosion of the LYD’s value, a surge in inflation, and a growing public mistrust in the state’s ability to steward its financial future. As foreign reserves shrink and black-market rates spike, Libya’s monetary system is no longer a stabilizing force; it is a mirror of its dysfunction. To call this mismanagement is too generous. This is structural predation, a system designed both to fail and extract. Public wealth is scarcely channeled into services or national development. It is captured, funneled through kleptocratic networks, and increasingly siphoned through untraceable contracts and offshore accounts.

Avenues of reform

Addressing this collapse requires more than fiscal prudence. It demands political realignment. Libya’s economic institutions must be recentered as sites of national governance, not tools of factional financing. The institutions that govern oil revenues, control disbursement, and oversee procurement must be protected, reformed, and in many cases rebuilt, not just with new laws, but with new incentives, protections, and public visibility.

A credible reform strategy must begin with mandatory public disclosure of all oil contracts, real-time publication of state spending, and a ban on off-budget arrangements. Procurement must be regulated through transparent, competitive systems. Revenue distribution must be guided by transparency, equity, and public oversight—not by decentralization for its own sake, nor by external stewardship. Reform must strengthen national institutions while ensuring that public funds reach intended sectors and communities through accountable, legally grounded mechanisms. These are not just technocratic ideals. They are prerequisites for legitimacy and recovery.

International actors—donors, multilateral institutions, and diplomatic envoys—must stop treating Libya’s economic collapse as a mere byproduct of its political fragmentation. Stability manufactured atop corruption is not stability at all. While much emphasis is placed on unifying the government, doing so without reforming its fiscal architecture would merely centralize corruption under a single executive. That may deliver temporary coherence, but it will not constitute progress. In fact, it risks consolidating the very networks that have driven economic ruin. Libya does need a single budget and a unified executive—but one subject to strict and enforceable guardrails on how public money is spent, disclosed, and audited. External engagement must support this principle. Anything less only subsidizes the continuation of state capture under a new administrative label.

Libya is not doomed to economic failure. But its current trajectory is unsustainable—not solely because the price of the oil barrel dropped, but because the political will to govern with integrity has long since evaporated. Recovery will require confrontation, not consensus. And it must begin with reclaiming the institutions that were designed to serve the public, not those who profit from its decline. Tinkering with technical levers like the exchange rate may buy time. But when such adjustments are used to sustain elite corruption rather than correct structural imbalances, they do not stabilize, they provoke. If this continues, the next phase of Libya’s crisis will not be quiet erosion. It will be public revolt.

Emadeddin Badi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council where he advises on US and European policies toward North Africa and the Sahel, focusing on Libya’s conflict.

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“The Secretary reiterated that the United States recognizes Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and supports Morocco’s serious, credible, and realistic Autonomy Proposal as the only basis for a just and lasting solution to the dispute,” reads the statement issued by the State Department after the visit. Nevertheless, one obstacle persists: Dismantling the obsolete and dysfunctional United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).

This time, the United States went further by urging the parties to engage in discussions without delay, stating that Morocco’s Autonomy Plan is the only acceptable framework for dialogue. Rubio even stepped up to offer to facilitate the process, signaling that the only way out of this fifty-year colonial impasse may be outside the United Nations and its legacy of failure to secure a sustainable solution for the Sahraoui people.

A mission without a mandate

As its name stipulates, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara was initially established in 1991 by Security Council resolution 690 to prepare for a referendum in which the people of Western Sahara would choose between independence and integration with Morocco. However, the mission failed to deliver on its mandate and only served to maintain a state of paralysis throughout the years. It is essential to clarify that while the MINURSO monitors the ceasefire, which still holds for nearly thirty-five years between Morocco and the Polisario Front separatists, it is in no way an active peacekeeping mission, and Morocco continues to administer de facto over 80 percent of the Western Saharan disputed territories since the Spanish exit in 1975. MINURSO staff remained spectators, even during the rare skirmishes that were reignited along the sand wall, when Morocco decided to retake the strategic Guerguerat crossing in November 2020 to open trade routes with Mauritania.

Staffan de Mistura, the United Nations Secretary-General envoy to Western Sahara, was set for defeat from the start. Since 2022, de Mistura has felt out of place in a fast-moving international context, shifting in favor of Morocco.

First, the United States recognized Rabat’s sovereignty over Western Sahara in conjunction with re-establishing diplomatic ties between Morocco and Israel in December 2020, knocking down the chessboard in a fragile geopolitical context where MINURSO had maintained the status quo between Morocco and Algeria.

Then came the coup de grace by the two former colonizers of Morocco and Western Sahara, who are at the source of the current superfluous borders, when Spain sided with Morocco in 2022. France followed in 2024, and over twenty-nine countries decided to open diplomatic representations in Western Sahara as a sign of support for the Moroccan stance.

The Italian diplomat himself indicated in October 2024 his intention to step down, alluding to his inability to mediate between a Morocco emboldened by overwhelming international support and an Algeria obstinate in supporting the mirage of Sahraoui self-determination until the very end. In his latest faux pas, Staffan de Mistura proposed the partition of Western Sahara, suggesting that the envoy and the MINURSO are neocolonial instruments from the past, wasting a sixty-one million dollar annual budget, funded in majority by the United States.

Another flagrant example of MINURSO’s irrelevance is how the disputed Western Sahara borders have been, for decades, uncharted territories for terrorist activities from al-Qaeda to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) and, more recently, a fertile ground for Iranian and Russian influence. Besides gathering intel and filing situation reports, the Mission has done very little to address the flourishing drug and human trafficking business in the disputed territories, leaving this task to the Moroccan and Algerian military.

The diversion of humanitarian aid destined for Sahrawis in the camps in Tindouf, Algeria, also continues to raise concerns, especially with evidence showing that much of the aid is subject to corruption and reselling in open markets like Nouadhibou in Northern Mauritania.

The impracticality of a Sahraoui referendum

Several founding myths surround the Western Sahara file, making a referendum a preposterous and impractical solution—a reality that Western allies like the United States started grasping in recent years.

Contrary to other conflicts, where Indigenous people claim the right to self-determination based on their distinct cultural identity, the Saharaoui people are not native to North Africa. The Arab tribes of Beni Hassan, who trace their ancestry to the Yemeni tribe of Maqil, started moving westward to the Maghreb around the thirteenth century, invited by the Almohad empire of Morocco that needed to reinforce its rule by balancing the Amazigh tribe with the Arab warrior populations. If anything, the Hassani people were the ones who pushed the Indigenous Amazigh tribal confederation of Sanhaja out of the Sahara after the massacre of Char Bouba War in the seventeenth century.

The Hassani people today are transnational communities inhabiting large sections of Mauritania, Algeria, Morocco, and Western Sahara—hence the impossibility of carrying out a census of who gets to participate in a referendum. To complicate things further for the MINURSO, the Alaouite sultan Moulay Ismail had established the “Guich System”, a feudal system where these very Hassani tribes were used to counter Amazigh rebellions in exchange for land up to the nineteenth century. The descendants of these fighters still live around the capital, Rabat, Marrakech, and Sidi Kacem, and still assert their Sahraoui roots.

In the Moroccan-administered portion of the territory, the central state had additionally provided generous incentives, including double salaries and subsidized gas and essential subsistence items, since the seventies for those willing to relocate to the Sahara, and two generations at least have been in the disputed land. Even in the five refugee camps in Algeria, where about 173,600 individuals still live, it is extremely hard to determine who is a Saharaoui and who came to Tindouf as a result of a multitude of other conflicts in the Sahel. Due to all these complexities, the MINORSO has consistently failed since its establishment to come up with voter lists that would be acceptable to all parties, thereby nullifying the prospects of a referendum and the relevance of a UN Mission entrusted to organize it.

What many Sahraoui people want

In a recent field study in July 2024 to Dakhla, Laayoun, and Boujdour, I covered nearly four hundred miles and spoke to dozens of civil society activists, journalists, officials, and ordinary Sahraoui people from my own tribesmen of Oulad Dlim. Most interviewees in the Moroccan-administered portion of Western Sahara (about 1.1 million inhabitants according to the September 2024 census) expressed extreme fatigue from five decades of conflict and a desire for normality and prosperity. They seemed more hopeful for a sustainable resolution through the Moroccan federal advanced regionalization plan proposed in 2006, which preserves their cultural identity and gives them sovereignty over local governance and natural resources under the Moroccan flag.

It was interesting to observe the shift in the Moroccan strategy toward the Sahara conflict, transcending the purely security approach under Driss al-Basri in the 1990s, beating and arresting demonstrators, to a vision focusing on regional development, a dynamic tourism sector, and the looming hope of the $1.2 billion Dakhla Atlantic harbor megaproject—the cornerstone of the kingdom’s Atlantic Initiative. This recent economic boom made some interlocutors confident in the future, although many stated that Morocco hasn’t provided any details of how the autonomy plan will work in practice and how much control they will have over their natural resources. It’s important to note that the research didn’t include Sahrawis in the camps, who may remain attached to self-determination after five decades on a different trajectory.

For the past thirty-four years, MINURSO has consistently deceived the Sahrawi people by failing to deliver on its mission, promoting a laissez-faire culture, and holding hundreds of thousands hostage to complicated geopolitical calculus. Now, the time is up, and the Sahrawi communities can no longer afford another fifty years of political stalemate. The parties to the conflict, along with US and trans-Atlantic allies, will need to defund, dismantle, and terminate it so the autonomy plan can start taking shape.

In The Revenge of Geography, Robert D. Kaplan said that “borders are not just lines on a map; they are a reflection of power dynamics,” and today’s dynamics are calling for greater accountability for UN programs like the MINURSO and for out-of-the-box decisive solutions under Trump’s leadership.

Sarah Zaaimi is a resident senior fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs, focusing on the Western Sahara conflict. She is also the center’s deputy director for media and communications.

The post Why it’s time to terminate the UN’s dysfunctional mission in Western Sahara appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Child marriage, and specifically the marriage of young girls to adult men, remains a long-standing problem in many parts of Iraq, even when forbidden under law. Tribal and religious leaders perform marriages outside the formal legal system, making it difficult for authorities to monitor or prevent child marriages. In areas stricken with poverty, conflict, and displacement, families are pushed to marry off their daughters as a means of economic survival or protection.

The original proposed text of the new amendments permitted the marriage of girls from the age of nine in certain circumstances, depending on religious interpretations, and granted religious authorities increased power over family matters, including marriage, divorce, and child custody. Proponents of those amendments, primarily conservative Shiite lawmakers, defended the changes as better aligning the law with Islamic principles and reducing Western influence on Iraqi culture.

Iraqi women’s rights activists protested that the amendments effectively “legalise child rape”, and constitute a dramatic rollback in the rights and protections previously guaranteed to women and children under Iraqi law. Their advocacy and pressure appear to have limited the amendments’ harm by retaining provisions for the minimum age of marriage, child custody, and polygamy.

Under the final text of amendments, which entered into force in February, Muslim couples concluding a marriage contract must elect whether the contract—which specifies right and obligations as regards marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance—is to be governed under the 1959 Personal Status Law or a Personal Status Code (mudawana), the latter to be developed by the Shia Ja’afari school of Islamic jurisprudence. For marriage contracts concluded and registered before the law’s effective date, either party may submit a request to the Personal Status Court to apply rulings of the Jaafari Shiite school of jurisprudence. If parties in a family dispute disagree on whether to apply the rulings of the Shiite Jaafari school in cases of divorce, the court will apply the choice of the husband.

The amendments also stipulate that the Shiite Endowment Scientific Council, with the assistance of judges and legal experts and in coordination with the State Council, shall develop a code of personal status based on the Jaafari Shiite school of jurisprudence, and submit it to the parliament within four months of the code’s effective date. This code must comply with existing provisions, including those of the 1959 Law, which sets the minimum age of marriage, with exceptions allowing marriage from the age of 15 with a judge’s permission and depending on the child’s “maturity and physical capacity.”

The Iraqi government issued a statement indicating that the amendments came at the request of the citizens represented by the Shiite component in the parliament. Baghdad also clarified that, under the new law, the rulings of the Shiite Jaafari school of jurisprudence apply exclusively to Shiite Iraqis and do not apply to the Sunni Muslims in Iraq.

While there have been some elements of relief that the Iraq parliament has pulled back from legalizing child marriage, the situation remains dynamic, with ongoing discussions concerning the implications of the amendments and the development of the new personal status code, applicable only to the Shia community.

Without enforcement of the law, the Iraqi government is continuing to fail in its duty to protect the rights of its most vulnerable citizens. Girl brides often have little power within their marriages and are less likely to complete their education or be employed, undermining their opportunities for personal and financial autonomy. If divorced or abandoned by their husbands, they have little to equip themselves with to escape cycles of poverty.

Many so-called early marriages constitute de facto forced marriages. Forced marriage is a violation in itself and is also the site of numerous other abuses, including sustained sexual and physical violence. For young girls, pregnancy and childbirth may come with numerous health consequences. According to the World Health Organization, pregnancy and childbirth complications are a leading cause of death among adolescent girls worldwide. Boys who are subjected to early and/or forced marriages are also harmed. Forced to become breadwinners in adolescence, boys suffer curtailed education and career prospects.

The attempts to roll back the rights of women and girls, and the Government’s empowerment of religious authorities to govern people’s personal affairs, underscore the urgent need to support Iraqi human rights activists, and women and children’s rights activists in particular. With Iraq receding from the international headlines and as US humanitarian aid cuts increase the fragility of human rights work, there is a danger that Iraq’s most vulnerable are being left behind.

Sareta Ashraph is a senior legal advisor for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council. 

The post Legalizing child marriage in Iraq: Stepping back from the brink appeared first on Atlantic Council.

But despite a convenient loss of interest by Taliban rulers, who have been in power-consolidation mode ever since their Kabul takeover, the prospect for practical intra-Afghan talks is not dead. 

In fact, February saw a blitz of conferences from the highly diversified Afghan diaspora and more moderate voices representing Afghan civil society. There are also signs of renewed interest on the part of the United Nations in adopting a more comprehensive trust-building approach rather than single-item agendas as a precondition for wider engagement and recognition.

Paired with a new US administration at the helm, which appears willing to break from diplomatic norms to drive results—as recently seen in the case of back-channel facilitations leading to the release of two American detainees in Kabul—there is a renewed urgency in achieving a streamlined vision for a dialogue framework. 

The international community now has an opportunity to pursue a two-track policy of ad hoc engagement on issues that are of interest to key stakeholders, while supporting a UN-led effort to address key recommendations as part of Security Council resolutions 2721 and 2777.

A fractioned diaspora, emerging talks

A slew of Afghan dialogues have emerged in recent months. The focus of the talks is as expansive as the diverse range of perspectives participating in them, and they address devastating cuts in humanitarian funding, deteriorating economic and environmental conditions, new regime restrictions on female education, and a lack of recognition compounded by governance weaknesses.  

On the diaspora side, three factions emerge. One, those who oppose any type of engagement, under any circumstances, involving the Taliban. This group is subdivided into those who support a military option using force to bring about radical change, and those who favor sanctions and the isolation of the current regime. Two, those who favor nonviolent engagement, but with softer conditions or practical objectives that would bring about policy reform or modifications, but also minimize the economic impact felt by more than 90 percent of the population as a result of sanctions and aid cutoff. The range of expectations within this group varies from lifting bans on female education and work to improving governance and widening political participation. And three, Taliban supporters and defenders—in much smaller numbers—who see no harm and generally agree with the regime’s policies.

Several intra-Afghan initiatives took place in February across various Afghan and international centers. A “dialogue forum” held in Istanbul brought together a number of former officials as well as diaspora and Kabul-based civil society participants. They expected Taliban de facto government members or associates to attend the event, but none were present. Two other meetings took place in Qatar. Among them, the Afghanistan Future Thought Forum (AFTF), involving regime sympathizers, civil society and non-Taliban Afghans, held its 10th session in Doha, during which pressing issues such as the evolving regional and international scene, women and girls’ access to education and health, and livelihood and ecological challenges facing Afghans, were discussed.

Another gathering sponsored by the National Resistance Front was held in Vienna. At this gathering, anti-Taliban figures from the republic era and diaspora representatives discussed adopting a program to pursue armed resistance while simultaneously bringing like-minded fractious groupings under a single umbrella.

Two cross-continental structured dialogue groups, the Salaam Center for Dialogue based in the US and the Intra-Afghan Dialogue in Australia, are among active groups merging research and dialogue facilitation methods with external expertise aimed at studying root causes of conflict and bridging the divide between civil societies and other stakeholders inside and outside Afghanistan. Another group, the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies, held a pro-democracy event in Madrid that included opposition figures and select foreign commentators focusing, mainly, on a post-Taliban future.

Other forms of sporadic interactive online chats involve former factional party members and remnants of 1980s and 1990s-era mujahideen groups, primarily based in Turkey, the Gulf States, and Western countries, and ad hoc groups of human rights and ethno-political advocates. Most of the former factional platforms are divided between the idea of fighting the Taliban and the desire to pursue power-sharing negotiations—an idea shunned by the ruling faction in Kabul.

While the primary objective of these gatherings is ostensibly to serve as discussion hubs, some act as ad hoc think tanks or advocacy movements. Notably, a few of these initiatives are for the first time trying to adopt a comprehensive approach to dialogue by bringing together individuals from diverse backgrounds, both men and women, from Afghanistan and beyond. None of these platforms claim explicit political affiliation with current or former governments, highlighting their independent or semi-impartial nature. Furthermore, the majority of these initiatives rely on external funding to meet their logistical needs, highlighting the importance of external support in sustaining these dialogues. 

Inside Afghanistan: Taliban posturing and limited dissent

Since their return to power, the resurgent Taliban have characterized the pre-August 2021 talks as suspended due to the collapse of the “republic”,  instead encouraging non-political talks within the country. They have at times tolerated a minimal level of Afghan participation on platforms that denounce violence and focus on soft political agendas, either on technical matters or as part of non-confrontational, civil society-led dialogues.

Intra-Taliban dissent—a potent subject—also has its own modalities and limitations, as recently demonstrated by the distancing of several high-ranking officials who are critical of policy strands on female education and more engagement. Despite a government-run commission set up to receive ex-officials who opt to return to the country, serious consultations on improving governance standards or using technocrats have yet to be formalized.

Suffice it to say that it is now evident that some Taliban favor female access to education and are not opposed to preliminary trust-building consultations with other Afghans, while another grouping – smaller yet influential – opposes lifting education curbs or any interaction that might lead to more serious talks on a participatory system or restructuring the existing governance model. 

Non-Taliban Afghans inside Afghanistan bring a diversity of views, too. While politically muted and non-provocative criticism of certain policies —particularly those concerning women’s access to education and employment, salaries and pensions, and economic hardship—is tolerated to some extent in public or in the media, the space for overt political dissent within the country has shrunk.

There are also reports of small-scale, non-political civil society interactions taking place in Afghanistan itself, yet media outlets underreport these.

Enduring challenges

A significant gap exists in the absence of an umbrella organization capable of bridging the two divergent paths of diplomatic and nonviolent engagement versus conflict. Partisanship in academia, the media, and advocacy movements highlights the complex interplay between research and activism.

The polarization of approaches and diversity of views has also made it more difficult for international intermediaries such as the UN to pursue a path that ties Afghan dialogues to intra-Afghan talks on governance and fundamental rights. 

Following the Security Council’s March debates on Afghanistan, the UN-sponsored Doha process plans to consider all issues dividing the current de facto Afghan regime and the international community as valid talking points for an Afghan roadmap as suggested in UN resolutions 2721 and 2777.

The UN process will need to make use of structured trust-building thematic engagement as a precursor to addressing legitimacy and normalization objectives. Some agenda-driven diaspora groups are opposed to UN efforts seeking consensus on a roadmap, while others see it as a credible option to negotiate on reforms and prevent further isolation and impoverishment of the country. 

Looking at the evolving intra-Afghan landscape, it’s apparent that the diversity of platforms, networks, and agendas that drive advocacy and dialogue processes face ideological, political, representation, structural, and funding challenges. Some also offer lessons-learned opportunities for addressing pressing issues, connecting diverse communities, and engaging in results-oriented exchanges that build trust and seek common ground. They are, nonetheless, valuable tools and incubators of thoughts and ideas at a time when both the international community and the Afghan population are looking for practical answers and solutions to the country’s five decades-long ordeal. How Washington, the UN, and especially, the de facto regime make use of the intra-Afghan opportunities will depend on political will and strategic foresight.

Omar Samad is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. He is also the founder and president of Silkroad Consulting, LLC. Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, Samad was a senior Afghan expert in residence with the Center for Conflict Management at the US Institute of Peace from January 2012 to January 2013. He also served as Ambassador of Afghanistan to France from 2009 to 2011 and Ambassador to Canada from 2004 to 2009.

The post In the thorny world of intra-Afghan talks, new challenges and opportunities emerge appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Öcalan’s call to disband the PKK came after two months of negotiations involving key players from Turkey, northeast Syria (NES), and the KRI. This has marked a watershed moment, signaling a willingness for dialogue not only within Kurdish ranks but also with Ankara. The political elite in the KRI has rallied behind Öcalan’s message, with prominent figures like Masoud Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), expressing optimism that this could catalyze a genuine peace process.

Among the immediate challenges is the Turkish government’s ongoing military operations against the PKK in the KRI and NES. While the PKK has declared a unilateral ceasefire, the situation remains precarious. The PKK insists that meaningful progress hinges on a face-to-face meeting with Öcalan, jeopardizing the ceasefire framework. This ambiguity reflects historical precedents of failed ceasefires that have left both the PKK, recognized by Turkey and some other countries as a terrorist organization, and Turkish forces skeptical of one another’s intentions. What will happen to Turkey’s expanded network of military bases?

Moreover, as political leaders in the KRI express their hope for a unified Kurdish front and the end of hostilities, the fate of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) remains a critical factor, despite the new developments. On March 10, Mazloum Abdi and Interim President Ahmed Al Sharaa signed an agreement stipulating the integration of civil and military institutions in Northeast Syria within the institutions of the Syrian state, to be implemented by the end of 2025. The deal recognizes Kurds, who make up about 10 percent of the population, as an indigenous community of the Syrian state and guarantees them political and constitutional rights. The deal gives away around 30 percent of Kurdish-controlled areas at the borders with Iraq and Turkey under the control of the central government. The deal has given the power to the central government to gain its territorial control, political influence, and financial recovery, while granting Damascus access to the oil and gas revenues in NES.

While the agreement was welcomed by some of the international community and Syrians, still some Kurds, Assyrians, and Druze of Syria unwelcomed the development, fearing for their rights to be dismissed, the Kurdish disunity contradicts the ongoing meetings in Erbil to encourage a one-voice approach to dealing with the central government. The question now is to what extent this deal will help with stopping Turkish attacks in NES and foster the ceasefire deal between the PKK and Turkey regionally. Despite Öcalan’s plea, SDF commanders clearly distinguish their operations from those of the PKK, indicating that disarmament for them is contingent upon Turkey’s cessation of attacks against Kurdish positions in Syria. The intricate relationship between the PKK and SDF adds another layer of complexity to peace negotiations, particularly as the Turkish government often lumps both groups together in its security rhetoric.

The PKK’s future will depend on the results of key questions about disarmament logistics. How will fighters safely lay down their arms despite enduring volatility, particularly in places like the Qandil Mountains – PKK’s headquarters in the KRI? More crucially, what legal protections will be established to ensure that PKK fighters are not pursued or punished after they disarm? While the KRG expresses its desire for a peaceful transition, the absence of a comprehensive legal framework could serve as a formidable barrier to successfully executing peace agreements.

Simultaneously, the ongoing conflict in Sinjar presents further complications. The 2020 Sinjar Agreement aimed to restore stability and allow for the return of displaced residents, yet the presence of PKK fighters has triggered repeated military strikes by Turkey, complicating the implementation of this agreement. The assumption that a reduction in hostilities could allow for the PKK withdrawal from Sinjar to their bases in the Qandil Mountains illustrates the interconnectedness of local conflicts and broader peace processes—a delicate dance undermined by mistrust and geopolitical rivalries.

In conclusion, Abdullah Öcalan’s call for disarmament heralds an encouraging shift toward peace among Kurdish factions. Yet, the complexities of reintegrating PKK fighters, navigating the nuanced dynamics of the Syrian conflict, and addressing Turkish military activity pose significant hurdles. A successful transition to peace hinges on ongoing dialogue, the establishment of protective legal frameworks, and cooperative agreements that resonate with all parties, particularly Turkey, Iraq’s federal government, the KRG, and Syrian Kurdish groups. As the KRI rallies around a vision of stability, the success of this appeal will ultimately depend on the commitment of all involved to transcend historical grievances and forge a shared path towards peace.

Hanar Marouf is a 2020 Millennium fellow at the Atlantic Council and a political officer at the British Consulate General in Erbil, Iraq. She has a PhD in politics and international relations, focusing on Iran’s influence in the Middle East, particularly as it relates to the case of Iraq. She is an expert in Iraq’s politics regionally and internationally. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the position of the UK government.

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Under President Donald Trump, the United States has rapidly shifted its approach toward Russia and the war in Ukraine. This has many pockets of Europe scrambling to understand the local implications of this change and to adjust their postures accordingly. The Western Balkans—a part of the continent outside the European Union (EU) where the United States has a significant security and development footprint—is already feeling the effects and is bracing for more.

The Trump administration is not expected to focus intently on the Western Balkans anytime soon. Yet it is reasonable to expect that a divergence between the United States and the EU on broader questions of security and trade will be reflected in the region. This could make the Western Balkans into an area of competition rather than complementarity for Washington and Brussels.

Western policy fragmentation could reshape regional dynamics that until recently had been anchored around EU and NATO accession—twin goals that the United States and the EU have pushed for together. Regional leaders who are angry with Brussels, whatever their reasons, may use the “Trump card” to agitate the EU, which could fuel instability and potentially even arms races and conflict.

For now, questions over the future of NATO,  unsubstantiated reports that the US military will retreat from the Balkans, and speculation on how a settlement to end the war in Ukraine could change Europe’s borders are already fueling security dilemmas in the region. This is particularly the case in non-NATO countries, such as Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which have interethnic tensions, border disputes with neighbors, and a reliance on NATO and the United States as guarantors of peace settlements.

Can Europe fill the gaps created by US disengagement and play a credible deterrent role in the Balkans at a time when it may also have to significantly step up its support for Ukraine? What would happen if, as part of its broader rapprochement with Russia, the United States went over Europe’s head and tried to resolve the Kosovo-Serbia dispute, which Brussels—much to the dismay of Washington—has failed to do for fourteen years? These are questions European policymakers need to start asking themselves.

But the uncertainty the United States’ policy shifts have caused in Europe could also turn out to be a blessing in disguise. The United States’ disengagement from the region could put further productive pressure on Europe to take care of its own security, fill the gaps in democracy promotion that Washington is leaving behind, and jolt EU enlargement from its current limping state.

Backlash against Brussels

US-EU discord is already deepening regional fragmentation, mostly in an anti-EU direction. Early signs of this were visible in last week’s United Nations General Assembly vote on Ukraine, which pit the EU against Russia and the United States.

While Serbia, the region’s hedging power, did vote in favor of the EU-sponsored resolution backing Ukraine, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić later backtracked and suggested that it was a mistake. North Macedonia—a country whose membership in the EU has been blocked by its neighbors—notably abstained. With Hungary the only EU country to abstain, the contours of a regional Kremlin-friendly Budapest-Belgrade-Skopje axis—hostile toward Brussels and able to paralyze decision making in the EU—are forming.

Countries along this axis understand the transactional nature of the Trump administration and are actively courting strategic US investments for further leverage. In other cases, like in Bosnia and Herzegovina—where Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik is ramping up his secessionist agenda—troublemakers are feeling emboldened to test the limits of the new geopolitical environment.

On the other side of the spectrum is the region’s most pro-US country, Kosovo, which finds itself in a strategic pickle, as its statehood and security rely on transatlantic unity. What’s more, the country’s decision making has been paralyzed in the aftermath of an inconclusive election in February, which could drag out the formation of a new government for weeks, if not months.

Kosovo is highly dependent on the United States for its security and has many grievances with the EU. Its statehood is still not recognized by five EU member states, which blocks any advancement to candidate status, and Pristina remains under EU restrictive measures due to how the outgoing government handled affairs in its Serb-majority north. At least one major part of Kosovo’s political spectrum is also angry at the EU for its treatment of Kosovo’s former leaders who are on trial for war crimes at The Hague—a grievance that some members of the Trump administration apparently share.

Whether Kosovo uses its “Trump card” in the context of a US-EU split depends largely on who forms the next government and what the Trump administration has to offer. For instance, a breakthrough in international recognition would be a compelling prospect. Yet, Kosovo also remains somewhat anxious about Trump’s cordial relations with Belgrade, while acting Prime Minister Albin Kurti, whose party came in first in the recent elections, had an infamously difficult history with the first Trump administration.

Albania and Montenegro seem to be more aligned with Brussels at the moment, as they have positioned themselves as regional frontrunners in the EU accession path and have both set the ambitious goal of joining the bloc in the next few years. Yet, this EU path is affected by another major shift in Washington’s foreign policy. EU accession is heavily centered on rule of law and democratic reforms, areas in which the United States has invested in the past few decades. The Trump administration’s decision to halt foreign aid through the US Agency for International Development (USAID) has given such efforts a major hit. For example, in the past few years, Albania has made progress on tackling elite impunity through new rule of law bodies, which were built largely through US technical expertise and are now vulnerable.

The disruption in the operations of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED)—a key pillar of US democracy promotion—is also shrinking the space for regional civil society. The Serbian government is now persecuting some of the leading pro-democracy nongovernmental organizations under the convenient pretext of “abusing USAID funds.”

How Europe can fill the gap in the Western Balkans

To prevent the further deterioration of the security situation and an authoritarian descent throughout the Western Balkans, Europe needs to step up and claim its role as an anchor of regional security and democracy. On security, that would require not just the usual French-German leadership within the EU, but also an active role for European NATO powers such as the United Kingdom and Turkey, both of which are invested in preserving the regional order and have troops on the ground in the Western Balkans. The upcoming visit to the region by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte is a welcome sign and should be followed by firm guarantees of deterrence.

On democracy, the EU already has the instruments in place to fund institutional reforms or support civil society—such as the continent’s NED equivalent, the European Endowment for Democracy. Now, it needs to use those instruments to fill the financial gaps left by the United States.

However, the real litmus test of Europe’s power will be its ability to resolve the lingering bilateral disputes in the Western Balkans and to finally push the region forward toward EU accession. Yet, these goals would be best served by an approach that tries to work together with Washington, rather than against it.

Competition over Western Balkans policy between the EU and the United States over the next four years would deepen the region’s fragmentation, undermining any attempts for an agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. Europe also needs Washington engaged because there is a need to deter Russia from continuing to play a spoiler role in the Western Balkans through its regional allies, primarily Serbia. The current US-Russia dialogue seems broad in scope—Washington and Moscow recently discussed Middle East issues—and, with US-EU coordination, these talks could be used to serve joint Western interests in the Balkans.    

At the same time, there are actions the EU could take on its own that could incentivize regional actors to anchor around its goals. It could start, for example, by eliminating decision-making obstacles to its enlargement process that have allowed individual member states to stall and veto candidate countries’ membership bids over petty disputes. Much like in the case of Ukraine, Washington cannot be blamed for, nor expected to solve, problems of the EU’s own making.

Agon Maliqi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is a political and foreign policy analyst from Pristina, Kosovo.  

Note: Some Atlantic Council work funded by the US government has been halted as a result of the Trump administration’s Stop Work Orders issued under the executive order “Reevaluating and Realigning US Foreign Aid.”

***

The Western Balkans stands at the nexus of many of Europe’s critical challenges. Some, if not all, of the countries of the region may soon join the European Union and shape the bloc’s ability to become a more effective geopolitical player. At the same time, longstanding disputes in the region, coupled with institutional weaknesses, will continue to pose problems and present a security vulnerability for NATO that could be exploited by Russia or China. The region is also a transit route for westward migration, a source of critical raw materials, and an important node in energy and trade routes. The BalkansForward column will explore the key strategic dynamics in the region and how they intersect with broader European and transatlantic goals.

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The Egyptian plan fulfills two central requirements: it excludes Hamas from governing Gaza and it takes off the table any thought that Gaza’s residents could be relocated. Instead, Gaza would be governed for six months by a technocratic council of Palestinians under the auspices, but presumably not the control, of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in Ramallah. United Nations (UN) peacekeepers would be invited in by the PA to both Gaza and the West Bank. An international contact group would oversee the effort. Arab governments would contribute to Gaza’s physical reconstruction.

There are many reasons why Israel will not accept this plan in its present form. Israel has reason to be wary of putting unnamed Palestinians in charge of Gaza—though Arab capitals and Jerusalem could reach an agreement in secret negotiations over who would be on the council.

Israel will also never accept UN peacekeepers, given the UN’s disastrous experience in Lebanon and the risk that Israel’s security could be jeopardized by big-power gridlock or pro-Palestinian sentiment at the UN. Even apart from the UN’s debacle in Lebanon in failing to enforce Security Council resolution 1701, adopted in 2006, UN peacekeeping has a spotty record of success. The Trump administration and many Democrats will back up Israel’s refusal to entrust its security to a UN force.

There are other ways to square this circle. The United States has more experience than any other country in the world in organizing effective military coalitions. This includes the effort to liberate Kuwait in 1991, in which many Arab states participated, as well as peacekeeping coalitions in Bosnia and elsewhere. In the case of Gaza, this could take the form of US involvement that does not entail US boots on the ground, at no net financial cost to the United States. That means the United States could provide logistical support, airlift, intelligence, and command and staff functions to a force of Arab and European units, funded by financial contributions from Arab countries or others. (For example, seizing frozen Iranian assets to reimburse the United States and its allies for rebuilding Gaza would be appealing to US President Donald Trump.) Trump hinted at openness to some US role in his February 4 press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, even as the White House closed the door the next day by saying Trump had not committed to putting US boots on the ground in Gaza. There are indications that a plan that threads this needle exists in a safe somewhere in the Pentagon. Trump political appointees at the Department of Defense probably abhor the idea, but if this is the only way to secure a lasting Israeli peace with Gaza and Trump’s Nobel Peace Prize, there is a way to organize a peacekeeping force for Gaza without involving the UN.

