Democratic Transitions - Atlantic Council

Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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Nine years after the Orange Revolution, Maidan would be the scene of a second Ukrainian revolution. This time, the spark came when Ukraine’s pro-Kremlin president, Viktor Yanukovych, pulled out of a long anticipated EU association agreement and unleashed the riot police against students who objected to this drastic geopolitical U-turn. Once again, millions of Ukrainians flocked to the capital and gathered on Maidan. This time, though, it would not be bloodless.

With strong backing from Russia, the Ukrainian authorities took a hard line approach to the protests, leading to weeks of running battles on Maidan and in the surrounding streets. The nadir came in late February 2014, when dozens of protesters were shot and killed in the city center. This Maidan massacre brought down the Yanukovych regime. With his support base evaporating, the disgraced Ukrainian president fled to Russia. Days later, Putin responded by invading Crimea. Russia’s war to extinguish Ukrainian statehood had begun.

The tragic events of February 2014 had a profound impact on Ukraine’s collective psyche and served to consecrate Maidan in the national imagination. Up until that point, the square had regularly hosted public holidays, pop concerts, and Christmas fairs. In the aftermath of the killings, such events were moved to other locations in the Ukrainian capital. Maidan itself would now be reserved for the most somber and significant occasions in the life of the nation, such as the funerals of soldiers, vigils for Ukrainians held captive in Russia, and memorials marking important Ukrainian anniversaries.

Since 2022, Maidan’s transformation has gained further momentum amid the shock and trauma of Russia’s full-scale invasion. During the initial stages of the war, people began planting flags on the square in memory of fallen soldiers. This impromptu memorial has since expanded organically to become a sea of flags and portraits commemorating those who have lost their lives in the defense of Ukraine. It is an authentic grassroots tribute that is entirely in keeping with the spirit of Maidan.

As Russia’s invasion has unfolded, Maidan’s role as the principal site for wartime mourning and reverence has served to confirm the square’s position at the heart of modern Ukraine’s national story. There could hardly be a more fitting location. After all, Vladimir Putin launched the current war because he viewed the emergence of an independent Ukraine as an intolerable threat to his own authoritarian regime and a potential catalyst for the next stage in Russia’s long retreat from empire.

Maidan embodies Putin’s darkest fears. The Russian dictator’s goal remains the destruction of Ukraine as a state and as a nation, but he is acutely aware that the country is slipping inexorably out of the Kremlin orbit. This is nowhere more evident than on Kyiv’s central square, which has become the ultimate symbol of Ukraine’s escape from empire and embrace of an independent identity.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

By contrast, Gabon enjoys a comparatively enhanced level of national wealth and societal prosperity. With a population of just 2.3 million people and vast reserves of oil, gold, and manganese, Gabon boasts the second-highest gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in continental Sub-Saharan Africa. It also has the third-highest prosperity score among the region’s countries in our Freedom and Prosperity Indexes, which measure prosperity levels across 164 countries by tracking income, health, inequality, environmental health, the treatment of minorities, and education. While Gabon suffers from a level of income inequality that rivals other countries in the region, on the whole, it is more prosperous than its West and Central African counterparts. Furthermore, while Gabon’s coup did give way to an interim military government, there was little to no post-coup conflict. And Gabon held democratic elections on April 12, 2025, that, while not without significant flaws, were nevertheless acclaimed by local, regional, and international observers as peaceful, lawful, and fair.

Gabon is more prosperous than its neighbors

Turning the page on the Bongo dynasty

In the weeks leading up the first election since the 2023 coup, Nguema’s picture could be seen plastered all over the capital city of Libreville. After serving as interim president for nineteen months, he was officially elected president on April 12, winning more than 90 percent of the vote. Both before and after the election, Nguema pledged to “restore dignity to the Gabonese people” and to root out the country’s corruption, which the legal subindex of our Freedom Index indicates is among the worst in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Despite these popular goals, the president has not been without his detractors. Such high vote shares are often indicative of corruption, and critics of Nguema note that he has long been a part of the corrupt political system he pledges to dismantle and that he broke his promise to relinquish power after deposing Bongo. In fact, Nguema is Bongo’s cousin and recently allowed Bongo and his wife to relocate to Angola despite them facing ongoing (but unspecified) corruption charges.

And although voter turnout was high and local observers were largely satisfied with the integrity of the election, Nguema’s most prominent opponent—former Prime Minister Alain Claude Bilie-By-Nze—accused Nguema of taking advantage of state resources to fund his campaign.

Furthermore, his interim government adopted a new constitution in 2024 that the Africa Center for Strategic Studies argues grants too much power to the executive and specifically favored Nguema. For example, the new constitution prevented a major political opponent from running in the election by banning candidates over seventy years of age. It also broke from past tradition by including a clause that allows military members to run in elections, extended the length of presidential terms to seven years, and eliminated the position of prime minister altogether. During Nguema’s time leading the interim government, he also suspended all political parties in a move that critics say gave him a distinct electoral advantage.

While Nguema was greeted with scenes of celebration after carrying out the 2023 coup and won an election victory indicative of overwhelming public support, it remains to be seen whether he is willing and able to instigate meaningful democratic reforms.

Yet, even if competition was restricted in this election, the very fact that it happened and that the Gabonese people were able to peacefully vote for someone other than a member of the Bongo family shows that there is an appetite for change and a willingness to engage in the most fundamental act of democracy.

In short, the years since the coup have provided both reason to believe that a more democratic future in Gabon is possible and reason to fear that Nguema is simply replacing the Bongo family’s form of autocracy with his own.

What the data tell us

The Freedom and Prosperity Indexes highlight a number of trends indicating that a country’s surest path to prosperity involves improving political and economic freedom, as well as the rule of law. Conversely, the data tell us that restricting freedom is a proven way to diminish societal well-being.

When a country experiences a freedom shock—meaning the one-year drop in its Freedom Index score is among the top 20 percent globally since 1995—its progress on prosperity tends to stall or even reverse as time goes on.

A country’s prosperity tends to stall or decline after experiencing a freedom shock

The drop in Gabon’s freedom score from 2022 to 2023 was among the most severe freedom shocks ever recorded—within the top 5 percent of one-year declines over the past thirty years. This decline was driven by a sharp dip in the country’s political freedom score, which was in turn driven by an even sharper fall in its elections score, which measures the extent to which political leaders are chosen in open, clean, and fair elections.

Gabon’s political freedom has declined sharply in recent years

Furthermore, out of the forty-six countries in Sub-Saharan Africa for which we have data, Gabon ranks thirtieth in the judicial independence and effectiveness indicator and thirty-eighth in the legislative constraints on the executive indicator.

Gabon’s judicial independence is below the regional average

Gabon’s executive has fewer legislative constraints than the regional average

It is important to recognize that these issues were fomented by the Bongo regime. However, the disempowered nature of the judiciary and legislature and the recent broad decline in political freedom show that Nguema must act quickly to reverse course before declines in freedom hinder Gabon’s long-term progress on prosperity. The country’s freedom score has changed very little in the time that Nguema has held power as interim president, with political freedom in further, albeit minimal, decline.

Despite Gabon’s impressive prosperity levels and per capita GDP in relation to its neighbors and to the broader Sub-Saharan Africa region, over one-third of the population currently lives in poverty. The Bongo family was known for gorging themselves on resource wealth while much of the population was left to suffer. Despite its high overall prosperity score, Gabon ranks in the bottom third of all Sub-Saharan African countries in the inequality component of the Prosperity Index. It has the fourth-highest unemployment rate in Sub-Saharan Africa, with over 20 percent of the total labor force—and 40 percent of young people—currently unemployed. If Nguema falls back on the autocratic habits of his predecessor and chooses personal wealth over the well-being of his country, any hope for democracy in Gabon that followed the 2023 coup will quickly die out.

The path to enduring freedom and prosperity

The data clearly show that establishing democracy as the political norm will help Gabon set itself apart from its neighbors and enhance national prosperity.

To create a strong and vibrant democracy, Nguema must first come to terms with the idea that his tenure as president is not indefinite. He must also commit himself to empowering core institutions of democracy such as the legislative branch and courts, and he must protect the societal freedoms that are fundamental to thriving democracies. This should include allowing political parties to exist and organize and lifting targeted age limits for presidential candidates.

By committing to competitive democracy and political freedom, Nguema can most effectively enhance prosperity and, in particular, reduce the inequality that has plagued Gabon for so long. It is too early to tell for sure whether Nguema has assumed the presidency with the intention of institutionalizing democracy and reducing inequality in Gabon or with the intention of ruling as an autocrat. What is certain is that the end of the Bongo regime—and the democratic impetus provided by the national election—provides Nguema with the opportunity to turn Gabon into the success story that West and Central Africa has been yearning for. For the good of the people who elected him, Nguema should do everything in his power to capitalize on it.

Will Mortenson is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center.

Correction: This article was updated on June 4, 2025, to reflect the fact that Gabon is located in Central Africa, not West Africa.

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In Syria’s fragile transition there’s a glimmer of a more stable Middle East

Charles Lister — Mon, 02 Jun 2025 14:00:00 +0000

For the better part of half a century, Syria has been an open wound in the heart of the Middle East, provoking instability, fueling conflict, and brutally suppressing its own people. Throughout Syria’s nearly fourteen-year civil crisis, a long list of destabilizing knock-on effects spilled over into neighboring countries and the world at large. The long-standing moniker of “what happens in Syria never stays in Syria” perfectly encapsulated what for most of the past decade looked to be a truly intractable crisis.

All of that changed on December 8, 2024, when Bashar al-Assad fled his palace in Damascus en route to a hurried and unexpected asylum in Russia. After a sudden and lightning-fast offensive, a coalition of armed opposition groups toppled Assad’s regime like a house of cards—in the space of ten days. All of a sudden, the international community has been presented with a historic and strategic opportunity to reshape the heart of the Middle East into a more stable, more integrated, and more constructive part of the region.

Syria’s ongoing transition is profoundly fragile. It faces enormous challenges, but it also presents the international community with a dilemma. Since day one, the transition has been led and dominated at the top by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a former affiliate of al-Qaeda that was originally born out of the Islamic State group’s predecessor movement, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). That historical baggage provides reason for pause when it comes to engaging Syria’s interim authorities.

However, the HTS of today is the outcome of nearly a decade of change. After splitting from ISIS in 2013, it went to war with the terror group. It publicly broke ties with al-Qaeda in 2016 and proceeded to facilitate the entry of thousands of soldiers into its territory by NATO member Turkey; agreed to and complied with a yearslong ceasefire brokered by Turkey and Russia; established a technocratic “salvation government” in northwest Syria that delivered a higher level of services than other regions of the country; launched crippling crackdowns on both ISIS and al-Qaeda; and began engaging with the international community behind closed doors. Throughout this formative post-2016 period, HTS’s ideology changed in ways that are arguably unprecedented in the history of the jihadist movement, with it not just turning away from global jihad, but turning against it—while embracing “revolution” and the green flag of Syria’s popular uprising.

Despite HTS and its leader Ahmed al-Sharaa being at the helm in Damascus, much of the international community has rushed to engage—calculating that contact and engagement offers a far greater chance of shaping the outcomes of a fragile transition than a policy of isolation. Initially, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland eased many sanctions linked to Syria’s economy, in the hope of breathing some life back into the country. For its part, the outgoing Biden administration introduced a six-month “general license” in January 2025, temporarily waiving some restrictive measures. But this had no effect in facilitating transactions with governing institutions in Syria.

After years of extraordinary conflict, Syria’s economy is broken and the humanitarian crisis worse than ever. Ninety percent of Syrians live under the poverty line; 70 percent of Syrians rely on aid; 99 percent of the Syrian pound’s value has been lost; 50 percent of the country’s basic infrastructure is destroyed; and fuel supplies have dropped to nearly zero. No matter who was running Syria’s transition, the prospects of successfully escaping such catastrophic conditions would be impossible without sanctions relief. Regional states—Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar, in particular—stand poised to flood Syria with investment, oil, electricity, and cash, but not while American sanctions prohibit them.

Taking advantage of the historic opportunity provided by Assad’s fall requires doing away with short-term tactical approaches and embracing a long-term view focused on Syrian and regional stability. On December 8, transitional authorities in Damascus were restricted only to HTS. Three months later, some things had changed: A national dialogue and conference had been held; broad committees had been formed to frame a constitutional declaration; and a transitional government was formed that significantly widened representation and technocratic rule in Syria’s ministries. The latter marked a significant broadening of government representation, with just four HTS members out of twenty-three ministers. More than half of the new cabinet members were educated and worked professionally in Europe and the United States. All in all, it marked a shift toward genuine, technocratic government.

Nevertheless, some instability continues. Deeply entrenched sociopolitical and sectarian tensions remain a source of acute concern, but a major spike in violence—as was seen on March 7-8, 2025—was short lived. A government-appointed investigative committee has been tasked with determining culpability for crimes. Meanwhile, structural issues relating to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), foreign fighters, and challenges posed by ISIS and an Alawite armed resistance all persist, but ultimately, a fragile transition still offers the best hope for gradual stabilization.

The United States and NATO face two options: to engage and conditionally support Syria’s transition in the hope that it will continue to consolidate control and broaden its representation; or to disengage and isolate the transition in favor or some other alternative. Neither is without risk, but the latter guarantees severe instability while the former aims to avoid it. President Trump’s announcement in Saudi Arabia in May 2025 that he intends to end all sanctions on Syria is a sign that strategic calculations are returning to the forefront of US policymaking on Syria. Subsequent public comments by Secretary of State Marco Rubio in front of Congress underlined that shift, as he suggested that if the United States did not lift sanctions, Syria was destined to collapse back into civil conflict. The key here will be time – how swiftly can executive waivers be issued to de facto remove sanctions restrictions on Syria’s economy? The EU’s decision on May 20 to lift all sanctions would suggest that things are set to move quickly. Should US diplomats return to Damascus, Syria could confidently be placed on a new trajectory of recovery.

Meanwhile, US Central Command (CENTCOM) has continued to play an instrumental role in facilitating negotiations between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Damascus, and in pressing the SDF to accept the framework agreement signed on March 11. Beginning in mid-December 2024, CENTCOM contact has included meetings with Sharaa and an established line of communication with the Defense and Interior ministries, through which counter-ISIS activities are coordinated, deconflicted, and planned. Since January 2024, at least eight ISIS plots have been foiled by the interim government in part due to intelligence provided by the United States. A surge in US drone strikes targeting legacy al-Qaeda operatives in Syria’s northwest in February 2025 was also almost certainly the result of a similar exchange.

With the United States determined to minimize its military and strategic investments in the Middle East and with NATO increasingly distracted by concerns in Europe, the prospect for stabilizing one of the thorniest and most destabilizing conflict theaters in recent history should be a no-brainer. Despite the risks and the many unknowns, prioritizing a strategy on Syria that is focused on shaping a stable and capable central government that is integrated into its neighborhood and capable of collectively resolving its own issues should be the only option on the table. That is the choice already made by Europe and the Middle East and the United States should follow suit. Should the Trump administration decisively join that track of engagement, the chances of Syria charting a course of stability will rise significantly.

Charles Lister is a senior fellow and head of the Syria Initiative at the Middle East Institute. Follow him on X at @Charles_Lister.

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The fall of Assad has opened a door. But can Syria seize the moment?

Qutaiba Idlbi, Charles Lister, and Marie Forestier — Mon, 02 Jun 2025 13:00:00 +0000

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For more than a decade, Syria’s crisis has caused unimaginable suffering inside the country and a constant stream of strategically significant spillover effects across the Middle East and globally. However, this dynamic changed in late 2024, when armed opposition groups in Syria’s northwest launched a sudden and unprecedentedly sophisticated and disciplined offensive, capturing the city of Aleppo and triggering an implosion of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. In the space of ten days, Assad’s rule collapsed like a house of cards, dealing a crippling blow to Iran’s role in Syria and significantly weakening Russia’s influence.

Now, for the first time in many years, Syria has a chance to recover and reintegrate into the international system. If the United States, Europe, Middle Eastern nations, and other stakeholders embrace the right approach, support the right policies, and encourage Syria’s transition to move in the appropriate direction, the world will benefit—and Syrians will find peace. The work of the Syria Strategy Project (SSP) and the policy recommendations in the report “Reimagining Syria: A roadmap for peace and prosperity beyond Assad” present a realistic and holistic vision for realizing that goal.

This report is the result of intensive joint efforts by the Atlantic Council, the Middle East Institute (MEI), and the European Institute of Peace (EIP), which have been collaborating since March 2024 on the SSP. At its core, the project has involved a sustained process of engagement with subject-matter experts and policymakers in the United States, Europe, and across the Middle East to develop a realistic and holistic strategic vision for sustainably resolving Syria’s crisis. This process, held almost entirely behind closed doors, incorporated Syrian experts, civil society organizations, and other stakeholders at every step.

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How the United States can support Cameroon as it faces its next democratic test

Jude Mutah — Fri, 30 May 2025 13:43:49 +0000

Cameroon’s upcoming presidential election, slated for October 2025, is set to be a showdown of critical importance for the country. It can either break Cameroon’s pattern of disputed and unfair elections, opening the door to a democratic shift for the country, or entrench that pattern, fueling instability and leaving opportunities untapped.

Ahead of this pivotal moment, the United States can act now to support a democratic electoral process in Cameroon and help the country navigate what unfolds after the vote.

Cameroonian President Paul Biya, now ninety-two years old and having held power since 1982, is one of Africa’s longest-ruling leaders. Over the course of his decades in office, elections have been routinely marred by fraud allegations and repression. In the country’s first multiparty elections, held in 1992, Biya clung to power amid accusations of rigging, and opposition leader John Fru Ndi was placed under house arrest during ensuing protests. More recently, in the 2018 election, Biya was declared the winner and credited with 71 percent of the vote, but there were irregularities: Turnout in the conflict-torn Anglophone regions was barely 10 percent. Protests over the result led to mass arrests of opposition supporters. Despite concerns about his age and health, Biya is expected to run again, presenting himself as the guarantor of stability. However, public clamoring for change has grown loud: Catholic bishops have urged Biya to step aside, and even a pro-government newspaper opined that the long-time leader “deserves a rest” in favor of new leadership.

Biya’s ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) and its allies are closing ranks to preserve power. Throughout 2024, several CPDM elites and patronage partners have pressed Biya to seek another term, touting his experience and warning that the country could suffer instability if he steps down. They are again mobilizing a broad coalition of smaller parties to back Biya, as in past elections. Meanwhile, intense behind-the-scenes jockeying is underway over who might succeed the aging president in a post-Biya scenario. Various power brokers have been floated as successors. Talk about one such name, Biya’s son Franck, has raised fears of an undemocratic dynastic transition. The uncertainty around succession is a significant risk factor, a ticking time bomb that could trigger factional infighting if not managed transparently.

The opposition sees 2025 as a rare chance to finally end decades of one-person rule. Over thirty opposition parties have allied to unify behind a single candidate, Maurice Kamto, aiming to overcome Cameroon’s one-round, first-past-the-post system that has historically favored the incumbent. Kamto—a former minister who insists he won the 2018 election—is campaigning on anti-corruption and reform, tapping into public yearning for change. Yet the regime has moved aggressively to undercut this challenge. Early this year, authorities banned two opposition coalitions, calling them “illegal” and “clandestine” associations, driving Kamto’s alliance underground. Legal obstacles are piling up: Election law requires a candidate’s party to hold parliamentary seats, but the Cameroon Renaissance Movement (MRC), Kamto’s party, has none after it encouraged Cameroonians to boycott a flawed 2020 legislative vote. In a brazen step, the CPDM-dominated government postponed the next legislative elections to 2026, denying the opposition any chance to gain seats before the presidential race.

Meanwhile, harassment of those who dissent continues unabated—activists and journalists are detained on spurious charges, peaceful protests are barred, and media outlets critical of the regime are silenced. These tactics cast doubt on whether the 2025 polls will be free or fair, absent significant pressure for a level playing field. Nevertheless, civil society and youth activists have been mobilizing: In 2024, they led mass voter registration drives to encourage turnout, signaling a grassroots appetite for change despite the odds.

The stakes extend beyond who wins. They encompass Cameroon’s stability, economy, and regional security. A flawed election could inflame simmering conflicts and public frustrations. The Anglophone Crisis in the country’s Northwest and Southwest regions has already killed over six thousand people and displaced nearly 700,000 internally, with around 100,000 more fleeing to Nigeria as refugees. Separatist militants reject the upcoming election and have violently enforced boycotts in those regions before, leaving a significant portion of the population disenfranchised.

Elsewhere, a contested outcome or a result marred by repression could spark unrest among a young population increasingly fed up with corruption and lack of opportunity. Ethno-regional tensions might also flare if a perceived power grab fuels resentment among communities who feel excluded. By contrast, a credible election and peaceful outcome would give the next government a mandate to address these crises, from pursuing a political solution to the Anglophone conflict to focusing the military on the Boko Haram insurgency in the Far North region. Cameroon is richly endowed with oil, timber, and fertile land, but its economic potential has been blunted by graft and mismanagement. Decades of kleptocratic governance have left over half the population impoverished. Another seven years of business-as-usual would likely deepen economic malaise and alienation, whereas a new commitment among leadership to reform could attract investment and better harness Cameroon’s resources for development.

International actors are watching closely, as Cameroon’s trajectory will impact Central African stability. France—Cameroon’s former colonial ruler—has backed Biya in the past, though French officials now avoid openly taking sides. The United States and European Union (EU) regularly urge fair elections and respect for human rights (the United States, for example, cut some military aid due to abuses in Anglophone regions). Still, their security cooperation interests temper Western leverage.

Meanwhile, other external players are exploiting the situation: Russian-linked media in Cameroon spread anti-Western narratives to bolster Biya’s regime. Regional governments, many led by entrenched leaders, generally prefer Biya to stay in power and are unlikely to press for change, prioritizing stability over democracy.

Ultimately, Cameroon’s future will be decided at home. A genuinely free and fair election would bolster Cameroon’s international standing and unlock greater foreign support, whereas a blatantly rigged vote may isolate the regime and sow internal turmoil.

Cameroon’s vote is about more than the country’s democratic future: As one analysis noted, it is part of a broader test of whether Africa’s elections will uphold democratic norms or contribute to a slide backward. Here is how the United States can help support democracy in Cameroon during this pivotal election year:

Use diplomacy to promote a free and fair election: The United States should convince Cameroonian leaders, both publicly and privately, to uphold democratic norms in the 2025 vote. Diplomatic engagement should emphasize that opposition candidates must be allowed to compete freely, international observers should be admitted, and security forces must refrain from violence. Coordinating these messages with allies (France, the EU, and the African Union) will increase impact and help deter electoral misconduct.
Leverage aid and security ties: Washington should tie aspects of its assistance to Cameroon’s electoral conduct and respect for human rights. The prospect of continued military aid and business engagement can be made conditional on the regime permitting a transparent election and avoiding crackdowns. Conversely, a blatantly fraudulent or violent process should prompt targeted consequences (such as visa bans or aid suspensions). By calibrating incentives and penalties, the United States can encourage accountability without undermining vital counterterrorism cooperation.
Support election monitoring and civic engagement: To reduce the risk of fraud or unrest, the United States should back robust election-observation and civil-society initiatives. This includes supporting credible international and domestic observers and assisting local groups in voter education and parallel vote tabulation. Such efforts—coordinated with other partners—will bolster public confidence in the process, deter manipulation, and empower Cameroonians to defend their votes peacefully.
Plan for post-election stability and reforms: The United States should prepare to help Cameroon navigate the vote’s aftermath. If the election results are disputed or violence looms, Washington (with African partners and United Nations agencies) can offer to facilitate dialogue or mediation to prevent escalation. In any outcome, the United States should encourage the winning candidate to pursue inclusive reforms—for example, an inclusive national dialogue to address the Anglophone Crisis and to introduce tangible anticorruption measures. Targeted US support (diplomatic partnership, technical aid, and peacebuilding programs) can be leveraged to help achieve these steps, reinforcing that long-term US partnership will deepen if Cameroon advances stability, inclusivity, and good governance.

Jude Mutah is a policy expert and practitioner in democracy support, peacebuilding, and governance, with over a decade of experience across Africa. He holds a Doctorate in Public Administration from the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Baltimore.

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From rubble to rebirth: A model for Syria’s reconstruction

Mahmood Alhosain — Thu, 08 May 2025 15:53:47 +0000

Almost six months have passed since Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell in Syria. The most notable event of this transitional phase was the establishment of a new Syrian government in late March 2025, consisting of twenty-three ministers from different backgrounds.

The new government has inherited the aftermath of more than five decades of authoritarian rule, compounded by the devastating consequences of nearly fourteen years of armed conflict. In addition, Syria continues to grapple with the impact of harsh international sanctions, which were imposed in response to the al-Assad regime’s widespread human rights violations. These challenges have rendered Syria a fragile state, with its institutions on the verge of total collapse.

However, the fall of the dictatorial regime and the formation of a new government offer an opportunity to begin rebuilding state institutions. Whether this new Damascus can seize this opportunity relies on four key pillars: achieving security and political stability, fostering inclusive political participation, establishing justice as a precondition for sustainable peace, and lifting sanctions to prevent the resurgence of violence.

The first pillar: Security and political stability

A deeply fragile security landscape, shaped by two major challenges, hinders Syria’s progress toward stability.

The first challenge is that the regions outside of the new Syrian government’s control, particularly the Jazira region of Eastern Syria—the provinces of Hasakah, Raqqa, and the eastern part of Deir ez-Zor—are currently under the authority of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). In March 2025, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi signed an agreement outlining the integration of the SDF into the institutions of the newly formed Syrian state. However, the agreement remains vague in its provisions and lacks a concrete timeline for implementation.

Subsequently, it is imperative that the international coalition—led by the United States, which still maintains military presence in Syria—plays a proactive role in facilitating the agreement’s execution. This involves applying political pressure and actively sponsoring dialogue between the parties to foster mutual understanding and avoid any potential military confrontation.

Nevertheless, spoilers are working to derail any potential agreement between the Syrian government and the SDF. Among them is the hardline faction within the SDF, primarily composed of foreign cadres affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). They oppose the agreement because its implementation would significantly diminish their influence, including restoring Damascus’s authority over oil and gas sites currently under SDF control. The shift would also undermine the influence of prominent SDF warlords, many of whom are PKK affiliates wielding unchecked authority.

Consequently, they have sought to escalate tensions and resist cooperating with the new administration, as seen with the SDF’s recent crackdown on civilians who displayed the new Syrian national flag. Moreover, according to human rights organizations, the SDF arrested 93 civilians in March 2025, including seven children.

The second challenge is Israel’s incessant military operations, which pose grave risks for Syria, the region, and Israel itself.

Fragmentation of the Syrian state could invite renewed foreign interference, particularly from Iran, which may view Syria’s weakened and divided state as a strategic opportunity to expand its influence.

But for Israel, the military campaign in Syria serves an objective of systematic destruction of Syrian military infrastructure to prevent the rebuilding of a functional defense apparatus. This also assists Israel in implementing a new regional security landscape, aimed at obstructing stabilization efforts through continued airstrikes and ground incursions.

Change in this calculus must come through pressure. The international community—particularly the European Union, Arab states, and the United States—must exert more meaningful and sustained diplomatic efforts to halt Israel’s military actions if they want to achieve sustainable peace in Syria.

The second pillar: Inclusive political participation

In Syria, decades of exclusion and sectarian domination under the al-Assad regime dismantled social cohesion and eroded political trust. It will be crucial to establish a political system that ensures genuine participation for all societal components—political, sectarian, ethnic groups, and civil society organizations. Such a system must provide for the equitable distribution of political and administrative influence through effective participatory mechanisms.

While the new Syrian administration has launched a national dialogue and appointed a qualified government, political participation must go beyond surface-level representation. Participatory governance must be the foundation for rebuilding state institutions. Any political exclusion or power monopolization risks driving certain groups toward disengagement or opposition, transforming them from constructive participants into potential nemeses of the political process.

Achieving this requires pursuing two complementary paths: both a top-down and a bottom-up approach.

The top-down model necessitates that the government lead by initiating structured and transparent programs that facilitate political inclusion. This includes continuing the national dialogue on foundational issues like transitional justice, constitutional reform, state structure, the political system, and foreign relations. These dialogues must be inclusive and truly representative of Syria’s diverse fabric.
Notably, Syrian public opinion demonstrates clear rejection of sectarian-based systems, favoring instead frameworks rooted in civil representation and citizenship. The new Syrian government must treat all Syrians as individual citizens, rather than as members of religious or ethnic groups, and anchoring national discourse in the concept of citizenship is fundamental.

Equally vital is the bottom-up role of civil society in advancing political transition and decision-making. Civil society should be granted the necessary space to operate freely, reflecting Syrian societal dynamics and avoiding inflaming social sensitivities. Valuable lessons can be drawn from the experiences of exiled Syrian civil actors, who—during the war—demonstrated a clear willingness to engage politically. According to the literature, these initiatives reveal strong potential for grassroots engagement. Building on these experiences is crucial for forming a cohesive, credible civil society capable of playing a constructive role in stabilization and institutional rebuilding.

The third pillar: Transitional justice

Transitional justice is pivotal for achieving sustainable peace in Syria. After more than a decade of violent conflict—fueled by an authoritarian regime responsible for killing hundreds of thousands and displacing millions—there is growing consensus that any political settlement that neglects Syrians’ demands for accountability will neither end the violence, nor enable legitimate and stable state building.

Lack of transitional justice fosters a culture of impunity and fuels the risk of renewed violence, driven by cycles of personal and collective vengeance. As numerous studies have shown, accountability goes beyond a legal or ethical imperative—it is a structural requirement for achieving long-term stability and peace.

It also includes a social and moral process that must begin with public acknowledgment of the suffering endured by victims and their families throughout the 14-year war. Such acknowledgment lays the groundwork for reparations and paves the way for meaningful national reconciliation, helping to move beyond nearly half a century of repression and violence.

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The literature on conflict and transitional justice highlights the importance of context-specific approaches. In Syria, this means that transitional justice must be rooted in the aspirations of Syrians, particularly survivors of violence, internally displaced persons, and refugees. Empirical research on Syrian refugee communities abroad confirms that many see justice as essential to achieving sustainable peace.

Therefore, the new government needs to initiate a transparent and credible transitional justice process supported by the international community. This process must include well-defined implementation mechanisms aligned with international legal standards and grounded in justice and human rights principles. Moreover, it should avoid transplanting external justice models, as approaches that are not adapted to Syria’s social and political context may reinforce ethnic and sectarian divisions rather than heal them.

This effort demands sincere political will, robust institutional frameworks, and the active participation of a broad range of actors, including human rights and legal organizations, civil society groups, and local communities. Furthermore, sustained support from international institutions, particularly the United Nations, is essential to ensuring the effectiveness of the transitional justice process.

The fourth pillar: Lifting sanctions

In the wake of the regime’s collapse, lifting sanctions has become paramount to achieving two core objectives. First, enabling the reconstruction of state institutions. And second, alleviating the profound economic suffering endured by the Syrian civilian population.

The continuation of sanctions severely impedes stabilization and early recovery efforts. Without access to financial and material resources, the state remains incapable of delivering basic services, perpetuating Syria’s status as a fragile state. This vacuum risks fostering environments conducive to radicalization and renewed violence, which could destabilize Syria and the broader region.

Years of economic isolation have induced severe shortages in basic goods, rampant inflation, record unemployment, and a dramatic depreciation of the Syrian pound. These conditions have exacerbated poverty and social disintegration, undermining any prospect for national reconciliation and peacebuilding.

Economic sanctions against Syria are exceedingly complex. Following the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011, the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations imposed comprehensive sanctions in response to the al-Assad regime’s widespread violence against civilians.

US sanctions have proven to be the most stringent, as they are open-ended with no built-in expiration, unlike EU sanctions, which are subject to annual renewal. Additionally, US sanctions on Syria predate the 2011 uprising, tracing back to 1979 when Washington designated Syria a State Sponsor of Terrorism. The most expansive US sanctions to date were imposed after 2011, culminating in the Caesar Act, which significantly intensified financial and economic restrictions on the regime and its affiliates.

While reports have surfaced indicating that the United States has outlined certain conditions for sanction relief—such as addressing the issue of foreign fighters—it is imperative that the new Syrian administration prioritize meaningful internal reforms. These reforms should include guaranteeing fundamental rights, refraining from suppressing individual freedoms, enhancing transparency, and reinforcing the rule of law. Commitment to these principles will likely prove more effective in building international confidence than focusing solely on foreign policy overtures.

Rebuilding Syrian state institutions in the post-Assad era requires a comprehensive, multi-dimensional approach integrating security and political stability, inclusive political participation, transitional justice, and sustained efforts to lift economic sanctions. Achieving this requires the support of both international actors and local stakeholders to ensure sustainable peace and stability.

Mahmood Alhosain is a PhD candidate in Conflict and Peace Studies in the political science department at Radboud University. His areas of interest focus on: Post-conflict studies, development, and deconstruction.

The post From rubble to rebirth: A model for Syria’s reconstruction appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Four contests for democracy in Europe challenge the narrative of advancing authoritarianism

Daniel Fried — Mon, 21 Apr 2025 14:14:55 +0000

Today, we are bombarded with evidence of rising authoritarianism and retreating liberal democracy, from Russian aggression in Europe to the democratic decline and degradation recently documented by Freedom House and the Economist Intelligence Unit. These twin trends are real and reshaping global affairs. But they do not tell the full story. Consider events that have been unfolding over the past weeks and months in countries in and around Europe, where large and in several cases sustained pro-democracy demonstrations have put some authoritarian regimes on the defensive.

Before zooming in on these storylines, it’s useful to zoom out on the broader sweep of history: For two centuries, Europe has advanced toward liberal democracy in uneven cycles: in 1848, a wave of mostly unsuccessful liberal and patriotic revolts; in 1918, the establishment of mostly liberal-democratic successors to the fallen Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires in Central and Eastern Europe; in the 1920s and 1930s, a surge of authoritarian and fascist takeovers; after 1945, democratic restoration in Western Europe under Pax Americana and Soviet imposition of communism in Central and Eastern Europe; and in 1989-91, a series of mostly successful liberal and patriotic revolts in Central and Eastern Europe. The twenty-first century has featured the ascent of nationalist, populist, and illiberal politics in Western Europe along with authoritarian and illiberal challenges or regression in Central and Eastern Europe.

These contemporary trends are on display in Hungary and Serbia, with the latter locked in a conflict between nationalism and liberal democracy since the violent breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Further east, in Turkey, the democratic opening and economic success that marked the early years of the AK Party’s rule have since steadily eroded. While nearby Georgia experienced a wave of economic and some democratic reform after the popular Rose Revolution in 2003, it has gradually slid into authoritarianism under Georgian Dream after the party was democratically elected in 2012.

Now, however, pro-democracy demonstrators are turning out in big numbers in Budapest, Belgrade, Istanbul, and Tbilisi. The specific grievances propelling people to the streets vary, but all challenge political authoritarianism and cronyism. So far, these protests have not resulted in any changes of regime—and they may never do so. But, if nothing else, the upsurge of democratic action in the face of threats and repression challenges and complicates the dark narrative that authoritarianism is inexorably on the march across Europe.

Below are closer looks at how these consequential contests for democracy are playing out, drawing on assessments that knowledgeable observers connected with these countries shared with me.

Tbilisi

Georgia

Budapest

Hungary

Belgrade

Serbia

Istanbul

Turkey

Tbilisi, Georgia

For nearly one hundred and fifty days, Georgians have taken to the streets in protest, resisting an authoritarian system imposed on them through Russian-backed state capture and information and electoral manipulation.

The ruling Georgian Dream party, led by Georgian businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili—whom the United States has sanctioned under an executive order targeting Kremlin agents—was initially freely elected but has spent the past decade consolidating power over all branches of government and aiming to do the same with independent media and civil society, squandering a democratic mandate in favor of raw power. A “foreign agents” law, modeled after Russian legislation, has been revived to brand Western-funded nongovernmental organizations and independent media as enemies of the state and force them out of public life. US-sanctioned Chinese surveillance tools track demonstrators with precision yet somehow fail to identify the police officers and men in black uniforms who abduct, beat, and torture protesters and reporters. Independent journalists and civic activists are jailed on politically motivated charges. Repressive laws are mounting, designed to silence dissent and tighten the regime’s grip. What was once a slow erosion of democratic space has become a galloping assault on it.

Civil resistance began slowly, in the aftermath of parliamentary elections in October 2024 that were criticized by international observers. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, for example, noted “serious concerns” about “the independence of institutions involved in the election process and pressure on voters.” That resistance surged after Georgian Dream announced in late November that it intended to abandon Georgia’s path toward European Union (EU) membership, a goal that is supported by more than 80 percent of the population and enshrined in the Georgian constitution. Resistance was not partisan but civilizational, as it was in Ukraine in 2014: a movement for a European, not a post-Soviet, future.

In Tbilisi and across the country, public servants, artists, educators, business owners, and students joined forces in a show of unity rarely achieved in the country’s modern history. Even ambassadors have resigned in protest. Despite the government raising fines—now set well above the average monthly salary—threatening livelihoods, and weaponizing the legal system, the protesters remain undeterred week after week. They are demanding new elections, the release of political prisoners, and a commitment to seek a European future.

One Georgian sympathetic to the demonstrators put the stakes this way: “For over a decade, Georgia’s ruling party cloaked itself in pro-Western rhetoric, masking a steady drift toward illiberalism. But after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the mask slipped. The allegiances of the current regime in Tbilisi lie elsewhere: openly aligned with Moscow, increasingly tied to Beijing, and comfortably situated within a growing authoritarian bloc that seeks to discredit liberal democracy, declare it obsolete, and replace it with a new world order shaped in its image.”

Budapest, Hungary

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz Party have consolidated power and defeated rivals since he assumed power for a second time in 2010. Orbán has emerged as a leading advocate of “illiberal democracy” (he helped coin the phrase), attracting ideological sympathizers, especially from the United States. His governance has included cultural conservatism and emphasis on what Fidesz terms traditional values; rhetorical hostility toward the European Union, notwithstanding the substantial EU funding Hungary receives; authoritarian political evolution; and flirtation with Russia. Some of this political agenda has significant support in Hungary, but credible charges of corruption and economic stagnation have begun to change that picture.

Displaying a desire for change, hundreds of thousands of Hungarians attended a March 15 National Day event organized by the main opposition right-of-center party, the Tisztelet és Szabadság Párt (Respect and Freedom Party), which is abbreviated as Tisza. The demonstrations have continued in the weeks since, even as protesters face increasingly frequent and aggressive attacks.

Tisza is a comet in the Hungarian political landscape. Founded just a year ago, it is led by Peter Magyar, a former Fidesz member who resigned from his government post in protest in February 2024, accusing the ruling party of corruption. Now a fierce critic of Orbán and Fidesz, Magyar is targeting state-level corruption, the poor performance of the economy, and the government’s dismantling of the pillars of democracy. The demonstrations and strong showing by Tisza have occurred despite Orbán’s control of the national media, a smear campaign unleashed against Magyar, and the increasingly threatening and toxic environment in which the Hungarian opposition operates.

Orbán appears worried about upcoming national elections in 2026. His speech during National Day on March 15 was perhaps the ugliest address he’s ever delivered. He called for an Easter “clean-up” and labeled his opponents “bed bugs”—echoing, to Hungarians’ ears, Hungarian fascist speeches from the 1930s and 1940s. His rubber-stamp parliament has further restricted laws governing free assembly. On March 19, it banned LGBTQI+ pride marches. With the tanking of the economy and the highest inflation rate in the EU, Hungary’s political winds may be shifting.

In describing the change afoot in his native country, a veteran of Hungary’s successful democratic dissident movement in the 1980s relayed an anecdote. As he walked by a group of Tisza supporters gathering for a demonstration in Budapest, he said, “Go, Tisza, go.” In an apparent allusion to Tisza’s other meaning as the name of the second-largest river in Hungary, they responded, “We are flooding. We are flooding.”

People gather at the Elisabeth Bridge as they take part in a demonstration against the banning of the annual Pride march and curbing the rights of assembly, in Budapest, Hungary, April 1, 2025. REUTERS/Bernadett Szabo

Belgrade, Serbia

Protests in Serbia have been ongoing for more than five months. They were sparked by a tragedy on November 1, 2024, when the canopy of a newly renovated train station in the northern city of Novi Sad collapsed, killing fifteen people. The cause of the disaster was corruption; the project was vastly overpriced, and the building was opened without the necessary permits.

Unlike many protests in the past, the demonstrations across Serbia today are led by students with no formal or singular leader, making them difficult for the authorities to control. The demonstrators’ main demand is not a change of government but the enforcement of the law. They want the government to investigate corruption and the hold those responsible for it accountable.

Serbia has one of the most acute brain drains in Europe. It ranks among the top countries for youth emigration, especially in information technology, medicine, and engineering. However, students from state universities who are participating in these protests consistently emphasize that they do not want to leave Serbia. Instead, they explain that they want to stay and live in a normal, free country where institutions do their job, where young people can build a future without political interference, and where democratic principles are respected.

Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, whose roots are in Serbian nationalist politics, has dismissed the accusations against the government, claiming that protesters’ demands have already been met after officials published thousands of documents related to the construction of the Novi Sad train station, prosecutors placed more than a dozen people in custody over the canopy collapse, and Prime Minister Miloš Vučević stepped down in January. With the media largely under government influence, students have resorted to unconventional methods to express their views. They have walked across Serbia to personally spread their message, culminating in the largest protest in the country’s history, with an estimated 325,000 participants, on March 15.

Despite the peaceful nature of the March 15 protests, during the fifteen minutes of silence in honor of the victims of the Novi Sad disaster, authorities appear to have used a sonic weapon, or long-range acoustic device—a nonlethal device that emits high-intensity sound waves to cause disorientation and pain. As a result, hundreds of people reportedly required medical assistance. Initially, the government denied possessing such a weapon, but evidence later surfaced that it had purchased the device, and multiple photos appear to show it on a police jeep parked in front of the National Assembly on the day of the protest. Many Serbians believe that the intent was to provoke chaos, giving the government a pretext for imposing a state of emergency.

What comes next? Possible scenarios include a general strike to increase pressure on the government to form a transitional or expert government, with a mandate limited to six to twelve months. This approach might fulfill the students’ demands and ensure the holding of free and fair elections, or it could lead instead to increased state repression. As a Serbian observer put it, “Vučić is balancing between crackdowns and electoral manipulation, but one thing is clear: Students—strongly supported by university professors and deans, high school teachers, farmers, and many other Serbian citizens—have emerged as a crucial political force, determined to persist in their fight for justice.”

Istanbul, Turkey

The jailing on March 19 of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, who is seen as the main rival to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, set off nationwide demonstrations under the slogan “Right, Law, Justice” despite a temporary ban on gatherings. These are the largest protests in the country since the 2013 Gezi Park protests.

Prior to İmamoğlu’s jailing, the main political opposition in the country, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), was preparing to hold primaries to elect its presidential candidate for the 2028 elections amid speculation about a potential early election. İmamoğlu was expected to be elected as the CHP’s presidential candidate, given his popularity across the political spectrum. İmamoğlu has won the Istanbul mayorship—often considered a key indicator of national political trends (Erdogan himself was once Istanbul’s mayor)—three times: first in 2019, with the elections then repeated due to alleged irregularities, and most recently in 2024.

On March 18, only five days before the CHP primaries, İmamoğlu’s university nullified his bachelor’s degree, citing alleged irregularities. Since a bachelor’s degree is a requirement for the presidency in Turkey, the move has jeopardized İmamoğlu’s candidacy. The next day, on March 19, İmamoğlu was detained in an investigation over corruption and support for terrorist organizations. His detention sparked widespread protests across the country, with many viewing it as politically motivated. Despite the protests, the Turkish courts officially ordered İmamoğlu’s arrest for corruption charges on March 23. On the same day, the CHP held its primaries for official party members as scheduled, with an additional invitation extended to all Turkish citizens to vote in symbolic “support” ballot boxes. While İmamoğlu was being transferred to Silivri Prison—notorious for holding individuals accused of political crimes—more than fifteen million Turks voted for him to be the next opposition presidential candidate.

In the weeks since, Saraçhane district, where the İstanbul town hall is located, has been the scene of protests and nightly condemnation speeches by CHP leader Özgür Özel. Drone footage shows hundreds of thousands of people in and around the square, with more protesters also converging around other municipal buildings. Many nights at 8:00 p.m., the sounds of pans, whistles, car horns, and shouts of protest slogans rise in Istanbul and other major cities.

Across Turkey, university students are at the forefront of the protests, joined by members of parliament and bar associations. The demonstrations start peacefully but often escalate through the night into violent confrontations with the police, with widespread use of rubber bullets, pepper gas, and water cannons. At least 1,900 people have reportedly been detained, including students, academics, lawyers, and journalists. The social media platform X initially deactivated opposition accounts. After facing backlash from international media, however, it issued a statement condemning the pressure it received from Turkish courts.

While the street protests have mostly calmed down following the Eid holidays, a broader economic boycott called by the CHP continues. Many Turks are avoiding some major media outlets, bookstores, coffeeshops, bus companies, and furniture brands for either failing to cover the protests, mistreating the demonstrators, or generally being perceived as close to government figures.

Since March 19, a broad segment of Turkish society has taken to the streets and to social media to express a growing concern that the democratic will of the people is under threat. Turkish observers shared that many Turks view what happened to İmamoğlu as a tipping point, reinforcing longstanding apprehension about the gradual erosion of democratic values in the Turkish Republic.

***

These are ongoing, unfinished storylines that have produced no definitive results so far. Popular protest can rise and fall. Democratic dissent fails more often than it succeeds. Authorities have the guns and thus the advantage on any given day. New forms of information manipulation may give an additional edge to incumbent authoritarian regimes.

And yet, the dissidents of the Baltic states, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland’s Solidarity movement were all written off by Western experts in and out of government, who urged “realism” and resignation. As it turned out, pro-democracy movements can, sometimes, bend the arc of history despite the odds and the skeptics. Talk of the irresistible rise of authoritarianism may be premature.

Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He is also on the board of directors of the National Endowment for Democracy and a visiting professor at Warsaw University. Fried served for forty years in the US Foreign Service. He is a former US ambassador to Poland, assistant secretary of state for Europe, and coordinator of sanctions policy. Follow him on X @AmbDanFried.

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Charai joins TV Abraham to discuss how Trump can curb the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region

Atlantic Council — Wed, 16 Apr 2025 22:15:47 +0000

Original source

The post Charai joins TV Abraham to discuss how Trump can curb the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Tahir in MSNBC on how Trump’s decision to cut Radio Free Europe comes at a great cost to democracy

Muhammad Tahir — Mon, 24 Mar 2025 14:13:23 +0000

ORIGINAL SOURCE

On March 24, Muhammad Tahir, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and former RFE/RL Central and South Asia liaison in Washington, DC, was published in MSNBC on the termination of the US Agency for Global Media’s RFE/RL federal funding grant and its impact.

In 2003, when I first walked through the doors of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), one of the first things I noticed was the wall of fallen heroes, RFE/RL journalists murdered for simply reporting the truth. Their names and photos were a chilling reminder that this wasn’t just a job. It was a mission.

Muhammad Tahir

Fellow

Muhammad Tahir

Eurasia Center

Central Asia Media

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Silencing Voice of America will only strengthen autocrats around the world

Mercedes Sapuppo — Thu, 20 Mar 2025 18:53:47 +0000

United States President Donald Trump has moved to shut down a series of prominent US-funded international media outlets including Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty as he continues efforts to cut government spending and reshape US foreign policy. In a March 15 statement, the White House said the decision “will ensure that taxpayers are no longer on the hook for radical propaganda.”

Critics fear the move will strengthen the position of authoritarian regimes around the world while leaving millions of people in closed societies without access to independent information. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty CEO Steve Capus called the step “a massive gift to America’s enemies.” He warned that the shutdown would make the United States weaker and would be celebrated by “the Iranian Ayatollahs, Chinese communist leaders, and autocrats in Moscow and Minsk.”

Russian opposition figure Vladimir Kara-Murza was one of numerous activists from the front lines of the fight against resurgent authoritarianism to voice their alarm over the closures. For many people living in authoritarian societies, outlets like Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty have provided an objective and trustworthy alternative to what is often a heavily censored domestic information space. Kara-Murza suggested the demise of these outlets would be toasted in Moscow and beyond. “One more champagne bottle opened in the Kremlin,” he quipped.

As expected, the shutdown of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America was enthusiastically welcomed on prime time Russian state TV. Margarita Simonyan, who heads Russia’s flagship international media platform RT and state-owned media group Rossiya Segodnya, called the news an “awesome decision by Trump.” Meanwhile, fellow Kremlin propagandist Vladimir Solovyov took time out from fantasizing about a nuclear attack on Britain to mock the more than one thousand journalists now facing an uncertain future. “You are nasty, lying, deplorable traitors to the motherland. Go and die in a ditch,” he commented.

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For decades, authoritarian regimes ranging from Nazi Germany to Communist China have griped against the influence of US-funded independent media outlets, and have adopted various measures to try and block them. Voice of America was first set up in 1942 at the height of World War II, while Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty was established in 1950 during the early years of the Cold War to provide uncensored information to people living behind the Iron Curtain.

Initially focused on radio broadcasts, these outlets and their numerous affiliates have evolved over time to become multimedia platforms reaching hundreds of millions of people every week. This has never been a purely altruistic endeavor; advocates maintain that providing access to objective information abroad strengthens the US position internationally.

Until their dramatic recent shutdown, Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and many other regional pro-democracy platforms such as Radio Free Asia were all overseen by the US Agency for Global Media (USAGM). While often the subject of debate in the United States due to allegations of political bias and doubts over their continued effectiveness, recent studies have indicated that they remained widely recognized by international audiences as important sources of unfiltered information.

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Despite being funded by the US government, the network adhered to a code of journalistic integrity and objectivity similar to the charters governing the work of other state-funded media such as the BBC. This independence from governmental editorial oversight had on occasion led to issues with United States officials. Some within the Trump White House attempted to justify the decision to cut funding by claiming that these state-funded broadcasters had become overly politicized and were no longer representative of the values the new administration wished to project.

The international impact of the USAGM stable of media outlets is perhaps most immediately apparent in the number of journalists jailed or otherwise targeted by authoritarian regimes for their professional activities. At present, ten journalists and staff members from USAGM-affiliated outlets are being held in countries including Belarus, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Myanmar. Following news of the shutdowns, Ukrainian journalist Stanislav Aseyev posted that while imprisoned by Russian forces in eastern Ukraine, he was subjected to electric shock torture specifically because he had previously worked for Radio Liberty.

The timing of Trump’s decision to shut down the United States international broadcasting network could hardly be worse. In today’s increasingly multipolar world, the information space is an critical front in the escalating global struggle between rival democratic and authoritarian camps. This has long been recognized by China and Russia, with both countries committing vast annual budgets to support sophisticated international media activities in a variety of guises. The US was previously seen as the world leader in this soft power contest, but that is suddenly no longer the case. Generations of autocratic regimes never did manage to silence Voice of America, but the Trump administration has now done so themselves.

Mercedes Sapuppo is assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

A light in the darkness: Why RFE/RL matters now more than ever

Muhammad Tahir — Thu, 20 Mar 2025 15:34:50 +0000

It was in the middle of a bitterly cold night in 2014 when my phone rang. At first, I ignored it. Then came a second call, and a third. The persistent buzzing was enough to jolt me awake. When I finally answered, a distressed female voice met me on the other end.

“They’re kicking me out of my home. I have two kids. Nowhere to go. I live in Mikrorayon,” she said, her voice breaking under desperation. She was referring to one of countless Cold War–era housing blocks built by successive regimes across the Soviet nations. Behind her, frantic voices clashed.

I knew that sound well. It was the sound of fear.

This was not unusual. As the director of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s (RFE/RL) Turkmen Service, locally known as Azatlyk, I often received such calls—cries for help in a country where independent journalism is considered a threat.

Turkmenistan, like many of the authoritarian regimes RFE/RL has covered, was built on the iron grip of a single ruler. Dissent was crushed, voices silenced, and truth distorted. RFE/RL was for many the only major source of news free from government manipulation.

The woman on the phone, whom I will call Maya, was a young widow with two children, the youngest just six months old. That night, city officials had come to demolish her home under the national leader’s so-called “beautification” campaign in the capital city Ashgabat.

When she saw the municipal workers approaching her home, she slammed the door shut, pressed her back against it, and, in that moment of desperation, reached for the only thing she believed could bring hope and protection: RFE/RL.

After gathering details, we did the only thing we could: We made a call to the local municipality. It was a simple act of journalism. We asked why a young widow with children was being thrown onto the streets in freezing temperatures.

That call was enough. The officials withdrew—not out of mercy, but out of fear. It was fear that the leader of the nation might catch wind of the story—that, as in many similar cases, he might view it as a stain on his image and make those responsible pay the price.

This is the power of RFE/RL. It is not just a news organization, but a shield for those whose own governments have abandoned them. In Turkmenistan, as in many of the places the organization serves, there are no fair and impartial courts to turn to, no free press to expose wrongdoing, no way for many citizens to hold power accountable. Without RFE/RL, Maya’s story would never have been heard. And she would have been just another forgotten casualty of authoritarian rule.

In recent days, however, the Trump administration has raised the specter of a world without RFE/RL. On March 15, the US Agency for Global Media terminated the funding grant for RFE/RL, endangering the organization’s ability to provide journalism for millions of people who would struggle otherwise to get access to news that is not controlled by an authoritarian government.

What’s the price of truth?

The recent decision to cut funding for RFE/RL along with its sister networks—Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, the Middle East Broadcasting Networks, and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting—is not just a financial cutback. It is a major blow to the millions who rely on it.

For decades, these networks have signaled that the United States has not turned its back on those living under the rule of autocrats and radical extremists. They have served as a voice for the silenced, a bridge connecting the oppressed to the world beyond their borders.

RFE/RL’s annual budget was $142 million in fiscal year 2024. That is slightly less than the cost of three Apache helicopters, the same type of aircraft that was lost in large numbers over two decades of war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, with little lasting progress to show for it.

With that single investment, RFE/RL reaches nearly 47 million people each week, broadcasting in twenty-seven local languages across regions spanning from Russia to the Balkans, from Iran to Central Asia, and all the countries in between.

In the tribal regions of Pakistan, where the Taliban’s grip remains strong, the alternative to RFE/RL’s Pashto-language Mashaal Radio is what locals call “Mullah Radio”—an extremist-run broadcast spewing radical propaganda.

After Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service exposed war crimes while Russian state media flooded the airwaves with propaganda. Now, as Russia tightens its grip on Central Asia and China expands its influence in the region, RFE/RL remains an important line of defense against a rising tide of disinformation.

Hope, even in darkness

When I first joined RFE/RL in 2003, it had already been the lifeline for millions behind the Iron Curtain for over half a century. I remember when former Czech President Václav Havel visited RFE/RL headquarters. He spoke of growing up under communism, of listening to RFE/RL in secret, and of how those broadcasts carried the hope that one day freedom would come.

Havel wasn’t alone. Generations of dissidents, reformers, and ordinary citizens across Eastern Europe and Central Asia have similar stories. They drew strength from the words they heard in the media outlet’s broadcasts.. And when the Iron Curtain finally fell, they didn’t just see journalists at RFE/RL—they saw the voices that had never abandoned them.

Now, if the voice of RFE/RL and its sister networks is silenced, then what will fill the void? Chinese state media? Russian disinformation? The Taliban’s “Mullah Radio?” These forces have long pursued this outcome—weaponizing intimidation, censorship, harassment, and violence. Yet so far they have failed. The leaders of Iran, China, Russia, and Belarus are likely cheering the position in which these channels now find themselves. With no counterbalance, the propaganda of these regimes could go unchecked.

This outcome also would contradict the Trump administration’s own stated commitment to free speech, depriving millions of access to independent journalism. In many of its broadcast regions, RFE/RL remains one of the last sources, if not the only source, of truth.

History has shown that when free media disappears, oppression often takes its place.

For Maya, and for the millions like her, RFE/RL must endure.

Muhammad Tahir is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former RFE/RL executive who dedicated eighteen years to advancing independent journalism and press freedom in some of the world’s most restrictive environments.

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Inside Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s diplomatic offensive with Syria’s Christians and Ismailis

Gregory Waters — Wed, 19 Mar 2025 17:48:44 +0000

Shortly after Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) drove Bashar al-Assad out of Syria last year, the group pledged to respect the rights of minorities. Yet, since HTS took control over much of the country, some across the international community have raised fears that Syria’s new leaders—with their jihadist backgrounds—might erode minority rights or exclude these communities from the political transition process. These fears have been newly flamed by the massive, targeted violence against Alawites on Syria’s coast during the second week of March. Nevertheless, there have been some signs for optimism about the inclusion of at least some minorities in post-Assad Syria.

This analysis draws on my conversations with members of these groups as well as HTS leadership over the past several years as a consultant with the International Crisis Group and an independent researcher. The people I spoke with were granted anonymity given the tenuous security situation in the country and their ongoing political work.

There are legitimate reasons for worry, specifically about the future of the Alawite community. In March, Alawite insurgents linked to the former regime launched a coordinated attack against security forces. Government forces, independent armed factions, and Sunni vigilantes mobilized in response, engaging in nearly four days of mass executions, killing more than six hundred Alawite civilians and detained insurgents. The insurgency by ex-regime elements is still ongoing.

This violence and the state’s inability to control both its own forces and the independent forces has reignited fears over minorities’ safety, but these devastating events should not be viewed as indicative of the fate of other minorities. The violence is rooted in the fact that, over Syria’s brutal civil war, Alawite men formed the core of the regime’s fighting forces and intelligence apparatus and that the Alawite sect has come to be linked to the regime via both Assad’s policies and Sunni extremist narratives. These political and social dynamics do not apply to other minority groups.

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For the other minority groups, there are positive indications that they will be included in post-Assad Syria. Even before entering Damascus, HTS had been reaching out to Syria’s minorities in Idlib for sensitive, but successful, diplomatic engagement for five years. Christian leaders in Idlib told me in a meeting in 2022 that HTS had consistently reached out to them, first through senior religious figures and then through dedicated political attachés. HTS appointed these individuals—and thus engaged with these communities—directly, rather than through the Syrian Salvation Government that HTS and other opposition groups had formed to administer Idlib. These political attachés came to serve as advocates for the local communities, representing their demands to the Salvation Government and HTS security forces.

