1. The G7 did not release a joint communiqué

The absence of a joint communiqué at this week’s G7 summit starkly illustrates the deepening policy divisions among leaders of the world’s most powerful economies. While policymakers debate what the G7 can accomplish amid growing US-European tensions, a more fundamental question has emerged: Is the G7 itself equipped to address today’s complex geopolitical landscape? 

The summit exposed significant rifts between G7 members and the United States on critical international issues. Trump’s assertion that ejecting Russia from the former Group of Eight (G8) was a strategic mistake amplified tensions over Russia’s war in Ukraine. While the G7 did endorse a statement calling for “de-escalation of hostilities, including a ceasefire in Gaza,” watered down statements like this underscore the challenges in achieving consensus. These parallel conflicts reveal not only internal G7 divisions but also the growing disconnect between G7 positions and broader global sentiment, especially when it comes to Israel and Gaza.  

The lead-up to the Kananaskis summit highlighted another critical question: Can the G7 remain relevant while excluding major global players? Pressure from G7 leaders ultimately compelled Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney to extend an invitation to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, despite ongoing diplomatic tensions over last year’s killing of a Khalistani separatist in British Columbia. This last-minute inclusion underscores an emerging reality—as one of the world’s largest economies, a crucial node in global supply chains, and a key player in Indo-Pacific security, India’s absence from major G7 discussions would render many outcomes meaningless. 

Perhaps most troubling is the weakening of the shared democratic values that supposedly bind the G7 together. The transatlantic relationship faces unprecedented strain as the Republican Party, under the leadership of Trump and Vice President JD Vance, increasingly views liberal European societies through a harsh cultural lens. While the United States frames China as the primary geopolitical challenge of its time, today’s Republican Party often sees European societies as equally divergent from American values and interests. This ideological drift threatens the very foundation upon which the G7 was built. 

These developments raise existential questions about the G7’s future relevance. A forum designed for the world’s democratic economic powerhouses now struggles to produce basic agreements, while excluding nations essential to global stability and prosperity. Today, the G7 risks becoming an increasingly irrelevant talking shop, much like the United Nations Security Council, unable to address many of the defining challenges of the twenty-first century. 

—Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

***

Trouble was brewing even before Trump’s early departure from the leaders’ summit on Monday evening and the absence of a communiqué on Tuesday. Trump’s trade policy had already effectively resulted in a G6+1—a coalesced European, Canadian, and Japanese front against the United States. But the fracture in the G7 has only become more evident this week. At the time of its formation fifty years ago, the group was created as a channel for economic coordination between the world’s largest economies. In recent years, the conflict between Ukraine and Russia had energized the G7, which had functioned as the hub for sanctions coordination and strategizing on supporting Ukraine. This energizing, and in some ways defining, achievement of the G7 in the past decade was put into question by Trump’s assertion on Monday that Russia should be brought back into the G8 fold, laying bare the misalignment between him and the other leaders. 

There are issues that could have possibly aligned G7 leaders, such as responding to Chinese economic influence, including Beijing’s manufacturing overcapacity. But what ultimately binds the group and makes it different from the Group of Twenty (G20) and the United Nations Security Council is broad agreement on democratic values, free and open markets, and a belief in working together with allies. A fracturing G7 puts these foundational tenets under scrutiny. Trump’s early departure also snubbed partners beyond the G7; India and Mexico were looking forward to their respective bilateral meetings that could have furthered trade negotiations.  

It’s clear that on its fiftieth anniversary, the G7 is in the middle of a geopolitical crisis, as the Israel-Iran conflict plays out, and an existential crisis, exacerbated by the United States’ strained relationship with the rest of the group. What lies ahead as France will take on the presidency in 2026, and whether the G6+1 break will continue, depends on how much value Washington sees in collaborating with its closest allies on economic issues. 

—Ananya Kumar is the deputy director for future of money at the GeoEconomics Center.  

2. Trump did not meet with Ukraine’s president

Trump did himself no favors at the G7 Summit toward his goal of achieving a durable peace in Ukraine. Trump has set out a tough approach to achieve that peace. He has asked for serious concessions from both Ukraine and Russia and said that he would exert pressure on the side(s) blocking progress. Since then, Ukraine has accepted every proposal Trump has offered since mid-March, and Russia has rejected them all except for one that it violated immediately. It is clear which side is obstructionist.   

Trump had an excellent chance to use the G7 Summit to put needed pressure on the Kremlin. The G7 was poised to lower the price cap for a barrel of Russian oil from sixty dollars to forty-five dollars, which would put pressure on the Russian oil revenues enabling its aggression in Ukraine. But the United States vetoed the proposal last week—Trump’s first gift to Russian President Vladimir Putin at this G7 Summit.   