But the central problem for the Netanyahu government is that it is not willing to commit to turning Gaza over to the PA and to setting up a Palestinian state. This gap can be bridged, but it will be the first serious test of the second Trump administration’s Middle East diplomacy and of the leaders in Arab capitals and Israel. Israel’s concerns over “de-radicalization” should not be dismissed. Egypt and other Arab states harbor their own grave concerns about Hamas and its Muslim Brotherhood roots. Talk of Palestinian unity cannot overlook the problem of Israeli concerns over the prospect of empowering Hamas and other advocates of a “one-state” Muslim Brotherhood solution, which makes Israelis do everything in their power to block a two-state solution.

Moreover, PA “reform” seems necessary but elusive. Israelis should not be asked to gamble their security on a reformed PA when Arab states have not been successful, so far, in forcing much-needed reforms on Ramallah. These are all serious problems, but the pressing need to begin Gaza’s physical and social reconstruction cannot wait for all these problems to be solved. An internationally led interim governance authority in charge of both security and reconstruction that brings in non-Hamas Palestinians is the only way to start this process.

The Egyptian proposal, like other proposals, is not going to be accepted immediately. But after years of Hamas’s disastrous rule, the Egyptian proposal could form the starting point for negotiations over a workable plan for postwar Gaza that will end both the security threat to Israel and the suffering of the people of Gaza.

Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council. He previously served in the US Department of State on Middle East and international justice issues.

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Will 2012 turn out to have been the high-water mark of human liberty? This volume documents that the downward trend in freedom and democracy, which started then, has continued for another year in 2024. Yet this Atlas also reminds us that there is hope amidst this adverse aggregate trend. In much of the world, women’s economic freedom is higher today than it was thirty years ago. Western Europe’s freedom is either unchanged or greater than it was fifteen years ago. The Global South is steadily becoming more prosperous.

The decline in freedom documented in this volume is clear, but it is also not a massive shift. Average global freedom has moved from Montenegro to Malawi, not from Sweden to Laos. Yet we can no longer maintain a Whiggish faith that we are on an inexorable path toward freedom, democracy, and prosperity, or that history has ended. As the fires of war burn in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Sudan, we must ask what has gone wrong, and what we can do about it. Measurement is the first task, and that is why this overview of liberty around the world is important.

The first section of this Foreword discusses the changing nature of the threat to freedom, and presents one hypothesis about rising executive aggrandizement. There has been a significant decline in the prevalence of coups since the 1960s, which means that democratically elected leaders need fear the “man on horseback” much less than in the past. Yet as the threat of military takeovers has fallen, the prevalence of “executive aggrandizements,” in which duly elected leaders push their power beyond constitutional limits, has not. Indeed, elected executives may be more likely to take risks precisely because military coups have become less plausible.

I present a simple framework for thinking about the interplay between technology and executive aggrandizement. Executives are limited by their ability to control the public sector and by popular opposition. Technology can enable the coordination of popular anti-regime action, as was shown vividly in the Twitter Revolutions of the Arab Spring. The increased threat of popular uprising may put limits on some political leaders, but technology can also increase the executive’s ability to control the public sector by monitoring disloyalty or malfeasance. Artificial intelligence (AI) could improve the central government’s ability to detect corruption. If the state is initially weak, the positive impact of technology on popular opposition may lead to less dictatorship. However, if the state is strong, technology will instead reduce the limits on executive activity.

The second section of this Foreword argues that geopolitical changes can also help explain why executive aggrandizement has increased and coups have fallen. Western powers, which used to engineer coups as Cold War policy, now intervene to reverse them. Even more importantly, the influence of the West, which championed democracy in the years after the Cold War, has declined. The 1990s was an era of democratic triumph, in which the strength of liberal democracies was at its apogee. What could have been more appealing to the former Warsaw Pact states of Eastern Europe than to rush toward European integration and prosperity? Mexico’s leaders similarly saw great advantages in tying their country to the United States through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In both cases, democracy ended up being the price of free trade.

Yet the last quarter century has seen a relative decline in the Western champions of liberty. The United States lost military face in its failed occupations of both Iraq and Afghanistan, and economic face in the global financial crisis. The economic importance of the European Union (EU) has declined, while China’s economic heft has expanded enormously. China’s growth provides an example of non-democratic success, and its foreign aid reduces the advantage of courting Western donors who have a deeper demand for democratic reform.

In the final section of the Foreword, I discuss the interplay between economic and political freedom. While I do not believe that complete economic freedom is necessary for political freedom, I do believe that a political executive with control over parts of the economy can use that control to augment its own political power. There are risks in supporting activist industrial and trade policies that enable political leaders to reward their supporters and punish their opponents. It would be far better for democratic leaders to articulate the positive case for freedom, which can both enable economic growth and empower human happiness, than to seek to micromanage the economy.

The man on horseback vanishes while executive aggrandizement persists

Bermeo documents that more than one-third of democracies faced coups between 1960 and 1964, and 15 percent of democracies were toppled by coups between 1965 and 1969. In every five-year interval since 1985, fewer than 5 percent of democracies fell to a coup. In every five-year interval since 1995, fewer than 10 percent of democracies have even faced the threat of a coup. Yet, as this volume documents, the global level of freedom has been declining since 2012.

Executive aggrandizement, where the executive expands its authority beyond constitutional limits, can erode freedom without the fireworks of a coup. Yet it has proven difficult to document a global wave in such expansions of incumbent power. Nevertheless, there are important examples, especially those of China, Russia, and Venezuela, in which political executives have significantly increased their power. Vladimir Putin and Hugo Chávez represent the more standard case in which a democratically elected executive expands his power. In the case of China, the more dispersed control of party leaders has been replaced by the more centralized control of Xi Jinping.

In this section, I first discuss the interplay between coups and executive aggrandizement, using Argentina’s 1930 coup as an example. I then turn to a framework that is meant to suggest how technological change might have influenced the prevalence of coups, protests, and executive aggrandizement. I focus on domestic forces that influence freedom in this section, and in the next section, I will focus on the role of foreign influence.

Coup and executive aggrandizement

Few coups seem so consequential as the 1930 coup in Argentina, which ended seventy-five years of political stability and liberal government and ushered in fifty years of coups and dictatorships. Argentina’s remarkable Generation of 1837, which included Domingo Sarmiento and Juan Bautista Alberdi, crafted that country’s 1853 Constitution and presided over a period of increasing freedom, wealth, and education. Like Britain before 1867, nineteenth-century Argentina was better at protecting freedoms than at promoting broad, uninfluenced suffrage, but after 1912, the Sáenz Peña Law made male suffrage universal, secret, and mandatory.

The Radical Civic Union (UCR) rode to power on the basis of broad population support in 1916, and came into conflict with the more conservative National Autonomist Party (PAN), which had held power since the end of Sarmiento’s presidency in 1874. Their conflict ended in 1930, when a military coup replaced the elected President Hipólito Yrigoyen with Lieutenant General Uriburu. Alemán and Saiegh provide evidence against “the claim that demands for drastic redistribution led to democratic breakdown is not a convincing explanation for the 1930 coup.” Instead, they see the coup as a response to the fact that Yrigoyen “used his authority to exclude the political opposition and take away their remaining bases of power.”

Alemán and Saiegh emphasize that the legislative divisions were not determined by ideology or attitudes toward redistribution. Instead, divisions were heightened over power plays, such as the frequent Federal “interventions” in which Yrigoyen replaced provincial governments with politicians that were more to his liking. While these interventions were and are (the last one occurred in 2004) supposed to be responses to unusual and deeply problematic local circumstances, there were twenty interventions during Yrigoyen’s first term and fifteen of these were done without legislative approval. During Yrigoyen’s second term, “between 1928 and 1929, he took over by executive decree the provinces of San Juan, Mendoza, Corrientes and Santa Fe,” and he nationalized the petroleum industry, which was also “seen as a political power-grab.”

On August 9, 1930, the opposition published the Manifesto of the 44 which denounced Yrigoyen for aggrandizement of executive authority. Within the month, a coup had begun and by September 10, Uriburu had replaced Yrigoyen as President of Argentina. Six more coups would follow in 1943, 1955, 1962, 1966, 1976, and 1981. Executive aggrandizement is a perpetual possibility, and, historically, the opponents of that aggrandizement often came from within the government, including from within the military.

Of course, there have been many cases of executive aggrandizement that have not met with opposition from the military. It took eleven years, and the realization that Hitler had led them into a military catastrophe, for any of the Wehrmacht’s leaders to fight against Hitler’s subversion of the Weimar Republic. Similarly, there have been many military coups that had little or nothing to do with executive aggrandizement, including Argentina’s 1943 coup, and the attempted coups in France in 1961, and Spain in 1981.

These two failed coups suggest that improvements in communications have reduced the ability of officers to command their soldiers to fight against political leaders. Improvements in information technology have made it easier for symbolically important legitimate leaders to communicate directly with the army, which can be effective because “military forces—especially perhaps conscript ones—are susceptible to numerous pressures from the civilian population and from civil institutions.”

During the weekend on April 22, 1961, a junta of French officers, hoping to keep Algeria an integral part of France, took control of Algiers. As Thomas writes, “de Gaulle’s military resources were unimpressive,” because “500,000 [soldiers] were in Algeria, whereas in France itself there were very few regular operational units.” Instead of fighting, on the evening of April 23, De Gaulle took to the radio.

The same voice that had travelled the airwaves in 1940 denouncing “the capitulation” to Nazi Germany in the name of “honor, common sense, and the higher interest of the Nation,” and inviting “all the French who want to remain free to listen to me and to follow me,” declared in 1961 that “I forbid every Frenchman, and in the first place every soldier, to carry out any order.” Even though the rebels controlled the Algiers stations, they could not stop ordinary citizens and soldiers from hearing De Gaulle on their transistor radios, and turning against the plot. The defeat of the coup has been called “la Victoire des Transistors.”

On the evening of February 23, 1981, armed agents of Spain’s Civil Guard, led by a Lieutenant Colonel, took control of the Congress of Deputies. In Valencia, General del Bosch rolled out his tanks and declared a state of emergency. Del Bosch had fought under Franco during the Spanish Civil War, and under German Command during World War II, and he wanted to stop Spain’s shift to liberal democracy. But at 1:14 a.m., King Juan Carlos appeared on television in the uniform of the Captain General of the Army and declared that “the Crown cannot tolerate in any form any act which tries to interfere with the constitution which has been approved by the Spanish people.” The coup promptly fizzled, and Spain’s democracy would survive.

In both France and Spain, coups were stopped by leaders who broadcast strong messages which fundamentally undermined their military subordinates. The framework in the next section will argue that improvements in communications technology more generally make it easier for leaders to stop rebellions from within. This is one hypothesis as to why the risks to freedom now come more from executive aggrandizement than from military coups.

Yet there are other reasons why the frequency of coups has declined, most notably the end of the Cold War and the changing behavior of Western powers. During the Cold War, American leaders often preferred a friendly military regime or monarchy to a hostile democratic one, and the US government supported coups from Tehran in 1953 to Chile in 1973. Since 1991, US-led regime change has meant overt invasion far more than covert coups. In 1994, the United States even acted to reinstate President Aristide of Haiti, who had been ousted by a coup in 1991.¹ I will return to the role of the West in promoting democracy in the next section, after first providing a framework for thinking about the interplay between technology and constraints on political leaders.

Technology and constraints on chief executives

The section considers two impacts of improved information technology on the limits facing elected executives or autocrats. Information can be used to organize protests, such as the mass demonstrations in Tahrir Square, Egypt, which brought down the Mubarak regime in 2011, and that places limits on executive action. But information technology can also be used to centralize control over the public sector, such as by granting leaders the ability to communicate directly with soldiers during a coup. I will not focus on other impacts of communications technology, such as enabling leaders like India’s Narendra Modi to bond with their voters by using radio broadcasts and social media.

All actions that an executive might want to take will create some opposition from both the private and public sectors. That opposition places limits on the actions of the executive. I assume that the executive will not risk actions that generate sufficient opposition from either the public sector, which might refuse to implement the action, or the private sector, which might break out into mass protests. If technology expands the range of actions that the executive can take, then the technology is authority-enhancing, but if it contracts the range of executive action, then it is authority-eroding.

The limits on an autocrat’s options are captured by the two solid lines in Figure 1. If the autocrat wants to limit their opposition from either sector to a fixed amount, then his or her options are limited to a rectangle that is below the solid blue line and to the left of the solid orange line. I will argue that recent changes in communications technology have given effective autocrats more power over their own bureaucracies, causing the blue line to rise, but made private opposition more effective by enabling organization, which shifts the orange line to the left.

While China’s surveillance of its own private citizens is frequently discussed in the Western media, the surveillance of public sector workers and the associated anti-corruption campaign has been far more central to Xi Jinping’s centralization of power. The bribery convictions of Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang in 2013 and 2015 eliminated two potential rivals early in Xi’s term as president of China. Moreover, because China has “vague and incomplete anti-corruption laws that leave more room for party control,” and “institutional arrangements that centralize control over local anti-corruption agencies,” the fight against corruption essentially gives national leadership the ability to discipline a large swath of the public sector.

Figure 1. The autocrat’s options and technological change

Complaints by ordinary citizens play a significant role in China’s anti-corruption campaign, and those complaints are often transmitted electronically. Pan and Chen report that “China has devoted substantial resources to monitoring the performance of lower-tier officials” including “telephone hotlines,” “government-managed websites where citizens can complain online,” and “web and mobile apps designed for individuals to complain to the government.” In order to reduce bribery, some Chinese “hospitals even put in place monitoring systems with facial recognition technology to identify unregistered medical representatives or unapproved visits.” Fan et al. document that computerizing value-added tax invoices “contributed to 27.1 percent of VAT revenues and 12.9 percent of total government revenues in the five subsequent years.” Beraja et al. examine artificial intelligence procurement across China and find that “autocrats benefit from AI: local unrest leads to greater government procurement of facial-recognition AI as a new technology of political control, and increased AI procurement indeed suppresses subsequent unrest.”

If laws are sufficiently fuzzy, then abundant electronic monitoring, supplemented by the complaints of random citizens, should make it possible to convict almost any public servant. That ability to convict provides a chief executive with enormous control over the public sector. Information technologies, such as the on-board computers carried by commercial truckers, have long been used by corporate chieftains to monitor their workers. There is every reason to believe that government leaders should be able to do the same, and that better technology will strengthen the hold of authoritarian leaders over public sector employees.

For that reason, Figure 1 depicts the blue line rising higher because of better monitoring technology. As the autocrat has an increasing ability to repress opposition within the public sector through better monitoring, they have a greater ability to undertake activities, from suppressing religious minorities to invading their neighbors, that might have been opposed by some public sector workers. This increased range of executive power provides one reason why information technology can lead to less individual freedom. This effect should be much stronger in countries with a more effective public sector.

Better technology can also give the public sector more ability to monitor their private citizens, but there is a countervailing force that I suspect is more important worldwide. Information technology also enables the coordination of citizens, especially through the sharing of information. Historically, cities have been hotbeds of regime change, partially because density enabled the coordination of opposition to the government. Information technology makes it easier to spread information both about why someone should protest and where a protest will occur.

In 2011, protests were coordinated on Twitter in Tunisia and Egypt and two autocrats were forced out of power. In 2022, Maria Litvina called for protests against the Russian invasion of Ukraine on Instagram. While she was arrested, thousands still took to the streets and protests in Russia have continued since then. While the Putin regime does not seem to be in danger, this activity still creates direct and indirect costs for the government, including the challenge of locking up thousands and potential embarrassment on the world stage.

In Figure 1, I chose to capture the ability of improved private coordination as empowering private protest against government, which increases the costs to governments of taking actions that generate private opposition, which shifts the orange line to the left. Consequently, it is unclear whether technology will reduce freedom, by strengthening executives’ controls over their bureaucracies, or increase freedom, by making citizen protest easier. In countries that have large and capable public sectors, such as those in East Asia, I suspect that technology will typically be freedom-reducing. In places where the public sector is weak, then technology seems more likely to encourage regime change, which may lead autocrats to be more cautious.

The core hypothesis put forth in this section is that technology has centralized authority within the government, which can reduce freedom for the rest of us. Direct communication between legitimate leaders and soldiers has reduced the threat of coups. Better monitoring of subordinates has reduced local corruption. The implication of this change is that the centralized authority of autocrats has increased. We now turn to a second hypothesis: that the decline in freedom is associated with the relative weakness of the West.

The decline of the West and the limits on autocracies

The 1990s were a strange time in world history. The Soviet Union was no more. Liberal democracies had triumphed, and they were much wealthier than their alternatives. They were role models for countries emerging from communism. Moreover, the Western democracies were successful enough that they could indulge in the luxury of encouraging others to embrace democracy.

Levitsky and Way emphasize the “international dimension of regime change” and especially the power of “linkage” or “the density of ties (economic, political, diplomatic, social, and organizational) and cross-border flows (of trade and investment, people, and communication) between particular countries and the United States, the European Union (EU), and Western-led multilateral institutions.” These ties led Latin American and Central European countries to democratize in the years after the fall of the Soviet Union.

The two democratizing nations that Levitsky and Way highlight were strongly influenced by the EU and NAFTA. In Slovakia, Vladimír Mečiar “regained control of the government and rapidly sought to eliminate major sources of opposition” and “in the absence of extensive linkage to the West, Mečiar’s autocratic government might well have consolidated power.” But the appeal of access to EU was enormous, and “it employed conditionality in 1997 by rejecting Slovakia’s request to begin accession negotiations due to a failure to meet democratic criteria.” This rejection had political bite, and “Slovakia’s failure to move towards EU membership, for which the EU directly (and very publicly) blamed Mečiar, created a salient electoral issue that benefited the opposition.” In 1998, Slovakia rejected Mečiar and the country has been democratic since then.

The authoritarian PRI (Institutional Revolution Party) controlled Mexico from 1929 to 2000, but the technocratic leadership of the party during the 1990s saw the tremendous economic advantages that could come by enacting NAFTA. While “successive U.S. administrations backed the PRI governments and explicitly excluded democracy from NAFTA negotiations… NAFTA increased Mexico’s salience in the U.S. political arena,” and “as NAFTA negotiations began, the PRI was subjected to intense international scrutiny, including unprecedented media coverage of electoral scandals and US congressional hearings on Mexican human rights”. Mexico’s attempt to placate the United States meant that “by the late 1990s opposition forces had strengthened to the point where they could win national elections” and that “preventing such an outcome would have required large scale fraud or repression, which, given Mexico’s international position, would have been extremely costly.”

Both of these case studies suggest that EU and US influence encouraged democracy in the 1990s either through clear conditionality (as with Slovakia) or through the court of US public opinion (as with Mexico). The democratizing push reflected the Western victory in the Cold War. That victory meant that Western powers looked like role models, and that access to Western markets was enormously profitable. Unlike during the Cold War, when the United States was eager for allies of any political variety, in the 1990s, the West felt sufficiently secure that they could risk alienating countries by pushing democracy.

Indeed, the level of American confidence reached such heights that the United States waged wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq with a stated goal of regime change. When President Bush addressed the nation on October 7, 2001, he said our goal in invading Afghanistan was to “defend not only our precious freedoms, but also the freedom of people everywhere to live and raise their children free from fear.” Two years later, when announcing the invasion of Iraq, President Bush reiterated “we will bring freedom to others and we will prevail” and “we have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and restore control of that country to its own people.” I am not claiming that promoting democracy was the primary objective of either war, but just that a significant number of policymakers believed that it was reasonable to go to war to promote freedom elsewhere.

Those wars were two reasons for the decline in US influence since 2006. While the US military readily defeated the armed forces of both Iraq and Afghanistan, the US government failed to establish lasting democracies in either country. Moreover, the US management of both occupations appeared incompetent to many global observers. The disastrous collapse of an American housing bubble then brought economic suffering not only to the United States but to the world. The United States started to seem far less like a role model, and a less triumphant United States was less likely to take on the mission of democratizing the world.

Europe’s economic clout has also waned over the last thirty years. While the EU produced one-fourth of the world’s gross domestic product in 1990 (at purchasing power parity prices), it produced less than 15 percent of global output in 2024. After 2005, Turkey seemed poised to join the EU, but it never came to be, partially because many Turks opposed EU membership. One Turkish poll in 2013 reported that “while one third of those surveyed agreed Turkey should persevere with the goal of becoming an EU member, two-thirds of the public lean closer to the view that Turkey should not become a full member.” Given those views, it is unsurprising that President Erdoğan supported a political referendum that would entrench his presidential power despite the risk that such a move would alienate the EU.

Europe’s relative economic heft has diminished, partially because of the growth of China. Between 1990 and 2024, China’s share of the world economy rose from 3.6 percent to 19.05 percent. A strong and wealthy China provides an alternative, non-democratic role model, and access to Chinese aid and markets most certainly does not require democratizing reform. Shinn and Eisenman write that “China’s focus on state sovereignty and reluctance to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations have assisted its ability to develop cordial ties with Africa.” Democratic powers are far less dominant now than they were twenty years ago, and that can help explain why freedom has declined since 2012.

Economic freedom and political freedom

Declining belief in the value of economic freedom in the West may also contribute to declining political freedom both in the Western democracies and elsewhere. Milton Friedman famously saw a particularly tight link between economic and political freedom, writing that “capitalism is a necessary condition for political freedom.” Similarly Hayek saw economic planning as leading down the “road to serfdom.” Critics of this perspective have pointed out that the Scandinavian social democracies seem to have enjoyed almost perfect political freedom, even when their economies looked decidedly non-capitalistic. They have also noted that East Asian economies with very limited political freedom have occasionally been hotbeds of capitalism.

Yet even if Friedman’s statement goes too far, there is an essential truth in his perspective. When the public sector has more discretion to interfere with the economy, then it will also have more ability to reward its supporters and punish its opponents. Hugo Chávez’s direct control over Venezuela’s petroleum enabled his domestic and foreign activities, including subsidizing friendly neighbors with cheap oil. Relief from regulation has been one of the most common sources of illicit public revenues throughout history, and those revenues can also be used to enhance political power.

But as the example of Scandinavia illustrates, not all economic interventions empower political executives. If the rules are decided collectively and enforced strictly, then they are not a source of power for the executive. If the rules are ad hoc and decided by the executive on the spot, then economic intervention can help consolidate political strength. In Chávez’s Venezuela or the Shah’s Iran, public oil revenues became a tool for tyranny. In Norway, they did not, partially because oil revenues go largely into a sovereign wealth fund that is managed by the politically independent Norges Bank.

Yet in recent years, political leaders in the United States and EU have championed economic policies, including industrial policy and tariffs, that are largely discretionary. If a politician seeks support from domestic producers of some product, then that politician can reward those producers either with subsidies, now called industrial policy, or with a selective tariff on that product. The politicization of US pre-World War II tariffs generates little hope that any future discretionary tariff policy will somehow be divorced from politics. Moreover, even if the United States limits its discretionary interventions, public support for these policies, from both parties, reinforces the idea that political leaders should have the right to favor some industries over others.

The case for economic freedom would be strong even if there was not a link between economic and political freedom. Yet, as long as economic policy Edward L. Glaeser interventions provide more scope for political leaders to reward and punish, then these interventions will also pose risks to political freedom. If the leaders of the West want to reverse the downward trend in freedom, then they should continue championing both political and economic liberty and continue to be engaged with the world.

Edward L. Glaeser is the Fred and Eleanor Glimp professor of economics at Harvard University, where he has taught microeconomics and urban economics since 1992. Glaeser previously directed the Taubman Center and the Rappaport Institute. He also leads the Urban Working Group at the National Bureau of Economic Research, co-leads the Cities Programme at the International Growth Centre, and is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Glaeser has written hundreds of papers on cities, political economy, and public economics. He received his PhD from the University of Chicago in 1992.

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On March 3, Atlantic Council Senior Advisor Harlan Ullman published an op-ed in the Hill that analyzes the “unprecedented opportunity” the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) has to “make America great.” He argues that Elon Musk’s current leadership style may breed “fierce resentment and anger” among the federal employees who he needs to contribute to government efficiency efforts—especially in the Department of Defense.

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The European Union’s Growth Plan for the Western Balkans aims to accelerate economic growth and convergence in the region—but can it truly deliver? With reform, investment, and EU integration at stake, how can the region turn this initiative into real progress?

Ilva Tare, Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, dives into the risks, opportunities, and challenges with three co-authors of the Atlantic Council’s EU Growth Plan report: Valbona Zeneli, economist and Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council; Richard Grieveson, Deputy Director at the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies; and Isabelle Ioannides, Europe’s Future Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences and the ERSTE Foundation.

Can the Growth Plan restore trust in the EU’s commitment to enlargement, or will political deadlock, limited funding, and institutional struggles stand in the way? What role can private sector investment and regional cooperation play in amplifying its impact? And how can the EU ensure stronger rule of law and accountability as part of the process?

Join us for an in-depth discussion on #BalkansDebrief as we break down what’s at stake for the region’s economic future.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

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Evolution of freedom

The Freedom Index shows two important features of the institutional development process that Kazakhstan has followed in the last three decades. On the one hand, the overall positive trend reflects the goal, maintained throughout the period, to integrate into the global community both politically and economically in order to foster the young country’s security and prosperity. All the strategies the country has adopted over the past thirty years consistently reflect its aspiration to have an open competitive economy and be a respected international actor. The latter implied becoming a functional democracy and complying with international human rights norms. On the other hand, while the government’s commitment to economic liberalization has been fairly consistent and genuine, its record in the areas of good governance, democratization, and human rights could be characterized as patchy at best. The divergent paths of the three freedom subindexes underscore the difference in commitment.  

Fluctuations observed in the Freedom Index can be explained by changes in circumstances and policies. Kazakhstan received a strong initial impulse toward liberalization thanks to the late Soviet perestroika reforms and the Washington Consensus. However, by the end of the 1990s, this impulse was subdued by the consolidation of an authoritarian regime under the country’s first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev. It was also challenged by the Asian financial crisis, which generated serious doubts about the benefits of unconstrained openness to financial and trade markets. In the early 2000s, oil revenues started to increase, and the government was clearly tempted to use the windfall to pursue interventionist and protectionist economic policies. Tensions between state-led development and free market orientations have been present ever since. Economic growth also allowed an enhancement of the social welfare system, which had been damaged by the economic crisis and neoliberal policies of the 1990s. Nazarbayev’s resignation in 2019 and comprehensive reforms laid out by president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in the wake of the dramatic unrest and crackdown in January 2022 created a positive dynamic reflected in the upward trend of the Index.  

Looking at the three freedom subindexes gives a more detailed view of developments in Kazakhstan. The economic subindex is the main contributor to the overall positive trajectory of the aggregate Index. It has been on the ascent and above the region’s average, with the exception of a sudden ten-point decrease in the 2000–04 period. Trade and investment freedom plummeted at that point due to the adoption of new legislation regulating investment, taxes, and environmental requirements. The government grew more assertive in its relations with foreign investors, introduced local content requirements, and renegotiated contracts. But the subindex quickly recovered, and since then has shown a very clear positive trend, which was helped by Kazakhstan’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2015.  

The relatively high score on women’s economic freedom is both a legacy of the Soviet modernization project and its emphasis on recruiting women into the labor force and a product of current circumstances. For many families, two incomes are needed to support a decent standard of living. A positive long-term consequence of the dramatic economic collapse of the late Soviet and early independence years is the high number of women entrepreneurs in Kazakhstan. At the time, many women quit their non-paying jobs and became shuttle traders, importing goods from China and Turkey and selling them in bazaars and small markets. This experience served as an incubator for women entrepreneurs in the country. The trend has been supported by the government and international donors, and nowadays, there is a relatively high share of female entrepreneurs running their own businesses.  

The political subindex shows a sustained deterioration between 1999 and 2019, with a temporary improvement in 2006–10, and a steep rise since 2019. The relatively higher scores of the 1990s represent the ebbing of the liberalization wave started by Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms in the mid-1980s. The super-presidential Constitution adopted in 1995 set Kazakhstan on the path of authoritarian consolidation. The trend is illustrated by the twenty-point fall in political rights of expression and association up until 2019. The situation with civil liberties during that period was better and more complex, as indicated by fluctuations on that component. The 2003, 2012, and 2016 dips are all linked to the adoption of new legislation (a 2003 law on extremism, a 2011 law on religious activities, and several legislative and legal amendments in 2016 targeting “extremism and terrorism”) which limited freedom of conscience in the name of security. However, unlike the almost linear deterioration of the political subindex, each dip was followed by a partial recovery, reflecting a certain degree of internalization of liberal values by the political elites.  

The power transition in Kazakhstan, which started with Nazarbayev’s resignation in 2019 and ended with the “Bloody January” events in 2022, produced a critical juncture for the country. The first event did not change the balance of power— Nazarbayev, his family and associates remained in control, with Nazarbayev still designated “Leader of the Nation”—but it changed the mood in society. People felt that change was possible, and started demanding reforms. Tokayev and his team perceived and tried to respond to this growing demand. They developed policies around the concept of the “hearing state” and experimented with more open local elections. However, under the Nazarbayev/Tokayev duumvirate, the system—long used to a clear and rigid vertical of power—grew confused and ineffective. The citizens’ urge for change led to protests at the beginning of 2022 which, combined with what many observers see as an unsuccessful attempted coup by Nazarbayev loyalists, resulted in the “de-Nazarbayevization” of the system. Unexpectedly, President Tokayev transformed from an appointed successor into a reformist president. While the official goals of the political reforms he has been undertaking are democratization and liberalization, they seem to be primarily aimed at removing the excesses of the super-presidential political system and improving governance. The geopolitical context is a factor affecting the direction and depth of reforms. On the one hand, deepening relations with the West is even more important under the new circumstances, and therefore Western perceptions of the human rights situation in Kazakhstan matter. On the other, there are fears that political liberalization could destabilize and weaken the country, making it more vulnerable to external meddling.  

The legal subindex reflects a very complex situation around the implementation of the rule of law in Kazakhstan. First, the improving quality and responsiveness of the bureaucratic apparatus is well captured by the data. The growing budget in the 2000s allowed the regime to invest in good governance, drawing on the understanding that the best way to reduce contestation and protests is to efficiently provide the population with public services through a well-functioning state. The focus has been on better training of civil servants and digitalization to improve efficiency and accountability (in line with the “hearing state” concept). Every public agency has social media accounts, and its performance assessment takes into account the public communication aspect.  

Second, there is a clear lack of improvement— and even deterioration—in the judicial independence and effectiveness score. The subservience of the judicial branch to the president, introduced by the 1995 Constitution, and the systemic corruption, greatly hindered the development of the rule of law in Kazakhstan. Realizing that this reduces the country’s attractiveness to foreign investors, the government created a legal enclave, the Astana International Financial Center, in 2018. It features its own court and international arbitration center, providing a common law system and employing foreign judges. While this arrangement serves as a quick fix for investor-related issues, it makes the injustices facing the general citizenry even more apparent.  

It is worth noting that President Tokayev initiated a judicial reform aimed at raising the qualifications of judges and legal personnel, “cleaning” the system of corruption, and improving processes and procedures. Over the next five years it will be possible to assess the implementation of that reform. One important positive development is the restoration of the Constitutional Court (the previous body was turned into a “toothless” Constitutional Council by the 1995 Constitution) and inviting highly professional and credible people to serve as judges. 

Evolution of prosperity

Kazakhstan is a large exporter of crude oil, gold, iron ore, copper, aluminum, zinc, uranium, and other metals, bringing substantial revenues to the country. It also produces and sells high-quality durum wheat, an important commodity in international markets. Therefore, it is not surprising that its overall Prosperity Index score has been above the regional average. In addition, the government’s efforts to improve social welfare, drawing on the norms and experiences of the Soviet welfare state, also help Kazakhstan to score better in the education and minorities components of the Index.  

Fluctuations of the inequality component show that economic growth does not necessarily translate into reductions in poverty and inequality, and that positive trends can be reversible. There are substantial spatial disparities in wealth and access to services between the regions and along the rural-urban divide. The two largest cities, Almaty and Astana, are better off, while the oil-producing regions of western Kazakhstan have both high income and high poverty rates and the agricultural and largely rural south ranks poorly on both counts. The government is trying to mend these regional inequalities by investing in infrastructure and changing budget allocations to incentivize regions to generate their own revenues through economic activities.  

The education component of the Index places Kazakhstan within the best performers in the world. It can boast nearly universal enrollment in elementary and secondary education, and high enrollment in tertiary education. The scores, however, do not show the patchy quality of the education provided. The neoliberal reforms of the 1990s responsible for underfunding the sector and “streamlining” schools in rural areas, and the gradual dissipation of the Soviet education system, accompanied by the retirement of Soviet-trained teachers, resulted in growing inequality of access and decreasing quality of instruction in public schools. Standardized tests such as PISA show serious deficiencies in the education of Kazakhstani pupils compared to those of Western Europe or other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. During the Nazarbayev period, the government tried to improve education, which it viewed as a crucial component of economic growth and development, through internationalization and creation of “pockets of excellence,” most importantly the newly established Nazarbayev University and a cluster of Nazarbayev Intellectual Schools, attracting the most talented students with fully funded grants. Tokayev’s government has been working on improving the quality of public, and especially rural, education, by allocating more funding, raising the status and salary of teachers, and reforming teacher training institutions. It also promotes partnerships between established foreign universities and regional universities in Kazakhstan.  

