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Sungmin Cho: For Lee, the economy comes first, but expect foreign policy shifts nonetheless

Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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Nine years after the Orange Revolution, Maidan would be the scene of a second Ukrainian revolution. This time, the spark came when Ukraine’s pro-Kremlin president, Viktor Yanukovych, pulled out of a long anticipated EU association agreement and unleashed the riot police against students who objected to this drastic geopolitical U-turn. Once again, millions of Ukrainians flocked to the capital and gathered on Maidan. This time, though, it would not be bloodless.

With strong backing from Russia, the Ukrainian authorities took a hard line approach to the protests, leading to weeks of running battles on Maidan and in the surrounding streets. The nadir came in late February 2014, when dozens of protesters were shot and killed in the city center. This Maidan massacre brought down the Yanukovych regime. With his support base evaporating, the disgraced Ukrainian president fled to Russia. Days later, Putin responded by invading Crimea. Russia’s war to extinguish Ukrainian statehood had begun.

The tragic events of February 2014 had a profound impact on Ukraine’s collective psyche and served to consecrate Maidan in the national imagination. Up until that point, the square had regularly hosted public holidays, pop concerts, and Christmas fairs. In the aftermath of the killings, such events were moved to other locations in the Ukrainian capital. Maidan itself would now be reserved for the most somber and significant occasions in the life of the nation, such as the funerals of soldiers, vigils for Ukrainians held captive in Russia, and memorials marking important Ukrainian anniversaries.

Since 2022, Maidan’s transformation has gained further momentum amid the shock and trauma of Russia’s full-scale invasion. During the initial stages of the war, people began planting flags on the square in memory of fallen soldiers. This impromptu memorial has since expanded organically to become a sea of flags and portraits commemorating those who have lost their lives in the defense of Ukraine. It is an authentic grassroots tribute that is entirely in keeping with the spirit of Maidan.

As Russia’s invasion has unfolded, Maidan’s role as the principal site for wartime mourning and reverence has served to confirm the square’s position at the heart of modern Ukraine’s national story. There could hardly be a more fitting location. After all, Vladimir Putin launched the current war because he viewed the emergence of an independent Ukraine as an intolerable threat to his own authoritarian regime and a potential catalyst for the next stage in Russia’s long retreat from empire.

Maidan embodies Putin’s darkest fears. The Russian dictator’s goal remains the destruction of Ukraine as a state and as a nation, but he is acutely aware that the country is slipping inexorably out of the Kremlin orbit. This is nowhere more evident than on Kyiv’s central square, which has become the ultimate symbol of Ukraine’s escape from empire and embrace of an independent identity.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

By contrast, Gabon enjoys a comparatively enhanced level of national wealth and societal prosperity. With a population of just 2.3 million people and vast reserves of oil, gold, and manganese, Gabon boasts the second-highest gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in continental Sub-Saharan Africa. It also has the third-highest prosperity score among the region’s countries in our Freedom and Prosperity Indexes, which measure prosperity levels across 164 countries by tracking income, health, inequality, environmental health, the treatment of minorities, and education. While Gabon suffers from a level of income inequality that rivals other countries in the region, on the whole, it is more prosperous than its West and Central African counterparts. Furthermore, while Gabon’s coup did give way to an interim military government, there was little to no post-coup conflict. And Gabon held democratic elections on April 12, 2025, that, while not without significant flaws, were nevertheless acclaimed by local, regional, and international observers as peaceful, lawful, and fair.

Gabon is more prosperous than its neighbors

Turning the page on the Bongo dynasty

In the weeks leading up the first election since the 2023 coup, Nguema’s picture could be seen plastered all over the capital city of Libreville. After serving as interim president for nineteen months, he was officially elected president on April 12, winning more than 90 percent of the vote. Both before and after the election, Nguema pledged to “restore dignity to the Gabonese people” and to root out the country’s corruption, which the legal subindex of our Freedom Index indicates is among the worst in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Despite these popular goals, the president has not been without his detractors. Such high vote shares are often indicative of corruption, and critics of Nguema note that he has long been a part of the corrupt political system he pledges to dismantle and that he broke his promise to relinquish power after deposing Bongo. In fact, Nguema is Bongo’s cousin and recently allowed Bongo and his wife to relocate to Angola despite them facing ongoing (but unspecified) corruption charges.

And although voter turnout was high and local observers were largely satisfied with the integrity of the election, Nguema’s most prominent opponent—former Prime Minister Alain Claude Bilie-By-Nze—accused Nguema of taking advantage of state resources to fund his campaign.

Furthermore, his interim government adopted a new constitution in 2024 that the Africa Center for Strategic Studies argues grants too much power to the executive and specifically favored Nguema. For example, the new constitution prevented a major political opponent from running in the election by banning candidates over seventy years of age. It also broke from past tradition by including a clause that allows military members to run in elections, extended the length of presidential terms to seven years, and eliminated the position of prime minister altogether. During Nguema’s time leading the interim government, he also suspended all political parties in a move that critics say gave him a distinct electoral advantage.

While Nguema was greeted with scenes of celebration after carrying out the 2023 coup and won an election victory indicative of overwhelming public support, it remains to be seen whether he is willing and able to instigate meaningful democratic reforms.

Yet, even if competition was restricted in this election, the very fact that it happened and that the Gabonese people were able to peacefully vote for someone other than a member of the Bongo family shows that there is an appetite for change and a willingness to engage in the most fundamental act of democracy.

In short, the years since the coup have provided both reason to believe that a more democratic future in Gabon is possible and reason to fear that Nguema is simply replacing the Bongo family’s form of autocracy with his own.

What the data tell us

The Freedom and Prosperity Indexes highlight a number of trends indicating that a country’s surest path to prosperity involves improving political and economic freedom, as well as the rule of law. Conversely, the data tell us that restricting freedom is a proven way to diminish societal well-being.

When a country experiences a freedom shock—meaning the one-year drop in its Freedom Index score is among the top 20 percent globally since 1995—its progress on prosperity tends to stall or even reverse as time goes on.

A country’s prosperity tends to stall or decline after experiencing a freedom shock

The drop in Gabon’s freedom score from 2022 to 2023 was among the most severe freedom shocks ever recorded—within the top 5 percent of one-year declines over the past thirty years. This decline was driven by a sharp dip in the country’s political freedom score, which was in turn driven by an even sharper fall in its elections score, which measures the extent to which political leaders are chosen in open, clean, and fair elections.

Gabon’s political freedom has declined sharply in recent years

Furthermore, out of the forty-six countries in Sub-Saharan Africa for which we have data, Gabon ranks thirtieth in the judicial independence and effectiveness indicator and thirty-eighth in the legislative constraints on the executive indicator.

Gabon’s judicial independence is below the regional average

Gabon’s executive has fewer legislative constraints than the regional average

It is important to recognize that these issues were fomented by the Bongo regime. However, the disempowered nature of the judiciary and legislature and the recent broad decline in political freedom show that Nguema must act quickly to reverse course before declines in freedom hinder Gabon’s long-term progress on prosperity. The country’s freedom score has changed very little in the time that Nguema has held power as interim president, with political freedom in further, albeit minimal, decline.

Despite Gabon’s impressive prosperity levels and per capita GDP in relation to its neighbors and to the broader Sub-Saharan Africa region, over one-third of the population currently lives in poverty. The Bongo family was known for gorging themselves on resource wealth while much of the population was left to suffer. Despite its high overall prosperity score, Gabon ranks in the bottom third of all Sub-Saharan African countries in the inequality component of the Prosperity Index. It has the fourth-highest unemployment rate in Sub-Saharan Africa, with over 20 percent of the total labor force—and 40 percent of young people—currently unemployed. If Nguema falls back on the autocratic habits of his predecessor and chooses personal wealth over the well-being of his country, any hope for democracy in Gabon that followed the 2023 coup will quickly die out.

The path to enduring freedom and prosperity

The data clearly show that establishing democracy as the political norm will help Gabon set itself apart from its neighbors and enhance national prosperity.

To create a strong and vibrant democracy, Nguema must first come to terms with the idea that his tenure as president is not indefinite. He must also commit himself to empowering core institutions of democracy such as the legislative branch and courts, and he must protect the societal freedoms that are fundamental to thriving democracies. This should include allowing political parties to exist and organize and lifting targeted age limits for presidential candidates.

By committing to competitive democracy and political freedom, Nguema can most effectively enhance prosperity and, in particular, reduce the inequality that has plagued Gabon for so long. It is too early to tell for sure whether Nguema has assumed the presidency with the intention of institutionalizing democracy and reducing inequality in Gabon or with the intention of ruling as an autocrat. What is certain is that the end of the Bongo regime—and the democratic impetus provided by the national election—provides Nguema with the opportunity to turn Gabon into the success story that West and Central Africa has been yearning for. For the good of the people who elected him, Nguema should do everything in his power to capitalize on it.

Will Mortenson is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center.

Correction: This article was updated on June 4, 2025, to reflect the fact that Gabon is located in Central Africa, not West Africa.

The post Can Gabon become a beacon of democratic entrenchment for West and Central Africa? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What Lebanon’s municipal election results mean for Hezbollah

David Daoud — Wed, 04 Jun 2025 13:37:06 +0000

Lebanon’s political machine is moving again.

In May, the Lebanese concluded country-wide municipal and mayoral elections—their first in nine years—on the heels of Joseph Aoun filling Beirut’s two-year presidential vacancy, and an uncharacteristically speedy appointment of a prime minister and cabinet.

Mere momentum should not be equated with long-term progress towards stabilization, particularly with respect to Hezbollah’s disarmament. The municipal election results did not demonstrate the prominent militant group’s outright dominance over Lebanon’s Shiites. However, Hezbollah nevertheless retains preponderant popularity among them and influence over their electoral and political choices. However, as Hezbollah dubbed them, these elections were a “promotional event” for the real prize: the May 2026 legislative elections. If the group can then expand upon its recent electoral success, and if Aoun’s interminable dialogue with Hezbollah over its arms ever becomes serious, then it can leverage its popular and political weight to steer those discussions toward an outcome allowing it to retain its arms.

Unpacking the results

Hezbollah boasts that its sweep of the municipal and mayoral elections in Beirut, Baalbek-Hermel, and south Lebanon was a virtually unmitigated “tsunami.”

At face value, the group’s claims are true. In south Lebanon’s Nabatieh and South Governorates, Hezbollah’s joint electoral list with the Amal Party, dubbed the “Development and Loyalty” list, ran unconstested and won 109 of 272 municipalities by default. In some municipalities, this victory was due to overwhelming local support for Amal and Hezbollah, and in others, to pressure from those parties forcing opponents to withdraw their candidacy or forgo running altogether.

The Amal-Hezbollah lists also took the overwhelming majority of the remaining municipalities, where the elections came down to a contest, with the exception of a handful of seats. But even there, the self-described Amal-Hezbollah Shiite Duo largely did not lose out to outright ideological opponents, apart from Amal’s loss of two municipal seats in Deir Al Zahrani to the Communist Party. Instead, in many cases, the group lost to familial or clan lists, otherwise seemingly neutral on the question of Hezbollah’s private arsenal.

In the Sidon District’s Zrarieh, for example, Development and Loyalty won only six of the fifteen contested seats against the opposition, development-focused “Build It Together” list. But opposition figure Riad al-Asaad—who has previously bemoaned American-led attempts to weaken Hezbollah as “an Israeli goal” and who backed Build It Together— insisted that “competition [with Hezbollah] isn’t over the choice of resistance, but development.”

These successes replicated earlier wins in the Baalbek-Hermel Governorate, which witnessed significantly higher voter turnout over the last municipal elections in 2016. Here, Development and Loyalty won all eighty municipalities—twenty-eight by default, twenty-nine through electoral contests, and twenty-two where independent pro-Hezbollah lists competed with each other. In many cases here as well, the Amal-Hezbollah list faced off against ostensible independents, but who were nevertheless ideologically aligned with Hezbollah, as in Bednayel, where Development and Loyalty confronted the explicitly pro-Hezbollah “Loyalty to the Resistance” list, or in Brital, where the Hezbollah-Amal backed “Brital Families” list faced openly pro-Hezbollah “Loyalty and Development” list.

For example, Hezbollah-backed candidates swept the municipal council after a hard-fought electoral battle in the city of Baalbek. But voting numbers painted a more complex picture: of 37,142 eligible voters—22,573 of whom are Shiites—a range of 11,674-12,199 voted for Development and Loyalty, while the political opposition list “My City Baalbek” garnered 5,258-5,802 votes. The latter only attracted four hundred to 790 Shiites, compared with 11,290 Shiites for Development and Loyalty, demonstrating the continued loyalty of Hezbollah’s sectarian base. Meanwhile, Hezbollah increased its inroads into Baalbek’s Sunni population, drawing close to 1500 of their votes, and widened its victory margin over My City Baalbek from the 2016 municipal elections.

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But these results, good as they are, were far from the unmitigated success that Hezbollah’s propaganda organs sought to spin. In a main Hezbollah stronghold like the city of Baalbek, the group should consider its victory margin too close for comfort, especially as voter turnout in the city itself, in sharp contrast to the District and Governorate level, stood at approximately 47.2 percent generally, and 53.51 percent among Shiites specifically. This was higher than 2016’s level of 44 percent turnout of 31,510 eligible voters. However, it was still low considering the group’s great efforts to encourage its base’s participation in an election painted as a referendum on Hezbollah’s arms and existence, occurring at a historical inflection point for Lebanon.

The electoral battles in the more populous South Lebanon and Nabatieh Governorates offered a starker warning to the group. These areas collectively witnessed similarly depressed voting levels—36.94 percent overall (43.17 percent in South Lebanon and 36.65 percent in Nabatieh) compared to 48.15 percent in 2016. Hezbollah’s results were also spottier at face value, with opposing lists, if not outright ideological opponents, making deeper inroads among the electorate despite ultimately failing to unseat the Hezbollah-Amal Duo.

The apathy factor

One plausible explanation is that Hezbollah has lost at least some of its ability to mobilize its loyal masses. This could stem, from, as some have alleged, growing Shiite discontent with the party, particularly over instigating the recent ruinous war with Israel—which could portend a massive backlash against Hezbollah coupled with sizable defections from its base’s ranks. But the materialization of this scenario depends on a complex set of currently absent factors, particularly the existence of a credible and unified Shiite opposition, with the means and ability to deliver on these people’s needs, and thus attract this alleged silent anti-Hezbollah majority.

It is more plausible that the depressed voter turnout had nothing to do with Hezbollah. After all, the silent—and allegedly anti-Hezbollah—majority of Lebanese southerners didn’t go out and vote for the group’s opponents either. They stayed home.

Therefore, rather than a silent vote against Hezbollah, their abstention seems to have stemmed from overall Lebanese political disillusionment and loss of hope in the system’s ability to bring about change, leading to complacency. In September of 2024, for example, Arab Barometer found 76 percent of all Lebanese “uninterested in politics,” while 45 percent described themselves as highly apathetic. Two years prior, 65 percent of Lebanese had even said they didn’t care if their country remained a democracy—more accurately, a procedural democracy—as long as it “can maintain order and stability.”

Political apathy isn’t ideal for Hezbollah. But a Shiite population as politically quiescent and disinterested as the rest of the Lebanese would not undermine the group’s political power, and is thus preferable to an actively hostile one. This, coupled with other factors, like fear of being caught in the midst of Israel’s ongoing military actions that escalated in the days preceding the election, and the difficulty of traveling to south Lebanon for voters displaced by the recent war, could have also impacted voter turnout.

Delayed disarmament

The municipal elections were the last in several significant, post-war milestones during which Hezbollah needed to demonstrate that it remains the primary political and social representative of Lebanese Shiites. But this victory is fragile, delaying, for now, he group’s disarmament, despite the calls for such action gaining increasing momentum. But delaying that prospect does not eliminate it altogether. That specter will continue to haunt Hezbollah unless and until it can expand its municipal election successes come 2026’s parliamentary plebiscite—sweeping all seats it contests while denying Shiite opposition figures any electoral victories, drive up the voting rate among its supporters, and broaden its share of the popular vote. It’s a tall order, but Hezbollah has long proven itself a learning organization, and it will use all the carrots and sticks at its disposal to achieve that result. Here, a combination of delivering on post-war reconstruction of predominantly Shiite areas damaged during the recent war with Israel, while cowing potential opponents with threats, legal action, and actual force, will prove critical to the group’s chances of success.

The question is, will its opponents likewise learn from their mistakes and failure to challenge the group’s Shiite hegemony at a time when they allege its sway over that sect is at its weakest ever—or will they once again rest on the laurels of their empty slogans and symbolic or imaginary triumphs, leaving the “Party of God” to once again be the victors?

David Daoud was a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs and a research analyst on Hezbollah and Lebanon at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI).

The post What Lebanon’s municipal election results mean for Hezbollah appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Experts react: What does South Korean President Lee Jae-myung mean for Indo-Pacific security?

Atlantic Council experts — Tue, 03 Jun 2025 20:30:30 +0000

No time for a victory party. Early Wednesday morning, Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung was named the winner of South Korea’s presidential election, and later the same day he will be sworn into office, without the typical two-month transition period. The election and immediate instatement follow a stretch of political upheaval in South Korea. In April, conservative President Yoon Suk Yeol was removed from office, after he declared a short-lived state of martial law in December 2024. So, will Lee’s leadership mean a calmer political future for the country? Looking at the wider region, how will the leadership shift from right to left affect South Korea’s policies toward the United States, North Korea, China, and Japan? Atlantic Council experts are on the job today answering these questions and more below.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Kayla Orta: Lee’s “pragmatic” approach comes as Seoul faces a more hostile security environment

Shawn Creamer: Military spending and shipbuilding are two areas of engagement with the Trump administration

Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi: Lee seems poised to take a pragmatic and balanced approach to regional security

For Lee, the economy comes first, but expect foreign policy shifts nonetheless

To understand Lee’s foreign policy orientation, it is more useful to compare his positions with that of former President Moon Jae-in, rather than that of Yoon, his conservative predecessor.

Lee’s foreign policy will generally align with the Democratic Party’s traditional approach, promoting dialogue with North Korea and maintaining stable ties with China. But he is notably more pragmatic than Moon. While Moon emphasized peace and inter-Korean reconciliation, Lee advocates conditional dialogue with Pyongyang, taking a step-by-step approach toward denuclearization. His foreign policy advisers, Wi Sung-lac and Kim Hyun-chong, are known more as internationalists than nationalists, reinforcing Lee’s pragmatic stance.

Lee prioritizes economic issues, and he has repeatedly stated that economic recovery is his top priority. During the campaign, for example, he pledged to establish an “Emergency Economic Taskforce” if elected. Given this focus, Lee is unlikely to pursue major foreign policy initiatives at first, avoiding Moon’s active diplomacy among Washington, Pyongyang, and Beijing.

South Korea’s foreign policy shifts may instead stem from external developments, especially if US President Donald Trump reengages with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Lee would likely support a third Trump-Kim summit and would not oppose US troop reductions if Washington insists. While such moves could reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula in the short term, there is concern that North Korea might exploit weakened deterrence to launch limited attacks against South Korea whenever it sees fit, as occurred during the 2010 crises.

Taiwan issues will test Lee’s pragmatism. Under US pressure for support, he will likely exercise strategic ambiguity to the maximum—quietly discussing contingency plans with Washington while avoiding public commitments. He will neither support nor oppose United States Forces Korea’s strategic flexibility. At the same time, Lee is likely to emphasize South Korea’s acknowledgment of the “One China” policy to maintain balance in its relations with Beijing.

In sum, Lee’s foreign policy is marked by pragmatism and economic urgency, distinguishing him from Moon’s more ideological and nationalistic approach.

—Sungmin Cho, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Sungkyunkwan University.

Lee’s “pragmatic” approach comes as Seoul faces a more hostile security environment

Lee ran on the platform of a “pragmatic” foreign policy, but whether his administration will be able to rise above the nation’s entrenched partisan divides to strengthen South Korea’s geostrategic position within the Indo-Pacific region remains to be seen.

Six months to the day since Yoon declared martial law, South Korean citizens took to the voting booths to elect a new leader. Lee’s win over the People Power Party nominee Kim Moon-soo heralds another pendulum swing in South Korea’s political leadership. As the liberal party returns to the presidency, the battle to address South Korea’s domestic political turmoil is only just beginning, and the nation’s fierce partisan divide is likely to continue.

The political aftermath of Yoon’s call for martial law shocked the nation, weakening confidence in South Korea’s decades-long democratic institutions. The next South Korean president will have a challenging five-year term ahead to reestablish public confidence in the government at home while simultaneously addressing South Korea’s foreign policy concerns abroad.

North Korea’s ongoing weapons of mass destruction and missile programs—and its expanded security partnerships with Russia and China—present an immediate and existential threat to South Korea. Seoul faces a more hostile security environment today than it did under Moon, Lee’s liberal predecessor who leaned into diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang. Many in South Korea are increasingly concerned about North Korea’s “irreversible” nuclear arms buildup and more than 70 percent of polled citizens consistently call for South Korea’s own nuclear armament in the near future.

Amid growing regional insecurity, Seoul’s relationships with Washington and Tokyo will matter. Despite previous statements, Lee campaigned on continuing to strengthen South Korea–Japan relations, building upon his predecessor’s US–South Korea–Japan trilateral security cooperation to address the growing instability in the Indo-Pacific region. However, balancing proactive foreign policy and intensifying domestic demands, as previously seen, is not an easy task.

Overall, Lee’s “pragmatic” diplomacy may signal strategic policy investment in bridging the conservative-liberal political divide. Lee may yet step up foreign policy initiatives in South Korea’s interest, building upon his predecessor’s foreign policy agendas.

—Kayla T. Orta is a nonresident fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Military spending and shipbuilding are two areas of engagement with the Trump administration

Lee’s election as president of South Korea is an opportunity to restore domestic political stability and resurrect Seoul’s reputation on the international stage following the martial law declaration, impeachment, and court drama surrounding the removal of Yoon from office. Domestic stability is made possible more from the political unity of the executive and legislative branches of government under the progressive Democratic Party than from a popular mandate. Political unity will likely allow the South Korean government to break out of partisan gridlock and make gains on efficient and effective governance.

While Lee will have party unity, there is a sizable conservative opposition that maintains low degrees of trust in the more leftist elements of the Democratic Party, including the new president. Time will tell whether Lee governs more like the centrist candidate or the leftist opposition politician of his past.

If the past is representative of the future, Lee will progressively evolve toward the center on foreign policy over his five-year term, as his Democratic Party predecessor Moon did. Moon learned, despite a troubled relationship with Trump, that South Korean sovereignty was best served by close alignment with the United States rather than an arrangement that subordinates it to the People’s Republic of China. Moreover, Moon learned that a deal with the Kim regime in North Korea would not be worth the paper it was printed on. Regrettably for peace and security in Northeast Asia, the Korea-Japan relationship will likely remain cool under Lee for the duration of his term based on the entrenched views of the Democratic Party.

There is both risk and opportunity for Lee in South Korea’s alliance with the United States. Lee holds some strong cards if he plays them well.

South Korea already funds its defense at 2.8 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP), and it has one of the most capable armed forces of all US allies. Lee should set in motion an increase in defense spending to above 3 percent of GDP in 2026 and chart a path for this to increase to at least 3.5 percent by 2030, demonstrating that South Korea is the US security partner of choice. Continued maturation of the Korean armed forces will also position South Korea to defend its interests in a very difficult neighborhood, while meeting alliance transformation benchmarks and increased Korean roles in combined defense.

Second, Korean manufacturing is extremely strong, particularly in shipbuilding. Lee should leverage Korean dominance in shipbuilding to help Trump rebuild the US Navy, giving Trump a political win and assisting the United States in maintaining its global extended deterrence commitments. South Korean advanced manufacturing capacity offers additional opportunity for the United States and European rearmament efforts. Lee can leverage this assistance to advance Korea’s global economic interests on more favorable terms.

There are also risks to the relationship with Washington, especially if Lee and Trump have a personality conflict. Lee will also find trouble with the US relationship if he seeks to deepen Korea’s relations with China or is overly antagonistic to Japan, the other major US ally in East Asia.

—Shawn Creamer is a nonresident senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative, and Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Lee seems poised to take a pragmatic and balanced approach to regional security

Lee’s victory in Tuesday’s presidential election was expected, given his ability to court the centrist majority and the conservative camp’s feuds to field a united force. But while Lee’s election is a victory for the Democratic Party, his populist but realist orientation is likely to make him a different type of revisionist than his more ideological predecessor Moon. Still, given the controversies surrounding Lee, as well as uncertainties over his and the Democratic Party’s policies, the new administration will struggle to unite the deep divisions in South Korea.

On the foreign policy and security front, it is possible that the new administration will take a balanced and pragmatic approach rather than a revisionist one. During the campaign, Lee talked about peace on the Korean Peninsula and restoring the 2018 military agreement with Pyongyang—trademark positions of the progressives. At the same time, he recognized the importance of the alliance with the United States and trilateral coordination with Japan—priorities for the conservatives. Even though much of this balanced approach was certainly part of Lee’s election strategy, it also reflects the strong recognition within South Korea about the importance of US-Japan-South Korea trilateral security coordination; threats posed by North Korea, China, and Russia; and the limited prospects of improving inter-Korean relations.

While there are many uncertainties about the Lee administration, Tokyo and Washington should continue working with Seoul to ensure strong, resilient, and sustainable trilateral security cooperation, which is imperative for stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

—Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, an associate professor at Tokyo International University, and a senior adjunct fellow at Pacific Forum.

The post Experts react: What does South Korean President Lee Jae-myung mean for Indo-Pacific security? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Experts react: Conservative Karol Nawrocki is Poland’s next president. What does it mean for Poland, Europe, and the world?

Atlantic Council experts — Mon, 02 Jun 2025 16:56:09 +0000

The polls have spoken. Karol Nawrocki, a historian and former boxer backed by Poland’s conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party, narrowly triumphed over Warsaw Mayor Rafał Trzaskowski in Sunday’s presidential election. Nawrocki, whose candidacy was embraced by the Trump administration, will be the head of state opposite the centrist, pro-European head of government, Prime Minister Donald Tusk. With war still raging in next-door Ukraine and US-European relations under strain, what should the world expect from Nawrocki? We turned to our Poland experts for answers.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Daniel Fried: Nawrocki is well placed to encourage Trump to back Ukraine and European security

Aaron Korewa: Poland’s conservative nationalism is pro-American and pro-NATO

Marek Magierowski: Nawrocki’s politics defy hysterical labels

Danuta Hübner: Will the new president overcome Poland’s polarization?

Mark Scott: Social media was rampant in this election. But how much impact it had is unclear.

Nawrocki is well placed to encourage Trump to back Ukraine and European security

Some initial analysis may depict the Polish presidential election as a fight between democracy and autocracy, or between a pro-Trump and pro-European candidate. This seems exaggerated. The real challenge for Nawrocki will be deciding whether to find common ground with the Tusk government in the face of the threat from Russia and the need to work with the Trump administration on behalf of European and Ukrainian security.

There are substantive grounds for at least some cooperation across partisan lines in Poland to help Ukraine resist Russian aggression and, to this end, to work with key European allies, such as Britain, France, and Germany, as well as with the United States. Unlike the Hungarian nationalist leader Viktor Orbán, Polish nationalists and outgoing President Andrzej Duda generally support Ukraine and resolutely oppose Russian aggression. In early 2022, for example, PiS party leader Jarosław Kaczyński publicly broke with Orbán over the latter’s lack of support for Ukraine at the time. Poland’s current rapid military buildup began during the previous PiS government and continued under the Tusk coalition. Both political camps support NATO and strong relations with the United States.

The Trump administration backed Nawrocki during the election campaign. However unwise US official partisanship during an election might have been, this will give Nawrocki advantages as a perceived ideological ally making the case in Washington for continued US military presence in Poland and US support for NATO and Ukraine. Nawrocki may face challenges working with the European Union (EU), which is still a source of significant funding for Polish development and is trying to support military buildup in Europe, an objective Poles across the political spectrum tend to support. He will also have to contain the anti-German rhetoric common to much of the Polish nationalist right. Poland has had legitimate complaints about German policy toward Russia. But it has won those arguments, as many Germans themselves recognize; Nawrocki would do well to take the win and work with Germany to counter the Russian threat both countries face.

Many Poles were supportive of Ukraine in the initial phases of the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022, providing extensive benefits to Ukrainian refugees and taking hundreds of thousands of them into their homes. While the presence of so many Ukrainian refugees has grown less popular over time, Polish support for Ukraine has remained steady. Still, influential Polish constituencies, such as farmers and some groups concerned with the difficult historical issues between Poles and Ukrainians, have been skeptical about the extent of Polish support for Ukraine. During the campaign, Nawrocki declared that he does not currently support Ukraine’s NATO accession. Now, Nawrocki will have to find a way to balance strategic and political imperatives on support for Ukraine.

As president, Nawrocki will have to balance his campaign rhetoric and partisan interests with broader national interests. He’s hardly the first winning candidate to have to do so.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

Poland’s conservative nationalism is pro-American and pro-NATO

The Poles showed their dissatisfaction with the current government and the political establishment. Nawrocki was an outsider and that paid off. He managed to attract the voters who chose far-right candidates in the first round, while Trzaskowski did not manage to mobilize enough of the voters who supported Tusk’s coalition in October 2023.

For Europe, this could mean that Poland will become more inwardly focused. At the same time, Tusk has previously signaled that he believes beating populism requires addressing some of the issues that drive it. Expect Poland to take a turn for the right on matters such as migration and the European Green Deal.

Nawrocki was the only candidate who visited US President Donald Trump in the White House and received his endorsement. In late May, the Conservative Political Action Conference, known as CPAC, also held a rally in the southeastern town of Rzeszów that featured US Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem. Nawrocki’s people made conscious outreach to the US administration. In Poland, the movement that backs Nawrocki is very pro-American and pro-NATO, unlike several other parties in Europe that stand for conservative nationalism. The optimistic scenario is that as president, Nawrocki will establish a connection with Trump that will prevent any plans to withdraw US troops from Poland. At the same time, Tusk’s government will continue forging partnerships with other relevant European states, such as France and the Nordic and Baltic countries.

—Aaron Korewa is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Warsaw Office which is part of the Europe Center.

Nawrocki’s politics defy hysterical labels

First and foremost, branding Nawrocki as “populist,” “hard-core Euroskeptic,” “far right,” “pro-Putin,” or “Trumpian” is preposterous. Polish politics is too complex to indulge in such simplistic terms.

Poland’s president-elect is probably as “pro-Kremlin” as his entire political camp, which, while in power, provided Ukraine with hundreds of tanks, aircraft, howitzers, and communication gear, while pressuring all European partners to ramp up sanctions against Russia.

Nawrocki is also as “Euroskeptic” as German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, given the attitude of both politicians toward migration policies and EU climate regulations. And he is as “Trumpian” as his Finnish soon-to-be counterpart Alexander Stubb, who charmingly played a spot of golf with the US president a few weeks ago.

Nawrocki is doubtless a staunch conservative who adroitly capitalized on the nature of wide swaths of the Polish electorate, which, contrary to European trends, has remained—politically, socially, and emotionally—attached to the notion of freedom, sovereignty, tradition, and Christian values. The PiS-backed candidate has also largely banked on the rising unpopularity of Tusk’s government, especially among young voters (Nawrocki won the eighteen-to-twenty-nine-year-old cohort).

Another major factor in Nawrocki’s win was the aristocratic style and aloofness of his rival, Trzaskowski, who was unable to connect with the working class and Poland’s rural constituency. This stood in contrast to Nawrocki, the former boxer and son of a toolmaker and a bookbinder.

—Marek Magierowski is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and the director of strategy for the Poland program at the Freedom Institute in Warsaw. He previously served as Poland’s ambassador to the United States and to Israel.

Will the new president overcome Poland’s polarization?

Poles know that their vote can change the course of the history of their country. And they have known from day one of this presidential campaign that this election matters deeply for our future. However, as, sadly, the campaign was about preventing the other side from coming to power, it is an open question whether the president we have just elected will understand what is good for Poles in these times of uncertainty. 

Will our new president spare no effort to overcome the deep polarization of the Polish people? A polarized society is easy to manipulate and an easy target for Russian disinformation. This is the biggest challenge for the new president—understanding the importance of building bridges between Poles. It is an extremely difficult task, especially in times when many political careers have been built for decades on societal divisions. And I worry that this president-elect comes from a political tradition with little propensity to seek compromise. The presidency is an important part of the Polish system of checks and balances, and the new president will need to support the government in building a democratic Poland where everyone can live.

Poles need a president who will understand that isolation has never done Poland any good, that the European Union is our place, and that it is crucial that Poland takes its share of responsibility for Europe. Will the new president support European efforts to build its defense capabilities and its security-based economic competitiveness? Will he work for peace on our continent? 

In addition, my hope is that the new president will work to keep the United States and Europe together. They need each other. 

—Danuta Hübner is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. She was Poland’s first-ever European commissioner, responsible first for trade, then with regional policy. She also established and oversaw the institutional structure to deliver Poland’s accession to the EU.

Social media was rampant in this election. But what impact did it have?

The narrow victory for Nawrocki in Poland’s presidential election is the latest example of why it’s hard to directly link any country’s electoral outcome with how voters engage with candidates, political operatives, and others across social media. There was a significant amount of hyper-partisan attacks across social media, from both sides, ahead of Sunday’s vote in the Central European country. There was also evidence—including via research from the Atlantic Council—that foreign governments attempted to sway voter outcomes.

But how successful these efforts were, as well as the ongoing interventions from social media companies to possibly reduce such content’s impact, are almost impossible to quantify. Given the tightly run race, small shifts in voters’ behavior—potentially spurred on by what people may have seen in their online feeds—could have played a role. But, at this stage, that is more a theory than confirmed reality.

The most recent Polish presidential election joins a growing list of both European and non-European elections in which social media and its impact on how people voted remain a black box. As much as EU policymakers have centered their attention on how the likes of TikTok and YouTube may have amplified anti-EU voices ahead of national elections, there has been a growing offline shift in public opinion across the bloc away from greater EU alignment that has nothing to do with the digital world.

At best, this weekend’s vote is another example of how, in the middle of 2025, these digital platforms are now part of every country’s election cycle. But social media’s impact on such a closely fought election is mostly unknown.

—Mark Scott is a senior resident fellow at the Digital Forensic Research Lab’s (DFRLab) Democracy + Tech Initiative within the Atlantic Council Technology Programs.

The post Experts react: Conservative Karol Nawrocki is Poland’s next president. What does it mean for Poland, Europe, and the world? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

New presidents and new nuclear developments test the United States–Republic of Korea alliance

Heather Kearney, Amanda Mortwedt Oh — Fri, 30 May 2025 22:26:48 +0000

Key takeaways

South Korea’s new President, who will be elected on June 3, will have to grapple with many South Koreans’ unease with relying on the United States’ nuclear arsenal for deterring North Korea.
The first and most important test the US-South Korea alliance under Trump and the incoming new South Korean president faces is the continuing growth of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities.
South Korea’s establishment of a new strategic command outside of the combined US-ROK military structure highlights Seoul’s willingness and capability to take greater responsibility for deterring North Korea, but careful coordination will be required to ensure this strengthens rather than strains the alliance.

In the coming years, the US-South Korea (Republic of Korea, or ROK) alliance is likely to be tested in at least three fundamental ways: by a concerning growth in North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile weapons program; by changes to ROK defense capabilities and structures, including the establishment of ROK Strategic Command (ROKSTRATCOM); and by potential strategy and policy changes under new US and ROK political administrations.

Though the alliance may rise to the challenges of these tests to emerge stronger, these factors could potentially prevent the United States and the Republic of Korea from leveraging the mutual benefits that come from being integrated into a unified wartime command system and the long-standing ideal of a US-ROK bilateral agreement that emphasizes mutual defense. The United States will need to continue to adapt its approach, account for its ally’s perspectives, and plan for the inevitable change to the status quo on the Korean Peninsula.

A second North Korean enrichment facility heightens security concerns in Seoul

The first test for the alliance is the continuing growth of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Current estimates suggest Pyongyang has enough fissile material to build up to 90 nuclear warheads, which generates compelling security concerns that could create tension among two longtime and staunch allies—the United States and the Republic of Korea. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has placed increasing importance on the regime’s nuclear weapons development in the last decade, portraying nuclear weapons as not only defensive but providing the means to win in conflict. In September 2022, North Korea promulgated a new law that laid out a much broader approach to the use of nuclear weapons, including their employment in various conditions.

In 2023, Kim updated Article 58 of the state’s constitution to “ensure the country’s right to existence and development, deter war and protect regional and global peace by rapidly developing nuclear weapons to a higher level.” In September 2024, North Korean state media released photos for the first time of a suspected second uranium enrichment facility and Kim called for a higher number of more capable centrifuges to boost his plans to “exponentially” increase nuclear warhead production. Further, 2025 marks the final year for Kim to achieve the military capability development goals laid out in his five-year plan.

Kim Jong Un touring a uranium enrichment facility at an undisclosed location. Photo released by Korean Central News Agency, September 2024.

North Korea has a nuclear dyad with land- and sea-based nuclear weapons, and it is developing new technologies, including hypersonic gliding flight warheads and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, consistent with Kim’s drive to rapidly develop nuclear weapons and the five-year plan. North Korea’s Strategic Forces have short-range, medium-range, intermediate-range, and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), along with 200 road-mobile launchers. North Korea’s continued development of its rail-based ballistic system shows the regime’s efforts to diversify launch platforms, including various vehicles and ground launch pads and potentially submarines, and increase the survivability of its force. While Kim’s ability to strike the US homeland with North Korean ICBMs only grows with additional testing and the introduction and testing of its solid-fuel ICBM in 2023, the regime is also hard at work improving the efficacy of its precision-guided tactical nuclear weapons, which are designed to significantly damage South Korea and US forces on the peninsula, as well as create response challenges for the alliance.

In addition, North Korea is moving forward on its sea-based deterrent. It has ballistic missiles and what it terms ”strategic” (alluding to long range and nuclear capability) cruise missiles for both developmental, missile-firing submarines and underwater platforms. Its tactical nuclear attack submarine, the Hero Kim Kun Ok, is designed to launch tactical nuclear weapons from underwater. In January 2024, the regime tested its underwater unmanned nuclear weapon system, the Haeil-5-23, as a purported response to the trilateral US-ROK-Japan maritime exercise. In January 2025, the regime tested an underwater-to-surface strategic guided cruise missile while also vowing to respond to the United States with the “toughest counteraction.”

Ultimately, North Korea wants to halt US-ROK joint (and multinational) military exercises and to splinter an alliance of seventy-plus-years between the two nations. Its determined and bellicose approach has the potential to highlight the asymmetry of what’s at stake between the United States and the ROK and, if unchecked, sow fear and doubt into the fabric of the alliance.

Would South Korea go nuclear? A shift in ROK defense architecture

The second test of the alliance follows changes in the ROK’s defense architecture and capabilities, including the advent of the ROK Strategic Command (ROKSTRATCOM), which may increase potential areas for divergence among allies even as the changes show the ROK’s increasing capability and willingness to take greater responsibility for its own defense. ROKSTRATCOM’s establishment may be an opportunity rather than just a challenge and it is perhaps more a response to an increasingly serious threat from North Korea than a shortfall in the US-ROK alliance. It nevertheless highlights that South Koreans may not feel US extended deterrence guarantees are sufficient given the growing North Korean threat.

Plans to establish ROKSTRATCOM were underway for over two years by the time of the command’s official establishment on October 1, 2024, yet many Americans either did not pay attention or believe there was a need for such a command on the Korean Peninsula. After all, the United States, South Korea’s strongest ally, has been with the ROK since the Korean War began in 1950. The two countries also have a long-standing Mutual Defense Treaty, signed shortly after the Korean War Armistice. So, for some observers, South Korea’s need for such a command was questionable. The United States already commits to defending South Korea, most visibly with 28,500 military personnel present on the peninsula and contributing to the Combined Forces Command, US Forces Korea, and the United Nations Command. Regular joint exercises and strategic activities, such as a port visit of the USS Kentucky ballistic missile submarine to Busan, also bolster this presence.

The ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC) marks its forty-sixth anniversary with a ceremony at Camp Humphreys, Pyeongtaek, November 7, 2024. Photo provided by United States Forces Korea.

Importantly, though, ROKSTRATCOM does not clearly fall under the combined alliance wartime command construct under a bi-national Combined Forces Command that has been in place since 1978. ROKSTRATCOM is instead an independent ROK-controlled command, currently led by ROK Air Force Lieutenant General Jin Young Seung, and it is still under development exactly how this new command will align and coordinate with CFC and other alliance constructs like the bilateral Military Committee.

Markus Garlauskas, Indo-Pacific Security Initiative director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, with Lt. Gen. Jin Young Seung, ROKSTRATCOM commander, at the ROKSTRATCOM headquarters in February 2025. Photo provided by the Atlantic Council

Operationally, ROKSTRATCOM resides under the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, serving as an integrator of ROK armed forces’ strategic weapons systems from each military branch. In July 2024, a former ROK minister of defense expressed the administration’s vision of the command:

The strategic command will be a unit that leads the development of nuclear and conventional integrated operational concepts and plans and combat development in new areas such as space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum in conjunction with the operation of the ROK-US Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG).

According to a news report citing the South Korean Ministry of National Defense, the command “would also give the orders to subordinate military assets to strike enemy targets or intercept hostile missiles as part of the Kill Chain strategy and the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation [KMPR] plan.” (See the ministry’s 2022 white paper for more information about the kill chain strategy and the KMPR plan.)

It is more than just command and control that is changing, however. South Korea’s independent strike capabilities are increasing. South Korea unveiled its most powerful conventional weapon, the Hyunmoo-5, referring to it as an “ultra-high-power ballistic missile.” The high-yield Hyunmoo-5 appears to be intended as a ROKSTRATCOM capability, integral to reinforcing ROK messages of an “overwhelming response” to any North Korea nuclear attack. It remains to be seen, however, how the command will contribute these forces to a conflict on the Korean Peninsula—and this calls into question the previously relied upon unified command system.

The establishment of ROKSTRATCOM is a historic event and time will tell if capabilities breed intentions. It appears South Korea is not willing to take the option of having nuclear weapons off the table despite the US nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence commitments. As the ROK continues to grapple with its current and future defense challenges, the United States should take care to be an integral part of this ROK process, thereby ensuring a better understanding of the intentions of allies, enhancing the alliance, and deterring North Korea from strategic attack.

New presidents in Washington and Seoul portend policy changes

The third test involves expected changes by the new Trump administration to US policies and strategies affecting the alliance, along with potential adjustments by the imminent new South Korean administration to its approach toward the alliance and to defense issues more broadly. Coupled with divisive domestic politics in both the United States and South Korea, these developments could potentially open old wounds and create new points of contention within the alliance. As the new US administration begins to set its tone for foreign policy for the rest of its term, many South Koreans seem hopeful, but uncertain. Meanwhile, South Korean media reports and commentaries are examining the implications of rumored US force reductions in Korea and other potential changes to US policy and strategy affecting the alliance as either challenges or opportunities.

South Korea will soon have its own new president, after the martial law declaration by Yoon and his removal from office resulted in elections set for June 3. A new ROK president may well inject more uncertainty into the state of South Korean affairs, which could affect the alliance, as the country works to self-heal from Yoon’s surprising martial law announcement and the subsequent fallout.

Meanwhile, there are lingering questions about whether South Korea will eventually develop its own nuclear weapons. While many Americans empathize with South Korea’s undesirable position, its creation of ROKSTRATCOM and varied calls by ROK officials for nuclear weapons are concerning for US assurance efforts and, potentially, its nonproliferation policy. Would South Korea really go nuclear? Given the tense nuclear-armed neighborhood that surrounds the small country, and North Korea’s continued refusal to give up its nuclear weapons, many ask, “Why not?” Others, however, argue South Korea “cannot” or would “never” do so because it is a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). However, the NPT has a get-out-of-jail free card in Article X. According to a 2005 Arms Control Today article by the late arms control experts George Bunn and John B. Rhinelander:

Article X of the NPT provides a “right” to withdraw from the treaty if the withdrawing party “decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this [t]reaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.” It also requires that a withdrawing state-party give three months’ notice.

South Korean public discussion of a nuclear latency capability and indigenous nuclear weapons has been growing, with some officials publicly expressing the desire to keep the option open or to actually build nuclear weapons. Most recently, the People Power Party presidential candidate, Kim Moon Soo, announced that, if elected, he would pursue a nuclear latency capability—meaning that South Korea would be much closer to being able to build nuclear weapons on short notice. This indicates South Korea’s unease with relying on the United States as the only nuclear weapons responder to a growing North Korean nuclear arsenal.

Conclusion

These new hurdles—a more capable and threatening nuclear North Korea; a shift in South Korea’s defense architecture, including a unilateral strategic command; and presidential-level political changes—will inevitably strain the alliance, but may also present opportunities. The US-ROK alliance has remained ironclad, with more than seven decades of experience and adaptation, underpinned by a commitment to each other’s mutual defense. Now it is up to both countries to learn from their past while developing new approaches to the changing status quo. No matter who wins the ROK presidential election, the continued strength of the US-ROK alliance matters in the face of threats confronting both the United States and South Korea. Early and in-depth engagement by Washington with the new South Korean president to begin charting a new course for the alliance will ensure the US-ROK alliance emerges even stronger and more equipped to enhance each country’s interests, as well as underpin stability in the region.

About the authors

Heather Kearney is a nonresident fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She is also a senior Indo-Pacific analyst in the Joint Exercise, Training, and Assessments Directorate at United States Strategic Command. As a senior analyst for risk of strategic deterrence failure, she leads a team dedicated to assessing trends in the environment in order to inform strategic risk assessments.

Amanda Mortwedt Oh is a USSTRATCOM liaison officer in the Office of Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Policy, Strategic Stability, in the Joint Staff J-5 Directorate. She focuses her research on Northeast Asia and strategic deterrence and was most recently a Fall 2024 Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Policy Fellow. She is the previous director of international outreach and development at the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) and has published several articles and reports on North Korea’s prison camps and human rights issues. She is also a lawyer in the US Army Reserve Judge Advocate General’s Corps.

Disclaimer: The views presented in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of US Strategic Command, the US Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US government.

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Your primer on the Polish presidential election

Aaron Korewa — Thu, 29 May 2025 20:14:19 +0000

Poles will vote for their next president on June 1. Depending on the outcome, this election could kick off a period of political stability—or further cement a gridlock that could lead to the government collapsing.

In the October 2023 parliamentary elections, current Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s center-right Civic Coalition (KO) ended eight years of rule by the national-conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party and formed a broad government consisting of centrists, liberals, socialists, and greens.

However, Tusk does not command a three-fifths majority in the Sejm (the lower house of parliament), which is needed to override any potential presidential veto. President Andrzej Duda, formally from PiS, has delayed or blocked many of the prime minister’s domestic legislative reforms. But now, Duda’s two terms are up.

Two candidates will face off in a final round: Rafał Trzaskowski, the mayor of Warsaw from KO, and Karol Nawrocki, head of the Institute for National Remembrance, who is tied to PiS.

Ahead of the second round, Aaron Korewa, director of the Atlantic Council’s Warsaw Office, breaks down the race and the potential impacts on Poland’s foreign policy.

How has the race unfolded so far?

The Poles voted in the first round on May 18. Trzaskowski, who was long considered the clear favorite, only managed to get slightly ahead of Nawrocki, securing 31.4 percent against Nawrocki’s 29.5 percent. To complicate things for Trzaskowski, the two next places were taken by Sławomir Mentzen of the far-right Confederation party (14.8 percent) and the very far-right Grzegorz Braun (6.3 percent). Mentzen has expressed skepticism towards both the European Union (EU) and aid for Ukraine, whereas Braun openly takes pro-Kremlin and anti-Semitic positions. As no candidate reached over 50 percent, the race proceeded to a second round. Those who voted for Mentzen and Braun are generally believed to be more likely to vote for Nawrocki than Trzaskowski in the second round.

Voter turnout was high by Polish standards: 67.3 percent. Young voters mainly went for Mentzen or Adrian Zandberg, from the leftist Razem party. Poland, like the rest of the Western world, is seeing backlash against established parties and elites. PiS has for a long time been able to capitalize on such sentiments, but less so now that it held power recently and (technically) still holds the Presidential Palace.

In the initial stages of the campaign, foreign policy was rarely discussed. This is because unlike in most European countries, the two main rivals—KO and PiS—in many ways share the same positions on strong support for NATO and transatlantic ties; they also both oppose Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Poland became a leading champion of Ukraine’s cause under the PiS government led by former Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki. Since Tusk took over in 2023, this has largely continued. On the other hand, within Polish society, the initial outpouring of support for Ukraine and its people seen in 2022 has soured somewhat. That is mainly due to fatigue with the large number of refugees but also resentment that Ukraine has not moved fast enough to address historical issues such as the infamous Volhynia massacre of Polish civilians by Ukrainian nationalist partisan forces during World War II. The Confederation and the parties to its right seem to have been able to capitalize on this, which prompted Nawrocki to use anti-Ukraine rhetoric himself in the final stages of the first round.

US President Donald Trump did not become a central issue in the Polish election. This is likely because nearly all parties recognize the role strong transatlantic ties play for Poland’s national security—approximately ten thousand US troops are currently stationed in Poland. Nawrocki was the only candidate who traveled to Washington to meet Trump, and he claims to have received the US president’s endorsement, but this occurred around early May holidays in Poland when voters tend to tune out news. Thus, the effect on the result of the first round was probably limited.

How do the first-round outcomes set the stage for the second round?

In recent polls, Trzaskowski and Nawrocki are neck and neck. Despite the combined vote for the right being around 52 percent, there’s no guarantee that those who voted for Mentzen and Braun will automatically support Nawrocki. PiS has traditionally received support from elderly, religious, and rural voters. PiS is clearly on the right when it comes to social issues but also proposes government support programs for the poor and disadvantaged. The Confederation, on the other hand, is economically libertarian and has young, well-off men as their base. Braun’s electorate is largely made up of ultra-Catholics, but they may also stay at home if their candidate is not on the ballot.

Polls also show that many voters who supported the parties in Tusk’s coalition in the October 2023 parliamentary election skipped the first round in this presidential election, which is likely due to dissatisfaction with the government. In recent days, Trzaskowski has been successful in reaching out to other members of the Tusk coalition. On Sunday, he held a march in Warsaw that saw about 140,000 participants and several speeches by former presidential candidates from the left and liberal side. Nawrocki held a march in Warsaw the same day, but his was smaller and only featured speakers from PiS. Last Friday, Trzaskowski and Nawrocki faced off in a final debate, where Trzaskowski strived to expose Nawrocki’s lack of experience. Finally, each of the candidates appeared on Mentzen’s YouTube channel, where they were asked to sign an eight-point pledge to satisfy the demands of Mentzen’s voters. Nawrocki agreed to all the points, including one saying that he would not sign the law ratifying Ukraine’s accession to NATO. Trzaskowski disagreed on that and on other points, but did not attack Mentzen or his voters in doing so.

In the final stages of the campaign, Trzaskowski’s card is that he’s likely seen as more “presidential.” But he’s also closely tied to Tusk as the deputy head of KO, and if the final round becomes a referendum on the government, Trzaskowski would be in trouble. Yet a high voter turnout would likely favor him. From his messaging, Trzaskowski also seems to have picked up on the fact that voters list healthcare and secure borders as the most important issues.

Nawrocki has the “man of the people” image down and can ride on the current right-wing “wave,” but he is inexperienced and comes off as somewhat unnatural in front of cameras. He is a historian and a former boxer, but it recently surfaced that he also engaged in soccer hooliganism in the past, once a major problem in Poland. Nawrocki has recently played up that he would have a better relationship with Trump if elected. At the Conservative Political Action Conference in Poland this week, US Department of Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem echoed this theme.

How will the outcome impact Poland’s foreign policy?

Whereas KO and PiS generally agree on NATO, transatlantic ties, and Russia, they sharply differ on the EU. KO is strongly pro-EU; before returning as prime minister, Tusk served as president of the European Council. Trzaskowski was a member of the European Parliament and a deputy foreign affairs minister responsible for EU affairs. PiS is not against Polish EU membership but is clearly Euroskeptic and pays lip service to muscular Polish nationalism that sees Brussels and Berlin (often intertwined) as threats to Polish sovereignty. A Trzaskowski win could play a part in Poland rising to a prominent position in the EU. A win for Nawrocki could disrupt it.

As for relations with the United States, Nawrocki has established a channel to Trump and is ideologically more in line with the “MAGA” wing of the Republican Party. But Trzaskowski has lived in the United States and has also established contacts with US politicians from across the aisle. He has made several appearances on US media outlets, most recently FOX Business.

Under Trzaskowski, Polish support for Ukraine will certainly continue. But it’s harder to say what will happen should Nawrocki win. PiS is not pro-Russia by any means, but Nawrocki has already used some anti-Ukraine rhetoric in his bid to attract the voters of Mentzen and Braun. In this scenario, expect no Polish blocking of Western aid to Ukraine but probably no leadership in expanding such aid either.

For foreign policy in general, Trzaskowski may bring domestic stability and an end to the political logjam of the past two years. A win for Nawrocki could mean more gridlock, forcing the Polish government to focus inward. There are even rumors that in this scenario, some of Tusk’s coalition partners may jump ship, prompting a new cycle of elections.

—Aaron Korewa is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Warsaw Office, which is part of the Europe Center.

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Portugal’s shift to the right is accelerating. What does that mean for its future?

Andrew Bernard — Tue, 20 May 2025 16:47:38 +0000

Portugal is going through a historic rightward shift. Initial results from Sunday’s election have the center-right Democratic Alliance (AD) winning, but without an absolute majority, the center-left Socialist Party (PS) falling hard, and the far-right Chega party continuing its meteoric rise.

This means that for the first time in Portuguese democratic history, there is not a “center majority” between the center-right and center-left. With new power balances in play, Portugal’s politics may get even messier—with political paralysis the new norm, preventing necessary reforms in key sectors such as housing, healthcare, and defense.

This was the third election in three years for Portuguese voters. Among European Union (EU) nations, only Bulgaria has had more elections than Portugal over the past seven years—and election fatigue was evident in this campaign. What Portuguese voters really want is stability, but these results might make that dream harder to come by in the months and years ahead.

Winners and losers

AD, a center-right coalition between the Social Democratic Party and the CDS-People’s Party, won the March 2024 legislative elections by the slimmest of margins, taking the reins of government from PS for the first time since 2015. That election also marked the surge of the far-right Chega party—“Enough” in Portuguese—with a strong third-place showing. Although this fractured political landscape made governing difficult for AD, led by Prime Minister Luís Montenegro, it was still able to pass a budget and begin implementing its program as a minority government.

The 2025 election campaign was nearly identical to the 2024 cycle, with the same eight principal parties/coalitions on the ballot—all led by their same respective leaders. The Portuguese housing crisis and migration topped the list of voter concerns, followed by healthcare, pensions, and salaries. The war in Ukraine, transatlantic relations, and defense investment were not actively discussed during the campaign and the debates.

Three parties secured the majority of the 230 parliamentary seats, and they will drive the Portuguese political system for the near future.

AD won the election, but it fell short of an absolute majority. With eighty-nine seats (up from eighty in 2024), the election reinforces Montenegro’s belief that the country is asking for stability and the opportunity to govern with the normal full four-year mandate. But even if AD partners with smaller parties, it still will not have a majority to govern outright. Thus, AD is hoping the president will once again ask the center-right to form a minority government.

The Socialist Party was the big loser on Sunday, securing only fifty-eight seats (down from seventy-eight) and losing more than 360,000 votes from 2024. This is an epic fall for a party that has been a staple of Portuguese politics since the transition to democracy in the 1970s. In the next government, PS—even if aligned with small left-wing parties—will not be able to outright block government initiatives, leaving the role of kingmaker to Chega.

The far-right party was the biggest winner, as Chega secured fifty-eight seats (up from fifty), gaining more than 230,000 votes from the 2024 contest. Depending on the distribution of the last four seats, which are reserved for the votes of Portuguese citizens living outside the country, Chega could find itself in second place. (The distribution of these seats will be known by May 28.) In 2024, Chega won two of the four “emigrant” seats, with the other two split between PS and AD. A similar outcome this year would put Chega in the runner-up position. The election results show that the issues most central to Chega’s program—illegal migration and corruption—continue to resonate with the Portuguese electorate.

Political pitfalls ahead

Although AD won the most votes, there is no guarantee that President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa will immediately invite Montenegro and AD to form a government. That’s because the president is keen on stability, and he made it clear during the election that he wants any government he nominates to have its program accepted by Parliament.

In Portugal, the nominated prime minister has ten days to present its governance plan to Parliament. If no party or faction within the new Parliament votes to reject (or approve) the program, then the program passes automatically, and the nominated government inherits full executive authority. Should any party or faction reject the program, then it would go to a vote to the whole of Parliament.

In this case, an absolute majority would be needed to bring down the nominated government—forcing the president to nominate a different government configuration (as happened in 2015) or subject the country to another legislative election. But the Portuguese Constitution prohibits the legislature from being dissolved within the first six months of its mandate or during the final six months of a presidential term. Rebelo de Sousa will finish his second term in March 2026, with the next presidential election scheduled for January 2026. This means late spring 2026 could be the earliest opportunity for new elections. So if a nominated government is brought down, it would leave a long-term caretaker government—a situation the president wants to avoid. It is unlikely that Chega and the Socialists would join forces to block the installation of an AD minority government. Nonetheless, the president will do his due diligence behind the scenes before nominating Montenegro to be prime minister again.

Regardless of the composition of the new government, there is now an absolute majority on the right. Should AD and Chega find common ground on a particular issue—such as immigration—they will be able to enact policy without the left blocking proposals. With Chega possibly becoming the number two party in Parliament, it will be under more pressure to show it is more than just an anti-incumbent party and has the ability and gravitas to govern.

From Lisbon to Washington

It is still too early to see how any new Portuguese government will approach the current US administration, but it is unlikely that Portugal will change its approach of having the transatlantic relationship be one of the pillars of its foreign policy. Montenegro’s government was reserved and cautious on transatlantic relations during the early days of the new US administration. The prime minister refused to critique the United States for its stance on Gaza, while asking for “realism” and dialogue concerning tariffs. Yet, Montenegro allowed his defense minister to openly question US predictability as an ally when making public comments about the potential purchase of the US-built F-35 fighter jet.

Chega’s outsized role in the next Parliament, even if it does not become part of the government, may change this dynamic and push the executive toward reinforced ties with the United States. US President Donald Trump invited André Ventura, Chega’s leader, to attend the presidential inauguration in January, while Chega vowed to “privilege the transatlantic link” and prioritize its alliance with the United States as part of its 2025 election campaign foreign policy program. Montenegro has often critiqued Chega as unreliable, but he may have to adapt to the new reality of the Portuguese political landscape.

The NATO Summit looms on the horizon, and it is possible a new government begins its mandate only a week or two before the June 24-25 event in The Hague. Whoever represents Portugal as head of government will have the unenviable position of articulating a plan to increase defense investment, which is still well below the 2 percent of gross domestic product threshold set in the Alliance’s 2014 Wales pledge.

Defense spending is one area that the AD and Chega may find common ground. Chega proposed for Portugal to meet its 2 percent goal in 2026, three years earlier than AD’s 2029 goal, while PS did not quantify a target date in its electoral plan. It will take political will by Montenegro and AD to use this opportunity to move Portugal out of the shrinking list of NATO members still unable to fulfill the Wales pledge. This willpower has been historically absent in Portugal among all parties, a country benefiting from its geography and its distance from the Alliance’s eastern flank to under-prioritize defense spending while focusing on social programs.

With the composition and functioning of the new government in flux, Portugal could remain in an era of political paralysis for some time. How the future center-right government leads with a far-right primary opposition will determine if the country can break through its fractured political landscape and address the country’s challenges. Lisbon’s foreign policy could remain unsettled for some time given this reality. The big question remains whether the government will come together effectively enough to avoid yet another election in a year’s time.

Andrew Bernard is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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Experts react: What message did Romanians send by electing Nicusor Dan?

Atlantic Council experts — Mon, 19 May 2025 14:48:39 +0000

The math adds up. On Sunday, Nicusor Dan, the mayor of Bucharest and a former mathematics professor, was elected as the next Romanian president. With more than 53 percent of the vote, the pro–European Union (EU) Dan beat out right-wing candidate George Simion. Dan’s victory comes after the Romanian Constitutional Court’s controversial decision to annul the country’s November 2024 presidential election following allegations of Russian interference. Below, our experts count up the ways that the election’s outcome matters for Romania, for EU and NATO support for Ukraine, and for the future of Eastern Europe.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Daniel Fried: Dan ran a pro-Europe, pro-NATO, and pro-Ukraine campaign

Victoria Olari: The implications of Dan’s win will ripple across Eastern Europe

Anca Agachi: Romanians don’t want more of the same, so how will Dan be different?

Mark Scott: It was an election fought as much online as offline

Andrei Covatariu: After the election, can Romania’s energy diplomacy bridge Brussels and Washington?

Olga Khakova: Energy policy can help build the coalition and strengthen the country

Dan ran a pro-Europe, pro-NATO, and pro-Ukraine campaign

There are two lessons to take from Romania’s presidential elections. First, Romanians seemed turned off by the establishment parties that have traded off running the government for decades. The candidate of the ruling coalition didn’t make it past the first round; and Dan and Simion were both seen, Romanians tell me, as alternatives to the ruling coalition. Second, despite predictions (or fears), the preference for an outsider didn’t translate into a preference for a nationalist or anti-EU firebrand, which is how Simion ran his campaign. Dan, a mathematician by training, ran a campaign that was pro-Europe, pro-NATO, and pro-Ukraine.

Simion appeared to enjoy support from Russia, and plenty of stories are circulating of Russian information ops in his favor. He had maintained distance from Russian President Vladimir Putin (wise in Russo-skeptic Romania) and instead courted the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement in the United States, even visiting the United States during the campaign. But this did not translate into enough support at home.

Dan’s win is decisive, but it alone will not overcome the divisions in Romanian society. Romanians have voted for Europe and democracy, not nationalism, but they also seem to want change in the form of better governance. Dan will have a mandate but a big job ahead.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

The implications of Dan’s win will ripple across Eastern Europe

Romania’s presidential runoff turned into an intense race with significant stakes for the nation and the wider region. Dan won, an outcome expected mainly given the high voter turnout, offering him a strong democratic mandate.

From the early hours of election day, Simion’s ultra-nationalist camp signaled that they would not accept a loss. They took to social media with accusations of fraud and amplified fake news stories that mimicked legitimate outlets and falsely declared Simion the winner. Simion told his supporters not to trust the exit polls, claiming that political elites had manipulated the results behind the scenes. His team also accused foreign actors of interference, notably targeting Moldova’s president, Maia Sandu, for allegedly mobilizing Romanian voters in Moldova. This followed an unprecedented voter turnout there in the second round, partly spurred by Simion’s hostile rhetoric toward Moldova. The nationalist camp further alleged meddling by France, specifically accusing President Emmanuel Macron of election interference.

Despite these efforts, the election results left little room for dispute. Dan secured a mandate from Romanians. Simion conceded early Monday morning, marking the end of a tense and polarized campaign.

This election isn’t just about Romania. It’s a big deal for the region, too. A win for Dan will likely lock in Romania’s commitment to the EU and NATO, a vital move as Russia’s war in Ukraine continues to unsettle the region. This is critical, as Romania’s strategic position strengthens regional security and support for Kyiv. Additionally, it will likely bolster Moldova’s EU integration efforts under Sandu, fostering closer Romania-Moldova ties and countering Russian influence. On the other hand, a Simion victory would have likely emboldened far-right movements across Europe, disrupted regional unity, and undermined support for Ukraine, which Simion openly opposed.

Even with all the divisions, Romanian voters sent a loud message: they reject the old political elite. Both Dan and Simion positioned themselves as anti-system challengers, capitalizing on widespread frustration with corruption and governance failures. This call for change is real, and it’s going to continue to shape Romania’s future.

—Victoria Olari is a research associate for Moldova at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab).

Romanians don’t want more of the same, so how will Dan be different?

“Hope and patience.” This is what Dan, the now president-elect of Romania, asked for in his speech when the first exit polls were released.

Patience because his mandate will be an incredibly difficult one. Immediately, he will have to choose a prime minister and help establish a pro-European political coalition in the Romanian Parliament, one third of which is made up of far-right parties. He will need to help build trust in an economy that has the EU’s highest budget deficit compared to gross domestic product. And he will need to lead the country’s foreign policy at a time when the regional context for Romania has never been more dangerous given Russia’s continued war in Ukraine. In the long term, Dan will have to face down the unaddressed root causes of discontent that gave oxygen to far-right parties in the first place and brought Romania to the brink of disaster. The country is plagued by poverty, inequality, a failing public health system, corruption, and inefficient, unresponsive, and distrusted state institutions, as well as a forgotten diaspora. He will have to “rebuild a one Romania” together with a divided population.

But Dan was also right to ask for hope. In the election result Sunday, Romania decided it cannot go back, and Romanians have firmly made the choice to remain anchored in the Western, transatlantic community. Despite external pressures, disinformation campaigns, suspicions of Russian interference, and fears of a contested election result, Romanians made it clear that they are European. But the same voters who turned out in massive numbers for two anti-system candidates also made it clear that more of the same in Romanian politics is simply not acceptable. This is the hope and the opportunity Romania is facing—starting now.

—Anca Agachi is a nonresident fellow with Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She currently serves as a defense policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, where she focuses on international security and defense issues.

It was an election fought as much online as offline

Faced with a barrage of false online information, potential foreign interference, and opaque practices by social media companies, Romania’s second-round presidential election held up to scrutiny—but only just. In the hours before Dan was elected, Simion took to X to proclaim himself as Romania’s new president, only to backtrack on that claim when the official tally gave Dan the final victory.

Pavel Durov, the chief executive of Telegram, the popular messaging service, also took to his platform and other social networks to accuse “a Western European government” of urging Telegram to “silence conservative voices in Romania.” The Russian tech boss subsequently named that country as France, though Paris denied any potential interference in the Eastern European country’s election.

More than any other recent European election, Romania’s vote has been riddled with potential digital attacks on local democratic institutions, including scores of cyberattacks that the country’s security forces suggested may have come from Russia. In response, Romanian officials and those from the European Commission have criticized social media companies for not doing enough to combat malign actors, both in and outside of the country.

Yet even hours after Dan was officially named as Romania’s next president, little, if any, evidence about the role these global platforms played in promoting election-related falsehoods has been made public. Local voters remain mostly in the dark about how social media—and potential bad actors—may have targeted them in this weekend’s election. That has left more questions than answers as policymakers, tech giants, and the public try to unpack how Dan successfully saw off Simion in an election that was fought as much online as offline.

—Mark Scott is senior resident fellow at the DFRLab’s Democracy + Tech Initiative within the Atlantic Council Technology Programs.

After the election, can Romania’s energy diplomacy bridge Brussels and Washington?

Romania avoided a political shock this weekend as pro-European candidate Dan defeated right-wing populist Simion. The result reassures Romania’s continued commitment to EU and transatlantic partnerships. Yet, after months of political turbulence and voter polarization, restoring macroeconomic stability now depends on forming a new government—no easy feat despite a pro-European majority in Romania’s Parliament.

The election outcome has implications for Romania’s strategic energy direction, too, even though energy and climate policy were not prominently featured in the campaign debates. Dan has pledged to keep Romania on its path of regional energy relevance, proven over the past few years, and to enhance the existing cooperation with the United States and the EU. His platform includes proposals to create a national energy champion, reduce Romania’s energy dependencies on authoritarian regimes, support strategic investment (including in data centers), and deepen ties with Moldova and Ukraine. His strong backing for EU enlargement further strengthens Romania’s geopolitical and energy role in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).

At the same time, Romania—like other CEE states—faces a growing tension between the EU’s accelerated decarbonization push and the United States’ emphasis on “energy freedom,” as recently articulated by US Energy Secretary Chris Wright at the Three Seas Business Forum in Warsaw. This divergence presents both challenges and opportunities. The Romanian president can play a key role in expanding the win-set between Brussels and Washington through enhanced energy diplomacy—advancing nuclear partnerships (notably small modular nuclear reactors with US support), Black Sea gas development, cross-border infrastructure with Ukraine and Moldova, and clean generation scale-up. Romania also has the potential to become a clean technology manufacturing destination, supporting both EU goals and transatlantic alignment in a shifting geopolitical landscape.

By advancing projects that resonate in both Brussels and Washington, Romania can amplify its geopolitical weight in the energy space.

—Andrei Covatariu is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

Energy policy can help build the coalition and strengthen the country

This anti-establishment, anti-corruption vote presents a historic opportunity for the new Romanian leadership to use this mandate to build on previous positive energy reforms. The next Romanian government has a chance to engage with the population to forge a secure, resilient, and diversified energy strategy that can attract new deals and investments in the energy sector.

However, the close election results showcase that national concerns such as energy prices, reliability, and industrial competitiveness helped drive a significant percentage of voters to support the candidate with a nationalistic platform. The good news is that Romania can prioritize domestic issues through stronger partnerships and deeper regional integration: developing Black Sea resources, integrating electricity and gas interconnections with neighboring countries, and making progress on nuclear agreements with countries like the United States.

Romania has led on diversification from Russian energy sources and support for Ukraine and Moldova’s energy security. The new coalition can lead by example in fortifying the region from backsliding into Russian natural gas dependence, as seen in the growing Russian liquefied natural gas shipments to the EU.

Moreover, a strong energy agenda could also be a unifying platform for building the ruling coalition.

—Olga Khakova is the deputy director for European energy security at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

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Why Romania chose centrism in the end

Atlantic Council — Mon, 19 May 2025 01:26:49 +0000

JUST IN

Dan’s the man. Bucharest Mayor Nicusor Dan won Sunday’s Romanian presidential election, a triumph for centrist, pro-European forces in a country that has been roiled by six months of electoral upheaval. “We need to build Romania together irrespective of who you voted for,” Dan told cheering supporters. His populist, far-right challenger, George Simion, claimed fraud and initially claimed victory, but conceded hours later. This election followed a canceled presidential race in December, when Romanian authorities determined that another populist, far-right candidate, Calin Georgescu, had violated campaign-finance rules and was the beneficiary of a dodgy social media campaign; he was later barred from running again. How did Dan triumph? What can we expect next for Romania and for the country’s relations with the world? We turned to our experts to parse the polls.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION BROUGHT TO YOU BY

Victoria Olari (@Olari_Victoria): Research associate at the Digital Forensic Research Lab
Daniel Fried (@AmbDanFried): Weiser Family distinguished fellow and former US assistant secretary of state for Europe
Anca Agachi (@AncaAgachi): Nonresident fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative and defense policy analyst at the RAND Corporation

Why Dan won

Dan may be a centrist, but he was not the chosen candidate of Romania’s ruling coalition. “Romanian voters sent a loud message: They reject the old political elite,” Victoria says. “Both Dan and Simion positioned themselves as anti-system challengers, capitalizing on widespread frustration with corruption and governance failures.”
But at the same time, “the preference for an outsider didn’t translate into preference for a nationalist or anti-EU firebrand, which is how Simion ran his campaign,” Daniel tells us. Instead, voters picked a mathematician who “ran a campaign that was pro-Europe, pro-NATO, and pro-Ukraine.”

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The foreign factor

While Russia appeared to back Simion, Daniel points out that Simion “maintained distance from Russian President Vladimir Putin (wise in Russo-skeptic Romania).”
Instead, the populist candidate courted US President Donald Trump’s Make America Great Again movement, traveling to the Conservative Political Action Conference and appearing on Steve Bannon’s podcast. “But this did not translate into support at home,” Daniel notes.
Victoria points out that on Sunday, Simion’s supporters “flooded social media with accusations of fraud and amplified fake news stories that mimicked legitimate outlets and falsely declared Simion the winner.” Simion and his backers also accused the presidents of both Moldova and France of meddling in the election. “These actions risk deepening Romania’s societal polarization,” Victoria says.
But Simion did concede in the end, turning the focus to what Dan’s win will mean for the region. Victoria notes that Dan’s pro-Ukraine stance “strengthens regional security and support for Kyiv.” Dan’s victory will also boost neighboring Moldova’s integration efforts with the European Union, she adds, “fostering closer Romania-Moldova ties and countering Russian influence.”

Romania’s road ahead

While Romanians “made it clear” with their vote that “they are European,” Dan’s mandate will still be “an incredibly difficult one,” Anca cautions, as the newly elected president will need to choose a prime minister to form a pro-European political coalition in the parliament, where far-right parties hold one-third of the seats.
His immediate task will involve building trust in an economy with the highest budget deficit in the European Union (as a percentage of gross domestic product), while guiding foreign policy “at a time when the regional context for Romania has never been more dangerous, given Russia’s continued war in Ukraine,” Anca says.
To succeed in the long run, “Dan will have to face down the unaddressed root causes of discontent,” Anca says—such as poverty, corruption, and distrust of state institutions—“that gave oxygen to far-right parties in the first place and brought Romania to the brink of disaster.”

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What will Labor’s landslide mean for Australia’s foreign policy?

Peter J. Dean — Wed, 07 May 2025 21:28:02 +0000

CANBERRA—It’s been five months since US President Donald Trump was elected to a second term, but it felt at times as if he was a candidate in Australia’s election on May 3, as well. During the campaign, Trump cast a long shadow over both the progressive Labor Party Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and conservative Liberal-National Coalition Opposition leader Peter Dutton.

Labor’s resounding election victory is now being viewed as a mandate for the sensible center of Australian politics and a rejection of Trump-style politics in Australia. One Australian political commentator saw the results as rebuffing “bunyip Trumpism,” a reference to a mythical Aboriginal creature that inhabits waterholes, which is colloquially used to describe something that is seen as an imposter or pretender. But this election was a rejection of not just hard-right policies but also of the hard left. The Australian Greens Party ran a campaign on cost-of-living measures but also identity politics, Gaza, and anti-Israel sentiment. The party lost two of its previous four lower house seats, while Adam Bandt, the party leader, lost his seat. The party made no gains in the Senate, and its hopes of a “Greenslide” were demolished.

Labor now looks set to claim up to ninety of the 150 seats in the House of Representatives, as well as up to three additional senators. The conservative opposition looks set to be reduced to forty seats or less in the House.

But while Australian voters made clear their rejection of Trump, they still are remarkably pro-United States. The Albanese government will have to balance those two notions as it maps out its foreign policy in the months ahead.

How Labor won

Albanese is the first Australian prime minister to be re-elected since John Howard in 2004, and he is the first premier in one hundred years to increase their party’s majority after the first term. Albanese is now set to lead the largest Labor majority in history. The scale of Labor’s election win almost guarantees the party a thir d term in government in three years’ time. Meanwhile, the conservative coalition was defeated so soundly that even Dutton lost his parliamentary seat, leaving the conservative opposition leaderless and rudderless.

But this was not a pre-ordained outcome. From late 2024 through early this year, Dutton’s coalition was ahead in the opinion polls. Albanese and his government were seen to be struggling in the face of cost-of-living pressures and global uncertainty. Media outlets were calling the election a tight race, predicting a minority Labor government that would be dependent on a large cross bench of independents and Greens in the House of Representative and the Senate in order to govern.

But Dutton’s coalition made significant missteps in the five-week campaign, including several proposals reminiscent of Trump policies. Dutton failed to develop policies to win back seats lost at the last election to the center-right independents known as the Teals. He proposed unpopular policies on nuclear power, healthcare, and cost-of-living relief. Moreover, Dutton proposed massive cuts to public service jobs, which echoed the Trump administration’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). A key moment for the campaign was when Jacinta Nampijinpa Price, a controversial conservative senator, vowed to “make Australia great again,” and accused the media of being “Trump-obsessed.”

These nods to Trump policies and slogans did the conservative coalition no favors. Since the beginning of Trump’s second term, Lowy Institute polling has recorded that Australians’ trust in the United States to act responsibly in the world fell by 20 percent, with only 36 percent of the public expressing any level of trust. Almost two thirds of the public (64 percent) say they hold “not very much” trust (32 percent) or no trust “at all” (32 percent) in the United States to act responsibly. Australians widely disapprove of several aspects of Trump’s policy agenda, including his proposal for a Ukraine peace deal that would cede territory to Russia (74 percent) and using tariffs to pressure other countries (81 percent). A majority of Australians also oppose the United States withdrawing from the World Health Organization (76 percent) and exiting from international climate change agreements (74 percent).

What will Labor do with this mandate?

The results leave the Labor Government with a strong mandate domestically and internationally. Albanese will likely continue with his steady, incremental reform agenda at home and abroad, focused on stability and pragmatism. Foreign policy was a carefully crafted balance among deepening the alliance with the United States; engaging in regional minilateralism, focused on Southeast Asia, Pacific Island nations, and India; and deepening security relations with Japan, both bilaterally and trilaterally with the United States.

Albanese’s brand of pragmatism will continue to drive how he engages with Trump and the United States. His government has refused to respond with reciprocal tariffs on the United States and has focused on dealing with the US president on the basis of Australia’s advantages in critical minerals, the US trade surplus with Australia, and a broader commitment to international free trade. Support for the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) security partnership was bipartisan in the campaign. Defense spending is set to rise, even if modestly, and the alliance remains core to Australian strategy. One of the key features of Labor’s last terms in office were advances in US force posture in Australia and the alignment of strategic posture around denial and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, which will continue to be a core focus over the next three years.