Through this, Christians in rural Idlib gradually regained control over their homes and farms and restarted public prayers. Additionally, security forces halted attacks on Christian communities. The engagement process was long and arduous, and, as HTS leaders told me in 2022, early on they were fearful that they’d face backlash from hardliners and populists in Idlib. However, as the years passed and the Christian community grew ever more integrated into Idlib’s society and the local government, HTS’s fears gradually ebbed.

Growing from this experience, HTS engaged with Syrian community and diaspora leaders just days into its final military offensive in late 2024. This diplomatic offensive helped ensure that HTS could sweep through Syria without taking many minority regions by force. The discussions, which took place primarily during the first week of December last year, resulted in a particularly strong relationship between HTS and Syria’s Christian and Ismaili minorities and also ushered in a new era of relations with groups previously seen as close to the regime.

A diplomatic offensive, from Nubl and Zahraa . . .

For example, the collapse of the regime in Aleppo in November last year spread panic through the nearby Shia towns of Nubl and Zahraa—once lynchpins of the regime’s defensive lines. Local Facebook pages claimed that two thousand Shia civilians had fled their homes, seeking shelter first in Aleppo and then in the town of Safira, where Hezbollah and Iran had built a strong militia network. By December 1, Safira came under at least partial opposition control, and regime forces abandoned the displaced people, resulting in widespread panic on Facebook over the fate of the civilians. On December 2, negotiations officially began between HTS and leaders from the displaced community to return them to their homes in Nubl and Zahraa, according to what an individual who facilitated the talks told me.

The negotiations began after members of the displaced community were able to reach one political activist living abroad, who told me that he helped establish a line to HTS’s political bureau and helped mediate. This initial experience quickly evolved into a small, multi-sect organization of activists representing a range of communities still under Assad’s rule—particularly the Ismaili-dominated cities of Masyaf and Salamiyah—all eager to assist in the peaceful handing over of their communities.

. . . to eastern Hama

This diplomatic approach expanded as HTS advanced on northern Hama. The city of Salamiyah, lying east of Hama, played a crucial role in the regime’s defense as it hosted the headquarters of several important regime militias operating in the countryside. But it also had a vibrant revolutionary movement dating back to the 1980s, particularly led by its Ismaili majority. “Ismailis have always opposed the regime,” one Ismaili activist told me, “but we work through political and civil means, not arms.” Salamiyah is also home to the Syrian National Ismaili Council, which supports and guides the Ismaili community across Syria. These factors opened the door to negotiations with HTS.

I spent several days in Salamiyah in early February, meeting with National Ismaili Council leader Rania Qasim and other security and civil society officials in discussions about the negotiations and resulting relations with HTS. According to Qasim, on December 2, HTS’s political bureau contacted her to initiate talks. The talks were led by Qasim and a representative from the Aga Khan Foundation, an international Ismaili humanitarian organization. The negotiations also included a coordination committee formed by the Ismaili Council’s Emergency Operations Center. Qasim told me that she and the other leaders of the negotiations saw themselves as participating in such talks on behalf of all communities across the Salamiyah region, not just Ismailis.

According to Qasim, the discussion focused on the fate of regime fighters in the region and on how HTS would enter the city of Salamiyah. The council, according to the people I spoke with, refused to provide cover for any criminals in the city, agreeing instead to HTS’s general taswiya (settlement) policy—employed nationally after the fall of Assad—that saw a grace period for all armed men to turn in their weapons and receive temporary civilian identification documents, but it did not provide them with blanket amnesty. In return, it was agreed that pro-regime fighters would lay down their weapons while HTS units simply drove through the main street on their way south to Homs. The coordination committee also agreed it would send a delegation to the outskirts of Salamiyah to meet the HTS convoy and escort them through the city.

These negotiations marked a significant first step in HTS’s relationship with the Ismaili community in Salamiyah. According to Qasim, the council spent the three-day negotiation repeatedly announcing to Salamiyah residents, “the council and the community will not fight; if you want to fight, it will be your own decision.” This message was carried even to some of the most infamous Alawite villages, such as Sabburah, where two pro-revolution Alawite ex-political detainees then worked within their village to ensure the local fighters agreed to lay down their weapons. Yet the Ismaili Council itself has never been affiliated with any armed faction and had no communication with regime military leaders; Qasim emphasized that at no point did they negotiate with or on behalf of any armed regime faction.

Instead, HTS leaders had to trust that the Ismaili Council had the influence needed to pacify the regime militias and ensure HTS’s safe entry into the city and surrounding villages. In fact, there was only one small skirmish—in the village of Tal Khaznah, on the road south to Homs—but otherwise, the handover of eastern Hama on December 4 was peaceful, local security officials and members of the Ismaili Council told me. According to Ismaili leaders in Salamiyah and Tartous, the Assad regime responded to these rapid negotiations by sending security officials to the Ismaili Council in Tartous and threatening them, telling them that their relatives in Salamiyah were “traitors.” However, the regime collapsed before these officials could follow through on any threats.

I was told that throughout this three-day negotiation period, other negotiations also took place on a more individual basis. Opposition fighters from both HTS and other factions who were from Salamiyah had begun reaching out to friends and families in their villages. One young commander remembered calling his family as his unit approached eastern Hama and asking them to connect him with the village’s mukhtar, telling me, “why would I want to risk fighting my father or brother?” He now leads a general security detachment in the countryside around his mixed-sect village, where he sees himself as bound to protect all locals no matter their sect.

The handover of the Salamiyah region was only the beginning of talks between HTS and the Ismaili Council, according to the Ismaili leaders I spoke with. The national council oversees seven regional branches, including ones in Tartous and Masyaf. With the regime still in control of western Syria, the Ismaili Council began negotiating on behalf of communities there. For its part, HTS ended its operations on the Masyaf front the same day it liberated Hama city, pausing its westward advance at the edge of the Ismaili- and Alawite-inhabited foothills. Ismaili leaders also told me that they began to share their positive experiences engaging with HTS with their contacts in the heavily pro-regime Christian towns of Muhradeh and Suqaylabiyah, which had ceased fighting but remained besieged by HTS. Those towns quickly concluded their own negotiations, which saw the peaceful entry of HTS units.

A foundation for a new Syria

The initial negotiations appear to have laid a strong foundation of trust that has extended beyond Salamiyah. According to the head of the Tartous Ismaili Council, HTS’s local military official met with the council the day after entering Tartous. The council was then invited to a general meeting between local representatives and HTS officials, was given a new line of communication with HTS’s political representative, and finally was welcomed to meetings with the new administrator of Tartous governorate. All of this evolved over just ten days. As one Ismaili official in Tartous described it to me, “It seems that the new government truly respects and has a special relationship with the Ismaili community. This came as a huge shock because we had never spoken with them before and had the same fears as the Alawites until December.”

HTS’s diplomatic offensive demonstrates the leadership’s political approach, which evolved over years of engaging with the Christian and Druze communities in Idlib. HTS leaders had justified these new policies to me years ago as a political necessity for one day governing a country as diverse as Syria and for legitimizing the movement among minority communities who only knew of the organization from its days as an al-Qaeda affiliate, then called Nusra Front. This understanding that Syria cannot be ruled as an Islamist Sunni country (but instead must be led as a country of diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds) has begun to shape the post-Assad era—at least at a local administration and security level.

The initial Salamiyah negotiations laid a strong foundation of cooperation that has continued to grow, ensuring the Ismailis across Syria “feel confident we will be fully represented in the constitutional process,” as a leader from the Tartous office told me. In Salamiyah, the Ismaili Council now plays a central role in the region’s administration, facilitating civil-political engagement, running a volunteer security force to assist local police, and hosting a security committee consisting of both civilian and military representatives to address security gaps and any violations committed by government forces.

Such relations have grown even stronger in the coastal city of Qadmus. According to two local Ismaili activists I spoke with, a small Ismaili volunteer force has been supporting the undermanned government police forces in Qadmus since December. Government forces have even provided these volunteers with small arms, while a new Ismaili-run local council has worked closely with the regime-era mukhtar—also an Ismaili—to coordinate services and administration with the HTS-appointed regional director. The council has also engaged in outreach with the Alawite villages around Qadmus, serving as a bridge between the new local administration and the Alawites.

Despite these efforts, their close relationship with the new government has made the Ismailis in Qadmus a prime target for pro-Assad Alawites, who killed two Ismaili security volunteers in late February and an Ismaili Council member and two government police officers on March 6. When the March uprising began, the Ismailis tried to protect the government forces in the town, eventually negotiating for their safe exit from the area after being besieged by insurgents. However, as a result, they faced widespread threats—by Alawites both in person and over WhatsApp—for “siding with the government,” local residents told me. Security forces eventually peacefully reentered Qadmus, and according to the locals I spoke with, the experience has only strengthened their ties with Damascus. Many Ismaili men have now volunteered to support government security forces, with at least some applying to become official security officers. Meanwhile, local security officials are discussing extending salaries to the entire volunteer force. Despite the events of the past week, the city’s local council continues to serve as an intermediary between local security forces and the Alawite villages, as the former works to negotiate the handover of weapons and wanted criminals.

Meanwhile, Christian civil society leaders in Syria’s tense coastal region also described a strong working relationship with local HTS-appointed administrators and security officials. Although they still have concerns centered on basic services, the economy, and the constitutional process, several activists and local Christian leaders told me in February that they did not fear direct attacks from the new government but rather worried about being caught in the growing violence between Alawites and government forces. Christian leaders across Syria were among the first men engaged by pro-opposition security forces in the days after Assad’s fall, with Facebook pages publishing pictures of meetings between military and political leaders and religious figures in rural Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo. As the violence on the coast escalated in March, the head of Aleppo’s Catholic community, Bishop Hanna Jallouf, reiterated the importance of a united Syria, affirmed the good treatment of Christians across the country, and called for a continuation of efforts to fully integrate all minorities into the political process.

These new interfaith and civil-centric networks and relationships will play a central role in shaping post-Assad Syria. However, the new government should do more to engage and empower groups such as the Ismaili and the Christian communities. It should do so both on a local and an international level, by working with groups such as the Aga Khan Foundation (to give Ismailis assurances) and even the Vatican (to do the same with Christians). Such efforts would help expand the local trust built with these groups into genuine representation in Damascus and would give real reason for optimism about the future of Syria’s minorities.

Gregory Waters is a researcher at the Syrian Archive, an associate fellow at the Middle East Institute’s Syria Program, and a research analyst at the Counter Extremism Project.

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Zaaimi quoted in Al Araby on the negative consequences of Trump’s policies on Arab-American relations

Atlantic Council — Tue, 11 Mar 2025 17:40:45 +0000

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Foreword: Protecting global freedom in an age of rising autocracy

Edward L. Glaeser — Wed, 05 Mar 2025 20:02:44 +0000

The man on horseback vanishes while executive aggrandizement persists

The decline of the West and limits on autocracies

Economic freedom and political freedom

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Will 2012 turn out to have been the high-water mark of human liberty? This volume documents that the downward trend in freedom and democracy, which started then, has continued for another year in 2024. Yet this Atlas also reminds us that there is hope amidst this adverse aggregate trend. In much of the world, women’s economic freedom is higher today than it was thirty years ago. Western Europe’s freedom is either unchanged or greater than it was fifteen years ago. The Global South is steadily becoming more prosperous.

The decline in freedom documented in this volume is clear, but it is also not a massive shift. Average global freedom has moved from Montenegro to Malawi, not from Sweden to Laos. Yet we can no longer maintain a Whiggish faith that we are on an inexorable path toward freedom, democracy, and prosperity, or that history has ended. As the fires of war burn in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Sudan, we must ask what has gone wrong, and what we can do about it. Measurement is the first task, and that is why this overview of liberty around the world is important.

The first section of this Foreword discusses the changing nature of the threat to freedom, and presents one hypothesis about rising executive aggrandizement. There has been a significant decline in the prevalence of coups since the 1960s, which means that democratically elected leaders need fear the “man on horseback” much less than in the past. Yet as the threat of military takeovers has fallen, the prevalence of “executive aggrandizements,” in which duly elected leaders push their power beyond constitutional limits, has not. Indeed, elected executives may be more likely to take risks precisely because military coups have become less plausible.

I present a simple framework for thinking about the interplay between technology and executive aggrandizement. Executives are limited by their ability to control the public sector and by popular opposition. Technology can enable the coordination of popular anti-regime action, as was shown vividly in the Twitter Revolutions of the Arab Spring. The increased threat of popular uprising may put limits on some political leaders, but technology can also increase the executive’s ability to control the public sector by monitoring disloyalty or malfeasance. Artificial intelligence (AI) could improve the central government’s ability to detect corruption. If the state is initially weak, the positive impact of technology on popular opposition may lead to less dictatorship. However, if the state is strong, technology will instead reduce the limits on executive activity.

The second section of this Foreword argues that geopolitical changes can also help explain why executive aggrandizement has increased and coups have fallen. Western powers, which used to engineer coups as Cold War policy, now intervene to reverse them. Even more importantly, the influence of the West, which championed democracy in the years after the Cold War, has declined. The 1990s was an era of democratic triumph, in which the strength of liberal democracies was at its apogee. What could have been more appealing to the former Warsaw Pact states of Eastern Europe than to rush toward European integration and prosperity? Mexico’s leaders similarly saw great advantages in tying their country to the United States through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In both cases, democracy ended up being the price of free trade.

Yet the last quarter century has seen a relative decline in the Western champions of liberty. The United States lost military face in its failed occupations of both Iraq and Afghanistan, and economic face in the global financial crisis. The economic importance of the European Union (EU) has declined, while China’s economic heft has expanded enormously. China’s growth provides an example of non-democratic success, and its foreign aid reduces the advantage of courting Western donors who have a deeper demand for democratic reform.

In the final section of the Foreword, I discuss the interplay between economic and political freedom. While I do not believe that complete economic freedom is necessary for political freedom, I do believe that a political executive with control over parts of the economy can use that control to augment its own political power. There are risks in supporting activist industrial and trade policies that enable political leaders to reward their supporters and punish their opponents. It would be far better for democratic leaders to articulate the positive case for freedom, which can both enable economic growth and empower human happiness, than to seek to micromanage the economy.

The man on horseback vanishes while executive aggrandizement persists

Bermeo documents that more than one-third of democracies faced coups between 1960 and 1964, and 15 percent of democracies were toppled by coups between 1965 and 1969. In every five-year interval since 1985, fewer than 5 percent of democracies fell to a coup. In every five-year interval since 1995, fewer than 10 percent of democracies have even faced the threat of a coup. Yet, as this volume documents, the global level of freedom has been declining since 2012.

Executive aggrandizement, where the executive expands its authority beyond constitutional limits, can erode freedom without the fireworks of a coup. Yet it has proven difficult to document a global wave in such expansions of incumbent power. Nevertheless, there are important examples, especially those of China, Russia, and Venezuela, in which political executives have significantly increased their power. Vladimir Putin and Hugo Chávez represent the more standard case in which a democratically elected executive expands his power. In the case of China, the more dispersed control of party leaders has been replaced by the more centralized control of Xi Jinping.

In this section, I first discuss the interplay between coups and executive aggrandizement, using Argentina’s 1930 coup as an example. I then turn to a framework that is meant to suggest how technological change might have influenced the prevalence of coups, protests, and executive aggrandizement. I focus on domestic forces that influence freedom in this section, and in the next section, I will focus on the role of foreign influence.

Coup and executive aggrandizement

Few coups seem so consequential as the 1930 coup in Argentina, which ended seventy-five years of political stability and liberal government and ushered in fifty years of coups and dictatorships. Argentina’s remarkable Generation of 1837, which included Domingo Sarmiento and Juan Bautista Alberdi, crafted that country’s 1853 Constitution and presided over a period of increasing freedom, wealth, and education. Like Britain before 1867, nineteenth-century Argentina was better at protecting freedoms than at promoting broad, uninfluenced suffrage, but after 1912, the Sáenz Peña Law made male suffrage universal, secret, and mandatory.

The Radical Civic Union (UCR) rode to power on the basis of broad population support in 1916, and came into conflict with the more conservative National Autonomist Party (PAN), which had held power since the end of Sarmiento’s presidency in 1874. Their conflict ended in 1930, when a military coup replaced the elected President Hipólito Yrigoyen with Lieutenant General Uriburu. Alemán and Saiegh provide evidence against “the claim that demands for drastic redistribution led to democratic breakdown is not a convincing explanation for the 1930 coup.” Instead, they see the coup as a response to the fact that Yrigoyen “used his authority to exclude the political opposition and take away their remaining bases of power.”

Alemán and Saiegh emphasize that the legislative divisions were not determined by ideology or attitudes toward redistribution. Instead, divisions were heightened over power plays, such as the frequent Federal “interventions” in which Yrigoyen replaced provincial governments with politicians that were more to his liking. While these interventions were and are (the last one occurred in 2004) supposed to be responses to unusual and deeply problematic local circumstances, there were twenty interventions during Yrigoyen’s first term and fifteen of these were done without legislative approval. During Yrigoyen’s second term, “between 1928 and 1929, he took over by executive decree the provinces of San Juan, Mendoza, Corrientes and Santa Fe,” and he nationalized the petroleum industry, which was also “seen as a political power-grab.”

On August 9, 1930, the opposition published the Manifesto of the 44 which denounced Yrigoyen for aggrandizement of executive authority. Within the month, a coup had begun and by September 10, Uriburu had replaced Yrigoyen as President of Argentina. Six more coups would follow in 1943, 1955, 1962, 1966, 1976, and 1981. Executive aggrandizement is a perpetual possibility, and, historically, the opponents of that aggrandizement often came from within the government, including from within the military.

Of course, there have been many cases of executive aggrandizement that have not met with opposition from the military. It took eleven years, and the realization that Hitler had led them into a military catastrophe, for any of the Wehrmacht’s leaders to fight against Hitler’s subversion of the Weimar Republic. Similarly, there have been many military coups that had little or nothing to do with executive aggrandizement, including Argentina’s 1943 coup, and the attempted coups in France in 1961, and Spain in 1981.

These two failed coups suggest that improvements in communications have reduced the ability of officers to command their soldiers to fight against political leaders. Improvements in information technology have made it easier for symbolically important legitimate leaders to communicate directly with the army, which can be effective because “military forces—especially perhaps conscript ones—are susceptible to numerous pressures from the civilian population and from civil institutions.”

During the weekend on April 22, 1961, a junta of French officers, hoping to keep Algeria an integral part of France, took control of Algiers. As Thomas writes, “de Gaulle’s military resources were unimpressive,” because “500,000 [soldiers] were in Algeria, whereas in France itself there were very few regular operational units.” Instead of fighting, on the evening of April 23, De Gaulle took to the radio.

The same voice that had travelled the airwaves in 1940 denouncing “the capitulation” to Nazi Germany in the name of “honor, common sense, and the higher interest of the Nation,” and inviting “all the French who want to remain free to listen to me and to follow me,” declared in 1961 that “I forbid every Frenchman, and in the first place every soldier, to carry out any order.” Even though the rebels controlled the Algiers stations, they could not stop ordinary citizens and soldiers from hearing De Gaulle on their transistor radios, and turning against the plot. The defeat of the coup has been called “la Victoire des Transistors.”

On the evening of February 23, 1981, armed agents of Spain’s Civil Guard, led by a Lieutenant Colonel, took control of the Congress of Deputies. In Valencia, General del Bosch rolled out his tanks and declared a state of emergency. Del Bosch had fought under Franco during the Spanish Civil War, and under German Command during World War II, and he wanted to stop Spain’s shift to liberal democracy. But at 1:14 a.m., King Juan Carlos appeared on television in the uniform of the Captain General of the Army and declared that “the Crown cannot tolerate in any form any act which tries to interfere with the constitution which has been approved by the Spanish people.” The coup promptly fizzled, and Spain’s democracy would survive.

In both France and Spain, coups were stopped by leaders who broadcast strong messages which fundamentally undermined their military subordinates. The framework in the next section will argue that improvements in communications technology more generally make it easier for leaders to stop rebellions from within. This is one hypothesis as to why the risks to freedom now come more from executive aggrandizement than from military coups.

Yet there are other reasons why the frequency of coups has declined, most notably the end of the Cold War and the changing behavior of Western powers. During the Cold War, American leaders often preferred a friendly military regime or monarchy to a hostile democratic one, and the US government supported coups from Tehran in 1953 to Chile in 1973. Since 1991, US-led regime change has meant overt invasion far more than covert coups. In 1994, the United States even acted to reinstate President Aristide of Haiti, who had been ousted by a coup in 1991.¹ I will return to the role of the West in promoting democracy in the next section, after first providing a framework for thinking about the interplay between technology and constraints on political leaders.

Technology and constraints on chief executives

The section considers two impacts of improved information technology on the limits facing elected executives or autocrats. Information can be used to organize protests, such as the mass demonstrations in Tahrir Square, Egypt, which brought down the Mubarak regime in 2011, and that places limits on executive action. But information technology can also be used to centralize control over the public sector, such as by granting leaders the ability to communicate directly with soldiers during a coup. I will not focus on other impacts of communications technology, such as enabling leaders like India’s Narendra Modi to bond with their voters by using radio broadcasts and social media.

All actions that an executive might want to take will create some opposition from both the private and public sectors. That opposition places limits on the actions of the executive. I assume that the executive will not risk actions that generate sufficient opposition from either the public sector, which might refuse to implement the action, or the private sector, which might break out into mass protests. If technology expands the range of actions that the executive can take, then the technology is authority-enhancing, but if it contracts the range of executive action, then it is authority-eroding.

The limits on an autocrat’s options are captured by the two solid lines in Figure 1. If the autocrat wants to limit their opposition from either sector to a fixed amount, then his or her options are limited to a rectangle that is below the solid blue line and to the left of the solid orange line. I will argue that recent changes in communications technology have given effective autocrats more power over their own bureaucracies, causing the blue line to rise, but made private opposition more effective by enabling organization, which shifts the orange line to the left.

While China’s surveillance of its own private citizens is frequently discussed in the Western media, the surveillance of public sector workers and the associated anti-corruption campaign has been far more central to Xi Jinping’s centralization of power. The bribery convictions of Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang in 2013 and 2015 eliminated two potential rivals early in Xi’s term as president of China. Moreover, because China has “vague and incomplete anti-corruption laws that leave more room for party control,” and “institutional arrangements that centralize control over local anti-corruption agencies,” the fight against corruption essentially gives national leadership the ability to discipline a large swath of the public sector.

Figure 1. The autocrat’s options and technological change

Complaints by ordinary citizens play a significant role in China’s anti-corruption campaign, and those complaints are often transmitted electronically. Pan and Chen report that “China has devoted substantial resources to monitoring the performance of lower-tier officials” including “telephone hotlines,” “government-managed websites where citizens can complain online,” and “web and mobile apps designed for individuals to complain to the government.” In order to reduce bribery, some Chinese “hospitals even put in place monitoring systems with facial recognition technology to identify unregistered medical representatives or unapproved visits.” Fan et al. document that computerizing value-added tax invoices “contributed to 27.1 percent of VAT revenues and 12.9 percent of total government revenues in the five subsequent years.” Beraja et al. examine artificial intelligence procurement across China and find that “autocrats benefit from AI: local unrest leads to greater government procurement of facial-recognition AI as a new technology of political control, and increased AI procurement indeed suppresses subsequent unrest.”

If laws are sufficiently fuzzy, then abundant electronic monitoring, supplemented by the complaints of random citizens, should make it possible to convict almost any public servant. That ability to convict provides a chief executive with enormous control over the public sector. Information technologies, such as the on-board computers carried by commercial truckers, have long been used by corporate chieftains to monitor their workers. There is every reason to believe that government leaders should be able to do the same, and that better technology will strengthen the hold of authoritarian leaders over public sector employees.

For that reason, Figure 1 depicts the blue line rising higher because of better monitoring technology. As the autocrat has an increasing ability to repress opposition within the public sector through better monitoring, they have a greater ability to undertake activities, from suppressing religious minorities to invading their neighbors, that might have been opposed by some public sector workers. This increased range of executive power provides one reason why information technology can lead to less individual freedom. This effect should be much stronger in countries with a more effective public sector.

Better technology can also give the public sector more ability to monitor their private citizens, but there is a countervailing force that I suspect is more important worldwide. Information technology also enables the coordination of citizens, especially through the sharing of information. Historically, cities have been hotbeds of regime change, partially because density enabled the coordination of opposition to the government. Information technology makes it easier to spread information both about why someone should protest and where a protest will occur.

In 2011, protests were coordinated on Twitter in Tunisia and Egypt and two autocrats were forced out of power. In 2022, Maria Litvina called for protests against the Russian invasion of Ukraine on Instagram. While she was arrested, thousands still took to the streets and protests in Russia have continued since then. While the Putin regime does not seem to be in danger, this activity still creates direct and indirect costs for the government, including the challenge of locking up thousands and potential embarrassment on the world stage.

In Figure 1, I chose to capture the ability of improved private coordination as empowering private protest against government, which increases the costs to governments of taking actions that generate private opposition, which shifts the orange line to the left. Consequently, it is unclear whether technology will reduce freedom, by strengthening executives’ controls over their bureaucracies, or increase freedom, by making citizen protest easier. In countries that have large and capable public sectors, such as those in East Asia, I suspect that technology will typically be freedom-reducing. In places where the public sector is weak, then technology seems more likely to encourage regime change, which may lead autocrats to be more cautious.

The core hypothesis put forth in this section is that technology has centralized authority within the government, which can reduce freedom for the rest of us. Direct communication between legitimate leaders and soldiers has reduced the threat of coups. Better monitoring of subordinates has reduced local corruption. The implication of this change is that the centralized authority of autocrats has increased. We now turn to a second hypothesis: that the decline in freedom is associated with the relative weakness of the West.

The decline of the West and the limits on autocracies

The 1990s were a strange time in world history. The Soviet Union was no more. Liberal democracies had triumphed, and they were much wealthier than their alternatives. They were role models for countries emerging from communism. Moreover, the Western democracies were successful enough that they could indulge in the luxury of encouraging others to embrace democracy.

Levitsky and Way emphasize the “international dimension of regime change” and especially the power of “linkage” or “the density of ties (economic, political, diplomatic, social, and organizational) and cross-border flows (of trade and investment, people, and communication) between particular countries and the United States, the European Union (EU), and Western-led multilateral institutions.” These ties led Latin American and Central European countries to democratize in the years after the fall of the Soviet Union.

The two democratizing nations that Levitsky and Way highlight were strongly influenced by the EU and NAFTA. In Slovakia, Vladimír Mečiar “regained control of the government and rapidly sought to eliminate major sources of opposition” and “in the absence of extensive linkage to the West, Mečiar’s autocratic government might well have consolidated power.” But the appeal of access to EU was enormous, and “it employed conditionality in 1997 by rejecting Slovakia’s request to begin accession negotiations due to a failure to meet democratic criteria.” This rejection had political bite, and “Slovakia’s failure to move towards EU membership, for which the EU directly (and very publicly) blamed Mečiar, created a salient electoral issue that benefited the opposition.” In 1998, Slovakia rejected Mečiar and the country has been democratic since then.

The authoritarian PRI (Institutional Revolution Party) controlled Mexico from 1929 to 2000, but the technocratic leadership of the party during the 1990s saw the tremendous economic advantages that could come by enacting NAFTA. While “successive U.S. administrations backed the PRI governments and explicitly excluded democracy from NAFTA negotiations… NAFTA increased Mexico’s salience in the U.S. political arena,” and “as NAFTA negotiations began, the PRI was subjected to intense international scrutiny, including unprecedented media coverage of electoral scandals and US congressional hearings on Mexican human rights”. Mexico’s attempt to placate the United States meant that “by the late 1990s opposition forces had strengthened to the point where they could win national elections” and that “preventing such an outcome would have required large scale fraud or repression, which, given Mexico’s international position, would have been extremely costly.”

Both of these case studies suggest that EU and US influence encouraged democracy in the 1990s either through clear conditionality (as with Slovakia) or through the court of US public opinion (as with Mexico). The democratizing push reflected the Western victory in the Cold War. That victory meant that Western powers looked like role models, and that access to Western markets was enormously profitable. Unlike during the Cold War, when the United States was eager for allies of any political variety, in the 1990s, the West felt sufficiently secure that they could risk alienating countries by pushing democracy.

Indeed, the level of American confidence reached such heights that the United States waged wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq with a stated goal of regime change. When President Bush addressed the nation on October 7, 2001, he said our goal in invading Afghanistan was to “defend not only our precious freedoms, but also the freedom of people everywhere to live and raise their children free from fear.” Two years later, when announcing the invasion of Iraq, President Bush reiterated “we will bring freedom to others and we will prevail” and “we have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and restore control of that country to its own people.” I am not claiming that promoting democracy was the primary objective of either war, but just that a significant number of policymakers believed that it was reasonable to go to war to promote freedom elsewhere.

Those wars were two reasons for the decline in US influence since 2006. While the US military readily defeated the armed forces of both Iraq and Afghanistan, the US government failed to establish lasting democracies in either country. Moreover, the US management of both occupations appeared incompetent to many global observers. The disastrous collapse of an American housing bubble then brought economic suffering not only to the United States but to the world. The United States started to seem far less like a role model, and a less triumphant United States was less likely to take on the mission of democratizing the world.

Europe’s economic clout has also waned over the last thirty years. While the EU produced one-fourth of the world’s gross domestic product in 1990 (at purchasing power parity prices), it produced less than 15 percent of global output in 2024. After 2005, Turkey seemed poised to join the EU, but it never came to be, partially because many Turks opposed EU membership. One Turkish poll in 2013 reported that “while one third of those surveyed agreed Turkey should persevere with the goal of becoming an EU member, two-thirds of the public lean closer to the view that Turkey should not become a full member.” Given those views, it is unsurprising that President Erdoğan supported a political referendum that would entrench his presidential power despite the risk that such a move would alienate the EU.

Europe’s relative economic heft has diminished, partially because of the growth of China. Between 1990 and 2024, China’s share of the world economy rose from 3.6 percent to 19.05 percent. A strong and wealthy China provides an alternative, non-democratic role model, and access to Chinese aid and markets most certainly does not require democratizing reform. Shinn and Eisenman write that “China’s focus on state sovereignty and reluctance to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations have assisted its ability to develop cordial ties with Africa.” Democratic powers are far less dominant now than they were twenty years ago, and that can help explain why freedom has declined since 2012.

Economic freedom and political freedom

Declining belief in the value of economic freedom in the West may also contribute to declining political freedom both in the Western democracies and elsewhere. Milton Friedman famously saw a particularly tight link between economic and political freedom, writing that “capitalism is a necessary condition for political freedom.” Similarly Hayek saw economic planning as leading down the “road to serfdom.” Critics of this perspective have pointed out that the Scandinavian social democracies seem to have enjoyed almost perfect political freedom, even when their economies looked decidedly non-capitalistic. They have also noted that East Asian economies with very limited political freedom have occasionally been hotbeds of capitalism.

Yet even if Friedman’s statement goes too far, there is an essential truth in his perspective. When the public sector has more discretion to interfere with the economy, then it will also have more ability to reward its supporters and punish its opponents. Hugo Chávez’s direct control over Venezuela’s petroleum enabled his domestic and foreign activities, including subsidizing friendly neighbors with cheap oil. Relief from regulation has been one of the most common sources of illicit public revenues throughout history, and those revenues can also be used to enhance political power.

But as the example of Scandinavia illustrates, not all economic interventions empower political executives. If the rules are decided collectively and enforced strictly, then they are not a source of power for the executive. If the rules are ad hoc and decided by the executive on the spot, then economic intervention can help consolidate political strength. In Chávez’s Venezuela or the Shah’s Iran, public oil revenues became a tool for tyranny. In Norway, they did not, partially because oil revenues go largely into a sovereign wealth fund that is managed by the politically independent Norges Bank.

Yet in recent years, political leaders in the United States and EU have championed economic policies, including industrial policy and tariffs, that are largely discretionary. If a politician seeks support from domestic producers of some product, then that politician can reward those producers either with subsidies, now called industrial policy, or with a selective tariff on that product. The politicization of US pre-World War II tariffs generates little hope that any future discretionary tariff policy will somehow be divorced from politics. Moreover, even if the United States limits its discretionary interventions, public support for these policies, from both parties, reinforces the idea that political leaders should have the right to favor some industries over others.

The case for economic freedom would be strong even if there was not a link between economic and political freedom. Yet, as long as economic policy Edward L. Glaeser interventions provide more scope for political leaders to reward and punish, then these interventions will also pose risks to political freedom. If the leaders of the West want to reverse the downward trend in freedom, then they should continue championing both political and economic liberty and continue to be engaged with the world.

Edward L. Glaeser is the Fred and Eleanor Glimp professor of economics at Harvard University, where he has taught microeconomics and urban economics since 1992. Glaeser previously directed the Taubman Center and the Rappaport Institute. He also leads the Urban Working Group at the National Bureau of Economic Research, co-leads the Cities Programme at the International Growth Centre, and is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Glaeser has written hundreds of papers on cities, political economy, and public economics. He received his PhD from the University of Chicago in 1992.

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1 Former President Aristide has accused the United States of forcing his resignation during a later 2004 coup; the United States has denied these allegations.

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Why post-Assad Syria complicates the Iran-Turkey rivalry

Giorgio Cafiero — Wed, 26 Feb 2025 22:44:58 +0000

Turkey and Iran’s complex relationship can be best described as a “cooperative rivalry.” The two countries maintain important trade ties and their interests overlap on several matters, from opposing Israel’s war on Gaza and bombing of Syria to supporting Qatar during the 2017-2021 blockade. Turkey has also played a key role in helping Iran dull the impact of Western sanctions. But with Ankara and Tehran aspiring to play increasingly influential roles in the Middle East, they have at times also seen high levels of competition and tension in bilateral affairs.

With Syria’s Iran-allied regime falling late last year and being replaced by a Turkey-oriented political order in Damascus, Syria’s fluid dynamics have, at least for now, shifted the Levant’s balance of power in Ankara’s favor while weakening Tehran’s clout. Developments in Syria could complicate Iran-Turkey relations, especially given that Tehran believes Ankara’s Syria policies pose a threat to Iranian interests. Turkish policymakers are likely worried about Iranian meddling in Syria that could affect the country’s fragile transition in manners that harm Turkey’s interests.

Nonetheless, Turkey and Iran can manage and compartmentalize their tensions vis-à-vis Syria in a way that prevents outright hostilities between them. Additionally, if Turkey and Israel’s tensions in relation to Syria continue heating up, there could even be reason to expect a degree of Iran-Turkey alignment in Syria.

Iran’s loss and Turkey’s win

With Turkey emerging as a “big winner” in Syria after Bashar al-Assad’s fall, Iranian policymakers are nervous about some of the wider implications for Tehran’s strategic interests. With the rise of a Sunni Islamist government in Damascus—one that views Iran-backed nonstate actors as a serious regional threat and vows to stop Iranian arms from flowing through Syria—Tehran has concerns about the future of Hezbollah, a group that has long played a critical role in the Iran-led Axis of Resistance. With Assad out of the picture (after Iran invested tens of billions of dollars in propping up his regime) and a Turkey-oriented administration leading in Damascus, Iran has suffered a humiliating loss in Syria.

Iranian media outlets close to the state frequently depict Turkey as having worked with the United States and Israel to topple Assad as part of a grander plot aimed at empowering the West and Israel while weakening Iran. Since Assad fell late last year, a number of Iranian voices have blasted Turkey for its role in facilitating Azerbaijan’s oil exports to Israel amid the war in Gaza—arguing that Ankara bears some responsibility for Palestinian suffering.

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The Syrian tilt in Turkey’s favor comes after Ankara gained clout in the South Caucuses with the unfolding of the 2020 Karabakh war, a conflict that underscored the power of the Azerbaijan-Turkey alliance while fueling major geopolitical and security concerns for Tehran.

Turkey is determined to help the Islamist rebels-turned-rulers in Damascus cement their control over all of Syria. Ankara sees the potential for a strong unitary state in Syria with a pro-Turkish government in power that is aligned with Turkey’s long-term interests. Turkey has fears about Iran potentially lending support to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party-linked People’s Protection Unit (YPG)—the armed group in Syria that Ankara is most concerned about from a security standpoint. Turkish policymakers are also monitoring the situation in Latakia, Tartus, and other parts of western Syria where, in the event of further fragmentation of the country, a breakaway Alawite-led statelet supported by Iran could form, cutting off the new government in Damascus from much of the country’s Mediterranean coast.

The precedent for managing tensions

As much as Turkey has gained clout in Syria at Iran’s and Russia’s expense, Ankara recognizes that Tehran has cards to play in post-Assad Syria, which could challenge Turkey and weaken Syria’s new government amid the war-torn country’s fragile transition. Within this context, Turkey and Iran will likely be keen to prevent their Syria-related tensions from fomenting hostilities in bilateral relations—they may even look for ways to advance common interests through cooperation.

There is a precedent for that. For example, in 2017, Turkey, Iran, and Russia met in Kazakhstan for the Astana Process (a forum on peace in Syria). To be sure, the new reality in Syria is different from the country’s situation in 2017. But the Astana Process highlighted how Ankara and Tehran, despite their conflicting interests in the Syrian crisis, can come together as two regional heavyweights and engage in dialogue geared toward resolving the conflict. Although the Astana Process failed to resolve the civil war, the format did, to its credit, lead to reduced violence in Syria.

The potential for alignment

Israel’s foreign policy vis-à-vis post-Assad Syria could play a part in bringing Turkey’s and Iran’s interests into greater alignment. At this stage, it is unclear whether Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s anti-Israeli rhetoric will evolve into more concrete actions or how such actions would play out. Nonetheless, Turkey and Syria’s new government are exploring a defense pact that could include Turkish airbases in central Syria. That may fuel tensions between Turkey and Israel, which could play out in a variety of ways. Even if a Turkish-Israeli military confrontation on Syrian soil seems unlikely at this point, intensifying friction between these two US allies would probably serve Iran’s interests.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar recently accused Ankara of facilitating Iranian cash flows to Lebanon’s Hezbollah. If true, this would mean that Turkey is helping Iran maintain influence in the eastern Mediterranean. The United States has also sanctioned Turkey-based Mira Ihracat Ithalat Petrol and its chief executive officer for “providing critical financial support” to a financial network that runs between Iran and Hezbollah. Some experts have noted that, since Assad’s fall, Iran could be eyeing Turkish airspace in its search for alternative routes for flying arms to Hezbollah. However, it is unclear whether Ankara would ever agree to playing this role for Iran and Hezbollah.

Looking ahead, the fragile transition in Syria is set to bolster Ankara’s regional influence in ways that complicate Turkey’s sensitive relationship with Iran. While the Trump administration surely would like to see Turkish influence in Syria serve as a bulwark against Iran, it is unlikely that Ankara will approach the Islamic Republic in a manner that fully aligns with any US-led “maximum pressure 2.0” agenda. With vested stakes in preventing hostilities with Iran, policymakers in Ankara are likely to seize on the new balance of power in Syria while also maintaining a fruitful dialogue with Iran and keeping Iranian security concerns about Syria-related issues in consideration.

Giorgio Cafiero is the chief executive officer of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University.

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Pavia joins i24 News to discuss the 14th anniversary of Tunisia’s revolt during the Arab Spring

Atlantic Council — Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:13:57 +0000

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From Tunis to Baghdad: Can platform-based politics take root?

Carrie Schenkel and James Storen — Mon, 24 Feb 2025 19:30:13 +0000

This paper is the fifth in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “State of the Parties” series analyzing the strength of multi-party systems in different regions of the world.

The organization of political parties has served multiple distinct roles in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). In many cases, regimes use them to create a light veneer of democratic legitimacy for authoritarianism; in other cases, parties exist to represent one identity group or are centered around a singular individual. In rare cases, but with a few successful examples, parties exist to represent an ideology. Rarer still, but key to the future democratic success of the region, are true platform-based parties. Vacuums of political leadership have developed due to the limited role parties play in shaping governance, representation, and public policy. In a rapidly changing region, the opportunity for effective, issues-based parties has never been more evident. Iran’s proxies in the region have been significantly weakened and the “Axis of Resistance” dismantled, presenting openings for new political leadership to emerge.

Political parties are not yet poised to meet the moment. In much of the region, long histories of implicit and explicit bans and one-party dominance have left political parties weak, unpopular, and ineffective. Extended periods of suppression and restriction—such as Jordan’s thirty-year party ban, Iraq’s decades of one-party rule under Saddam Hussein, and Tunisia’s twenty-three years of party bans during the Ben Ali era—have resulted in political parties that lack both organizational capacity and broad public appeal. Rather, they are fragmented, ideologically vague, and centered around individuals rather than coherent platforms.

The proliferation of political parties—more than 220 are currently registered in Tunisia, for example—has further undermined any sense of clear policy platforms and the ability to differentiate one party from another. Rather than reforming or uniting under existing frameworks, disillusioned members frequently break away to form new parties, stymieing coalition-building and the development of rooted, comprehensive party ideologies.

Disillusionment with traditional parties has led citizens to favor actors perceived as more directly serving their interests, such as Hezbollah—which positions itself as a resistance force against Israel—or Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated parties, which have gained trust through their provision of essential social services in Egypt, Jordan, and elsewhere. In an era defined by youth-led movements, digital activism, and persistent calls for democratization, these parties stand at a crossroads. Whether they act as agents of change or instruments of entrenched power remains a central question, shaping not only the future of governance within individual nations but also the trajectory of regional stability and development.

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Ukrainians are proudly democratic but resoundingly reject wartime elections

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 20 Feb 2025 23:43:38 +0000

As the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion draws close, the chorus of voices calling for new elections in Ukraine is growing louder and louder. Curiously, however, these calls are not coming from the Ukrainians themselves, but from the Kremlin and the Trump White House.

Since his inauguration one month ago, US President Donald Trump has begun echoing Russian demands for fresh Ukrainian elections. This week, he sparked outrage by branding Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy a “dictator without elections.” These attacks have proved popular in Moscow but have fallen flat in Kyiv, with most Ukrainians rejecting the US leader’s claims and rallying behind Zelenskyy.

The debate over Ukrainian elections reflects the challenging wartime realities in the partially occupied country. Ukraine was scheduled to hold presidential and parliamentary votes in 2024 but was forced to postpone both ballots as the Ukrainian Constitution does not allow national elections during martial law, which was introduced in 2022 and remains in place. Zelenskyy has vowed to hold elections as soon as the security situation allows, but argues that it would be impossible to stage free and fair votes in the current circumstances.

The majority of Ukrainians appear to agree. Two of Zelenskyy’s main political rivals, Petro Poroshenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, have publicly rejected the idea of wartime elections as impractical and illegitimate. Ukraine’s vibrant civil society has also voiced its opposition to the return of elections before a peace agreement has been signed. Meanwhile, a new opinion poll conducted in February 2025 found that 63 percent of Ukrainians are against holding any national votes until the war with Russia is over.

This lack of appetite for wartime elections is not the product of apathy or oppression. On the contrary, Ukrainians are fiercely proud of their country’s democratic credentials, which were hard-won during two separate pro-democracy revolutions in 2004 and 2014. On both occasions, millions of Ukrainians took part in massive protest movements opposing Russian-backed attempts to subvert the country’s emerging democracy and place Ukraine on a trajectory toward Kremlin-style authoritarianism. This grassroots embrace of democratic values has become central to modern Ukraine’s sense of national identity.

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For more than two decades, Ukraine’s burgeoning democratic culture has been one of the key triggers behind Moscow’s escalating campaign of aggression against the country. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s obsession with Ukraine can be traced back to the 2004 Orange Revolution, which was in part provoked by his botched intervention in the Ukrainian presidential election. This was to prove a watershed moment in relations between the two post-Soviet countries. Over the subsequent two decades, Ukraine has pursued a European democratic future, while Putin’s Russia has turned back toward the imperial past.

Putin’s fear of Ukrainian democracy is easy enough to understand. As a young KGB officer in East Germany, his formative political experience was the fall of the Berlin Wall and the rapid collapse of the Soviet Empire as a wave of democratic uprisings swept across Eastern Europe. Ever since the Orange Revolution, Putin has been haunted by the idea that an increasingly democratic Ukraine could serve as a catalyst for the next stage in Russia’s imperial retreat and spark the breakup of the Russian Federation itself.

Mounting concern in Moscow over the possible impact of Ukraine’s democratic progress was a major contributing factor behind Putin’s fateful decision to invade Ukraine in 2014. When the occupation of Crimea and eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region failed to prevent the consolidation of Ukrainian democracy or derail the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration, Putin felt compelled to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

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Ukrainians would be the first to admit that their country’s democracy is still very much a work in progress that suffers from a wide range of imperfections including deeply entrenched institutional corruption and excessive oligarch influence. Temporary wartime security measures targeting Kremlin-linked political parties and institutions such as the Russian Orthodox Church have also raised concerns. At the same time, Ukrainians are acutely aware that their country’s recent history of internationally recognized elections and strengthening democratic culture set them apart from their Russian neighbors.

The fight for democracy has in many ways defined Ukraine’s post-Soviet journey, but the vast majority of Ukrainians do not support the idea of holding elections in the current wartime conditions. This skepticism is understandable. More than ten million Ukrainians, representing around a quarter of the population, have been internally displaced by Russia’s invasion or forced to flee abroad as refugees. Millions more are currently living under Russian occupation. Without their participation, any vote would lack legitimacy. Likewise, around one million Ukrainian men and women are now serving in the armed forces. Attempting to provide safe voting conditions for them would be a logistical and security nightmare.

It would be similarly impossible to organize a credible election campaign. With the entire country subject to virtually daily Russian bombardment, large-scale campaign events and election rallies would be out of the question. It would be even more reckless to open thousands of polling stations on election day and invite attacks from Russian drones and missiles. Over the past three years, the Kremlin has repeatedly bombed Ukrainian civilians at train stations, funerals, and other public gatherings. There is little reason to believe election day crowds would not also be targeted. Even if a ceasefire was introduced well before the vote, the threat of renewed Russian air strikes would loom large over the entire campaign and deter public participation.

In addition to these practical impediments, attempting to stage an election campaign prior to the signing of a peace treaty would risk sowing division within Ukrainian society at a pivotal moment in the country’s history. Many believe this is the true reason for the Kremlin’s sudden and otherwise inexplicable enthusiasm for Ukrainian democracy. After all, Russia is the world leader in election interference. While Putin’s army has been unable to defeat Ukraine on the battlefield, he may feel that he can still achieve his goal of dividing and subjugating the country via the ballot box. At the very least, if current Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy failed to win reelection, this would remove a very high-profile obstacle to a peace agreement in Russia’s favor.

Democracy is at the very heart of Ukraine’s current fight for national survival and is destined to remain one of the core values in postwar Ukraine. For now, though, most Ukrainians acknowledge that any attempt to stage elections would be impractical and irresponsible in the extreme. For this reason, there is currently no clamor whatsoever for elections within Ukrainian society. The current generation of Ukrainians have fought long and hard for their democratic rights, but they also recognize that the country must be at peace before credible elections can take place. It would be absurd to ignore their wishes and impose premature elections on Ukraine as part of a Kremlin-friendly peace process.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

With anti-government protests still taking place in cities across Georgia on an almost daily basis, the authorities have also recently introduced new laws limiting public gatherings and criminalizing minor protest actions such as placing stickers on public property. Since protests flared in late 2024, hundreds have been detained, with many reporting human rights abuses while in custody including beatings and torture.

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Critics say these latest steps serve as further confirmation of the Georgian government’s intention to establish a Kremlin-style authoritarian state. In early February, Transparency International Georgia executive director Eka Gigauri told the Associated Press that she believed the authorities were using the same tactics employed by the Putin regime against opponents. “There is nothing new in how they attack civic activists,” she said. “This was happening in Russia years ago.”

Similar sentiments have been expressed by international human rights watchdogs monitoring the current crisis. “The government is relentlessly taking the country into a repressive era that is uncharted for Georgia but all too familiar in authoritarian states,” commented Human Rights Watch Europe and Central Asia Director Hugh Williamson in January 2025.

In recent months, Georgia’s Western partners have become more vocal in their criticism of the country’s increasingly authoritarian policies and apparent turn toward Moscow. This Western response has included imposing sanctions against a number of Georgian officials including billionaire Georgian Dream founder Bidzina Ivanishvili, who is widely seen as the country’s de facto leader and architect of Georgia’s current pro-Kremlin policies. On February 13, the European Parliament adopted a resolution questioning the legitimacy of the current Georgian authorities and calling for fresh elections in the coming months monitored by international observers.

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Meanwhile, relations with Russia continue to improve. Georgia has won favor in Moscow in recent years by refusing to participate in Western sanctions over the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Instead, Georgia has welcomed Russian businesses and has been accused of helping the Kremlin bypass international restrictions put in place in response to the war.

Members of the Georgian Dream party have positioned themselves as the only political force capable of establishing pragmatic relations with Russia. With around twenty percent of Georgia currently under Russian occupation, the threat of renewed Russian military aggression is a highly sensitive issue for Georgian society. In the run-up to Georgia’s October 2024 parliamentary election, Georgian Dream sparked controversy by using campaign posters contrasting peaceful Georgia with war-torn Ukraine as part of election messaging that sought to position the vote as a choice between war and peace.

With international attention now firmly fixed on developments in and around Ukraine, the political crisis in Georgia has slipped out of the headlines. However, this small nation in the southern Caucasus has a geopolitical significance that far outweighs its size. For the past two decades, Georgia has been widely seen in Western capitals as a post-Soviet success story, but the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations now hang in the balance. This represents a significant foreign policy challenge for the new Trump administration and for Europe.

Recent repressive measures indicate that the Georgian authorities are intent on escalating their clampdown against domestic opponents and strengthening ties with the Kremlin. If they succeed, it would represent a major victory for Vladimir Putin in the confrontation between the democratic world and an emerging alliance of authoritarian powers including Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.

Mercedes Sapuppo is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Dispatch from Syria: ‘Syrians cannot focus on their future if they are still drowning in their past’

Arwa Damon — Thu, 13 Feb 2025 16:07:06 +0000

SEDNAYAH—Sobhi Shebah shuffles through the hauntingly silent halls of Syria’s infamous Sednaya prison. Most of the cells are totally emptied out, while others have a smattering of discarded clothing. He’s not quite sure what he’s looking for—there are no guards here, no authorities, no one to answer questions—but it’s the last place he saw his son alive.

Sobhi’s son, Sameer, was carrying out his military service when Syria’s revolution first broke out back in 2011. He, along with most of his unit, was detained and accused of wanting to defect to rebel forces. Sobhi says that for years, he paid exorbitant amounts in bribes to get the paperwork needed to visit his son.

“It was always through a fence, no more than five minutes. A guard would shove him forward and it was always just ‘hi, how are you, how’s the family,’” he remembers.

Sobhi is utterly emotionally lost and has been for years. He shows us the notification he received with his son’s alleged death date.

“I saw him after this date,” he says. “What is the meaning of this, what is the goal of this psychological torture?”

He begged and pleaded with the authorities for answers.

“They all just played games with us,” he remembers. “I told them if he’s dead, let me know. Once one told me to stop nagging him. ‘I can’t tell you more, he’s alive, but I don’t know where.’”

Sobhi’s voice trembles with quiet anger as he lists the names of the officers. He wants more than just answers: He wants to see the officers behind bars, and he wants to be able to confront those who took his son, who caused him so much pain.

I went to Syria at the end of December, a country I covered extensively in my former job as a senior international correspondent for CNN. I was back this time in my capacity as the founder of my charity, the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA). One of the first neighborhoods my team and I visited was Darayya, a Damascus suburb that for years was bombed, besieged, and starved. In Darayya alone, local officials estimate that some fifteen thousand men were disappeared by the Assad regime. Mothers who used to tell their children “daddy is with the regime” are now at a loss, unsure how to answer the question “but mommy, the regime is gone, why isn’t daddy back?”

The pain felt by those searching for clues in the dark void of the former regime’s detention system is palpable.

Justice, accountability, and reparations are not just “catch words,” Joumana Seif, a prominent lawyer and Atlantic Council fellow, argues. Also a human- and women’s-rights activist, Joumana has been pushing for the creation of a Syria Victims Fund for years, so that the states that have been collecting hundreds of millions of dollars linked to violations of sanctions and other Syria-related crimes are no longer lining their own coffers but are giving that money back to the Syrian people.

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“It’s important for this damage, pain to be recognized and compensated, morally and also with some services and financial support,” Joumana explains. “Without this I think people will start to think about revenge, and this will be chaos. How to prevent revenge is to establish a clear transparent process of transitional justice.”

Time is not on Syria’s side, not when so much damage has been done, when the fabric of society is so frayed, when the country still is a patchwork of territories with de facto borders, and when there has been so much death and destruction. There have already been revenge attacks on Syria’s Alawite community—the sect with which the Assad family is affiliated.

Joumana knows the system well. Her father, Riad Seif, was a parliamentarian back in the 1990s and is a well-known voice of political dissent. He was twice jailed under the Assad regime.

“We need a process to go forward so that at least people see that there will be justice, and they can wait for that,” Joumana says.

As the rebel-forces-turned-rulers of Syria flung open the gates of the Assad regime’s prisons, a flood of hope and dread swept over the families of the missing.

“When the 8th of December happened, I was so scared because I thought that’s the end of the journey and now I will either know that my father is alive or no, that he’s not alive,” says Wafa Mustafa with The Syria Campaign. She is one of the most prominent and outspoken voices for the families of Syria’s missing.

“He’s here, I don’t know how, I don’t know in what form. I feel he’s here, but at the same time, I cannot see him. I’m this close, but I cannot find him.”

Wafa’s father disappeared from their Damascus home in 2013, forcing Wafa and the rest of her family into exile. He was always a dominant force in her life, as a father, a hero, a source of comfort, and a guiding light. The two were especially close, and both were highly politically active, first closely following as the Arab Spring erupted in other countries and then actively partaking in demonstrations in Damascus.

Since fleeing, first to Turkey and then onwards to Germany, Wafa has been relentless in her demand for answers, standing outside for hours in the freezing cold or sweltering summer heat, holding solitary vigils or joining others in holding photographs of missing loved ones. She has held and participated in countless press conferences, panels, meetings, and media appearances.

Now back in Damascus for the first time, memories reemerge, of not just her father but also the ghostly faces of friends and fellow protestors who are dead or missing.

The need for the truth—for Wafa, the truth of what happened to her father—is a gnawing and raw wound, one that rips through the psyche of countless Syrians. There are an estimated 100,000 to 200,000 Syrians missing, according to the International Commission on Missing Persons.

“If you don’t bring to justice those who were responsible, how do you think people will feel about justice? How do you think that people will seek justice? Many will go for revenge, and revenge literally means no peace,” Wafa warns.

Prison papers, identification documents, and other files were not preserved in the chaos following the shockingly fast fall of the regime of dictator Bashar al-Assad.

“We have no clarity on any level. We don’t know what they are doing with the detainees, the files, the mass graves,” Wafa explains.

It took two months for representatives of the families of the missing, including Wafa, to finally get an audience with Syria’s new president, Ahmad al-Sharaa, and its foreign minister, Asaad al-Shaibani.

“I think it was good as a first step,” Wafa says. “This is just the beginning, and I hope that this meeting will be a step towards an actual plan and the real and serious work.”

A number of regime officials, including Assad, managed to flee the country. Much criticism has been leveled at Syria’s new rulers for not publicly asking that the deposed dictator be handed back over to Syria. While that may not be realistic at this stage, the people at least need reassurance that their new leaders recognize the importance of justice and accountability.

Joumana says there need to be steps toward establishing a hybrid court and that the trial needs to happen in Syria with international judges to guarantee that international standards are followed.

“The people themselves need to decide if there should be amnesty or a forgiveness process for lower-ranking regime members,” she explains. “There also needs to be justice and recognition for the crimes of forced displacement, sexual and gender-based violence.”

“We need to create our own model. It’s different from one context, one people, one area to another,” she says. “We can find a solution, we can tailor our process, our transitional justice, and we will create a very good example of this.”

Syrians cannot focus on their future if they are still drowning in their past.

“For years the Assad regime made us feel unseen. We, our detained loved ones, our wounds and our demands, we were unseen,” Wafa says. “I will feel seen when we see actual steps.”

Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA), a nonprofit organization that focuses on building a network of logistical support and medical care to help children who need life-saving or life-altering medical treatment in war-torn nations.

The post Dispatch from Syria: ‘Syrians cannot focus on their future if they are still drowning in their past’ appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Three worlds in 2035: Imagining scenarios for how the world could be transformed over the next decade

Andrea Ratiu — Wed, 12 Feb 2025 11:00:00 +0000

Three worlds in 2035

Imagining scenarios for how the world could be transformed over the next decade

By Peter Engelke, Greg Lindsay, and Paul Saffo

Welcome to three possible worlds in the year 2035. As resident and non-resident senior fellows in the Atlantic Council’s foresight practice, we produced these scenarios by assessing how current trends and uncertainties across a variety of categories—including geopolitics, the economy, demography, the environment, technology, and society—might interact with one another in the years to come.

These are not forecasts or predictions of what the future will bring. Instead, these scenarios are intended to inspire imagination and spur readers to consider possible futures, including future worlds that do not align with the readers’ expectations. To paraphrase a sentiment often expressed by the physicist and futurist Herman Kahn, the point of working with future scenarios is to find out what you don’t know and should know but that you didn’t even know you didn’t know.

We invite readers to interpret these scenarios in that spirit. Consider the interplay among the cause-and-effect elements that lead to each of the potential future worlds, as well as the myriad other possible scenarios that could emerge in the years to come.

Perhaps the world of 2035 might vaguely resemble one of the three scenarios presented here, but that is not the central purpose of this exercise. The primary reason why we crafted these scenarios is to generate deeper insights into how today’s actions and inactions might create a better or worse world ten years from now.

Choose your global future

The reluctant international order

China ascendant

Climate of fear

The reluctant international order

Global governance has never been more complicated than it is in 2035. But although the problems are complex, thus far the governance landscape is proving capable of containing at least some of them, as occurred several years ago when we endured a near-miss catastrophe from a bioweapon-fueled pandemic.

We might not be experiencing the halcyon days of a revitalized multilateralism, but thankfully we’re also not inhabiting a kill-or-be-killed nihilistic hellscape. We seem to be living through what some commentators are now calling the “Reluctant International Order.”