Kazakhstan’s health component has fluctuated above and below the regional average. A steep increase in life expectancy in the 2000s reflects the improvement of the socioeconomic situation and bigger investments in the healthcare system, which enabled Kazakhstan to achieve a substantial decline in infant and maternal mortality, approaching the OECD average. As with the rest of the region, Kazakhstan experienced a decline in life expectancy as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. The stronger negative effect of the pandemic in Kazakhstan compared to the rest of the region might be the outcome of better and more honest statistics. The country’s government was very active in handling the healthcare crisis during the pandemic and carried out a mass vaccination campaign once vaccines became available. The national Healthy Nation project currently being implemented aims to increase life expectancy from the current seventy-five years to seventy-seven within five years. 

Kazakhstan has scored high in the minorities component. Its Constitution outlaws any discrimination “on the grounds of origin, social, official, or property status, sex, race, nationality, language, attitude to religion, convictions, place of residence or any other circumstance.” Managing interethnic relations has been the biggest challenge. In the early days of independence, the country’s leadership crafted an approach carefully balancing the interests of its multiple ethnic groups (especially  Russians) with the need to develop a nation state around the Kazakh identity. Representatives of different ethnic groups compose the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, a special political body, chaired by the president of the country. Five members of the Assembly are elected to the Senate.  

Finally, Kazakhstan scores above the regional average in the environment component. It is not a big carbon emitter, but this is largely due to the country’s small population of 20 million people, dwarfed by its large neighbors in the broader Eurasia region. Kazakhstan’s carbon intensity, that is the amount of carbon dioxide emitted per unit of energy, is high (0.33 kg per kilowatt-hour) and exceeds those of China (0.26 kg/kWh) and India (0.28 kg/kWh). The government has an ambitious decarbonization program, aiming to reach net zero by 2060. 

The path forward

Kazakhstan finds itself at an inflection point. The January 2022 events put a sudden end to the Nazarbayev era, and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine undermined the post-Soviet political and security order. The combined domestic and geopolitical shocks are causing concerns, fears, and anxieties about the present and the future. At the same time, they are creating space for change and new beginnings. Whether Kazakhstan can move toward more freedom and prosperity will be determined by choices made today and tomorrow, and shaped by the domestic dynamic of state-society relations and external incentives and pressures.  

At present, Tokayev’s reform agenda points to further liberalization of the system. We can expect an improvement in the political subindex: modest improvements on the elections, political rights, and legislative constraints on the executive components; and more substantial improvements on the civil liberties component. The situation with religious freedoms might not improve, but will probably not deteriorate either, despite growing concerns about radical Islamism and terrorism. The legal subindex scores are likely to grow, particularly the judicial independence and effectiveness and bureaucracy and corruption components. There will also be improvement of prosperity scores due to active policies on women’s empowerment, inclusion of people with disabilities, and decarbonization efforts.  

For the gradual liberalization agenda to work, on the domestic side, the state needs to maintain the will for reforms and capacity to implement them with a substantial degree of success, and society needs to be interested in reforms and exercise consistent pressure. If the relations between the two grow conflictual (fueled by inequalities and grievances), there is a risk that the reforms will be curtailed. There will be more clarity about the trajectory of Kazakhstan’s development by 2029, the year when president Tokayev’s single term comes to an end. It is important to keep in mind that there are anti-liberal as well as pro-liberal forces in Kazakhstan’s society. Growing social conservatism that accompanies Islamic revival could become a formidable challenge over the next ten years.  

On the geopolitical side, the liberalization agenda needs to be incentivized and supported by the West. Such a partnership would be useful for both parties—but not easy for either. Kazakhstan wants deeper relations with the West in order to develop and not be overwhelmed by its giant neighbors, Russia and China. However, it needs to build those relationships gently, to avoid angering Moscow and annoying Beijing too much. For the United States, European countries, and others, the challenge is to engage in an effective manner, providing the right incentives. Unlike in the 1990s, the supremacy of the West is now being challenged, and new approaches and ways of dealing with countries like Kazakhstan are needed.  

Taking into account internal and external factors, I can envisage three scenarios. The first, optimistic, scenario, “More freedom and prosperity,” hinges on the success of liberalization reforms and a benign external environment. Under this scenario, President Tokayev and his team are able to successfully implement some reforms, giving them more legitimacy, and Kazakhstani society keeps pushing for more liberalization. Tokayev ends his term in 2029, as defined by the Constitutional amendment, and there is a peaceful power transfer. Relations with the West are strong, Russia accepts the new situation, and China finds it useful for managing relations with Europe. Kazakhstan is not a liberal democracy, but it is on a promising path, gradually internalizing liberal values and norms.  

The second scenario, “Prosperity at the expense of freedom,” implies limited reforms, skewed in favor of professional state and socioeconomic goals. The leadership decides that tightening control over society with the help of traditional and new (digital) surveillance means is a must, and there is no need to pay too much attention to what Western actors think and say on the matter. The aspiration is to be a functional authoritarian state, and that means accepting being a political and economic satellite of China, the new superpower.  

The third scenario, “No freedom and no prosperity,” is a sad story of Kazakhstan imploding from internal tensions and/or destabilized from outside. The January 2022 events provided a glimpse of such destabilization. Transformation of a consolidated, personalized and corrupt authoritarian regime into a softer and better governed one is a way to prevent conflicts and improve the development trajectory of the country, but as with all modernizations, it can be unsettling and pregnant with risks. Russia, unhappy with Kazakhstan “drifting away,” decides to “bring it to heel” using hybrid war methods. 

Nargis Kassenova is a senior fellow and director of the Program on Central Asia at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University. Kassenova’s research focuses on Central Asian politics and security, Eurasian geopolitics, China’s Belt and Road Initiative, governance in Central Asia, and the history of state-making in Central Asia.

“The Atlantic Council and its staff, fellows, and directors generate their own ideas and programming, consistent with the Council’s mission, their related body of work, and the independent records of the participating team members. The Council as an organization does not adopt or advocate positions on particular matters. The Council’s publications always represent the views of the author(s) rather than those of the institution.”

2024 Atlas: Freedom and Prosperity Around the World

Twenty leading economists and government officials from eighteen countries contributed to this comprehensive volume, which serves as a roadmap for navigating the complexities of contemporary governance. 

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Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

Learn more

The post Surrounded by superpowers, Kazakhstan walks a geopolitical tightrope appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Evolution of freedom

Poland, along with the three Baltic states, stands as one of history’s most remarkable examples of how embracing democratic institutions and a free-market economy can radically transform a nation and propel it onto a trajectory of rapid development. Following an unprecedented transition in 1989, Poland and other former communist bloc nations successfully established the three foundational pillars of a free society—rule of law, democracy, and market economy—guided by frameworks like the Freedom Index. Although the Index’s coverage begins only in 1995, when many key reforms were already implemented, Poland’s journey in the subsequent decades offers valuable insights. Notable milestones include its accession to the European Union (EU) in 2004 and, more recently, significant challenges to the rule of law starting in 2015, which is the primary focus of this piece. 

The political shift following the 2015 parliamentary elections serves as an archetype of what might be called a “bad transition.” In such scenarios, authoritarian leaders or parties rise to power through legitimate electoral processes—a necessary but insufficient condition for true democracy—and proceed to systematically erode institutional independence, particularly within the justice system and civil service. The Law and Justice Party (PiS), under Jarosław Kaczyński’s leadership, secured a decisive victory in a fair election but quickly revealed its authoritarian tendencies. The sharp decline in political and legal subindexes from 2016 onward vividly illustrates this regression. 

Among the political subindex components, the most severe deterioration occurred in political rights, driven largely by the PiS’s capture of public media, turning it into a propaganda tool. Fortunately, private media outlets managed to resist government pressure and served as a critical counterbalance. 

However, the most dangerous attack came against the judiciary, as evidenced by the more than thirty-five-point drop in the judicial independence component within the legal subindex. Legislative changes in 2016 merged the roles of prosecutor-general and minister of justice, granting a political appointee sweeping powers over the judicial system, including appointments, promotions, and case allocations to specific prosecutors. This effectively undermined safeguards for prosecutorial independence, which allowed compliant prosecutors to be rewarded and dissenters punished. Judicial independence similarly eroded under politicized appointment processes. 

Poland’s judicial system survived this assault primarily due to the vigorous defense mounted by civil society and advocacy groups. The rulings of the European Court of Justice in 2021 and 2023, alongside political pressure from the European Commission, played a crucial role, but these external interventions would likely have been insufficient without the active involvement of Polish non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and grassroots organizations. 

PiS was unsuccessful in undermining the free elections, and those held in 2023 were democratic. The newly elected government has prioritized the restoration of judicial independence, a commitment that has led to the European Commission’s recent decision to terminate the Article 7(1) Treaty on European Union (TEU) procedure, citing that “there is no longer a clear risk of a serious breach of the rule of law in Poland.” 

Turning to the economic subindex, several notable aspects deserve attention. From the early 1990s, the anticipation of eventual EU membership spurred a series of significant liberalizing reforms. Between Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004 and 2016, the country benefited from increasing policy credibility and access to the common market for trade and capital, driving a robust convergence process with other EU member states. 

However, during the years of PiS governance, economic freedom suffered, primarily due to increased nationalizations and expansion of the state sector in the economy. Higher fiscal spending and growing budget deficits during this period Evolution of Prosperity further weighed on economic freedom, representing a clear drag on progress in this area. 

Despite these challenges, the economic subindex reflects an overarching positive trajectory, largely attributed to a notable increase in women’s economic opportunities. A rare positive legacy of the socialist era is the strong foundation of gender equality within Polish society, particularly in economic participation. The sharp rise in this indicator in 2010 aligns with the adoption of European regulations promoting equal treatment—standards that were already a widespread practice in Poland. 

Evolution of prosperity

The Polish economy has undergone a remarkable convergence with the EU. In 1990, Poland’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was less than 40 percent of the EU average. Over the past twenty-five years, this gap has significantly narrowed, reaching 83 percent of the EU average by 2023. 

A notable aspect of Poland’s economic performance is its resilience during the 2008 financial crisis, which left no significant negative impact on the country’s economy. As illustrated in Figure 1, Poland’s GDP per capita growth remained consistently positive from 1992 until the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. In contrast, the financial crisis, followed by the debt crisis, had substantial repercussions in neighboring countries such as Estonia and Latvia, not to mention the severe impacts felt in Greece. Consequently, Poland today is wealthier than all these countries, despite having a lower GDP per capita than each of them in 2007. 

Finally, it is worth noting a significant external factor that has boosted the Polish economy in recent years, namely, the absorption of around one million Ukrainian refugees since the beginning of the Russian aggression on Ukraine. In 2023, estimates suggested that Ukrainian refugees contributed between 0.7 and 1.1 percent to GDP in Poland.

Figure 1. Real GDP per capita in selected countries

Source: World Bank, GDP per capita, measured in purchasing power parity (PPP), constant 2021 international dollars.

When analyzing the health component, it is evident that persistent challenges remain. Poland’s life expectancy continues to lag behind EU averages, particularly among men, who face a gap of over four years. Lifestyle factors such as high rates of tobacco and alcohol consumption account for much of this disparity. While smoking rates in Poland have declined in parallel with the EU, alcohol consumption has stagnated since 2007, posing an ongoing public health concern. Alcohol consumption is more than three times higher among men. Similarly, 28 percent of Polish men smoke tobacco, compared with only 20 percent of women. 

Figure 2. Life expectancy by gender, EU vs Poland, 1990-2019

Source: World Bank.

The socialist economic system proved to be detrimental not only to consumers but also to the environment. The shift toward market-oriented policies in Poland significantly reduced the volume of emissions required to generate additional income per capita. However, the transition to an environmentally sustainable economy is not yet complete, as coal continues to play an important role in industry and energy generation. EU regulations in this area are expected to drive further change and the adoption of environmentally sustainable policies, though the pace of the reform will be a critical factor. While there is a risk that some of these regulations may be overly severe or implemented too quickly, the general direction of these measures is undeniably positive. 

Turning to the minorities component, it seems clear that the marked decline in this component beginning in 2015 correlates with the rise to power of the PiS government. A detailed analysis of the underlying data confirm this connection. The sharp drop primarily reflects increased discrimination in access to public sector employment and business opportunities based on political The Path Forward affiliation. This decline illustrates the previously mentioned politicization of public institutions, including the prosecution office and public media, among other agencies that should have remained neutral and independent. 

The path forward

Following the turbulent tenure of the previous government, support for democracy and the rule of law has strengthened in Poland. Consequently, there is little reason for concern, in my opinion, about the stability of these institutions in the near future. Instead, the more pressing issue lies in sustaining economic growth. Although Poland has significantly narrowed the income gap with the EU, including Germany, disparities remain, and the country faces several unresolved challenges requiring a new wave of reforms. 

One persistent issue is the incomplete privatization process initiated in the 1990s. The public sector’s share in the economy remains high—one of the largest in Europe. To ensure sustained growth, Poland must pursue privatization and enhance competition in sectors like energy and oil processing. Unfortunately, no major political party has presented a comprehensive strategy for addressing this issue. Nonetheless, a carefully planned privatization initiative is essential for medium- and long-term economic growth. 

Another major challenge is excessive fiscal spending, largely driven by social welfare programs. What is more, this spending is not effectively targeted, as it does not primarily benefit the poorest households. The tax and transfer system has a minimal impact on reducing income inequality. For instance, the “Family 500+” program, introduced by PiS and later expanded by the current government, provides universal child allowances irrespective of income and number of children in a given household. Such unselective transfers are more characteristic of populist policies than measures aimed at addressing inequality. 

Finally, Poland shares demographic challenges with other developed nations, particularly the rapid aging of its population. Without substantial reforms, economic growth is likely to slow further, and fiscal pressures will intensify. Polish civil society has shown remarkable resilience in defending democratic institutions during recent crises. With these threats now neutralized, it is crucial for citizens to channel this energy to pressure the current government to implement essential reforms. These efforts will be vital to ensuring continued prosperity over the coming decade. 

Leszek Balcerowicz is an economist and professor of economics at the Warsaw School of Economics. He served as deputy prime minister and minister of finance in the first non-communist government in Poland after 1989 (1989–91), and again between 1997 and 2000. He was president of the National Bank of Poland from 2001–07. A member of the Washington-based international advisory body Group of Thirty, he is founder and chairman of the Civil Development Forum, a Warsaw-based think tank. 

The author is grateful to Bartłomiej Jabrzyk for assistance in the preparation of this paper. 

“The Atlantic Council and its staff, fellows, and directors generate their own ideas and programming, consistent with the Council’s mission, their related body of work, and the independent records of the participating team members. The Council as an organization does not adopt or advocate positions on particular matters. The Council’s publications always represent the views of the author(s) rather than those of the institution.”

2024 Atlas: Freedom and Prosperity Around the World

Twenty leading economists and government officials from eighteen countries contributed to this comprehensive volume, which serves as a roadmap for navigating the complexities of contemporary governance. 

Read the Book

Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

Learn more

The post Poland’s democracy stands firm, but its economy faces headwinds appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Evolution of freedom

Spain became a democratic country only fifty years ago, through a paradigmatic transition process from Franco’s autocratic regime to becoming one of the freest and most advanced modern democracies in the world. Just eight years after the approval of the democratic Constitution of 1978, Spain joined the European Union (EU), and by the year 2000 the country also became part of the European Economic and Monetary Union. The European dream (and the Maastricht requirements) led to an extremely deep and fast transformation of the country in terms of democratic freedoms and economic liberties. That is, the most important reforms in Spain took place before 1995, and thus are already accounted for at the beginning of the period covered by the Freedom Index. Although many reforms and improvements in the Spanish institutional framework have been undertaken in the last thirty years, the profound transformation of the country during the 1980s and early 1990s needs to be underscored for an adequate interpretation of the data compiled in this Atlas.

This is particularly relevant when trying to explain the evolution of the economic subindex since 1995. A close look at the different components shows that the scores on trade and investment freedom, as well as on property rights protection, have been high throughout the period, and it is the radical improvement in women’s economic freedom that single-handedly drives the overall positive trend of this subindex. Both tendencies are accurate. On the one hand, the bulk of the regulations and policies related to trade and investment are determined at the EU level, ensuring a common and extremely open environment for all member states, both within the Union’s borders and with the rest of the world. Additionally, European institutions make it very difficult for national governments to interfere in foreign investment, and very significantly reduce expropriation risks. Therefore, property rights protection is relatively high, and the mild deterioration observed in this component between 2005 and 2014 probably just captures some isolated disputes between the government and some large companies regarding subsidies to green energies that peaked in the 2008–10 period, together with the temporary uncertainty generated by the sovereign debt crisis of 2010–12.

On the other hand, the radical progress made in women’s economic opportunities, autonomy, and independence is one of the most important developments in recent Spanish economic history, and the effects have been astonishing. As Figure 1 below shows, female labor force participation increased from barely 40 percent in 1991 to 70 percent today, completely closing the gap with respect to the EU average. Educational attainment among current generations is higher for females than males, and there is no significant inequality in terms of access to the labor market for recent graduates. Nonetheless, it is clear that policies aimed at helping families and especially women in their work-life balance have not progressed accordingly and the gender gap has mutated into a very significant maternity gap. To be sure, this is a generalized problem in developed societies, but it is undeniable that some countries are able to tackle it better than others. I believe that today, this factor explains the noteworthy gap observed in Figure 1 with respect to the most advanced countries of the world (8 percentage points below Denmark or 12 below Sweden). The very substantial extension of paternity leave is certainly an important policy tool in this respect and Spain has passed a series of reforms in the area, already achieving equalization. Anyhow, it is still very common that women are pushed to part-time jobs after having the first child, which is, in most cases, not the result of a voluntary expression of their preferences, but the only option to continue their professional careers while having a family. Overall, it seems clear that, after a very successful integration of women into the labor market, Spain needs to continue implementing policies in the areas of more accessible childcare and work flexibility so mothers can develop professionally on equal terms with their male counterparts.

Figure 1. Female labor force participation rate (% of female population aged 15–64)

The political subindex situates Spain as one of the most democratic countries of the world. The components measuring the quality of elections and civil and political rights receive very high scores throughout the 1995–2023 period, with very minor fluctuations. This is especially relevant given the political rollercoaster of the last decade, and most importantly when one recalls that Spain endured in 2017 the most serious challenge to the democratic institutional framework in decades, namely, the Catalan independence crisis. The culmination of that process was the unilateral declaration of independence by which the Catalan government tried to subvert the Constitutional order and exchange it for a different “Catalan” set of independent laws, ignoring the legal and democratic procedures to do so, without the necessary majorities in either the Catalan parliament or the national Congress in Madrid, and consciously disobeying several Constitutional Court rulings on the matter, in order to unilaterally proclaim the independence of Catalonia from the rest of the nation. The response on the political and judicial fronts was certainly firm and strong, at all times according to the legal provisions and constitutional powers granted to the different branches of power. This is well captured by the absence of any significant movements of the judicial independence component included in the Freedom Index. Nonetheless, the outcome of the process involved the imprisonment of several political leaders, which is undoubtedly an exceptional situation in developed and well-established democracies. The very recent clemency measures exercised by Pedro Sánchez’s government have generated a heated debate among the Spanish public but are probably a reasonable step to normalize the situation.

Besides the very particular situation in Catalonia, the Spanish political atmosphere shares various contemporaneous features with many other established democracies in Europe and North America. In particular, the emergence of extremist parties at both sides of the political spectrum and an increase in populist rhetoric and conduct are certainly worrisome. One of the effects of the greater political fragmentation that started in 2015 is the growing difficulties in approving laws and relevant reforms in parliament. This explains the significant upsurge in the use of emergency legislative instruments that emanate directly from the executive (real decreto ley), and are only ratified by parliament after their implementation, in a process that limits public debate and impedes the possibility of introducing amendments or changes. Originally envisioned as an exceptional instrument to be used in very restricted situations, the different governments in the last decade have turned to this tool as a way to circumvent the legislative process and overcome a situation of parliamentary weakness. To give a sense of the issue, during the fourteen years of Felipe Gonzalez’s presidency (1982–96), 130 norms of this kind were passed. Pedro Sánchez, who has held the presidency since June 2018, has already passed 167 such decrees. There is no doubt that this tendency, together with other legislative strategies like the practice of proposing omnibus laws that contain a wide variety of heterogenous and unrelated measures, erodes the legislative and controlling powers of parliament, which could explain Spain’s relatively low score on the legislative constraints on the executive component of the political subindex.

Among the components of the legal subindex, I think clarity of the law, and bureaucracy and corruption are the most relevant for understanding the Spanish situation in relation to the rule of law. Regarding the former, the quantity and ambiguity of Spanish legislation, much higher than in neighboring countries, is certainly a matter of concern. The very decentralized quasi-federal system designed in the 1978 Constitution has proven beneficial in many aspects, but has also produced undeniable overregulation, generating economic inefficiency and legal uncertainty. This problem especially affects small and medium-sized businesses, which find it really difficult to navigate the legal system and comply with all its requirements. Even more so when there is a clear lack of proper coordination mechanisms between different levels of government, as during the pandemic crisis.

The massive real estate boom of the 1990s and early 2000s produced numerous adverse economic distortions that will be addressed in the next section. The real estate boom fueled political corruption, especially among local governments in charge of granting construction permits. Upon joining the Eurozone, the very favorable economic conditions produced by lower risk perceptions and easy credit worked as a mirage, making it difficult for citizens and voters to extract the signals from the economy they needed to judge and control political leaders. Uncovered corruption scandals seemed to have few electoral consequences for the parties or individuals involved. The financial crisis painfully exposed the situation, and widespread corrupt practices became apparent, infuriating a citizenry that was suffering the severe effects of austerity policies while newspapers were filled with political scandals and excesses. There is excessive politicization of some parts of the state apparatus, especially in the regional and local bureaucracies, as well as among top public officials in supervisory or regulatory agencies. These officials, who should have detected and prevented the situation, failed to do so, probably influenced by political considerations. Demands for a substantial regeneration of the system led to the emergence of two new parties on the extreme left (Podemos) and center (Ciudadanos) of the political spectrum with a clear anti-corruption agenda. Anyhow, during the last decade, change has been very modest on this front and very few initiatives have been put forward to reduce abuses of influence by political parties on independent agencies.

Finally, the quality of bureaucracy does not seem to be much worse in Spain than in other comparable countries, but there are three factors that may generate a certain degree of inefficiency: aging public servants; the low level of digitalization, especially of publicly available data for the evaluation of public policies; and the sometimes perverse incentives associated with lifetime jobs typical in the public sector. A modernization of the administration, with a special focus on these three areas, would unquestionably be beneficial for the country. Unfortunately, the political costs of such reforms make them improbable in the near future.

Evolution of prosperity

In economic terms, from the 1970s to the mid-2000s Spain followed a solid path of convergence with the EU average. From being about 30 percent below the mean income per capita in the EU, the gap was closed to 9 percent in 2006. However, the trajectory started to diverge since the financial crisis, and today Spain’s income per capita is about 15 percent lower than the EU’s average.

It is not clear that the implicit assumption of the European Economic and Monetary Union—that if low productivity countries were stripped of the capacity to devalue their currency, they would be forced to make institutional reforms favoring efficiency gains through human capital accumulation, improved technology adoption, etc.—has worked as expected. This push from outside certainly helped Spain to drastically reform the country during the 1980s to enter the European Economic Community and then to meet the Maastricht requirements to join the euro. But once these goals were accomplished, the drop in the risk perception for the country led to high amounts of capital inflows and cheap credit, and a relaxation of the political constraints, which fueled a giant real estate bubble. Just to give an idea of its magnitude, at the peak of the boom in 2007, about two-thirds of the houses built in the EU were built in Spain, and about one in every four male workers was employed in construction-related activities.

As became apparent during the financial crisis, Spain’s fast catch-up growth was not founded on solid grounds but was based on a low productivity economic structure with severe imbalances. Some of the factors causing the low levels of productivity of the Spanish economy include: a bias toward low value-added sectors such as tourism and related services, proliferation of small firms and businesses, relatively low human capital accumulation, and a segmented labor market (temporary versus permanent workers). As a result, the recovery from the crisis was extremely painful and slower than in neighboring countries, taking the country ten years to recover the pre-crisis level of income per capita. Once again forced by external factors, some relevant liberalizing reforms were implemented following the banking bail-out by the “troika” (EU, International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank) in 2012, the austerity measures helped to contain public debt, and growth and job creation reignited for a few years until 2019.

The economic effects of the pandemic were significant, but Spain’s recovery has been surprisingly strong. Despite having a very difficult governance situation and a precarious and unstable majority in parliament, Sánchez has managed to stay in power and pass some relevant reforms in a large left-wing coalition. These include the already mentioned extension of paternity leave, a cumulative minimum salary rise of more than 50 percent with no substantial negative effects on the economy or job creation, and a new labor regulation that has improved the situation of temporary workers. Unfortunately, other much-needed structural reforms have not been pursued in the last decade, as I will point out in the final section.

The evolution of inequality has two important specificities. First, it is closely linked to labor market performance. The fundamental source of inequality in Spain is between those with permanent and relatively stable jobs and those who are endlessly switching between employment, underemployment, and unemployment. The extreme volatility of unemployment in Spain, which reached 24 percent in 1994, went down to 8.2 percent in 2007, rose again to 26.1 percent in 2013, and is today around 12.5 percent, reflects the volatile evolution of inequality observed in the data. Second, children and youth in particular suffer from this pattern, and it is very discouraging to see that Spain performs significantly worse than other OECD countries in terms of infant poverty and youth unemployment, despite some policies implemented to tackle this problem in recent years.

The treatment of minorities is inseparable from the immigration debate. From the mid-1990s to the Great Recession, Spain received more than four million immigrants, a remarkable inflow for a country with a population of around forty million in 1995. The absorption process has proven very successful by all standards, compared to other countries in Europe, due to a combination of good integration policies and a cultural factor, as a very large share of the immigrants came from Spanish speaking countries of Latin America. In general terms, social unrest associated with immigration is very low in Spain, and this is something to celebrate. But at the same time, being one of the EU’s border countries with North Africa generates a constant f low of migrants trying to cross to Spain illegally at the Moroccan border, as well as by sea in small boats, which many times ends in catastrophic loss of life. The eruption of an extreme-right political party with a hard, sometimes outright xenophobic, discourse on illegal immigration is contributing to the increasing perception of immigration as a problem in Spain, and it has proven extremely difficult to reach a consensus on adequate policies regarding the close to 400,000 illegal immigrants already in the country.

The universalization of education in Spain was a great milestone in the 1980s, but the lack of a profound modernizing reform in the last three decades has exposed numerous structural deficiencies in the system. This is a clear example of a real political topic that very much matters to the average citizen, but because it is so politically loaded, it is only used by the political elites as a political weapon, endlessly postponing necessary reform. The incentive scheme to attract good students to the educational profession, which has proven the cornerstone of the best systems of the world, has not been addressed in the numerous educational laws passed since 1990. Moreover, according to comparative data from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the system is not managing to truly succeed in the two most important academic objectives: generating excellent students; and improving the situation of vulnerable students. In fact, poor students are four times as likely to repeat a school year as rich students. Additionally, the fact that educational spending is decided by regional governments generates substantial differences in levels of investment per student, creating unacceptable inequalities of opportunity among children living in different areas of the country. An interesting fact observable in the data is the high dropout rates (among the highest in the EU) in the 1995—2008 period, produced by a kind of “Dutch disease” attributable to the construction boom that pulled thousands of young Spaniards to leave school early to work in the housing sector. A few years later, they found themselves in an extremely precarious situation, combining unemployment with very low human capital. Fortunately, since 2010 Spain has managed to significantly reduce dropout rates, advancing towards convergence again with the European average.

The Spanish healthcare system is internationally recognized as one of the best of the world, with a combination of efficiency and low expenditure that has produced outstanding results in the last four decades. Moreover, the quality and excellence in some areas like transplants is a source of national pride. The relatively large shock produced by the COVID-19 pandemic in terms of excess mortality was, in my view, due to the fact that Spain was one of the first countries to be severely hit, and thus was not as prepared as those who could learn which policies and measures had been effective elsewhere. The lack of integrated digital information and insufficient coordination between regional administrations and the central government, caused by excessive politicization, were arguably detrimental as well, but probably were not the main factor.

Spain has taken advantage of its unparalleled natural environment and conditions to produce green energy, especially solar and wind power, which has allowed the country to become one of the leaders in renewable energies and the green transition. Moreover, recent research has documented a clear disconnect between GDP and pollution levels in the country, evidence that environmentally sustainable economic growth is a real possibility for developed nations.

The path forward

Since the promulgation of the democratic Constitution of 1978, Spain has experienced the largest improvement in prosperity in the country’s modern history. The country’s current position in the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes corroborates this fact. Nonetheless, the reform impulse seems to have slowed in the last decade, and it is imperative that it is reinvigorated if the country is to take advantage of the opportunities lying ahead to continue improving the standards of living of its citizens. I am particularly concerned that the important windfall of resources represented by the NextGenerationEU funds—of which Spain, together with Italy, is the largest beneficiary—may translate into insufficient structural reform. The relaxation of political constraints thanks to the apparent easy availability of resources, both external and internal, could easily lead to a complacency trap, hampering the reform impetus. Given the divergent productivity trajectory of Spain vis-à-vis the EU and the growing spending and investment needs, Spain needs to ensure sustained increases in productivity for the next decade, and this will require some fundamental reforms.

Medium-term fiscal sustainability is a central area of concern, especially regarding the pension system, due to the extremely challenging demographic prospects for Spain. The flip in the population pyramid projected in the medium term will produce a dramatic rise in the proportion of the population above sixty-five years old, from the current 35 percent to 75 percent by 2050. The Spanish pay-as-you-go pension system has produced deficits since 2010, and these can only increase unless a rigorous reform is put in place. Unfortunately, this is a politically thorny issue and reforms of the system in 2021 and 2023 have gone in the opposite direction, eliminating previous restrictions to limit the system’s growth—such as demographic or economic growth considerations—and ensuring the automatic update of pensions with the price index.

First and foremost, the educational system requires a profound overhaul with the clear aim of improving its quality at all levels, with a long-term vision that necessarily requires an ample political consensus. Some central aspects of such a reform should involve: (1) the selection process for teachers and professors, in order to attract the most talented, improving their remuneration and social recognition; (2) a decided commitment to excellence, especially at the university level, extending the incentives for top researchers to return and stay in Spain; (3) a focus on improving the effectiveness of active labor market policies so they actually help to redeploy workers into sectors where the demand is rising, such as tech or clean energy; and (4) a significant expansion of educational reinforcement for students with learning difficulties and especially those from marginalized and less favorable social backgrounds.

The current political fragmentation is a strong source of concern for Spain. The two parties in the center of the political spectrum (Social Democrat and Conservative), which have alternated in power since the 1980s, now have meaningful competition coming from their respective extremes. This has led to a pernicious increase in polarization and poses serious impediments to reaching transversal agreements indispensable to push forward structural reform. The capacity to reach agreements among those with different political views, epitomized in Spain during the democratic transition, needs to become a reality again. This, however, should by no means stop governments pushing forward small incremental policies to help advance in some key areas such as education.

The reduced tensions in Catalonia nowadays cannot lead to the conclusion that territorial conflict in Spain is a problem of the past. A reform of the federal system consecrated in the Constitution should contribute to setting up clearer rules regarding the relative powers of the regions and the central government, the financing system, common public services and their minimum standards, and the establishment of the necessary coordination mechanisms to ensure the efficient collaboration of all levels of government. The current strategy of bilateral negotiations between the central government and each of the regional administrations does not seem optimal, as the national government’s dependence on small Catalan and Basque parliamentary groups is likely to produce agreements involving a reduction of interregional transfers that will inevitably be rejected by poorer regions. Once again, only a consensus among the two majoritarian parties seems to be a potentially successful path on this front.

Finally, there are non-negligible signs of institutional erosion produced by the current government’s insufficient respect for formal and implicit agreements regarding the independence of important agencies and institutions. I am not naïve on this matter. It is clear that no public agency is perfectly independent since it is led and formed by individuals who obviously have political opinions. However, the president appointing some of his former cabinet members as general attorney, Constitutional Court justice, or governor of the central bank could lead to a dangerous slippery slope of institutional deterioration if those patterns are established as a point of departure by future governments.

Toni Roldán Monés is the director of the ESADE Center for Economic Policy (EsadeEcPol) and visiting professor in practice at the School of Public Policy of the London School of Economics (LSE). Prior to joining ESADE, Roldán was a Member of the Spanish Parliament, and economics spokesman and head of policy for Ciudadanos, a centrist party. Roldán has worked as a senior political risk analyst at Eurasia Group, the European Commission, and the European Parliament.

The Atlantic Council and its staff, fellows, and directors generate their own ideas and programming, consistent with the Council’s mission, their related body of work, and the independent records of the participating team members. The Council as an organization does not adopt or advocate positions on particular matters. The Council’s publications always represent the views of the author(s) rather than those of the institution.

2024 Atlas: Freedom and Prosperity Around the World

Twenty leading economists and government officials from eighteen countries contributed to this comprehensive volume, which serves as a roadmap for navigating the complexities of contemporary governance. 

Read the Book

Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

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Meanwhile, the West and its partners, caught up in defending democracy and human rights, feel guilt over their failure to stabilize Libya following an intervention that bizarrely morphed from a mission to protect a population from Muammar Gaddafi’s wrath into one of regime change. Consequently, the coalition has yet again turned to an inept United Nations (UN)to push for democratic change through elections. However, this goal has not materialized and is unlikely to do so in the near future.

Historically, other countries have approached resolving the situation in Libya with a mindset of “what’s in it for me?,” highlighting how national and regional interests shape attempts at change—particularly in the context of Libya. This was similarly true during UN discussions on how to address Italian colonies taken by the Allies post-World War II and the intense negotiations among the United States, European countries, and Russia regarding Libya’s fate in the late 1940s. Notably, strong views were expressed by Azzam Pasha (an Egyptian diplomat who was at the time the secretary general of the Arab League) regarding Egypt’s interests in Libya. Such discussions have an eerie similarity to today’s regional and international negotiations about Libya’s future.