In addition, key areas such as shipbuilding, nuclear-powered submarine production, defense industrial collaboration, and the manufacture of guided weapons are priorities both of the Labor government and the Trump administration. This provides a strong foundation for defense cooperation. However, Australia and the United States diverge on key issues around international trade and the rules-based international order. This means there will be points of friction, and the Albanese government should be expected to carefully and tactfully point out policy differences on these issues.

Crucially, Australian dislike of the Trump administration should not be mistaken for antipathy toward the United States. The same Lowy Institute poll that showed a rejection of Trump’s policies shows that the Australian public is rock-solid in its support of the United States. Eighty percent of Australians continue to support the alliance with the United States (only a 3 percent drop from 2024) and they are evenly split on Trump’s demand that allies spend more on defense.

Labor will continue to focus on the Indo-Pacific, working closely with the United States and its regional allies and partners. It will keep dealing cautiously with, and balancing against, China and doubling down on ties with Southeast Asia, Pacific Island nations, Japan, India, and South Korea. With Albanese ascendant, expect more of the steady hand of Australia’s center-left government over the next three years rather than any policy radicalism.

Peter J. Dean is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and director of foreign policy and defense at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney.

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Your primer on Albania’s parliamentary election

Ilva Tare, Agon Maliqi, and Valbona Zeneli — Wed, 07 May 2025 19:31:40 +0000

A prime minister seeking an unprecedented fourth term, a deeply entrenched opposition, and a crop of new parties angling for influence—Albania’s parliamentary election on May 11 comes amid deep domestic polarization. Voters will head to the polls at a strategically pivotal moment for the Western Balkan nation, which remains among the most staunchly pro-US countries in the region and is determined to press forward with its bid for European Union (EU) membership.

Ahead of the election, Europe Center experts break down the key issues, players, and trends to watch this weekend.

Who is Prime Minister Edi Rama—and who are his main challengers?

The Socialist Party (PS) and its popular leader Edi Rama are running for a fourth term in office, despite the wear and tear of years in power and a series of corruption-related controversies tied to their administration at various political and executive levels.

Rama’s main challenger is Sali Berisha, who has been the leader of Albania’s largest opposition party, the Democratic Party (PD), for the last three decades. He served as prime minister from 2005 to 2013—a position he last held twelve years ago. In the interim, he faced a three-year period of internal party conflict over his designation as “persona non grata” by the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as corruption investigations by the Special Structure against Corruption and Organized Crime (SPAK).

Next to the eleven parties participating in this election, SPAK is a key actor to watch, as it is currently investigating high-level politicians across the political spectrum. Ilir Meta, the former president of the Freedom Party (PL)—the third largest party in the country based on the results of the 2021 parliamentary elections—is under arrest; Arben Ahmetaj, the former deputy prime minister, is on the run; Erion Veliaj, the mayor of Tirana, has been detained; and Sali Berisha, the main opposition leader, is under investigation.

Due to its handling of high-profile cases, SPAK is now the most trusted institution in Albania, and a majority of voters support its continued operation as an independent body, free from political interference. Meanwhile, opposition leaders such as Berisha have openly called for SPAK’s dismantlement and frequently accuse the agency of political bias.

It’s also worth noting that over the past year, three new political entities—the Coalition Shqipëria Bëhet (Albania is Being Made), the Mundësia (Opportunity) Party, and Lëvizja Bashkë (Together Movement)—have entered the race. Although these parties represent diverse ideological positions—spanning the center, right, and left—they share anti-establishment sentiments and appear to be emerging as a significant political force ahead of the vote.

—Ilva Tare is a resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center

Rama, the eccentric leader of the PS, has been a central figure in Albanian politics for nearly a quarter century, serving three terms as the mayor of the capital Tirana (2000-2011), and then another three as prime minister. He is now seeking an unprecedented fourth term while still presenting himself as a candidate of change. Although this narrative seems far-fetched, it might gain traction, largely because his main rival, Berisha, has been in politics even longer, serving as Albania’s first post-communist president and later as prime minister for two terms.

Albania’s highly polarized political scene is largely a duopoly between the PS and PD, where electoral victories have often been determined by the ability of the two parties’ strong-handed leaders to control “rebellious” factions on the margins. The PD’s last stint in power (2005-2013) came after a sizable split within the left. Now, it is the right wing that has splintered, creating a few smaller factions and leaving the opposition less competitive. A handful of small, new parties are competing and may secure a few seats—mostly in the capital, Tirana. They hope to gain decisive leverage if Rama, who is favored to win, fails to secure a majority to govern alone.

—Agon Maliqi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center

Active in Albanian politics since 1998, starting as minister of culture, Rama has served as prime minister since 2013. While internationally recognized for his distinctive political style, his artistic background, and his focus on urban development, Rama’s three terms in office have been marked by a mix of modernization efforts and corruption scandals.

His main challenger is the center-right PD, the country’s primary opposition force, which has itself been mired in internal turmoil in recent years. Meanwhile, the former Socialist Movement for Integration, now known as the PL, has seen its influence wane, particularly after suffering heavy losses in the 2021 elections. Party leader and former President of Albania, Ilir Meta, remains in custody since his arrest in October 2024 on charges of corruption and money laundering. Yet he is still running for a seat in parliament on the open list of the Democratic Party’s “Alliance for Glorious Albania” coalition.

The novelty in these elections is the prominent role of SPAK, whose creation and operations have been strongly backed by the United States and the EU. SPAK’s mandate—to investigate corruption, electoral crime, vote-buying, abuse of public office, and ties between organized crime and politics—directly targets the longstanding problems that have weakened Albania’s electoral integrity.

—Valbona Zeneli is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

What political dynamics are shaping Albania’s 2025 parliamentary elections?

Prime Minister Edi Rama enters this election with a twelve-year track record, positioning himself and the PS as the only modernizing political force equipped to bring Albania’s lengthy transition from communism to a close through EU accession. However, Rama’s party carries the weight of his long tenure, which has been marred by major corruption scandals at various levels of governance, along with economic difficulties stemming from the rising cost of living and deepening income inequality. Albania also continues to grapple with emigration and a rapidly aging population.

According to national polls, the PS currently holds a lead with more than 40 percent of projected votes, followed by the PD with 30 percent, and smaller shares going to the new parties. Due to the highly fragmented opposition vote and the regional proportional electoral system—which includes a single preferential vote that can distort results if opposition parties fail to win seats in multiple districts—projections indicate that the PS could once again secure a majority of at least seventy-one seats in parliament. Rama hopes to surpass the party’s previous result of seventy-four seats and move closer to a qualified majority of eighty-four seats. For the first time, Albanians living abroad have been granted the opportunity to vote. So far, more than 245,000 vote-by-mail requests from eighty-five countries have been registered. It remains to be seen how many of these will turn into actual ballots. Diaspora votes will be counted at the district level.

—Ilva Tare

There are no significant ideological differences between the PS and the PD on either domestic issues or foreign affairs. Their competition largely hinges on the personalities of their leaders and their historical patronage networks. Both parties are seeking to motivate their base and convince a small pool of independent voters that they can govern more effectively. Incumbency and political control over resources favor Rama, but after three terms in office, the flip side is deep fatigue and disillusionment. These elections are essentially a referendum on how tired Albanians are of Rama’s long rule and how motivated PS voters are to turn out. Meanwhile, Berisha is seen as too polarizing beyond the PD base, and the right is fractured.

Rama’s rule has brought about some transformative change, with public and private investments reshaping infrastructure, particularly in urban and coastal areas. This has fueled an unprecedented tourism boom and solid economic growth. Yet a widespread corruption and oligarchic control have sent most of the spoils to the well-connected, while wages have struggled to keep up with inflation and a sharp spike in the cost of living. On the issue of corruption, Albania’s new rule of law bodies—backed by the EU and the United States and created during Rama’s rule—have been shaking up the political landscape. There have been a series of indictments across the political spectrum, implicating powerful leaders on both the left and the right (including members of Rama’s inner circle and his rivals Berisha and Meta). This has created a paradoxical situation in which Rama is attempting to brush over corruption scandals while simultaneously taking credit for establishing SPAK, the institution responsible for uncovering them. Both camps seem uncomfortable discussing corruption directly, so the campaign focus has mostly been on cost of living and who can increase salaries the most.

—Agon Maliqi

How will the outcome of the election shape Albania’s EU ambitions?

As part of his alleged push for positive reform in the country, Rama is pulling out all the stops to accelerate Albania’s accession to the EU, with the ambitious goal of concluding accession talks with Brussels by 2027. If reelected, Rama will seek to maintain Albania’s reputation as a front-runner for EU accession in the Western Balkans, alongside Montenegro.

Indeed, EU membership is the flagship promise of the PS in this election. According to Rama, US President Donald Trump’s victory has created a unique geopolitical opportunity for Albania, as it has heightened European concerns about US disengagement—prompting the EU to accelerate integration efforts in the Western Balkans. Rama argues that this moment aligns the EU’s political will to expand with Albania’s readiness to meet technical and political criteria through a preferential negotiation path. That said, EU integration has never been a politically divisive issue in Albania. The only real debate concerns the pace of the process and which political actor is best suited to deliver it. Looking ahead, Albania might try to make the most of the current geopolitical moment—but the EU’s decisions on enlargement are likely to remain highly unpredictable in the coming years.

—Ilva Tare

This election will serve as a litmus test of Albania’s democratic maturity and could either advance or hinder its EU accession. In the past, Albanian elections have been marred by issues such as vote-buying, opaque political party financing, and allegations of organized crime influencing voter mobilization in certain regions. If the integrity of the election process is once again questioned, it could trigger a new wave of political instability that may jeopardize the EU accession path.

The most significant development in Albania in recent years has been the tangible progress in reforming the justice sector—one of the key requirements for the EU. After nearly a decade of restructuring and overhauling judicial institutions and introducing the vetting of prosecutors and judges, SPAK has made great strides in dismantling the culture of impunity that has long pervaded the country’s political class since the fall of communism. SPAK’s increasing prominence is helping restore public trust in rule of law. Indictments of former and current political leaders—prime ministers to mayors—as well as ongoing investigations into powerful organized crime figures have been pivotal in advancing Albania’s EU accession process. These efforts have positioned Albania alongside Montenegro as a regional frontrunner in the accession race. Whether this momentum can be sustained, and whether SPAK and other institutions can continue to scale their efforts, remains to be seen.

—Agon Maliqi

These elections will be pivotal not only for Albania’s EU integration but also for the broader stability of the Western Balkans. After years in the EU’s waiting room, Albania has gained fresh momentum, spurred by the new geopolitical urgency surrounding enlargement.

Edi Rama has centered the PS campaign on securing EU membership before 2030, positioning his administration as the only force capable of delivering the necessary reforms. While EU integration is not a divisive issue in Albania, internal political rifts and the lack of bipartisan consensus on key reforms have posed significant obstacles. Ultimately, these elections carry deep implications, not just for who governs, but for whether Albania’s parliament can foster the cross-party cooperation needed to advance EU membership and strengthen liberal democracy.

Albania’s upcoming elections take place within days of the European Political Community (EPC) summit, which will occur in Tirana from May 16 to 17. At the summit, European leaders will address enlargement, security, and stability in the Western Balkans, placing Albania in the center of both regional and European attention.

—Valbona Zeneli

What is the role of the United States in the election and its campaign?

The influence of “Trump World” has become a striking feature of Albania’s 2025 campaign landscape. Both Prime Minister Edi Rama and opposition leader Sali Berisha are invoking the US president in their campaigns—albeit for different purposes. Rama, who has traditionally aligned with European social democrats, is now publicly praising Trump as “good for everyone” and presenting Albania’s EU accession hopes as aligned with a second Trump presidency, emphasizing the new geopolitical reality that it has brought about.

Meanwhile, Berisha—who is banned from entering the United States over corruption allegations—has embraced the Trump playbook. The PD has hired Trump’s former campaign manager Chris LaCivita and adopted the slogan “Make Albania Great,” signaling a strategic pivot toward nationalism, anti-elite rhetoric, and culture-war themes designed to energize a disillusioned electorate.

The result is an election in which Trump’s legacy—his methods, his advisors, and his message—resonates far beyond US borders, influencing not only campaign strategies but also how candidates position Albania within a rapidly shifting global order.

—Ilva Tare

The United States has featured prominently in the current campaign as both camps have sought to project an image of being on good terms with the new US administration while also seeking to influence decision-making in Washington, DC, in their favor. Berisha—who was sanctioned by the Biden administration on allegations of corruption, a serious obstacle for a political career in a pro-US country and NATO member—has touted the hiring of a Trump campaign manager as his own campaign aide. The PD has reportedly also engaged lobbyists to reverse the sanctions against Berisha, which it claims were the result of left-wing lobbying. Meanwhile, Rama’s government has given preferential strategic investor status to a private company owned by Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner to develop a luxury resort on an Albanian island.

With many other priorities around the world, the United States appears largely disinterested in Albania—at least for now. Most importantly, voters in Albania also seem unlikely to be swayed by any of these moves by the political elite.

—Agon Maliqi

The United States is Albania’s most important strategic ally. While the US government maintains a neutral stance toward political parties in Albania, it has consistently supported democratic processes, institutional reforms, and anti-corruption efforts. Nevertheless, Albanian leaders often seek to leverage their US ties for personal or political gain, such as with the PD’s enlistment of Chris LaCivita as an advisor and its embrace of an anti-elite, nationalist “Make Albania Great” message—though so far, it has struggled to gain strong traction with voters.

—Valbona Zeneli

What Trump’s approach to Europe means for the Western Balkans

By Agon Maliqi

Shifts in US policy toward Europe could prompt the EU to step up on security for the Western Balkans and revive the enlargement process.

Freedom and Prosperity Political Reform

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Christopher Sands: The results show a Canada both united and divided

The post Your primer on Albania’s parliamentary election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Your primer on the Romanian presidential election

Daniel Fried and Alex Serban — Wed, 07 May 2025 11:53:51 +0000

It’s been a long road to this election for Romania. The country went to the polls to elect a new parliament on December 1, 2024, and a new president just five days later. While the parliamentary elections were carried out smoothly, irregularities in the presidential campaign sparked concern after far-right candidate Călin Georgescu climbed from an expected support of around 5 percent to 23 percent of the vote. Following a Romanian government investigation alleging that external actors had financed and used social media to tilt the election in Georgescu’s favor, the second round was canceled entirely and a second attempt of the first round was rescheduled for May 4. With the rescheduled election starting from scratch, the Romanian Constitutional Court decided to ban Georgescu from running again in May.

Sunday’s first round saw nationalist candidate George Simion win more than 40 percent of the vote, putting him in first place heading into the runoff. Following Simion’s victory, Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu resigned, triggering the National Bank of Romania to intervene and prevent the currency from weakening and highlighting an emerging period of instability.

Ahead of the second round on May 18, our experts are breaking down the race and its potential impacts on Romania’s foreign policy.

What happened in the first round on May 4?

Romania, like many European Union (EU) members, is undergoing a wave of populist backlash against established parties and elites, including the traditional ruling parties—the Social Democratic Party (PSD), National Liberal Party (PNL), and Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR)—which have formed the basis of governance over the past thirty-five years. Two parties (PSD and PNL) have been in a coalition since 2021, renewed this past December after the pro-Western parties led the vote and, together with a party of the ethnic-Hungarian minority, secured a slim majority of 53 percent to form a government.

In Romania this backlash has taken the form of populist nationalism, led primarily by a very active diaspora of over three million people who get much of their information via social media. Last year’s first round of elections saw the previously obscure Georgescu ride a TikTok campaign to first place. He proved an untenable figure due to his controversial background, including praising fascist leaders, not declaring campaign spending, and the use of a security detail comprised of mercenary/former military elements who were accused of inciting social unrest. This time around, the winner was Simion with 40 percent of the vote, running on a similar far-right populist nationalist platform—pro-US and pro-NATO, but with anti-EU and pro-Russian rhetoric—and also capturing the Georgescu electorate and message. Second place went to Nicusor Dan, the mayor of Bucharest, a pro-EU and reformist candidate who received 21 percent.

Simion has sought to align himself with the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement in the United States, making connections with influencers and media and showing up everywhere from the Conservative Political Action Conference to Steve Bannon’s podcast. Meanwhile, former Prime Minister Victor Ponta (in fourth place at 15 percent) also sought to align with MAGA by openly associating himself with US President Donald Trump and running a “Romania First” campaign. His electorate could be decisive for the final round.

These voters are driven by a combination of ideological support for nationalist political rhetoric and a strong anti-establishment streak that Romanians at home and abroad have twice brought to victory in parliamentary elections, with issues such as the lack of economic opportunities and shortcomings in the education and health systems moving the barometer of discontent. As such, no traditional party has made it into the second round in two consecutive presidential elections (December 2024 and May 2025).

—Alex Serban is a nonresident senior fellow in the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, based in Bucharest.

Simion’s strong result, like Georgescu’s, seems to have been a protest vote against the political establishment of centrist parties that has governed the country for many years. Romania’s economy has been growing steadily, due in part to the country’s EU membership, but public aggravation with corruption, problems with government services such as health and housing, and a simple desire for change have given rightist populists the edge. The candidate of the ruling political coalition, Crin Antonescu, came in third, behind Dan, who has positioned himself as a good governance reform centrist. Georgescu supported Simion. As a result of Antonescu’s poor showing that suggests popular rejection of the ruling coalition, Ciolacu has resigned, and his center-left Social Democratic Party is reportedly set to leave the coalition. Romania’s interim President Ilie Bolojan, in office only since February when his predecessor resigned in the wake of the annulled presidential vote, nominated Interior Minister Catalin Predoiu as a caretaker prime minister.

Simion is the favorite in the runoff but not a shoo-in. While Simion’s vote total was impressive, it is roughly matched by the combined totals of Dan and Antonescu. The second round could go either way as voters chose between two opposition politicians.

—Daniel Fried is the Atlantic Council’s Weiser Family Distinguished Fellow and a former US ambassador to Poland.

How do the outcomes set the stage for the second round?

Simion received 41 percent of the vote and Ponta 13 percent, which is a majority for the populist candidates, leading to speculation that Simion is nearly guaranteed to win the second round. Both candidates used pro-US messages, with Simion positioned as a Trump-like figure and supported by “Patriots for Europe” parties (including those of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and former Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki).

There are, however, a few signals that the race may be becoming much closer than the first round would indicate. With the elimination of Antonescu, the establishment parties’ votes are up for grabs as well as millions of undecided voters who may not have participated in the first round—the likes of whom helped swing the presidential elections for Traian Basescu in 2004 and Klaus Iohannis in 2019.

Instead, there is Dan, an independent who was twice elected mayor of Bucharest on a platform of anti-corruption and against political parties, who has fought back allegations of ties to controversial pro-Russian business and intelligence services.

So the vote is becoming a referendum on Simion and his views about Europe, as well as the candidates’ views on Russia. It is not clear if the anti-establishment vote will translate into support for Simion in the second round, since there is not a clear establishment choice on the ballot to vote against. Further complicating matters, a larger turnout is expected on May 18.

Another consideration is Romania’s history of massive urban and diaspora turnouts in second rounds when emotional issues drive dormant voters, as occurred in 2000 against Vadim Tudor’s extreme right candidacy under the Greater Romania Party and in 2014 against PSD’s attempts to constrain voting by the diaspora. This latter phenomenon saw Iohannis emerge from second place in the first round, where his 30 percent of the vote trailed Ponta’s 40 percent, to win the second round, 54 percent to 46 percent. Despite a poor organization and low charisma, Iohannis won the second round by mobilizing an additional four million votes, mostly from increased urban voting, driven largely by anti-PSD sentiment.

This time around, Dan held a sizeable lead over Simion in Bucharest in first-round voting, so there is the potential for Dan to turn out new voters in urban areas. Simion has a greater share of high-propensity voters. If turnout is similar to the first round, then he is the likely winner, but Dan has a higher ceiling and is better positioned to win if there is high turnout. Dan is hoping to take turnout from around 47 percent in the first round to 65 percent, as he aims to make the final round about Romania’s strategic orientation. Dan essentially wants to ask Romanians to choose between a pro-Western direction vs. an anti-Western one.

—Alex Serban

How might the second-round outcome impact Romania’s foreign policy?

Dan seems to be solidly pro-Western and pro-EU. His victory could give a second wind to the pro-democracy forces (of various stripes) that have led Romania since its chaotic, violent, but successful overthrow of communism in 1989 and drove hard toward the country’s successful accessions to NATO and the European Union.

Simion’s strategic orientation is less clear. He and his Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) party have been reaching out the MAGA movement in the United States. Simion has declared himself pro-US and has styled himself as a Trump-like “Romania First” candidate, conservative on cultural issues, skeptical of the EU and its liberal political culture, and reserved about support for Ukraine (including on the basis of Ukraine’s alleged mistreatment of its Romanian minority).

Whether as president Simion would push a strategic realignment away from the EU and NATO is not clear. Cultural conservativism plays well in Romania. There may be a political market in Romania for a nationalist defense of Romanian communities in Ukraine. As president, Simion would probably push both these ideas. However, Romania receives a lot of funding from the EU, a disincentive for any Romanian leader to go further than performative swipes at Brussels. A Romanian strategic turn toward Moscow would face strong obstacles: Romania’s history has left bitter memories of Russian imperialism and Soviet domination (and dismemberment) of Romania. Fears of being abandoned by the United States in the face of Kremlin ambitions seem present even among some in Simion’s AUR party.

Simion could of course turn toward Moscow, much as has his fellow rightist, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. An alignment with Orbán, however, whose Hungarian nationalism comes partly at Romania’s expense, might not be a political winner in Romania. Alternatively, Simion could draw from the successful tactics of Meloni, who is solidly rightist and well-tied to MAGA but also Atlanticist and pro-Ukrainian.

In that case, a President Simion would continue support for Ukraine but combine it with an effort to push issues related to Ukraine’s Romanian minority. Should the Trump administration finally set a policy of support for Ukraine—either in the form of a sustainable negotiated cease-fire or in response to continued Kremlin stonewalling—Romania, even with a Simion presidency, would be more likely to back this.

In short, a Dan presidency is more likely to be better integrated with the European mainstream and certainly a good strategic partner for the United States; a Simion presidency has its risks, especially if Simion goes full anti-Ukraine and pro-Kremlin. But it could also land in a rougher version of pro-Western and, potentially, even use its ties with MAGA to urge the Trump administration to hold the line against Kremlin aggression.

—Daniel Fried

A Simion presidency would pivot Romanian foreign policy toward “Romania First” and Euroskepticism, emulating Trump’s MAGA model. His anti-EU stance, viewing Russian President Vladimir Putin as non-threatening, could weaken ties with Brussels, risking the isolation of Romania akin to Orbán’s Hungary, including for EU funding. Despite repeatedly praising NATO’s role on the eastern flank, Simion’s opposition to Ukraine aid and call to “stop the war” may strain NATO cohesion and Romania’s role in the Black Sea. His pro-Americanism seeks stronger bilateral relations, but it may falter if US policy demands support for Ukraine and if the Department of Homeland Security’s recent suspension of Romania’s participation in the visa waiver program remains part of the Trump administration’s anti-immigration agenda.

A Dan presidency would solidify Romania’s pro-Western alignment. Leading a coalition of center-right, center-left, Hungarian, and progressive parties will consolidate Dan’s pro-EU agenda and strengthen ties with Brussels, ensuring Romania’s influence in EU decision making. His commitment to NATO and Ukraine aid would maintain Romania’s strategic role, supporting US-led initiatives and regional stability. Dan’s anti-corruption focus could enhance Romania’s credibility in Western institutions, attracting EU funds and investments. However, his reliance on an urban base may mean he struggles to unify rural voters, requiring deft coalition-building to counter nationalist sentiment. Dan’s victory would reinforce Romania’s role as a reliable NATO and EU partner, prioritizing democratic reforms and transatlantic unity.

—Alex Serban

Are there concerns about the election’s integrity after the first round?

Despite the absence of major public or press focus on election integrity, some security concerns persist from the first round.

Russian hacker group DDOSIA/NoName057 launched cyberattacks targeting government and candidate websites (e.g., Antonescu and Dan), though Romania’s Cybersecurity Directorate mitigated disruptions.

Simion alleged fraud involving deceased voters on electoral rolls, but these claims lack substantiation and have not gained traction in mainstream media or among the public.

Overall, there has been no significant evidence of systemic fraud or foreign manipulation, and—in contrast with the more personality-focused 2024 election—the local population appears focused on candidate platforms, with Simion’s nationalism and Dan’s pro-EU stance dominating the discourse.

Press coverage has emphasized electoral outcomes over integrity issues, reflecting confidence in institutional oversight following the reforms put in place following the December 2024 vote. However, ongoing campaign finance probes and disinformation risks warrant vigilance for the May 18 runoff to maintain Romania’s electoral stability.

—Alex Serban

Is Merz’s double-take chancellor vote a sign of things to come in Germany?

Jörn Fleck and Jurek Wille — Tue, 06 May 2025 19:59:39 +0000

After an Odyssean, two-decade journey, Friedrich Merz has arrived as Germany’s tenth chancellor. But instead of the expected Krönung, a coronation, members of the Bundestag gave him a shot across the bow on Tuesday. For the first time in modern German history, it took two rounds of voting to elect a chancellor. This, of course, is not fatal for Merz, but this short-lived saga shows that political instability in Europe’s largest economy and reluctant hegemon may not be over, despite Merz’s promises to the contrary. The next government is taking office weakened at a time when Germany and Europe can least afford it.

In the first vote, Merz missed the required support of 316 members of the Bundestag by just six votes, although the coalition of Merz’s Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Social Democratic Party (SPD) theoretically holds a slim majority of 328 in parliament. In the second round, Merz received 325 votes. Dissent is not unusual among coalition parties, of course. Dozens of members of the Bundestag refused to vote for Chancellor Angela Merkel in years past, too. The current coalition, however, promised to restore Germany’s predictability and credibility in Europe, a promise that has taken some damage now.

It may be impossible to figure out why Merz lost those votes in the first round. Members of the Bundestag elect the chancellor in a secret ballot. The fact that he is a polarizing figure, however, was well known beforehand. Shortly after winning the snap elections in February, some in the SPD and even the CDU/CSU began to question whether Merz had what it takes to be chancellor. On the SPD’s side, many were annoyed by the personal attacks against outgoing Chancellor Olaf Scholz and the CDU’s anti-migration campaign. In particular, young, left-leaning members of the SPD’s Bundestag group may have felt sidelined by Lars Klingbeil, the SPD’s co-chairman and Merz’s designated vice chancellor, and some of them may have withheld their support for Merz in the first round.

This will not go unnoticed in Moscow, Beijing, or Washington.

The euphoria surrounding Merz was also muted in his own party. Some conservatives criticized Merz for doing an about face on central campaign promises, including his push for a massive special fund for infrastructure and debt brake reforms even before he entered office. Some moderate party members were apparently displeased by Merz’s populist style and fierce criticism of Merkel. Many felt he gave up too much ground on critical CDU issues in the coalition negotiations. The question is whether those members of parliament who voted against Merz in the first round simply meant to send a warning shot or whether the resistance is more deep-seated. If it is the latter, then it could destabilize the government every time controversial issues and complex compromise deals are up for a vote.

Germany’s incoming foreign minister, Johann Wadephul, described the day’s voting as “an obstacle, but not a catastrophe.” That is true, but the unexpected first-round defeat will affect how many Germans and foreign capitals view Merz and his coalition.

Merz promised to govern with professionalism and strength, to reassure markets, and assume the international leadership necessary for navigating current crises. On Monday, upon presenting the signed coalition agreement, Merz tried to project that strength, saying “this government is determined to move Germany forward through reforms and investments.” He added that Germany’s voice would be “heard in Europe and the world.” Instead, Tuesday’s vote and the dissension against Merz from his own ranks suggests Germany’s next leadership will continue to struggle with fragility, division, and indecisiveness. This will not go unnoticed in Moscow, Beijing, or Washington. Markets took note as well; the DAX 40 fell on news of the first vote, only to claw back most of its losses following the second vote.

The concern is that Tuesday’s votes may be a sign of things to come for the coalition’s ability to drive difficult reforms. More to the point, it raises questions of trust between the chancellor and his vice chancellor. Merz and Klingbeil displayed a united front in recent weeks, but they have shown that they are not in full control of their parliamentary groups. Both parties have already blamed each other publicly, and the coalition peace has become passé on day one, pointing to rocky years ahead.

At best, this is a blip, soon to be forgotten as Merz takes over the chancellorship. He will certainly try to frame it as such when he visits his counterparts in France and Poland on Wednesday. But at worst, an uncertain majority in parliament means Merz and the government risk becoming a lame duck immediately. This is bad news for Europe, which needs unity and strength to avoid paralysis on critical issues, including a potential transatlantic trade war and a much-needed European response to the war in Ukraine. Much will depend on Germany’s defense spending, its leadership in Europe, and its relationship with China.

One risk is clear: the next government will have the weakest mandate in modern history at a moment when strength is needed the most, and the instability of previous years could continue, to the detriment of Germany and Europe.

Merz should quickly move beyond Tuesday’s embarrassing start and keep his focus on what comes next. “The most important thing for me is that ten years from now, we are still a country that enjoys freedom and peace,” Merz said in his first interview as chancellor. “But freedom and peace are in danger,” he warned. His first priority, he added, would be to restore both. Merz also said that his government will move swiftly to address deep structural changes the economy is undergoing and restore its industrial power. But after Tuesday’s events, Merz must provide more concrete, ambitious measures to reassure markets and allies that he can govern with a more stable hand than his predecessor. Merz can reassert himself on foreign and security policy, on which the coalition agreement remained unexpectedly thin, with a joint Franco-German-Polish initiative in support of Ukraine, for example. A quick-action agenda for the first hundred days, driving forward the coalition’s, Leuchtturmprojekte, or key “lighthouse” initiatives, can restore confidence that German leadership is back under Merz. This way, it is not the start of the new government that is remembered but its subsequent successes.

Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Jurek Wille is a student of international relations at Johns Hopkins SAIS. Before joining SAIS, he worked for the German government.

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How Trump’s tariffs could reshape Australia’s strategic outlook

John T. Watts — Mon, 05 May 2025 20:01:26 +0000

ADELAIDE, Australia—“Running up the score.” This is a phrase I heard reverberate through the Australian media over the past month.

Perhaps surprisingly, “running up the score” did not originate from any of the candidates in the run-up to Australia’s May 3 election, which saw Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and his Labor Party score a comfortable victory. Instead, the phrase was a retort on April 8 by US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, who is tasked with overseeing the implementation of the new global tariff regime.

Asked by US Senator Mark Warner why the Trump administration’s tariffs apply to US ally Australia, despite a free trade agreement and a trade deficit, Greer said that the United States “should be running up the score on Australia.” The phrase embodies everything that many Australians now perceive as the new reality of the alliance with the United States: that it is no longer about “mateship,” shared sacrifice, and mutual fondness. Instead, the United States now sees Australia as simply another lackey to squeeze.

It is not the first time the relationship has been seen this way. Leave aside the romanticized image of US and Australian soldiers fighting alongside each other in every conflict since the 1916 Battle of Le Hamel. The reality is that the US-Australia relationship was predominately transactional until the 1950s, as is illustrated by the United States offering the creation of the Australia-New Zealand-United States security alliance, or ANZUS, in part to secure Australia’s military support for the Korean War.

Today, the US-Australia alliance is deep and multi-faceted. In fact, it is one of the most integrated US alliances in the world. The AUKUS partnership (also including the United Kingdom) and the Five Eyes intelligence alliance (also including Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) might be the most well-known. But there is a deep network of interdependencies that make this relationship vital to the national security of both countries.

But that doesn’t mean the United States is irreplaceable for Australia. Britain remained Australia’s security guarantor after federation in 1901, with Australia sending vast military support to British wars throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Not only were all facets of the Australian military built on the foundations of British doctrine, culture, and equipment. The two countries were also more economically, politically (still sharing a head of state), and culturally integrated than the United States is with Australia today.

Despite this, when Britain was unable to continue to support Australian security interests after the fall of Singapore in World War II, Australia made the pragmatic decision to pivot to the United States as its security partner of first choice.

If Australia were to pivot again today, then where might it turn?

I can tell you where Australians will not turn: China. The idea that China could realistically displace the United States as Australia’s primary security partner is delusional. It would take decades and billions—perhaps trillions—of dollars to transition Australia’s military equipment, doctrine, laws, and institutions for this to work. And it would still lack the shared history, language, and culture required to build the trust needed for a relationship approaching that of the one between Australia and the United States.

While there will always be segments of the population wanting Australia to pivot to China, no serious security analyst believes it is possible or beneficial. If they do, then perhaps their affiliations and financial arrangements should be examined.

However, there is a plethora of secondary military relationships Australia shares with like-minded nations that Canberra could elevate. Australia and Britain remain close, and in a post-Brexit world there may be mutual benefits to renewing increased engagement. Canada and Australia share many military and societal similarities. They are economically, geographically, and demographically comparable in size and nature. Australians and Canadians also share many cultural, political, and military values and systems, and there is already scope for increased cooperation. There has long been talk of an Australia-European Union Free Trade Agreement, and Australia worked hand in hand with NATO forces in Afghanistan. Not to mention that Australia already purchases a significant amount of military equipment from European countries, including many of Australia’s modern naval surface combatants. Moreover, Australia’s relationships and cooperation with Japan, South Korea, and Singapore grow apace, and there are even burgeoning links with Middle Eastern nations, such as the United Arab Emirates.

While Australia values the “interoperability” of utilizing US equipment, like many nations it has sourced equipment elsewhere due to cost, availability, and logistics considerations. None of these relationships alone could replace the role the United States plays, but a constellation of like-minded countries just might.

If US policies continue in the spirit of “running up the score” on allies, then they risk not just eroding US leadership, respect, and standing abroad. They potentially also weaken US relevancy—not in every aspect, but in important ones. Will tariffs erode the foundations of Australia’s alliance with the United States? No. At least not in isolation. But it is a piece of a puzzle that will raise questions in Australians’ minds—including in Albanese’s government—about who to focus their limited resources for cooperation with and who to rely on to source military equipment from.

John T. Watts is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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Foreign policy was a hot topic in Canada’s election. Now it’s on Carney to make it last.

Imran Bayoumi, Maite Gonzalez Latorre — Thu, 01 May 2025 21:22:37 +0000

In a country where national security and defense have rarely been major topics on the campaign trail, Canada’s April 28 election was an outlier. Prime Minister Mark Carney of the Liberal Party and his main opponent, the Conservative Party’s Pierre Poilievre, spoke often and in detail during the campaign about Canada’s national security and defense. Both promised, for example, to review Canada’s F-35 program with the United States, to increase Canadian military presence in the Arctic, and to ramp up defense spending.

It’s easy to see where this campaign focus on defense came from: Canada faces a growing number of threats to its security. But now that the election is over, it is imperative that Carney find a way to translate talking points into action and invest in strengthening Canadian security. Last year, Canada spent less than 1.4 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. It should work to increase its spending to meet or exceed NATO’s target of allocating at least 2 percent of its GDP to defense. Moreover, the money should be spent wisely to support the capabilities, relationships, and regions that will be at the forefront of a changing world.

Carney’s plan to ramp up defense spending, released during the campaign, includes a pledge to increase spending by approximately $13 billion (USD) to meet the 2 percent NATO spending target over the next four years. The Liberals also pledged to buy new submarines, build or upgrade bases in the Arctic, and purchase new icebreakers.

With NATO allies expected to approve a higher target for defense spending at the upcoming NATO Summit in The Hague, Carney will have to move fast to pass a budget, sustain the momentum around foreign policy and defense that emerged during the campaign, and put Canada on the path to meeting its defense commitments.

The best way to do so is by focusing and investing in areas where Canada already has an advantage.

First, Carney should focus on Canada’s north. Strengthening Ottawa’s ability to defend and protect its Arctic can help demonstrate a lasting commitment to improving Canada’s national security and spur greater economic development across the region. During the campaign, the Liberal Party pledged hundreds of millions of dollars to boost Canada’s military presence in the Arctic and an additional five billion dollars to purchase an over-the-horizon radar system from Australia. The Conservatives announced plans to establish a permanent military base in the region, double the number of Canadian Rangers—who patrol the region—to four thousand, and commit to purchasing two new icebreakers. Both the Conservative and Liberal plans have strengths, and Carney should consider incorporating some of the opposition party’s ideas into his new government’s policies.

Second, Carney should expand Canada’s presence in Latin America and the Caribbean. The threat of China’s and Russia’s growing influence there and the rise of transnational criminal organizations demand a comprehensive Canadian response modeled after Ottawa’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. Canada should increase its naval presence in the Caribbean waters and along Pacific coastlines to counter illicit trafficking and foreign naval expansion. It should implement military capacity-building programs focused on disaster response and maritime security. To combat criminal organizations and foreign state interference, it should strengthen intelligence sharing with partners in the region. And it should establish cyber defense partnerships to protect critical regional infrastructure and democratic institutions from digital threats.

Canada offers unique advantages as a trusted actor in a region where US influence now faces challenges. The Tenth Summit of the Americas in the Dominican Republic, taking place in December of this year, presents an opportunity to unveil this strategy. By focusing on the Western Hemisphere as its immediate neighborhood, Canada can exercise regional leadership while advancing its foreign policy priorities.

Third, Carney will need to craft a new relationship with its southern neighbor.

“Our old relationship with the United States, a relationship based on steadily increasing integration, is over,” stated Carney on election night. He added, “the system of open global trade anchored by the United States, a system that Canada has relied on since the Second World War, a system that, while not perfect, has helped deliver prosperity for our country for decades, is over.”

While dramatic, Carney’s comments highlight a very real sentiment felt across Canada that has left Canadians and their leaders wondering what Ottawa’s future security partnerships will look like. This uncertainty has spurred Ottawa to deepen its partnerships with other countries, such as Australia, which recently sold an over-the-horizon radar system to Canada. Future partnerships with countries such as France and South Korea to share intelligence and purchase new platforms, respectively, are also promising.

At the same time, no matter the rhetoric, Canada will need to continue to work with the United States. The two nations still share a long border, close cultural and familial ties, and a shared responsibility to defend North America via the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). During Carney’s upcoming trip to Washington to meet with US President Donald Trump, listen for discussions on Canada’s potential participation in the US Golden Dome project, ways to advance North American energy security, and resolving disagreements over tariffs.

Carney and Poilievre were right to focus on national security and defense during the campaign. The hard part now is for Carney to put actions and resources behind his rhetoric. Doing so is essential as Canada faces a series of compounding threats to its security in an increasingly volatile world.

Imran Bayoumi is an associate director with the GeoStrategy Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Maite Gonzalez Latorre is a program assistant at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and Caribbean Initiative.

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What’s next for Trinidad and Tobago’s new prime minister?

Wazim Mowla and Dale Ramlakhan — Tue, 29 Apr 2025 23:38:34 +0000

Kamla Persad-Bissessar will be the next prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago following parliamentary elections on April 28. The landslide victory for Persad-Bissessar and her United National Congress reflects the state that Trinidad and Tobago has found itself in over the past few years. Declining natural gas production, spikes in homicide numbers and gang violence, and a dramatically changing geopolitical order all played their part on election day. Persad-Bissessar returns to the role of prime minister, having previously held the role between 2010 and 2015, but she has a tall mountain to climb this second time around. Reducing crime, bolstering energy security, and strengthening relations with the United States should be key features of Persad-Bissessar’s first one hundred days.

Persad-Bissessar will face significant challenges ahead. This past year was the deadliest in Trinidad and Tobago’s modern history, with a homicide rate of 45.7 per 100,000. That puts it at the fifth-highest in Latin America and the Caribbean. Growing gang violence and illegal small arms inflows from the United States and Venezuela are primary factors, even leading the then prime minister, Keith Rowley, to issue a state of emergency late last year.

Getting crime and violence under control must be a priority. The new government will have to address internal security concerns, such as gang activity, while protecting the country’s borders and informal ports of entry from illicit trafficking. A first step can be working with partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada to invest in maritime interdiction capabilities. This would build off of the $500 million memorandum of understanding signed between Trinidad and Tobago and the United States in 2024.

Next, declining natural gas production threatens Trinidad and Tobago’s energy security. Natural gas is the bedrock of the country’s economy. It provides low electricity costs for its citizens and, through its petrochemical industry, is responsible for more than 80 percent of the country’s export revenues. However, over the past fifteen years, Trinidad and Tobago has struggled to tap into new natural gas reserves. Few awards are given to bidders during offshore auctions—zero were awarded between 2015 and 2022—and there are limited financial incentives to encourage further exploration by oil and gas operators.

Here, there are two areas Persad-Bissessar can focus on. First, she can work to fast-track development of commercially viable natural gas fields through tax concessions and subsidies. Second, she can take steps to diversify the energy matrix by investing in renewables. Trinidad and Tobago is primed to be a renewable energy leader in green hydrogen, onshore and offshore wind, and utility-scale solar. The country has a large electricity grid and population relative to its Caribbean neighbors, meaning that investors can invest at scale in a country that already has a track record of developing power generation projects.

Finally, Persad-Bissessar will become prime minister as the international system is entering a new era. Small countries do not develop in a silo. Instead, they need international partnerships. Trinidad and Tobago should start by strengthening its relationship with the United States. To do that, Trinidad and Tobago should seek out financial and technical assistance through the US Department of Defense and US Southern Command, which will be essential to enhancing the country’s capacity to address gang activity and protect its ports from illegal arms inflows.

Therefore, Persad-Bissessar should consider making Washington, DC, her first foreign trip as prime minister. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s recent trip to the Caribbean is a signal that the region is unlikely to be an afterthought for the United States, at least in the near term. Persad-Bissessar has a unique opportunity to capitalize on this attention and use a diplomatic visit to shore up support from the United States, engage members of the US Congress, and present the country’s natural gas and renewable energy potential as investment destinations for US businesses.

Persad-Bissessar has a tough task ahead. Energy security, citizen safety, and strong international partnerships are a must, but these challenges cannot be tackled alone. An all-hands-on-deck approach that includes working closely with the private sector and nongovernmental organizations can help Persad-Bissessar build a more secure and prosperous future for Trinidad and Tobago.

Wazim Mowla is the fellow and lead of the Caribbean Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Dale Ramlakhan is a nonresident senior fellow at the Caribbean Initiative.

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Canada’s voters send a message to Washington—and the world

Atlantic Council — Tue, 29 Apr 2025 18:06:07 +0000

GET UP TO SPEED

It was a state-ment. Canadian voters returned the Liberal Party to power on Monday after a stunning political comeback fueled by tensions with the United States—including an election-day message from US President Donald Trump calling for Canada to become the “fifty-first state.” Prime Minister Mark Carney declared in his victory speech that the United States will never “own” Canada. “But we also must recognize the reality that our world has fundamentally changed.” Our Canada-watchers are here to diagram what this new world looks like as Carney prepares to form a government.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION BROUGHT TO YOU BY

Christopher Sands (@USCanada_Sands): Adjunct lecturer and the director of the Hopkins Center for Canadian Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
Imran Bayoumi (@BayoumiImran): Associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
Maite Gonzalez Latorre: Program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Flag waving

The election was essentially a referendum on the Canada-US relationship, Chris tells us, as “a surge of nationalist sentiment swept the country, including in Quebec,” which historically has maintained its own identity.
Carney, who took over from Justin Trudeau in March, and the Liberal Party appear to have fallen short of a hoped-for majority of 172 seats. Meanwhile, the Conservative Party stumbled—with its leader Pierre Poilievre losing his own seat. “Carney outperformed expectations, but the appetite for change remains strong. Canadians are still divided on who should lead,” Chris says.
The Trump administration, Chris says, could view a minority government as “weak.” Therefore it could ratchet up “pressure on Canada to meet NATO’s 2 percent of gross domestic product defense spending target, strengthen border security, and unlock its critical minerals—goals first promised by Trudeau in 2019 with little progress.”

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Let’s make a deal

Given Ottawa’s ongoing tensions with Washington, Imran says we should expect Carney “to look beyond the traditional defense partnership with the United States and to forge new, smaller defense deals with a variety of nations.”
We got a few hints during Carney’s first overseas trip, when he went to Paris and London rather than Washington and said Canada was reconsidering its decision to purchase F-35 fighter jets from the United States. Imran also points to a radar deal with Australia, a potential submarine deal with South Korea, and a proposed closer partnership with Nordic countries.
Carney’s Ottawa will distance itself from Washington on defense, “except where needed,” Imran predicts, “such as on North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) modernization.”

Rocky Mountain low

Though Carney called for unity in his victory speech, that will be put to the test in the Conservative stronghold of Alberta, Maite notes, where the Liberals won just two ridings. “With blue-collar Albertans significantly impacted by US tariffs, Carney now faces a critical opportunity to demonstrate his commitment to all Canadians, not just Liberal supporters or Ontario residents.”
Carney and Trump-aligned Alberta Premier Danielle Smith, Maite points out, “have not started their relationship on solid footing.” But the Edmonton native Carney “may leverage his Alberta connections to build bridges with Smith and provincial voters.”
Alberta will also be the site of global intrigue in June, when Canada hosts Trump and other world leaders for the Group of Seven (G7) Summit in Kananaskis. That trip to the Canadian Rockies, followed by a flight to the Netherlands for the NATO Summit, represent “two defining tests” for Carney, Chris says: “How he performs will shape Canada’s standing abroad—and at home.”

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Experts react: What the Liberal Party’s win in Canada means for the world

Atlantic Council experts — Tue, 29 Apr 2025 15:16:52 +0000

Canadians are seeing red. Prime Minister Mark Carney will form a new government in Canada after his Liberal Party secured the most seats in parliament in Monday’s election, completing a remarkable political turnaround amid a simmering confrontation with the United States. The comeback win came as Carney—after taking over for Justin Trudeau in March—clashed with US President Donald Trump over tariff policy and Trump’s calls to add Canada as the “fifty-first state.” “Our old relationship with the United States, a relationship based on steadily increasing integration, is over,” Carney declared in his victory speech. What does the Liberals’ victory mean for trade, security, and diplomacy in North America and beyond? We put out the call to our experts for answers.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Diane Francis: The election was a referendum on joining the United States. Canadians rejected it.

Michael Bociurkiw: Canadians voted for a steady hand in turbulent times

Imran Bayoumi: Expect Carney to pursue defense deals with new partners

Maite Gonzalez Latorre: Conservative wins in Alberta reveal the political divide in Canada

Kimberly Donovan, Maia Nikoladze, and Lize de Kruijf: Next, Carney will need to strengthen coordination among Canada’s provinces

Reed Blakemore: Energy and infrastructure will be core to managing the US-Canada relationship

Mark Scott: Expect Carney to push ahead on AI and social media regulation

Layla Mashkoor: Meta’s news blackout in Canada creates a troubling precedent

The results show a Canada both united and divided

Canada’s April 28 federal election was a referendum on the country’s relationship with the United States. Both the governing Liberals and opposition Conservatives campaigned against pressure from the Trump administration—tariffs, border demands, and jabs about Canada as the “fifty-first state.” A surge of nationalist sentiment swept the country, including in Quebec. Canadians appeared more united than ever.

Yet the result was a divided verdict: a Liberal minority government, with 162 seats—ten short of a majority in the 343-seat House of Commons. It’s a gain from the 153 seats held before the election but not the majority Carney hoped for. Carney, elected as a member of parliament for the first time, will now be invited by the governor general to form a government.

Canada has elected only two majority governments since 2004. Minority governments typically govern by negotiating support vote by vote. The New Democratic Party’s poor showing in 2025 makes another formal “supply and confidence” agreement unlikely.

Conservative leader Pierre Poilievre lost his seat, and a party that led in polls for over a year failed to adjust its message after Trudeau’s exit. Carney outperformed expectations, but the appetite for change remains strong. Canadians are still divided on who should lead.

This result may be seen in Washington as weak. The Trump administration is expected to renew pressure on Canada to meet NATO’s 2 percent of gross domestic product defense spending target, strengthen border security, and unlock its critical minerals—goals first promised by Trudeau in 2019 with little progress.

June will bring two defining tests for Carney: hosting the Group of Seven (G7) summit in Kananaskis—Trump’s first visit to Canada in his second term—and attending the NATO summit in The Hague. How he performs will shape Canada’s standing abroad—and at home.

—Christopher Sands is an adjunct lecturer and the director of the Hopkins Center for Canadian Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

The election was a referendum on joining the United States. Canadians rejected it.

Canada’s political landscape shifted to a two-party system for the first time in years, giving the Liberals a slight advantage. But the man not even on the ballot, Trump, influenced the outcome more than did any of the Canadian party leaders. As such, the election of 2025 could be considered a referendum on joining the United States that was roundly rejected by Canadians.

Canadians fled into one of the two mainstream parties as Trump waded directly into the campaign. On election day, the US president broke the unwritten rule that US and Canadian leaders won’t interfere directly in elections in one another’s countries. Trump posted that Canadians should vote for him in order for Canada to become the fifty-first state.

It didn’t work.

—Diane Francis is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. She is a well-known journalist, author, broadcaster, and editor-at-large at the National Post.

Canadians voted for a steady hand in turbulent times

OTTAWA—Canadians have never had much appetite for dramatic change, especially in turbulent times—a fact underscored by yesterday’s election results and record turnout in advance polls. Voters appeared to be looking for a steady, capable hand in Carney, a former banker: someone with the backbone to confront Trump, who seems intent on turning Canada into a de facto fifty-first state, and the competence to undo nearly a decade of economic mismanagement under Trudeau.

Trump’s belligerence helped the Liberals erase a twenty-one-point deficit and avoid a return to the opposition benches. But in the final days of the campaign, domestic concerns reclaimed center stage—housing affordability, the inflation of food prices, a crumbling health system, immigration, and crime. A tragic vehicle attack at a Filipino festival in Vancouver on the campaign’s final day may have briefly boosted support for Poilievre, who campaigned on tough-on-crime policies. Nevertheless, Poilievre lost his Ottawa seat and now faces political purgatory.

Carney’s ability to enact his agenda will depend largely on how quickly he builds working relationships with opposition parties—notably the Bloc Québécois, which secured at least twenty-three seats. It also hinges on whether the Conservatives cooperate in a “Team Canada” approach or spend the next six months trying to bring down the government.

On the global stage, Carney must work to reestablish Canada as a respected middle power in a world where the rules-based order is unraveling. With the world’s largest Ukrainian diaspora outside Russia, the Liberals face pressure to maintain strong support for Kyiv—including calls to transfer twenty-three billion Canadian dollars in frozen Russian assets to help fund Ukraine’s war effort and reconstruction. Canada’s upcoming G7 summit offers Carney an opportunity to rally allies against returning $300 billion in frozen Russian central bank reserves to Moscow.

In style as well as substance, Carney marks a stark shift from his predecessor. Gone are the flashy socks, selfies, hobnobbing with Hollywood celebrities, and empty virtue signals. Though he has the charisma of an icicle in a Canadian winter, Carney brings confidence, competence, and a steady hand—the qualities Canadians seem to value most right now.

—Michael Bociurkiw is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Expect Carney to pursue defense deals with new partners

Both Carney and Poilievre made foreign policy and defense a central pillar of their campaigns, with both calling for increased investment in the Arctic and increased defense spending. For Carney to achieve this, expect him to look beyond the traditional defense partnership with the United States and to forge new, smaller, defense deals with a variety of nations.

In Carney’s first trip abroad as prime minister, he visited Paris and London, spurning the traditional initial stop in Washington, DC. On the trip, the prime minister said that Canada was reconsidering its commitment to purchase F-35 fighter jets from the United States, and he announced the framework for a new security and intelligence partnership with France.

As Canada faces an increasingly volatile world, expect Carney to continue to pursue deals and new partnerships like the decision to purchase the JORN over-the-horizon radar from Australia. Closer ties between Canada and South Korea are also possible, with a Korean delegation visiting Ottawa early in March to pitch Canada on the purchase of submarines. Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy white paper, released in December 2024, called for closer cooperation with the Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden), leveraging the security challenges and NATO membership shared by these nations.

With Carney declaring that Canada’s old relationship with the United States is “over,” expect the new government to look away from furthering closer defense ties with the United States, except where needed, such as on North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) modernization. Ottawa will instead be seeking to forge relationships with other countries that have a shared threat perception and possess valuable technology and insights that can strengthen Canada.

—Imran Bayoumi is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Conservative wins in Alberta reveal the political divide in Canada

Elbows up for Carney, but elbows down for Liberals in Alberta. This morning’s results confirmed Conservative dominance across the province, with the New Democratic Party managing to hold just one seat and the Liberals securing only two. The province has sent a large team of Conservative wins to Ottawa, though a handful of city ridings hosted tight races, highlighting Alberta’s persistent rural-urban divide.

While Conservatives and Liberals battled fiercely at the national level, Alberta presented a simpler equation: guaranteed Conservative victories with only potential New Democratic Party upsets in select ridings. Canadians clearly recognized this election’s importance with over seven million advance ballots cast nationwide, setting a record. Alberta saw turnout exceeding 63 percent, with Elections Canada counting 2,064,167 votes from 96 percent of polls out of 3,234,505 registered voters.

The election results have definitively answered whether Alberta voters would choose the New Democratic Party or the Liberals for provincial representation in competitive races against Conservatives. During his victory speech, Carney emphasized national unity: “Who’s ready to stand up for Canada with me? And who’s ready to build Canada strong?” With blue-collar Albertans significantly impacted by US tariffs, Carney now faces a critical opportunity to demonstrate his commitment to all Canadians, not just Liberal supporters or Ontario residents.

Alberta Premier Danielle Smith, who has aligned closely with Trump, and Carney have not started their relationship on solid footing. As an Edmonton native, however, Carney may leverage his Alberta connections to build bridges with Smith and provincial voters despite the overwhelming Conservative victory in the province.

—Maite Gonzalez Latorre is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Next, Carney will need to strengthen coordination among Canada’s provinces

With Canada’s federal election now behind us, Carney and his Liberal government face an important task: consolidating the country’s economic power to respond more effectively to global challenges.

Unlike the United States, where the federal government can regulate nearly all economic activity, Canada’s Constitution grants provinces broad authority. This fractured structure can hamper the federal government’s ability to respond swiftly and with a unified strategy to external economic pressures.

The recent US imposition of tariffs on Canadian goods highlighted this vulnerability. Instead of presenting a coordinated national response, Alberta, Canada’s largest oil-producing province, broke ranks with Ottawa. While Canadian oil is a critical energy source for US refineries, Alberta refused to support leveraging this as a bargaining tool. This divergence weakened Canada’s negotiating position and underscored how regional interests can undermine national cohesion.

The United States-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) trade agreement adds further complexity. Article 32.10 requires Canada to notify the United States and Mexico if it seeks a trade deal with a nonmarket economy—potentially allowing them to withdraw from the agreement. This restricts Canada’s trade flexibility and reinforces its dependence on US policy.

To secure its economic future, the next federal government must prioritize a more unified approach to economic governance. Strengthening coordination with the provinces is no longer optional—it is essential. Without it, Canada will remain a collection of competing regional interests, ill-equipped to respond to external pressures or shape its own global economic path. As the 2026 USMCA review approaches, Canada needs a clearer, united voice—not only to protect existing partnerships but to ensure it can build new ones. Strategic alignment—at home and abroad—is the only way forward.

—Kimberly Donovan is the Director of the Atlantic Council’s Economic Statecraft Initiative.
—Maia Nikoladze is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Economic Statecraft Initiative.
—Lize de Kruijf is a project assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Economic Statecraft Initiative.

For more on Canada’s need for economic consolidation, read the Economic Statecraft Initiative’s report:

Issue Brief

Mar 27, 2025

Canada needs an economic statecraft strategy to address its vulnerabilities

By Kimberly Donovan, Maia Nikoladze, Lize de Kruijf

To address threats from Russia and China and reduce trade overdependence on the United States, Canada’s federal government will need to consolidate economic power and devise an economic statecraft strategy that will leverage Canada’s economic tools to mitigate economic threats and vulnerabilities.

China Cybersecurity

Energy and infrastructure will be core to managing the US-Canada relationship

The Liberal Party’s victory is a profound change from just six months ago, when the Conservatives held a 20 percentage point lead in the polls. That the Liberal Party will now find a relatively simple pathway to building a majority coalition, while Poilievre lost his own seat in Parliament to a Liberal candidate, underscores how adverse the reaction in Canada has been to the Trump administration’s rhetoric around Canada’s sovereignty and to the disruption of US-Canadian economic integration through tariffs. Rather than a Conservative government in Ottawa that may have been philosophically aligned if not collaborative with its agenda, the White House will now have a Canadian counterpart with a clear mandate to assert its strength and independence while beginning a process of economic diversification.

But now the hard work begins, with energy and infrastructure playing a key role in the months ahead. Energy—specifically crude oil and electricity—is one of the foundational pieces of the US-Canada relationship. Tariff exemptions on Canadian crude reflect this reality, given their connection to refineries in the US Midwest and as a reliable, secure source of heavy crude. From oil and gas to minerals and electricity, expanding Canadian energy resources are a core part of managing US energy prices, and they are worthwhile contributions to the idea of American (or North American) Energy Dominance.

A Carney-led government will have to embrace this opportunity. During his campaign, Carney spoke about revisiting Canada’s carbon price regime, which was a major part of the Conservative platform and has to-date been an obstacle to unlocking investment in Canadian energy. However, Carney has committed to sustaining legislation on infrastructure impact assessments, which has been a pain point for energy companies to expand their own infrastructure. Those specific policy measures aside, Carney has largely communicated that his government will seek broad-based energy investment, including for critical minerals and next-generation nuclear.

The details of the Canadian energy agenda will be fulcrum issues for any of Ottawa’s ambitions to diversify energy exports away from the United States and toward global markets. Energy resources remain largely the jurisdiction of Canada’s individual provinces, and how Carney navigates a federal energy platform will be critical to building the cross-provincial partnerships necessary to reach new export markets. The negotiation of those partnerships has been a longstanding obstacle to east-west energy infrastructure in Canada. With that in mind, Carney’s diversification strategy is as much a function of internal diplomacy as it is external.

—Reed Blakemore is a director with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

Expect Carney to push ahead on AI and social media regulation

In the build-up to this week’s election, there were widespread efforts across social media to undermine political candidates and Canada’s democratic institutions. Those tactics have now become a mainstay in many votes worldwide, and Canada was no exception. Ahead of the April 28 vote, local officials coordinated with outside researchers to flag potentially harmful online content. That included content by foreign actors, including some from the United States, seeking to influence how Canadians voted.

Yet despite these digital political messages, the online conversation around the election was dominated by offline events, especially Canada’s ongoing strained relationship with the United States. It is almost impossible to quantify the impact of online influence operations. But on the day after election day, it is hard to say such tactics played a meaningful role ahead of the Liberal Party’s victory because offline events—and not digital narratives—appear to have driven many voters’ choices.

In the weeks ahead, Ottawa will likely double down on tech policy issues that had stalled under Trudeau’s leadership. Efforts around artificial intelligence (AI) governance and greater checks on social media are likely as Carney sets out his policy objectives to reposition the country in the wake of its deteriorating relationship with the United States.

—Mark Scott is a senior resident fellow at the Digital Forensic Research Lab’s (DFRLab) Democracy + Tech Initiative within the Atlantic Council Technology Programs.

Meta’s news blackout in Canada creates a troubling precedent

During Canada’s short-lived thirty-five-day election cycle, candidates took their campaigns to cities, towns, and online platforms to win over voters. One distinguishing feature of Canada’s information ecosystem is the absence of news content on Facebook and Instagram, following Meta’s decision to block it in response to the Canadian Online News Act. This is particularly noteworthy as Facebook was reported to be the platform most used by Canadians.

Exacerbating the issue was Meta’s January 2025 decision to end its fact-checking programs, which played an important role in maintaining protective safeguards against information manipulation—safeguards that are even more necessary in the face of proliferating AI-enabled deceptions.

Canadian Meta users were left to navigate an uncertain landscape, one without adequate protections but rife with potential risks and deliberate harms. This creates a concerning precedent, suggesting that platform resistance may create information vulnerabilities that can be exploited during critical democratic processes.

As the tactics of information manipulation evolve, democratic societies must foster adaptable, evidence-based responses that protect electoral integrity and preserve the principles of open, free discourse. This requires ongoing innovation in both policy and technology to stay ahead of emerging threats while upholding the values of democracy.

—Layla Mashkoor is a deputy managing editor at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.

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What Noboa’s reelection means for US-Ecuador ties

Isabel Chiriboga — Mon, 14 Apr 2025 19:49:40 +0000

In Sunday’s presidential election, the Ecuadorian people sent a clear signal of their hopes for economic stability, continuity, and closer alignment with Western allies in reelecting President Daniel Noboa. With 97 percent of the ballots counted and a voter turnout of 83 percent, Noboa and running mate Maria José Pinto secured more than 55 percent of the vote, an 11-percentage-point margin over challenger Luisa González, the heir to former President Rafael Correa’s populist legacy. González has refused to recognize the results and alleges that the results were fraudulent. However, her party has presented no concrete evidence to support this claim. Meanwhile, the National Electoral Council and international observers report no signs of widespread irregularities. Nevertheless, the claim fuels tensions in an already polarized electorate and could potentially result in social unrest.

In contrast with Noboa, González had signaled a drift from Western allies, including with statements that she would not recognize Edmundo González’s electoral win over dictator Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela and with her party’s flirtation with removing the dollar as Ecuador’s currency. Noboa’s win, despite his policy-light campaign, embodies steadiness and predictability, two aspects that are key for international cooperation.

Ecuador desperately needs international cooperation with partners such as the United States to curb the country’s crime wave and spur economic growth. Here’s what to expect for US-Ecuador relations now that Noboa will maintain his post in Quito.

Mano dura—but backed by American muscle?

Security will be the foundation of any strengthened partnership for the future of Ecuador. Noboa’s government has been firmly rooted in a “mano dura” (iron fist) policy, declaring an internal armed conflict against twenty-two criminal gangs in January 2024 and classifying them as terrorist organizations. Many of these groups work directly with transnational drug cartels including Mexico’s Sinaloa and Jalisco Nueva Generación, and even Albanian mafias; in addition. The intensifying operations of these groups has led to a spike in violence, including a staggering 1,300 homicides in just the first fifty days of 2025. Recurrent states of emergency and military deployments have become commonplace, especially in port cities such as Guayaquil, as the government fights to reclaim control of strategic trade routes. As the government has expanded its drug interdiction efforts, these criminal groups have diversified into other illicit markets including arms and human trafficking as well as illegal mining and logging to sustain their operations and increase their resilience.

Noboa is signaling a willingness to bring Ecuador’s security doctrine into alignment with Washington’s. He has done so by proposing the use of drones on borders and by requesting the assistance of US forces, reportedly preparing the port of Manta (which used to host a US air base, shut down by Correa in 2009) for their arrival. This commitment aligns well with US regional priorities. In the wake of rising transnational crime and drug trafficking across the hemisphere, the Trump administration—greatly concerned with border security and containing narcotrafficking—is keen to support governments willing to take action. Thus, Noboa’s openness to cooperation with the United States, particularly his willingness to integrate US intelligence and surveillance technology into domestic operations, could be met with interest.

Yet, the backdrop for Noboa’s second term will not lack of challenges. Ecuador remains stalled in a multidimensional crisis. The economy contracted in three out of four quarters in 2024, with the third posting a 1.5 percent decline in the gross domestic product. Ecuador had a $726 million fiscal deficit in the first quarter of 2025, marking the third largest deficit in a decade, and severe electricity shortages have caused blackouts of up to fourteen hours, further dampening economic prospects. Add to that the challenges of governing a polarized constituency—44.35 percent of whom voted for his opponent—and a country still traumatized by the assassination of presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio during the 2023 election.

But opportunity also knocks. While Ecuador’s country risk, as measured by the investment bank JP Morgan, reached a fifteen-month high of 1,900 points in the days ahead of the elections, Ecuadorian sovereign bond prices soared following Noboa’s win, indicating strong investor confidence. This is telling: markets, outside observers, and potential allies see Noboa as a stabilizing force. Despite a fragmented National Assembly—where the opposition party, Citizen Revolution, holds sixty-seven seats compared to the sixty-six held by Noboa’s party—the significant margin in the election results suggests that many voters who supported other candidates in the first round backed Noboa in the second. This may pave the way for political alliances and cooperation, enabling the passage of key security and pro-investment legislation. For Washington, that is an open door for broadened strategic cooperation at the economic, political, and military levels.

Teasing out trade

Trade will also be on Noboa’s agenda for cooperation with the United States. The Trump administration has imposed a 10 percent tariff on Ecuadorian goods; however, it is important to note that, unlike other countries in the region, such as Peru and Colombia, Ecuador does not have a free trade agreement with the United States. This means the 10 percent tariff will be added to existing tariffs on other products, while goods that previously entered duty-free will now face a 10 percent tariff. Ecuador currently holds a negative trade balance of $644.5 million with the United States, but Ecuador’s economic vulnerability makes the United States a vital partner. The US market takes a significant portion of Ecuador’s nonpetroleum exports, mainly agricultural products such as shrimp, cacao, bananas, and flowers. If tariffs increase on countries that compete in providing these products to the United States—such as Vietnam and Cambodia, which Trump planned to hit with much higher tariff rates before a recent ninety-day pause—Ecuadorian exporters could capitalize on their comparative advantage. Yet, Ecuador is still at a disadvantage on other products that face higher levies such as roses, broccoli, and tuna. Therefore, Ecuador will likely bring up trade as an essential component of cooperation—provided Washington and Quito can establish predictable, rules-based trade arrangements.

On this note, Noboa’s apparent alignment and closeness with the Trump administration is significant. At a time when US migration policy is tightening and the hemisphere is shifting toward more pragmatic leadership on this front, Noboa’s actions signal that the bilateral relationship will be built on strategic alignment rather than ideological affinity. While Noboa’s visit to Mar-a-Lago on March 29 (deemed “friendly”) was faulted in some circles, it earned Noboa political capital at home. The Trump meeting also put González at a disadvantage, given her coalition’s association with anti-US rhetoric, including Correa’s statements after the United States imposed visa bans on him, his vice president, and their immediate families for corruption. Noboa built a victorious coalition in large part with older voters, some of whom expressed fear about the unpredictability that accompanies populist choices.

What change will take

The list of tasks ahead for Noboa is significant: His administration will need to balance a $36 billion budget amid rising crime and violence, declining petroleum revenues, and rising debt payments. The promise of better security, economic reactivation, and infrastructure modernization cannot be fulfilled without outside support and financing from multilateral lenders and foreign investment, including the United States.

Furthermore, there is the risk that any long-term alignment with Washington in pursuit of improving security and the economy will not be able to withstand Ecuador’s volatile domestic political landscape. The composition of the National Assembly, depending on how alliances and seats shake out before inauguration day, will be key to determining the difficulties or opportunities Noboa will face. At the same time, he must demonstrate his ability to navigate an increasingly polarized environment. To succeed, he will need to strike a careful balance between domestic legitimacy and external engagement, backing up his rhetoric with consistent action.

Noboa’s presidency may not have started with a master plan, but his second term will begin with a unique set of geopolitical alignments. The question now is whether he can turn them into tangible gains for Ecuador. For the United States, this is a rare chance to engage with a willing, democratically elected government in a region beset by instability. For Ecuador, it is a chance not only to restore domestic stability but also to continue combating the security crisis with the United States as a partner.

In a region where friendships blow with the political winds, Ecuador under Noboa can chart a course of pragmatic collaboration and strategic partnership—if both sides are willing to make it work.

Isabel Chiriboga is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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Russia’s endless ceasefire excuses are proof that Putin does not want peace

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 08 Apr 2025 20:08:45 +0000

Almost one month since Ukraine agreed to a US-led unconditional ceasefire, Russia has this week come up with yet another excuse to avoid following suit. Speaking in Moscow on April 7, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov claimed that while Russian President Vladimir Putin backs calls for a ceasefire, questions remain over the Ukrainian government’s alleged inability to control “a number of extremist and nationalist units that simply do not obey Kyiv.”

This latest excuse is a variation of the tired old trope about “Ukrainian Nazis” that has been used exhaustively by the Kremlin since 2014 to legitimize Russia’s escalating aggression against Ukraine. For more than a decade, Putin’s propagandists have been depicting Ukraine as a hotbed of far-right extremism as part of a disinformation campaign designed to dehumanize ordinary Ukrainians and prepare the ground for the wholesale erasure of Ukrainian national identity. It therefore comes as no surprise that Moscow is now citing this phantom fascist threat in order to rebuff calls for a ceasefire.

In reality, Ukrainian public support for far-right political parties is among the lowest in Europe. After years of failure at the ballot box, Ukraine’s nationalist parties formed a coalition ahead of the country’s last prewar parliamentary elections in 2019, but could only collectively muster 2.16 percent of the vote. That same year, Ukrainians also elected Russian-speaking Jewish comedian Volodymyr Zelenskyy as the country’s president. Zelenskyy’s Jewish heritage has helped highlight the absurdity of Russia’s “Nazi” narrative, forcing Kremlin officials to engage in increasingly ridiculous mental gymnastics. Most notoriously, during a 2022 interview with Italian television, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov sought to defend Moscow’s baseless claims by declaring that Adolf Hitler “also had Jewish blood.”

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In addition to invoking imaginary Ukrainian Nazis, the Kremlin has also sought to stall negotiations over a possible ceasefire by questioning the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government. Ukraine was scheduled to hold presidential and parliamentary elections in 2024, but the Ukrainian Constitution stipulates that elections cannot take place during martial law. Despite this constitutional barrier and numerous logistical obstacles to wartime elections in Ukraine, officials in Moscow have repeatedly called for a new national ballot while arguing that President Zelenskyy lacks the authority to conclude a peace deal.

Most recently, Putin went one step further by suggesting that Ukraine should be placed under some kind of external administration, with United Nations officials overseeing elections. This obvious attempt to derail peace talks proved too much even for US President Donald Trump, who reportedly responded by stating that he was “pissed off” with Putin. Trump then threatened to impose secondary tariffs on Russian oil exports if the Kremlin dictator refuses to make a deal ending the war in Ukraine.

Putin’s inflexible negotiating position further underlines his intention to continue the invasion of Ukraine. Kyiv has made a number of major concessions in recent months, including expressing its readiness to accept the temporary occupation of Ukrainian regions currently under Kremlin control. Rather than offering compromises of his own, Putin has insisted on the surrender of additional Ukrainian land that the invading Russian army has so far been unable to seize. He also demands an end to all foreign aid and the dramatic reduction of the Ukrainian army to a mere skeleton force. This would leave Ukraine partitioned, isolated, disarmed, and defenseless against further Russian aggression. No Ukrainian government could expect to remain in power for long if they accepted Putin’s maximalist terms. Indeed, it is unlikely that Ukraine itself would survive such a suicidal settlement.

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By now, it should be abundantly clear that Putin does not want peace. For more than two months, the Trump administration has tried to entice Moscow by pressuring Ukraine into concessions while offering the prospect of lucrative future cooperation between Russia and the United States, only to be met with endless excuses and stalling tactics. Although Putin remains reluctant to openly reject Trump’s peace overtures, his goal evidently remains the complete subjugation of Ukraine and the effective end of Ukrainian statehood.

Many Western leaders are now publicly criticizing Putin’s refusal to engage in meaningful peace talks. “It is urgent that Russia stops with the pretenses and stalling tactics and accepts an unconditional ceasefire,” French President Emmanuel Macron commented recently. The Trump White House is also apparently now finally running out of patience. While US officials have been keen to talk up progress in talks with their Russian counterparts, Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated last week that Trump was not “going to fall into the trap of endless negotiations” with Moscow.

Trump’s initial attempt to broker a Ukraine peace deal by offering Putin an attractive off-ramp has failed. He must now decide whether he is prepared to employ sticks as well as carrots. At present, Putin has little interest in limited territorial concessions and remains committed to the destruction of Ukraine as a state and as a nation. Crucially, he has been encouraged by Trump’s reluctance to maintain US support for the Ukrainian war effort. This has strengthened the Russian ruler’s conviction that he can ultimately outlast the West in Ukraine.

In order to force a change of mood in Moscow, the United States must increase the costs of the invasion while undermining Russian hopes of military victory. This can be achieved by tougher sanctions measures targeting the Russian energy sector along with increased military aid that will allow the Ukrainian army to regain the battlefield initiative. Anything less will be interpreted by the Kremlin as a tacit green light to continue the invasion. If Trump is serious about persuading Putin to seek peace, he must first convince him that the alternative is defeat.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

As in neighboring Ecuador and Chile, the current crime wave has ground Peru to a halt. Between 2019 and 2024, reported extortions increased sixfold, and in 2025 every third Peruvian reports knowing a victim of extortion, many of whom are small business owners. Homicides, too, have doubled since 2019. And in January of this year alone, there were 203 percent more homicides than in January of 2017.

Behind these alarming figures hide strengthened transnational criminal organizations, such as the Tren de Aragua, as well as a myriad of other drug trafficking organizations, mafia syndicates, and gangs that alternately cooperate, collude, and compete for the control of illegal activities. While drug trafficking, homicides, and extortions are terrorizing Peru’s populous coastal cities, Peru’s Amazon has been ravaged by illegal gold mining, where illegal miners have made record profits as the value of gold has soared in international markets. In 2025, over 75 percent of Peruvians report being scared when leaving their homes.

While transnational criminal organizations are the actors behind the current crime wave, it is weak state capacity that has allowed the crime to permeate. The Peruvian sate’s capacity to respond has been impaired by political corruption, often influenced by criminal actors themselves. By 2024, 67 of 130 Congress members (a simple majority of Peru’s legislature) were under criminal investigation. When prosecutors charged Congress members of allegedly being part of criminal organizations, Congress passed a law narrowing the definition of “organized crime,” hindering investigations into corruption and extortion. President Dina Boluarte did not veto this bill, and it became law in August 2024. (Congress later reinstated extortion under the definition of organized crime but left many corruption offenses excluded.) Congress also passed a law in in September 2024 that placed a larger role of the police in criminal investigations, taking functions away from the Attorney General’s Office, which legal experts warned would weaken investigative efficiency. And Boluarte has weakened the Attorney General’s Office as she herself is being investigated for corruption. As a result, the state’s ability to prosecute crimes has been stymied by public officials seeking to blunt investigations against themselves.

Peruvians will vote next year amid a crisis that the state is incapable of protecting its citizens from. The parallels between the 2021 and 2026 elections are clear. In 2021, voters were enraged by Peru’s world-highest per capita COVID-19 death rate and a scandal in which political elites received vaccines before the public. Peruvians’ frustration propelled Castillo—then a little-known populist with no governing plan—to victory. After leading a government ridden with corruption, Castillo and his advisors sought to break the constitutional order with a “self-coup.” Peruvian democratic institutions held up and their attempt remained short-lived.

Now, heading into 2026, voters face a new crisis: a crime wave and a state failing to ensure public safety. This climate is fertile ground for populist promises of a mano dura, or “iron fist,” approach to combating crime. But any real solution must also tackle crime’s institutional roots. Candidates should promote a comprehensive political reform that reduces organized crime’s influence in the country’s political bodies. This reform should include steps that make running for office more difficult for those charged with corruption. In addition, the Attorney General’s Office should be depoliticized and promote a new cohort of competent, apolitical prosecutors and judges.

At the same time, the United States and other partner nations must recognize the risk that corruption poses to the survival of Peruvian democracy. The US State Department should designate Peruvian public officials engaged in corruption and prevent them from entering the United States, an action it took this month against former Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, who was convicted of corruption charges in Argentina. Equally critical is addressing other root causes of crime—poverty, inequality, and lack of education—which have made Peru’s youth vulnerable to recruitment by criminal gangs in the first place.

Politicians promising to be the “Peruvian Bukele” may garner attention. But leaving the institutional causes of crime unaddressed will only deepen Peru’s democratic crisis while doing little to curb crime.

Martin Cassinelli, a Peruvian native, is an assistant director at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center of the Atlantic Council.

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How Germany’s incoming government will work with Turkey

Hürcan Aslı Aksoy — Tue, 25 Mar 2025 13:23:19 +0000

Ahead of Germany’s parliamentary elections in February, Friedrich Merz, leader of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), emphasized Turkey’s strategic importance. In doing so, he called upon European countries to strengthen their foreign-policy cooperation with Turkey in response to mounting security challenges and potential shifts in US foreign policy. In addition, he committed to strengthening Turkey’s ties with the European Union, specifically on migration and Syrian security—while implicitly arguing that Turkey should have a “privileged” or “strategic” partnership with the EU, rather than full membership.

Now, with CDU/CSU having won the February parliamentary election, Merz is likely to become Germany’s next chancellor. Here is what to expect from a Merz-led Germany’s approach to ties with Turkey.

A more transactional approach

Expectations for the incoming German government, as the powerhouse of the EU, are considerable. These include sustaining military and financial support for Ukraine, addressing a shrinking German economy, and navigating the challenges of declining transatlantic reliability.