The second gift came after his arrival in Canada. The US president repeated his criticism of the G7 for kicking Russia out of the group because of its conquest and “annexation” of Crimea in 2014. (Trump had done the same in his first term.) Since Putin is blocking his peace efforts, why would Trump provide this offering to the Russian dictator at this time? It is also true that by departing the summit early to deal with the ongoing crisis in the Middle East, Trump missed a planned side meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. No harm, no foul there, but achieving a real peace in Ukraine will remain a distant wish if the White House continues to treat the aggressor to bouquets. 

—John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine. 

3. Trump did not meet with Mexico’s president

After much anticipation, the first face-to-face meeting between Trump and Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum did not take place due to the US president’s early departure. Perhaps unexpectedly, the leaders have had an amicable and constructive relationship so far, with mutual praise often being shared between the two and at least seven phone calls taking place since Trump’s election in 2024.  

The meeting in Kananaskis, however, would have offered neutral ground for both leaders to further discuss the actions Sheinbaum has taken to address US security concerns while also addressing the thornier aspects of the bilateral relationship. This includes Mexico’s refusal to accept the involvement of US troops in its strategy against the illegal drug trade and cartels. It also includes Mexico’s concern about a proposed 3.5 percent tax on remittances currently moving through the US Senate. (Remittances to Mexico represent roughly 3.7 percent of the country’s gross domestic product.)  

A three amigos-style meeting of Trump, Sheinbaum, and Carney was off the table even before the summit. But the presence of all three newly minted North American leaders and their confirmed bilateral meetings on the sidelines of the G7 Summit had nonetheless raised hopes across the region that a tangible agenda to discuss next steps for the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) would be set. Now, just over a year before the sunset clause is activated in July 2026, the private sector across all three countries will be left craving certainty about the future of the trade deal, especially against the current backdrop of continuously changing trade conditions and recently doubled steel and aluminum tariffs.  

So what comes next? US-Mexico communication lines remain open. Mexico has an ally in Christopher Landau, a US deputy secretary of state and a former US ambassador to Mexico who met with Sheinbaum last week. The United States should now continue to signal its willingness to engage with Mexico to find solutions to shared challenges by setting a date for Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s announced visit and pave the way for a Trump–Sheinbaum tête-à-tête.  

—Valeria Villarreal is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

4. No momentum was generated going into the NATO Summit

The G7 presents two cautionary tales for next week’s NATO Summit in The Hague. First, if Zelenskyy’s presence at the G7 contributed to Trump’s early departure, then this would serve as a reminder for NATO allies to tread lightly on signaling too much support for Ukraine in The Hague at the risk of alienating the US administration. Second, Trump’s comments in Canada suggesting that Russia should rejoin the G8 are also a warning to NATO. While allied leaders were already unlikely to raise costs on Russia at the summit for its ongoing war in Ukraine, Trump’s comments highlight that even tough language on Russia in the expected summit communiqué could exacerbate tensions while Trump is in The Hague.  

Ignoring the threats Russia poses to the Alliance and the importance of maintaining support for Ukraine comes with different (and I would argue more problematic) risks. But if NATO’s goal in The Hague is to project Alliance unity and avoid a dust-up with Trump, then the Alliance should stay focused on securing a new defense spending pledge and go home. All the hard work, for better or for worse, will fall after the summit. 

—Torrey Taussig is the director of and a senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Previously, she was a director for European affairs on the National Security Council.

The post What did not happen at the G7 Summit in Canada (and why it matters) appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The White House has tied potential tariff relief to the elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers identified in the Office of the US Trade Representative’s 2025 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (NTE Report). While the administration’s plan may be a well-intentioned attempt to increase US exports to the region in general, it overlooks a critical reality: Many of the so-called “barriers” are rooted in complex legal systems that cannot be easily dismantled without legislative or judicial processes. Pressuring countries to enact sweeping reforms in uncertain political environments could destabilize fragile democracies and weaken strategic partnerships, particularly at a time of growing global competition.

Profitable economic relationships

Despite ongoing challenges, Latin America has proven to be a successful economic partner for the United States. Washington enjoys trade surpluses with most Latin American countries that have existing agreements. According to US Census Bureau data, in 2024, US exports to CAFTA-DR nations totaled $47 billion, compared to $36.6 billion in imports.

Several examples illustrate this point. Colombia has consistently posted a surplus in industrial goods since 2012, driven by exports of machinery, vehicles, agrochemicals, and pharmaceuticals. Very recently, the United States has gained a trade surplus in agricultural goods with Colombia. Peru and Chile are also vital markets for US technology, medical equipment, and engineering services, due to their dynamic mining and agricultural sectors.

Moreover, many larger US companies have made significant investments across Latin America—investments made viable by the legal certainty that free trade agreements provide. 