Currently, the motivations for international involvement in Libya are shaped by three main concerns: 1) Europe’s alarm over the massive scale of illegal migration flowing through porous Libyan borders and its significant security and socioeconomic implications; 2) unease about the potential downward spiral of sociopolitical conditions in North African and Sahel states, which could undermine the economic interests of major corporations in the region; and 3) worry that a chaotic and fragile state may allow terrorist entities to thrive and potentially spread, escalating security threats.

In the eyes of the international community, these concerns require dealing with a central authority in Libya, regardless of the authority’s perceived legitimacy or its true value to the Libyan people and their institution building. These factors have, in part, led to a series of poorly devised proposals and roadmaps put forth by the UN and endorsed by international actors, which have resulted in little progress and worsened the divisions currently observed in Libya today.

From my observations during my frequent visits to the country and my conversations with Libyan leaders, politicians, and academics, I have identified five reasons why previous efforts put forth by the international community to shape a modern state in Libya have failed.

First, there are historical roots of division that have not yet been addressed. This is one of the reasons why the numerous attempts by multiple representatives of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to engage Libyan actors in various stabilizing roadmaps over the last thirteen years have failed miserably. The last effort, expected to lead to elections in December 2022, went nowhere due to political wrangling between two executive bodies and two legislative ones located—by no coincidence—in the eastern and western parts of the country, reflecting the historical divisions between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. It is practically impossible to envision effective presidential and parliamentary elections occurring in the near future without acknowledging these historical roots of division.

Second, it is clear that political and security actors on the ground in both regions of Libya have exploited these divisions for their own political and financial benefit through alliances with benefactor militias, corrupt entrepreneurs, members of the nouveau riche, and cross-border smugglers. This blend of neo-militocracy and kleptocracy heavily influences political and security decisions in the executive, legislative, judicial, and security branches in Libya, ensuring that national and international distractions allow them to remain in power for the foreseeable future.

Third, after forty-two years of oppression and a dismissal of rights and democracy under Gaddafi, as well as additional fourteen years of poverty and insecurity following the collapse of state institutions in 2011, the populace is busy with surviving day by day and lacks the means necessary to express their discontent. This, along with a sense of defeat regarding their aspirations for a better life following the failed Arab Spring, renders it unlikely that any significant movement will arise from the streets of Libyan cities in the near future, creating grounds for the continuation of the status quo.

Fourth and most importantly, the emergence of more pressing global conflicts and a shift in the international community’s priorities over the past four years, particularly with a focus on Ukraine and Southeast Asia, has diminished the attention and resources devoted to Libya’s situation. That is the case despite the fact that the West is concerned about the exponential growth of Russian and Chinese influence in Libya and the African continent at large. 

Last, it is clear that the populations of many developing countries, particularly in the Middle East and Africa (including Libya), perceive Western governments to have lost their moral compass and can no longer be trusted as custodians of democratic and humanitarian change. This perception has been exacerbated by the catastrophe that has befallen the Arab people of Gaza—which countries in the West either failed to prevent or openly supported. Thus, in the eyes of the Libyan people, the West’s ability to recommend, supervise, or contribute to any democratic or nation-building initiatives has become compromised. This observation reinforces a decade-long sentiment among Arabs that it is not uncommon for Western governments to support and deal with autocracies and militaries throughout the Arab world—from Algeria to Egypt to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States—contributing to their skepticism about elections and hopes for democratic change.

One of the few successes in Libya since 2020 (the year that marked the end of the civil war that divided the country into territories east and west of the city of Sirte), is that the line dividing the country has become more distinct. Today, Libya has two governments, effectively two legislative bodies, and two security entities controlling the political, economic, and daily operations in their respective regions. Ironically—despite initial unifying efforts to address the disastrous situation in the aftermath of Storm Daniel in 2023, which claimed nearly twelve thousand lives—grand reconstruction opportunities in the regions have instead led to further segmentation of decision making and project funding. Such mega-funding and the anticipated engagement of international corporations and governments has only further entrenched Libya’s split.

Thus, Libya is currently a de facto two-state entity. The elusive internationally recognized government based in Tripoli exists primarily to allow the international community and its corporations to advance their own interests, failing to address the complex realities on the ground in Libya. International players such as China, Russia, and others are moving within Libya with disregard to issues of migration or border security, and are more focused on strategic economic engagement with Africa. This further undermines European and US interests while taking advantage of the West’s inertia and lack of clear strategy and engagement in Libya. 

Furthermore, Libyans have grown disillusioned with the role of the international community and the United Nations, and they no longer trust or see much value in UNSMIL. Libyans are now gradually accepting and adapting to the current de facto demarcation of the country, going along with this in almost every aspect of their daily functions. An unnatural symbiosis seems to be developing between the aspirations of the people of Cyrenaica for more regional governance—away from the centralist hegemony Tripolitania exercised since 1969—and the military autocracy led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. At the same time, the internationally recognized government in Libya’s west continues to struggle to maintain power under the leadership of Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah who (along with his cousin) was sanctioned for corruption by the Libyan interim government and continues to face allegations of corruption, which he denies. Recent street anger against Dbeibah, stemming from his government’s attempt at rapprochement with Israeli officials as well as an escalation of pressure from dissatisfied militia, could catalyze the collapse of the internationally recognized government. This, in turn, could prompt Dbeibah to resort to military skirmishes with the east to distract from public discontent and prolong his government’s lifespan.

This week, the UN secretary-general appointed Hanna Serwaa Tetteh, a seasoned Ghanaian diplomat, as the new head of UNSMIL, making her the tenth person to serve that position in thirteen years. The appointment came after much wrangling between the United States and Russia, again suggesting that foreign interests will likely continue to dominate conversations about resolutions for Libya.

Libya needs new ideas and a national and international will to reset a realistic path toward a modern state, premised on a recognition of its history and a mentality of “what’s in it” not just for the international community but, more importantly, for its own people, as well.

Hani Shennib is the founding president of the National Council on US-Libya Relations

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His chances of success are far from clear. What is clear is that given Lebanon’s dire economic state, its postwar reconstruction needs, and the balance of political power in the country, Salam is highly unlikely to meaningfully confront Hezbollah and risk escalating internal conflict during his premiership.

The powers of the prime minister

Under Lebanon’s pre-civil war constitution, the presidency—earmarked by convention for a Maronite, the country’s dominant Christian sect—was Lebanon’s preeminent and most powerful office. The Taif Agreement of 1989, which ended the Lebanese Civil War, amended the constitution and shuffled Lebanon’s balance of power to better accord with the best estimate of the country’s new demographic realities. In part, it expanded the power of the Sunni-designated post of prime minister and his cabinet at the presidency’s expense—creating a balance between two offices that would now operate as mutual counterweights. 

Today, according to the Lebanese constitution, the cabinet “set[s] the general policy of the State in all domains, draws up bills and organizational decrees,” and “Oversees the implementation of laws and regulations, and supervises the activities over all the State’s institutions, including civil, military, and security administrations and institutions without exception.” If he cobbles together a cabinet and then gains the parliament’s confidence within thirty days, Salam will become the latest beneficiary of that expanded power. 

Lebanon’s political landscape

But Salam and his cabinet are unlikely to usher in fundamental changes. 

Lebanon’s next parliamentary elections are set for May 2026. Salam therefore has a year and a half, at most, to tackle a wide range of issues, from a collapsed economy and poor infrastructure to security challenges, before his government dissolves by operation of law. His government will be responsible for fully implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and the November 27, 2024, cease-fire deal with Israel. And Salam, who has not yet fully assumed the premiership, has already confronted and overcome a legitimacy crisis.

Salam’s candidacy won the support of eighty-four of Lebanon’s 128 parliamentarians. But that wasn’t supposed to happen. His predecessor and longtime ally of Hezbollah, Najib Miqati, was set to retake the office, reportedly as part of the guarantees and assurances that presidential candidate Aoun gave Hezbollah and the Amal Party—the so-called Shia duo—in exchange for backing Aoun’s election. When many of the parties that had seemingly committed to Miqati switched their votes at the last minute to Salam, first Hezbollah and then Amal responded by withholding their support. The pro-Hezbollah newspaper Al-Akhbar decried what it called a “total American coup” while the head of the group’s Loyalty to the Resistance parliamentary bloc, Mohammad Raad, angrily accused Salam’s backers of “sever[ing]” the conciliatory hand Hezbollah had extended by voting for Aoun.

The Shia duo thus denied Salam the backing of the only two representative parties of Lebanese Shias—likely the country’s largest and fastest-growing sect. Their statements also left it ambiguous as to whether they would join or support Salam’s government. While not constitutionally required, because Lebanon continues to operate on the basis of sectarian power sharing and consensus, convention would require Salam’s cabinet to have pan-sectarian support. Without it, the cloud of illegitimacy and “exclusion” of one of Lebanon’s constituent components would hang over his government. Salam and Aoun therefore reportedly scrambled to placate the Shia duo—with Salam sending them assurances that his designation wasn’t intended to exclude them, and Aoun stepping in to mediate.

Salam and the Shia duo appear to have smoothed matters over. Caught off guard, Hezbollah and Amal’s intransigence was only temporary political muscle-flexing to extract concessions or guarantees from Salam. This was a similar tactic to when they withheld their votes from Aoun during the first round of voting for the president on January 9. Whatever the eventual composition of Salam’s future government or the content of its policy statement, they sought to ensure that Salam would uphold the president’s assurances that were supposed to come through Miqati—and not move against Hezbollah, its arms, or its shadow state. 

To be sure, Salam is closer to a consensus candidate than the anti-Hezbollah pugilists Ashraf Rifi and Fouad Makhzoumi, the preferred candidates of the old-guard opposition and activist opposition, respectively, who withdrew in favor of Salam. Nevertheless, Salam is not a partner and known quantity like Miqati. And an unfriendly prime minister could theoretically initiate the process of disarming Hezbollah. After all, Lebanon’s armed forces are constitutionally “subject to the authority of the Cabinet”—and not the president, who is only their nominal commander. 

Toeing the line

But Salam was always unlikely to pick a fight with Hezbollah. Salam’s list of vital tasks is long, and his time in office could be short. The Shia duo are not marginal societal actors. Hezbollah alone won 356,122 of the 1,951,683 votes cast in the 2022 parliamentary elections—the most of any party by 150,000 votes—and two separate 2024 polls showed that 85-93 percent of Shias in Lebanon support the group. Amal won an additional 191,142 votes. At best, clashing with them would be met with the obstructionism and political paralysis at which the Shia duo—and especially Hezbollah—excels. At worst, given their popularity, it would be flirting with civil war. But their compliance, at minimum, would enable Salam and his government to pursue at least some of its goals.

Salam must steer Lebanon through economic recovery, update and upgrade the country’s decayed infrastructure, enact political and judicial reform, and begin the work of postwar reconstruction. These are heavy lifts for a normally functioning state, and for Lebanon they may be impossible—even without compounding these challenges by trying to disarm Hezbollah. Therefore, confronting the group will likely drop to the bottom of Salam’s priorities, if it isn’t absent from his agenda entirely.

The danger of Israel resuming its campaign against Hezbollah, the main inducement for Lebanon to act against the group, diminished considerably under international and US pressure with Aoun’s election. Pressure on Israel to refrain from escalating again in Lebanon is only likely to increase, including from the Trump administration, as Salam forms his government. Salam wouldn’t be the first Lebanese politician to deem it unwise to risk igniting a civil war by pushing to disarm Hezbollah to stave off a renewal of conflict between Hezbollah and Israel. Another Lebanese civil war could last at least a decade and would devastate the entire country. Another full-scale Israel-Hezbollah war, in contrast, is now unlikely to recur for years, would probably be relatively short-lived, and its destruction would likely fall largely on Hezbollah-dominated areas.

Reports indicate that Salam’s intended cabinet policy statement will mirror Aoun’s inaugural speech. Based on Salam’s own promise to “fully implement Resolution 1701 and all terms of the [November 27] cease-fire agreement,” it will likely incorporate Aoun’s promise to monopolize force in the hands of the Lebanese state. Some have interpreted these ambiguous words as a vow to disarm Hezbollah. But Lebanon has long interpreted these terms idiosyncratically to exclude disarming the group. As Salam proceeds with the formation of his government, and if he succeeds in securing his premiership, he is very likely to fall back on these interpretations to avoid a clash with Hezbollah that will transform his term into a paralyzed failure. 

David Daoud is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where he focuses on Israel, Hezbollah, and Lebanon affairs.

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Evolution of freedom

Since 1995, Georgia has gone through a series of waves of reform, which are clearly reflected in the upward trend of the Freedom Index, at least until 2018. Nonetheless, I would point to two important caveats that might curb this optimistic view. First, there are significant differences between the three subindexes, as well as among their components, with the legal subindex clearly showing a lower score than the economic and political subindexes. This is probably a subtle image of the second caveat: the clear divergence between the country’s institutional framework as it appears on paper and in practice. Georgian written laws and regulations are comparable to those of the most developed countries of Europe or North America. There are always areas where improvement is possible. Still, on paper, we (Georgia) seem to be a democratic state with all necessary institutions, the balance of power, and fundamental principles of human rights protection. However, implementing our legal norms and regulations is far from complete. Therefore, some components of the Freedom Index may not present a realistic view of the actual situation experienced by most citizens in the country. Analyzing the three subindexes in detail corroborates this general concern.

Improvements in trade and economic freedoms mainly drive the positive evolution of the economic subindex, and this does capture a real advancement. We have signed free trade agreements with all major regional players, like the European Union, China, Russia, and Turkey. Our trade relations and policies are fairly free and flexible. Georgia has undoubtedly benefited from this economic openness, boosting the economy and income per capita. The acceleration of economic freedoms over the past decade is also due to the increased respect for property rights, as previously, the country had experienced severe problems in this regard, with waves of mass property dispossession.

However, developments around Anaklia deep sea port in 2019 have shaken Western investors’ confidence in Georgia. In August 2019, the US construction and development company and founder of the Anaklia Development Consortium (ADC), the Conti Group, announced it was leaving the consortium. ADC has accused the government of sabotaging the project, which received major support from Georgia’s strategic partner, the United States, and the European Union. Overall, the ADC’s departure marked a significant setback for Georgia’s infrastructure ambitions. The port was intended to boost Georgia’s economic and strategic standing as a major transit hub.

The component measuring women’s economic freedom also seems to have improved significantly, at least since 2005, but this is an excellent example of the gap between the de jure and de facto situations. On paper, Georgian legislation ensures a high level of gender equality on any economic issues, such as employment rights, ownership of assets, the establishment of legal entities, etc. However, the proportion of women is deficient when looking at top business positions or the state apparatus. Also, the gender salary gap is substantial and does not seem to be closing. Again, there is no legal standing for this reality; this is not because of a failure of the law to uphold women’s economic opportunities; it is a symptom of the patriarchal nature of Georgian society.

The score for property rights is notably lower compared to the other components because it captures actual property protection, especially against arbitrary public expropriation, a severe problem in Georgia prior to 2012. The data series shows well the gradual deterioration of the situation until 2012, when the government or its proxies were constantly—and arbitrarily—seizing private property. One of the ways this occurred was that individuals were imprisoned for a crime, and they would then buy their way out of prison by handing over their property to the state. This culture became widespread and led to extremely high numbers of incarcerations. According to the International Centre for Prison Studies, by 2012, Georgia had the highest prison population in Europe and the fourth highest in the world. In 2011, it also recorded one of the highest death rates in prisons. In 2012, the new government led by the Georgian Dream Coalition sharply amended the situation, and the component may not fully reflect the substantial improvement in property rights protection since then.

Both the political and legal subindexes illustrate well the two major episodes of institutional liberalization in Georgia, following the 2003 Rose Revolution and the 2012 change of government.

Since 2018, the country has been experiencing a dramatic institutional regression that is only slightly observable in the political subindex and not yet visible in the legal subindex components. The improvement shown in the legal subindex is perhaps the most misleading signal in the data presented here. No institution in the country needs reform more than the judiciary, and the general population and international community clearly perceive this. The deficiencies of the judicial system are the product of a selection process that is non-transparent and entirely arbitrary, which has allowed this crucial pillar of the state to be administered by a significantly small elite of judges for almost two decades. The High Council of Justice, the agency in charge of appointing judges, has been controlled by the same people since 2007, recurrently reappointing themselves to different high administrative positions. It is hard to agree with the sustained improvement shown in the judicial independence component when the interests of the ruling party and the judicial system are so closely intertwined, and the line between them is completely blurred.

A clear example of this behavior is the episode that occurred on July 22, 2024, when the judiciary unlawfully interfered with the constitutional authority of the president by suspending the appointment of a Supreme Council of Justice member. According to the Constitution of Georgia, the president has full and exclusive authority to appoint a member of the Supreme Council of Justice without anybody’s consent or consultation. However, the judiciary clearly views even a single dissenting voice as an intolerable threat to its clannish rule. Its interference with the constitutional powers of the president is not only illegal; it undermines the constitutional principle of separation of power.

Finally, the political subindex only mildly shows the degradation of the situation in the last few years, but the negative turn starting in 2018 is evident in all four components. Regarding civil and political rights, the data do not yet reflect the passing of recent laws on foreign agents and LGBT rights, which will certainly further reduce Georgia’s score in terms of civil liberties. Similarly, several amendments were passed to electoral legislation, reducing the opposition’s and civil society’s capacity to monitor and contest the government. Last, the fact that no reactionary reforms have been passed in relation to the power and capacity of parliament masks the fact that legislative constraints on the executive become fictional when the same political party runs virtually all institutions of the state. Today, barely any officials – just the president and one small-city mayor in a mountainous region of Georgia – are not part of the ruling party. Thus, there is no effective control of the executive nor any real checks and balances within the state apparatus. As this report was under development, parliamentary elections in Georgia produced an even more hostile and polarized environment, with all major opposition parties, civil society monitoring organizations, and international observers claiming major fraud. The judicial branch is by no means a safeguard of individual rights, so Georgia is rapidly and effectively falling into one-party rule, which is concerning and not fully captured in the Index.

Evolution of prosperity

The evident catch-up process concerning the rest of Europe observed in the Prosperity Index is mainly driven by the strong performance of the income and education components. Georgia has had a period of fast growth, but this would be somewhat expected given its low level at the beginning of the period of analysis. Coming from a socialist economic environment, the liberalizing economic reforms mentioned above surely produced a boost in economic growth. Even accounting for inflation and purchasing power parity, the Georgian economy has clearly closed the gap with the most developed European countries.

The Index also captures the impressive increase in years of schooling, placing the country among the top performers worldwide in the education component. However, it is essential to note that the situation is very different in terms of quality. We are not anywhere close to the best educational systems in the world, as evidenced by standardized tests such as the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), where Georgia falls significantly below the OECD average.

At least two components of the Prosperity Index—inequality and minority rights—may not accurately reflect the reality experienced by Georgians. Growth in income per capita can indeed advance the situation of the middle class, and this has probably been the case in Georgia, explaining the improvement in the inequality component measured by the Gini coefficient. However, the differences between regions within the country, as well as between urban and rural areas, are very sizeable. Parts of the country still rely on a barter economy, and this is most likely not captured adequately. Regarding the treatment of minorities, the positive trend of this component does not reflect the situation of several minority groups, such as the LGBTQ+ community, which has been discriminated against and disadvantaged intentionally and will likely suffer even larger stigmatization given the new legislation passed by the parliament framed as “Protection of Family Values.” Sadly, the government ignores the abuse and discrimination not only when it comes to employment, for example, but also the highly violent cases of physical assault and harassment. In recent years, Georgia witnessed several instances of violent attacks against LGBTQ+ civil society organizations, as well as individuals and politicians who champion minority rights. Most of those attacks were large in scale and well organized. One of the most outrageous instances of brutality that shocked Georgia was the murder of 37-year-old transgender model Kesaria Abramidze on September 18. Coincidentally, this hate crime happened the day after anti-LGBTQ legislation was passed. Brutality was widely displayed on the streets of the capital city, Tbilisi, during the attacks of July 5, 2021, when Tbilisi Pride was violently disrupted by far-right groups, leaving 53 media workers who were covering the events injured and one dead. Anti-LGBTQ+ protesters also raided offices belonging to the NGO Tbilisi Pride and Shame Movement, which organized the event. This was not an exceptional event. Virtually every time the queer community comes out in public, they are pushed back into the social periphery by crowds led by far-right activists. It is also true that virtually every time, the police and state fail to protect LGBTQ+ people, control the mob, arrest their leaders, or bring them to justice. There is a dominant perception that the authorities are collaborating with violent groups. 

The only possible explanation for any increase in the minority component since 1995 may be found in the efforts made in the educational system to integrate ethnic minorities through a common language and other inclusive educational policies. Those efforts notwithstanding, a disturbing downturn in minority rights was visible from 2021–22. Despite some improvement since then, the decline will likely become apparent again in the coming years because of the way the ruling party and its proxies control all public spaces and opportunities and fight differences. This will inevitably reduce fair access to public jobs and business opportunities for those not politically aligned with them.

It is certainly true that substantial effort has been put into improving the healthcare system in the last couple of decades, and this is observed in the rise in the health indicator score. Most of it has been directed to primary care, children’s health, childbirth, pregnancy, and so on, and not so much to advanced medical care such as surgery or the treatment of serious conditions. This is why those Georgians who can afford to do so go abroad to get quality care for serious illnesses. According to the data from the Georgian statistics department, the number of citizens of Georgia going to foreign countries for medical care doubled in 2023. This explains why the healthcare gap with the rest of Europe persists.

COVID-19 provides a good example of this gap. At first, it is surprising that the data seem to show that the COVID-19 pandemic hit Georgia harder than the rest of Europe, as the country’s robust primary healthcare system should have allowed it to cope with the crisis relatively well. However, the problem was mismanagement and the absence of a structured, systematic approach. Georgia was doing well as long as the government maintained a state of emergency—run jointly by police and the military. Rules were as rigid as in any democracy across the globe. However, as the economy was suffering and people slowly started disobeying the rules, the government understood the need for change and eased the restrictions. This is where major shortcomings of governance presented themselves, and the number of infections started to grow dramatically. The COVID-19 crisis showed all the deficiencies of the governance system in Georgia. The state can manage the most difficult situations, provided it can do so with a draconian response based on police rule, but when you need a nuanced, rules-based approach with basic freedoms for citizens guaranteed, the government fails every time. Democracies are truly tested during a crisis, and the best test is to see whether policies remain balanced while dealing with the emergency. This is where Georgia fails every time.

The path forward

Georgia stands at a critical crossroads. One of the most significant risks Georgia faces is the ongoing influence of Russia, which exerts considerable power through economic, political, and military channels. Russian-backed hybrid threats present ongoing dangers that could undermine the Georgian government and disrupt reform efforts. Political polarization and governance challenges constitute another major hurdle. The political climate in Georgia is often plagued by fierce rivalries and divisions, hindering the passage of essential reforms and destabilizing governance. Without a shared vision among political parties, advancements in critical areas such as judicial reform, anti-corruption initiatives, and economic policy risk stagnation. The absence of political consensus diminishes the government’s strength and undermines public confidence in democratic institutions. To achieve greater freedom, a concerted effort is needed to build multiparty agreement on vital reforms and nurture a political culture prioritizing national interests over individual party agendas.

Economic inequality and emigration threaten Georgia’s progress. Despite economic growth, high unemployment, regional disparities, and limited opportunities push many young Georgians to seek work abroad. To sustain a robust economy and reduce emigration, addressing these inequalities, investing in regional development, and creating jobs for youth are essential.

Georgia must urgently reform its judiciary. An independent judiciary is vital for attracting foreign investment and building public trust. However, the judiciary faces corruption and political interference, obstructing economic and democratic growth. Legal reforms that ensure fair and transparent processes could restore public confidence and improve the business environment, making Georgia a more appealing investment destination.

As the majority of the population is predominantly asking for practical steps to bring Georgia closer to the EU and eventual membership, nondemocratic moves and decisions of the government stand as an impediment to this popular demand. This path forward will hinge on Georgia’s ability to integrate more closely with Western institutions, manage regional security risks, and drive economic modernization. Several key drivers of change will shape the country’s progress toward freedom and prosperity. Still, significant challenges—such as Russian influence, the authoritarian nature of the government, political polarization, and social inequality—could impede progress. By addressing these obstacles and embracing transformative reforms, Georgia can lay the groundwork for a resilient, prosperous, and democratic future.

Georgia’s drive for European integration is a significant factor in its future growth. The populace’s strong pro-European stance serves as a primary catalyst for change. Important milestones, like visa-free travel within the EU for Georgians and free trade agreements, represent advancement and inspire citizens’ hopes for EU membership. These successes also provide clear leverage for the government to sustain current benefits and advance even more.

Economic modernization is a crucial factor. Georgia’s economy has traditionally relied on agriculture and low-value exports, heavily dependent on the Russian market, which risks vulnerability to disruptions. Future development needs to shift toward services, tourism, technology, and trade for sustained growth. Investing in infrastructure—roads, ports, telecommunications—and achieving energy independence through renewables can enhance economic resilience and reduce reliance on external energy. Digital reforms and a focus on tech startups provide new opportunities, particularly for youth, while increased foreign investment may boost economic vitality. However, these changes require political stability, a favorable business environment, and better governance.

Regional security and stability are crucial for Georgia’s future. The South Caucasus is geopolitically sensitive, and prone to conflicts. For sustainable development, Georgia must ensure a peaceful environment domestically and with neighbours like Turkey and Azerbaijan. Partnerships with the EU and NATO are essential for countering security threats and fostering a stable regional investment climate.

Georgia’s vibrant civil society drives democratic progress. Citizens push for transparency and reforms through NGOs and grassroots movements. Increased civic engagement pressures the government to implement meaningful changes. Support for independent media ensures an informed citizenry to hold officials accountable. Civic education for youth encourages engagement, creating a more participatory political landscape.

Georgia’s future freedom and prosperity depend on leveraging European integration, driving economic modernization, unifying the country, and strengthening civil society. By fostering resilience, diversifying its economy, and ensuring political stability, Georgia can achieve growth, and greater freedom. Although the journey is complex, sustained commitment could position Georgia as a model of democratic resilience and economic innovation in the region.

Tinatin Khidasheli is head of Civic IDEA, a Georgian think tank countering Soviet legacy and Russian propaganda while advancing Georgia’s defense policies. Author of the first Georgian language book on hybrid warfare, Khidasheli teaches at Caucasus University, Georgian Institute of Public Administration, and Ilia University. Formerly Georgia’s first female defense minister, Khidasheli also chaired the Parliamentary Committee for European Integration. She holds an LLM from Tbilisi State University, and an MA in science from Central European University.

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2024 Atlas: Freedom and Prosperity Around the World

Twenty leading economists and government officials from eighteen countries contributed to this comprehensive volume, which serves as a roadmap for navigating the complexities of contemporary governance. 

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Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

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Evolution of freedom

At the onset of the crisis in the European periphery—around 2008—Greece was significantly more prosperous than its institutional quality would have suggested; property rights, legal institutions, government efficiency, control of corruption, and economic freedom were all far lower than in nations with comparable incomes per capita. The GDP-institutions difference was evident in all crisis-hit countries, such as Spain and Portugal, but it was the largest in Greece. Given the strength of the institutions-development nexus, this paradox was unlikely to last indefinitely. It would be resolved either by improving institutions and enhancing economic freedom, as a way to “firm up” the prosperity already achieved—or by income and prosperity falling away. Sadly, the latter took place, and dramatically so. It is hard to underestimate the profound and prolonged toll of the 2008–16 crisis. Greece lost a quarter of its output, unemployment tripled, hundreds of thousands of talented Greeks emigrated, the welfare state collapsed, and poverty became increasingly evident. While the fiscal profligacy of 2004–09 and deteriorating competitiveness were instrumental, the Greek economic crisis was essentially institutional.

The economic adjustment programs agreed between the Greek government and the “troika” of international lenders (International Monetary Fund, European Union (EU), and European Central Bank) focused—obsessively—on austerity and reforming the inefficient pensions system; yet, some much-needed changes in labor, product, and capital markets took place. Reforms such as opening “closed professions,” making hiring and firing easier, strengthening the Competition Commission, and making it easier to start a business contributed to the mild improvement in the aggregate Freedom Index during 2010–15. However, despite the progress, there is still a significant gap between Greece and most (developed) European countries in numerous proxies of institutional quality and economic liberty. Given the causal link between institutions, economic freedom, and development, enhancing the institutional apparatus is still needed.

One would have hoped that, as the country was leaving the crisis (and austerity) behind, the policy focus would switch from government finance to enhancing the legal protection of citizens and investors, strengthening property (and intellectual property) protection, investing in public administration, and making product markets more competitive. However, neither the Syriza/Anel coalition (2015–19) nor the New Democracy administration (2019–present) have instituted genuine institutional reform, including making markets more competitive, strengthening investor protection, speeding the judicial process, and safeguarding the independence of public agencies. Despite relatively meager post-2016 growth of about 1.0–1.5 percent during 2016–19 and around 1.8–2.4 percent more recently (2023–24), there has been little discussion on the need to liberate and modernize the Greek economy—much needed for a genuine new cycle of convergence.

Delving into the components of the economic subindex sheds light on the many challenges and the few successes. Starting with the latter, an encouraging development is the substantial rise of the component measuring women’s economic freedom. Fortunately, this topic has gathered ample consensus across the political spectrum and society following the progressive family law reforms in the early 1980s (abolition of dowry, equal pay, women’s right to keep their family names, and many others). Administrations of all political colors and leanings have pushed in the same direction, advancing equal rights and opportunities for men and women. In the past decade, we have seen genuine efforts and legislative measures to improve matters for the LGBTQ community. Despite internal opposition from its vocal right, the center-right administration proceeded aggressively on this front in 2024. Nonetheless, women’s labor force participation still lags considerably behind other (Southern) European countries, reflecting “conservative’’ attitudes and a considerable child penalty on wages. In the 2010s, the country improved its already strong score on the trade freedom component, which reflects tariffs, hidden restraints, quotas, and exchange rate barriers. This progress built on the opening of trade in 1980 when the country joined the European Community, and Greece’s adoption of the euro in 2001.

In contrast, the components of investment freedom and property rights have not shown much improvement over the past three decades, once averaged. While one can always question the fluctuations, investing in Greece, registering property, and starting a business are costly, time-consuming, and somewhat uncertain, as there are myriad processes and licenses investors need from numerous organizations. And while the current administration has rightly prioritized big, often deemed “strategic” investments—including offering assistance with licenses and providing subsidies—the situation for small and medium-sized enterprises or smaller-scale investments is still anachronistic, formalistic, and cumbersome. While not reflected in the subindex, many entrepreneurs and businesspeople complain about extensive delays and red tape in disbursement of national or EU subsidies. Perhaps it is no wonder that most of the growth of the past years, around 1.5–2 percent per annum, reflects consumption rather than much-needed—and expected after a significant downturn—investment.

Greece celebrated its democratic golden jubilee in 2024, fifty years on from the fall of the military dictatorship in 1974. Over the past half-century, the country enjoyed political freedom and an expansion of civil liberties. In line with this, the political subindex, which tracks the quality and competitiveness of the elections, civil liberties, and political rights, exceeds 95 (out of 100) for most of the years in the dataset. The slight decline during the second half of the crisis most likely reflects riots, demonstrations, and attacks by far-right groups on immigrants. The stability of Greek democracy, despite the severe and prolonged economic downturn and the associated surge of far right and radical left populism, speaks to its resilience. It is the stable democracy that should serve as the basis for the desperately needed economic recovery.

The legislative constraints on the executive component paints a less rosy picture, which is concerning given the strong link between legal quality, financial, and economic development. To start with, Greece’s score throughout the 1990s, 2000s, and early 2010s is not perfect, reflecting the tendencies of various administrations to intervene in the judiciary, the media, and independent agencies. Besides, before the crisis, members of parliament rarely challenged their party’s cabinet. The forty-point drop in the legislative constraints on the executive component of the past years perhaps overstates the case. But while one can reasonably question the apparent size of the fall, it should be a wake-up call for the political system, civic organizations, and Greece’s partners in the EU. The fall in political rights likely reflects the massive-scale spyware scandal, where for several years between 2019 and 2023, dozens of individuals—including members of parliament (MPs), opposition leaders, journalists, businesspeople, judges, and even cabinet members and the joint chief of staff—were under surveillance by the Secret Service, under the direct control of the then-prime minister’s office and a still-mysterious private company. Many targets were under surveillance by both the Secret Service and the private agency. Perhaps even more alarming, the investigation has been slow, key witnesses have not been called upon to testify, and the administration and the judiciary have shown little interest in shedding light. Most targets, including ministers, did not even question who was spying on them or why. Media outlets connected with the administration and government-aligned MPs attacked independent agencies, the courageous journalists who uncovered the scandal, and even the independent committee of the European Parliament that tried to shed some light. To make things worse, the judiciary—perhaps nudged by the administration—has been absurdly slow in investigating other cases with significant public interests, such as the conditions of a devastating train accident in 2023, where dozens of people, mainly university students, died, and the drowning of hundreds of helpless refugees in the Sea of Pylos (in Messenia) in June 2023. Another alarming development of the past decade is the evident effort of the administration to control the main media outlets. Historically, most Greek parties, in government and opposition, tried to influence newspapers and TV; however, there are nowadays clear signs that very few of the principal media outlets would oppose the government. Let us be clear, though: Greece’s decline in constraints on the executive is rather subtle and a far cry from some other European cases, such as Orbán’s Hungary.