During his election campaign, Merz outlined a three-step plan for reshaping German foreign policy. First, he intends to restore Germany’s capacity to engage effectively in foreign, security, and European policy. Second, he aims to “win back” the trust of international partners and allies. Third, he seeks to establish clear strategic priorities. He has also appeared keen to reassert Germany’s influence within the EU. Many of these efforts will see the CDU/CSU leader forging partnerships not only with European allies but also with key regional players such as Turkey.

With Turkey’s significant role in NATO and its strategic location, Germany-Turkey relations under the likely German government are expected to remain pragmatic yet cooperative. Given prevailing geopolitical challenges and a clear shift toward realpolitik, Berlin is likely to maintain its transactional approach, prioritizing short-term strategic interests over long-term, value-based engagement. With this transactional approach, both Germany and Turkey may sideline normative concerns such as democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in favor of more immediate objectives related to three areas: security and defense, economic relations, and migration.

Yet on the other hand, Germany plays a pivotal role in shaping EU policy towards Turkey, so the new German government will face the challenge of balancing European Turkey policy with a future German approach to Turkey, whose foreign policy and domestic politics are increasingly diverging from European norms and values.

The highest priorities

One of the most pressing challenges for the next German government will be supporting Ukraine and strengthening Europe’s defense capabilities, particularly in light of growing concerns over US reliability. The controversial meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and US President Donald Trump on February 28—followed by the subsequent withdrawal (and, later, reinstatement) of military support to Ukraine—has reinforced doubts about Washington’s commitment to European security. In response, Merz and his likely coalition partners proposed easing Germany’s infamous debt brake to allow for increased defense and infrastructure spending, and a plan which was approved by parliament last week. However, securing Europe’s long-term security will require more than just financial adjustments—it will necessitate strengthening strategic partnerships with both European and non-European allies.

Security cooperation between Germany and Turkey has long served as a stabilizing factor in the bilateral relationship, despite numerous tensions. During his electoral campaign, Merz emphasized his intention to reduce Europe’s reliance on external powers. This position could pave the way for deeper cooperation with Turkey in the defense and security sectors, given Turkey’s role within NATO and its broader regional security influence. As discussion on the future of NATO unfolds across European capitals, Turkey’s role in European security architecture has gained prominence. With its geostrategic position, military capabilities, and expanding defense industry, Turkey is increasingly seen as a significant actor in the reshaping European security framework.

In addition to its potential role in shaping the future of European security, Turkey is also viewed as a pivotal partner in ensuring regional security. Following the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, Turkey has taken on a central role in the country, while Russia and Iran’s influence has waned. In December 2024, Merz stated that Turkey will play a more prominent role in the Middle East and emphasized that Germany and the EU must engage closely with Turkey to support Syria’s economic recovery and promote regional stability.

Migration remains a crucial area of cooperation between Germany and Turkey. The issue became a contentious topic during the German elections, with Merz placing it at the top of his agenda following a series of deadly attacks allegedly involving immigrants. The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), fueled by anger over immigration and refugees, secured second place in the election, while mainstream parties also adopted a more hardline stance on the issue. In an interview, Merz praised Turkey’s efforts in hosting millions of Syrian refugees as part of the 2016 EU-Turkey deal on irregular migration. This agreement included giving six billion euros to Turkey to help support the externalization of migration management, which is in line with EU and German interests.

Another cornerstone of German-Turkish relations is economic cooperation. Germany is one of Turkey’s most important trading partners and foreign investors, with investments reaching nearly $2.5 billion in 2022. In 2023, bilateral trade reached a record high of 55 billion euros. Beyond conventional sectors, Turkey and Germany have in recent years increased trade in new commercial areas, many linked to the energy transition. Eying green transformation and supply chains, Turkey aims to boost the bilateral trade up to $60 billion. German companies are increasingly involved in projects related to wind, solar, and hydroelectric power. Platforms such as the Joint Economic and Trade Commission and the Turkish-German Energy Partnership facilitate dialogue between the political and business actors in both countries. Given the search for more cooperation with Turkey on security-related issues, the defense industry can become an important sector in bilateral economic relations.

A stronger German focus on national interests, security, and leading the EU may reshape Germany-Turkey relations to be more transactional in the years ahead. But such an approach may not yield long-term success. The new German leadership should clarify its priorities and strike more of a balance—both pursuing shared interests and addressing diverging norms—in working with Turkey.

Hürcan Aslı Aksoy is head of the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Ullman in the Hill on Trump’s reshaping of the Republican and Democratic parties

bgalicia — Wed, 12 Mar 2025 13:27:25 +0000

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On March 10, Atlantic Council Senior Advisor Harlan Ullman published an op-ed in the Hill that outlines how US President Donald Trump “disappeared” the traditional notions of the Republican and Democratic parties. He argues that President Trump “won a new working-class coalition” of historic Democratic voters while shifting traditional Republican ideals inside his own party.

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#AtlanticDebrief – What was at stake in the German federal election? | A debrief with Jörn Fleck

nlawler — Mon, 10 Mar 2025 21:54:16 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

Germany headed to the polls on Sunday, February 23 for a federal election. Germany’s early election, after the former ruling coalition government collapsed in November 2024, comes at a critical time for Germany, Europe, and the transatlantic relationship. The next German government will have much to content with, including with shifting dynamics inside Germany, including the rise of the far-right AfD, and growing concerns over the durability of the United States’ commitment to Europe’s security. What are the key details to look for in the election? What are the challenges the next government will have to contend with?

On this edition of #AtlanticDebrief, Jorn Fleck, Senior Director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center speaks with Rachel Rizzo about the German federal election and German politics.

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Experts react: What Mark Carney means for the US-Canada relationship

Atlantic Council experts — Mon, 10 Mar 2025 18:04:14 +0000

Mark his words. Mark Carney, the former governor of the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England, will become the next Canadian prime minister this week, after he was elected leader of the Liberal Party by a landslide on Sunday. In his victory speech, Carney had hockey skate–sharp words for Canada’s southern neighbor. “America is not Canada. And Canada never, ever will be part of America in any way, shape, or form,” Carney said in response to US President Donald Trump, who has threatened tariffs and floated the idea of Canada becoming the fifty-first US state. He added, “We didn’t ask for this fight, but Canadians are always ready when someone else drops the gloves.” So, what’s next for Carney, who takes office ahead of a required national election before October 20? And what’s next for the Washington-Ottawa relationship? Below, Atlantic Council experts answer these questions and more.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Josh Lipsky: Central bankers are no strangers to politics

Imran Bayoumi: Forget the border—Carney’s biggest security challenge is in the high north

Michael Bociurkiw: Canada—and the world—must now wait for the Carney-Poilievre face-off

Maite G. Latorre: Carney comes to power at a moment of growing Canadian patriotism

Stuart Jones: Canada may now look to Europe as tensions with the US grow

Central bankers are no strangers to politics

Think Carney’s experience leading two different Group of Seven (G7) central banks isn’t relevant for his new role? Think again. Carney wasn’t just any central banker—he was a central banker during multiple crises. First, he led the Bank of Canada during the global financial crisis and won praise from his colleagues for quick action on interest rates that helped Canada weather the storm. In fact, he did such a good job that he became the first non-Brit to lead the Bank of England. In that role, he had to lead the bank through Brexit—one of the biggest shocks the UK economy has experienced in decades.

All of this prepares him quite well to handle the toughest economic test he has ever faced—how to handle a trade war with a neighbor who seemingly has much more leverage. Carney has already highlighted how Canada will use US reliance on Canadian energy to try and even the playing field. Perhaps this is a negotiating tactic and he will seek to reset US-Canada ties following the frosty relationship between Trump and outgoing Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. But don’t expect a pure technocratic approach despite his CV. Remember, trade wars are also currency wars. The way a country’s currency appreciates or depreciates can have an enormous impact on who bears the costs of tariffs. And Carney is uniquely suited to lead his country in that kind of battle.

—Josh Lipsky is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and a former adviser to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Forget the border—Carney’s biggest security challenge is in the high north

While tariffs have put a spotlight on the US–Canada border, the biggest security challenge that Carney will have to deal with is instead hundreds of miles away in the Arctic.

Climate change is melting sea ice, making the Arctic more accessible, opening new shipping routes, and creating new opportunities for resource extraction. Canada’s relatively undeveloped Arctic makes the region an “attractive, strategic, and vulnerable destination,” for foreign adversaries according to the Canadian Security Intelligence Services, which notes that enemies will likely be interested in investing in infrastructure and resources to gain a foothold in Canada’s high north.

With an upcoming election, Carney should make strengthening Canada’s Arctic security a priority. For his part, Poilievre pledged a substantial increase in Canada’s military presence in the Arctic if the Conservatives are elected.

The Trudeau government announced last week an investment to build three Northern Operational Support Hubs, acting as a presence for the Canadian Armed Forces in the region. However, the development of these hubs will take place over twenty years, far too long a timeframe to meet a real and already present threat, and Carney would be well suited to expedite this timeline.

In aiming to boost Canada’s Arctic security, Carney should look south. Cooperation with the United States may seem fraught today, but in the long term it is essential for the security and stability of the North American Arctic.

The two nations’ continued close cooperation, alongside Finland, is essential to the success of the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (ICE Pact), which aims to build Arctic and polar icebreakers while sharing information and knowledge among the three nations.

Additionally, Carney should seek to clarify and advocate for Canada’s participation in Trump’s plan for the Golden Dome missile defense system. Canada’s role in the Golden Dome has never been clear, but Ottawa and Washington already work together via North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), with both nations planning to install modern over-the-horizon radar stations and seabed-based sensors in the Arctic to better detect cruise or ballistic missiles. Carney should look beyond advocating for just sensors and instead work to install interceptors to knock down incoming threats. Doing so would require Canada to reverse its 2005 decision against joining the US homeland Ballistic Missile Defense System, a politically bold move for Carney, but one that would enhance the security of the Arctic—and North America as a whole.

—Imran Bayoumi is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Canada—and the world—must now wait for the Carney-Poilievre face-off

The Canadian Liberal Party leadership race had a Ukrainian twist to it, with former finance minister and deputy prime minister, Chrystia Freeland, in the running—but she ended up with devastating results in the single digits.

What is amazing is that Carney managed to pull off such a stunning result for someone who has never held public office. The Ukrainian community in Canada, the largest outside Russia, pulled hard for Freeland in the hopes she would become, at least temporarily, the first Canadian of Ukrainian origin to hold the post of prime minister. However, it seems that she was hurt by being too closely tied to the policies of the politically toxic Trudeau. Her abysmal performance may exclude her from a prize seat at a vastly slimmed-down cabinet table in a Carney government. Another possible path for Freeland is to pursue a future career outside politics in a multilateral body such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Economic Forum, or elsewhere.

My prediction is that, in a national election, which has to happen by this fall, the opposition Conservative Party under Poilievre will become the new government but without the strong majority they had hoped for (the huge gap between the Liberals and Conservatives has been narrowed by the Trump trade war, with Trudeau’s Liberals gaining significant ground by positioning themselves as the team best suited to defend the country’s interests in an era of Trump’s whiplash foreign policy). Watching Carney for the first time addressing his followers, I sensed very little fire or emotion, and that could benefit Poilievre, who’s been criticized in the past for being too stiff on the hustings. He has since gained some mojo.

Last week, the leader of His Majesty’s Official Opposition made some sound remarks on Canadian foreign policy toward Ukraine, saying that the country should move quickly to help Europe wean itself off of Russian oil and gas (which, he correctly said, powers Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war machine) by building terminals on the east coast to ship liquefied natural gas (LNG) across the Atlantic. But whichever party is in power, cross-aisle support for aiding Ukraine will continue, albeit with a global influence that’s been vastly diminished under the Trudeau Liberals.

—Michael Bociurkiw is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Carney comes to power at a moment of growing Canadian patriotism

Like many Canadians, Carney once had dreams of being a hockey player. An Edmonton Oilers fan, he likely never imagined his path would lead him to politics. Yet, with a staggering 86 percent of the vote, he has emerged as the new Liberal leader. Notably, he is the first leader of the country to have never held elected office.

Carney, much like Trump, is not a career politician. And that might be exactly what Canada needs to move past the Trump era. “I know how the world works,” he remarked, signaling his understanding of the private sector and the global economy. With Washington no longer the Washington of the past and politics evolving rapidly, Canadians are hungry for change, and the Liberals seem to have recognized that.

Carney’s election is a strategic move by the Liberals. While he may not have political experience in the traditional sense, he certainly knows how to tackle crises and make tough decisions. As Carney said on Sunday, “We are facing the most significant crisis of our lives.”

At the same time, Canadians appear to be feeling more patriotic than ever, and they want a leader who can harness that energy. If he succeeds, then Carney could be the Liberals’ best shot at making the party competitive again. His time in power may be brief, depending on when he calls the elections, so his strategy will have to focus on quick but impactful wins to prove himself to Canadians. With the economy front and center, negotiating on US tariffs should be at the top of his agenda. The puck has been dropped, and Carney is stepping onto the ice. Now, it’s up to Canadians to decide if he’s the right player to lead the team.

—Maite G. Latorre is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Canada may now look to Europe as tensions with the US grow

Carney’s landslide victory over Freeland in the leadership race for Canada’s Liberal Party will be welcome news for Europe in the near term. Under Trudeau, the Liberals have advanced a steadfast alignment with the European Union (EU) prioritizing trade. The government did this through the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, or CETA, which eliminated 98 percent of tariffs between the two blocs since its provisional implementation in 2017. It has also focused on joint participation in research initiatives, such as Horizon Europe and with the “A7” in the Arctic, as well as on defense cooperation in NATO, exemplified by Canada’s leadership in Latvia’s Multinational Brigade. Should the Liberals win this year’s impending general election under Carney’s leadership, Canada will likely seek to continue this track record and further deepen ties with Europe.

In his acceptance speech on Sunday evening, Carney vowed to “create new trading relationships with reliable partners”—a clear jab at Trump, who was in many ways the central focus of the event in Ottawa and a common pain point for Europeans in recent weeks. Across the pond, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in a Sunday press conference in Brussels specifically named Canada as a “like-minded” ally to work with in today’s contentious geopolitics. Closer Canada-EU alignment in the face of the transatlantic crisis was already on display last week with Trudeau’s attendance at the emergency summit on Ukraine in London.

The question now is about the long term: when the next election will ultimately take place, which Conservatives are calling for as early as possible, and whether Carney can lead the Liberals to victory as its candidate against Poilievre. The Liberals are now enjoying a momentum which few could have foreseen given the state of national polls even just a few weeks ago. However, if Carney does win in the upcoming contest with Poilievre, it remains to be seen whether he can successfully expand CETA to offset Canada’s increasingly costly trade with the United States. So far, CETA has increased the value of Canada-EU trade in goods by 65 percent and in services by 73 percent. But the agreement remains unratified by ten EU countries, including the major economies of France, Italy, and Poland, and has faced protests across Europe in the past.

—Stuart Jones is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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Will Merz step up Germany’s role in the Balkans? | A Debrief with Gerald Knaus

sjones — Fri, 07 Mar 2025 18:00:00 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

Germany’s political landscape is shifting after the parliamentary elections on February 23—conservatives won, the far-right AfD surged, and foreign policy questions loom large over Berlin. What will the next leadership in Germany mean for the country’s approach to EU enlargement and, in particular, the Western Balkans?

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare, Resident Senior Fellow at the Europe Center, sits down with Gerald Knaus, Chairman of the European Stability Initiative, a leading voice on EU engagement, to discuss why Germany must step up as Europe’s stabilizer. Knaus warns that the next four years are critical: Berlin must push for EU enlargement in the Balkans—no more delays, no vague goals. Without bold leadership, the region risks stagnation.

Knaus also highlights Merz’s recent foreign policy statements as the boldest from any European leader now and argues that Merz’s government could be the most consequential in Germany since Konrad Adenauer in 1949.

Will Germany step up as Europe’s stabilizer? As Europe faces a growing security crisis, will Germany push for a stronger NATO presence in the Balkans? Could a potential divide between the United States and the EU weaken efforts to stabilize the region? What one piece of advice would Gerald Knaus give to Germany’s new leadership regarding the Balkans?

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Explore the Mexico Country Scorecard

The post Will Merz step up Germany’s role in the Balkans? | A Debrief with Gerald Knaus appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Mexico’s fork in the road: Rule of law or authoritarian shift?

Vanessa Rubio-Márquez — Fri, 07 Mar 2025 17:37:03 +0000

Introduction

Evolution of freedom

Evolution of prosperity

The path forward

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Introduction

2024 has brought a time of renewed upheaval in Mexico, six years after the election that fundamentally changed the political and economic systems of the country. Claudia Sheinbaum, standard-bearer for the incumbent Morena party, won the presidency in June 2024, the first ever woman to do so. The presidential and legislative elections were among the most decisive in Mexican history. With her victory comes a spate of questions about the political and economic future of the country, as she moves to cement the momentous political reforms her predecessor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (known as AMLO), set into motion. In such a time of transformation, the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Index remains deeply illuminating.

Starting in the late 1980s, Mexico underwent a series of structural transformations that have significantly modified the nature of the state, the market, and their relationship in the country. At the tail end of the Institutional Revolutionary Party’s seventy-year single-party rule, public and international pressure brought about a democratic transformation that included the emergence of wide-ranging independent and technical institutions, with remits of electoral integrity, monetary policy, competition, statistics, transparency, and the specific regulation of markets. The state’s interventionist role in the economy was reduced, with an overarching privatization process that, among other things, touched banking, telecommunications, and infrastructure. More structural economic change came with free trade agreements and their upward pressure on competition in the private sector. Most notable among them was the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which along with its 2018 successor the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) has shifted the economic matrix over three decades from significantly primary to mostly secondary and tertiary activity: Where oil-related products once represented almost 20 percent of exports in the early-mid 1990s, today they account for less than 5 percent; instead, manufacturing has climbed to approximately 90 percent of exports over the past decade. Several notable milestones have followed:

Technocratic rule prevailed for years and favored a relatively unfettered private market.
The ruling party lost in the 2000 presidential election—a first in seven decades—to a right-wing party.
The 2018 landslide election of a left-leaning populist prompted changes to the nature of the state-market relationship by strongly favoring the role of the state.
The concentration of power has accelerated since 2024, when the incumbent ruling party achieved a legislative supermajority (via a friendly legal interpretation) and full judicial control (through a constitutional amendment). The promise, at least on paper, is not only to give extraordinary weight to the state but also to give force to the market as an engine for growth and prosperity. The result of this experiment is yet to be known.

Taking a step back to examine the Mexican index from its beginning in 1995, we can see a notable difference between the freedom and prosperity indices. On the one hand, the Prosperity Index has shown a steady, though slow, rise over the past twenty-eight years from 55.4 to 65.8 (the COVID-19 crisis notwithstanding). On the other hand, the Freedom Index shows Mexico rated only slightly higher than in 1995, despite a significant period of improvement in the 2000s. We can see two distinct inflection points that form a kind of “plateau” of higher freedom scores, around the years 2000 and 2018. The former coincides with the election of Vicente Fox, of the National Action Party (PAN), to the presidency, enabled through democratic reforms in the 1980s (including the establishment of the precursor to today’s National Electoral Institute). His rise marked a momentous moment in Mexican politics as the first president from outside the PRI, which had previously enjoyed essentially single-party rule since 1929.

The second inflection point, in 2018, is particularly notable as it includes the effects of two countervailing forces on the Freedom Index. The first is the signing of the USMCA, which according to the index’s methodology resulted in a significant increase in economic freedoms. The second is the election of AMLO, who rose to power on a wave of antielite sentiment. Once in power he began implementing his unique brand of populist governance, combining a redistributive fiscal policy with democratic backsliding and power consolidation. These features have blended to create a notable downward trend in freedoms over a half a decade, as we will explore in detail below, though they also have contributed to the continued improvement in some of the prosperity indices.

Focusing on the past five years, the index shows the continuation of a trend that is rare in the region and elsewhere—the decoupling of freedom and prosperity. Mexico is one of the few cases in the last five years, together with Nicaragua and Chile, where prosperity has continued to increase while freedom has declined. This is contrary to the wider trend in the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region, where both indices have declined.

In a marked shift from its categorization as “mostly free” in the 2023 index, Mexico is classified in the 2024 edition as a “low freedom” country, ranked 90 in the world—reflecting accumulated, significant antidemocratic shifts over the years of the AMLO presidency. Mexico continues to be “moderately prosperous,” though the changes underlying the reductions in freedom can be expected to damage prosperity as well, sooner rather than later.

Atlantic Council research suggests that, in general, the level of freedom in a country plays a significant causal role in its prosperity. The effect of a significant shift in freedoms is usually delayed by several years, taking up to two decades to manifest fully. In the case of the recent reductions in freedom in Mexico, the economic effects are likely to be felt much sooner. For example, as I will discuss below, judicial reforms are likely to pose an enormous challenge for the private sector and the renegotiation of the USMCA in the coming year, which could have severe economic ramifications for the country, as uncertainty affects investment climate. In the context of the current authoritarian shift in Mexican politics, this highlights the importance of steadfast, long-term public policy. That said, whether we continue to see this divergence going forward through the Sheinbaum presidency is yet to be seen.

Evolution of freedom

Mexico’s Freedom Index score has continued its decline, falling almost six points to 63.3 over the five years leading up to 2023. The score is characterized, after a decade of stop-start improvement, by a sharp fall since 2018, driven by declining political and legal freedoms. While Latin American countries have seen declining freedoms in this timeframe, Mexico’s slide is an outlier. Despite starting the period with a higher freedom score than the rest of the region, it has now slipped well below the average of 66.4, ranking eighteenth among the twenty-four nations in LAC, and the trendline continues to be negative. While economic freedom has been steady at around 76 after a notable drop in 2019, legal and political freedom scores have plunged since 2018. Mexico’s legal freedom score is 48.6, down from 54 in 2018; in fact, while the score has steadied in the past year, recent judicial developments (discussed below) suggest that we will see a severe drop next year. Political freedom has recorded an even more severe decline, dropping over ten points to 65.4 in 2023.

We can see several notable declines within the political subindex. Political rights have fallen steeply in the past five years. Mexico has dropped over twelve points and twenty-five places in the international rankings, and well down among the LAC countries in the nineteenth position. This score reflects the adversarial stance of the former AMLO government regarding criticism, opposition, public protest, and most significantly, the freedom of the press. The president presided over a militarized response to anti-femicide protests in Mexico City, for example, and he continued to constantly attack specific press representatives during his mandate. On one occasion in February 2024, he revealed the private phone number of a New York Times journalist during a live press conference; on another, he exposed private income and tax information of a Mexican one.

In another sign of democratic backsliding, the elections score has declined almost three points to 89.1. As president, AMLO often used his platform to campaign for members of his party as well as continuously attack political opponents from his privileged tribune, contrary to legal principles. The decline also reflects the fact that while the National Electoral Institute (INE) remains de jure independent, it has been subject to relentless political pressure and intervention, as well as severe funding cuts. The former president accused the institute of fraud and sought to centralize it under the executive. Furthermore, the legislature—controlled by the ruling party, Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional, or Morena—has continued to leave the Elections Tribunal without its required seven magistrates. Those threats and the loss of funding have yet to translate into a further deterioration of election integrity; nonetheless, it remains part of a worrying trend.

On a similar note, the most severe decline was in the legislative constraints on the executive score, which fell almost thirty points to 36.3 in 2023. This period coincided with AMLO’s sweeping election and legislative majorities (including a supermajority in the Chamber of Deputies), giving the administration a period of total legislative control until the supermajority was lost in 2021 (coinciding with a brief uptick in the constraints score). However, AMLO continued to undermine legislative independence: for example, forcing through legislation in violation of procedure. With Sheinbaum’s election victory in 2024 came not only the presidency but a questionable supermajority in the Congress of the Union. In fact, the ruling coalition now controls 73 percent of the Chamber of Deputies with 54 percent of the popular vote for the chamber, against a constitutional limit of 8 percent for the difference between representation and vote share. Despite initially falling one vote short in the Senate, a subsequent—questionable in its form—defection from the opposition has handed the coalition a supermajority across both bodies for the first time since the 1990s. Morena has also sought to remove additional constraints on executive power, for instance by following through on the elimination of several key autonomous agencies. These include the National Institute of Transparency Access to Information and Data Protection (INAI), an essential resource for government accountability; the Federal Economic Competition Commission, known as COFECE, which has a broad antitrust and competition remit; the National Council for Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL), which is in charge of the evaluation of social programs and for poverty reduction strategy; the Federal Telecommunications Institute, the telecom regulator; and the Energy Regulatory Commission. The proposal was passed in November 2024, ostensibly to reduce costs, though the savings will amount to less than 0.05 percent of the federal budget. This follows years of AMLO hamstringing the agencies via unfilled appointments and budget cuts. Additionally, while Sheinbaum’s government made some changes to AMLO’s initial proposal to remain compliant with USMCA provisions, potentially compromised regulatory functions may yet violate the treaty if they end up favoring state-owned entities.

A similar dismantling on presidential checks and balances characterizes the decline in the legal subindex score. Apart from informality, which has been steady, every other legal indicator has fallen sharply since 2018, driving a twenty-one-place drop in global rankings for Mexico. Judicial independence has nose-dived to 50.4 from 62.2, reflecting an extended offensive from the Morena government against the national judiciary. AMLO appointed four justices to the Supreme Court of the Justice of the Nation, including a party insider with no judicial experience. He has repeatedly accused the court of treachery and corruption, encouraged public anger at the court’s president, threatened the pensions of judiciary workers, and slashed the court’s budget. Among the most contentious political issues of the past two years is a radical judicial overhaul, first proposed by AMLO but supported by, and eventually passed under, President Sheinbaum in late 2024. In a world first, the reform aims to require every judge in the system (over 17,000) to be elected by popular vote along with a reduction by two seats in the size of the Supreme Court. A significant portion of the candidates will be prescreened by the ruling Morena party. This presents severe dangers to the rule of law and independence in the judiciary, with judges exposed to the influence of political pressure and public sentiment on what should be a fully indifferent, impartial process. Legal interpretations will become unreliable as politicization in the judiciary results in inconsistent ad-hoc rulings. The role of the judiciary as a check on the executive and legislative will be greatly diminished, primarily by means of its ability to intervene against political parties and other political actors which will now control its judges’ candidacies. Despite the imminent need for significant improvement and the administration’s continuous attacks on and heavy-handed influencing of the court, it had remained de jure independent; but the recent judicial reform throws even that into question.

The ramifications of this fundamental reform, which undermines the capacity and oversight of the judiciary, will be manifold. This includes effects on the Mexican economy, as discussed below, but to start with, top-to-bottom elections set for June 2025 will cost $650 million. These expensive elections come in the context of one of budgets aiming at reducing the historically high fiscal deficit of 2024through severe fiscal consolidation in 2025.

The fight against corruption, which has been a key justification for Morena’s authoritarian measures like the judicial reform, has shown little signs of improvement over the past five years. On the contrary, some notable loci of corruption have only emerged during recent years. In one case, the director of the recently established Institute to Return Stolen Property to the People (INDEP) resigned after explosive revelations of theft within the agency. The agency was established to redistribute the value of assets seized from criminals to the Mexican people (though critics argued it simply renamed an existing agency with the same purpose); instead, “multimillion dollar corruption” has plagued its operations. Additionally, while seized assets were previously used solely to compensate victims of crime, the new agency has opaque authority to distribute funds as it pleases, including to other political priorities, increasing risks of cronyism on top of corruption.

The judicial reform is likely to exacerbate the problem by politicizing judicial officials in lower courts and opening them to the influence of political interests and even crime. Additionally, the elimination of key autonomous oversight agencies, as discussed above, is likely to lead to less transparency and accountability for two reasons. One is that by destroying the agencies and absorbing their functions into the executive branch, regulatory and antitrust capacity are likely to suffer significantly, likely allowing more cases of bad practice to fall through the cracks. Additionally, they would be less likely to scrutinize entities associated with the executive. Similarly, while in office AMLO also directed a growing share of economic power to the sole purview of the military, including seaports, airports, customs processing, and major pet infrastructure projects like Tren Maya (Maya Train) and the Trans-Isthmic Corridor. Removing the requirement of competitive bidding and procurement, along with limited outside oversight of militarized economic activity, raise additional transparency and accountability concerns.

Militarization was also a key component of AMLO’s approach to security. In this case, a relatively flat trendline may belie a regression in Mexico’s internal security situation; the former president’s conciliatory approach to cartel violence has failed to reduce their impunity; despite misleading assurances to the contrary, a government agency confirmed that more homicides occurred during AMLO’s time in office than any other Mexican president in history. He also reversed course on his support for Mexico’s “desaparecidos,” over 100,000 unsolved cases of criminal kidnapping. However, President Sheinbaum’s approach to security may prove to be a case of significantly distancing herself from the previous government. Instead of continuing AMLO’s “hugs, not bullets” strategy, she seems willing to rely more on action than inaction, and on counterintelligence and coordination to combat and deter unsustainable levels of violence. This enormous change will be legitimized (vis-à-vis AMLO) by the need to opt for a completely different approach when put between a rock and a hard place by the United States, threatened with a 25 percent blanket tariff if inaction and lack of cooperation occur in terms of tackling drug-trafficking organizations and migration.

Finally, the clarity of law has also suffered, with Mexico dropping twenty-seven places in global rankings and losing eleven points to reach a score of 37.6. This metric assesses whether Mexican laws are general, public, consistent, and predictably enforced. Indeed, all four of those characteristics were tested repeatedly by the previous administration, perhaps most notably in an anticompetitive electricity reform bill that was struck down by the Supreme Court in early 2024. Now that Morena has pushed through its judicial overhaul, it is likely that such distortions of the clarity of the law will have fewer checks going forward, whether through anticompetitive measures from the government or unpredictable enforcement by a judicial system in disarray. Further reduction in the clarity of the law has taken place via government abridgments of private property rights.

The economic subindex shows only a moderate decline of three points since 2018. However, within the average lies an interesting dynamic, with subindices moving in different directions. On one hand, trade freedom and investment freedom show a marked increase in 2018, following the ratification of the USMCA. Trade freedom especially benefited from the agreement, showing further improvement in 2020 once the agreement was ratified.

On the other hand, the property rights score has decreased dramatically following the 2018 election. Despite being an enshrined principle in the constitution, the previous administration took several notable actions to weaken the right to private property and fair treatment of that property by the government. In 2019, the government passed a law equating tax evasion with organized crime and assigned the corresponding punishment; among its outcomes is the ability to enforce mandatory pretrial detention without bail as well as asset forfeiture prior to a guilty verdict. While this was later overturned by the Supreme Court in 2022, citing unconstitutionality, such court-ordered rollbacks are less likely given the recent erosion of judicial independence. We can see the effect of this law on the sharp drop in the score in 2019. This follows from one of the broader themes of the past AMLO administration, which was active interventionism and an anticompetitive role for the state in a variety of sectors. For example, AMLO’s energy nationalism has resulted in more and more of the government’s fiscal eggs going into the basket of Pemex, the state-owned oil company, at the expense of private investment in both fossil fuel energy production as well as, critically, renewables. This is likely to be another area where President Sheinbaum distances herself from her mentor and predecessor as she recently presented an Energy Plan which included private-sector participation through mixed investment and the reprioritization of energy transition through renewable generation. It is yet to be seen, however, what the practical implementation of such a plan will be and how a much more doubtful private sector will respond to these recent policy shifts.

It is important to also mention that the government showed a particular tendency to infringe on property rights when pushing AMLO’s pet projects; for example, in May 2023 the government illegally seized a privately administered rail track, despite a legal contract granting the company its concession, to advance the Trans-Isthmic Corridor rail initiative. Additionally, in 2023, the government sent armed military, in contravention of court order, to seize the port assets of an American company in Playa del Carmen. In the final days of his presidency, AMLO issued a decree expropriating the entirety of that private land for a nature reserve. He has previously suggested using the rare deepwater port as a cruise dock; it is also the only port in the region capable of transporting the required raw materials for the Tren Maya, which has been subject to considerable environmental and economic criticism from opponents. Neither of those two incidents are reflected in the property rights score for the past two years, but they will affect foreign investment, particularly from the United States, and resulted in a sharp rebuke from the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee. While President Sheinbaum has taken a conciliatory tone with foreign investors so far, it remains to be seen how she will align further concentration of power with an environment of enablement and certainty for business development in Mexico.

By contrast, despite some concerning years when women’s marches were met with the use of force, the women’s economic freedom score has stayed flat at 88.8 and now offers reason for cautious optimism. President Sheinbaum plans to introduce several policies aimed at advancing women’s empowerment, including supplemental pensions for women aged sixty to sixty-four and an extension of parental leave. She also has proposed a National Care System aimed at supporting unpaid work (like childcare) that traditionally falls to women, though funding for the system has yet to be established.

Evolution of prosperity

Despite the dramatic backsliding in political, economic, and legal freedoms, Mexico has mostly resisted a similar decline in the Prosperity Index during the same period, rising six places in the global rankings. Despite a foundation of macroeconomic stability, overall growth has remained frustratingly low relative to its potential. Its score has tracked fairly closely with the regional level since 1995.

While Mexico’s global prosperity score rose above pre-COVID-19 levels in 2022, in contrast to the regional average, the income subindex shows the opposite: Mexico remains below its pre-COVID levels, while the region on average has surpassed them. This can be attributed to the government’s low levels of fiscal support (0.7 percent of gross domestic product) during the pandemic, which stands in stark contrast to others in the region such as Brazil, which spent close to 9 percent of GDP on its response. Even before COVID-19, the economic growth of Mexico suffered a significant deceleration. During the first year of AMLO’s government, the economy contracted by 0.1 percent and the compounded average growth of his term (excluding 2024) is less than 1 percent. The economy notably underperformed compared to the just-under 2 percent compounded annual growth seen over the three preceding administrations from 2001 to 2018.

There are also lagging indicators that suggest constraints on growth going forward. For example, while overall foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown in recent years (mostly due to profit reinvestment), new FDI inflows show a different story. Fresh FDI inflows via equity capital have plunged steeply from $15.3 billion in the first three quarters of 2022 to only $2.0 billion for the same period in 2024, based on the latest Mexican government data.

Despite sluggish income growth, Mexico has made significant strides in reducing inequality since 2018, moving up eleven places in the global rankings and five points to 57.7. This has been driven by AMLO’s social policy; for example, the minimum wage has nearly tripled since 2018 (by decree, rather than as a result of higher productivity and competition), and poverty has declined by 20 percent since 2020, in large part due to a costly and enormous rise in cash transfers. This creates further fiscal pressures at a time when the country is running its highest deficit in almost four decades, at 5.9 percent of GDP. Remittances have also virtually doubled from about $8 billion in the first quarter of 2019 to $14 billion in the first quarter of 2024. (International Monetary Fund research has shown that remittances have a downward effect on inequality in Mexico). It should be noted, however, that the rate of improvement in the inequality score has remained reasonably consistent since 2012.

On the environment, the index shows Mexico suffered only a slight decrease from 67.2 in 2018 to 67 in 2023. This reflects a flat trend, on average, for emissions, air pollution deaths, and access to clean cooking technology. In the case of Mexico, however, this obscures significant setbacks in environmental progress from a policy perspective. Mexico dropped seven places to 39 in the 2024 Climate Change Performance Index, which rated its climate policy as “low performance.” AMLO’s oil nationalism prioritized public investments in the floundering state-owned oil supermajor, pushing out competition and heavily disincentivizing investment in renewable energy and the wider green transition. Additionally, some of the administration’s pet projects, particularly the Tren Maya, have been criticized for environmental damage to sensitive ecosystems of the Yucatán peninsula. According to Global Forest Watch, primary forest loss saw a large increase in 2019 and 2020. This was likely due to the misguided Sembrando Vida (Sowing Life) policy, which aimed to address rural poverty and environmental degradation but resulted in large tracts of forest destroyed for timber or agriculture—despite many of the landowners having been compensated for protecting existing forest under the prior government’s policy regime. The data shows a marked improvement in 2021, suggesting the government acted to stymie Sembrando Vida’s negative externalities.

The path forward

Thus far, democratic backsliding has seemingly been either aligned with the will of the voters; a cost they are willing to pay for cash transfers, a renewed hope derived from populist rhetoric, or as punishment to previous governments. Or perhaps Mexicans simply don’t care or do not acknowledge – due to a lack of effective engagement and communication from previous governments – material benefit from a rather ethereal concept: democracy. AMLO’s presidency came with noticeable material improvements in many lives, as we can see with significant progress on poverty, inequality, remittances (though unrelated to his policies), and the minimum wage. Additionally, the political opposition is in total disarray, tainted with accusations of elitism and corruption—and without capacity to self-assess, regroup, and present a compelling alternative. AMLO, with his singular star power, and now Claudia Sheinbaum with more than 75 percent popularity (in January 2025), have effectively capitalized on their absence with an inclusive narrative of economic nationalism and executive strength.

On top of backsliding, the targeted problems of corruption, lack of security, and a culture of privilege remain largely unsolved. Additionally, the risks of continuing down the path of democratic retrenchment are immense and wide-ranging. The politicization of the judicial system risks an even deeper loss of public trust in the law as well as deeper entrenchment of a single hegemonic party, further reducing the viability of a basic democratic requirement: a strong opposition, which has also inflicted significant self-damage to be seen as an appealing and trustworthy political option.

In addition to driving a cycle of continuously shrinking freedoms, the existing approach may also struggle to generate an adequate growth engine required for improvements in economic vibrancy. The country is facing several headwinds in achieving its growth potential in the medium term. For one thing, returning the budget deficit to manageable levels—Sheinbaum has pledged to meet a 3.9 percent deficit target in 2025—will require fiscal trade-offs. It will require the president to confront her government’s relationship with Pemex, the roughly $100 billion elephant in the room. While her predecessor injected almost $100 billion into Pemex via direct financing and tax breaks, production declined and losses doubled to $8.1 billion in October 2024 compared to a year earlier. The company’s debt now stands at almost 6 percent of the entire country’s GDP and the government has pledged almost $7 billion more this year amid a rapidly tightening budgetary environment. The Pemex albatross will hang heavily on the sovereign balance sheet, as we are seeing already. Along with concerns about the constitutional reform, Pemex’s fiscal burden helped drive Moody’s latest downgrading of Mexico’s debt outlook from “stable” to “negative” in November 2024.

Additionally, Mexico’s macroeconomic scenario is highly dependent on foreign trade, particularly its integration with the United States and Canada via the USMCA. Exports accounted for over 40 percent of Mexico’s GDP in 2022, and over 80 percent of those exports went to the United States. Those who invest and trade with Mexico crave certainty, particularly in a context of transformative changes to international supply chains. However, current uncertainty is driven by two key factors, one domestic and one international. Domestically, dramatic policy change toward concentration of power, fewer checks and balances, and less competitive markets are likely to alarm international investors as well as curtail domestic economic activity. The latter factor concerns Mexico’s trade relationships within North America, especially the outcome of USMCA negotiations and their effect on nearshoring growth. Donald Trump, following his decisive electoral victory in the United States, has advocated for extreme trade protectionism, including against Mexican imports. While rhetoric must soon give way to actual policy implementation for the Trump administration, it remains to be seen if his most severe threats will be realized, such as the imposition of a 25 percent tariff on Mexican imports that would have likely been implemented the first day of February, had the Mexican president not engaged in a forty-five-minute call with Trump in which, among other things, she committed to the immediate deployment of 10,000 military forces in the northern border area of the country. The coming four years, but particularly this year, are expected to be quite uncertain as, according to mostly vague thresholds of cooperation on organized crime and migration, the main anchor of the Mexican economy (trade with the US) will become extremely volatile.

One thing is for sure: There will be uncertain and tense times ahead, beginning with the first months of the second Trump administration and continuing until an agreement for a revamped trade agreement is in place, most probably, one which considers a form of sectoral customs union. Mexico is the main US trading partner and source of imports. Mexico also is among the top trading partners of the majority of the fifty US states, so having a free trade agreement that anchors certainty and promotes competitiveness and productivity in North America is a matter of priority for the United States as well. That said, one should expect a great deal of rhetoric and threats to stand in the way before a consensus emerges. Mexico will have to stay focused and display a sophisticated and effective multilevel strategy to reduce uncertainty and enhance its position in the negotiating process. The most important aspect will be managing the effects of rhetoric on business sentiment and avoiding the implementation of drastic and costly measures for Mexicans and the country’s economy.

The drop in FDI noted above is a foreboding sign. Investors had been awaiting the outcomes of the Mexican judicial reform and the US election, among other factors, and now they watchfully wait to see the Trump administration’s actual policies. Meanwhile, so far, Mexico has seized less of the unique nearshoring opportunity than it should have from Asian competitors like India and Vietnam. To do so, it must still meet important nearshoring requirements such as improvements in infrastructure, energy reliability, and security.

In conclusion, the past several years of deepening democratic retrenchment have culminated in a seismic shift in Mexican politics. Despite continued improvements in poverty and inequality and steady, if low, income growth, these reductions in freedoms may soon threaten Mexico’s prosperity in the medium term. Most of the population has fluctuated between eagerness and indifference vis-à-vis these changes so far. If President Sheinbaum and Morena continue to consolidate power and reduce checks and balances, it may be too late to reverse course once the full effects are felt.

President Sheinbaum has made her choice on the political transformation of the country, moving toward more concentration of power in the executive and the cancellation of several checks and balances which, however imperfect and thus improvable, were there as both limit and anchor. Her second conundrum will be around the economic system, where a series of contradictions derived from the chosen course of action in the political sphere will play out. We have yet to see what can become of a new model and a new trend in the world: regimes with autocratic features or even full-blown autocracies that create the avenues, spaces, and conditions for the private sector to accommodate and flourish in an era of deglobalization and strategic ally shoring; post-truth politics and social media; and a more polarized and volatile ecosystem.

Note: The text of this report was finalized in February of 2025.

Vanessa Rubio-Márquez is professor in practice and associate dean for extended education at the London School of Economics’ (LSE) School of Public Policy. She is also a member of the Freedom and Prosperity Advisory Council at the Atlantic Council, an associate fellow at Chatham House, and a member of organizations such as the Mexican Council of International Affairs, the International Women’s Forum, Hispanas Organized for Political Equality, and LSE’s Latin America and the Caribbean Center. Previously, Rubio-Marquez had a twenty-five-year career in Mexico’s public sector, including serving as three-times deputy minister (Finance, Social Development, and Foreign Affairs) and senator.

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How Merz can leverage Germany’s green transition for growth and security

Carol Schaeffer — Fri, 28 Feb 2025 20:07:11 +0000

Friedrich Merz is poised to be Germany’s next chancellor, and coalition talks are already underway following the February 23 national election. Much of the talk in the past week has been about how the new German government will need to lead Europe’s push for security “independence”—a word Merz used in his election night speech—as the continent faces an uncertain future with the United States’ security guarantees. But another critical aspect of Europe’s long-term security is energy and climate diplomacy, which must not be overlooked and could be crucial in forming a solid ruling coalition.

Germany stands at a crossroads in its green transition. As political winds shift both in Berlin and beyond, the next government will need to decide whether to lean into the economic opportunities of clean energy or retreat in the face of short-term political obstacles.

Germany’s changing political landscape on climate

Political winds in Germany have indeed shifted. The environment was front and center in the September 2021 election that saw Olaf Scholz become chancellor. By mid-2022, the Greens were polling at 26 percent, rivaling the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Christian Democrats (CDU). But by 2023, backlash to a heat pump mandate—which in effect banned new oil and gas heating installations—contributed to decreasing support for Scholz’s government, with both the center-right CDU and the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) capitalizing on the unpopularity of environmental policies.

In the run-up to the election, Merz’s CDU signaled that it would retreat from key climate measures. The party backs a “true European Energy Union” but seeks to gut core aspects of the European Green Deal. (Ironically, the European Green Deal is championed by European Commissioner and CDU member Ursula von der Leyen.) In Brussels, the CDU and its allies in the European People’s Party are leading the charge to roll back regulations.

At home, Merz has pledged to weaken European Union (EU) emissions limits for cars and reverse the planned 2035 ban on combustion engines, favoring German automakers over climate commitments. With the EU poised to negotiate a 90 percent emissions reduction target for 2040, Germany could soon shift from climate leader to climate roadblock.

The economic and political case for staying the course

Critics of the green transition paint it as too expensive and bureaucratic. But the reality is quite the opposite—clean energy is an economic engine. Investing in the green transition means new industries, new jobs, and long-term growth that far outweighs the initial costs.

This isn’t just political rhetoric; it’s quickly becoming economic consensus. Former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi’s September 2024 landmark report makes it clear: the only path to Europe’s long-term competitiveness is shifting away from fossil fuels. As the Draghi report illustrates, clean technology is no longer just an environmental necessity—it’s an economic imperative.

The International Energy Agency estimates that the global clean energy market will triple, to two trillion dollars by 2035. That’s one-third of the US federal budget and four times Germany’s. If Germany slows down now, it risks forfeiting a once-in-a-generation economic opportunity.

Merz also should not overlook the political advantages to be gained from incorporating strengthened green initiatives into his program. Coming in behind the SPD, the Greens were the fourth-largest party, gaining nearly 12 percent of the vote. Although Merz no longer necessarily needs the Greens to form a coalition, this is only because the Free Democrats (FDP) and Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) narrowly missed the 5 percent parliamentary threshold. Looking ahead, Merz may very well end up needing the Greens on his side. In addition, priorities for green initiatives are often shared among much of the electorate for both the SPD and Die Linke, or the Left Party, as well. Taking those priorities seriously could go a long way toward building approval among the 36 percent of the German electorate who voted for leftist parties.

Energy security and the geopolitical stakes

Beyond economics, energy independence is a growing security concern. To speak in broad terms, Germany has three options:

Buy natural gas from a hostile Russia or a United States that seems increasingly unreliable toward Europe
Continue relying on coal, a finite and highly polluting resource
Pioneer renewable energy and solidify its position as a global leader

With transatlantic security ties under strain and Europe forced to take more responsibility for its defense, energy security is now national security. A centralized investment in energy independence is Germany’s best bet for maintaining economic strength and strategic autonomy.

A blueprint for German leadership

Germany doesn’t need to go it alone—it needs to double down on partnerships and innovation. Key policies to strengthen its role in the global green economy include:

Using its influence in the EU to expand the bloc’s Net-Zero Industry Act to bring 40 percent of clean tech production back to Europe by 2030
Scaling up investments in critical minerals mining and refinement with partners such as Canada and Australia
Advancing green hydrogen projects, like those already underway in Namibia
Focusing on high-value, specialized clean tech (offshore wind, hydrogen, advanced battery chemistries) rather than trying to outcompete China in mass production

Europe’s strategic advantage

While Germany and the EU may not be able to displace China in climate supply chains, they can out-innovate Beijing in key sectors. The future of the transatlantic alliance could be built on a clean energy partnership, not just military cooperation.

By investing where there is inevitable demand, Germany can secure its place as a leader in the twenty-first-century economy—strengthening both Europe’s geopolitical standing and its relationship with the United States in the process.

The choice is clear: cutting back on green policies would be an economic and strategic mistake. The incoming German government can either seize the momentum or let others lead the way.

Carol Schaeffer is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and a policy fellow with the Jain Family Institute, focusing on decarbonization, the energy transition, and European policy.

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Senegal’s president must not miss the opportunity afforded by the country’s democratic spotlight

Hippolyte Fofack — Fri, 28 Feb 2025 14:47:56 +0000

French politician Jacques Chirac once said that democracy is a luxury Africa can ill afford. But last year, the people of Senegal made clear in a free and fair presidential election that democracy can prevail in Africa.

Almost a year since his election, President Bassirou Diomaye Faye now has a clear mandate to carry out reforms, following his party’s resounding victory in November’s legislative elections. He must now turn his focus to continuing along the democratic track, lifting the constraints associated with credit rationing and leveraging commodity-based industrialization, and setting Senegal up for robust economic growth and welfare improvements.

By the end of the presidential election early last year, outgoing President Macky Sall—who had attempted to postpone the election, a move that led to deadly protests—congratulated Faye, calling the elections the “victory of Senegalese democracy.” Such a victory is important for Senegal, as democracy (contrary to what Chirac suggested) is not a luxury but a necessity for national reconciliation, the legitimacy of national institutions, and, ultimately, shared prosperity.

The presidential election was a victory not only for Senegal’s democracy but for democracy globally, rekindling confidence internationally in a system of government that has come under strain in Africa, especially in West Africa, where military coups have surged. That boost in confidence comes as people in even Western democracies grow dissatisfied with how democracy works in their countries. For example, an Ipsos poll in 2023 conducted across seven Western countries (including France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) found that most respondents believed the economy is rigged to the advantage of the rich and powerful and that “radical change” is needed to improve the political system.

In that poll, 70 percent of American respondents and 73 percent of French respondents—whose countries are seeing rising political polarization—said they believe that the state of democracy has declined in their countries in recent years. Moreover, the 2024 Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index ranked both the United States and France as “flawed democracies.”

While massive amounts of campaign financing are considered a prerequisite (and perhaps the most important attribute) for winning an election, Senegal’s presidential election was a reminder that conviction and ideas still matter. Faye—who secured 54.28 percent of the vote as an independent after his party was banned—defeated candidates who had far more financial firepower and ample time to rally support on their campaign trails. Despite being released from prison just a little over a week before the presidential election, Faye’s message and program were in sync with people’s aspirations and garnered broad-based support at the ballot box.

Faye promised to improve the living conditions in Senegal. For too long, the country has contended with widespread poverty, especially in rural areas where as many as 57 percent of people are considered poor. Furthermore, Senegalese youth continue to face high unemployment. The informal economy—which is generally associated with low productivity and endemic poverty—has become a major piece of the economy, accounting for nearly 37 percent of Senegal’s gross domestic product (GDP). Recently, the rising cost of living and income inequality have exacerbated Senegal’s socioeconomic challenges. Inflation has proven particularly sticky and is eroding household purchasing power. Amid these challenges, increasing numbers of Senegalese migrants are risking their lives to sail the seas en route to Europe in search of better opportunities.

Faye has also promised to fight corruption, promote good governance, and strengthen the rule of law and democratic institutions. For years, a “strongman” culture across Africa has enabled collusion between politicians and multinational companies, which has weakened agency and popular ownership of policies to undermine economic opportunity and exacerbate income inequality. This is especially the case in countries rich in natural resources, which are more vulnerable to corruption due to the significant revenues generated by resource exploitation, management, and trade.

Departing from the norm, Faye declared his assets in the lead-up to the presidential election. Upon becoming president, he announced he would conduct an audit of Senegal’s oil, gas, and mining sectors to rebalance them in the national interest. These moves establish baselines against which the people of Senegal can assess the president’s work toward tackling corruption and enhancing efficiency in the allocation of resources, with an ultimate goal of achieving more inclusive growth and shared prosperity in the country.

These are important steps in the right direction. Improving welfare for the Senegalese people requires a fundamental transformation of the economy. Expectations in Senegal are high following the discovery of major oil and gas reserves a few years ago. There are similarly high expectations for Africa as a whole. Despite its immense natural-resource wealth, the continent has, over the last several decades, become the world’s epicenter of poverty: Africa has the largest share of extreme poverty rates globally and is home to twenty-three of the world’s poorest twenty-eight countries.

This starkly contrasts with Nordic countries and the Gulf states, which have successfully leveraged their natural-resource wealth to boost prosperity in a span of a few decades. This contrast is partly due to the fact that rather than processing its own natural resources, Africa instead largely exports them overseas, increasing the prevalence of macroeconomic shocks and the risk of poor governance—both of which adversely affect the investment climate and heighten growth volatility.

But Senegal, arguably a latecomer to the hydrocarbon world, can learn from other African countries’ management (and mismanagement) of natural resources.

Considering the experience of the most successful oil-rich countries, Faye should look to alter the structure of value chains to retain more production and refining processes locally. If Senegal can nurture these industries, it will set up the country for commodity-based industrialization that expands employment opportunities, enhances technology transfer, and accelerates integration into the global economy. This will help Senegal avoid a deterioration in commodity terms of trade, which is fueling internal and external imbalances. Last October, Moody’s downgraded Senegal’s long-term credit rating, citing a significantly weaker fiscal and debt position.

There are mechanisms and conditions in Africa that would help Faye in localizing natural-resource production and refining processes. The African Continental Free Trade Area’s rules of origin (which prioritize made-in-Africa goods) should help catalyze the production of intermediate and manufactured goods and the development of robust regional value chains. The scale of the continental market should help Senegal offset the potential losses of international trade associated with expanding protectionist barriers in a geopolitically fractured world.

The rise of globally competitive African businesses necessitates large-scale, long-term investment, so reforming the banking system will also be important. Affordable patient capital is particularly critical in Senegal, where domestic credit to the private sector remains very low (31.3 percent of GDP, versus 126.8 percent in Norway) and overwhelmingly short term. According to a report by the Central Bank of West African States, more than 80 percent of loans issued in 2022 had a maturity within less than two years.

Faye has an opportunity to achieve the systemic change he promised. Democracy has provided a path to greater ownership of policies that equalize access to opportunities and raise living standards in Senegal and more generally across Africa, a continent rich in resources and where the people are no longer prepared to accept intergenerational poverty as an inevitability. But democracy must not be regarded as an end; it must be seen as a means to greater security and prosperity. Thus, Faye must actively use the opportunity provided by the rekindling flame of democracy to usher in a new era—one that yields huge democratic and economic dividends.

Hippolyte Fofack, a former chief economist at the African Export-Import Bank, is a fellow with the Sustainable Development Solutions Network at Columbia University, a research associate at Harvard University, a distinguished fellow at the Global Federation of Competitiveness Councils, and a fellow at the African Academy of Sciences.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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Kabawat mentioned in Deutsche Welle Arabic on the Syrian National Dialogue

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:13:39 +0000

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Kabawat mentioned in Catholic Culture on the committee drafting Syria’s new constitution

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:13:37 +0000

original source

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History’s clock is ticking (again) in Germany

Frederick Kempe — Mon, 24 Feb 2025 22:32:16 +0000

It’s hard to overstate the United States’ historic investment in Germany’s success—and its impact on Europe’s future.

Americans alongside allies defeated Imperial Germany in World War I and Nazi Germany in World War II, only thereafter to help rebuild and democratize West Germany, or the Federal Republic, laying the groundwork for its peaceful reunification in 1990 as both a NATO and European Union member.

It’s only with that as context that one hears the weight of likely next German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s election-night mention of the need for “independence” from Washington, even before the final vote results were in. It’s worth reading his full quote.

“My absolute priority will be to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that, step by step, we can really achieve independence from the USA,” said Merz, one of the most authentic Atlanticists I’ve known. “I never thought I would have to say something like this on a television program. But after Donald Trump’s statements last week at the latest, it is clear that Americans, at least this part of the Americans, this administration, are largely indifferent to the fate of Europe.”

It’s also with an understanding of Germany’s centrality to European history over the past two centuries—both its worst and best parts—that one can fully digest Merz’s warning the day after the election that it is “five minutes to midnight” in Europe.

With that, Merz underscored the immediacy of the economic, security, and geopolitical challenges facing Germany and Europe.

Merz may be the most pro-business chancellor Germans have elected since World War II, but his Christian Democrats face the country’s near-zero growth with just 28.6 percent of the vote, their second worst outcome since the war. Their likely coalition partners, the Social Democrats, at 16.4 percent, scored their worst result since 1887, even worse than March 1933, when Adolf Hitler came to power.

The real winners this week were the far-right Alternative for Germany party, or AfD, which doubled its vote to 20.8 percent, and the far-left Die Linke, with 8.8 percent. With a third of all the votes in the Bundestag resting with the far right and the far left, they have the power to block the sort of constitutional changes Merz would need to spur the growth and defense spending Germany can only achieve through lifting its debt brake.

Are things as bad in the transatlantic relationship as Merz suggests?

One hopes not, and US President Donald Trump can change rhetoric and policy on a pfennig. However, it would be short-sighted for European leaders not to grasp the urgent need for greater self-reliance, particularly as the United States today voted against a United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning Russia on the third anniversary of its war of aggression on Ukraine—going against all the European allies and siding with Russia and its friends.

Is the clock ticking down as fast as Merz says on European security and economic threats?

Merz is a keen enough observer to know the severity of the situation. He’s also a good enough politician to realize that he’ll only have the leverage to address it if voters recognize the gathering dangers.

Most importantly, Merz knows that if he and his prospective coalition partners don’t act decisively now, those far-right and far-left numbers will grow, and German history shows us where that leads.

What Merz has identified is the historic moment. The coming months will determine how he rises to it.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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From Tunis to Baghdad: Can platform-based politics take root?

Carrie Schenkel and James Storen — Mon, 24 Feb 2025 19:30:13 +0000

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This paper is the fifth in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “State of the Parties” series analyzing the strength of multi-party systems in different regions of the world.

The organization of political parties has served multiple distinct roles in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). In many cases, regimes use them to create a light veneer of democratic legitimacy for authoritarianism; in other cases, parties exist to represent one identity group or are centered around a singular individual. In rare cases, but with a few successful examples, parties exist to represent an ideology. Rarer still, but key to the future democratic success of the region, are true platform-based parties. Vacuums of political leadership have developed due to the limited role parties play in shaping governance, representation, and public policy. In a rapidly changing region, the opportunity for effective, issues-based parties has never been more evident. Iran’s proxies in the region have been significantly weakened and the “Axis of Resistance” dismantled, presenting openings for new political leadership to emerge.

Political parties are not yet poised to meet the moment. In much of the region, long histories of implicit and explicit bans and one-party dominance have left political parties weak, unpopular, and ineffective. Extended periods of suppression and restriction—such as Jordan’s thirty-year party ban, Iraq’s decades of one-party rule under Saddam Hussein, and Tunisia’s twenty-three years of party bans during the Ben Ali era—have resulted in political parties that lack both organizational capacity and broad public appeal. Rather, they are fragmented, ideologically vague, and centered around individuals rather than coherent platforms.

The proliferation of political parties—more than 220 are currently registered in Tunisia, for example—has further undermined any sense of clear policy platforms and the ability to differentiate one party from another. Rather than reforming or uniting under existing frameworks, disillusioned members frequently break away to form new parties, stymieing coalition-building and the development of rooted, comprehensive party ideologies.

Disillusionment with traditional parties has led citizens to favor actors perceived as more directly serving their interests, such as Hezbollah—which positions itself as a resistance force against Israel—or Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated parties, which have gained trust through their provision of essential social services in Egypt, Jordan, and elsewhere. In an era defined by youth-led movements, digital activism, and persistent calls for democratization, these parties stand at a crossroads. Whether they act as agents of change or instruments of entrenched power remains a central question, shaping not only the future of governance within individual nations but also the trajectory of regional stability and development.

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Ukrainians are proudly democratic but resoundingly reject wartime elections

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 20 Feb 2025 23:43:38 +0000

As the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion draws close, the chorus of voices calling for new elections in Ukraine is growing louder and louder. Curiously, however, these calls are not coming from the Ukrainians themselves, but from the Kremlin and the Trump White House.

Since his inauguration one month ago, US President Donald Trump has begun echoing Russian demands for fresh Ukrainian elections. This week, he sparked outrage by branding Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy a “dictator without elections.” These attacks have proved popular in Moscow but have fallen flat in Kyiv, with most Ukrainians rejecting the US leader’s claims and rallying behind Zelenskyy.

The debate over Ukrainian elections reflects the challenging wartime realities in the partially occupied country. Ukraine was scheduled to hold presidential and parliamentary votes in 2024 but was forced to postpone both ballots as the Ukrainian Constitution does not allow national elections during martial law, which was introduced in 2022 and remains in place. Zelenskyy has vowed to hold elections as soon as the security situation allows, but argues that it would be impossible to stage free and fair votes in the current circumstances.

The majority of Ukrainians appear to agree. Two of Zelenskyy’s main political rivals, Petro Poroshenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, have publicly rejected the idea of wartime elections as impractical and illegitimate. Ukraine’s vibrant civil society has also voiced its opposition to the return of elections before a peace agreement has been signed. Meanwhile, a new opinion poll conducted in February 2025 found that 63 percent of Ukrainians are against holding any national votes until the war with Russia is over.

This lack of appetite for wartime elections is not the product of apathy or oppression. On the contrary, Ukrainians are fiercely proud of their country’s democratic credentials, which were hard-won during two separate pro-democracy revolutions in 2004 and 2014. On both occasions, millions of Ukrainians took part in massive protest movements opposing Russian-backed attempts to subvert the country’s emerging democracy and place Ukraine on a trajectory toward Kremlin-style authoritarianism. This grassroots embrace of democratic values has become central to modern Ukraine’s sense of national identity.

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As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

For more than two decades, Ukraine’s burgeoning democratic culture has been one of the key triggers behind Moscow’s escalating campaign of aggression against the country. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s obsession with Ukraine can be traced back to the 2004 Orange Revolution, which was in part provoked by his botched intervention in the Ukrainian presidential election. This was to prove a watershed moment in relations between the two post-Soviet countries. Over the subsequent two decades, Ukraine has pursued a European democratic future, while Putin’s Russia has turned back toward the imperial past.

Putin’s fear of Ukrainian democracy is easy enough to understand. As a young KGB officer in East Germany, his formative political experience was the fall of the Berlin Wall and the rapid collapse of the Soviet Empire as a wave of democratic uprisings swept across Eastern Europe. Ever since the Orange Revolution, Putin has been haunted by the idea that an increasingly democratic Ukraine could serve as a catalyst for the next stage in Russia’s imperial retreat and spark the breakup of the Russian Federation itself.

Mounting concern in Moscow over the possible impact of Ukraine’s democratic progress was a major contributing factor behind Putin’s fateful decision to invade Ukraine in 2014. When the occupation of Crimea and eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region failed to prevent the consolidation of Ukrainian democracy or derail the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration, Putin felt compelled to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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Ukrainians would be the first to admit that their country’s democracy is still very much a work in progress that suffers from a wide range of imperfections including deeply entrenched institutional corruption and excessive oligarch influence. Temporary wartime security measures targeting Kremlin-linked political parties and institutions such as the Russian Orthodox Church have also raised concerns. At the same time, Ukrainians are acutely aware that their country’s recent history of internationally recognized elections and strengthening democratic culture set them apart from their Russian neighbors.

The fight for democracy has in many ways defined Ukraine’s post-Soviet journey, but the vast majority of Ukrainians do not support the idea of holding elections in the current wartime conditions. This skepticism is understandable. More than ten million Ukrainians, representing around a quarter of the population, have been internally displaced by Russia’s invasion or forced to flee abroad as refugees. Millions more are currently living under Russian occupation. Without their participation, any vote would lack legitimacy. Likewise, around one million Ukrainian men and women are now serving in the armed forces. Attempting to provide safe voting conditions for them would be a logistical and security nightmare.

It would be similarly impossible to organize a credible election campaign. With the entire country subject to virtually daily Russian bombardment, large-scale campaign events and election rallies would be out of the question. It would be even more reckless to open thousands of polling stations on election day and invite attacks from Russian drones and missiles. Over the past three years, the Kremlin has repeatedly bombed Ukrainian civilians at train stations, funerals, and other public gatherings. There is little reason to believe election day crowds would not also be targeted. Even if a ceasefire was introduced well before the vote, the threat of renewed Russian air strikes would loom large over the entire campaign and deter public participation.

In addition to these practical impediments, attempting to stage an election campaign prior to the signing of a peace treaty would risk sowing division within Ukrainian society at a pivotal moment in the country’s history. Many believe this is the true reason for the Kremlin’s sudden and otherwise inexplicable enthusiasm for Ukrainian democracy. After all, Russia is the world leader in election interference. While Putin’s army has been unable to defeat Ukraine on the battlefield, he may feel that he can still achieve his goal of dividing and subjugating the country via the ballot box. At the very least, if current Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy failed to win reelection, this would remove a very high-profile obstacle to a peace agreement in Russia’s favor.

Democracy is at the very heart of Ukraine’s current fight for national survival and is destined to remain one of the core values in postwar Ukraine. For now, though, most Ukrainians acknowledge that any attempt to stage elections would be impractical and irresponsible in the extreme. For this reason, there is currently no clamor whatsoever for elections within Ukrainian society. The current generation of Ukrainians have fought long and hard for their democratic rights, but they also recognize that the country must be at peace before credible elections can take place. It would be absurd to ignore their wishes and impose premature elections on Ukraine as part of a Kremlin-friendly peace process.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Who is Germany’s presumptive next chancellor, Friedrich Merz, and what is his track record?

Friedrich Merz emerged on the political stage in the 1990s, first as a member of the European Parliament until 1994, then as a Bundestag member until 2009. He briefly served as chairman of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) parliamentary group in 2000, but was sidelined under Merkel‘s leadership and pivoted to the private sector, working as a corporate lawyer and heading the supervisory board of the German branch of BlackRock until 2018. Throughout this period, he maintained his diplomatic influence—and his international and transatlantic ties—as chairman of Atlantik-Brücke, a non-profit association promoting German-American understanding and cooperation. Merz stepped back into the political fray in Berlin as a challenger for Merkel’s succession in 2018, only to be beaten by then-CDU leader Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer. He was eventually selected to lead the CDU in 2022.

Given his track record, the presumptive next chancellor is likely to prioritize Germany’s fiscal discipline at home, with implementing strict budget cuts—for example, by restructuring the country’s “Bürgergeld”—while projecting German strength abroad to counterparts on the European and international stage. This approach was evident in a recent TV debate, in which he asserted with the other candidates: “We are not neutral. We do not stand in the middle. We are on the side of Ukraine and, with Ukraine, we defend the political order we have here.”

— Stuart Jones is a program assistant in the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

What are the key issues for voters, and how does Russia’s war in Ukraine factor in?

Click on a picture above to read more.

What has driven the rising support for the far-right AfD?

Over the last decade, the Overton window in Germany has shifted, just as it has in the United States. The AfD, founded in 2013, was once considered a fringe political party, but in recent years, it has gained significant traction. Today, it’s on the verge of its strongest national showing yet, likely coming in second behind the CDU/CSU. Part of this success stems from the fact that the AfD has adopted a playbook similar to that of the New Right in the United States. The messages it promotes to the German public prey on the same grievances: illegal immigration, government overreach, and culture wars, among others.

— Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Does the AfD stand a chance of joining the governing coalition?

No. All of the major parties in this election have been very clear about excluding the AfD from any coalition to form a government. The “remigration” plan, outlined in a secret Potsdam retreat of some AfD leaders in November 2023, sparked widespread anti-Nazi protests across Germany and led the country’s mainstream parties to distance themselves from the far-right outfit as far as possible. This sentiment largely remains intact in 2025. While the AfD continues to be considered taboo for its advocacy of a “master plan” for mass deportations of migrants and asylum-seekers, the CDU’s recent use of AfD votes to pass a non-binding resolution on stricter migration rules has caused political outrage and nationwide protests. Fears persist that a CDU-led government, even without the AfD in coalition, could still rely on the party’s support in the Bundestag.

— Stuart Jones

Although the “Brandmauer” will hold, meaning the AfD won’t be part of a governing coalition, it will be difficult to completely ignore a party that will likely secure over 20 percent of the German vote. That’s where the rubber hits the road: Will the next German chancellor and his coalition be able to reclaim key narratives from the AfD, or will the AfD be able to continue pulling German society further to the right?

— Rachel Rizzo

What should allies across Europe and the Atlantic watch out for?

The AfD, poised for a strong performance this year, will dominate international headlines. While the CDU remains the front-runner, the prospective rise of the far-right party—classified by Germany’s intelligence agency as an “extremist group”—would mark a historic shift in postwar Germany’s electoral balance. Outcomes at the extremes, including the AfD, leftwing parties like Die Linke and the Sarah Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), and the FDP, which is hovering around the 5 percent threshold, could yield enough seats to form a one-third blocking minority, scattering ambitions for much-needed fiscal reforms. Last-minute gains from Die Linke, combined with a significant share of undecided voters, will determine whether Berlin is headed for a two- or three-way coalition government.

Europe is looking to Berlin to regain its leadership role, overcoming divisions that are bleeding into Brussels’s policymaking at a critical time. Confronted with complicated domestic fiscal and EU budget negotiations, imminent trade negotiations with Washington, decisive defense support for Ukraine, and far-reaching reforms on Europe’s competitiveness, immigration, and tech regulations, the next German government will face critical decisions. High on the agenda, the future chancellor will have to reinvigorate Franco-German partnership, which is crucial for shaping the continent’s defense policy in light of dwindling US security commitments.

— Jacopo Pastorelli is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Germany’s economy has gone from engine to anchor. Here’s what the next chancellor faces.

By Piotr Arak

Revitalizing growth in Germany’s economy, which appears increasingly mired in stagnation, will demand urgent action from the next chancellor.

Economy & Business Elections

New Atlanticist Feb 4, 2025

The next German chancellor must lead from the front, not the middle, on European security

By Rachel Rizzo, James Batchik

From support for Ukraine to defense spending, German leaders would be wise to take the phrase Führung aus der Mitte permanently out of their vocabulary.

Elections Germany

New Atlanticist Dec 18, 2024

Scholz’s no-confidence vote isn’t the start of political dysfunction. It’s Germany’s way out of it.

By Jörn Fleck, Rachel Rizzo

One might assume that the German chancellor losing a vote of confidence this week signals political paralysis ahead, but look deeper.

Elections Germany

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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Germany’s economy has gone from engine to anchor. Here’s what the next chancellor faces.

Piotr Arak — Wed, 19 Feb 2025 14:58:13 +0000

For decades, Germany has been the economic engine of Europe, boasting the largest economy in the European Union (EU) and ranking third globally by nominal gross domestic product (GDP). However, in recent years the nation’s economic trajectory has faltered. Following two consecutive years of contraction, Germany faces significant structural and political challenges that will demand the next chancellor’s immediate attention. With federal elections set for February 23, the stakes are high for Germany . . .

. . . and for Europe. “When Germany sneezes, Europe catches a cold.” This well-worn metaphor encapsulates Germany’s outsized influence on the EU’s economic and political landscape. The nation’s economic slowdown and political instability reverberate across the continent, threatening the cohesion and growth of the bloc’s members.

Understanding Germany’s current challenges is crucial to assessing the potential risks for the EU as a whole. Some of these challenges were pointed out by the former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi in his report last year on the future of European competitiveness.

Political uncertainty

Polls suggest a fragmented political landscape ahead of the February 23 elections. The center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), and its Bavarian counterpart, the Christian Social Union (CSU) are leading with 30 percent. The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) follows in second with 22 percent, while the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Greens, and smaller parties trail behind. While the AfD has been gaining support, it still appears unlikely that any of the established parties will form a coalition with it. If this holds after the election, then coalition negotiations are set to be particularly complex. One likely scenario is the “Kenya coalition” of the CDU/CSU, SPD, and Greens, so-called because of the party colors that mirror the black, red, and green of the Kenyan flag. Another is a “Germany coalition” of the CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP.

The continuation of the “traffic light” coalition (SPD, Greens, and the Free Democratic Party) appears unlikely, strengthening expectations that CDU leader Friedrich Merz will assume the role of chancellor. A prominent Atlanticist and long-time opponent of former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Merz returned to politics after she left office in 2021. A former businessman, he has reshaped the CDU’s political direction, adopting more conservative positions on migration, a market-oriented approach to economic policies, and a more pragmatic stance on the energy transition.

Economic stagnation and structural issues

Germany’s most immediate problem is that its economic growth has stalled. The European Commission forecasts GDP growth of just 0.7 percent in 2025, marking the slowest pace among EU nations. Since 2017, the German economy has grown by a mere 1.6 percent, far below the EU average of 9.5 percent. Structural weaknesses, such as high energy costs, low public investment, and an overreliance on exports, have entrenched stagnation. Financial Times associate editor Wolfgang Münchau’s newest book, Kaput: The End of the German Miracle, underscores these imbalances. In it, he warns that Germany’s export-driven model and limited domestic investment have left it ill-prepared for future challenges.

Germany’s industrial base, once the backbone of its economy, is eroding. Prominent German companies are relocating some production abroad, citing lower costs and fewer bureaucratic hurdles. Industrial production has declined steadily, with 2024 output at just 90 percent of 2015 levels. In stark contrast, Poland’s industrial production grew to 152 percent of its 2015 level, reflecting a broader shift of manufacturing capabilities to Central and Eastern Europe.

Germany’s aging population poses significant challenges for its workforce and productivity. With a shrinking labor pool, industries face rising costs and pressure to automate. The unemployment rate in Germany remains low, at 5 percent, but industrial layoffs and restructuring are expected. While the Hartz labor market reforms of the early 2000s and the introduction of the euro in 1999 mitigated similar challenges, today’s environment demands significant public investment and policy innovation to sustain competitiveness. This time, devaluating and decreasing wage growth is not on the table.

High energy prices, driven in part by volatile gas markets, are undermining German competitiveness. Public investment remains inadequate, accounting for just 2.8 percent of GDP—below the EU average of 3.6 percent and far behind Poland (5.1 percent) and Sweden (5.2 percent). Bureaucratic obstacles and a cultural aversion to deficit spending continue to stymie large-scale projects that could drive innovation and increase sustainability.

In contrast to Germany, several Central and Eastern European nations—such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—have emerged as more dynamic competitors. These economies benefit from robust foreign investment and growing service sectors. Spain, too, has become a more attractive destination for foreign direct investment, outpacing Germany in growth and innovation.

Risk aversion and Chinese competition

Germany’s bureaucracy, often seen as a hallmark of precision and order, has increasingly become a barrier to innovation and economic dynamism. Complex regulatory frameworks and lengthy approval processes are stifling entrepreneurial initiatives, making it difficult for businesses to adapt swiftly to changing market conditions. The country’s aversion to risk, rooted in a cultural preference for stability and caution, further exacerbates this challenge.

Many German companies prioritize incremental improvements over bold, transformative projects, fearing failure and the potential regulatory repercussions. (Think, for example, about how it has been slow on the electric vehicle revolution.) This conservative mindset has hindered Germany’s ability to compete in fast-evolving sectors, such as technology and green energy, where agility and risk-taking are essential. Addressing these structural issues will require not only simplifying administrative processes but also fostering a cultural shift toward embracing innovation and calculated risks.

The growing dominance of Chinese automakers in the global electric vehicle (EV) market, in accordance with the “Made in China 2025” strategy, poses a significant threat to Germany’s automotive sector, a cornerstone of its economy. Chinese manufacturers, supported by substantial state subsidies and vertically integrated supply chains, have achieved cost efficiencies and technological advancements that are challenging Germany’s competitive edge.

Chinese automakers such as BYD and NIO are entering European markets with affordable and innovative EV models, outpacing German automakers in battery technology and production scalability. This competition is eroding the global market share of German automotive giants, such as Volkswagen, BMW, and Mercedes-Benz, which are grappling with high production costs, regulatory hurdles, and slow domestic EV adoption.

Data from the German Association of the Automotive Industry reveals that passenger car production in Germany declined by over 25 percent between 2017 and 2023. Given the industry’s contribution to exports, the competitive pressures from China threaten to further weaken its industrial base, with potential spillovers to its EU partners, which are reliant on German trade and investment.

Germany’s car production, which is a key export to the United States, is included in the tariff package prepared by the Trump administration, with a 25 percent tariff at the US border. Any potential economic hurdles for Germany could not only create political challenges but also lead to an economic crisis.

The path forward

The challenges facing Germany’s next chancellor are formidable, encompassing economic, political, and structural domains. Revitalizing growth in an economy that appears increasingly mired in stagnation demands urgent action. Central to this effort is the need to reconcile Germany’s traditional reliance on industrial exports with increased public investment. At the same time, navigating coalition dynamics will be critical, as the past several years have demonstrated a lack of meaningful progress.

On the economic front, Germany must reevaluate its energy policy. High energy prices, driven in large part by an overreliance on renewable energy sources without sufficient grid modernization and storage solutions, have burdened businesses and households alike. A robust industrial strategy is essential to bolster the competitiveness of Germany’s automotive manufacturing sector. Deregulation and streamlined bureaucracy are also urgently needed to inject greater dynamism into the German economy.

Failure to implement reforms risks exacerbating Germany’s economic problems, with repercussions that extend beyond its national borders. A weakened Germany would likely erode confidence in European markets, exacerbate economic disparities within the EU, and embolden Euroskeptic movements. Conversely, decisive leadership and transformative reforms could not only rejuvenate Germany’s economy but also reaffirm its role as a stabilizing force and leader within the European project. For the next chancellor, the stakes are nothing less than determining Europe’s future trajectory or overseeing the economic collapse of their country.

Piotr Arak is an assistant professor of economic sciences at the University of Warsaw and chief economist at VeloBank Poland.

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Georgia’s pro-Kremlin authorities intensify crackdown on opposition

Mercedes Sapuppo — Tue, 18 Feb 2025 22:05:22 +0000

The Georgian authorities presented new legislation in early February that critics say will increase pressure on the country’s civil society and independent media while also placing additional restrictions on public gatherings. The move comes amid a wave of anti-government protests that began following Georgia’s disputed October 2024 parliamentary elections and escalated weeks later when the government took steps to suspend the country’s EU accession efforts.