Let’s begin with what has not happened: neither the much-feared collapse nor the much-hoped-for revitalization of what often is called the rules-based international order (we’ll use the acronym “RBIO”). Which means that neither the 1930s nor the 1990s have returned.

The international order that the United States and its allies created and maintained after 1945 delivered benefits for decades—benefits that were admittedly partial and often uneven but nonetheless real. Embedded within the RBIO are norms, such as non-aggression toward other countries and respect for human rights, that are laudable ideals. And at its core are multilateral institutions, including the United Nations (UN), World Bank, and World Health Organization (WHO), which were designed to contain conflict, assist with economic development, anticipate and then manage crises of various kinds, and provide some governance in an otherwise anarchic world. The whole order is premised on the notion that international cooperation, combined with the open exchange of ideas and goods, will lead to a better and more peaceful world.

Yet there has long been dissatisfaction with the RBIO. Today, as before, many countries are unhappy with the RBIO and seek to upend or reform it. China and Russia, the two most powerful and vocal of these states, have remained steadfast in their opposition to at least parts of this order, although it also has become clear that their ends are not identical. A decade ago, both began to join with North Korea and Iran to form a grouping that was labeled an “axis of aggressors” because of widespread concern about those countries coordinating to directly challenge the West and the international order, militarily and otherwise. Numerous other countries, often middle and emerging powers in the so-called Global South have sought, at a minimum, to modify the RBIO. These states—with India and Brazil the most prominent examples—have accused the RBIO of being unrepresentative and its defenders of being hypocritical because of their selective application of the order’s underpinning norms. Even the core group of democratic nations that historically defended the order, including the United States, often have acted against the RBIO when it suited their interests.

Resilient rules

Despite all this, the various challenges to the RBIO have never been powerful enough to destroy it. Neither the axis of aggressors nor the partnership between China and Russia ever amounted to real military alliances, reflecting weak rather than strong bonds among them. These revisionist states have acted in disjointed fashion, as a result of their divergent interests, and never staged a coordinated attempt to directly confront the West. Partly for that reason, there has been no global war and thus no wholesale shock that reset the global governance system, as occurred after World War II.

Russia emerged from its war against Ukraine (which ended in a negotiated peace in 2026) far weaker than it was when the conflict began, and it has yet to sufficiently recover to mount another similar challenge westward in Europe. China has made no overt move to seize control of Taiwan either. Evidently, Chinese President Xi Jinping has decided he does not want to gamble his country’s future in a confrontation with the United States, which after all remains a great economic and military power with a formidable nuclear deterrent. (The United States’ increased investment in defense of the Western Pacific also appears to have influenced Xi’s calculations.) It does not help China that Russia is a much-debilitated junior partner.

The case of Taiwan is important for another reason. It underscores that, so far, China and the United States have decided that coexistence is the preferable direction for their relationship, which has prevented the international system from collapsing altogether. Their rivalry has been channeled through other pathways short of war, including diplomatic efforts to curry favor abroad and support for various minilateral and multilateral institutions. And they’ve found, more than occasionally, that their interests actually intersect. In the realm of nuclear nonproliferation, for example, both China and the United States have continued working in tandem to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, albeit by utilizing very different mechanisms and forms of leverage.

But while the RBIO has not collapsed—meaning there has been no repeat of the era between World War I and World War II—it also has not been revitalized. There has been no return to a triumphalist end of history, no 1990s-style heyday wherein major and middle powers mostly work in concordance with one another toward peaceful and prosperous coexistence within what they perceive as a benign set of global norms and institutions. Hence the increasing references to a “Reluctant International Order,” if meant in jest.

What has happened instead has been an evolution rather than a revolution, characterized more by experimentation and incrementalism than by some jarring disruption. This has occurred because the world’s problems demand coordinated responses even for countries reluctant to do so and because those countries recognize that the opportunity costs of not engaging are so high.

Today, the outward institutional trappings of the RBIO remain in place. The UN continues its work as before, partially because China does not want to destroy it. (The UN’s embrace of state sovereignty, for example, appeals to China’s interests.) Global trade is still growing, despite the tariff wars of the mid-to-late 2020s, owing in part to technological developments that have continued to lower the cost of trade. And the norms underpinning the RBIO haven’t disappeared, either, since many around the world—national and sub-national governments, civil-society and non-profit organizations, grassroots groups and ordinary citizens—want to preserve them and continue to see value in cooperative approaches to transnational problems.

Trading places

Consider trade. More than a decade ago, many nations began curtailing their exposure to global trade flows out of justifiable concern that trade was having detrimental impacts on their security, economies, and societies. Yet despite extensive anti-globalization rhetoric and policies (with the tariff wars the best example), the prevailing perception is that the benefits of trade continue to outweigh the costs. China and the United States, for instance, still have one of the largest bilateral trade relationships of any two countries in the world, despite their now lengthy history of trade disputes, including tariffs and a range of trade restrictions in sensitive technologies.

The leaders of many countries have realized that they have a compelling interest in remaining engaged in trade and talks to increase trade. This has resulted in the creation, maintenance, or expansion of a number of regional free-trade agreements. Several of these efforts have proven quite successful, perhaps best illustrated by the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Over the past fifteen years, African states have joined with the African Union to extend and deepen AfCFTA and, in so doing, to realize several of its longer-term objectives such as the reduction of intra-continental tariffs and loosening of visa restrictions. The case of AfCFTA and others like it—for instance, strengthened trade agreements between the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Asian countries—underscore that while global trade volume has grown since the mid-2020s, the geography of trade continues to shift.

Nonstate actors have been critical to the maintenance of this system. Multinational companies around the world have made their support for trade well-known, which has helped compel countries to continue defining their interests in pro-trade terms.

Bioweapon-inspired cooperation

Nothing underscored both the value of cooperation and the powers (positive and negative) of nonstate actors like the 2029 bioweapon scare.

That year, a shadowy, transnational doomsday cult—akin to Aum Shinrikyo, which terrorized Japan with sarin gas in 1995—used an artificial intelligence (AI)-enhanced synthetic biology (“SynBio”) process to develop a deadlier and more easily transmissible strain of smallpox. Because the cult’s plot to release it was foiled at the last minute, owing to frantic collaboration among national intelligence services and INTERPOL, the world narrowly avoided a pandemic that would have been far worse than the COVID-19 pandemic.

Horrified by this close call, most of the world’s governments—including the United States, China, and Russia—grasped for solutions. Since pandemics do not respect boundaries, world leaders recognized that there was an upper limit on how much they could protect their people on their own. In response, they quickly sought to deepen collaboration with one another and with leading multilateral public-health institutions such as the WHO, multinational corporations including companies that develop major AI platforms, and the global scientific community that sets standards and runs laboratories. The mandate was clear: Determine how to monitor and regulate the biotechnology space more effectively—or risk perhaps hundreds of millions dying in an AI-enhanced, SynBio-caused (“AIxBio”) pandemic along the lines that the doomsday cult had almost willed into existence.

One of this new coalition’s proposals, which was quickly funded and implemented, was to create an institution similar to the International Atomic Energy Agency but focused on AIxBio. Its formal membership is based on a novel multi-stakeholder model that includes national governments, big-tech firms, and scientific organizations.

The smallpox bioweapon scare vividly illustrated, even for adversarial major powers, the intolerably high risk of countries not engaging with one another through international institutions and on international norms to address the world’s greatest challenges—and on the enduring relevance and value of the RBIO ninety years after its creation. Halting progress in some areas of the international system doesn’t qualify as a renaissance. But even a Reluctant International Order is better than retreat.

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China ascendant

Welcome to 2035, and a world whose center of gravity has shifted decisively toward Beijing.

China now has more influence on world affairs than does any other country, including the United States. It is ascendant on every metric of power—diplomatic, military, economic, and technological. That power has enabled Beijing to begin remaking the world to its liking. It has been busy recasting the global system, including multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN), in its preferred image, and is in the process of dismantling the democratic norms that have animated the international order since 1945.

China has arrived at this ascendant position in part because the United States has not done much to stand in its way. At the turn of this century, such an outcome would have been impossible to imagine. Even a decade ago, when Washington’s commitment to the rules-based international order showed initial signs of wavering, such an outcome would have been difficult to forecast. But US leaders have been consumed by the challenges of dealing with the country’s weakening economy, fraying societal bonds, and unrelentingly harsh domestic politics. These dynamics have eliminated the longstanding bipartisan consensus around defending the global order that the United States, along with its many allies and partners, had built and maintained for decades.

The result has been that the United States no longer has an unwavering commitment to its allies and partners, the core multilateral institutions at the center of the order that it built, and the norms and principles that it stood behind all those years. Instead, the United States has definitively turned inward. By nearly every metric, the United States remains a major power. But it no longer has much interest in maintaining its leadership role in the world. It has ceded that ground to others, especially to China.

Taiwan-style tipping points

The impact of the US withdrawal from global affairs is evident in various flashpoints around the world, including in Taiwan. While the prevailing fear in the 2010s and early 2020s was of a devastating clash between the United States and China over the island, the Taiwan issue was resolved without firing a shot. China subordinated Taiwan by applying intense pressure—via sabotage, cyber operations, propaganda campaigns, overt and covert influence campaigns within Taiwan, espionage, murky hybrid operations on the island and around its waters—to influence Taiwanese domestic politics toward a cross-Straits settlement with the People’s Republic of China. Its efforts to shape domestic politics within Taiwan succeeded. In 2030, Taiwan’s government agreed to (among other things) such a settlement, which included ceasing defense cooperation with foreign governments and reducing Taiwan’s direct engagement with foreign officials. The United States, which did not respond to China’s various forms of pressure against Taiwan, ultimately could not prevent the cross-Straits agreement, given the Taiwanese government’s support for it. None of China’s individual provocations were dramatic enough for an already hesitant United States to risk a direct military confrontation with China over it.

What happened in Taiwan has also played out on a global scale. There was no one exceptional event or even set of events that triggered a transformation of the international system—no explosion that China engineered to blow up the global order. Thus, there never was a single focal point for China’s rivals—especially the United States—to rally their citizens around and respond to in a coordinated and decisive way. Rather, there has been a gradual and now inexorable shift away from the US-led order and toward a Chinese-led one. This shift resulted from decisions made by both US and Chinese leaders: inward-looking in the case of the former, outward-looking in the case of the latter. It was, in short, a slow-motion fait accompli.

China has positioned itself as the world’s inevitable leader, seizing on its strengths to curry favor with other countries and on the opportunity presented by the United States’ implosion to diminish its rival. Take the performance of the two countries’ economies as an example. A decade ago, the economic outlook was bleaker for China than it was for the United States. But over the past ten years, that script has flipped. In the mid-2020s, Chinese President Xi Jinping managed to right China’s sputtering economy, stabilizing it and returning it to steady growth (if less spectacular growth than during the country’s long boom). He did so by successfully transitioning the country to what many are now calling “an innovation system with Chinese characteristics,” striking a balance of rewarding innovation and entrepreneurialism while maintaining the Chinese Communist Party’s control over the nation’s political apparatus.

All this has enabled China to return to selling itself and its economic rebound on the one hand, plus the United States’ economic stagnation (due to dysfunctional politics) on the other, as a compelling reason why the United States is both unreliable and a poor economic model for the rest of the world, and by extension why China represents a better model. That message has even more resonance around the world now than it did ten years ago.

Because of the pull of China’s growing economy, which remains integrated within global trade flows, plus the relative weakness of the US economy, foreign governments have become more willing to sign onto China’s various economic diplomacy efforts, such as the Global Development Initiative. Beijing now hosts a robust schedule of international economic forums that position it at the center of the economic universe, and thus as the destination for intergovernmental bargaining and influence on issues such as trade and investment. To outside observers, the economic pull of Beijing has eclipsed that of Washington and, for that matter, of Brussels, London, Paris, Seoul, or Tokyo.

As a result, China’s influence has grown in many parts of the world. In the Global South, lower- and middle-income countries in Africa, Latin America, and South Asia (where China remains engaged with India in a long-running contest for influence) have been even more eager to trade with and receive investment from China than they were in the 2020s. This outcome is the product of years (in some cases decades) of aggressive economic diplomacy by China and disinterest from the US government. It also stemmed from reform to China’s overseas lending and investment vehicles, which China recognized needed fine-tuning to make them more palatable abroad and deflect rising criticism of the unsustainable debt and other problems they engendered. Thus far, these policy shifts appear to have worked. China has also become the world’s largest trading nation for both imports and exports, ahead of the United States. Shifting trade in goods also has accelerated movement away from trade denominated in US dollars and toward trade denominated in renminbi—a sure sign of the relative strengths of the two economies.

For China, the advantages are enormous: more wealth at home and influence abroad. China’s diplomatic ties with major materials exporters such as Brazil (soybeans and other crops), the Gulf Cooperation Council states (oil), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (critical minerals such as cobalt) have increased. For the United States, the reverse has been true. For the average American, wages and incomes have stagnated, and imported goods are more expensive. Abroad, US goods are less competitive in foreign markets than Chinese goods are.

Allies hedging

The United States still has numerous allies and partners, but the bonds that held them together are weaker now than they were in the past owing to the rise of China and the self-induced retreat of the United States.

In Asia, nervous US allies including Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines are hedging between China and the United States in more ways than they were in the 2020s. But now, having witnessed what happened in Taiwan, these countries are even more concerned about the security guarantee that the United States has provided to them. Both Japan and South Korea have admitted that they are exploring options to acquire nuclear weapons in order to deter China and North Korea, and most analysts expect both to become nuclear-weapons states by 2040. Various forms of US-led minilateral diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific such as the Quad have died slow deaths, the result of both US indifference and Asian countries’ doubts about the value of these efforts to counter and contain a rising China. India, for example, believes it can achieve more through its own bilateral actions to check Chinese influence than it can by working through such forums.

Also contributing to the deep unease of US allies is the growth of China’s military in size and capabilities, and its increasing forward presence in the Asia-Pacific and elsewhere around the world. China has been steadily increasing its number of basing agreements globally to the point where, just as US intelligence services feared a decade ago, China now has bases in Africa, South Asia, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and the islands in the Pacific and Indian oceans.

A similar story is playing out in Europe, albeit focused on a different threat. There, European NATO members are arming themselves rapidly, spending well above the 2 percent of gross domestic product threshold for defense spending that Washington had been requesting for decades. Although that amounts to a victory of sorts for US foreign policy, it really is a defeat because the spending is an expression of serious doubt about the United States’ commitment to NATO and the Alliance’s Article 5 collective-defense pledge should war come again to the continent. Although the previous war in Ukraine ended in a negotiated stalemate, most European observers believe that it is only a matter of time before a rearmed and resurgent Russia decides to test NATO, likely through a long-feared invasion focused on the Baltics.

In this climate, many are pinning their hopes on Beijing rather than Washington, believing that China will restrain Russia, its junior partner, from going on the offensive in Europe. Partly for this reason, and the fact that China is now Europe’s largest trading partner (having surpassed the United States in the early 2030s), European leaders have muted their criticisms of China’s record on human rights, including privacy rights, and have eased China’s access to the common market despite ongoing concerns about dumping, intellectual-property theft, and other such practices.

Institutional shifts

In part because China never has been interested in tearing down the entire international system and replacing it with something else entirely, few Western leaders have paid much attention to how China has been busy recasting these institutions in its image. And indeed, the UN system and the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and International Monetary Fund) continue, with China maintaining its representation in them as it has for decades.

But there have been important changes within the UN system. Recently, for instance, China has been far more successful than it was in previous decades at getting its appointees installed within various technical standard-setting bodies such as the UN’s International Telecommunication Union—a function of China’s unrelenting focus on these specialized bureaucracies plus its rising economic, scientific, and technological prowess.

Or consider the UN’s historic role in maintaining peace and security. China was long willing to support UN peacekeeping operations around the world by providing troops and funds, at least to an extent. Yet with the United States and its democratic allies among the UN Security Council’s five permanent members—France and the United Kingdom—now far less willing to spearhead these operations, China has yet to pick up the leadership mantle. China remains willing to contribute to peacekeeping but generally not to lead large-scale efforts, whether in terms of the Security Council’s broad peacekeeping mandates or the financial, human, and technical resources necessary to build them. The result has been fewer such operations and weaker ones as well, leaving more of the world’s conflicts to devolve and even in some cases metastasize.

Perhaps the most worrisome change has to do with the norms and principles that underpin the global system—both within the UN and more generally as well. Although China expresses support for some of the system’s principles—for example, the UN’s emphasis on state sovereignty and territorial integrity—it manifestly does not support others and especially those based upon democratic values. As a result, serious emphasis on human rights and related norms, as well as global oversight of them, has collapsed within multilateral institutions, including the UN.

These developments are having real, on-the-ground impact. China has successfully built a more robust surveillance apparatus globally that includes more sophisticated cyber-espionage operations capable of tracking the communications of ordinary people around the world, along with a major expansion of China’s overseas police stations. The Chinese government claims that these stations are designed only to service the Chinese diaspora, but their true purpose seems to be to keep track of and pressure both the diaspora and China’s external critics as well.

The erosion of global human-rights enforcement speaks to a broader trend: The so-called democratic recession that has been plaguing the world since the early 2000s is now bordering on a depression. With China ascendant, the world’s autocratic leaders are acting with greater confidence at home and abroad. Midway through the 2030s, the long-running contest between democratic and authoritarian systems appears to be resolving—in favor of the latter.

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Climate of fear

In 2035, the Earth’s climate is hotter and less stable than it’s ever been in human history. This instability is causing people to turn on one another—and politics to become more abrasive than it was a decade ago. Climate-driven turbulence is making nearly every other problem—be it geopolitical or conflict-related—harder to solve. These challenges transcend national boundaries and afflict every country, whether rich or poor, to the north or south. Numerous local conflicts and one tense regional standoff (in South Asia) have been fueled by the consequences of a changing climate.

These trends have produced some positive outcomes as well, but in the 2030s it’s difficult to foresee a bright future. As a result, many are looking to radical solutions to get humanity out of its predicament.

Ecological crisis

There is almost no good news to be found in the natural world. A range of climate-induced problems are all worse than they were a decade ago. Observable, on-the-ground environmental changes have consistently outpaced scientists’ predictions from twenty or even ten years ago.

The data indicates that several climate tipping points—including the drying of the Amazon rainforest, the melting of the West Antarctic ice sheet, and the ongoing slowing of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation system, which regulates temperatures and precipitation in Europe, Africa, and elsewhere—are nearer than we previously thought. Scientists’ modeling, based on real-world data in the 2030s, now points even more strongly toward one or more of these or other critical systems collapsing in the next few decades. When these systems begin to collapse, there will be no practical way back from truly horrific ecological disasters.

Even short of such disasters, the world today lacks the capacity to adjust quickly enough to the climate impacts that are here already. Chronic heat is a problem nearly everywhere in the world, with lengthy heat waves now routine on every continent—including on Antarctica, where record highs, well above freezing, are increasingly common. Most frightening is the rapid increase in “wet bulb” days in some regions near the equator, where high heat plus high humidity make it impossible for humans to survive for long outdoors. Massive storms—flash flooding in the wake of record-breaking torrential rainfall, for example, or hurricanes and cyclones that strike well inland—are commonplace now as well. Several coastal cities around the world, including Bangkok, Miami, and Jakarta, regularly flood, even more frequently than they did a decade ago. In 2029, China’s low-lying Pearl River Delta was hit by a massive typhoon that crippled the region’s manufacturing output for months, disrupting global supply chains.

These developments have numerous second- and third-order consequences. The world’s forests, for example, have become tinderboxes, which means that firefighting has become a significant part of national-security planning for an ever-lengthening list of the world’s governments.

(Geo)political upheaval

Politics and geopolitics are changing with the natural world, largely for the worse. Climate change has weakened the world’s democracies, which already had suffered through decades of decline. From Spain and Greece to South Africa, Nepal, and Panama, storms and suffocating heat waves have disrupted elections by making it harder for some voters to cast their ballots. Such events have also affected who participates in elections in the first place, given how they have influenced the outflows and inflows of people through cities and countries, and the voter registration and verification problems that have followed.

Many years ago, when climate-driven migration was first hypothesized in the scientific literature, few paid attention. Not so today, as fears about the consequences of so-called climate migrants or climate refugees have generated real policies involving real people. These fears often have been based on lurid imagination about crime and chaos rather than on facts.

In 2035, there are an estimated 150 million migrants worldwide who are either temporarily displaced or permanently on the move because of climate impacts, although no one knows the true number because migration is such a complex, multifaceted phenomenon. Yet everyone agrees that more migrants are coming.

Most climate-driven migration remains within national boundaries, often coming in the form of rural-to-urban migration into cities such as Bogotá and Karachi. Or it is intra-regional migration within areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia. Such trends are also occurring within wealthy regions and countries such as the United States.

These migration patterns have reminded many of the Syrian crisis of the early 2010s, which was preceded by drought-stressed migrants fleeing the countryside for the cities. Although that internal migration likely was only an indirect cause of the subsequent uprising against the Assad regime—which lasted well over a decade and ultimately resulted in the regime’s overthrow—many now see repetition of that past. They point to how climate-fueled internal displacements have increased recruitment into armed nonstate groups. They note the increasing number of communities around the world where climate impacts have exacerbated preexisting vulnerabilities to cause local conflicts, too many of which have started to become deadly. And they cite the increasing number of failed and failing states resulting in part from climate-driven disasters such as intense, multi-year drought.

Governments have responded through pull-up-the-drawbridges measures—and not just in Europe or the United States, where one might expect that to happen, but around the world, including within the Global South. Border walls designed to keep migrants out were already widespread ten years ago. They are everywhere now.

India, for example, has clamped down on its borders with Bangladesh and Myanmar, heavily fortifying them with more personnel, fencing, sophisticated electronic-surveillance systems, and autonomous enforcement technologies such as drones. Numerous critics, both within India and outside of it, have voiced objections, but the Indian government insists that it is only doing what its voters want. This has led to a volatile diplomatic situation in South Asia. Pakistan, which long ago patched up its relations with Bangladesh, has joined Bangladesh and Myanmar in loudly and publicly pushing India to reverse its border policies, to no avail. The region is not at war, nor is there an immediate risk of one. But it is at a knife’s edge, with climate-driven migration having become one of the biggest sources of friction.

Turbulence-induced transformations

There are some bright spots in this otherwise discouraging picture. Renewables are now firmly established as the world’s dominant sources of energy, reflecting both their market competitiveness and the rapid electrification of the global economy. And nuclear energy has begun making a comeback in much of the world, with the latest reactor designs now seen as safely providing reliable, zero-emission electricity. (New power plants, however, remain rare.) In addition, green-technology markets are expanding rapidly across many industries such as food, water, energy, transportation, and consumer goods. Nearly a third of the world’s stock of cars and trucks is fully electric.

The challenge lies in the rate at which decarbonization is occurring—a pace that simply has not been fast enough. Although global greenhouse-gas emissions finally peaked in the late 2020s, humankind nonetheless surpassed the carbon budget required to stay within the target of keeping global warming above pre-industrial levels to 1.5 degrees Celsius, as laid out in the 2015 Paris Agreement. Scientists had prioritized staying below this target to limit the worst impacts of climate change.

One of the factors contributing to this challenge is that much of the world’s legacy energy infrastructure remains in place. Decommissioning such infrastructure, particularly coal and natural-gas plants, is expensive. Too many of the world’s high-carbon plants still exist, especially coal-fired power plants concentrated in China.

Behind all this is global energy consumption, which has continued to rise fast, consistently outstripping renewables’ capacity to fully meet the demand. (A challenge here is that interest rates for borrowing in riskier storm-affected regions have increased, constraining the expansion of capital-intensive renewables such as offshore wind farms.) There are many drivers of this increasing demand, including technological developments such as advances in artificial intelligence (AI). As was feared in the mid-2020s, the infrastructure necessary to support AI’s growth—in the form of computing power and data centers—boosted global energy demand. Although tech companies have greened their models, the problem is about scale: AI’s ubiquity translates into a massive source of energy usage. Some tech companies have become players in the nuclear-energy space for this reason.

As they navigate this turbulence, and as already foreshadowed in the 2020s, both right- and left-wing populist governments are no longer reflexively hostile to policies to combat climate change like they once were. There is renewed interest in accelerating decarbonization efforts, including revitalizing the moribund United Nations-led process for mitigating climate change.

Another response to the unsustainable status quo has been the embrace of more radical solutions. Geoengineering—and specifically solar radiation modification (SRM), which refers to atmospheric and even space-based efforts to reduce warming by reflecting sunlight back into space—has rapidly gone from a scientific curiosity to a subject of serious research. Although SRM engineering is complex, compared with other approaches it is straightforward and inexpensive. As a result, already in 2035 both state and nonstate actors are experimenting with SRM in the atmosphere. There is great fear that the implementation of these new approaches will be a nightmare, as for-profit companies, tech billionaires, and rogue states initiate their own unilateral solutions, while countries fight over the expected (but dimly understood) impacts on their regions. Although the scientific community is warning that SRM’s consequences aren’t yet sufficiently understood, there is a growing sentiment among many (though not all) politicians that it should be tried at scale. But everyone is asking whether effective geoengineering is even possible without some sort of global governance and regulatory regime.

Meanwhile, the clock is ticking and the climate is changing. Humankind’s efforts to master the natural world during the post-industrial era produced the climate crisis. Now, in 2035, the Earth increasingly seems the master of human affairs rather than the other way around.

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About the authors

Peter Engelke, Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

Engelke is on the adjunct faculty at Georgetown University’s School of Continuing Studies and is a frequent lecturer to the US Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute. He was previously a member of the World Economic Forum’s Global Future Council on Complex Risks, an executive-in-residence at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, a Bosch fellow with the Robert Bosch Foundation, and a visiting fellow at the Stimson Center.

Greg Lindsay, Nonresident Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

Lindsay is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s GeoStrategy Initiative, as well as a nonresident senior fellow of the Arizona State University Threatcasting Lab and the MIT Future Urban Collectives Lab.

Paul Saffo, Nonresident Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

Saffo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s GeoStrategy Initiative and co-editor of Futures Research Methodologies, which will be released later this year.

Global Foresight 2025

In this year’s Global Foresight edition, our experts share findings from our survey of global strategists on how human affairs could unfold over the next decade. Our team of next-generation scholars spot “snow leopards” that could have major unexpected impacts in 2025 and beyond. And our foresight practitioners imagine three different scenarios for the next decade.

Learn More Full Survey

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Welcome to 2035: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts

In the fall of 2024 after the outcome of the US presidential election, the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security surveyed the future, asking leading global strategists and foresight practitioners around the world to answer our most burning questions about the biggest drivers of change over the next ten years. Here are the full results.

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2025

By Emily Milliken, Imran Bayoumi, Ginger Matchett, Srujan Palkar, Sydney Sherry

Atlantic Council foresight experts spot the underappreciated phenomena that could have outsized impact on the world, driving global change and shaping the future.

Civil Society Climate Change & Climate Action

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Three worlds in 2035: Imagining scenarios for how the world could be transformed over the next decade

2024 was marked by increased climate shocks and collaboration of autocratic adversaries. What will the world look like in the next decade? The Atlantic Council’s top experts brought their globe-spanning expertise to the task of forecasting three different scenarios for the future.

Africa China

The post Three worlds in 2035: Imagining scenarios for how the world could be transformed over the next decade appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Global Foresight 2025 survey: Full results

Andrea Ratiu — Wed, 12 Feb 2025 11:00:00 +0000

The Global Foresight 2025 survey

Full results

This survey was conducted from November 15, 2024 through December 2, 2024.

Demographic data

Survey questions

Global Foresight 2025

Learn More Full Survey

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Welcome to 2035: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Six ‘snow leopards’ to watch for in 2025

By Emily Milliken, Imran Bayoumi, Ginger Matchett, Srujan Palkar, Sydney Sherry

Atlantic Council foresight experts spot the underappreciated phenomena that could have outsized impact on the world, driving global change and shaping the future.

Civil Society Climate Change & Climate Action

Atlantic Council Strategy Paper Series Feb 12, 2025

Three worlds in 2035: Imagining scenarios for how the world could be transformed over the next decade

Africa China

The post The Global Foresight 2025 survey: Full results appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Tannebaum quoted in Newsweek on DOGE’s access to Treasury payment systems

irosales — Sat, 01 Feb 2025 21:06:55 +0000

The post Tannebaum quoted in Newsweek on DOGE’s access to Treasury payment systems appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The foreign aid freeze poses risks to US interests in Syria

Diana Rayes — Fri, 31 Jan 2025 22:15:27 +0000

Days into the second Trump administration, the US State Department and US Agency for International Development (USAID) have paused—with few exceptions and waivers—all US foreign aid assistance as the administration undertakes a policy review. According to a State Department press release announcing the aid freeze, the pause is meant to ensure foreign assistance is “efficient and consistent with US foreign policy under the America First agenda.”

This comes at a critical time for Syria following the collapse of the Assad regime late last year and the establishment of a new interim government led by Ahmed al-Shara, who headed the rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Syria—and US regional and European partners—are relying on the United States to lead the way in sanctions relief efforts to allow trade and investment to flow into the country and bolster the state-building process. While limited sanctions relief was granted in the final weeks of the Biden administration, likely prompting the European Union (EU) to also recently ease economic restrictions, the Trump administration’s foreign assistance freeze has the potential to jeopardize Syria’s fragile recovery.

In his confirmation hearing in January, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio previewed his priorities for an outcome in Syria that is favorable to US interests and, more importantly, for the people of Syria. Rubio described an endgame in which Syria is not a land bridge for Iranian proxies, a chessboard for foreign interventions, or an exporter of drugs and terrorism. On several fronts, the Trump administration should pick up where the Biden administration left off in helping Syrians to rebuild their country.

The United States should also use this critical opportunity in Syria to learn from the challenges of the past three administrations. While the strategic importance of Syria’s stability for the Middle East, European allies, and US adversaries has long been a point of bipartisan understanding, strategic outcomes in Syria have been ill-defined. US policy levers, from humanitarian aid and sanctions to military presence on the ground, were misaligned with US goals. Going forward, US humanitarian and economic assistance to the country should be better aligned with clearly identifiable goals that help the Syrian people while furthering US interests in a stable and peaceful Syria.

Reliance on foreign aid assistance in Syria

Humanitarian needs in Syria are at an all-time high—in 2024, 16.7 million people were estimated to require assistance, the largest number since the beginning of the civil war in 2011. Foreign assistance, particularly from the United States, has played a significant, lifesaving role in Syria in the last decade and a half. Despite this, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs recently reported ongoing and severe underfunding for the Syria Humanitarian Response Plan—with only 34.5 percent of its $4.1 billion funding requirements fulfilled as of the beginning of this year.

The United States is the largest foreign aid provider to Syria, contributing more than $18 billion in humanitarian assistance since 2011, including $1.2 billion in 2024. Most of last year’s funding supported humanitarian and emergency response efforts, with $76.8 million for refugee and conflict victim support, $34.7 million for humanitarian aid like food and nutrition, and $20.2 million for emergency food assistance and related services.

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US funding has been crucial in supporting humanitarian efforts on the ground in Syria. The White Helmets, an internationally-supported Syrian civil rescue organization, has received US support for critical operations across the country, including search and rescue missions, as well as health and protection programming. In the weeks since Bashar al-Assad’s fall, their critical work has included the clearing of unexploded ordnance across the country, which pose a severe threat to civilians, especially children, and have resulted in hundreds of deaths and injuries. The White Helmets have also prioritized securing and recovering chemical weapons stockpiles left by the Assad regime, activities which have since been halted by the recent pause, raising concerns over the ability to prevent the spread of chemical weapons in Syria and neighboring countries.

US aid has also played a critical role in managing Al-Hol and Al-Roj camps in northeast Syria, which house over 46,000 displaced individuals—primarily women and children—from former Islamic State of Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) territories. Essential water and sanitation services managed by US-funded humanitarian staff were suddenly suspended, placing camp residents at greater risk of lack of access to safe drinking water, as well as water and vector-borne disease spread. Also alarming was the effect of the sudden pause on funding that contributes to the security and administrative management of major detention facilities holding close to ten thousand ISIS fighters in these areas, which raised concerns among counterterrorism officials about mass prison breaks and a potential ISIS resurgence. State Department officials quickly responded by granting exceptions for foreign aid cuts related to the management of these facilities. However, other sudden moves to withdraw aid in Syria or downsize the US military presence in the country could pose significant counterterrorism risks for the United States and its partners. It is in the United States’ broader interest to ensure security needs in Syria are met in order to prevent violent extremists from exploiting political vacuums.

What does the “stop-work” order mean for Syria?

The recent “stop-work” order has introduced significant uncertainty for ongoing aid and economic recovery efforts in Syria—and as a result poses risks to US interests in the region. While the order originally included a carve-out for emergency food aid, the exact scope and implementation of these exceptions remain unclear for Syria, raising concerns from the United Nations and aid groups about disruptions to critical forms of assistance globally. In response to this pressure, Rubio has since issued a waiver for “life-saving assistance,” which includes medical services, food, shelter, and subsistence assistance. Aid organizations, like the White Helmets and even US-based contractors and small businesses supporting US-funded programs abroad, are still navigating an unpredictable funding environment, making it difficult to plan for long-term relief and stabilization efforts.

This development comes in the context of previous US measures aimed at mitigating the impact of sanctions on humanitarian aid in Syria. The Biden administration had previously granted select sanctions relief to Syria for six months through the US Treasury Department to facilitate the provision of public services and humanitarian assistance. This relief applied to sanctions related to transactions with Syria’s government and the processing of personal remittances to the country through the Syrian Central Bank. This was followed promptly by a waiver to the Foreign Assistance Act relating to Syria’s designation as a state sponsor of terror for Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Ukraine. Not without its flaws, the move aimed to enable critical aid and development assistance in sectors ranging from energy and agriculture to technology and healthcare. Other countries, as well as the EU, are using a “step-by-step” approach to the lifting of sanctions on Syria as leverage to ensure the new government is meeting key indicators of a successful and sustainable political transition.

With the stop-work order now in effect, the future of US-backed humanitarian operations in Syria is now in question. The recent waiver issued by the State Department for this order notably does not include stabilization assistance—of which the United States has collectively contributed more than $1.3 billion since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011—and is defined as multi-sectoral support to “local governance, essential services, and livelihoods and economic recovery.” Experts have noted that these efforts to promote stability in Syria in the coming months is contingent on indicators to the Syrian people that the economic conditions in the country are on the mend under the new government. It is therefore in the United States’ and its partners’ national security interests to aid postwar recovery in Syria to begin the process of improving US-Syria relations, facilitate the return of refugees and displaced Syrians around the globe, and ensure regional stability.

The Trump administration has also issued a series of executive orders on personnel at the State Department and USAID. The administration has placed senior career civil servants on administrative leave, fired institutional contractors, and pressured employees to resign. These include officials who have worked on Syria for over a decade and possess critical institutional knowledge on conflict stabilization, humanitarian assistance, and development in fragile economies.

Aid groups and policymakers are closely monitoring whether additional exemptions or funding adjustments will be made to prevent further disruptions to essential services. The potential consequences of prolonged aid suspensions could exacerbate existing humanitarian crises and create new security risks in a region already facing instability.

Ensuring a stable Syria

Syria is at a critical juncture in its history, and the next few months are essential for the country’s interim authorities to ensure national and regional stability. As Sinan Hatahet highlights in a piece for the Atlantic Council, the United States has an especially vital role to play in Syria’s recovery efforts as this “post-Assad honeymoon” phase fades.

As other post-conflict contexts have demonstrated, foreign aid and stabilization programming—led out of the US State Department and USAID—will be instrumental in determining Syria’s trajectory. To facilitate a stable postwar recovery in Syria, the United States must ensure that US leadership in aid development is not in question. In addition to resuming existing aid programs, there are several steps the administration can take to improve its aid to Syria and better align it with US objectives.

Evaluate how local programs fit into broader US policy and Syria’s evolving political situation.
Ensure aid is aligned with local systems and development priorities as programs are renewed or new ones are developed.
If unwilling for political reasons to increase US aid to Syria, continue Biden administration steps, including taking further actions to permanently roll back sanctions in Syria and to remove barriers for allies and partners to do so.

Postwar Syria faces a precarious economic and security situation and the United States’ assistance—or lack thereof—will play an outsize role in its outcome. For the sake of both the Syrian people and the United States’ interest in a stable and peaceful Syria that does not become a terrorist threat, it is imperative that US aid to Syria continue.

Diana Rayes, PhD, is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Note: Some Atlantic Council work funded by the US government has been paused as a result of the Trump administration’s Stop Work Orders issued under the Executive Order “Reevaluating and Realigning US Foreign Aid.”

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Libya’s de facto partition demands a solution designed for it—not for outside contenders

Hani Shennib — Fri, 31 Jan 2025 20:09:15 +0000

While the West continues to fixate on elections in promoting democracy worldwide, many Libyans today have become resentful. They largely perceive the elections touted by the West as part of a strategy to legitimize a government that serves foreign interests rather than fulfilling Libyans’ needs for stability and institution building. They simply do not trust that elections conducted under current conditions—characterized by a lack of constitutional foundations, profound corruption, forceful arrests, and streets dominated by militias and warlords—can lead to fair outcomes.

Meanwhile, the West and its partners, caught up in defending democracy and human rights, feel guilt over their failure to stabilize Libya following an intervention that bizarrely morphed from a mission to protect a population from Muammar Gaddafi’s wrath into one of regime change. Consequently, the coalition has yet again turned to an inept United Nations (UN)to push for democratic change through elections. However, this goal has not materialized and is unlikely to do so in the near future.

Historically, other countries have approached resolving the situation in Libya with a mindset of “what’s in it for me?,” highlighting how national and regional interests shape attempts at change—particularly in the context of Libya. This was similarly true during UN discussions on how to address Italian colonies taken by the Allies post-World War II and the intense negotiations among the United States, European countries, and Russia regarding Libya’s fate in the late 1940s. Notably, strong views were expressed by Azzam Pasha (an Egyptian diplomat who was at the time the secretary general of the Arab League) regarding Egypt’s interests in Libya. Such discussions have an eerie similarity to today’s regional and international negotiations about Libya’s future.

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Currently, the motivations for international involvement in Libya are shaped by three main concerns: 1) Europe’s alarm over the massive scale of illegal migration flowing through porous Libyan borders and its significant security and socioeconomic implications; 2) unease about the potential downward spiral of sociopolitical conditions in North African and Sahel states, which could undermine the economic interests of major corporations in the region; and 3) worry that a chaotic and fragile state may allow terrorist entities to thrive and potentially spread, escalating security threats.

In the eyes of the international community, these concerns require dealing with a central authority in Libya, regardless of the authority’s perceived legitimacy or its true value to the Libyan people and their institution building. These factors have, in part, led to a series of poorly devised proposals and roadmaps put forth by the UN and endorsed by international actors, which have resulted in little progress and worsened the divisions currently observed in Libya today.

From my observations during my frequent visits to the country and my conversations with Libyan leaders, politicians, and academics, I have identified five reasons why previous efforts put forth by the international community to shape a modern state in Libya have failed.

First, there are historical roots of division that have not yet been addressed. This is one of the reasons why the numerous attempts by multiple representatives of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to engage Libyan actors in various stabilizing roadmaps over the last thirteen years have failed miserably. The last effort, expected to lead to elections in December 2022, went nowhere due to political wrangling between two executive bodies and two legislative ones located—by no coincidence—in the eastern and western parts of the country, reflecting the historical divisions between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. It is practically impossible to envision effective presidential and parliamentary elections occurring in the near future without acknowledging these historical roots of division.

Second, it is clear that political and security actors on the ground in both regions of Libya have exploited these divisions for their own political and financial benefit through alliances with benefactor militias, corrupt entrepreneurs, members of the nouveau riche, and cross-border smugglers. This blend of neo-militocracy and kleptocracy heavily influences political and security decisions in the executive, legislative, judicial, and security branches in Libya, ensuring that national and international distractions allow them to remain in power for the foreseeable future.

Third, after forty-two years of oppression and a dismissal of rights and democracy under Gaddafi, as well as additional fourteen years of poverty and insecurity following the collapse of state institutions in 2011, the populace is busy with surviving day by day and lacks the means necessary to express their discontent. This, along with a sense of defeat regarding their aspirations for a better life following the failed Arab Spring, renders it unlikely that any significant movement will arise from the streets of Libyan cities in the near future, creating grounds for the continuation of the status quo.

Fourth and most importantly, the emergence of more pressing global conflicts and a shift in the international community’s priorities over the past four years, particularly with a focus on Ukraine and Southeast Asia, has diminished the attention and resources devoted to Libya’s situation. That is the case despite the fact that the West is concerned about the exponential growth of Russian and Chinese influence in Libya and the African continent at large.

Last, it is clear that the populations of many developing countries, particularly in the Middle East and Africa (including Libya), perceive Western governments to have lost their moral compass and can no longer be trusted as custodians of democratic and humanitarian change. This perception has been exacerbated by the catastrophe that has befallen the Arab people of Gaza—which countries in the West either failed to prevent or openly supported. Thus, in the eyes of the Libyan people, the West’s ability to recommend, supervise, or contribute to any democratic or nation-building initiatives has become compromised. This observation reinforces a decade-long sentiment among Arabs that it is not uncommon for Western governments to support and deal with autocracies and militaries throughout the Arab world—from Algeria to Egypt to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States—contributing to their skepticism about elections and hopes for democratic change.

One of the few successes in Libya since 2020 (the year that marked the end of the civil war that divided the country into territories east and west of the city of Sirte), is that the line dividing the country has become more distinct. Today, Libya has two governments, effectively two legislative bodies, and two security entities controlling the political, economic, and daily operations in their respective regions. Ironically—despite initial unifying efforts to address the disastrous situation in the aftermath of Storm Daniel in 2023, which claimed nearly twelve thousand lives—grand reconstruction opportunities in the regions have instead led to further segmentation of decision making and project funding. Such mega-funding and the anticipated engagement of international corporations and governments has only further entrenched Libya’s split.

Thus, Libya is currently a de facto two-state entity. The elusive internationally recognized government based in Tripoli exists primarily to allow the international community and its corporations to advance their own interests, failing to address the complex realities on the ground in Libya. International players such as China, Russia, and others are moving within Libya with disregard to issues of migration or border security, and are more focused on strategic economic engagement with Africa. This further undermines European and US interests while taking advantage of the West’s inertia and lack of clear strategy and engagement in Libya.

Furthermore, Libyans have grown disillusioned with the role of the international community and the United Nations, and they no longer trust or see much value in UNSMIL. Libyans are now gradually accepting and adapting to the current de facto demarcation of the country, going along with this in almost every aspect of their daily functions. An unnatural symbiosis seems to be developing between the aspirations of the people of Cyrenaica for more regional governance—away from the centralist hegemony Tripolitania exercised since 1969—and the military autocracy led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. At the same time, the internationally recognized government in Libya’s west continues to struggle to maintain power under the leadership of Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah who (along with his cousin) was sanctioned for corruption by the Libyan interim government and continues to face allegations of corruption, which he denies. Recent street anger against Dbeibah, stemming from his government’s attempt at rapprochement with Israeli officials as well as an escalation of pressure from dissatisfied militia, could catalyze the collapse of the internationally recognized government. This, in turn, could prompt Dbeibah to resort to military skirmishes with the east to distract from public discontent and prolong his government’s lifespan.

This week, the UN secretary-general appointed Hanna Serwaa Tetteh, a seasoned Ghanaian diplomat, as the new head of UNSMIL, making her the tenth person to serve that position in thirteen years. The appointment came after much wrangling between the United States and Russia, again suggesting that foreign interests will likely continue to dominate conversations about resolutions for Libya.

Libya needs new ideas and a national and international will to reset a realistic path toward a modern state, premised on a recognition of its history and a mentality of “what’s in it” not just for the international community but, more importantly, for its own people, as well.

Hani Shennib is the founding president of the National Council on US-Libya Relations

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Lebanon’s prime minister-designate is unlikely to confront Hezbollah

David Daoud — Wed, 29 Jan 2025 16:16:41 +0000

After a two-year vacancy, Lebanon finally has a president. On January 9, Joseph Aoun was swept into office as its fourteenth holder to Lebanese and international acclaim. More importantly, if less glamorously, Lebanon has also selected a prime minister-designate to form a cabinet. Nawaf Salam—a former Palestine Liberation Organization and Fatah militant turned Lebanese diplomat who also served as president of the International Court of Justice—is now expected to assume the premiership. As the head of Lebanon’s true executive authority, lifting the country out of its compounding crises—not the least of which is the question of what will become of Hezbollah and its arms—will fall upon Salam.

His chances of success are far from clear. What is clear is that given Lebanon’s dire economic state, its postwar reconstruction needs, and the balance of political power in the country, Salam is highly unlikely to meaningfully confront Hezbollah and risk escalating internal conflict during his premiership.

The powers of the prime minister

Under Lebanon’s pre-civil war constitution, the presidency—earmarked by convention for a Maronite, the country’s dominant Christian sect—was Lebanon’s preeminent and most powerful office. The Taif Agreement of 1989, which ended the Lebanese Civil War, amended the constitution and shuffled Lebanon’s balance of power to better accord with the best estimate of the country’s new demographic realities. In part, it expanded the power of the Sunni-designated post of prime minister and his cabinet at the presidency’s expense—creating a balance between two offices that would now operate as mutual counterweights.

Today, according to the Lebanese constitution, the cabinet “set[s] the general policy of the State in all domains, draws up bills and organizational decrees,” and “Oversees the implementation of laws and regulations, and supervises the activities over all the State’s institutions, including civil, military, and security administrations and institutions without exception.” If he cobbles together a cabinet and then gains the parliament’s confidence within thirty days, Salam will become the latest beneficiary of that expanded power.

Lebanon’s political landscape

But Salam and his cabinet are unlikely to usher in fundamental changes.

Lebanon’s next parliamentary elections are set for May 2026. Salam therefore has a year and a half, at most, to tackle a wide range of issues, from a collapsed economy and poor infrastructure to security challenges, before his government dissolves by operation of law. His government will be responsible for fully implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and the November 27, 2024, cease-fire deal with Israel. And Salam, who has not yet fully assumed the premiership, has already confronted and overcome a legitimacy crisis.

Salam’s candidacy won the support of eighty-four of Lebanon’s 128 parliamentarians. But that wasn’t supposed to happen. His predecessor and longtime ally of Hezbollah, Najib Miqati, was set to retake the office, reportedly as part of the guarantees and assurances that presidential candidate Aoun gave Hezbollah and the Amal Party—the so-called Shia duo—in exchange for backing Aoun’s election. When many of the parties that had seemingly committed to Miqati switched their votes at the last minute to Salam, first Hezbollah and then Amal responded by withholding their support. The pro-Hezbollah newspaper Al-Akhbar decried what it called a “total American coup” while the head of the group’s Loyalty to the Resistance parliamentary bloc, Mohammad Raad, angrily accused Salam’s backers of “sever[ing]” the conciliatory hand Hezbollah had extended by voting for Aoun.

The Shia duo thus denied Salam the backing of the only two representative parties of Lebanese Shias—likely the country’s largest and fastest-growing sect. Their statements also left it ambiguous as to whether they would join or support Salam’s government. While not constitutionally required, because Lebanon continues to operate on the basis of sectarian power sharing and consensus, convention would require Salam’s cabinet to have pan-sectarian support. Without it, the cloud of illegitimacy and “exclusion” of one of Lebanon’s constituent components would hang over his government. Salam and Aoun therefore reportedly scrambled to placate the Shia duo—with Salam sending them assurances that his designation wasn’t intended to exclude them, and Aoun stepping in to mediate.

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Salam and the Shia duo appear to have smoothed matters over. Caught off guard, Hezbollah and Amal’s intransigence was only temporary political muscle-flexing to extract concessions or guarantees from Salam. This was a similar tactic to when they withheld their votes from Aoun during the first round of voting for the president on January 9. Whatever the eventual composition of Salam’s future government or the content of its policy statement, they sought to ensure that Salam would uphold the president’s assurances that were supposed to come through Miqati—and not move against Hezbollah, its arms, or its shadow state.

To be sure, Salam is closer to a consensus candidate than the anti-Hezbollah pugilists Ashraf Rifi and Fouad Makhzoumi, the preferred candidates of the old-guard opposition and activist opposition, respectively, who withdrew in favor of Salam. Nevertheless, Salam is not a partner and known quantity like Miqati. And an unfriendly prime minister could theoretically initiate the process of disarming Hezbollah. After all, Lebanon’s armed forces are constitutionally “subject to the authority of the Cabinet”—and not the president, who is only their nominal commander.

Toeing the line

But Salam was always unlikely to pick a fight with Hezbollah. Salam’s list of vital tasks is long, and his time in office could be short. The Shia duo are not marginal societal actors. Hezbollah alone won 356,122 of the 1,951,683 votes cast in the 2022 parliamentary elections—the most of any party by 150,000 votes—and two separate 2024 polls showed that 85-93 percent of Shias in Lebanon support the group. Amal won an additional 191,142 votes. At best, clashing with them would be met with the obstructionism and political paralysis at which the Shia duo—and especially Hezbollah—excels. At worst, given their popularity, it would be flirting with civil war. But their compliance, at minimum, would enable Salam and his government to pursue at least some of its goals.

Salam must steer Lebanon through economic recovery, update and upgrade the country’s decayed infrastructure, enact political and judicial reform, and begin the work of postwar reconstruction. These are heavy lifts for a normally functioning state, and for Lebanon they may be impossible—even without compounding these challenges by trying to disarm Hezbollah. Therefore, confronting the group will likely drop to the bottom of Salam’s priorities, if it isn’t absent from his agenda entirely.

The danger of Israel resuming its campaign against Hezbollah, the main inducement for Lebanon to act against the group, diminished considerably under international and US pressure with Aoun’s election. Pressure on Israel to refrain from escalating again in Lebanon is only likely to increase, including from the Trump administration, as Salam forms his government. Salam wouldn’t be the first Lebanese politician to deem it unwise to risk igniting a civil war by pushing to disarm Hezbollah to stave off a renewal of conflict between Hezbollah and Israel. Another Lebanese civil war could last at least a decade and would devastate the entire country. Another full-scale Israel-Hezbollah war, in contrast, is now unlikely to recur for years, would probably be relatively short-lived, and its destruction would likely fall largely on Hezbollah-dominated areas.

Reports indicate that Salam’s intended cabinet policy statement will mirror Aoun’s inaugural speech. Based on Salam’s own promise to “fully implement Resolution 1701 and all terms of the [November 27] cease-fire agreement,” it will likely incorporate Aoun’s promise to monopolize force in the hands of the Lebanese state. Some have interpreted these ambiguous words as a vow to disarm Hezbollah. But Lebanon has long interpreted these terms idiosyncratically to exclude disarming the group. As Salam proceeds with the formation of his government, and if he succeeds in securing his premiership, he is very likely to fall back on these interpretations to avoid a clash with Hezbollah that will transform his term into a paralyzed failure.

David Daoud is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where he focuses on Israel, Hezbollah, and Lebanon affairs.

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On prosperity, Taiwan ranks high—but its future hinges on Chinese power plays

Shelley Rigger — Thu, 23 Jan 2025 19:14:15 +0000

Evolution of freedom

Evolution of prosperity

The path forward

Explore the Taiwan country scorecard

Return to Full Essay collection

Download PDF of the entire book

Evolution of freedom

Taiwan’s diplomacy stresses its peaceful transition from a single-party authoritarian state under the Chinese Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT), to a robust democracy with strong protections of civil and political rights. It identifies as a “beacon of democracy,” especially in East Asia, a region in which democracy has not been the predominant political form historically. The time coverage of the Freedom Index, 1995–2023, is well-suited to analyze Taiwan’s contemporary institutional evolution, and our survey findings support Taiwan’s self-image as a liberal democracy.

Binary indexes of democracy, such as the Boix-Miller-Rosato (BMR) or the Democracy Dictatorship Index, identify 1996 as the year of Taiwan’s democratic transition, but the transition away from the authoritarian system that had existed in Taiwan since 1945 was as early as the late 1970s. As pressure from below demanding steps towards greater political openness intensified in the 1980s, the KMT-led authoritarian regime grew increasingly tolerant of dissent, allowing the democratization process to move forward.

A key factor behind the regime’s changing attitude toward democratization was Taiwan’s deepening isolation as leading countries, including the United States, abandoned the view that Taiwan’s “Republic of China (ROC)” state represented all of China and shifted recognition to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Some key inflection points included the lifting of the “Temporary Provisions for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion” in 1991, which had originally been enacted as a constitutional amendment in 1948. This was accompanied by a series of increasingly significant elections, including the first comprehensive elections for the National Assembly (1991) and Legislative Yuan (1992), as well as the first direct election of a Taiwan Provincial Governor (1994).

While Taiwan’s democratization was an incremental process, 1996 is generally seen as the crucial milestone in Taiwan’s political history, for that year saw its first direct presidential election. The victor was the incumbent, Lee Teng-hui, the candidate of the former authoritarian regime’s ruling party, the KMT. Lee’s strong performance—he won more than 50 percent of the vote in a four-way race—benefitted from his decision to align himself with the democratic transition. His election also helped to marginalize those in the KMT who took a more skeptical view of democracy. The political subindex, based on the continuous measure of democracy produced by the V-Dem project, likely reflects the slow adoption of democratic values by those who saw their political dominance eroding under the new rules of the game.

Taiwan’s democracy took another big step forward in 2000. In that year, the index jumps to a level comparable to that of well-established democracies in Europe and North America. The Index reflects the first turnover of power in the new democracy following the victory of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) presidential candidate, Chen Shui-bian. The opposition party’s first national election victory marks the completion of the democratic transition of Taiwan, which since then has experienced only small, incremental changes in political freedom in areas such as women’s representation and protection of minorities.

Nonetheless, the political subindex components point to some features of Taiwan’s political and constitutional architecture that lag behind more established democracies. Most saliently, the component measuring the degree of legislative constraint on the executive receives a significantly lower score than the rest of the components, and presents a greater volatility throughout the period of analysis. I believe this discrepancy reflects the awkwardness of Taiwan’s quasi-presidential constitutional system. The head of state (president) is separately elected for a fixed term, giving him or her a popular mandate. This important role coexists with a standard parliamentary system in the legislature. The president appoints the head of government (premier), and while legislative confirmation is not required, the legislature can remove the premier with a vote of no confidence, which triggers new legislative elections. Since 1996, Taiwanese politics have been characterized by a constant debate about the relative powers of the presidency versus the legislature and premier. This challenge recedes during periods of unified government (2008–16, 2016–24), when the president takes the leading role, but it reemerges in periods of divided government (2000–08, 2024 to the present).

The legislative constraints indicator closely reflects the two parties’ relative strength in these two branches of power. From 2000 to 2008, the DPP held the presidency but the KMT had a majority in the legislature, leaving President Chen Shui-bian struggling to implement his domestic agenda. In 2008, the country returned to unified government under President Ma Ying-jeou, with the KMT holding both the presidency and the legislative majority. While Ma faced a surprisingly feisty legislative leadership, the legislature was still much more deferential to presidential power than had been the case under Chen. The small ups and downs in the indicator since 2016—a period of unified government under DPP President Tsai Ing-wen—reflect the ongoing search for a stable balance of legislative and executive power. Indeed, when Taiwan returned to divided government in 2024, the KMT-led legislature immediately proposed reforms aimed at constraining the presidency.

Taiwan’s scores on two other components of the political subindex are low compared to other measures and require explanation. First, the score for political rights of association and expression is lower than might be expected, in part because the two main political parties tend to exploit the popularity of democracy to achieve a political edge. Both parties, when they were out of power, accused their opponents of reviving undemocratic practices, including politically motivated prosecutions of party leaders and officials. In fact, accusations of corruption have been used to sideline politicians, especially after they leave office. Chen Shui-bian’s conviction on bribery charges in 2009 is a clear example of this practice.

Second, Taiwan imposes restrictions on media ownership, a practice which is reflected in the political rights component of the Index. Some Taiwanese see these restrictions as an effort to deny certain political views access to the media. However, others believe they are necessary to prevent the Beijing government from influencing mass media in Taiwan. In particular, the visible drop on this measure starting in 2020 probably captures the National Communications Commission’s decision not to renew the TV license of Chung T’ien Television. Chung T’ien was widely believed to be a mouthpiece for Beijing whose news coverage was biased against the DPP and in favor of KMT, which argues for more favorable relations with the PRC.

Turning now to the economic subindex, Taiwan has a long history of strong performance in terms of economic freedom. It is clear that the component measuring women’s economic freedom is the main factor driving the overall positive trend since 1995, and especially until 2004, with an extraordinary increase of more than thirty points. Half of this increase takes place in 2003, reflecting the improvement in legislation regarding workplace conditions for women, mainly in the areas of nondiscrimination, sexual-harassment prevention, and maternity leave conditions. Other important advances include granting equal treatment for men and women regarding asset holdings in 2004, and equal access to industrial and dangerous jobs in 2015. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the overall high degree of gender equality in the public sphere is not always accompanied by a similar level of equality in the private domain. Taiwanese women still carry a disproportionate share of household work, as well as other burdens typical in strongly patriarchal societies.

The indicators of trade and investment freedom seem to be highly sensitive to Taiwan’s relationship with mainland China. In particular, the large movements in investment freedom (2005, 2015, 2017, and 2022) reflect changes in cross-Strait investment regulations that alternately ease and tighten the conditions for PRC-Taiwan capital flows. Similarly, the seven-point drop in trade freedom in the early 2000s is likely a product of stricter restrictions for export and import of goods and services with China. As the concluding section details, China poses a significant threat to Taiwan’s democracy. Anxiety about how economic interactions could make Taiwan vulnerable to PRC economic coercion explains why Taiwan’s trade and investment policies have not moved consistently in the direction of greater openness. If we could exclude the China element from these indicators, I assess that Taiwan’s scores would be a lot smoother, reflecting a sustained commitment to fairly open trade and capital movement with the rest of the world.

The rule of law in Taiwan, as measured by the legal subindex, has experienced a mild increase since the year 2000, mainly driven by notable increases in improving bureaucratic quality, control of corruption, and informality. The democratization process very significantly improved the level of accountability for political leaders and public officials at large, improving the overall capacity and efficiency of the public sector to enforce and abide by the law. Judicial effectiveness and independence is an important factor contributing to this development, and the fact that the score on this area is relatively high since the year 2000 certainly captures the reality of the situation in Taiwan. My intuition is that the transitory dip in the 2008–16 period is due to what people perceive to be politically motivated prosecutions of politicians, a perception that was particularly acute in the immediate aftermath of Chen Shui-bian’s presidency.