The legal subindex reflects the low quality of bureaucracy, the problematic judiciary, and weak corruption control. As in other European countries on the peripheries of the continent, the quality of legal institutions deteriorated gradually in the 2000s. The reforms of the early 2010s tried to improve the absurdly slow judiciary and reduce red tape. Still, their impact was muted as they were mainly ad hoc, and they went hand-in-hand with an exodus of public servants, significant salary cuts for judges, legal personnel, and prosecutors, and underinvestment in IT and infrastructure. People’s trust in courts—and other core free-market liberal institutions—plummeted during the economic crisis (2007–15). The quality of legislation, already far from great, deteriorated after 2012, as Greek governments passed multiple laws with tight deadlines, insufficient preparation, and without thinking of the big picture. In addition, MPs’ lawmaking skills are evidently low and have deteriorated. The recent decline of this subindex reflects rising informality and, to a lesser extent, worsening security, both of which are hard to verify. However, progress was made after 2019, as the new administration went forward with a well-designed and professionally implemented policy to digitize the public sector, which received a massive boost during the pandemic. In addition, the digitization and reforms of tax authorities during the crisis years have helped curb tax evasion in small businesses. Coupled with the boom in tourism and hospitality, these have raised much-needed public revenues.

Finally, the sharp drop in security during the 2008–15 period mainly captures the socio-political unrest of the time, with numerous demonstrations and protests that eventually ended with minor clashes with the police. Common criminality in Greece has increased somewhat, although the country is still safe and secure.

Evolution of prosperity

Being a composite of six components, some slow-moving (like education and health), the Prosperity Index only slightly reflects the dramatic effects of the debt crisis of 2010–15. The income plot does give an accurate perception of the magnitude of the loss of output per capita the country experienced during the crisis, with the fall in the Greek score around five times larger than the European average. While much ink has been spilled on the causes of the Greek crisis with the 25 percent output loss, there has been little discussion of the mediocre recovery after 2015—the point at which the Syriza/Anel government performed a U-turn and the country stayed in the Eurozone. Economic reasoning and past experience from other crisis-hit countries suggest fast, albeit temporary, growth driven by investment following such a vast output loss, an “internal devaluation,” and the elimination of exchange rate risk. Alas, growth has been slow, about 1–1.5 percent in 2016–19, and somewhat higher, around 2 percent, after the pandemic in 2023–24. In addition, most of the recent growth comes from hospitality, tourism, construction, and real estate, while growth in manufacturing is close to nil. The current administration appears satisfied with the pace, contrasting it with the close-to-nil growth experienced by Germany and the other advanced Eurozone countries. However, given that growth in the “frontier” economies (e.g., United States, United Kingdom, Germany) has been historically about 1.7–2.0 percent per annum, Greece needs much faster growth, driven by investments in IT, infrastructure, machinery, and equipment, for at least a decade to catch up and converge again to the European core. While many citizens, businesspeople, journalists, and policymakers seem satisfied that the country has left the worst of the crisis behind, Greece is today the second poorest country in the European Union, behind Bulgaria, and the least developed euro member. Average output growth of about 2 percent, typical of the wealthiest countries, is not something to celebrate, and given the disaster of the crisis, it is, to me, a pathetic target.

The component of economic inequality points to a non-negligible fall. However, the data are far from completely reliable due to tax evasion (undeclared income), high levels of informality, and the large share of small enterprises. The crisis harmed the middle class relatively more. Professionals, public, and private sector employees suffered the most from the substantial tax hikes of the 2010–18 period. The middle class and the poor also suffered the most from the sizable expenditure cuts that hit the welfare state.

Greece’s scores are high in the education and health components, but some important caveats are in order. First, the education component only reflects years of schooling, crucially missing their quality. Sadly, international test scores and other measures of the quality of the educational system illustrate the (very) dire conditions in primary and secondary schools. The university system is in poor condition, with the crisis making things worse. Improving the quality of education is a sine qua non for a sustained recovery, raising real wages, and bringing down chronically high unemployment. Besides, an analysis of PISA scores pinpoints considerable inequality and low intergenerational mobility in education, especially when adjusted for quality. This further shows that prioritizing human capital will bring much-needed growth and opportunity for the left-behind. The enduring deficiencies of the university system, which generates degrees rather than skills, are at the core of the persistence of unemployment and low wages. Even during the high growth era of 1994–2005, the unemployment rate was double-digit. Today, despite the emigration of Greeks in the crisis years and the (mild) recovery, unemployment still hovers around 10 percent. Sadly, a significant effort to reform tertiary education in 2010 was abandoned and, in some domains, even reversed. A recent attempt to redesign the sector has been partial at best, prioritizing the establishment of foreign private universities in the country which, while needed, does not address the core of the problem in public universities.

Second, the health component only reflects life expectancy, missing morbidity, and other aspects. The pandemic revealed the deficiencies of the welfare state. The national health system, established in the mid-1980s, had already weakened in the 2000s and further deteriorated during the crisis, hit by austerity, misallocation, and negligence. During the years of the economic adjustment programs, doctors left en masse (for abroad or the private sector), there was limited investment, and no significant recruitment of nurses and support personnel. Even now, hospitals do not publish detailed accounts and the system is plagued by inefficiencies of all sorts. One can only hope that modernizing and reforming the national health system will soon be the focus of genuine policy action. Sadly, modernizing and strengthening the health system are not the administration’s priorities.

Greece’s relatively higher level of minority protection than the rest of Europe, at least until 2015, is probably due to its high ethnic, linguistic, and religious homogeneity. Women’s legal status is strong, although gender discrimination in the labor market is present and one rarely sees women running big corporates or holding senior management posts. Greece integrated a large influx of immigrants from Albania and Eastern Europe in the 1990s and early 2000s, with immigration contributing to the solid growth in these years. However, as the crisis intensified, far-right and xenophobic groups and parties started attacking immigrants. As thousands of refugees from Syria, Libya, Asia, and Africa began to reach Greek islands en route to Northern Europe, a portion of the population started exhibiting anti-immigrant sentiments. The significant fall in the minority component score since 2016, especially from 2019, will surprise most of my compatriots. I think it is somewhat unfair. It most likely reflects criticism of the Syriza/Anel and New Democracy administrations in terms of their treatment of refugees in camps and the “pushbacks” of migrant boats in the Aegean Sea. For instance, tragic episodes like the sinking of a migrant boat in June 2023 in which hundreds of refugees died outside Pylos, receive more attention from international than local media and authorities. Besides, one rarely sees immigrants or minorities in senior jobs.

Finally, the sustained improvement in the environmental component is again the product of different administrations’ consistent efforts to incentivize clean energy sources in the last decade. Fortunately, there is little divide across the political spectrum about this topic, and the EU’s impulse is unquestionable. However, the environmental measure used in the Prosperity Index does not capture Greece’s most pressing environmental challenges today, related to the conservation and protection of the islands and the pristine countryside from overbuilding. Recurrent wildfires and floods, a rarity in the country, have had a huge environmental toll. I am not optimistic on this front, as the government has limited The Path Forward capacity—and perhaps will—to impose construction, forest, and building legislation nationwide. Executive orders restricting or banning new building licenses in some Greek islands have not been enforced. On one hand, the government initiated an ambitious plan during the pandemic to make the island of Astypalaia eco-friendly; on the other hand, state agencies have granted planning consent for a tourist village that will almost double the island’s occupancy. Paradoxically, the state subsidizes hotels in the most overbuilt areas and islands. Construction permits and forest and seaside protection are mainly in the hands of municipalities and local agencies; they are decentralized, understaffed, have limited IT systems, and are prone to corruption. There are limited, if any, interventions concerning water management and wildlife protection. In addition, starved of funds and resources since the crisis, local communities, municipal leaders, and policymakers often turn a blind eye, even to conspicuous violations of environmental protection.

The path forward

As Greece celebrates fifty years since the restoration of democracy there is much to consider for the decades ahead. First, while the country enjoys free and fair elections within a competitive political landscape, freedom and civil liberties must be sustained. While the burst of populism that hit the country alongside the deep crisis has faded, trust in core democratic institutions is in decline. Restoring trust is a must. Strengthening the judiciary, enhancing checks and balances on the executive, and investing seriously in the rule of law are sine qua nons, not only to restore confidence in democracy but also to promote much-needed economic growth. The priorities should be to enhance institutions, tackle corruption, promote economic freedom (by bringing down cartels and freeing product markets), and seriously invest in public administration and independent agencies (e.g., competition authority). I am afraid that while these reforms are obvious, in practice, they are not on the administration’s priority list.

Second, Greece desperately needs a new round of convergence and investment-led growth to raise wages and create opportunity. Human capital, much of it abroad, coupled with capital from markets and the EU, can bring back much-needed growth and hope.

Third, Greece must carefully manage the trade-off between the environment and growth. Rather than destroying the landscape, pristine beaches, beautiful historic settlements, and forests, the administration, parties, and local communities must use that beauty and history for growth and resist the temptation of “easy” money from its exploitation.

Fourth, the country used to—and to some extent still does—take pride in the high life expectancy stemming from the Greek diet, strong family ties enabling risk sharing, a decent national health system, and the high education of many Greeks. Investments in education and health were at the core of upward mobility, hope, and high growth after  World War II, and the restoration of political freedom in the mid-1970s. The land of Aristotle, Socrates, and Pericles needs to once again become a land of opportunity, centered around human capital, for its people.

Elias Papaioannou is a professor of economics at the London Business School, where he co-directs the Wheeler Institute for Business and Development. Papaioannou, a fellow of the British Academy, also serves as a managing co-editor of the Review of Economic Studies. He has worked at the European Central Bank and Dartmouth College and held visiting professorships at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Harvard. His research covers international finance, political economy, economic history, and growth.

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2024 Atlas: Freedom and Prosperity Around the World

Twenty leading economists and government officials from eighteen countries contributed to this comprehensive volume, which serves as a roadmap for navigating the complexities of contemporary governance. 

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Jun 15, 2023

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The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

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Modern statehood has eluded Lebanon since its independence in 1943. As a result, Lebanon—which Michael Hudson termed “the precarious republic”—has seen a surge of disasters, leaving the country a battlefield for the wars of others and inflicting economic ruin on an enterprising, innovative populace.

Between 1958 and 1964, then President Fouad Chehab—Lebanon’s first army commander-in-chief, who was elevated to the presidency to end the low-grade civil war of 1958—tried his best to overcome the Ottoman legacy of sectarianism and feudalism and replace that legacy with a state. He instituted a series of administrative reforms designed to increase the effectiveness and reach of Lebanon’s central government and, by virtue of his personal modesty and incorruptibility, provided a model of selfless public service to his countrymen, a model rarely replicated by his successors. Indeed, Lebanon’s political class blocked him in the end. In 1970, the sectarian feudalists elected, by a single vote margin, one of their own to the presidency: Suleiman Frangieh. Lebanon’s trajectory has been straight downhill ever since.

Over a half-century later, Franjieh’s grandson—another Suleiman—was the presidential candidate of choice of Iran’s Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah. Hezbollah, at the behest of Iran, has for decades supported a ravenously corrupt and ruinously incompetent Lebanese political class. In return, the politicians have recognized the group as “The Lebanese Resistance,” a designation elevating it above the status of armed militia and permitting it to bear arms. Twice, in 2006 and 2023, Hezbollah initiated hostilities with Israel, causing massive destruction falling mainly on its Shia Lebanese constituents. Finally, in late 2024, much of that kinetic destruction fell on Hezbollah itself.

Unlike several of his predecessors, Aoun neither mentioned nor paid obeisance to “The Lebanese Resistance” in his inaugural speech. Instead, he pledged “to carry out my duties as the supreme commander of the armed forces and as the chairman of the Higher Defense Council, working to ensure the state’s right to hold a monopoly on weapons, and to invest in the army to monitor the borders, maintain their security in the south, define the boundaries in the east, north and at sea, prevent smuggling, fight terrorism and preserve the unity of the Lebanese territory.” Indeed, much of the analysis following Aoun’s accession to the presidency has, quite understandably, mined his speech for references to Hezbollah, but Aoun did not mention the group by name. 

Aoun’s first task will be to ensure that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) implements Lebanon’s role in the ceasefire with Israel by removing and replacing Hezbollah as the armed Lebanese presence south of the Litani River. He will, to be sure, require the cooperation of Iran’s proxy, which retains considerable military capabilities notwithstanding the pounding it has absorbed from Israel. To succeed, Aoun must perform a diplomatic high-wire act: He must, in effect, mediate between Hezbollah and Israel.

The mediation tool most readily at his disposal is the 1949 Israel-Lebanon General Armistice Agreement. The ongoing validity of the armistice, unilaterally (and unjustifiably) renounced by Israel in 1967, is cited by the 1989 Taif Agreement and is, therefore, a tenet of post-civil war Lebanon’s constitutionalism. 

Aoun could signal to Israel his interest in implementing and consolidating the current ceasefire by offering Israel the opportunity to update and fully implement the armistice, a critical first step toward eventual peace and diplomatic normalization. Israel could, in turn, assure Lebanon of its own commitment to making the ceasefire work by revoking its 1967 renunciation, completing its withdrawal behind the Blue Line (demarcated by the United Nations in 2000), and declaring its readiness to resolve diplomatically all territorial disputes with Lebanon. It could even suspend its overflights of Lebanese airspace, perhaps as part of a third-party arrangement providing ceasefire-related aerial reconnaissance services. Given that the armistice is anchored in Lebanese constitutionalism, Hezbollah—which acknowledges the need to focus on reconstruction, for the sake of its constituents—might be hard-pressed to object and obstruct. Ideally, Hezbollah’s constituents will urge the organization’s leadership cadre to put Lebanon first by becoming part of a Lebanese political party instead of a proxy for Iran.

Aoun knows what must be done to stabilize the Lebanon-Israel frontier. But the long game he wishes to contest and win centers on Lebanese statehood. This is how he put it in his inaugural speech: “if we want to build a nation, we must all be under the roof of law and justice, where there will be no more mafias or security islands, no more leaks or money laundering, no more drug trafficking, no more interference in the judicial system, in police stations, no more protections or clientelism, no more immunity for criminals and the corrupt. Justice is the bulwark, it is the only guarantee that every citizen has. This is my commitment!” This will be a tall order because the collaboration between Hezbollah—meaning Iran—and Lebanon’s abysmal political class (which still dominates parliament) has left the country awash in all the depravities cited by Aoun.

The Lebanese presidency in 2025 is not endowed with the same powers it enjoyed before the 1989 Taif Accord, and in any event, such powers were insufficient for Chehab to build a state. Aoun will not be able administratively to compel governmental decency, honesty, and competence, even if he proves able to broker a respectable cabinet of ministers and even if he retains the full, enthusiastic support of the LAF. If he wishes to succeed, he must build a mass political movement from the ground up, one dedicated not to him personally but to the idea that it is time, at long last, for Lebanon to graduate from Ottomanism, and that it is time for citizenship-based statehood to emerge. As Aoun put it in his acceptance speech, “No sect should be favored over another, and no citizen should have privilege over another. This is the time for respecting the Constitution, building the state and applying the laws. This is the oath of Lebanon!” 

Aoun must, in short, use his office to build the political infrastructure needed to win elections, to ultimately replace the parliamentarians who have used that which has passed for the “government of Lebanon” as a feeding trough. Only with the support of enough Lebanese people willing to abandon political sectarianism and localism can he build a foundation for a nation-state willing and able to meet the needs of all Lebanese citizens, especially the poorest and most vulnerable.

As Aoun embarks on a journey to complete the work of Chehab, he will need both external support and internal protection. Lebanon’s reconstruction needs are enormous, as are the operational challenges faced by the LAF. And there are, to be sure, those in Lebanon who correctly see Aoun as a threat to their ability to steal the fruits of Lebanese diligence, ingenuity, and enterprise. 

It is only the gratuitous and often unspeakable suffering and impoverishment of most Lebanese and their consequent desperation that makes Aoun’s quest something other than mission impossible. Some three-quarters of all Lebanese people are now experiencing poverty, and they know that business as usual by a dysfunctional political class is no longer tolerable. The people of Lebanon now have a president willing to say the following: “My commitment is your commitment, honorable members of parliament, and that of every Lebanese person who wants to build a strong state, a productive economy, stable security, a united nation and a promising future.” 

The duty of all Lebanese people and all friends of Lebanon is to give Aoun the support he needs to build the “strong” state that the people of Lebanon require to thrive and to live in peace.

Frederic C. Hof is a senior fellow at Bard College’s Center for Civic Engagement. Hof served as a military attaché during Lebanon’s civil war and mediated both maritime and land disputes between Israel and Lebanon from 2009 to 2012 as a State Department official. He is the author of Reaching for the Heights: The Inside Story of a Secret Attempt to Reach a Syrian-Israeli Peace (2022).

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Understanding the demographics of this region is crucial to avoid significant US foreign policy mistakes that could impact regional security and lead to unforeseen consequences. Washington should take note of the complexities in the region and not be bound by the past as it engages its old partner in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the new leadership in Damascus. The security of the entire region is at stake.

The demographics of northeast Syria

One of Syria’s two main economic arteries, the M4 highway runs across northeast Syria parallel to the Turkish border and extending toward Iraq. Northeast Syria can be divided into two regions: north and south of the M4.

The area south of the M4 is the heartland of Arab tribes in Syria, aside from a few Assyrian villages near Tal Tamr. The area north of the M4 is home to a mix of Arabs and Kurds, with minority populations of Assyrian Christians, Turkmen, and Circassians. For example, the city of Qamishli features a diverse demography. Out of its twenty-three neighborhoods, eight are predominantly Kurdish, six are predominantly Arab, two are primarily Christian, and seven are mixed. To the south of the city, the villages are almost entirely Arab.

Another example can be found in the internationally renowned Kurdish town of Ayn al Arab (Kobane), which is not solely inhabited by Kurds. Kobane is home to various Arab tribes, including the Jubour tribe, Bani Said tribe, Omayrat clan, Adwan clan, and Henadi clan. Furthermore, people from the Turkmen tribes, such as the Arbaliyah, Turyaki, Qadirli, Qasimiliyah, Qazli, and the Qara Shaikhli clans, also reside in Kobane. Among the Kurdish population, several tribes are represented, including the Zirwar, Alaidan, Shadad Wawij, Zarki, Hefaydi, Bish Alti, Shaikhan, and Daydan clans.

According to Syria’s 2004 census—the most recent data available—the demographically mixed sub-districts north of the M4 highway had a population of 599,873. The ethnically diverse sub-districts reaching north and south of the M4 had a combined population of 378,151. Meanwhile, the almost homogeneous Arab sub-districts south of the M4 had a population of 1,721,132. 

The goal of using the 2004 census is not to make a definitive statement, but to have a reference point. The census recorded a population of 2,488,818 in areas currently held by the Kurdish-dominated SDF. Of this total, 277,535 individuals lived in Kurdish-majority towns and villages. If you count all of those people as Kurds and add half of the populations of Qamishli, Qahtaniyah, and Malikiyah, the total count amounts to 482,425 people—meaning that only about 19 percent of the total residents of SDF-held regions were Syrian Kurds, according to the 2004 census. Since Syrian Kurds historically have a lower birth rate compared to the Arab tribes in the region, the current percentage of Syrian Kurds has likely decreased even further than this rough reference point.

The Syrian Kurds

Like any ethnic group, Syria’s Kurds have a range of political, religious, and tribal orientations. The prominent historic Kurdish political movement in Syria is the Syrian Kurdish National Council (KNC), which has close ties to Iraqi Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party. The KNC’s military arm, the Rojava Peshmerga, is based in Iraqi Kurdistan and is trained by the Zarawani Peshmerga, who have received military training from the United States. In Iraq, both the Zarawani and Rojava Peshmerga fought against ISIS. The KNC has officially been part of the Syrian opposition.

The Democratic Union Party (PYD) was established as the Syrian branch of Turkey’s Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which is classified as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States, NATO, the European Union, and Turkey. The PYD is a relatively new political entity in Syria. Its military wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), was formed in 2012 by PKK veterans before the Assad regime transferred control of Kurdish areas in northern Syria to them. This exchange aimed to silence the Kurdish opposition and prevent a united front between Arabs and Kurds in the region. Several politicians from the KNC have been arrested, exiled, or killed by the YPG.

Many Syrian Kurds view the PYD and YPG as extensions of the PKK, with its main decision-making power coming from cadres based in the Qandil Mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan. This has led to perceptions that the PYD/YPG is ultimately a Turkish-Kurdish organization rather than Syrian. Notably, the general commander of the SDF, Mazloum Abdi, is also a PKK veteran who was once stationed in the Qandil Mountains.

The United States, France, and the United Kingdom are currently facilitating talks between the SDF and the KNC to establish a joint Kurdish committee that will be sent to Damascus. At the same time, the KNC has sent a delegation to Damascus to engage with civil society and local leaders. Additionally, the SDF recently held its first meeting with the new government in Damascus. It’s important to note that a previous US-brokered intra-Kurdish mediation effort in 2020 failed due to the SDF’s resistance to any power-sharing arrangements, the burning of KNC offices, and the refusal to allow the Rojava Peshmerga to enter Syria.

The Arab tribes

After the United States formed a partnership with the YPG-dominated SDF, Kurdish forces made significant advances into areas that were previously held by ISIS. The Arab tribes in northeastern Syria—of which the primary groups are the Uqaydat, the Baqqara, the Jubour, the Shammar, the Tayy, and the Bushaban—have lived under the authority of the SDF. Until recently, several foreign actors, including Turkey, Russia, Iran, and the United States, have co-opted these tribes to further their own interests.

This had major ramifications for internal tribal relations and tribal identity. With some tribal chiefs aligning with outside powers, association at the tribe level decreased in favor of stronger bonds with the clan or even greater family level.

Some tribal chiefs were part of the Syrian revolution, working with the Syrian opposition and Turkey. However, these tribal chiefs were in exile until the collapse of the Assad regime and have now returned to areas on the western side of the Euphrates River. Another group of tribal chiefs feared the Assad regime and established a pragmatic relationship with the SDF as the lesser evil. Lastly, one group of tribal chiefs remained loyal to the Assad regime or recently aligned with the Assad regime and Iran in a bid to free their homelands from the YPG.

After the tribal uprising in August and September 2023 failed to secure US support for their control over Arab tribal areas, several tribal chiefs expressed frustration. Contrary to their expectations, the United States did not intervene to prevent the SDF from brutally suppressing the uprising. In their bitterness, many tribal leaders viewed cooperation with the Assad regime and Iran as their only viable option. Under Iranian supervision, many tribal chiefs, including uprising leader Ibrahim Al-Hafel of the Uqaydat tribe, were integrated into the tribal military units of the Assad regime. This situation mirrored the mistake made in Iraq when the United States abandoned the Sahawat Movement.

With the establishment of a new government in Damascus, the situation has shifted significantly. The first group of tribal chiefs has developed into effective mediators between Damascus and other tribal leaders. Those tribal chiefs who previously collaborated with the Assad regime and Iran to remove the SDF have now realigned themselves in support of Damascus. And the tribal chiefs who saw the SDF as the lesser of two evils no longer have the Assad regime to contend with. Ahmad al-Sharaa, the leader of the new government in Damascus, has held meetings with tribal chiefs, including a specific gathering with tribal leaders from northeastern Syria.

Except for the Shammar tribe, all Arab tribes in northeastern Syria have either directly or are rumored to have secretly aligned themselves with the winners in Damascus, seeking to be part of the future of Syria. The Shammar tribe, however, holds a unique position. It shares a strong historical bond with both Iraqi and Syrian Kurds. During the Arab-Kurdish wars in Iraq from 1961 to 1975, the Shammar tribe fought alongside the Kurds. In Syria, its members have maintained a relatively autonomous stance within the SDF under the Sanadid Forces, the tribal military units of the Shammar tribe, and have closely collaborated with the YPG. Nevertheless, their loyalty to the KDP and Syria may be stronger than their allegiance to the SDF leadership. It remains to be seen whether they will indicate a shift in their alignment.

The way forward

For the stake of stability and the future of Syrian Kurds, the SDF should withdraw from the south to the north of the M4 highway. These Arab regions are home to the oil facilities, agricultural lands, and strategic dams that the new government in Damascus will need as resources to establish security and stability in Syria. The current oppression of Arabs reportedly in the form of extensive curfews, mass arrest campaigns, and the killing of peaceful demonstrators by the SDF is counterproductive and risks an Arab-Kurdish escalation. Furthermore, the four recent suspected SDF car or motorcycle bomb attacks  in the regions of Manbij and Tel Rifaat, areas recently lost by the YPG, are only terrorizing civilians and fueling hatred. Between June 2018 and July 2021, the YPG conducted, on average, one car bomb attack every six days. The public expression of joy and happiness when the SDF was driven out of the Arab region of Manbij on December 8 should have been a teaching moment for the SDF. The facade that the SDF puts on of being a multi-ethnic armed group was never real. The YPG always called the shots.

As it withdraws from Arab areas, the SDF should hand ISIS prisoners and families over to the new government in Damascus, preventing any potential risks. The new authorities in Damascus have demonstrated their capability in eliminating the ISIS threat in Idlib. The US partnership with the SDF against ISIS is an outdated concept.

Afterward, the SDF should hand its weapons to the new government in Damascus, integrate into the new security and administrative system, and become part of a new Syria. Both Ankara and Damascus have extended an olive branch to the SDF offering just such a deal, on the condition of disarmament, the departure of senior PKK cadres from Syria, and the YPG’s transformation into a political party. The Syrian Kurds are an essential part of Syria and should engage in politics and gain governmental positions along with all Syrians. The SDF should accept this new reality and prevent the Arab-Kurdish escalation that would come from trying to hold onto the Arab-majority areas in northeastern Syria.

After losing the protection of Russia and the Assad regime, the SDF relies on the United States. Therefore, Washington has huge leverage over the SDF. If the United States can convince the SDF to take this olive branch, it would set the framework for a new regional security arrangement in which Syria would be no threat to any regional state, including Turkey and Israel. Furthermore, a peaceful resolution to the SDF question will help for more constructive dialogue vis-à-vis the Kurdish issue in Turkey as well. In short, the United States should not bet on a horse that has already lost the race and work constructively with Damascus, not limiting itself with northeastern Syria.

Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

The post To help build the new Syria, the US needs to better understand the Kurds and Arabs of the northeast appeared first on Atlantic Council.

DAMASCUS—Over a half-century of Assad regime rule, including fourteen years of a brutal civil war, had turned Syria into a state of mass oppression as well as a geopolitical black hole. In December, a startling advance by an umbrella of armed opposition groups, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), led to an unprecedented takeover and a rapid transition in governance. Just a month ago, I (and the millions of Syrians both inside and outside of the country) would not have imagined this day would come. Now that it has, the challenges and opportunities of rebuilding Syria—a free, secure, inclusive, and prosperous Syria—are becoming clearer.

I am in Syria for the first time in nearly fifteen years. While visiting Damascus, Homs, and Hama days after the collapse of the Assad regime and the initial period of joy and uncertainty that followed, I saw Syrians slowly returning to business as usual. In Damascus (considered the world’s oldest inhabited capital city) policemen in orange vests whistled and directed the congested traffic, vendors reopened their shops, and students boarded school buses ahead of the holiday. Young children wove between cars selling revolutionary flags—the new Syrian flag, which features a green band along the top. License plates from Idlib, Aleppo, and Daraa suggested that many of these cars belonged to displaced individuals who were either returning to their homes or coming back to Damascus for the first time in years.

There were notable differences between this visit and my last. For one, across the city, posters depicting former Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad’s face had been torn by jubilant civilians. Another was that the tarnished statue of Bashar’s father and predecessor Hafez al-Assad, which once stood dauntingly outside of the al-Assad Library, had been toppled and was lying in front of the Damascene Sword monument across the street. Syrians stomped on it, celebrating their freedom from fifty-four years of tyranny. These symbols of state repression aside, the indication of Syrians’ newfound liberties that stood out the most was their speaking and assembling freely without the fear of being thrown into one of the regime’s prisons or being bombed by a Russian jet.

The Syrian civil war was the deadliest and most devastating conflict of the 2010s, with profound consequences for human security, regional security, and global politics. The toll on civilian lives, infrastructure, and the economy was staggering, and its ripple effects were felt across the globe. Over half of the country’s population—fourteen million people—had been displaced at least once, and over five million Syrian refugees fled to neighboring countries. During the global migrant crisis of the 2010s, over a quarter of the world’s refugees were Syrians. Migration proved a lightning-rod issue warping politics from Ankara to Berlin to London to Washington. The ramifications of a free and stable Syria are huge for vulnerable populations as well as the countries that host them. Discussions about repatriation are already underway, for example in European countries. However, these conversations are concerningly premature: Syria is not yet prepared to receive and integrate returnees, as significant humanitarian, economic, and political-military challenges must be addressed. 

Since the start of the conflict in 2011, Syria’s economy has contracted by a staggering 85 percent. The estimated cost of rebuilding the country ranges between $250 billion and $400 billion—figures that, given the extensive damage to the country’s infrastructure, appear increasingly accurate. For those returning, one of the most striking changes is the visible level of poverty that greets them within minutes of entering the city center. The toll on society is undeniable: Buildings, both public and residential, are unusable, dirty, and neglected, and streets and storefronts are damaged and in disarray. The road between Homs and Hama, normally a leisurely thirty-minute drive, took longer to navigate as it was littered with debris and had been subject to destruction by bombardment from the Syrian regime, Russia, and Iran-backed militias. But the visible destruction hardly captures the societal scars left behind.

“We are waking up from a long nightmare,” someone in Damascus told me. Others described it as “living in a dream” and said that many are in “denial” of this new reality. It became clear that the trauma of authoritarianism, for societies held in an iron fist like in Syria, is intergenerational. And it will likely take generations to heal. 

This was apparent in the days following the collapse of the Syrian regime, which led to the freeing of thousands of prisoners—men, women, and children— from Assad’s prisons. Their release shed new light on the decades of crimes committed by both Assads—Hafez and Bashar—and a harsh reminder for regional and international parties who sought to normalize with the regime. Syrians were confronted with a painful reality that they had long known but had been forced into staying silent about for generations. Families today are still searching the Syrian regime’s notorious prisons and mass graveyards for loved ones forcibly detained or disappeared.

In Damascus’s Martyr’s Square, I met with families hanging photographs of their missing loved ones, many of whom had been taken as prisoners as early as 2012. I spoke to two mothers: one who had identified her son in an online video released after the liberation and was still trying to find him. Another mother had heard her son, missing since 2014, had been spotted near their old home by a neighbor. “I will wait for him at the Umayyad Mosque, maybe he will turn up there,” she said, with a glimmer of hope in her eyes.

I also met with civil society groups, who highlighted that the greatest challenge continues to be providing support to the 70 percent of Syrians living in poverty and the one in four Syrians experiencing extreme poverty. Earlier this year, the United Nations reported that over 16.7 million Syrians—around 79 percent of the population—are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. 

Syrians know they will not get what they need to rebuild as a society, stabilize their economy, and set up government services and a social safety net with one hand tied behind their backs. Nearly every conversation I had with civil society groups touched upon the need for global sanctions relief, with people expressing hope that sanctions would soon be eased to facilitate the flow of money from abroad, enable the delivery of remittances from the diaspora, and streamline licensing processes to allow nongovernmental organizations to operate more effectively and provide much-needed humanitarian aid. In the West, policymakers and humanitarian organizations have begun to reexamine such sanctions, seeing as they could stunt Syria’s recovery.

The Syrian interim authorities’ success is contingent on buy-in from the Syrian people, as international security expert Sana Sekkarie wrote for the Atlantic Council in her recent analysis. Addressing the current economic crisis and guaranteeing that basic needs are met, including access to food, water, electricity, and healthcare, will be critical to political stability. Without fundamental needs and services being met, public trust and stability will remain elusive, further complicating efforts to foster sustainable peace and democratic governance. 

A multifaceted crisis such as the one in Syria demands innovative and swiftly implemented solutions. Among many priorities, it is crucial for the new governing party or leadership to focus on rebuilding trust and legitimacy. And while Syrians are ready to take ownership of their country, this society—plagued by half a century of tyranny—will need to unlearn its fear of the state. Syrians will also need to deliberately work together, for the first time, across minority groups and sects. These are the first of many steps toward building a free, stable, and prosperous Syria that can serve as an inspiration for other countries impacted by conflict across the world.

Diana Rayes is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She is the chairwoman of the Syria Public Health Network.

The post Dispatch from Damascus: The challenges of rebuilding are becoming clearer in Syria appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Gulf countries publicly cited regional tensions and the growing role of non-Arab states in Syria as reasons for normalization. Saudi Arabia was the latest to reopen its embassy in Damascus in September 2024, following similar moves by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain in December 2018, ostensibly to “reduce Iranian influence,” according to Robert Ford, a former US ambassador to Syria. (By contrast, Qatar maintained a staunchly critical stance toward the Assad regime, refusing to normalize ties.)

Assad was welcomed back into the Arab League last year, attending a summit in Saudi Arabia. And the UAE even reportedly joined the United States in negotiations aimed at securing US sanctions relief in return for Assad curbing Iran’s arms smuggling through Syria.

With Assad having fled to Moscow after the stunning and rapid fall of his regime this month, Gulf states that had supported Assad are now left empty-handed. But the turn of events offers these countries, which rarely act as a bloc, an immense opportunity to join forces and wield significant influence—both political and financial—over Syria’s future while adapting to Turkey’s rising prominence in the country.

The Gulf’s friendly overtures

Shortly after Assad’s December 8 fall, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Oman resumed their diplomatic activities in Damascus, and they were in turn thanked by the new Syrian government’s Department of Political Affairs in a December 12 statement. This statement followed meetings the new leadership held with the ambassadors from these countries, as well as Qatar. Also on December 12, Bahrain—which headed the Arab League this year—expressed its support for the transition via a letter to the new leadership in Syria. On December 14, the Arab Ministerial Contact Committee on Syria (which includes Arab, Western, and Turkish diplomats) highlighted Arab support for Syria’s political transition under the interim authorities. 