Complexity, not obstructionism

It is worth zeroing in on the “barriers” the White House aims to remove. The 2025 NTE Report outlines a variety of trade “barriers,” ranging from health policies to customs procedures. Yet many of these are embedded in domestic legal frameworks and cannot be removed through executive fiat. In Colombia, for example, lifting certain phytosanitary restrictions requires prior consultation with indigenous communities, as mandated by the country’s constitutional court. In the Dominican Republic, altering labeling or certification norms requires legislative action. In Honduras, reforms to intellectual property laws must pass through cumbersome legislatures facing intense social scrutiny.

These legal and institutional realities should not be viewed as roadblocks but as features of functioning democracies. The United States expecting immediate compliance is not only unrealistic; it risks backfiring.

Still, there are areas where progress can be swift and impactful. Many Latin American governments are already working to streamline health registration processes, modernize customs systems, and improve transparency in public procurement. For instance, Peru’s National Customs Superintendency has digitized import procedures, significantly reducing clearance times. Guatemala’s Ministry of Economy has pushed for regulatory alignment with international food safety standards, boosting trade efficiency.

These efforts reflect a clear political will to cooperate and offer the Office of the US Trade Representative a path to pursue measurable outcomes without demanding sweeping structural reforms upfront. Furthermore, these efforts are a clear message that FTA partners in the region are facilitating trade with the United States by avoiding unnecessary red tape procedures while also complying with WTO standards.

A strategic imperative: Latin America vs. Southeast Asia

Meanwhile, Southeast Asia is emerging as a strong competitor for US investment, bolstered by market-friendly reforms and frameworks such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. Vietnam, Thailand, and other countries in the region are actively positioning themselves as preferred US trade partners in that part of the world, but with the caveat that none of them currently has an FTA with the United States.

There is no doubt, however, that China is wielding its geopolitical influence to use neighboring countries to export its goods to Latin America. From there, China takes advantage of the current network of trade pacts in Latin America to distort the rules of play of many products covered under FTAs. The triangulation of goods from third countries can often circumvent proper country-of-origin rules, undermine trade facilitation efforts in the region, and contribute to unfair trade practices.

US trade partners in Central and South America cannot afford to fall behind. The region’s comparative advantages—geographical proximity, shared legal traditions, integrated supply chains, and democratic values—are unmatched. Unlike Southeast Asia, Latin America shares a common geopolitical space with the United States, in addition to their shared economic security interests.

It is time for US stakeholders to fully recognize the strategic value of Latin American partners. Providing support for viable reforms, offering technical cooperation, and showing flexibility in tariff negotiations can help ease current trade tensions and solidify the US presence in a region where China is seeking to expand its influence.

Thankfully, an appropriate framework for institutional trade cooperation is already in place. These agreements don’t require reinvention—only thoughtful adjustment. To give one clear example, free trade commissions established under free trade agreements—such as CAFTA-DR and the free trade agreements with Colombia and Peru—play a critical role in ensuring adherence to agreed commitments and resolving disputes effectively and diplomatically. These bilateral committees, which offer the possibility of engaging separately in previous consultations with the private sector, provide a structured forum for addressing trade issues, implementing dispute resolution mechanisms, and updating the technical provisions of agreements as trade dynamics evolve.

Under CAFTA-DR, the committees have helped resolve disputes concerning agricultural market access and rules of origin. In the case of Colombia, the committee has facilitated dialogue on labor practices and sanitary barriers affecting US agricultural exports. With Peru, the committee has been instrumental in addressing environmental concerns, particularly those related to illegal logging.

By providing an institutionalized channel for engagement, these bodies help prevent diplomatic tensions and foster mutually beneficial outcomes, thereby enhancing stability and predictability in trade relations. The United States should look to make the most of these important committees.

In an increasingly fragmented global landscape, deepening ties with existing partners is the most direct and effective path to advancing US economic security and strategic interests. The best way to foster sustainable growth for US exports to the region is for the United States to seek predictable rules of engagement with its trading partners in the Western Hemisphere.

Enrique Millán-Mejía is a senior fellow for economic development at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. He previously served as a senior trade and investment diplomat of the government of Colombia to the United States between 2014 and 2021.

The post What should Trump do next on trade? Optimize existing US trade agreements in Central and South America. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While this latest Kyiv blitz was by no means unprecedented in a war that has been marked by frequent Russian attacks on Ukraine’s civilian population, the timing is unlikely to have been coincidental. Like a mafia boss ordering elaborate killings to send coded messages, Putin has repeatedly scheduled major bombardments of Ukraine to coincide with international summits and gatherings of Western leaders. For example, Russia bombed Kyiv, Odesa, and other Ukrainian cities on the eve of NATO’s 2023 summit, and conducted a targeted missile strike on Ukraine’s biggest children’s hospital as NATO leaders prepared to meet in Washington DC last summer.