The current crisis reflects widespread tensions in Georgian society, with the governing Georgian Dream party accused of attempting to turn the country away from decades of Euro-Atlantic integration and return to the Russian orbit. Government officials deny the charges, claiming instead that they seek to guard against undue Western influence while avoiding any involvement in the geopolitical confrontation over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Georgian Dream officials announced in early February that the party planned to draft legislation that would tighten restrictions on foreign-funded media outlets and establish a new code of journalistic ethics to be monitored by a government body. Similar legislative initiatives are being prepared targeting Georgian civil society organizations. Opponents have likened these steps to the draconian measures introduced by the Putin regime over the past twenty-five years to silence domestic opposition inside Russia.

With anti-government protests still taking place in cities across Georgia on an almost daily basis, the authorities have also recently introduced new laws limiting public gatherings and criminalizing minor protest actions such as placing stickers on public property. Since protests flared in late 2024, hundreds have been detained, with many reporting human rights abuses while in custody including beatings and torture.

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Critics say these latest steps serve as further confirmation of the Georgian government’s intention to establish a Kremlin-style authoritarian state. In early February, Transparency International Georgia executive director Eka Gigauri told the Associated Press that she believed the authorities were using the same tactics employed by the Putin regime against opponents. “There is nothing new in how they attack civic activists,” she said. “This was happening in Russia years ago.”

Similar sentiments have been expressed by international human rights watchdogs monitoring the current crisis. “The government is relentlessly taking the country into a repressive era that is uncharted for Georgia but all too familiar in authoritarian states,” commented Human Rights Watch Europe and Central Asia Director Hugh Williamson in January 2025.

In recent months, Georgia’s Western partners have become more vocal in their criticism of the country’s increasingly authoritarian policies and apparent turn toward Moscow. This Western response has included imposing sanctions against a number of Georgian officials including billionaire Georgian Dream founder Bidzina Ivanishvili, who is widely seen as the country’s de facto leader and architect of Georgia’s current pro-Kremlin policies. On February 13, the European Parliament adopted a resolution questioning the legitimacy of the current Georgian authorities and calling for fresh elections in the coming months monitored by international observers.

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Meanwhile, relations with Russia continue to improve. Georgia has won favor in Moscow in recent years by refusing to participate in Western sanctions over the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Instead, Georgia has welcomed Russian businesses and has been accused of helping the Kremlin bypass international restrictions put in place in response to the war.

Members of the Georgian Dream party have positioned themselves as the only political force capable of establishing pragmatic relations with Russia. With around twenty percent of Georgia currently under Russian occupation, the threat of renewed Russian military aggression is a highly sensitive issue for Georgian society. In the run-up to Georgia’s October 2024 parliamentary election, Georgian Dream sparked controversy by using campaign posters contrasting peaceful Georgia with war-torn Ukraine as part of election messaging that sought to position the vote as a choice between war and peace.

With international attention now firmly fixed on developments in and around Ukraine, the political crisis in Georgia has slipped out of the headlines. However, this small nation in the southern Caucasus has a geopolitical significance that far outweighs its size. For the past two decades, Georgia has been widely seen in Western capitals as a post-Soviet success story, but the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations now hang in the balance. This represents a significant foreign policy challenge for the new Trump administration and for Europe.

Recent repressive measures indicate that the Georgian authorities are intent on escalating their clampdown against domestic opponents and strengthening ties with the Kremlin. If they succeed, it would represent a major victory for Vladimir Putin in the confrontation between the democratic world and an emerging alliance of authoritarian powers including Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.

Mercedes Sapuppo is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Is Kosovo Headed for Political Gridlock? | A Debrief with Jeff Hovenier

sjones — Thu, 13 Feb 2025 21:55:00 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

Kosovo’s parliamentary elections on February 9 have painted a complex picture, as Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s Vetëvendosje remains the strongest party, but it has lost its absolute majority from 2021. So, why did voters back Kurti yet limit his power? Is this a sign of growing dissatisfaction in Kosovo, or perhaps a call for more political balance?

With coalition talks ahead, the big question iss whether Kurti can form a stable government or if opposition parties will seek to unite and form a mandate. Meanwhile, tensions with Serbia remain high, normalization talks are stalled, and Kosovo’s relationship with key Western allies—including the United States—has become increasingly strained.

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare, Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, sits down with former U.S. Ambassador to Kosovo, Jeff Hovenier, to break down the election results, the possible governing scenarios, and what’s at stake for Kosovo’s democracy, regional stability, and international partnerships.

Drawing from his personal experience, Hovenier reflects on the challenges of navigating the often-tense relationship between Washington and Prime Minister Kurti’s government during his tenure.

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Your primer on Kosovo’s parliamentary election

Ilva Tare, Jonathan Moore, and Stuart Jones — Thu, 06 Feb 2025 17:02:43 +0000

After a four-year mandate in Pristina, Prime Minister Albin Kurti faces a test at the polls as Kosovars vote for a new parliament on February 9. With prominent opposition candidates in the running, the election will be a test of Kurti’s political momentum after his sweeping victory in 2021 and will take place against the backdrop of a contentious international landscape for the Western Balkans and the transatlantic community writ large.

Ahead of the election, the Europe Center is answering questions about the key candidates and issues at play.

What is the political context of this election?

Kosovo is gearing up for parliamentary elections on February 9, marking a big moment in its political history—the first time a government has completed a full term since Kosovo declared independence in 2008. Prime Minister Albin Kurti and his party Vetëvendosje (“Self-Determination Movement,” VV), who won a landslide victory in 2021 with 50.28 percent of the vote, are now seeking re-election in what’s shaping up to be a heated contest, as the opposition is determined to make significant gains.

Kurti is a bold and polarizing figure—hailed as a reformer and disruptor by those who want sweeping changes, yet criticized by others who claim his policy undermines progress toward positive regional relations. For many, he is a symbol of hope and progress; for others, his hardline stances, especially on domestic reforms and the stalled dialogue with Serbia, raise red flags. As voters head to the polls, Kurti’s leadership and vision remain at the center of Kosovo’s political debate, sparking questions about the country’s path forward.

Kosovo’s future depends heavily on its integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions, with a new European Commission team and opportunities with the freshly appointed special representative for the normalization dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. Additionally, a potential shift in priorities of the new US administration adds another layer of uncertainty. As Kosovo navigates this evolving global landscape, its relationship with the United States will play a key role in shaping the country’s future aspirations.

—Ilva Tare is a resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center

Kosovo is often viewed as stagnant, and its attempts to build respect and diplomatic recognition on the international stage have been largely ineffective. Although Kurti is heading the longest-serving government since Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008, he has been repeatedly accused by opposition parties of delivering little, defying the international community, and complaining about Serbia while missing out on opportunities to build infrastructure and develop Kosovo economically. The results of this election will be a critical indicator of Kosovo’s future.

—Jonathan Moore is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center

Who is Albin Kurti—and who are his main challengers?

Kurti, the current prime minister and leader of VV has long maintained a strong stance on Kosovo’s sovereignty, frequently targeting Serbia’s influence in the region. He has labeled Serbia a “proxy of Russia” and accused Western powers of appeasing Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić. His campaign continues to focus on anti-corruption, national independence, and a tough approach to Kosovo’s relationship with Serbia.

Kurti’s main challengers are the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), now led by Memli Krasniqi, who has nominated Bedri Hamza as their candidate for prime minister, and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), led by Lumir Abdixhiku. The PDK, which won 17 percent of the vote in 2021, is focusing its campaign on economic reform and strengthening Kosovo’s international relationships. Bedri Hamza has emphasized the need for Kosovo to attract foreign investments and improve living standards, proposing pragmatic policies to stabilize the economy and create jobs. The LDK, which secured 13 percent in 2021, advocates for a more balanced approach to the dialogue with Serbia and calls for a reset in Kosovo’s diplomatic strategy. Abdixhiku’s campaign centers on restoring Kosovo’s credibility in international negotiations and rebuilding trust with the West. Both parties have criticized Kurti and his handling of the dialogue with Serbia in particular, which they argue has stalled Kosovo’s domestic and international progress. They emphasize their commitment to economic development, strengthening Kosovo’s international presence, and adopting a more constructive approach to relations with the European Union (EU) and the United States. Despite their criticism, recent polls indicate that while VV maintains a lead, the opposition parties are closing the gap. However, the result remains uncertain as election day approaches.

—Ilva Tare

Kurti entered the political stage as a firebrand, initially making his mark as a student protestor in the late 1990s. His left-leaning party VV gradually built its parliamentary presence starting in 2010. VV was founded on a reputation of refusing to compromise, even with Kosovo’s most important international partners. While Kosovo’s lack of progress toward EU standards may be more apparent outside the country, voters are increasingly aware that they are falling behind. At the same time, many Kosovars view Kurti’s political opposition as either compromised or outright corrupt. The three major opposition parties (Alliance for the Future of Kosovo, or AAK; LDK; and PDK) share similar goals: they want to leverage US and European support to secure NATO and EU membership. However, their difficult histories and bitter rivalries on the local level have prevented them from uniting ahead of the election. There is much talk of joining efforts if VV fails to secure an outright majority, with the most successful of the three parties taking the lead in forming a new government. However, the outcome of such an effort is uncertain. Especially, as all of the three parties have leaders who are determined to succeed on their own. On top of that, it is also conceivable that Kurti could form a coalition with one of them to retain power.

—Jonathan Moore

What do the polls say about who is likely to win?

The question is in the air about what would happen if VV falls short of the 50 percent threshold required to govern with an outright majority. Even though some local media have speculated about a potential coalition between VV and the PDK, Deputy Prime Minister Besnik Bislimi has recently denied this possibility. The presidency, which will become vacant after Vjosa Osmani’s term ends next year, could become a key bargaining chip in such negotiations if they do take place with an opposition party. Kosovo’s ethnic Serbs make up about 2.3 percent of its 1.6 million population, though this figure is contested due to a census boycott by Serbs. The next government will need to face the issue of implementing the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities (ASM), which aims to address the concerns of Kosovo’s Serbian minority and is backed by both the EU and the United States. Additionally, Serbia is expected to deliver on the de facto recognition of Kosovo.

—Ilva Tare

As is often the case elsewhere in the region, polls in Kosovo have not been very accurate in the past, and VV’s victory in 2021 was unprecedented, with the three opposition parties performing poorly (PDK: 17 percent; LDK: 12.7 percent; AAK: 7.1 percent). Since then, both PDK and LDK have changed their leadership.

—Jonathan Moore

What are the biggest challenges Kosovo’s next government will face?

The United States must play a more prominent role in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue to address the region’s political complexities. It is unclear how the recent statement by Special Envoy Ric Grenell about Kurti and his government’s relationship with Washington may reflect future US policy toward the region. However, the EU’s inability to break the deadlock has stalled progress. With Serbia’s ongoing ties to Russia and Kosovo’s aspirations to solidify its sovereignty, the United States could leverage its influence to steer both parties toward a more pragmatic, long-term agreement. The shifting international landscape calls for a more balanced approach, emphasizing stronger transatlantic collaboration to foster stability and address unresolved issues between Kosovo and Serbia. A critical aspect of this dialogue is Serbia’s eventual recognition of Kosovo, which could also push the EU’s five non-recognizing members to reconsider their stance, thereby strengthening Kosovo’s international legitimacy. The ultimate goal remains the full normalization of relations, culminating in Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo as an independent state and the country’s integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions.

—Ilva Tare

Kurti has built a reputation on refusing to compromise and takes pride in his unwillingness to normalize relations with Serbia. If the opposition comes to power, they are likely to seek closer ties with Washington and Brussels, but will struggle to make significant progress on normalization in the short term. They had the opportunity of implementing agreed-upon steps in the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue when in power but chose not to, citing domestic political objections. Incentives to move the normalization Dialogue forward, particularly from the EU, would be important.

—Jonathan Moore

Youth brain drain is a major policy challenge across the Western Balkans, and the next government in Pristina must contend with it. One in four citizens has left the region, driven by low salaries, limited economic opportunities, political instability, and corruption. The World Bank’s latest report on the Western Balkans highlights that emigration from the healthcare sector, in particular, has resulted in over 20 percent of Kosovo’s young talent residing in other European countries. As Kosovo’s population continues to age, this will only intensify, presenting an even greater challenge for the incoming government.

—Stuart Jones is a program assistant in the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center

What obstacles does Kosovo face in achieving its foreign policy goals?

NATO and EU membership remain top priorities for Kosovo’s foreign policy, but both the current government and some of its predecessors have, at times, put the cart before the horse. Even though it has made significant diplomatic efforts to secure global recognition and membership in the Council of Europe, Kosovo remains outside the United Nations. NATO and EU members—some of which have yet to recognize Kosovo’s independence or establish diplomatic relations—continue to demand tangible steps toward “normalization” between Belgrade and Pristina, along with the implementation of past agreements. The timing of this election coincides with the appointment of Danish/EU diplomat Peter Sørensen to head the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, potentially shaping the course of future negotiations.

—Jonathan Moore

Kosovo’s path toward EU accession hinges on the outcome of these elections. If Kurti secures another majority mandate, the country could see more political brinkmanship between Kosovo and the EU, particularly if US President Donald Trump pivots away from traditional US support for the region’s Euro-Atlantic integration and Brussels remains divided on enlargement. On the latter, there are positive signs that under High Representative Kaja Kallas, enlargement will be a political priority, at least with regard to Ukraine and Moldova. Renewed enthusiasm for enlargement, spurred by these two countries, should in all logic be good news for the Western Balkans.

If VV is forced into a governing coalition with PDK or LDK, there is some hope that Kurti’s rhetoric could become more moderate, leading to greater openness to dialogue with regional and international partners. However, a PDK-LDK grand coalition excluding VV would likely lead to an unpredictable platform and an unstable mandate. With such widespread support, Kurti in opposition would be a nightmare for a PDK or LDK prime minister, similar to governments elsewhere in Europe, such as in France, Spain, and potentially Germany, where diverse political alliances struggle to maintain cohesion, sometimes at the expense of effective policymaking.

—Stuart Jones

Report

Dec 11, 2023

Getting back on track: Unlocking Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic and development perspective

By Agon Maliqi

Report exploring the path forward for Kosovo’s integration into transatlantic institutions and the geopolitical and economic challenges and opportunities facing the country.

Economy & Business Energy & Environment

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Explore the Kazakhstan country scorecard

The post Your primer on Kosovo’s parliamentary election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Surrounded by superpowers, Kazakhstan walks a geopolitical tightrope

Nargis Kassenova — Wed, 05 Feb 2025 14:00:00 +0000

Evolution of freedom

Evolution of prosperity

The path forward

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Evolution of freedom

The Freedom Index shows two important features of the institutional development process that Kazakhstan has followed in the last three decades. On the one hand, the overall positive trend reflects the goal, maintained throughout the period, to integrate into the global community both politically and economically in order to foster the young country’s security and prosperity. All the strategies the country has adopted over the past thirty years consistently reflect its aspiration to have an open competitive economy and be a respected international actor. The latter implied becoming a functional democracy and complying with international human rights norms. On the other hand, while the government’s commitment to economic liberalization has been fairly consistent and genuine, its record in the areas of good governance, democratization, and human rights could be characterized as patchy at best. The divergent paths of the three freedom subindexes underscore the difference in commitment.

Fluctuations observed in the Freedom Index can be explained by changes in circumstances and policies. Kazakhstan received a strong initial impulse toward liberalization thanks to the late Soviet perestroika reforms and the Washington Consensus. However, by the end of the 1990s, this impulse was subdued by the consolidation of an authoritarian regime under the country’s first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev. It was also challenged by the Asian financial crisis, which generated serious doubts about the benefits of unconstrained openness to financial and trade markets. In the early 2000s, oil revenues started to increase, and the government was clearly tempted to use the windfall to pursue interventionist and protectionist economic policies. Tensions between state-led development and free market orientations have been present ever since. Economic growth also allowed an enhancement of the social welfare system, which had been damaged by the economic crisis and neoliberal policies of the 1990s. Nazarbayev’s resignation in 2019 and comprehensive reforms laid out by president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in the wake of the dramatic unrest and crackdown in January 2022 created a positive dynamic reflected in the upward trend of the Index.

Looking at the three freedom subindexes gives a more detailed view of developments in Kazakhstan. The economic subindex is the main contributor to the overall positive trajectory of the aggregate Index. It has been on the ascent and above the region’s average, with the exception of a sudden ten-point decrease in the 2000–04 period. Trade and investment freedom plummeted at that point due to the adoption of new legislation regulating investment, taxes, and environmental requirements. The government grew more assertive in its relations with foreign investors, introduced local content requirements, and renegotiated contracts. But the subindex quickly recovered, and since then has shown a very clear positive trend, which was helped by Kazakhstan’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2015.

The relatively high score on women’s economic freedom is both a legacy of the Soviet modernization project and its emphasis on recruiting women into the labor force and a product of current circumstances. For many families, two incomes are needed to support a decent standard of living. A positive long-term consequence of the dramatic economic collapse of the late Soviet and early independence years is the high number of women entrepreneurs in Kazakhstan. At the time, many women quit their non-paying jobs and became shuttle traders, importing goods from China and Turkey and selling them in bazaars and small markets. This experience served as an incubator for women entrepreneurs in the country. The trend has been supported by the government and international donors, and nowadays, there is a relatively high share of female entrepreneurs running their own businesses.

The political subindex shows a sustained deterioration between 1999 and 2019, with a temporary improvement in 2006–10, and a steep rise since 2019. The relatively higher scores of the 1990s represent the ebbing of the liberalization wave started by Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms in the mid-1980s. The super-presidential Constitution adopted in 1995 set Kazakhstan on the path of authoritarian consolidation. The trend is illustrated by the twenty-point fall in political rights of expression and association up until 2019. The situation with civil liberties during that period was better and more complex, as indicated by fluctuations on that component. The 2003, 2012, and 2016 dips are all linked to the adoption of new legislation (a 2003 law on extremism, a 2011 law on religious activities, and several legislative and legal amendments in 2016 targeting “extremism and terrorism”) which limited freedom of conscience in the name of security. However, unlike the almost linear deterioration of the political subindex, each dip was followed by a partial recovery, reflecting a certain degree of internalization of liberal values by the political elites.

The power transition in Kazakhstan, which started with Nazarbayev’s resignation in 2019 and ended with the “Bloody January” events in 2022, produced a critical juncture for the country. The first event did not change the balance of power— Nazarbayev, his family and associates remained in control, with Nazarbayev still designated “Leader of the Nation”—but it changed the mood in society. People felt that change was possible, and started demanding reforms. Tokayev and his team perceived and tried to respond to this growing demand. They developed policies around the concept of the “hearing state” and experimented with more open local elections. However, under the Nazarbayev/Tokayev duumvirate, the system—long used to a clear and rigid vertical of power—grew confused and ineffective. The citizens’ urge for change led to protests at the beginning of 2022 which, combined with what many observers see as an unsuccessful attempted coup by Nazarbayev loyalists, resulted in the “de-Nazarbayevization” of the system. Unexpectedly, President Tokayev transformed from an appointed successor into a reformist president. While the official goals of the political reforms he has been undertaking are democratization and liberalization, they seem to be primarily aimed at removing the excesses of the super-presidential political system and improving governance. The geopolitical context is a factor affecting the direction and depth of reforms. On the one hand, deepening relations with the West is even more important under the new circumstances, and therefore Western perceptions of the human rights situation in Kazakhstan matter. On the other, there are fears that political liberalization could destabilize and weaken the country, making it more vulnerable to external meddling.

The legal subindex reflects a very complex situation around the implementation of the rule of law in Kazakhstan. First, the improving quality and responsiveness of the bureaucratic apparatus is well captured by the data. The growing budget in the 2000s allowed the regime to invest in good governance, drawing on the understanding that the best way to reduce contestation and protests is to efficiently provide the population with public services through a well-functioning state. The focus has been on better training of civil servants and digitalization to improve efficiency and accountability (in line with the “hearing state” concept). Every public agency has social media accounts, and its performance assessment takes into account the public communication aspect.

Second, there is a clear lack of improvement— and even deterioration—in the judicial independence and effectiveness score. The subservience of the judicial branch to the president, introduced by the 1995 Constitution, and the systemic corruption, greatly hindered the development of the rule of law in Kazakhstan. Realizing that this reduces the country’s attractiveness to foreign investors, the government created a legal enclave, the Astana International Financial Center, in 2018. It features its own court and international arbitration center, providing a common law system and employing foreign judges. While this arrangement serves as a quick fix for investor-related issues, it makes the injustices facing the general citizenry even more apparent.

It is worth noting that President Tokayev initiated a judicial reform aimed at raising the qualifications of judges and legal personnel, “cleaning” the system of corruption, and improving processes and procedures. Over the next five years it will be possible to assess the implementation of that reform. One important positive development is the restoration of the Constitutional Court (the previous body was turned into a “toothless” Constitutional Council by the 1995 Constitution) and inviting highly professional and credible people to serve as judges.

Evolution of prosperity

Kazakhstan is a large exporter of crude oil, gold, iron ore, copper, aluminum, zinc, uranium, and other metals, bringing substantial revenues to the country. It also produces and sells high-quality durum wheat, an important commodity in international markets. Therefore, it is not surprising that its overall Prosperity Index score has been above the regional average. In addition, the government’s efforts to improve social welfare, drawing on the norms and experiences of the Soviet welfare state, also help Kazakhstan to score better in the education and minorities components of the Index.

Fluctuations of the inequality component show that economic growth does not necessarily translate into reductions in poverty and inequality, and that positive trends can be reversible. There are substantial spatial disparities in wealth and access to services between the regions and along the rural-urban divide. The two largest cities, Almaty and Astana, are better off, while the oil-producing regions of western Kazakhstan have both high income and high poverty rates and the agricultural and largely rural south ranks poorly on both counts. The government is trying to mend these regional inequalities by investing in infrastructure and changing budget allocations to incentivize regions to generate their own revenues through economic activities.

The education component of the Index places Kazakhstan within the best performers in the world. It can boast nearly universal enrollment in elementary and secondary education, and high enrollment in tertiary education. The scores, however, do not show the patchy quality of the education provided. The neoliberal reforms of the 1990s responsible for underfunding the sector and “streamlining” schools in rural areas, and the gradual dissipation of the Soviet education system, accompanied by the retirement of Soviet-trained teachers, resulted in growing inequality of access and decreasing quality of instruction in public schools. Standardized tests such as PISA show serious deficiencies in the education of Kazakhstani pupils compared to those of Western Europe or other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. During the Nazarbayev period, the government tried to improve education, which it viewed as a crucial component of economic growth and development, through internationalization and creation of “pockets of excellence,” most importantly the newly established Nazarbayev University and a cluster of Nazarbayev Intellectual Schools, attracting the most talented students with fully funded grants. Tokayev’s government has been working on improving the quality of public, and especially rural, education, by allocating more funding, raising the status and salary of teachers, and reforming teacher training institutions. It also promotes partnerships between established foreign universities and regional universities in Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan’s health component has fluctuated above and below the regional average. A steep increase in life expectancy in the 2000s reflects the improvement of the socioeconomic situation and bigger investments in the healthcare system, which enabled Kazakhstan to achieve a substantial decline in infant and maternal mortality, approaching the OECD average. As with the rest of the region, Kazakhstan experienced a decline in life expectancy as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. The stronger negative effect of the pandemic in Kazakhstan compared to the rest of the region might be the outcome of better and more honest statistics. The country’s government was very active in handling the healthcare crisis during the pandemic and carried out a mass vaccination campaign once vaccines became available. The national Healthy Nation project currently being implemented aims to increase life expectancy from the current seventy-five years to seventy-seven within five years.

Kazakhstan has scored high in the minorities component. Its Constitution outlaws any discrimination “on the grounds of origin, social, official, or property status, sex, race, nationality, language, attitude to religion, convictions, place of residence or any other circumstance.” Managing interethnic relations has been the biggest challenge. In the early days of independence, the country’s leadership crafted an approach carefully balancing the interests of its multiple ethnic groups (especially Russians) with the need to develop a nation state around the Kazakh identity. Representatives of different ethnic groups compose the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, a special political body, chaired by the president of the country. Five members of the Assembly are elected to the Senate.

Finally, Kazakhstan scores above the regional average in the environment component. It is not a big carbon emitter, but this is largely due to the country’s small population of 20 million people, dwarfed by its large neighbors in the broader Eurasia region. Kazakhstan’s carbon intensity, that is the amount of carbon dioxide emitted per unit of energy, is high (0.33 kg per kilowatt-hour) and exceeds those of China (0.26 kg/kWh) and India (0.28 kg/kWh). The government has an ambitious decarbonization program, aiming to reach net zero by 2060.

The path forward

Kazakhstan finds itself at an inflection point. The January 2022 events put a sudden end to the Nazarbayev era, and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine undermined the post-Soviet political and security order. The combined domestic and geopolitical shocks are causing concerns, fears, and anxieties about the present and the future. At the same time, they are creating space for change and new beginnings. Whether Kazakhstan can move toward more freedom and prosperity will be determined by choices made today and tomorrow, and shaped by the domestic dynamic of state-society relations and external incentives and pressures.

At present, Tokayev’s reform agenda points to further liberalization of the system. We can expect an improvement in the political subindex: modest improvements on the elections, political rights, and legislative constraints on the executive components; and more substantial improvements on the civil liberties component. The situation with religious freedoms might not improve, but will probably not deteriorate either, despite growing concerns about radical Islamism and terrorism. The legal subindex scores are likely to grow, particularly the judicial independence and effectiveness and bureaucracy and corruption components. There will also be improvement of prosperity scores due to active policies on women’s empowerment, inclusion of people with disabilities, and decarbonization efforts.

For the gradual liberalization agenda to work, on the domestic side, the state needs to maintain the will for reforms and capacity to implement them with a substantial degree of success, and society needs to be interested in reforms and exercise consistent pressure. If the relations between the two grow conflictual (fueled by inequalities and grievances), there is a risk that the reforms will be curtailed. There will be more clarity about the trajectory of Kazakhstan’s development by 2029, the year when president Tokayev’s single term comes to an end. It is important to keep in mind that there are anti-liberal as well as pro-liberal forces in Kazakhstan’s society. Growing social conservatism that accompanies Islamic revival could become a formidable challenge over the next ten years.

On the geopolitical side, the liberalization agenda needs to be incentivized and supported by the West. Such a partnership would be useful for both parties—but not easy for either. Kazakhstan wants deeper relations with the West in order to develop and not be overwhelmed by its giant neighbors, Russia and China. However, it needs to build those relationships gently, to avoid angering Moscow and annoying Beijing too much. For the United States, European countries, and others, the challenge is to engage in an effective manner, providing the right incentives. Unlike in the 1990s, the supremacy of the West is now being challenged, and new approaches and ways of dealing with countries like Kazakhstan are needed.

Taking into account internal and external factors, I can envisage three scenarios. The first, optimistic, scenario, “More freedom and prosperity,” hinges on the success of liberalization reforms and a benign external environment. Under this scenario, President Tokayev and his team are able to successfully implement some reforms, giving them more legitimacy, and Kazakhstani society keeps pushing for more liberalization. Tokayev ends his term in 2029, as defined by the Constitutional amendment, and there is a peaceful power transfer. Relations with the West are strong, Russia accepts the new situation, and China finds it useful for managing relations with Europe. Kazakhstan is not a liberal democracy, but it is on a promising path, gradually internalizing liberal values and norms.

The second scenario, “Prosperity at the expense of freedom,” implies limited reforms, skewed in favor of professional state and socioeconomic goals. The leadership decides that tightening control over society with the help of traditional and new (digital) surveillance means is a must, and there is no need to pay too much attention to what Western actors think and say on the matter. The aspiration is to be a functional authoritarian state, and that means accepting being a political and economic satellite of China, the new superpower.

The third scenario, “No freedom and no prosperity,” is a sad story of Kazakhstan imploding from internal tensions and/or destabilized from outside. The January 2022 events provided a glimpse of such destabilization. Transformation of a consolidated, personalized and corrupt authoritarian regime into a softer and better governed one is a way to prevent conflicts and improve the development trajectory of the country, but as with all modernizations, it can be unsettling and pregnant with risks. Russia, unhappy with Kazakhstan “drifting away,” decides to “bring it to heel” using hybrid war methods.

Nargis Kassenova is a senior fellow and director of the Program on Central Asia at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University. Kassenova’s research focuses on Central Asian politics and security, Eurasian geopolitics, China’s Belt and Road Initiative, governance in Central Asia, and the history of state-making in Central Asia.

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The next German chancellor must lead from the front, not the middle, on European security

Rachel Rizzo, James Batchik — Tue, 04 Feb 2025 21:19:15 +0000

Voters in Germany will head to the polls on February 23 at a precarious moment for the transatlantic alliance. US President Donald Trump is back in the White House, Germany’s economy continues to lag behind those of its peers, energy prices are high, and the war in Ukraine continues to rage. The next German government will have no shortage of issues to confront head on. Although a more forward-leaning security and defense posture might not be at the forefront of voters’ minds, the next chancellor should make this a priority given that it will in part determine the health of the US-German relationship for at least the next four years.

Indeed, if German leaders need an impetus for action, they should look no further than Washington. In the US capital, Berlin has been dealt a tough hand politically. For years, it has been targeted (mostly by the right) as the poster child of a bad ally. Last October, US Vice President JD Vance said that NATO’s problem is that Germany doesn’t spend enough. More recently, billionaire and Trump adviser Elon Musk’s bizarre support for the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) has led to a series of tweets in which he says they’re the only party that can save Germany. Beyond this, because of the transactional approach that the Trump administration will surely take toward Europe, the next German government simply won’t have the luxury of time to carve out a new role for itself within the European Union (EU), NATO, or as a “good” ally of the United States. It must instead lead, not just because of pressure from Washington, but for its own sake.

Where should the next government start?

First on the docket must be Ukraine. Kyiv needs more equipment to keep fighting, and fast; it is struggling on the battlefield, with Russia slowly but surely continuing to gain ground. Given Trump’s desire to bring about an end to the fighting, it’s unclear if Kyiv will see the same type of support from the United States that it saw during the Biden administration. In fact, it’s probably safe to say that it won’t. Europe must take a leading role for Ukraine’s long-term security, first with more financial, military, and humanitarian assistance, and second with talk around Europe’s engagement in the outcomes of negotiations.

Germany needs to be creative on negotiations as well. Trump will want to take on the role of “primary negotiator” in any talks that might take place, but if Germany isn’t willing to put real skin in the game, then it will risk being left out of critical decision making. Coming to the table without a real offer of support or trying to explain why certain actions just aren’t feasible in Germany will be seen as weak. It will simply feed into the administration’s rhetoric of “feckless Europeans.” In fact, German leaders would be wise to take the phrase Führung aus der Mitte, or “lead from the middle,” permanently out of their vocabulary.

Instead, the next German government will have to determine how to help secure Ukraine’s long-term security and enforce any peace, potentially by sending German troops to Ukraine and supporting other European forces in a meaningful capacity. If the option of “boots on the ground” becomes a reality, Germany must be there. It will be unacceptable for Berlin to sit on the sidelines.

The new government should immediately announce further military aid to Ukraine, including a new package that has so far failed to come from this government. This will help Ukraine in the short term, and it will help the West come to the table for potential negotiations from a place of strength rather than weakness.

The turning point: Take two

Beyond Ukraine, Berlin will also need to deliver on the faltering Zeitenwende. The sea change in Germany’s defense policy promised by Chancellor Olaf Scholz was a laudable initial effort that was applauded from Washington. But it quickly sputtered out and has failed to deliver in a way that experts hoped or expected. Sustained defense spending is on shaky ground once the one hundred billion euro “special fund” runs out in 2027. Procurement to refurbish Berlin’s military capabilities is too slow, and the lack of real political will at the highest levels has so far doomed attempts to breathe fresh life into the effort.

Germany’s defense transformation also struggles with the general public. While it’s true that leaders and analysts alike perhaps assigned a wider meaning to the Zeitenwende than Scholz anticipated, the current government had a major messaging problem in selling its ideas to a broad audience beyond the so-called “Berlin bubble.” Most of the country understands the threat Russia poses, and polls last year showed that Germans remain broadly supportive of Ukraine and for increased defense spending. But still, a recent poll found that 55 percent of the country opposed prioritizing defense spending over social spending.

However, politicians must not be tempted to hide behind public attitudes, especially in a country with a complex relationship with its military. Perhaps the most important lesson from the Zeitenwende is the power of political will. The public can be convinced with clear-eyed and consistent speeches, statements, and engagement that defense spending, arming Ukraine, and deterring Russian aggression on the European continent makes them safer.

Break it off?

But Germany needs more than just defense spending. Germany continues to confront the consequences of decades of absent or under-investment in various sectors within the country. According to the International Monetary Fund, “Over the medium term, Germany faces rising spending pressures from aging and defense, as well as a need to expand public investment in transport, energy, communications, and other infrastructure.”

To do this, Germany must figure out how to relax its fiscal rules to accommodate higher spending and more sustained long-term investment. The oft-cited “debt brake” should be first on the list. The debt brake was written into the German Constitution in 2009 by the Merkel government, and it requires that the country’s budget deficit does not exceed 0.35 percent of structural gross domestic product (GDP). This rule has helped Germany maintain a debt-to-GDP ratio around 60 percent, which is well below the eurozone average. At the same time, it has also reduced the government’s ability to invest in infrastructure and encourage economic growth.

Reforming the debt brake will be difficult. The next German parliament will need a two-thirds majority to reform the rules, which will be tough given that it’s unlikely any potential coalition will have this majority. There are some creative ways to get around this, but relaxing the debt brake rules should be a priority for everyone, as it will be key for Germany to unlock its potential during the Trump era and beyond.

On the defense side, the German Armed Forces need increased and ongoing investments into the production of ammunition and artillery shells, for example. The next government should also embrace institutional changes to shape more productive decision making. A national security council, for example, would go a long way in helping Germany streamline its defense decision making. Although this isn’t a new idea by any means, it hasn’t gotten the traction it deserves, as the idea is often dismissed as too difficult or unrealistic given how the German government works. But now is the time for Germany to challenge its own self-imposed limitations, for its own sake and not just to placate critics in Washington.

None of these efforts will be cheap, and German politicians will need to expend serious political capital selling these ideas. That effort will become even more difficult in areas where far-right and far-left politicians have spread anti-NATO and anti-EU messages throughout the population. But given the political realities facing the transatlantic partners, it’s beyond time Germany steps up and plays the leadership role everyone wants it to play. If not, it will be sidelined, seen as irrelevant, and this moment will have been squandered.

Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

James Batchik is an associate director with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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Libya’s de facto partition demands a solution designed for it—not for outside contenders

Hani Shennib — Fri, 31 Jan 2025 20:09:15 +0000

While the West continues to fixate on elections in promoting democracy worldwide, many Libyans today have become resentful. They largely perceive the elections touted by the West as part of a strategy to legitimize a government that serves foreign interests rather than fulfilling Libyans’ needs for stability and institution building. They simply do not trust that elections conducted under current conditions—characterized by a lack of constitutional foundations, profound corruption, forceful arrests, and streets dominated by militias and warlords—can lead to fair outcomes.

Meanwhile, the West and its partners, caught up in defending democracy and human rights, feel guilt over their failure to stabilize Libya following an intervention that bizarrely morphed from a mission to protect a population from Muammar Gaddafi’s wrath into one of regime change. Consequently, the coalition has yet again turned to an inept United Nations (UN)to push for democratic change through elections. However, this goal has not materialized and is unlikely to do so in the near future.

Historically, other countries have approached resolving the situation in Libya with a mindset of “what’s in it for me?,” highlighting how national and regional interests shape attempts at change—particularly in the context of Libya. This was similarly true during UN discussions on how to address Italian colonies taken by the Allies post-World War II and the intense negotiations among the United States, European countries, and Russia regarding Libya’s fate in the late 1940s. Notably, strong views were expressed by Azzam Pasha (an Egyptian diplomat who was at the time the secretary general of the Arab League) regarding Egypt’s interests in Libya. Such discussions have an eerie similarity to today’s regional and international negotiations about Libya’s future.

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Currently, the motivations for international involvement in Libya are shaped by three main concerns: 1) Europe’s alarm over the massive scale of illegal migration flowing through porous Libyan borders and its significant security and socioeconomic implications; 2) unease about the potential downward spiral of sociopolitical conditions in North African and Sahel states, which could undermine the economic interests of major corporations in the region; and 3) worry that a chaotic and fragile state may allow terrorist entities to thrive and potentially spread, escalating security threats.

In the eyes of the international community, these concerns require dealing with a central authority in Libya, regardless of the authority’s perceived legitimacy or its true value to the Libyan people and their institution building. These factors have, in part, led to a series of poorly devised proposals and roadmaps put forth by the UN and endorsed by international actors, which have resulted in little progress and worsened the divisions currently observed in Libya today.

From my observations during my frequent visits to the country and my conversations with Libyan leaders, politicians, and academics, I have identified five reasons why previous efforts put forth by the international community to shape a modern state in Libya have failed.

First, there are historical roots of division that have not yet been addressed. This is one of the reasons why the numerous attempts by multiple representatives of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to engage Libyan actors in various stabilizing roadmaps over the last thirteen years have failed miserably. The last effort, expected to lead to elections in December 2022, went nowhere due to political wrangling between two executive bodies and two legislative ones located—by no coincidence—in the eastern and western parts of the country, reflecting the historical divisions between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. It is practically impossible to envision effective presidential and parliamentary elections occurring in the near future without acknowledging these historical roots of division.

Second, it is clear that political and security actors on the ground in both regions of Libya have exploited these divisions for their own political and financial benefit through alliances with benefactor militias, corrupt entrepreneurs, members of the nouveau riche, and cross-border smugglers. This blend of neo-militocracy and kleptocracy heavily influences political and security decisions in the executive, legislative, judicial, and security branches in Libya, ensuring that national and international distractions allow them to remain in power for the foreseeable future.

Third, after forty-two years of oppression and a dismissal of rights and democracy under Gaddafi, as well as additional fourteen years of poverty and insecurity following the collapse of state institutions in 2011, the populace is busy with surviving day by day and lacks the means necessary to express their discontent. This, along with a sense of defeat regarding their aspirations for a better life following the failed Arab Spring, renders it unlikely that any significant movement will arise from the streets of Libyan cities in the near future, creating grounds for the continuation of the status quo.

Fourth and most importantly, the emergence of more pressing global conflicts and a shift in the international community’s priorities over the past four years, particularly with a focus on Ukraine and Southeast Asia, has diminished the attention and resources devoted to Libya’s situation. That is the case despite the fact that the West is concerned about the exponential growth of Russian and Chinese influence in Libya and the African continent at large.

Last, it is clear that the populations of many developing countries, particularly in the Middle East and Africa (including Libya), perceive Western governments to have lost their moral compass and can no longer be trusted as custodians of democratic and humanitarian change. This perception has been exacerbated by the catastrophe that has befallen the Arab people of Gaza—which countries in the West either failed to prevent or openly supported. Thus, in the eyes of the Libyan people, the West’s ability to recommend, supervise, or contribute to any democratic or nation-building initiatives has become compromised. This observation reinforces a decade-long sentiment among Arabs that it is not uncommon for Western governments to support and deal with autocracies and militaries throughout the Arab world—from Algeria to Egypt to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States—contributing to their skepticism about elections and hopes for democratic change.

One of the few successes in Libya since 2020 (the year that marked the end of the civil war that divided the country into territories east and west of the city of Sirte), is that the line dividing the country has become more distinct. Today, Libya has two governments, effectively two legislative bodies, and two security entities controlling the political, economic, and daily operations in their respective regions. Ironically—despite initial unifying efforts to address the disastrous situation in the aftermath of Storm Daniel in 2023, which claimed nearly twelve thousand lives—grand reconstruction opportunities in the regions have instead led to further segmentation of decision making and project funding. Such mega-funding and the anticipated engagement of international corporations and governments has only further entrenched Libya’s split.

Thus, Libya is currently a de facto two-state entity. The elusive internationally recognized government based in Tripoli exists primarily to allow the international community and its corporations to advance their own interests, failing to address the complex realities on the ground in Libya. International players such as China, Russia, and others are moving within Libya with disregard to issues of migration or border security, and are more focused on strategic economic engagement with Africa. This further undermines European and US interests while taking advantage of the West’s inertia and lack of clear strategy and engagement in Libya.

Furthermore, Libyans have grown disillusioned with the role of the international community and the United Nations, and they no longer trust or see much value in UNSMIL. Libyans are now gradually accepting and adapting to the current de facto demarcation of the country, going along with this in almost every aspect of their daily functions. An unnatural symbiosis seems to be developing between the aspirations of the people of Cyrenaica for more regional governance—away from the centralist hegemony Tripolitania exercised since 1969—and the military autocracy led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. At the same time, the internationally recognized government in Libya’s west continues to struggle to maintain power under the leadership of Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah who (along with his cousin) was sanctioned for corruption by the Libyan interim government and continues to face allegations of corruption, which he denies. Recent street anger against Dbeibah, stemming from his government’s attempt at rapprochement with Israeli officials as well as an escalation of pressure from dissatisfied militia, could catalyze the collapse of the internationally recognized government. This, in turn, could prompt Dbeibah to resort to military skirmishes with the east to distract from public discontent and prolong his government’s lifespan.

This week, the UN secretary-general appointed Hanna Serwaa Tetteh, a seasoned Ghanaian diplomat, as the new head of UNSMIL, making her the tenth person to serve that position in thirteen years. The appointment came after much wrangling between the United States and Russia, again suggesting that foreign interests will likely continue to dominate conversations about resolutions for Libya.

Libya needs new ideas and a national and international will to reset a realistic path toward a modern state, premised on a recognition of its history and a mentality of “what’s in it” not just for the international community but, more importantly, for its own people, as well.

Hani Shennib is the founding president of the National Council on US-Libya Relations

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After the Monsoon Revolution, Bangladesh’s economy and government need major reforms

Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak — Tue, 28 Jan 2025 14:15:43 +0000

Evolution of freedom

Evolution of prosperity

The path forward

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Evolution of freedom

Movements in the Freedom Index suggest that the institutional environment of Bangladesh has experienced substantial volatility since the 1990s. After the democratic revolution of the early 1990s, the country had a period of credible elections with relatively peaceful alternation of power between the two main Bangladeshi political parties, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Awami League. The Index shows a clear institutional deterioration during the 2000–08 period, coinciding with governance approaches by both major parties that appeared to intensify unhealthy political competition. In an environment with escalating corruption, the leadership and allies of both parties intensely focused on holding onto power at all costs, leading to increased political tensions. Widespread corruption by those in power became the norm, and both parties became increasingly eager to hold on to power by any means necessary. The main political tool employed by a marginalized opposition was to impede the functions of government. In particular, calling general strikes with increasing frequency (and of longer duration) became the political weapon of choice for the opposition, to signal their street-level organizational capabilities to the government and to citizens. The strategy was deployed to erode the dominance of the party in government, but it came at the expense of the citizenry because it disrupted economic activity and the freedom of movement. An extreme example was to call general strikes to coincide with important visits by foreign investors exploring investment opportunities. This was designed to weaken the government and undermine its ability to attract investment, and it came at a high cost to the country’s economic prospects.

Escalating corruption and this form of destructive political competition created a situation of increased political instability up to 2006, when scheduled elections could not be held, and a military-backed caretaker government remained in power for two years.¹ The deep fall in the political subindex driven by a more than forty-five-point decrease in the elections component reflects this episode. The election score rebounds when elections that were widely considered free and fair were held in 2008. The Awami League received a supermajority as citizens used the 2008 election to express their deep discontent with the heightened corruption and misgovernance under the pre-2006 BNP regime. But the subsequent Awami League government, led by Sheikh Hasina, squandered the opportunity for improving governance. Instead, governance trends indicated a shift toward more centralized authority, as evidenced by a sustained decline in political and civil liberties scores. Examples of these autocratic tendencies include the abolition of the caretaker government system, widespread persecution of opposition political leaders accused of war crimes, and the rapid deterioration of citizens’ civil rights based on security concerns after terrorist episodes and an attempted military coup in 2012. Repression of both political opponents and ordinary citizens, more severe restrictions on speech, and increased government corruption became the norm. The Awami League exacerbated the type of misgovernance that had led the BNP to be voted out of office. Despite these concerns, the Awami League maintained in power for fifteen years amidst reports of increased political repression of citizens.

Elections held during the last fifteen years have been characterized by boycotts by the major opposition party and were not free or fair, so the relatively high election score assigned to Bangladesh in the political subindex is not an accurate reflection of the poor quality of politics and governance during this era. Elections followed a regular schedule, but it is difficult to see them as meaningful. Beyond the opposition election boycotts, the atmosphere of political violence and deep erosion of individual rights dramatically limited the level of contestation in the electoral process. Bangladesh’s extremely low score on legislative constraints on the executive partly explains why it was so easy for the Awami League to create an autocracy so quickly.

The legal subindex further confirms the erosion of the system of checks and balances necessary in a functioning democracy, clearly showing a negative trend in the two components that deal with the legal framework of the country: clarity of the law and judicial independence and effectiveness. The two-year caretaker government during 2006–08, and constitutional changes made by the subsequent Awami League government generated a state of legal uncertainty and insecurity. The twenty-point drop in the level of judicial independence since 2010 reflects the autocratic government’s efforts to control the judiciary to safeguard its hold on power and to use it as a weapon to persecute the opposition.

The improvement of the security component of stricter measures that curtailed some civil liberties. Mass protests and strikes, which were popular in the early 2000s, were no longer permitted, which resulted in a reduction in open street clashes and insecurity. But this also reflects political repression, so this clearly imposed costs on citizens. The data obviously do not yet reflect the mass student protests that began in July 2024, which ultimately resulted in the ouster of the autocratic government.

Also notable is the sustained improvement in Bangladesh’s informality score after 2005. The government made a big push towards digitalization of public services, including in tax administration. Digitizing third-party information improves the government made a big push towards digitalization of public services, including in tax administration. Digitizing third-party information improves the government’s ability to collect taxes, particularly Value Added Tax, which in turn limits firms’ capacity to operate in an informal shadow economy. This fact could also explain the small progress in bureaucracy and corruption observed in the data from 2004 to 2016, but it is important to stress that the level of this component is still exceptionally low for Bangladesh, not only creating discontent with the government and the state apparatus, but obviously generating substantial economic costs and inefficiencies.

Finally, the economic subindex evolution is driven by the movements in two components, namely trade and investment freedoms. The improvement in trade freedom in the late 1990s is a product of the adjustment programs imposed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank around this period, which forced a liberalizing process in several economic sectors. The ten-point fall in this component in 2013 is likely the result of stricter labor and workplace regulations implemented after the Rana Plaza disaster, which led to workplace injuries and deaths for hundreds of garment factory workers. Garment buyers in Bangladesh’s export destination countries pushed for these regulations. The sharp collapse of investment freedom between 2005 and 2008 is definitely capturing the political uncertainty of those years, and the rapid recovery when finally a government was formed captures the initial enthusiasm once the crisis was resolved.

It is important to comment on the surprisingly low level of women’s economic freedom observed in the data. Bangladesh scores almost eighteen points below the regional average in 2023, and the indicator only shows a mild improvement between 2007 and 2011. I think this might be explained by the distinction between the legal definition of women’s economic freedom versus actual practice. The real situation of women in economic affairs is probably better in Bangladesh than one would infer by looking at the formal legislation. For example, the Bangladeshi female labor force participation rate (39.5 percent) is significantly higher than in many neighboring countries such as India (29.9 percent) and Pakistan (25.9% percent), and the average for South Asia (30percent).² The rapid expansion of the garment industry in the 1980s and 1990s created many new job opportunities, especially for women. That improved returns to education for girls, which led to greater investments in girls’ schooling. Bangladesh achieved the Millennium Development Goal of gender parity in educational enrollment by 1995, fifteen years ahead of schedule. Girls’ primary school enrollment has exceeded that of boys since then. As a by-product, early marriage and early motherhood have decreased dramatically. These improvements in women’s economic opportunities do not seem adequately captured by the legalistic approach embedded in the World Bank Women Business and the Law Index which determines the quantitative score on this component.

Evolution of prosperity

The positive evolution of the Prosperity Index fairly reflects the situation of the country in the last three decades. Despite the institutional volatility and bad governance, Bangladesh has outperformed most regional neighbors economically, and this has closed the prosperity gap, especially since 2014. Scholars have referred to this as “the Bangladesh paradox.” Early improvements in health and educational indicators created the preconditions for economic growth. Bangladesh’s health and educational achievements exceed what the country’s income per capita would predict. The country has made substantial progress in material wellbeing, and unlike some other countries in the region, has not suffered a major economic crisis in the last three decades.

The flat performance of the inequality component of the Index may reflect a lack of detailed data. Economic growth in the country has been obviously urban-biased, with increased activity in sectors such as construction and infrastructure that have benefited cities more than rural areas. Those sectors are also heavily prone to corruption and graft, leading to massive wealth accumulation at the high end of the income distribution.

The health and education components of the Index show that Bangladesh’s improvement has outpaced that of its regional comparators since 1995. While school enrollment has massively improved since 1995, a measure of average years of education does not adequately capture the quality of learning that happens in school. Learning and human capital remain important challenges for Bangladesh today. I suspect that a quality-weighted measure of education would not present as optimistic a picture.

Considerable progress has been made in the health sector, thanks to a determined commitment to ensure child vaccination and access to maternal and neonatal healthcare. A vibrant non-governmental organization sector in Bangladesh has played a positive role to deliver basic services. Again, the quality of healthcare remains poor, and there are emerging areas of concern such as worsening mental health—an issue that needs greater attention from policymakers.

I think the evolution of the environment score masks two opposing trends. Increased economic prosperity in rural areas expands access to cleaner burning cookstoves and other technologies that protect environmental health. Much of the population has remained rural, which probably drives the aggregate positive trend of the indicator. However, in urban areas, outdoor air quality has clearly worsened with increased manufacturing and construction activities (including emissions from brick kilns), and the attendant loss of green space. Increasing prosperity has also led to a proliferation of motorized vehicles and increased congestion, and a lack of urban planning has allowed the urban living environment to deteriorate. These detrimental effects are not adequately captured by the component.

The path forward

An autocratic government that had steadily consolidated its power was finally ousted by a student-led “Monsoon Revolution” during the summer of 2024. The revolution was diffuse and decentralized— with organic student protests that quickly spread throughout the country—and was not organized under the banner of any political party. As a result, the post-revolution political leadership and the way forward remain unclear. Dr. Muhammad Yunus, the founder of the Grameen Bank and a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, took charge as “chief advisor to the caretaker government” at the behest of students. His international name recognition and stature make him a credible leader, and temporarily stabilized the political uncertainty. But as I write, the country’s political future remains uncertain.

Given the political instability and challenges that Bangladesh has faced, citizens are willing to give an unelected caretaker government some leeway and time to govern and reform political institutions. For the moment, all parties, the military, and civil society appear to have implicitly agreed and acknowledged that the caretaker government should remain in power for at least eighteen months, so that they have sufficient time to institute reforms. But important sources of uncertainty remain unresolved. First, the political parties, and especially the recently-ousted Awami League, may pursue strategies to regain influence, which could lead to political instability. Misinformation propagated by right-wing groups in India seems deliberately aimed at destabilizing Bangladesh by inflating fears of religious conflict. However, the impact of these efforts is not yet clear. Second, to maintain legitimacy, the caretaker administration will have to perform, since it does not derive legitimacy from any election. Governing a country with a population of 175 million is a complex undertaking. The bureaucracy and other government institutions, including public universities, were reportedly subject to political influence during the Awami League’s administration. This makes reform even more complex. Third, the power of Bangladeshi political parties has traditionally stemmed from grassroots and street-level organization, with a power hierarchy that extends into rural areas. The caretaker government and the students who led the July 2024 Monsoon Revolution do not have the same political infrastructure and organization.

Bangladesh is in uncharted territory. There is a lot of hope among average citizens that ousting a powerful autocratic government was a major achievement, and that the architects of that uprising can ensure better governance going forward, by instituting some fundamental reforms and not repeating the mistakes of the past. Whether those hopes of a nation can be successfully realized remains to be seen. Given how fundamental many reforms need to be, including a re-examination of several aspects of the country’s constitution, the path ahead is likely neither linear nor straightforward.

Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak is a professor of economics and management at Yale University and the founder of the Yale Research Initiative on Innovation and Scale (Y-RISE). Mobarak conducts field experiments in Bangladesh, Sierra Leone, and Nepal to investigate the adoption of welfare-enhancing innovations and behaviors, and the scaling of effective development interventions. His research has been covered by major global media outlets and published in journals across disciplines. He received a Carnegie fellowship in 2017 and was named in Vox’s inaugural list of “50 scientists working to build a better future.”

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1 The caretaker government system of Bangladesh was introduced in 1996 to ensure a fair and free electoral process. An unelected interim government appointed by the incumbent executive would be tasked with organizing an election within ninety days, and hand over power to the newly elected government within 120 days. The system was abolished in 2012.

2 ILO estimates for labor force participation rates for females as a share of total female population aged 15–64, obtained from the World
Bank data portal.

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European Parliament and United States condemn ‘sham’ Belarus vote

Mercedes Sapuppo — Thu, 23 Jan 2025 18:24:04 +0000

The European Parliament has condemned this weekend’s presidential election in Belarus as a “sham” designed to keep the country’s long-serving dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka in power. In a resolution adopted ahead of the January 26 vote, MEPs noted the absence of any credible opposition candidates and called for the strengthening of sanctions against Belarus.

Days earlier, the United States said the vote could not be free or fair due to the “repressive environment” in the country. “The United States joins many of our European allies in assessing that elections cannot be credible in an environment where censorship is ubiquitous and independent media outlets no longer exist,” commented US Secretary of State Antony Blinken.

This international condemnation comes as no surprise. Since the early 1990s, seventy year old Lukashenka has been steadily concentrating power in his own hands. For more than three decades, he has fostered an authoritarian political culture in Belarus that closely echoes the Soviet past.

The political climate became particularly oppressive following Belarus’s last presidential election in 2020, which saw opposition candidate Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya emerge from obscurity to mobilize a grassroots movement demanding change. When the authorities then rigged the vote in favor of Lukashenka, weeks of nationwide protests erupted that threatened to topple the regime.

Lukashenka was ultimately able to cling onto power in 2020 thanks to support from the Kremlin. In the wake of the protests, he launched a ruthless crackdown on all opposition, leading to thousands of arrests and reports of grave human rights abuses. Targets included civil society and the country’s last remaining independent media outlets. Hundreds of thousands fled Belarus to avoid possible persecution.

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The Belarusian dictator is clearly in no mood to repeat the mistakes of 2020, when his decision to allow a wildcard outsider onto the ballot backfired so disastrously. Ahead of Sunday’s vote, only the tamest of regime-approved opponents have been permitted to participate.

Lukashenka was so fearful of the upcoming election that he “completely cleansed the political field, leaving no room for alternative candidates,” commented Hanna Liubakova, a journalist from Belarus who has been forced to remain in exile since the 2020 protests. “The trauma of 2020 and deep distrust remain high,” she noted.

Tsikhanouskaya, the rival candidate in 2020 who now leads the Belarusian democratic opposition from exile, was similarly critical of the forthcoming vote. “The Belarus dictator’s so-called ‘election’ is nothing more than a sham,” she commented. “We won’t be fooled. All political prisoners must be freed and repressions must end.”

With Lukashenka guaranteed to win Sunday’s vote, the only remaining question is the margin of victory he chooses on this occasion. In 2020, he was officially credited with 81 percent, despite widespread claims that Tsikhanouskaya had actually garnered more votes. “The last intriguing moment in this sham election is how many votes Lukashenka will claim for himself,” commented Liubakova.

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Lukashenka’s deepening dictatorship is not only a threat to domestic human rights and democratic values in Belarus itself. The country is also a key ally of the Kremlin and a junior partner in the emerging axis of autocratic regimes that includes Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.

Minsk and Moscow have enjoyed close relations for decades and are bound together in a broad but vague Union State agreement dating back to the 1990s. Despite this apparent intimacy, Lukashenka has spent much of his reign attempting to maintain a degree of independence by balancing between Russia and the West. However, this strategy collapsed in the wake of the 2020 uprising, which left the Belarus dictator shunned by Western leaders and heavily reliant on Putin for his continued political survival.

Since 2020, Lukashenka has permitted the dramatic expansion of Russian influence over Belarus in a process some have likened to a creeping annexation of the country. He allowed tens of thousands of Russian troops to use Belarus as a base for the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and has since begun hosting limited quantities of Russian nuclear weapons. Lukashenka has also been linked to alleged Russian war crimes including the forced deportation of Ukrainian children.

Meanwhile, Belarus is facing accusations of attempting to undermine the European Union through weaponized migration on the country’s western border. According to a recent POLITICO report, Belarus is helping large numbers of migrants enter the EU illegally as part of Lukashenka’s “revenge” for the imposition of sanctions. In response, Poland is beefing up security at the Belarusian border and calling for the EU to take tougher action.

Sunday’s sham election is a timely reminder of the ongoing struggle for basic freedoms against a brutal dictatorship in the geographical heart of Europe. Western governments can play a meaningful role in this struggle by supporting independent Belarusian media, backing human rights defenders, imposing further sanctions, and highlighting the plight of the country’s many political prisoners. While international attention is rightly focused on Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine, Western leaders must not forget that neighboring Belarus also remains a critical front in the fight against resurgent authoritarianism.

Mercedes Sapuppo is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—President Salome Zourabichvili joins to discuss the political landscape in Georgia and the threat of malign Russian influence.

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A day after watching US President Donald Trump give his inaugural address, Salome Zourabichvili—who is considered by pro-democracy forces as Georgia’s legitimate president, in contrast to the president installed by the Georgian Dream party regime in December—said she picked up on Trump’s vow to make the United States stronger. “A strong America that is effective and is active. . . that is the America that certainly Georgia needs,” she said, “because we cannot just have words. We need action in today’s situation in Georgia.”

Speaking at an Atlantic Council Front Page event Tuesday, Zourabichvili said that she would like to see Trump publicly acknowledge that “elections in Georgia were rigged, that this is not acceptable, and that new elections have to take place.”

“Georgia needs today, more than ever, the attention of its American friends,” Zourabichvili said. “We are really at a turning point,” with the question being whether Georgia moves closer to Russia or closer to the West.

Zourabichvili said she’d also like to see European countries take “more clear positions” beyond refusing to recognize the Georgian Dream government. She would also like to see more support for protesters, who are being arrested, repressed, and even tortured by the regime.

“The people in Georgia need to know that our traditional partners, Americans and Europeans, are on their side,” she said. “We need to be seen and supported morally.”

Below are more highlights from the conversation—moderated by Ia Meurmishvili, chief international correspondent at the Cipher Brief—in which Zourabichvili discussed Georgian Dream’s tactics and the strength of the pro-democracy protests across the country.

A wrong turn

Georgian Dream has begun shopping for “alternatives” to Georgia’s Western partners, Zourabichvili said. “They think they can find the compensation”—whether in the form of economic support from China, political support from Russia, or regional influence with Iran—needed “to support their dictatorship,” she explained.
But, she warned, those potential powers have “geopolitical interests” in Georgia and will thus “exploit” Georgian Dream’s weaknesses.
For example, Russia is interested in Georgia in line with its aim to expand its influence in the Black Sea region—and may “exploit” the country as part of, “in a way, finding a revenge [for] the war it cannot win in Ukraine,” Zourabichvili said.
In Georgia, Russia is “close” to its “end goal,” she warned, as there is now a Georgian government “which they can control. . . [treats] the European-American partners the way [Vladimir] Putin does, and [does] not have any aspiration or attempt to independence.”
She said that China would exploit Georgian Dream for its own economic aims, for example by advancing its interests around the Anaklia port and by offering Georgia nontransparent contracts for such infrastructure projects. “Georgia has nothing to gain,” Zourabichvili argued.

The Euro-Atlantic path

Zourabichvili called the question of Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic path an “existential” one. That path “is what the Georgian population wants today, as it wanted yesterday, and as it wants for its future.”
Zourabichvili praised the Mobilizing and Enhancing Georgia’s Options for Building Accountability, Resilience, and Independence Act, reintroduced in the US Congress earlier this month, which aims to support Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration and to conduct a sanctions review of all Georgian Dream officials.
“It shows that if we want to be isolated, that those are the risks of isolation. And if we come back to our original path, the Euro-Atlantic path, then there can be measures taken that will very quickly bring us back to the partnership with the United States.”
She said that the United States has been “essential” in helping Georgia along that Euro-Atlantic path, including by helping shape the country’s institutions. But “I don’t think that the United States can accept a country as a friend and as a partner” if it no longer has “any of the institutions that the United States has supported over the years,” she said, pointing to the disputed elections.

The voice of the people

Zourabichvili said that the tools available to her as president had been “restricted” to the point that she was left with “nothing much” but pardoning and granting decorations. Now that she has left the presidential palace, she said that she is determined to “represent the large part of the society that today has no other forms of expression” and to continue representing Georgia internationally.
Zourabichvili noted that, during the election campaign, Georgian Dream pushed a narrative that Georgia could be “dragged into a war” if it grew closer to the West. “It’s a very Russian propaganda, and it has worked,” she said. “The result now,” she said, is that Georgia’s government has declared “political war. . . not only on our partners. . . but on its own population.”
She added that not only is Georgian Dream adopting Russian rhetoric, the regime is resorting to “Russian-type repression” through violent crackdowns and tactics meant to instill fear in protesters. Zourabichvili said that such “terror” tactics aren’t working—instead, they’re fueling the movement and eroding political support for Georgian Dream.
Nevertheless, “there is no sign” that the protesters “are going to resign,” Zourabichvili said.

Katherine Walla is the associate director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

Watch the full event

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The quest ahead for Lebanon’s new president: Secure a modern statehood

Frederic C. Hof — Tue, 21 Jan 2025 13:39:50 +0000

If the words of Lebanese President Joseph Aoun’s inaugural address are to be taken at face value, his election represents the resumption of a long-suspended quest to transform the Cedar Republic from a fragment of the long-deceased Ottoman Empire to a modern nation-state. If Aoun proves able in the coming years to translate his word into action, Lebanon’s politics may someday rest on a solid foundation of citizenship instead of sectarianism.

Modern statehood has eluded Lebanon since its independence in 1943. As a result, Lebanon—which Michael Hudson termed “the precarious republic”—has seen a surge of disasters, leaving the country a battlefield for the wars of others and inflicting economic ruin on an enterprising, innovative populace.

Between 1958 and 1964, then President Fouad Chehab—Lebanon’s first army commander-in-chief, who was elevated to the presidency to end the low-grade civil war of 1958—tried his best to overcome the Ottoman legacy of sectarianism and feudalism and replace that legacy with a state. He instituted a series of administrative reforms designed to increase the effectiveness and reach of Lebanon’s central government and, by virtue of his personal modesty and incorruptibility, provided a model of selfless public service to his countrymen, a model rarely replicated by his successors. Indeed, Lebanon’s political class blocked him in the end. In 1970, the sectarian feudalists elected, by a single vote margin, one of their own to the presidency: Suleiman Frangieh. Lebanon’s trajectory has been straight downhill ever since.

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Over a half-century later, Franjieh’s grandson—another Suleiman—was the presidential candidate of choice of Iran’s Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah. Hezbollah, at the behest of Iran, has for decades supported a ravenously corrupt and ruinously incompetent Lebanese political class. In return, the politicians have recognized the group as “The Lebanese Resistance,” a designation elevating it above the status of armed militia and permitting it to bear arms. Twice, in 2006 and 2023, Hezbollah initiated hostilities with Israel, causing massive destruction falling mainly on its Shia Lebanese constituents. Finally, in late 2024, much of that kinetic destruction fell on Hezbollah itself.

Unlike several of his predecessors, Aoun neither mentioned nor paid obeisance to “The Lebanese Resistance” in his inaugural speech. Instead, he pledged “to carry out my duties as the supreme commander of the armed forces and as the chairman of the Higher Defense Council, working to ensure the state’s right to hold a monopoly on weapons, and to invest in the army to monitor the borders, maintain their security in the south, define the boundaries in the east, north and at sea, prevent smuggling, fight terrorism and preserve the unity of the Lebanese territory.” Indeed, much of the analysis following Aoun’s accession to the presidency has, quite understandably, mined his speech for references to Hezbollah, but Aoun did not mention the group by name.

Aoun’s first task will be to ensure that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) implements Lebanon’s role in the ceasefire with Israel by removing and replacing Hezbollah as the armed Lebanese presence south of the Litani River. He will, to be sure, require the cooperation of Iran’s proxy, which retains considerable military capabilities notwithstanding the pounding it has absorbed from Israel. To succeed, Aoun must perform a diplomatic high-wire act: He must, in effect, mediate between Hezbollah and Israel.

The mediation tool most readily at his disposal is the 1949 Israel-Lebanon General Armistice Agreement. The ongoing validity of the armistice, unilaterally (and unjustifiably) renounced by Israel in 1967, is cited by the 1989 Taif Agreement and is, therefore, a tenet of post-civil war Lebanon’s constitutionalism.

Aoun could signal to Israel his interest in implementing and consolidating the current ceasefire by offering Israel the opportunity to update and fully implement the armistice, a critical first step toward eventual peace and diplomatic normalization. Israel could, in turn, assure Lebanon of its own commitment to making the ceasefire work by revoking its 1967 renunciation, completing its withdrawal behind the Blue Line (demarcated by the United Nations in 2000), and declaring its readiness to resolve diplomatically all territorial disputes with Lebanon. It could even suspend its overflights of Lebanese airspace, perhaps as part of a third-party arrangement providing ceasefire-related aerial reconnaissance services. Given that the armistice is anchored in Lebanese constitutionalism, Hezbollah—which acknowledges the need to focus on reconstruction, for the sake of its constituents—might be hard-pressed to object and obstruct. Ideally, Hezbollah’s constituents will urge the organization’s leadership cadre to put Lebanon first by becoming part of a Lebanese political party instead of a proxy for Iran.

Aoun knows what must be done to stabilize the Lebanon-Israel frontier. But the long game he wishes to contest and win centers on Lebanese statehood. This is how he put it in his inaugural speech: “if we want to build a nation, we must all be under the roof of law and justice, where there will be no more mafias or security islands, no more leaks or money laundering, no more drug trafficking, no more interference in the judicial system, in police stations, no more protections or clientelism, no more immunity for criminals and the corrupt. Justice is the bulwark, it is the only guarantee that every citizen has. This is my commitment!” This will be a tall order because the collaboration between Hezbollah—meaning Iran—and Lebanon’s abysmal political class (which still dominates parliament) has left the country awash in all the depravities cited by Aoun.

The Lebanese presidency in 2025 is not endowed with the same powers it enjoyed before the 1989 Taif Accord, and in any event, such powers were insufficient for Chehab to build a state. Aoun will not be able administratively to compel governmental decency, honesty, and competence, even if he proves able to broker a respectable cabinet of ministers and even if he retains the full, enthusiastic support of the LAF. If he wishes to succeed, he must build a mass political movement from the ground up, one dedicated not to him personally but to the idea that it is time, at long last, for Lebanon to graduate from Ottomanism, and that it is time for citizenship-based statehood to emerge. As Aoun put it in his acceptance speech, “No sect should be favored over another, and no citizen should have privilege over another. This is the time for respecting the Constitution, building the state and applying the laws. This is the oath of Lebanon!”

Aoun must, in short, use his office to build the political infrastructure needed to win elections, to ultimately replace the parliamentarians who have used that which has passed for the “government of Lebanon” as a feeding trough. Only with the support of enough Lebanese people willing to abandon political sectarianism and localism can he build a foundation for a nation-state willing and able to meet the needs of all Lebanese citizens, especially the poorest and most vulnerable.

As Aoun embarks on a journey to complete the work of Chehab, he will need both external support and internal protection. Lebanon’s reconstruction needs are enormous, as are the operational challenges faced by the LAF. And there are, to be sure, those in Lebanon who correctly see Aoun as a threat to their ability to steal the fruits of Lebanese diligence, ingenuity, and enterprise.

It is only the gratuitous and often unspeakable suffering and impoverishment of most Lebanese and their consequent desperation that makes Aoun’s quest something other than mission impossible. Some three-quarters of all Lebanese people are now experiencing poverty, and they know that business as usual by a dysfunctional political class is no longer tolerable. The people of Lebanon now have a president willing to say the following: “My commitment is your commitment, honorable members of parliament, and that of every Lebanese person who wants to build a strong state, a productive economy, stable security, a united nation and a promising future.”

The duty of all Lebanese people and all friends of Lebanon is to give Aoun the support he needs to build the “strong” state that the people of Lebanon require to thrive and to live in peace.

Frederic C. Hof is a senior fellow at Bard College’s Center for Civic Engagement. Hof served as a military attaché during Lebanon’s civil war and mediated both maritime and land disputes between Israel and Lebanon from 2009 to 2012 as a State Department official. He is the author of Reaching for the Heights: The Inside Story of a Secret Attempt to Reach a Syrian-Israeli Peace (2022).

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What Trump’s inaugural address means for the world

Atlantic Council — Mon, 20 Jan 2025 23:46:58 +0000

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“A tide of change is sweeping the country.” Beneath the 180-foot-high Capitol dome on Monday, US President Donald Trump was sworn in for a second term, promising in his inaugural address and with a slew of executive orders to enact a 180-degree turn away from many of his predecessor’s policies. Below, Atlantic Council experts offer their insights on what the new US president announced on his first day back—and what to expect next.

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Josh Lipsky (@joshualipsky): Senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center
Rachel Rizzo (@RachelRizzo): Nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center

An ‘intermestic’ inaugural

While Trump emphasized a theme of “peace through strength” on defense policy and even pledged a US mission to Mars, it was primarily “an ‘America first’ speech,” Matt notes, with Mexico, Panama, and China the only foreign countries briefly mentioned.
But Trump “highlighted a series of intermestic issues—those of both domestic and international concern—including plans to follow through on campaign promises with near-term action to strengthen border security, pursue energy dominance, and levy new trade tariffs,” Matt adds.

Border lines

The US southern border stood out as a focus. Trump is declaring an emergency at the border, authorizing the US military to help secure the border, labeling Mexican drug cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, and ending the “catch and release” practice for migrants.
That will yield some immediate results: “Declaring a national emergency and designating cartels as terrorists gives Trump access to authorities and resources that the federal government would not have otherwise,” Tom explains. But don’t expect everything at once: Trump will need not just expanded authority but also “billions of dollars to make his border security plans succeed, and that will not be settled on day one.”
Trump “also needs public support over several years,” Tom adds, pointing to polling showing strong backing for some policies but weaker support for other actions.

Close-up on the Canal

The Panama Canal was another focus for Trump, who criticized the US transfer of the critical trade waterway as a “foolish gift.” “We’re taking it back”, Trump said, in response to what he described as unfair treatment of US ships transiting the canal and the creeping presence of China in the area. Panamanian President José Raúl Mulino swiftly responded with an official communication reiterating Panama’s sovereignty over the canal.
Jason notes that Trump’s concerns about the canal go back decades, and he sparred with Panama in his first term. But one option that Jason predicts the Panamanians would welcome is “to ramp up US investment in the canal and in the many direct and indirect businesses that support canal operations. The United States needs to really get in the game to win the game.”
“The new Panamanian government is more pro-US than its predecessors,” Jason says, and China’s growing influence there can be addressed. On a recent trip to Panama, Jason adds, “I saw and heard concerns of a disproportionate uptick in Chinese investment and a yearning for more US companies to invest in Panama.”

What wasn’t said

Watching with attendees at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Josh tells us that there was “a shared surprise (and perhaps relief) that the president’s favorite word—‘tariffs’—got such little attention in the speech.”
Why? Josh, who predicted a careful opening salvo, says that if Trump were to follow through on the large, immediate tariffs that he promised on the campaign trail, the stock market “would react badly” and “tit-for-tat retaliation” from target countries could increase inflation. Without his economic team in place, that was a risk Trump wasn’t willing to take, Josh surmises.
“One lesson of the first Trump administration is tariffs are a core policy conviction, but the president is sensitive to what the markets think,” Josh adds. “While the markets may have won out today, it’s more likely than not that the president returns to his favorite word in the very near future.”
Another word that did not make the address: “Ukraine.” But Rachel points to Trump’s criticism of “unlimited funding to the defense of foreign borders.” That could “spell trouble for Europe and Ukraine,” she tells us.
Trump’s incoming national security team has indicated support for stronger sanctions on Russia, seizing frozen Russian assets, and pushing for a negotiated peace in Ukraine. But Trump has also signaled a desire to reduce the US commitment to Europe’s defense. Rachel notes that Trump will expect the Europeans to lead on any potential negotiation for a ceasefire in the war, including “holding a ceasefire line and providing long-term security guarantees for Ukraine.”

The post What Trump’s inaugural address means for the world appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Eight big ideas for the second Trump administration

Atlantic Council experts — Fri, 17 Jan 2025 16:57:17 +0000

He’s back. On Monday, Donald Trump will be inaugurated as the forty-seventh president of the United States, as he vows to shake up the US government and world affairs in pursuit of American interests. But that world looks a lot different than the one he left behind when he exited the White House in 2021. So what exactly should he do? Read on to find out what Atlantic Council experts recommend Trump 2.0 do about Ukraine, the military, the dollar, and much more.

Ideas

Ratchet up pressure on Russia to bring peace to Ukraine

John E. Herbst

The new administration can maximize its chances for a successful and quick negotiation.

Read the idea

Make an “Iron Dome for America” a reality

Robert Soofer and Mark J. Massa

The new administration can enhance homeland missile defense.

Read the idea

Take the lead on 5G

Trisha Ray

The new administration can help provide the assurance needed for entities to make long-term investments in commercial wireless.

Read the idea

Future-proof the dollar

Josh Lipsky

The new administration can take steps to invest heavily in the future of the dollar network.

Read the idea

Launch the US Volunteer Business Corps

Aubrey Hruby

The new administration can tap into human capital from seasoned professionals to the next generation.

Read the idea

Become the president of strategic resilience

Thomas S. Warrick

The new administration can make disaster mitigation grants to strengthen the federal response.

Read the idea

Create a competitive defense economy

Edward Brady

The new administration can complete major overhauls of dated defense processes.

Read the idea

Shake up shipping

Michael Hogan

The new administration can take immediate steps to bolster the US maritime industry in the short term.

Read the idea

Ratchet up pressure on Russia to bring peace to Ukraine

For months, the Trump team has trumpeted the big idea of bringing Russia’s aggression against Ukraine to an end quickly—initially suggesting it could be done in twenty-four hours, but now allowing that it might take three to six months. Trump has said that he will not abandon Ukraine, whose survival is important to the United States. Trump’s dilemma is that he has informally laid out elements of a solution requiring compromise by both Moscow and Kyiv.

While Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has indicated a readiness for the kind of territorial compromise that Trump suggests must be part of an agreement, the Kremlin has demonstrated no willingness to consider either the establishment of a demilitarized zone patrolled by European troops or the arming of Ukraine by the West to deter future Russian aggression. Russian President Vladimir Putin has every reason to delay negotiations to encourage Trump to weaken his support for Ukraine—and to give Russia time to gain control over additional Ukrainian territory and kick Ukrainian troops out of the Russian territory of Kursk.

If the new administration wants to maximize its chances for a successful and quick negotiation, it needs to increase pressure on Moscow. It has spoken of using leverage; it must be ready from day one to do so. We know for sure that in one area, Trump is ready. He intends to remove the ill-considered measures taken by the Biden administration to limit US oil and gas production. This should put downward pressure on global oil and gas prices and reduce Russian hydrocarbon revenues. The Trump team can increase pressure on the Kremlin by implementing the new sanctions the Biden administration placed on Moscow last week. It should also go beyond the Biden team in persuading its Group of Seven (G7) partners to enable the transfer of all Russian state frozen assets to Ukraine.

Most important of all, the new president should follow up his decision last spring to enable the passage of the long-delayed US aid package to Ukraine by introducing his own aid package. This could be a loan, but it must include advanced weapons—certainly longer-range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMs) and F-16 fighter jets, but perhaps more—to ensure that Putin understands that continuing his aggression will not lead to additional territorial gains. This approach could produce the sustainable peace that could earn Trump a Nobel Peace Prize.

—John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

Make an “Iron Dome for America” a reality

On the campaign trail, then candidate Trump called for an Iron Dome-style defense for the United States. What can the incoming Trump administration do to make this vision for enhanced homeland defense into a reality?

The first required change is one of strategy. Today, US homeland missile defense strategy covers (a) ballistic missile attacks from North Korea and (b) cruise missile defense against possible attacks from strategic competitors, but essentially only in the Washington, DC, region. That approach no longer makes sense. Homeland missile defense strategy should be expanded to include air and missile threats from all vectors, with special attention to staying ahead of the North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile threat; complicating limited, coercive missile strikes from Russia or China; and protecting US nuclear forces against a disarming strike. Doing so will defeat adversary strategies that depend on deterring or preventing the United States from coming to the aid of its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and Europe.

This expanded strategy is achievable. It will require short-term investments in layered defense, knitting together capabilities like the Ground-Based Interceptor, Standard Missile-3 Block IIA, and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense. In the medium term, much more capable and survivable sensors, including those in space and covering additional angles of approach, will be essential, especially for discriminating attacking warheads from decoys. In the long term, investments in space-based defenses and directed energy will be required.