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia expressed the “strongest support” for Syria’s people after the fall of Assad’s government, commending measures taken by the new leadership in Damascus to protect Syria’s minorities and promote stability. A Saudi delegation headed by an advisor from the Saudi Royal Court met with Syria’s new leader on December 22, amid reports that Saudi Arabia will start supplying oil to Damascus. A good indicator that Saudi Arabia is serious about cooperating with Syria’s transition is that the kingdom is already cooperating at the highest level with the most influential outside player in Syria—one that is rapidly ascendant in the region—Turkey.

The UAE, which started the normalization process with Assad in the Gulf, was the last Gulf country to publicly signal positive engagement with Syria’s new administration, marked by a phone call between the respective foreign ministers on December 23. It remains to be seen whether Abu Dhabi will cautiously move to fully and publicly support the new administration in Damascus by sending humanitarian or financial aid to the country in the upcoming weeks, as neighboring Qatar has already done. On December 14, Anwar Gargash, diplomatic advisor to the UAE’s president, expressed optimism about the new leadership’s language on unity. Gargash also strongly emphasized the need to remain on guard given the new leadership’s ties to Islamist factions. He also wrote in an X post that the Arab Ministerial Contact Committee on Syria’s meeting “reflected a positive Arab approach to support our brothers in the path of political and peaceful transition” in Syria.

These moves across the Gulf add up to a positive signal that the countries that normalized with Assad are likely to deal pragmatically with the realities of the new Syria.

Turkey’s rising influence

As the country with the strongest relationship with Syria’s new leadership, Turkey is likely to hold ample leverage over Syria’s future—and even the region, given its increasingly assertive role across the Middle East and North Africa. Turkey’s gains in Syria bolster its standing vis-à-vis Iran in other areas such as the South Caucasus, where Turkey maintains close cooperation with Azerbaijan while Iran has close ties with Armenia. However, Ankara should not shoulder the role of reconstruction and state-building in Syria alone. Collaborating with the Arab states of the Gulf could bring both legitimacy and essential financial resources to Syria’s reconstruction efforts.

Among the Gulf states, Qatar is likely to wield the most influence over the new leadership in Damascus, having played a central role in facilitating talks between foreign ministers from Arab states, Turkey, Russia, and Iran during the Doha Forum that ultimately determined Assad’s fate. In meetings in Doha with Atlantic Council experts (myself included) just hours after the fall of Assad had been announced on December 8, senior Qatari national security figures expressed an air of vindication for their refusal to normalize with the Assad regime. Notably, Qatar was the only country in the Gulf already hosting the Syrian National Coalition, which it recognized as Syria’s sole legitimate representative.

The Trump administration’s opportunity

The fall of Assad represents a massive setback for Iran, and Gulf states must seize this moment as an unparalleled opportunity to reinforce the Arab role in Syria’s future. By pressuring and guiding the new leadership in Syria to form an inclusive government, Gulf countries can safeguard their interests while minimizing the risks of renewed instability that threaten the entire region.

The Trump administration also has a key role to play. As the new Syrian government faces the daunting and costly task of reconstruction, regional and international support will be indispensable to ensure that Syria does not fail again and destabilize the region. President-elect Donald Trump should lead the way alongside Turkey and the Arab Gulf states in pooling the funds required for Syria’s reconstruction and transitional governance, which would also strike a decisive strategic blow to Iran’s presence in Syria. Such assistance should be tied to clear conditions that would guarantee stability and an inclusive political process to build something better than what Syrians endured under Assad.

The fall of the Assad regime will have profound consequences for the region in the years ahead. And the United States and Gulf states have new leverage—both financial and diplomatic—to shape what those consequences will be. Any new administration in Damascus is likely eager to get Washington’s approval at the earliest possible moment to solidify its international legitimacy. That gives the United States and its Gulf allies the chance to positively impact the new political process in the country—and to secure any necessary changes from Syria’s new leadership—if it strays off course.

Joze Pelayo is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

The post What role will the Gulf states play in shaping the new Syria? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

At this moment, HTS is eager to build goodwill inside Syria and internationally. The United States should act swiftly and strategically to help ensure the country’s transition toward a more stable and democratic system. The United States can leverage its diplomatic, economic, and political tools to influence the post-Assad landscape in Syria. Here are several critical steps the United States should consider.

1. Provide diplomatic recognition to the new government

The political situation in Syria is fluid, and the future government will likely be a coalition of opposition groups, civil society organizations, and representatives from various ethnic and sectarian groups, including HTS. One of the most significant actions that Washington could take is to provide early diplomatic recognition to this emerging government—contingent on commitments to a peaceful transition, democratic reforms, and the protection of human rights. Recognition may be contingent upon specific steps, including:

• Formation of a transitional government: This government should be representative of Syria’s diverse political and ethnic groups, and include women, youth, political structures currently in exile, and opposition military factions.
• Commitment to a democratic process: The interim government should agree to hold free and fair elections with international oversight and establish a justice and accountability mechanism to address past atrocities.
• Constitutional reform: A new, inclusive constitution should be developed with input from all Syrian stakeholders to lay the foundation for a democratic governance system.
• International oversight: The United Nations should be allowed to oversee the transition, including monitoring justice and accountability processes and ensuring the dismantling of Syria’s chemical weapons program. Encouragingly, HTS has indicated its readiness to cooperate with the international community to monitor Assad regime military sites.  

2. Provide humanitarian aid and reconstruction assistance

Syria faces an enormous humanitarian crisis. Millions of Syrians are displaced, and much of the country’s infrastructure is in ruins. The United States should work with international organizations to ensure that aid is distributed effectively. Given the opposition’s experience in governance, existing structures on the ground can be leveraged to channel aid, minimizing the risks that would come from trying to create entirely new systems from scratch. However, this aid should be conditional on:

• Political inclusivity: The transitional government must equitably provide aid to all regions of Syria.
• Anti-corruption measures: Donors must insist on transparency and accountability mechanisms to prevent misuse of funds.

3. Begin the process of removing sanctions on HTS and the new Syrian government

HTS is currently designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). The group’s evolving stances, including its recent public commitments to protect religious minorities and refrain from retributive violence, suggests that HTS may be open to political accommodation. The United States should initiate a gradual, good-faith process for removing sanctions and designations on HTS and the new Syrian government. Additionally, the United States has designated the government of Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism since the 1970s and has since added additional sanctions beginning in 2011 in response to the Assad regime’s exercise of violence and repression. This process could include:

• Phased sanctions relief on HTS: The United States should start by removing sanctions on individuals who demonstrate a willingness to engage in a political transition, particularly HTS leaders. Over time, as HTS shows concrete steps toward reconciliation, further sanctions can be lifted. 
• Quick sanctions relief on Syria: Removing broader sanctions on Syria can be done swiftly, as the new Syrian government will likely be hostile to US-designated terror groups like Lebanese Hezbollah or Iraq’s Asaib Ahl al-Haq, which were instrumental in bolstering the previous Syrian regime. As for the second batch of sanctions on Syria related to the regime’s exercise of violence on civilians, if HTS follows through on its promises to refrain from retributive violence against civilians, the United States should lift this second set of sanctions as well.
• Diplomatic engagement: Engaging with HTS and other opposition groups is critical. Past US policy on similar groups, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), shows that delisting a group from the FTO list is possible if the organization demonstrates a genuine commitment to peace.

4. Cooperation on counter-terror measures

HTS has a law enforcement body that has since 2017 conducted dozens of operations against Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) cells operating in northwestern Syria, including arresting many members of its leadership. HTS has also arrested members of the al-Qaeda branch in Syria, Hurras al-Din, largely dismantling the organization. HTS will have an interest in preventing more extremist actors from trying to reform in Syria as the rest of the state rebuilds. The United States may thus find HTS willing to cooperate on counterterror measures. 

• Intelligence sharing: Intelligence sharing on counterterrorism measures can build good faith on both sides and prevent extremist groups from proliferating.  

5. Encourage SDF participation in the political process

Syria’s Kurdish population, particularly those in the northeast, will play a crucial role in the country’s future. The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have been key allies in the fight against ISIS, but tensions with other opposition groups remain. The United States should encourage dialogue between the SDF and HTS, as well as other opposition factions. This dialogue could include:

• Inclusion of Kurdish leaders in the political process: A future Syria should represent the interests of all Syrians, including Kurds, Arabs, and other minorities. The United States can mediate discussions between the SDF and HTS to ensure Kurdish representation in the future government.

Seizing the moment

Failure for the United States to engage with Syria’s new leadership can lead to several negative outcomes. HTS could radicalize further if it does not have international checks or relies on other actors for diplomacy, trade, and support. Russia and Iran could fill the vacuum and partner with the new Syrian government to sideline the United States in the region. A new Syrian government without international support could fall into chaos and sow instability, leading to further mass displacement throughout the rest of the region. The United States must seize this moment to help influence the future of Syria, rather than waiting to see what happens. No potential path forward for Syria or HTS is inevitable. The sooner the United States takes concrete action, the more likely it can positively impact Syria’s future.  

HTS leader Ahmed al-Shara, formerly known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, entered the political scene in Syria over ten years ago. He has long been mindful of the lessons learned from the failures of al-Qaeda to win the support of the Iraqi people. HTS was formed by military officials who wanted to work within the contexts of the societies they lived in. HTS has continuously moderated since its inception and break from Jabhat al-Nusra—al-Qaeda’s Syria branch—in 2017. Of course, part of its strategy may be for optics, but much of the group’s rhetoric about moderation has taken the form of concrete actions. HTS has a Directorate of Minority Affairs that has guaranteed the safety of Christians and Alawites under its control. HTS has ordered its fighters not to disturb public institutions. And the larger and more diverse the population that comes under its governance, the more HTS will need to evolve and the less power it will have to determine what governance looks like on the ground. 

It is important not to overstate the current moderation of HTS. The group is not a bastion of liberal democracy, and its political evolution is still ongoing. However, HTS is actively seeking diplomatic recognition and has expressed a willingness to engage with the international community. The United States should not expect perfection but should recognize that political entities are capable of evolving, especially when faced with the realities of governance and international expectations. Shara has already reached out to regional countries, including Lebanon, Iraq, and Russia, reassuring them that he intends to have good relations despite past support their past support for Assad. If HTS proves genuinely open to dialogue and reform, the United States should pursue engagement rather than exclusion.

As long as HTS is willing to evolve and accept constructive criticism, the United States should engage with the group. Ignoring Syria’s new leaders will not make them go away. US outreach to HTS is not just engagement for the sake of engagement. A post-Assad Syria, especially one with leaders willing to engage with Washington, presents an opportunity for the United States to promote stability and democracy in the Middle East, curb Iranian and Russian influence in the region, and provide a safe and secure home for Syrians both inside and outside Syria. 

Sana Sekkarie is a digital threat analyst focusing on the Middle East. She was previously a researcher focused on Syrian opposition groups at the Institue for the Study of War and the University of Virginia.  

The post A US blueprint for Syria’s fragile transition appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s EU aspirations first began to take shape in the aftermath of the country’s 2004 Orange Revolution. However, the European Union initially showed little sign of sharing this Ukrainian enthusiasm for closer ties. Instead, it took nine years for Brussels and Kyiv to agree on the terms of an Association Agreement that aimed to take the relationship forward to the next level.

When the Association Agreement was finally ready to sign in late 2013, Russia intervened and pressured Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych to pull out. This led to protests in Kyiv, which then spiraled into a popular uprising following heavy-handed efforts to disperse students rallying in support of EU integration. The Revolution of Dignity, as it came to be known, reached a bloody climax in February 2014 with the murder of dozens of protesters in central Kyiv. In the aftermath of the killings, Yanukovych fled to Russia.

Yanukovych’s successor, Petro Poroshenko, signed the EU Association Agreement months later. By then, Putin had already decided to intervene militarily, seizing control of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula and sparking a war in eastern Ukraine. This was the start of an undeclared Russian war against Ukraine that would eventually lead to the full-scale invasion of 2022.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

As Russian troops approached Kyiv during the opening days of the invasion in February 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy officially applied for EU membership. This gesture underlined the historical significance of the country’s European choice at a time when Moscow was openly attempting to force Ukraine permanently back into the Kremlin orbit.

Amid the horrors of Europe’s largest invasion since World War II, EU officials and individual member states also recognized the importance of Ukraine’s European integration. In June 2022, Ukraine was granted EU candidate status. This was followed in late 2023 by a decision to start membership accession negotiations, with talks beginning in June 2024.

The dramatic progress made since 2022 has led to growing confidence in Ukraine that EU membership is a realistic goal for the country. It is certainly a popular option. The number of Ukrainians who back joining the EU has been rising steadily since the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, with recent polls consistently indicating that more than three-quarters of Ukrainians would like to see the country as part of the EU.

This overwhelming public support means there is unlikely to be any shortage of political will in Kyiv to adopt the policies that will bring Ukraine closer to achieving EU membership. Nevertheless, the pathway forward is complex and demanding. Effective governance reforms, particularly in the fight against corruption, are essential for Ukraine’s EU aspirations. Aligning with EU legal standards across 35 policy areas including taxation, energy, and judicial reform will also require a monumental effort.

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Ukraine will be hoping for an accelerated period of EU integration progress when Poland takes on the six-month rotating presidency of the European Council in January 2025. This follows on from a Hungarian presidency that brought few benefits for Ukraine, and should create favorable conditions for constructive engagement on key reform issues.

Looking ahead, Ukraine’s EU bid is likely to encounter additional obstacles and headwinds as the prospect of membership draws nearer. Ukraine’s agricultural prowess in particular is set to present both opportunities and challenges. Ukraine is already a major exporter of agricultural products to the EU. If the country is able to join the single market and eliminate existing barriers including tariffs and quotas, this would potentially overwhelm European markets.

Increased Ukrainian grain exports to the EU since 2022 have already become a controversial issue in many EU member states, sparking protests and border blockades. This opposition will only grow in the coming few years, with EU farmers pressing their governments to act in their interests and prevent Ukraine from achieving unrestricted access.

Labor flows of Ukrainian workers may also create some concerns among existing EU members. While millions of Ukrainians are already living and working in the EU including many with refugee status, membership could lead to an influx similar to the large number of Poles who moved to other EU member states following Poland’s 2004 EU accession. To address these concerns, transition periods may be necessary.

How soon could Ukraine achieve EU membership? EU Ambassador to Ukraine Katarína Mathernová has expressed confidence that Ukraine could join by the end of the decade. This was echoed by EU Commissioner for Enlargement Oliver Varhelyi, who stated in October that Ukraine could potentially secure membership by 2029 if it completes the necessary reforms.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has underscored the nation’s determination to achieve fast-track integration. While there is strong support for Ukraine’s membership bid in most EU capitals, the accession process is rigorous and requires unanimous approval. Further progress is likely in 2025, but the road to full membership remains long and challenging.

Kateryna Odarchenko is a partner at SIC Group Ukraine.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Nov 18, 2024

Imposing neutrality on Ukraine will not stop Putin or bring peace to Europe

By Mykola Bielieskov

Imposing neutrality on Ukraine will not bring about a durable peace in Europe. On the contrary, it would leave Ukraine at Putin’s mercy and set the stage for a new Russian invasion, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

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UkraineAlert Nov 26, 2024

Putin’s Ukraine obsession began 20 years ago with the Orange Revolution

By Peter Dickinson

Vladimir Putin’s poisonous obsession with Ukraine first began to take root 20 years ago when millions of Ukrainians directly defied him during the Orange Revolution, writes Peter Dickinson.

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UkraineAlert Dec 12, 2024

Why Finland thinks Finlandization is a bad idea for Ukraine

By Minna Ålander

Some believe the Finlandization of Ukraine is the most realistic option to end Russia’s invasion, but any attempt to impose neutrality would leave Ukraine in a precarious position, writes Minna Ålander.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

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To address this, a “National Energy Strategy” (NES)—like the National Defense Strategy (NDS)—should be mandated through Congress, with regular reviews and bipartisan collaboration to ensure stability and adaptability to emerging challenges. The next administration could work closely with Congress to draft an NES that ensures efforts are enduring and aligned with long-term national interests. Subject to five-year reviews and Congressional oversight, this approach would maintain policy continuity and resilience across political cycles.

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President-elect Donald Trump’s announcement of establishing a National Energy Council (NEC) at the White House underscores the critical need for a cohesive and long-term energy strategy. Trump proposed that the NEC would oversee the path to US energy dominance by enhancing private sector investments across all sectors of the economy, prioritizing innovation, and accelerating review and approval processes to increase energy production and delivery. This approach aligns with the broader need for a structured NES that not only drives economic growth and energy independence but also establishes a durable energy policy framework.

Creating a durable, de-politicized energy strategy

Establishing an NES under Congress elevates energy security as a national security priority. This can allow for a cohesive strategy resilient to short-term political fluctuations. Congressional oversight would align energy policies with long-term national interests, including economic growth, self-reliance, economic and energy sustainability, and global leadership. A structured NES should enhance domestic energy production, diversify supply chains, secure strategic reserves, and integrate sustainable practices. It must also prioritize technological advancements, invest in new energy sources, improve energy efficiency, and ensure the security and transparency of critical mineral supply chains. This strategy would secure reliable and affordable energy production, boost efficiency—especially for AI and data centers—safeguard industrial productivity, stabilize energy markets, and reduce dependence on foreign actors for essential resources. By promoting resilience, sustainability, and strategic autonomy, the NES would also solidify US leadership and strategic partnerships in the global energy and mineral supply chain and energy access.

A regular review mechanism for the NES every four or five years would ensure continued relevance and strategic effectiveness by adapting to new technologies and their supply chains, shifting geopolitical currents, and emerging threats like cyberattacks on energy infrastructure. This process could mirror the NDS, incorporating expert analysis and industry input to keep the strategy up to date.

Strong bipartisan collaboration within the NES would ensure energy security remains a national priority regardless of partisan changes in presidential administration or Congressional majorities. Bipartisan support is essential for creating a stable policy environment that enables long-term energy projects to move forward without disruption, fostering investment confidence in critical energy infrastructure and innovation projects.

How the NES would enhance US energy security

The NES can support investor confidence in emerging technology sectors with uncertain energy demand scenarios.

For example, rising energy demand in data centers, cloud computing, and artificial intelligence (AI) requires stable and resilient power supplies. A significant percentage of global internet traffic flows through data centers in Northern Virginia. The region’s electricity demand is projected to increase as more data centers come online. According to the author’s conversations with the Northern Virginia Electric Cooperative, the region would require the addition of 14 GW by 2030 and 24 GW by 2038 if its data center growth were to continue its steep upward trajectory. This demand is equivalent to the construction of twenty-six to thirty nuclear power plants.

AI’s energy consumption is also growing rapidly, with no reliable method yet to predict its future power needs. Without bipartisan support for long-term energy policies, the United States risks energy shortages that could stall economic and technological advancements.

In addition, the NES must conduct a risk assessment of the US energy system and address the diversification of key energy sources and supply chains. Uranium and critical mineral supply vulnerabilities provide an example of how the NES can foster resilient supply chains. In 2022, US nuclear power plants purchased 25 percent of their uranium from Kazakhstan, where Russia holds large shares in its uranium mines, and 12 percent directly from Russia. China controls much of the global production and processing of critical minerals, essential for renewable technologies.

A robust NES would strengthen US nuclear fuel and strategic mineral supply chains and reduce reliance on Russia and China by leveraging bipartisan collaboration to secure long-term energy investments and ensure policy stability. This approach is essential for advancing domestic energy sources, promoting investment in nuclear power, isotope production, and emerging technologies like hydrogen and fusion. Additionally, bipartisan efforts would help forge international alliances for critical minerals and battery supply chains, diversify supply chains through domestic and global mineral processing, and establish transparent markets for fair pricing and secure access to essential resources.

Finally, by regularly updating the strategy in line with unforeseen technological and geopolitical changes, the United States can proactively address emerging energy trends while systematically identifying and assessing risks, threats, and vulnerabilities within the national energy system. This approach allows for the reinforcement of strategic strengths and opportunities, as well as the reassessment of international alliances and energy trade partnerships. A well-executed review mechanism should prioritize infrastructure resilience to safeguard critical sectors like defense, healthcare, and digital services from new cyber and physical threats.

The NES protects the United States in an uncertain energy future

A comprehensive National Energy Strategy—anchored by Congressional oversight, bipartisan collaboration, and regular reviews—is essential for securing US national security and long-term energy stability. Prioritizing energy security will protect supplies, bolster economic growth, and sustain US leadership in global energy markets. This strategy will equip the United States to address future challenges, from rising energy demands to enhancing domestic energy resources, expanding clean energy, ensuring access to affordable energy, securing critical energy supply chains, and fostering transparent markets.

Sara Vakhshouri is founder and president of SVB Energy International & SVB Green Access, director of IWP Center for Energy Security and Energy Diplomacy, and a senior energy fellow at Oxford Institute for Energy.

EnergySource

EnergySource is the Global Energy Center’s (GEC) online publication providing commentary and analysis on developments in the energy and climate sector from a wide-array of thought leaders, politicians, and experts.

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EnergySource Oct 30, 2024

What will a Trump or Harris administration mean for climate and energy policy?

By David L. Goldwyn, Andrea Clabough

In the upcoming election, US voters face a defining choice on how the country addresses climate and energy. Four related issues will need immediate attention from the next president, and although Donald Trump and Kamala Harris converge on certain ideas, their starkly different views on others will be highly consequential.

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

EnergySource Jul 11, 2024

Chevron deference is dead—and US climate action hangs in the balance

By David L. Goldwyn, Andrea Clabough

The US Supreme Court’s seismic decision to overturn Chevron deference ends decades of federal agencies’ regulatory authority to interpret laws’ where there is ambiguity. While not specifically about climate or energy, the change is deeply consequential for the current—and next—administration’s ability to act on these issues according to its agenda.

Energy & Environment Energy Markets & Governance

EnergySource Oct 4, 2023

What’s next in the two-front war against climate change and energy insecurity?

By Robert F. Ichord, Jr.

Electrification is a powerful weapon in the battles against climate change and the weaponization of energy supply. To improve overall system reliability and resilience, the United States and European Union must decarbonize, meet new consumer and industrial demands, and expand transmission capacity.

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The Global Energy Center develops and promotes pragmatic and nonpartisan policy solutions designed to advance global energy security, enhance economic opportunity, and accelerate pathways to net-zero emissions.

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The post The United States needs a durable national energy strategy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On December 5, Elliot Ackerman, non-resident senior fellow at Forward Defense, published a piece in the Atlantic entitled “Bring Back the War Department.” Ackerman, a Marine veteran, speaks on the successes and failures of the Department of Defense since its creation in 1947. He argues that a reversion of the name to the former “Department of War” could influence the way the United States conducts wars in the future. He writes, “If you want a clear strategy for winning wars, don’t play a semantic game with the name of the department that’s charged with the strategy’s execution. Call things what they are.”

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Elliot Ackerman

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Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Elliot Ackerman in the <i>Atlantic </i>on semantics and the War Department appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Nikoladze interviewed by Global News Canada on protests in Georgia amid EU bid appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This protest, against what the opposition and the country’s president have called a rigged election, was meant to be big. The opposition called for people to take days off work and mobilize overnight to prevent the new parliament from convening.

Instead, what occurred in front of the parliament building was barely a protest. It was more like a funeral—and not a particularly well-attended one. The hundreds of thousands of pro-European Union (EU) citizens who filled the streets in the spring to protest the government’s crackdown on civil society largely elected now to stay at home.

Unless something drastically changes, it seems like the ruling Georgian Dream party will be able to consolidate some form of authoritarian governance and that the country’s EU membership hopes are in tatters.

But most painfully for pro-EU forces, Georgian democracy did not die heroically in a hail of Russian bullets, or under the batons of riot police. It appears to be dying because it’s too cold outside and Georgians are too depressed and nihilistic to resist. 

How did this happen? And how did a Georgian Dream party seen as being a vector for Kremlin interests manage to win in a country that consistently polls as one of the most anti-Russian and pro-EU in the world? How does an election almost universally criticized as being insufficiently free and fair lead not to sustained protests but to passive acquiescence to authoritarian rule?

Like its role model of Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, Georgia demonstrates that defeating democracy is terrifyingly easy if you use the right tactics. The playbook will no doubt be studied carefully by would-be dictators across the world. 

Here is how Georgian Dream stole an election and got away with it:

1. Find the Goldilocks level of election manipulation—not too much, not too little

Discussion of rigged elections often invokes places where the dictator wins by ego-boosting but comically large and improbable margins. But the key to modern authoritarianism is to nudge the scales just enough to win and still be believable. This requires using a range of methods that individually don’t seem significant but collectively get the regime over the line. 

Georgian Dream is expert at this. Vote-buying is one such tactic. Stories abound of voters getting paid in exchange for their votes. But when that fails, intimidation is also very effective. Many polling stations had gangs of burly intimidating men present as “observers” but who in fact enforced the ruling party’s interests. The ruling party also had video cameras inside most polling stations, which is legal in Georgia. This was what Iulian Bulai, the head of the Council of Europe parliamentary observation mission, meant when he said there was a feeling of “Big Brother is watching you” during the election.

Combined with serious issues related to the secrecy of the ballot—the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe mission reported that “voter secrecy was potentially compromised in 24 per cent of observations”—this made for an intimidating environment.

There is also growing evidence of direct, brazen fraud alongside the softer methods. Statistical analysts have pointed to the presence of a so-called “Russian tail” in turnout patterns, which is indicative of fraud and multiple voting. Reports also abound of multiple voting using ID cards either taken or bought from other voters, an allegation recently corroborated by a whistleblower who claims that his team was paid to vote 163 times this way.

But the key to all of this is moderation. The regime did not rely on a single method. When caught red-handed (as in one case where ballot stuffing was caught on camera in southern Georgia) this enabled the authorities to hold up their hands and call it an isolated incident. The aim was not to emerge with a Vladimir Putin-style 80 percent or more of the vote, but to cheat just enough to boost the ruling party from the 40-42 percent the exit polls suggested to the 54 percent it officially got.

2. Embrace older, rural conservatives, and use their fears and homophobia

This is a tactic common for right-wing populist movements in many countries. From the Brexit campaign to Orbán’s Hungary, the playbook looks quite similar. But the version of it that works best in Eastern Europe adds extra emphasis on anti-LGBTQI+ attitudes. Before the election, Georgian Dream adopted a law that makes it a crime to spread what it terms “LGBT propaganda.” It has also taken advantage of the older generation’s weaker fealty to democracy and involves a close embrace of the country’s powerful and thoroughly Russian-infiltrated Orthodox Church.

Georgian Dream also used fear very effectively to mobilize older voters.

“No to War–Choose Peace” was a key ruling party slogan, and posters featured images of destruction in Ukraine juxtaposed with Georgian monuments to drive home the point. The message was very much one of “vote for us or Russia will invade again.” Georgians may not have much love for Russia, but there is little appetite for war.

3. Embrace the Kremlin . . . from behind an EU flag

Anyone traveling to Georgia during the election campaign would be forgiven for believing that Georgian Dream was the primary pro-EU force in the country. Their posters featured large EU flags and the slogan “Towards Europe with Dignity.” Despite constantly bad-mouthing Brussels and refusing to take the steps required for EU membership, Georgian Dream was careful to hide their amenability to Russian interests behind a patina of pro-EU messaging.

This message, although cynical, was not altogether false. Georgian Dream does see itself as part of a European project, albeit that of the European populist far-right represented by Orbán and the leader of the French National Rally party, Marine Le Pen.

The message gave ostensibly pro-EU but functionally anti-Western voters sufficient cover to vote in line with Russian interests without openly doing so.

4. Allow but ignore protests and free speech (unless it gets to a critical level)

A crucial difference between the new authoritarianism of Georgian Dream and the older version is the attitude toward free speech and protests. Old-style dictators do not allow any protests and seek to muzzle critical voices. Georgian Dream took the opposite approach of, to paraphrase Georgian Dream’s billionaire founder Bidzina Ivanishvili, letting them shout until they get tired.

During the spring, some of the biggest protests in Georgian history took place with hundreds of thousands of people in the streets to oppose the so-called Russian law, referred to this way by its detractors in reference to its origin as a piece of Russian legislation. The law demanded that civil society organizations register as nefarious-sounding “vectors of foreign influence” and was judged by the EU as being incompatible with membership. 

For months, protests ground Tbilisi and other major cities to a halt. The regime occasionally responded with police brutality and the use of “titushky” thugs to beat up protesters. But overall, they allowed the protests to continue until they ebbed by themselves, as thoughts turned both to the summer holidays and to the October elections.

Ivanishvili was proved right. When the elections came, there was no more energy. The youth, having seen their spring protests fail, largely shrugged their shoulders and gave up. The government managed to survive by merely ignoring, rather than cracking down on, protesters. Particularly problematic individuals were singled out for arrests or beatings by regime goons, but these could be dismissed as isolated incidents.

5. Steal hope from the youth and encourage them to emigrate

The youth in Georgia, as in most places, are the main engine of social protest. They were the driving force behind the spring protests and were expected to form the backbone of postelection protests. But Gen Z are, by and large, missing in action on the streets of Tbilisi.

Talk to young Georgians and the overwhelming message one hears is one of hopeless resignation. Most dream of individual escape through emigration rather than collective liberation.

This is partly a result of the highly individualist culture that the low-trust, low-tax, Wild West model of capitalism in Georgia has produced. A once proud communitarian, neighborhood-oriented culture has been replaced by atomization and dog-eat-dog competition. This is true for everyone. But, unlike older generations, the youth has never experienced anything else and so tends to look for ways to run away rather than cooperate to win change.

As a result, institutions that serve as backbones for social movements in the West, such as trade unions and community campaign organizations, are weak and distrusted by young people in Georgia. It is difficult to build a revolution through Facebook alone, which means that there is a lack of coherent leadership or organization.

But the government itself has done everything it can to sow despair and hopelessness in the youth. The more young people give up and leave, the fewer votes any change-oriented alternative is likely to get.

6. Be corrupt, but also spread just enough money around to keep key groups quiet

Georgia has always been stuck between its national political aspiration of joining Europe and a stubborn economic reality that binds it to Russia. Despite preferential access to the EU market, Georgia doesn’t produce anything Europe wants to buy. Russia, however, devours many Georgian products, such as wine. The influx of Russian tourists and shady and potentially sanctions-evading “investment” has also created a wealthy elite dependent on financial flows from the north.

This inflow of wealth may not be benefiting ordinary Georgians, who still overwhelmingly live in or near poverty. But it is appearing in statistics, with Georgia currently enjoying double-digit economic growth. This extra money buys the support of some and the acquiescence of others.

Figures close to Georgian Dream control many of the major businesses and especially the dubious financial flows from Russia. This, combined with its control of the resources of the state and billionaire Ivanishvili’s net worth of a fifth of the country’s gross domestic product, gives it huge patronage.

Georgians may love Europe in their hearts, but their pockets (at least for a part of the elite) are being filled with Russian rubles.

7. Have an incompetent opposition

The failure of the protest movement was not merely a function of superior government strategy. It was also one of abject incompetence on the part of the opposition.

The opposition did not decide on an approach to the election until the last minute, with talks on alliances ongoing until just weeks before polls opened. When they did eventually consolidate into four major blocs, their campaigns were weak and generic. The biggest of these blocs, Coalition for Change, ran a poster campaign of generic images and the meaningless slogan “The future is yours.” 

Opposition leaders barely bothered to leave the comfort of the major cities. And they appeared to spend more time lobbying in Washington, DC, and Brussels than they did talking to voters. This played into the government’s narrative that the opposition were all elitist “foreign agents” who held ordinary Georgians in disdain.

The continued presence of figures from the similarly authoritarian, albeit more pro-Western, previous government among the opposition was another hindering factor, albeit less so than in previous elections. The specter of a return to power of imprisoned former President Mikheil Saakashvili, while increasingly far-fetched, remained sufficient for a subset of voters to stay loyal to Georgian Dream.

But most shockingly of all, despite having spent the pre-election period warning about the potential for fraud and manipulation, the opposition appears to have been caught completely unprepared when the results came in. Opposition leaders made a statement refusing to recognize the results and then spent the next few weeks dithering while both international attention and passion among the Georgian public evaporated. The weeks of excuses and staggering incompetence merely served to convince the public that the battle was hopeless.

Alex Scrivener is the executive director at the Democratic Security Institute, an independent, nonpartisan think tank based in Tbilisi, Georgia.

The post Why Georgia’s pro-democracy protests failed appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Left with no other institutional mechanisms to defend democracy, Georgia’s united opposition, led by President Salome Zourabichvili, has launched a nonviolent protest movement. The country now stands at a pivotal crossroads in its modern history, with the outcome of the current confrontation set to have geopolitical consequences that will reverberate far beyond Georgia’s borders. 

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

President Zourabichvili’s denunciation of the October parliamentary elections as illegitimate has shaken the nation. She has claimed that evidence of Russian interference and systematic election manipulation reveal a ruling party embracing increasingly authoritarian tactics.

Zourabichvili and other opposition figures accuse the governing Georgian Dream party of weaponizing anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian narratives in order to gain political advantage during the election campaign. This included claims that the country’s opposition forces are part of a Western-led “Global War Party” that is allegedly seeking to open a “second front” against Russia.

Critics claim the events of October 26 in Georgia were less an election and more a performance designed to entrench the political status quo in the country. Independent exit polls revealed a decisive majority for Western-leaning opposition parties. Nevertheless, Georgian Dream declared victory.

Reports from international observers and Georgian civil society reveal a troubling reality including widespread evidence of glaring irregularities such as altered voter turnout figures and statistical anomalies. The vote itself featured numerous examples of violence and intimidation.

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Developments in Georgia are geopolitically significant for the surrounding region. Positioned at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, Georgia serves as a critical energy transit hub and a potential model of democratic resilience in a region where autocracies and empires have long vied for dominance.

Since coming to power in 2012, the Georgian Dream party has increasingly aligned with authoritarian regimes. This has included favoring Chinese firms over American companies for projects like the Anaklia deep sea port, and facilitating Russian sanctions evasion.