Two more insights are worth mentioning. On one hand, the visible fall in clarity of the law between 2012 and 2016 can only be explained by an aggravation of the discussions regarding the balance of power between the presidency and the legislature in a period of intense partisan competition and outside-the-system political mobilization. Efforts to use constitutional revision to settle these disputes necessarily introduce uncertainty about the legal system.

On the other hand, Taiwan’s security score experienced a sharp decline of over ten points between 1996 and 2000. While this component has fluctuated since 2000, it remains below its 1995 level. I believe it would be a mistake to attribute this decline to domestic factors. Taiwan continues to be a safe society with low rates of crime. The timing of fluctuations in the security component suggest it is highly sensitive to Taiwan’s citizens’ feelings of insecurity relative to the PRC’s military threat. The drop in the security score during the Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian presidencies (1996–2008) reflects the increase in PRC political and military pressure on Taiwan, beginning with its military exercises at the time of the 1996 elections. While the PRC paused some of its pressure on Taiwan during Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency (2008–16), the sense of threat has steadily increased over the first quarter of the century.

Evolution of prosperity

The evolution of Taiwan’s Prosperity Index score is somewhat easier to analyze, as the positive overall trend since 1995 is mainly driven by economic and health outcomes, but nonetheless there are some interesting takeaways from the analysis of the different components.

Taiwan’s economic success story is well known, with impressive and sustained gross domestic product (GDP) per capita growth numbers for several decades now. The income component of the Prosperity Index not only reflects this fact, but also the limited negative effects of the last two large global crises, namely, the Great Recession of 2008–09 and the COVID-19 pandemic. The Taiwanese economy has proven resilient and mature, despite a very profound transformation from a developmental state with a relatively high level of state intervention to a much more deregulated market economy.

Despite Taiwan’s strong growth, inequality has increased over recent decades, from a very low base in the early years of our study. Rising inequality is due in part to the structural changes in terms of economic policy mentioned above, together with a weak legal environment for unionization. Other forces driving incomes in a more unequal direction include the offshoring of traditional manufacturing after 1987, primarily to mainland China, and an economy increasingly bifurcated between the domestic-facing retail and service sectors and an export-oriented high-tech sector. Despite the decline in performance in eradicating inequality, Taiwan still maintains a more equitable income distribution compared to the United States and China. Its Gini coefficient, around eighty in recent years, remains higher than the East Asia and Pacific regional average (66), mainland China (56.5), and the United States(65.3).

Regarding health, Taiwan is among the top performers in the world, increasing its score by more than ten points since 1995, when the country adopted a universal health insurance scheme. The recent evolution of the health indicator in Taiwan contrasts sharply with that of other developed countries, especially when it comes to its handling of the COVID-19 crisis. Taiwan managed the health emergency better than virtually any other country of the world, closing its borders very early, requiring quarantine for everyone entering the country, implementing a state takeover of mask production and distribution, requiring masks in public, and accelerating the production and implementation of vaccinations. As a result, COVID-19 did not spread in Taiwan until the vaccines were available, and the death toll from the pandemic is negligible in the health indicator, unlike European countries and the United States (Figure 1). It is certainly true that other countries, especially Asian developed nations like Japan, were also capable of containing the negative public health effects of the pandemic. Nonetheless, the really distinctive feature of Taiwan is that it was able to do so without a major erosion, even if shortlived, of civil liberties of its citizens (Figure 1). There were restrictions in Taiwan, but the limitations on individual freedom were drastically lower than in other developed countries, and did not require draconian enforcement thanks to the generalized voluntary compliance of the population.

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes, Atlantic Council (2024)

Finally, the dynamics of the minorities component are complex and require interpretation. The sharp increase in the year 2000, coinciding with the first DPP presidency, surely reflects the substantial improvement of the indigenous Taiwanese population in terms of access to public services, jobs, and opportunities. On the contrary, the fall in the score in the last five years is probably explained by the situation of migrant workers, whose numbers have increased significantly in the recent period, and whose legal status and conditions have not been as well protected as those of domestic workers. During the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, some foreign workers were confined to their workplaces for long periods of time, while most Taiwanese enjoyed a relatively normal lifestyle with few pandemic-related limitations on their day-to-day activities.

The path forward

Taiwan’s democratic institutions have functioned smoothly for nearly three decades. After eight rounds of presidential elections and even more of legislative and local elections, campaigning and voting in competitive, multiparty elections is routine. Taiwanese also enjoy a high degree of protection for their civil rights, in realms ranging from freedom of speech to marriage equality for LGBTQ+ couples. While all democracies have their flaws— Richard Bush’s book Difficult Choices outlines many of Taiwan’s—the island’s political system seems to meet the conventional definition of a consolidated democracy: democracy is, indeed, the “only game in town.”¹

Perhaps the best evidence of the strength of Taiwan’s democracy is its citizens’ tendency to view it as the defining trait that makes Taiwan Taiwan, and differentiates it from the People’s Republic of China.

With the exception of indigenous Taiwanese, who constitute a little over 2 percent of the population, the people of Taiwan are descended from settlers from mainland China. Their ancestors arrived over several centuries, including a long wave of migration between the late sixteenth and late nineteenth centuries and a short wave between 1945 and 1949. From 1895 to 1945 Taiwan was colonized by the Japanese empire.

For most of its history, Taiwanese were subjects of empires and states that controlled the island from afar. When the ROC took control of the island at the end of World War II, the new government expected Taiwan to uphold its goal of merging Taiwan into the Chinese state on the mainland. Even after the ROC lost the civil war and the PRC was founded in 1949, the ROC government continued to insist that “recovering the mainland” was its destiny, and Taiwanese should work toward restoring the ROC in the mainland. The PRC, too, believes in merging Taiwan into China, but its policy is that the Chinese state Taiwan should join is the PRC.

The advent of democracy in the 1990s opened the possibility of a different destiny for Taiwan. Some Taiwanese even called for formal independence from China—for abandoning the “ROC” label and eschewing forever the possibility of merging into a mainland-based nation. Some made the case for independence on the grounds that Taiwan is not “Chinese.” Advocates of Taiwanese cultural nationalism argued that, despite their Chinese ancestry, Taiwan’s culture is an amalgam of indigenous, Japanese, and Western influences that differentiate it from China.

No matter how the case for independence is made, however, the PRC government has made it clear that it will oppose such a move with military force, so the idea of formal independence has lost much of its support in Taiwan.

At the same time, Beijing’s pressure on Taiwan to allow itself to be absorbed into the PRC was intensifying, Taiwan’s political and social institutions were becoming freer and more democratic. Meanwhile, despite Beijing’s efforts to promote the idea, support for unification within Taiwan has dwindled. And the mainstream rationale for Taiwan’s separate status has shifted from cultural nationalism to a sense of civic nationalism—the idea that what makes Taiwan unique—and unification unwelcome—is the island’s liberal democratic political system. Democracy, warts and all, has become a point of pride and distinction for Taiwanese, which should make for a bright projection for its continued thriving in Taiwan.

Unfortunately, the future of democracy on the island does not depend on the Taiwanese people alone. The PRC opposes both Taiwan’s continued self-government and its democratic system. In Beijing’s view, Taiwan’s historic connections to the Chinese mainland make it an inseparable part of “China,” and as the PRC state is the current government of China, Taiwan must, sooner or later, be incorporated into the PRC. There’s no chance that the PRC would adopt Taiwan’s liberal democratic institutions and practices, so unification would almost certainly bring an end to democracy in Taiwan, as it has in Hong Kong.

How likely is this outcome? It is impossible to predict, but the PRC is determined to bring Taiwan to heel, peacefully if possible, but by force if necessary. So far, the two sides have managed to avoid conflict, in part because the costs and risks of forcible unification are high, and in part because Beijing believes it can prevail without force eventually. I think it is likely that this stalemate will continue in the near future. If it does continue for the next five to ten years, the situation may evolve to a point where a mutually acceptable arrangement is possible. Or it may not, in which case Taiwan’s democracy will continue to exist under constant threat.

Taiwan’s prosperity is similarly dependent on external factors. The high-tech boom that followed the offshoring of traditional manufacturing in the late 1980s and the 1990s has made Taiwan more important than ever in the global economy. The IT manufacturing ecosystem—of which the semiconductor giant Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) is only the most famous of many critically important firms—has made Taiwan more central to the global economy than ever. Regional and global supply chains connect Taiwan to partners in Japan, Korea, the United States, the PRC, and more, as well as to customers around the world.

The mutual benefit derived from these relationships is an important deterrent to military conflict in the Taiwan Strait—Beijing has everything to lose, economically, if these economic relationships are disrupted. Beijing thus faces a dilemma: realizing its goal of unification could undercut its economic success, but avoiding that outcome means tolerating a political status quo in the Taiwan Strait that the PRC leadership has defined as unacceptable. As long as Taiwan continues to act with restraint— avoiding creating the perception that unification has become impossible—the economic benefit of tolerating the status quo will probably outweigh the political cost. Still, any of these factors could shift unexpectedly, with the likely result that both democracy and prosperity in Taiwan would take a tragic turn.

Shelley Rigger is Brown professor of East Asian Politics and vice president for academic affairs/ dean of faculty at Davidson College. Rigger has a PhD in government from Harvard University and a BA from Princeton University. Rigger is the author of two books on Taiwan’s domestic politics, Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy (Routledge 1999) and From Opposition to Power: Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2001). She has published two books for general readers, Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse (2011) and The Tiger Leading the Dragon: How Taiwan Propelled China’s Economic Rise (2021).

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1 Richard C. Bush, Difficult Choices: Taiwan’s Quest for Security and the Good Life (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2021).

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What a Secretary of State Rubio means for the Middle East: Getting tougher on Iran and tighter with allies

Joze Pelayo — Tue, 21 Jan 2025 20:41:18 +0000

Marco Rubio spent fourteen years in the US Senate mixing a record of advocacy for a strong and proactive US foreign policy with careful attention on domestic and local issues in his home state of Florida. He is now set to take the first part of that record to the global stage, as he was unanimously confirmed by the Senate on Monday to be the seventy-second US secretary of state—hours after President Donald Trump was sworn in.

The Miami-native secretary has lately embraced a more isolationist approach to US engagement abroad (such as his vote last April against a $95 billion aid bill for Israel, Ukraine, and Taiwan) to align better with Trump’s messaging about prioritizing a robust domestic economic agenda. But one of his former advisers recently said that Rubio “still seems to favor a strong, engaged US posture in the world”—and this is a good thing. The United States cannot be everywhere and must prioritize issues critical to its national security, particularly in the Middle East. By straddling the Ronald Reagan-era and Trump-era Republican foreign policy worldviews, Rubio is now well-positioned to counterbalance isolationist voices within the president’s circle.

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A steadfast advocate for US strength

Given Trump’s rhetorical tendencies toward isolationism, the choice of Rubio for secretary of state and former Rep. Michael Waltz for national security advisor—and their respective records while on Capitol Hill—may help to reinforce traditional Republican notions preferring a more assertive US foreign policy in the Middle East. This approach is likely to be tough on Iran, supportive of the Gulf states and Israel, and focused on expanding US influence and partnerships in the region. Rubio’s staunch support for Israel and its security concerns, a key aspect of his political career, will also appeal to Trump’s base and a large portion of the GOP’s constituency in Florida.

Even as some critics disagree with Rubio’s hardline approach to world affairs, his deep and profound understanding of these issues, and his recognition of the United States’ indispensable role in global affairs—especially in the face of a rising China and a more aggressive Russia—make him a crucial voice in shaping US policy. Rubio, as Trump’s chief diplomat, can make the case that both peace abroad and prosperity and security at home are not mutually exclusive. He can lead an assertive foreign policy that still meets the president’s directives, as Rubio outlined at his January 15 confirmation hearing: “Does it make America safer? Does it make America stronger? Does it make America more prosperous?”

Confronting China in the Middle East

Rubio is clear-eyed about the threats posed by Beijing, which he described as “America’s ‘biggest threat” during his confirmation hearing. However, Rubio also mentioned that a China-US armed conflict would be “catastrophic” and should be avoided. His vision and push for a policy of strength to deter China’s abuse of the US-led international system is likely to test Middle Eastern countries’ relationship with Beijing—especially Chinese efforts and capabilities to acquire US/Western technology through cooperation with US partners in the region.

For example, China continues to act as a free-rider in the Red Sea, benefiting from US naval protection while failing to act as the responsible world leader it aspires to be and to use its agreement with the Houthis to deter attacks on international shipping.

What’s in store for the Gulf states?

Rubio is committed to containing Iran and assured Congress during his January 15 hearing that a nuclear-capable Iran, with the resources and military capabilities to continue its sponsorship of terrorism to destabilize the region, cannot be tolerated under any circumstances. These conditions will likely be part of any future US-Iran deal, which the secretary of state remains open to. However, Rubio’s hardline stance on Iran may also face obstacles with some more moderate Gulf states that view Iran differently than they did during Trump’s first term and have taken a more conciliatory tone toward Tehran in recent years.

Nevertheless, Rubio sees Gulf allies as essential for containing Iran and as key partners in tackling terrorism threats. He is likely to seek to build on Trump’s first-term close relationships with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and to close an Israel-Saudi Arabia deal with a Palestinian state as part of a regional grand bargain. The senator has endorsed the deal with Israel as having many security benefits for Saudi Arabia.

Given Rubio’s commitment to maintaining a strong US force posture in the region, he will likely be supportive of the 2024 deal that extends and expands the Al Udeid military base in Qatar, relying on Doha to maintain and invest in reinforcing the US military presence in the region. While issues like the Al Jazeera news network’s editorial line could remain contentious, the rift seen in the first Trump term with Doha is also unlikely to be repeated. That’s because of the strategic importance of Qatar’s access to all actors—especially adversarial ones, such as Hamas, given that Doha’s pressure on the group may have contributed to a ceasefire in Gaza—which is an asset to an incoming administration interested in making deals. However, Rubio and the Trump administration will likely increase pressure on Doha to end its hosting of Hamas officials in the country (as seen in a letter Senate Republicans wrote to the Biden-Harris administration in November 2024, which was signed by Rubio).

Unlocking historic opportunities for the region

Rubio emphasized during his confirmation hearing that there are historic and extraordinary opportunities in the Middle East that did not exist three months ago. He pointed to recent developments in Syria and their implications for Lebanon, as well as the future of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire. While Rubio is one of the most qualified of the president’s Cabinet picks—and although his insights into the region’s outlook are invaluable—his views are unlikely to surpass Trump’s own instincts on key matters.

However, Rubio’s close ties to Waltz and his role in helping Trump on the campaign trail should work in his favor in shaping the president’s foreign policy decision-making. Having the secretary’s principled views in the room is promising for a US policy in the Middle East that is more assertive, able to get concessions in challenging situations, and likely to meet the expectations of a new mandate from the voters who, as Rubio said, “want a strong America.”

Joze Pelayo is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

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The quest ahead for Lebanon’s new president: Secure a modern statehood

Frederic C. Hof — Tue, 21 Jan 2025 13:39:50 +0000

If the words of Lebanese President Joseph Aoun’s inaugural address are to be taken at face value, his election represents the resumption of a long-suspended quest to transform the Cedar Republic from a fragment of the long-deceased Ottoman Empire to a modern nation-state. If Aoun proves able in the coming years to translate his word into action, Lebanon’s politics may someday rest on a solid foundation of citizenship instead of sectarianism.

Modern statehood has eluded Lebanon since its independence in 1943. As a result, Lebanon—which Michael Hudson termed “the precarious republic”—has seen a surge of disasters, leaving the country a battlefield for the wars of others and inflicting economic ruin on an enterprising, innovative populace.

Between 1958 and 1964, then President Fouad Chehab—Lebanon’s first army commander-in-chief, who was elevated to the presidency to end the low-grade civil war of 1958—tried his best to overcome the Ottoman legacy of sectarianism and feudalism and replace that legacy with a state. He instituted a series of administrative reforms designed to increase the effectiveness and reach of Lebanon’s central government and, by virtue of his personal modesty and incorruptibility, provided a model of selfless public service to his countrymen, a model rarely replicated by his successors. Indeed, Lebanon’s political class blocked him in the end. In 1970, the sectarian feudalists elected, by a single vote margin, one of their own to the presidency: Suleiman Frangieh. Lebanon’s trajectory has been straight downhill ever since.

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Over a half-century later, Franjieh’s grandson—another Suleiman—was the presidential candidate of choice of Iran’s Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah. Hezbollah, at the behest of Iran, has for decades supported a ravenously corrupt and ruinously incompetent Lebanese political class. In return, the politicians have recognized the group as “The Lebanese Resistance,” a designation elevating it above the status of armed militia and permitting it to bear arms. Twice, in 2006 and 2023, Hezbollah initiated hostilities with Israel, causing massive destruction falling mainly on its Shia Lebanese constituents. Finally, in late 2024, much of that kinetic destruction fell on Hezbollah itself.

Unlike several of his predecessors, Aoun neither mentioned nor paid obeisance to “The Lebanese Resistance” in his inaugural speech. Instead, he pledged “to carry out my duties as the supreme commander of the armed forces and as the chairman of the Higher Defense Council, working to ensure the state’s right to hold a monopoly on weapons, and to invest in the army to monitor the borders, maintain their security in the south, define the boundaries in the east, north and at sea, prevent smuggling, fight terrorism and preserve the unity of the Lebanese territory.” Indeed, much of the analysis following Aoun’s accession to the presidency has, quite understandably, mined his speech for references to Hezbollah, but Aoun did not mention the group by name.

Aoun’s first task will be to ensure that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) implements Lebanon’s role in the ceasefire with Israel by removing and replacing Hezbollah as the armed Lebanese presence south of the Litani River. He will, to be sure, require the cooperation of Iran’s proxy, which retains considerable military capabilities notwithstanding the pounding it has absorbed from Israel. To succeed, Aoun must perform a diplomatic high-wire act: He must, in effect, mediate between Hezbollah and Israel.

The mediation tool most readily at his disposal is the 1949 Israel-Lebanon General Armistice Agreement. The ongoing validity of the armistice, unilaterally (and unjustifiably) renounced by Israel in 1967, is cited by the 1989 Taif Agreement and is, therefore, a tenet of post-civil war Lebanon’s constitutionalism.

Aoun could signal to Israel his interest in implementing and consolidating the current ceasefire by offering Israel the opportunity to update and fully implement the armistice, a critical first step toward eventual peace and diplomatic normalization. Israel could, in turn, assure Lebanon of its own commitment to making the ceasefire work by revoking its 1967 renunciation, completing its withdrawal behind the Blue Line (demarcated by the United Nations in 2000), and declaring its readiness to resolve diplomatically all territorial disputes with Lebanon. It could even suspend its overflights of Lebanese airspace, perhaps as part of a third-party arrangement providing ceasefire-related aerial reconnaissance services. Given that the armistice is anchored in Lebanese constitutionalism, Hezbollah—which acknowledges the need to focus on reconstruction, for the sake of its constituents—might be hard-pressed to object and obstruct. Ideally, Hezbollah’s constituents will urge the organization’s leadership cadre to put Lebanon first by becoming part of a Lebanese political party instead of a proxy for Iran.

Aoun knows what must be done to stabilize the Lebanon-Israel frontier. But the long game he wishes to contest and win centers on Lebanese statehood. This is how he put it in his inaugural speech: “if we want to build a nation, we must all be under the roof of law and justice, where there will be no more mafias or security islands, no more leaks or money laundering, no more drug trafficking, no more interference in the judicial system, in police stations, no more protections or clientelism, no more immunity for criminals and the corrupt. Justice is the bulwark, it is the only guarantee that every citizen has. This is my commitment!” This will be a tall order because the collaboration between Hezbollah—meaning Iran—and Lebanon’s abysmal political class (which still dominates parliament) has left the country awash in all the depravities cited by Aoun.

The Lebanese presidency in 2025 is not endowed with the same powers it enjoyed before the 1989 Taif Accord, and in any event, such powers were insufficient for Chehab to build a state. Aoun will not be able administratively to compel governmental decency, honesty, and competence, even if he proves able to broker a respectable cabinet of ministers and even if he retains the full, enthusiastic support of the LAF. If he wishes to succeed, he must build a mass political movement from the ground up, one dedicated not to him personally but to the idea that it is time, at long last, for Lebanon to graduate from Ottomanism, and that it is time for citizenship-based statehood to emerge. As Aoun put it in his acceptance speech, “No sect should be favored over another, and no citizen should have privilege over another. This is the time for respecting the Constitution, building the state and applying the laws. This is the oath of Lebanon!”

Aoun must, in short, use his office to build the political infrastructure needed to win elections, to ultimately replace the parliamentarians who have used that which has passed for the “government of Lebanon” as a feeding trough. Only with the support of enough Lebanese people willing to abandon political sectarianism and localism can he build a foundation for a nation-state willing and able to meet the needs of all Lebanese citizens, especially the poorest and most vulnerable.

As Aoun embarks on a journey to complete the work of Chehab, he will need both external support and internal protection. Lebanon’s reconstruction needs are enormous, as are the operational challenges faced by the LAF. And there are, to be sure, those in Lebanon who correctly see Aoun as a threat to their ability to steal the fruits of Lebanese diligence, ingenuity, and enterprise.

It is only the gratuitous and often unspeakable suffering and impoverishment of most Lebanese and their consequent desperation that makes Aoun’s quest something other than mission impossible. Some three-quarters of all Lebanese people are now experiencing poverty, and they know that business as usual by a dysfunctional political class is no longer tolerable. The people of Lebanon now have a president willing to say the following: “My commitment is your commitment, honorable members of parliament, and that of every Lebanese person who wants to build a strong state, a productive economy, stable security, a united nation and a promising future.”

The duty of all Lebanese people and all friends of Lebanon is to give Aoun the support he needs to build the “strong” state that the people of Lebanon require to thrive and to live in peace.

Frederic C. Hof is a senior fellow at Bard College’s Center for Civic Engagement. Hof served as a military attaché during Lebanon’s civil war and mediated both maritime and land disputes between Israel and Lebanon from 2009 to 2012 as a State Department official. He is the author of Reaching for the Heights: The Inside Story of a Secret Attempt to Reach a Syrian-Israeli Peace (2022).

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Charai in National Interest: Donald Trump and the New Middle East

Atlantic Council — Fri, 17 Jan 2025 20:28:24 +0000

Explore the Venezuela country scorecard

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As a new Syria takes shape, Iraq will need to recalibrate its role in the Middle East

Abbas Kadhim — Wed, 15 Jan 2025 17:59:41 +0000

The fall of Assad’s regime in Syria has broken the corridor stretching from Iran through Syria and to Lebanon. Iraq (sandwiched between Iran and Syria) now has an opportunity to shift its focus toward securing its borders and minimizing domestic security threats. But to succeed in this effort, the Iraqi government must navigate several challenges, recalibrate its role in the region, and balance its foreign relations—including with the United States—in response to Iraq’s national security needs and Syria’s recent developments.

After US forces in Iraq toppled Saddam Hussein in 2003, the Assad regime effectively turned Syria into a training ground, with terrorist groups entering Iraq to commit heinous acts. That played a major role in destabilizing Iraq, and the Assad regime ultimately contributed to the killing of thousands of Iraqis. The Iraqi government worked diligently to cast a light on the Assad regime’s practices, including by referring these violations to the United Nations when, in 2009, former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki appeared to accuse the Assad regime of being behind two bombings on government buildings in Baghdad and asked the United Nations envoy to form a fact-finding commission to investigate these terrorist acts.

But the Iraqi government’s position changed after the Syrian uprising in 2011 and the rise of an assortment of terrorist organizations (many active in Iraq) that were vying to replace the Assad regime. The Iraqi government pragmatically preferred Assad as the lesser evil and refused to contribute to his downfall. While Assad was not able to cause Iraq any harm, as he was preoccupied with the existential threat he faced in the civil war, threats from Syria have not subsided. Then in June 2014, the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) began an offensive from Syria, overrunning the Nineveh province and proceeding to occupy one-third of Iraq’s territory. It took Iraq and an international coalition three years of brutal fighting to defeat ISIS and liberate the areas the terrorist group controlled.

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With Assad out of Syria, Iraq once again is in a vulnerable position. As a matter of principle, it is untenable for the Iraqi government to accept the new Syrian leader Ahmed al-Sharaa who, under the nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, ran atrocious terrorist operations in Iraq for many years and was responsible for the killing of numerous innocent Iraqi civilians. While almost all relevant governments in the region (and many beyond) seem to be looking past the new Syrian leadership’s terrorist affiliations and are opening lines of communication with them, Iraq cannot ignore the security risks arising along its 372-mile border with Syria. Such dangers may come as a result of direct hostility by the new regime, but they also may come from the ungoverned territories of northeastern Syria, where the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are on the verge of collapse under threats from Turkey and the new Syrian government, a collapse that could be avoided if the United States expresses a strong commitment to the Kurdish group. The SDF currently keeps several detention camps, and the most concerning among them is al-Hol, which hosts some forty thousand detainees, including alleged ISIS affiliates, families, and sympathizers. The majority of them are Iraqis.

In recognition of these dangers, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani sent the newly appointed director of national intelligence, Hamid al-Shatri, to meet the new Syrian government in December last year to discuss Iraqi security concerns. The Iraqi government also sent Minister of Foreign Affairs Fuad Hussein to represent Iraq at January 12 meetings in Saudi Arabia, which gathered partner and neighboring countries in a conversation about supporting Syria. By engaging in this way, the Iraqi government has shifted the burden of establishing good-faith security cooperation to the new Syrian leadership.

The challenge for Iraq in the coming months will be twofold: On the one hand, there is the long border with Syria, where several hostile armed groups operate without any opposition from the Syrian side. The Iraqi security forces will have to multiply their resources and vigilance to maintain border security. The scale of this threat will depend on whether Syria is heading toward stability or disintegration into conflict. On the other hand, Iraq will face serious internal pressure from changing geopolitical conditions. For example, Assad’s fall marks the beginning of a new era, one in which Turkey could see its influence spreading across what used to be an Iranian sphere of influence. The Iraqi leadership will be under great pressure from Iran, which seeks compensation for its recent loss of influence, including by having a better political, economic, and security posture in Iraq. At the same time, Iraq will also be under pressure to recalibrate its bilateral relations with the United States. The new reality in Syria will push Iraq and the United States to revisit the recently reached troop-withdrawal agreement, with the Iraqi government simultaneously navigating its need to ensure its territorial security and the scrutiny of rival groups who call for the timely adherence to troop withdrawal.

To test the new geopolitical reality, Sudani made an important visit to Iran on January 8 where he met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The visit resulted in a lot of analysis and speculation about a possible Iraqi effort to persuade the Iranians to agree to a deferment of the US troop withdrawal and the demilitarization of the Iraqi armed groups that identify primarily with Iran. The speculation was put to rest by the X account of the Iranian supreme leader, which put out several concise statements. On the first issue, the ayatollah said the presence of US forces in Iraq is “illegal and contrary to the interests of the people and the government.” On the question of the Iraqi fighting forces, he said that the Popular Mobilization Forces represent “a crucial component of power in Iraq, and more efforts should be made to preserve and strengthen it”—adding that Sudani “emphasized” this as well. The supreme leader argued, in a third statement, that “the more developed and secure Iraq is, the more it will also benefit the Islamic Republic of Iran.” Whatever the bilateral talks may have accomplished, it all has been overshadowed by these three short statements.

It is now up to the government of Iraq to balance its regional policies with full consideration of the opportunities and the challenges the fall of Assad has put forward. At the same time, it will have to be mindful not only of the new Syrian political order but also the change of posture that major regional and international actors will make in the post-Assad era.

Abbas Kadhim is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative. Follow him on X: @DrAbbasKadhim.

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What the world can do about Maduro

Atlantic Council experts — Fri, 10 Jan 2025 21:10:24 +0000

JUST IN

He’s tightening his grip. Venezuelan autocrat Nicolás Maduro was inaugurated for a third term as president on Friday despite international observers, including the United States, determining that his victory in last year’s election was fraudulent. Maduro’s swearing-in was accompanied by a new round of US sanctions against Venezuelan officials and comes one day after the government briefly detained opposition politician María Corina Machado. Below, our experts explain what Maduro’s inauguration means for the region, the Venezuelan opposition, and the future of US sanctions policy.

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Iria Puyosa (@NSC): Senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab
Jason Marczak (@jmarczak): Vice president and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center
Geoff Ramsey (@GRamsey_LatAm): Senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

What Biden did, and Trump can do

“The Biden administration has slightly increased pressure” on Maduro’s regime, Iria tells us. While the United States has sanctioned two thousand individuals and raised the bounties on Maduro and his interior minister, Diosdado Cabello, US oil giant Chevron maintains its license to operate in Venezuela. “The new sanctions are insufficient to remove Maduro and Cabello from power,” she argues.
After it takes office in ten days, the Trump administration should work with regional governments, says Jason, to “accelerate diplomatic coordination to give new momentum to the opposition and to make life harder for Maduro and his accomplices.”
Despite the regime’s escalating crackdown on the opposition, “it is easy to overstate how strong Maduro really is,” Geoff argues. He points to Maduro’s post-election cabinet reshuffle to empower hardliners, coupled with the elevation of Cabello, a longtime rival, as “a sign of just how few friends Maduro has left.”
Geoff advises the incoming Trump administration to take note of internal divisions in the Maduro regime that can be further undermined by economic pressure. “Sanctions alone are unlikely to unseat Maduro,” he says, “unless they are accompanied by a clear roadmap to lift them, giving fence-sitting regime figures a blueprint to follow.”

Regional rejection

Maduro has brought Latin American leaders “from across the political spectrum together to reject his new power grab,” Jason tells us. Chilean President Gabriel Boric, Argentinian President Javier Milei, and Panamanian President José Raúl Mulino, he notes, have all rejected Maduro’s claim to victory in last year’s presidential election.
The highest-ranking foreign official at Maduro’s inauguration, Jason points out, may have been the speaker of Russia’s Duma.
“The continued large-scale regional rejection of Maduro is no small feat,” Jason says, given Latin America’s historical divisions. “But the critical question,” he adds, “is how to avoid complacency and leverage this unity to further support the democratic opposition.”

A mobilized opposition

Amid Maduro’s third inauguration, “Venezuelans are again taking to the streets in large numbers, demanding a transition to democracy and the inauguration of González,” says Iria. The Biden administration should use this opportunity to take more “meaningful action” against Maduro, she argues, as “the opposition is now strategically united, the people are mobilized, and the ruling coalition is showing cracks.”
Regional governments working to pressure Maduro, Jason says, should also strive to “avoid burdening the Venezuelan people with more hardships.” Pressuring Maduro’s government while sparing the Venezuelan people from the worst effects of sanctions is “a delicate tightrope to walk” Jason adds, but is “necessary to give further hope to the overwhelming number of Venezuelans who cast a vote for democracy and freedom in July.”

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To help build the new Syria, the US needs to better understand the Kurds and Arabs of the northeast

Ömer Özkizilcik — Fri, 10 Jan 2025 15:39:55 +0000

With the removal of the Assad regime, the new government in Syria now controls all parts of the country except for the northeast, where the Kurdish US partner force against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) continues to hold sway. While it is common in international circles to hear the residents of northeast Syria described as ‘Syrian Kurds,’ the area has a predominantly Arab tribal population.

Understanding the demographics of this region is crucial to avoid significant US foreign policy mistakes that could impact regional security and lead to unforeseen consequences. Washington should take note of the complexities in the region and not be bound by the past as it engages its old partner in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the new leadership in Damascus. The security of the entire region is at stake.

The demographics of northeast Syria

One of Syria’s two main economic arteries, the M4 highway runs across northeast Syria parallel to the Turkish border and extending toward Iraq. Northeast Syria can be divided into two regions: north and south of the M4.

The area south of the M4 is the heartland of Arab tribes in Syria, aside from a few Assyrian villages near Tal Tamr. The area north of the M4 is home to a mix of Arabs and Kurds, with minority populations of Assyrian Christians, Turkmen, and Circassians. For example, the city of Qamishli features a diverse demography. Out of its twenty-three neighborhoods, eight are predominantly Kurdish, six are predominantly Arab, two are primarily Christian, and seven are mixed. To the south of the city, the villages are almost entirely Arab.

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Another example can be found in the internationally renowned Kurdish town of Ayn al Arab (Kobane), which is not solely inhabited by Kurds. Kobane is home to various Arab tribes, including the Jubour tribe, Bani Said tribe, Omayrat clan, Adwan clan, and Henadi clan. Furthermore, people from the Turkmen tribes, such as the Arbaliyah, Turyaki, Qadirli, Qasimiliyah, Qazli, and the Qara Shaikhli clans, also reside in Kobane. Among the Kurdish population, several tribes are represented, including the Zirwar, Alaidan, Shadad Wawij, Zarki, Hefaydi, Bish Alti, Shaikhan, and Daydan clans.

According to Syria’s 2004 census—the most recent data available—the demographically mixed sub-districts north of the M4 highway had a population of 599,873. The ethnically diverse sub-districts reaching north and south of the M4 had a combined population of 378,151. Meanwhile, the almost homogeneous Arab sub-districts south of the M4 had a population of 1,721,132.

Region	Subdistrict	Ethnic Majority	Population	Total
North of the M4 highway	Ayn al Arab	Kurdish	81,424	599,873
	Shuyukh Tahtani	Kurdish	43,861
	Tel Abyad*	Arab	44,671
	Suluk*	Arab	44,131
	Rasulayn*	Arab	121,536
	Dirbasiyah	Kurdish	55,614
	Amuda	Kurdish	56,101
	Jawadiyah	Kurdish	40,535
	Malikiyah	Arab-Kurdish	112,000
Across the north and south of the M4 highway	Ayn Issa	Arab	40,912	378,151
	Qamishli	Arab-Kurdish	232,095
	Qahtaniyah	Arab-Kurdish	65,685
	Yarubiyah	Arab	39,459
South of the M4 highway	Dayr Hafir**	Arab	34,366	1,721,132
	Maskanah**	Arab	64,829
	Sarrin	Arab	69,931
	Raqqa	Arab	338,773
	Al-Karamah	Arab	74,429
	Al-Sabkhah**	Arab	48,106
	Al-Thawrah**	Arab	69,425
	Mansoura**	Arab	58,727
	Al-Jarniyah**	Arab	31,786
	Kasrah	Arab	63,226
	Deir Ezzour***	Arab	***
	Suwar	Arab	37,552
	Busayrah	Arab	40,236
	Khasham	Arab	28,718
	Diban	Arab	65,079
	Hajin	Arab	97,870
	Susah	Arab	45,986
	Tel Hamis	Arab	71,699
	Bir al-Helou al-Wardiyah	Arab	38,833
	Tel Tamr	Arab	50,982
	Hasakah	Arab	251,570
	Al Hawl	Arab	14,804
	Arishah	Arab	30,544
	Shadadi	Arab	58,916
	Markada	Arab	34,745

*The SDF does not hold these subdistricts. They are controlled by Turkish-backed forces and were taken during Operation Peace Spring in 2019. Therefore, 210,338 majority Arab persons in this pocket of northeast Syria will not be counted in the calculation below.

**The SDF currently controls these subdistricts located on the western side of the Euphrates River.

***The population count of the Arab Deir Ezzour subdistrict, which reaches across the Euphrates River and is mostly within non-SDF-held areas, has not been included as the official data does not reveal the population on the eastern side of the river.

The goal of using the 2004 census is not to make a definitive statement, but to have a reference point. The census recorded a population of 2,488,818 in areas currently held by the Kurdish-dominated SDF. Of this total, 277,535 individuals lived in Kurdish-majority towns and villages. If you count all of those people as Kurds and add half of the populations of Qamishli, Qahtaniyah, and Malikiyah, the total count amounts to 482,425 people—meaning that only about 19 percent of the total residents of SDF-held regions were Syrian Kurds, according to the 2004 census. Since Syrian Kurds historically have a lower birth rate compared to the Arab tribes in the region, the current percentage of Syrian Kurds has likely decreased even further than this rough reference point.

The Syrian Kurds

Like any ethnic group, Syria’s Kurds have a range of political, religious, and tribal orientations. The prominent historic Kurdish political movement in Syria is the Syrian Kurdish National Council (KNC), which has close ties to Iraqi Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party. The KNC’s military arm, the Rojava Peshmerga, is based in Iraqi Kurdistan and is trained by the Zarawani Peshmerga, who have received military training from the United States. In Iraq, both the Zarawani and Rojava Peshmerga fought against ISIS. The KNC has officially been part of the Syrian opposition.

The Democratic Union Party (PYD) was established as the Syrian branch of Turkey’s Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which is classified as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States, NATO, the European Union, and Turkey. The PYD is a relatively new political entity in Syria. Its military wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), was formed in 2012 by PKK veterans before the Assad regime transferred control of Kurdish areas in northern Syria to them. This exchange aimed to silence the Kurdish opposition and prevent a united front between Arabs and Kurds in the region. Several politicians from the KNC have been arrested, exiled, or killed by the YPG.

Many Syrian Kurds view the PYD and YPG as extensions of the PKK, with its main decision-making power coming from cadres based in the Qandil Mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan. This has led to perceptions that the PYD/YPG is ultimately a Turkish-Kurdish organization rather than Syrian. Notably, the general commander of the SDF, Mazloum Abdi, is also a PKK veteran who was once stationed in the Qandil Mountains.

The United States, France, and the United Kingdom are currently facilitating talks between the SDF and the KNC to establish a joint Kurdish committee that will be sent to Damascus. At the same time, the KNC has sent a delegation to Damascus to engage with civil society and local leaders. Additionally, the SDF recently held its first meeting with the new government in Damascus. It’s important to note that a previous US-brokered intra-Kurdish mediation effort in 2020 failed due to the SDF’s resistance to any power-sharing arrangements, the burning of KNC offices, and the refusal to allow the Rojava Peshmerga to enter Syria.

The Arab tribes

After the United States formed a partnership with the YPG-dominated SDF, Kurdish forces made significant advances into areas that were previously held by ISIS. The Arab tribes in northeastern Syria—of which the primary groups are the Uqaydat, the Baqqara, the Jubour, the Shammar, the Tayy, and the Bushaban—have lived under the authority of the SDF. Until recently, several foreign actors, including Turkey, Russia, Iran, and the United States, have co-opted these tribes to further their own interests.

This had major ramifications for internal tribal relations and tribal identity. With some tribal chiefs aligning with outside powers, association at the tribe level decreased in favor of stronger bonds with the clan or even greater family level.

Some tribal chiefs were part of the Syrian revolution, working with the Syrian opposition and Turkey. However, these tribal chiefs were in exile until the collapse of the Assad regime and have now returned to areas on the western side of the Euphrates River. Another group of tribal chiefs feared the Assad regime and established a pragmatic relationship with the SDF as the lesser evil. Lastly, one group of tribal chiefs remained loyal to the Assad regime or recently aligned with the Assad regime and Iran in a bid to free their homelands from the YPG.

After the tribal uprising in August and September 2023 failed to secure US support for their control over Arab tribal areas, several tribal chiefs expressed frustration. Contrary to their expectations, the United States did not intervene to prevent the SDF from brutally suppressing the uprising. In their bitterness, many tribal leaders viewed cooperation with the Assad regime and Iran as their only viable option. Under Iranian supervision, many tribal chiefs, including uprising leader Ibrahim Al-Hafel of the Uqaydat tribe, were integrated into the tribal military units of the Assad regime. This situation mirrored the mistake made in Iraq when the United States abandoned the Sahawat Movement.

With the establishment of a new government in Damascus, the situation has shifted significantly. The first group of tribal chiefs has developed into effective mediators between Damascus and other tribal leaders. Those tribal chiefs who previously collaborated with the Assad regime and Iran to remove the SDF have now realigned themselves in support of Damascus. And the tribal chiefs who saw the SDF as the lesser of two evils no longer have the Assad regime to contend with. Ahmad al-Sharaa, the leader of the new government in Damascus, has held meetings with tribal chiefs, including a specific gathering with tribal leaders from northeastern Syria.

Except for the Shammar tribe, all Arab tribes in northeastern Syria have either directly or are rumored to have secretly aligned themselves with the winners in Damascus, seeking to be part of the future of Syria. The Shammar tribe, however, holds a unique position. It shares a strong historical bond with both Iraqi and Syrian Kurds. During the Arab-Kurdish wars in Iraq from 1961 to 1975, the Shammar tribe fought alongside the Kurds. In Syria, its members have maintained a relatively autonomous stance within the SDF under the Sanadid Forces, the tribal military units of the Shammar tribe, and have closely collaborated with the YPG. Nevertheless, their loyalty to the KDP and Syria may be stronger than their allegiance to the SDF leadership. It remains to be seen whether they will indicate a shift in their alignment.

The way forward

For the stake of stability and the future of Syrian Kurds, the SDF should withdraw from the south to the north of the M4 highway. These Arab regions are home to the oil facilities, agricultural lands, and strategic dams that the new government in Damascus will need as resources to establish security and stability in Syria. The current oppression of Arabs reportedly in the form of extensive curfews, mass arrest campaigns, and the killing of peaceful demonstrators by the SDF is counterproductive and risks an Arab-Kurdish escalation. Furthermore, the four recent suspected SDF car or motorcycle bomb attacks in the regions of Manbij and Tel Rifaat, areas recently lost by the YPG, are only terrorizing civilians and fueling hatred. Between June 2018 and July 2021, the YPG conducted, on average, one car bomb attack every six days. The public expression of joy and happiness when the SDF was driven out of the Arab region of Manbij on December 8 should have been a teaching moment for the SDF. The facade that the SDF puts on of being a multi-ethnic armed group was never real. The YPG always called the shots.

As it withdraws from Arab areas, the SDF should hand ISIS prisoners and families over to the new government in Damascus, preventing any potential risks. The new authorities in Damascus have demonstrated their capability in eliminating the ISIS threat in Idlib. The US partnership with the SDF against ISIS is an outdated concept.

Afterward, the SDF should hand its weapons to the new government in Damascus, integrate into the new security and administrative system, and become part of a new Syria. Both Ankara and Damascus have extended an olive branch to the SDF offering just such a deal, on the condition of disarmament, the departure of senior PKK cadres from Syria, and the YPG’s transformation into a political party. The Syrian Kurds are an essential part of Syria and should engage in politics and gain governmental positions along with all Syrians. The SDF should accept this new reality and prevent the Arab-Kurdish escalation that would come from trying to hold onto the Arab-majority areas in northeastern Syria.

After losing the protection of Russia and the Assad regime, the SDF relies on the United States. Therefore, Washington has huge leverage over the SDF. If the United States can convince the SDF to take this olive branch, it would set the framework for a new regional security arrangement in which Syria would be no threat to any regional state, including Turkey and Israel. Furthermore, a peaceful resolution to the SDF question will help for more constructive dialogue vis-à-vis the Kurdish issue in Turkey as well. In short, the United States should not bet on a horse that has already lost the race and work constructively with Damascus, not limiting itself with northeastern Syria.

Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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Venezuela’s 2024 stolen election compounds challenges to stability and democratic renewal

Sary Levy-Carciente — Wed, 08 Jan 2025 23:02:28 +0000

Evolution of freedom

Evolution of prosperity

The path forward

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Evolution of freedom

Since 1995¹, Venezuela’s overall Freedom Index score has significantly declined, with a decrease of more than twenty-eight points. Initially, the country’s freedom score was just 1.4 points below the Latin America & the Caribbean regional average, but its scores on all three subindexes have declined and the gap between Venezuela and the regional average now exceed thirty points. The national statistical system has faced a significant setback, with data either disappearing or remaining outdated. Venezuela has outperformed the region on only one indicator—women’s economic freedom, with a significant increase of thirty-five points since 1971, and over eighteen points since 1995, making this evolution a consistent trend in the society.

Venezuela’s poor performance in the twenty-first century can be attributed to the political and ideological project known as “socialism of the twenty-first century,” which aimed to dismantle the institutional framework established during the democratic period, 1958–1998, and replace it with a system rooted in socialist ethics and production mode, with a geopolitical scope, and where individual freedom is no longer a value.

Its economic subindex improved by over eight points from 1995 to 2000, driven by trade freedom, but has since declined. The most significant driver of the decline has been the erosion of property rights, with 1,423 documented cases of expropriations, interventions, occupations, and confiscations . Additionally, the “land rescues” under the 2001 Land Law resulted in the seizure of five million hectares, equivalent to 5 percent of Venezuela’s territory, according to the National Land Institute. From 2014 to 2019, the Organic Law on Fair Prices, enforced by the National Superintendence for the Defense of Socioeconomic Rights, led to 149,811 actions, including inspections, closures, and fines. As a result, the economy stagnated, supply chains were dismantled, and the violation of property rights exacerbated uncertainty, heightened risk perception, discouraged investment, stifled job creation, and deepened poverty.

Since 2020, a series of pseudo-privatizations have occurred, under the Anti-Blockade Law, which allows the suspension of legal provisions, the use of exceptional contracting mechanisms, and the classifying of actions as secret or confidential. Alongside this, an indeterminate number of affected companies and assets have been returned without transparency, and have not adhered to the basic standards of reparation or property rights restitution.

The socialist model currently guiding Venezuela’s policies is marked by excessive populism and state intervention. Economic activity and entrepreneurship are severely hampered by widespread government interference, inconsistent regulatory enforcement, and a heavy bureaucratic burden. The lack of transparency in government decision making, the shrinking of market size, and entrenched cronyism have resulted in a market with little competition and virtually no freedom for investment.

The government’s lack of transparency and accountability and a setback in the official statistical system have been other key factors in undermining economic freedom, making it difficult to base decisions on reliable information and fueling misinformation. This issue is particularly evident in the erosion of information related to the national budget and its management, with clear political intent, allowing the executive between 2006 and 2012, the discretionary and opaque management of large public funds for social programs known as “Misiones,” which failed to produce positive social outcomes.

At the same time, political freedom in Venezuela has drastically declined, with a nearly fifty-five-point drop since 1995 in the political subindex. Initially, Venezuela outperformed the regional average by twelve points but now lags by more than forty points, with the gap widening after 1999. Electoral performance has steadily worsened, with sharp declines between 2012–13 and 2016–17. The presidential election on July 28, 2024, particularly exposed the subordination of the electoral and judiciary branches to the executive, disregarding the popular will and eroding the integrity of elections as a means of democratic alternation.

Legislative checks on the executive have collapsed by 85 points since 1995. Although there was an apparent improvement between 2014–2016, when the democratic opposition won a qualified majority in the National Assembly, this progress was undone by a Supreme Court decision loyal to the executive, followed by the establishment of a Constituent Assembly that stripped the National Assembly of its powers. The situation seemed to offer some hope in 2018–2019, with the emergence of an interim presidency and mounting international pressure and sanctions on the regime. However, the anticipated political change toward greater freedom never materialized.

The rule of law, as measured by the legal subindex, has eroded, with the score dropping dropped by over twenty-five points in Venezuela since 1995. Initially, scores were above the regional average, but this trend reversed in 1998, leading to the country’s current position below that average. Judicial independence and effectiveness have sharply deteriorated, with significant declines between 1997–2000 and 2003–05, after which they have remained consistently low.

The main drivers for the decline in the rule of law during this century are a) the consolidation of executive supremacy, enabled by the expansion of presidential powers in the 1999 Constitution and the frequent use of decrees and special powers through enabling laws; b) the increasing role of the military in controlling and implementing government policies; and c) the rise in corruption and lack of transparency, bypassing legal accountability standards. The decline has been further compounded by a 73 percent drop in judicial independence between 1995 and 2017. These elements have eroded democratic governance and undermined institutional integrity.

In 2019, the UN Human Rights Council established an Independent International Fact-Finding Mission to investigate human rights violations in Venezuela since 2014. Its latest report issued in September 2024 focused on the post-electoral crisis following the presidential elections of July 28, 2024. The report highlighted a significant intensification of the state’s repressive apparatus, documenting serious human rights violations, including brutal crackdowns on protests, which resulted in twenty-five deaths, hundreds of injuries, and thousands of arrests, including 158 minors. The report detailed arbitrary detentions, forced disappearances, torture, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, including sexual and gender-based violence, all of which escalated during this period. Additionally, the report noted an increase in harassment and judicial persecution of journalists, nongovernmental organizations, and key civil society actors. This repression worsened following the approval of the Law on the Supervision, Regularization, Action, and Financing of Non-Governmental and Related Organizations (August 2024), which imposed severe restrictions on the operations of these organizations.

Evolution of prosperity

Since 1995, Venezuela’s Prosperity Index score has experienced significant fluctuations, while the regional average has generally improved. Between 2003 and 2012, Venezuela saw a period of growth, followed by a sharp decline, placing it among the lowest-ranked countries in terms of prosperity. This decline demonstrates how undermining the institutional framework that safeguards individual freedom, freedom of expression, and political and economic liberty can devastate a society’s prosperity and the quality of life of its citizens.

The perception of progress in income per capita during the positive period was largely driven by an oil price boom that was managed wastefully. Even before oil prices reversed, the country was left impoverished, with a destroyed middle class, crippling debt, and a lack of basic services such as water, sanitation, electricity, transportation, and telecommunications, as well as of public goods like security, healthcare, and education. Furthermore, Venezuela lost nearly a quarter of its population to migration. Today, its prosperity has fallen below early 2000 levels, reaching a state of low prosperity.

Between 2013 and 2021, Venezuela’s economy contracted by more than 75 percent (as measured by GDP). Despite apparent recovery rates in recent years, the economy remains far too small to meet the population’s needs, and without a robust institutional framework ensuring transparent and fair rules, sustainable growth and improved quality of life remain elusive. Since 2008, Venezuela has suffered from double-digit inflation year-over-year, reaching hyperinflation between 2016 and 2019, which would be overcome by a process of dollarization.

Given the lack of updated and verifiable official economic data², the World Bank in 2021 unclassified Venezuela, which previously classed as an upper-middle-income country. For the size of the economy at that time, Venezuela could have been classified as a low-income country.

Official socioeconomic data is scarce and irregular, so it is thanks to the National Survey of Living Conditions (ENCOVI) conducted by well-reputed Venezuelan universities that we know that in 2021, 94.5 percent of the population lived in poverty, with extreme poverty affecting two-thirds of the households, due to the combined effects of a collapsed economy and the COVID-19 pandemic. Those figures improved by 2023 when extreme poverty dropped to 59.1 percent and multidimensional poverty to 58 percent, but in rural areas, both indicators remained over 70 percent, so the population is still struggling. This starkly contrasts with the year 2000, when seventy percent of the population belonged to the middle class, and fewer than 25 percent lived in poverty.

The education system has become increasingly substandard, with significant deterioration since 2013. However, the true extent of this decline is difficult to assess due to the manipulation, absence, or lack of updated official statistics, which can lead to misleading information being reported to multilateral organizations. The education crisis is marked by crumbling public school infrastructure, a shortage of underpaid teachers, inadequate educational coverage, high student dropout rates, and a significant reduction in both the reach and consistency of the school feeding program. This downward trend extends to university education, where enrollment dropped by 24 percent between 2008 and 2018, and by 60 percent in the country’s major universities from 2012 to 2024. According to the 2023 ENCOVI report, only 60 percent of students regularly attend school with some degree of normality, while 40 percent have irregular attendance.

The decline in educational quality is further highlighted by an Early Grades Reading Assessment test, where third grade students achieved, on average, only 57.3 percent correct answers. Additionally, seventy-five percent of students scored below 76 percent, with just 25 percent achieving between 76 percent and 100 percent correct answers, underscoring the significant gaps in learning outcomes. The situation deteriorated further during the COVID-19 pandemic, as schools were unprepared for virtual learning. The post-pandemic period brought additional challenges, with many schools being looted, resulting in the loss of supplies, furniture, and electrical wiring and damage to infrastructure. Compounding the crisis is the government’s response to teachers’ demands, which has involved threats, harassment, and surveillance. This hostile environment, coupled with poor working conditions and restricted freedom of speech, has driven many educators to quit their jobs or leave the country altogether, exacerbating the already fragile state of the education system.

In contrast to the improving health outcomes in much of Latin America, Venezuela’s health performance has stagnated and deteriorated. Once outperforming the regional average, the country fell behind in 2009 and is now more than three points below the regional mean. Various indicators reflect the decline in the overall health of the Venezuelan population during the twenty-first century. Life expectancy dropped from around seventy-three to seventy-two years, while the infant mortality rate increased from 17.9 per 1,000 live births in 2000 to 21.1 per 1,000 by 2017. Maternal mortality surged to 125 per 100,000 live births by 2015³. By 2020, nearly one-third of Venezuelans were food insecure, and the 2017 ENCOVI survey found that 64.3 percent of the population had lost weight due to food shortages. Additionally, once-controlled communicable diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, and diphtheria resurfaced, with malaria cases rising from 35,500 in 2009 to over 400,000 by 2017. By 2018, over 80 percent of hospitals reported shortages of basic medicines, and many healthcare facilities lacked electricity and clean water.

This situation stems from a combination of factors: lack of investment in public services worsening healthcare; infrastructure collapsing due to corruption, poor maintenance, and a lack of new investments; ineffective public policies; the exodus of healthcare workers and skilled professionals because of low salaries and poor working conditions; widespread shortages of food and medicine; rising poverty; and persistent inflation and hyperinflation. These issues result from the model imposed at the beginning of the century, which dismantled the institutional framework, curtailing liberty and economic opportunities.

Additionally, Venezuela has experienced significant environmental degradation, jeopardizing the prospects for future generations. The massive and uncontrolled exploitation of the Orinoco Mining Arc, which encroaches on Indigenous territories and Areas Under Special Administration Regime with government knowledge and authorization, has drawn serious concerns from social, environmental, and human rights organizations since 2016 regarding its harmful implications for Indigenous communities and biodiversity. This mining project has led to significant destruction in the Amazon region in Venezuela, with illegal mining operations deforesting 1,000 hectares of Canaima National Park and damaging 2,227 hectares in Yapacana National Park. Moreover, mercury pollution has affected the Ventuari, Caura, Caroní, Cuyuní, and Orinoco rivers.

Petróleos de Venezuela, the national oil company, has also neglected environmental and safety protocols, increasing accidents, including spills in sensitive ecosystems such as the Orinoco River and Lake Maracaibo. The Global Gas Flaring Tracker from the World Bank indicates that Venezuela’s flaring intensity quadrupled between 2012 and 2021, with the amount of gas flared in 2022 exceeding the amount of gas recovered for productive purposes. This practice contributes to higher emissions of harmful gases, placing Venezuela fifth globally in gas flaring.

Several indicators highlight the environmental harm in Venezuela. Global Forest Watch tracks increased deforestation, the Living Planet Index reveals a decline in biodiversity, the Water Quality Index assesses levels of water pollution, and the Environmental Performance Index (EPI), and the Global Carbon Atlas, reflects the environmental stress caused by fossil fuel extraction and energy mismanagement. The Air Quality Index (EPI-Yale) indicates issues related to inadequate industrial regulation and vehicular emissions, the Waste Management Index (EPI) shows a decline in waste management capacity, with improper disposal of solid and hazardous waste, and the Environmental Vulnerability Index highlights high vulnerability due to poor natural resource management. These indicators collectively demonstrate the country’s ecological deterioration across multiple dimensions. This troubling environmental situation stems from a lack of rule of law, corruption, and influence peddling, leading to the indiscriminate depletion of natural resources and the contamination of the environment to the detriment of future generations.

The path forward

Venezuela’s current situation is critical: Citing the nation’s institutional and social fragility, the International Monetary Fund placed it on its List of Fragile and Conflict-Affected States. The International Monetary Fund has alluded to a government that is either unable or unwilling to fulfill essential state functions such as providing security, justice, and basic services to the majority of its population, with weak institutions, nonexistent governance, and high poverty levels.

This crisis is the result of nearly twenty-five years of the socialism of the twenty-first century model, which has eroded the progress made in the previous century. From the outset, various levels and forms of resistance to this model have emerged, yet the regime has maintained its grip on power through various means, increasingly revealing its authoritarian nature over time. Despite these challenges, the population has demonstrated remarkable resilience, remaining active and committed to pursuing political change that could reverse the current situation by leveraging its available natural, human, and financial resources.

Thus, this moment can be seen as a crossroads, a tipping point, a moment of bifurcation, with the potential to shape the future. The political driver at play will serve as the catalyst for two vastly different scenarios.

1) Scenario 1: Oppression and poverty. This scenario envisions the end of Venezuela’s liberal democratic republic model, resulting in the entrenchment of tyranny and the subordination of all powers to the executive. Venezuela could become a significant node in the multidimensional networks of illegality.

If the popular will, as expressed in the 2024 presidential elections, is disregarded, the country may plunge deeper into a society marked by diminished freedom and prosperity. Venezuela is unlikely to reintegrate into global financial flows, facing obstacles in renegotiating its debt with multilateral organizations and receiving the necessary support to address its complex humanitarian crisis.

In this context, recurrent macroeconomic imbalances are expected, leading to increased economic volatility and a shortened investment horizon, which would elevate risk premiums. Maintaining policies to stabilize the exchange rate and control inflation would become increasingly difficult, with restrictions on credit and foreign currency inflows. That will widen the gap between official and parallel exchange rates, fostering the debasement of the national currency and deepening dollarization.

To manage these macroeconomic challenges, fiscal and parafiscal pressures on the private sector would intensify, making production less profitable and riskier, promoting informal economic activity, reducing domestic supply, and reigniting inflationary pressures.

The prevailing situation would hinder the ability to address social needs, exacerbating poverty and exclusion. As popular dissatisfaction rises, the government is likely to respond with increased repression, leading to a heightened militarization of public spaces and severe human rights violations. This dynamic would contribute to the further erosion or outright extinction of the rule of law, undermining freedoms of expression and association, as well as civil, political, and economic rights.

Such conditions would foster opacity in public fund management, heightening corruption and enabling arbitrary public policies and decision-making processes. An ongoing source of income may come from continued licenses for oil resource exploitation or from actors unconcerned about the reputational risks of engaging with a sanctioned state, which would likely result in lower prices for oil sales.