Bombing raids have also taken place during high-profile visits of international dignitaries. In spring 2022, Russia launched an airstrike on Kyiv while UN Secretary General António Guterres was in the Ukrainian capital. At the time, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the attack was a deliberate attempt by the Kremlin to “humiliate” the United Nations. Two years later, Russia subjected Ukrainian Black Sea port Odesa to intense bombardment as Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis visited the city.

The massive bombardment of Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities during this week’s G7 summit is the latest example of Putin’s penchant for sending messages with missiles. On this occasion his message could hardly have been clearer: Russia does not want peace. On the contrary, Moscow feels increasingly emboldened by growing signs of Western weakness and is more confident than ever of securing victory in Ukraine.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Russia’s rejection of US-led peace efforts is equally evident in the diplomatic arena. While Ukraine agreed to US President Donald Trump’s call for an unconditional ceasefire more than three months ago, Russia still refuses to follow suit. Instead, the Kremlin has engaged in obvious stalling tactics while creating a series of obstacles aimed at derailing any meaningful progress toward peace. At one point, Putin even claimed the Ukrainian authorities lacked the legitimacy to negotiate a settlement and suggested the country be placed under temporary UN administration.

The recent resumption of bilateral talks between Moscow and Kyiv has provided further confirmation of Russia’s commitment to continuing the war. Putin personally initiated these talks but then chose not to attend and sent a low-level delegation instead. In the two meetings that have since taken place, Russian officials have presented a list of ceasefire conditions that read like a call for Kyiv’s complete capitulation.

The Kremlin’s demands include Ukraine’s withdrawal from four partially occupied Ukrainian regions that the Russian army has so far been unable to fully occupy. This would mean handing over dozens and towns and cities while condemning millions of Ukrainians to the horrors of indefinite Russian occupation.

Moscow also wants to ban Ukraine from any international alliances or bilateral security partnerships, while imposing strict limits on the size of the Ukrainian army and the categories of weapons the country is allowed to possess. In recent days, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko has underlined Moscow’s insistence on Ukraine’s total disarmament by calling on the country to destroy all Western weaponry provided since 2022.

Putin’s punitive peace terms are not limited to sweeping territorial concessions and harsh military restrictions. The Kremlin also expects Ukraine to grant the Russian language official status, reinstate the Russian Orthodox Church’s legal privileges, rewrite Ukrainian history in line with Russian imperial propaganda, and ban any Ukrainian political parties that Moscow deems to be “nationalist.”

The Kremlin’s negotiating position envisions a postwar Ukraine that is partitioned, disarmed, internationally isolated, and heavily russified. If imposed, these terms would allow Russia to reestablish its dominance over Ukraine and would deal a fatal blow to Ukrainian statehood. In other words, Putin wants a Ukraine without Ukrainians.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Tue, June 17, 2025 • 1:00 pm ET

Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

Donald Trump’s talk of peace through strength succeeded in generating considerable optimism during the early months of 2025, but it is now time to acknowledge that this was largely based on wishful thinking. Since Trump returned to the White House, the Russians have significantly escalated their air war against Ukraine’s civilian population. On the battlefield, Putin’s troops are now engaged in the early stages of what promises to be a major summer offensive. Meanwhile, Kremlin officials continue make maximalist demands at the negotiating table that no Ukrainian government could accept. These are not the actions of a country seeking a pathway to peace.

In both words and deeds, Putin is sending unambiguous signals that he has no interest whatsoever in ending his invasion and remains determined to achieve the complete subjugation of Ukraine. This uncompromising stance will not change unless Western leaders can convince Putin that the most likely alternative to a negotiated peace is not an historic Russian triumph but a disastrous Russian defeat.

The steps needed to bring about this change and create the conditions to end the war are no secret. Sanctions measures against Russia must be tightened and expanded to starve the Kremlin war machine of funding and weaken the domestic foundations of Putin’s regime. Countries that currently help Moscow bypass international sanctions must be targeted with far greater vigor. In parallel, Western military aid to Ukraine must be dramatically increased, with an emphasis on providing long-range weapons and financing Ukraine’s rapidly growing domestic defense industry.