Allowing Georgia to slip into authoritarian hands would send a dangerous message that democratic values are negotiable. For the US and EU, this is not just about Georgia. At stake is the West’s credibility in the wider region. Georgia aligns with Western foreign policy priorities such as countering the expansion of Chinese, Russian, and Iranian influence in the Black Sea region.

Georgia’s united democratic opposition and civil society have shown they are ready to lead a peaceful transition of power and position Georgia as a dependable Western ally. Achieving this vision, however, demands coordinated action from Washington, Brussels, and London.

First, new elections under international supervision are necessary. Only transparent elections monitored by independent actors can succeed in restoring democratic integrity and advance Georgia’s EU accession prospects.

Second, the West should impose targeted sanctions on Georgian Dream leaders and their enablers for undermining democracy and advancing Russian interests. These sanctions would send a clear message of support for Georgia’s democratic aspirations.

The US could expand current visa bans to include financial restrictions, with Brussels doing likewise. The prompt adoption of pending legislative bills in the US Congress to support the Georgian people would further demonstrate decisive commitment.

Third, Georgia’s civil society, and independent media need greater protection from repression. With a Russian-inspired “foreign agents” law now in place in Georgia, targeted funding and diplomatic support are crucial to ensuring these democratic pillars remain free and accountable.

Coordinated transatlantic pressure is crucial. Decisive action on Georgia can help strengthen a Western ally and stabilize a critical region, while also bolstering democracy at a pivotal moment. Georgia is far from a lost cause, but it will require bold Western leadership to prevent the country’s capture by the Kremlin.

Zviad Adzinbaia is a doctoral fellow at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy specializing in Russian hybrid warfare, disinformation, and Euro-Atlantic security and politics.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Oct 31, 2024

Russia’s economy is overheating but Putin cannot change course

By Alexander Mertens

Russia’s wartime economy is in danger of overheating due to a combination of record military spending, sanctions pressures, and runaway inflation, but Vladimir Putin dare not change course, writes Alexander Mertens.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Nov 21, 2024

Ukraine wary of Western disunity ahead of possible Russia peace talks

By Katherine Spencer

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s recent call to Vladimir Putin has sparked alarm in Kyiv and criticism from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as Ukraine seeks maximum Western unity ahead of possible Russia peace talks, writes Katherine Spencer.

Conflict European Union

UkraineAlert Nov 18, 2024

Imposing neutrality on Ukraine will not stop Putin or bring peace to Europe

By Mykola Bielieskov

Imposing neutrality on Ukraine will not bring about a durable peace in Europe. On the contrary, it would leave Ukraine at Putin’s mercy and set the stage for a new Russian invasion, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post Abandoning Georgia to the Kremlin would be a big geopolitical blunder appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This paper is the fourth in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “State of the Parties” series analyzing the strength of multi-party systems in different regions of the world.

Across Latin America and the Caribbean, personality-driven political movements and political outsiders are increasingly prevalent, often at the expense of party-based politics. A theme of recent elections in the region has been a widespread embrace of political figures and movements vowing to upend the status quo. From Ecuador to Argentina to Guatemala, political outsiders have unseated the establishment. Meanwhile, recently formed, ideologically vague political movements in Mexico and El Salvador overtook the traditional parties that they broke away from to win landslide elections. With few exceptions, the region has failed to develop competitive, institutionalized, and programmatic parties. This breakdown in party systems and proliferation of personality-driven movements has not delivered better results. Improving institutionalized competition among programmatic, ideologically distinct, and identifiable parties would bolster Latin American democracy, delivering citizens freedom and prosperity.
 
Within the past decade, several countries with once seemingly institutionalized party systems, such as El Salvador and Mexico, collapsed as parties lost their grip on power to personality-driven figures and movements. Others, like Ecuador and Guatemala, have systems that appear to provide a wide variety of options to citizens through a great proliferation of parties. These systems are unpredictable to citizens, and parties are unable to develop the structure, ideology, and institutionality necessary to deliver solutions to citizen’s needs.
 
This piece examines how political parties across four Latin American countries in two types of systems have failed to serve as effective vehicles for delivering democracy, and what must change for parties in the region to succeed. We examine the breakdown of the formerly institutionalized party systems in Mexico and El Salvador, and the persistently weak parties in Guatemala and Ecuador. Each country’s experience illustrates how a lack of programmatic parties has contributed to poor governance, which fails to adequately deliver essential services to citizens, potentially undermining democracy and the freedom it should deliver. For each case, we reference data from the Atlantic Council Freedom and Prosperity Indexes and other sources to illustrate the critical role of parties in advancing democracy.

Issue Brief Aug 30, 2024

South Asia’s political parties need internal reforms to revitalize regional democracy

By Steve Cima, Geoffrey MacDonald, James Storen

This paper is the third in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “State of the Parties” series analyzing the strength of multi-party systems in different regions of the world.

Democratic Transitions Elections

Issue Brief Aug 30, 2024

Unloved but indispensable: Political parties in Europe

By Paul McCarthy, Thibault Muzergues, Patrick Quirk

The experience of the past decade has shown that despite their unpopularity, political parties remain indispensable for the functioning of democracies in Europe—when they are present, plural, and organized, democracy is doing well. To prove this assertion, this paper will look at four telling examples in recent European history.

Democratic Transitions Elections

Issue Brief Jun 11, 2024

The missing piece: Political parties are critical to democracy in Africa

By Santiago Stocker, Patrick Quirk, and Dan Scaduto

As many as seventeen countries in Africa will head to the polls in 2024. This piece analyzes the state of political parties in Sub-Saharan Africa, using Freedom and Prosperity Indexes data to show why multiparty systems are key to democratic strength.

Africa Democratic Transitions

State of the Parties

This pathbreaking new series delivers insights and policy recommendations from leading experts on how to enhance efforts to strengthen democracy in all regions of the world. 

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

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The post The shift from party to personality politics is harming Latin American democracies appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On November 13, Steven Grundman, senior fellow at Forward Defense was quoted in a piece in Reuters entitled “Explainer: How Musk’s US government efficiency panel might work.” He spoke on Elon Musk’s influence in the private sector and the benefits of bringing that perspective into government.

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Steven Grundman

Senior Fellow

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Industry Defense Policy

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Steven Grundman in Reuters on the proposed government efficiency panel appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This week’s awkward standoff in Tbilisi highlighted the ongoing geopolitical tensions sparked by Georgia’s controversial recent parliamentary vote. According to the country’s Central Election Committee, Georgian Dream was the clear winner with 54 percent of the vote. This outcome is questioned by opposition parties and election observers, who accuse the government of rigging the ballot.

Opponents led by Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili have claimed that the vote was flawed and have dismissed the official results as illegitimate. Zurabishvili branded the election a “Russian special operation,” a clear reference to the Kremlin’s preferred euphemism for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Three monitoring groups, including the OSCE, have backed allegations of election irregularities including vote-buying, multi-voting, and widespread Russian disinformation.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The election was widely seen as a referendum on Georgia’s future geopolitical direction. The country’s Russia-friendly authorities hoped to secure a mandate for a pro-Kremlin manifesto, while opponents sought to return Georgia to the path of Euro-Atlantic integration. This westward trajectory is certainly popular, with polls consistently indicating that around 80 percent of Georgians support the country’s bid for EU membership. At the same time, many have been alarmed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and are fearful of facing the same fate if they attempt to turn away from Moscow.

The Georgian Dream party has been in power since 2012 and is officially committed to supporting European integration. However, party officials in Tbilisi have become increasingly critical of the West in recent years, and have faced mounting accusations of trying to steer the country back into the Kremlin orbit. Criticism has intensified following the adoption earlier this year of draconian laws similar to the authoritarian policies of Putin’s Russia. Critics say these legislative changes are aimed at silencing Georgia’s political opposition and muzzling the country’s civil society.

In the wake of the disputed election, Georgia’s pro-Western political forces have vowed to fight back against what they see as an attempt to undermine their country’s fledgling democracy. A number of large protest rallies have taken place in downtown Tbilisi since the late October ballot. Meanwhile, opposition parties are demanding fresh elections, refusing to serve in the new parliament, and calling on Georgia’s Western partners to conduct an international investigation into allegations of electoral misconduct.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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Russia has refrained from officially celebrating the election victory of its Georgian Dream allies. Instead, Moscow has accused the West of trying to “destabilize” Georgia with calls for an investigation into alleged violations. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that the vote represents a significant geopolitical triumph for the Kremlin and a major setback for the West.

Critics of Georgia’s governing party fear the country may now follow the geopolitical trajectory of Belarus, which in recent years has become increasingly subject to creeping Russian control in every sphere of national life from the economy to defense. This would represent a significant turnaround for Russia, which had looked to be in danger of losing its traditional influence in the southern Caucasus region.

Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 and continues to occupy approximately 20 percent of the country. Bilateral relations between Moscow and Tbilisi have remained tense ever since this brief war sixteen years ago. However, while the Georgian public has overwhelmingly backed closer ties with the West, many have also spoken of the need to avoid a resumption of hostilities with Russia. Georgian Dream officials have sought to exploit these concerns over the possibility of a new Russian invasion. During the recent election campaign, the party ran a series of controversial adverts featuring images of wartime destruction in Ukraine along with appeals to “choose peace.”

Some observers believe Russia’s approach to Georgia may offer hints of the Kremlin’s ultimate intentions in Ukraine. After first invading and occupying a large portion of Georgian territory, Russia then helped engineer the election of a sympathetic government that has paid lip service to the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations while working toward mending fences with Moscow. This proved possible despite frequent evidence of intense anti-Russian sentiment throughout Georgian society. While such an outcome is extremely hard to imagine in today’s wartime Ukraine, the remarkable revival of Russian influence in Georgia could certainly serve as inspiration for Kremlin policymakers.

Protests look set to continue in Tbilisi. However, it is not clear whether anything can now be done to prove the allegations of election fraud or annul the results of the October vote. Georgia’s Western partners have voiced their concerns over the election but remain reluctant to withhold official recognition. Georgia will be on the agenda when EU foreign ministers meet next week in Brussels, but the European Union is not expected to take a stance on the legitimacy of the election. Instead, the most meaningful sanction will likely be the continued freezing of EU membership talks, which have been on pause since June 2024.

With Western leaders unwilling to confront the Kremlin in the Caucasus, Russia is the real winner of Georgia’s recent elections. The vote has demonstrated Moscow’s ability to overcome popular opposition by forging powerful alliances with local elites and ignoring international concerns over election interference. Russia will doubtless seek to apply the lessons learned in Georgia as it turns its attention to future election campaigns in front line countries like Moldova, and may also seek to adopt a similar approach to postwar Ukraine.

Nicholas Chkhaidze is a research fellow at the Baku-based Topchubashov Center.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Nov 7, 2024

Donald Trump’s election victory fuels hopes and fears in Ukraine

By Peter Dickinson

Donald Trump’s election win has sparked alarm in Ukraine, where many fear he will end US support for the country. However, some war-weary Ukrainians hope he can help end the Russian invasion, writes Peter Dickinson.

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• Foreword
• Executive summary
• Explainer Videos
• Publication Signatories – US-Colombia Advisory Group
• Introduction
• Policy recommendations
• Conclusion
• Acknowledgments

Foreword

I am grateful to the US-Colombia Advisory Group for inviting me to share these words and for its valuable work in advancing the US-Colombian partnership.

Peace processes are constituent moments in any country, generating great expectations and hope. However, a peace accord alone—even the most innovative one—does not automatically produce the transformative changes necessary to create peace. Full implementation, in the social, political, and economic spheres, is required to consolidate peace for the decades to come.

Realism is of the essence. Peace agreements take time to implement. This is why the 2016 Peace Accord between the government of Colombia and the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC-EP) sets a fifteen-year horizon to ensure its implementation. Eight years after it was signed, the significant and tangible progress that has taken place is a testament to the hard work and sacrifices of many. Few peace agreements indeed manage to truly consolidate as vectors of political change. It is worthy of celebration.

But the eighth anniversary of the accord is also an opportunity to acknowledge that more work needs be done to address challenges such as persistent violence in rural areas, the murder of social leaders and former combatants, the slow implementation of structural reforms, and the need to strengthen the territorial and cross-cutting approaches of the agreement.

One important lesson to emerge from Colombia is that sustainable peace is not achieved solely by the demobilization of armed groups. Despite FARC-EP’s disarmament and reintegration, dissidents and criminal groups emerged to occupy the spaces left by the former guerrillas. This underlines the need for a comprehensive approach to security, which not only creates peace, but also dismantles the illicit economies that fuel violence. Security is not achieved solely through disarmament, but also through the creation of viable economic alternatives for affected communities and the capacity of the state to consolidate its central role in the areas once occupied by armed groups.

Amid it all, prioritizing the rights and needs of victims is crucial to strengthening the legitimacy of the accord and allowing for reconciliation. Despite the difficulties and significant delays, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) and reparation processes established by the accord remain one of Colombia’s greatest contributions to the practice of peacebuilding globally. The JEP’s ability to deliver justice rapidly and ensure legal security to those under its jurisdiction  will be essential to the legitimacy of the peace process and the durability of peace.

As it engages other armed groups into negotiating peace settlements, it is crucial the Colombian state doesn’t lose sight of the importance of safeguarding and prioritizing the comprehensive implementation of the 2016 accord. It presents a carefully designed road map of coherent political responses to comprehensively tackle some of the main challenges that Colombia faces today: violence, insecurity, inequality, drug trafficking, and exclusion of marginalized populations. Following this road to the end will open many more such opportunities for all. But that will first and foremost require a full and successful implementation of the accord.

Dag Nylander
Director, Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF)

Executive summary

Colombia’s 2016 peace accord between the government of Colombia and the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC-EP) is often held up as one of the more successful instances of conflict resolution in history, putting an end to the longest-running armed conflict in the western hemisphere. Support for this accord, and for its full implementation, has been a cornerstone of the US-Colombia relationship since the beginning of its negotiation in 2010. When it was signed, the accord laid out a fifteen-year roadmap to implement provisions meant to reform the country’s rural economy, reduce illicit crop cultivation, provide peace in neglected areas, and establish democratic guarantees to protect the rights of social activists and victims of the conflict.

However, halfway through the accord’s implementation period, progress has been slow. According to the Peace Accords Matrix of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies,¹ which is responsible for technical verification and monitoring of implementation of the accord, as of May 2024 the Colombian government has fully implemented 33 percent of its stipulations, while 37 percent saw “minimum”² implementation, and 20 percent are in an “intermediate” state.³ Evidence from the Kroc Institute suggests that at the current rate, the accord’s implementation will not reach full implementation before the established deadline of 2031. The delay further complicates Colombia’s search for peace amid rising security concerns in the country, in addition to posing a threat to US security interests in the hemisphere and contributing to the flow of illicit goods northward.

Through a series of consultations and roundtables with the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s US-Colombia Advisory Group (UCAG), members identified that coordination challenges both at a national and territorial level between and among institutions with a role in the implementation of the accord have hindered its full implementation. Lack of coordination was also recognized throughout the three additional constraints identified:

• Proliferation and fragmentation of illegal armed groups and increased crime and violence in Colombia, which disproportionately impacts ethnic minorities, vulnerable populations, and the areas hardest hit by the conflict.
• Difficulty in prioritizing the 2016 peace accord amid a broader, unclear security strategy to combat illegal armed groups.
• Lack of progress in crop substitution programs launched as a result of the accord.

Policy recommendations

1. Prioritize the implementation of the ethnic chapter of the accord and its ethnic focus throughout, in coordination with peace negotiations and local ceasefires, to curb existing violence in isolated regions with predominantly Afro-Colombian, Indigenous, and vulnerable populations including victims from the armed conflict. Addressing the severe delays in implementing these ethnic commitments requires an overhaul of state presence through strengthened policing, judicial systems, and economic support, all tailored to meet local needs and establish trust. Additionally the Petro government should improve coordination with local leaders and leverage the Special High-Level Forum with Ethnic Peoples (IEANPE) to secure community-driven progress. International partners, particularly the US, should provide dedicated technical and financial support to ensure sustainable implementation of the accord, with a focus on addressing specific needs of ethnic territories and creating viable economic opportunities to reduce illegal group influence.
2. Enhance the impact of existing, targeted development programs by increasing resource allocation and leveraging international support and local buy-in to develop targeted strategies to support newly identified conflict-prone and conflict-affected areas in Colombia. It is essential to incentivize development in conflict-affected areas, especially through the Territorially Focused Development Programs (PDETs) and Zones Most Affected by the Armed Conflict (ZOMACs) created under the 2016 peace accord. Despite their promise, these programs face funding shortages, weak institutional capacities, and ongoing security challenges that restrict effective implementation and delay critical infrastructure projects. Strengthening PDETs requires addressing resource allocation gaps, supporting local capacity-building, and prioritizing equitable development. Additionally, real-time data monitoring of conflict zones will enable targeted security and development interventions, with US support for local monitoring and evaluation actors enhancing resource distribution and operational effectiveness. By investing in community engagement and new support programs, the United States can bolster Colombia’s stability, curb the expansion of illegal armed groups, and address significant shared security concerns.
3. Prioritize the implementation of the 2016 peace accord before the 2031 deadline to build stronger national and international support for creating more effective negotiation structures with illegal armed groups in Colombia. President Petro’s establishment of the “Alta Instancia para la Implementación” reflects a commitment to better coordinate efforts across 54 government entities, backed by a significant budget allocation. However, poor coordination, limited budget execution, and a deteriorating security environment due to increased illegal armed group presence continue to obstruct progress. Observers from academia and civil society should support Colombia’s efforts to streamline fund utilization, ensuring the accord’s constitutional mandate is prioritized over political agendas. Successful negotiations with armed groups require a balanced, transparent approach grounded in inclusivity and monitored incentives, backed by a clear legislative framework, with insights from international partners like the US and Norway.
4. Support the independence and efficiency of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, an innovative and far-reaching transitional and restorative justice system in Colombia. Support for the JEP is key, yet many ex-combatants remain in legal limbo, and the JEP’s delay in resolving key “macro cases” has weakened its credibility. Additionally, the inclusion of high-profile paramilitary figures not intended for JEP jurisdiction has further eroded public trust. To enhance peace process success, U.S. agencies should support Colombia’s efforts to ensure victim and perpetrator participation in restorative justice. Improving JEP’s communication with ethnic communities, coordinating across cases, and delivering culturally sensitive reparations are also vital for effective implementation and justice for serious conflict-related crimes.

Explainer Videos

Signatories

US-Colombia Advisory Group Members

• Jaime Asprilla
• Cynthia Arnson
• Ambassador Carolina Barco
• Ambassador William Brownfield
• Minister Mauricio Cárdenas
• Enrique Carrizosa
• Ambassador Paula J. Dobriansky
• Stephen Donehoo
• Steve Hege
• Muni Jensen
• Bruce Mac Master
• Paola Buendia
• Minister Maria Claudia Lacouture
• Ambassador P. Michael McKinley
• Ambassador Mariana Pacheco
• Kristie Pellecchia
• Arturo Valenzuela
• Kevin Whitaker

Introduction

Colombia’s 2016 peace accord between the government of Colombia and the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP) is often held up as one of the more successful instances of conflict resolution in history, putting an end to the longest-running armed conflict in the western hemisphere. Support for this accord, and for its full implementation, has been a cornerstone of the US-Colombia relationship since the beginning of its negotiation in 2010. When it was signed, the accord laid out a fifteen-year roadmap to implement provisions meant to reform the country’s rural economy, reduce illicit crop cultivation, provide peace in neglected areas, and establish democratic guarantees to protect the rights of social activists and victims of the conflict.

However, halfway through the accord’s implementation period, progress has been slow. According to the Peace Accords Matrix of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies,⁴ which is responsible for technical verification and monitoring of implementation of the accord, as of May 2024 the Colombian government has fully implemented 33 percent of its stipulations, while 37 percent saw “minimum”⁵implementation, and 20 percent are in an “intermediate” state.⁶ Evidence from the Kroc Institute suggests that at the current rate, the accord’s implementation will not reach full implementation before the established deadline of 2031. The delay further complicates Colombia’s search for peace amid rising security concerns in the country, in addition to posing a threat to US security interests in the hemisphere and contributing to the flow of illicit goods northward.

Factors that have hindered the accord’s implementation include inconsistent political will, governance and coordination challenges and institutional weakness in areas affected by the conflict, insufficient allocation of resources, and, most importantly, the persistence of the armed conflict. Violent conflict persists in Colombia on three fronts: between the state and preexisting armed actors; between the state and new emerging actors, including FARC dissidents, illegal armed groups and transnational criminal organizations; and between and among these groups. The lag in implementation as a result of these factors carries implications for the future of the US-Colombia partnership.

Given that Colombia is past the halfway mark in the set timeframe, the time is ripe for accelerating the implementation of the 2016 peace accord. A broad consensus on this fact exists among local governments, the business community, multilateral partners, civil society, and, most importantly, between Washington and Bogotá. In an era of deepening instability and insecurity in neighboring Andean countries and, more broadly, in Latin America and the Caribbean, the United States has a clear interest in ensuring that Colombia overcomes its own security challenges and builds state presence in the areas hardest hit by violence and conflict. Indeed, the commitments that Colombia made in its 2016 peace accord have ramifications that go far beyond the initial objective of reaching peace with the FARC. If fully implemented, the accord could lay the foundation to deepen Colombia’s democracy, bring new opportunities for investment in neglected but resource-rich areas of the country, and deal a crushing blow to organized crime. Although principally a Colombian achievement, a fully implemented accord would also be a capstone of over two decades of dedicated US commitment to Colombia. Achieving this, however, will require commitment and political will from the Colombian government to prioritize the implementation—as well as coordination and continued support from the United States.

Through a series of consultations and roundtables with the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s US-Colombia Advisory Group (UCAG), members identified that coordination challenges both at a national and territorial level between and among institutions with a role in the implementation of the accord have hindered its full implementation. Lack of coordination was also recognized throughout the three additional constraints identified:

• Proliferation and fragmentation of illegal armed groups and increased crime and violence in Colombia, which disproportionately impacts ethnic minorities, vulnerable populations, and the areas hardest hit by the conflict.
• Difficulty in prioritizing the 2016 peace accord amid a broader, unclear security strategy to combat illegal armed groups.
• Lack of progress in crop substitution programs launched as a result of the accord.
• UCAG members propose that while addressing the lag in the accord’s implementation requires a holistic approach, it is imperative to address the current rise in crime and violence in both urban and rural areas in Colombia, an issue that ranks as the number one concern of Colombians today.

This publication builds on the UCAG’s first report, “Advancing US-Colombia Cooperation on Drug Policy and Law Enforcement,” by outlining four recommendations for steps the United States and Colombia can take to accelerate the accord’s implementation and simultaneously address the underlying issue of security in Colombia and the broader region. The three core challenges are discussed below.

The proliferation and fragmentation of illegal armed groups and increased crime and violence in Colombia, which disproportionately impact ethnic minorities, vulnerable populations, and the areas hardest hit by the conflict

Colombia’s complex geography and richness in natural resources bring important opportunities for tourism and economic growth, but also require significant state capacity and resources to support the country’s most rural and isolated areas. State-neglected areas are where illegal armed groups thrive, enjoying full control and freedom of operation that pose extensive threats to local communities. The 2016 peace accord, while historic, only ended one armed conflict—between the Colombian state and the FARC-EP. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, at least eight domestic armed conflicts were identified in 2024, based on their legal classification.⁷ Three of the conflicts are between the Colombian state and illegal armed groups which aim to replace or overthrow the democratic government, including the National Liberation Army (ELN), the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC), and the former FARC-EP (Disidencias, by its current name in Spanish). The other five conflicts exclude the state and are between new and existing illegal armed groups. (See table 1 below). All eight of the groups identified here engage in an array of illegal activities, principally narcotics production and trafficking, trade of people and illicit goods, illegal mining, and extortion. Included in these eight conflicts are groups that never demobilized when the accord was signed and those that took up arms again when they claimed the accord was violated. In its majority, these conflicts take place within marginalized and rural communities, and community leaders in these areas have suffered disproportionately. In Petro’s first two years, more than 350 social leaders and human rights defenders and at least 75 signatories of the 2016 peace accord have been murdered, and over 165 massacres have occurred.

In April 2024 700 civil society organizations presented a report to the United Nations claiming that violence perpetrated by illegal armed groups has expanded by 36 percent in the first trimester of 2024, affecting 189 municipalities (almost 20 percent of Colombian territory), with over 272 violent events being recorded during the same period. In practice, the impact of rising violence in Colombia has resulted in over 400 violations of human rights both by state and nonstate actors. Communities under threat face heightened rates of recruitment, homicides, displacement, confinement, sexual violence, and other effects. To put things in perspective, on a national level, more than 145,049 people were individually displaced in 2023, which meant an increase of 18 percent compared to 2022. Territorial disputes among armed actors also led to the confinement of 47,013 people (in 2023), representing an increase of 19 percent at the national level compared to 2022.

The forced displacement crisis in Riohacha has placed growing pressure on the resources of the Riohacha District, particularly in health, social welfare, security, and community cohesion. Displaced families face searious challenges in accessing a safe and stable environment, which heightens their need for assistance. Given the magnitude of the crisis, coordinated inter-institutional support and international cooperation are essential to alleviate the humanitarian impact. 

Genaro Redondo Choles, mayor of Riohacha

This 2024 report of the Analytical Service of Colombian National Police (CEPOL) outlines that on a national level, extortion, homicides, and personal injuries have seen a significant increase in the first trimester of 2024, while crimes such as theft and kidnapping have decreased. Many departments including Arauca, located on the border with Venezuela, have suffered a wave of killings as armed groups attack social leaders in areas controlled by rival groups and who are often accused of sympathizing with the “wrong” side. The reconfiguration of nonstate armed actors extends beyond its initial reliance on drug trafficking, as such groups have diversified their operations to other forms of profitable illicit businesses such as illegal mining, human smuggling, and money laundering, exacerbating the humanitarian consequences that affect the civilian population. Their complex operations, which are related to the historical institutional weakness in the most remote areas of Colombia, show the long road that remains to achieve peace in Colombia.

Since the 1990s, violence in Puerto Tejada has escalated, with an increase in homicides linked to its role as a drug trafficking corridor and the expansion of the Cali Cartel, as well as the arrival of paramilitaries who led “social cleansing” efforts and social control actions, primarily affecting young people. Today, violence continues with the proliferation of gangs, where youth engage in theft, extortion, and drug-related activities, while data shows alarming homicide rates and a pattern of intergenerational revenge. To address this situation, it is proposed to strengthen prevention programs for children and youth, resocialization for ex-convicts, and detox programs for substance users, while seeking alliances to improve security and coexistence in the municipality.

Luz Adiela Salazar, mayor of Puerto Tejada

Difficulty in prioritizing the 2016 peace accord amid a broader, unclear security strategy to combat illegal armed groups

Since taking office in August 2022, Gustavo Petro’s administration has rolled out its new strategy for peace, titled Paz Total, or Total Peace. This strategy aims to end the violence that has plagued Colombia for decades by brokering simultaneous ceasefires with various armed and criminal groups, offering judicial leniency and other benefits in exchange for permanent disarmament. However, 66 percent of Colombians say that progress on Petro’s Total Peace strategy is moving in the wrong direction and 85 percent think Colombia’s security situation is worsening, according to a June poll.

The lapsed ceasefires with the Estado Mayor Central (EMC), the AGC, the ELN, and other armed groups highlight the biggest challenge for Total Peace: The government has yet to describe an attractive incentive structure for armed and criminal groups—which reap significant profits and effectively control large portions of the country—to abandon their power and influence. The worsening violence has continued to erode public confidence in Petro’s ambitious approach. (Table 2) The government is now involved in ten sets of peace talks with more than a dozen armed groups, and Bogotá still hopes its talks with the ELN can be revived.

According to the UN Humanitarian Coordinator report, 129 possible ceasefire violations were reported in 2023, including humanitarian impacts on the civilian population and offensive actions or armed incidents. The report considers not only the two official ceasefires—those of the ELN and the EMC—but also those declared unilaterally by other groups. Additionally, concerns have been raised about instances where advancing the Total Peace plan may come at the expense of certain commitments established in the 2016 peace accord. For example, the 2016 accord was intended to be the final opportunity for the FARC to surrender their weapons. However, some observers feel that by moving beyond this framework, Petro may be creating challenges for the sustainability of both the 2016 peace accord and future accords.

A key factor has been the intensification of violent competition among new and existing illegal armed groups: During Petro’s first year in office, intergroup confrontations rose by 85 percent. Given their power and influence, negotiations with some of these illegal armed groups are needed but are stalling as the government attempts to address the incentive structures of these groups. The ceasefires, when announced, have not yielded clear benefits. Meanwhile, clashes between groups and state forces have continued to disproportionately affect ethnic minorities and marginalized communities in areas most impacted by violence. In this context, the United States and other international partners must continue to pressure the Colombian government on the protections of the rights of local communities who are getting caught in the crossfire in the absence of a local strategy to tackle this.

The proliferation of armed groups in this region has trapped our communities in the crossfire. Though we are not participants in the conflict, we are suffering its
most critical impacts—our movement within our own territories is restricted due
to the presence of dominant armed groups, and we fear being mistaken as
affiliated with one side or another. Our communities must no longer be targets
of this conflict. Ceasefire violations have left us vulnerable, undermining our
access to healthcare, education, economic and social development, and even
political stability.

Ana Milena Hinojoso, mayor of Atrato

Amid widespread criticism for not delivering on the promise of Total Peace and the slow implementation of the 2016 peace accord, Petro has repeatedly highlighted the need for broader reforms (i.e., agrarian, education, health) as mechanisms to accelerate the implementation of the accord. Under the 2023–2026 National Development Plan, Colombia Potencia Mundial de la Vida, the Petro administration has highlighted the importance of fully implementing the peace accord as a key aspect of Colombia’s transformation, detailing more than 164 directives. Some of the key issues include the creation of the National System for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development, the strengthening of the multipurpose registry,⁸ financing for the peace accord’s Land Fund, strengthening citizen oversight, creating the National Reincorporation System and the Comprehensive Reincorporation Program, and reforming the National Drug Policy and the Victims’ Law.

However, while little progress has been witnessed overall, two notable achievements regarding Colombia’s “institutionality for peace” are worth highlighting. First, Law 2272/2022 establishes a policy called Para la Paz Total y la Seguridad Humana, which includes the implementation of the 2016 peace accord and strengthens the institutions responsible for its execution. Second, the Peace Accord Implementation Unit (UIAP) was created by decree and operates under the office of the High Commissioner for Peace, facilitating new approaches and dialogue processes with illegal armed groups. Yet, the UIAP has faced numerous challenges so far, as it is responsible for advising, coordinating, supporting, monitoring, and verifying the implementation of the accord, and has little capacity to do so.

Additionally, the newly created Ministry of Equality and Equity has had little impact on accord implementation efforts despite the fact that the government tasked it with addressing the accord’s gender and ethnic approaches. The Constitutional Court invalidated the law creating the Ministry of Equality—led by Vice President Francia Márquez—and deferred its decision for two years, allowing the ministry to operate until 2026. As of September 2024, only 13 percent of the ethnic chapter’s stipulations and 22 percent of the gender approach stipulations have been implemented. While these changes could potentially drive progress, the government’s failure to achieve tangible results in the Total Peace strategy and the 2016 accord remains an important concern.

A lack of progress in the crop substitution programs that were launched as part of the accord

The rollout of Petro’s ten-year National Drug Policy in November 2023 represents a shift from past administrations’ respective approaches to counternarcotics. The approach fully centers on efforts to generate greater pressure on financial structures of organized crime, as well as generating incentives for small coca-producing farmers in geographically isolated areas to replace their illicit crops with legal ones. The Petro administration has also eliminated all forms of “forced eradication,” except for coca plots classified as industrial plantations, reversing decades of Colombian counternarcotics policy that was coordinated with and extensively supported by the United States. In a practical matter, there are still no clear criteria on the identification and monitoring of industrial plantations, meaning that little eradication is taking place. According to the latest UNODC survey, cocaine production in Colombia surged by 53 percent in 2023. The increase was explained by the continued concentration of coca cultivation in areas with the highest productivity across all three stages of its production—cultivation, extraction, and processing—enabling a single hectare of coca to yield up to twice as much cocaine as it did 11 years ago. Additionally, the area dedicated to coca cultivation also expanded in 2023, increasing by 10% from 230,000 to 253,000 hectares. This growth, however, represents a slower rate compared to the previous year, which saw a 13% rise in coca plantations.

Coca prices have plummeted, and some analysts attribute the decline in prices to a variety of factors including persistent conflict in cultivation areas, which creates uncertainty and deters buyers; the saturation of drug smuggling routes out of Colombia, as evidenced by high seizures; and the oversupply and rapid growth of coca cultivation. Cartels also have altered their purchasing strategies, opting to buy counternarcotics closer to trafficking routes and from fewer locations. This shift has negatively impacted coca farmers in areas such as Putumayo. However, the UNODC notes that while Colombian cocaine prices have plummeted, global prices remain stable, and the drug is reaching new markets. A kilogram of cocaine can sell for up to $25,000 in the United States, $35,000 in Europe, $50,000 in Asia, and $100,000 in Australia, making it an extremely profitable and vibrant business, able to adapt to changes in supply, transport, and demand. Instead of attributing the decline in coca prices to oversupply, the UNODC points to a lack of consistent market controls as the main issue. This has led to a volatile market characterized by uncertainty.

Given stable cocaine prices in the global market, low coca leaf prices in Colombia lead drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) from Mexico, Europe, and other parts of the world to see the region and Colombia specifically as an area of opportunity, given the greater profit margins resulting from low coca prices and cultivation costs. While synthetic drug production, illegal mining, arms trafficking, and human trafficking contribute to the diversified operations of criminal businesses, and earned billions for transnational criminal organizations in 2023, cocaine remained the principal driver of criminal evolution and earnings, and must therefore remain a priority as enshrined in the 2016 peace accord.