In this tyrannical scenario, characterized by a lack of freedom and a bleak future, a significant new wave of migration could emerge, predominantly involving very low-income groups. This influx would put pressure on neighboring and destination countries, potentially fueling anti-migration policies and discriminatory attitudes.
The consolidation of a tyrannical regime would facilitate the exploitation of Venezuela’s valuable natural resources to support illicit networks, transforming the country into a hub of regional, hemispheric, and global instability.

2) Scenario 2: Freedom and prosperity. This scenario envisions the reestablishment of Venezuela as a liberal democratic republic, anchored in Western values of freedom, individual dignity, and prosperity. Under this vision, Venezuela could reclaim its stabilizing role in the western hemisphere.

If the democratic alternative—which won the presidential elections on July 28, 2024 and transparently demonstrated its results to the world—gets into power, it will pave the way for a positive future. This could not only enhance freedoms and respect for political, civil, and human rights but also improve the quality of life and spur economic growth.

The recovery would be guided by a proposed plan called Venezuela: Land of Grace—Freedom, Democracy, and Prosperity, advanced by the team supporting the political leader Maria Corina Machado, and built on three foundational pillars: (a) free development of individuals: recognizing the intrinsic dignity and creative potential of free individuals; (b) a state at the service of the citizen: protecting life, liberty, and property, ensuring access to justice and public security through independent branches of government, with a focus on efficiency, transparency, and public-private partnerships in managing services as well as education, healthcare, and security; and (c) free market economy: unlocking the country’s potential by transforming its abundant resources into wealth through citizens’ efforts, fostering entrepreneurship, and stimulating economic growth.

With these pillars in place, a myriad of opportunities could arise to restore citizens’ quality of life in an ambiance of freedom and peace. A robust institutional framework and a stable macroeconomic environment could attract investments across various productive sectors, enhancing domestic supply, creating jobs, and improving living conditions for households. Full support from multilateral organizations, following the renegotiation of defaulted external debt, could guide the nation toward overcoming the humanitarian crisis and significantly reducing poverty levels.

Venezuela could emerge as an energy hub due to its vast reserves of hydrocarbons and renewable energy resources, bolstered by private investments, reclaiming its status as a major player in oil and gas production and refining, and resuming its role as reliable supplier within the western hemisphere. In this scenario, Venezuela could contribute to reducing global geopolitical tensions, combating illegality, and promoting freedom and peace.

Sary Levy-Carciente is a research scientist at the Adam Smith Center for Economic Freedom, Florida International University; former president of the National Academy of Economic Sciences (Venezuela); and dean of the faculty of Economic and Social Sciences (Central University of Venezuela). LevyCarciente is a Fullbright fellow at the Center for Polymer Studies, Boston University; and visiting researcher at the Department of Economics, UMASS. Levy-Carciente is the author of the International Property Rights Index (Property Rights Alliance) and the Index of Bureaucracy (Florida International University).

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1 The first half of the 1990s was a very turbulent period for Venezuela. Waves of protests and looting led to a state of social and political upheaval, weakening the government and creating the breeding ground for two attempted coups d’état. Later the president was forced out of office by the Supreme Court. Finally, Venezuela experienced its worst historic banking crisis in 1994 (with an estimated bailout cost of twenty percent of gross domestic product). Those elements placed the country, in 1995, at a very low level in all metrics of freedom and prosperity, many of which recovered to levels by 2000. This means that the assessment of changes from 1995 to the present may be somewhat distorted: understating the decline assessment while overstating the improvement in the twenty-first century.

2 Since 2012 the Ministry of Interior Relations and Justice stopped regularly publishing crime statistics, including homicide, kidnapping and robbery rates. Since 2014 the National Institute of Statistics (INE) stopped publishing poverty and living conditions figures, including information on extreme poverty, access to basic services and the quality of life of Venezuelans, and data on the number of people that left the country. Since 2015 the Central Bank stopped publishing regular data on inflation, core inflation, GDP, and other key economic indicators. PDVSA, the national oil company, stopped publishing detailed reports on oil production. And since 2014 data on foreign trade has not been published. Since 2016 the Ministry of Health stopped publishing its weekly epidemiological bulletin, which included key data on diseases, mortality, and morbidity rates. The last industrial census in Venezuela was conducted in 2001.

3 Venezuelan Ministry of Health data, although official statistics have been irregular since then.

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Recalibrating the use of individual sanctions in Venezuela

Geoff Ramsey, Lucie Kneip — Wed, 08 Jan 2025 19:15:49 +0000

In response to Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro’s decision to claim a new illegitimate mandate on January 10 based on a stolen election, the United States and its allies face a major test of their strategy moving forward. Effectively pressuring the Venezuelan government will require innovative thinking on the use of individual sanctions from US authorities, as well as careful coordination between the United States and Latin American and European governments.

As Venezuela continues to grapple with a deep political and economic crisis, the international community is at a critical juncture in shaping its response. The stolen presidential election of July 28 marked a watershed moment, signaling the country’s further descent into authoritarianism under Nicolás Maduro’s regime. In this context, policymakers in the United States and other countries are likely to continue to impose sanctions against political, military, and economic elites as a means of seeking to exert pressure without worsening the humanitarian situation.

With over eight million Venezuelans displaced by the crisis, US and other international policymakers are cautious about the unintended consequences of tightening existing oil and financial sanctions. Although the outgoing Biden administration at one point said it was evaluating whether to rescind privately issued specific licenses that authorize energy companies to maintain a foothold in the country, it has not done so, partly out of an interest in preventing the worsening of economic conditions. Instead, the Biden administration prioritized sanctions against individuals responsible for Venezuela’s deteriorating human rights situation. On September 12, the Biden administration sanctioned sixteen government-linked individuals, including leaders of the National Electoral Council who oversaw the stolen election, and members of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice who validated the fraudulent results. Biden’s Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the goal of the individual sanctions is to “promote accountability” for those undermining democracy in Venezuela. Three months later, Canada’s foreign ministry announced it would add five of these same individuals to their sanctions list for fraudulently declaring Maduro the winner of the July election. The US added an additional 21 individuals to the sanctions list in November 2024. Following Maduro’s illegitimate inauguration in January 2025, the US, Canada, and the EU all announced additional sanctions on regime officials and affiliates.

This interest in targeted sanctions is likely to continue under the second Trump administration, given that Trump’s first term saw heated internal debate over the potential impact of broader economic sanctions on Venezuela’s migration crisis. Indeed, the use of individual sanctions accelerated under President-elect Trump’s first presidential term even as he oversaw the imposition of broader sectoral sanctions targeting Venezuela’s links to the international oil and financial markets.

With Trump returning to the Oval Office, here’s what policymakers should know about the use of individual sanctions—and what can make Venezuela sanctions policy more effective.

The sticks: A history of the Venezuela sanctions regime

From 2009 to 2015, Venezuela-related sanctions were few and primarily targeted kingpin leaders involved in drug trafficking and financial support for Hezbollah. In March 2015, Executive Order 13692 created the country-specific sanctions regime on Venezuela. Seven military officials were initially sanctioned for their involvement in stifling protests. This program allowed the United States government to sanction individuals involved in human rights abuses, corruption, or the undermining of democratic processes. In November 2018, Executive Order 13850 created a new Venezuela-related sanctions program under which the United States could freeze assets and prevent actors from conducting corrupt transactions with the Venezuelan government to move money. In August 2019, Executive Order 13884 blocked Venezuelan government assets and enabled sanctions on actors assisting the Venezuelan government, and an initial seven military officials were sanctioned for their involvement in actions undermining democratic processes.

This graph does not include sanctions issued by the United States on January 10, the date of Maduro’s illegitimate re-inauguration.

The Obama administration sanctioned seventeen individuals, including the first seven military officials sanctioned under the Venezuela-specific sanctions regime. After Trump took office in January of 2017, the number of individual sanctions increased dramatically, with forty-one issued in 2017 alone. The administration issued twenty individual sanctions in 2018, forty-nine in 2019, and twenty-five in 2020. (These numbers do not include individuals who were sanctioned and later delisted). Under the Trump administration, some of the sanctions targeted Venezuelan access to the US dollar and to international financing, and therefore Venezuela’s ability to reconcile its sovereign debt. The Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” strategy took off in 2019, which saw the imposition of over 180 Venezuela-related sanctions, including the forty-nine targeting individuals. That year also saw the first implementation of sectoral sanctions on industries including oil, gold, finance, defense, and security.

This shifted under US President Joe Biden. Until September 2024, Biden had not added a single Venezuelan national to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list since taking office. However, after the July 28 stolen presidential election, the government-backed National Electoral Council declared incumbent Nicolás Maduro the winner, despite opposition candidate Edmundo González emerging as the clear victor following the opposition’s independent collection and publication of over 80 percent of the official actas, electoral vote tallies produced by each voting center. Roughly a month and a half after the election, the United States announced new sanctions on sixteen individuals, for obstructing the elections and intensifying post-election repression, ultimately forcing Gonzalez to flee the country. Two more rounds of sanctions were announced in November 2024 and January 2025.

The carrots: When and why individual sanctions have been lifted

The Biden administration largely opted for a different approach than the first Trump administration, seeming to prefer carrots over sticks. On multiple occasions, Biden took Venezuelan nationals off the list.

In December 2021, the administration announced it would no longer designate the former Colombian guerrilla movement, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), as a terrorist group. As part of a package of ninety-two FARC-linked delistings, the Treasury Department lifted sanctions on five Venezuelans including Ramón Rodríguez Chacín, a military officer and former Venezuelan minister of interior who worked as a go-between between the FARC rebels and the Venezuelan government.

In June 2022, the Treasury Department announced that it had lifted the sanctions on Carlos Erik Malpica Flores, a former national treasurer and vice president of Venezuela’s state-owned oil company PDVSA. Malpica Flores is also the nephew of current Venezuelan first lady Cilia Flores, and his delisting was reportedly part of an effort to induce the Venezuelan government to restart negotiations with the opposition—and indeed, days later opposition and government representatives met in Oslo. In November 2022, two other nephews of Flores, known as the “narcosobrinos” due to their involvement in transnational drug trafficking operations, were released as part of a prisoner swap that included the release of ex-officials of Citgo, the US-based subsidiary of PDVSA.

In July 2023, the Treasury removed Carlos Rotondaro, former board president of the Venezuelan Institute of Social Security (IVSS), from the SDN list. Sanctioned for “economic mismanagement and acts of corruption,” Rotondaro was reportedly delisted for providing information to the United States on financial movements made by the family of Haiman El Troudi, former Minister of Planning and Development and Minister of Public Works.

These delistings fit with the Biden administration’s broader reticence toward announcing new sanctions on Venezuela. Rather than rolling out new sectoral sanctions, the Biden White House sought to incentivize a democratic opening by issuing licenses to US and Western oil companies to operate in the country despite broader oil and financial sanctions, in exchange for a series of agreements between the government and the democratic opposition that led to the July 28 election.

Biden was not alone in attempting to use sanctions relief to incentivize change in Venezuela. Even as the first Trump administration ramped up the use of individual sanctions, it also offered sanctions relief to individuals who “take concrete and meaningful actions to restore democratic order, refuse to take part in human rights abuses and speak out against abuses committed by the government, and combat corruption in Venezuela.” As part of this strategy, the Trump administration lifted sanctions in two cases. In March 2019, the Treasury delisted the wives of Raúl Gorrín and Gustavo Perdomo, two regime-linked businessmen who reportedly tried to work as middlemen between Washington and Caracas. According to press accounts, Gorrín worked to support a failed attempt to overthrow Maduro in April of that year, and Treasury’s removal of his wife and the wife of his business partner from the sanctions list was a decision made in exchange for his support for the coup.

In May 2019, after the uprising failed, the United States delisted Manuel Cristopher Figuera, former Director General of Venezuela’s National Intelligence Service (SEBIN). Figuera had taken part in the coup attempt and fled the country when it failed. In its press release, the Treasury Department stated that the move “demonstrates that U.S. sanctions need not be permanent and are intended to bring about a positive change of behavior.”

Who’s on the list?

The United States has rescinded the visas of almost two thousand Venezuelans and currently sanctions 202 Venezuela-linked individuals on the SDN list (as of January 13, 2025). Of these 202, eighty-one have been sanctioned primarily for their current or former roles with Venezuelan security and intelligence outfits. Nine have worked in the military counterintelligence branch known by its Spanish-language acronym DGCIM, eleven have worked in the intelligence branch (SEBIN), thirty have worked in the national armed forces (FANB), twenty-six have worked for the national guard (GNB), and seven have worked for the national police (PNB). Some of these individuals have worked for multiple branches of the security or counterintelligence service.

The United States also has a history of sanctioning key Venezuelan political officials. Maduro has been sanctioned since 2017, and his wife and son have been sanctioned since 2018 and 2017, respectively. Attorney General Tarek William Saab was sanctioned in 2017. Vice President Delcy Rodríguez and her brother, Communications Minister Jorge Rodríguez, Former National Assembly President Diosdado Cabello and his wife and brother, and Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez were all sanctioned in 2018.

Beyond key officials of the Venezuelan government and their affiliates, the United States has also sanctioned several economic and financial elites linked to operations with the government or the state-owned oil and natural gas company. Veronica Esparza Garcia, Joaquin Leal Jimenez, and Olga Maria Zepeda Esparza were sanctioned in 2020 for “operating a sanctions-evasion scheme benefitting the illegitimate Maduro regime and PDVSA.” In early 2021, Alessandro Bazzoni, an Italian citizen, Francisco Javier D’Agostino, a dual Spanish-Venezuelan citizen, and Philipp Paul Vartan Apikian, a Swiss citizen, were sanctioned for their ties to “a network attempting to evade United States sanctions on Venezuela’s oil sector.” Apikian and his company, Swissoil, were removed from the sanctions list in June 2023. Bazzoni and D’Agostino were removed in January 2025.

Additionally, as of September 2024, eleven individuals connected to Venezuela have been sanctioned under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act and classified as “specially designated narcotics traffickers.” The sanctions connected with this particular designation are separate from the Venezuela-specific sanctions programs created by executive order but have been perceived by observers as connected to the US-led pressure campaign.

Coordinating sanctions with allies

This graph does not include sanctions issued by all three countries on January 10, the date of Maduro’s illegitimate re-inauguration.

The United States, with its current list of 202 designees, is not the only government that has sanctioned individuals related to Venezuela. Canada currently sanctions 115, and the European Union (EU) sanctions sixty-nine. Of the 202 US-sanctioned individuals, Canada sanctions eighty-three of the same individuals, while the EU sanctions fifty-eight. Forty-eight individuals are currently sanctioned by all three parties. Most of these were sanctioned by the United States months or years before they were sanctioned by Canada and the EU. These include high-level officials such as Delcy Rodríguez, Tarek William Saab, and Diosdado Cabello. However, it is notable that the EU has not placed individual sanctions on Maduro himself. Neither Canada nor the EU has placed sanctions on any individuals sanctioned by the United States that we have classified as economic elites.

Of the thirty-two people that Canada sanctions that the United States does not, a number are judicial officials such as magistrates and individuals associated with repressive acts. All except for one were sanctioned between 2017 and 2019. The eleven individuals sanctioned by the EU that are not sanctioned by the United States include people known to have committed human rights violations and officials contributing to the erosion of democracy and democratic institutions. Most of these were sanctioned between 2020 and 2021.

How effective are individual sanctions?

Individual sanctions can allow decisionmakers in Washington to signal a policy stance and provide a degree of accountability, which may be useful to victims of Venezuela’s authoritarianism. Listed individuals are unable to travel to the United States and they cannot operate directly in broader financial systems. There is an argument to be made that this makes the target’s life uncomfortable or at least more difficult, whether the sanctions involve freezing assets, limiting their mobility, or restricting business operations. Individual sanctions may also serve as a measure of justice for human rights victims. However, in Venezuela so far there is little evidence that being added to the individual sanctions list encourages defection. Only one case of a sanctioned official defecting exists (Manuel Christopher Figuera). Other key individuals who have defected, such as former Oil Minister Rafael Ramírez and former Prosecutor General Luisa Ortega Díaz, were never sanctioned by the United States (although Ramírez was sanctioned by Canada).

One way to tighten the strategy for individual sanctions involves targeting more overseas assets of Venezuelans who have contributed to political and economic destabilization, and those of their family members and associates. While some of the assets of more prominent Venezuelans have been seized, a number of Venezuelan officials still own properties in Miami and other US cities, Latin America, and Europe. According to a 2022 joint investigation by Armando.Info and El Nuevo Herald, at least 718 companies in Florida are owned by current or former Venezuelan officials, including over two hundred that are owned by members of the military. Most of these owners have not been sanctioned. While an SDN designation implies that all US properties and financial assets of the individual will be frozen, some sanctioned officials continue to have access to large financial networks through assets held by family members or affiliates who are not sanctioned. Ramping up the targeting of the asset networks of current or former affiliates of the dictatorship could potentially create more room for those affiliates to consider the value of remaining loyal to Maduro, while avoiding harming the Venezuelan people.

The key question lies in how international actors can sanction individuals in a way that pulls the regime apart instead of consolidating it. Maduro has honored some of those sanctioned with replicas of independence leader Simón Bolívar’s sword. After the most recent wave of sanctions, government officials have painted being sanctioned as a badge of honor, a sign of loyalty to the revolution. According to Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López, being sanctioned is a recognition of officials’ “morale, physical and professional integrity, and their leadership.”

One way to mitigate this is to follow sanctions announcements with targeted, discrete, and strategic communication with sanctioned individuals on the steps needed to get off the list, as occurred in the case of Manuel Christopher Figuera. Similar communication could occur with individuals the government is considering sanctioning, as may have been the case with Ortega Díaz. Coordinating more closely with multiple countries to impose parallel individual sanctions on individuals can help the international community to align on sanctions priorities. This may include advising interested international allies on the creation of their own legal sanctions frameworks.

But sanctions should not be the only manner of engagement with regime affiliates. The goal should always be to identify and engage those most likely to support democratic reform from the inside. This means empowering moderate elements within Chavismo and isolating hardliners to maintain the potential for a peaceful, democratic solution.

Methodology

Designations were drawn from the following sanctions programs: VENEZUELA, VENEZUELA-EO13884, VENEZUELA-EO13850, SGDT, and SDNTK. For the SGDT and SDNTK programs, only Venezuelans or individuals sanctioned for Venezuela-related activities were counted.

At least four individuals on the SDN list are reportedly deceased but have yet to be removed from the list: Henry Castellanos Garzón, Hernán Darío Velásquez Saldarriaga, José Leonardo Noroño Torres, and Miguel Santanilla Botache. Castellanos Garzón and Darío Velásquez were ex-FARC commanders killed in 2021. Noroño Torres reportedly died in a transit accident in 2020, and ex-FARC dissident Santanilla Botache was reportedly killed in 2022. The Treasury often takes time to formally delist deceased individuals due to various factors, such as difficulty in obtaining a formal death certificate or verifying an individual is deceased, and ensuring the individual’s assets are not used by a third party. As these individuals are still on the SDN list, they were included in the analysis.

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Lucie Kneip is a program assistant at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The authors would like to thank Brennan Rhodes for his research support in contributing to this piece.

Charai in the Jerusalem Strategic Tribune: Look to Middle Eastern Diasporas for Figures to Inspire Change

Atlantic Council — Mon, 06 Jan 2025 15:37:54 +0000

The post Charai in the Jerusalem Strategic Tribune: Look to Middle Eastern Diasporas for Figures to Inspire Change appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Dispatch from Damascus: The challenges of rebuilding are becoming clearer in Syria

Diana Rayes — Fri, 03 Jan 2025 19:03:29 +0000

View of Damascus (photo courtesy of Diana Rayes)

DAMASCUS—Over a half-century of Assad regime rule, including fourteen years of a brutal civil war, had turned Syria into a state of mass oppression as well as a geopolitical black hole. In December, a startling advance by an umbrella of armed opposition groups, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), led to an unprecedented takeover and a rapid transition in governance. Just a month ago, I (and the millions of Syrians both inside and outside of the country) would not have imagined this day would come. Now that it has, the challenges and opportunities of rebuilding Syria—a free, secure, inclusive, and prosperous Syria—are becoming clearer.

I am in Syria for the first time in nearly fifteen years. While visiting Damascus, Homs, and Hama days after the collapse of the Assad regime and the initial period of joy and uncertainty that followed, I saw Syrians slowly returning to business as usual. In Damascus (considered the world’s oldest inhabited capital city) policemen in orange vests whistled and directed the congested traffic, vendors reopened their shops, and students boarded school buses ahead of the holiday. Young children wove between cars selling revolutionary flags—the new Syrian flag, which features a green band along the top. License plates from Idlib, Aleppo, and Daraa suggested that many of these cars belonged to displaced individuals who were either returning to their homes or coming back to Damascus for the first time in years.

There were notable differences between this visit and my last. For one, across the city, posters depicting former Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad’s face had been torn by jubilant civilians. Another was that the tarnished statue of Bashar’s father and predecessor Hafez al-Assad, which once stood dauntingly outside of the al-Assad Library, had been toppled and was lying in front of the Damascene Sword monument across the street. Syrians stomped on it, celebrating their freedom from fifty-four years of tyranny. These symbols of state repression aside, the indication of Syrians’ newfound liberties that stood out the most was their speaking and assembling freely without the fear of being thrown into one of the regime’s prisons or being bombed by a Russian jet.

Protesters step on top of a toppled a statue of Hafez al-Assad (photo courtesy of Diana Rayes)

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The Syrian civil war was the deadliest and most devastating conflict of the 2010s, with profound consequences for human security, regional security, and global politics. The toll on civilian lives, infrastructure, and the economy was staggering, and its ripple effects were felt across the globe. Over half of the country’s population—fourteen million people—had been displaced at least once, and over five million Syrian refugees fled to neighboring countries. During the global migrant crisis of the 2010s, over a quarter of the world’s refugees were Syrians. Migration proved a lightning-rod issue warping politics from Ankara to Berlin to London to Washington. The ramifications of a free and stable Syria are huge for vulnerable populations as well as the countries that host them. Discussions about repatriation are already underway, for example in European countries. However, these conversations are concerningly premature: Syria is not yet prepared to receive and integrate returnees, as significant humanitarian, economic, and political-military challenges must be addressed.

Since the start of the conflict in 2011, Syria’s economy has contracted by a staggering 85 percent. The estimated cost of rebuilding the country ranges between $250 billion and $400 billion—figures that, given the extensive damage to the country’s infrastructure, appear increasingly accurate. For those returning, one of the most striking changes is the visible level of poverty that greets them within minutes of entering the city center. The toll on society is undeniable: Buildings, both public and residential, are unusable, dirty, and neglected, and streets and storefronts are damaged and in disarray. The road between Homs and Hama, normally a leisurely thirty-minute drive, took longer to navigate as it was littered with debris and had been subject to destruction by bombardment from the Syrian regime, Russia, and Iran-backed militias. But the visible destruction hardly captures the societal scars left behind.

(Photo courtesy of Diana Rayes)

“We are waking up from a long nightmare,” someone in Damascus told me. Others described it as “living in a dream” and said that many are in “denial” of this new reality. It became clear that the trauma of authoritarianism, for societies held in an iron fist like in Syria, is intergenerational. And it will likely take generations to heal.

This was apparent in the days following the collapse of the Syrian regime, which led to the freeing of thousands of prisoners—men, women, and children— from Assad’s prisons. Their release shed new light on the decades of crimes committed by both Assads—Hafez and Bashar—and a harsh reminder for regional and international parties who sought to normalize with the regime. Syrians were confronted with a painful reality that they had long known but had been forced into staying silent about for generations. Families today are still searching the Syrian regime’s notorious prisons and mass graveyards for loved ones forcibly detained or disappeared.

(Photo courtesy of Diana Rayes)

In Damascus’s Martyr’s Square, I met with families hanging photographs of their missing loved ones, many of whom had been taken as prisoners as early as 2012. I spoke to two mothers: one who had identified her son in an online video released after the liberation and was still trying to find him. Another mother had heard her son, missing since 2014, had been spotted near their old home by a neighbor. “I will wait for him at the Umayyad Mosque, maybe he will turn up there,” she said, with a glimmer of hope in her eyes.

Families hold photographs of their missing loved ones. (Photo courtesy of Diana Rayes)

I also met with civil society groups, who highlighted that the greatest challenge continues to be providing support to the 70 percent of Syrians living in poverty and the one in four Syrians experiencing extreme poverty. Earlier this year, the United Nations reported that over 16.7 million Syrians—around 79 percent of the population—are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance.

Syrians know they will not get what they need to rebuild as a society, stabilize their economy, and set up government services and a social safety net with one hand tied behind their backs. Nearly every conversation I had with civil society groups touched upon the need for global sanctions relief, with people expressing hope that sanctions would soon be eased to facilitate the flow of money from abroad, enable the delivery of remittances from the diaspora, and streamline licensing processes to allow nongovernmental organizations to operate more effectively and provide much-needed humanitarian aid. In the West, policymakers and humanitarian organizations have begun to reexamine such sanctions, seeing as they could stunt Syria’s recovery.

The Syrian interim authorities’ success is contingent on buy-in from the Syrian people, as international security expert Sana Sekkarie wrote for the Atlantic Council in her recent analysis. Addressing the current economic crisis and guaranteeing that basic needs are met, including access to food, water, electricity, and healthcare, will be critical to political stability. Without fundamental needs and services being met, public trust and stability will remain elusive, further complicating efforts to foster sustainable peace and democratic governance.

A multifaceted crisis such as the one in Syria demands innovative and swiftly implemented solutions. Among many priorities, it is crucial for the new governing party or leadership to focus on rebuilding trust and legitimacy. And while Syrians are ready to take ownership of their country, this society—plagued by half a century of tyranny—will need to unlearn its fear of the state. Syrians will also need to deliberately work together, for the first time, across minority groups and sects. These are the first of many steps toward building a free, stable, and prosperous Syria that can serve as an inspiration for other countries impacted by conflict across the world.

Diana Rayes is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She is the chairwoman of the Syria Public Health Network.

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How Jimmy Carter’s support for human rights helped win the Cold War

Daniel Fried — Sun, 29 Dec 2024 22:17:06 +0000

During his presidency and for many years thereafter, many viewed Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy as a mix of disasters—the Iranian Revolution and hostage crisis, the failure of détente with the Soviet Union, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan among them—and major achievements, including the establishment of diplomatic relations with China and the Israeli-Egyptian peace forged at Camp David. Despite these successes, Carter’s legacy has often and wrongly been dismissed as an inconsequential prelude to President Ronald Reagan’s return to US leadership of the free world and to a forward-leaning, ultimately successful strategy of pressure on the Soviet Union.

One of Carter’s most consequential initiatives—the general elevation of human rights in US foreign policy—has usually been overlooked. Moreover, the specific application of human rights criteria to US relations with then-Soviet-controlled Central and Eastern Europe has been underappreciated. As the tributes roll in following Carter’s death on December 29 at the age of one hundred, this aspect of his legacy deserves its due.

Introducing human rights into US bilateral relations meant that the default Cold War policy that a reliably anticommunist government could be embraced and its authoritarian nature tolerated was no longer automatic. A junior foreign service officer at the time, I recall a furious debate within the State Department between the newly established Human Rights Bureau, headed by human rights activist Patricia Derian, and the more traditional State bureaus over whether the United States should use economic leverage against the Argentinian government, a repressive military regime that had a habit of “disappearing” its opponents. Derian’s people said yes, but most of State was appalled by the thought (and corridor talk was openly sexist in dismissing human rights as a policy criterion in general and Derian in particular). Derian and her people took grief for their views, but the impact of the policy grew over time; it was not dispositive, but it meant fewer free rides for dictatorships.

Carter put the United States on offense in the Cold War and on the side of the people of the region.

The impact in Europe was more profound. An implicit axiom of President Richard Nixon’s détente was that the Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe at the end of World War II, marked by the imposition of the Iron Curtain, was a sad but by then immutable fact. Official Washington and most of US academia regarded the Soviet Bloc—communist-dominated Europe from the Baltic to the Black Sea east of West Germany—as permanent and, though this was seldom made explicit, stabilizing. Talk of “liberating” those countries was regarded as illusion, delusion, or cant. Maintaining US-Soviet stability, under this view of Cold War realism, required accepting Europe’s realities, as these were then seen. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Final Act of Helsinki, a sort of codification of détente concluded under President Gerald Ford, did include general human rights language, and this turned out to be important. However, few at the time expected the Helsinki Accords to have any more operational impact than the vague language about democracy included in the Declaration of Liberated Europe issued at the Yalta Summit in 1945, which had no impact at all.

Carter’s shift toward human rights challenged this uber-realist consensus. It came just as democratic dissidents and workers’ movements inspired by them began to gather strength in Central and Eastern Europe, especially Poland. Carter, and his national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, put the United States in a better position to reach out to these movements and to work with them when communist rule began to falter as Soviet Bloc communist regimes started running past their ability to borrow money on easy “détente terms,” making them vulnerable. More broadly, by elevating human rights in the mix of US-Soviet and US-Soviet Bloc relations, Carter put the United States on offense in the Cold War and on the side of the people of the region.

In 1978, a Polish cardinal, Karol Wojtyła, was elected pope John Paul II. In 1980, workers’ strikes at a shipyard in Gdańsk exploded into a national movement—Solidarity—that about ten million Poles joined within a year. Later that year, the Soviet Union, alarmed by Solidarity’s rise, started threatening to invade Poland, as it had Czechoslovakia in August 1968. At that time, the Lyndon Johnson administration, consumed with Vietnam, barely reacted. This time, the Carter administration warned the Soviets not to invade Poland. The United States under Carter was no longer ceding Central and Eastern Europe to the Soviets’ undisturbed control, as “their” sphere of influence.

Reagan’s support for Solidarity, the sanctions he imposed on communist Poland and the Soviet Union after Poland instituted martial law in December 1981, and his support for democracy around the world embodied in the new National Endowment for Democracy (of which, full disclosure, I am a board member) that he inspired have rightly been lauded since. However, these successes were built on a foundation that Carter laid down. Carter from the center-left and Reagan from the right brought together a consensus that US interests could be advanced through support for US values abroad. This was not the first time US presidents made the link between values and interests, but Carter reconnected that link after the cynical and defeated Vietnam era. He did so just in time to catch the wave of freedom that swelled and crested with the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989 and the Soviet Union itself in 1991.

That’s some legacy.

Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and former US ambassador to Poland.

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Postwar Syria could go wrong in many ways. Here’s how the US can help it go right.

Thomas S. Warrick — Tue, 24 Dec 2024 14:59:52 +0000

Both US President Joe Biden and President-elect Donald Trump have been careful but predictable in their statements so far about the overthrow of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The early decisions—increasing humanitarian aid, keeping the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) down, and telling the new Syrian leaders that they will be judged by their actions, not just their words—are the easy ones. The hard part is just starting. There are many ways this could go wrong, and only a few ways it could go right.

As someone extensively involved in postwar planning efforts over many decades, including leading US State Department efforts in postwar Iraq, I am somewhat amused by statements claiming that “no one knows” what will happen next in Syria. In fact, it is relatively easy to predict the major outlines of what will happen next, despite (or often because of) well-meaning but ill-informed or under-resourced efforts by outside actors. Trump’s statement on December 16 that “Turkey is going to hold the key to Syria” was one of the most refreshingly honest statements by any US official, past or present. There are many ways in which the result could turn into chaos, leading to terrorism and more fighting that could draw the United States into another major Middle East war within the next fifteen years. The United States will need to steer between too much involvement and too little involvement. Here is how the near future will likely play out.

Follow the money (and guns)

In the next few months, there will be a power struggle among the anti-Assad groups in Damascus and western Syria. Adding to this combustible mix, former regime supporters and outside players like Iran will seek a comeback. The cynical reality is that whichever groups have the most guns and control the most money will become the leading voices in Syrian politics. It would be naïve to think that Syrians will get to decide this peacefully on their own without outside interference. Instead, external support and internal ruthlessness will be decisive.

This is a warning, but if handled in a clear-eyed fashion, it can also be a blueprint for managing the politics of postwar Syria in ways that lead to better outcomes for the Syrian people, the region, and countries like the United States that want a sustainable peace in the Middle East.

Well-meaning international mediators, such as those the United Nations (UN) was supposed to provide under Security Council Resolution 2254, will talk about power-sharing and a constitution, but the real power around the negotiating table will be the groups that have the most guns and the most money. The nascent civil society that Syria truly needs will have only minor influence, and most of that will come, if at all, at the insistence of outside players. In late 2025 or early 2026, the UN will be brought in to oversee elections. I can already predict that everyone will say, in hindsight, that these elections were held too soon. The UN elections experts will insist on a proportional representation system, ostensibly to give all Syrian political factions a voice.

What this will do is cement in power those groups that control the guns and the money. Money is the mother’s milk of politics. Syria is no exception. The proportional representation system gives party bosses who control party funds the power to rank-order the candidates, with those at the top of the lists of the bigger parties assured of election victory. Loyalty to the party boss becomes all-important for these candidates, not representing the people who elect them.

Neither al-Qaeda offshoot Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) nor the Turkish-supported Syrian National Army needs lessons about controlling guns and money. For years, HTS has ruthlessly and efficiently taken control of “customs duties” and monopolies over trucks and people crossing the Turkey-Syria border. These groups, unless blocked by their international supporters, will try to seize Syrian government ministries as a lucrative source of funds and jobs for supporters before elections take place. Iraqi political parties did this in 2003.

There is good reason to be concerned about HTS leader Ahmad al-Sharaa (formerly known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Jolani). In his interviews, he talks about “institutional governance.” To be fair, he understands the need to project moderation because many Syrians do not want to replace the Assad dictatorship with a Salafi jihadist one. Syrians want peace, not a march on Jerusalem. Remember that Fidel Castro tried to moderate his image after he seized power in Cuba in 1959, only to reveal his true intentions a few months later. The Taliban in 2021 tried to project an image of moderation, only to revert to gender apartheid. Overcoming skepticism toward HTS’s claims of moderation will depend on the new Syrian government taking actions that gain the support of both Syrians and countries, such as the United States, whose support is going to be essential for Syria to move in a positive direction.

Iran and Hezbollah will almost certainly try to regain power through politics. In 2003, Iran recovered quickly from the US takeover of Iraq by generously funding political parties (which the United States would not do) and militias to intimidate nationalist Iraqis. The Iranian Quds Force—the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ overseas paramilitary and covert action group—has deep connections to Syrian politics and the country’s security services. Plus, Iran still has ground lines of communication through Iraq into eastern Syria using Iranian-backed militias.

Seven steps to help the transition

The United States and the world have a lot to lose if Syria’s new leaders revert to terrorism, if ISIS is allowed to recover, or if Iran and Hezbollah regain power in Syria. Here are seven ways to improve the odds:

Turkey, Jordan, and other Arab governments will be supporting groups inside Syria, whether the United States wants them to or not. For the moment, Turkey is in the driver’s seat. The United States should work closely with its allies, with the goal of getting everyone to support only groups that work toward tolerance and coexistence internally and peace with all of Syria’s neighbors externally, including not just Israel and Lebanon but also, importantly, with Turkey. Groups that are not willing to meet these criteria need to be cut off from outside support, no matter what previous support they received.
The United States should make it a top priority to prevent Iran and Hezbollah from being spoilers in the new Syria. And Washington should expose Russian attempts to bribe its way back into influence.
The United States and its allies should prioritize keeping aid distribution out of the control of hard-line groups. Look at Gaza, where Israelis complain that Hamas controls distribution and criminal gangs intercept aid shipments.
HTS should be given a chance to show it has changed, and actions matter more than words. But Syrian officials should not be made to guess about what actions matter the most to the United States. The United States will need a channel to convey to the new Syrian leadership which actions would jeopardize prospects of further US support, including the all-important sanctions relief that new Syrian officials, including Sharaa, are aware they need.
Outside governments should work to keep Syrian ministries in technocratic hands, out of the control of individual militias or parties, to avoid a repeat of the disastrous muhasasa system in Iraq.
Since the 1980s, the United States has been allergic to funding foreign political parties directly, although Trump often shows little regard for historical restraints on US action. But how internal politics is funded in a country emerging from tyranny is hugely consequential. Then-President George W. Bush ordered the US invasion of Iraq in part to help make Iraq a democracy, but the United States failed to fund Iraqi political parties, leading some to take money from Iran and others to engage in massive corruption, in part to fund party activities. First-time free elections in countries like Syria do not result in stability and progress by chance. The United States has a poor record of picking winners in foreign countries (Iraq and Afghanistan being obvious cases in point), but the United States does well at promoting leadership development more broadly. Funding a robust system of opinion polling could also be one of the most important investments in a stable Syria that the United States and its European allies could make. Given that US allies and adversaries are unlikely to feel restrained from picking their preferred winners, the United States should stay clear-eyed about the importance, at least, of thwarting the ambitions of its enemies.
It’s too early to predict which electoral system will have the best chance to produce a peaceful, stable Syria, but this will be a hugely consequential decision that should not be left only to UN elections experts when the time comes. This requires careful analysis, not just by neutral elections officials but by those most knowledgeable about Syrian internal politics. The United States needs to be prepared to weigh in with its allies and with the UN to make sure that the election system gives the Syrian people the best chance for a stable, peaceful future.

Countries such as Turkey, Israel, and Lebanon may have bigger stakes in Syria than the United States does, but what happens in postwar Syria is still vitally important to US interests. No one suggests that Syria needs more US troops, but the next few years will see a historic opportunity to avoid a future Middle East war that could draw in the United States. Expanding the Abraham Accords depends in part on better relations between Israel and Syria. The next few weeks will be crucial, but Trump could have a truly historic win if he listens to the right advisers on his team.

It will be up to the Trump administration whether Syria falls into the hands of terrorists, Iran, or chaos—or whether the Syrian people will genuinely have a chance to determine their own path to peace, reconstruction, and prosperity.

Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security.

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A US blueprint for Syria’s fragile transition

Sana Sekkarie — Sat, 21 Dec 2024 20:27:12 +0000

On December 8, Syria’s opposition forces captured the capital city of Damascus from Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who had ruled the country with an iron fist for decades. The gains were led on the ground by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a group sanctioned by the United States and formerly associated with an offshoot of al-Qaeda, but which has increasingly moderated its stance. The fall of Assad is not only a military victory for the rebels, but a moment of hope for Syrians who have lived under his authoritarian rule for decades. As Syrians take this time to celebrate and topple the statues and billboards of the Assad family that have haunted them for decades, what comes next for Syrians is an open question.

At this moment, HTS is eager to build goodwill inside Syria and internationally. The United States should act swiftly and strategically to help ensure the country’s transition toward a more stable and democratic system. The United States can leverage its diplomatic, economic, and political tools to influence the post-Assad landscape in Syria. Here are several critical steps the United States should consider.

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1. Provide diplomatic recognition to the new government

The political situation in Syria is fluid, and the future government will likely be a coalition of opposition groups, civil society organizations, and representatives from various ethnic and sectarian groups, including HTS. One of the most significant actions that Washington could take is to provide early diplomatic recognition to this emerging government—contingent on commitments to a peaceful transition, democratic reforms, and the protection of human rights. Recognition may be contingent upon specific steps, including:

Formation of a transitional government: This government should be representative of Syria’s diverse political and ethnic groups, and include women, youth, political structures currently in exile, and opposition military factions.
Commitment to a democratic process: The interim government should agree to hold free and fair elections with international oversight and establish a justice and accountability mechanism to address past atrocities.
Constitutional reform: A new, inclusive constitution should be developed with input from all Syrian stakeholders to lay the foundation for a democratic governance system.
International oversight: The United Nations should be allowed to oversee the transition, including monitoring justice and accountability processes and ensuring the dismantling of Syria’s chemical weapons program. Encouragingly, HTS has indicated its readiness to cooperate with the international community to monitor Assad regime military sites.

2. Provide humanitarian aid and reconstruction assistance

Syria faces an enormous humanitarian crisis. Millions of Syrians are displaced, and much of the country’s infrastructure is in ruins. The United States should work with international organizations to ensure that aid is distributed effectively. Given the opposition’s experience in governance, existing structures on the ground can be leveraged to channel aid, minimizing the risks that would come from trying to create entirely new systems from scratch. However, this aid should be conditional on:

Political inclusivity: The transitional government must equitably provide aid to all regions of Syria.
Anti-corruption measures: Donors must insist on transparency and accountability mechanisms to prevent misuse of funds.

3. Begin the process of removing sanctions on HTS and the new Syrian government

HTS is currently designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). The group’s evolving stances, including its recent public commitments to protect religious minorities and refrain from retributive violence, suggests that HTS may be open to political accommodation. The United States should initiate a gradual, good-faith process for removing sanctions and designations on HTS and the new Syrian government. Additionally, the United States has designated the government of Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism since the 1970s and has since added additional sanctions beginning in 2011 in response to the Assad regime’s exercise of violence and repression. This process could include:

Phased sanctions relief on HTS: The United States should start by removing sanctions on individuals who demonstrate a willingness to engage in a political transition, particularly HTS leaders. Over time, as HTS shows concrete steps toward reconciliation, further sanctions can be lifted.
Quick sanctions relief on Syria: Removing broader sanctions on Syria can be done swiftly, as the new Syrian government will likely be hostile to US-designated terror groups like Lebanese Hezbollah or Iraq’s Asaib Ahl al-Haq, which were instrumental in bolstering the previous Syrian regime. As for the second batch of sanctions on Syria related to the regime’s exercise of violence on civilians, if HTS follows through on its promises to refrain from retributive violence against civilians, the United States should lift this second set of sanctions as well.
Diplomatic engagement: Engaging with HTS and other opposition groups is critical. Past US policy on similar groups, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), shows that delisting a group from the FTO list is possible if the organization demonstrates a genuine commitment to peace.

4. Cooperation on counter-terror measures

HTS has a law enforcement body that has since 2017 conducted dozens of operations against Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) cells operating in northwestern Syria, including arresting many members of its leadership. HTS has also arrested members of the al-Qaeda branch in Syria, Hurras al-Din, largely dismantling the organization. HTS will have an interest in preventing more extremist actors from trying to reform in Syria as the rest of the state rebuilds. The United States may thus find HTS willing to cooperate on counterterror measures.

Intelligence sharing: Intelligence sharing on counterterrorism measures can build good faith on both sides and prevent extremist groups from proliferating.

5. Encourage SDF participation in the political process

Syria’s Kurdish population, particularly those in the northeast, will play a crucial role in the country’s future. The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have been key allies in the fight against ISIS, but tensions with other opposition groups remain. The United States should encourage dialogue between the SDF and HTS, as well as other opposition factions. This dialogue could include:

Inclusion of Kurdish leaders in the political process: A future Syria should represent the interests of all Syrians, including Kurds, Arabs, and other minorities. The United States can mediate discussions between the SDF and HTS to ensure Kurdish representation in the future government.

Seizing the moment

Failure for the United States to engage with Syria’s new leadership can lead to several negative outcomes. HTS could radicalize further if it does not have international checks or relies on other actors for diplomacy, trade, and support. Russia and Iran could fill the vacuum and partner with the new Syrian government to sideline the United States in the region. A new Syrian government without international support could fall into chaos and sow instability, leading to further mass displacement throughout the rest of the region. The United States must seize this moment to help influence the future of Syria, rather than waiting to see what happens. No potential path forward for Syria or HTS is inevitable. The sooner the United States takes concrete action, the more likely it can positively impact Syria’s future.

HTS leader Ahmed al-Shara, formerly known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, entered the political scene in Syria over ten years ago. He has long been mindful of the lessons learned from the failures of al-Qaeda to win the support of the Iraqi people. HTS was formed by military officials who wanted to work within the contexts of the societies they lived in. HTS has continuously moderated since its inception and break from Jabhat al-Nusra—al-Qaeda’s Syria branch—in 2017. Of course, part of its strategy may be for optics, but much of the group’s rhetoric about moderation has taken the form of concrete actions. HTS has a Directorate of Minority Affairs that has guaranteed the safety of Christians and Alawites under its control. HTS has ordered its fighters not to disturb public institutions. And the larger and more diverse the population that comes under its governance, the more HTS will need to evolve and the less power it will have to determine what governance looks like on the ground.

It is important not to overstate the current moderation of HTS. The group is not a bastion of liberal democracy, and its political evolution is still ongoing. However, HTS is actively seeking diplomatic recognition and has expressed a willingness to engage with the international community. The United States should not expect perfection but should recognize that political entities are capable of evolving, especially when faced with the realities of governance and international expectations. Shara has already reached out to regional countries, including Lebanon, Iraq, and Russia, reassuring them that he intends to have good relations despite past support their past support for Assad. If HTS proves genuinely open to dialogue and reform, the United States should pursue engagement rather than exclusion.

As long as HTS is willing to evolve and accept constructive criticism, the United States should engage with the group. Ignoring Syria’s new leaders will not make them go away. US outreach to HTS is not just engagement for the sake of engagement. A post-Assad Syria, especially one with leaders willing to engage with Washington, presents an opportunity for the United States to promote stability and democracy in the Middle East, curb Iranian and Russian influence in the region, and provide a safe and secure home for Syrians both inside and outside Syria.

Sana Sekkarie is a digital threat analyst focusing on the Middle East. She was previously a researcher focused on Syrian opposition groups at the Institue for the Study of War and the University of Virginia.

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Latin America and the Caribbean in 2025: Ten predictions to shape the year ahead

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center — Fri, 20 Dec 2024 15:00:00 +0000

2025 could redefine Latin America and the Caribbean’s political and economic future.

2024 was a transformative year for Latin America and the Caribbean. Elections brought some surprises, but the region also bucked the global trend as continuity was the theme in the Dominican Republic and Mexico, where Claudia Sheinbaum made history as its first female president. Further south, Brazil played a pivotal role as the host of the Group of Twenty and Peru welcomed the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit, asserting Latin America’s leadership on the global stage.

Meanwhile, the region faced enduring challenges—from Nicolas Maduro’s ignoring electoral results in Venezuela to the growing influence of transnational criminal organizations. The region remains trapped in a low-growth economic environment with considerable strains on fiscal revenue, while a strong hurricane season reinforced the importance of building greater resilience across the Caribbean. China’s influence surged, with increased, notable new investments and Colombia’s decision to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

What might be in store for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2025?

How might the incoming Trump administration engage with the region? Can economies across the hemisphere grow beyond current predictions? How will leaders address security challenges? Might new tech hubs emerge?

Take the quiz and see if you agree with our predictions for 2025!

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What will minority and women’s rights look like in the new Syria?

Sinan Hatahet — Fri, 20 Dec 2024 14:33:22 +0000

The fall of the Assad regime marked a seismic shift in Syria’s governance dynamics. The new administration, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), is navigating a delicate balance between its ideological origins and the practical necessity of governance. One of the immediate challenges it faces is addressing the rights and concerns of Syria’s minorities and women. I witnessed this balancing act play out firsthand while in Damascus in the frenetic days following dictator Bashar al-Assad’s ouster. How the new transitional government responds to these challenges will be crucial for consolidating its internal legitimacy, managing societal cohesion, and engaging with the broader international community.

For minorities, between reassurance and skepticism

From the outset, the new authorities demonstrated a conscious effort to signal a departure from the divisive practices of their predecessors. In Aleppo, HTS contacted prominent Christian leaders and clergy across various denominations to repair strained relations and foster a sense of security. These meetings were not superficial; they included discussions on tangible grievances, such as the injustices faced by Christians in Jisr al-Shughur a year prior. Some of these grievances have since been addressed mainly through accountability and restoring properties to their rightful owners, an unprecedented move that underscores the leadership’s understanding of the need for inclusivity, albeit carefully managed.

Similar gestures were made towards the Druze community in Idlib Governate’s Jabal al-Summaq area, where HTS leadership engaged with representatives to rebuild trust and ensure that their communities were not targeted. Additionally, on December 17, leaders held dialogues with prominent figures from the Druze community in Suwayda and Jabal al-Arab, sending assurances of safety and future inclusion. For the Ismailis of Salamiyah, the transition of power was remarkably smooth, as the town surrendered without violence. This cooperative handover reflects longstanding tensions between the Ismaili community and the Assad regime, which had marginalized them over the years.

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However, the situation remains more nuanced with the Alawite community. The new government refrained from delivering targeted reassurances to the Alawites, instead embedding its messages of justice and reconciliation within broader declarations. The new authorities emphasized that no one would face retribution without due process and clear evidence of wrongdoing. The deployment of rebel forces in Latakia and its surrounding mountains occurred without notable violence, with explicit orders to safeguard public property and prevent retaliatory attacks. Such actions suggest an effort to mitigate fears of collective punishment among Alawites—a community burdened with its historical association with the Assad regime.

Still, there are lingering anxieties within minority communities. The Alawites, in particular, remain wary of the new leaders’ promises, balancing a cautious optimism with deep-seated concerns about potential reprisals. In response, some within the community have distanced themselves publicly from Assad, framing the current transition as an opportunity for a fresh start and a shared national future. Whether the new authorities can translate these gestures into meaningful inclusion will depend on their willingness to integrate minority representatives into future governance structures and decision-making processes.

For women, between pragmatism and policy gaps

The evolving role of women in Syria is shaped by societal necessity and practical realities. Syria’s protracted conflict has led to significant demographic shifts: countless men have been killed, displaced, or forced into exile due to military conscription, economic hardship, or combat involvement. As a result, women now bear much responsibility for sustaining households, working in various sectors, and managing day-to-day economic activities.

In urban centers and rural areas alike, women have maintained an active presence in the public sphere. Notably, no widespread attempts have been made to impose restrictive dress codes or curtail women’s mobility, in stark contrast to the fears many harbored when HTS first rose to prominence. Women freely participated in public celebrations across towns and villages, underscoring the relative ease with which they navigated public spaces under the new leadership.

However, women need to achieve meaningful political inclusion. While women are visible in mid-level administrative roles in the transitional government, there has yet to be any effort to appoint them to senior leadership positions or ministries. This mirrors a broader trend in conservative governance structures where women’s participation is often limited to symbolic roles. The new government’s failure to include women in decision-making risks alienating a critical population segment and undermining its claims of inclusivity.

Moving forward, the new leadership must recognize that empowering women is not merely a concession to international pressure but a practical necessity for rebuilding Syria. Women’s inclusion in governance, education, and economic development will be critical for addressing Syria’s demographic and financial challenges. The government can indicate its commitment to inclusivity with concrete steps, such as appointing women to leadership roles, supporting women-led initiatives, and ensuring equal access to education and employment.

Drafting a constitution

Despite the positive gestures made toward minorities and women, Syria’s new government under HTS leader Ahmed al-Shara faces structural and institutional challenges that threaten to undermine these early gains. Effective governance is not simply a matter of security or symbolic inclusivity; it requires building functioning institutions that deliver services, mediate disputes, and foster participation from all segments of society.

The need to integrate the experiences and expertise of Syria’s technocratic and bureaucratic workforce is at the heart of this challenge. The structure of Syria’s public administration going back decades included representation from various sects and backgrounds and significant contributions from women. Often overlooked in political narratives, this workforce remains vital to the country’s reconstruction and future success. The new government’s ability to retain and mobilize these experienced individuals within its evolving institutions will determine the effectiveness of its governance.

However, there are signs of tension between ideological considerations and practical governance. While Shara has shown a degree of pragmatism, particularly in dealing with local communities, the transitional government’s structures remain centralized and hierarchical, with power concentrated in a small leadership circle. This limits opportunities for inclusive decision-making and reinforces perceptions of exclusion among minorities and women.

To foster genuine participation, the new government must decentralize aspects of its governance, empower local councils, and integrate representatives from underrepresented groups. Decentralization has been a demand in many post-conflict contexts, allowing communities to manage their affairs while preserving national cohesion. In Syria, where local dynamics vary significantly across regions, such an approach would not only address the concerns of minorities and women but also strengthen the new authorities’ legitimacy.

The drafting of a new constitution presents both an opportunity and a challenge. On one hand, it offers a chance to codify the principles of inclusivity, justice, and representation essential for Syria’s long-term stability. On the other hand, the process is fraught with risks, particularly in a polarized environment where trust remains fragile. Minority communities and women must sit at the table during this process, ensuring their voices are heard and their rights are protected.

A constitution that explicitly guarantees the rights of minorities and women will strengthen the new government’s domestic legitimacy and address longstanding grievances that have fueled instability. It will provide a legal foundation for Syria’s governance, creating a framework that transcends political factions and ensures continuity in protecting vulnerable communities.

The test ahead

Syria is at a crossroads. The departure of the Assad regime has created a unique opportunity to redefine the relationship between the state and its people. The actions taken by Shara thus far—reaching out to minorities, refraining from imposing restrictive norms on women, and prioritizing internal legitimacy—reflect a pragmatic shift in HTS’s governance approach. However, these actions remain tentative and incomplete.

The true test lies in the new authorities’ ability to institutionalize these early gestures through concrete policies and legal frameworks. A new constitution that guarantees the rights of minorities and women will serve as a foundation for Syria’s future, ensuring that these rights are not contingent on political or ideological changes. Similarly, meaningful political inclusion—by appointing women and minority representatives to leadership roles—will signal a genuine commitment to shared governance.

For the Syrian people, the stakes are clear. After years of conflict and division, there is an opportunity to build a more inclusive and just future that reflects the resilience, diversity, and aspirations of all Syrians. The leaders of the new government face a critical choice: they can either embrace this opportunity and chart a path toward stability and legitimacy or retreat into exclusionary practices that risk perpetuating the very divisions they seek to overcome.

Sinan Hatahet is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the vice president for investment and social impact at the Syrian Forum.

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What the fall of the Assad regime really means for China

Jonathan Fulton — Wed, 18 Dec 2024 21:57:25 +0000

If you’ve been closely following China in the Middle East over the past decade, you haven’t had to think too much about Syria. There has been little in meaningful engagement between the two countries, despite recent pronouncements that the fall of former Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad’s regime represents the loss of an important partner for Beijing. The reality is that the dramatic events in Syria reshape the strategic environment for China, but at the bilateral level, little is likely to change.

The most obvious reason to assume that Syria was important to Beijing was China’s use of its United Nations Security Council (UNSC) veto at key points in Syria’s civil war to prop up the Assad regime. China vetoed UNSC resolutions relating to the Syrian civil war eight times, which is especially notable since Beijing has only ever used its veto sixteen times. That fully half of its vetoes were used to prevent efforts to oust Assad lends credibility to the idea that his government must have mattered to China.

In this case, China’s support for the Assad regime was likely more about perceived threats than any affinity for the Assad family. When the Arab Spring began, China was facing a great deal of domestic unrest. The situations in Tibet and Xinjiang were untenable for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and there was massive pushback against corruption, with an average of five hundred “mass incidents” (CCP-speak for protests) per day in 2010. Revolutions in the Arab world heightened a sense of vulnerability among CCP leadership.

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Syria’s civil war further complicated Beijing’s response to the Arab Spring. Thousands of Uyghurs, a Turkic-speaking Muslim minority from western China—mostly from Xinjiang—traveled to Syria to fight alongside al-Qaeda against the Syrian government. For the CCP, the prospect of rebels fighting in Syria and then returning home was especially troublesome. One Uyghur combatant quoted in an AP news article in 2017 reportedly said, “We didn’t care how the fighting went or who Assad was. We just wanted to learn how to use the weapons and then go back to China.” A defeated Syrian government, therefore, had serious potential repercussions for Beijing.

Another reason that Assad’s survival seemed important to China was a recent increase in China-Syria bilateral engagement. In January 2022, Assad announced that Syria had joined the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This seemed like a natural fit; the BRI is associated with infrastructure contracting and Syria had a dire need for infrastructure after a decade of war. However, the assumption that Chinese institutions were willing to finance unprofitable projects in high-risk environments has not reflected the reality since 2017, the high point of BRI lending. In fact, China had not made any major contracts or investments in Syria since 2010. Even more telling is the miniscule level of trade between the two countries. The peak of China-Syria trade over the past fifteen years was in 2011, when it was valued at approximately two billion dollars. In 2022, it was a mere $541 million. Chinese companies have no shortage of attractive markets in the Middle East, and Syria hasn’t been one of them for a long time.

That said, Assad did visit China in September 2023 to attend the Asian Games, during which he signed a China-Syria strategic partnership agreement. But a strategic partnership is far from an alliance—it is a mechanism that Beijing uses to focus on areas of mutual interest and comes with no commitments other than to cooperate on issues where it is convenient.

To put this in context, sixteen of the Arab League’s twenty-two member states have strategic partnerships with China. The only member countries that do not are Comoros, Lebanon, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. Since Syria signed its agreement with Beijing last year, Tunisia and Libya have also been designated as strategic partners and Bahrain has become a comprehensive strategic partner with China. But there is little in the way of strategic engagement with any of these recent partnerships, which makes it look like Beijing is simply ticking diplomatic boxes at this point, in an effort to show it has deep ties with everyone in the Middle East and North Africa region. All of which is to say that Syria’s strategic partnership was not especially meaningful, and little had been done to enhance the bilateral relationship since it was announced.

Thus, China-Syria ties were less important than they appeared from the headlines. But the collapse of Assad’s regime is nevertheless troubling for Beijing because of what it says about Russia and Iran, two of China’s much more important partners. That neither Moscow nor Tehran was able to prop up Assad any longer demonstrates their diminished power. Leaders in Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran have been cooperating bilaterally, trilaterally, and multilaterally through BRICS+ and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, all with the goal of advancing a multipolar international order. Neither Russia nor Iran look like poles of power or influence right now, and Chinese leaders have to be worried about both countries’ strength and durability.

As for China’s overall presence in the Middle East, not much will change in the near term. As I have argued before, China is primarily an economic actor in the Middle East and its relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Egypt are the load-bearing pillars of its regional policy. This will not be seriously affected by events in Syria.

Will China’s support for Assad subject Beijing to blowback from Syria’s new leaders? Syrians who saw photos of a smiling Assad with Chinese leader Xi Jinping no doubt resent that China long legitimized his brutal oppression and repeatedly used its UNSC veto in support of his government. At the same time, China is not at the top of the list of the most hated external actors among Syrians; Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah have that distinction. The incoming Syrian government might look at China the same way the Taliban did: as a possibly useful but not especially trustworthy country. If Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has difficulty building relations with the United States and Europe, then Syria’s new leaders may be willing to overlook China’s ties to the old regime as it looks for international partners.

In short, the end of the Assad era makes the Middle East far more complicated for Beijing, but it does not undermine China’s regional presence or threaten its most important regional relationships.

Jonathan Fulton is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an associate professor of political science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.