All this will require a degree of political will that is currently lacking. It would also be expensive. Indeed, during this week’s G7 summit, Trump balked at the idea of imposing new sanctions, saying they would “cost us a lot of money.” This is dangerously shortsighted. Trump and other G7 leaders need to urgently recognize that if Putin is allowed to succeed in Ukraine, the cost of stopping him will skyrocket.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 29, 2025

UN probe: Russia’s ‘human safari’ in Ukraine is a crime against humanity

By Peter Dickinson

UN investigators have concluded that a coordinated Russian campaign of deadly drone strikes targeting civilians in southern Ukraine’s Kherson region is a crime against humanity, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert Jun 12, 2025

Putin’s peace plan is a blueprint for the end of Ukrainian statehood

By Tetiana Kotelnykova

Russia’s peace plan sends a clear signal that Moscow wants to erase Ukraine as a state and as a nation. If Western leaders wish to avoid this catastrophic outcome, they must convince Putin that the alternative to a negotiated peace is a Russian defeat, writes Tetiana Kotelnykova.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

UkraineAlert Jun 3, 2025

After Ukraine’s innovative airbase attacks, nowhere in Russia is safe

By David Kirichenko

Ukraine carried out one of the most audacious operations in modern military history on June 1, using swarms of smuggled drones to strike four Russian airbases simultaneously and destroy a significant portion of Putin’s bomber fleet, writes David Kirichenko.

Artificial Intelligence Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Putin’s Kyiv blitz sends message to G7 leaders: Russia does not want peace appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Session I

Session II

Session III

Session IV

Session V

Sasha Toperich
Executive Vice President
Transatlantic Leadership Network

Report May 20, 2025

The European Union Growth Plan for the Western Balkans: A reality test for EU enlargement

By Valbona Zeneli, Richard Grieveson, Isabelle Ioannides, Dimitar Bechev

EU enlargement faces a test case in the Western Balkans. The current plan offers real benefits before accession, creating incentives for reform, but questions of enforceability and the relatively low amount of financial support threaten the success of the EU’s political influence in the region.

Economy & Business Europe & Eurasia

New Atlanticist Mar 7, 2025

What Trump’s approach to Europe means for the Western Balkans

By Agon Maliqi

Shifts in US policy toward Europe could prompt the EU to step up on security for the Western Balkans and revive the enlargement process.

Freedom and Prosperity Political Reform

Report Oct 7, 2024

Working on a new transatlantic approach toward the Western Balkans

By Maja Piscevic, Ilva Tare

The United States and the European Union must work together, and play to their own respective strengths, to prioritize democratic and economic growth and alignment with the West.

Corruption European Union

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post Southeast Europe Transatlantic Economic Forum 2025 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A little noticed fact is that the Ukrainian economy is actually doing relatively well in the context of the current war. The Russian onslaught in 2022 reduced Ukraine’s GDP by 29 percent, but in 2023 it recovered by an impressive 5.5 percent. Last year, Ukrainian GDP rose by a further 3 percent, though growth is likely to slow to 1.5 percent this year.

Any visitor to Ukraine can take out cash from an ATM or pay in shops using an international credit card. Countries embroiled in major wars typically experience price controls, shortages of goods, and rationing, but Ukraine has none of these. Instead, stores are fully stocked and restaurants are crowded. Everything works as usual.

How has this been possible? The main answer is that Ukraine’s state institutions are far stronger than anybody anticipated. This is particularly true of the ministry of finance, the National Bank of Ukraine, and the state fiscal service. After 2022, Ukraine’s state revenues have risen sharply.

In parallel, wartime Ukraine has continued to make progress in combating corruption. When Russia’s invasion of Ukraine first began in 2014, Ukraine was ranked 142 of 180 countries in Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perceptions Index. In the most recent edition, Ukraine had climbed to the 105 position.

Rising Ukrainian patriotism has helped fuel this progress in the fight against corruption. EU accession demands and IMF conditions have been equally important. Ukraine has gone through eight quarterly reviews of its four-year IMF program. It has done so on time and with flying colors. The same has been true of each EU assessment.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Looking ahead, three critical factors are necessary for wartime Ukraine’s future economic progress. First of all, Ukraine needs about $42 billion a year in external budget financing, or just over 20 percent of annual GDP, to finance its budget deficit. The country did not receive sufficient financing in 2022 because EU partners failed to deliver promised sums. This drove up Ukraine’s inflation rate to 27 percent at the end of 2022. The Ukrainian budget was fully financed in 2023 and 2024, driving down inflation to 5 percent. The budget will be fully financed this year.

The second factor is maritime trade via Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. Shipping from Odesa and neighboring Ukrainian ports to global markets has been almost unimpeded since September 2023 after Ukraine took out much of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The vast majority of Ukraine’s exports are commodities such as agricultural goods, steel, and iron ore, which are only profitable with cheap naval transportation, so keeping sea lanes open is vital.

The third crucial factor for wartime Ukraine’s economic prospects is a steady supply of electricity. Russian bombing of Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure disrupted the power supply significantly in 2024, which was one of the main reasons for the country’s deteriorating economic performance.