A logical starting point should be Colombia’s Comprehensive National Crop Substitution Program (Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos, or PNIS), which was born out of the 2016 peace accord with the goal of reducing the amount of coca crops in the country through substitution programs. The program has been lagging significantly, due to the lack of communication and follow-through from previous governments with communities in coca-growing areas, as well as insufficient budget allocation and operational capacities. The Colombian Congress has also shared concerns about the lack of progress in program implementation, amid media reports that only 5 percent of the budget allocated to the program was actually disbursed in 2023. The Petro administration has responded by appointing new directors of both the PNIS and the overall Paz Total programs this year, but concerns remain. Considering the lack of demonstrated progress on key aspects of the PNIS, the Kroc Institute cautions that the commitments at the minimum level of implementation risk not being completed by the deadline set in the final accord.

The current national government’s drug policy outlines its willingness to move forward with the PNIS, which consists of making payments of 36 million pesos—about $9,000—to persons who agree to eradicate their coca plantations. However, the government’s commitments to productive projects that define how this money will be used by families remains undefined. Only 10.8 percent of PNIS families with ethnic affiliation and 7.5 percent of the ethnic families with woman heads of household have benefited from the program. Despite these lags in implementation, the Territorial Renewal Agency (ART), through the Special Consultation Mechanism (MEC), has provided technical training to ethnic communities related to project formulation and management with private companies. Given the complex realities of coca-growing areas in Colombia, where criminal groups have strengthened their presence over the last year, it seems unlikely that even these subsidies will bring about lasting change unless there are secure conditions in the territories to do it, and unless the government defines a comprehensive and implementable set of programs to transition PNIS beneficiaries to the licit economy. Currently, there are 70,000 beneficiaries of the PNIS program, while the total number of coca growers in Colombia is estimated at 400,000. Thus, for the PNIS to continue effectively, its transition would need to encompass all coca growers across the country and be flexible enough to be consistently updated.

Policy recommendations

1. Prioritize the implementation of the ethnic chapter of the accord and its ethnic focus throughout, in coordination with peace negotiations and local ceasefires, to curb existing violence in isolated regions with predominantly Afro-Colombian, Indigenous, and vulnerable populations including victims from the armed conflict.

Addressing the implementation of the 2016 peace accord’s ethnic chapter requires a fundamental overhaul of state presence and citizen security nationwide through strengthened police and justice systems in conflict-prone areas. Without such a transformation, Colombia risks slipping back into the turmoil experienced between the 1980s and the 2000s.

The ethnic chapter and approach of the 2016 peace accord is lagging behind significantly, compared to overall accord implementation. Significant obstacles such as the absence of ethnic approach mainstreaming in planning and programmatic work, the slow implementation of security guarantees for ethnic communities, and the lack of application of prior consultation for ethnic peoples have hindered its implementation. As of September 2024, 13 percent of the eighty ethnic approach stipulations had yet to reach the stage of implementation initiation, while 61 percent were at a minimal level, 14 percent were at an intermediate level, and only 13 percent were completed. Similarly, the commitments in the final accord’s ethnic chapter reflect this slow trend as well, with 15 percent of stipulations not initiated, 62 percent showing minimal progress, 15 percent at an intermediate level, and only 8 percent completed. This is concerning, particularly given that close to 20 percent of victims from the armed conflict belong to ethnic minority communities and regions, with Indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations facing heightened impacts from clashes between rival illegal armed groups. The enduring conflict in regions predominantly inhabited by ethnic minorities, particularly Afro-Colombians, is intrinsically linked to cross-sectional inequality within Colombian society. The unwillingness of successive governments to acknowledge and address these realities have thus generated a disconnect between the marginalized communities and the rest of Colombia—a critical factor that perpetuates conflict.

To address this issue, the Petro administration has tasked Márquez (who also serves as minister of equality and equity) with overseeing and coordinating the ethnic chapter and approach implementation. Last November, Indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants, Raizal, Palenquero, and Rrom communities, alongside the national government and others, renewed their commitment through a pact aimed at advancing effective implementation of the ethnic chapter. Slight progress was seen in commitments linked to the ethnic approach within the PNIS, completion of prior consultation processes for land registry in ethnic territories, and the establishment of a budget tracker dedicated to ethnic minority community funding. However, important challenges persist, particularly in conducting consultations and reaching accords with these communities, due to the lengthy, complex nature of the consultative process, resource constraints, and the lack of confidence of vulnerable populations in government efforts. The presence of illegal armed groups in Afro-Colombian and other predominantly ethnic minority communities have impeded both government efforts and effective implementation of projects in affected areas.

Similarly, the international community, especially the United States, must continue to steadfastly support Colombia’s peace process. This entails providing sustained technical, political, and financial assistance to prevent fragmented implementation of the accord. Long-term financial and technical support should be prioritized for the Special High-Level Forum with Ethnic Peoples (IEANPE), the primary consultative, representative, and liaison body of the Commission for Monitoring, Promoting, and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement (CSIVI). The IEANPE has focused on improving the implementation of the ethnic approach and promoting the ethnic chapter’s pedagogy at the territorial level. It participated in the Pact for the Ethnic Chapter and led sessions to deepen understanding and gather inputs for reports on the implementation of the ethnic approach. Although Petro’s government allocated a portion of its implementation budget to the IEANPE in 2023 for the first time since the accord was signed, it is essential that this financial support is diversified, sustainable, and not solely reliant on government funding, which can change rapidly.

Economic development is also a key component needed for the progress of these communities and resource-rich territories. Local leaders and producers should receive the technical knowledge needed to connect their products to broader markets across Colombia and beyond: A best practice that can be applied here is cooperative farming to enhance export capacity by tapping into wholesale buyers. Ensuring financial support and tailored technical programs for local leaders, civil society groups, and grassroots initiatives in these regions will strengthen efforts to expedite the implementation of the ethnic chapter and, consequently, provide economic incentives for local communities to operate in legality at the face of the alternative, ideally creating safer conditions in neglected areas affected by persistent conflict, as well as access to quality public goods including education and health.

Community development is essential for the effective implementation of the ethnic chapter, as it bolsters the local economy and reinforces legal frameworks. By advancing initiatives such as cooperative agriculture and expanding access to broader markets, this approach fosters economic sustainability and progress in regions impacted by conflict, ensuring improved living conditions and essential services for these communities.

Gessica Vallejo, mayor of Candelaria

2. Enhance the impact of existing, targeted development programs by increasing resource allocation and leveraging international support and local buy-in to develop targeted strategies to support newly identified conflict-prone and conflict-affected areas in Colombia.

To prevent and address the recurrence of armed conflict in Colombia, it is crucial to provide incentives for development and investment in conflict-affected areas across Colombian territory. During the negotiation of the 2016 peace accord, 170 municipalities were designated as Territorially Focused Development Programs, or PDETs. These programs aim to transform the Colombian countryside and rural environment by fostering a more equitable relationship between rural and urban areas through increased government presence and investment in conflict-ridden regions. PDETs encompass a variety of development projects, such as the construction of roads and schools, improved access to electricity and critical infrastructure, and enhanced health services. Incentives for investment are provided by the government through tax credits; PDET territories also are part of larger municipal clusters that have been most affected by the conflict, known as ZOMACs (Zones most affected by the armed conflict), which provide similar incentives. Both PDETs and ZOMACs are essential components of Colombia’s 2016 peace accord, designed to address the root causes of conflict and promote sustainable development in vulnerable regions. Despite their significance, their implementation faces numerous challenges.

Funding shortages prevent the adequate rollout of development and infrastructure projects, limiting the scope and impact of PDETs in vulnerable communities. These shortages—paired with institutional weaknesses such as limited capacity, poor coordination among government agencies, and difficulties in ensuring meaningful community participation in the execution and implementation of PDET programs—have led to delays and inefficiencies. The structural inefficiencies that have hindered the progress of PDETs are now compounded by growing security concerns, as ongoing conflicts in certain regions restrict access to communities and obstruct development efforts. Strengthening PDET implementation and closing gaps in prioritization by ensuring equitable distribution of resources and assistance for all initiatives will be essential. In addition, assessing the barriers limiting the activation of ethnic people’s own initiatives and strengthening the MEC’s technical capacities for formulating projects that are likely to be funded by international actors will help close this gap.

With conflict and violence expanding into new territories across Colombia (see table 2), it is essential to utilize real-time data to monitor and analyze the growth of conflict, the presence and expansion of illegal armed groups, and the resilience of institutions in these areas. This data-driven approach will be crucial for shaping comprehensive development strategies and informed security policies. US agencies, such as the US Southern Command, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and USAID, should play a complementary role by supporting local monitoring and evaluation actors such as the CSIVI and other independent academic institutions to allocate resources more effectively, tailor security operations to local conditions, and direct development initiatives toward regions experiencing increased conflict. Proactively engaging in these efforts can prevent further instability and enhance the overall response to emerging security challenges.

The United States should seize this opportunity to deepen existing support for Colombia in developing new programs and funding lines that strengthen institutional capacities in newly conflict-prone and conflict-affected areas. This could include investing in local governance training, improving resource allocation, and addressing budget disparities to ensure that these regions receive adequate support to confront the evolving threats of crime and insecurity. However, before deploying development funds, it is imperative to engage with and listen to local communities in these newly identified areas. Building trust and understanding local needs through community consultations and advisory boards will enhance the relevance and effectiveness of development programs. In doing so, the United States will not only help to curb the rapid expansion of illegal armed groups—which drive migration northward and erode state authority across Colombia—but also address a significant national security concern that affects its own interests. Supporting Colombia in this way will help foster stability, reinforce democratic governance, and reduce the broader regional security risks posed by transnational criminal organizations.

3. Prioritize the implementation of the 2016 peace accord before the 2031 deadline to build stronger national and international support for creating more effective negotiation structures with illegal armed groups in Colombia.

One of the most commonly heard critiques of both the Duque administration and the current Petro administration is the failure to take consistent and concrete steps to implement the 2016 peace accord. When Petro took office, he promised to implement an “Alta Instancia para la Implementación,” a high-level governing body to help coordinate and articulate efforts aimed at fulfilling the implementation of the 2016 accord. This coordination is crucial due to the number of entities and sectors involved. In the National Development Plan, 50 billion pesos (close to $2.7 billion) were allocated for the implementation of the accord, a budget shared by fifty-four entities that must work together to uphold the comprehensive spirit of the accord.

The responsibility for accelerating the implementation of the accord falls under the Peace Accord Implementation Unit, spearheaded by Gloria Cuartas. Yet the unit has faced heavy criticism for its lack of action and results so far, attributed to inadequate budget execution, poor coordination among government agencies, and, most importantly, the rapid deterioration of security caused by the increased presence of illegal armed groups across the country, as well as declining confidence among demobilized individuals and communities on the ground. However, despite this criticism, the UIAP has a fundamental role. For the government’s security strategy to be effective, it is crucial to ensure that the UIAP is closely engaged in any new talks and that the funds allocated for implementing the peace accord are leveraged effectively as part of these violence prevention strategies.

To ensure the effective implementation of the 2016 peace accord in Colombia, it is crucial that observers, including academic institutions and civil society organizations, provide insights to support Colombian governmental efforts to optimize the utilization of funds that back the accord, ensuring efficient results within a strict timeline. Colombia entered the commitments associated with the 2016 accord already aware that there would be costs, both in terms of finances and government attention; it’s essential, even as the Petro administration works on its initiatives, that accord-related commitments be honored. The 2016 peace accord is a mandate in the Colombian constitution, making it a binding commitment that the current and successive administrations must continue to honor—and takes precedence over other aspirational commitments in political agendas. Therefore, entities overseeing the accord’s implementation must ensure that the government upholds this commitment, taking full responsibility for its effective execution.

The ongoing armed conflict in Colombia continues to hinder the implementation of the peace accord. While President Petro’s emphasis on negotiation is important, given the diverse range of conflicts across the country, his strategy has only yielded mixed results. To enhance the effectiveness of negotiations with illegal armed groups, the government should adopt a multifaceted approach that emphasizes inclusivity, local engagement, and transparency. It is crucial to closely monitor the incentives for armed groups and understand the power dynamics and reasons behind their reluctance to engage in meaningful dialogue. The ability to inflict harm gives illegal armed groups a significant bargaining chip, making it also hard for the Colombian state to offer anything that these armed groups want enough to loosen their grip over territories that bring in ample profits.

Negotiations with criminal groups run the risk of undermining the rule of law; therefore, any incentives used must be approached with great caution and ideally supported by a legislative framework passed by democratically elected lawmakers. A well-defined, structured negotiation strategy, rather than an ad hoc approach, is essential. Countries with relevant expertise, such as the United States and Norway, should collaborate with the Colombian government to develop this framework.

4. Support the independence and efficiency of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), an innovative and far-reaching transitional and restorative justice system in Colombia.

The Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) is a backbone of Colombia’s 2016 peace accord. Its ability to deliver justice promptly and guarantee legal certainty to those under its jurisdiction is essential for the legitimacy and sustainability of the peace process. Particular attention should be paid to the resolution of the case to grant amnesty and guarantee legal security to demobilized FARC combatants, who were signatories of the accord for political or other relatively minor crimes, as stipulated in the final accord. Even after seven years, the overwhelming majority of these individuals still do not have their respective legal situations resolved, despite having administrative amnesties. This is a core commitment of the accord, and failure to follow through might lay ground for resentment and the resurgence of conflict in Colombia.

Equally critical is the work of the JEP in advancing all eleven “macro cases” that it has taken on. The failure to resolve even one of these macro cases, now eight years after the signing of the accord, has damaged the credibility of the JEP and shaped public opinion about it. This is compounded by the JEP’s decision to include—and thereby protect from normal judicial processing—high-profile individuals whose cases were not intended to be treated in this manner. Both of these issues—one an error of omission (failure to resolve macro cases) and the other an error of commission (including Salvatore Mancuso, a Colombian paramilitary leader who once was second in command of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), and other paramilitary leaders)—have undermined public confidence in the JEP.

To ensure the success of the peace process, it is vital that US agencies work alongside the Colombian government to support effective implementation and ensure the participation of both victims and perpetrators in restorative justice mechanisms. It is essential that the JEP, under its jurisdiction, make progress in holding accountable those responsible for the gravest crimes committed in the Colombian armed conflict, eight years after the accord was signed. It is also vital that US agencies work alongside the Colombian government to ensure effective implementation and support for victims and perpetrators’ participation in restorative justice mechanisms. Strengthening the strategy for communication and participation of ethnic peoples in all cases, but especially Case 09, will help ensure the conditions necessary for their participation in judicial proceedings to have a reparation-oriented purpose. This includes providing for culturally specific measures, such as guaranteeing interpretation during hearings and translation of essential court documents, for communities still using their native languages. It is of the utmost importance to strengthen mechanisms for coordination across cases so that the most serious and representative acts perpetrated during the armed conflict are held accountable before the JEP and that sanctions are closely related to the harm caused. Reparation under the JEP is collective and symbolic. Importantly, it is not solely the JEP’s responsibility to deliver reparations; the Colombian state and its judicial institutions also play a crucial role.

Conclusion: A call to action

The implementation of the 2016 peace accord requires political will, broader coordination, and consistent technical assistance. The persisting conflict in Colombia requires attention and a coordinated strategy that places the 2016 peace accord at its core. Tides are changing in the region, as illegal armed groups and organized crime groups are thinking creatively about how to bypass state institutions to expand their illicit empires. Meanwhile, many governments in the region are approaching the problem differently, without a clear strategy in mind. Colombia, however, has a clear roadmap with the 2016 peace accord to help territories prevent the resurgence of conflict and deal with current illegal actors. Partner governments like the United States and European countries have committed to Colombia’s security by investing millions of dollars in the peace accord—but Colombia’s government needs the political will to prioritize the accord.

Addressing the lagging implementation of the accord will not only result in greater security for Colombia but will also address persistent drivers of violence such as poverty and inequality. The security situation across Colombia is resulting in loss of territories and greater clashes among groups, with citizens getting caught in the crossfire. The expansion of multinational criminal entities also poses a threat to US national security, meaning that more actors across governments, international organizations, business communities, and foundations are motivated to unlock new and innovative ways of support. Leveraging these opportunities will be critical.

But the bottom line is that Colombia needs to continue upholding its part by prioritizing the implementation of the 2016 peace accord and showing tangible results to regain its legitimacy in the fight against organized crime.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Senator Bill Hagerty (R-TN) and Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD), chairman of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, for their leadership as honorary co-chairs of the US-Colombia Advisory Group. It is always a true pleasure and honor to work with them and to see how successful bipartisan efforts come to fruition. Thank you to Robert Zarate, Daniel Tirosh, Lucas Da Pieve, Charles Orta, Guy Mentel, and Tom Melia for facilitating the unwavering cooperation of our honorary co-chairs.

Isabel Chiriboga, assistant director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center (AALAC), was an instrumental force behind this project from start to finish. She played a key role in coordinating the advisory group, drafting the report, and organizing multiple strategy sessions. We also thank Enrique Millán-Mejía, an AALAC consultant, who provided crucial expertise and important feedback, and Isabella Palacios, AALAC young global professional, for her excellent research, editorial support and logistical support throughout the publication process. The success of this project is also thanks to the leadership of Jason Marczak and Geoff Ramsey, who worked to convene the advisory group and whose passion for a prosperous US-Colombia strategic partnership is reflected in this brief.

For decisive input, thorough research, and as an exceptional adviser on the topic, we thank Ambassador Kevin Whitaker, Ambassador Carolina Barco, and Steve Hege. We would also like to thank AMUNAFRO (Asociación de Alcaldes de Municipios con Población Afrodescendiente) and the mayors who provided decisive input and perspectives during their trip to Washington DC and after reading this publication. For their precise editorial assistance and flexibility, we thank Mary Kate Aylward and Beverly Larson and for the excellent design assistance, we thank Andrea Ratiu.

Report Nov 30, 2023

Advancing US-Colombia cooperation on drug policy and law enforcement

By Atlantic Council US-Colombia Advisory Group

Consumption and price of the drug has remained stable in the United States in recent years. However, the current trend of falling coca leaf and cocaine prices in Colombia present a natural incentive for coca growers to find alternative forms of income, which could mean a higher rate of success for alternative development programs.

Civil Society Colombia

New Atlanticist Nov 13, 2023

What Colombia’s ambitious new anti-drug plan means for US relations

By Lucie Kneip and Geoff Ramsey

The Colombian government recently unveiled a new ten-year drug strategy, attempting to break from a half-century of policies that have failed to curb coca production.

Americas Colombia

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

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The post A path forward for Colombia’s 2016 peace accord and lasting security  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ilva Tare, a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, sits down with Majlinda Bregu, the outgoing Secretary General of the Regional Cooperation Council, in this compelling #BalkansDebrief episode to discuss the current challenges of the region’s integration and cooperation as well as the gap between signing regional agreements and their actual implementation. Bregu highlights pressing issues such as the recognition of professional qualifications and the freedom of movement with ID cards, emphasizing that the effectiveness of these agreements relies heavily on the commitment of regional leaders to take action beyond ceremonial signings.

Bregu explains the Common Regional Market (CRM) 2.0 goals and its critical role in aligning with EU integration, by enhancing economic cooperation and convergence and paving the way for smoother entry into the EU’s single market.

She also addresses the Western Balkans’ pressing security and economic challenges, revealing how rising inflation, increasing costs, and corruption are creating distress for citizens and businesses. Moreover, Bregu warns that non-economic concerns, particularly the region’s troubling depopulation and ongoing disputes, are emerging as significant security threats.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

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Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post Why is Depopulation a Threat to Balkan Security? | A Debrief with Majlinda Bregu appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A last-minute breakthrough enabled the Western Balkans to sign key regional cooperation agreements at the Berlin Process Summit on October 14 of 2024. This was thanks to the skilled diplomacy of Manuel Sarrazin, Germany’s Special Representative for the Western Balkans, and the political will of regional leaders.

In a crucial compromise, Kosovo agreed to lift its ban on Serbian imports at the Merdare crossing. As part of the deal, Germany and its allies pledged to provide advanced scanners to enhance security at Kosovo-Serbia borders, a necessary step that has yet to be implemented.

Ilva Tare, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, sat down with Manuel Sarrazin to discuss the complexities of these negotiations. Sarrazin shares how he played a pivotal role in persuading Kosovo’s Prime Minister, Albin Kurti, to lift the ban—a move vital to unblocking CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Agreement) and advancing the Berlin Process.

Sarrazin also speaks about the security concerns that arose, particularly in light of the recent Banjska incident, and how Germany’s offer to provide scanners is part of a broader effort to bolster both trade and border security.

While the situation at the border remains fragile, with ongoing security concerns, Sarrazin emphasizes that the political capital Germany has invested, alongside the EU and the US, is creating momentum for deeper regional cooperation and economic progress.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

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The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post How was the CEFTA deal secured before the Berlin Process Summit? | A Debrief with Manuel Sarrazin appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As the Berlin Process celebrates its 10th anniversary in 2024, over 115 organizations gathered at the Civil Society and Think Tank Forum on October 9-11 this year to raise alarms about shrinking civic spaces, threats to democracy, and rising intimidation across the Western Balkans.

In this insightful episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare, Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, speaks with Simonida Kacarska, Director of the European Policy Institute, and Klodjan Seferaj, Program Manager at the Open Society Foundation Western Balkans, about the forum’s key recommendations and the uncertain future of the Berlin Process writ large—including where the next summit will take place and the adjustments needed to maintain its relevance.

What are the biggest challenges for civil society in the Western Balkans today? How are governments responding to concerns about the rule of law, democracy, and civic spaces? And what can be done to hold them more accountable? Watch now for expert analysis on the future of the Berlin Process.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post What’s next for the Berlin Process? | A Debrief with Simonida Kacarska and Klodjan Seferaj appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Charai in the National Interest: The US and Israel’s Path to Supporting the Iranian People’s Aspirations appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Since the Islamic Revolution, Iran has faced many crises, but recent months have seen a significant escalation. Notable events include the Raisi’s death in a mysterious helicopter crash in May, the assassination of Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh at President Masoud Pezeshkian’s inauguration in June, two retaliatory attacks against Israel in April and October, a catastrophic explosion at a coal mine in September, and ongoing protests by various facets of Iranian society amid rising poverty. These incidents underscore the incompetence of Iran’s leadership, culminating in the assassination of Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Iran’s most important proxy, which has reinforced the regime’s uncertainty.

Reports of Israeli intelligence agency Mossad’s infiltration of the Islamic Republic’s strict intelligence and security infrastructure are challenging trusted systems that have ostensibly sustained the regime for forty-five years. The fear of an interloper sabotaging the revolution’s mission is concerning. Khamenei, who has already isolated himself for protection, has continuously narrowed his inner circle to include only a handful of his most trusted loyalists. Given these circumstances, his son Mojtaba is theoretically the only individual he can trust and influence as a future leader. 

But the process is not a slam dunk—at least, it should not be presented as such. The exercise of selecting Khamenei’s successor has proven cumbersome and bureaucratic. The Assembly of Experts, directed by the ninety-three-year-old Movahedi Kermani, is tasked with selecting the next supreme leader in what is essentially a filtering process. The assembly comprises individuals approved by the Guardian Council, a body of members who have met various criteria and obtained the direct or indirect approval of the supreme leader before they were elected by the citizens in eight-year cycles. Although there is a strategy to distance the present leader from appointing his successor, Khamenei remains the de facto chief filtering officer. 

With rumors circulating for years about the octogenarian’s declining health, many names have been floated as potential successors. The most famous among them have died, often under mysterious circumstances, including Raisi; Ahmad Khomeini, the son of the founder of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini; former President Ayatollah Ali Akbar Rafsanjani; Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, the former judiciary head. The only name that has gained traction is Mojtaba Khamenei, who, in essence, fits Khamenei’s vision for an Islamic Republic 2.0 made up of young and pious figures.

Though his voice is rarely heard, Mojtaba’s name is recognized widely in Iran and abroad and, thanks to repeated references, carries an aura of mystery. But to Iranians who have long been fighting for freedom, he is a familiar agent of repression, earning his credentials when he orchestrated the violent crackdown on 2009 protests following the elections that put hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in power for a second term. Mojtaba Khamenei’s combination of character, capacity, and proximity to the supreme leader has led pundits inside and outside Iran to bet on him more than any other contender.  

But his silence was broken in what was described as an unprecedented event. On September 22, a poorly produced video message shared on Persian-language social media revealed Mojtaba’s voice to the world for the first time. He declared that he was discontinuing his virtual seminary classes for disciples abroad.

To Western audiences, the news of a teacher suspending classes would qualify as neither breaking news nor an event worthy of analysis. However, this message was consequential in the context of Iran’s system. Historically, ayatollahs don’t abandon their seminary duties unless they are too ill or about to receive a more significant responsibility. Since its inception, the Islamic Republic has only seen two leaders—Yousef Saanei and Abdolkarim Mousavi Ardebili—forced to abandon their instructional duties to serve in the government’s judicial system. For Mojtaba Khamenei, who is healthy and relatively young, the choice to suspend classes is more likely prompted by a significant new assignment than by concerns about his health. 

Interestingly, Mojtaba, who has a fifteen-year teaching record, wasn’t even bestowed the title of ayatollah until almost two years ago when a short article casually mentioned that he ascended to the rank of ayatollah, in an announcement that included registration instructions for his seminary. The quiet announcement was a remarkable moment, granting Mojtaba Khamenei the most important constitutional prerequisite for the supreme leader role.

Such sudden ascents are rare, but not unprecedented. Following the death of Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989, the Assembly of Experts faced a dilemma. It wanted to appoint Khamenei as the new leader but was held back by his lack of proper religious rank. To overcome the dilemma, the assembly bestowed Khamenei with the title ayatollah overnight, qualifying him to take the reins.                                         

Although the quality of Mojtaba’s was poor and haphazard on the surface, the message was clear and calculated. He also noted that his “honorable father” was unaware of his decision. This move was designed to demonstrate a degree of independence and autonomy from his father and deflect potential allegations of nepotism. Nonetheless, hardliners and reformists are increasingly vocal about the potential hereditary succession model for supreme leadership.

In an atmosphere where loyalties are shaken, fear of Mossad agents looms large, and proxy commanders are swiftly eliminated, replacing seasoned leaders is increasingly daunting. Khamenei’s closest and most experienced acolytes are gone, and the pool of potential replacements appears inexperienced, disloyal, or even treasonous. It will be hard for Khamenei to trust anyone other than his kin.

Absent free and fair elections, the process of replacing the supreme leader will play out more as a balancing act than a concrete course. Those tasked with the harrowing job of replacing one living totalitarian leader with another will need to balance their legitimacy with the public while pleasing the current tyrant. On the other hand, Khamenei must allow the process to run its course while playing coy about his candidate of choice. The heir to the turban needs to build a base of supporters and pray for a miracle of legitimacy in a country caught in a stubborn spell of disasters. The uncertainty continues to be amplified by the rapidly changing course of events making Iran’s fate precarious.

Marjan Keypour is a human rights advocate and advisory committee member of AC’s Iran Strategy Project.

The post As the threat of conflict grows, Khamenei’s son is back in the spotlight appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Since taking power a quarter of a century ago, Vladimir Putin has transformed Russia into an increasingly ruthless and aggressive dictatorship. The warning signs were there from the very beginning, such as his December 2000 decision to reinstate the Stalin-era Soviet national anthem. Putin also embraced the pomp and pageantry of the Russian Empire, reflecting his goal of underlining the continuity in Russian history from Ivan the Terrible to Joseph Stalin.

During the early years of Putin’s reign, some of his government’s initial acts of oppression focused on the Russian media. Independent TV channels were taken under state control and satirical programs shut down. Efforts to dismantle Russia’s fledgling democracy also began almost immediately. The level of fraud during the first parliamentary elections of the Putin era took many by surprise. At the time, we could not imagine how farcical the entire process of Russian elections would soon become.

As Putin sought to strengthen his grip on power, the Kremlin initially targeted those accused of economic crimes. However, this was soon expanded to include political opponents and anyone deemed a potential threat to the regime. Within a few years, political repression had become one of the defining features of Putin’s rule.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Putin’s powerful propaganda machine has succeeded in convincing the majority of Russians to accept the return of authoritarianism. While public support for the regime is far less enthusiastic than the Kremlin likes to claim, most Russians have been persuaded to stay away from politics and ignore the increasingly oppressive climate in the country. At the same time, around 20 percent of the Russian population categorically disagree with the direction the country has taken since 2000. It is this group that Putin seeks to silence via policies targeting the most active elements.

The Kremlin is primarily concerned with two groups: Commentators and activists. Those who publicly criticize the regime pose a threat because the authorities have no response to their accusations other than oppression. Activists are viewed as even more dangerous as they remain ready to join protests and participate in elections. The courage, clarity, and selflessness they demonstrate has the power to resonate on a human level with far larger numbers of ordinary Russians, including millions who are otherwise disengaged from politics.

The Kremlin has developed a system for dealing with these troublesome elements. To begin with, they may receive a warning. They are then fined, deprived of civil rights, and declared foreign agents. If they still do not stop their activities or leave the country, they are likely to be jailed. In this manner, the Putin regime silences its opponents and prevents any opposition from gaining momentum.

The list of offenses that qualify as anti-regime activity also continues to expand. Any opinions on the invasion of Ukraine that differ from the official narrative are deemed worthy of jail time. There have also been instances of people being imprisoned for expressing generic anti-war sentiments such as “thou shalt not kill,” or for displaying the yellow and blue colors of the Ukrainian flag. In one recent case, a man was jailed for given the “wrong” answer to journalists surveying public opinion about the war in Ukraine.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Tue, June 17, 2025 • 1:00 pm ET

Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

The Anti-War Committee, an organization created by well-known Russian political emigrants in cooperation with various anti-war organizations in Russia, has put together a list of one thousand names of Russian political prisoners whose cases are purely political in nature. But even this list is not complete.

There are currently believed to be around one and a half thousand political prisoners in Russia. Officially, they are incarcerated for offensives including discrediting the armed forces, supporting terrorism, and treason. In practice, this often means voicing opposition to the invasion of Ukraine or criticizing Putin and his policies. There may actually be many more political prisoners, as numerous activists have been jailed on criminal charges.

These figures do not compare to the scale of political oppression witnessed during the Stalin era, of course. The Putin regime has learned that targeted cases of persecution are sufficient to exercise control over the wider population. The quantity of people who have been frightened into silence is many thousands of times greater than the relatively small number of Russians currently being held as political prisoners.

The outlook for Russia’s current generation of political prisoners is bleak. They are completely at the mercy of their jailers and the regime. Many have died in prison. While the deaths of prominent figures such as Alexei Navalny have garnered international headlines, this has done little to deter the Kremlin. On the contrary, it is widely recognized that other political prisoners are at risk of suffering the same fate.

Most of Russia’s political prisoners understood the risks they were taking. They knew that by attending a peaceful protest or expressing their opposition to the invasion of Ukraine, they could lose their liberty permanently and might never return home. This makes their actions even more courageous. The international community must not tolerate the brutal oppression of people who voluntarily risked their lives for the freedom of others.

Many Russians are doing whatever we can to raise awareness about our country’s political prisoners. Others can also make valuable contributions. Every single reminder that there are brave people in today’s Russia who oppose Putin is important. If international political leaders can be encouraged to raise the issue, they may be able to save lives. And if an amnesty for political prisoners becomes a key demand for any future agreements with Putin, the number of lives saved could be in the thousands. Most of all, we must never forget those who are prepared to sacrifice everything for the values that many in the democratic world take for granted.

Leonid Gozman is a Russian politician, psychologist, and pro-democracy activist. He was declared a “foreign agent” by the Russian authorities in 2022 and arrested on political charges. He was able to leave the country before being sentenced in absentia to eight and a half years for his anti-war views.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Sep 1, 2024

Key Ukrainian front line city evacuates as Russian offensive gains pace

By Maria Avdeeva

Evacuation efforts are accelerating in Pokrovsk as Russian troops draw closer amid fears the city will soon become the latest in a growing list of Ukrainian urban centers reduced to rubble by Putin’s invading army, writes Maria Avdeeva.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Aug 21, 2024

Invasion? What invasion? Putin is downplaying Ukraine’s Kursk offensive

By Peter Dickinson

Vladimir Putin’s efforts to downplay Ukraine’s invasion of Russia have severely dented his strongman image and make a mockery of the West’s escalation fears, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Sep 24, 2024

There can be no sustainable peace in Europe without security for Ukraine

By Mykola Bielieskov

A compromise peace that rewards Putin with around 20 percent of Ukraine would only embolden Moscow and set the stage for further Russian aggression in Ukraine and beyond, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict Defense Policy

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

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The post Russia’s political prisoners must not be forgotten appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Cyber-attacks are on the rise in the Western Balkans, with 1.2 million personal records exposed to data breaches and a 200% surge in ransomware attacks over the past two years. Businesses across the region have paid millions of euros to recover compromised data, and 75% of companies report facing phishing attacks. Cyber-actors are exploiting internal ethnic tensions to target reconciliation efforts, while disinformation campaigns undermine democracy, destabilize institutions, and disrupt daily life.

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, sits down with Ramadan Ilazi from the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies and Filip Stojanovski, Director of Partnerships at Metamorphosis in North Macedonia. Together, they delve into the cybersecurity vulnerabilities threatening the region’s political and economic stability, examining the implications for critical infrastructure, businesses, and citizens.

The discussion tackles key questions, including how cyberattacks are being used to advance political agendas, the impact of emerging technologies like AI and the Internet of Things, and the gaps in regional cooperation. They also explore how the Western Balkans can strengthen its integration into the EU’s cybersecurity framework, including the role of ENISA in supporting regional efforts.

As cyber threats continue to evolve, this conversation highlights the urgent need for a resilient digital future in the Western Balkans, from workforce development to bolstering regional collaboration. Tune in for expert insights on navigating one of the region’s most critical challenges.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

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The post How do cyber-attacks threaten the Balkans? | A Debrief with Dan Ilazi and Filip Stojanovski appeared first on Atlantic Council.