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The fall of the Assad regime is just the beginning of Syria’s quest for stability

Amir Asmar — Wed, 18 Dec 2024 21:11:53 +0000

After the sudden exit of ousted Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad, the only certainty is that both the former Islamist opposition, led by al-Qaeda offshoot Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and the Syrian people face a monumental transition. This is not so much the beginning of the end of the bloody civil war. Rather, it is the end of the beginning of the conflict, as Syria—freed from Assad—attempts to find its way despite significant social and religious divisions and the presence of many armed groups.

After gaining its independence from restrictive and authoritarian French rule, Syria suffered through a series of short-lived and unstable regimes, endured more than fifty years of brutal Assad family rule, and finally devolved into civil war. Syria is divided by competing ethnic and sectarian communities, creating barriers to the coalition building that could foster greater stability outside authoritarian rule. If, however, an Islamist coalition led by HTS can consolidate power in this environment, it would represent a massive transformation in a nation that has long been cursed with instability and portend significant implications for the region.

Broken promises and a divided nation

The Syrian Arab Republic, as it exists today, is largely based on territorial boundaries established during the French mandate, which lasted from 1920 to 1946. The British and French—anticipating an Ottoman defeat in World War I and eager to absorb the spoils into their respective colonial empires—divided Syria between them: a French northern Syria and a British southern Syria, breaking wartime promises to the Arabs to promote their independence if they revolted against Ottoman rule during the war. France further subdivided its area, managing Lebanon—with much of northern Syria’s Mediterranean coastline—as a separate mandate and ceding another portion of the coast around the city of Iskenderun to the newly independent Republic of Turkey.

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The borders drawn by the European powers before and during the Syria mandate not only divided ethnic and sectarian communities but also institutionalized and exacerbated existing divisions. The Sunni majority, which makes up more than two-thirds of the state’s population, was composed of multiple ethnicities including Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, and others. A third of the country’s population was composed of Christians, Shia, and Alawi Muslims, as well as smaller Druze and Jewish communities, among others.

Further, the Arab centers of culture, learning, and nationalist ferment—cities such as Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad—all ended up in different countries. The artificial boundaries ignored historical, cultural, and social ties, setting the stage for many of the conflicts and identity struggles that have continued to shape the region in the present era.

France did little to build the state institutions necessary for the constricted Syrian republic to manage its affairs after gaining independence in 1946. The new state went on to have twenty-one governments in the following twenty-four years, when Hafez al-Assad assumed power in an intra-regime coup in 1970.

Decades of suppression

Although Hafez introduced a level of stability previously unknown in Syria, he established one of the most authoritarian states in the region. His minority regime—dominated by the schismatic Alawi sect of Islam—severely circumscribed the role of Sunni Muslims, which comprised most of Syria’s population, in politics and the security services. A 1982 challenge by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was met with brutal crackdowns, which resulted in an estimated tens of thousands killed and forced the organization into exile.

The elder Assad’s suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood set the script for his son Bashar al-Assad’s later effort to quash the demonstrations that began the 2011 Syrian uprising: declaring all opposition elements to be Islamic extremists and mobilizing state security resources to destroy them. Although radical Islamists, including al-Qaeda elements and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) would ultimately conduct their own struggles against the regime, the initial popular uprising was not ideological, and it was Assad’s overreaction that turned it into a civil conflict that would engulf the entire country.

It was Hafez’s effort to protect the Alawis from a vengeful communal reorganization after his death that led him to install his son in the presidency. Notably, Bashar was not Hafez’s first choice for succession. Years of preparing his oldest son Basil came to naught when he was killed in a car accident, putting the ophthalmologist Bashar in line to assume the presidency upon Hafez’s death in 2000. Despite talk of political and economic liberalization, the younger Assad’s regime was ruthless and kleptocratic. It was that ruthlessness that would ultimately lead to demonstrations, civil war, and the regime’s undoing. The Assad government’s brutal crackdown against children who had painted anti-regime graffiti in 2011 in the southern city of Daraa, who were subjected to torture and abuse, was one of the incidents of oppression that sparked the almost fourteen-year civil war that would ultimately result in Assad’s ouster.

Russia, Iran, and the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah had fought on behalf of the regime earlier in the war. But when HTS launched its offensive in November, each of these allies couldn’t respond fast enough, as they had all been weakened by other conflicts and had fewer resources to dedicate to the Assad regime. Bashar and his family are now living in asylum in Russia, as Moscow negotiates with HTS to retain its military bases in Syria.

International implications

Whether the Islamist coalition led by HTS can consolidate power over the country has significant regional implications. If it does, Tehran will have lost a stalwart ally and a link in its land bridge to Lebanon’s Shia community. The elder Assad, contemptuous of former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, had gone so far as to support Iran in the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq war, and Syria could always be relied upon to support Iranian regional policies. With a Syrian government no longer friendly toward Iran, Tehran’s ability to support Hezbollah would become far more complicated.

Israel, which has attacked Syria for being a conduit of Iranian support to Hezbollah in Lebanon, may find that radical Sunni Islamists are just as dangerous and just as committed to Israel’s destruction as Hezbollah’s Shia. Both Israel’s respective borders with Lebanon and Syria are each approximately fifty miles long, but there is no United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution, however poorly executed, mandating a buffer zone along the border area in Syria as UN Security Council Resolution 1701 does in Lebanon. Finally, it is worth remembering that only the United States recognizes Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, which is internationally recognized as Syrian territory captured in the Arab-Israeli war in 1967. In fact, UN Security Council Resolution 497 explicitly states that Israel’s “decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction, and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights is null and void and without international legal effect.”

Turkey, under the regime of the Islamist Justice and Development Party of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, known to have close ties to global Islamist establishments, would presumably benefit from a relationship with the new regime, as it has long supported elements of the Syrian opposition and demonstrated long-standing disquiet about Assad remaining in power. Ankara will seek to remain involved in Syria to repatriate the millions of Syrian refugees it currently hosts and to combat the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), an organization it considers a dangerous terrorist group because of its links to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is designated as a terrorist organization by both Turkey and the United States.

The United States’ principal Arab partners—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—have all taken hostile stands against Islamists since the Arab Spring uprisings of 2010-11, and the new Syrian regime may struggle to gain acceptance or support from other Arab states. Qatar, however, has often been accused of supporting Islamist groups considered beyond the pale by its Arab neighbors, and Doha may see an opportunity to make its mark on the region by buttressing the new HTS-led regime.

Minority rights

While it would be inaccurate to assert that the Syrian Arab Republic, as carved by European colonial powers, never had a chance at stability, both European rulers and Syrian leaders share great responsibility for the mess in which the country finds itself. Neither contributed to the evolution of functioning institutions that are essential for stability. Without a new national identity in the constricted Syrian republic, ineffectual Sunni Arab-dominated governments and communal tensions combined to promote instability and, ultimately, a strongman dictatorship in the form of Alawi minority rule.

Now, in the aftermath of Assad’s ouster, both internal divisions among Syrians and external interests in shaping the country’s future threaten to render the current moment a lull in the civil war rather than its conclusion. Although the emerging HTS-dominated government has yet to consolidate its authority, it would be highly unexpected if—as a Sunni Islamist government—it were to guarantee the civil rights of Twelver Shias, Alawis, Druze, and other groups generally considered schismatic and which are often discriminated against among Sunni-majority communities.

There are many flavors of Islamists in Syria, both within and outside the HTS coalition, including pockets of ISIS. Elements of the Syrian military may yet reinvent themselves into an insurgency, as happened next door in Iraq after the fall of Hussein’s Baathist regime in 2003. Minorities, particularly Alawis, may elect to fight to protect their future from perceived Sunni animus. Syrian Kurds, long disenfranchised by the outgoing regime, are armed and have demonstrated resilience against other armed groups.

Finally, although the United States is mostly steering clear of direct involvement in Syria’s transition, Russia, Iran, and Turkey all have major interests in attempting to shape the country’s trajectory in their favor.

Given Syria’s long history of sectarian divisions, the presence of multiple armed factions in the country, and external powers’ competing interests in shaping the aftermath of the Assad regime’s downfall, the swift triumph of HTS and its allies may prove to be merely the end of a phase of the Syrian civil war rather than the end of the conflict.

Amir Asmar is an adjunct professor of Middle East issues at the National Intelligence University. He was previously a senior executive and Middle East and terrorism analyst in the US Department of Defense.

The views expressed are the author’s and do not imply endorsement from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or any other US Government agency.

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Even in authoritarian countries, democracy advocates are worth investing in

Fernanda Buril, Nate Grubman, and Patrick Quirk — Wed, 11 Dec 2024 14:35:44 +0000

Freedom and democracy are in decline globally, according to the Atlantic Council’s Freedom Index. Political freedom in particular has slumped sharply since 2019, bringing the world to a twenty-four-year low. The biggest backsliders—the places with the sharpest declines in political freedom—span every major geographic region and many are particularly relevant to US national security.

There are several fundamental reasons for the United States to support strategies that aim to halt such backsliding and foster democratization, including ones that go beyond the moral obligation to support humanitarian values. For instance, research shows that democracies are less prone to enable and export transnational crime or terrorism, and democracies are better at adapting to adverse economic events and avoiding large-scale disasters, and are more reliable trading partners, offering better business opportunities by upholding the rule of law and protecting investments from the arbitrary predation of political elites. Most notably, the vast majority of people around the world continue to prefer to be governed democratically.

Democracy support also strengthens the US position more broadly in the strategic contest against the autocratic rivals of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Robust democratic institutions—transparent judiciaries, capable legislatures, responsive political parties, an active civil society, and a free press—make it harder for the rulers in the autocratic bloc to co-opt elites in other countries and advance their malign agendas.

But with the world experiencing a global democratic recession, questions arise as to whether supporting democracy is a losing battle. Despite the bleak recent data on global democratic progress, democracy assistance is still crucial, not only in countries undergoing political openings and democratic consolidation but also—and perhaps even more so—in countries that are backsliding.

Case studies in the Middle East, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and sub-Saharan Africa suggest that using foreign assistance (in addition to and in concert with diplomacy and investment) to support democracy champions wherever they are is an effective strategy, even if the payoff is not immediately apparent at the level of a country’s political system.

Russian victory in Ukraine would spark a new era of global insecurity

Victor Liakh — Tue, 10 Dec 2024 21:49:34 +0000

The election of Donald Trump has set the stage for what many expect to be a push for some kind of peace deal between Russia and Ukraine in the coming months. The outcome of these efforts is likely to redefine the entire global security framework and determine whether the rules-based order established since World War II is replaced by a new era of international instability.

In the eighty years since the defeat of Nazi Germany, the United States has emerged as the key architect of global stability. The decades of unprecedented economic growth and relative peace that followed the Cold War allowed nations to enjoy a period of relative security and prosperity under the umbrella of international law. However, it is now clear that this tranquility lulled some democracies into neglecting their defense commitments, which helped convince autocracies like Putin’s Russia that the time was right to contest the existing order.

Ukraine now finds itself on the front lines of a clash between the democratic and authoritarian worlds. Since the collapse of the USSR, the former captive nations of the Soviet Union have struggled to emerge from centuries of Russian imperial rule. Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia have succeeded in integrating into Western economic and security alliances. Others such as Belarus have returned to the Kremlin orbit. Ukraine’s journey has been the most challenging of all.

Since 1991, Ukraine has slowly but steadily moved away from the totalitarian past and set out on a pathway toward a democratic European future. However, these efforts have been hampered by Russia’s determination to reassert its control over the country. Since the early years of the post-Soviet era, it has become apparent that Moscow views the emergence of a genuinely independent and democratic Ukraine as an existential threat to its own authoritarian model and a potential catalyst for the next chapter in Russia’s retreat from empire.

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Ukraine’s resilience in the face of Russia’s initial invasion in 2014 and the full-scale attack of 2022 demonstrates the success of the country’s nation-building efforts and the strength of Ukrainian civil society. Despite the immense pressures of war, today’s Ukraine remains committed to democratic values and Euro-Atlantic integration. This helps to explain why Putin regards continued Ukrainian independence as so dangerous.

Moscow’s ambitions are no secret. The Kremlin views its war against Ukraine as both a crucial step toward rebuilding the Russian Empire and as a tool in the broader struggle to transform the geopolitical landscape. Putin is determined to erase Ukrainian statehood while simultaneously eroding the very foundations of international law and global security.

In Putin’s worldview, today’s rules-based order is merely a construct that serves US interests rather than a framework for mutually beneficial global cooperation. He is now building a coalition of like-minded autocrats who share his ambition of establishing a new world order defined by spheres of interest and power projection, where the world’s largest nations are free to dominate their smaller neighbors.

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The first cracks in the current rules-based order began to emerge in 2014 with the Russian invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. This provoked an underwhelming response from the international community, which was interpreted by Moscow as an invitation to go further. More recently, the chaotic 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan was seen as further proof that the United States was a declining power. This helped convince Putin to proceed with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Continued Western weakness in the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion has made Putin even more ambitious and has encouraged his authoritarian allies. Moscow has expanded its presence in Africa and the Middle East, while strengthening cooperation with the likes of China, Iran, and North Korea. This axis of autocrats is playing an increasingly important role in Russia’s war effort. In recent weeks, the first contingent of approximately ten thousand North Korean soldiers joined the Russian invasion of Ukraine. They are unlikely to be the last.

It should now be abundantly clear that a Russian victory in Ukraine, no matter how limited, would embolden autocracies worldwide. This would ignite a chain reaction and accelerate the unraveling of global security. Moreover, abandoning Ukraine would send a chilling message to all US allies. This would pave the way for a far more dangerous world where aggression is met with silence and order gives way to chaos.

It is not too late to prevent this descent into geopolitical lawlessness. A resolute Western stance on ending the Russian invasion of Ukraine can still secure “peace through strength” and send a powerful message that international aggression will not be tolerated. However, failure to do so will undermine global security and prosperity for years to come.

Victor Liakh is the CEO of the East Europe Foundation. From 2005 to 2008, he was executive director of the Child Well-Being Fund Ukraine. Previously, he worked at the Ukrainian State Center for Social Services for Youth (1996–2001) and for UNICEF (2000–2001).

Protests erupted as soon as the decision to freeze EU talks was announced, with large numbers of people flocking to the center of the Georgian capital to defend against what many see as an attack on their country’s democratic system and European future. The authorities have reacted by ordering a hard line response that has included the use of water cannons and tear gas against protesters along with the arrest of prominent opposition figures and multiple incidents of heavy-handed policing. Security forces are accused of deliberately targeting journalists and attacking protesters seeking to record evidence of excesses.

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The protests currently taking place across Georgia are the latest episode in an extended period of anti-government unrest that began last year when the ruling Georgian Dream party attempted to pass Russian-style foreign agent legislation targeting civil society. Protests then resumed in the aftermath of the parliamentary election in October. Many in Tbilisi are now comparing current events to the April 1989 protests that were crushed by the Soviet authorities, sparking Georgia’s independence movement. There have also been widespread comparisons with Ukraine’s two post-Soviet Maidan revolutions in defense of the country’s fledgling democracy and European choice.

Some Georgian government officials are siding with the protesters, with hundreds signing an open letter condemning the suspension of EU accession talks. A number of Georgian ambassadors and senior officials including Deputy Foreign Minister Teimuraz Jandzhalia have resigned in protest. Meanwhile, schools and universities across the country have halted classes amid signs of a growing civil disobedience campaign.

The protests have also attracted considerable international support. In a November 29 statement, US Helsinki Commission leaders expressed solidarity with the Georgian people while condemning the government crackdown and declaring the Georgian authorities “illegitimate.” Other countries have issued similar statements or imposed sanctions measures on Georgian Dream officials linked to violence against protesters.

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The mounting confrontation in Georgia has potentially far-reaching implications for the wider region. Critics of the Georgian Dream authorities accuse the party of seeking to turn their country away from Euro-Atlantic integration and return Georgia to the Russian sphere of influence. They argue that Georgia is a key battleground in the struggle between the democratic world and the emerging axis of authoritarian nations led by Russia and China.

If Moscow is able to return Georgia to the Kremlin orbit, this could have grave consequences for neighboring Armenia, which has sought to deepen ties with the West amid disillusionment over Russia’s failure to support the country during its recent war with Azerbaijan. It would also send a powerful message to other countries looking to turn away from Moscow at a time when Russia is waging the largest European war since World War II in Ukraine over Kyiv’s European aspirations.

The Georgian Dream authorities reject accusations that they are steering the country away from Europe and back toward Moscow. During the recent parliamentary election campaign, they focused on messages of peace and stability while claiming to being shielding Georgia from Ukraine’s fate. However, the sheer scale of the current protests suggests that a large percentage of Georgians reject the idea of securing peace at the expense of their most basic human rights and democratic freedoms.

With the opposition movement gaining momentum, much may now depend on the role of the international community. Protest leaders will be hoping that the US, EU, and other Western countries impose tougher sanctions on Georgian Dream officials while increasing their support for Georgia’s independent media and civil society. As they mull their response to events in Georgia, Western officials will be well aware of the high stakes involved. The outcome of the protests will likely define Georgia’s future and shape the geopolitical climate in the southern Caucasus and beyond for years to come.

Ana Lejava is a policy associate at the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security.

Nikoladze interviewed by Global News Canada on protests in Georgia amid EU bid

irosales — Sat, 30 Nov 2024 18:44:15 +0000

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Putin’s Ukraine obsession began 20 years ago with the Orange Revolution

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 26 Nov 2024 22:36:41 +0000

This month marks the twentieth anniversary of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. When protests over a rigged presidential election first erupted in downtown Kyiv on November 22, 2004, few observers could have imagined that they were witnessing the opening act in a geopolitical drama that would eventually lead to the largest European conflict since World War II. And yet there can be little doubt that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s desire to crush Ukraine first began to take shape two decades ago as he watched the Ukrainian people defy their own authoritarian rulers and demand a democratic future.

For the past twenty years, there has been a tendency to view the Orange Revolution primarily as a political failure. This assessment is easy enough to understand. After all, while the revolution overturned a fraudulent presidential vote and brought reformist candidate Viktor Yushchenko to power, it did not lead to the kind of political transformation that the millions of Ukrainians who participated in the protest movement hoped for. Instead, Yushchenko spent much of his presidency squabbling with colleagues and compromising with opponents, before eventually losing the 2010 election to Orange Revolution villain Viktor Yanukovych.

While the revolution clearly fell short of its lofty political goals, focusing exclusively on domestic Ukrainian politics is short-sighted. In order to appreciate the true historic significance of the Orange Revolution, it must viewed in a far broader context.

Prior to the revolution, post-Soviet Russia had substantial influence in Ukraine, with Vladimir Putin topping polls as the most popular politician among Ukrainians. At the same time, the two countries were already quite distinct. The centralized power vertical in Russia created the conditions for hard authoritarianism. In contrast, the need to balance competing centers of influence and power in Ukraine gave rise to a softer authoritarianism.

Putin’s heavy-handed promotion of Viktor Yanukovych ahead of the 2004 presidential election, and his subsequent push for a crackdown on protesters during the Orange Revolution, highlighted the growing differences between the two nations. This hastened Ukraine’s trajectory away from Russia, a pattern that continues to this day.

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Putin played a very prominent personal role in the Orange Revolution. Russian television, which was at the time widely watched in Ukraine, relentlessly pushed the candidacy of Viktor Yanukovych during the buildup to Ukraine’s presidential election. On the eve of the vote, Putin made the fateful decision to intervene directly. He traveled to Kyiv in late October 2004, where he was greeted with an impromptu military parade before appearing on national TV to lecture the Ukrainian public at length on the importance of backing his preferred presidential pick.

It soon became clear that Putin had miscalculated disastrously. His open and unapologetic attempt to interfere in Ukraine’s internal affairs was widely interpreted as a grave insult and an indication of his contempt for Ukrainian statehood. This electrified public opinion and helped mobilize millions of previously apolitical Ukrainians.

Weeks later, after a deeply flawed second round of voting, Ukrainians would respond to the attempted theft of their election by flooding into central Kyiv in huge numbers. It is no exaggeration to say that Putin’s act of supreme imperial hubris was one of the key causes of the Orange Revolution.

This pattern has repeated itself throughout the past twenty years, with Putin’s efforts to impose his will on Ukraine consistently backfiring and pushing the two countries further apart. In 2013, he pressured his Ukrainian ally Yanukovych to abandon European integration and return the country to the Kremlin orbit, only for this to provoke a second revolution and the fall of the Yanukoych regime.

Putin then opted for a military solution. He began the invasion of Ukraine in February 2014 with the seizure of Crimea, before sending forces into eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region weeks later. When it became obvious that this limited military intervention had merely succeeded in strengthening Ukraine’s resolve to exit the Russian sphere of influence entirely, Putin began plotting what would become the full-scale invasion of February 2022.

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Since the Orange Revolution, Putin’s quest to reconquer Ukraine has come to define his entire reign. In his single-minded pursuit of this goal, he has demonstrated a willingness to incur huge costs. In addition to the lives of the countless Russian soldiers killed or maimed while fighting in Ukraine, Putin has also sacrificed Russia’s economic prosperity, the country’s international standing, and its ties to the developed world.

The historic shift in Putin’s worldview was already evident soon after the Orange Revolution. Within a few months of Ukraine’s people power uprising, he ordered work to begin on the development of what would become the Kremlin’s flagship RT English-language media platform. This was the first step in a process that has established the Putin regime as the undisputed global leader in the dissemination of anti-Western disinformation.

In spring 2005, the Kremlin also backed a nationwide campaign encouraging Russians to display orange-and-black St. George’s ribbons in honor of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. With images of rebellious Ukrainians sporting orange ribbons still fresh in everyone’s minds, the loyalist symbolism of this counter-gesture was hard to miss. St. George’s ribbons have gone on to establish themselves at the heart of a fanatical victory cult as the Putin regime has sought to justify its own authoritarianism via ever more extravagant forms of WWII reverence. What began life as a reaction to the orange ribbons of Ukraine’s revolution has become the ultimate symbol of the entire Putin era.

Why is Putin so obsessed with Ukraine, and what was it about the country’s Orange Revolution that triggered him so irreversibly? The answers to these questions lie in Putin’s imperialistic understanding of Russian identity and his formative political experiences as a KGB officer in Eastern Europe during the collapse of the Soviet Empire.

Putin was in East Germany in 1989 when the Berlin Wall fell. He watched helplessly as the entire Soviet presence throughout the region crumbled amid a surge in pro-democracy protests. In his own account of this traumatic time, Putin claims that his stunned superiors informed him, “Moscow is silent.” This experience has haunted Putin and left him convinced that Moscow must never be “silent” again, especially when confronted by mass protest movements or attempts to shake off Kremlin control.

Putin is particularly sensitive to modern Ukraine’s national awakening and its embrace of European democracy because he views the country as part of Russia’s imperial heartlands. If a democratic political culture can take root in a place as central to Russia’s national identity as Ukraine, this could prove contagious and serve as a catalyst for similar demands within Russia itself.

Tellingly, Putin first began to indicate his opposition to Ukrainian independence soon after the Orange Revolution. In April 2005, he had recent events in Ukraine very much in mind when he branded the fall of the USSR “the greatest political catastrophe of the twentieth century.” This is apparent from some of the lesser quoted segments of his speech, which also referenced an “epidemic of disintegration” and bemoaned the fate of the “tens of millions of countrymen” who found themselves beyond the borders of Russia in 1991. At the time, Ukraine was home to by far the largest population of ethnic Russians in the former Soviet Union.

Little has changed during the intervening twenty years. Today’s ongoing Russian invasion is a direct result of Putin’s firm conviction that the loss of Ukraine would pose an existential threat to Russia itself. It is therefore delusional to suggest that some kind of limited territorial settlement could end the current war and lead to a sustainable peace. Any attempt to offer concessions will only result in a temporary pause in hostilities before Putin resumes his campaign to extinguish Ukrainian statehood.

Vladimir Putin’s efforts to reassert Russian control over Ukraine date back to the 2004 Orange Revolution and have now escalated from political interference to the bloodiest European war for generations. He sees the destruction of the Ukrainian state as his historic mission and believes the fate of Russia hinges on his success. In such circumstances, talk of compromising with the Kremlin is futile. Instead, peace will only be possible if Putin can be convinced that Ukrainian independence is irreversible.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

President Zourabichvili’s denunciation of the October parliamentary elections as illegitimate has shaken the nation. She has claimed that evidence of Russian interference and systematic election manipulation reveal a ruling party embracing increasingly authoritarian tactics.

Zourabichvili and other opposition figures accuse the governing Georgian Dream party of weaponizing anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian narratives in order to gain political advantage during the election campaign. This included claims that the country’s opposition forces are part of a Western-led “Global War Party” that is allegedly seeking to open a “second front” against Russia.

Critics claim the events of October 26 in Georgia were less an election and more a performance designed to entrench the political status quo in the country. Independent exit polls revealed a decisive majority for Western-leaning opposition parties. Nevertheless, Georgian Dream declared victory.

Reports from international observers and Georgian civil society reveal a troubling reality including widespread evidence of glaring irregularities such as altered voter turnout figures and statistical anomalies. The vote itself featured numerous examples of violence and intimidation.

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Developments in Georgia are geopolitically significant for the surrounding region. Positioned at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, Georgia serves as a critical energy transit hub and a potential model of democratic resilience in a region where autocracies and empires have long vied for dominance.

Since coming to power in 2012, the Georgian Dream party has increasingly aligned with authoritarian regimes. This has included favoring Chinese firms over American companies for projects like the Anaklia deep sea port, and facilitating Russian sanctions evasion.

Allowing Georgia to slip into authoritarian hands would send a dangerous message that democratic values are negotiable. For the US and EU, this is not just about Georgia. At stake is the West’s credibility in the wider region. Georgia aligns with Western foreign policy priorities such as countering the expansion of Chinese, Russian, and Iranian influence in the Black Sea region.

Georgia’s united democratic opposition and civil society have shown they are ready to lead a peaceful transition of power and position Georgia as a dependable Western ally. Achieving this vision, however, demands coordinated action from Washington, Brussels, and London.

First, new elections under international supervision are necessary. Only transparent elections monitored by independent actors can succeed in restoring democratic integrity and advance Georgia’s EU accession prospects.

Second, the West should impose targeted sanctions on Georgian Dream leaders and their enablers for undermining democracy and advancing Russian interests. These sanctions would send a clear message of support for Georgia’s democratic aspirations.

The US could expand current visa bans to include financial restrictions, with Brussels doing likewise. The prompt adoption of pending legislative bills in the US Congress to support the Georgian people would further demonstrate decisive commitment.

Third, Georgia’s civil society, and independent media need greater protection from repression. With a Russian-inspired “foreign agents” law now in place in Georgia, targeted funding and diplomatic support are crucial to ensuring these democratic pillars remain free and accountable.

Coordinated transatlantic pressure is crucial. Decisive action on Georgia can help strengthen a Western ally and stabilize a critical region, while also bolstering democracy at a pivotal moment. Georgia is far from a lost cause, but it will require bold Western leadership to prevent the country’s capture by the Kremlin.

Zviad Adzinbaia is a doctoral fellow at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy specializing in Russian hybrid warfare, disinformation, and Euro-Atlantic security and politics.

Ilva Tare

Welcome to Balkans Debrief. I’m Ilva Tare , a resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Centre. Today we will focus on the growing protests in Serbia over the controversial lithium mining project in the Jadar Valley. While the government promotes this initiative as a game changing boost to the economy, local communities are sounding the alarm on environmental risks and government accountability—heightened by the recent tragic loss of 14 lives at Novi Sad railway station.

Joining me today is professor Ivanka Popovic, one of the founders of the ProGlas movement and also a former rector of the university of Belgrade. Thank you and welcome Ivanka. I hope we will discuss about the roots of this resistance, the government’s ambitions, and what this all means for Serbia’s future.

Ivanka Popović

Thank you, Ilva, it’s pleasure to be here.

Ilva Tare

Thank you so much. And I’ll start with the first question that is around the fact that, what do you think in your view, what has driven such a rare unity among Serbian citizens against this project, the lithium mining, despite their political or social differences?

Ivanka Popović

Well, I think we, what we’re seeing now is the culmination of the system breaking down and not meeting citizens’ expectations. First and foremost, many of the communal services such as the water supply, sewage, landfills, sanitary landfills, they’re all failing in the respect that they’re not functioning.

So something as challenging and high tech as a complex that would include a mine, a processing plant, and then also a landfill, a place where you would leave the residue of the process, is something that has, I have to say, really made people frightened, because people have lost trust in the system, in the various safeguards that exist through the functioning of institutions, independent institutions that would monitor the process.

This would not function for the needs of the people, but for the needs of those who would earn some money off of this project. And this is a real fear, because as I said, we’ve seen very simple projects fail.

For example, I’ll give you one really shocking event. For example, you have simple water supply systems in Serbia that provide running water. More than one third of this water is lost somewhere in the pipe because they have holes. So if we cannot even provide a full transfer of running water, how can we talk at all about some kind of higher technological level?

And the second point that I would like to make, there are some other projects that have already been realized in Serbia that have caused significant pollution and have affected the health of citizens in the eastern part of Serbia.

So when people put two and two together, it doesn’t really matter what your political affiliation is. You are really needing to respond to protect yourself and your family and your future.

Ilva Tare

Professor, I wanted to ask you, how are the citizens and you that are part of the protest and other citizens that have joined this cause, how do you balance the concerns about the environmental damage that you are mentioning with the potential economic benefits, such as jobs and infrastructure investment from this project, the Jadar lithium?

Ivanka Popović

So I would like to make something very clear. I am a chemical engineer and I fully understand how such a processing plant could function. And with all the potential that could exist, and even then there would be some risk. Considering how this country functions, I think it’s a really serious issue that we are facing here.

And my second point that I want to make, this is not a population that is against technological progress. Because for decades, and in former Yugoslavia, this was an area that was really growing very quickly in terms of economic development, industrial growth. But what we see now is the offset of potential gains, which I have to say would not be significant because the multilateral company Rio Tinto is the owner of this complex. And actually the very poor arrangement of how Serbia would be compensated in terms of mining fees is such that there would be significant revenue for Serbia. On the other hand, the potential problems are tremendous. And I will also explain why this is an unusual situation that we have with this potential complex.

First of all, it’s situated in fertile agricultural land that has for centuries been used for these purposes. It is one of, while not a breadbasket, it’s a place where fruit, vegetables are grown, there is very lively agricultural activity.

And the second point, because of the increasing threat of lack of quality water supply, this location is directly above what is a very significant aquifer. It’s a regional reservoir of underground water that in the future could supply Belgrade and surroundings and also this area.

Any type of interference above ground could pollute this water. So I think it’s a gamble that many people do not think is worth it, because even if there were money to compensate for damages, the funds required to correct the situation would far outweigh what the actual economic gain was.

So as a concerned citizen, but also as someone who is I think sufficiently technically literate, I could say that this is a very, very risky project that would not provide the benefits that Serbia needs. And I do believe that Serbia needs that economic development, industrial growth, but maybe in projects that would not be so rich yet.

Ilva Tare

Professor, apart from the government backing this project, there are EU countries, governments and corporate support for the lithium mining in the Jadar Valley. How do you think the citizens and the protesters can have their voice, concerns heard compared to the West, let’s say, supporting this project of the government?

Ivanka Popović

Well, this is also something that has disturbed people. As you know, Serbia is a candidate country that has not been very, let’s say efficient, in fulfilling the requirements to join the European Union. So, it’s still a long road ahead.

But on the other hand, Serbia has signed an agreement with the EU dealing with critical resources. And because these lithium reserves are quite significant, there are also other resources available in Serbia. And this is time, as I said, when you have a mutually beneficial partnership that will be beneficial for both sides.

What I see here is that maybe that there is on the side of the European Union, unfortunately, more a belief that the benefit would outweigh the risks. And of course, the benefit would be all exclusively for the European Union and not for us.

And what we have seen is also that Chancellor Scholz, the German Chancellor, visited Serbia in the summer. And there was, as I said, this agreement that was signed also with Sefcovic from the European Union. And in some ways, Germany almost wanted to provide guarantees that the project would run smoothly, but as you know, then I don’t believe that in any case in history that one country could guarantee for another country the implementation of a project. And what we all have seen is the collapse of the German coalition in power, so I think there will be new elections in Germany. No one can guarantee who the new German Chancellor will be.

So this is more or less, I have to say, a smokescreen for the Serbian government to say, the Germans are guaranteeing this, so it’ll be fine. It won’t be fine. And each country is responsible for, well, its own activities. And I think we have to be very responsible for our own population. We don’t want to be uncooperative, and we also—or some of us here—want to be part of the European Union, but in a way that we would like to see an even a partnership that would not somehow see as a relationship where one side is having much more benefits.

Ilva Tare

How do you assess the government’s handling of the public opposition to the lithium mining? And in your view, what steps are needed to address citizens’ concerns? Is there, in your opinion, any potential ideal scenario that all the concerns, environmental concerns can be addressed and the project can continue?

Ivanka Popović

Well, I would say that this is an issue that far surpasses environmental issues. We’re talking about the need for social change in this country and a government that would be willing to implement it.

And if you know, in 2022, there were mass demonstrations in Belgrade and other places in Serbia, where the number of people that were actually protesting was such that the government pulled the plug on this project, halted it, and said they will stop the project.

That was 2022. After elections this year, which were a very specific process where fortunately the population became fully aware of the amount of manipulation and tampering with voting that was occurring. In the summer, we also had very, very large, demonstrations dealing with it, you know, because after the elections in June, the government said, yes, we are now continuing with the project, knowing that there will be less opposition because there are no new elections in sight.

But this is something that really disturbed people and brought them out into the streets again. So what we’re seeing is an abuse of power by the government, so we all fully recognize that in a democracy, the majority will rule, but if this majority has been made to manipulate the processes, which is highly probable in this case, then you wonder about the legitimacy of this government.

Also, when the institutions have been hijacked, when you have a judiciary that is not responding in the proper way, but only for the needs of the government, and independent institutions that could monitor not only the environmental aspect, but any other aspect, like the financial aspect, anything that is going on. We are really worried.

And the recent tragedy in Novi Sad, this is a town 80 kilometers to the north of Belgrade, where the roof of the newly renovated train station collapsed, killing now 15 people and leaving two people fighting for their lives. It’s something that really sent the message home. You know, the first aspect with Jadar, we know the consequences of mining in eastern Serbia. Now we know because of very questionable contracts that were signed, obvious and significant corruption that is going on, a train station that was opened twice in the previous years by politicians and hailed as a tremendous step forward has made it insecure that no matter where you are in Serbia, in some kind of a building that has been somehow maybe renovated, you are really risking your life.

And I don’t think that fear is the best driving force for social change, but it’s becoming quite a significant factor to make people aware of their rights as citizens and that they need to do something to make a change and change this country into a functioning democracy where government works for the people and not so that the people are working for the benefit of the government.

Ilva Tare

And as one of the founders of the ProGlas movement—“For vote” movement—how do you see grassroots activism shaping national debates on issues like lithium mining?

Could this current public outcry over lithium be a catalyst for broader democratic changes in Serbia, in your view?

Ivanka Popović

Yes Ilva, I think you’re quite right because this—ProGlas is a play on words. It means “Pro vote”, but it also means “pro voice,” because Glas is voice. That means we would like, as a group, to be an initiative that makes people socially aware and aware of their civic rights and duties as active citizens to maintain our society and get it moving in the right direction.

The various civic initiatives have increased over the years because citizens are disappointed by opposition parties that somehow are not managing to voice the needs of the citizens and are maybe seen sometimes as maybe looking for their own narrow interest, to maybe enter parliament, which is maybe being too rough on this opposition, which is very weak and is not sufficiently united, but it’s clear that it’s not only citizens groups, grassroots organizations, but all also these opposition parties and perhaps new ones that will, grow out of these grassroots organizations will be needed.

It will have to be a very massive front encompassing all parts of the political spectrum and active citizens to try to make a change. So yes, I think this is a topic, because if you look at it either from an environmental, political, economic, any aspect, it’s a sort of a showcase of everything that’s wrong in this country and what we need to do to change it.

So I think, yes that this is the beginning of a movement that will continue and it will be very, very persistent and have a lot of energy. It does not matter how long it will take, but it will try to change this country for the better.

Ilva Tare

And lastly, how has media coverage shaped public opinion on the issue of the lithium mining and the civic movements that it has sparked in your view?

Ivanka Popović

Oh, that’s a very sensitive issue. Let’s say it’s a very depressing one.

Serbia, as you know, unfortunately does not have freedom of the press. You have a state-controlled media, regardless of whether they are state-funded or private, and you actually have only a few independent media that do not have national coverage.

So at the moment, all national coverage is by government-controlled media. A lot, a good part of the population is not even getting a balanced view of what is going on. It has increased the importance of social networks trying to get the message out because, as I said, this is not someone trying to sell a better product. It’s a question of providing the population with all the necessary information so that they themselves can make a decision on what they want to do. If they don’t want to do anything, that’s fine, but they need to have all the information and they don’t have it now.

Ilva Tare

Do you think this protest, and as I said, this rare unity among Serbian citizens will be successful in the end? And what will success be for you? What will it look like?

Ivanka Popović

Well, I’m always an optimist, so yes, I believe that we will prevail in the end, but it’s the learning curve.

Serbia is a country that has a very fragile democracy. It doesn’t have a democratic tradition, and therefore it doesn’t have a population that is used to being active in governance, more of a passive situation where more or less you vote, agreeing or not agreeing fully with what’s going on, and then you sort of are the recipient of what the government calls out for you.

Now we are trying to show, and really working on it, to show that the government—the citizens themselves have the power and duty to change the situation in this country. So yes, I’m optimistic, but I cannot give you a time frame.

Ilva Tare

Thank you very much for sharing your concerns and I wish you the best of luck with raising the voices and concerns and this activism that you are keeping alive in Serbia. Thank you Professor Popović.

Ivanka Popović

Ilva thank you very much. And I would just like to say one thing at the end.

I think it’s very important to understand that this is an autonomous, really unique situation where you can hear the voice of the Serbian people.

This is not an imported revolution or imported or somehow manipulated situation. I think we are now really seeing and hearing that people want change. Thank you so much for your time.

Ilva Tare

Thank you.

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The shift from party to personality politics is harming Latin American democracies

Christine Zaino, Sofia Herrera — Tue, 19 Nov 2024 15:00:00 +0000

This paper is the fourth in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “State of the Parties” series analyzing the strength of multi-party systems in different regions of the world.

Across Latin America and the Caribbean, personality-driven political movements and political outsiders are increasingly prevalent, often at the expense of party-based politics. A theme of recent elections in the region has been a widespread embrace of political figures and movements vowing to upend the status quo. From Ecuador to Argentina to Guatemala, political outsiders have unseated the establishment. Meanwhile, recently formed, ideologically vague political movements in Mexico and El Salvador overtook the traditional parties that they broke away from to win landslide elections. With few exceptions, the region has failed to develop competitive, institutionalized, and programmatic parties. This breakdown in party systems and proliferation of personality-driven movements has not delivered better results. Improving institutionalized competition among programmatic, ideologically distinct, and identifiable parties would bolster Latin American democracy, delivering citizens freedom and prosperity.

Within the past decade, several countries with once seemingly institutionalized party systems, such as El Salvador and Mexico, collapsed as parties lost their grip on power to personality-driven figures and movements. Others, like Ecuador and Guatemala, have systems that appear to provide a wide variety of options to citizens through a great proliferation of parties. These systems are unpredictable to citizens, and parties are unable to develop the structure, ideology, and institutionality necessary to deliver solutions to citizen’s needs.

This piece examines how political parties across four Latin American countries in two types of systems have failed to serve as effective vehicles for delivering democracy, and what must change for parties in the region to succeed. We examine the breakdown of the formerly institutionalized party systems in Mexico and El Salvador, and the persistently weak parties in Guatemala and Ecuador. Each country’s experience illustrates how a lack of programmatic parties has contributed to poor governance, which fails to adequately deliver essential services to citizens, potentially undermining democracy and the freedom it should deliver. For each case, we reference data from the Atlantic Council Freedom and Prosperity Indexes and other sources to illustrate the critical role of parties in advancing democracy.

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Charai in The Jerusalem Post: Why Jared Kushner’s return matters for Jews, Arabs, and Muslims alike

Atlantic Council — Mon, 18 Nov 2024 14:12:10 +0000

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Charai in National interest: How Trump Could Restore America’s Influence and Inspire Global Youth

Atlantic Council — Mon, 18 Nov 2024 14:08:25 +0000

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Forcing Ukraine to cede land will only increase Putin’s imperial appetite

Peter Dickinson — Thu, 14 Nov 2024 21:54:31 +0000

Donald Trump’s US presidential election victory has sparked a new round of speculation over the possibility of a compromise deal with the Kremlin to end the war in Ukraine. Many commentators are convinced that some form of Ukrainian territorial concessions are now inevitable. Others insist that trading land for peace is Kyiv’s only option to exit a devastating conflict that is threatening to destroy the Ukrainian nation.

These arguments are certainly not without merit, but anyone now calling for a negotiated settlement that grants Russia control over large parts of Ukraine must also consider the consequences of such an historic step. If the Ukrainian authorities are forced to cede land in exchange for peace, Vladimir Putin’s entire invasion will be legitimized and his imperial appetite will only grow. The West may succeed in securing a temporary respite at Ukraine’s expense, but the threat of an expansionist Russia will remain and the ultimate cost of stopping Putin will only rise.

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The entire notion that Putin could be satisfied by simply freezing the war along the current front lines in southern and eastern Ukraine reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the imperialistic motives behind Russia’s invasion. Putin already rules over what is by far the largest nation on the planet. He has little interest in seizing a handful of Ukrainian regions or adding new land to Russia’s staggering vastness. Instead, Putin’s decisions are shaped by an almost mystical belief in his own historic mission that is beyond the comprehension of many if not most observers in the West.

Putin’s whole political career has been defined by his burning resentment at the perceived injustices of the Soviet collapse. Since the very early years of his reign, it has been apparent that Putin regards the emergence of an independent Ukraine as a particularly painful symbol of Russia’s post-Soviet humiliation. Back in 2005, he had Ukraine very much in mind when he famously described the disintegration of the Soviet Union as the “biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century.” Over the subsequent two decades, Putin has frequently elaborated on his view that Ukrainians are actually Russians (“one people”) who have no legitimate right to a state of their own.

Putin’s Ukraine obsession is not only a product of his determination to reverse the verdict of 1991. Crucially, he regards modern Ukraine’s efforts to secure a democratic European future as a potential catalyst for the further breakup of the Russian Federation. Like most of his current Kremlin colleagues, Putin’s formative political experience came during the twilight years of the USSR. As a young KGB officer in East Germany, he was on hand to witness the fall of the Berlin Wall and watched in horror as the entire Soviet Empire in Central and Eastern Europe evaporated almost overnight.

This has left Putin with a lifelong dread of people power movements and a profound sense of Russia’s imperial fragility. In light of this backstory, it is hardly surprising that he was so violently triggered by Ukraine’s two post-Soviet revolutions, and so obviously alarmed by the slow but steady consolidation of Kyiv’s democratic credentials. Given the patchwork nature of the Russian Federation, Putin has long been acutely aware that if left unchecked, Ukraine’s strengthening grassroots democracy and successful embrace of self-determination could eventually inspire secession movements and imperial collapse within his own authoritarian realm.

For Putin, therefore, Ukrainian independence represents an existential threat to Russia itself. This explains why he has been prepared to risk everything in order to erase Ukraine from the map. It also makes a mockery of suggestions that he could be bought off by the offer of the Ukrainian regions currently under Russian occupation. Clearly, Putin cannot risk the continued existence of a genuinely independent Ukraine. He must either reassert Russian control over Kyiv, or extinguish Ukrainian statehood altogether.

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Putin’s imperial ambitions are not limited to Ukraine, of course. He routinely describes the current invasion as a quest to return “historically Russian lands,” leaving the door open for further wars of aggression against other former vassals of the Russian Empire including Finland, Poland, the Baltic states, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the whole of Central Asia.

Evidence of this expanding imperial appetite is already visible. When Putin first announced the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he denied having any territorial ambitions beyond the two eastern Ukrainian provinces the make up the Donbas region. Six months later, he announced the annexation of a further two provinces. In summer 2024, Putin confirmed that his claims now extended to the administrative borders of all four provinces, despite the fact that the Russian military had yet to establish complete control over any of them.

None of this is to say that temporary territorial concessions are out of the question. On the contrary, there is growing recognition in Western capitals and in Kyiv that the complete liberation of Ukraine is not militarily feasible in the present circumstances. Nevertheless, it is vital for Ukraine’s partners to understand that any agreement to cease hostilities would not bring an end to the danger. Instead, it would mark the beginning of a new phase in the struggle against Putin’s resurgent Russian Empire. This struggle will require eternal vigilance along with dramatic increases in defense spending throughout the West. Above all, Western leaders must commit to the kind of watertight security guarantees for Ukraine that will make Putin think twice before resuming his criminal crusade for a place in Russian history.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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The election was widely seen as a referendum on Georgia’s future geopolitical direction. The country’s Russia-friendly authorities hoped to secure a mandate for a pro-Kremlin manifesto, while opponents sought to return Georgia to the path of Euro-Atlantic integration. This westward trajectory is certainly popular, with polls consistently indicating that around 80 percent of Georgians support the country’s bid for EU membership. At the same time, many have been alarmed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and are fearful of facing the same fate if they attempt to turn away from Moscow.

The Georgian Dream party has been in power since 2012 and is officially committed to supporting European integration. However, party officials in Tbilisi have become increasingly critical of the West in recent years, and have faced mounting accusations of trying to steer the country back into the Kremlin orbit. Criticism has intensified following the adoption earlier this year of draconian laws similar to the authoritarian policies of Putin’s Russia. Critics say these legislative changes are aimed at silencing Georgia’s political opposition and muzzling the country’s civil society.

In the wake of the disputed election, Georgia’s pro-Western political forces have vowed to fight back against what they see as an attempt to undermine their country’s fledgling democracy. A number of large protest rallies have taken place in downtown Tbilisi since the late October ballot. Meanwhile, opposition parties are demanding fresh elections, refusing to serve in the new parliament, and calling on Georgia’s Western partners to conduct an international investigation into allegations of electoral misconduct.

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Russia has refrained from officially celebrating the election victory of its Georgian Dream allies. Instead, Moscow has accused the West of trying to “destabilize” Georgia with calls for an investigation into alleged violations. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that the vote represents a significant geopolitical triumph for the Kremlin and a major setback for the West.

Critics of Georgia’s governing party fear the country may now follow the geopolitical trajectory of Belarus, which in recent years has become increasingly subject to creeping Russian control in every sphere of national life from the economy to defense. This would represent a significant turnaround for Russia, which had looked to be in danger of losing its traditional influence in the southern Caucasus region.

Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 and continues to occupy approximately 20 percent of the country. Bilateral relations between Moscow and Tbilisi have remained tense ever since this brief war sixteen years ago. However, while the Georgian public has overwhelmingly backed closer ties with the West, many have also spoken of the need to avoid a resumption of hostilities with Russia. Georgian Dream officials have sought to exploit these concerns over the possibility of a new Russian invasion. During the recent election campaign, the party ran a series of controversial adverts featuring images of wartime destruction in Ukraine along with appeals to “choose peace.”

Some observers believe Russia’s approach to Georgia may offer hints of the Kremlin’s ultimate intentions in Ukraine. After first invading and occupying a large portion of Georgian territory, Russia then helped engineer the election of a sympathetic government that has paid lip service to the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations while working toward mending fences with Moscow. This proved possible despite frequent evidence of intense anti-Russian sentiment throughout Georgian society. While such an outcome is extremely hard to imagine in today’s wartime Ukraine, the remarkable revival of Russian influence in Georgia could certainly serve as inspiration for Kremlin policymakers.

Protests look set to continue in Tbilisi. However, it is not clear whether anything can now be done to prove the allegations of election fraud or annul the results of the October vote. Georgia’s Western partners have voiced their concerns over the election but remain reluctant to withhold official recognition. Georgia will be on the agenda when EU foreign ministers meet next week in Brussels, but the European Union is not expected to take a stance on the legitimacy of the election. Instead, the most meaningful sanction will likely be the continued freezing of EU membership talks, which have been on pause since June 2024.

With Western leaders unwilling to confront the Kremlin in the Caucasus, Russia is the real winner of Georgia’s recent elections. The vote has demonstrated Moscow’s ability to overcome popular opposition by forging powerful alliances with local elites and ignoring international concerns over election interference. Russia will doubtless seek to apply the lessons learned in Georgia as it turns its attention to future election campaigns in front line countries like Moldova, and may also seek to adopt a similar approach to postwar Ukraine.

Nicholas Chkhaidze is a research fellow at the Baku-based Topchubashov Center.

Katherine Spencer — Thu, 24 Oct 2024 21:31:52 +0000

Georgians go to the polls this weekend in a parliamentary election that is widely expected to determine whether the country will pursue integration with Moscow or the West. This closely mirrors the situation in Moldova, where voters face a similar choice on November 3 when the country holds the second round of its presidential election.

Allegations of undue Russian influence have overshadowed the ongoing election campaigns in Georgia and Moldova, highlighting the geopolitical significance of both votes. Critics have accused Moscow of engaging in everything from disinformation to voter bribery as part of Russian efforts to promote Kremlin-friendly candidates.

The first round of voting in Moldova took place last weekend and featured a separate referendum on enshrining the country’s European aspirations in their constitution, which voters backed by a razor-thin margin. Moldova’s pro-EU President Maia Sandu responded to this close win by suggesting that the Kremlin was engaged in a comprehensive campaign of election interference. “We have won the first battle in a difficult fight that will determine the future of our country,” she commented. “We fought fairly and won justly in an unjust struggle.”

Sandu’s claims of Russian meddling received prompt and strongly-worded backing from Brussels and Washington. Moldova’s presidential election and EU referendum campaigns had been marked by “really unprecedented intimidation and foreign interference by Russia and its proxies,” EU officials commented on Monday.

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The outlook ahead of this Saturday’s Georgian parliamentary vote is similar with one key difference: The country’s pro-Kremlin Georgian Dream party has already been in power for the past twelve years and is now looking to secure a mandate for its increasingly open advocacy of closer ties with Russia.

Officially, at least, the Georgian Dream party remains committed to furthering Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration. However, opponents claim that in practice, the party is becoming increasingly aligned with the Kremlin. They accuse the current authorities of passing authoritarian legislation such as a Russian-style “foreign agent law” that threatens to muzzle Georgia’s vibrant civil society.

The Georgian Dream political party was founded by the country’s richest man, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, who reportedly has extensive business ties to Russia. In recent months, Ivanishvili has attempted to attract voters by warning that election victory for his pro-Western opponents could lead to renewed hostilities with Russia, which continues to occupy around twenty percent of Georgia. “We choose peace, not war,” he told a rally in Tbilisi on Wednesday.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has cast a long shadow over Georgia’s parliamentary elections. During the final weeks of the campaign, Georgian Dream officials sparked controversy by unveiling a series of adverts juxtaposing grim photos of war-torn Ukraine with bright images of a peaceful and prosperous Georgia. “I have never seen anything so shameful, so offensive to our culture, traditions, history, and beliefs,” commented Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili.

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The election interference tactics Russia is currently accused of employing in Moldova and Georgia echo earlier Kremlin efforts to manipulate Ukraine’s fledgling democracy and prevent the country from turning westward. Prior to the onset of Russian military aggression against Ukraine in 2014, Moscow had attempted to use a wide range of tools including bribery, information warfare, and political violence to stop Kyiv exiting the Kremlin orbit. When all these measures failed to reverse Ukraine’s European choice, Putin escalated to direct military intervention with the seizure of Crimea. This set the stage for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine eight years later.

Voters in Moldova and Georgia are acutely aware of the Kremlin’s increasingly violent reaction to the potential loss of Ukraine, and are understandably eager to avoid suffering the same fate. At the same time, Moscow must contend with considerable public enthusiasm in both countries for European integration. While Moldova’s recent referendum on EU membership ended in a virtual tie, polls typically indicate majority backing for the European Union of sixty percent or higher. Pro-EU sentiment is thought to be even stronger in Georgia, with one recent poll finding seventy nine percent in favor of joining the EU.

Geopolitics is not the only topic shaping the current election cycles in Moldova and Georgia, of course. Domestic issues such as household budgets and the management of the economy will also be crucial in determining the outcome of the two votes. Nevertheless, the prominence of Russia in both election campaigns is a timely reminder that Moscow is in no mood to retreat and remains fully committed to retaining its regional influence.

Vladimir Putin chose to invade Ukraine because he became convinced that the country was slipping irreversibly away from Russia and could no longer be kept in place by non-military means. This chilling reality looms large over the Moldovan and Georgian electorates as they prepare to vote in elections that will potentially define their futures for decades to come.

In a soft power contest of ideas, there is little doubt that the West would prove far more appealing to Moldovan and Georgian voters than anything the Kremlin has to offer. However, in the more pragmatic and immediate realm of hard power, it is Russia that currently holds the clear advantage. Coupled with Moscow’s proven record of successful election influence operations, this means there is every chance that pro-Kremlin forces could strong-arm their way to ballot box success in both Moldova and Georgia.

Katherine Spencer is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Karim Mezran, Alissa Pavia — Fri, 04 Oct 2024 18:43:10 +0000

As Tunisia approaches its election on October 6, the political landscape remains heavily influenced by the events of the past few years, particularly the 2021 presidential soft coup carried out by the legally elected President Kais Saied. This event marked a turning point, reshaping the country’s democratic framework and leading to the suspension of the parliament and the concentration of authority in the executive branch.

Since his consolidation of power, Saied has dismantled many democratic institutions, extending the state of emergency and adopting a new constitution that centralizes power around the presidency. As a result, political pluralism has been significantly restricted, leading to fears of increased political repression and tighter control over the media. This shift has raised concerns about the erosion of democratic institutions established following the 2011 Arab uprisings, of which Tunisia constituted the only real attempt to reach a pluralistic and liberal government in North Africa.

Saied’s presidency, marked by an increasing hold on power and skepticism toward reform, poses critical questions about the future of Tunisia.

The current political climate indicates that Saied will likely continue to consolidate his influence over Tunisia’s political landscape. The president’s track record of suppressing dissent, restricting media freedom, and sidelining political opponents suggests that these authoritarian measures will likely persist in the months and years ahead. Recent changes to the electoral process have further tightened his grip on power, with several key presidential candidates imprisoned or barred from participating in the elections. This has effectively cleared the field for Saied, raising concerns about the integrity of the electoral process and the future of political pluralism in Tunisia. The increasingly restricted political environment, combined with these legal and procedural maneuvers, points to a continued erosion of democratic norms under his rule.

In addition to the dire political evolution of the country is its deteriorating economic situation. Tunisia’s economy is precarious, since it is heavily reliant on agreements with the European Union (EU) and even more so with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to sustain its political and economic viability. The EU is a key economic partner, pledging over $900 million in funding contingent upon successful negotiations with the IMF, which are stalled due to the Tunisian government’s withdrawal from negotiations. In fact, Saied’s skepticism toward certain reforms, particularly those involving subsidy reductions and austerity measures, has complicated these negotiations. This hesitance has created uncertainty about Tunisia’s economic future and the government’s ability to address growing public discontent, underscoring a perilous state of affairs with unforeseeable consequences for the whole region.

Furthermore, migration has become a critical issue in Tunisia’s relations with the EU. In response to rising irregular migration from North Africa, the EU has sought to bolster border control and manage migrant flows through partnerships with Tunisia. While Saied has occasionally cooperated with EU initiatives, he has also adopted more nationalistic rhetoric, accusing foreign powers of seeking to use Tunisia as a border guard for Europe. This dual approach complicates negotiations and poses risks not only to the agreements on migration with the EU, but also to the more general economic well-being of the country.

Moreover, the outcome of the upcoming US presidential elections could also significantly affect Tunisia and North Africa. Former President Donald Trump has advocated for an isolationist foreign policy, and if he wins it could lead to the United States reducing economic and political assistance to Tunisia while maintaining military aid for monitoring the situation in the region. In contrast, Vice President Kamala Harris, given her past positions in areas such as rallying international support for Iranian women following Mahsa Amini’s death, may adopt a more proactive stance on human rights and governance, possibly increasing scrutiny on Saied’s administration while still recognizing the importance of military support given the region’s challenges. In this case, the risk of Tunisia radicalizing would increase, with Saied veering toward further authoritarianism and even aligning with countries such as Algeria and possibly Russia and China.

As Tunisia heads toward its election, the intertwining of domestic politics, economic struggles, and international relations sets the stage for a complex political environment. Saied’s presidency, marked by an increasing hold on power and skepticism toward reform, poses critical questions about the future of Tunisia.

The situation makes it difficult for the international community to take decisive action. For the United States, due to geographical distance and a lack of direct national interest in Tunisia, it may be easier for the administration to adopt a tougher stance on the political establishment and push for a return to the democratic process. However, for Europe, the situation is more complex. The EU must maintain a strategic balance between addressing its own challenges—such as migration, terrorism, and regional stability—and upholding the democratic ideals that the Tunisian people championed during the 2011 Jasmine Revolution. Balancing these interests while engaging with Tunisia’s current political realities will be a delicate task.

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

Alissa Pavia is the associate director of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative.

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Charai in National Interest: The Second Trump Assassination Attempt Shows Why America Must Stand United

Atlantic Council — Tue, 17 Sep 2024 13:54:27 +0000

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Ukraine’s biggest wartime government shakeup prompts muted reaction in Kyiv

Andrew D’Anieri — Tue, 10 Sep 2024 21:19:09 +0000

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy presided over his government’s largest wartime reshuffle in early September, with nine ministries getting new permanent leadership. As the news filtered into Western capitals, media and experts alike scrambled to make sense of the changes. Back in Kyiv, many lawmakers and analysts appeared relatively unmoved by the announcements, in contrast to the cheers and jeers that have come with previous shifts in Zelenskyy’s government.

Perhaps the most notable figure to resign was Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, who had been a steady, passionate voice as Ukraine’s top diplomat for the last four years. Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration Olha Stefanishyna, another longtime minister, resigned from her post only to be quickly named as the new Justice Minister, replacing Denys Maliuska.

Oleksandr Kamyshin’s swift rise in government looks set to continue as he takes up a post as presidential advisor for strategic issues after resigning as Minister of Strategic Industries. He joins former Deputy Prime Minister for the Reintegration of Occupied Territories Iryna Vereshchuk, who will be a new deputy in the Office of the President.