Ukraine’s economic position looks set to worsen this year. In the first four months of 2025, economic growth was only 1.1 percent, while inflation had risen to 15.9 percent by May. The main cause of rising inflation is a shortage of labor. The national bank will presumably need to hike its current interest rate of 15.5 percent, which will further depress growth. After three years of war, Ukraine’s economy is showing increasing signs of exhaustion. The country has entered stagflation, which is to be expected.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Tue, June 17, 2025 • 1:00 pm ET

Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

Russia’s current economic situation is surprisingly similar to Ukraine’s, although almost all trade between Russia and Ukraine has ceased. After two years of around 4 percent economic growth in 2023 and 2024, Russia is expecting growth of merely 1.5 percent this year, while official inflation is 10 percent. Since October 2024, the Central Bank of Russia has maintained an interest rate of 21 percent while complaining about stagflation.

The Russian and Ukrainian economies are both suffering from their extreme focus on the military sector. Including Western support, Ukraine’s military expenditure amounts to about $100 billion a year, which is no less than 50 percent of Ukraine’s GDP, with 30 percent coming from the Ukrainian budget in 2024. Meanwhile, Russia’s 2025 military expenditure is supposed to be $170 billion or 8 percent of GDP. Unlike the Ukrainians, the Russians complain about the scale of military spending. This makes sense. The Ukrainians are fighting an existential war, while Russia’s war is only existential for Putin.

Contrary to common perceptions, Russia does not have an overwhelming advantage over Ukraine in terms of military expenditure or supplies. Russia does spend significantly more than Ukraine, but much of this is in reality stolen by politicians, generals, and Putin’s friends. Furthermore, Western sanctions impede the Russian military’s ability to innovate. In contrast, Ukraine benefits from innovation because its economy is so much freer, with hundreds of startups thriving in areas such as drone production.

Russia is now entering a fiscal crunch. Its federal expenditures in 2024 amounted to 20 percent of GDP and are likely to stay at that level in 2025, of which 41 percent goes to military and security. However, the Kremlin has financed its budget deficit of about 2 percent of GDP with its national welfare fund, which is expected to run out by the end of the current year. As a result, Russia will likely be forced to reduce its public expenditures by one-tenth.

Low oil prices could add considerably to Russia’s mounting economic woes and force a further reduction in the country’s public expenditures. However, Israel’s attack on Iran may now help Putin to stay financially afloat by driving the price of oil higher.

Economically, this is a balanced war of attrition at present. Ukraine’s Western partners have the potential to turn the tables on Russia if they choose to do so. Ukraine has successfully built up a major innovative arms industry. What is missing is not arms but funds. The West needs to double Ukraine’s military budget from today’s annual total of $100 billion to $200 billion. They can do this without using their own funds if they agree to seize approximately $200 billion in frozen Russian assets currently held in Euroclear Bank in Belgium. This could enable Ukraine to outspend Russia and achieve victory through a combination of more firepower, greater technology, and superior morale.

Anders Åslund is the author of “Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy.”

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 10, 2025

Ukrainian innovations are redefining the role of drones in modern war

By Vitaliy Nabukhotny

Ukraine’s audacious drone strikes on Putin’s bomber fleet at airbases across Russia have been hailed as a watershed moment in military history, leading to claims that Ukraine is “redefining modern warfare,” writes Vitaliy Nabukhotny.

Conflict Defense Industry

UkraineAlert Jun 12, 2025

Putin’s peace plan is a blueprint for the end of Ukrainian statehood

By Tetiana Kotelnykova

Russia’s peace plan sends a clear signal that Moscow wants to erase Ukraine as a state and as a nation. If Western leaders wish to avoid this catastrophic outcome, they must convince Putin that the alternative to a negotiated peace is a Russian defeat, writes Tetiana Kotelnykova.

Conflict Freedom and Prosperity

UkraineAlert Jun 10, 2025

Modern Ukraine’s national journey can be traced on Kyiv’s central square

By Peter Dickinson

Since 1991, Kyiv’s Maidan square has emerged from Ukraine’s post-Soviet identity crisis via two popular uprisings to become the sacred ground zero of a nation forged in the crucible of revolution and war, writes Peter Dickinson.

Civil Society Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Russia and Ukraine are locked in an economic war of attrition appeared first on Atlantic Council.

July 1 will mark a dozen years since Croatia joined the the European Union (EU), the most recent country to do so. In the years after Croatia’s accession, the bloc’s eastern enlargement process stalled almost entirely. The EU’s enthusiasm for admitting new members waned, driven by rising anti-EU sentiment within member states and fears that further expansion could strain the bloc’s already burdened consensus-based decision-making. Meanwhile, democratic backsliding and disputes between candidate countries further undermined their cases for accession.

Then in 2022, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine revived the geopolitical imperative for enlargement in Brussels by highlighting Europe’s vulnerability to “gray zones.” Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia swiftly advanced along their accession paths, and hopes were somewhat revived in the six countries of the Western Balkans.