The second needed change is in resourcing. The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) proclaimed that “the homeland is no longer a sanctuary,” and the 2022 NDS asserts that “first, we will defend the homeland.” For this stated top priority, the Department of Defense budgets a pittance. Despite the first Trump administration’s stated support for homeland missile defense, spending at the US Missile Defense Agency in fact declined toward the end of the first Trump administration. The second time around, the administration cannot miss out on the opportunity to adequately invest in homeland missile defense.

—Robert Soofer is a senior fellow in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, where he leads the Nuclear Strategy Project. He served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy from 2017 to 2021.

—Mark J. Massa is the deputy director for strategic forces policy in the Forward Defense program within the Scowcroft Center.

Take the lead on 5G

The United States is still punching under its weight on 5G wireless. Domestically, the lack of mid-band (1-6 GHz) spectrum continues to be a barrier for commercial applications, even as, globally, China is pushing for harmonization of standards for the 6GHz band. The absence of a forward-looking agenda for telecommunications, beyond defensive line-holding against China, is a barrier to US competitiveness in 5G, and in turn limits the scope and ambition of its global 5G project. One part of this agenda should be a re-evaluation of the Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC’s) spectrum allocation authority—the FCC’s authority to grant licenses for spectrum use to nonfederal entities with the aim of maximizing the public good—which lapsed on March 9, 2023. FCC Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel stated at the one-year mark since the lapse that “in light of the reality the agency has faced for almost a year, we are now compelled to ask what we can do with our current unassigned spectrum in order to keep innovation moving ahead in a global market for wireless that is not slowing down.”

The incoming Trump administration should prioritize the extension of the FCC’s spectrum allocation authority, a necessary step to help spur investment in commercial 5G. The FCC’s authority is a crucial market signal, providing the assurance needed for entities to make long-term investments in commercial wireless applications. By way of low hanging fruit, there is currently a bill in Congress—the Spectrum Auction Reauthorization Act—that would reinstate this authority through 2026.

—Trisha Ray is an associate director and resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center.

Future-proof the dollar

If you haven’t been paying close attention to the Atlantic Council’s Dollar Dominance Monitor (and we forgive you if you haven’t), you might have been surprised to see Trump, two weeks after his re-election, tweeting about how he will tariff countries trying to de-dollarize.

Trump has identified a real problem, but in this situation, tariffs are likely to backfire. As our research has shown, a range of countries are trying to build new cross-border payment systems to work around the dollar—especially when it comes to sanctions. While these efforts don’t threaten the dollar as a global reserve currency (only US fiscal excess or challenging central bank independence could do that) it does undercut the way the United States uses the dollar as a tool of national security. It is not a coincidence that since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Group of Seven (G7) sanctions response, the number of countries pursuing cross-border digital currency projects has more than doubled.

But Trump’s response to these developments shouldn’t be to threaten countries. That just reinforces the reasons that countries like India and Brazil are looking for alternatives in the first place. Instead, the United States should invest heavily in the future of the dollar network. The first step would be building the next generation of the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) network—a fifty-year-old European-based institution that sits at the heart of how money moves around the world. Next, the United States should lead the way in setting standards for the use of digital assets in cross-border payments and make the issue a major focus when Washington hosts the Group of Twenty (G20) presidency next year. The dollar has enormous advantages, and when working in tandem with the euro, pound, and yen, no country in the world can afford to be outside this system. If Trump offers more carrots than sticks, he’ll find a world eager to remain part of the dollar network for the long term.

––Josh Lipsky is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and a former advisor at the International Monetary Fund.

Launch the US Volunteer Business Corps

The geopolitical challenges the Trump administration will face call for innovative solutions that harness the full spectrum of US resources, including tapping into human capital from seasoned professionals to the next generation of leaders. The Trump administration should create a US Volunteer Business Corps (USVBC). This organization would aim to enhance US soft power, cost-effectively expand the capacity and reach of agencies such as the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and provide global exposure to the next generation of US business executives. Given the coming efforts of the Department of Government Efficiency to cut back on bureaucracy, the USVBC would provide a cost-effective way to bring together retiring professionals and recent graduates to support the DFC’s efforts in frontier and emerging markets. Both groups represent untapped resources:

Boomer retirees: The United States is experiencing a wave of retirements, with nearly sixty-five million Americans reaching retirement age by 2025, adding four million per year through 2027. This cohort represents a wealth of knowledge, skills, and experience that could be redirected toward work that benefits US national security and competitiveness.
Student debt-burdened business school graduates: Instead of implementing student debt forgiveness as was done in the Biden administration, students could work off their debt through service in the USVBC. Thus, the Corps would create a win-win scenario—addressing student debt while making future US business executives more globally competitive through mentoring from retirees and international exposure.

The US maintains some of the highest rates of volunteerism in the world. Over seventy-five million Americans volunteered in 2024. The USVBC would direct some of that energy to US international goals.

Operationally, under the new Trump administration, the DFC should immediately create a program for private sector secondees, volunteers, and retirees to serve in advisory council roles on specific funds, deals, and sector teams. By recruiting volunteers with expertise in business, finance, engineering, and project management, the DFC could increase its operational capacity to identify, assess, and advance projects of strategic import while creating a cadre of individuals who support the DFC through its reauthorization in 2025. The 2025 DFC program would be a prototype of the USVBC, allowing for learning and refining before the rollout of a much larger on-the-ground program that would involve deep coordination with the Department of State.

—Aubrey Hruby is a senior advisor at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and co-founder of Tofino Capital.

Become the president of strategic resilience

Great presidents often must govern on issues different from the ones on which they campaigned. Franklin Roosevelt famously shifted from “Doctor New Deal” to “Doctor Win the War.” Trump faces just such a challenge after the series of devastating hurricanes in Florida in September and North Carolina in October, as well as this month’s wildfires in California. Trump should become the president of strategic resilience.

The United States faces a crisis, like the COVID-19 pandemic that hit in March 2020, that will have devastating consequences if the Trump administration does not get in front of the challenge. Already, insurance rates in Florida and the Gulf states have skyrocketed, and California’s already horrible insurance situation is about to become desperate. Homeowners have to have insurance or they cannot get a federally insured mortgage to buy a house. Businesses have to have insurance to be able to stay in business, and if they can’t stay in business, unemployment skyrockets. Two category 5 hurricanes hitting Florida or a Gulf state in a single season, or another wildfire season next winter like the one California is in now, will put the economy of those states, and perhaps the country, into recession or worse. Americans living elsewhere should not be smug: they will get hit by the bills if Congress has to appropriate hundreds of billions of dollars in emergency aid. Voters could well take revenge against those in office.

The alternative approach is to commit to the steps required to save lives and reduce the damage when disasters occur. The federal government, through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its Federal Emergency Management Agency, is responsible for both coordinating disaster response and increasing resilience at the state, local, and personal levels. Trump can use DHS’s considerable infrastructure expertise, its network of partnerships, and its authority to make disaster mitigation grants (which are separate from disaster recovery grants) to strengthen the federal response, and work with state and local governments and the private sector to have a legacy that leaves the United States a stronger and more resilient nation.

—Thomas S. Warrick is the director of the Future of DHS project at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense program and former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security.

Create a competitive defense economy

During his last administration, Trump was deeply involved in the defense industry, including personally leading negotiations and spurring foreign military sales. Two major reforms—reforming the budgeting process and creating competition within the Department of Defense—could create a defense economy in the United States that is more responsive and competitive, increasing military and economic strength for the nation. Such action would be the greatest US defense reform since Goldwater-Nichols passed in 1986.

The new administration should embrace the reforms proposed by the bipartisan Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Reform Commission. The commission made many recommendations, but the chief issue is that the current PPBE process makes it too easy to disconnect resourcing from strategy. Installing a new system, including restructuring the budget so it is easier to understand, will improve this shortfall. The new system should enable the president, Congress, and the American people to understand what capabilities the military is trying to buy and how money is being appropriated to buy them.

Trump can make this new system more successful by fostering a competitive environment within the Department of Defense. Lack of competition within the defense industry and high barriers between service responsibilities have dangerously reduced defense productivity and increased program costs. Active encouragement of competition between programs in addition to competition between companies can reduce the negative impacts of the government’s monopsony.

The new Trump administration is in a unique position to complete major overhauls of dated defense processes. Many nominees for key positions within the Department of Defense do not have major ties to existing bureaucracies, while the same party will be in control of the White House and Congress. This sets the stage for the kind of major defense defense reform that hasn’t bee seen in decades, at a time when the United States needs to find a competitive edge.

—Edward Brady is the 2024-2025 senior Air Force fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The views expressed in this article represent the personal views of the author and are not necessarily the views of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Air Force, the Air University, or any other US government agency.

Shake up shipping

In spring 2024, a bipartisan, bicameral group of Congress members released “Congressional Guidance for a National Maritime Strategy.” Two of the members, Representative Michael Waltz and Senator Marco Rubio, have since been tapped for cabinet posts in the incoming administration. The other two introduced the SHIPS Act in December 2024, a much-needed bill that will provide the necessary investment and focus to revitalize the national shipping industry over the next ten years. While it is vital that the new administration support this initiative, in addition to the Navy’s request for 3 to 5 percent budget increases above inflation to improve its shipbuilding, these are long-term solutions that do little to turn the tide to ensure effective deterrence against China by 2027—the year US officials have said China is targeting to attain the military capability to invade Taiwan.

In the short term, Trump should be bold and turn to allies and partners to bolster the US maritime industry until the SHIPS Act has a significant effect. He should push for Congress to repeal or meaningfully change the Jones Act, which mandates that only US-built, -owned, and -staffed ships travel between domestic ports. Until that is done, he should issue broad waivers for ships and crew to meet US needs. While China is the largest shipbuilder in the world, the next three, South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, are vital allies in the region. The United States should provide additional funding to invest in their shipbuilding capacity and buy merchant ships, which can immediately supplement the currently dismal US maritime industry. The SHIPS Act would recruit and train new American mariners, but until then Trump can open H-2B visas (he has recently signaled his approval for legal migration for foreign workers) or even create a path to citizenship for mariners from the Philippines, Indonesia, and India, the three largest suppliers of seafarers outside of China and Russia. A short-term program to add merchant ships and their vetted crews to the US fleet could reduce the strategic sealift shortfalls to ensure readiness in the Indo-Pacific by 2027.

—Michael Hogan is the 2024-2025 senior US Navy fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the views or policy of the US Defense Department, the Department of the Navy, or the US government.

The post Eight big ideas for the second Trump administration appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What the world can do about Maduro

Atlantic Council experts — Fri, 10 Jan 2025 21:10:24 +0000

JUST IN

He’s tightening his grip. Venezuelan autocrat Nicolás Maduro was inaugurated for a third term as president on Friday despite international observers, including the United States, determining that his victory in last year’s election was fraudulent. Maduro’s swearing-in was accompanied by a new round of US sanctions against Venezuelan officials and comes one day after the government briefly detained opposition politician María Corina Machado. Below, our experts explain what Maduro’s inauguration means for the region, the Venezuelan opposition, and the future of US sanctions policy.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION BROUGHT TO YOU BY

Iria Puyosa (@NSC): Senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab
Jason Marczak (@jmarczak): Vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center
Geoff Ramsey (@GRamsey_LatAm): Senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

What Biden did, and Trump can do

“The Biden administration has slightly increased pressure” on Maduro’s regime, Iria tells us. While the United States has sanctioned two thousand individuals and raised the bounties on Maduro and his interior minister, Diosdado Cabello, US oil giant Chevron maintains its license to operate in Venezuela. “The new sanctions are insufficient to remove Maduro and Cabello from power,” she argues.
After it takes office in ten days, the Trump administration should work with regional governments, says Jason, to “accelerate diplomatic coordination to give new momentum to the opposition and to make life harder for Maduro and his accomplices.”
Despite the regime’s escalating crackdown on the opposition, “it is easy to overstate how strong Maduro really is,” Geoff argues. He points to Maduro’s post-election cabinet reshuffle to empower hardliners, coupled with the elevation of Cabello, a longtime rival, as “a sign of just how few friends Maduro has left.”
Geoff advises the incoming Trump administration to take note of internal divisions in the Maduro regime that can be further undermined by economic pressure. “Sanctions alone are unlikely to unseat Maduro,” he says, “unless they are accompanied by a clear roadmap to lift them, giving fence-sitting regime figures a blueprint to follow.”

Regional rejection

Maduro has brought Latin American leaders “from across the political spectrum together to reject his new power grab,” Jason tells us. Chilean President Gabriel Boric, Argentinian President Javier Milei, and Panamanian President José Raúl Mulino, he notes, have all rejected Maduro’s claim to victory in last year’s presidential election.
The highest-ranking foreign official at Maduro’s inauguration, Jason points out, may have been the speaker of Russia’s Duma.
“The continued large-scale regional rejection of Maduro is no small feat,” Jason says, given Latin America’s historical divisions. “But the critical question,” he adds, “is how to avoid complacency and leverage this unity to further support the democratic opposition.”

A mobilized opposition

Amid Maduro’s third inauguration, “Venezuelans are again taking to the streets in large numbers, demanding a transition to democracy and the inauguration of González,” says Iria. The Biden administration should use this opportunity to take more “meaningful action” against Maduro, she argues, as “the opposition is now strategically united, the people are mobilized, and the ruling coalition is showing cracks.”
Regional governments working to pressure Maduro, Jason says, should also strive to “avoid burdening the Venezuelan people with more hardships.” Pressuring Maduro’s government while sparing the Venezuelan people from the worst effects of sanctions is “a delicate tightrope to walk” Jason adds, but is “necessary to give further hope to the overwhelming number of Venezuelans who cast a vote for democracy and freedom in July.”

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Experts react: What does Maduro’s third-term power grab mean for Venezuela’s future?

Atlantic Council experts — Fri, 10 Jan 2025 18:58:30 +0000

Meet the new boss, same as the old boss. On Friday, Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro was sworn in for a third six-year presidential term, six months after an election widely viewed as stolen in Maduro’s favor. Vote tallies collected by the opposition after the election showed that opposition candidate Edmundo González, not Maduro, secured more votes. Ahead of Friday’s inauguration, the Maduro regime cracked down on dissent, including by temporarily detaining María Corina Machado, another prominent opposition leader. Maduro digging in comes as the Biden administration imposed news sanctions on Venezuelan officials, and as many leaders in the Western Hemisphere, including US President-elect Donald Trump, expressed their support for González. So, what’s next for Venezuela? Atlantic Council experts share their insights below.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Geoff Ramsey: Trump should take note of the Maduro regime’s internal tensions

Iria Puyosa: The new sanctions are insufficient to remove Maduro from power

Lucie Kneip: The Venezuelan opposition will need to unite around a theory of change

William Tobin: Going forward, the US should better balance oil sanctions with sanctions against individuals

Latin American leaders across the political spectrum are rejecting Maduro’s power grab

The voting tally sheets overwhelmingly showed that González won Venezuela’s presidential election on July 28, 2024. It’s even a point on which Trump and US President Joe Biden agree. Both have referred to González as president-elect, with Trump doing so over social media yesterday following the reported detention—and release—of opposition leader Machado.

So, in what type of country does a president lose an election—and there’s evidence to back it up—but then goes ahead and assumes another term anyways? “It’s a dictatorship,” says Chile’s president, Gabriel Boric, in reference to Maduro’s government. Boric is one of many Latin American leaders who have categorically rejected Maduro’s claim that he won the July presidential election. On that point, there is agreement among Boric on the left to Argentinian President Javier Milei and Panamanian President José Raúl Mulino on the right—both countries which González has visited. González also visited the United States in the past week, where I had a chance to speak with him.

In a fragmented and polarized region, what Maduro has achieved is to bring leaders from across the political spectrum together to reject his new power grab. Brazil, Colombia and Mexico—although not recognizing Maduro’s win—unfortunately had representatives present at today’s inauguration. But at least the presence was limited to the current ambassadors serving in the country. Perhaps the highest-level foreign official at the inauguration was the speaker of Russia’s Duma, Vyacheslav Volodin.

The continued large-scale regional rejection of Maduro is no small feat. The region is historically divided. But the critical question is how to avoid complacency and leverage this unity to further support the democratic opposition. Regional governments, including the incoming Trump team, should accelerate diplomatic coordination to give new momentum to the opposition and to make life harder for Maduro and his accomplices. At the same time, these governments should work to avoid burdening the Venezuelan people with more hardships. It’s a delicate tightrope to walk, but it’s necessary to give further hope to the overwhelming number of Venezuelans who cast a vote for democracy and freedom in July.

—Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Trump should take note of the Maduro regime’s internal tensions

By assuming yet another illegitimate mandate based on a fraudulent election, Maduro has confirmed that he is willing to cling to power at all costs. Opposition leader Machado and election winner González are deeply popular in Venezuela, but Maduro has the guns and thugs on his side—and he’s not afraid to use them. Yet in spite of the mounting number of political prisoners and the recent reported detention and release of Machado, it is easy to overstate how strong Maduro really is.

In the wake of July’s stolen election, Maduro has had to reconfigure his cabinet completely, placing more and more power in the hands of hardliners in the Chavista coalition. A key benefactor of Maduro’s drive to assume a new mandate is Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, a longtime rival who Maduro has kept at arm’s length since taking power in 2013. Entrusting him as top enforcer may well be a sign of just how few friends Maduro has left inside Chavismo. Others in the coalition, meanwhile, may well have doubts about the idea of six more years of economic chaos, violence, and international isolation.

When Trump takes office on January 20, his team should take careful note of these internal dynamics. The goal should be to combine pressure with incentives that can disrupt regime cohesion, presenting key figures in the ruling coalition with dilemmas in a way that makes a democratic transition more appealing than clinging to power. For this strategy to work, the next US administration will have to keep sanctions policy nimble and responsive to events on the ground, and avoid a “set it and forget it” approach. Sanctions alone are unlikely to unseat Maduro, unless they are accompanied by a clear roadmap to lift them, giving fence-sitting regime figures a blueprint to follow. The first Trump administration’s Democratic Transition Framework, presented in 2020, laid out a vision for change involving power sharing and reconciliation, and it may be worth dusting off this time around as well.

—Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The new sanctions are insufficient to remove Maduro from power

In response to Maduro’s illegitimate swearing-in for another term as president of Venezuela—despite González’s electoral victory—the Biden administration has slightly increased pressure on his authoritarian regime. The new measures include raising the rewards for Maduro and Cabello to a maximum of twenty-five-million dollars and sanctions against two thousand individuals involved in repression, violation of human rights, and electoral fraud. However, the US oil company Chevron’s license to operate in Venezuela remains in place.

Indeed, the new sanctions are insufficient to remove Maduro and Cabello from power. The ruling coalition, which White House representatives are now labeling as “narcoterrorists,” can continue to collaborate with transnational criminal networks that include allies in Iran and Russia while simultaneously increasing repression against democratic political leaders and human rights defenders in Venezuela.

Venezuelans are again taking to the streets in large numbers, demanding a transition to democracy and the inauguration of González. The Biden administration has an opportunity to take more decisive action to support Venezuela’s democratic re-establishment. Helping to pave a clear path for Venezuela’s return to democracy could become a significant legacy for Biden in the Western Hemisphere. Delaying meaningful action could risk losing this crucial opportunity, especially since the opposition is now strategically united, the people are mobilized, and the ruling coalition is showing cracks.

—Iria Puyosa is a senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.

The Venezuelan opposition will need to unite around a theory of change

Maduro’s illegitimate re-inauguration is the latest scheme in the authoritarian government’s campaign to eliminate resistance to its consolidation. To add insult to injury, regime affiliates briefly detained Machado during her first public emergence after months of hiding, rattling supporters domestically and abroad. While swaths of the Venezuelan opposition quickly condemned her detention, it remains to be seen how the opposition will respond to tests of its ability to unify in 2025, given differences in attitudes toward electoral participation, negotiations, and pressure tactics.

Heading into the 2025 subnational elections, opposition coalition candidates will have to determine whether it’s worth throwing their hat in the ring given the electoral conditions. Some may decide that the government’s blatant fraud at the national level will be even more easily achieved at the local level, while others may seek to draw on the infrastructure of their strongholds to procure as much regional power as possible, in which case they will need to develop a clear strategy of mobilization. The regime will seek to exploit these conflicting strategies to undermine the opposition’s political will to rise to the occasion.

Maduro’s government has historically proven adept at taking advantage of internal divisions by providing opportunities for disgruntled splinter groups within parties to gain footing by positioning themselves more closely to regime affiliates. This strategy of party cooptation is likely to continue in many of the major parties unless the opposition can find a way to resolve internal differences and coordinate on defining a theory of change.

Beyond electoral participation, opponents of Maduro will continue to face repression through the targeting of political figures, journalists, and human rights activists, as well as crackdowns on protests and digital censorship. Maduro’s best strategy is to stoke fear and fatigue with protests and mobilization. International allies will be critical in supporting political participation and free speech as Maduro seeks to further stifle these tenets of democracy.

—Lucie Kneip is a program assistant at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Going forward, the US should better balance oil sanctions with sanctions against individuals

As Maduro illegitimately steps into office for his third term today, Venezuela’s oil sector is in sustained yet marginal recovery. In recent months, Venezuela surpassed the one-million-barrel-per-day milestone for the first time since mid-2019.

The oil sector in Venezuela has been experiencing a secular decline since the early 2000s, and production output from Venezuela’s degrading oilfield infrastructure began to drop dramatically during the first half of 2014. An oil price crash sent dominoes cascading for Venezuela’s state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, SA, which faced declining demand at the same time as it confronted a sizeable volume of maturing debt, the beginning of central bank monetization, and intensifying operational inefficiencies.

The sanctions imposed on the oil sector under the “maximum pressure” campaign from 2018 to 2022, spanning the Trump and early Biden administrations, exacerbated but did not cause this decline. However, the strategy did divert most of Venezuela’s oil to China at discounted prices, and led Iranian service company NIORDC to play a key role in maintaining output. Phantom traders from China and Iran handled virtually all of Venezuela’s exports in 2021.

The recent uptick in Venezuelan oil output has come with the reentry of Western firms, most substantially since April 2024 under the US Treasury Department’s policy of “specific licensing.” Under this policy, individual firms can seek authorization from the Office of Foreign Assets Control to operate in Venezuela under transparent and restricted terms, which strictly limit remuneration to Maduro’s enablers. Under this policy, approximately half of Venezuela’s exports have been routed to the United States or to Europe since May 2024. This effectively represents a diversion from China and increases transparency.

There is doubt that a renewed maximum pressure strategy would achieve its aims. In any case, it is incumbent on the Treasury Department to ensure that Maduro cannot use the oil sector as a cash cow, and to continue to tighten its clasp around Maduro’s network of enablers through individual sanctions.

—William Tobin is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, where he focuses on international energy and climate policy.

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Venezuela’s 2024 stolen election compounds challenges to stability and democratic renewal

Sary Levy-Carciente — Wed, 08 Jan 2025 23:02:28 +0000

Evolution of freedom

Evolution of prosperity

The path forward

Explore the Venezuela country scorecard

Return to Full Essay collection

Evolution of freedom

Since 1995¹, Venezuela’s overall Freedom Index score has significantly declined, with a decrease of more than twenty-eight points. Initially, the country’s freedom score was just 1.4 points below the Latin America & the Caribbean regional average, but its scores on all three subindexes have declined and the gap between Venezuela and the regional average now exceed thirty points. The national statistical system has faced a significant setback, with data either disappearing or remaining outdated. Venezuela has outperformed the region on only one indicator—women’s economic freedom, with a significant increase of thirty-five points since 1971, and over eighteen points since 1995, making this evolution a consistent trend in the society.

Venezuela’s poor performance in the twenty-first century can be attributed to the political and ideological project known as “socialism of the twenty-first century,” which aimed to dismantle the institutional framework established during the democratic period, 1958–1998, and replace it with a system rooted in socialist ethics and production mode, with a geopolitical scope, and where individual freedom is no longer a value.

Its economic subindex improved by over eight points from 1995 to 2000, driven by trade freedom, but has since declined. The most significant driver of the decline has been the erosion of property rights, with 1,423 documented cases of expropriations, interventions, occupations, and confiscations . Additionally, the “land rescues” under the 2001 Land Law resulted in the seizure of five million hectares, equivalent to 5 percent of Venezuela’s territory, according to the National Land Institute. From 2014 to 2019, the Organic Law on Fair Prices, enforced by the National Superintendence for the Defense of Socioeconomic Rights, led to 149,811 actions, including inspections, closures, and fines. As a result, the economy stagnated, supply chains were dismantled, and the violation of property rights exacerbated uncertainty, heightened risk perception, discouraged investment, stifled job creation, and deepened poverty.

Since 2020, a series of pseudo-privatizations have occurred, under the Anti-Blockade Law, which allows the suspension of legal provisions, the use of exceptional contracting mechanisms, and the classifying of actions as secret or confidential. Alongside this, an indeterminate number of affected companies and assets have been returned without transparency, and have not adhered to the basic standards of reparation or property rights restitution.

The socialist model currently guiding Venezuela’s policies is marked by excessive populism and state intervention. Economic activity and entrepreneurship are severely hampered by widespread government interference, inconsistent regulatory enforcement, and a heavy bureaucratic burden. The lack of transparency in government decision making, the shrinking of market size, and entrenched cronyism have resulted in a market with little competition and virtually no freedom for investment.

The government’s lack of transparency and accountability and a setback in the official statistical system have been other key factors in undermining economic freedom, making it difficult to base decisions on reliable information and fueling misinformation. This issue is particularly evident in the erosion of information related to the national budget and its management, with clear political intent, allowing the executive between 2006 and 2012, the discretionary and opaque management of large public funds for social programs known as “Misiones,” which failed to produce positive social outcomes.

At the same time, political freedom in Venezuela has drastically declined, with a nearly fifty-five-point drop since 1995 in the political subindex. Initially, Venezuela outperformed the regional average by twelve points but now lags by more than forty points, with the gap widening after 1999. Electoral performance has steadily worsened, with sharp declines between 2012–13 and 2016–17. The presidential election on July 28, 2024, particularly exposed the subordination of the electoral and judiciary branches to the executive, disregarding the popular will and eroding the integrity of elections as a means of democratic alternation.

Legislative checks on the executive have collapsed by 85 points since 1995. Although there was an apparent improvement between 2014–2016, when the democratic opposition won a qualified majority in the National Assembly, this progress was undone by a Supreme Court decision loyal to the executive, followed by the establishment of a Constituent Assembly that stripped the National Assembly of its powers. The situation seemed to offer some hope in 2018–2019, with the emergence of an interim presidency and mounting international pressure and sanctions on the regime. However, the anticipated political change toward greater freedom never materialized.

The rule of law, as measured by the legal subindex, has eroded, with the score dropping dropped by over twenty-five points in Venezuela since 1995. Initially, scores were above the regional average, but this trend reversed in 1998, leading to the country’s current position below that average. Judicial independence and effectiveness have sharply deteriorated, with significant declines between 1997–2000 and 2003–05, after which they have remained consistently low.

The main drivers for the decline in the rule of law during this century are a) the consolidation of executive supremacy, enabled by the expansion of presidential powers in the 1999 Constitution and the frequent use of decrees and special powers through enabling laws; b) the increasing role of the military in controlling and implementing government policies; and c) the rise in corruption and lack of transparency, bypassing legal accountability standards. The decline has been further compounded by a 73 percent drop in judicial independence between 1995 and 2017. These elements have eroded democratic governance and undermined institutional integrity.

In 2019, the UN Human Rights Council established an Independent International Fact-Finding Mission to investigate human rights violations in Venezuela since 2014. Its latest report issued in September 2024 focused on the post-electoral crisis following the presidential elections of July 28, 2024. The report highlighted a significant intensification of the state’s repressive apparatus, documenting serious human rights violations, including brutal crackdowns on protests, which resulted in twenty-five deaths, hundreds of injuries, and thousands of arrests, including 158 minors. The report detailed arbitrary detentions, forced disappearances, torture, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, including sexual and gender-based violence, all of which escalated during this period. Additionally, the report noted an increase in harassment and judicial persecution of journalists, nongovernmental organizations, and key civil society actors. This repression worsened following the approval of the Law on the Supervision, Regularization, Action, and Financing of Non-Governmental and Related Organizations (August 2024), which imposed severe restrictions on the operations of these organizations.

Evolution of prosperity

Since 1995, Venezuela’s Prosperity Index score has experienced significant fluctuations, while the regional average has generally improved. Between 2003 and 2012, Venezuela saw a period of growth, followed by a sharp decline, placing it among the lowest-ranked countries in terms of prosperity. This decline demonstrates how undermining the institutional framework that safeguards individual freedom, freedom of expression, and political and economic liberty can devastate a society’s prosperity and the quality of life of its citizens.

The perception of progress in income per capita during the positive period was largely driven by an oil price boom that was managed wastefully. Even before oil prices reversed, the country was left impoverished, with a destroyed middle class, crippling debt, and a lack of basic services such as water, sanitation, electricity, transportation, and telecommunications, as well as of public goods like security, healthcare, and education. Furthermore, Venezuela lost nearly a quarter of its population to migration. Today, its prosperity has fallen below early 2000 levels, reaching a state of low prosperity.

Between 2013 and 2021, Venezuela’s economy contracted by more than 75 percent (as measured by GDP). Despite apparent recovery rates in recent years, the economy remains far too small to meet the population’s needs, and without a robust institutional framework ensuring transparent and fair rules, sustainable growth and improved quality of life remain elusive. Since 2008, Venezuela has suffered from double-digit inflation year-over-year, reaching hyperinflation between 2016 and 2019, which would be overcome by a process of dollarization.

Given the lack of updated and verifiable official economic data², the World Bank in 2021 unclassified Venezuela, which previously classed as an upper-middle-income country. For the size of the economy at that time, Venezuela could have been classified as a low-income country.

Official socioeconomic data is scarce and irregular, so it is thanks to the National Survey of Living Conditions (ENCOVI) conducted by well-reputed Venezuelan universities that we know that in 2021, 94.5 percent of the population lived in poverty, with extreme poverty affecting two-thirds of the households, due to the combined effects of a collapsed economy and the COVID-19 pandemic. Those figures improved by 2023 when extreme poverty dropped to 59.1 percent and multidimensional poverty to 58 percent, but in rural areas, both indicators remained over 70 percent, so the population is still struggling. This starkly contrasts with the year 2000, when seventy percent of the population belonged to the middle class, and fewer than 25 percent lived in poverty.

The education system has become increasingly substandard, with significant deterioration since 2013. However, the true extent of this decline is difficult to assess due to the manipulation, absence, or lack of updated official statistics, which can lead to misleading information being reported to multilateral organizations. The education crisis is marked by crumbling public school infrastructure, a shortage of underpaid teachers, inadequate educational coverage, high student dropout rates, and a significant reduction in both the reach and consistency of the school feeding program. This downward trend extends to university education, where enrollment dropped by 24 percent between 2008 and 2018, and by 60 percent in the country’s major universities from 2012 to 2024. According to the 2023 ENCOVI report, only 60 percent of students regularly attend school with some degree of normality, while 40 percent have irregular attendance.

The decline in educational quality is further highlighted by an Early Grades Reading Assessment test, where third grade students achieved, on average, only 57.3 percent correct answers. Additionally, seventy-five percent of students scored below 76 percent, with just 25 percent achieving between 76 percent and 100 percent correct answers, underscoring the significant gaps in learning outcomes. The situation deteriorated further during the COVID-19 pandemic, as schools were unprepared for virtual learning. The post-pandemic period brought additional challenges, with many schools being looted, resulting in the loss of supplies, furniture, and electrical wiring and damage to infrastructure. Compounding the crisis is the government’s response to teachers’ demands, which has involved threats, harassment, and surveillance. This hostile environment, coupled with poor working conditions and restricted freedom of speech, has driven many educators to quit their jobs or leave the country altogether, exacerbating the already fragile state of the education system.

In contrast to the improving health outcomes in much of Latin America, Venezuela’s health performance has stagnated and deteriorated. Once outperforming the regional average, the country fell behind in 2009 and is now more than three points below the regional mean. Various indicators reflect the decline in the overall health of the Venezuelan population during the twenty-first century. Life expectancy dropped from around seventy-three to seventy-two years, while the infant mortality rate increased from 17.9 per 1,000 live births in 2000 to 21.1 per 1,000 by 2017. Maternal mortality surged to 125 per 100,000 live births by 2015³. By 2020, nearly one-third of Venezuelans were food insecure, and the 2017 ENCOVI survey found that 64.3 percent of the population had lost weight due to food shortages. Additionally, once-controlled communicable diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, and diphtheria resurfaced, with malaria cases rising from 35,500 in 2009 to over 400,000 by 2017. By 2018, over 80 percent of hospitals reported shortages of basic medicines, and many healthcare facilities lacked electricity and clean water.

This situation stems from a combination of factors: lack of investment in public services worsening healthcare; infrastructure collapsing due to corruption, poor maintenance, and a lack of new investments; ineffective public policies; the exodus of healthcare workers and skilled professionals because of low salaries and poor working conditions; widespread shortages of food and medicine; rising poverty; and persistent inflation and hyperinflation. These issues result from the model imposed at the beginning of the century, which dismantled the institutional framework, curtailing liberty and economic opportunities.

Additionally, Venezuela has experienced significant environmental degradation, jeopardizing the prospects for future generations. The massive and uncontrolled exploitation of the Orinoco Mining Arc, which encroaches on Indigenous territories and Areas Under Special Administration Regime with government knowledge and authorization, has drawn serious concerns from social, environmental, and human rights organizations since 2016 regarding its harmful implications for Indigenous communities and biodiversity. This mining project has led to significant destruction in the Amazon region in Venezuela, with illegal mining operations deforesting 1,000 hectares of Canaima National Park and damaging 2,227 hectares in Yapacana National Park. Moreover, mercury pollution has affected the Ventuari, Caura, Caroní, Cuyuní, and Orinoco rivers.

Petróleos de Venezuela, the national oil company, has also neglected environmental and safety protocols, increasing accidents, including spills in sensitive ecosystems such as the Orinoco River and Lake Maracaibo. The Global Gas Flaring Tracker from the World Bank indicates that Venezuela’s flaring intensity quadrupled between 2012 and 2021, with the amount of gas flared in 2022 exceeding the amount of gas recovered for productive purposes. This practice contributes to higher emissions of harmful gases, placing Venezuela fifth globally in gas flaring.

Several indicators highlight the environmental harm in Venezuela. Global Forest Watch tracks increased deforestation, the Living Planet Index reveals a decline in biodiversity, the Water Quality Index assesses levels of water pollution, and the Environmental Performance Index (EPI), and the Global Carbon Atlas, reflects the environmental stress caused by fossil fuel extraction and energy mismanagement. The Air Quality Index (EPI-Yale) indicates issues related to inadequate industrial regulation and vehicular emissions, the Waste Management Index (EPI) shows a decline in waste management capacity, with improper disposal of solid and hazardous waste, and the Environmental Vulnerability Index highlights high vulnerability due to poor natural resource management. These indicators collectively demonstrate the country’s ecological deterioration across multiple dimensions. This troubling environmental situation stems from a lack of rule of law, corruption, and influence peddling, leading to the indiscriminate depletion of natural resources and the contamination of the environment to the detriment of future generations.

The path forward

Venezuela’s current situation is critical: Citing the nation’s institutional and social fragility, the International Monetary Fund placed it on its List of Fragile and Conflict-Affected States. The International Monetary Fund has alluded to a government that is either unable or unwilling to fulfill essential state functions such as providing security, justice, and basic services to the majority of its population, with weak institutions, nonexistent governance, and high poverty levels.

This crisis is the result of nearly twenty-five years of the socialism of the twenty-first century model, which has eroded the progress made in the previous century. From the outset, various levels and forms of resistance to this model have emerged, yet the regime has maintained its grip on power through various means, increasingly revealing its authoritarian nature over time. Despite these challenges, the population has demonstrated remarkable resilience, remaining active and committed to pursuing political change that could reverse the current situation by leveraging its available natural, human, and financial resources.

Thus, this moment can be seen as a crossroads, a tipping point, a moment of bifurcation, with the potential to shape the future. The political driver at play will serve as the catalyst for two vastly different scenarios.

1) Scenario 1: Oppression and poverty. This scenario envisions the end of Venezuela’s liberal democratic republic model, resulting in the entrenchment of tyranny and the subordination of all powers to the executive. Venezuela could become a significant node in the multidimensional networks of illegality.

If the popular will, as expressed in the 2024 presidential elections, is disregarded, the country may plunge deeper into a society marked by diminished freedom and prosperity. Venezuela is unlikely to reintegrate into global financial flows, facing obstacles in renegotiating its debt with multilateral organizations and receiving the necessary support to address its complex humanitarian crisis.

In this context, recurrent macroeconomic imbalances are expected, leading to increased economic volatility and a shortened investment horizon, which would elevate risk premiums. Maintaining policies to stabilize the exchange rate and control inflation would become increasingly difficult, with restrictions on credit and foreign currency inflows. That will widen the gap between official and parallel exchange rates, fostering the debasement of the national currency and deepening dollarization.

To manage these macroeconomic challenges, fiscal and parafiscal pressures on the private sector would intensify, making production less profitable and riskier, promoting informal economic activity, reducing domestic supply, and reigniting inflationary pressures.

The prevailing situation would hinder the ability to address social needs, exacerbating poverty and exclusion. As popular dissatisfaction rises, the government is likely to respond with increased repression, leading to a heightened militarization of public spaces and severe human rights violations. This dynamic would contribute to the further erosion or outright extinction of the rule of law, undermining freedoms of expression and association, as well as civil, political, and economic rights.

Such conditions would foster opacity in public fund management, heightening corruption and enabling arbitrary public policies and decision-making processes. An ongoing source of income may come from continued licenses for oil resource exploitation or from actors unconcerned about the reputational risks of engaging with a sanctioned state, which would likely result in lower prices for oil sales.

In this tyrannical scenario, characterized by a lack of freedom and a bleak future, a significant new wave of migration could emerge, predominantly involving very low-income groups. This influx would put pressure on neighboring and destination countries, potentially fueling anti-migration policies and discriminatory attitudes.
The consolidation of a tyrannical regime would facilitate the exploitation of Venezuela’s valuable natural resources to support illicit networks, transforming the country into a hub of regional, hemispheric, and global instability.

2) Scenario 2: Freedom and prosperity. This scenario envisions the reestablishment of Venezuela as a liberal democratic republic, anchored in Western values of freedom, individual dignity, and prosperity. Under this vision, Venezuela could reclaim its stabilizing role in the western hemisphere.

If the democratic alternative—which won the presidential elections on July 28, 2024 and transparently demonstrated its results to the world—gets into power, it will pave the way for a positive future. This could not only enhance freedoms and respect for political, civil, and human rights but also improve the quality of life and spur economic growth.

The recovery would be guided by a proposed plan called Venezuela: Land of Grace—Freedom, Democracy, and Prosperity, advanced by the team supporting the political leader Maria Corina Machado, and built on three foundational pillars: (a) free development of individuals: recognizing the intrinsic dignity and creative potential of free individuals; (b) a state at the service of the citizen: protecting life, liberty, and property, ensuring access to justice and public security through independent branches of government, with a focus on efficiency, transparency, and public-private partnerships in managing services as well as education, healthcare, and security; and (c) free market economy: unlocking the country’s potential by transforming its abundant resources into wealth through citizens’ efforts, fostering entrepreneurship, and stimulating economic growth.

With these pillars in place, a myriad of opportunities could arise to restore citizens’ quality of life in an ambiance of freedom and peace. A robust institutional framework and a stable macroeconomic environment could attract investments across various productive sectors, enhancing domestic supply, creating jobs, and improving living conditions for households. Full support from multilateral organizations, following the renegotiation of defaulted external debt, could guide the nation toward overcoming the humanitarian crisis and significantly reducing poverty levels.

Venezuela could emerge as an energy hub due to its vast reserves of hydrocarbons and renewable energy resources, bolstered by private investments, reclaiming its status as a major player in oil and gas production and refining, and resuming its role as reliable supplier within the western hemisphere. In this scenario, Venezuela could contribute to reducing global geopolitical tensions, combating illegality, and promoting freedom and peace.

Sary Levy-Carciente is a research scientist at the Adam Smith Center for Economic Freedom, Florida International University; former president of the National Academy of Economic Sciences (Venezuela); and dean of the faculty of Economic and Social Sciences (Central University of Venezuela). LevyCarciente is a Fullbright fellow at the Center for Polymer Studies, Boston University; and visiting researcher at the Department of Economics, UMASS. Levy-Carciente is the author of the International Property Rights Index (Property Rights Alliance) and the Index of Bureaucracy (Florida International University).

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1 The first half of the 1990s was a very turbulent period for Venezuela. Waves of protests and looting led to a state of social and political upheaval, weakening the government and creating the breeding ground for two attempted coups d’état. Later the president was forced out of office by the Supreme Court. Finally, Venezuela experienced its worst historic banking crisis in 1994 (with an estimated bailout cost of twenty percent of gross domestic product). Those elements placed the country, in 1995, at a very low level in all metrics of freedom and prosperity, many of which recovered to levels by 2000. This means that the assessment of changes from 1995 to the present may be somewhat distorted: understating the decline assessment while overstating the improvement in the twenty-first century.

2 Since 2012 the Ministry of Interior Relations and Justice stopped regularly publishing crime statistics, including homicide, kidnapping and robbery rates. Since 2014 the National Institute of Statistics (INE) stopped publishing poverty and living conditions figures, including information on extreme poverty, access to basic services and the quality of life of Venezuelans, and data on the number of people that left the country. Since 2015 the Central Bank stopped publishing regular data on inflation, core inflation, GDP, and other key economic indicators. PDVSA, the national oil company, stopped publishing detailed reports on oil production. And since 2014 data on foreign trade has not been published. Since 2016 the Ministry of Health stopped publishing its weekly epidemiological bulletin, which included key data on diseases, mortality, and morbidity rates. The last industrial census in Venezuela was conducted in 2001.

3 Venezuelan Ministry of Health data, although official statistics have been irregular since then.

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Recalibrating the use of individual sanctions in Venezuela

Geoff Ramsey, Lucie Kneip — Wed, 08 Jan 2025 19:15:49 +0000

In response to Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro’s decision to claim a new illegitimate mandate on January 10 based on a stolen election, the United States and its allies face a major test of their strategy moving forward. Effectively pressuring the Venezuelan government will require innovative thinking on the use of individual sanctions from US authorities, as well as careful coordination between the United States and Latin American and European governments.

As Venezuela continues to grapple with a deep political and economic crisis, the international community is at a critical juncture in shaping its response. The stolen presidential election of July 28 marked a watershed moment, signaling the country’s further descent into authoritarianism under Nicolás Maduro’s regime. In this context, policymakers in the United States and other countries are likely to continue to impose sanctions against political, military, and economic elites as a means of seeking to exert pressure without worsening the humanitarian situation.

With over eight million Venezuelans displaced by the crisis, US and other international policymakers are cautious about the unintended consequences of tightening existing oil and financial sanctions. Although the outgoing Biden administration at one point said it was evaluating whether to rescind privately issued specific licenses that authorize energy companies to maintain a foothold in the country, it has not done so, partly out of an interest in preventing the worsening of economic conditions. Instead, the Biden administration prioritized sanctions against individuals responsible for Venezuela’s deteriorating human rights situation. On September 12, the Biden administration sanctioned sixteen government-linked individuals, including leaders of the National Electoral Council who oversaw the stolen election, and members of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice who validated the fraudulent results. Biden’s Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the goal of the individual sanctions is to “promote accountability” for those undermining democracy in Venezuela. Three months later, Canada’s foreign ministry announced it would add five of these same individuals to their sanctions list for fraudulently declaring Maduro the winner of the July election. The US added an additional 21 individuals to the sanctions list in November 2024. Following Maduro’s illegitimate inauguration in January 2025, the US, Canada, and the EU all announced additional sanctions on regime officials and affiliates.

This interest in targeted sanctions is likely to continue under the second Trump administration, given that Trump’s first term saw heated internal debate over the potential impact of broader economic sanctions on Venezuela’s migration crisis. Indeed, the use of individual sanctions accelerated under President-elect Trump’s first presidential term even as he oversaw the imposition of broader sectoral sanctions targeting Venezuela’s links to the international oil and financial markets.

With Trump returning to the Oval Office, here’s what policymakers should know about the use of individual sanctions—and what can make Venezuela sanctions policy more effective.

The sticks: A history of the Venezuela sanctions regime

From 2009 to 2015, Venezuela-related sanctions were few and primarily targeted kingpin leaders involved in drug trafficking and financial support for Hezbollah. In March 2015, Executive Order 13692 created the country-specific sanctions regime on Venezuela. Seven military officials were initially sanctioned for their involvement in stifling protests. This program allowed the United States government to sanction individuals involved in human rights abuses, corruption, or the undermining of democratic processes. In November 2018, Executive Order 13850 created a new Venezuela-related sanctions program under which the United States could freeze assets and prevent actors from conducting corrupt transactions with the Venezuelan government to move money. In August 2019, Executive Order 13884 blocked Venezuelan government assets and enabled sanctions on actors assisting the Venezuelan government, and an initial seven military officials were sanctioned for their involvement in actions undermining democratic processes.

This graph does not include sanctions issued by the United States on January 10, the date of Maduro’s illegitimate re-inauguration.

The Obama administration sanctioned seventeen individuals, including the first seven military officials sanctioned under the Venezuela-specific sanctions regime. After Trump took office in January of 2017, the number of individual sanctions increased dramatically, with forty-one issued in 2017 alone. The administration issued twenty individual sanctions in 2018, forty-nine in 2019, and twenty-five in 2020. (These numbers do not include individuals who were sanctioned and later delisted). Under the Trump administration, some of the sanctions targeted Venezuelan access to the US dollar and to international financing, and therefore Venezuela’s ability to reconcile its sovereign debt. The Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” strategy took off in 2019, which saw the imposition of over 180 Venezuela-related sanctions, including the forty-nine targeting individuals. That year also saw the first implementation of sectoral sanctions on industries including oil, gold, finance, defense, and security.

This shifted under US President Joe Biden. Until September 2024, Biden had not added a single Venezuelan national to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list since taking office. However, after the July 28 stolen presidential election, the government-backed National Electoral Council declared incumbent Nicolás Maduro the winner, despite opposition candidate Edmundo González emerging as the clear victor following the opposition’s independent collection and publication of over 80 percent of the official actas, electoral vote tallies produced by each voting center. Roughly a month and a half after the election, the United States announced new sanctions on sixteen individuals, for obstructing the elections and intensifying post-election repression, ultimately forcing Gonzalez to flee the country. Two more rounds of sanctions were announced in November 2024 and January 2025.

The carrots: When and why individual sanctions have been lifted

The Biden administration largely opted for a different approach than the first Trump administration, seeming to prefer carrots over sticks. On multiple occasions, Biden took Venezuelan nationals off the list.

In December 2021, the administration announced it would no longer designate the former Colombian guerrilla movement, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), as a terrorist group. As part of a package of ninety-two FARC-linked delistings, the Treasury Department lifted sanctions on five Venezuelans including Ramón Rodríguez Chacín, a military officer and former Venezuelan minister of interior who worked as a go-between between the FARC rebels and the Venezuelan government.

In June 2022, the Treasury Department announced that it had lifted the sanctions on Carlos Erik Malpica Flores, a former national treasurer and vice president of Venezuela’s state-owned oil company PDVSA. Malpica Flores is also the nephew of current Venezuelan first lady Cilia Flores, and his delisting was reportedly part of an effort to induce the Venezuelan government to restart negotiations with the opposition—and indeed, days later opposition and government representatives met in Oslo. In November 2022, two other nephews of Flores, known as the “narcosobrinos” due to their involvement in transnational drug trafficking operations, were released as part of a prisoner swap that included the release of ex-officials of Citgo, the US-based subsidiary of PDVSA.

In July 2023, the Treasury removed Carlos Rotondaro, former board president of the Venezuelan Institute of Social Security (IVSS), from the SDN list. Sanctioned for “economic mismanagement and acts of corruption,” Rotondaro was reportedly delisted for providing information to the United States on financial movements made by the family of Haiman El Troudi, former Minister of Planning and Development and Minister of Public Works.

These delistings fit with the Biden administration’s broader reticence toward announcing new sanctions on Venezuela. Rather than rolling out new sectoral sanctions, the Biden White House sought to incentivize a democratic opening by issuing licenses to US and Western oil companies to operate in the country despite broader oil and financial sanctions, in exchange for a series of agreements between the government and the democratic opposition that led to the July 28 election.

Biden was not alone in attempting to use sanctions relief to incentivize change in Venezuela. Even as the first Trump administration ramped up the use of individual sanctions, it also offered sanctions relief to individuals who “take concrete and meaningful actions to restore democratic order, refuse to take part in human rights abuses and speak out against abuses committed by the government, and combat corruption in Venezuela.” As part of this strategy, the Trump administration lifted sanctions in two cases. In March 2019, the Treasury delisted the wives of Raúl Gorrín and Gustavo Perdomo, two regime-linked businessmen who reportedly tried to work as middlemen between Washington and Caracas. According to press accounts, Gorrín worked to support a failed attempt to overthrow Maduro in April of that year, and Treasury’s removal of his wife and the wife of his business partner from the sanctions list was a decision made in exchange for his support for the coup.

In May 2019, after the uprising failed, the United States delisted Manuel Cristopher Figuera, former Director General of Venezuela’s National Intelligence Service (SEBIN). Figuera had taken part in the coup attempt and fled the country when it failed. In its press release, the Treasury Department stated that the move “demonstrates that U.S. sanctions need not be permanent and are intended to bring about a positive change of behavior.”

Who’s on the list?

The United States has rescinded the visas of almost two thousand Venezuelans and currently sanctions 202 Venezuela-linked individuals on the SDN list (as of January 13, 2025). Of these 202, eighty-one have been sanctioned primarily for their current or former roles with Venezuelan security and intelligence outfits. Nine have worked in the military counterintelligence branch known by its Spanish-language acronym DGCIM, eleven have worked in the intelligence branch (SEBIN), thirty have worked in the national armed forces (FANB), twenty-six have worked for the national guard (GNB), and seven have worked for the national police (PNB). Some of these individuals have worked for multiple branches of the security or counterintelligence service.

The United States also has a history of sanctioning key Venezuelan political officials. Maduro has been sanctioned since 2017, and his wife and son have been sanctioned since 2018 and 2017, respectively. Attorney General Tarek William Saab was sanctioned in 2017. Vice President Delcy Rodríguez and her brother, Communications Minister Jorge Rodríguez, Former National Assembly President Diosdado Cabello and his wife and brother, and Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez were all sanctioned in 2018.

Beyond key officials of the Venezuelan government and their affiliates, the United States has also sanctioned several economic and financial elites linked to operations with the government or the state-owned oil and natural gas company. Veronica Esparza Garcia, Joaquin Leal Jimenez, and Olga Maria Zepeda Esparza were sanctioned in 2020 for “operating a sanctions-evasion scheme benefitting the illegitimate Maduro regime and PDVSA.” In early 2021, Alessandro Bazzoni, an Italian citizen, Francisco Javier D’Agostino, a dual Spanish-Venezuelan citizen, and Philipp Paul Vartan Apikian, a Swiss citizen, were sanctioned for their ties to “a network attempting to evade United States sanctions on Venezuela’s oil sector.” Apikian and his company, Swissoil, were removed from the sanctions list in June 2023. Bazzoni and D’Agostino were removed in January 2025.

Additionally, as of September 2024, eleven individuals connected to Venezuela have been sanctioned under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act and classified as “specially designated narcotics traffickers.” The sanctions connected with this particular designation are separate from the Venezuela-specific sanctions programs created by executive order but have been perceived by observers as connected to the US-led pressure campaign.

Coordinating sanctions with allies

This graph does not include sanctions issued by all three countries on January 10, the date of Maduro’s illegitimate re-inauguration.

The United States, with its current list of 202 designees, is not the only government that has sanctioned individuals related to Venezuela. Canada currently sanctions 115, and the European Union (EU) sanctions sixty-nine. Of the 202 US-sanctioned individuals, Canada sanctions eighty-three of the same individuals, while the EU sanctions fifty-eight. Forty-eight individuals are currently sanctioned by all three parties. Most of these were sanctioned by the United States months or years before they were sanctioned by Canada and the EU. These include high-level officials such as Delcy Rodríguez, Tarek William Saab, and Diosdado Cabello. However, it is notable that the EU has not placed individual sanctions on Maduro himself. Neither Canada nor the EU has placed sanctions on any individuals sanctioned by the United States that we have classified as economic elites.

Of the thirty-two people that Canada sanctions that the United States does not, a number are judicial officials such as magistrates and individuals associated with repressive acts. All except for one were sanctioned between 2017 and 2019. The eleven individuals sanctioned by the EU that are not sanctioned by the United States include people known to have committed human rights violations and officials contributing to the erosion of democracy and democratic institutions. Most of these were sanctioned between 2020 and 2021.

How effective are individual sanctions?

Individual sanctions can allow decisionmakers in Washington to signal a policy stance and provide a degree of accountability, which may be useful to victims of Venezuela’s authoritarianism. Listed individuals are unable to travel to the United States and they cannot operate directly in broader financial systems. There is an argument to be made that this makes the target’s life uncomfortable or at least more difficult, whether the sanctions involve freezing assets, limiting their mobility, or restricting business operations. Individual sanctions may also serve as a measure of justice for human rights victims. However, in Venezuela so far there is little evidence that being added to the individual sanctions list encourages defection. Only one case of a sanctioned official defecting exists (Manuel Christopher Figuera). Other key individuals who have defected, such as former Oil Minister Rafael Ramírez and former Prosecutor General Luisa Ortega Díaz, were never sanctioned by the United States (although Ramírez was sanctioned by Canada).

One way to tighten the strategy for individual sanctions involves targeting more overseas assets of Venezuelans who have contributed to political and economic destabilization, and those of their family members and associates. While some of the assets of more prominent Venezuelans have been seized, a number of Venezuelan officials still own properties in Miami and other US cities, Latin America, and Europe. According to a 2022 joint investigation by Armando.Info and El Nuevo Herald, at least 718 companies in Florida are owned by current or former Venezuelan officials, including over two hundred that are owned by members of the military. Most of these owners have not been sanctioned. While an SDN designation implies that all US properties and financial assets of the individual will be frozen, some sanctioned officials continue to have access to large financial networks through assets held by family members or affiliates who are not sanctioned. Ramping up the targeting of the asset networks of current or former affiliates of the dictatorship could potentially create more room for those affiliates to consider the value of remaining loyal to Maduro, while avoiding harming the Venezuelan people.

The key question lies in how international actors can sanction individuals in a way that pulls the regime apart instead of consolidating it. Maduro has honored some of those sanctioned with replicas of independence leader Simón Bolívar’s sword. After the most recent wave of sanctions, government officials have painted being sanctioned as a badge of honor, a sign of loyalty to the revolution. According to Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López, being sanctioned is a recognition of officials’ “morale, physical and professional integrity, and their leadership.”

One way to mitigate this is to follow sanctions announcements with targeted, discrete, and strategic communication with sanctioned individuals on the steps needed to get off the list, as occurred in the case of Manuel Christopher Figuera. Similar communication could occur with individuals the government is considering sanctioning, as may have been the case with Ortega Díaz. Coordinating more closely with multiple countries to impose parallel individual sanctions on individuals can help the international community to align on sanctions priorities. This may include advising interested international allies on the creation of their own legal sanctions frameworks.

But sanctions should not be the only manner of engagement with regime affiliates. The goal should always be to identify and engage those most likely to support democratic reform from the inside. This means empowering moderate elements within Chavismo and isolating hardliners to maintain the potential for a peaceful, democratic solution.

Methodology

Designations were drawn from the following sanctions programs: VENEZUELA, VENEZUELA-EO13884, VENEZUELA-EO13850, SGDT, and SDNTK. For the SGDT and SDNTK programs, only Venezuelans or individuals sanctioned for Venezuela-related activities were counted.

At least four individuals on the SDN list are reportedly deceased but have yet to be removed from the list: Henry Castellanos Garzón, Hernán Darío Velásquez Saldarriaga, José Leonardo Noroño Torres, and Miguel Santanilla Botache. Castellanos Garzón and Darío Velásquez were ex-FARC commanders killed in 2021. Noroño Torres reportedly died in a transit accident in 2020, and ex-FARC dissident Santanilla Botache was reportedly killed in 2022. The Treasury often takes time to formally delist deceased individuals due to various factors, such as difficulty in obtaining a formal death certificate or verifying an individual is deceased, and ensuring the individual’s assets are not used by a third party. As these individuals are still on the SDN list, they were included in the analysis.

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Lucie Kneip is a program assistant at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The authors would like to thank Brennan Rhodes for his research support in contributing to this piece.

Charai in the Jerusalem Strategic Tribune: Look to Middle Eastern Diasporas for Figures to Inspire Change

Atlantic Council — Mon, 06 Jan 2025 15:37:54 +0000

The post Charai in the Jerusalem Strategic Tribune: Look to Middle Eastern Diasporas for Figures to Inspire Change appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How might Germany’s coming election shape future support for Ukraine?

Stuart Jones, Katherine Spencer — Tue, 24 Dec 2024 15:32:53 +0000

The collapse of the governing coalition in Germany, which was made official on December 16 when Chancellor Olaf Scholz lost a Bundestag no-confidence vote, has been followed closely in Kyiv. This interest is understandable; Germany is one of Ukraine’s most important supporters in Europe and has provided military aid valued at over 11 billion euros since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion almost three years ago. This is more than any other European country and second only to the United States.

The next government in Berlin will be confronted by a number of challenges as it addresses the future of German support for Ukraine. However, there are indications that Kyiv and the wider transatlantic community may have reason to welcome the early Bundestag elections slated for February 2025.

With the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) currently well ahead in nationwide polls, CDU leader Friedrich Merz is widely expected to be the next chancellor. This is potentially good news for Ukraine. Merz is more hawkish toward Russia than current German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. He is also poised to have a stronger majority in the Bundestag than Scholz, whose three-party coalition ultimately imploded amid internal feuds. For Ukraine, this would hopefully mean more predictability in bilateral relations with Berlin.

Before the election campaign officially began in Germany, Merz traveled to Kyiv in early December for meetings with the Ukrainian government. He is a vocal proponent of delivering German Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine, which Scholz has consistently refused to allow.

Scholz has also been criticized for a recent phone call to Vladimir Putin, which critics saw as indicating Western disunity at a critical point in diplomatic efforts to set the stage for possible peace talks. Meanwhile, Scholz’s party has been emphasizing “peace” rather than security in its campaign messaging, further widening the gap with the CDU, which is seen as being comparatively tougher on Russia.

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The outlook from Ukraine’s perspective is not entirely favorable. If he does secure election victory, Merz will face many of the same issues that confronted his predecessor. This includes Germany’s constitutional debt brake, which in effect limits the German government’s ability to spend more on defense without cutting expenditure elsewhere.

The CDU would have limited tools to safeguard funding for Ukraine. They could potentially reform the debt brake or seek to reduce state funding in other areas like welfare and transportation (which voters would be unlikely to appreciate). Alternatively, they may repeat the approach adopted by Scholz and attempt to pass another extra-budgetary “special fund.” While this is not a long-term solution for Germany’s defense spending, a new special fund specifically for Ukraine could potentially win enough political will in the Bundestag under the right stewardship.

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With Donald Trump’s election victory fueling uncertainty over the future of US military support for Ukraine, finding solutions to maintain German aid should be high on the agenda for the new government in Berlin in early 2025. In addition to Trump’s imminent return to the White House, France also remains stuck in a period of domestic political instability, which could disrupt French aid to Ukraine at a time when Europe’s Franco-German engine is more necessary than ever.

Officials in Kyiv will be keen to avoid any developments in Germany that raise questions over the country’s continued backing for Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin is widely believed to be counting on an eventual weakening of Western resolve as he looks to outlast the democratic world in Ukraine. Any signs of disunity or uncertainty in Berlin could help convince Putin that time is on his side, thereby further reducing the chances of meaningful peace negotiations.

Trump has vowed to end the war and is widely expected to push for the start of talks once he takes office in January. However, with the Russian army advancing in eastern Ukraine amid mounting signs of deteriorating Ukrainian morale and increasingly acute troop shortages, Putin will be in no hurry to compromise. Unless the battlefield dynamics change significantly in the coming weeks, it may prove difficult to persuade Putin to accept any peace terms that do not legitimize his invasion or represent a clear Russian victory.

There is a good chance that Germany’s snap elections will result in increased support for Ukraine in Berlin. However, the uncertainty of the next two months presents an unwelcome challenge, particularly as Kyiv seeks to convey a message of Western unity to Moscow. As they face another wartime winter, Ukrainians must wait to see who will lead the new German government and how they will articulate their plans.

Stuart Jones is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. Katherine Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

What might be in store for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2025?

How might the incoming Trump administration engage with the region? Can economies across the hemisphere grow beyond current predictions? How will leaders address security challenges? Might new tech hubs emerge?

Take the quiz and see if you agree with our predictions for 2025!

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Scholz’s no-confidence vote isn’t the start of political dysfunction. It’s Germany’s way out of it.

Jörn Fleck, Rachel Rizzo — Wed, 18 Dec 2024 20:40:01 +0000

On Monday, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz lost the no-confidence vote he had called in the Bundestag, paving the way for early elections in Europe’s largest economy in 2025. That may end up being a good thing for Germany and its role in Europe and the transatlantic partnership.

The move followed weeks of political haggling in the aftermath of Scholz’s three-way coalition collapsing on November 6, itself the result of more than a year of dysfunction, political warfare, and personal animosity among the coalition partners.

One might assume that Germany is the latest in a series of democracies to fall into self-induced political turmoil this year, following France, South Korea, Romania, and others. But that assessment fails to look deeper at the politics in Berlin. Just as new reevaluations of the supposed stability of the Angela Merkel years reveal major underlying problems, the apparent instability of Scholz’s term lays the path for a relatively steady way forward. In that sense, a no-confidence vote and early elections are a relief compared to the alternative, which would have been a divided three-way coalition hobbling along unable to get anything done until the originally scheduled elections took place in September 2025.

The feeling is most palpable in Berlin. Ever since the news of the government’s demise, there has been a sense of relief that the experiment of the traffic light coalition is over. Internal coalition disputes on major issues such as the budget, industrial and clean energy transitions, China, and even Ukraine made decision-making in Berlin look like a patchwork of three separate governments on any given day. Sniping across rival ministries played out in the press, absent leadership in the Chancellery led to dysfunction and paralysis when geopolitical crises developed, and economic woes remained stubbornly persistent.

This paralysis had real policy implications. On the issues that mattered most, Germany acted as a brake that ground progress to a halt rather than a gas pedal that accelerated it. The Zeitenwende, or “turning point” on foreign and defense policy, once a bright spot for the government, has fallen flat as the Bundeswehr’s struggles remain well-documented, and German defense spending cannot keep up with new demands. Further, nearly three years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Berlin is still one of the principal opponents (along with the United States) of advancing NATO membership discussions or providing more lethal weapons for Ukraine. For all the excitement around “releasing the Leopards” in 2023, there’s still no appetite for sending the Taurus missile system, and Scholz has made it clear that position wouldn’t change.

None of these ongoing dynamics would have gone over well with the incoming Trump administration. In fact, the current government and its problems likely would have been disastrous for the US-German relationship. Whereas the Biden administration worked overtime to keep the Germans close, Berlin will not to be so lucky in the next four years.

President-elect Donald Trump and his allies are no friends of Germany to begin with. Over the past couple years, Trump allies such as Senator Mike Lee and Vice President-elect JD Vance have outwardly chastised Germany for its free riding off of US security guarantees. At this point, Germany cannot afford any missteps that would provide an opportunity for the next administration to use it as the standard bearer for Europe’s supposed fecklessness.

Instead, an election offers a fresh start, or at best a fresh start as one can hope for. Here are a few things to watch for:

First, the upcoming elections, likely to be held on February 23, are taking place on a condensed timeline. Accounting for a month or two of coalition negotiations, there could realistically be a new government in Berlin by April, coinciding with the Trump administration’s staffing of its own agencies and departments. Avoiding a drawn-out process will be the key to clarity.

Second, if polls hold—and they are usually reliable in Germany—the likely outcomes will mean relative stability under a conservative government. Expect another grand coalition like in the Merkel era, led by the Christian Democratic Union. A Christian Democrats and Greens coalition would be more of a long-shot. But such a coalition would produce a more hawkish outcome on virtually all major foreign policy issues, from Ukraine/Russia to China and German rearmament—and would create more of an opening for engaging the Trump administration. This dynamic would likely be better received in Washington, both because a center-right-led government would more closely align with the Trump administration politically and because the chancellor would have a stronger mandate for action than Scholz did in the three-way coalition.

The political woes of the last government, however, do not guarantee success for the next one. Any new government will have its work cut out for it to make the case for the US-German and the NATO partnership to an administration that will likely be less inclined to buy into the rhetoric of the transatlantic alliance. Germany will also have to confront hard questions over budgetary challenges and prioritization, US-German trade, its defense policies, its approach to China, and more. That will be a political test for whoever ends up in the Chancellery.

Germany should not have to change just to please the incoming US administration. It should do it for its own sake, too. It will take much more decisiveness and political will across the board to prove that Germany can be a strong ally in Europe and for the United States, and that it can lead on the challenges facing the transatlantic partnership. That should be the starting point for any new German government.

Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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The global ripple effects of South Korea’s political turmoil

Atlantic Council experts — Tue, 17 Dec 2024 20:12:52 +0000

What happens in Seoul doesn’t stay in Seoul. South Korea’s Constitutional Court this week is beginning impeachment trial proceedings in the case of President Yoon Suk Yeol. The parliament voted to impeach Yoon on December 14, in response to his aborted attempt to declare martial law, leading to his suspension from office and the installation of President Han Duck-soo as the country’s temporary leader. The impact of this high political drama will be felt far beyond South Korea’s shores. So we turned to our experts to explore the burning questions about what’s going on and what it all means for the region and the United States.

1. Why was Yoon impeached?

Yoon was impeached by the National Assembly on December 14 for his unconstitutional attempt to impose martial law. Yoon had declared martial law on December 3, citing the need to protect South Korea from “North Korean communist forces” and “anti-state forces,” as well as to “rebuild and protect” the nation from “falling into ruin.” He accused the opposition party of attempting to undermine democracy by impeaching his cabinet members and blocking budget plans. His decision appears to have been influenced by right-wing YouTube channels that propagated conspiracy theories, exaggerating perceived threats to his administration. The impeachment underscores the effectiveness of democratic checks and balances, as Yoon’s misguided and authoritarian decision was ultimately overturned through parliamentary action.

—Sungmin Cho is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Impeachment is a rare occurrence in the United States, with only three presidents having faced the process in nearly two-and-a-half centuries. Conversely, South Korea has seen three presidents face impeachment in just twenty years, with several others leaving office in less-than-ideal circumstances.

Nor is martial law unknown in South Korea. The country experienced it under the control of Park Chung-hee in the 1970s. Then, the South Korean people fought with blood, sweat, and tears to institute a true democracy. It’s under this context, with martial law in the living memory of many in the country, that South Korea was galvanized to call for impeachment for an already massively unpopular Yoon. South Koreans are very protective of their democracy, and Yoon’s attempt at martial law drew comparisons to the authoritarian Park Chung-hee government, especially since Yoon’s first move after the martial law declaration was seemingly to block the National Assembly from voting to end it. This move was undoubtedly one step too far for the South Korean public and the calls for impeachment were a statement from the population that they will not take a threat to the democratic process lightly.

—Lauren D. Gilbert is a deputy director with the Atlantic Council’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative.

2. What is the potential removal process?

After the National Assembly impeached Yoon, his powers were immediately suspended, and the prime minister assumed the role of acting president. The impeachment case will now be reviewed by the Constitutional Court, which has up to 180 days to decide if Yoon violated the Constitution or laws to a degree warranting removal. In former President Park Geun-hye’s impeachment case that began in late 2016, the Constitutional Court took ninety-two days to reach a decision. Both Yoon and the National Assembly will present arguments, evidence, and witnesses in a trial-like process before the judges of the Constitutional Court. If upheld, Yoon will be formally removed from office, triggering a presidential election within sixty days; if rejected, he will be reinstated. Throughout this period, public opinion and political debates will intensify as the nation awaits the court’s final decision.

—Sungmin Cho

Now that Yoon is facing impeachment, the Constitutional Court has 180 days to decide, and the vote requires at least six of the full court’s nine judges to vote yes for impeachment. However, at present, the court only has six judges, with three seats on the court left vacant. This is leading to a debate over how and when the court should proceed. Some say that the vote should go through with the six current judges, while others say the vacant seats must be filled first.

There is also debate over whether the judges should be appointed by the National Assembly or whether Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, who has taken over the presidency during the impeachment process, has the right to appoint the three judges. Further complicating matters, the court has several other impeachment cases still awaiting its decision, adding to the oversaturation of the Constitutional Court. While we await the decision on how they will proceed with the appointment (or not) of the three vacant seats, there is still the possibility that Yoon’s impeachment will be overturned. There is a precedent for this. Former president Roh Moo-hyun’s impeachment was overturned in 2004, although unlike Yoon, Roh had the public’s support.

—Lauren D. Gilbert

3. What does this mean for South Korea’s relations with Japan?

In the immediate term, Japan and South Korea will broadly continue to communicate and coordinate along the lines forged over the past two-and-a-half years. However, South Korea and also to some extent Japan will have limited political capital to undertake any new measures to strengthen the relationship. Instead, Tokyo and Seoul are focusing on making both their bilateral relations and the trilateral security framework with Washington resilient and long-lasting to minimize the effects of political revisions in the future.

Japan is concerned about who will take the presidency in South Korea if the impeachment is upheld. The political momentum gained by progressives in Seoul is raising concerns about a reversal of the progress made in Japan-South Korea relations in recent years. On the plus side, however, Japan and South Korea have rebuilt ties and worked on the strategic and operational mechanisms and procedures of close coordination, setting a strong precedent for the future.

—Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative.

4. What does this mean for relations with Washington and trilateral security cooperation with the US and Japan?

In the near term, the acting president, Han, is already moving to ensure continued alliance coordination between Seoul and Washington. Key meetings and working-level coordination are likely to return to some semblance of normalcy, as the institutional memory and mechanisms of the alliance are strong. However, in practical terms, the timing of this political crisis will make it challenging to have high-level strategic coordination or make progress on key alliance issues in 2025. South Korea will have only an acting president when US President-elect Donald Trump takes office in January. And depending on how long the Constitutional Court takes to decide the impeachment case, it could be as long as eight months from now before a new president is elected. We also cannot rule out a prolonged period of uncertainty followed by Yoon’s return to office, in a much-weakened and tenuous position, in the event the court does not uphold the impeachment.

—Markus Garlauskas is the director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative and a former national intelligence officer for North Korea.

5. What can we expect from North Korea right now?

North Korea appears to have been laying the groundwork for a renewed military confrontation with South Korea for some time now, and it could initiate that confrontation at a particularly inopportune moment for the alliance. Pyongyang’s silence so far suggests that North Korea will wait for the outcome of the Constitutional Court’s decision and the election of a new president in South Korea before moving to take advantage of the situation, however. North Korea likely recognizes that pursuing a confrontation with Han, the interim president, could simply strengthen the position of South Korean conservatives inclined to take a harder line against North Korea. Meanwhile, before pushing too far, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is likely to want some time to probe Trump’s new position.

A major thaw in relations is unlikely, even if South Koreans elect a progressive president inclined to engage Pyongyang, given Kim’s moves this year to reinforce the permanence of the division between North and South. Despite optimism in some quarters about the possibility of renewed Trump-Kim summitry in 2025, not much is likely to result. A lot has changed in the four years since Trump left office, and Kim’s position has solidified in ways that make it much less likely that he would be willing to offer major, meaningful concessions to Washington or Seoul.

—Markus Garlauskas

On the surface, North Korea’s response to the political crisis has been limited to domestic media commentary and has refrained from openly confronting South Korea so, perhaps to prove wrong Yoon’s claims about North Korean infiltration. At the same time, the political turmoil in South Korea is a prime situation for North Korea to carry out covert cognitive warfare—particularly through social media and other communication methods. In particular, Pyongyang would be piggybacking and boosting the criticisms in South Korea toward Yoon and the conservatives.

For North Korea, such measures are essentially about investing in the return of the progressives to power, which North Korea could exploit to make South-North relations and circumstances on the peninsula more advantageous for Pyongyang. North Korea’s new official policy of recognizing South Korea as an “adversary” rather than a “partner for unification” was not only to bolster its militarily confrontational stance, but a means of hybrid warfare to apply further pressure on Seoul—particularly vis-à-vis the progressives. Hence for now, North Korea will likely see how the situation in South Korea plays out while also ensuring that it has the upper hand in dictating the direction of inter-Korean relations.

—Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi

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There’s a rare opportunity to deepen US-Somaliland ties. But several obstacles stand in the way.

Maxwell Webb — Tue, 17 Dec 2024 15:32:50 +0000

On November 13, Somalilanders voted in their fourth presidential election since the self-governing region of Somaliland declared its independence from Somalia in 1991. In the end, Somaliland rejected incumbent President Muse Bihi Abdi and his Kulmiye party, electing in his place Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (also known as Irro), leader of the Waddani party, who was sworn in last week. As new administrations take office in both Washington and Hargeisa, a new chapter of relations between the United States and Somaliland may be beginning.

Recent reports have indicated that President-elect Donald Trump is poised to recognize Somaliland. Such recognition would be beneficial for several reasons—it reflects the reality on the ground, acknowledges and rewards Somaliland for building a successful democracy, and could help deepen regional trade with key US partners such as Ethiopia. It could also encourage a pro-Somaliland cadre of nations to follow suit and would allow the United States to develop a beneficial security partner in a challenging region of the world.

However, the United States should also proceed with caution. Moving too quickly could destabilize the Somalia security sphere, empowering al-Shabaab and angering other US partners, such as Turkey, Egypt, and the African Union. Moving forward without bipartisan support could also give the impression that the matter of Somaliland’s recognition is backed exclusively by the Republican Party, jeopardizing the effort.

In lieu of recognition, the United States should consider deepening the US-Somaliland partnership across other sectors: for example, security, diplomatic, business, and trade. That would be a good first step, and such a partnership (even without full recognition) would still be positive for Somaliland.

Over the past eight years, Somaliland’s strategic location along the Gulf of Aden has led US officials from both the Trump and Biden administrations to look more closely at the US-Somaliland relationship. Somaliland is located at the intersection of several converging US interests, as it is host to hundreds of miles of peaceful coastline along one of the world’s busiest trade routes. It is also strategically located near Yemen, where the Houthis have become increasingly emboldened against US allies and disruptive for Red Sea maritime trade since the onset of the Israel-Hamas war. A deeper partnership with Somaliland would also allow the United States to keep a watchful eye on the conflicts in Sudan and Ethiopia, as well as the fight against al-Shabaab in Somalia. It could also help relieve the military congestion in Djibouti, freeing up the United States to more flexibly operate against national security threats in the wider Red Sea security arena.

However, there are several factors that could hinder the prospects for an expanded US-Somaliland partnership. The United States’ focus on other regions, US relations with Egypt’s anti-Somaliland leadership, and the potential for Somaliland to become a partisan US political issue all risk derailing the potential benefits of deeper cooperation between Washington and Hargeisa.

Opportunity for renewed support

Under the first Trump administration, Somaliland was embraced by the United States to an unprecedented degree. Several officials working on Africa under Trump were advocates of recognizing Somaliland. Simultaneously, Somaliland was able to build bases of support with congressional Republicans and conservative policy institutions close to the president. Though Trump formally supported a “One-Somalia” policy (standard US policy, though often championed by Democrats), his National Security Council praised Taiwan’s recognition of Somaliland and the president withdrew US forces from Somalia, a sign interpreted by Somalilanders as a pivot toward a new Somalia doctrine in Washington.

Under the Biden administration, bipartisan US-Somaliland ties continued to grow. Top officials from Somaliland’s government, including a delegation led by Abdi, visited Washington to meet with leaders in Congress and the administration. Furthermore, both houses of the US Congress introduced key Somaliland-related legislation, including provisions for greater collaboration with the Federal Government of Somalia and Somaliland in the Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Additionally, the commander of US Africa Command visited Hargeisa, meeting with Abdi, in 2022; and a delegation of congressional staffers (from senior policy analysts to chiefs of staff) visited Somaliland in June. Just this month, US Ambassador to Somalia Richard H. Riley and Commander of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa Major General Brian T. Cashman were in Somaliland for meetings with both Abdi and Irro.

However, Democrats in Washington continued to leave Somalilanders frustrated. Though bipartisan, most of the US support for recognizing Somaliland continues to be led by Republicans and conservative policy analysts. Republicans introduced pro-Somaliland legislation to Congress, but the bills were ultimately rejected in both the House and the Senate. Additionally, the Biden administration continued to favor Somalia over Somaliland rhetorically and in practice, once again deploying US troops to Somalia, training Somalia’s Danab special forces, and building new bases for the Somali military. The Biden administration also excluded Somaliland representatives from the 2022 US-Africa Leaders Summit and was publicly critical of the Somaliland government.