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The somewhat muted reaction in Ukraine to such a significant government shakeup reflects a number of factors. First, none of the cabinet changes came in the wake of a scandal or amid whispers of corruption. They appear to be purely a shift in personnel.

Second, Zelenskyy had long telegraphed plans for a major government shakeup. Speaking to Italian media in February 2024, he said “a reset” was necessary. “I have something serious in mind, which is not about a single person but about the direction of the country’s leadership,” he commented. At the time, observers fixated on the “single person” reference, assuming he was talking about Ukraine’s highly regarded military commander Valeriy Zaluzhny, who was subsequently removed and appointed Ukrainian ambassador to Great Britain.

Crucially, none of the changes in the recent reshuffle directly involve the military or the economy. Replacing the minister of defense or economy would have set off alarm bells among Ukraine’s Western partners, but those positions look stable. The closest person to the battlefield was Kamyshin, who leaves Ukraine’s Ministry of Strategic Industries with a revamped and highly effective drone program in place.

The new blood leading these ministries is not all that new, either. Instead, Zelenskyy appears to be promoting trusted cadres, assigning others new or enhanced portfolios, offering acting ministers permanent gigs, and, in the case of former foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba, giving some a deserved break after years of strenuous work.

Publicly at least, Ukraine’s Western partners took the personnel changes in stride. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and many other foreign ministers thanked Kuleba for his work and dedication. The European Union offered a suitably bland reaction, calling the shakeup Ukraine’s “internal matter” and expressing hopes to “continue very good cooperation” with Kyiv.

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The two most interesting newcomers are new Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha and Oleksiy Kuleba, the incoming Deputy Prime Minister for Restoration of Ukraine and Minister for Communities and Territories Development.

Sybiha moves from the Office of the President back to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he has spent much of his government career. He previously served as Ukraine’s ambassador to Türkiye and at the Ukrainian Embassy in Poland, both senior diplomatic posts working with two of Ukraine’s most important neighbors. Zelenskyy will be hoping Sybiha’s experience and strong relationship with presidential chief of staff Andriy Yermak make him an efficient liaison between Kyiv and its many partners.

Kuleba takes over a large ministry formed by the merger of the Ministry for the Reintegration of Occupied Territories and the Ministry of Community Development, Territories, and Infrastructure, which had been led by Oleksandr Kubrakov until his dismissal in May. Some outlets reported that Kuleba’s ministry will soon be split in two, with one ministry set to focus on reconstruction and development, while the other concentrates on infrastructure. That may be a sensible move ahead of what could be another harsh winter of Russian assaults on Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure. Kuleba’s previous job was head of regional policy in the Office of the President, working closely with Yermak.

The most controversial personnel decision to emerge from the recent flurry of changes in Kyiv was the firing of Ukrenergo CEO Volodymyr Kudrytskyi. He is widely credited with having worked miracles as head of Ukraine’s state-owned electrical grid operator, most significantly leading the country’s disconnection from the Russian grid in February 2022, months ahead of schedule. Kudrytskyi was seen as a real reformer in Western capitals, leading to significant alarm over his dismissal. Two members of Ukrenergo’s supervisory board resigned in protest, calling Kudrytskyi’s firing “politically motivated.”

Overall, Zelenskyy appears to be shuffling the deck rather than choosing a new set of cards. It is unlikely the nine new ministers will produce dramatic changes in government policy, but they may offer new impetus as Ukraine heads toward its third winter of full-scale war. Kyiv’s whole-of-government approach to the country’s defense has been largely effective so far; Zelenskyy may be betting these tweaks will maintain Ukraine’s edge.

Andrew D’Anieri is a resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Samantha Sultoon: It’s time to tighten sanctions and limit Maduro’s access to the UN

Diego Area: González now has an opportunity to lead renewed diplomatic efforts from abroad

Iria Puyosa: With Venezuela’s opposition under siege, now is the moment for coordinated international support

Democracies need to make life miserable for Maduro

González ultimately saw no other alternative. He was left with two choices: face arrest—and likely torture—by the Maduro regime or continue the fight for Venezuelan democracy from abroad.

At age seventy-five, the choice was Spain—a longtime destination for those fleeing Maduro’s autocracy. But it’s not a choice he should have had to make. Instead, it’s a reflection of the inability of the international community to force Maduro’s hand after published vote tallies showed that González bested Maduro by more than 30 percentage points in the July 28 presidential election. While Brazil and Colombia have sought to find some type of negotiated solution, the actions of Maduro—including detaining over 2,400 people—show that he is only looking to double down on this newest campaign of repression.

González’s departure leaves opposition leader María Corina Machado to fight for a restoration of democracy in Venezuela. She will need regional and global democracies to back her up with more than just statements. Words don’t resonate with Maduro unless backed up by actions to make life miserable for him and those closest to him. Here, the recent seizing of Maduro’s plane in the Dominican Republic should be a warning of what more could be coming his way, especially with greater international coordination.

Months before his election, González said, “We’re confident that on the day the opposition vote will be so massive our victory will be indisputable.” He was right. The victory of the opposition is clear. Now, what must be made clear to Maduro are the consequences of the most blatant vote grab in recent regional history.

—Jason Marczak is the vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Democracies should use Venezuela’s military and private sector to squeeze Maduro

González’s tragic if understandable decision to leave Venezuela represents the failure of a well-conceived effort to achieve an institutional exit from dictatorship. A government-in-exile will be doomed to irrelevance. González’s departure will increase demands from supporters in the United States from both parties, along with the astonishingly stalwart Machado, to impose new sanctions. But “maximum pressure” failed before and will again, as Maduro enjoys the support of an authoritarian bloc led by China. Moreover, sanctions on the oil sector could rebound with catastrophic economic and political consequences if they feed an otherwise likely fresh wave of emigration. Internationally, the Brazil-Mexico-Colombia diplomatic gambit appears defunct. The Venezuelan street has been largely silent.

The bitter reality is that Venezuela’s best chance in decades for an institutional democratic exit from dictatorship failed. Maduro and his thugs plainly see that neither sanctions, nor negotiations, nor popular pressure has dislodged them, despite González’s undeniable electoral victory.

For supporters of democratic change, recognition of the inadequacy of our tools is not the end of the discussion. The center of gravity of the regime remains the armed forces, where we lack entree. That path needs to be (re?) examined, perhaps in the persons of the hard men and women who led US efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. These former officials’ will and professionalism can have special purchase with those leading Venezuela’s armed forces. They could explain to the Venezuelan generals that their responsibilities should be to support and defend Venezuela’s institutions, not the interests of the repressive Maduro regime. Meeting their unique responsibilities will bring them credit; continuing to support the dictatorship will damage Venezuela’s national interests and will have direct implications for them as individual leaders. In addition, there could be a shared interest in confronting the criminal groups sheltering in Venezuela that feed the flow of migrants and drugs to the United States.

Another unexploited angle is with the Venezuelan private sector, which has profited from collusion with the Bolivarian regime yet enjoys access to US and other Western markets. Finally, while the current leaders of Latin America’s genuine democracies in Mexico City, Brasília, and Bogotá have demonstrated their incapacity or unwillingness to press forward, civil society in all three nations can be mobilized in support of democratic change in Venezuela.

Critically, we all must acknowledge the unsustainability of the situation. A continuation of Maduro’s dictatorship will bring pain to Venezuela and a renewed flood of migrants, to the detriment of all involved.

—Kevin Whitaker is a nonresident senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and a former US ambassador to Colombia.

It’s time to tighten sanctions and limit Maduro’s access to the UN

The abrupt departure of Venezuelan opposition leader González, less than two months after the disputed Venezuelan elections, most likely reflects the level of aggressive threats the Maduro regime made against him. In addition to last week’s arrest warrant accusing him of falsifying public documents, instigation to disobey the law, conspiracy, and other charges that clearly seek to undermine the integrity of the opposition’s vote tally, regime officials have made every effort—public and private—to undermine and intimidate González and the opposition into submission. This aggressive effort to deny the Venezuelan people democratic representation by those for whom the people clearly voted in the July elections is quintessential Maduro. Time and time again, when the opportunity for a fresh start is offered, Maduro and his cronies throw it away and suffocate the will of the Venezuelan people. Declaring Christmas in October will not allow Maduro to gloss over his continued destruction of the Venezuelan economy.

While the Biden-Harris administration is carefully balancing multiple global conflicts and the United States’ role within each of them, its efforts to support the people of Venezuela will need to be redoubled, and quickly. Without González in the country and without credible, transparent election results shared publicly, the Venezuelan people will be left to wonder why they turned out to vote in the first place. They will also certainly question where the United States, European Union, and others that voice support for Venezuelan democracy do not back up their words with clear public actions.

Tightening sanctions on Maduro and his cronies responsible for continuing to undermine democratic processes and institutions in Venezuela, along with the regime’s ongoing corruption and human rights abuses, is one available step. Another public messaging step could be limiting access during the upcoming United Nations General Assembly in New York. If Maduro and his cronies seek to participate in such global gatherings, then there should be a minimum bar for entry that disallows those who squander democracy until they’ve publicly changed their ways. Further public (and private) efforts should be coordinated across the Group of Seven (G7) or other international alliances to highlight for Maduro the isolation he is inviting if he is sworn in again in January. While unlikely, there is still a narrow window for change that remains.

—Samantha Sultoon is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center, a former director for Threat Finance and Sanctions at the National Security Council at the White House, and a former sanctions policy expert for the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control.

González now has an opportunity to lead renewed diplomatic efforts from abroad

A new chapter begins in the courageous struggle to liberate Venezuela from a dictatorship that has lost its support base both domestically and internationally, following the flight of González to Spain. His life was clearly at risk after receiving multiple threats and an arrest warrant amid a wave of postelection repression, which the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights labeled as “state terrorism.” While this decision may seem like a retreat, it is undoubtedly a strategic move in the broader fight for Venezuela’s freedom.

Rather than disheartening those who support Venezuela’s democratic restoration, this should be viewed as a safeguard—González, with his legitimacy intact, is now beyond the reach of a regime that imprisons, tortures, and executes opponents while stealing elections and suppressing the people’s will. It also provides González with a historic opportunity to engage with more than seven million Venezuelans who have fled the country, many of whom were denied their political rights. Only 69,211 Venezuelans were allowed to vote in this year’s election.

As an experienced diplomat, González’s escape positions him to lead renewed diplomatic efforts with international allies. The Maduro regime will likely continue to channel resources into complex lobbying structures, influencing narratives and spreading disinformation in coordination with Russia, China, and Iran. But now the democratic opposition will have a legitimately elected leader mobilizing Venezuelan communities worldwide to counteract the regime’s economic and repressive power.

—Diego Area is a deputy director of strategic development at the Adrienne Arsht Latin American Center.

With Venezuela’s opposition under siege, now is the moment for coordinated international support

The Venezuelan regime’s forced exile of González has unquestionably crossed the threshold that democratic governments in the Americas and Europe have repeatedly warned against. Urgent action is now imperative, and democratic governments must go beyond mere expressions of concern and take immediate steps to support a peaceful transition of power that the people of Venezuela have rightfully earned through democratic processes.

While it is Venezuelans’ responsibility to continue their impressive movement towards democracy, the recent crackdown against political parties and civil society has significantly hindered progress. The movement’s leaders, including Machado, are now under siege. External support is crucial for reestablishing democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights in Venezuela. What can external allies do to compel Maduro to step down and ensure that a new president takes the oath on January 10, 2025?

The response must focus on severing the regime’s support from its current pillars. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation and Drug Enforcement Administration, along with agencies in partner countries, should disrupt transnational criminal networks that exploit Venezuela’s natural resources, engage in financial corruption, and have ties to organized crime. The United Nations could be a good venue for external allies to address the international support that the Maduro regime continues to receive from authoritarian states and some left-leaning democratic countries that place ideological affinity over fundamental rights. Moreover, the United States and regional countries should look for opportunities to thwart Venezuela’s security forces and ruling party paramilitaries, as they instill fear among the population—and even among the armed forces’ middle ranks—through kidnapping, incarceration, and torture.

A solid and coordinated international effort to weaken the regime pillars will enable the pro-democracy movement to force the ruling party to accept the transition, ultimately bringing about positive changes in Venezuela and the entire Western Hemisphere.

—Iria Puyosa is a senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.

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South Asia’s political parties need internal reforms to revitalize regional democracy

Steve Cima, Geoffrey MacDonald, James Storen — Fri, 30 Aug 2024 19:56:46 +0000

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This paper is the third in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “State of the Parties” series analyzing the strength of multi-party systems in different regions of the world.

Nearly 50 percent of the world’s countries will see voters head to the polls in 2024 in what has become known as the “year of elections,” and South Asia leads the way, representing nearly half of the world’s voters this year. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Maldives, and Bhutan have already held their general elections. Sri Lanka’s presidential election is scheduled for this fall. Only Nepal, which held its last national elections in 2022, is not joining this year’s voting festivities.

These elections come at a precarious time for South Asia’s democratic standing. Prominent democracy indices, including Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), Freedom House, and the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes, show most of the region going in the wrong direction. Recent elections in South Asia’s most populous nations illuminate this trend.

As South Asia’s democracies show signs of dysfunction, citizens are disengaging. In all five of South Asia’s completed elections this year, voter turnout was down. In the most recent wave of the World Values Survey (2017-2022), which included Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and the Maldives, less than 15 percent of respondents said they were “very interested” in politics and only small minorities had participated in political activities such as engaging with online political organizations, signing a petition, or joining a political demonstration. Large majorities reported no party membership. Across South Asia, it appears that democracy is not delivering.

South Asia’s political parties are contributing to the problem. The region’s oldest and most institutionalized political parties have lost their vigor. Many key parties that have historically relied on the popularity of family dynasties are losing ground, failing to cultivate dynamic leaders, generate innovative ideas, or respond to citizen needs. World Values Survey data show that majorities in South Asia’s surveyed countries had “not very much” or “no” confidence in political parties. The weakening of the region’s main parties—many of which have been integral to winning and sustaining democracy in their countries—has corresponded with South Asia’s democratic stagnation.

Nevertheless, these same parties are an essential part of the solution to the region’s political problems. Despite evidence of atrophy, most of the leading parties still possess strong organizational characteristics and a core base of support. Internal reforms are needed to revive citizen-centered political competition, demonstrate that democracy delivers, and revitalize public faith in representative government.

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State of the Parties

This pathbreaking new series delivers insights and policy recommendations from leading experts on how to enhance efforts to strengthen democracy in all regions of the world.

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Unloved but indispensable: Political parties in Europe

Paul McCarthy, Thibault Muzergues, Patrick Quirk — Fri, 30 Aug 2024 18:43:45 +0000

This paper is the second in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “State of the Parties” series analyzing the strength of multi-party systems in different regions of the world.

The rise of political parties in their modern form in Europe has historically been associated with the coming of age of mass politics, and the subsequent need for representation of sectional interests (in other words, the interests of specific social classes). Following the end of World War II in Western Europe, and the end of the Cold War in Central and Eastern Europe, political parties became a central component of European democracies.

Scholars often describe the 1960s and 1970s as the golden age of (Western) European democratic parties. However, the honeymoon did not last beyond this period. A long decline has made political parties much less relevant to modern politics, as they were often replaced by personalized politics and the politicization of one-issue social movements throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Political parties today are generally unpopular and distrusted by the wider public.

Yet what is remarkable is that despite their decline and a crisis that many had described as terminal, European parties have remained at the center of the game in most countries’ political systems. Perhaps even more importantly, they have proved indispensable for the functioning of democracy in Europe: in the Netherlands, despite an extremely atomized party system and a global rejection of parties, no agreement on a coalition government can be passed without negotiations among them. In Italy, the Five Star Movement soon understood that it needed to convert into a much more classical political party to implement its political program: it built more traditional structures and adopted a clear positioning on the very left-right divide that it had claimed to supersede a few years before.

The experience of the past decade has shown that despite their unpopularity, political parties remain indispensable for the functioning of democracies in Europe—when they are present, plural, and organized, democracy is doing well. When they are not, or when the party system is unbalanced, democracies suffer and even backslide.

To prove this assertion, this paper will look at four telling examples in recent European history, taking from the experiences of Romania, Spain, France, and Hungary.

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State of the Parties

This pathbreaking new series delivers insights and policy recommendations from leading experts on how to enhance efforts to strengthen democracy in all regions of the world.

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Algeria has never seen a smooth transfer of power. It won’t in this election, either.

Andrew G. Farrand — Fri, 30 Aug 2024 16:03:44 +0000

Algeria will hold a presidential election on September 7, in which incumbent President Abdelmadjid Tebboune will face off against two weak challengers.

Tebboune was first elected in a controversial 2019 poll organized against the backdrop of the Hirak, a mass popular uprising demanding new leadership. The call for transition was a direct challenge to the country’s reigning political order—the shadowy cabal of military and political elites that Algerians refer to as “le pouvoir” (the power).

Five years later, those popular demands for new leadership have been addressed only superficially. Le pouvoir is still in place.

Nonetheless, next month, Tebboune is all but certain to win reelection to a second five-year term, disappointing the many Algerians who long for fresh faces and fresh thinking in the country’s leadership.

Broken handovers

In its sixty-two-year modern history, Algeria has never witnessed a smooth transfer of power from one president to another.

The country’s first post-independence president was deposed in a military coup after just three years in office. The coup leader, Houari Boumediene, ruled with an iron grip for more than a decade, entrenching a system of military rule with a thin civilian façade that has endured ever since. He would have reigned longer but for an obscure illness that claimed his life in 1978, sparking rumors of foul play.

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His successor, Chadli Bendjedid, elected in 1979, ruled until an oil price slump obliged the state to curtail social spending, provoking a crisis. His solution, a hasty political opening, nearly delivered the country to an extremist Islamist party. To prevent that outcome, the army seized power in 1992, triggering a civil war.

In search of a figurehead, the military tapped independence hero Mohamed Boudiaf—but soon regretted its choice when he launched ambitious anti-corruption and reform campaigns that threatened its interests. After just five months in office, Boudiaf was assassinated on live television by his own bodyguard—with signs pointing to the military’s involvement.

The army’s chosen replacement soon had his own falling out with the generals. So, too, did his successor, Liamine Zeroual, who resigned unexpectedly in 1998, complaining of undue influence from the military.

The following year, the army’s hand-picked candidate, former Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika, won an election intended to turn the page on Algeria’s “dark decade.” He was reelected three times and, despite being incapacitated by poor health, remained le pouvoir’s default pick in 2019.

The imposition of an infirm and invisible president for a fifth term struck a chord of indignity for many Algerians. Just days after Bouteflika’s candidacy was announced, peaceful mass protests erupted nationwide.

Following five weeks of sustained demonstrations, the military signaled that it no longer backed the president. Two days later, on April 2, 2019, Bouteflika resigned. Arrests of many of his cronies soon followed.

The Hirak had coalesced around a blanket call for transition—the slogan “Yetnehaw gaa” (“Get them all out”). But here, it fractured. Some had sought new leaders rather than new institutions. The ouster of the sitting president and his corrupt entourage was enough for them. It also marked a symbolic passing of the torch from the long-ruling independence generation.

But other protesters sought a more fundamental reset of Algeria’s political system: an inclusive national transition process, a new constitution, and clearing of the political deck. Some even dared to demand an end to the long tradition of de facto military rule, which had seen every one of Algeria’s post-independence leaders drawn from the ranks of liberation heroes while the army lurked behind every president, steering decisions to maintain its authority.

After Bouteflika resigned, those military leaders rejected protesters’ calls for fundamental change and instead rushed to elections.

Tebboune, a former regional governor, housing minister, and failed prime minister—who holds the distinction of being Algeria’s shortest-serving premier, lasting less than three months in 2017—emerged as the army’s anointed pick in the controversial polls, which protesters boycotted. He was elected amid record-low turnout.

“The new Algeria”

During his five years as president, Tebboune has built a checkered legacy.

Just months after his inauguration, the COVID-19 pandemic ravaged the country’s healthcare system. Meanwhile, Tebboune fled to Germany for treatment when he contracted the virus.

The Ukraine war saved his fortunes. As Europe scrambled to secure alternatives to Russian energy, demand for Algerian oil and gas soared. European leaders flocked to Algiers to sign new energy deals, bringing an influx of cash.

Tebboune used this windfall to buy support and compensate for his limited electoral legitimacy. He more than doubled the military’s budget (from $10 billion in 2022 to nearly $22 billion today), expanded social spending, and shelved planned subsidy cuts. But he struggled to rein in inflation and failed to meet his own export growth targets.

At the same time, he clamped down on public freedoms to smother the Hirak and prevent its return. He snuffed out the last protests, amended the penal code to make it easier to arrest dissidents on political charges, imprisoned journalists, shuttered unfavorable media outlets, and dissolved the country’s leading human rights organizations. He also passed a new constitution that further reinforced presidential powers.

These measures deepened a long-standing dichotomy. Today, those content to keep their heads down and mouths shut, and to accept some limited role in the state-dominated economy, stick around and do as they’re told. Meanwhile, more ambitious, free-thinking Algerians chafe at the restraints, with many ultimately fleeing abroad or landing behind bars.

On foreign policy, Tebboune failed to leverage Algeria’s newfound popularity to advance key foreign policy priorities—gaining admittance to the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) coalition in 2023, protecting the Palestinians from Israeli aggression, defending Western Sahara’s right to self-determination, or maintaining Algeria’s sphere of influence in the Sahel.

The election

Tebboune’s record offers plenty of reasons why Algerians might want to vote him out of office. But this election offers little hope for a transition of power.

Every national institution of consequence has been coopted and pressed into service as an arm of Tebboune’s campaign, including the former ruling National Liberation Front and its allied parties; national organizations of women and veterans; and national councils of youth and civil society established by Tebboune.

Anyone who could threaten Tebboune’s reelection chances has already been sidelined. Former Foreign Minister Ramtane Lamamra was pushed into a United Nations envoy post abroad, General Ali Ghediri’s bogus prison sentence was extended, leftist firebrand Karim Tabbou is confined to his neighborhood and barred from politics, former candidate Rachid Nekkaz fled to the United States, and journalist Ihsane El Kadi languishes in prison. Others announced early retirements from politics to avoid similar fates. Algeria’s leading Islamist party, the Movement of a Society of Peace (MSP), blocked its outgoing president, Abderrezak Makri, from running in what appeared to be an orchestrated deal with le pouvoir.

Despite the risks, more than thirty candidates hoped to challenge Tebboune. Ultimately, authorities approved only two, while pursuing fraud charges against several others over their candidate paperwork.

The two approved contenders—Abdelaali Hassani Cherif, the Islamist who succeeded Makri as MSP president last year, and Youcef Aouchiche, the young leader of the Socialist Forces Front (FFS)—each have a solid campaign machine but will struggle to attract support beyond their limited electoral bases. Tebboune is an old bureaucrat in a young country, but handouts and the trappings of office have enabled him to rally a sizable core of supporters.

In sum, Tebboune is nearly certain to win an overwhelming majority on the first vote, eliminating the need for a second round.

Confident of victory, his campaign is concentrated on boosting participation beyond the 39.9 percent officially reported in 2019, having seen how that limited participation has sapped his legitimacy.

There is little reason to believe Tebboune will make dramatic gains on that score. The dissatisfaction with the ruling elite and their refusal to share power that pushed Algerians into the streets in 2019 remain largely unaddressed. A weak slate of alternative candidates and the near certainty of Tebboune’s victory will also do little to inspire participation. Algerians aren’t likely to see their first normal handover of power in 2024—le pouvoir won’t let them.

Andrew G. Farrand is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and author of The Algerian Dream.

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Zaaimi quoted in Deutsche Welle on Morocco’s strategy on the Western Sahara

Atlantic Council — Mon, 26 Aug 2024 13:37:40 +0000

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Thirty-five years later, the Baltic Way still inspires the fight for freedom

Inga Samoškaitė — Thu, 22 Aug 2024 17:04:53 +0000

Thirty-five years ago, my parents and my eldest brother got in the car and drove toward the A2 motorway, which runs between the cities of Vilnius and Panevėžys. People had gathered all along the motorway, and the horizon looked like a sea of flags. That day, my family joined hands with more than two million people, without even the slightest thought that after fifteen minutes the history of the Baltic states and the world would change.

There’s a saying that extraordinary things can happen when ordinary people come together, and the Baltic Way is a living example of this belief. The peaceful movement demonstrated the power of an unwavering desire for independence and became a symbol of hope. It showed that when people unite, they can change the course of history—Lithuania would declare independence on March 11, 1990, soon followed by Latvia and Estonia, starting the collapse of the Soviet empire.

The turning point in the Baltic states’ fight for freedom was August 23, 1989. That day marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, an agreement signed by Josef Stalin’s Soviet Union and Adolf Hitler’s Germany in 1939 that divided Europe into spheres of influence and sealed the dark fate of several European nations, including the Baltic states. In protest of the pact and its consequences, people from the three Baltic states formed what became known as the Baltic Way. More than two million people from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia joined hands in a breathtaking display of unity. They created a chain stretching more than 430 miles, connecting the Gediminas Tower in Vilnius, the Freedom Monument in Riga, and the Hermann Tower in Tallinn. All of them symbolically stood with their faces turned toward the west and their backs to the east, declaring to the world their choice for freedom.

It is hard to believe that this peaceful, yet powerful movement transformed fifteen minutes into a lifetime of independence. Despite the Kremlin’s aggressive rhetoric about overstepped boundaries, the movement received significant support and encouragement from the West. In December 1989, the Soviet Union acknowledged its past crimes against the Baltic states and denounced the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. As a result, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia returned to the world map as free, democratic, and sovereign states.

In the past thirty-five years, the Baltic Way has inspired peaceful and democratic movements around the world, and people in their own fights tried to replicate the determination and solidarity that defined the Baltic Way. From the human chains in Bangladesh in 2004 to the protests in Catalonia in 2013 and the demonstrations in Hong Kong in 2019, the Baltic Way’s legacy has been felt far and wide.

However, the fight for freedom in the Baltic region is far from over. Following the fraudulent Belarusian elections in 2020, a human chain was formed between Lithuania and Belarus. Lithuanians once again joined hands amid growing concerns about Russian influence and the ongoing struggle for democracy in the region.

People make a human chain in Lithuania from Vilnius to the Belarusian border in support of protests in Belarus against Alyaksandr Lukashenka on the thirty-first anniversary of the Baltic Way. (Scanpix via Reuters Connect, August 23, 2020)

Today, as Russia continues its brutal war against Ukraine, the Baltic states stand united alongside a war-torn country, echoing the same spirit of solidarity they demonstrated more than three decades ago. This unwavering support for Ukraine is rooted in the deep historical trauma the Baltic states experienced during decades of Soviet repression, killings, and deportations, which cost the lives of hundreds of thousands people in the region. This shared and painful history fosters a heightened sense of empathy and solidarity with Ukraine’s struggle for freedom.

Civil society initiatives continue to amaze the world, as ordinary citizens have raised millions of dollars to purchase essential military equipment, such as Bayraktar drones and air-defense radars, to aid Ukraine’s fight against Russian aggression. This strong support reflects the Baltic countries’ firm belief that the future of the democratic world depends on the outcome of this war, and there can be no doubt: Ukraine must win.

The Baltic countries’ experience during the five decades of Soviet occupation underlines the importance of not letting authoritarian regimes continue their brutality today. In addition, the Baltic Way denounced the cooperation between two of history’s authoritarian regimes, a precedent that echoes today as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea align their positions.

Today, the Baltic states see Ukraine as a reflection of their past struggles, and they’re advocating for Ukraine’s rightful place in NATO and the European Union. They remind the world that this integration is crucial not only for Ukraine’s security but also for the entire region’s stability.

Perhaps most of all, the story of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia is a reminder that the commitment to freedom and against repression is deeply and widely held, but it is not always visible. Oppression can obscure it. In 1989, the Baltic Way did not create this commitment to freedom; it made visible what was already there.

Inga Samoškaitė is an assistant director with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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Ukraine’s EU accession hinges on stronger defense and consolidated reforms

Zachary Popovich — Thu, 22 Aug 2024 15:27:36 +0000

Ukraine officially began accession talks with the European Union on June 25. While these negotiations offer hope for a nation that has long sought more comprehensive integration with European political and economic structures, they will also be qualified by contemporary security and political considerations. To achieve EU accession, Ukraine must strengthen its defense capabilities, execute administrative reforms within its judiciary, and implement a multi-sector approach to corruption.

Future administrative, judicial, and institutional reforms necessary for EU integration depend above all on Ukraine’s ability to secure its sovereignty and defend its territory. At the June 2024 Ukraine Recovery Conference in Berlin, “United in defense, united in recovery, stronger together” was a rallying cry and call to action. Ukrainian and European stakeholders outlined Ukraine’s needs for air defense systems necessary to protect the country’s critical civilian infrastructure.

Ukraine must also build upon recent defense reforms to expand transparency and strengthen efficiency throughout its procurement and production system. In June 2023, Ukraine’s state-owned defense conglomerate Ukroboronprom was transformed into a joint-stock venture as Ukrainian Defense Industries (UDI). It introduced institutional reforms to create a new corporate structure reflecting European standards. Direct engagement with EU representatives has helped Ukraine adapt its administrative architecture while creating new production and procurement initiatives with Ukrainian agencies.

These new relationships have grown exponentially over the past year and feature plans to produce equipment and ammunition in Ukraine. In July, German defense firm Rheinmetall announced that it had received a request from the Ukrainian government to open an ammunition factory in Ukraine. In the same month, UDI signed an agreement with US defense company Northrop Grumman to jointly produce NATO-standard, medium-caliber munitions. Additional joint-venture initiatives with European states and individual companies can help Ukraine obtain the resources to halt Russian territorial advances and strengthen its long-term security capabilities.

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While these reforms will help overcome material deficits, Ukraine must also address corruption, which diminishes the country’s administrative capacities and erodes international appetite to support Ukraine. In 2023, former European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker justified his reserved attitude toward Ukraine’s EU integration by identifying Kyiv’s corruption challenges, stating, “Despite its efforts, it is not ready for accession; it needs massive internal reform processes.”

President Zelenskyy’s administration has increased efforts to remove corrupt defense officials and accomplices. In 2024, the Ukrainian Security Service opened investigations into five public officials who allegedly created fraudulent ammunition procurement contracts valued at $40 million. In 2023, Ukraine’s then Minister of Defense, Oleksii Reznikov, resigned after investigative journalists uncovered numerous mismanaged procurement contracts resulting in overpriced personnel equipment, food supplies, and clothing.

Ukraine’s battle with corruption transcends the defense sector and needs to be conducted with equal effectiveness throughout its public institutions. Looking ahead, the country’s ability to remove corrupt officials and the structures that conceal their relationships will be critical for its EU accession process.

Ukraine has taken concrete steps before and since Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion to improve public accountability and transparency. As a result of Ukraine’s 2014 Revolution of Dignity, Kyiv formed multiple agencies charged with enforcing anti-corruption laws and implementing preventative measures.

The National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) is now Ukraine’s primary anti-corruption law enforcement agency investigating high-level cases. Since its inception in 2015, NABU has brought over 1,000 cases to court implicating high-profile public officials including a Ukrainian Supreme Court Justice, a member of parliament, and an oligarch. By empowering this and other anti-corruption agencies, Ukraine has made steady progress in removing corruption as an impediment to joining the EU.

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Political action reforming Ukraine’s judiciary is necessary to align Ukraine’s legal structures with European standards and safeguard progress in eradicating corruption. Specifically, legislation is needed to address issues relating to the selection and regulation of judges and public prosecutors.

So far, Ukraine has been responsive to domestic and international calls for greater action. In November 2022, the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) released a report outlining recommendations for Ukraine to change the procedure for selecting judges for the Constitutional Court. By August 2023, Kyiv enacted legislation outlining merit-based procedures to select justice candidates for the court. This legislation also established an Advisory Group of Experts to serve as a pre-selection body of members appointed by Ukraine’s President, the Council of Judges, and international organizations. While this process will help reduce the political control of judicial leaders, similar legislation should be replicated to select public prosecutors.

Multiple semi-public agencies are responsible for appointing and regulating public prosecutors. The National Conference of Prosecutors holds considerable influence in appointing some of the members of other prosecution service governance bodies, including the Council of Prosecutors and the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors (QDCP). Staff supporting the Council of Prosecutors are unpaid and serve part-time, while members of the QDCP comprise eleven appointed representatives selected by academic leaders and public interest groups.

Even though the Council of Prosecutors and the QDCP are financed by Ukraine’s Office of the Prosecutor General, the existing system of selecting, administering, and regulating prosecutors diminishes Ukraine’s ability to service legal cases and potentially gives power to external interest groups. Instead, Ukraine can empower the Office of the Prosecutor General, granting them financial and administrative authority rather than relying on the discretion of lobbyists and private stakeholders.

During an October 2023 meeting of EU foreign ministers in Kyiv, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock stated, “The future of Ukraine lies in the European Union. In our community of freedom, which will stretch from Lisbon to Luhansk.” Since gaining independence in 1991, Ukraine has committed to securing a democratic future alongside its European neighbors. This goal is now within reach. By strengthening its defense capabilities and taking a multi-sector approach to eradicating corruption, Ukraine can achieve the European future it has long sought and rightfully deserves.

Zachary Popovich is Young Professionals in Foreign Policy’s Rising Expert on Eastern Europe. He holds a master’s degree in public administration from James Madison University.

Venezuela is experiencing a deepening of its crisis. The lack of transparency in the electoral process and the failure of the CNE to present the electoral bulletins have led the country into a chaotic situation. Repression is increasing by the day, reaching levels that exceed anything previously seen in Venezuela. Respect for the right to demonstrate and for the popular will of the people are fundamental pillars of any government that calls itself democratic. The world cannot remain silent in the face of the systematic and violent repression of opponents and dissidents in Venezuela.

—María Ángela Holguín is a former foreign minister of Colombia and a senior advisor to the Atlantic Council’s Venezuela Solutions Group.

The situation in Venezuela is deeply alarming, especially given the fact that the government has not presented detailed results for each polling station to back up its figures. Transparency in the process of counting votes is essential. A thorough verification of the election results must be carried out to ensure that they faithfully reflect the will of the Venezuelan people. This verification must include a complete count of all tally sheets, which the CNE must provide without further delay.

—Miguel Vargas is a former foreign minister of the Dominican Republic and a senior advisor to the Venezuela Solutions Group.

2. What exactly is the issue with the election results?

The voting, counting, and tallying system used in Venezuela includes a mechanism for verifying its operation and auditing its results through what is known as the “paper trail.” This paper trail consists of physical records and voting receipts that verify whether the results announced by the CNE reflect the valid will of the voters. The paper trail includes several components, such as the receipt given to each voter after casting their ballot. This receipt allows voters to confirm that it contains the candidate’s name and the organization they supported. This is the first step in the verification process. Voters then place this receipt into a secure box.

At the end of the voting process, the machine immediately prints out the voting record. For the presidential election on July 28, 30,026 voting machines were deployed for the CNE, each corresponding to a separate voting table. Consequently, 30,026 original voting records were printed and kept in the custody of the Plan República military personnel. Once the machine transmits the results, copies of the voting records are printed for all witnesses. These witnesses must verify that these copies are accurate reproductions of the original records printed by the system.

Additionally, each voting record features a QR code summarizing the data printed on the record. Following the transmission, up to 54 percent of the machines are audited by manually opening the boxes containing the printed voting receipts to ensure that the data on the records is accurate.

Starting on Monday, July 29, the opposition began publishing digitized images of the voting records collected by its witnesses. It is important to note that in many cases, Plan República agents prevented opposition witnesses from accessing this material. As of the time of this report, the opposition has managed to collect, validate, and digitize 83 percent of the election records.

However, the CNE has reported hacking of the 30,026 private transmission lines for the machines (one encrypted line per machine) and has refused to disclose the results broken down by center and table. This has made it impossible to compare the opposition’s copies with the results released by the CNE. Additionally, the telecommunications audit and phase II verification, scheduled for July 29 and August 2, respectively, were suspended. These reviews are crucial for assessing the consistency of the announced results.

Trust in an automated voting system is not a matter of faith. Trust is built through auditability, and to date, the Venezuelan government has obstructed the auditability of the results. After more than two weeks, there are also reasonable concerns about the custody of physical electoral materials and databases. The initial international request to present the voting records is proving to be inadequate.

—Eugenio Martínez is the director of Votoscopio, a Venezuela elections specialist, and a member of the Venezuela Solutions Group.

3. What role can other countries in the region play?

Latin American countries have a crucial responsibility at this moment. It is necessary to support efforts to promote credible negotiations that will lead to a peaceful and democratic solution in Venezuela. However, it is imperative that any negotiations incorporate the desire of both the Venezuelan people and all of Latin America to respect the rule of law and democratic order in Venezuela. Only through a firm commitment to these principles can we move toward a solution that reflects the will of the Venezuelan people.

—Miguel Vargas

Faced with this reality, it is imperative that Latin American countries continue to demand electoral transparency and condemn repression and the violation of human rights. It is essential to increase diplomatic coordination and demand transparency, independent auditing, and respect for the popular vote. Only with a firm and coordinated position in the region will we be able to engender a way out of the deep crisis in Venezuela, which must occur through a credible and realistic negotiation process with the accompaniment of guarantor countries.

—María Ángela Holguín

4. Is there any hope the Maduro regime will negotiate a transfer of power?

We must start from the premise that Maduro’s government made a political decision in ignoring the results of the presidential election. This implies a radical break with popular sovereignty, which Chavismo proclaimed as the foundation of its legitimacy. The cost of this rupture is as high as the associated costs of international isolation and of reversing steps taken toward economic stabilization, because it enshrines the divorce between the ruling coalition and its popular bases. However, the dominant coalition perceives that it can stay in power if it manages to deflate the strong feeling of change and, above all, unity, through the weakening of the leadership of María Corina Machado and González, in a kind of repetition of the resistance-attrition strategy it used to address the 2019 crisis with the interim government of Juan Guaidó.

The ruling coalition tries to do so through repression and self-isolation. It is attempting to prevent an internationally supported negotiation from forcing it to recognize the opposition’s victory. And it is doing so with a degree of open, articulate, and express support from the military that had not been necessary to exhibit in the past. The efforts of Colombian President Gustavo Petro and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva are geared toward opening a crack to move Maduro from his position, which at this time is completely insensitive to the usual list of incentives. Thus, it is not foreseeable that in the short term an effective negotiating body can be built to ensure the verification of results. Perhaps it is necessary to start, as in serious armed conflicts, with more basic areas of agreement, such as advancing mutual guarantees and respect for human rights.

—Colette Capriles is an associate professor and researcher in philosophy, politics, and social sciences at Simón Bolívar University and a member of the Venezuela Solutions Group.

5. How is the US working to advance a democratic transition?

On August 11, the Wall Street Journal reported that Washington is engaged in secret talks with Maduro, and may be offering him and those around him an amnesty from US narcoterrorism charges in exchange for a democratic transition. This news may be a sign that the Biden administration is trying to preserve space for negotiations behind the scenes. However, Maduro is a serial abuser of dialogue and, should these efforts fail, it is likely that the White House’s patience will run out. The good news is that the United States still holds considerable leverage, which can be used to shape elite interests and maximize opportunities for a democratic solution.

For the Biden administration, the challenge lies in finding a balance between applying targeted, effective pressure on elites and preventing Venezuela from drifting further into Russia’s and China’s spheres of influence. Some in Washington fear that a return to “maximum pressure” could drive Maduro closer to the United States’ geopolitical rivals. Individual sanctions may be a more appealing strategy, but it will be crucial to focus this pressure on fostering a democratic opening while avoiding actions that strengthen regime unity. More than 160 regime members have already been sanctioned—many of whom have been celebrated in public ceremonies and awarded replica swords of Venezuela’s liberator, Simón Bolívar. Bringing pressure to bear while avoiding anything that helps unify Maduro’s coalition at his weakest moment in years will be absolutely crucial.

—Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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A Russia without Russians? Putin’s disastrous demographics

Harley Balzer — Wed, 07 Aug 2024 14:00:00 +0000

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 challenged much of the common Western understanding of Russia. How can the world better understand Russia? What are the steps forward for Western policy? The Eurasia Center’s new “Russia Tomorrow” series seeks to reevaluate conceptions of Russia today and better prepare for its future tomorrow.

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Introduction

I. Addressing the Soviet legacy

II. Pre-war policies

III. The ethnic variable

V. Conclusion

About the author

Russia’s future will be characterized by a smaller population. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war has virtually guaranteed that for generations to come, Russia’s population will be not only smaller, but also older, more fragile, and less well-educated. It will almost certainly be ethnically less Russian and more religiously diverse. While some might view diversity as a strength, many Russians do not see it this way. In a world with hordes of people on the move to escape war, persecution, poverty, and the increasing impact of climate change, xenophobic political rhetoric sells well.

Putin has spoken frequently about Russia’s demographic problems, beginning in his first months as president. Despite spending trillions of rubles on high-profile “national projects” to remedy the situation, population decline continued. Putin’s choice of timing for military aggression in Ukraine might have reflected an understanding that Russia’s demographic (and economic) situation would not improve in the next two decades. However, the war is turning a growing crisis into a catastrophe.

The demographic consequences from the Russian war against Ukraine, like those from World War II and the health, birth rate and life expectancy impact from Russia’s protracted transition in the 1990s, will echo for generations. Russia’s population will decline for the rest of the twenty-first century, and ethnic Russians will be a smaller proportion of that population. The ethnic and religious groups that embrace the “traditional family values” Putin favors are predominantly non-Russian.

United Nations scenarios project Russia’s population in 2100 to be between 74 million and 112 million compared with the current 146 million. The most recent UN projections are for the world’s population to decline by about 20 percent by 2100. The estimate for Russia is a decline of 25 to 50 percent.

While Russia is hardly unique in facing declining birth rates and an aging population, high adult mortality, and infertility among both men and women, increasingly limited immigration and continuing brain drain make Russia’s situation particularly challenging. Population size is determined by a combination of natural factors—birth rates and life expectancy, along with the emigration-immigration balance. Putin’s war on Ukraine has undermined all the potential sources of population growth.

There have been four important inflection points in demography policy since Putin became president. The first came in 2006, when Putin’s rhetoric about demography finally resulted in specific policies: demography was one of the first four national projects he launched at that time. The second significant change came following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. The reaction to that aggression in Ukraine, Moldova, and other former Soviet republics narrowed the number of countries providing labor to Russia.

A third key moment was the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack near Moscow in March 2024. Tajiks made up half of the immigrants to Russia in 2023, but that has become politically problematic in the aftermath of the Crocus attack. The most recent policy shifts accompanied the formation of a new government in May 2024. Initial reports promise a long-term approach that perhaps begins to recognize Russia’s new demographic reality. It comes too late, and the measures proposed fail to offer new solutions.

The paper begins with a summary of the demographic problems the Russian Federation inherited from the Soviet Union and its ineffective initial response. The second section reviews the deteriorating situation after 2013. The third section focuses on ways Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine is exacerbating all of these challenges. The conclusion suggests what impact population decline will have on Russia’s future.

Addressing the Soviet legacy

The Soviet Union experienced multiple demographic shocks in the twentieth century. Following Joseph Stalin’s death, recovery appeared possible. Yet by the 1960s, Russia’s high infant mortality and low adult life expectancy were outliers compared with most highly industrialized countries.

The population shock from World War II echoed for decades. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s anti-alcohol campaign in 1986–1987 generated a brief improvement in life expectancy, but this was hardly enough to change the dynamic.

Economic disruptions, beginning with Gorbachev’s perestroika and continuing into the 1990s, resulted in fewer births, higher mortality, and significant emigration. The dissolution of the Soviet Union spurred massive population relocation, as millions of Russians and non-Russians returned to their titular homelands. Every former Soviet republic became more ethnically homogeneous. This trend has continued within the Russian Federation, as some non-Russian republics continue to become less Russian. Russians relocating within the Russian Federation have reduced the population in the Far East.

Russia’s immigration-emigration balance involves several population flows. Russians have moved back to Russia from newly independent former Soviet republics. As Russia’s economy improved, labor migrants, primarily from former Soviet republics, have found formal and informal work in Russia. Prior to the war, the immigrants compensated for the multiple waves of (mostly Russian) people emigrating from Russia.

The breakdown of the Warsaw Pact —and then the Soviet Union itself—disrupted economic linkages and supply chains that had existed for decades. Economic insecurity reduced already-declining birth rates across much of the post-Soviet space. Russia’s total fertility rate (TFR)—the number of births per woman—dropped from just below replacement level in 1988 to 1.3 in 2004. Maintaining a population level requires a TFR of at least 2.1 without positive net immigration; Russia’s high adult mortality rate requires one even higher.

In his initial inaugural address in August 2000, Putin warned that Russia could become “an enfeebled nation” due to population decline. Despite the warnings, little was done. Russia’s TFR increased from 1.25 in 2000 to 1.39 in 2007. This slight improvement reflected better economic conditions due to rising oil prices, and a (temporarily) larger number of women in the 18–35 age cohort.

One reason for persistent difficulty in achieving higher birth rates or TFR numbers has been the legacy of Soviet polices. Lack of access to effective birth control and male resistance to condom use resulted in abortion being the widely used solution for unwanted pregnancies. Murray Feshbach calculated that the Soviet-era abortion rate averaged seven per woman. Far less attention has been devoted to male infertility. Alcohol and substance abuse have resulted in unusually high infertility rates among Russian men.

Low birth rates are only one part of the population problem. Unhealthy diet and lifestyle, binge alcohol consumption, and accidents contribute to the high adult mortality numbers. When Putin was first elected president in 2000, Russian men aged 18–64 were dying at four times the rate of European men. Russian women were perishing at about the same rate as European men.
Until early 2005, Putin’s public position was that Russia could offset its population decline by attracting more Russians living in former Soviet republics to return to Russia, bringing with them needed skills while augmenting the ethnic Russian population. This immigration offset much of the population loss in the 1990s but has increasingly declined since Putin became president. Significantly, non-Russians became the dominant labor migrants.

Data from the Russian state statistics service Goskomstat indicate legal immigration peaked at 1.147 million in 1994 and declined each year thereafter, shrinking to 350,900 in 2000 and 70,000 in 2004.

Despite the declining numbers, the Russian government adopted a highly restrictive law in 2002 limiting legal immigration. When the Security Council discussed immigration again in 2005, Putin called for a more “humane approach,” dropping the racial and religious criteria. Yet he followed this with a “clarification” prioritizing Russian speakers. It is possible that Putin understood the situation but adjusted his rhetoric in accord with public opinion.

Russian media reports of a massive influx of Chinese immigrants in the 1990s were wildly exaggerated. By 2000, as oil prices rose, workers from Central Asia, Ukraine, and Moldova found formal or informal work in Russia. Russia incorporated the populations of Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014, and additional territories since 2022, which accounts for official claims of a larger “Russian” population.

Immigrants to Russia have come overwhelmingly from former Soviet republics, which account for 95–96 percent of the total. Just five countries that were part of the Soviet Union (Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) had population growth between 1989 and 2004. Migrants from two former Soviet republics with declining populations, Ukraine and Moldova, continued to provide labor until 2014. Putin reiterated the importance of demography in his inaugural addresses in 2012, 2018, and 2024, and in many of his annual call-in programs. Several times he has acknowledged the failure to achieve promised increases in births. Yet there appears to be no learning curve regarding policies. Putin’s 2024 address promised more of the same: paying Russians to have larger families, accompanied by invoking the need for more soldiers to defend the motherland.

Pre-war policies

As the price of oil increased in the 2000s, Putin’s government debated how to use the windfall to address persistent demographic challenges. As in many countries, immigration remains politically fraught. Russian nationalist groups adopted “Russia for the Russians” as a campaign slogan. Improving life expectancy is an ideal solution, but it is slow and expensive, depending on adults taking care of their health. Putin’s government opted for pro-natal policies. In his presidential address in 2006, Putin cited demography as “the most serious problem in Russia today.” Rather than listening to advisers familiar with the basket of diverse policies that improved birth rates in France and Sweden—prenatal and postnatal care, parental leave, daycare, preschool programs, housing support, and other incentives—Russia’s government emphasized “maternity capital.”

The initial maternity capital program offered incentives to women for the birth or adoption of a second or additional child. The funds, paid when a child turned three, could be used for housing, the child’s education at an accredited institution, the mother’s pension, or assistance for children with disabilities. Over time, changes have included payment for a first child and improved housing. The annually indexed funding was enough to encourage additional births in rural areas and smaller towns but had little impact in higher-priced urban areas that are home to 70 percent of the population. Moreover, many women who experienced giving birth in a Russian maternity hospital decided once was sufficient.

The pro-natal policy coincided with slightly higher Russian birth rates, raising the TFR from 1.3 when the maternity-capital program was launched in 2007 to nearly 1.8 in 2015. Most demographers, however, attribute the higher numbers to a (temporarily) larger cohort of women in prime child-bearing years, economic growth due to higher oil prices during Putin’s first two terms, and hopes that nationwide protests over the 2011–2012 elections augured real change. After 2012, the reduced number of returning compatriots offset the gains in births.

Despite the augmented maternity-capital program, Russia’s TFR dropped back to 1.5 by 2019, prior to COVID-19 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian official sources continued to report the rate as 1.8. Without immigration, even a TFR of 1.8 would result in Russia’s population decreasing by about 20–25 percent in each generation.

The other endogenous factor in natural population change is life expectancy. Russia is hardly an outlier in experiencing lower birth rates. Most countries outside of Africa are projected to have smaller populations in the coming decades. Yet Russia continues to be exceptional among developed countries in the rate of mortality among adults aged 18–64. Russia’s economic recovery during Putin’s first two terms as President did lead to some improvement. While Russian men died at four times the rate of European men in 1990, by 2022 the rate was merely double the European rate.

The modest improvements during Putin’s first two terms were due to the economic recovery, greater stability, and efforts to improve healthcare. Yet the major focus of the healthcare program was not the badly needed primary and preventive care. Instead, most of the funds were used to purchase expensive new equipment, creating opportunities for graft.

The improvements in life expectancy began to reverse by 2019. Russia’s COVID-19 response was deeply flawed, resulting in the highest per-capita death rate among industrialized countries, though official statistics have consistently concealed the impact.

Economic benefits from people living longer are double edged. The impact depends on individuals’ capacity to work and the related dependency ratio for the population. Societies need enough able-bodied workers to support the young, the old, and the disabled.

Russia’s demographic issues involve quality as well as quantity. Even before Putin opted to invade Ukraine, Russia was experiencing another significant brain drain. Just before the war, Valerii Fal’kov, Russia’s Minister of Science and Higher Education, told Putin that the number of scientists in Russia was declining. Outside of atomic energy and the defense industry, Russia’s best specialists preferred to work in the US, Europe, and “even China.” Nikolai Dolgushkin, Academy of Sciences Chief Scientific Secretary, reported that emigration by scientists had increased from 14,000 in 2012 to 70,000 in 2021. Russia was the only developed nation where the number of scientific personnel was shrinking.

The challenges have become more serious, as the war on Ukraine has resulted in as many as half a million young men killed or wounded, women choosing to forego having children, women being sent to fight in Ukraine, and more than one million mostly young and highly educated people choosing to leave Russia.

Replacing them has been increasingly undermined by shortsighted government policies. In a country with a history of claiming to be multinational while viewing Russians as the system-forming ethnicity, recent government policies are creating additional difficulties. One of the great ironies of the situation Putin has created is that, in addition to poor rural villagers, the demographic groups best matching his August 2022 decree advocating “preservation and strengthening traditional Russian spiritual-moral values” are Russia’s non-Russian and non-Russian Orthodox populations.

The ethnic variable

Russia’s birth rates vary across regions and ethnic and religious populations. The rates in major urban centers resemble those of Central Europe, with later marriages, widespread use of birth control, and a large number of single-child families. Rural regions and small towns tend to retain more traditional values around child-rearing. People in these venues marry and begin having children earlier and are far more likely to have two or more children. Yet 70 percent of Russians live in the urban centers. The citizens most likely to have large families live in villages, small towns, and Russia’s non-Russian regions and Republics. In 2023, the non-Russian share of the population was about 30%.

Putin-era policies have persistently undermined the principles of federalism enshrined in Russia’s 1993 constitution. Some non-Russians believe the assault on their special status stems, in part, from Russians fearing their higher birth rates.

Significant differences in birth rates among ethnic and religious groups within Russia pose serious policy challenges. Some groups have been more resistant to the “demographic transition” than others. The predominantly non-Russian and Muslim republics of the North Caucasus are experiencing the “demographic transition” more slowly than most Russian regions. The Chechens in particular have responded to their deportation to Central Asia during World War II with a strong pro-natal ethos.

Comparative studies find relationships between high birth rates and traditional religious beliefs in multiple places. Some accounts emphasize higher birth rates among Muslims, despite wide variation across communities. Religious conservatives in many faiths record higher birth rates: evangelical Christians, Mormons, Hindus, Orthodox Jews, and others. Some groups have historically been known for large families. In Russia, some non-Russian ethnic groups have higher birth rates than Russians. The birth rates in the largely Muslim North Caucasus have been a particular concern for Moscow. Despite birth rates among many ethnic populations declining, births in many non-Russian communities continue to remain higher than those of ethnic Russians.

Several analysts call attention to a phenomenon of ethnic groups that feel threatened responding with high fertility rates. Russia’s “punished peoples”—those accused of sympathizing with the Germans during World War II and deported from their homelands—have received particular attention. Marat Ilyasov, a scholar from Chechnya who now teaches in the US, makes a strong case for the Chechens, one of the groups that managed to return to their ancestral territory, striving for high birth rates to guarantee the nation’s survival. They have the highest birth rates in the country.

Chechens are hardly the only ethnic group in the North Caucasus with birth rates higher than the Russian average. Some official sources intentionally downplay the numbers of Chechens and other non-Russian groups in an attempt to emphasize “Russianness” and downplay the significance of non-Russian populations.

Some Russian demographers suggest that non-Russians are increasingly experiencing the “demographic revolution,” but at a slower pace. While this is plausible, complaints about changing definitions and undercounting in recent Russian censuses provide ample grounds for skepticism regarding the official numbers.

Even the official data show that birth rates continue to be higher among many of the non-Russian groups in Russia. Many leaders of non-Russian peoples claim that these populations are being sent to fight in Ukraine in far larger numbers than ethnic Russians. Russian officials try to emphasize that it is the rural population that provides most of the soldiers, due to the high wages the military offers.

Data show that individuals from ethnic republics in Russia’s far east and south have a far higher chance of being mobilized for combat. While proving intent is complicated, the numbers are shocking. Men living in Buryatia have a 50- to 100-percent greater chance of being sent to fight in Ukraine than a resident of Moscow or St. Petersburg.

It is too early to gauge whether the high numbers of deaths and injuries will stimulate a response by some groups to try increasing birth rates. It does appear that the war is resulting in a more serious decline in births among ethnic Russians in urban centers than in both Russian and non-Russian rural communities. Russia’s non-ethnic-Russian citizens increasingly perceive their populations as being singled out as cannon fodder in Ukraine.

Immigrants have also been pressed into military service, causing a precipitous drop in immigration.

Wartime policies undermine population growth

Russia’s natural population growth has been curtailed by mobilization, casualties, emigration, and widespread reluctance to have children. Illegally annexing Crimea added 2.4 million people to Russia’s population, but significantly reduced immigration from Ukraine and Moldova. After 2014, labor migration to Russia was limited to five countries in Central Asia. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine stalled, the Kremlin has consistently needed more troops, forcing increasing numbers of these workers into military service.

Offering high salaries has attracted mercenaries from Cuba, Syria and elsewhere, but devious tactics have discouraged many labor migrants. In 2023, half of Russia’s labor migrants came from Tajikistan. The Crocus City Hall terror attack in March 2024, which Russian law enforcement alleges was carried out by Tajiks, is curtailing this pipeline. Tajiks have been rounded up for deportation and subjected to physical violence. Efforts to develop new sources of labor migration from Southeast Asia have been undermined by Russia continuing to send labor migrants to Ukraine.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine also provoked another large exodus of Russians from Russia. Some families had their bags packed and were ready to leave when Russian troops crossed the border in February 2022. Mobilization in September 2022 caused an additional exodus, primarily by young men. Many information technology (IT) specialists left, believing they could continue to work while abroad.

A man walks past banners in support of the Russian Army in Saint Petersburg, Russia. (Anton Vaganov via REUTERS)

Emigration by hundreds of thousands of young men, and an unknown number of young women, is reducing the already small cohort of Russians in prime reproductive years. Hundreds of thousands of men being sent to serve in Ukraine further limits reproductive potential. Russian women have increasingly opted to avoid pregnancy in the face of economic difficulties and growing uncertainty. In the first half of 2023, a record number of Russians applied for passports for travel abroad “just in case” (na vsyaki sluchi).

The regime has responded with efforts to prevent abortion and limit birth control. This comes at a time when abortions are less frequent. Some Russian women are choosing sterilization instead. This represents an ironic shift from the Soviet-era legacy of many women being unable to have children due to multiple abortions. Births in 2023 reflected the lowest fertility rate in the past two or three centuries.

The declining value of the ruble and raids on immigrant communities to conscript workers to fight in Ukraine have reduced the number of Central Asians seeking work in Russia. The number willing to become paid mercenaries is limited.

Russia’s leadership apparently did not anticipate the need to recruit additional soldiers for a protracted war in 2022. Doing so now represents a serious challenge. Data in 2015 indicated that Russians were pleased that Crimea was under Russian control. However, fewer than 20 percent of Russians surveyed thought their government should spend large sums to rebuild occupied areas of Ukraine, especially the Donbas region. Fewer than 10 percent said it was worth risking Russian lives to keep these territories.

The Russian government’s polling consistently reports approval for the war as high as 70–80 percent. Some Western analysts accept these numbers, and some have commissioned their own polling that confirms strong support for the war. Others are dubious, reporting data similar to those of 2015, when respondents were asked about financing reconstruction or the need to suffer casualties.

One indication that Russia’s leadership understands the problem of sending Russians to fight in Ukraine is an increasingly desperate and shortsighted attempt to find alternatives to mobilizing more Russians. After the February 2022 invasion provoked a large exodus of Russians of all ages, the “partial” mobilization conducted in September 2022 resulted in tens of thousands more, primarily young men, leaving the country. No one has precise data, and many of these Russian citizens have moved on from their initial refuge. If seven hundred thousand Russians now registered as living in Dubai is any indication, the émigrés may number far more than one million.