While Montenegro is the most advanced in accession negotiations today, Albania is also capitalizing on this new enlargement momentum. On May 11, Albania held parliamentary elections in which the Socialist Party, led by Prime Minister Edi Rama, won its fourth consecutive mandate, promising EU membership by 2030. After gaining EU candidate status in 2013 and waiting over a decade for the next formal step, Albania and the EU have been on an unprecedented roll since October 2024. Over the span of several months, the EU opened four clusters of negotiation chapters with Albania—covering twenty-four out of thirty-three chapters—and may open the remaining ones by the end of June. The opening of chapters signals that Albania has met initial EU benchmarks in those policy areas and will now negotiate to close the chapters—which aim to align Albanian laws, institutions, and practices with EU law.

The prevailing narrative among EU leaders, including European Council President António Costa, is that Albania and Montenegro are now leading the race to become the EU’s next member states. Both Albanian and EU officials have set 2027 as the target year to conclude the technical accession talks, paving the way for a membership vote. In May, that ambitious goal received a boost from French President Emmanuel Macron—once a skeptic of enlargement—who called it “realistic” during a visit to Tirana.  

Albania is moving fast, but will face headwinds

Several factors explain why Albania and Montenegro are pulling ahead of everyone else. To begin with, both are NATO members and—unlike Russia-friendly Serbia—are fully aligned with the EU’s Common and Foreign Security Policy. Albania, in particular, is seen as a reliable pro-Western security anchor in a volatile region where ethnic Albanians dominate in neighboring Kosovo and are a politically significant bloc in NATO members North Macedonia and Montenegro. Unlike Kosovo, which remains unrecognized by five EU member states, and North Macedonia, which is blocked by Bulgaria over historical disputes, Albania faces no such bilateral hurdles to its accession path from EU members—aside from intermittent tensions with neighboring Greece over ethnic Greek property rights and maritime borders.

Yet perhaps the main driver of Albania’s recent progress has been its sweeping EU- and US-sponsored reforms in the justice sector. Over nearly a decade, Albania has overhauled its judicial institutions and established new bodies, such as the Special Structure Against Corruption and Organised Crime (SPAK). While corruption remains high, the reformed institutions have shaken the culture of impunity that has plagued the country since the fall of communism. High-profile indictments—ranging from former presidents and prime ministers to powerful mayors—have started to build a credible track record in the fight against corruption and are helping to restore public trust in the rule of law. Yet SPAK’s results need to be sustained, and political commitment to the rule of law will increasingly be tested the deeper that investigations go.

Albania’s democracy also remains fragile and polarized. While the most recent parliamentary elections improved on earlier contests from an administrative standpoint, the political playing field continues to be uneven in favor of the ruling party. Corruption, the stifling effect of politics on media freedoms, the strength of organized crime, and weak administrative capacity—all persistent problems—could hinder the adoption of EU standards. 

Most importantly, the geopolitical mood in European capitals could easily shift away from its current support for enlargement. While Rama has secured strong political backing from major countries such as France and Italy, it is not clear whether it will receive support from the new government in Germany, which is not striking equally enthusiastic tones. The German government’s coalition agreement ties enlargement to necessary internal EU institutional reforms, which means that the EU must first ensure it can operate effectively before allowing other countries in. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and his Christian Democrats seem to favor intermediate integration models—such as having the Western Balkans join the European Economic Area, or layering the EU into concentric circles of states with varying degrees of integration.

What’s more, getting EU governments to support accession is one thing; getting the support of EU members’ parliaments to ratify accession is another. European public opinion remains wary of enlargement in several countries.

Race to the top

The prospect of Albania and Montenegro joining the EU ahead of their neighbors also raises pressing regional questions. With the rapid pace at which Albania is opening negotiation chapters, it has effectively leapfrogged over the region’s largest country, Serbia, whose accession talks have remained frozen since 2021.

For the Western Balkans, EU enlargement has functioned not only as a tool for political transformation but also for peacebuilding. The EU has long pursued a strategy of integrating the region as a group, using accession as leverage to foster regional stability, set up bilateral formats to resolve bilateral disputes—such as the Kosovo–Serbia dialogue on normalization of relations—and promote cooperation through initiatives like the Common Regional Market.

Critics may warn that Albania and Montenegro advancing alone could reinforce Serbia’s narrative of marginalization, fuel anti-EU sentiment, and undermine frameworks for regional cooperation—especially given Serbia’s pivotal role and the size of its population. But the long-standing Serbia-centric approach to enlargement—which posits that the region cannot move forward without accommodating Serbia due to its power and influence over other countries—has not worked. Rather, it has merely emboldened Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić to wield even greater de facto veto power and leverage over regional countries and their EU trajectory, even as he slips deeper into authoritarianism, sustains close ties with Russia, and has helped erode support for EU accession among Serbians.