With Trump returning to office in January and Republicans resuming control of the House and the Senate, many in Somaliland are optimistic that their cause could take a prominent place in US foreign policy. One can expect the Trump administration to again install pro-Somaliland aides and advisers to positions of influence. With wars raging in the Middle East, just north of the Horn of Africa, the new US administration may be motivated to deepen security ties with Somaliland.

With control of both houses of Congress, Republicans will also have a better chance of passing pro-Somaliland legislation. Additionally, countering Chinese influence is likely to be a cornerstone of Trump’s second-term foreign policy. Somaliland’s relationship with Taiwan—and rejection of Chinese engagement—could potentially therefore play a role in the years to come. What’s more, Trump has a proven track record of making untraditional foreign policy decisions, such as when he recognized Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara in 2020 (a move that happened in the context of Morocco normalizing relations with Israel). While the context behind the Western Sahara case differs from that around Somaliland, Trump’s willingness to reverse longstanding US policy regarding Africa could favor Somaliland come January. The Trump administration is also likely to be frustrated with Somalia, where stalled counterterrorism efforts, an increase in al-Shabaab activity, and electoral reform issues paint Somalia as an unreliable partner. If Trump feels that the United States is not benefiting from its investment in Somalia, he may look for partners elsewhere in the region.

Challenges ahead

Nevertheless, it is the unpredictability of Trump’s politics that directly challenges Somaliland’s progress in its quest for recognition. Increasingly, isolationist foreign policy has become a trend within the Republican Party. On the one hand, questioning and challenging the institutions and precedents that hold back Somaliland’s recognition prospects may help its cause. But completely withdrawing from those institutions, or being unwilling to cooperate with them, could leave Somaliland, and the entire African continent, behind.

Engagement with Africa was not a pillar of the first Trump administration’s “America first” foreign policy. But the Biden administration pushed for the African Union to be a permanent member of the Group of Twenty (G20) and advocated for African nations to be given permanent seats in the UN Security Council. Based on his first administration’s foreign policy, Trump is very likely to deprioritize bolstering Africa’s inclusion in international institutions, as he will be focusing on the wars raging in Europe and the Middle East, challenges around the US-Mexico border, and increasing tension with China. For Somaliland to play a role in global affairs, and sell itself as a partner worth investing in, it will have to garner attention from the Trump administration at a challenging time.

Additionally, Egypt may be another major roadblock to Somaliland’s relationship with Trump. For several reasons—such as Ethiopia’s building a dam on the Nile River and the memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed by Somaliland and Ethiopia earlier this year—Egypt has become a major supporter of Somalia. Included in this support are weapons and training for Somalia’s military. Trump and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Sisi also have a close relationship, with the former calling the latter a “good man” and claiming the Egyptian leader has done “a fantastic job” with his country in 2019. With Egypt under pressure internally and externally, Trump looking to quickly end the war in Gaza, and both Sisi and Trump looking to expand and deepen relations between the United States and Egypt and its partners, these two leaders are almost certain to strengthen their ties. It is unlikely that Trump would want to squander relations with Sisi over Somaliland in the near future.

Relatedly, as of last week, Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to begin working on resolving their tension over the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU, which granted landlocked Ethiopia sea access. After talks on December 11, Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to set up commercial arrangements that would allow Ethiopia “reliable, secure, and sustainable access to and from the sea.” However, it is still unclear whether these new commitments—negotiated by Turkey, a key partner to Somalia and Egypt—will impact the MOU and Ethiopia-Somaliland relations. However, if relations between Somalia and Ethiopia are to improve, the Trump administration may step further away from greater engagement with Somaliland out of concern over adding to destabilization in the region.

Longstanding US policy priorities—most importantly the fight against al-Shabaab—might also prevent the Trump administration from fully shifting course. Despite its many challenges, the Federal Government of Somalia still remains an active US partner in the fight against al-Shabaab and other militant groups in the Horn. Additionally, the recent rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham in Somalia, with the affiliate setting up base in Puntland, may cause the Trump administration to proceed with caution as it approaches Somalia policy. Moreover, at the end of this year, the African Union mission in Somalia is undergoing a transition, with new forces coming in and a new mandate taking place. This period of transition will be very fragile, and a new Trump administration may not be willing to make immediate moves that would jeopardize the success of any apparatus aimed at fighting Islamic militants in the Horn. On top of all of this, Somalia is currently facing its own internal problems, with tensions rapidly rising between the federal government and the government of Jubaland. All of this is to say that, while the Trump administration has good reason to engage with Somaliland, the fear of further destabilizing an already precarious situation in Somalia may cause the White House to use caution around the issue of recognition.

Finally, Somaliland’s core supporters in the US government are Republican politicians and conservative analysts in mostly right-wing policy spaces. While this support is important, if Somaliland becomes a focal point of Trump’s foreign policy, it risks its recognition becoming a partisan issue and could face backlash the next time the Democratic Party retakes the White House. If Somaliland works to bolster support for its cause only among the Republican Party, it could hurt its own quest for recognition.

The path forward

Despite these challenges, politics within Somaliland may provide the necessary boost to surpass the challenges of the moment. Following the election, it was announced that Irro and the Waddani party won with 64 percent of the vote. The election has been praised by international partners, including the United States, as being free, fair, and well-executed. Irro ran on the notion of unifying Somaliland amid internal division and on reforming the economy to stabilize the country’s finances. On foreign policy, Irro has expressed frustration with the lack of transparency around the memorandum of understanding between Somaliland and Ethiopia and is expected to take a more nuanced approach to the agreement, while still supporting it. Moreover, he has stated a commitment to resolving the conflict in the eastern regions of Sool and Sanaag, an issue that has not only divided the country and hurt it economically but also drew concern from international partners, particularly the United States. Irro has expressed interest in continuing to build relations with Washington, and he offered Trump congratulations for his election victory.

The Irro administration will have a chance to reenergize relations with the United States and overcome any hurdles it might face with Trump. As far as US partners in East Africa, Irro could be an appealing choice for the Trump administration, as the new US president will be looking for opportunities to end conflict and resolve regional tension, and Irro is likely to lead a more nuanced approach to foreign policy. With key Trump allies having contributed to the praise of Somaliland’s elections, a successful democratic transition in the coming months will send a big signal to the incoming US administration of Somaliland’s reliability as a partner.

This isn’t to say that US-Somaliland relations still don’t face an uphill battle. Somalilanders will need to undertake robust and active diplomacy with both Republicans and Democrats to capitalize on the momentum of their election. The Irro administration will need to double down on its efforts to demonstrate Somaliland’s value to the United States and make a larger push to appeal to Democrats and diversify their base of support. Meanwhile, the United States needs to take Somaliland’s success as a democracy seriously. There are real opportunities for partnership across sectors. The United States must take advantage of Somaliland’s key strategic positioning against US adversaries, including China, or else lose the opportunity to develop a democratic partner in an important region.

Maxwell Webb is an independent Horn of Africa and Middle East analyst who currently serves as the coordinator of leadership initiatives at the Israel Policy Forum’s IPF Atid program.

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Dispatch from Bucharest: Why has Romanian politics suddenly gone sideways?

Daniel Fried — Mon, 16 Dec 2024 21:23:27 +0000

BUCHAREST—It’s never a good thing when presidential elections are annulled. But that’s just what happened in NATO and European Union (EU) member Romania earlier this month.

In Bucharest late last week, I saw firsthand how the Romanian political class is reeling from the sudden rise of Călin Georgescu. This is especially true among many pro-Western, liberal-minded Romanians. On November 24, Georgescu, a formally fringe mystic nationalist, earned the most votes in the first-round presidential election. Then, just before the second round runoff, the Romanian Constitutional Court announced that it was annulling the results of the first round. The court’s decision was based on declassified Romanian government assessments of foreign (Russian) election interference, including using the social media platform TikTok to promote Georgescu. US intelligence officials privately confirmed to me that the allegations are credible. Still, evidence of Russian interference in European and US elections is abundant. No country before Romania has cancelled a presidential election because of it.

By contrast, Romania’s parliamentary elections were held without incident on December 1. The parliamentary elections produced a strong result for the three centrist governing parties—the center-right liberals, the center-left social democrats, and the Hungarian minority party—plus a fourth liberal party. These four parties are now in negotiations to form a new coalition government. Political players I visited with in Bucharest told me that the coalition is likely to be announced before Christmas. The new government will then have to rerun the cancelled presidential election, likely early next year. Outgoing President Klaus Iohannis will probably remain in office until then.

In Romania, there is a widespread sense, accurate or not, that the establishment has been focused on itself.

The twin shocks—Georgescu’s rise and the annulment of the presidential election—have shaken the hitherto complacent centrists in Romania. While the accusations of Russian interference (and attempted sabotage) are plausible, given that the Kremlin engages in such activities throughout the West, Georgescu’s popularity is not simply a foreign import. That a man regarded as a fringe character even by fellow nationalists could rise within a few weeks from near obscurity to a leading contender for the presidency speaks to broad social dissatisfaction with the Romanian centrist parties, which have been trading control of the government back and forth for years.

My Romanian interlocutors expressed embarrassment, even shame, at the court’s annulment of the election, and they agreed that it set a terrible precedent for the country and the region. They also acknowledged that the centrist parties had lost touch with Romanian society and its cultural and economic dissatisfactions that, when spelled out, sounded similar to those of unhappy right-wing voters in Germany (particularly in the former East Germany), France, and to some degree the United States. In Romania, there is a widespread sense, accurate or not, that the establishment has been focused on itself, not on the problems faced by ordinary citizens, and that traditional national values and even national sovereignty were being lost.

More thoughtful liberals told me that Georgescu’s rise was, in effect, a protest vote against centrist complacency, not a vote for the candidate’s weird brand of nationalism and Romanian fascist nostalgia. The answer, they said, was for the incoming coalition to bring forward new faces, not the old ones who had lost credibility, for the posts of prime minister and president. But a shrewd leader of one of the nationalist parties was skeptical. There is no way, he said to me, that the centrist parties will put aside their own leaders in favor of a fresh team. That’s not their operating style, he insisted, predicting that they would go for the status quo leaders yet again.

Between their domestic politics, the Russian menace in neighboring Ukraine, and concerns about the direction of US foreign policy under the incoming Trump administration, most of the Romanians I spoke with were jittery. Nevertheless, they were focused on a way ahead to limit the damage of the annulled presidential election to Romania’s democracy. That way ahead is to rerun the presidential election in a fast, credible manner and quickly address the political discontent that had propelled Georgescu, they said. Some Romanian politicians I spoke with even seemed ready to consider bringing in fresh faces to head the next government.

This may be easier said than done. Whether Georgescu will be allowed to compete given various irregularities in his campaign, including his alleged claim to have spent no money at all on his campaign, is not clear. If he is not allowed to compete, the credibility of the rerun presidential election will be questioned within and without the country. If he is allowed to compete, he could win. In that case, a nationalist president and centrist government could rapidly find themselves at loggerheads. The resultant political paralysis could hamper governance, raising social frustrations still more.

The political tensions in Romania take place against a backdrop of a generation or more of overall successful transformation after decades of communist rule. Romania’s communist dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu was repressive and economically incompetent, even by communist standards. When Romanians overthrew his rule in swift (and violent) revolt in December 1989, it was one of the poorest countries in Soviet-dominated Europe. No longer. After a slow start, Romania’s free-market reforms kicked in. The country’s economy has quadrupled in size since 1989, and it has joined NATO and the EU. Even as the current political crisis took hold, Romania gained admission to the EU’s Schengen area, meaning free travel within the bloc. It was a big deal for Romanians, and everyone I spoke with in Bucharest regarded it as a major national achievement.

But success as seen from afar and in context does not seem enough to assuage Romanian voters. The political dissatisfaction common throughout Europe and the United States has hit Romania hard. The good news, as I reminded those with whom I spoke in Bucharest, is that Romania is part of the same political family as the rest of Europe and the United States. The bad news is that they share the same challenges and are struggling with them.

Many of Romania’s nationalists seem to believe that the incoming Trump administration will favor them. There have been some in the broader reaches of President-elect Donald Trump’s world who have sought out those they consider ideologically sympathetic. Indeed, Romanian media was filled with speculation that Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., whom Trump has nominated to lead the US Department of Health and Human Services, had planned to visit Romania after the first-round presidential election essentially to promote Georgescu. (The trip did not take place, and the story may have been generated by Georgescu’s allies.) Whether the Trump administration will find Georgescu’s self-styled Romania First (pro-Russian, anti-Ukrainian, and anti-foreign investment) views useful is questionable: ideological compatibility may not translate into policy compatibility.

What happens next depends on the Romanians: Will the next government have new faces? When and how will the presidential election be rerun? And can the centrist Romanian parties learn from what is a near-miss political train wreck?

Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council, former US ambassador to Poland, and former US assistant secretary of state for Europe.

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What Trump’s next presidency will mean for Africa

Rama Yade — Fri, 13 Dec 2024 15:35:54 +0000

Discussion of Africa was almost completely absent from this year’s US presidential campaign. That might lead Africans to expect nothing of substance from the administration of President-elect Donald Trump once he takes office in January.

But reading between the lines of Trump’s campaign promises—and looking back on the president-elect’s first administration—reveals that Africa can expect substantial changes from the United States over the next four years.

Trump’s first term

In his first term, Trump’s isolationist strategy and “America first” foreign policy led him to advocate for Congress to reduce development programs. Most of them are in Africa. While administration officials such as Mike Pompeo and Trump family members—including his wife, Melania, and his daughter Ivanka—visited several countries in Africa, Trump never actually visited himself. During his four years in the White House, Trump welcomed only two Sub-Saharan African heads of state: Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria and Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya. His administration did not host a US-Africa summit; meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin spectacularly kicked off a series of Russia-Africa summits, the first taking place in Sochi in 2019.

Notably, Trump recognized Morocco’s sovereignty over the territory of Western Sahara in 2020, making the Maghreb country a decisive player in the Abraham Accords. From this precedent, the kingdom could see its importance rise under Trump 2.0.

Seeing Africa through a lens of competition with China

Following substantial growth in China’s influence in Africa—and the weakening of US influence in Africa—the Trump administration created the Development Finance Corporation (DFC), which was better funded than its predecessors. The first Trump administration also launched the Prosper Africa initiative, in an effort to “support US investment across the continent, grow Africa’s middle class, and improve the overall business climate in the region,” according to John Bolton, the national security advisor at the time. The fact that the announcement was made by the national security advisor clearly demonstrated that competition with China and Russia was a main driver of these new initiatives.

Since then, these adversaries have expanded their influence on the continent: Russia has confirmed its status as Africa’s largest arms seller and China has become Africa’s largest trading partner, now having five times more trade volume with Africa than the United States does.

Beyond Trump, the profiles of leading officials will say a lot about the intentions of the White House. From Marco Rubio (as secretary of state) to Elise Stefanik (as ambassador to the United Nations), Trump’s picks for influential positions suggest a clear interest in containing China, Russia, and other adversaries. That tougher approach could potentially be employed in the competition over influence in Africa.

Project 2025

While Trump has repeatedly distanced himself from the policy agenda known as Project 2025, he has since tapped people who helped craft the plan for various administration posts.

Project 2025, in its suggestions for the US Department of State, calls for a return of focus to “core diplomatic activities” and away from promoting policies focused on cultural values, for example ones that support LGBTQI+ rights. This would resonate positively in African countries that have criminalized LGBTQI+ people and activities, including in democratic countries such as Senegal or Ghana. Similarly, Uganda—which the Biden administration excluded from preferential trade treatment under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) due to concerns about gay rights—could find a more sympathetic ear from the Trump administration.

A business mindset

Trump’s focus on a transactional approach with Africa will likely place an emphasis on reducing development assistance in favor of expanding US-Africa business ties and fostering economic growth through free-market principles.

Renewals of AGOA and DFC in 2025 and the Export-Import Bank in 2026—if they occur—would provide signals of the direction Trump wants to pursue in his trade strategy toward Africa. The fate of certain large-scale projects such as the Lobito Corridor—US President Joe Biden’s major legacy in Africa—will also have to be monitored.

Arguing that the Paris Agreement places an unfair economic burden on Americans and their businesses, Trump withdrew from the international treaty on climate change during his first presidency. Africa, meanwhile, is paying disproportionately high costs for climate adaptation despite having contributed relatively little to the changing climate—and there remains a massive climate-finance gap. With reports indicating Trump is preparing to withdraw from the Paris Agreement again (jeopardizing global cooperation on climate change) and with African countries walking away disappointed from the United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties (also known as COP29) in Azerbaijan, Africa can likely expect to keep paying increasingly steep costs.

It’s also worth watching Elon Musk, the South African-born billionaire who has emerged as a close advisor to Trump and is keen to make gains in African markets, particularly with Starlink, and may offer new perspectives for reducing the energy divide. He was seen in New York, on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in September, meeting with South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, Namibian President Nangolo Mbumba, and Lesotho Prime Minister Sam Matekane.

Musk is set to play an influential role with the incoming administration, and his relationships with Ramaphosa in particular could take on outsized importance. South Africa’s relationship with the United States has become more complex due to its growing ties with Russia and China and its recent genocide case against Israel.

Security concerns

The next Trump administration will need to keep a close eye on various security situations in Africa.

One such situation is the one unfolding in Somaliland. In recent years, some Republicans have advocated for the recognition of Somaliland as an independent state in order to strengthen US strategic influence by the Red Sea. Recent reporting suggests that Trump may do so once in office—marking a considerable change in US policy toward the Horn of Africa.

But there will be other risks to watch closely. The war in Sudan is raging on, tensions between Rwanda and the DRC are rising, and the cease-fire in Ethiopia is fragile. Accordingly, it would be risky for Trump to erode the US relationship with Kenya, officially a major non-NATO ally of the United States, for the sake of US interests in East Africa.

In the Sahel, after Niger and Chad told the United States to remove its military bases, the United States will need to find new strategic locations that could host US defense systems vital for US security interests. Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire may be countries of interest for the new Trump administration.

Africa first?

Much has changed in Africa since Trump left the White House in January 2021. Most notably, African nations have an ace up their sleeve: a new centrality on the world stage that makes them highly courted partners around the world. Africa now has options. The ball is therefore in Washington’s court to engage on the continent. Otherwise, “America first” may take a backseat to “Africa first”—to US adversaries’ benefit.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

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Even in authoritarian countries, democracy advocates are worth investing in

Fernanda Buril, Nate Grubman, and Patrick Quirk — Wed, 11 Dec 2024 14:35:44 +0000

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Freedom and democracy are in decline globally, according to the Atlantic Council’s Freedom Index. Political freedom in particular has slumped sharply since 2019, bringing the world to a twenty-four-year low. The biggest backsliders—the places with the sharpest declines in political freedom—span every major geographic region and many are particularly relevant to US national security.

There are several fundamental reasons for the United States to support strategies that aim to halt such backsliding and foster democratization, including ones that go beyond the moral obligation to support humanitarian values. For instance, research shows that democracies are less prone to enable and export transnational crime or terrorism, and democracies are better at adapting to adverse economic events and avoiding large-scale disasters, and are more reliable trading partners, offering better business opportunities by upholding the rule of law and protecting investments from the arbitrary predation of political elites. Most notably, the vast majority of people around the world continue to prefer to be governed democratically.

Democracy support also strengthens the US position more broadly in the strategic contest against the autocratic rivals of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Robust democratic institutions—transparent judiciaries, capable legislatures, responsive political parties, an active civil society, and a free press—make it harder for the rulers in the autocratic bloc to co-opt elites in other countries and advance their malign agendas.

But with the world experiencing a global democratic recession, questions arise as to whether supporting democracy is a losing battle. Despite the bleak recent data on global democratic progress, democracy assistance is still crucial, not only in countries undergoing political openings and democratic consolidation but also—and perhaps even more so—in countries that are backsliding.

Case studies in the Middle East, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and sub-Saharan Africa suggest that using foreign assistance (in addition to and in concert with diplomacy and investment) to support democracy champions wherever they are is an effective strategy, even if the payoff is not immediately apparent at the level of a country’s political system.

In Ghana, incoming President John Mahama must follow debt restructuring with economic reform

Rabah Arezki — Tue, 10 Dec 2024 20:16:37 +0000

On December 7, John Dramani Mahama emerged as the winner in Ghana’s presidential election. His victory follows an energetic campaign that seemed to revolve around one central theme: the ensuing economic hardship that has been imposed on the Ghanaian population amid the country’s dire financial straits.

It may be tempting to blame Ghana’s situation on the outgoing president, Nana Akufo-Addo, who will leave office in January. And, granted, the Akufo-Addo administration has its fair share of responsibility for Ghana’s financial predicament. But the roots of the problem run deeper. For years and across several administrations, Ghana’s government has relied too heavily on excessive borrowing from domestic and international capital markets to finance fiscal expenditures. Mahama himself previously lead Ghana between 2012 and 2017. He was voted out at the end of that one term, which should serve as a reminder that the population is eager for change and ready to remove any leader who moves too slowly. Mahama, who is known as a pragmatist, will need to turn the situation around swiftly considering the popular discontent.

To get out of the current financial predicament and reset its economy, Mahama and his administration will need to reform how it governs its gold, oil, and cocoa industries. But to enact these necessary economic reforms, Ghana and the international community will need to follow through on the country’s external debt restructuring.*

Ghana’s debt crisis

How did Ghana get to this point? The country’s ramp-up in external borrowing was made possible beginning in 2004, after it had completed the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries program—a debt-relief program created by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for developing countries. Then, energy companies discovered the Jubilee Oil Field in 2007, followed by several other oil fields. This coincided with the start of the era of low interest rates following the global financial crisis. The easy financing conditions and the anticipated revenues from this new oil find stimulated large infrastructure projects. Then, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in a pervasive decline in investment and production in the oil sector in Ghana. In turn, revenues fell, even as large-scale borrowing from international markets continued as a “gamble for redemption.”

This all came to a halt in 2022, when the depreciation of the cedi, Ghana’s currency, raised external debt and interest payments so high that they surpassed government revenues, which led Ghana to default on its eurobond obligations. Total public debt, which includes both external and domestic debt, reached 92 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2022, which is far higher than the average among Sub-Saharan African countries. Public debt has since declined but remains high (around 83 percent of GDP).

Other factors have also contributed to the country’s economic problems. Just a few months ago, Ghana lost an arbitration case against Trafigura, a commodities multinational, over the rupture of an energy contract, which will cost the country more than $140 million. This outcome has enraged civil society.

In an attempt to stop the crisis, the government has restructured its domestic debt and, in October, announced a deal to restructure its external debt that could be completed by June 2025. This is good news after protracted negotiations, but the final elements of the deal and the issues of implementation and enforcement remain important hurdles to clear. Delay on dealing with these issues could subdue growth and increase poverty. Indeed, poverty in Ghana has worsened over the past few years, reaching more than 30 percent of the population.

The current situation is reminiscent of the troubled economic times of the 1990s, when Ghana, like many developing countries in Africa, faced a debt crisis. It took more than ten years for debt relief initiatives to deliver an economic reset. But what is different this time is that private creditors, as well as China, have become important players, making it more difficult for creditors to coordinate to deliver an expedient debt resolution. The debt treatment under the G20 Common Framework has been too slow, and the rules lack clarity and enforceability. The lesson from Ghana is that countries facing debt crises cannot afford to wait for this process to be fixed. The international community needs to support indebted developing countries in a much more decisive and urgent way, perhaps by bringing more forceful actions against creditors, especially private creditors, by enforcing the comparability of treatment.

What Ghana needs now

A more expedient debt resolution for Ghana is a necessary condition for an economic reset. One key objective for Ghana is to rebalance its structure of external capital away from external debt and toward foreign direct investment. This would shift the international investment position away from debt and toward equity. That accrued foreign direct investment would bring much more stability to its external financing, a needed boost to productivity, economic growth, and job creation that Ghanaians have been longing for. But Ghana must also achieve a radical governance shift in key sectors to deliver that economic growth.

Ghana’s export structure is dominated by three commodities—gold, oil, and cocoa—constituting respectively 47.7 percent, 26.1 percent, and about 10 percent of its total merchandize exports. Ghana is the world’s second-largest producer of cocoa, and the cocoa sector employs millions of workers. Like in many sectors in Ghana, the state has a heavy hand in the cocoa sector, which is run by a Cocoa Board, a state-controlled organization that supports the production, processing, and marketing of cocoa. Yet, Ghana has been structurally unable to develop efficient production and move up the value chain by transforming cocoa beans. In spite of skyrocketing cocoa prices—expected to last until 2026—the cocoa industry has been unable to attract financing, and investment has plummeted.

This situation mirrors that of the oil sector, where investors have been wary about the business climate in Ghana. The gold sector also enjoys rising prices and is mostly controlled by private operators. The government is eager to boost production and attract more investment, but the gold sector throughout the continent is faced with major transparency challenges, with gold smuggling leading to significant losses in government revenues. What’s more, illegal mining is causing environmental and health challenges, including river pollution. To reset its economy, Ghana needs to inject radical transparency in these key sectors to maximize government revenues and benefits to its citizens. Ghana also needs to achieve a better balance between the need for private sector investment and the state’s role in regulating investment in these sectors.

As Mahama prepares to take office as Ghana’s new president on January 7, he will need to work toward achieving macroeconomic stability while boosting the competitiveness of the country’s economy. Yet, poverty is already rampant, with inflation further eroding the purchasing power of the country’s impoverished population. Therefore, the sequencing of reforms must account for that social context. The Mahama administration will need to focus on increasing transparency and removing corporate subsidies—whether public or private—rather than removing household subsidies, which many rely on for subsistence.

Rabah Arezki is a former chief economist and vice president at the African Development Bank and former chief economist of the World Bank’s Middle East and North Africa region. He is also the former chief of commodities in the International Monetary Fund’s research department. He is a professor and research director at the CNRS, a member of the FERDI’s chair working group on the international architecture of financing for development, and a senior fellow at Harvard Kennedy School.

Note: This piece was updated on December 14 to clarify the status of Ghana’s debt restructuring.

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Romania annulled its presidential election results amid alleged Russian interference. What happens next?

Atlantic Council experts — Fri, 06 Dec 2024 23:21:32 +0000

Instead of a runoff, they’ll have a rerun. On Friday, Romania’s Constitutional Court annulled the results of the country’s first-round presidential election, in which dark horse candidate Calin Georgescu won the most votes. The court’s order that the presidential electoral process must be “entirely redone” comes after Romanian President Klaus Iohannis declassified intelligence reports alleging a Russian interference campaign geared toward benefiting Georgescu on TikTok and Telegram.

What are the next steps for Romania’s presidential race after this unprecedented ruling? And what are its implications for the country’s democracy? Our experts answer six burning questions below.

1. Why was the presidential election nullified?

This decision is historic and unprecedented. The Constitutional Court of Romania unanimously made the decision on the basis of Article 146 (f) of the Constitution concerning the legality and correctness of the presidential electoral process, with the court’s decision today stating that the “entire electoral process will be integrally redone.” The rollout of the decision was somewhat fumbled, as it became public while polling stations were already open for the diaspora in the second-round presidential election, and by the time the process was stopped, around 53,000 citizens abroad had already voted.

This binding decision from the court comes on the heels of rapidly developing information concerning state-sponsored interference in the electoral process and Russian hybrid activities, as well as accusations of campaign finance violations. The court made its decision stating that the integrity of the vote had been affected, as one candidate skirted the law in his campaign and benefited from unfair promotion. Continued clear communication from the authorities will be critical to provide information to a society that is feeling tense and exhausted after weeks of elections.

—Anca Agachi is a defense policy analyst at the RAND Corporation and a nonresident fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

It’s never a good thing when an election is nullified. In this case, Romania’s Constitutional Court appears to have acted on the basis of information regarding Russian interference on behalf of Georgescu. Romanian society appears divided in its reaction, with even the liberal opposition leader, Elena Lasconi, Georgescu’s opponent in the presidential race, criticizing the decision. Demonstrations could follow in what seems to be a highly charged political environment. Romania’s December 1 parliamentary elections, however, are not affected by the decision. The new Parliament should be seated around December 21 and will be in a position to create a new government.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former assistant US Secretary of State for Europe.

The decision to annul the first round of Romania’s presidential election revolves around declassified documents from the country’s intelligence services that allege that a coordinated campaign promoted pro-Russian candidate Georgescu to unexpectedly garner the largest percentage of the vote on November 24.

Those allegations, which have not been proven beyond what has been published by Romania’s security services, include a coordinated campaign across social media platforms such as Telegram, Facebook, and, most importantly, TikTok that gave would-be voters the assumption that Georgescu was a more prominent candidate than had been expected before the November 24 vote. Hashtags associated with the ultranationalist candidate gained significant visibility on TikTok in the days ahead of the first round vote, and the country’s authorities subsequently asked the European Commission to look into the irregularities under the bloc’s newly passed social media laws.

A lot remains uncertain. While the Atlantic Council’s own analysis of TikTok and Telegram found significant amounts of coordination to promote Georgescu to the widest online audience possible, much of this activity was completely legal under Romania’s election laws. Claims that online influencers were paid to champion the candidate’s causes—and did not disclose those payments under campaign financing rules—do fall into the category of potential illegal behavior.

It’s unclear whether social media significantly altered voters’ choices in this particular election. Repeated studies have demonstrated that people’s access to digital platforms like TikTok represent only a part of a wider media diet, including access to traditional media and discussions with friends and family, that contributes to how they eventually decide to vote. What we do know is there is clear evidence that Georgescu’s campaign was promoted heavily by often clandestine activity across multiple social media platforms in ways that, while opaque, were mostly legal, based on what has been disclosed by local authorities and via the Atlantic Council’s own analysis.

—Mark Scott is senior resident fellow at the Digital Forensic Research Lab’s (DFRLab) Democracy + Tech Initiative within the Atlantic Council Technology Programs. He was previously the chief technology correspondent for Politico.

2. What does this incident tell us about the resilience of democracy in Romania?

We just experienced a near-miss in the heart of NATO. Romania, a NATO ally for two decades with a record of democratic integrity, almost had a presidential election stolen by foreign intervention. The good news is that Romania’s democracy proved itself to be sufficiently robust and resilient to prevent this interference from having a decisive impact—though the final outcome of the rescheduled elections will ultimately determine that.

The alleged interference also underscores the power of social media, how vulnerable tech platforms are to manipulation, and how significant this can be to the future of democracy. Much thought and action is urgently needed to ensure that social media is channeled and structured so that it enhances the vibrancy of democracy rather than becoming a weapon to undermine it.

—Ian Brzezinski is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy.

The next days, weeks, and months will be critical to ensuring that Romanian democracy has long-term prospects of not only survival, but recovery. This election season comes on the heels of massive structural challenges, such as endemic distrust in state institutions and socioeconomic issues, such as cost of living hikes and brain drain. Another major challenge for the country is corruption, which led to a sizable anti-system vote in both the presidential and parliamentary elections and provided a fertile ground for far-right parties and for malicious interference activities.

On top of these structural challenges, there were issues with the authorities’ communication in the aftermath of the presidential election. The public experienced a whiplash in the Constitutional Court’s decisions as to whether the presidential election can proceed to the second round. The government’s communication was inconsistent concerning the fate of the presidential election, the role played by state-sponsored actors, and Russia’s role in influencing the process (including if and how these factors influenced the actual voting result). Meanwhile, jockeying among domestic political parties has created tension and deepened distrust in society.

Notably, nongovernmental organizations, the media, and other civil society groups rose up to fill the void in an essential and constructive fashion. For instance, a media investigation uncovered links between the Kremlin and pro-Georgescu Romanian influencers. And it was civil society organizations that asked for the declassification of Supreme National Council of Defence documents pertaining to election interference. The information this kind of engagement has uncovered has been like oxygen to a society holding its breath.

—Anca Agachi

3. Who is in charge of managing this issue now, and what can we expect from the key players in the election and society at large?

This will be a whole-of-government effort, likely spread across the newly elected (and fragmented) Parliament with responsibility over legislation and choosing the new prime minister, Iohannis (who will remain in power until a new president can take the oath of office following elections), relevant authorities with responsibilities for resilience and security, electoral authorities, and probably the judicial branch as well.

Ideally, their focus will be on three things: 1) Build national unity in the face of far-right and anti-Euro-Atlantic forces. 2) Take action to inspect and secure critical vulnerabilities from further foreign interference. 3) Investigate the causes that led to this outcome, especially the details of the interference effort, potential collusion of those who may have benefited from it, and any responsibility of Romanian authorities in the slow identification of coordinated campaigns to influence the vote.

Elected officials will play a critical role in communicating with the public regarding what lies ahead until the elections can be held again (likely in March), given the tension that exists in society already, massive gaps in information concerning this unprecedented decision, its implications for the country, and the challenges posed by foreign interference. However, as the entire presidential election process will be restarted, a lot of attention will be focused domestically on the repositioning of candidates and political blocs.

—Anca Agachi

The new Parliament will support a new government. The current president may continue in office until his successor is elected but may also resign, in which case the new president of the Senate will become interim president. One wild card is whether supporters of Georgescu will mount protests and whether these can attract widespread support.

—Daniel Fried

4. What sort of government will emerge when the new Parliament convenes on December 21?

While predictions are uncertain, the pro-European parties appear to have formed a coalition and have a majority of votes in the Parliament. That said, the parliamentary and presidential elections indicated a strong anti-incumbency trend in Romania.

—Daniel Fried

5. What can we expect next from Russia?

We can expect Russian denunciation and a wave of (feigned) outrage. The Kremlin appears to support political extremes in Romania, as elsewhere, promoting through statements and trolls a narrative of Western oppression and domination of Romania, hoping that Romanians forget the long record of Kremlin-imposed communist rule that kept Romania poor and autocratic for two generations.

—Daniel Fried

6. What lessons should the United States and Europe take from this, and what should they do right now?

First, democratic resilience is an issue to be taken extremely seriously in Europe, not only because of what it means for domestic stability in transatlantic countries, but also given its implications for broader regional security and defense. Romania is a key NATO country in the southeast of the Alliance, and its internal political turmoil has broad implications for allied stability. Given the growth of far-right movements throughout Europe, the circumstances of this election should not be taken lightly.

Second, renewed attention should be paid toward deepening and expanding the national and transatlantic toolbox available to respond to hybrid incidents in a broader context of transatlantic adaptation in the aftermath of Russia’s war in Ukraine. We expect information to come out in the next few weeks about what exactly happened in Romania’s case, but whatever the findings may be, it is clear that broader resilience and operational capacity in hybrid responses will be critical to transatlantic security.

—Anca Agachi

Russia seeks to strengthen extremist politics and promote a sense of threat throughout Europe, using a variety of methods including information manipulation, support for extremist politics, economic pressure, sabotage, threats, intimidation, and, in the case of Ukraine, war. Those in Europe who thought that Russian aggression had nothing to do with them have discovered their error. Russia has not created political fissures in European countries (or the United States) but seeks to exacerbate and exploit them. The solution lies in resisting Russian pressure while working to address those social and economic problems that give rise to vulnerabilities. This is not a new challenge but a current manifestation of an older one, and some perspective can help guide a common response.

—Daniel Fried

The post Romania annulled its presidential election results amid alleged Russian interference. What happens next? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What the US-Turkey relationship will look like during Trump 2.0

Rich Outzen — Fri, 06 Dec 2024 16:12:53 +0000

US President-elect Donald Trump’s second term will begin on January 20, 2025 with a hefty dose of realpolitik and disruption in store for US foreign policy. A shift seems set to take place, from the Biden administration’s ideological division of the world into two camps—democracies and autocracies—to a world of more pragmatic and transactional relations, based on the president-elect’s statements during the campaign and nominations for national security and foreign policy positions since.

The Trump campaign’s rhetoric centered on ending wars in the Middle East and Ukraine, meeting the economic and geopolitical challenge of China, and implementing border security and domestic reforms. But there will also be new opportunities and risks for the US-Turkey relationship that the Trump administration would be remiss to overlook.

Trump has a mixed history with Turkey. He has shown respect for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and an inclination to seek mutually beneficial deals on Syria, trade, and other matters, and Erdoğan hopes to proceed on that basis. Yet during Trump’s first term, the combination of a series of crises in the region—the war in Syria, the aftermath of the attempted coup in Turkey, and tension between the Turks and other US allies—and turbulent times in both capitals led to difficult bilateral relations. There were moments of comity and goodwill, as well as intervals of threats, sanctions, and embargoes between the two allies.

The second Trump term can hardly start worse than the Biden administration did vis-à-vis the US relationship with Turkey. After ignoring or discomfiting Erdoğan for over a year—by waiting months for a counterpart call, excluding Turkey from the Summit for Democracy, and officially recognizing the Armenian genocide that began in 1915—the Biden administration only engaged Ankara in a cooperative manner once Russia ramped up its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Over the two years that followed, descriptions of Turkey in Washington would evolve from “so-called strategic partner” to close ally and partner and then to “indispensable ally,” but mutual mistrust remained evident in the drawn-out negotiations on Sweden’s NATO accession and Ankara’s purchase of F-16 fighter aircraft.

From 2022 to 2024, bilateral relations took on a more constructive tone, due in part to the presence of savvy and congressionally connected US Ambassador Jeff Flake in Ankara. While Biden and Erdoğan had little direct contact, working groups and senior officials developed options and momentum for more positive relations. The fruits of that included increased coordination on Ukraine and defense cooperation. It helped that the most avid Turkey critic in the US Congress, Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ), stepped down from chairing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 2023 and resigned from office in August this year following a bribery scandal.

The US-Turkey relationship under the second Trump administration is set to look quite different than it did under both the Biden administration and the first Trump administration. Trump’s second term will have a more cohesive foreign and national-security policy team, one more attuned to his vision and preferences. Despite previous statements or actions by several Trump nominees (Tulsi Gabbard, Marco Rubio, Mike Waltz, Pete Hegseth) that might worry Ankara, there is a high probability that Trump’s affinity for Erdoğan and willingness to seek positive relations with Turkey will set the tone for the US-Turkey relationship. In addition, the incoming team has an inclination for hard power, geopolitical thinking, and transactional relationships with allies and adversaries alike and a clear focus on China and Iran as leading threats. The diplomatic record of Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) also shows a transactional streak, indicating there will be room for mutually satisfying agreements over the next four years. A Trump administration that seems likely to reengage with Russia and decrease the ideological dimension of US-Russia relations may find complementarities with Erdoğan’s approach, which combines deterrent measures against Russia with economic incentives and consultations. Erdoğan, in any case, has maintained a cautious wait-and-see approach in reacting to the slate of Trump nominees.

More importantly, Turkey’s position as a multiregional power has improved over the past several years. During Trump’s first term, Turkey was dealing with the aftermath of a failed coup attempt and the growing US proxy relationship with the People’s Defense Units (YPG), a Syrian offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is an anti-Turkey terror group. Turkey was also dealing with Washington’s “absurdly narrow focus” on the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham and with its own tattered regional relations. Since that time, the Erdoğan government has consolidated control through elections and prosecutions of coup plotters, stabilized its monetary position, proven its influence over the conflict in Ukraine, and battered Iranian proxies in Syria.

Trump and Erdoğan both have terms that run through 2028, meaning electoral pressures should not constrain ideas the two leaders may develop for cooperation. The second Trump administration opens with Turkey positioned as a stronger and more stable regional partner, an attractive idea for a US administration more focused on domestic reforms than on micromanaging international affairs.

There are both opportunities and risks for the bilateral relationship entering 2025:

Syria: A late-2024 opposition offensive against the Syrian regime has dramatically shifted the balance of power among the Assad regime, the rebels, militias backed by the United States and Iran, and respective external supporters. Damascus’s strategy of spurning negotiations and slowly strangling the opposition has withered under the hammer blows of Israel’s regional air campaign and the coordinated offensives of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Syrian National Army, which is backed by Turkey. A significant shift of influence in Turkey’s favor has occurred, with a commensurate loss of leverage for Russia and Iran. While the political fallout of these events—and the military developments themselves—may not be fully evident by inauguration day, it is clear that there is a new urgency, and a new set of possibilities, in Syria for the United States and Turkey to pursue their respective counterterrorism and geopolitical goals.

Ukraine: Trump has appointed Keith Kellogg, a retired lieutenant general, as Ukraine envoy, and Kellogg has laid out a specific plan to end the war based on negotiations, a demilitarized zone, conditional aid to Ukraine, and reengagement with Russia. The plan requires continued NATO deterrence around Ukraine (including around the Black Sea), multilateral reconstruction efforts, and likely monitoring or peacekeeping forces. Turkey, through its balanced approach, is uniquely positioned to contribute in these areas, making it an indispensable partner for the strategy to work.

The South Caucasus/Central Asia: Without prompting from Washington, Ankara has supported normalization and peace negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia. A regional deal that would finally demarcate the two countries’ borders, reopen Turkey-Armenia trade, and incentivize progress on the Middle Corridor trade initiative would lessen the dependence of Central Asian and South Caucasus states on Russia and dampen Iranian influence. A little diplomatic and financial support from the United States and its European allies could help this multilateral trade and peace initiative get off the ground, with transformative long-term potential.

Stability in the Middle East: The Trump administration will carry over from its first term a commitment to the security of allies in the Middle East, with a strong preference for cooperation among regional partners rather than dependence on direct US interventions. Since 2021—when Ankara started its process of regional reconciliations with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and others—defense deals and cooperation in security affairs between Turkey and these other US partners have increased. The Turkish defense industry and the country’s military capabilities make Turkey an attractive partner for emerging collective security and diplomatic arrangements in the region.

Israel and the YPG: The two biggest risks for early friction between the Trump administration and Turkey stem from the deep freeze in relations between the latter and Israel (which has driven deep mistrust in the US Congress) and the still-unresolved fate of the YPG. Neither risk is new, and both required a good deal of diplomatic investment to manage during the first Trump administration. Ankara attempted a reset with Jerusalem in the months prior to Hamas’s October 7, 2023 terror attacks and may be convinced to try again once permanent ceasefires emerge in Gaza and Lebanon. Recent signals from Ankara that it would be open to a new peace process to disarm the PKK might help ease tensions with the YPG in Syria, facilitating a drawdown of US military presence and resumed cooperation on counterterrorism.

The nature of presidential transitions in the United States makes speculation about future policy a fraught exercise. While confirmed cabinet nominees will begin their roles in January, full staffing in the national security and foreign policy bureaucracies will take weeks or months longer, and deliberative processes on the thorniest regional challenges longer still. There are grounds for cautious optimism, though—based on the factors and opportunities highlighted here—that the US-Turkey bilateral relationship will see progress (albeit gradual) rather than the cycle of crisis and mutual mistrust that marked the two preceding presidential terms.

Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Turkey Program with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on X @RichOutzen.

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Experts react: France’s government lost a no-confidence vote. What’s next?

Atlantic Council experts — Thu, 05 Dec 2024 15:31:54 +0000

The political terms left and right first emerged in France to describe opposing factions that were unsettling national politics. On Wednesday, French lawmakers demonstrated how the two sides could work together to the same effect. In the National Assembly, Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally joined a left-wing coalition to pass a no-confidence vote against Prime Minister Michel Barnier, who submitted his resignation on Thursday. Barnier had been in office for just ninety-one days, following legislative and European Parliament elections this summer that see-sawed between support for the right and the left. So what lies ahead? Could French President Emmanuel Macron step down under pressure? And what does this mean for the rest of Europe? Below, Atlantic Council experts share their frank insights.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Gérard Araud: This is only the first stage of France’s political crisis

Charles Lichfield: The French Parliament chose chaos over compromise on the budget

Leonie Allard: The collapse comes at a critical moment for transatlantic security

Aaron Korewa: French political turmoil reinforces Warsaw’s approach of looking beyond Paris and Berlin

The French political scene is increasingly pushing for Macron’s resignation

The overthrow of the Barnier government is historic. This is only the second time under the Fifth Republic that the French government has been overthrown by a no-confidence vote. This was perfectly predictable as a right-wing government from the weakest party in Parliament could not last without any democratic legitimacy, given that the left had won the legislative elections of July 2024. Secondly, having placed itself from the outset in the hands of the far right, which is unreliable in political negotiations, the Barnier government had lost part of its credibility with the left, which, consequently, never wanted to be associated with it. As for the government team, it had no clear political line, not really being supported by Macron’s party.

All this plunges France into an exceptional crisis as the country faces stark challenges, with a public debt that has increased by more than half in seven years, from 2 trillion to 3.2 trillion euros. Not to mention, France has nine million people living in poverty, an increase in factory closures, and a foreign trade deficit of around one hundred billion euros in 2023—a sign of an accelerated deindustrialization of the French economy.

As a result, a growing number of people in the French political scene do not see how the government can carry on like this until the next presidential election in 2027. To unlock the political crisis, many imagine no other outcome than Macron’s resignation and the organization of an early presidential election.

—Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a senior fellow with the Europe Center. She was the first woman of African descent to become a member of the French cabinet, serving as France’s deputy minister of foreign affairs and human rights, deputy minister of sports, and ambassador to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) under French President Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012).

This is only the first stage of France’s political crisis

The fall of the Barnier government was predictable. It was a minority government, the survival of which was dependent on the will and the ability of the political parties to negotiate compromises. But the leaders of the two main parties on the far right and on the far left didn’t have any interest in playing this game. Both wanted to go to a crisis in the hope of obliging Macron to resign. On the left, Jean-Luc Mélenchon wants to run before the emergence of competitors, and on the right, Le Pen wants to run before being convicted in an ongoing court case.

It is an unprecedented crisis with an unpredictable outcome. How to govern France with a hung Parliament where a majority agrees only on one issue—the refusal of compromises? With snap elections constitutionally impossible, because France just held one last summer, Macron is now on the front line. The pressure for his resignation is growing. I doubt he will cave in. This is only the first stage of the French political crisis.

—Gérard Araud is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and a former ambassador of France to the United States.

The French Parliament chose chaos over compromise on the budget

The French government has fallen amid increasingly desperate attempts to pass a budget that even begins to address the country’s economic challenges. Macron bears some responsibility for how we got here. The last government also lacked a parliamentary majority, albeit by a smaller margin. It was therefore likely to fall if it had stayed on to pass a budget for 2025. But the French president responded to his party’s poor performance in June’s European elections by dissolving Parliament.

Macron still claims he was right to do so. The fragile but effective alliance of the broader left coupled with the heavy campaigning of the centrist parties that support Macron pushed the obvious favorites, Le Pen’s far-right National Rally, into third place. It helped that the latter was very badly prepared. But the Parliament of France is now divided three ways—a slightly larger center block sandwiched between the far left and the far right. So the equation for passing a budget is even more complex than it might have been had the previous Parliament stayed in place.

It is not only Macron’s fault that the parties that didn’t support Barnier’s beleaguered government chose chaos over compromise. This sorry story has also provided a crystal clear illustration of how irresponsible French members of Parliament can be. The tax increases and modest savings put forward by Barnier to plug France’s gaping deficit were never seriously discussed. Instead, both upper and lower houses diluted most savings (especially anything concerning pensioners) and claimed to be compensating for this through scattered and ill-thought tax increases, with little to no consideration for the competitiveness of the French economy.

Parliaments in the rest of Europe have demonstrated a knack for compromise when passing budgets. This is their job. But France has an irresponsible Parliament. Suggesting that Macron’s resignation could solve this mess is shockingly hypocritical.

—Charles Lichfield is the deputy director and C. Boyden Gray senior fellow of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

The collapse comes at a critical moment for transatlantic security

Despite the political instability of his second term, Macron has aimed to keep the course on France’s most pressing foreign policy issues. The fragility of his minority government has placed him yet again in a dilemma he has tried to avoid: accept the far right’s upper hand or build a coalition with the left bloc. While the government’s stability doesn’t hinge on foreign policy issues, especially in light of the president’s special prerogatives in this domain, the possible necessity to build a coalition could open a debate regarding France’s position on Israel’s wars with Hamas and Hezbollah and, to a lesser extent, on Ukraine. In French domestic politics, the Palestinian cause is often perceived through the lens of the country’s complicated relationship with its Muslim community. While French support for Ukraine remains less tied to domestic affairs, Le Pen’s party has been critical of Macron’s policy toward Russia.

The political vacuum in Paris and Berlin directly affects European leadership and unity. The reshuffle comes at a critical juncture—just as Europe needs to adapt both its support for Ukraine and its security architecture given the new limits on transatlantic relations imposed by the return of a Trump administration.

Despite an unstable domestic context, France has worked to build a common strategic vision for European foreign and defense policy. It has done so by investing in the European Union, as well as by participating in mini-lateral formats such as the Weimar Triangle and the E3, Italy, Poland dialogue. It has also taken steps to strengthen its engagement with Central and Eastern Europe. Now more than ever, France should continue to bolster its support for those countries that enjoy more political initiative at the European level. Macron’s virtual appearance at the November 27-28 Harpsund summit, organized by the Nordic and Baltic states in partnership with Poland, to discuss European security is the kind of step that can keep France heading in the right direction.

—Léonie Allard is a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, previously serving at the French Ministry of Armed Forces.

French political turmoil reinforces Warsaw’s approach of looking beyond Paris and Berlin

Despite long-standing political polarization in Poland, there is a broad consensus that new leadership for Europe is needed. The collapse of the government in France, recently preceded by similar events in Germany, will only reinforce this view.

Following US President-elect Donald Trump’s victory, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has publicly warned of serious challenges for Europe and signaled that he takes Trump’s campaign announcements about Ukraine very seriously. The Polish government, Tusk announced, wants to urgently coordinate with countries with a similar outlook to jointly address Europe’s geopolitical challenges.

Being a staunch pro-European at heart, Tusk initially banked on the Weimar Triangle, but cooperation among Poland, France, and Germany has been disappointing. Poland has had difficulty breaking through the Paris-Berlin consensus. For a long time, Poland accepted its status as the junior partner. But now that Poland is the most politically stable member of the three, those days are gone. Who could have imagined that when the initiative was first created in 1991?

The recent developments in France will likely reinforce Tusk’s conviction that Poland was right to sign a strategic partnership agreement with Sweden at the recent Nordic-Baltic summit in late November. These countries, along with Romania and the Czech Republic, were identified as Poland’s “valuable and forward-looking allies” in Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski’s recent statement to the Polish parliament.

The collapse of the French government will also strengthen Tusk’s belief that Polish-British relations are important for Polish security. Warsaw will likely take advantage of the fact that London is interested for similar reasons.

We should expect Warsaw to lean into these relationships as Poland takes over the presidency of the Council of the European Union, which will have a heavy focus on European security. For Poland, Paris and Berlin no longer loom as large as they once did.

—Aaron Korewa is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Warsaw Office, which is part of the Europe Center.

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Georgian protests escalate amid fears over mounting Russian influence

Ana Lejava — Wed, 04 Dec 2024 14:49:59 +0000

Huge crowds have taken to the streets of Tbilisi and other Georgian cities in recent days to protest the government’s November 28 decision to freeze accession talks with the EU. This latest wave of protests comes following weeks of unrest in the wake of the country’s controversial October parliamentary election, which opposition parties and independent observers say was marred by widespread fraud.

The announcement of a freeze in the country’s EU membership bid coincided with a European Parliament resolution denouncing Georgia’s parliamentary election as “neither free nor fair” and calling for a rerun of the vote under international supervision. The resolution strongly condemned “Russia’s systematic interference in Georgia’s democratic processes,” and criticized policies implemented by the ruling Georgian Dream party as “incompatible with Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration.”

Opponents accuse the Georgian authorities of violating the Georgian Constitution, which mandates integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures. The decision to put the EU accession process on pause has sparked widespread anger and dismay throughout Georgian society, where a majority have long favored closer ties with Europe. Polls indicate that around 80 percent of Georgians support the country’s EU integration.

Protests erupted as soon as the decision to freeze EU talks was announced, with large numbers of people flocking to the center of the Georgian capital to defend against what many see as an attack on their country’s democratic system and European future. The authorities have reacted by ordering a hard line response that has included the use of water cannons and tear gas against protesters along with the arrest of prominent opposition figures and multiple incidents of heavy-handed policing. Security forces are accused of deliberately targeting journalists and attacking protesters seeking to record evidence of excesses.

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The protests currently taking place across Georgia are the latest episode in an extended period of anti-government unrest that began last year when the ruling Georgian Dream party attempted to pass Russian-style foreign agent legislation targeting civil society. Protests then resumed in the aftermath of the parliamentary election in October. Many in Tbilisi are now comparing current events to the April 1989 protests that were crushed by the Soviet authorities, sparking Georgia’s independence movement. There have also been widespread comparisons with Ukraine’s two post-Soviet Maidan revolutions in defense of the country’s fledgling democracy and European choice.

Some Georgian government officials are siding with the protesters, with hundreds signing an open letter condemning the suspension of EU accession talks. A number of Georgian ambassadors and senior officials including Deputy Foreign Minister Teimuraz Jandzhalia have resigned in protest. Meanwhile, schools and universities across the country have halted classes amid signs of a growing civil disobedience campaign.

The protests have also attracted considerable international support. In a November 29 statement, US Helsinki Commission leaders expressed solidarity with the Georgian people while condemning the government crackdown and declaring the Georgian authorities “illegitimate.” Other countries have issued similar statements or imposed sanctions measures on Georgian Dream officials linked to violence against protesters.

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The mounting confrontation in Georgia has potentially far-reaching implications for the wider region. Critics of the Georgian Dream authorities accuse the party of seeking to turn their country away from Euro-Atlantic integration and return Georgia to the Russian sphere of influence. They argue that Georgia is a key battleground in the struggle between the democratic world and the emerging axis of authoritarian nations led by Russia and China.

If Moscow is able to return Georgia to the Kremlin orbit, this could have grave consequences for neighboring Armenia, which has sought to deepen ties with the West amid disillusionment over Russia’s failure to support the country during its recent war with Azerbaijan. It would also send a powerful message to other countries looking to turn away from Moscow at a time when Russia is waging the largest European war since World War II in Ukraine over Kyiv’s European aspirations.

The Georgian Dream authorities reject accusations that they are steering the country away from Europe and back toward Moscow. During the recent parliamentary election campaign, they focused on messages of peace and stability while claiming to being shielding Georgia from Ukraine’s fate. However, the sheer scale of the current protests suggests that a large percentage of Georgians reject the idea of securing peace at the expense of their most basic human rights and democratic freedoms.

With the opposition movement gaining momentum, much may now depend on the role of the international community. Protest leaders will be hoping that the US, EU, and other Western countries impose tougher sanctions on Georgian Dream officials while increasing their support for Georgia’s independent media and civil society. As they mull their response to events in Georgia, Western officials will be well aware of the high stakes involved. The outcome of the protests will likely define Georgia’s future and shape the geopolitical climate in the southern Caucasus and beyond for years to come.

Ana Lejava is a policy associate at the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security.

Role of Congress

The US Constitution intentionally divided authority over foreign policy between the president and Congress. While Congress has been relatively less assertive in the post-Cold War period, it retains important checks on executive authority. These include budget and appropriations approval (what’s called the power of the purse,) oversight powers, the ability to approve or curtail military operations, and to provide “advice and consent” for international agreements. The House of Representatives and the Senate share many of these responsibilities, but approving treaties, and perhaps most importantly in the early stages of an administration, confirming presidential nominees, is reserved for the Senate.

US presidential transitions have long operated on the principle that “personnel is policy,” meaning that effecting change in foreign affairs, national security, domestic programs, or anything else depends upon getting the right people with the right skills into the right presidential appointments. The Senate is a key player in that process, as it can either expedite or slow confirmations as part of a policy bargaining process, and both Republicans and Democrats have played hardball with nominations in the past.

Slow-rolling nominees may again be a feature of the upcoming presidential transition. Yet the bigger picture of a closely divided Congress gives grounds for guarded optimism as to the overall foreign policy direction and priorities once the winner has been declared. Even in times of acrimonious division on domestic politics and partisan polarization, representatives and senators have worked across party lines more often than not on matters of national security and foreign policy. Sudden lurches in foreign policy, including a potential softening of commitment to NATO and European security, would run headlong into the prerogatives of Congress, especially the Senate, in the sensitive early stages of a new administration.

119^th Congress

How will Congress look when it convenes on January 3, 2025? The results of the November 5^th election yielded flipped the Senate from Democrat to Republican control with the Republicans holding a 53-47 advantage. The House of Representatives appears headed for a closely balanced 2025 composition, with a slight Republican edge. While it is possible that both the presidential and congressional outcomes could seem more decisive after counting (and lawsuits) conclude, the likely outcome on the legislative side will be two chambers with slim majorities, possibly controlled by different parties, and consequently a higher need for compromise and bipartisanship on foreign policy issues.

Committee leadership changes in each chamber, depending upon the majority party in that chamber. For the 118^th Congress this has meant Democratic leadership of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) and Republican leadership of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC). The SFRC serves as the primary counterweight to executive authority on foreign policy, balancing, reinforcing, or sometimes opposing the administration’s approach. SFRC Chairman Ben Cardin will depart, as he retires. With the Republican majority, James Risch of Idaho will likely be the new chairman. Risch is known as an ardent supporter of NATO and a passionate advocate for strong Alliance relations. A current SFRC member, Marco Rubio, has been tapped as Trump’s secretary of state nominee. Rubio has good working relations with Trump, but can be expected to put his own stamp on foreign policy. There also are two Republican senators who will remain on the SFRC, Todd Young and Rand Paul, who have major differences over policy or personality with Trump and can be expected to take a very critical look at any sharp turns in foreign policy or Alliance matters.

On the Democratic side of the aisle, Jean Shaheen will make history as the first female senator to serve as ranking member of the SFRC. A dedicated Atlanticist, she has a strong working relationship with Risch and a similar strategic outlook. Other Democratic members of the SFRC likely to return have been sharply critical of Trump, but might play a prominent role in a potential Harris administration due to the latter’s relatively enigmatic foreign policy views and thinner base of overseas experience compared to President Biden. These senators include Tim Kaine (Virginia), Chris Van Hollen (Maryland), and Chris Murphy (Connecticut), who would likely work to keep a new Democratic administration’s major foreign policy themes consistent with the Biden administration’s approach.

November till January

A flurry of activity is commencing as the incoming administration focuses on roles, policy priorities, personnel, and myriad administrative details. New members of the House of Representatives are attending New Member Orientation as the House organizes for the new term (all members of the House stand for election each two years). The Senate, which elects only one-third of its membership each two years, is taking up committee and leadership assignments during this period. In a sense, this gives the Senate and the SFRC a head start in organizing for the policy debates that will begin after the presidential inauguration of January 20.

Given the constitutional structures, political dynamics, and leading personalities in play this election cycle, US allies and partners have better grounds to expect continued US leadership— and alliance commitment—than is commonly appreciated. Whether the United States will lead, and whether the winning candidate fulfills worst fears and expectations posited during the year-plus presidential campaign, may be the wrong question. The right question is how quickly the administration can get its team in place, and how quickly it can forge consensus with key congressional stakeholders on foreign policy. And while the answer remains to be seen, the prospects for a balanced/closely divided Congress with a number of experienced foreign policy hands augurs for an outcome that may exceed expectations.

Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Turkey with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on X @RichOutzen.

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Nikoladze interviewed by Global News Canada on protests in Georgia amid EU bid

irosales — Sat, 30 Nov 2024 18:44:15 +0000

The post Nikoladze interviewed by Global News Canada on protests in Georgia amid EU bid appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Why Georgia’s pro-democracy protests failed

Alex Scrivener — Thu, 28 Nov 2024 19:49:19 +0000

On the cold, damp morning of November 25, around two thousand people held a gloomy protest in front of Georgia’s parliament building. As ultimately unnecessary phalanxes of police protected the building, the determined last holdouts of Georgia’s once-huge protest movement were left to contemplate how they came to be so comprehensively defeated.

This protest, against what the opposition and the country’s president have called a rigged election, was meant to be big. The opposition called for people to take days off work and mobilize overnight to prevent the new parliament from convening.

Instead, what occurred in front of the parliament building was barely a protest. It was more like a funeral—and not a particularly well-attended one. The hundreds of thousands of pro-European Union (EU) citizens who filled the streets in the spring to protest the government’s crackdown on civil society largely elected now to stay at home.

Unless something drastically changes, it seems like the ruling Georgian Dream party will be able to consolidate some form of authoritarian governance and that the country’s EU membership hopes are in tatters.

But most painfully for pro-EU forces, Georgian democracy did not die heroically in a hail of Russian bullets, or under the batons of riot police. It appears to be dying because it’s too cold outside and Georgians are too depressed and nihilistic to resist.

How did this happen? And how did a Georgian Dream party seen as being a vector for Kremlin interests manage to win in a country that consistently polls as one of the most anti-Russian and pro-EU in the world? How does an election almost universally criticized as being insufficiently free and fair lead not to sustained protests but to passive acquiescence to authoritarian rule?

Like its role model of Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, Georgia demonstrates that defeating democracy is terrifyingly easy if you use the right tactics. The playbook will no doubt be studied carefully by would-be dictators across the world.

Here is how Georgian Dream stole an election and got away with it:

1. Find the Goldilocks level of election manipulation—not too much, not too little

Discussion of rigged elections often invokes places where the dictator wins by ego-boosting but comically large and improbable margins. But the key to modern authoritarianism is to nudge the scales just enough to win and still be believable. This requires using a range of methods that individually don’t seem significant but collectively get the regime over the line.

Georgian Dream is expert at this. Vote-buying is one such tactic. Stories abound of voters getting paid in exchange for their votes. But when that fails, intimidation is also very effective. Many polling stations had gangs of burly intimidating men present as “observers” but who in fact enforced the ruling party’s interests. The ruling party also had video cameras inside most polling stations, which is legal in Georgia. This was what Iulian Bulai, the head of the Council of Europe parliamentary observation mission, meant when he said there was a feeling of “Big Brother is watching you” during the election.

Combined with serious issues related to the secrecy of the ballot—the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe mission reported that “voter secrecy was potentially compromised in 24 per cent of observations”—this made for an intimidating environment.

There is also growing evidence of direct, brazen fraud alongside the softer methods. Statistical analysts have pointed to the presence of a so-called “Russian tail” in turnout patterns, which is indicative of fraud and multiple voting. Reports also abound of multiple voting using ID cards either taken or bought from other voters, an allegation recently corroborated by a whistleblower who claims that his team was paid to vote 163 times this way.

But the key to all of this is moderation. The regime did not rely on a single method. When caught red-handed (as in one case where ballot stuffing was caught on camera in southern Georgia) this enabled the authorities to hold up their hands and call it an isolated incident. The aim was not to emerge with a Vladimir Putin-style 80 percent or more of the vote, but to cheat just enough to boost the ruling party from the 40-42 percent the exit polls suggested to the 54 percent it officially got.

2. Embrace older, rural conservatives, and use their fears and homophobia

This is a tactic common for right-wing populist movements in many countries. From the Brexit campaign to Orbán’s Hungary, the playbook looks quite similar. But the version of it that works best in Eastern Europe adds extra emphasis on anti-LGBTQI+ attitudes. Before the election, Georgian Dream adopted a law that makes it a crime to spread what it terms “LGBT propaganda.” It has also taken advantage of the older generation’s weaker fealty to democracy and involves a close embrace of the country’s powerful and thoroughly Russian-infiltrated Orthodox Church.

Georgian Dream also used fear very effectively to mobilize older voters.

“No to War–Choose Peace” was a key ruling party slogan, and posters featured images of destruction in Ukraine juxtaposed with Georgian monuments to drive home the point. The message was very much one of “vote for us or Russia will invade again.” Georgians may not have much love for Russia, but there is little appetite for war.

3. Embrace the Kremlin . . . from behind an EU flag

Anyone traveling to Georgia during the election campaign would be forgiven for believing that Georgian Dream was the primary pro-EU force in the country. Their posters featured large EU flags and the slogan “Towards Europe with Dignity.” Despite constantly bad-mouthing Brussels and refusing to take the steps required for EU membership, Georgian Dream was careful to hide their amenability to Russian interests behind a patina of pro-EU messaging.

This message, although cynical, was not altogether false. Georgian Dream does see itself as part of a European project, albeit that of the European populist far-right represented by Orbán and the leader of the French National Rally party, Marine Le Pen.

The message gave ostensibly pro-EU but functionally anti-Western voters sufficient cover to vote in line with Russian interests without openly doing so.

4. Allow but ignore protests and free speech (unless it gets to a critical level)

A crucial difference between the new authoritarianism of Georgian Dream and the older version is the attitude toward free speech and protests. Old-style dictators do not allow any protests and seek to muzzle critical voices. Georgian Dream took the opposite approach of, to paraphrase Georgian Dream’s billionaire founder Bidzina Ivanishvili, letting them shout until they get tired.

During the spring, some of the biggest protests in Georgian history took place with hundreds of thousands of people in the streets to oppose the so-called Russian law, referred to this way by its detractors in reference to its origin as a piece of Russian legislation. The law demanded that civil society organizations register as nefarious-sounding “vectors of foreign influence” and was judged by the EU as being incompatible with membership.

For months, protests ground Tbilisi and other major cities to a halt. The regime occasionally responded with police brutality and the use of “titushky” thugs to beat up protesters. But overall, they allowed the protests to continue until they ebbed by themselves, as thoughts turned both to the summer holidays and to the October elections.

Ivanishvili was proved right. When the elections came, there was no more energy. The youth, having seen their spring protests fail, largely shrugged their shoulders and gave up. The government managed to survive by merely ignoring, rather than cracking down on, protesters. Particularly problematic individuals were singled out for arrests or beatings by regime goons, but these could be dismissed as isolated incidents.

5. Steal hope from the youth and encourage them to emigrate

The youth in Georgia, as in most places, are the main engine of social protest. They were the driving force behind the spring protests and were expected to form the backbone of postelection protests. But Gen Z are, by and large, missing in action on the streets of Tbilisi.

Talk to young Georgians and the overwhelming message one hears is one of hopeless resignation. Most dream of individual escape through emigration rather than collective liberation.

This is partly a result of the highly individualist culture that the low-trust, low-tax, Wild West model of capitalism in Georgia has produced. A once proud communitarian, neighborhood-oriented culture has been replaced by atomization and dog-eat-dog competition. This is true for everyone. But, unlike older generations, the youth has never experienced anything else and so tends to look for ways to run away rather than cooperate to win change.

As a result, institutions that serve as backbones for social movements in the West, such as trade unions and community campaign organizations, are weak and distrusted by young people in Georgia. It is difficult to build a revolution through Facebook alone, which means that there is a lack of coherent leadership or organization.

But the government itself has done everything it can to sow despair and hopelessness in the youth. The more young people give up and leave, the fewer votes any change-oriented alternative is likely to get.

6. Be corrupt, but also spread just enough money around to keep key groups quiet

Georgia has always been stuck between its national political aspiration of joining Europe and a stubborn economic reality that binds it to Russia. Despite preferential access to the EU market, Georgia doesn’t produce anything Europe wants to buy. Russia, however, devours many Georgian products, such as wine. The influx of Russian tourists and shady and potentially sanctions-evading “investment” has also created a wealthy elite dependent on financial flows from the north.

This inflow of wealth may not be benefiting ordinary Georgians, who still overwhelmingly live in or near poverty. But it is appearing in statistics, with Georgia currently enjoying double-digit economic growth. This extra money buys the support of some and the acquiescence of others.

Figures close to Georgian Dream control many of the major businesses and especially the dubious financial flows from Russia. This, combined with its control of the resources of the state and billionaire Ivanishvili’s net worth of a fifth of the country’s gross domestic product, gives it huge patronage.

Georgians may love Europe in their hearts, but their pockets (at least for a part of the elite) are being filled with Russian rubles.

7. Have an incompetent opposition

The failure of the protest movement was not merely a function of superior government strategy. It was also one of abject incompetence on the part of the opposition.

The opposition did not decide on an approach to the election until the last minute, with talks on alliances ongoing until just weeks before polls opened. When they did eventually consolidate into four major blocs, their campaigns were weak and generic. The biggest of these blocs, Coalition for Change, ran a poster campaign of generic images and the meaningless slogan “The future is yours.”

Opposition leaders barely bothered to leave the comfort of the major cities. And they appeared to spend more time lobbying in Washington, DC, and Brussels than they did talking to voters. This played into the government’s narrative that the opposition were all elitist “foreign agents” who held ordinary Georgians in disdain.

The continued presence of figures from the similarly authoritarian, albeit more pro-Western, previous government among the opposition was another hindering factor, albeit less so than in previous elections. The specter of a return to power of imprisoned former President Mikheil Saakashvili, while increasingly far-fetched, remained sufficient for a subset of voters to stay loyal to Georgian Dream.

But most shockingly of all, despite having spent the pre-election period warning about the potential for fraud and manipulation, the opposition appears to have been caught completely unprepared when the results came in. Opposition leaders made a statement refusing to recognize the results and then spent the next few weeks dithering while both international attention and passion among the Georgian public evaporated. The weeks of excuses and staggering incompetence merely served to convince the public that the battle was hopeless.

Alex Scrivener is the executive director at the Democratic Security Institute, an independent, nonpartisan think tank based in Tbilisi, Georgia.

The post Why Georgia’s pro-democracy protests failed appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin’s Ukraine obsession began 20 years ago with the Orange Revolution

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 26 Nov 2024 22:36:41 +0000

This month marks the twentieth anniversary of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. When protests over a rigged presidential election first erupted in downtown Kyiv on November 22, 2004, few observers could have imagined that they were witnessing the opening act in a geopolitical drama that would eventually lead to the largest European conflict since World War II. And yet there can be little doubt that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s desire to crush Ukraine first began to take shape two decades ago as he watched the Ukrainian people defy their own authoritarian rulers and demand a democratic future.

For the past twenty years, there has been a tendency to view the Orange Revolution primarily as a political failure. This assessment is easy enough to understand. After all, while the revolution overturned a fraudulent presidential vote and brought reformist candidate Viktor Yushchenko to power, it did not lead to the kind of political transformation that the millions of Ukrainians who participated in the protest movement hoped for. Instead, Yushchenko spent much of his presidency squabbling with colleagues and compromising with opponents, before eventually losing the 2010 election to Orange Revolution villain Viktor Yanukovych.

While the revolution clearly fell short of its lofty political goals, focusing exclusively on domestic Ukrainian politics is short-sighted. In order to appreciate the true historic significance of the Orange Revolution, it must viewed in a far broader context.

Prior to the revolution, post-Soviet Russia had substantial influence in Ukraine, with Vladimir Putin topping polls as the most popular politician among Ukrainians. At the same time, the two countries were already quite distinct. The centralized power vertical in Russia created the conditions for hard authoritarianism. In contrast, the need to balance competing centers of influence and power in Ukraine gave rise to a softer authoritarianism.

Putin’s heavy-handed promotion of Viktor Yanukovych ahead of the 2004 presidential election, and his subsequent push for a crackdown on protesters during the Orange Revolution, highlighted the growing differences between the two nations. This hastened Ukraine’s trajectory away from Russia, a pattern that continues to this day.

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Putin played a very prominent personal role in the Orange Revolution. Russian television, which was at the time widely watched in Ukraine, relentlessly pushed the candidacy of Viktor Yanukovych during the buildup to Ukraine’s presidential election. On the eve of the vote, Putin made the fateful decision to intervene directly. He traveled to Kyiv in late October 2004, where he was greeted with an impromptu military parade before appearing on national TV to lecture the Ukrainian public at length on the importance of backing his preferred presidential pick.

It soon became clear that Putin had miscalculated disastrously. His open and unapologetic attempt to interfere in Ukraine’s internal affairs was widely interpreted as a grave insult and an indication of his contempt for Ukrainian statehood. This electrified public opinion and helped mobilize millions of previously apolitical Ukrainians.

Weeks later, after a deeply flawed second round of voting, Ukrainians would respond to the attempted theft of their election by flooding into central Kyiv in huge numbers. It is no exaggeration to say that Putin’s act of supreme imperial hubris was one of the key causes of the Orange Revolution.

This pattern has repeated itself throughout the past twenty years, with Putin’s efforts to impose his will on Ukraine consistently backfiring and pushing the two countries further apart. In 2013, he pressured his Ukrainian ally Yanukovych to abandon European integration and return the country to the Kremlin orbit, only for this to provoke a second revolution and the fall of the Yanukoych regime.

Putin then opted for a military solution. He began the invasion of Ukraine in February 2014 with the seizure of Crimea, before sending forces into eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region weeks later. When it became obvious that this limited military intervention had merely succeeded in strengthening Ukraine’s resolve to exit the Russian sphere of influence entirely, Putin began plotting what would become the full-scale invasion of February 2022.

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Since the Orange Revolution, Putin’s quest to reconquer Ukraine has come to define his entire reign. In his single-minded pursuit of this goal, he has demonstrated a willingness to incur huge costs. In addition to the lives of the countless Russian soldiers killed or maimed while fighting in Ukraine, Putin has also sacrificed Russia’s economic prosperity, the country’s international standing, and its ties to the developed world.

The historic shift in Putin’s worldview was already evident soon after the Orange Revolution. Within a few months of Ukraine’s people power uprising, he ordered work to begin on the development of what would become the Kremlin’s flagship RT English-language media platform. This was the first step in a process that has established the Putin regime as the undisputed global leader in the dissemination of anti-Western disinformation.

In spring 2005, the Kremlin also backed a nationwide campaign encouraging Russians to display orange-and-black St. George’s ribbons in honor of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. With images of rebellious Ukrainians sporting orange ribbons still fresh in everyone’s minds, the loyalist symbolism of this counter-gesture was hard to miss. St. George’s ribbons have gone on to establish themselves at the heart of a fanatical victory cult as the Putin regime has sought to justify its own authoritarianism via ever more extravagant forms of WWII reverence. What began life as a reaction to the orange ribbons of Ukraine’s revolution has become the ultimate symbol of the entire Putin era.

Why is Putin so obsessed with Ukraine, and what was it about the country’s Orange Revolution that triggered him so irreversibly? The answers to these questions lie in Putin’s imperialistic understanding of Russian identity and his formative political experiences as a KGB officer in Eastern Europe during the collapse of the Soviet Empire.

Putin was in East Germany in 1989 when the Berlin Wall fell. He watched helplessly as the entire Soviet presence throughout the region crumbled amid a surge in pro-democracy protests. In his own account of this traumatic time, Putin claims that his stunned superiors informed him, “Moscow is silent.” This experience has haunted Putin and left him convinced that Moscow must never be “silent” again, especially when confronted by mass protest movements or attempts to shake off Kremlin control.

Putin is particularly sensitive to modern Ukraine’s national awakening and its embrace of European democracy because he views the country as part of Russia’s imperial heartlands. If a democratic political culture can take root in a place as central to Russia’s national identity as Ukraine, this could prove contagious and serve as a catalyst for similar demands within Russia itself.

Tellingly, Putin first began to indicate his opposition to Ukrainian independence soon after the Orange Revolution. In April 2005, he had recent events in Ukraine very much in mind when he branded the fall of the USSR “the greatest political catastrophe of the twentieth century.” This is apparent from some of the lesser quoted segments of his speech, which also referenced an “epidemic of disintegration” and bemoaned the fate of the “tens of millions of countrymen” who found themselves beyond the borders of Russia in 1991. At the time, Ukraine was home to by far the largest population of ethnic Russians in the former Soviet Union.

Little has changed during the intervening twenty years. Today’s ongoing Russian invasion is a direct result of Putin’s firm conviction that the loss of Ukraine would pose an existential threat to Russia itself. It is therefore delusional to suggest that some kind of limited territorial settlement could end the current war and lead to a sustainable peace. Any attempt to offer concessions will only result in a temporary pause in hostilities before Putin resumes his campaign to extinguish Ukrainian statehood.

Vladimir Putin’s efforts to reassert Russian control over Ukraine date back to the 2004 Orange Revolution and have now escalated from political interference to the bloodiest European war for generations. He sees the destruction of the Ukrainian state as his historic mission and believes the fate of Russia hinges on his success. In such circumstances, talk of compromising with the Kremlin is futile. Instead, peace will only be possible if Putin can be convinced that Ukrainian independence is irreversible.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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President Zourabichvili’s denunciation of the October parliamentary elections as illegitimate has shaken the nation. She has claimed that evidence of Russian interference and systematic election manipulation reveal a ruling party embracing increasingly authoritarian tactics.

Zourabichvili and other opposition figures accuse the governing Georgian Dream party of weaponizing anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian narratives in order to gain political advantage during the election campaign. This included claims that the country’s opposition forces are part of a Western-led “Global War Party” that is allegedly seeking to open a “second front” against Russia.

Critics claim the events of October 26 in Georgia were less an election and more a performance designed to entrench the political status quo in the country. Independent exit polls revealed a decisive majority for Western-leaning opposition parties. Nevertheless, Georgian Dream declared victory.

Reports from international observers and Georgian civil society reveal a troubling reality including widespread evidence of glaring irregularities such as altered voter turnout figures and statistical anomalies. The vote itself featured numerous examples of violence and intimidation.

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Developments in Georgia are geopolitically significant for the surrounding region. Positioned at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, Georgia serves as a critical energy transit hub and a potential model of democratic resilience in a region where autocracies and empires have long vied for dominance.

Since coming to power in 2012, the Georgian Dream party has increasingly aligned with authoritarian regimes. This has included favoring Chinese firms over American companies for projects like the Anaklia deep sea port, and facilitating Russian sanctions evasion.