The people mobilized are overwhelmingly from low-income rural and non-Russian regions. Stories have emerged about recruits needing to provide their own equipment, including bandages in case of injury. Some received less than a week of training before being sent into combat. These conditions confirm the belief that the authorities view them as expendable cannon fodder. The result is widespread efforts to evade serving.

In an attempt to reduce the need for mobilization, other tactics were developed. Yevgeny Prigozhin, founder of the paramilitary Wagner Group, toured Russian prisons to offer convicts the opportunity to serve six months in Ukraine in return for presidential pardons. Tens of thousands took him up on the offer and died at the front. Survivors have returned to Russia, with some resuming their criminal activity, including rape and murder.

Prigozhin perished when his plane was shot down a few months after he staged an aborted march to Moscow to convince Putin to fire military commanders the Wagner leader deemed incompetent. But his program lives on, and recent reports indicate it is being expanded to include female prisoners.

Ironically, while the convicts who survive their six-month contracts have been allowed to return home, Russians who have been fighting for two years or more are still on active duty. Their families are furious. One of the few significant protest groups left in Russia, “the Council of Wives and Mothers,” that has protested the length of time their husbands and sons have been forced to serve, was declared a foreign agent in July 2023 in an effort by Putin to stifle public awareness of the treatment of soldiers and overall casualties in the war.

Despite major recruitment efforts, Russia is not experiencing a major influx of new immigrants or returning compatriots. The full-scale war has further limited the already diminishing prospects of inducing a large share of the 30 million Russians living outside of Russia to return home. In 2006, Putin signed a decree establishing a program to encourage Russians to return, and some eight hundred thousand did so between 2006 and 2018. The number of both applications and returns declined in 2020 due to COVID-19. The numbers recovered slightly in 2021 but declined after the start of the full-scale war in 2022. In 2023 the number applying to return was the lowest in a decade. The number who did return dropped below the 2020 COVID-19 level:

Legislation designed to prohibit Russians—especially mobile IT workers—from working while abroad has provoked sharp battles between security services and Russian companies that depend on these employees in a tight labor market.

Treatment of Central Asian and other foreign labor migrants has increasingly shifted to forced labor and sometimes outright slavery. Central Asians working in Russia have been rounded up and sent to join the war on Ukraine. A study of the Uzbek community reports that many Uzbeks have been arrested for minor or contrived offenses and sentenced to terms of fifteen, twenty, or even twenty-five years. Once in prison, they are offered the Wagner option of “volunteering” to fight in Ukraine.

Predatory practices have extended beyond Russia’s usual sources of migrant workers. Individuals from Nepal, Syria, and India have been recruited to work in factories or as guards at various venues in Russia. After they arrive, their passports are confiscated and they are sent to fight in Ukraine. As during World War II, punishment squads are deployed to prevent soldiers from retreating. These predatory tactics differ from the treatment of Cuban and African mercenaries who are attracted by the money.

In addition to money, another inducement to attract foreign fighters is the offer of Russian citizenship. If these commitments are honored, the result will be to add more non-Russians to the country’s population. The disastrous long-term impact of the predatory recruitment policies is clear. As information (and bodies) reach families, word spreads. Russian programs to increase labor recruitment in Southeast Asia are being undermined as word of these tactics spreads.

Conclusion

Why would a leader who has proclaimed demography to be one of the most serious threats to a nation’s future launch an unprovoked war against a neighboring country that was a significant source of labor before 2014? We may never be able to answer this. We can conclude that Putin has turned a daunting crisis into a cataclysm.

Putin’s policies cannot solve these demographic problems. He has been reiterating the importance of Russia’s dire demographic situation for a quarter-century. Manipulating demographic data, adding people in occupied Ukrainian regions to Russia’s population, and omitting war casualties from the census do not generate sustainable population growth. These tactics cannot meet the needs of employers who report serious labor shortages in nearly every sector of the economy. Russia’s defense industry is operating “three shifts” by requiring workers to work sixty to seventy hours per week. The sustainability of these measures and the impact on quality raise significant questions. Financial incentives are undermined when workers are compelled to make “voluntary” contributions to fund the war effort.

In 2022–2023, the most serious labor shortages were reported in agriculture and construction, sectors that rely heavily on Central Asian migrants. Now Russia’s government is endeavoring to attract labor from India, Pakistan, and North Korea to replace the war casualties and émigrés. Firms involved in production, retail, logistics, and e-commerce face labor shortages. While manufacturers continue to prefer Russian workers, one company told journalists that bringing workers from India required paying salaries at the same level as those for Russian staff, plus the cost of transporting and registering the workers. Yet the company was looking for a contractor to arrange providing five hundred workers from India. The reasoning was that workers who lack Russian language are less likely to be recruited by competitors, while foreign workers who know Russian are more mobile.

A Russian entrepreneur noted that labor brokers in Kazakhstan smuggle thousands of workers from Bangladesh into that country in containers each year. They are now offering their services to Russian employers, suggesting that the same tactics can be used to bring workers from India. Others point out that labor from India remains crucial in several Middle Eastern countries where wages are higher, making Russia the option for the least skilled and least desirable migrants.

Sources of labor globally are increasing due to population growth in developing countries that face serious impacts from climate change. Demographers project that the major growth in global population during the rest of the twenty-first century will be in Africa. Yet the six African countries with the largest populations also appear on most lists of the places likely to face the greatest threats from climate change. As in Latin America, this will result in “green migration.” These are not traditional sources of labor for Russia, and the regime may choose to rely on these countries for mercenaries.

Putin’s government has not evinced visible concern that Russia’s population might be cut in half by century’s end. Unless Russia’s leaders can develop and finance a more effective set of policies, the only solutions to population decline will be a combination of incorporating non-Russian territory and/or immigration from Asia and Africa.

If Putin truly believed that demography is an existential problem for Russia, he might have calculated how many Ukrainians lived or worked in Russia before annexing Crimea and launching an invasion.

Putin’s regime is both seeking and discouraging repatriation by compatriots. On February 1, 2024, Russian media reported new legislation allowing the government to seize property belonging to Russians outside the country who criticize the war on Ukraine. Multiple instances have been reported of Russian diplomats and security personnel demanding that other countries detain and repatriate Russians who speak freely. Threats to seize their property in Russia are a logical extension of policies threatening family members still living in Russia.

At the same time, Russia’s policy does encourage compatriots to return, even as other citizens continue to depart.

One possible solution to the problems compounding Russia’s labor shortage would be to decentralize policy, allowing Russian regions to make their own decisions about attracting foreign labor. The resulting competition could go a long way toward improving conditions for foreign workers. Regional development was the prime mover in China’s massive urbanization and industrialization after 1978. While this involved horizontal mobility within the country, the model would resemble the significant influx of immigrants that, at least thus far, has kept the US population at well above replacement level. As Russia’s population continues to decline, immigrants will be increasingly vital to economic recovery.

Invading Ukraine while facing a catastrophic demographic challenge appears to have been a massive folly for the Kremlin. Hubris based on an astonishing intelligence failure might account for the miscalculation. Another possible explanation is that Putin understood that Russia’s economic and demographic challenges mean the country would not be in a more favorable condition any time in the coming decades.

Every corner of Russia’s economy is experiencing personnel shortages, while war casualties continue to shrink the able-bodied population. Russians and their leaders must learn to value diversity, or Russia will have an increasingly smaller and older population. Either way, there will be fewer ethnic Russians.

About the author

Jason Marczak

Vice President and Senior Director

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Americas Caribbean

The post Marczak quoted by AP on Venezuela’s election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Can Maduro hold onto power?

Atlantic Council — Mon, 29 Jul 2024 20:17:07 +0000

JUST IN

He’s not giving up without a fight. Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s election commission declared him the winner in Sunday’s vote, despite ample evidence of fraud and intimidation. Opposition candidate Edmundo González declared victory as the United States and other countries expressed concerns about the results. What will be the opposition’s next move? How will Maduro respond? And what role will regional and global powers play? We polled our experts for the answers.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION COURTESY OF

Jason Marczak (@jmarczak): Vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center
Iria Puyosa (@NSC): Senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab
Geoff Ramsey (@GRamsey_LatAm): Senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

How to steal an election

The stage was set for this moment in the months leading up to the vote, when the regime banned opposition leader María Corina Machado, with González ending up on the ballot. Then, as Jason points out, only small delegations from the United Nations and the Carter Center were allowed to monitor the vote, meaning “the González campaign could only count on its own observers to verify results.”
The González camp said he won about 70 percent of the votes that his team was able to verify—while Venezuela’s National Electoral Council claimed that González won 44 percent of the vote, with Maduro earning 51 percent. Jason notes that “it would be a mathematical miracle for Maduro to prevail” based on how the opposition has described the votes that it has seen.
The public isn’t fooled, Iria tells us, noting the “outpouring of messages and videos on social media” from witnesses on the ground indicating their certainty that González won. “This is strengthening the opposition’s unity and determination to continue its fight for the restoration of democracy,” she adds.
As of this afternoon, those voters are mobilizing in the streets, creating a new test for the regime. “Maduro has to convince the ruling elite that he can keep things under control, but both he and the military know that he can’t govern a country in flames,” Geoff says. “He’s effectively inviting the biggest loyalty test he’s faced in years.”

Pressure from abroad

In addition to the “serious concerns” expressed by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, several countries throughout the region called for more transparency around the vote count—including neighboring Colombia, where, as Jason notes, “President Gustavo Petro has maintained a close relationship with Maduro.”
Without full results and an independent audit, “the international community has no choice but to respond with swift condemnation and diplomatic pressure,” Geoff says, with the United States and its allies in Latin America and Europe playing a crucial role.
That international pressure will be important to uphold the will of Venezuelans, but there are self-interested reasons for regional and international powers to push for change. Jason says another six years of Maduro will lead to “new outward migration flows and new transnational criminal activity that will extend far beyond Venezuela’s borders.”

Crackdown at home?

The major point of contention will be sanctions, which the United States reimposed in April after the Maduro government didn’t uphold its end of last year’s deal to hold free and fair elections. “I doubt Venezuelan elites are eager for six more years of repression, sanctions, and economic catastrophe,” Geoff says.
The opposition, therefore, should “exploit divisions within the ruling coalition,” Iria says. At the same time, opposition leaders should “find ways to address public discontent without exposing the population to the violent repression experienced in 2017.”
And if Maduro were to return to the bargaining table, it would look very different from the negotiations between the government and the opposition, Iria tells us. Now, she says, negotiations would no longer be about electoral conditions “but rather on Chavismo’s exit from power after its defeat in the voting booths. The next six months will be a crucial period of intense conflict in Venezuela.”

The post Ramsey quoted in Los Angeles Times on Venezuela’s election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The West should articulate the possibility of a European future for Belarus now

Richard Cashman — Thu, 25 Jul 2024 20:12:28 +0000

Belarus is often overlooked by the Euro-Atlantic policy-making community, with many taking for granted the relative stability represented by Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka during his three decades in power. In reality, however, today’s Belarus may soon reach a fork in the road that will force its people to choose between European democracy and Eurasian autocracy. The choice they make will have significant implications for Euro-Atlantic security. Articulating the possibility of a European future for Belarusians now can help shape their thoughts and actions when the time comes.

During the 1990s, some Russians claimed the dictatorial Lukashenka model was exactly what the troubled and oligarchic Russian Federation needed. Although always opposed to the Belarusian language and broadly aligned with Moscow, Lukashenka tenaciously maintained his independence when Vladimir Putin came to power in Russia, skillfully extracting benefits from both the Kremlin and the West.

This independence was severely undermined by the massive grassroots protests that erupted in Belarus in the wake of the country’s 2020 presidential vote. Large numbers of Belarusians believed reformist opposition candidate Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya had won the election and took to the streets to protest. Lukashenka only survived thanks to Russian support. This left him far more reliant on the Kremlin and significantly reduced his room for maneuver.

In February 2022, Lukashenka allowed Putin to use Belarusian territory to launch his full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, it soon became clear that things were not going according to Putin’s plan. Russia’s heavy losses during the initial weeks of the invasion restored some of Lukashenka’s independence, while disquiet in his own armed forces and some quarters of the security services convinced him that further direct involvement in Russia’s war would be folly. Since then, Lukashenka has provided training and equipment to Russian forces, but has resisted pressure to join the invasion.

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Putin remains eager to exploit Belarus’s resources and strategic position to threaten Kyiv once more and to target Western supplies entering Ukraine from Poland. Belarus could also play an important role in the future, if Russia seeks to intensify hybrid hostilities against the Baltic states or to launch a direct attack. This looks unlikely as long as Lukashenka remains in power. The Belarusian dictator may therefore represent a status quo which fundamentally favors Ukraine and its allies more than Russia.

If Putin continues to fail in his immediate objective of occupying all of Ukraine’s Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions, there is a real possibility that he will ultimately lose patience with Lukashenka and move to either replace him or otherwise compel Belarus to join the invasion. Moreover, it is almost certain that Putin will attempt to secure Belarusian human and material resources if Lukashenka dies before him.

Many Belarusians already know what would await them if Putin fully incorporated and militarized their country. They would experience an oligarchic raiding of businesses, covert or overt mobilization, and the extinguishing of the traditionally Western-looking aspect that is an important part of Belarusian national identity.

In contrast, if Belarusians manage to maintain their independence and empower a reformist leadership, they can begin moving towards European integration, with European Union membership an eventual possibility. In this context, it is vital that all Belarusians, including political elites along with members of the military and security forces, receive assurances that they have a viable alternative to the Kremlin vision for their country’s future.

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Articulating a European future for Belarus does not need to entail talk of NATO membership. Instead, it should involve acknowledging the possibility of removing sanctions, enhancing access to EU travel, education, and capital, and eventually embracing Belarus’s modest population of 9.2 million people under democratic leadership and after deep structural reforms.

From a purely practical standpoint, European integration would not be an insurmountable task. Lukashenka’s repressive regime has actually resulted in relatively good infrastructure conditions for Belarusians, especially in rural areas, compared to most other former Soviet republics. Belarus boasts a highly educated and comparatively young demographic. Prior to the 2020 protests, the country had burgeoning IT and entrepreneurial sectors.

A Belarus free of Russian military entanglements and increasingly aligned with the Euro-Atlantic community instead of the developing Russia-China-Iran-North Korea axis of autocracies would contribute significantly to the security of Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltic states. A Belarusian geopolitical pivot toward the West could also encourage transformation inside Russia itself and compel more Russians to embrace a post-imperial identity.

Failure to articulate the possibility of a European future for Belarus leaves the Euro-Atlantic community at risk of being caught off guard without a plan when Belarus does, indeed, reach its fork in the road. This may come sooner than many are prepared for. By taking steps now to engage with Belarusian society, the EU can strengthen its own foreign policy credentials as a major geopolitical player, mitigate against the risk of a rapid Russian militarization of Belarus, and set the stage for a cooperative relationship with Belarusians in the years to come.

Richard Cashman is a nonresident fellow at the Centre for Defence Strategies.

The Olympics never take place in a political vacuum, and this year’s context is chilling.

By comparison, the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics unfolded just before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and just after Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin entered their bloody, “no limits” partnership. The 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics were tarnished by revelations of Russia’s state-sponsored doping program and set the stage for Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics before them signaled Xi’s rise as China’s most powerful and autocratic leader since Mao Zedong, and Putin’s Russia invaded neighboring Georgia during the Games.

The Olympics never take place in a political vacuum, and this year’s context is chilling: wars in Europe and the Middle East and growing tensions in Asia, all of which contribute to the biggest threats to global order since the 1930s.

“The world is really longing for something unifying among all these tensions and confrontations,” International Olympic Committee (IOC) President Thomas Bach noted in a recent must-read Washington Post feature. Bach added that the Paris Olympics could be that something. Speaking last November at the United Nations, the IOC president worried that the world was in a “dangerous downward spiral . . . Political, social, and economic divisions are gaining more ground.”

The Washington Post’s Les Carpenter writes, “Many in the Olympic world are hoping these Games will do what Los Angeles did 40 years ago” at the 1984 Summer Games.

Those Olympics followed the US-led boycott, joined by more than sixty countries, of the 1980 Moscow Summer Games to protest the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. The Los Angeles Games also set the stage for one of the most dramatic expansions of democracy in history.

They transpired toward the end of US President Ronald Reagan’s first term and five short years before the Berlin Wall’s fall, which was followed by the Soviet Union’s collapse. They were a demonstration of a vibrant US democracy, full of confidence and determined to shape its times.

The games also marked a new, successful business model for the Olympic movement. They were run by a young travel executive named Peter Ueberroth, who introduced rich television deals and corporate sponsorships that produced more than two hundred million dollars in profit. The Soviets and many of their allies boycotted, and US athletes won four times more gold medals than anyone else.

It’s hard to say what legacy the Paris Games might have, though their context feels less promising than Reagan’s “morning in America.” From tomorrow through August 11, the Paris Olympics will coexist with the continued reverberations from French President Emmanuel Macron’s call for snap parliamentary elections, which resulted on July 7 in victory for the New Popular Front, a broad alliance of left-wing parties, and an unexpected defeat for the far right, with a prime minister yet to be chosen.

In the United States, a particularly divisive and decisive election will follow in November, amid an assassination attempt on former President Donald Trump and President Joe Biden’s withdrawal as a candidate.

There have been worse contexts for Olympics.

In 1936, Adolf Hitler used the Berlin Games to rally fascism ahead of World War II; five Games have been cancelled due to wars; Munich’s 1972 Olympics were blighted by a terrorist attack that killed Israeli athletes. Putin has launched invasions of northern Georgia, Crimea, and eastern Ukraine during the period of “Olympic truce,” when for the week ahead of the Games and the week after world leaders agree not to attack other countries.

Here’s the 2024 backdrop: The years that followed the Los Angeles Games saw more countries than ever become democratic—a formidable wave of democracy that lasted more than two decades. This stopped around 2006, and democracy has been in relative decline since then, according to Freedom House, the V-Dem Institute, and the Atlantic Council’s own Freedom and Prosperity Indexes.

When the final medal is awarded and the last athlete departs, the Paris Olympics will likely have reflected more than shaped our geopolitical scrum. They won’t signal autocratic rise, as did those in Beijing and Moscow before them, but it’s probably too much to expect that, like Los Angeles, they will be followed by a positive wave of democratic change.

The good news is that the next five Olympic Games, including both winter and summer, are in Milan-Cortina, Los Angeles, the French Alps, Brisbane, and Salt Lake City. Each will be held in a country that democratically elects its government, and each can be a milestone to measure if democracies are on a winning trajectory.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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I was sentenced to ten years in absentia for highlighting Belarus’s descent into dictatorship

Alesia Rudnik — Tue, 16 Jul 2024 19:48:25 +0000

At the beginning of July, I was one of twenty internationally-based Belarusian academics, analysts, and journalists to be sentenced in absentia by a court in Minsk on charges of conspiracy to overthrow the government and taking part in an extremist group.

News of my ten-year sentence provoked very conflicting emotions. While many colleagues congratulated me on what they saw as tacit recognition of my efforts in support of a democratic Belarus, I have struggled to find the right words when explaining to my Belarusian relatives that we may never meet again.

The charges against me and my co-defendants did not come as a complete surprise, of course. Nevertheless, at a time when the struggle for Belarusian democracy is no longer in the international spotlight, it is important to reflect on how we arrived at this point.

Back in the summer of 2020, there were unmistakable signs of growing political engagement throughout Belarusian society. More and more ordinary people were volunteering to join the campaigns of opposition candidates in the country’s upcoming presidential election, or simply expressing their political opinions. Although I was studying outside the country at the time, I also made a conscious decision to continue writing about the political situation in my homeland.

When Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka was then proclaimed the winner of a deeply flawed presidential ballot in August 2020, I was among the thousands of journalists, activists, and academics to speak up against election fraud and condemn the violent Kremlin-backed crackdown that followed. Like me, some had already left Belarus to advance their careers abroad. Others were forced to flee as the regime sought to silence domestic dissent. This large community of exiled Belarusians has continued its open criticism of the Lukashenka regime.

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Lukashenka was able to suppress the 2020 protest movement in Belarus thanks to Russian support. Ever since, he has remained heavily dependent on Moscow for his political survival. In exchange for this backing, he has allowed the Kremlin to expand its influence over Belarus in a process that some have likened to a creeping annexation. Lukashenka has also agreed to play the role of junior partner in Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s hybrid war against the West.

In February 2022, Lukashenka allowed Putin to use Belarus as a base for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. During the first month of the invasion, the country served as a gateway for the Russian march on Kyiv, which the Kremlin hoped would be the decisive offensive of the war. Russia has since used Belarus as a training ground for troops and as a launch pad to bomb targets across Ukraine.

In 2023, Putin announced the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons to Belarus, further involving the country in the confrontation between Russia and the West. Moscow is also accused of funneling migrants through Belarus to the border with the EU as part of its efforts to weaponize illegal immigration.

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While tensions with the West have escalated, the domestic situation in Belarus has continued to deteriorate. Approximately one thousand four hundred people remain in prison on politically motivated charges, while up to six hundred thousand Belarusians are believed to have fled the country, representing more than five percent of the overall population.

In recent years, the Lukashenka regime has signaled its intention to target critics who have left the country. In January 2023, five administrators of a Telegram channel run by exiled Belarusians were each sentenced in absentia to twelve years. Since then, several more opposition politicians and activists have been convicted in the same fashion on charges of attempting to seize power, threatening national security, and organizing extremist groups.

On January 24, 2024, I woke up to news that I also faced similar charges along with nineteen colleagues. While we were arbitrarily grouped together as analysts of Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, many of us had never actually met each other. Our trial started in May. None of us were able to get in touch with assigned lawyers, receive court materials, or join the hearings online. Instead, the case proceeded amid an almost complete information blackout until we learned of our guilty verdicts and prison sentences on July 1.

When I received confirmation of my sentence, I was struck by an overwhelming sense of anger at the injustice and absurdity of the entire process. At the same time, I have also been filled with gratitude for the solidarity expressed by international organizations and colleagues.

Our trial is the latest indication of the increasingly authoritarian political climate in today’s Belarus. In my opinion, this attempt to punish critical voices located outside the country and beyond the reach of the Belarusian authorities reflects the insecurities of a man who knows he has long since lost any remaining legitimacy as ruler of the country. Lukashenka’s growing desperation makes him an even greater threat to Belarusians, and means that he is also significantly more dangerous internationally as an ally of the Kremlin.

Those inside Belarus are well aware of the Orwellian reality they must deal with on a daily basis. They know that any public opposition to the regime will likely have grave consequences. In contrast, Belarusians living abroad still have the opportunity to voice our political opinions and share information about the horrors unfolding in our homeland. It is vital we continue to do so. The fact that Lukashenka is now attempting to intimidate us confirms that our efforts are not in vain.

Alesia Rudnik is a PhD Fellow at Karlstad University in Sweden and director of Belarusian think tank The Center for New Ideas.

Atlantic Council — Sun, 14 Jul 2024 18:16:37 +0000

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Historic day for Ukraine as EU launches official membership talks

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 25 Jun 2024 19:43:21 +0000

Ukraine began official membership talks with the EU on June 25, providing the embattled East European nation with a powerful morale boost as it continues to fight for survival against Russia’s ongoing invasion.

The talks, which took place within the framework of an intergovernmental conference in Luxembourg, marked the launch of a process that could still take years to complete. While much work lies ahead, Ukrainian officials were keen to emphasize the symbolic importance of this latest milestone in the country’s long journey toward European integration.

“Today is an historic day,” commented Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in a celebratory social media post. “We will never be derailed from our path to a united Europe, to our common home of all European nations. A home that must be peaceful!”

Ukraine’s Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Olga Stefanishyna, who headed the country’s delegation in Luxembourg, called the talks “a truly historical moment for my country.” Stefanishyna noted that Tuesday’s breakthrough would give Ukrainians “the moral power to continue withstanding” Russia’s invasion.

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While the official start of accession talks was widely toasted in Kyiv, formal negotiations are unlikely to get underway for several more months. Ukraine must then implement a wide range of reforms in thirty-five separate policy areas in order to bring the country’s laws and regulations into line with EU standards. Ukrainian officials have spoken tentatively of aiming to join the EU by 2030, but even this timeline might be overly optimistic.

Nor does the start of negotiations represent any guarantee of future Ukrainian EU membership. A host of other European countries including Türkiye, Serbia, North Macedonia, and Albania are all also bidding to join the bloc. The experience of the Western Balkans in particular illustrates the challenges of transitioning from EU candidate to member status, with numerous countries still struggling to advance despite in some cases more than a decade of talks.

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Ukraine’s progress on the road to EU membership has been remarkably rapid since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Days after the outbreak of hostilities, President Zelenskyy announced the country’s application to join the European Union in a video address delivered from Kyiv as columns of Russian troops advanced on the city. Four months later, EU leaders granted Ukraine official candidate country status. The decision to begin talks then followed amid much fanfare in December 2023. Rarely has Brussels bureaucracy seemed so dramatic.

For millions of Ukrainians, the quest for EU membership represents the country’s civilizational choice of a European future and the decisive rejection of Russian authoritarianism. This historic shift began in 1991, when more than ninety percent of Ukrainians backed the country’s declaration of independence and voted to leave the Soviet Union.

The next major milestone in Ukraine’s geopolitical divorce from Russia was the 2004 Orange Revolution, which saw Ukrainians from across the country flood into Kyiv to protest a rigged presidential vote and prevent the election of a Kremlin-backed candidate. This was to prove a watershed moment in post-Soviet history; the Orange Revolution established Ukraine’s European integration aspirations and sparked a rift with Russia that would only grow more pronounced over the coming decades.

Nine years after the Orange Revolution, Ukrainians once more took to the streets to oppose a renewed Russian bid to force the country back into the Kremlin orbit. The 2013-14 Euromaidan Revolution further cemented Ukraine’s pivot toward the West, while deepening the divide separating the country from Russia. Days after Ukraine’s ousted pro-Kremlin president Viktor Yanukovych fled across the border to Russia, Vladimir Putin began the invasion of Ukraine with the seizure of Crimea, sparking a war that continues to this day.

The past decade of Russian aggression has had a profound impact on Ukraine’s commitment to European integration. Prior to the start of Russia’s invasion in 2014, many Ukrainians still favored close ties with Moscow and other former Soviet republics. However, the war unleashed by Putin has transformed Ukrainian public opinion, with the vast majority in today’s Ukraine now backing EU membership.

Ukrainians understand that joining the European Union will not protect them from further Russian aggression. They are also realistic enough to recognize that huge challenges remain before they can finally achieve the goal of member status. Nevertheless, the start of official EU membership talks sends a strong signal that the country is moving in the right direction toward a future that is worth fighting for.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The path to prosperity: The 2024 Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

Ignacio Campomanes, Nina Dannaoui-Johnson, Joseph Lemoine, Dan Negrea — Tue, 25 Jun 2024 15:00:00 +0000

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Executive summary

We are living in turbulent times, and 2024 is without doubt a crucial year. A total of sixty-four countries and almost half of the population of the world will hold national elections this year. Their results will determine the future path for freedom and prosperity in years to come. This report presents the annual update of our indexes, which portray a clear picture of the situation of the world during this decisive year. Moreover, a detailed analysis of the trends of freedom, prosperity, and their respective components during the last decade uncovers several striking facts that can help us understand how we got to this critical juncture.

Freedom at a global level has been stagnant in the last decade, and we document that this is the outcome of two opposing forces: declining political freedom and increasing economic freedom. The former is by far the most worrisome trend in recent years. Our political subindex clearly shows that this process started way before the COVID-19 pandemic, and is still ongoing today, several years after. Overall, the political subindex scores of two-thirds of the countries of the world have decreased since 2013, including a vast majority of countries with well-established democracies in Western Europe and North America.

Analyzing the components of the political subindex, we find that the erosion of political institutions is due to a significant weakening of the safeguards and guarantees that ensure contestation and control of power. Political rights, especially freedom of expression and information, and legislative constraints on the executive, have suffered major declines across the world in the last decade. The widespread wave of disinformation and election interference is deeply troubling. It represents not just an attack on democracy, but a fraudulent attempt to subvert the electoral process. Once in power, if governments succeed in limiting the ability of civil society and other institutions to hold them accountable, they pave the way for a slide into outright autocracy.

While the legal subindex has shown a slight decline since 2013, it’s noteworthy that the components most closely linked to the core principles of liberal democracy, such as clarity of the law and independent justice, have seen the steepest declines. This fact can only reinforce the perception of a major regression in the system of checks and balances that characterizes free societies.

The bright side of freedom measurement in the last decade is driven by freer economic environments across the globe. A total of 130 countries, out of the 164 covered by the indexes, have improved their economic subindex score. Moreover, this positive tendency is predominantly driven by a prominent improvement of the component measuring women’s economic opportunities, which has risen in virtually all the countries of the world. Furthermore, it is encouraging to notice that some of the worst performers in gender equality in terms of economic affairs, such as some Gulf monarchies, have improved substantially. Globally, economic freedom improvements, including mild but widespread increases in trade and investment freedom, as well as property rights’ protection, have acted as a counterweight to the negative evolution of political freedom.

The Prosperity Index reveals the remarkable effects of the pandemic in several of its components—health, income, and education—which jointly produced a halt in the strong improvement of the previous decades. As of today, the global prosperity scores have yet to reach their pre-2019 levels. Nonetheless, this fact does not seem to be solely attributable to the devastating consequences of the pandemic, given two additional circumstances we document in this report.

On the one hand, the component measuring the treatment received by minorities has worsened consistently since 2013, a trend we connect with the deterioration of the political environment and institutions. On the other, the index shows that the share of countries experiencing prosperity growth rates exceeding the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average has been substantially lower since 2013, compared to the previous decade. This means that from 1995 to 2013, developing countries were improving their prosperity faster than wealthy countries. This convergence process has clearly slowed down and fewer countries are progressing as quickly, with significant repercussions for millions of citizens in the world’s least developed areas.

The descriptive trends documented above raise the fundamental question of whether there is a clear link between the evolution of freedom and that of prosperity. Unfortunately, the unprecedented effects of the pandemic on prosperity make it hard to assess the effects of the stagnation of freedom in the last decade. Nonetheless, the ample time coverage of the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes allows us to analyze the relation between both indexes with a long-term perspective. We provide several pieces of evidence, reaching a consistent result: freedom is closely associated with prosperity.

Higher scores in our Prosperity Index are highly correlated with prosperity (0.71). Moreover, when we look at changes in both indexes, we obtain again a very substantial association (0.49). When we compare the third of countries with the highest freedom improvement since 1995 to the less-improved third, we find that prosperity growth has been 50 percent higher in the former group.

Having shown the close long-term relation between freedom and prosperity, we delve into a related question: Do reforms toward freer institutions produce immediate effects on prosperity, or are their fruits only visible after a long time? Our results, based on local linear projections, lean toward the latter. A significant positive shock to the Freedom Index (i.e., the top 20 percent of yearly changes), generates an instantaneous effect on prosperity that is rather small (0.11 points in the year of the shock). Nonetheless, the cumulative effect extends during the following two decades, and is estimated to be seven times higher after twenty years. Conversely, a negative shock produces a 0.13-point drop in prosperity on the year of the impact, but again the cumulative effect in the next two decades is substantially higher, reaching 0.56 points.

The facts and analysis provided in this report are only a small example of the significant capabilities and usefulness of the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes for academic and policy-oriented research. We firmly believe that unbiased, rigorous, data-driven research and policy implementation is the surest path to advance freedom and generate sustained prosperity across the world. Therefore, we encourage scholars and public officials to use the indexes to further explore the mechanisms and interaction between freedom and prosperity, as well as their components, in specific countries, regions, or periods of time.

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Kyiv Pride event highlights changing attitudes in wartime Ukraine

Aleksander Cwalina — Mon, 24 Jun 2024 21:38:28 +0000

On June 16, members of Ukraine’s LGBTQI+ community and allies gathered in central Kyiv to celebrate the first Pride March in the Ukrainian capital since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than two years ago. The event highlighted changing attitudes in wartime Ukraine as the country stands defiant against Russia and embraces a European future.

Hundreds of kilometers from Kyiv on the front lines of the war with Russia, the Ukrainian LGBTQI+ community is also present within the ranks of the military among Ukrainians of all ethnic backgrounds and religions defending the country. While calculating the exact number of LGBTQI+ soldiers is challenging, a 2023 article in Britain’s Daily Telegraph estimated that between two and seven percent of serving personnel in the Ukrainian Armed Forces are members of the LGBTQI+ community.

Some serve openly, sporting symbols such as a unicorn patch below the blue and yellow national colors of Ukraine on their military uniform. In many cases, they do so to demonstrate that, contrary to assertions from Russian propagandists and other opponents, LGBTQI+ Ukrainians are just as willing to defend their country as other Ukrainians.

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The increasing openness in Ukraine toward issues of sexual orientation and identity stands in stark contrast to the deteriorating situation in regions of the country currently under Kremlin control. Throughout occupied Ukraine, the LGBTQI+ community faces the reality of draconian Russian legislation that often prevents them from defending their rights and sets the stage for serious human rights abuses.

According to Nash Svit, a Ukrainian LGBTQI+ organization, these abuses include public humiliation, torture, extortion, and sexual violence. The National LGBTQ Consortium in Ukraine has documented a similarly oppressive atmosphere of increased fear and violence in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region and the Crimean peninsula following Russian occupation in 2014.

In Russia itself, LGBTQI+ individuals have long featured in the ever-growing category of scapegoated groups, where they are joined by representatives of the free media, civil society, and the country’s tiny anti-war opposition as proxy targets in the Kremlin’s campaign against the West. Scores of LGBTQI+ Russians have fled the country in recent years, citing a mounting climate of insecurity and oppression. Those who remain face routine discrimination along with threats to their livelihood and personal safety.

In line with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s increasingly radical anti-Western rhetoric, last year Russia’s Supreme Court declared the “international LGBTQ movement” a terrorist and extremist organization. The Russian authorities have since used this ruling to convict Russians of displaying the rainbow flag, raid LGBTQI+ clubs, and brand LGBTQI+ activists as foreign agents.

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The oppression of the LGBTQI+ community in Putin’s Russia has sparked debate across the border and helped persuade many in traditionally conservative Ukraine to reject homophobia. A June 2023 poll found that more than 70% of Ukrainians believe members of the LGBTQI+ community should have the same rights as any other Ukrainian citizen, representing a significant increase from prewar levels of social acceptance.

Despite indications of progress, significant challenges remain. While LGBTQI+ individuals can now serve openly in the Ukrainian military, many say they face difficulties not experienced by non-LGBTQI+ soldiers. Efforts are ongoing to secure equal partner rights, including the right of same-sex partners to make medical decisions on behalf of their partner in case of injury, and to receive the same state benefits for military service.

Amid the unprecedented trauma and turbulence of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the issue of LGBTQI+ rights remains on Ukraine’s political agenda and continues to gain traction. In 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy acknowledged growing demand for recognition of same-sex civil unions. A year later, Ukrainian MP Ivana Sovsun formally introduced a bill on civil unions.

Current trends look set to continue. As Ukraine takes additional steps toward membership of the European Union, the accession process will include a growing focus on Ukrainian human rights legislation. This will include measures to bring Ukrainian law into line with EU standards, meaning the likely introduction of greater legal protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.

Ukraine’s LGBTQI+ community is in many ways at the forefront of the struggle against Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian brand of Russian imperialism. From the LGBTQI+ soldiers on the front lines of the war to the activists pushing for social change in Kyiv, the community plays a vital role in Ukraine’s ongoing European integration and defense against the Kremlin’s anti-Western crusade.

Aleksander Cwalina is a program assistant for the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

The Syrian electoral system guarantees inequality

Vladimir Pran and Maroun Sfeir — Mon, 24 Jun 2024 17:37:28 +0000

President Bashar al-Assad set July 15 as election day for the 250 seats of the Syrian People’s Assembly to be held in the areas controlled by his government. As the electoral process unfolds, a series of articles will deconstruct the key elements of Syrian elections and their role in legitimizing Baath Party rule. It will also conduct a deep dive into the challenges of moving ahead with electoral reform in the United Nations (UN)-facilitated political process.

The first article of the series discussed the outline of the election process and its significance.

This article examines the system of representation, which determines how many candidates will be elected for a four-year term from each of the electoral districts and how the voters will vote for candidates in these districts. Variations of these elements can produce vastly different results. In Syria, the system guarantees three effects: overrepresentation of regime strongholds in parliament, manipulation of candidates through a quota system that reserves seats for workers and farmers, and prevention of effective multi-party competition.

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There are no criteria for the number of members of parliament allocated from each governorate, with allocation decided purely at the president’s discretion. The allocation remains the same as it was in the 2012, 2016, and 2020 elections, failing to consider any demographic changes seen in Syria since 2011. Based on the most recent official data, Syria’s population is 30 million (compared to a United Nations estimate of 23 million), and there has been no census since 2004.

Source: Authors

Even a cursory look reveals how unfair the allocation of seats to constituencies is, and that it leads to significantly disproportional values of the vote. The allocation directly discriminates against the voters of the Raqqa, Al-Hasakah, Daraa, Aleppo, and Damascus City governorates—historically associated with opposition—while it favors voters in Quneitra, Latakia, Tartus, and Damascus governorates. The chart shows clearly the “value of the vote.” As an example, comparison of the official population data reveals that Damascus City governorate is represented in the assembly double than Rural Damascus and three times more than al-Hassakah. In another example, only 85,000 residents are needed for one member representing Lataka, while it takes 150,000 residents of Dara for a seat in the assembly. This is contrary to the international electoral standard of equality of the vote.

While districting defines the inequality of the vote, the quota for farmers and workers defines inequality between the candidates. Of the 250 seats in parliament, the presidential decree assigned 127 to farmers or workers and 123 to “other sectors of society,” but the law does not elaborate on what “other sectors” means.

Source: Authors

Nominally, the quota for farmers and workers introduced in 1973 was supposed to reflect socialist values and secure representation for working-class Syrians. In practice, the lack of criteria for candidacy in this category allows for manipulation, and many businessmen opted to run for these seats. In the 2020 elections, only 27.5 percent of the candidates (456 of the total 1,658) registered to run as farmers or workers, making those seats far less competitive. Also, while the system has a quota for farmers and workers, it does not include a quota for women. While far from the only method for protecting the representation of women, such a quota could counter the extraordinary and historically low representation of women; in the 2020 elections, only twenty-eight women were elected (11 percent of members).

But of all the stifling elements of the system, the ballot structure is the most damaging. On its face, the system appears simple: voters vote for as many candidates as there are seats in the district. Candidates run as individuals and, after the votes are tallied, are ranked simply by the number of votes. Those with the highest rankings win the seats. Yet this simplicity masks the extraordinary effect of this system, which is somewhat deceptively called the “block vote” system. In theory, it allows voters to vote for individual candidates, but in practice voters almost exclusively give all the votes to a block of candidates, often using a ballot with already selected candidates rather than voting on a blank “write-in” ballot.

Source: Authors

Even when a block gains only a slight advantage, this translates into winning all the seats in the district. Those familiar with the Palestinian elections will remember that this system produced an overwhelming parliamentary majority for Hamas in 2005. In Lebanon, it guaranteed the pro-Syrian composition of the parliament in the post-civil war elections from 1992 to 2005. The Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, and Jordan abandoned this system, so Syria remains the only country in the world using it for the national elections. This is not by coincidence—the system is designed to disincentivize competition between political parties. The results of the 2020 elections demonstrate its effect, as the candidates nominated by the Baath-dominated National Unity list won all the seats for which they competed, while those who were not on the list had no chance to be elected. This will remain the case as long as there is no well-organized, disciplined, and unified opposition with a single list of candidates, as the effect of vote splitting between the individual candidates is tremendously damaging to all that campaign as individuals.

It is virtually impossible to estimate outcomes if Syrian elections were held under a different electoral system. Because each voter votes for multiple candidates, their votes cannot simply be re-calculated to present how much each party would receive under a putative proportional representation system. Besides vote tallying, the block vote system has far-reaching implications for political competition as well. Because it assumes competition between individual candidates, undermining options for political organizing and competition between political parties, it all but ensures fragmentation of the opposition. The framework of the block vote is so advantageous to the Baath Party that, even if the opposition were welcome to compete in elections with guarantees that their candidates would not be disqualified or harassed, in practice, opposition parties would not stand a chance to win a significant number of seats.

Vladimir Pran advises electoral authorities, governments, and political leaders on transitional, electoral, and political processes.

Maroun Sfeir advises international and local civil society organizations, political groups, and electoral authorities on electoral and political processes.

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Don’t be fooled by the ‘reformist.’ Iran’s presidential election won’t bring fundamental change.

Holly Dagres — Fri, 21 Jun 2024 17:43:33 +0000

“Does the potential election of Masoud Pezeshkian in Iran provide a glimmer of hope for reform and a possibility of diplomacy in the region?” US Representative Ro Khanna (D-CA) posed this question on X on June 16. In recent days, reformist politicians, including former President Mohammad Khatami—relics of the past for many Iranians—began throwing their weight behind the sole reformist presidential candidate, Pezeshkian. The member of parliament representing the northwestern city of Tabriz is one of six candidates—the remainder are principalists (known in the West as “hardliners”)—partaking in the upcoming presidential election prompted by the death of then President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash on May 19.

The reformist faction has controlled major power centers in Iran, such as the presidency and parliament. However, despite their promises of “reform” and increased civil liberties, their rule was marked by bloody crackdowns, and Iranians are no longer fooled by such undeliverable and false promises.

Just months prior to Raisi’s death, Khatami—whose name and face have been blacked out from appearing in state media for supporting the 2009 post-election protests known as the Green Movement—boycotted the March parliamentary election. That election was described by the Iranian Reformist Front, a coalition of reformist factions, as “meaningless, noncompetitive, and ineffective” because all reformists had effectively been disqualified. Yet, Khatami, the face of the bygone reformist era that aimed to democratize the country, still placed faith in a system and role he once described as no more than a “footman” to maintain the status quo that most Iranians—especially Iranian Gen Z—are disillusioned by and want gone, as evidenced by a poll conducted by Netherlands-based GAMAAN in February.

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The reformist movement in the Islamic Republic has long been dead. Activist Bahareh Hedayat, who spent her life advocating for gradual change, confirmed it in a letter from Evin prison—where she continues to languish—at the height of the 2022 Women, Life, Freedom uprising. Former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif stated in a March audio leak that the clerical establishment sought the movement’s “erasure.” (Despite his leaked comments, Zarif has now joined Pezeshkian’s campaign team because he believes in overriding loyalty to the Islamic Republic.)

The trajectory of the Islamic Republic in recent years makes it abundantly clear that there is no room for reform under Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, with principalists—up until Raisi’s death—leading all government branches: the presidency, parliament, and judiciary. This was no accident and engineered by Khamenei, who, with the help of the Guardian Council—a twelve-member vetting body in which six are appointed by him directly—is making every calculation with the Islamic Republic post-mortem in mind. The supreme leader’s vision is an Islamic Revolution 2.0, in which relatively young ultraconservatives take the helm of the country—a new cohort nicknamed the “super revolutionaries.”

Very telling Iranian election cartoon

Families who lost loved ones during #MahsaAmini protests versus clerical establishment and the ballot box

"This gap will no longer be filled" https://t.co/T7mFkMlLYp
— Holly Dagres (@hdagres) June 14, 2024

The Islamic Republic had two historically low-turnout elections: the 2021 presidential election—or “selection,” as many described it at the time—which was engineered to hand the presidency to Raisi with 48.8 percent turnout and the March 2024 parliamentary election, which gave 233 out of 290 seats to the principalists with 41 percent turnout, an outcome not much different from the 2020 election. Khamenei has always emphasized that the regime’s legitimacy stemmed from its popularity and always encourages citizens to vote to show that popular support.

Since the December 2017–January 2018 protests, protesters have vocalized that all factions are irredeemable, as evident by the chant: “Reformists, principalists, the game is over.” This is likely why one reformist was allowed to run: to stimulate a higher voter turnout to give the clerical establishment legitimacy, which it lacks domestically. However, the Islamic Republic does not lack legitimacy on the international stage, as it recommenced ties with its Persian Gulf Arab neighbors including Saudi Arabia, has joined the economic grouping known as BRICS and the more security-focused Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and has continued to attend international conferences such as the World Economic Forum in Davos.

Iranian elections are unpredictable, though Pezeshkian could slightly move the election needle, leading to a second round. Still, the average Iranian is not stirred by a man who uses Khamenei’s formal title and claims that he intends to follow “the general policies of the exalted supreme leader” —language not commonly used by reformists.

And while he seems to be hitting all the buzz-worthy topics such as reviving the defunct nuclear deal and speaking out against the so-called morality police’s latest crackdown on women and girls, the Nour initiative, Pezeshkian has not moved the public, as evidenced by one interview that was described as “boring.”

در انتخاب سرنوشت خود سهیم باشید :))#رای_بی_رای pic.twitter.com/BOH49371vE
— MH (@justice2045) June 13, 2024

Pezeshkian has also co-opted the de facto Women, Life, Freedom protest anthem “Baraye” (For the sake of) by singer Shervin Hajipour in his campaign, using “For the sake of wanting a normal life” in an election poster and “For the sake of Iran” as a campaign hashtag. The song reference has angered many Iranians who haven’t forgotten how more than 550 protesters—including sixty-eight children—were killed during the uprising (and the more than 1,500 others in previous protests), as shown by the slogan, “A sea of blood divides us,” referring to the people and the clerical establishment. To many, Pezeshkian and other candidates are merely puppets, which was best highlighted by a viral meme of candidates’ faces superimposed on Khamenei. I’ve been repeatedly told that Iranians are so unenthusiastic about the upcoming election that boycotting is not even a serious topic of conversation, because many assume that is what the majority will do. Even a poll conducted by the Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA) noted that 73 percent of Iranians didn’t follow the first presidential debate.

Elections aside, Iranians are drowning in hopelessness, prompted by multiple unsuccessful cycles of protests aimed at ending the Islamic Republic; a dire economic situation caused by systemic mismanagement, corruption, and, in part, US sanctions; and the brutal clampdowns on dissent. The June 15 prisoner swap of two Swedish nationals for Hamid Nouri, an Iranian official who was convicted of war crimes for his role in the 1988 massacre of five thousand political prisoners, was just another instance that demonstrated to Iranians that they could not rely on the West to hold the Islamic Republic accountable. The only way out of this conundrum is if Iranians take their destiny into their own hands. And if one thing is certain, it’s that their destinies will not be determined by the ballot box.

Holly Dagres is a nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and editor of the Atlantic Council’s IranSource blog. She is also the author of the “Iranians on #SocialMedia” report. Follow her on X: @hdagres.

The post Don’t be fooled by the ‘reformist.’ Iran’s presidential election won’t bring fundamental change. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

There are several Iranian presidential candidates, but only one Khamenei might want

Shay Khatiri — Fri, 21 Jun 2024 17:22:16 +0000

The June 28 presidential election in Iran will be the first of its kind. Since the 1988 constitutional reforms that abolished the prime minister’s office and elevated the presidency, this is the first time that the Islamic Republic is holding an election ahead of schedule.

There have been two key trends in the Islamic Republic’s elections. Inside Iran, one is known as shol kon, seft kon (loosen, tighten). It refers to eight-year intervals of conservative administration followed by eight years of a reformist or pragmatist one. For eight years, the regime increases domestic oppression and hostility toward the free world to rally its conservative base. For the next eight years, marginal social freedoms would give hope for gradual reform, and rhetorical softening of foreign policy would release foreign pressure, through sanctions relief. Until recently, this policy recovered the political capital the regime had spent at home and abroad during the previous eight years of conservative administrations.

This has been the norm since Ayatollah Ali Khamenei became the supreme leader, with conservative Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) followed by reformist Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005), conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), pragmatist Hassan Rouhani (2013-2021), and conservative Ebrahim Raisi (2021-2024).

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Raisi’s sudden death in a helicopter crash nearly three years into the job broke this trend. On the other hand, the Islamic Republic feels less of a need to play the same game. Domestically, reformists and moderates cannot rally the people any longer. On the international stage, it’s well-known that the presidency is not a policymaking office. Also, Democratic US administrations give the regime breathing room even if there is a conservative in office—the nuclear negotiations began when Barack Obama and Ahmadinejad were in office in March 2013—and Republicans will increase pressure even if a moderate governs—the Donald Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” strategy began under Rouhani’s presidency in 2018.

The second trend has been that known commodities never get the presidential job. The last president widely known inside and outside Iran was Rafsanjani, who was a prominent revolutionary and the commander in chief of the armed forces during the Iran–Iraq War. Khatami, Ahmadinejad, Rouhani, and Raisi became famous after running for president. The Islamic Republic limits presidents to two consecutive terms. Rafsanjani made two further attempts, but both failed—he lost in 2005, likely because of election fraud, and was disqualified during his 2013 run. Reformist Mir Hossein Mousavi, a former prime minister and already a prominent figure, was also cheated out of office during the 2009 election, which prompted the post-election protests known as the Green Movement.

Khamenei worries that established figures can create movements within the regime structure that, combined with their knowledge of how the system works, can challenge him. Therefore, he has preferred unknown, uncharismatic figures, especially when it comes to reformists. Indeed, Ahmadinejad proved to be a formidable foe who freelanced too much. This was due, in part, to the fraudulent outcome of the 2009 election and the subsequent Green Movement. The widespread protests rallied the regime’s base behind Ahmadinejad as almost a martyr, metaphorically speaking. This elevated his stature to unprecedented heights and provided him with immunity from Khamenei’s wrath, which protects him to this day.

The president’s function

Elected offices in the Islamic Republic could be compared to the US civil service. In Iran, things are upside down. The policymaking class is unelected and forms the permanent state, while bureaucrats run in elections to implement this permanent state’s policies. Khatami once described his office as “the system’s footman.” Like all bureaucrats, elected officials can cause headaches for the policymakers through incompetence or mischief. Presidents can also use their bully pulpit to promote a cause. In Ahmadinejad’s case, that cause was himself, a mistake that can never be repeated in Khamenei’s eyes.

Khamenei needs an economic manager to address the economic crisis that ails the Islamic Republic. Khamenei’s hand is relatively light in economics. Sanctions have taught him that he needs self-sufficiency, or economic nationalism, wherein everything is produced at home and science and research are elevated, a concept he termed a “resistance economy.” He also ensures wealth is distributed among all important regime subsidiaries—particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Beyond that, he leaves the details to his elected bureaucrats to figure out. More than ever, Khamenei needs a president who executes this imperative. Whether this is possible is a different question, but Raisi failed to satisfy the need.

Perhaps more than competence, Khamenei needs someone to rally his conservative base. Economic indicators, support for the system, confidence in institutions, and all other measurable and immeasurable political values in Iran are in decline. The supreme leader is not someone who fires up the base. He needs a president who can boost morale among the hardliner youth and motivate them ideologically to beat up protesters in the streets and fight in Syria and Iraq—and elsewhere if Iran expands its direct presence.

Considering these different trends and necessities, the six approved candidates require further scrutiny.

Candidate gallery

The only reformist among the six candidates is the amusingly named Masoud Pezeshkian—his last name means “of physician lineage,” and he lives up to his name as a surgeon and former health minister. Pezeshkian was Khatami’s health minister during his second term and has been a member of parliament since 2008. While there once were sincere reformists in Iran, many rounds of purges and eliminations have left only the insincere and slavish ones in office, including Pezeshkian. However, he checks an essential box for Khamenei: he has no charisma, popular base, or following within the regime structure. His competence and economic management are untested, but he will not rally any base for anyone. That Khamenei has yet to send a signal of support to rally the security forces behind a conservative is potentially a tacit sign that he favors Pezeshkian.

The second category of candidates is the fringe conservative. Amir-Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi is one of the dozen vice presidents—better described as deputy presidents—and oversees the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans portfolio. It is a fairly obscure position that oversees benefits for veterans and the families of war casualties. Despite its obscurity, this is an important position. The beneficiaries have been the regime’s foot soldiers, on whose shoulders it has stood for decades, but they are increasingly abandoning the regime. In his current role, Ghazizadeh Hashemi is tasked with using ideological and financial incentives to mobilize veterans. With his experience as the incumbent food distributor among the regime’s base, combined with his hardline politics, Ghazizadeh Hashemi could be the wildcard in this race for his capacity to rally support.

Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani is the other member of the fringe-conservative category and a former member of parliament. He has a low profile and provides no value to Khamenei’s needs. Zakani is the typical supporting character who will be forgotten as a candidate, so a detailed look is unnecessary.

The last category is the known conservative. Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf is a former IRGC unit commander and mayor of Tehran, and is currently the speaker of parliament. He is always a feature of presidential elections, but never a threat. He is also uncharismatic and not particularly popular among the regime’s base. Ghalibaf’s extreme corruption came to light in recent years, which makes him unappealing among the regime’s populist base. But he clears one box: loyalty to Khamenei. He could even be credibly accused of competence, which the regime needs in a president more than ever. But he has been around for too long and is a known commodity—not something Khamenei typically wants. If Khamenei opts to support him, it will be due to the extraordinary circumstances under which this election is being held, and the fact that there has not been enough time to choose and elevate a lesser-known figure.

Saeed Jalili is the other member of the known-conservative category. A war veteran with a missing leg, and as ideologically rigid as they come, he has the bragging right that he did not give an inch when he was the nuclear negotiator. The base loves him already, but he is the one candidate who could be another Ahmadinejad. It is also a problem that his ideological rigidity comes at the cost of competence. His understanding of politics could be summarized as, “Everything will work out if people pray harder and believe more in the system.” Unlike Raisi, who had the wisdom to avoid fiery statements about foreign matters, Jalili carries the risk of public remarks that would jeopardize the current loosening of sanctions. Like Ahmadinejad, he is a candidate who comes with significant risks but potentially big rewards.

The last candidate is Mostafa Pourmohammadi. Raisi was infamous for the 1988 massacre of political prisoners, and Pourmohammadi was a key actor in it. Though Raisi kept somewhat of a low profile after 1988 until he ran for president in 2017, Pourmohammadi has been a feature of every oppression campaign as a member of the security apparatus with close ties to the IRGC. As Ahmadinejad’s interior minister responsible for law enforcement, he set up the morality police and enforced an extreme religious code in public, and occasionally in private. Ahmadinejad sacked him in 2008 for being Khamenei’s mole in his cabinet. He returned to the security apparatus and played a leading role in cracking down on the 2009 protests. As Rouhani’s justice minister, he oversaw a spike in executions. He might prove to be a better economic manager than Raisi, can rally the base, and is not a risk to abuse the bully pulpit against Khamenei or sabotage sanctions relief.

Pourmohammadi is the ideal candidate except for two issues. First, he is a known commodity, which Khamenei does not like. He has been a prominent figure within the system and is shrewd enough to get his way. Second, he is the only cleric in the field. So far, Khamenei’s only civilian president has been Ahmadinejad, which gives Pourmohammadi another advantage. However, a hardliner cleric could immediately become a contender for supreme leadership, which might raise objections from Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba, who is allegedly gearing up for the position.

Pourmohammadi’s work at the security apparatus in intelligence, secret-police, law-enforcement, and prosecution capacities means that he is in a perfect position to challenge Khamenei from within, but this does not mean that he will. Unlike Ahmadinejad, the cautionary tale, Pourmohammadi has known Khamenei since the 1980s. This could mean that the supreme leader knows the candidate enough to trust him—or enough not to. But if the elder Khamenei finds him trustworthy, Pourmohammadi is his ideal president, even though the younger Khamenei might object.

The question of Iran’s next president has swung from one misunderstanding to another in Washington. Once upon a time, Americans hoped that a new president would effect reform and change. Now, they ignore elections as entirely irrelevant.

The president of Iran matters in two ways. First, like the US civil service, the Islamic Republic’s administrations cannot make policies, but they have nontrivial influence in implementing them. Whether due to incompetence, disagreement, or corruption, the president can become an obstacle to the permanent state. Second, who Khamenei wants to become president tells us about the internal state of the system and what Khamenei believes to be his regime’s vulnerabilities for a new president to address.

Many crises consume the Islamic Republic, and most of these candidates are a patch for some of these problems. Whoever becomes president will be a hint as to which of these crises Khamenei believes to be the most urgent. It also will tell us where he wants to take Iran next.

Shay Khatiri is the vice president of development and a senior fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

The post There are several Iranian presidential candidates, but only one Khamenei might want appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The missing piece: Political parties are critical to democracy in Africa

Santiago Stocker, Patrick Quirk, and Dan Scaduto — Tue, 11 Jun 2024 19:00:00 +0000

This paper is the first in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “State of the Parties” series analyzing the strength of multi-party systems in different regions of the world.

In 2024, as many as seventeen countries across Africa, with a total population of nearly 300 million people, will hold national elections. These electoral processes are consequential because whether they are free, fair, and transparent will help determine if the troubling trend in several countries across the continent of democratic regression, military coups, or political instability worsens—or ebbs and begins to reverse, as was recently demonstrated in Senegal.

The stakes are clearly high in these contests, which will occur in the so-called year of elections wherein more than four billion people globally are eligible to cast ballots. While the elections are important to Africa’s democratic trajectory, they are not single-handedly determinative of it.

Strong and institutionalized political parties are also key to the future of democracy on the continent; however, policymakers have not afforded this key institution much attention or associated resources. For example, the US’s national security strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa does not reference strengthening political parties despite the document’s emphasis on democracy promotion. Further, the Biden administration’s Summits for Democracy—the third of which took place in March 2024—have not included commitments from participating governments (the United States included) to strengthen political parties.

Robust political parties inform whether a political system delivers for citizens, provide a key link between citizens and their government, and foster measurable resilience against democratic erosion. For these and other reasons, therefore, political parties as a core institution of democracy will help chart the continent’s future, both in terms of freedom and prosperity.

This piece analyzes the state of political parties in sub-Saharan Africa and uses Atlantic Council Freedom and Prosperity Indexes data and other sources to show why parties are essential to democratic progress. It examines this argument through four case studies and concludes with a path forward for re-centering democracy assistance work in Africa to shore up this critical component.

Explore the series

State of the Parties

This pathbreaking new series delivers insights and policy recommendations from leading experts on how to enhance efforts to strengthen democracy in all regions of the world.