Allowing Georgia to slip into authoritarian hands would send a dangerous message that democratic values are negotiable. For the US and EU, this is not just about Georgia. At stake is the West’s credibility in the wider region. Georgia aligns with Western foreign policy priorities such as countering the expansion of Chinese, Russian, and Iranian influence in the Black Sea region.

Georgia’s united democratic opposition and civil society have shown they are ready to lead a peaceful transition of power and position Georgia as a dependable Western ally. Achieving this vision, however, demands coordinated action from Washington, Brussels, and London.

First, new elections under international supervision are necessary. Only transparent elections monitored by independent actors can succeed in restoring democratic integrity and advance Georgia’s EU accession prospects.

Second, the West should impose targeted sanctions on Georgian Dream leaders and their enablers for undermining democracy and advancing Russian interests. These sanctions would send a clear message of support for Georgia’s democratic aspirations.

The US could expand current visa bans to include financial restrictions, with Brussels doing likewise. The prompt adoption of pending legislative bills in the US Congress to support the Georgian people would further demonstrate decisive commitment.

Third, Georgia’s civil society, and independent media need greater protection from repression. With a Russian-inspired “foreign agents” law now in place in Georgia, targeted funding and diplomatic support are crucial to ensuring these democratic pillars remain free and accountable.

Coordinated transatlantic pressure is crucial. Decisive action on Georgia can help strengthen a Western ally and stabilize a critical region, while also bolstering democracy at a pivotal moment. Georgia is far from a lost cause, but it will require bold Western leadership to prevent the country’s capture by the Kremlin.

Zviad Adzinbaia is a doctoral fellow at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy specializing in Russian hybrid warfare, disinformation, and Euro-Atlantic security and politics.

More than other cabinet departments, DHS needs to factor into its decisions how its actions affect the trust Americans have in it. DHS needs the support of the American people to succeed. DHS is the third-largest US government department, with more than 260,000 people. Its work is vital to the security and economic prosperity of the United States. DHS has more contact with the American people than any other federal department: everyone who uses computers, cell phones, and online networks; travels through airports; enters or leaves the country; is hit by a natural or man-made disaster; goes to a house of worship that uses a grant to pay for increased security; or visits a federal office building protected by DHS anywhere in the country—they all engage with what DHS does.

DHS requires cooperation from state and local governments on law enforcement and protecting the borders. It relies on voluntary cooperation and the sharing of information from state and local governments, and from the private sector, to protect computer networks and critical infrastructure. Security missions such as aviation and border security rely on Americans accepting what DHS does as necessary for their protection. People need to have confidence that the sensitive, personal information they provide to DHS is used appropriately. Public confidence in DHS cannot be commanded; it must be earned whenever DHS takes action.

While most of DHS has earned public trust since the department’s founding in 2003, the past two presidential terms have seen that trust fray significantly with different parts of the public. In the first Trump administration, an intentional policy of child separation at the border in 2018, misuse of DHS’s intelligence resources after the 2020 death of George Floyd, and the heavy-handed use of Customs and Border Protection’s elite Border Patrol Tactical Unit on the streets of Portland, Oregon, had the effect of energizing broad popular opposition to Trump administration homeland security policies.

In 2021, the Biden administration reversed many Trump immigration policies, but it failed to provide additional resources to quickly reject unfounded asylum claims. This led to more releases and more arrivals at the border. The surge of releases into the United States fueled the impeachment of Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas in February of this year (quickly acquitted in the Senate). A late 2023 bipartisan Senate compromise for additional resources and policy changes was blocked by Congress, at Trump’s request, in January 2024. The number of unauthorized migrants dropped in the summer of 2024, but by then it was too late.

According to polls, voters concluded that they did not trust Democrats with border security. Adding to this perception was the Secret Service’s failure in July to stop an attempted assassination of Trump, and controversies, many unjustified, over disaster aid to victims of hurricanes Helene and Milton. The administration’s performance on border security had become the second-most important issue in the presidential election that Trump won.

Mass deportations are coming

During his Republican Party convention speech in July, Trump promised that he would deliver “the largest deportation operation” in US history. Democrats may question the wisdom but for now they cannot question the mandate. Since his reelection, Trump has appointed Tom Homan, a former senior officer in the Border Patrol and one of Trump’s acting directors of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), as border czar. Stephen Miller, Trump’s immigration adviser during his first term, has been named as deputy White House chief of staff, where he is expected to have substantial control of overall immigration and border policy. Trump also nominated South Dakota Governor Kristi Noem to be the next secretary of homeland security. In 2021, she sent South Dakota National Guard troops to the Texas-Mexico border.

By one estimate, Trump is trying to remove 11.7 million people from the United States. To give a sense of the effort required, the Trump administration deported 1.5 million people during his first term, a number the Biden administration will match by the end of its term. An additional 2.8 million people were expelled during the pandemic between March 2020 and May 2023. The previous recent high was five million deported or removed in President George W. Bush’s second term.

Trump has promised deportations will begin on “day one.” He is also certain to quickly revoke the parole that has allowed in tens of thousands from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Those awaiting a court date for their asylum claims are likely to see Trump administration efforts to shorten the legal process and deny most claims. Those without authorization to be in the United States face the choice between going home now or taking the risk of arrest and deportation if they stay.

Homan, one of the toughest and most highly skilled operators in the new Trump team, understands how he wants this to unfold. Initially, deportations will target migrants with criminal records, according to Vice President-elect JD Vance. The total number of such individuals is uncertain, but according to ICE, it is probably less than one million. This should have broad public support. They will also go after the 1.19 million people who have received “final orders of removal” from immigration judges, but it will take some effort to find many of them. Then they can target those whose parole was revoked or who have given DHS or the Department of Justice their current addresses.

Homan will need to quickly build up the resources and infrastructure to remove detained individuals as fast as they come in. Right now, there are not enough ICE agents, holding sites, contract jails, and aircraft or buses to remove people as fast as ICE can bring them into custody—especially if, as Trump and Miller have said, some state National Guard units also help detain people. Trump has already confirmed that he will declare a national emergency and use military assets to help with deportations. The infrastructure to do this at Trump’s scale does not exist and will need to be assembled, almost certainly with help from the Department of Defense. Until then, Homan can (1) limit the pace of arrests to the pace of deportations, which will frustrate Trump and Miller, or (2) get the money, people, and equipment to move more people out quickly. Republican control of both houses of Congress will make the latter possible, but Homan needs to have his reprogramming plan, and a supplemental funding request from Congress, ready in January.

Make no mistake, the price tag will be breathtaking. The January 2024 bipartisan Senate compromise asked for $20.3 billion. It is hard to see Homan’s plan as costing anything less than that, even in the first year. Trump has already made it clear that he will support this plan whatever it costs, and Republican control of both houses of Congress should allow him to get it.

What could go wrong?

There are three breaking points that could end public support for Trump’s deportation plans, and Homan has already shown he understands at least two of them. First, Homan knows that Americans will not accept mass detention camps, even though Miller described camps in Texas to podcaster Charlie Kirk in November 2023. Some in the Trump administration may want detention camps in the desert—in order to signal to migrants not to come to the United States. This could lead to a clash inside the Trump administration early in 2025.

The second potential breaking point, which Homan also seems to understand, is that the way to detain undocumented migrants is through targeted arrests, not roundups from people’s houses or children’s schools. Workplace enforcement actions would send a signal to businesses that use undocumented workers—and there are many fewer businesses that use undocumented workers than there are undocumented workers the Trump administration would want to arrest. Enforcing laws requiring hiring only those legally able to work in the United States could reduce the “pull” effect that draws potential workers from Central and South America to the US economy. But doing this in too heavy-handed a way will not be accepted by many Americans.

The third potential breaking point will occur after immigration advocates try to slow the deportation process through legal challenges and court injunctions. There are several existing legal settlements that give the courts the ability to slow or block certain procedural steps the Trump administration will likely try.

The Trump administration no doubt believes a Trump-friendly US Supreme Court will approve the measures they intend to take. But the White House needs to respect the rule of law and let the legal processes work out, even if it takes months, for a very important political reason. Many Americans are likely to accept the use of the law to deport people, but even more Americans may balk at the Trump administration breaking the law to do so.

Blowing through the rule of law would have severe consequences not just for immigration and border security but for other parts of the Trump agenda. The Trump administration should consider carefully the grave risks if it goes forward by ignoring the courts. With public trust in tatters, Trump’s opponents might then consider themselves justified in ignoring the law. That way lies anarchy.

Thomas S. Warrick is a senior fellow and director of the Future of DHS Project at the Atlantic Council. He served in the Department of State from 1997-2007 and as deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security from 2008-2019.

The post Border security and the future of DHS: Will Trump 2.0 earn the public’s trust? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The shift from party to personality politics is harming Latin American democracies

Christine Zaino, Sofia Herrera — Tue, 19 Nov 2024 15:00:00 +0000

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This paper is the fourth in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “State of the Parties” series analyzing the strength of multi-party systems in different regions of the world.

Across Latin America and the Caribbean, personality-driven political movements and political outsiders are increasingly prevalent, often at the expense of party-based politics. A theme of recent elections in the region has been a widespread embrace of political figures and movements vowing to upend the status quo. From Ecuador to Argentina to Guatemala, political outsiders have unseated the establishment. Meanwhile, recently formed, ideologically vague political movements in Mexico and El Salvador overtook the traditional parties that they broke away from to win landslide elections. With few exceptions, the region has failed to develop competitive, institutionalized, and programmatic parties. This breakdown in party systems and proliferation of personality-driven movements has not delivered better results. Improving institutionalized competition among programmatic, ideologically distinct, and identifiable parties would bolster Latin American democracy, delivering citizens freedom and prosperity.

Within the past decade, several countries with once seemingly institutionalized party systems, such as El Salvador and Mexico, collapsed as parties lost their grip on power to personality-driven figures and movements. Others, like Ecuador and Guatemala, have systems that appear to provide a wide variety of options to citizens through a great proliferation of parties. These systems are unpredictable to citizens, and parties are unable to develop the structure, ideology, and institutionality necessary to deliver solutions to citizen’s needs.

This piece examines how political parties across four Latin American countries in two types of systems have failed to serve as effective vehicles for delivering democracy, and what must change for parties in the region to succeed. We examine the breakdown of the formerly institutionalized party systems in Mexico and El Salvador, and the persistently weak parties in Guatemala and Ecuador. Each country’s experience illustrates how a lack of programmatic parties has contributed to poor governance, which fails to adequately deliver essential services to citizens, potentially undermining democracy and the freedom it should deliver. For each case, we reference data from the Atlantic Council Freedom and Prosperity Indexes and other sources to illustrate the critical role of parties in advancing democracy.

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State of the Parties

This pathbreaking new series delivers insights and policy recommendations from leading experts on how to enhance efforts to strengthen democracy in all regions of the world.

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Charai in The Jerusalem Post: Why Jared Kushner’s return matters for Jews, Arabs, and Muslims alike

Atlantic Council — Mon, 18 Nov 2024 14:12:10 +0000

The post Charai in The Jerusalem Post: Why Jared Kushner’s return matters for Jews, Arabs, and Muslims alike appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Charai in National interest: How Trump Could Restore America’s Influence and Inspire Global Youth

Atlantic Council — Mon, 18 Nov 2024 14:08:25 +0000

The post Charai in National interest: How Trump Could Restore America’s Influence and Inspire Global Youth appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Charai in The Jerusalem Post: Why Jared Kushner’s return matters for Jews, Arabs, and Muslims alike

Atlantic Council — Sun, 17 Nov 2024 16:11:55 +0000

The post Charai in The Jerusalem Post: Why Jared Kushner’s return matters for Jews, Arabs, and Muslims alike appeared first on Atlantic Council.

North Macedonia: A reform agenda on the path to EU integration

Thu, 14 Nov 2024 22:24:50 +0000

Jump to a policy section:

Introduction | Aleksej Demjanski
Economy: So much to do, so little on the agenda | Branimir Jovanović
EU integration: Gaining credibility | Malinka Ristevska Jordanova
Anti-corruption: A holistic approach to reduce risk factors | Biljana Ivanovska
Youth: From rhetoric to real change | Sara Milenkovska
Civil society: Inclusion and integration | Lura Pollozhani
Conclusion and policy recommendations

Introduction

Aleksej Demjanski

North Macedonia’s 2024 presidential and parliamentary elections resulted in a major shift in power. Seven years after securing victory by riding a wave of protests demanding concrete reforms, a renewed EU accession perspective, and the fight against corruption, the liberal center-left Social Democratic Union of Macedonia saw its worst election result since independence in 1991. This year, the conservative center-right opposition Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization–Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) rode its own wave of dissatisfaction with the slow pace of EU integration burdened by bilateral demands from Bulgaria and unrealized domestic reforms.

A coalition government between VMRO-DPMNE, the Albanian VLEN bloc, and the ZNAM movement has taken the reins. The partners have agreed on a set of priorities that include the economy, EU integration, and the fight against corruption. A slew of urgent tasks lies ahead for the new government in these areas, but also in tackling other pressing challenges regarding youth and emigration as well as cooperation with civil society. Addressing these priorities—domestically and internationally—will require astutely walking a tightrope amid citizens’ demands for a change in the status quo.

While the transatlantic community will remain preoccupied with a political transition in the European Union (EU) and elections the United States over the next six months, the new government in North Macedonia will have time to prepare its reform agenda and engage international partners on achieving common goals. The modus operandi of all Macedonian governments since independence is no longer tenable. A paradigm shift is needed to pursue reforms that benefit all North Macedonia’s citizens.

This policy brief is a compilation of expert analyses that serve as a kind of reform agenda—a road map of policy recommendations for the new Macedonian government in several key areas the coalition partners have already identified as priorities. The first section by Branimir Jovanović outlines how the government can revive the fragile economy and deliver on important public investments. The second section by Malinka Ristevska Jordanova argues the need to shift the EU narrative in North Macedonia and double down on reforms at home to unlock the path to EU accession. The third section by Biljana Ivanovska outlines how the new government can reduce risk factors for corruption and take a holistic approach to tackling the problem. The fourth section by Sara Milenkovska looks at how the new government can improve the approach to youth policies and address the challenges confronting the country’s youth. Finally, the fifth section by Lura Pollozhani provides a series of recommendations for how civil society can better engage the new government and how the government can reap the benefits of a constructive partnership with the country’s civic sector.

The brief concludes with a section outlining all these tangible policy recommendations for North Macedonia’s new government. These recommendations will serve as a useful tool for civil society and the international community in advocating for North Macedonia’s further democratic progress and European integration.

Economy: So much to do, so little on the agenda

Branimir Jovanović

North Macedonia’s new government faces several challenges. These are not limited to the dire fiscal situation and the tricky task of supporting a faltering economy while working within budgetary constraints. They also include deep-seated structural issues born from decades of governments pursuing a flawed economic model.

The most pressing challenge will be finding the money to sustain public spending. North Macedonia’s fiscal deficit in the first three months of the year amounted to 7.4 percent of the gross domestic product. This resulted from the generous fiscal package that the previous government adopted at the end of 2023 to win public support ahead of the elections. While that public support never came, the money was still spent and will continue to be spent, further straining the budget.

The second challenge will be supporting the fragile economy, which grew just 1.2 percent in the first quarter of 2024. Even this modest growth was largely due to the generous fiscal package mentioned above, which will soon vanish. Therefore, the new government must think of something quickly if it wants to avoid a recession.

The most daunting issue, though, will be to transform the outdated economic model based on low taxes, stingy public spending, nonintervention of the government in the economy, and a preference for foreign investment. This model, pursued over the past twenty to thirty years, has kept the country’s average per capita income at just 40 percent of the EU average, the poverty rate at more than 20 percent, and the rate of inequality among the highest in Europe.

Regrettably, the electoral program of the victorious VMRO-DPMNE party and initial statements from its leadership offer little cause for optimism. In his first interview after the election, incoming Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski addressed only the immediate financial challenge, proposing to secure a €1 billion loan from another country. Since then, North Macedonia and Hungary have agreed to a €500 million loan.

However, Mickoski did not say how he plans to support the economy, only cryptically stating his preference for investment over public consumption. This suggests that the economy is likely to decelerate in the second half of the year and might even slip into a recession after the expiration of the current fiscal package.

Most troubling, VMRO-DPMNE’s electoral program lacks the structural reforms needed to address North Macedonia’s outdated economic model. It merely echoes programs from former prime minister Nikola Gruevski’s time in office, recycling outdated concepts such as the regulatory guillotine, tax reductions, labor market flexibilization, offering public-sector employees to private firms, and closing old and opening new state agencies and ministries.

In addition to securing a loan to address the country’s urgent fiscal challenges, the new government must enhance fiscal revenues over a longer term by implementing a progressive tax system. It should impose higher taxes on higher-income brackets, larger corporations, and wealthier individuals.

To kick-start the economy, the government should increase the minimum wage, public-sector salaries, and all social transfers. Additionally, it should accelerate public investments in infrastructure, including roads, railways, and energy.

Finally, structural reforms are crucial to overhaul the outdated economic model. The government should introduce a strategic industrial policy to support key economic sectors, fostering innovation and international competitiveness. Investments in public services such as education, healthcare, and social protection need to be significantly increased to enhance the quality of life and productivity. The current exploitative model must be replaced with one that emphasizes equality and ensures the benefits of growth are broadly shared across the population rather than captured by a small, privileged elite.

EU integration: Gaining credibility

Malinka Ristevska Jordanova

In 2019, the Republic of Macedonia changed its name to the Republic of North Macedonia to end a dispute with Greece and pave the way for its Euro-Atlantic integration. However, while North Macedonia has been admitted into NATO, its membership in the EU remains blocked. The new French methodology on enlargement from 2020 further delayed the launch of EU accession negotiations and was followed by a Bulgarian veto. The unprecedented Bulgarian conditions related to Macedonian identity and history were incorporated in the accession process through the 2022 “French proposal.” The proposal, which includes General Affairs Council conclusions, joint/common positions, as well as the negotiating framework, triggered massive protests and reactions both domestic and international. The conditions, which include changing the Macedonian historic narrative, are based on the Bulgarian claim that the Macedonian nation does not exist. Bulgaria also does not recognize the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria and fails to implement its international obligations related to the freedom of association.

In practice, Macedonia’s (imposed) bilateral agreements with Greece and Bulgaria have become a tool for these neighboring countries—EU and NATO members—to further exert pressure on the Macedonian side for concessions on issues of identity and history rather than serve as a demonstration of solidarity, support for its EU accession, and improve cooperation in good faith.

In addition, while the enlargement process has returned to the EU agenda with Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, it did not actually make the EU perspective for Western Balkan countries, including North Macedonia, more tangible. Instead, the EU enlargement agenda was tied to the future EU internal reform agenda, and new proposals for gradual or partial integration of the Western Balkan countries came to the forefront.

The almost-three-decades-long process of EU integration and the continued imposition of bilateral conditions that have nothing to do with the Copenhagen criteria that define whether a country is eligible to join the EU, and even run opposite, have diminished the EU’s credibility in North Macedonia. Lacking the majority in the Macedonian parliament needed to deliver the promised first step in fulfilling Bulgaria’s numerous conditions—constitutional amendment to include the 3,504 Macedonian citizens that identify as ethnic Bulgarians in the 2022 census as a minority community—the former government (strongly supported by international partners) failed to deliver its promise to the EU.

Around 65 percent of Macedonian citizens are against the constitutional amendment—80 percent of the majority ethnic Macedonian community is against them, while 53 percent of the Albanian ethnic minority community is in favor. Nourishing ethnic division and polarization, the twisted national European agenda has turned into a perpetual response to vetoes rather than a genuine process of Europeanization.

Furthermore, marred by “constructiveness” in bilateral relations and promises that EU accession negotiations will automatically bring reform and well-being, backsliding on reforms related to EU membership, especially in the area of rule of law, became apparent. The distorted EU agenda was a key factor in the opposition VMRO-DPMNE’s victory in the recent parliamentary and presidential elections.

The new government, led by VMRO-DPMNE and largely perceived internationally as “nationalist,” will face a critical challenge: How can it inject credibility into the EU reform process, both internally and externally, without compromising its promises to the electorate?

The Macedonian EU narrative needs an essential shift—from fulfilling bilaterally imposed conditions that have nothing to do with EU accession criteria toward genuine economic and normative convergence with the EU. Instead of short-term concessions for small rewards, a long-term approach that protects national interests should be designed and implemented. A consistent and cohesive national strategy for EU accession needs to be developed and meticulously pursued domestically and internationally. An inclusive approach based on dialogue and arguments is essential in this process.

In order to gain credibility, the new government has to demonstrate, in practice, a decisive commitment to upholding EU standards on democracy, fundamental rights, and the rule of law while at the same time fulfilling the expectations of Macedonian citizens.

In that vein, EU-related reforms must be domestically driven and embedded in a consistent, inclusive, transparent, and evidence-based policymaking process. Significant improvements are necessary to put the policymaking cycle on track. In this context, the transposition of the EU acquis should be well-planned and methodologically consistent.

Furthermore, only depoliticized institutions can support the societal change needed for genuine Europeanization. The institutional setup for EU accession negotiations and management of the EU integration process should be streamlined and resources pooled. Developing capacity for the absorption of EU funds, in parallel with improving the national policymaking process, is imperative.

Finally, the Macedonian authorities’ dialogue within the region, Europe, and internationally needs to be significantly intensified and elevated to prevent further bilateralization of the EU accession process and protect crucial national interests. Macedonian authorities should take better advantage of their NATO membership, as well as membership in other international organizations, and foster sustainable and constructive relations with their partners.

Anti-corruption: A holistic approach to reduce risk factors

Biljana Ivanovska

Corruption is a multifaceted phenomenon, constantly evolving and intertwined with diverse economic, legal, political, and sociological factors. The negative effects of corruption are profound and far-reaching, spanning the public, private, and civil sectors. Corrupt behavior undermines confidence in institutions and the efficient use of public resources. It threatens democracy and the exercise of human rights due to the erosion of social values.

Through a systematic approach and assessment of corruption risks pertaining to spending public funds or abusing official positions in the public sector, the Macedonian State Commission for the Prevention of Corruption prepared a National Strategy for Prevention of Corruption and Conflict of Interest (2021-2025). The strategy, a pivotal step in confronting corruption, was adopted in 2020 by the Assembly of North Macedonia. However, the efficacy of this strategy hinges on the thorough execution of the accompanying Action Plan, which, unfortunately, has seen limited implementation thus far.

Corruption manifests through various channels, with several common denominators identified across sectors. Political interference in the public sphere, deficiencies in the rule of law, and a culture of impunity all contribute to its proliferation. Institutional weaknesses, a lack of integrity and transparency, and inconsistent regulations create fertile ground for corrupt practices to thrive.

A multifaceted approach is imperative to tackle corruption effectively. Strengthening integrity lies at the core of this endeavor. Personal and institutional integrity can be strengthened by fostering a merit-based value system and promoting ethical behavior. Moreover, ensuring the impartial enforcement of the rule of law and establishing independent and transparent institutions are vital steps in combating corruption’s entrenched presence.

Transparency and accountability are powerful weapons in the fight against corruption. Embracing digitalization initiatives can enhance transparency, streamline processes, and minimize opportunities for malfeasance. Simultaneously, robust accountability mechanisms must be enforced to hold perpetrators accountable and deter future misconduct. Strengthening supervisory and control mechanisms will further bolster anti-corruption efforts, providing additional safeguards against the abuse of power.
Legislative reforms are indispensable in fortifying the anti-corruption framework. Legal accountability must be enforced through rigorous prosecution of corrupt individuals, supported by legislation on the origin of property to curtail illicit wealth accumulation. Moreover, protecting whistleblowers and fostering public awareness are necessary to empower citizens to report corruption without fear of reprisal.

Political accountability must be upheld, with public officials answerable for their actions and decisions. Transparent employment practices, coupled with integrity-driven recruitment and human resource policies, are essential to cultivate a culture of accountability within public institutions. Institutional capacity-building and strengthening law enforcement agencies, the prosecutor’s office, and the judiciary are equally critical, equipping them with the resources and expertise to effectively investigate and prosecute corruption cases.

The private sector also plays a pivotal role in anti-corruption efforts. Regulatory frameworks should be implemented to promote transparency and integrity in private-sector operations, mitigating the risk of collusion and bribery. Furthermore, civil society and media engagement are indispensable in fostering public awareness and scrutiny, holding institutions accountable, and advocating for systemic reforms.

Cooperation among relevant stakeholders is indispensable in translating anti-corruption rhetoric into tangible action. Prioritizing the recommendations of anti-corruption agencies and fostering interstate cooperation can also attract collective expertise and resources to combat corruption effectively at all levels.

In conclusion, addressing corruption in North Macedonia demands a holistic approach that encompasses legislative reforms, effective criminal justice response, digitalization of public services, institutional capacity-building, and societal engagement.

Strengthening institutional integrity, enhancing transparency and accountability, and fostering cooperation among stakeholders can pave the way for a more efficient anti-corruption future.

Youth: From rhetoric to real change

Sara Milenkovska

In Macedonian politics, youth have been paid lip service but have not seen a substantial improvement in their situation. Contrary to the popular narrative in the media that youth in North Macedonia are apathetic, young people have led societal change and played a crucial role in civil society.

Still, a recent survey by the Westminster Foundation for Democracy shows that young people in North Macedonia are disillusioned and disengaged. Only 31 percent of youth surveyed believe the country is moving in the right direction, and a mere 3 percent are fully satisfied with their place in society. Six out of ten respondents feel they cannot impact government decisions, and only 22 percent think the government is addressing youth issues. Social inactivity is high, with 71 percent describing themselves as inactive citizens, and just 8 percent have tried to solve societal problems. Additionally, 90 percent have never participated in civic or nongovernmental organizations. While 64 percent always vote in elections, half of all surveyed do not believe voting can influence the country’s situation.

Despite these challenges, youth organizations were able to make progress. For example, they continued to advocate for adopting the Law on Youth Participation and Youth Policies in 2020 and pushed for a new National Youth Strategy. In past elections, political parties prioritized youth issues in their election promises. The failure to implement the Law on Youth Participation and Youth Policies, however, reinforced young people’s perception that they are not a priority for decision-makers. A 2019 survey by the National Youth Council of Macedonia (NYCM) found that 13 percent of respondents felt decision-makers ignored them and that current practices in the country make it challenging to alter this perception among the youth. This sentiment was confirmed by youth organizations involved in developing the National Youth Strategy. The NYCM noted that the final document adopted by the government differed from what had been collaboratively created. Respondents also pointed to a lack of implementation, action plan, indicators, and budget.

Further, the NYCM’s Monitoring Report on the Implementation of the Law on Youth Participation and Youth Policies revealed that only 12 percent of municipalities in North Macedonia have established local youth councils, only 11 percent have opened a youth office, and 69 percent have appointed a youth official. This indicates minimal progress and a lack of prioritization of the institutional implementation of youth policies at the local level, evidenced by insufficient investment. A key recommendation for further implementation is to introduce a dedicated budget for youth within municipal and state budgets. As the law outlines, this would ensure transparency and accountability in fund allocation.

In October 2022, the Agency of Youth and Sport, with the support of the international community and youth organizations, began developing the National Youth Strategy for 2023-2027. This strategic document was supposed to set medium-term goals and priorities for youth policy development and promote the interests of young people in North Macedonia. As important as it is that youth organizations are not giving up on these processes, there is a need for a strong and clear approach on the part of the government to implement the strategy. Therefore, some of the recommendations that the future government can take include:

Youth, youth policies, and youth participation should be recognized as a priority and a matter of strategic interest for the country’s development.
A commitment should be made to implementing and funding youth policies by aligning government actions with the objectives outlined in the National Youth Strategy. This includes proper allocation of resources, both financial and human, to support youth initiatives and programs.
Young people should not be treated as tokens but rather included in the decision-making processes at all levels of government. This should be achieved by establishing local youth councils in all municipalities and investing in informal education and creating youth centers to serve as focal points for youth-related issues and initiatives. The proper implementation of this recommendation will mean creating a national youth assembly that will elect youth representatives to its advisory body. Youth must actively participate in creating and monitoring youth policies, including the fiscal implications, through participation in the advisory body. Hopefully, the diverse participation will compensate for the general lack of intersectionality when creating youth policies.
Ensure transparency and accountability in implementing youth policies by developing clear action plans, indicators for monitoring progress, and dedicated budgets for youth within municipal and state budgets.

Unfortunately, VMRO-DPMNE doesn’t have a good track record of working with civil society. Therefore, the new government must clearly commit to strengthening civil society engagement to foster stronger partnerships with youth-led organizations and civil society groups that can amplify youth voices and address their concerns effectively. The new government has reconstructed the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy to create the Ministry of Social Policy, Demography, and Youth. While the new ministry’s scope includes the aspects of youth policy, its broader mandate includes many other areas, which may dilute the focus on youth if not properly balanced and prioritized.

North Macedonia can leverage its demographic dividend by focusing on youth empowerment, encouraging inclusive dialogue, and providing opportunities for meaningful participation. Even with the right support systems in place and its youth’s energy, creativity, and passion a significant transformation across all areas of society cannot occur without a clear political will.

Civil society: Inclusion and integration

Lura Pollozhani

Civil society in North Macedonia is an active and crucial actor in preserving the country’s democracy. According to data from 2022, nearly fifteen thousand civil society organizations (CSOs) are registered in the country, which attests to the diversity of the sector. As per the European Commission’s 2023 report, CSOs “continue to operate in an enabling environment” in North Macedonia. However, more needs to be done to integrate them into the government’s work and, more importantly, to support the inclusion and the work of an independent civil society.

The government of North Macedonia has a Department for Cooperation with Civil Society Organizations within its General Secretariat. This department follows the implementation of the strategy for cooperation with and development of the civic sector and its 2022-2024 Action Plan, which expires this year. The strategy lists these priorities:

Normative, institutional, and financial framework for the development of civil society
Democratization, active participation of civil society in societal processes, the creation and monitoring of policies, with a special focus on EU integration
Civil society sector as a stakeholder in socioeconomic development

An advisory council for cooperation between the government and civil society was established in 2018. Initially, the council worked efficiently and contributed to better collaboration between civil society and the government. However, cooperation started to crumble after the COVID-19 pandemic, which saw a reduction in transparency and funds for CSOs. Notably, CSOs were not consulted on the administrative reforms of 2022, when funds for CSOs were cut and transferred to a new entity, the Ministry of Political System and Inter-Community Relations, among other issues. This led to a boycott by CSOs, which is ongoing and has seriously affected cooperation and trust between the government and the civil sector. It has also hampered the implementation of the abovementioned strategy. This conflict has exposed the need to make cooperation more organic and less dependent on the politics of the day. There needs to be a way to safeguard the environment of CSOs by establishing a secure budgetary framework that is only revised with their input.

Regarding the visibility of CSOs and their work, they cover various fields, including education, human rights, environmental issues, political participation of marginalized groups, economic empowerment, etc. However, one persistent issue is the inclusiveness of these organizations. Many CSOs that receive and secure more funding are based in Skopje. They are generally organizations with a history of funding, making it harder for new players to come along. There is also the issue of outreach depending on the CSOs’ target audience. For instance, posts and publications are rarely translated into local languages other than Macedonian unless the organization’s primary work is on interethnic issues. The same goes for the inclusion of other marginalized groups or doubly marginalized groups.

Despite these shortcomings, the CSO sector is well placed to improve, learn, and, most importantly, act as one of the main enablers of democracy in the country, particularly by taking concrete measures. An annual session between the government and CSOs should be instituted to assess the government’s priorities as well as the needs of the field arising from the work of CSOs. These annual sessions should resemble the government’s regular weekly sessions, where ministers provide updates on their ministries’ activities and set out the work envisioned ahead. For more transparency, it would be best to set a date and time for these meetings that coincide with the EU Progress Reports. CSOs are already included in the Program of the Government, but there needs to be more direct contact between ministers and CSO representatives.

Local government is equally important, if not more so. There needs to be more investment in creating an enabling environment for CSOs at the local level. This can be achieved by instituting local councils to foster better cooperation between CSOs and local government. Similarly, financial support for the work of CSOs with public money must be based on the needs of CSOs and determined in a consultative process between the government and CSOs. In that vein, the government should also secure a fund for inclusiveness for CSOs that want to reach out to marginalized groups but lack the resources. This may include language interpretation and translation or the installation of ramps and other supporting infrastructure. Finally, CSOs should be encouraged to cooperate by funding projects involving at least one partner from another city and community. This would ensure that CSOs connect and engage beyond Skopje.

Conclusion and policy recommendations

North Macedonia is once again at a crossroads. With the election of a new government, the country has the opportunity to move forward, making necessary democratic reforms, revitalizing the economy, and advancing toward EU membership. It can serve as a success story for the region, or it can remain caught in limbo, in a no man’s land, unable to advance on EU accession and reluctant to implement domestic reforms, further becoming a cautionary tale for other countries in the region. The EU’s approach to the region and North Macedonia over the past decade or more is partly to blame for the present situation. The EU should, as part of its ongoing internal reforms, ensure that bilateral issues remain outside of the accession process. The Union must regain its credibility in the region and North Macedonia. The enlargement process was and should remain based on merits, reforms, and adherence to the Copenhagen criteria. It is in the EU’s own interest that discussions around integration focus on European values and democratic standards, not debates about national identity and history. By focusing on democratic values and standards, from the fight against corruption to improving living standards, North Macedonia’s government and citizens will also be reinvigorated to make concrete, meaningful strides toward EU accession. We hope the policy recommendations, as described in this brief and outlined below, will serve to kickstart this process in North Macedonia and allow it to become the region’s success story.

Economy

Implement a progressive tax system by imposing higher taxes on higher-income brackets, larger corporations, and wealthier individuals to enhance revenues over a longer term.
Increase the minimum wage, public-sector salaries, and all social transfers to kick-start the economy.
Accelerate public investments in infrastructure, including roads, railways, and energy.
Introduce a strategic industrial policy to support key economic sectors, fostering innovation and international competitiveness to overhaul the outdated economic model.
Increase investments in public services such as education, healthcare, and social protection to enhance the quality of life and productivity.

EU integration

Develop and pursue a consistent, cohesive, and inclusive national strategy for EU accession domestically and internationally. The Macedonian EU narrative needs an essential shift—from fulfilling bilaterally imposed conditions that have nothing to do with EU accession criteria toward genuine economic and normative convergence with the EU.
Elevate and intensify the level of dialogue by Macedonian authorities within the region, Europe, and internationally. Take better advantage of NATO membership, as well as membership of other international organizations, to prevent the bilateralization of the EU accession process and protect national interests.
Ensure the credibility of the Macedonian EU accession process by pursuing resolute reforms and ensuring a high level of compliance with EU and international standards, especially in the priority areas: democratic standards, human rights, and the rule of law.
Transpose, embed, and drive domestically the EU acquis and other EU-related reforms through an inclusive and transparent evidence-based policymaking process. Significant improvements are necessary to get the policymaking cycle on track.
Streamline, depoliticize, and pool resources among institutions to manage the EU accession process.
Develop the capacity to absorb EU funds in parallel with improving national policymaking processes.

Anti-corruption

Embrace digitalization initiatives to enhance transparency, streamline processes, and minimize opportunities for malfeasance.
Enforce robust accountability mechanisms to hold perpetrators accountable and deter future misconduct.
Strengthen supervisory and control mechanisms to bolster anti-corruption efforts, providing additional safeguards against the abuse of power.
Fortify the anti-corruption framework through legislative reforms.
Rigorously prosecute corrupt individuals to enforce a standard of legal accountability.
Advance legislation on the origin of property to curtail illicit wealth accumulation.
Protect whistleblowers and foster public awareness to empower citizens to report corruption without fear of reprisal.
Hold public officials politically accountable and answerable for their actions and decisions.
Cultivate a culture of accountability within public institutions through transparent employment practices coupled with integrity-driven recruitment and human resource policies.
Build the institutional capacity of law enforcement agencies, the prosecutor’s office, and the judiciary by equipping them with the resources and expertise needed to effectively investigate and prosecute corruption cases.
Implement regulatory frameworks to promote transparency and mitigate the risk of collusion and bribery in private-sector operations.
Prioritize the recommendations of anti-corruption agencies and foster inter-state cooperation.
Engage civil society and media as essential actors to promote public awareness and scrutiny, hold institutions accountable, and advocate for systemic reforms.

Youth

Recognize and prioritize youth, youth policies, and youth participation as an essential matter of strategic interest for the country’s development by adding youth to the list of strategic priorities.
Commit to implement and fund youth policies by aligning government actions with the objectives outlined in the National Youth Strategy.
Allocate financial and human resources to support youth initiatives and programs.
Establish local youth councils in all municipalities, create youth centers to serve as focal points for youth-related issues and activities, and invest in nonformal education.
Create a national youth assembly that will elect youth representatives to an advisory body. The youth sector has an obligation to actively participate in the creation and monitoring of youth policies, including their fiscal implications, through participation in an advisory body.
Develop clear action plans, indicators for monitoring progress, and dedicated budgets for youth within municipal and state budgets to ensure transparency and accountability in the implementation of youth policies.
Make a clear commitment to strengthening civil society engagement. This will foster stronger partnerships with youth-led organizations and CSOs that can amplify youth voices and address their concerns effectively.

Civil society

Institute a yearly session between the government and CSOs to assess both the priorities of the government and the needs from the field emanating from the work of CSOs. These yearly sessions should resemble the government’s regular weekly sessions, where the ministers update on the activities of the year and set out the work envisioned ahead. It would be best if there is a date and time set out for these meetings which could coincide with the EU Progress Reports for more transparency. There is already CSO inclusion in the Program of the Government, but there needs to be more direct contact between ministers and CSO representatives.
Institute local councils for better cooperation between CSOs and local government. Local government is equally as important if not more so and there needs to be more investment to create an enabling environment for CSOs at the local level.
Base public-funded support for the work of CSOs on the needs of CSOs through a consultative process between the government and CSOs.
Secure a fund for inclusiveness for CSOs that want to reach out to marginalized groups but lack the resources. This may include language interpretation and translation or the installation of ramps and other supporting infrastructure depending on needs.
Encourage cooperation between CSOs by funding projects that involve at least one partner from another city and community. This would ensure that CSOs connect and engage beyond Skopje.

About the authors

Aleksej Demjanski is an independent researcher and political analyst specializing in North Macedonia and Southeast Europe. He works as a program officer at the National Endowment for Democracy, providing political analysis and managing support for independent media and civil society in North Macedonia, Kosovo, and the broader Balkan region. He specializes in transparency, accountability, anti-corruption, and media development. He has extensive democracy and civil society program management experience alongside policy analysis, consulting, and research stints in the United States and Central and Eastern Europe. As a hobby, he created the Macedonian Matters weekly newsletter, curating news on politics and society in North Macedonia.

Biljana Ivanovska is an economist and currently an adviser at North Macedonia’s Audit Authority for IPA Funds. Most recently, she served as the president of the State Commission for the Prevention of Corruption (2019–2024). Ivanovska started her career in parliament, where she worked for six years in the parliamentary commissions for economic affairs. She then continued her work at the Ministry of Finance where she was head of the Budget and Funds Department. After that, she spent thirteen years at the State Audit Office as a principal auditor carrying out audits of state bodies, local governments, and public enterprises in North Macedonia.

Branimir Jovanović is an economist at the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, focusing on the economies of the Western Balkans. His research primarily explores topics such as economic inequality, poverty, fiscal policy, taxation, social policies, EU integration, and foreign direct investment. He served as an adviser to the minister of finance of North Macedonia from 2017 to 2019 and was a researcher at the National Bank of North Macedonia from 2007 to 2015. He also participated in the social protests in his native North Macedonia from 2014 to 2016, including the “Colourful Revolution.”

Sara Milenkovska is a researcher and co-founder of the Stella Network, a mentoring network for women and girls. With a background in gender studies, political science, and strategic communications, she holds a master of science in gender, politics, and inequality from the London School of Economics and Political Science and a master in strategic communications from Institute for Communication Studies Skopje. Her research delves into youth and systemic inequality, intersectionality, anti-gender movements, and (digital) gender-based violence.

Lura Pollozhani is a researcher at the University of Graz, researching social movements in the Western Balkans as well as EU enlargement. Her other research interests include radicalization, citizenship practices in divided societies, and democratization.

She completed her PhD in law and politics at the University of Graz and earned an MSc in European studies: ideas and identities at the London School of Economics. Pollozhani worked as an adviser to the prime minister of North Macedonia on cooperation with international organizations between 2019 and 2020. She is one of the co-founders of the Stella Network, a mentoring network for women and girls, and is a member of the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group.

Malinka Ristevska Jordanova has been engaged in the EU integration process since the late nineties, holding high public administration positions in the Macedonian parliament and government. She made special contributions to the candidacy of the Republic of Macedonia for its accession to the EU and road map for visa liberalization.

Dr. Ristevska Jordanova is a former director (from 2011 to February 2017) of the Macedonian think tank European Policy Institute. In her research, Jordanova has focused on the application of the EU policy of conditionality in the region, as well as on the transposition of the EU acquis.

About the program

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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Pınar Dost quoted in Frankfurter Allgemeine on Ankara’s reaction to Trump’s election victory and what it means for Syria

aozen — Thu, 14 Nov 2024 11:45:33 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

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Russia emerges as the real winner of Georgia’s disputed election

Nicholas Chkhaidze — Tue, 12 Nov 2024 22:25:17 +0000

A delegation of parliamentarians from France, Germany, Poland, Sweden, Finland, and the Baltic states arrived in Tbilisi on Monday as the fallout continued from Georgia’s disputed October 26 parliamentary elections. The European delegation was welcomed by opposition figures but was snubbed by representatives of the country’s Georgian Dream ruling party, who refused to meet the visiting EU politicians and accused them of “propagating lies” amid allegations of systematic election fraud.

This week’s awkward standoff in Tbilisi highlighted the ongoing geopolitical tensions sparked by Georgia’s controversial recent parliamentary vote. According to the country’s Central Election Committee, Georgian Dream was the clear winner with 54 percent of the vote. This outcome is questioned by opposition parties and election observers, who accuse the government of rigging the ballot.

Opponents led by Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili have claimed that the vote was flawed and have dismissed the official results as illegitimate. Zurabishvili branded the election a “Russian special operation,” a clear reference to the Kremlin’s preferred euphemism for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Three monitoring groups, including the OSCE, have backed allegations of election irregularities including vote-buying, multi-voting, and widespread Russian disinformation.

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The election was widely seen as a referendum on Georgia’s future geopolitical direction. The country’s Russia-friendly authorities hoped to secure a mandate for a pro-Kremlin manifesto, while opponents sought to return Georgia to the path of Euro-Atlantic integration. This westward trajectory is certainly popular, with polls consistently indicating that around 80 percent of Georgians support the country’s bid for EU membership. At the same time, many have been alarmed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and are fearful of facing the same fate if they attempt to turn away from Moscow.

The Georgian Dream party has been in power since 2012 and is officially committed to supporting European integration. However, party officials in Tbilisi have become increasingly critical of the West in recent years, and have faced mounting accusations of trying to steer the country back into the Kremlin orbit. Criticism has intensified following the adoption earlier this year of draconian laws similar to the authoritarian policies of Putin’s Russia. Critics say these legislative changes are aimed at silencing Georgia’s political opposition and muzzling the country’s civil society.

In the wake of the disputed election, Georgia’s pro-Western political forces have vowed to fight back against what they see as an attempt to undermine their country’s fledgling democracy. A number of large protest rallies have taken place in downtown Tbilisi since the late October ballot. Meanwhile, opposition parties are demanding fresh elections, refusing to serve in the new parliament, and calling on Georgia’s Western partners to conduct an international investigation into allegations of electoral misconduct.

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Russia has refrained from officially celebrating the election victory of its Georgian Dream allies. Instead, Moscow has accused the West of trying to “destabilize” Georgia with calls for an investigation into alleged violations. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that the vote represents a significant geopolitical triumph for the Kremlin and a major setback for the West.

Critics of Georgia’s governing party fear the country may now follow the geopolitical trajectory of Belarus, which in recent years has become increasingly subject to creeping Russian control in every sphere of national life from the economy to defense. This would represent a significant turnaround for Russia, which had looked to be in danger of losing its traditional influence in the southern Caucasus region.

Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 and continues to occupy approximately 20 percent of the country. Bilateral relations between Moscow and Tbilisi have remained tense ever since this brief war sixteen years ago. However, while the Georgian public has overwhelmingly backed closer ties with the West, many have also spoken of the need to avoid a resumption of hostilities with Russia. Georgian Dream officials have sought to exploit these concerns over the possibility of a new Russian invasion. During the recent election campaign, the party ran a series of controversial adverts featuring images of wartime destruction in Ukraine along with appeals to “choose peace.”

Some observers believe Russia’s approach to Georgia may offer hints of the Kremlin’s ultimate intentions in Ukraine. After first invading and occupying a large portion of Georgian territory, Russia then helped engineer the election of a sympathetic government that has paid lip service to the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations while working toward mending fences with Moscow. This proved possible despite frequent evidence of intense anti-Russian sentiment throughout Georgian society. While such an outcome is extremely hard to imagine in today’s wartime Ukraine, the remarkable revival of Russian influence in Georgia could certainly serve as inspiration for Kremlin policymakers.

Protests look set to continue in Tbilisi. However, it is not clear whether anything can now be done to prove the allegations of election fraud or annul the results of the October vote. Georgia’s Western partners have voiced their concerns over the election but remain reluctant to withhold official recognition. Georgia will be on the agenda when EU foreign ministers meet next week in Brussels, but the European Union is not expected to take a stance on the legitimacy of the election. Instead, the most meaningful sanction will likely be the continued freezing of EU membership talks, which have been on pause since June 2024.

With Western leaders unwilling to confront the Kremlin in the Caucasus, Russia is the real winner of Georgia’s recent elections. The vote has demonstrated Moscow’s ability to overcome popular opposition by forging powerful alliances with local elites and ignoring international concerns over election interference. Russia will doubtless seek to apply the lessons learned in Georgia as it turns its attention to future election campaigns in front line countries like Moldova, and may also seek to adopt a similar approach to postwar Ukraine.

Nicholas Chkhaidze is a research fellow at the Baku-based Topchubashov Center.

louhri — Fri, 08 Nov 2024 19:52:53 +0000

Oleh Shamshur and Peter Dickinson

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Global China Hub Nonresident Senior Fellow Michael Schuman in Politico

Michael Schuman — Fri, 08 Nov 2024 16:03:52 +0000

original source

On November 7th, 2024, Global China Hub nonresident senior fellow Michael Schuman spoke to Politico’s E&E News about how how the second Trump administration may approach trade with China, and how this could impact American clean energy manufacturers.

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Global China Hub Nonresident Fellow Wen-Ti Sung in Business Times

Wen-Ti Sung — Fri, 08 Nov 2024 16:03:17 +0000

Original source

On November 7th, 2024, Global China Hub nonresident fellow Wen-Ti Sung was quoted in a Business Times article on how a second Trump administration may approach relations with Taiwan: “Trump’s transactional nature means that U.S. support for Taiwan could come at a price.”

The post Global China Hub Nonresident Fellow Wen-Ti Sung in Business Times appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What the world thinks of Trump’s return to the US presidency

Atlantic Council experts — Fri, 08 Nov 2024 15:01:50 +0000

What happens in the United States doesn’t stay in the United States. The consequences of President-elect Donald Trump’s victory on Tuesday will radiate across the globe. To get on-the-ground insight into how people are reacting to the results of the 2024 US elections in different countries, we turned to our global network of staff and fellows. Embark on your world tour below.

Turkey

Many Ukrainians see Trump’s victory as a risk to US support for Kyiv

KYIV—Prior to the US election, Ukrainians were anxiously contemplating the possibilities, fully aware that US assistance is indispensable for their country’s struggle against Russian aggression. Ukrainians were assessing each candidate on how strongly and consistently they would support Ukraine, if at all.

Many Ukrainians look at Trump with suspicion because of his well-known doubts about continuing assistance to Ukraine and especially because of his “peace plan” for ending the war, details of which were revealed by his running mate and severely criticized by Ukrainian media. Here in Ukraine, this plan is viewed as hostile to Ukraine’s national interests and playing into the hands of Russian President Vladimir Putin. There is also a fear that Trump will exert pressure on Ukrainian leadership to make major concessions to Russia to advance his “peace” initiative. So many Ukrainians perceive his election as posing a risk to continuing US support for Ukraine.

However, there is also a general understanding that Ukraine has no other choice but to work with the president chosen by American voters. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy indeed congratulated Trump for his election victory soon after it was called. He referred to Trump’s “peace through strength” approach as being able to contribute to a “just” peace in Ukraine.

It remains to be seen if Putin’s aggression and intransigence will have a sobering effect on Trump and lead him to reconsider his stance on the Russia-Ukraine war.

—Oleh Shamshur is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former Ukrainian ambassador to the United States.

The second Trump presidency will be a “leap into the unknown” for Ukraine in its fight against Russia

KYIV—There was an unmistakable sense of foreboding in Kyiv on the morning when Ukrainians woke to news of Trump’s election victory. The US president-elect has long been viewed by many in Ukraine as a somewhat unpredictable ally with a record of both backing Ukraine and publicly questioning US support for the country. There are now widespread concerns that once he returns to the White House, Trump may reduce or end military aid to Ukraine entirely. Some also fear that he could pressure the country’s leaders into an unfavorable peace deal that would reward Russia while leaving Ukraine in a perilous position.

Not all Ukrainians share this pessimistic perspective, with a significant number expressing hopes that Trump can reinvigorate international efforts to counter the Kremlin. Frustration has been mounting for some time over what is widely perceived as the Biden administration’s excessive caution in relation to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has translated into slow weapons deliveries and restrictions on Ukraine’s ability to defend itself. Some believe Trump will adopt a bolder stance toward Russia as he prepares to negotiate with Putin from a position of strength. They recognize that a second Trump presidency is a leap into the unknown and a huge gamble, but see this as preferable to slowly bleeding out as a result of the inadequate aid Ukraine has been receiving from the Biden White House.

—Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Is this an opportunity for Europe to “grow up” and be more independent?

BRUSSELS—Here, the “man on the street” and mainstream media are surprised but not shocked. However, many are clearly puzzled and somewhat worried about the return of the former president. There is almost zero understanding of the US political system and how the two-party system works, and all they know about Vice President Kamala Harris is that she is not Trump.

The political world (the European Commission, Council, and Parliament) is a totally different animal, and there was a barrage of “internal” meetings on the subject on Wednesday. On a lower level of the Brussels bureaucracy, Harris was the clear favorite. However, the higher up the ranks officials were, the more cautious they became. Officials I spoke with and who have European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s ear made it very clear: We might have had our personal preferences, but that doesn’t matter. They took a pragmatic, wait-and-see approach. Surprisingly enough, many were expecting a Harris defeat. There was no sign of taking sides publicly. The tone of von der Leyen’s friendly message of congratulations is indicative of this thinking: Europe has no choice but to work closely with the Trump administration. “We will not repeat Angela Merkel’s disastrous attitude toward Trump,” one official told me.

The issues that stand out in my conversations are Trump’s stance on support for Ukraine, the US relationship with Russia, US policy toward China, and transatlantic trade. Some said Trump’s return may be an opportunity for Europe to “grow up” and be a stronger, less dependent, and better ally to the United States. Finally, they know Trump is “transactional” and are trying to figure out what this actually means for the relationship.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is an outlier: He took sides publicly and is now running victory laps, enjoying the probable windfalls of the gamble he took early on in support of Trump. The man on the street in Budapest and the remaining few independent or semi-independent media in the country are asking: We know what’s in it for Orbán, but what’s in it for Hungary?

—András Simonyi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center. He is a former Hungarian ambassador to the United States and NATO.

Israeli politicians celebrate Trump’s victory, but should be careful what they wish for

JERUSALEM—The reactions of Israeli government officials after Trump’s election represent a sigh of relief.

Throughout the election campaign, it was clear that cabinet ministers, members of the coalition, and the prime minister himself supported Trump and hoped that he would “liberate” Israel from the constant pressure exerted on it by the current Democratic administration, a pressure that in their view was expected to continue if Harris were elected.

Now, in addition to the hope that US President Joe Biden’s time as a “lame duck” will pass without dramatic steps against Israel, it seems that the various parties in the coalition hope that the beginning of Trump’s term will allow them to fulfill their long-held desires. Mainly, that means the annexation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and Israeli action against nuclear facilities in Iran.

But from the statements of Trump and those surrounding him, a completely different picture emerges. Trump strives to end the war and prioritizes the political—rather than military—path to tackle Iran’s nuclear program, while it seems that he is more committed to the Muslim population in the United States that supported him in the election campaign.

In light of this reality, and despite the hopes of ministers and maybe the prime minister, these gaps may lead to friction between the administrations in Jerusalem and Washington sooner than expected.

—Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and a member of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project working group. He previously served for twenty-five years in a variety of command positions units in the Israel Defense Intelligence.

Poland hopes to be recognized, at last, as an anchor of European defense

WARSAW—Prior to the election, polling in Poland showed that about 30 percent of Poles preferred Trump as president of the United States while the rest went for Harris. Despite the high levels of political polarization, the country’s main political rivals largely agree on the importance of supporting NATO, backing Ukraine, and resisting the threat from Russia.

The Polish national-conservative political movement (still strong despite the 2023 election loss) may agree with the Trump agenda on issues of culture and values, but some of its supporters are nervous about a possible US abandonment of Ukraine. There is a sense here that Trump may appreciate how Poland spending more than 4 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense makes it a leading example of what a NATO member state should look like. However, that won’t amount to much if Ukraine is overrun by Russia and if the United States, either frustrated over lack of progress with countries such as Germany or due to rising “Asia first” voices in the incoming administration, decides to turn away from Europe. Likewise, both political sides in Poland worry about the possibility of US-EU trade wars and tariffs that will hurt the Polish economy, Trump’s positive views of Poles notwithstanding. Supporters of the current centrist government also worry that Trump’s triumph will give a boost to populist movements all over Europe.

Optimists point out that Polish President Andrzej Duda enjoys a positive relationship with Trump that dates back to the 2016-2020 period. Duda will conclude his second term in the spring of 2025, though, and he cannot run again. The current Polish government, despite its strong anti-populist rhetoric, also has people, such as Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski, who have good contacts with the American right. “The American people have made a decision that we respect,” Sikorski said Wednesday. “The correctness of Poland’s foreign policy, which consisted of maintaining contact with both Democrats and Republicans, has also been affirmed.”

Some especially optimistic voices here point out that whereas Poland and the United States were good wartime allies under US President Joe Biden, the Democratic foreign policy establishment always saw Poland as a second-class partner and ran Europe policy mainly through a Berlin-Paris-London model. This approach did not fully appreciate how much Poland is now an anchor of European defense and not a mere security consumer. Such commentators hope that Trump’s inclination toward dumping conventional thinking may make the United States finally break away from seeing Western Europe as the only Europe that counts.

—Aaron Korewa is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Warsaw Office, which is part of the Europe Center.

The US-Australia alliance and AUKUS agreement have enduring support—no matter the heated rhetoric

CANBERRA—Like Americans, Australians were glued to television news and social media watching the outcome of the US elections. At the same time, the machinery of government in Australia ground on. As the results solidified around a second Trump term in the United States, the Australian Senate was holding defense estimates, capturing some of the first official responses to the US election results. At one point David Shoebridge, a far-left Greens Party senator, asked the Australian secretary of defense, Greg Moriarty, about ending the Australia-New Zealand-United States alliance and canceling the Australia-United Kingdom-United States partnership (AUKUS) now that Trump was guaranteed to win. Moriarty replied that strong support for the alliance and AUKUS in Australia will continue, as it has in the past, on a bipartisan basis. Soon after, a senior Labor Party source noted that the “Albanese government would focus on maintaining public support for the US-Australia relationship and keeping the alliance strong.”

These initial exchanges are reflective of how Trump 1.0 was dealt with in Australia, and they are a forerunner of things to come with Trump 2.0. Many of these exchanges will generate heat (especially in the media) but little light. The far left’s opposition to Trump does not reflect Australian government policy or public opinion on key policy issues. The alliance and AUKUS are strongly bipartisan, and they command deep public support.

Without a doubt, Harris was the preferred candidate among Australians. While public support for the US-Australia alliance was generally a bit lower during Trump’s first term than during the presidents who preceded and succeeded him, it still was at 78 percent approval when Trump left office. The focus once again will quickly turn to playing each issue or event on its own merits, rather than reacting exhaustively to Trump’s rhetoric. Former Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull advised Prime Minister Anthony Albanese not to “suck up” to Trump: “If you actually want to get good outcomes . . . you’ve got to be able to stand your ground and make your case.”

A key issue in Australia will be the future of AUKUS. While I believe that a new Trump administration will support AUKUS, opinion polling shows that only 18 percent of Australians are confident that AUKUS would not be canceled by a second Trump administration. Along with AUKUS, Ukraine, the war in Gaza, China policy, climate policy, and tariffs are dominating the Australian public debate in response to the election outcome.

But there’s a domestic political lesson too. Inflation and cost of living pressures have been fatal to incumbent democratically elected governments around the world. Australian politicians ignore this lesson of the US election at their peril.

—Peter J. Dean is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and director of foreign policy and defense at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney.

Amid their own turmoil, Germans’ fears are rising about the future of NATO

BERLIN—Fears about the United States stepping out of NATO have been renewed. Trump has long threatened to leave NATO if European nations do not pay their agreed share of defense spending. Although as of July, twenty-three out of the thirty-two NATO members are expected to meet NATO’s guideline of spending 2 percent of GDP on defense, Trump has continued to suggest that NATO membership is perhaps not in the United States’ future.

This has concerned Germans and the German government, whose increasingly fractious coalition has been rapidly preparing its budget for 2025. The constraints of the debt brake are looming over spending considerations. Last year some sixty billion euros evaporated from the federal budget, as concern over meeting existing welfare demands and pressure to increase defense spending have placed the governing coalition in a near-impossible position. Trump has long represented the threat of instability—a deep fear for Germans who prize stability above many other priorities. (And yet, despite this fear of instability, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz kicked Finance Minister Christian Lindner out of government on Wednesday, collapsing the governing coalition.)

The US election was seen around the world as a referendum on immigration and economic policy—issues that have also plagued Germany in the past year since the budget crisis. Germany will soon be reevaluating where it can turn for stability at a time when its own politics are in turmoil.

—Carol Schaeffer is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and a journalism fellow with the Jain Family Institute.

Serbia’s president basks in Trump’s victory

BELGRADE—“I was the first, or among the first in the world, who congratulated Donald Trump on his victory. By around 6:00 a.m., I was already talking to people from his closest circle,” stated Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić. He also said that Trump’s victory brings hope, at least with regard to Serbia, and that it will have a beneficial effect on global affairs. “In Europe, most people were hoping for Kamala Harris’s victory, while in Serbia, 90 percent of citizens were hoping for Donald Trump to win,” he said during his address.

One of the most widely read Serbian tabloids, Informer, under the control of the ruling regime, announced the placement of fifty billboards in Belgrade, the Serbian capital, featuring a photograph of Trump after the July assassination attempt against him, with the message: “Congratulations, Trump, you are Serbian!”

In the few independent media outlets in the country and among pro-European citizens of Serbia, reactions were far more restrained, with a significant number greeting the news of Trump’s victory with apprehension due to the unpredictability of his policies, assessing that the world is entering a period of heightened uncertainty.

—Maja Piscevic is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and representative of the center in the Western Balkans.

Iraqi Kurdistan worries about rising US-Iran tensions

SULAYMANIYAH—Iraqi Kurdistan government officials and party leaders congratulated and supported Trump’s victory. However, public reactions in the Kurdistan region and Iraq as a whole were mixed, especially since peace between Israel and Hamas is not on the horizon. The reactions primarily centered around two key concerns.

First, the potential impact on US-Iran relations could affect the region both politically and economically. The stability of currency exchange rates between US dollars and Iraqi dinars is of particular concern, directly impacting residents’ daily lives.

Second, there are widespread security concerns. Many worry that given the current tensions between Israel and Iran, Trump’s victory could escalate the situation into a regional conflict. This poses particular risks for the Kurdistan region and Iraq as a whole. Any US military action against Iran could trigger retaliatory strikes by Iran and its allies, potentially targeting US interests in Kurdistan. Some analysts predict the region could become a proxy battleground between US-aligned forces and Iran.

Despite these concerns, there is also optimism among some Kurdish people. They hope Trump will support Kurdish interests in Syria and facilitate peace negotiations with Turkey, particularly given his promises to end conflicts and promote stability in the Middle East.

—Sarkawt Shamsulddin is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He served as a member of the Iraqi Parliament from 2018 to 2021.

Questions around support for Ukraine and trade weigh heavily in Sweden

STOCKHOLM—In Sweden, media outlets are often accused of being obsessed with US elections. Indisputably, the news coverage of US elections by far outweighs that of European Union elections or elections in major nearby countries such as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.

Another key feature is that overall, Swedes leans toward the Democrats. If Swedes could have voted in the US election, 90 percent would have voted for Harris. Among all of Sweden’s political parties—from the right to the left—only voters from the right-wing extremist Sweden Democrats prefer Trump, spurred by his tough stance on immigration.

Against this background, the official reactions in Stockholm on Wednesday were polite but somewhat cautious. On one hand, Sweden depends on the United States both for trade and security. It will need to cooperate well with the incoming president. Therefore, Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson and Foreign Minister Maria M. Stenergard quickly congratulated Trump and Vice President-elect JD Vance on the social media platform X, expressing their wish for friendly and close collaboration with the new administration.

On the other hand, a second Trump administration is perceived as carrying risks, which the Swedish government openly addressed on Wednesday, naming economic protectionism, a lack of measures to combat climate change, and a lack of support to Ukraine as top concerns. “No other question has the same existential importance to countries in our part of the world than Ukraine,” Kristersson underlined.

Opposition leaders from the Green, Left, and Centre parties expressed concern for the climate and for women’s rights under a Trump administration, while former Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson of the Social Democrats urged the government to immediately connect with key people in the incoming administration and try to persuade them of the importance of NATO, free trade, and support to Ukraine.

In the transactional world of Trump, Sweden would come to the table with a solid case for negotiations. As NATO’s newest ally, Sweden already spends 2.2 percent of GDP on defense and will reach 2.6 percent in 2028. On support for Ukraine, Sweden spends more than 0.83 percent of its GDP. In the United States, Sweden directly supports 379,000 jobs and indirectly an additional 620,000. Sweden is also the tenth-largest foreign investor in the United States, while its population is only the eighty-seventh largest in the world. Thus, together with NATO and European Union allies, Sweden should be well positioned to negotiate with the Trump administration on crucial issues.

—Anna Wieslander, PhD, is director for Northern Europe and head of the Atlantic Council Northern Europe Office in Stockholm, Sweden.

Southeast Asia sees continuity in the US-China relationship, with fears of escalation

SINGAPORE—In Southeast Asia, governments and local media did not express much shock or surprise at Trump’s election victory. Pragmatism prevailed, and Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy does not worry the region’s leaders. With the possible exception of the Philippines’ security needs, there is no Southeast Asian dependence on the United States as that which exists in Europe or the Arabian Peninsula. For most of the countries in the region, the biggest foreign policy issue remains the evolution of US-China relations and their ability to keep good ties with both sides. During the campaign, there was a sentiment across most of Southeast Asia that there were no fundamental differences between Trump and Harris on the topic of China. At a policy level, there will be expectations for greater US military engagement, in particular among countries such as Thailand and the Philippines, whose relations with China have grown more contentious. But none of the ten countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is comfortable with the idea of an open confrontation, so the martial tone of Trump when he talks about China is still cause for concern.

Putting rhetoric aside, Southeast Asian countries will carefully monitor the policies of the new Trump administration on Taiwan, as any escalation there would have direct implications for Southeast Asian security interests. Developments in the Korean Peninsula are also likely to impact the region: Vietnam and Singapore previously hosted summits between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Since then, the situation between Seoul and Pyongyang has worsened, though it is unclear how Trump would respond to an escalation.

—Jean-Loup Samaan is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

India sees uncertainty but also opportunities for trade

NEW DELHI—India’s reaction to the Trump victory has been largely positive and optimistic.

The US-India relationship deepened during Trump’s first term, like it has over the last three decades and through many administrations in New Delhi and Washington. Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi developed a strong rapport, which enabled productive engagements. Both sides were also able to navigate occasional tensions such as Washington revoking India’s designation as a beneficiary of the Generalized Scheme of Preferences, which enabled duty-free imports into the United States.

Some of Trump’s priorities—especially involving trade and protectionism—are sources of uncertainty. But these uncertainties are also seen as presenting opportunities for mutually beneficial deals, particularly in the context of a likely ramp-up of tensions between the United States and China. New Delhi and Washington were reportedly even close to finalizing a mini trade deal during the first Trump presidency.

—Gopal Nadadur is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and vice president for South Asia at The Asia Group.

Ankara views Trump’s election as an opportunity to enhance US-Turkish ties

ANKARA—Many Turks feel a connection with the United States, and the talking points of the Trump campaign resonated with many in Turkey, particularly among supporters of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and supporters of the pro-Kurdish DEM party. Trump’s rhetoric highlighting a fight against the “establishment” aligns with pro-government sentiments in Turkey, as Erdoğan’s AK Party and its close allies assert that they carried out a struggle against a military establishment to take power. Turkey hosts millions of refugees and has successfully reduced their influx by building a wall along its borders. Therefore, Trump’s stances on migration resonate with many Turks.

Still, Turks are divided on the future of Turkish-American relations. Some critics highlight the turbulence in the first Trump administration and suggest that the new Trump administration will pose similar risks. Additionally, the Turkish opposition is concerned about a potential decline in US support for its political agenda.

On the pro-government side, expectations are high. The previously established working relationship between Erdoğan and Trump is seen as a potential avenue for addressing various bilateral issues. Many people in Ankara are hoping for a significant deal with Washington to resolve their disagreement over the US partnership with the People’s Defense Units (YPG), the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The PKK has been designated as a foreign terrorist organization by both Turkey and the United States, and has become Ankara’s top security concern.

Ankara views Trump’s election as an opportunity to enhance the F-16 fighter jet sales finalized during the Biden administration and to explore ways for Turkey to rejoin the F-35 program. Turks anticipate increased defense cooperation, but there are concerns regarding geopolitical risks. Turkey appears to support Trump’s anti-Iran stance, but a second Trump administration’s strong backing of Israel might upset Ankara, which has expressed strong disapproval of Israeli actions following the Hamas terrorist attack on October 7, 2023.

—Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is an Ankara-based analyst of Turkish foreign policy, counterterrorism, and military affairs.

Trump and Erdogan will get along, but unpredictability is a concern

ISTANBUL—After Trump’s election, Erdoğan was among the first leaders to congratulate the president-elect, and he expressed hope that global crises like “the war in Palestine and Russia-Ukraine war” would end. While Trump’s election was mainly seen by Turkish media as potentially easing leader-to-leader relations, his unpredictability causes concern within both pro-government and opposition circles.

Regarding ongoing wars in the region, many commentators agree that Turkey will probably offer to be a mediator as part of Trump’s efforts to end the war in Ukraine. But what’s received less attention is the security threat that a peace deal favoring Russia and allowing it to keep Crimea would pose in the Black and Mediterranean seas. Meanwhile, due to Turkey’s strong pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel stance, Trump’s expected robust support for Israel could create tension in US-Turkish relations.

When it comes to existing US-Turkish disputes, given the Republican majority in the US Senate and perhaps the US House, some Turkish media reports have suggested that Trump will have more leeway on issues such as the lifting of sanctions against Turkey, the delivery of US F-16 fighter jets, and the renewal of the F-35 deal, potentially strengthening his position in dealings with Turkey.

Perhaps the most important issue in US-Turkish relations is Syria, particularly US support for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which are led by the YPG, a group associated with the PKK terrorist group. While Trump could not fully implement his 2019 decision to withdraw US forces from Syria, there is an expectation in Turkish circles that under his administration, a withdrawal similar to the pullout from Iraq might be easier. On the other hand, many commentators argue that the escalation of violence in the Middle East, especially in Lebanon and Syria, and the risk of an all-out Israel-Iran war may push the United States to remain in Syria and to continue its support for the SDF. Some experts believe that Turkey has read this situation well in advance and that the governing coalition’s new “Kurdish opening,” which seems focused on domestic politics, is actually an effort both to prevent PKK violence within the country and to negotiate with the SDF, thus strengthening Turkey’s position in negotiations over Syria with other actors.

When it comes to bilateral economic relations, Trump’s protectionist policies, including the steel tariffs imposed during his first term, have already caused significant damage to Turkey. New tariffs, along with a potential trade war with China, could create tensions with Turkey, especially since Turkey seeks to diversify its markets and strengthen relations with South Asia and Southeast Asia through the Asia Anew Initiative, as well as its attempts to become a member of the BRICS economic grouping that includes China, Russia, India, and others.

While there is considerable discussion in Europe and the United States about Trump’s possible disengagement from NATO and the security of the West, this is not as widely debated in Turkey. However, due to the potential risks of such disengagement, we started to see a softening of relations between Turkey and Europe ahead of the US elections. For example, Germany approved large-scale arms exports to Turkey for the first time in years and Scholz met with Erdoğan in Turkey, where the sale of Eurofighter Typhoon jets to Turkey was one of the main topics of discussion. This could lead to stronger defense and security cooperation with European countries both bilaterally and within the NATO framework.

—Pinar Dost is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Turkey Programs.

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Donald Trump’s election victory fuels hopes and fears in Ukraine

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 07 Nov 2024 22:33:29 +0000

Donald Trump’s election victory has sparked considerable disquiet in Ukraine, with many Ukrainians fearful that he may reduce or end US backing for the country once he takes office early next year. Trump provided Ukraine with significant military support during his first presidential term, but has also made a number of unfavorable statements that have led to questions over his commitment to the country’s struggle against Russian aggression.

At the same time, there are also hopes that Trump may prove more decisive than his predecessor in his approach to the war with Russia. This reflects growing frustration in Ukraine at what many see as the overly cautious policies adopted by President Biden, which have resulted in delayed weapons deliveries and restrictions on Ukraine’s ability to defend itself. With their country trapped in a bloody war of attrition against its far larger neighbor, many Ukrainians are desperate for a change in tactics and believe Trump may be able to provide it.

Ukrainian officials have been quick to congratulate Trump and demonstrate their readiness to work with him. “I appreciate President Trump’s commitment to the ‘peace through strength’ approach to global affairs,” commented Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in a congratulatory social media media post. “This is exactly the principle that can bring a just peace in Ukraine closer. I am hopeful that we will put it into action together.”

As the world continues to digest the implications of Donald Trump’s return to the White House, the Atlantic Council invited a selection of Ukrainian politicians, academics, and civil society representatives to share their thoughts on what a second Trump presidency may mean for their country.

Kira Rudik, Ukrainian MP, Golos Party leader: It is important to remember that Donald Trump is not president yet. There are still more than two months for President Biden to secure his place in history by taking decisive steps to support Ukraine. This could include lifting restrictions on missile strikes inside Russia, or inviting Ukraine to join NATO. Biden can still cement his political legacy as the leader of the democratic world by helping Ukraine in its fight for a free and democratic future.

By the time Trump returns to the White House in January 2025, Ukraine must prepare a truly pragmatic and efficient victory plan. We also need to work with supporters within the Republican Party and Trump’s team, especially those who have been urging Biden to switch from his policy of indefinite support toward a clearer strategy to win the war. It is true that many Ukrainians remain concerned over Trump’s earlier statements about ending the war in a single day, but we also hope that beyond the campaign trail, there is a clear understanding that wars cannot be stopped overnight without allowing dictators to have their way.

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Oleksiy Goncharenko, Ukrainian MP, European Solidarity Party: Despite what many people think, Trump’s election was not a particularly happy day for Putin. Trump said during the election campaign that he wants to pump oil, and again emphasized this following his win. Oil is Putin’s weak spot. As soon as prices begin to fall, the Russian economy follows. The Kremlin also benefits from instability in the United States and was hoping for some kind of civil unrest to emerge from the election. It is now apparent that this is not going to happen.

How should Ukraine react to Trump’s victory? We need to stop making emotional appeals and focus more on demonstrating what we have to offer the United States in practical terms as a partner. This includes one of the most experience armies in the world. Our soldiers have an unrivaled understanding of modern warfare and can share this with our American allies. We can play a vital role in global food security. We have vast natural resources that can be developed together with our partners. Ukraine has to work around the clock to promote these messages.

Eurasia Center events

Jörn Fleck: The coalition partners lacked leadership and a shared vision of “progress”

Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

Olena Tregub, Executive Director, Ukraine’s Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (NAKO): While there were signs of panic in many European capitals following news of Trump’s election victory, in Kyiv the dominant emotion was hope. Many Ukrainians have been encouraged by talk within the Trump camp of “peace through strength,” which they see as an indication that Ukraine may receive the kind of support and security guarantees that can prevent Russia from continuing to destroy their country. Nobody knows how peace through strength would work in practice, of course, but significant numbers of Ukrainians hope Donald Trump will now seek to showcase the United States as a global power and reestablish the rules broken by Russia and other rogue actors.

Frustration in Ukraine with the current United States administration stems from its tendency toward self-deterrence and its consistent deference to red lines set by Russia. Ukrainians believe these policies should be reversed, with the US leading instead of Russia. Many think that Trump’s personality may lead to a more resolute approach, which is fueling a degree of guarded optimism over his election. Of course, there are also widespread fears that Ukraine could be thrown under the bus by the Trump administration. However, Ukrainians are more accustomed to uncertainty than most and are desperate to see a change in US policy toward their country.

Volodymyr Dubovyk, Associate Professor, Odesa Mechnikov National University: I believe Trump’s return to the White House is probably bad news for Ukraine. I do not subscribe to the view that a change from the current administration is for the best, even though I recognize the many flaws in its policy toward Ukraine. I think it is extremely naive to hope that Trump’s unpredictability, impulsiveness, and ego will push him to stand up to Putin. Based on past experience, he is more likely to do the opposite.

Trump will try to end the war, but that is far easier said than done. He will find that it is impossible to alter Russia’s objectives in Ukraine, and will decide that it is much simpler to pressure Ukraine into concessions. Crucially, Trump does not appear convinced that supporting Ukraine is in US interests. He will be happy to focus his attention elsewhere, while delegating the Ukraine issue to Europe. The future of US aid to Ukraine is clearly now in question, both in terms of military supplies and humanitarian assistance.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Charai in The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune: Mr. President, Lead the Way Forward

Atlantic Council — Thu, 07 Nov 2024 18:34:00 +0000

Original source

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Experts react: Scholz’s coalition has collapsed. What’s next for Germany?

Atlantic Council experts — Thu, 07 Nov 2024 15:08:14 +0000

The traffic light is flashing red. On Wednesday, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz sacked Finance Minister Christian Lindner, ending the ruling government’s “traffic light” coalition of Scholz’s Social Democratic Party (SPD), Lindner’s Free Democratic Party (FDP), and the Greens. Scholz, whose public support is flagging, also announced that the parliament will hold a confidence vote in his government in January. This vote could move the next Bundestag elections up to March 2025, and it comes as far-right and far-left political parties are making inroads with German voters. Below, our experts explain the latest Sturm und Drang out of Berlin.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Carol Schaeffer: A “Macron-level gamble” by the German finance minister

Theresa Luetkefend: Europe needs stability and strength. For the moment, Germany is providing neither.

The coalition partners lacked leadership and a shared vision of “progress”

It started in 2021 as a hopeful three-way “Fortschrittskoalition,” or coalition for progress, after sixteen years of Merkelian status-quo politics in Europe’s largest economy. Three years, a major ongoing European land war, and a series of German economic woes later, that uneasy alliance among the SPD, the Greens, and the FDP had devolved into a dysfunctional government of estranged, feuding former allies. On Wednesday, it reached a breaking point: Germany’s “traffic light” coalition collapsed the same day Donald Trump was declared the next US president. But rather than push German angst to a fever pitch amid so much seeming global instability, the end of the coalition, a confidence vote, and potential early elections by March 2025—all things Germany’s postwar constitution guards against—may be seen as a reprieve, both at home and across Europe. Better a horrible end than endless horror, as the German saying goes.

Months of acrimonious infighting and an ever-shrinking consensus among the three unlikely partners contributed to a gloomy outlook for Germany’s economy, which has narrowly avoided a recession and which the International Monetary Fund downgraded to zero growth for 2024 two weeks ago. Any concerted government effort to address structural economic challenges to Germany’s economy and thereby revive Europe’s once much-envied engine of growth repeatedly failed amid competing proposals, leaks, and public recriminations among the Green economy minister, Robert Habeck, and Lindner, under absent leadership from Scholz.

Major transformational projects—from the green energy transition to Germany’s Zeitenwende (turning point) in defense and foreign policy were poorly executed, too often renegotiated after having been already agreed, or killed by political deadlock. The coalition’s genuine achievements—managing to wean Germany off of Russian gas at record speed, emerging as Europe’s leader in supporting Ukraine, and stepping up with a permanent deployment of a German brigade on NATO’s eastern flank—went undersold and unnoticed.

Ostensibly, the fight over how to fill multibillion euro gaps in the 2025 budget amid a stalling economy and dwindling tax revenues broke the coalition’s back, with much help from Lindner’s brinkmanship in recent days and weeks. More fundamentally, the three partners could not reconcile the limits of narrow German fiscal orthodoxy and its constitutionally enshrined centerpiece of the debt brake with a set of supercharged geopolitical and geoeconomic challenges that demand greater German leadership. Nor did they seem to share a coherent vision of the progress they set out to achieve and the resourcing needed to do so. The dysfunction and paralysis in Berlin often extended to Brussels, as coalition infighting prevented German leadership and clear positions on key issues or threatened to unravel carefully constructed compromise deals by the twenty-seven European Union (EU) member states on the homestretch.

For German citizens at home and for allies in Europe and abroad, greater political clarity and leadership in Berlin might be elusive even after the end of the coalition. Germany needs to have an honest debate with itself about what it takes to step up and navigate a challenging fiscal, economic, and geopolitical environment, much like it did in the early 2000s. The debt brake and German obsessions with it ought to be part of such a discussion.

But there are few signs of such a debate across the country’s political landscape, which has splintered in line with trends across European countries. The extremist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) on the right and the former communist politician Sahra Wagenknecht’s BSW on the left have emerged as insurgents that meet in a horseshoe formation on nationalist, social, and pro-Russian positions. The once-dominant center-right Christian Democrats (CDU) lead polling at around 33 percent. All three “traffic light” coalition partners have dropped in the polls significantly, with Lindner’s liberals even falling under Germany’s 5 percent federal threshold to make the Bundestag. While a slight majority of Germans in a poll published this week support early elections, it’s unclear whether and how the electorate might punish or reward different actors for their role in the coalition’s collapse.

So the next coalition formation might not be much easier than the 2021 negotiations that led to the “traffic light.” Current polling suggests the CDU would have the limited choice of another grand coalition with the SPD or its favorite nemesis of the last three years, the Greens. Still, if Scholz does proceed with a confidence vote in January and the German president agrees then to call early elections in March, a fresh start might be the next best chance for Europe’s former powerhouse to find its footing.

—Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

A “Macron-level gamble” by the German finance minister

The long-suffering German coalition has finally broken after hanging on by a mere thread for much of the last year. The decision comes just a month before the deadline for the federal budget for 2025 and many inside the government were hoping that it could linger on, especially in the destabilizing event of Trump’s victory in the United States, announced early in the morning European time.

Speculation of a collapse had been mounting since Lindner wrote a position paper that seemed designed to antagonize his more left-of-center coalition partners. Many in government saw the paper as a “divorce document” designed to force his coalition partners to throw him out—which they did. Despite concession efforts on the part of Habeck and Scholz, the government failed to keep the coalition together.

Lindner’s maneuvering to leave the government on a principled stance is a Macron-level gamble, designed to hopefully bring his party back above the 5 percent threshold necessary to maintain a presence in the Bundestag.

Many Germans and international observers are painfully aware that the country’s economy cannot be pulled out of a slump with the debt brake in place. However, support for the fiscal rule remains high, with a poll released earlier this year indicating that 61 percent of Germans were opposed to loosening the brake. But this overall support masks internal party divisions, with 55 percent of SPD voters and 67 percent of Green voters in favor of reforming the debt brake.

The FDP’s position has been that suspending the debt brake is a politically risky move, given the apparent high levels of support for keeping it in place, and it is a legally risky move, given that the constitutional courts blocked an attempted circumvention of the debt brake last year. But by exiting the government and facing potential dissolution, the FDP will be forced to work directly with the CDU, which will still need to form a governing coalition. And all parties will then likely have to face the reality that to save the floundering economy some reform of the debt brake will be needed.

This was the first three-party system since the 1960s and evidence of a fractured electorate after the sixteen-year tenure of Angela Merkel, the third-longest serving chancellor of Germany.

Moreover, Germany often has been seen as the lodestone of Europe, holding together a sometimes tempestuous EU. This government collapse signals the potential for an era of turbulence in Europe’s near future. But it might be the best chance Germany has of turning the page.

—Carol Schaeffer is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center

Europe needs stability and strength. For the moment, Germany is providing neither.

Scholz has called for a vote of confidence in January, likely followed by early elections. That means even in the best case, a new government is unlikely to take office before May—with coalition negotiations potentially extending this timeline further.

That’s a long time for Germany to be thrust into political upheaval, particularly at a time when European stability depends on its strength. The reelection of Trump introduces new uncertainties for transatlantic relations and global security. Scholz’s budget deal contained, among other aspects, a proposal to increase Germany’s support for Ukraine ahead of a tough winter. After the US election, this measure was intended to send a clear signal that Germany is a reliable partner to its allies.

There was hope that the three coalition parties could set aside their differences in light of Trump’s reelection and the intensified need for strong transatlantic cooperation. However, the government’s collapse makes it clear that it was no longer able to play the cohesive, robust role that Europe needs. Internal conflicts have delayed agreement on a supplementary 2024 budget, and prospects for the 2025 budget remain similarly contentious.

Scholz recognized the increased uncertainty, pledging on Wednesday to strengthen transatlantic ties and work with the new Trump administration while investing in a resilient EU. However, achieving these objectives requires a stable government, not one mired in internal discord. Such stability appears out of reach.

From a security policy perspective, there may be a long-term upside to a new government for transatlantic relations, particularly with a Trump-led United States. New elections could open the door for a government more amenable to substantial increases in defense spending—a key area of criticism from Trump. Under the current government, Germany’s defense budget only barely met NATO’s target of 2 percent of gross domestic product in 2024, thanks mainly to spending from the off-budget one-hundred-billion-euro special fund that was created in 2022 and will run out by the end of 2027. Lindner’s strict adherence to the debt brake has hindered meaningful progress on a true Zeitenwende in German defense policy. A new government has the opportunity—and responsibility—to initiate a serious, sustainable increase in defense spending, sending a clear signal of commitment to allies and partners.

While the future holds potential, the immediate reality is immense uncertainty, and it could remain in this state for some time. Scholz has shown a willingness to collaborate with CDU leader Friedrich Merz on economic and defense matters, which might help to bridge this transitional period, but Germany will remain in a vulnerable position in its dealings with the United States until a more stable government is in place.

—Theresa Luetkefend is an assistant director in the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program.

The post Experts react: Scholz’s coalition has collapsed. What’s next for Germany? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Donald Trump just won the presidency. Our experts answer the big questions about what that means for America’s role in the world.

Atlantic Council experts — Wed, 06 Nov 2024 15:13:06 +0000

Get ready for the sequel. On November 6, the Associated Press declared Donald Trump the winner of the 2024 US presidential election. A transition now kicks off as world events continue to churn. When he returns to the presidency on January 20, Trump’s inbox will be full of global challenges. How will he respond? And what will the consequences be? Below, our experts provide answers across twenty-four of the most significant policy matters awaiting the next administration.

What the next administration will do about…

US leadership in the world

What can we expect from a Trump 2.0 foreign policy? In defense and security policy, we can anticipate a return of a “peace through strength” approach. This will mean big investments in US defense capabilities to strengthen deterrence and use force decisively if deterrence fails. Trump will rightly ask allies to contribute more to ensure US alliances in Europe and Asia have the capabilities they need.

In economic policy, we can expect a focus on fair and reciprocal trade, prioritizing addressing China’s unfair trading practices, and an unleashing of the United States’ domestic energy potential. Values will center around an “America first, but not alone” orientation that will ensure that US global engagement benefits the peace, prosperity, and freedom of the American people and, in so doing, the broader free world.

—Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Global trade

What will the Trump administration do about global trade? This is the thirty-trillion-dollar question. It was what every finance minister and central bank governor at the recent International Monetary Fund-World Bank Annual Meetings wanted to chat about privately. Here’s what we know.

The important question about Trump and trade is: Will he do what he says he will do on tariffs? That answer is more likely yes than no, but it will not happen overnight. Trump’s trade views were shaped in the 1980s during Japan’s rapid economic growth. He views trade in binary terms, with bilateral imbalances the key determinant of whether a policy is succeeding or not. The first step in his trade policy will be, somewhat surprisingly, to try and revise the Phase 1 trade deal with China that he brokered at the end of his first term. The deal was largely judged a failure since China didn’t live up to any of its commitments, but the excuse given is that the pandemic prevented what would have been a successful first step. That’s more likely initially than a 60 percent tariff on Chinese imports.

Once he tries to revive (or, as Trump trade people say, “finally enforce”) the China trade deal, Trump will turn his attention to the European Union. Here there will be a deep divide, and Trump will seek reciprocal tariffs on a range of products—many of which he will be able to impose unilaterally. His blanket tariff promise of 10 percent seems unlikely in the near term, but instead a scattershot of specific tariffs will be a signal to countries—both allies and adversaries—that this is just the beginning. The likely response will be a tit-for-tat escalation that will be inflationary in the United States and for the global economy. While the Trump economic team disputes this, citing the fact that Trump’s first term didn’t produce inflationary results, the size and scale of what is being proposed now is vastly different.

—Josh Lipsky is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and a former adviser to the International Monetary Fund.

The war in Ukraine

The greatest national security threat to the United States, its fellow NATO members, and other US allies is the increasingly aggressive partnership of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. The focal point of this threat is Ukraine, where Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war of conquest is just a prelude to more provocations and, potentially even war further west, against NATO’s eastern states. A victory in Ukraine for Russia, which is now bolstered by North Korean troops soon to be fighting in Europe, will encourage a Chinese move on Taiwan.

It is not clear that Trump fully acknowledges this challenge. But whether he understands it or not, his administration will have to deal with it and its most dangerous point of confrontation: Ukraine. It is difficult to anticipate Trump’s policy on the war because his team contains personnel with very different views. One group advocates sharply reducing aid to Ukraine—a view many associate with Trump. This group is naive about the Kremlin’s policy toward the United States—Putin states plainly that the United States is adversary number one—and clueless about the danger of a Kremlin victory in Ukraine. The other camp recognizes the threat to US interests in Europe and elsewhere if Washington were to abandon Ukraine. This group would pursue a Reaganesque policy of peace through strength and, unlike the Biden team, not be intimidated by Putin’s nuclear bluster. The first clues about Trump’s policy will be the appointments he makes to senior national security positions.

—John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

NATO

For much of the past year, Europeans have been asking if NATO can be “Trump-proofed,” hoping they would never have to find out. But with Trump on his way back to the White House, European leaders, in particular NATO’s new secretary general, Mark Rutte, will have to show they have a plan to work with the new administration.

The first thing to note about the new Trump administration’s NATO policy is that anyone claiming to know definitively what that policy will be—beyond the inevitable calls for Europeans to shoulder more of the Alliance’s responsibilities—should be treated with significant skepticism. Trump’s diplomatic approach is to always keep others—friend and foe alike—off balance. It is to make a virtue of unpredictability. For an Alliance that prizes stability and reliability, NATO (especially Rutte) will have to relearn how to deal with Trump’s brinkmanship, drama, and unpredictability.

The second is to acknowledge that Trump world’s leading foreign policy practitioners are not monolithic. Views on NATO among potential administration personnel range from the true-believing, isolationist “America first” crowd (in reality a relatively small group in elite circles), to the “division of labor” school (which holds that the United States needs to focus exclusively on the Indo-Pacific and leave Europe to the Europeans), to the Reaganite Cold Warriors. Vice President-elect JD Vance has straddled these first two groups. While he recently reaffirmed his commitment to NATO, he also said that the United States needed to recognize that NATO is “not just a welfare client” and that “it should be a real alliance.” The relative sway of these differing factions will have significant bearing on the policy direction of the new administration.

—Philippe Dickinson is deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served on the political team at the British Embassy in Washington, DC.

Competition with China

Trump’s policy toward China in his second administration will likely be similar to the approach during his first term. He has already shown a continued fixation on trade and outlined a plan to impose high tariffs, which will reignite disputes with Beijing over this issue and likely prompt retaliation against US businesses. In other respects, Trump may actually ease tensions with China—but not to the benefit of US strategic interests. Trump’s stated Russia-friendly position on the war in Ukraine will remove a point of contention with Beijing but also serve Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s geopolitical agenda. Trump has already signaled a lack of support for Taiwan and seems to believe that he can deter Chinese military action through personal charisma. Xi is not likely to be bedazzled, and Trump’s display of weakness could embolden Beijing to take an even more aggressive stance toward the island’s democratic government. More broadly, Trump’s overt contempt for Washington’s traditional allies will likely complicate collective action toward China and open divisions for Xi to exploit and expand Chinese global influence. Trump promises a focus on issues of minimal strategic importance to the United States that nevertheless will lead to Beijing and Washington bickering, along with a withdrawal of US global leadership that allows Xi to promote Chinese power at Washington’s expense.

—Michael Schuman is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and a contributing writer at the Atlantic.

Iran

The return of Trump is likely to quickly evoke memories of his maximum-pressure campaign and killing of Iranian Quds Force leader Qasem Soleimani. It is a clear possibility that Trump would immediately return to a maximum-pressure campaign in which sanctions would not just increase but be enforced.

One of the first major decisions facing Trump vis-a-vis Iran is the expiration of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231’s snapback mechanism in October 2025, which allows for the reimposition of sanctions due to Iranian non-performance under the nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The big question will be whether to join with European counterparts and invoke the snapback. Russia and China are almost certain to reject doing so, but Trump and his team are very likely to favor such a policy.

However, Trump and his national security team may struggle to find the same level of support in the region that they had four years ago. At the time, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were united behind Trump’s efforts to more aggressively take on Iran and Iranian interests. But following the end of the Saudi blockade on Qatar and what was viewed by Riyadh as insufficient US support after an attack by Iranian-supported Houthi terrorists on Saudi oil infrastructure at Abqaiq (which was followed a year into Biden’s term with a Houthi attack on Abu Dhabi), most wealthy Gulf state allies have turned inward and are seeking to calm tensions with Iran.

As a result, the incoming Trump administration may be unable to recreate its full network of allies to undertake an intensive anti-Iran policy, especially if the policy does not contain a clear end goal of reaching a comprehensive deal with Iran. Many policy officials in the president-elect’s orbit are likely to balk at the idea of new negotiations with Iran, but that does not mean Trump wouldn’t consider it eventually. More than anything, Trump wants to make a deal. He would probably relish the opportunity to stand in Tehran and boast about his ability to conclude a deal no one else could. But such an occasion, if it ever happened, would likely be quite far off, because it would mean Trump having to first put aside the memory of Iran seeking his assassination. That’s something that Trump, and the people around him, will focus on for a long time to come.

—Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council.

Relations with the EU

Trump’s return to the White House will pose a significant challenge for the European Union (EU). The US-EU relationship will become much less strategic and much less all-encompassing. Instead, EU and member state leaders will have to expend political capital at home and in Washington to make progress. And things will get worse quickly before they get better. Trump may well make good on his threat of imposing tariffs on the bloc, which would pressure Brussels into retaliation and a tit-for-tat trade war. The Trump administration will also probably not look kindly on existing initiatives that the EU enjoyed with the Biden administration, and many in the Trump circle aiming for top jobs are no friends of Brussels. The EU will no longer have a strategic partner by default, including in its support for Ukraine or ambitions for EU defense, economic security, or the green transition. Paradoxically, the Trump administration will also likely demand more from the EU—on trade, China policy, support for Ukraine if US aid is to continue, and more.

Another Trump presidency does not preclude cooperation, but the Trump team will see the relationship through a much more transactional lens. Deals will be possible if Europe’s leaders manage to stay disciplined, cut through the inevitable noise of the president’s rhetoric and their own domestic reactions, and come ready to negotiate. The EU will have to prioritize a few key areas reflecting Trump’s priorities—from a handful of trade sectors to strengthening its posture toward China. EU and European leaders will have to decide which anti-European and anti-EU rhetoric to ignore and when to step in to protect the EU’s unity. Regardless, there is plenty the incoming Trump administration and the EU can and should do together, and the Trump team may realize they need the EU and the Europeans more than they think if Washington is to take on the likes of China.

—Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Digital currencies

Trump changed his tune on crypto this election cycle, going from a nonbeliever to a full-on convert—most notably through the launch of his own cryptocurrency company, World Liberty Financial, in September. This shift came amid the industry’s emergence as a major political player (one crypto Super PAC, Fairshake, has raised more than $200 million this election cycle) and its whole-hearted embrace of Trump—which is not surprising, given the libertarian ideals that sparked and continue to sustain the crypto world. Trump has also indicated that he would be open to a Bitcoin strategic reserve, much like the petroleum one currently in place.

Moving beyond rhetoric, the task at hand for the Trump administration is to signal deregulation through regulation by passing at least one of the many bills on stablecoin and cryptocurrency regulation currently under consideration in Congress, some of which have bipartisan support. This approach would likely also entail appointing crypto-friendly heads of agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

On the other hand, the Republican Party’s position on the issue of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) is straightforward: ban them, since they could potentially control every aspect of your life. The Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025 proposes a CBDC ban, and states like Indiana, Florida, and Alabama have passed legislation opposing the use of or experimentation with CBDCs. This May, the Republican-controlled House passed the CBDC Anti-Surveillance Act, which, if it becomes law, would make the United States the only country to ban a CBDC. While much depends on the composition of Congress, it’s highly unlikely that the United States will issue a retail digital dollar under the Trump presidency, and the Federal Reserve will become more cautious about even researching one.

—Ananya Kumar is the deputy director for the future of money at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

Artificial intelligence

The second Trump administration will likely chart a different course on AI than the one taken over the past four years. Trump has historically favored limited government regulation, emphasizing AI as a tool to strengthen US competitiveness, particularly against China. Trump’s approach to AI will center on dismantling the Biden administration’s regulatory measures, which he and many of his supporters view as stifling innovation. Instead, Trump will prioritize the “free speech and human flourishing” ethos from the Republican Party platform, likely advocating for self-regulation within the tech industry and giving companies wide leeway to innovate without oversight constraints. Trump’s administration will also strategically boost energy production to fuel an AI race more driven by national competitiveness than international standards. Rather than engaging in multilateral AI forums, Trump will favor a US-centric approach, aiming for victory over China in an AI race and establishing independent US dominance. This will spill over into the national security domain, where Trump will seek to enhance military capabilities and maintain a strong technical edge over any and all geopolitical adversaries.

—Raul Brens Jr. is the acting senior director and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center.

Climate change

On the campaign trail, Trump promised to repeal federal regulations on greenhouse-gas emissions, lambasted the Green New Deal as the “greatest scam in history,” and committed to boosting fossil-fuel production. However, his administration will need to consider the danger of these actions. Climate change is global. Regardless of where greenhouse gasses are coming from, climate inaction will impact the entire planet, including the United States. Climate change impacts livelihoods and daily finances, damages infrastructure, costs taxpayers, and reduces national security. Every three weeks, climate disasters create one billion dollars of damage. Annually, it costs the United States $150 billion. Soberingly, that is likely an underestimation. The Trump administration will find that it cannot overlook these concerns. If the United States steps back on its climate leadership, it will be difficult—if not impossible—to phase down fossil fuels and halt global warming, not just in the next four years but also for future US administrations. We cannot afford that. Trump has an opportunity to revisit his proposed plans and instead focus on investing in sustainable infrastructure, mobilizing the sustainable energy sector, and reducing national emissions.

—Jorge Gastelumendi is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Climate Resilience Center. He previously served as chief adviser and climate negotiator to the government of Peru.

The energy transition

Trump’s election will reinvigorate a debate around US “energy independence” as he renews government support for the oil and gas industry and doubles down on bipartisan progress around the deployment of nuclear technology as well. Overall, his administration is likely to favor conventional energy resources over emissions-free alternatives, expediting liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports and oil-and-gas production licenses while potentially clawing back unspent Inflation Reduction Act funds. But the reality is that the ongoing transformation of the global energy system largely transcends Washington’s political cycles.

The US exit from the Paris Agreement, for example, was a signature feature of Trump’s first-term energy and climate policy and an act that is all but certain to be reinstituted early next year. But around the world, the price of energy and the security of supply tend to outweigh the impact of US engagement in multilateral fora, hinting at why deployment of solar and wind energy in the United States grew by 66 percent over the course of Trump’s first term.

One exception moving forward, however, will be Trump’s use of tariffs to boost US manufacturing and foster job growth. Trump-era tariffs focused on Chinese electric vehicles and solar technologies have endured throughout Biden’s presidency. With the interplay of climate and trade policy only growing closer since Trump’s first term, it’s all but inevitable that his second administration will go further in deploying trade-related tools to strengthen US energy dominance. How the world—in particular China—reacts will be critical to the scale and pace of the energy transition.

—Landon Derentz is the senior director and Morningstar chair for global energy security at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center. He previously served as director for energy on the White House National Security Council.

Global democracy promotion

In a second Trump administration, we can expect a shift toward a more constrained and transactional model of democracy promotion, with a primary focus on strategic interests over global democratization efforts. Trump’s previous tenure demonstrated a tendency to prioritize national security and economic leverage. We can expect more of the same in his second term.

US global democracy promotion is likely to remain inconsistent, which will further jeopardize progress on US engagement with the Global South. Trump will probably distance himself from Biden’s rhetorical framing of the United States leading a contest “between democracy and autocracy.” This approach is apt to make US support for global democracy initiatives more selective, concentrating on regions and countries where efforts align closely with US economic and security interests. These targeted initiatives may achieve faster, more measurable results than broad symbolic gatherings. In practice, Trump is likely to prioritize economic stability and regulatory reforms in countries with strong trade or investment ties to the United States, safeguarding US interests while promoting democratic functions aligned with these priorities. This approach contrasts with the Biden administration’s broader democracy agenda, which includes social issues like LGBTQI+ rights and climate change.

—Joseph Lemoine is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center.

Taiwan

A Trump presidency will entail significant uncertainty for Taiwan. Strategically, the Trump administration’s transactionalist tendencies mean that the president-elect expects US support for Taiwan to come at a price, and be decided on a case-by-case basis, rather than to stem from a partnership based on more enduring considerations.

Economically, Trump has repeatedly criticized Taiwan’s semiconductor industry for stealing American jobs. Combined with Trump’s demonstrated inclination to use tariffs as his economic-policy instrument of choice, his election signals that there may be greater punitive tariff policies coming against the Taiwanese economy’s champions, thereby complicating Taipei’s international economic integration.

—Wen-Ti Sung is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub.

US-Turkey relations

Trump’s victory will create further uncertainty in Turkish-US relations. In the first Trump administration, bilateral relations hit bottom because of a series of incidents including visa restrictions, US sanctions against Turkey, the arrest of a US pastor in the country, and several Trump tweets threatening to destroy the already fragile Turkish economy. My hope is that the relationship between these two strategic allies, which faces many challenges, including a lack of mutual trust, will be smoother over the course of the second Trump administration.

There is a general belief in Turkey that another Trump administration will be good for the relationship simply because Trump and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan appreciate strong counterparts, and therefore each will be able to communicate with the other directly and frequently. However, Trump’s positions on the Ukraine war, NATO, and the Gaza conflict are clear.

Despite its relationship with Russia, Turkey maintains a balancing act in the war in Ukraine—which Trump has vowed to end quickly—by providing drones and equipment to Kyiv. Turkey has the second-biggest military in NATO and plays a major role in the Alliance’s southern flank, but that might not mean much for the new president-elect, a frequent critic of NATO. Turkey’s position in favor of Hamas in its war with Israel also won’t play well with the new administration, which is clearly leaning closer to the Netanyahu government in the conflict. Efforts to normalize relations between Turkey and Armenia also may hit snags under the Trump administration, given the pro-Armenian positions Trump took during the election campaign.

The recent terror attack in Ankara by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), recognized as a terrorist organization by both Turkey and the United States, has made already fragile relations between the two countries even more complicated. One of the major points of contention in US-Turkey relations is US support for the YPG/PYD—a group viewed as the Syrian wing of the PKK—in the US fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. Turkey accuses the United States of providing weapons and equipment to the Kurdish militia in Syria that are then used against Turkish targets. The Trump administration may adopt a stance in this dispute that is more favorable to Turkey.

The road ahead for the relationship will remain challenging, and both sides will need to invest more in it regardless of how frequently the countries’ presidents communicate.

—Defne Arslan is the senior director and founder of Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, leading the Council’s global work and programming on Turkey.

Venezuela

Exactly how Trump will approach Venezuela remains to be seen. On the one hand, in his first administration he led a maximum-pressure campaign on Venezuelan ruler Nicolás Maduro, which ramped up financial, oil, and individual sanctions against the government and key regime figures. On the other hand, in recent months he has notably refrained from publicly promising a return to this approach. On the campaign trail, his remarks on Venezuela largely focused on the flow of migrants and refugees from the country, with Trump claiming that the country’s crime rate has plummeted because so many Venezuelan “criminals” have come to the United States. This, combined with the fact that former Trump officials have said that he became frustrated with the Venezuelan opposition and with the failure of the pressure campaign to achieve results, could point to a second Trump administration adopting a more transactional approach to Caracas. The Trump administration, after all, on multiple occasions engaged in backchannel talks with Maduro, and Trump himself expressed interest in meeting Maduro face to face back in 2020. Ultimately, while it is likely that Trump will adopt more confrontational rhetoric on Venezuela, he may see more value in containing the outward flow of migration and securing a US and Western footprint in Venezuela’s oil sector than in reverting to a maximum-pressure approach.

—Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

North Korea

Want to know what the next US administration’s policy toward North Korea will be? Look to Pyongyang, not Washington. Neither presidential candidate spoke much about North Korea on the campaign trail, and Trump doesn’t seem to be planning to make it a priority—unsurprisingly, given the many other major issues competing for the White House’s attention and the apparent intractability of the problem posed by Pyongyang.

But North Korea has a way of forcing itself onto a president’s agenda and compelling presidents to react. It’s worth recalling, for example, that then-President Trump’s memorable “fire and fury” rhetoric directed at Kim Jong Un in 2017 was in response to a campaign of North Korean missile and nuclear tests that had begun in 2016 before he took office and continued into 2017. Similarly, while Trump had expressed openness to meeting with Kim even before taking office, his first summit with the North Korean leader in 2018 came about because he accepted an offer from Kim—conveyed by South Korean officials—rather than pushing for the meeting himself.

Just because a new US president is taking office doesn’t mean Pyongyang will back away from a range of efforts that challenge US interests: sending troops and munitions to support Russia’s war against Ukraine; aligning with Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran against the United States while increasing the risk of simultaneous conflicts; continuing to threaten South Korea; and enhancing its nuclear and missile forces.

North Korea, however, will not charge along heedlessly. Its leaders are skilled at keeping their actions just at the level where they may trigger headlines but not truly strong responses—as demonstrated by recent launches of short-range missiles and an intercontinental ballistic missile, along with an escalating commitment of artillery shells, then missiles, and then troops to Russia. There is reason to expect that North Korea may even escalate further to limited aggression against South Korea. We also cannot rule out North Korea embarking on a new, tactical charm offensive directed primarily at Washington to prevent a unified and strong US and international response even while Kim remains committed to these overall lines of effort.

The question is whether North Korea’s actions next year will be dramatic enough to provoke a focused response from the White House—perhaps in the form of a military confrontation followed by negotiations, if the past is prologue—or if these actions will remain below the threshold of triggering much of a response from the new administration, thereby allowing North Korea to set a “new normal” at a higher level of dangerous behavior. Either way, history and logic suggest that Kim will have the initiative, and the new US administration will be reacting to him rather than charting its own course on North Korea policy.

—Markus Garlauskas is the director of the Scowcroft Center’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative and served as the US government’s national intelligence officer for North Korea from 2014 to 2020.

The Abraham Accords between Israel and Arab nations

The Abraham Accords will likely serve as a key pillar of US policy in the Middle East for the Trump administration. Knowing that the Accords were among the foremost policy successes during Trump’s first term, the administration will prioritize enhancing and expanding the Accords, with a particular focus on securing agreements with key players such as Saudi Arabia.

While the Trump administration will pursue opportunities to engage Palestinian leadership and bring an end to the Israel-Hamas war, it will not see a peace agreement as a necessary precursor for expanding the Accords. Instead, Trump will focus on creating a regional alliance against Iranian influence, leveraging recent Iranian and proxy actions across the region to entice new members with weapons agreements. Additionally, the new administration will likely explore initiatives that foster trade and investment among signatory nations to bolster new and existing agreements.

—Emily Milliken is the associate director of media and communications for the N7 Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

US-India relations

A second Trump term will likely bring a transactional approach to US-India relations. Expect an intensified focus on trade negotiations centered around market access and tariffs—potentially revisiting issues such as access to various Indian sectors and trade preferences granted to India as well as immigration.

If Trump does pull back from the Indo-Pacific—by, for example, ceding ground to China on Taiwan—this could inadvertently push India to fill the void. This could come in the form of India strengthening military ties with Southeast Asian nations or the other “Quad” countries, Japan and Australia. At the same time, Trump’s “America First” approach could complicate broader multilateral engagements and climate discussions. Defense cooperation, particularly arms sales and joint exercises, would likely continue as a central pillar of the US-India relationship. But India’s balancing act between its strategic autonomy and deepening US ties could face more strain under the Trump administration.

India would have been fine with either outcome, but now it can celebrate the rapport between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Trump. Expect Modi’s government to focus on working with Trump on countering China (potentially using the China Plus One strategy to deal with trade tensions) and establishing India’s strength in the Indo-Pacific.

—Srujan Palkar is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

Relations with Africa

One in four people on the planet is projected to be African by 2050. That demographic—and economic—opportunity is appealing to Trump, particularly given his increasing focus on competition with China, which is making its own inroads on the continent. Trump is likely to “unleash as much of that youthful energy as possible” in his second term by streamlining regulations and encouraging business development and trade with Africa, as former Republican Congressman Vin Weber recently wrote for the Atlantic Council’s AfricaSource section.

One big moment to watch will be the 2025 reauthorization of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). While Trump is more prone to bilateral trade deals than sprawling agreements, Weber wrote that AGOA “is finding broader and deeper support in the business communities on both continents,” so “there is no reason to believe that Trump would seek to weaken” the trade deal.

—Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously, he led US Treasury Department efforts to combat corruption, money laundering, terrorist financing, and financial crimes on the African continent.

AfricaSource

Oct 29, 2024

What Africa can expect under a second Trump administration: A focus on the ‘numbers’

By Vin Weber

The next Trump administration would likely seek to unleash as much energy from a growing young African population as possible.

Africa Politics & Diplomacy

US-Mexico relations

A second Trump administration with JD Vance as vice president (both Trump and Vance have floated sending the US military into Mexico) is likely to prioritize harsh immigration and trade policies in its relations with Mexico. The two issues would be explicitly tied. Building upon his previous term’s initiatives, such as the “Remain in Mexico” policy and the construction of the border wall, Trump may seek to implement more aggressive measures to curb illegal immigration and may take advantage of the upcoming US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) review period to demand more of Mexico in terms of immigration enforcement. Though he has talked about mass deportations and the use of military forces to enforce border security, it is unclear how he would operationalize these policies.

On trade, Trump’s “America First” approach may lead to a dramatic renegotiation of the USMCA, and he may strain ties with Mexico by imposing higher tariffs on Mexican imports in the name of protecting US industries. For the incoming Trump-Vance administration, the relationship with Mexico will be transactional and zero-sum.

—María Fernanda Bozmoski is deputy director of operations and finance at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she leads the center’s work on Mexico and Central America.

Immigration

Trump will move quickly to “begin the largest deportation operation in the history” of the United States. If Trump follows through on his past statements, even those who are now here legally but were paroled in from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela will quickly find their legal status revoked and be ordered to leave. Initially, deportations will target those with criminal records. But the Biden administration has already prioritized those cases, so the Trump administration will quickly turn to other undocumented people—and this is where the trouble will start. Watch to see if the 2018 policy of separating children from their parents comes back, especially for undocumented spouses or parents with US-citizen spouses or children. (Trump surrogate Tom Homan told CBS’s 60 Minutes that Trump’s answer will be to deport the US-citizen children along with their parents.) As Trump administration officials ramp up detentions, look out for whether they set up mass detention camps in Texas, the only border state with a Republican governor. The breaking point will occur if the courts order the Trump administration to halt deportations but Trump decides to ignore court orders and proceed anyway. That would provoke a backlash of extraordinary proportions.

—Thomas S. Warrick is the director of the Future of DHS project at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft GeoStrategy Initiative. He previously served as deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the Department of Homeland Security.

Nuclear weapons

The question is not whether the Trump administration will expand US nuclear forces but rather when and by how much. At a minimum, expect the Trump administration to continue what it likely sees as the unfinished business of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR): the development of the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N). The SLCM-N was delayed by bureaucracy in the Trump administration, canceled by the Biden administration, and then nonetheless funded and mandated by Congress. With a cooperative administration, the development of this capability could move more quickly. It is also possible that the Trump administration will direct the expansion of the US strategic nuclear force. In a Foreign Affairs piece, former Trump National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien called for maintaining US “technical and numerical superiority to the combined Chinese and Russian nuclear stockpiles” and considering a resumption of nuclear testing. The New START arms-control agreement with Russia expires in February 2026 with no replacement on the horizon, so that could be the starting point of a US buildup. The incoming Trump administration will likely embrace the 2018 NPR’s affirmation of modernizing the US nuclear arsenal and maintaining the nuclear triad (silo-, bomber-, and submarine-based nuclear forces), as well as its rejection of the notions that the United States should rule out using nuclear weapons first in a conflict or declare that the sole purpose of its nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States or its allies.

—Mark J. Massa is the deputy director for strategic forces policy in the Forward Defense program within the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Nuclear energy

Nuclear energy policy has enjoyed bipartisan consensus in Washington over the last two administrations. With the second Trump administration on the horizon, more bipartisan legislation in support of nuclear energy will likely be passed by Congress and signed into law by Trump, along the same lines as the legislation on nuclear energy that was a hallmark of Trump’s first administration.

The Trump administration passed a number of pieces of legislation, with bipartisan backing, on nuclear energy policy. The Energy Act of 2020 provided $6.6 billion in funding for all stages of nuclear reactor development and included provisions for nuclear fuel and funding for the Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program; the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act of 2019 was aimed at streamlining the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and the Nuclear Energy Innovation Capabilities Act of 2018 cut regulatory costs and tried to streamline the siting process for next generation nuclear reactors.

The outcome of congressional elections may have a greater impact on nuclear energy policy in the coming years. For example, the US Export-Import Bank—which provides loans for US nuclear projects overseas and has previously faced opposition from some Republicans—is up for reauthorization by Congress in 2026, and it will also need three of its four board members to be appointed in January 2025. Ultimately, nuclear energy policy champions should continue to engage with the new administration, especially highlighting the role of nuclear energy in US national security, in order to continue the momentum of the last several years.

—Jennifer T. Gordon is the director for the Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

US grand strategy

Grand strategy rarely comes up on the campaign trail, but whatever hints Trump offered for how he would approach it pale in comparison with this reality: The post-Cold War “holiday from history” is over, and the world has entered a period of protracted systemic instability, with increasingly fragile regional power balances and the risk of great-power conflict growing exponentially. These dynamics will compel the next administration to recognize, when crafting the United States’ national security strategy, that geopolitics has returned with a vengeance. They will require articulating the country’s irreducible national interests, while identifying the key theaters the United States needs to shape and the resources it must bring to bear to achieve its strategic objectives. Urgent priorities will include reassessing unstable regional balances and genuinely reconsidering the organization of US relationships with adversaries, allies, and partners. US strategy will also need to address continuing economic turbulence, especially as it impacts the reliability of supply chains.

—Andrew Michta is the director of and a senior fellow in the Scowcroft GeoStrategy Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The post Donald Trump just won the presidency. Our experts answer the big questions about what that means for America’s role in the world. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What to know about foreign meddling in the US election

Atlantic Council — Wed, 06 Nov 2024 00:07:14 +0000

GET UP TO SPEED

The target is you, voter. Russia, China, Iran, and other bad actors sought to interfere in the run-up to today’s US elections, according to research by the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), which has been monitoring online trends along with statements by governments, private companies, and civil society in its Foreign Interference Attribution Tracker. As DFRLab experts detail below, this year’s malign efforts in many ways surpass previous influence campaigns in sophistication and scope, if not in impact—and they are expected to continue well after the polls close.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION BROUGHT TO YOU BY

Emerson T. Brooking (@etbrooking): Director of strategy and resident senior fellow at the DFRLab
Dina Sadek (@DinaMSadek): Resident fellow at the DFRLab
Graham Brookie (@GrahamBrookie): Atlantic Council vice president for technology programs and strategy, and senior director of the DFRLab
Kenton Thibaut (@kentonthibaut): Senior resident China fellow at the DFRLab

Tipping the scale

“By sheer volume, foreign interference in the 2024 US election has already surpassed the scale of adversarial operations in both 2016 and 2020,” Emerson says.
Dina notes that each US adversary played to its strengths. For example, Iran and China “attempted to breach presidential campaigns in hack-and-leak operations that raise concerns about their cyber capabilities during and after the elections,” she tells us.
At the same time, the United States is more prepared than it was in previous election cycles. Russian efforts in 2016 “made foreign interference a vivid fear for millions of Americans,” Emerson notes. “Eight years later, the US government is denouncing and neutralizing these efforts, sometimes in real time.”
In fact, Graham tells us, “the combined actions by the US departments of Justice, Treasury, and State against two known Russian interference efforts was the largest proactive government action taken against election influence efforts before an election.”

Doppelgangers and down-ballot races

US officials this week called Russia “the most active threat,” and it’s easy to understand why. Emerson notes Russia’s “ten-million-dollar effort to infiltrate and influence far-right American media,” alongside the “Doppelganger” network, which has spread “tens of thousands of false stories and staged videos intended to undermine election integrity in the swing states of Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Arizona.” Increasingly desperate, Russian actors have even sought to shut down individual polling places with fake bomb threats, he adds.
Meanwhile, China has focused on “down-ballot races instead of the presidential election to target specific anti-China politicians,” Kenton explains. Using fake American personas and generative artificial intelligence, China-linked operations have appeared across more than fifty platforms. Perhaps surprisingly, Kenton adds, “attributed campaigns appeared sparingly” on the Chinese-owned platform TikTok and far more often on Facebook and X.

Faith, fakes, and falsehoods

“The primary aim is to erode Americans’ faith in democratic institutions and heighten chaos and social division,” Kenton explains, and thus to undermine the ability of the US government to function so it will have less bandwidth to contain adversarial powers.
“Some of the fake and already debunked narratives and footage circulating before the elections will likely continue to be amplified by foreign threat actors well after November 5,” Dina predicts. Expect to see activity around the submission of certificates of ascertainment on December 11, the December 17 meeting of the electors to formally cast their votes, and through inauguration day on January 20.
And in a post-election period where the results will likely be contested, Graham thinks there’s a “high likelihood” that foreign actors will “cross a serious threshold” from pre-election attempts to broadly influence American public opinion in service of their geopolitical interests to “direct interference” by trying to mobilize Americans to engage in protests or even violence.
Nevertheless, Graham points out that the high volume of foreign-influence efforts observed during this year’s election cycle so far does not appear to have had a significant impact in terms of changing Americans’ opinions or behavior.
The consequences of foreign disinformation, Emerson adds, should be assessed against “the far more viral, sophisticated, and dangerous election-day falsehoods that Americans spread among themselves.”

Elections 2024: America’s role in the world

The Atlantic Council’s guide to the most consequential US political contest in generations.

The post What to know about foreign meddling in the US election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This should be atop the next US president’s reading list

Frederick Kempe — Mon, 04 Nov 2024 12:01:00 +0000

Whoever is elected US commander-in-chief this week will have a daunting inbox. However, none of the challenges will be of greater significance than deciding what to do about what former National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, in a new essay in Foreign Affairs, calls the “Axis of Losers.”

Less colorfully, he explains that this refers to “the burgeoning cooperation among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia,” a challenge serious enough that experts fear it could plunge the world into either World War III or “a slew of separate conflicts scattered around the globe.”

At the Atlantic Council, where Hadley serves as the chair of our International Advisory Board and an executive vice chair of the Board of Directors, we’ve been debating what to call this quartet of autocrats, which some compare in its potential to the German-Italian-Japanese axis of World War II, or worse.

“Axis of Evil” already has been used. “Axis of Chaos” understates their common cause. “Axis of Autocrats” suggests all authoritarian leaders agree with them (and they certainly don’t). “Tryst of Tyrants” alliterates but trivializes. In my own writings, I’ve chosen “Axis of Aggressors,” so Hadley’s new entry in the naming stakes intrigued me.

However, what’s significant about the piece isn’t the clever turn of phrase. What makes it a must-read for the next US president is Hadley’s compelling recipe for a response.

Hadley starts with the premise that China is both the most significant long-term concern for Washington among these four actors and, at the same time, the only one—the others being rogue states in their regions—that is so deeply integrated into the global economy.

The logic follows that the United States ought to try to peel off (my words) China due to its self-interest. Hadley, however, instead quotes former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who proposed to me in an interview recently at the Atlantic Council Global Future Forum that policymakers “slam them together and make them deal with the consequences of the fact they don’t actually have that much in common.”

Writes Hadley: “Washington’s aim should be to make clear to Chinese President Xi Jinping how counterproductive and costly to Beijing’s interests these new relationships will turn out to be. That means effectively countering Iran, North Korea, and Russia in their own regions, thereby demonstrating to China that tethering itself to a bunch of losers is hardly a path to global influence.”

That’s easier written than done. Still, it is an approach that has the benefit of being logical and pragmatic. It could summon allies’ support, and either of the dramatically different US presidential candidates could embrace it.

Hadley outlines how this goal could be accomplished. Here’s a brief rendition.

With Russia, it would mean preventing Russian President Vladimir Putin from winning in Ukraine, and that would require sustained Western diplomatic, economic, and military support. The goal would be to integrate Ukraine into institutions, such as the European Union and NATO, as a democratic, secure, prosperous, noncorrupt, and sovereign state.

It’s significant that Hadley starts with Russia. If the next US president abandons Ukraine or provides insufficient support, the rest of the “Axis of Losers” strategy falls apart.

With Iran, it would mean “quashing Tehran’s hegemonic ambitions in the Middle East,” which the United States and its allies currently have the greatest chance in decades to do. That would require support for Israel as it gains momentum in delivering blows against Iran and its proxies.

At the same time, it would mean achieving greater regional stability through continued reconciliation between Israel and its Arab neighbors, a more promising future for the Palestinians, and a chance for Lebanon to free itself from Hezbollah’s domination.

With North Korea, it would require deterring Pyongyang by strengthening the diplomatic, economic, and military capabilities of the United States’ regional allies—Australia, Japan, and South Korea—“all with the aim of continued progress toward a free, open, and peaceful Indo-Pacific.”

The US foreign policy community keeps looking for a contemporary equivalent of the timely clarity of the “X Article,” written by George F. Kennan and published under the pseudonym “X” in the July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs magazine, where the new Hadley essay appears.

Entitled “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” the piece introduced the term “containment” to widespread use. It built on a confidential February 1946 cable from Kennan’s Moscow posting on how to address the emerging challenges of that era, which became known as “the long telegram” because of its, well, 8,000-word length.

Hadley would be too humble to embrace my comparison of his essay, “Xi Jinping’s Axis of Losers: The Right Way to Thwart the New Autocratic Convergence,” with Kennan’s. That said, like Kennan, Hadley provides a significant contribution at the early stages of a new era in describing its perils and in prescribing an achievable response.

Kennan’s essay set the stage for the Cold War that would follow, but it’s worth remembering that Cold War’s resolution only came more than forty years later with the Berlin Wall’s fall and Soviet collapse.

Whether Vice President Kamala Harris or former President Donald Trump is elected this week, Hadley’s essay could help the next US president navigate a dangerous new era that is emerging.

“The right U.S. strategy could make Xi understand that he can best serve his own interests by breaking with the axis of losers,” concludes Hadley.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

The post This should be atop the next US president’s reading list appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Congressman Mike Turner on how the ‘emerging axis of evil’ will challenge the next US administration

Daniel Hojnacki — Thu, 31 Oct 2024 16:07:50 +0000

Online Event Wed, October 30, 2024 • 2:00 pm ET

Elections 2024: Congressman Mike Turner on geopolitics and the next US president

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—Congressman Mike Turner, chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, lays out his expectations of the foreign policy challenges facing the next administration and what lies ahead for the 119th Congress.

Economy & Business Elections Politics & Diplomacy Resilience & Society

The next presidential administration is going to have to “step up to the plate” in terms of leadership to “change the direction” of the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, said US Congressman Mike Turner at an Atlantic Council Front Page event on Wednesday.

Turner, an Ohio Republican who is chair of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, added that the next president must ensure that US adversaries “see a United States that is going to step up and say, ‘We’re going to not only de-escalate but resolve these conflicts in favor of the United States.’”

He also addressed the recent movement of thousands of North Korean troops into Russia to fight Ukraine, which Turner said should be considered a “red line” for Ukraine’s Western partners. “The United States and NATO allies should seriously discuss and consider attacking directly North Korean troops that are in Ukraine and that are attacking Ukraine,” he said. “I’m not saying that it should be a decision that is finalized,” he added, but he said that NATO leaders should “have the discussion.”

Below are more highlights from this discussion on the US election and the national security threats the next administration will face, which was moderated by Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe.

An emerging axis

Turner said that “China is the most significant threat” that the United States faces, but he added that the “most immediate threat” to US interests is the “emerging axis of evil,” referring to increasing defense and economic cooperation among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.
The next administration, Turner said, must understand that this enhanced defense cooperation “is a direct threat” to the United States and the West. “These are not small territorial skirmishes. They’re not regional conflicts. This is a much broader conflict,” he said.
Meeting this threat, he said, will require significant investments in the “deferred maintenance and modernization that needs to happen to the United States’ military systems so that we can have parity with our great power competitors.”

Nuclear threats

Comparing the US nuclear arsenal to an antique car, Turner said the United States needed to modernize its nuclear weapons capabilities. Since Russia’s and China’s nuclear weapons are newer, Turner argued, they “don’t look at us as having the same level of deterrence that they do.”
Turner highlighted the threat that would be posed if Russia were to put an anti-satellite nuclear weapon in space, as US intelligence that Turner made public in February indicates Moscow has made advances toward. Comparing the prospect to a “Cuban missile crisis in space,” he said that if Russia were to detonate such a weapon, “all low-Earth orbit satellites would be decimated,” and financial, communications, and military infrastructure relying on space “would be wiped out.”
As Israel has dealt severe blows to the Iranian-backed Hezbollah and Hamas, there is “an opportunity to impact Iran’s march to becoming a nuclear weapon state.” With Tehran’s proxies diminished, Turner said, “the focus becomes directly on Iran itself.”

The way forward in Ukraine

Turner argued that more robust support for Kyiv, such as allowing Ukrainian forces to strike deeper inside Russia with US and Western weapons, would lead to greater congressional support for more Ukraine aid. “People want a plan to win,” he said. “If there is viable support and strong support” for Ukraine from the next administration, he added, “I think you’ll see stronger support in Congress.”
On a potential peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia, Turner said that whatever the outcome of such negotiations, “we need to make certain that Crimea does not become militarized.” If Russia kept Crimea in a peace settlement and militarized it, Turner warned, then along with the exclave of Kaliningrad, Russia will have “reconstituted the reach of the former Soviet Union through the Warsaw Pact countries by merely owning two pieces of real estate.”

Daniel Hojnacki is an assistant editor on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council.

Watch the full event

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Inside Israeli politics and public opinion with a pollster

Stefanie Hausheer Ali — Wed, 30 Oct 2024 18:36:34 +0000

As the Israel-Gaza war continues and expands regionally, Atlantic Council nonresident fellow Stefanie H. Ali spoke to Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin on October 15 to discuss how Israelis view Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the ongoing conflict, and the future.

Scheindlin is a Tel Aviv-based public opinion researcher and political advisor who has worked on nine national campaigns in Israel. Scheindlin is also the author of The Crooked Timber of Democracy in Israel: Promise Unfulfilled and is a policy fellow at The Century Foundation. She is also a regular columnist for Haaretz and has co-hosted The Tel Aviv Review podcast and the Election Overdose podcast at Haaretz in the past.

STEFANIE HAUSHEER ALI: There was support among the majority of Jewish Israelis for military action against Lebanese Hezbollah prior to the expansion of the war. It remains to be seen whether the over 60,000 Israelis and the over 1.2 million Lebanese displaced will be able to return to their homes and how the Israel-Iran confrontation will play out. Is Netanyahu gaining points politically for the operations in Lebanon? Is there public support for engaging Iran directly?

DAHLIA SCHEINDLIN: There is a contradictory dynamic. When it comes to the regional dimension, Israelis feel like there is an aggressive multi-front attack on them that is distinguished from Gaza in their minds. Israelis know there is an ongoing occupation and conflict with Palestinians, and they see the Hamas attack as genocidal, but they are disappointed over the failure to achieve the Gaza war aims, particularly the return of the hostages. But still, there is a more unifying national rallying when it comes to regional attacks.

As a result, every time there was a significant attack on senior Hezbollah figures or others from the Iran-backed Resistance Axis, like against Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh, there was an incremental, modest, but steady rise in support for Prime Minister Netanyahu, his party, and, to some extent, his political coalition.

The somewhat contradictory trend is that Jewish Israeli attitudes have actually been quite divided this year about what Israel should do in Lebanon. Over 60 percent of Jewish Israelis have supported taking an aggressive stance on Lebanon in past surveys. However, if survey respondents are given choices about gradations of the severity of the military action and possible ramifications, such as occupying southern Lebanon and/or war with Iran, attitudes are much more divided. About 50 percent of Jewish Israeli respondents will choose the more severe military options, and roughly the other half will choose a less severe option and prefer a role for diplomacy.

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That was up until a few months ago. Right before Israel began its significant ground operation in Lebanon on October 1, a survey by the Israel Democracy Institute showed Jewish Israelis were quite divided on whether there should be a ground operation. Forty-one percent were against it, and 47 percent were for it, but if you include lower support among Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel, the total was just 40 percent support. So the more imminent war becomes, and the more that is understood about what a full-scale war means, people start to consider actual consequences and alternatives.

There is surprisingly little public opinion survey data on how Israelis feel about military conflict with Iran so far. I have only seen one survey published that specifically asked about Israel getting directly engaged with Iran. A credible pollster conducted it this year for a hawkish think tank, and it did not have a huge sample, but it’s a legitimate survey. The survey found that roughly two-thirds of the Israeli population support a strike on Iran. However, that’s a total. In fact, these responses were also broken down by more granular options: About 37 percent supported a strike only if the US cooperated/participated (in Hebrew, the term used can mean either of these), and only 31 percent of respondents supported a strike on Iran in any case.

The 30 percent or so that support a strike on Iran, no matter what, overlap with the 30 percent that pretty consistently support Bibi (Netanyahu’s nickname), his coalition, and other hardline positions. They are hardline position supporters. In a number of countries globally where we see a rise of the hard right, their support is typically about 30 percent among the population. As a pollster, I find that interesting.

STEFANIE HAUSHEER ALI: Is the Israeli public concerned about the economic impact of the war? Some companies are re-considering large new investments into Israel, especially if they have a significant personnel footprint.

DAHLIA SCHEINDLIN: Everybody has been affected by this economically on some level. There is serious damage to certain key industries, not necessarily Israel’s biggest industries, but [the damaged industries] are numerous: construction, largely because Israel has blocked Palestinian workers from coming in from the West Bank; tourism, both international and Israeli tourists; [and] the service industry. Forty-six thousand small businesses have closed, and [this number] may hit 60,000 by year-end, according to reports. For purposes of comparison, about 70,000 businesses closed during COVID, which was an economic disaster.

Anecdotally, I can tell you that businesses are suffering even if they are still open. In my entire neighborhood, you cannot buy things from many shops, restaurants, or cafes after four or five p.m. The city used to be open all hours. Now, a lot of places I used to go to in the early evening are closed due to human resource shortages with people serving in the reserves.

The deficit is rising to 8 percent of the GDP, which is way beyond what it was in recent years. The defense budget has basically doubled. It rose by 87 percent, which is a huge drain on the national budget. Right now, the government is debating the cuts that will be needed to finance this. They are considering slashing some ministries. We have a bloated government with thirty-three different ministries. They may cut all subsidies to a range of needy people, including Holocaust survivors. They are also considering taxing widely used medium-term tax-free savings plans that are very popular among the middle class.

There is also a lot of fear about the shekel. It’s been erratic during the year, and people are worried about a currency collapse. Some people are exporting their money or using shekels to buy dollars and export it.

STEFANIE HAUSHEER ALI: What is your perspective on public attitudes about the impact on reservists? There are reports of reservists who have closed their businesses and are fatigued from the lengthy service they have already done with no end to the war in sight. And how does the issue of the ultra-orthodox possibly being drafted for the first time come into the public conversation?

DAHLIA SCHEINDLIN: On the issue of the 76-year-old frustration that ultra-orthodox have been given a free ride as some Israelis see it, there was attention on this long before the war. We have to keep in mind that this is an unprecedented level of war for Israel. It is all-consuming at a day-to-day level. Israelis are aware that there are more significant efforts to draft them, and the overriding sense is it is a very unfair situation with the ultra-orthodox not part of the draft. The profound frustration doesn’t boil over because Israelis have been habituated to that grating, ongoing anger about this fundamentally unequal situation for the country’s entire history and because people are so consumed by day-to-day survival that they can’t bring themselves to rally around that issue. People have limited bandwidth with [unmanned aerial vehicles] coming in, rocket fire, displaced people, and hostages. There is now coincidentally a stronger argument than ever before [due to the ongoing war], backed by Supreme Court decisions, that the ultra-orthodox have to be drafted. It is not yet fundamentally changing the political scene, but the issue of religion versus state—and this issue specifically—has historically been a main trigger for collapsing governments.

Right now, people are demonstrating for three related reasons: first, the hostages; second, anti-government sentiment; and third, the desire for an independent investigative commission on October 7, 2023. They also know there is a mechanism moving towards a wider draft in Israel. In addition, people are so existentially scared that there is lots of talk about unity, so some people just don’t want to deepen the social divide right now.

STEFANIE HAUSHEER ALI: Some thought the August killing of six hostages—including one high-profile Israeli-American—might result in mass-scale protests that could topple the Netanyahu government, but that hasn’t happened. In fact, the opposite seems to be occurring, with attention focused on intensifying military campaigns on multiple fronts. Do you see a realistic scenario that could break Netanyahu’s coalition before the next scheduled election in October 2026?

DAHLIA SCHEINDLIN: Public opinion survey research shows Netanyahu has recovered a lot of what he lost since October 7, but he is nowhere near a majority. His coalition is recovering in all polls relative to the first six months but is still unable to achieve more than fifty-four seats out of 120 total in the Knesset. You need sixty-one to form a government. He’s not there.

Netanyahu’s personal ratings are better: He is now in the low 40 percent range. That’s where he was for years, so he is back up in the polls compared to the first six months of the war. But we vote based on party, not direct elections for an individual. His party, at best in polls, has gotten twenty-six seats—mostly fewer than that, currently around twenty-four—rather than the thirty-two it got in the last election of 2022.

Netanyahu just added a fragment of a party to his coalition. Now he has sixty-eight seats rather than sixty-four, so this is an insurance policy. His government can still stay if some members rebel.

Right now, there is no imminent crisis that could cause the government to collapse, at least for the next few months, especially with no hostage deal on the table. We may be at a turning point where people are so worried about the regional war we are in and the fighting is so severe that no politician would seek to collapse the government. We are pretty close to that line now.

Some opposition voters and critics of Netanyahu also worry there won’t be elections in 2026. They think the war could be ongoing, too severe, and that the government will find a reason to delay them. I don’t think it’s an unreasonable worry since this government has authoritarian and fascist tendencies and is not terribly interested in the democratic process.

Israeli governments tend to fall before four years, but we are in extraordinary times.

STEFANIE HAUSHEER ALI: You’ve argued that Netanyahu is not just beholden to the far right but has, in fact, “become more like them.” No Israeli politician seems to be countering the prime minister’s approach with a viable alternative. Where is the Israeli opposition and what factors are constraining them?

DAHLIA SCHEINDLIN: The Israeli opposition is almost a non-entity. There are parties that are technically not in the government, so we call them the opposition. All of those parties have been winning a majority in surveys since the war and since before the war. But those parties are facing the same exact problems of going into a coalition government together, which made it difficult for them when they formed that government in 2021, which only lasted one year and then collapsed. They wouldn’t have an easy time forming a coalition.

The biggest and most popular opposition party leading in surveys is the party of Benny Gantz. He has criticized Netanyahu, but no one knows what he stands for. He offers no vision. He joined the war coalition, and his main credential is he is a career military person. We don’t know what he understands about democracy or the rule of law or other issues that were animating Israel before the war. He doesn’t articulate anything about the kind of country he wants to build or lead or how it would be different from what Israel did before 2023. He doesn’t talk about a two-state solution or how to end the war or reach a comprehensive resolution for the occupation of Palestinians.

The current actual opposition leader is centrist Yair Lapid—he has the second biggest party according to the last election. He is centrist in the sense of being 100 percent behind the war. He is not interested in a deep rethinking of Israel. He is committed to liberal democratic institutions. Notably, he is the only recent Israeli prime minister to support the two-state solution publicly but has barely mentioned this since the war.

There is a lot of atrophy in the Israeli political system, and no one has been truly offering an alternative to the biggest questions that have been driving this conflict forward: the Israel-Palestine conflict, the nature of Israeli democracy, and the need for a shared constitutional basis for this country. Those issues cannot be separated.

STEFANIE HAUSHEER ALI: Where do you see Israeli public opinion going in terms of the future—particularly the two-state solution or a different formulation such as a confederation? You’ve written about the striking “mirror images” of victimhood on both sides. How would you assess these attitudes compared to attitudes in the past during major threats or conflicts? In other words, do you think these attitudes could moderate over time if the conflict or threat reduces? Are more Jewish Israelis now in favor of re-settling Gaza or “transferring” Palestinians out of the territory?

DAHLIA SCHEINDLIN: Only a minority of either side supports a two-state solution, with a slight recent rise among Palestinians. Forty percent of Palestinians support a two-state solution, compared to just over 20 percent of Jewish Israelis, a significant decline.

On the Jewish Israeli side, it is less because they are against a certain peace formulation and more that they are against any comprehensive political solution involving Palestinian independence because they don’t trust Palestinians, they don’t see a Palestinian leader who would be a partner for peace, and they see all Palestinians as implicated on October 7. A political or diplomatic resolution is just not the language Jewish Israelis are thinking about. Palestinians are much more desperate to change the situation.

Forty-two percent of Jewish Israelis say they support annexing the West Bank and giving Palestinians limited rights—twice the rate of Jewish Israelis who support a two-state solution. Thirty-three percent of Palestinians support an inverse formulation where they are given the land and Jewish Israelis are given limited rights.

These are not good trends, but changing the reality could change minds. If we end the war, get a ceasefire, get the hostages back, de-escalate the regional fronts, launch a new diplomatic framework for containing Iran with incentives and pressure, and there is generally less bloodshed in all directions, people could start to change their minds. Then, people could be much more wary of breaking a phase of less violence.

October 7 also largely strengthened existing views. If a person broadly had the worldview that occupation and an unresolved military conflict were bad for Israel, the events of the last year have just strengthened that. The same portion of Israeli society still identifies as left-wing. The [number] of people who identify as left-wing dipped after October 7, but then it went back to the previous low level. Some people expected left-wingers to admit the error of their ways, and some did, but many reverted. The right wing hasn’t grown either: It did initially, but then it went back down—though still a majority. When I ask people if they have changed their views, they say something along the lines of: “I think what I thought before October 7 but more so.”

Stefanie Hausheer Ali is an Atlantic Council nonresident fellow and a senior director at international affairs consulting firm Rice, Hadley, Gates & Manuel LLC. The information in this article represents the views and opinions of the author and does not necessarily represent the views or opinions of Rice, Hadley, Gates & Manuel LLC.

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Putin is making the most of a distracted and divided United States

Frederick Kempe — Wed, 30 Oct 2024 14:56:12 +0000

Russian President Vladimir Putin is moving on several fronts simultaneously, both military and political, to take advantage of a United States that is distracted and divided ahead of next week’s presidential election.

Putin’s risky move to bring thousands of North Korean soldiers to Russia to fight Ukraine, and his doubling down to push for pro-Kremlin electoral outcomes in Georgia and Moldova, all come as Washington is neither likely to respond in any meaningful way nor rally its allies in a manner that is sufficient for the challenge.

American neglect couldn’t come at a more perilous time. Autocratic aggressors are acting in increasing common cause, particularly through unprecedented defense-industrial cooperation, recognizing a rare chance to reshape the international order to their advantage, with the Biden administration losing steam and the two US presidential candidates focused more on defeating each other than any external foe.

“Western security officials have warned for months of growing cooperation between an ‘axis of adversaries,’ made up of Russia, North Korea, Iran, and China,” writes columnist Gideon Rachman in the Financial Times. “North Korean support for Russia is the most dramatic evidence yet of that axis in action.” Yet it has also been the most disregarded until now.

Rachman warns the West about its mistaken tendency to treat North Korea as an international joke, “a land of ill-fitting suits and bad haircuts that is more likely to launch a comic meme than a nuclear weapon,” rather than as part of a rising threat that is fielding advanced offensive cyber capabilities, had already delivered millions of shells and dozens of ballistic missiles to Russia, and now is providing thousands of its best forces.

“Like [Chinese leader Xi Jinping] and Putin, Kim Jong Un seems to be convinced that the US is in long-term decline,” writes Rachman. “He may sense a historic opportunity to prevail over his enemies, as part of a broader global realignment that Xi has hailed as ‘great changes unseen in a century.’”

Should Kim then turn his attention to aggression against South Korea, Putin many conclude that he owes him one.

New NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, who only became the Alliance’s top official this month, confirmed this week that North Korean military units have been deployed to Russia’s Kursk region for potential battle with Ukrainian troops, who have seized territory there. Pentagon officials estimate that as many as ten thousand North Korean soldiers have been sent to Russia for military training, among them the country’s elite special forces.

Even as Russia escalates militarily against Ukraine, it has deployed disinformation, influence operations, and money in Moldova and Georgia, working to turn back pro-Western majorities in both countries that favor eventual integration into the European Union (EU) and other Western institutions.

In Moldova, a pro-EU referendum won far more narrowly than anticipated, nevertheless enshrining the goal of joining the EU into the constitution, despite an extensive Russian influence campaign. That said, the pro-Western president, Maia Sandu, will face a runoff against a pro-Kremlin candidate on November 3 due to her failure to cross the 50 percent threshold in the first round.

In Georgia, the Kremlin-friendly Georgian Dream party is defending a declared but disputed victory last weekend against street protests and widespread charges of fraud. On Monday, tens of thousands of Georgians protested outside the nation’s parliament, many draped in EU and Georgian flags, responding to pro-Western President Salome Zourabichvili’s call to annul the “totally falsified” results.

“I do not recognize these elections,” Zourabichvili said. “Recognizing them would be tantamount to legitimizing Russia’s takeover of Georgia.” Describing documented evidence of ballot stuffing, bribery, and voter manipulation, she added, “We cannot surrender our European future for the sake of future generations.”

The Atlantic Council’s Brian Whitmore sees three potential outcomes: a peaceful pro-democracy revolution akin to Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution, a violent crackdown and suppression of the democratic opposition with covert Russian assistance, or direct Russian intervention.

“More than two decades after Georgian civil society came of age in the Rose Revolution,” writes Whitmore, “the country is headed for another decisive round. This weekend’s deeply flawed election was just the opening bell.”

Last week, BBC reporter Steve Rosenberg pressed the Russian president on whether his actions over the last two and a half years had increased or decreased security and stability. A defiant Putin launched into a bitter attack against Western institutions. “We want to change this, and we will change it,” he said.

That leaves the United States, Europe, and their allies with a difficult choice, writes Rachman: “Allow Russia to defeat Ukraine with North Korean assistance—and then contemplate the changed security picture in Europe and Asia. Or sharply increase their own support for Ukraine and their willingness to take risks in confronting an axis of adversaries.” For the moment, the greatest peril is US risk aversion in the face of increasing aggression. History hangs in the balance.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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Experts React: Georgia just concluded a contested election, with the country’s future at stake. Now what?

Atlantic Council experts — Sun, 27 Oct 2024 23:01:53 +0000

It’s a democratic stress test. Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party declared victory following Saturday’s pivotal vote, but opposition parties immediately challenged the outcome amid many reports of intimidation and some exit polls showing the opposition ahead. Refusing to recognize the official results and dismissing the contest as a “Russian special operation,” pro-Western President Salome Zourabichvili called on Georgians to come out in protest on Monday. Will Georgian Dream consolidate power and pull Georgia further toward Russia and away from Western institutions? What’s next for the opposition? How should the United States and the European Union (EU) respond? We polled our experts for their thoughts.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Daniel Fried: The US and EU need a plan for Georgian government repression

Leslie Shedd: As an election monitor, I saw Georgian Dream’s intimidation tactics up close

Brian Whitmore: This flawed election was just the opening bell in the opposition’s fight against Russian influence

Maia Nikoladze: The international community must question the legitimacy of this election

Laura Linderman: The elections were marred by intimidation and surveillance. Zourabichvili is right not to recognize them.

Andrew D’Anieri: In the election’s aftermath, Georgians’ civil liberties are at stake

The US and EU need a plan for Georgian government repression

Georgia’s authoritarian-minded ruling party Georgian Dream, led by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, has dubiously claimed victory in the country’s October 26 parliamentary elections, while the pro-democracy opposition has asserted fraud and the election-monitoring mission of the respected Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has cited extensive efforts to intimidate voters and manipulate the results. Tensions in the country are high, as are the chances of government repression to retain power.

Credible exit polls published on October 26 (from Mtavari and Formula TV) gave Georgian Dream 41 percent and 42 percent percent of the vote, respectively. The official Georgian Central Election Commission announced on October 26 that Georgian Dream had won with about 54 percent, at odds with this credible exit polling.

The elections occurred against a background of mounting authoritarian threats and actions by the Georgian government, including threats to outlaw opposition parties and a law putting pressure on civil-society groups that receive foreign funding.

Georgians have consistently and over many years expressed their desire to integrate with Europe and NATO. Russia has for years sought to undermine this option, using economic pressure, disinformation, and, in 2008, war. Russian propagandists have boasted that the October 26 elections marked a defeat for Western efforts to engineer “regime change” in Georgia.

Georgia’s President Salome Zourabichvili, who has publicly supported the democratic opposition, condemned the elections on October 27, characterizing the official results as illegitimate and the product of Russian efforts to subordinate the country. She announced a public demonstration for the evening of October 28.

The Georgian government is likely to press ahead with its claims of victory. The opposition demonstration on Monday is likely to be huge. Violence, instigated by the authorities directly or through surrogates, could ensue.

The United States and Europe (not counting Hungary’s pro-Russian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who congratulated Georgian Dream even before the government announced the results and may visit Tbilisi on Monday) face a crucial set of decisions. The West must decide how to characterize these patently bad elections, how to respond to the ruling party’s repression (including the potential for a Belarus- or Venezuela-style scenario of retaining power through force), and how to support the Georgian people in both the immediate period ahead and the longer term.

The United States has reportedly prepared sanctions against Georgian leaders, including Ivanishvili, which it will probably employ in the event of government-instigated violence or the government remaining committed to election fraud. The key variable will be whether Georgian society has the determination to resist, on a sustained basis, the imposition of authoritarian rule.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US assistant secretary of state for Europe.

As an election monitor, I saw Georgian Dream’s intimidation tactics up close

I traveled to Georgia to serve as one of the International Republican Institute’s short-term observers for the country’s parliamentary elections. As I witnessed first-hand, fears that the ruling party, Georgian Dream, would use aggressive and illegal tactics to secure a victory were realized.

Leading up to the election, there was a systemic and pervasive intimidation campaign. One of the most common stories I heard was employers forcing employees to turn over their IDs to either prevent them from voting or so those IDs could be used to commit voter fraud.

On Election Day, rules limiting campaign materials and campaigning near polling stations were unabashedly ignored. The most glaring violation I saw was in the town of Tkibuli, where a large screen displayed a video of the Tbilisi mayor, a Georgian Dream member, giving a speech, his voice ringing out over the city’s loudspeaker system. In addition, at most of the polling stations I visited, groups of people hovered outside watching voters come and go, creating an air of surveillance. They were often large, intimidating-looking men, in groups of three or four, not talking but simply watching.

A video plays of the Tbilisi mayor, a prominent Georgian Dream politician, outside a polling place in Tkibuli, with sound playing over city speakers. Photo by Leslie Shedd.

We also witnessed the activities of what appeared to be fake observer organizations deployed to “monitor” the elections. In the small town of Satsire, I met a woman working for one roughly translated as the “Georgia Lawyers Barristers International Organization.” For an hour and a half, we observed her approaching voters and walking them to the side of an adjacent building where she couldn’t be seen. When we asked her what she was doing, she hurriedly walked away while a different man who had also been “monitoring” the station demanded we leave. Worse, inside every single station I visited I witnessed a small video camera pointed at the voting booths or at the ballot boxes. I was told they were set up by Georgian Dream or election officials, purportedly for security and to prevent ballot stuffing.

This all sent a very clear message: We are watching.

—Leslie Shedd is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and the president of Rising Communications.

This flawed election was just the opening bell in the opposition’s fight against Russian influence

The battle for Georgian democracy is now headed for the streets, which is exactly where most observers have long expected it to end up. After an election marred by what international observers called vote buying, double voting, and voter intimidation, the ruling Georgia Dream party’s claim to have won a parliamentary majority lacks any legitimacy. In fact, it is absurd. Moreover, Zourabichvili’s refusal to recognize the result, and her call for street protests, fully and firmly aligns the largely ceremonial presidency, the only institution of the Georgian state that has not been captured by Russia, with Georgia’s pro-Western opposition.

The battle lines are drawn. So what happens next? If Zourabichvili’s allegation that Georgia is the victim of a Russian special operation is correct—and few serious observers of the region doubt that this is the case—it stands to reason that the Kremlin and its Georgian proxies have a plan for the day after, as well.

Georgia’s 2024 parliamentary election has entered its “Maidan” phase. There are three possible outcomes: This could lead to a redux of Georgia’s 2003 peaceful Rose Revolution in which street protests ousted a corrupt and authoritarian government. It could lead to a violent crackdown and suppression of the democratic opposition, with covert Russian assistance, as was the case in Belarus in 2020. Or it could provide the pretext for direct Russian intervention, as in Ukraine in 2014. More than two decades after Georgian civil society came of age in the Rose Revolution, the country is headed for another decisive round. This weekend’s deeply flawed election was just the opening bell.

—Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, an assistant professor of practice at the University of Texas-Arlington, and a founder and host of the Power Vertical Podcast.

The international community must question the legitimacy of this election

Georgia’s Central Election Commission (CEC), a government agency, reported that the ruling Georgian Dream has received about 54 percent of the votes so far. Opposition leaders have expressed concerns that CEC could be under pressure from the ruling party during these pivotal elections. Now CEC is under scrutiny from the public because of the widespread violations that took place in voting districts outside of big cities in Georgia, which have cast doubt on the legitimacy of these elections.

It is indeed suspicious that in a country where 79 percent of the population supports EU membership, 54 percent would vote for a party that has been driving a wedge between Georgia and its Western partners, most recently by adopting the controversial foreign-agent law and offshore law.

Before accepting the highly contested election results, the international community should question the legitimacy of the elections.

Violations such as ballot stuffing and voter intimidation appear to have had what one watchdog group called “a significant impact on the election results.” Both Transparency International and the International Society for Fair Elections and Monitoring have reported that 10 percent or more of the votes were impacted by “systemic fraud” and “widespread rigging.”

As the Georgian public and international observers navigate the challenging process to ensure that the Georgian people’s votes are accurately counted, Western policymakers should keep two things in mind:

1. The Georgian people are doing all they can to keep the country on a Western course, including by voting and volunteering to observe the elections, but they are not on a level playing field.

2. Pushing Georgia away from the West will only benefit the Russia-China-Iran axis, which could turn Georgia into an economic black hole if the Georgian government supports the evasion of sanctions and export controls.

—Maia Nikoladze is an associate director at the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

The elections were marred by intimidation and surveillance. Zourabichvili is right not to recognize them.

The official CEC results of the Georgian parliamentary elections have raised significant concerns regarding the integrity of the electoral process.

As Georgian domestic observation organizations and international observers have noted, the elections were marred by manipulation of the results through the strategic use of intimidation, surveillance, and targeted interventions in vulnerable areas of the voting system. It strains credulity to believe that the Georgian Dream party would receive its highest numbers since the 2012 election after massive protests this spring over its foreign-agent law and amid high voter turnout.

Eoghan Murphy, head of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) ODIHR election-observation mission, concluded that the parliamentary elections were not “in line with international democratic principles.” Considering the typically restrained standards of the OSCE’s commentary on elections, the ODIHR statement was remarkably critical for a diplomatic organization and outlined evidence that supports many of the claims made by national organizations and international observers.

I echo Zourabichvili’s assertion that the elections were a “Russian special operation,” and she is right not to recognize the results. The people of Georgia deserve free and fair elections that are not marked by the kinds of irregularities that both national and international observers observed on Saturday.

—Laura Linderman is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a senior fellow and program manager at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at the American Foreign Policy Council.

In the election’s aftermath, Georgians’ civil liberties are at stake

This weekend’s parliamentary elections in Georgia went largely according to the grim forecasts of many experts. The ruling Georgian Dream party appears to have cheated, mainly through widespread voter intimidation, particularly in small cities and rural areas. The Georgian Dream-friendly electoral commission declared the ruling party the victor, opposition voters and parties credibly alleged electoral fraud, and Tbilisi looks set for mass street protests Monday evening. Things could get ugly if the government deploys the new crowd-control materiel it has bragged about or if it deploys thugs to beat up protesters as it did in May.

At stake in the aftermath of this disputed election is nothing less than Georgians’ civil liberties. Egged on by Ivanishvili, Georgian Dream has already passed laws to harass civil-society organizations and to largely criminalize homosexuality, both of which the party could use to stifle dissent and jail political opponents if it remains in power. Georgian Dream’s “foreign-agent law” and “LGBTQI+ propaganda law” are lifted directly from the Russian playbook. But the ruling party won’t stop there. Its leaders have pledged to pass legislation to ban opposition political parties and codify a Belarus-style one-party autocracy. Georgian Dream has so far made good on its goals of limiting the freedoms of its citizens. We should believe party leaders when they say this is just the beginning.

The United States should continue to support Georgians’ right to self-determination and free and fair elections. More importantly, the Biden administration should have a significant policy response ready should Georgian authorities resort to further violence against protesters or political opponents.

—Andrew D’Anieri is a resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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Moldovan and Georgian elections highlight Russia’s regional ambitions

Katherine Spencer — Thu, 24 Oct 2024 21:31:52 +0000

Georgians go to the polls this weekend in a parliamentary election that is widely expected to determine whether the country will pursue integration with Moscow or the West. This closely mirrors the situation in Moldova, where voters face a similar choice on November 3 when the country holds the second round of its presidential election.

Allegations of undue Russian influence have overshadowed the ongoing election campaigns in Georgia and Moldova, highlighting the geopolitical significance of both votes. Critics have accused Moscow of engaging in everything from disinformation to voter bribery as part of Russian efforts to promote Kremlin-friendly candidates.

The first round of voting in Moldova took place last weekend and featured a separate referendum on enshrining the country’s European aspirations in their constitution, which voters backed by a razor-thin margin. Moldova’s pro-EU President Maia Sandu responded to this close win by suggesting that the Kremlin was engaged in a comprehensive campaign of election interference. “We have won the first battle in a difficult fight that will determine the future of our country,” she commented. “We fought fairly and won justly in an unjust struggle.”

Sandu’s claims of Russian meddling received prompt and strongly-worded backing from Brussels and Washington. Moldova’s presidential election and EU referendum campaigns had been marked by “really unprecedented intimidation and foreign interference by Russia and its proxies,” EU officials commented on Monday.

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The outlook ahead of this Saturday’s Georgian parliamentary vote is similar with one key difference: The country’s pro-Kremlin Georgian Dream party has already been in power for the past twelve years and is now looking to secure a mandate for its increasingly open advocacy of closer ties with Russia.

Officially, at least, the Georgian Dream party remains committed to furthering Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration. However, opponents claim that in practice, the party is becoming increasingly aligned with the Kremlin. They accuse the current authorities of passing authoritarian legislation such as a Russian-style “foreign agent law” that threatens to muzzle Georgia’s vibrant civil society.

The Georgian Dream political party was founded by the country’s richest man, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, who reportedly has extensive business ties to Russia. In recent months, Ivanishvili has attempted to attract voters by warning that election victory for his pro-Western opponents could lead to renewed hostilities with Russia, which continues to occupy around twenty percent of Georgia. “We choose peace, not war,” he told a rally in Tbilisi on Wednesday.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has cast a long shadow over Georgia’s parliamentary elections. During the final weeks of the campaign, Georgian Dream officials sparked controversy by unveiling a series of adverts juxtaposing grim photos of war-torn Ukraine with bright images of a peaceful and prosperous Georgia. “I have never seen anything so shameful, so offensive to our culture, traditions, history, and beliefs,” commented Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili.

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