The EU—and Serbia itself—might be better served by fostering a merit-based “race to the top” that either rewards or fails Montenegro and Albania depending on how they deliver on reforms. Demonstrating that EU enlargement remains a real and attainable goal could create the kind of positive societal pressure the region has desperately needed and could incentivize other EU candidate countries to seize this historic window of opportunity by embracing an agenda of reforms.

Agon Maliqi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is a political and foreign policy analyst from Pristina, Kosovo.  

***

The Western Balkans stands at the nexus of many of Europe’s critical challenges. Some, if not all, of the countries of the region may soon join the European Union and shape the bloc’s ability to become a more effective geopolitical player. At the same time, longstanding disputes in the region, coupled with institutional weaknesses, will continue to pose problems and present a security vulnerability for NATO that could be exploited by Russia or China. The region is also a transit route for westward migration, a source of critical raw materials, and an important node in energy and trade routes. The BalkansForward column will explore the key strategic dynamics in the region and how they intersect with broader European and transatlantic goals.

The post Are Albania and Montenegro on the fast track to EU membership? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Over the weekend, new details emerged about how the share is intended to work, provoking some comparisons with nationalization schemes in other countries. Below, Sarah Bauerle Danzman, a resident senior fellow with the GeoEconomics Center’s Economic Statecraft Initiative, delves into where exactly this deal lands between free enterprise and state control—and what it might mean for other US businesses.  

1. What is a “golden share”?

A golden share typically refers to a special class of ownership stake in a publicly traded company reserved for a government. The golden share confers substantial shareholder rights that would otherwise be atypical given the size of the ownership position.  

For instance, the Brazilian government has a golden share in Embraer, its national aviation champion, that amounts to an approximately 5 percent equity stake in the previously state-owned company. The arrangement also provides the government substantial governance rights, such as the ability to direct the company’s strategic director or veto a takeover or joint-venture arrangement involving the company.

The United Kingdom has used golden-share arrangements extensively to retain influence over strategically important companies, such as BAE (a major defense contractor) and NATS (its air traffic control provider) after they were privatized.  

Reporting suggests that the US government’s golden share is in US Steel rather than in Nippon Steel. This distinction is important because it means that the US government’s formal influence over Nippon will only relate to its US business (called US Steel) and not to its business operations in other locations. By tying the golden share to US Steel, the US government has also ensured that it will be able to fully control any future sale of the company. 

2. Does this deal amount to the nationalization of US Steel?

The golden share is “noneconomic,” meaning that it did not require the US government to make an investment in the company, and it also does not provide the United States with an equity stake in the company. This means that the US government will not be earning an economic return on its share, nor would it be eligible to accrue dividends. Additionally, the United States is not going to be involved in the day-to-day operations of US Steel. Because of this, and because the United States is not taking equity stakes away from owners, this is not a nationalization. 

However, the golden share gives the US government an extraordinary amount of control over the company. The company’s governance documents will outline the areas of strategic and operational decision making over which the US president will now have veto authority. US Steel may not be state-owned, but it is certainly now controlled by the US government.  

3. How will it be enforced?

The golden share will require presidential approval for a range of strategic and operational decisions, including capital allocation and investment decisions. Plainly, Nippon has agreed to an arrangement in which it would need to seek presidential approval if market conditions changed, and it decided it could not fulfill its commitment to invest another fourteen billion dollars into US operations over the next several years.  

This raises several questions: How will these requirements be enforced? What if Nippon reduced investments even without presidential approval? How would the US government compel Nippon to increase investments to its promised amount? The enforcement options of the US government are relatively weak here, especially if Nippon finds itself in a fragile economic position. A golden share gives the government substantial strategic control on the cheap, but the US government may find that some elements of its authority would be hard to enforce in a soft economy. 

4. What wider implications could this have for US businesses?

A golden share reduces the economic value of the company for other investors, even if the government only takes a “noneconomic” position. That is because the government is reducing the ability of equity shareholders to control the strategic and operational decision making of the company, which could generate costs and inefficiencies for the corporation. If golden shares were ubiquitous, then financing costs would increase and the attractiveness of the United States and US businesses as investment opportunities would decline. 

5. How can the US government mitigate these concerns?

The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, known as CFIUS, and the president should release more guidance as quickly as possible to make clear the circumstances under which CFIUS would seek to mitigate national security risks through a golden-share arrangement. These should be very rare cases, and the government should make clear its commitment to restraint. Otherwise, what is to stop the US government from always taking a golden share in any cross-border merger of interest? 

The post Did Trump effectively nationalize US Steel with his ‘golden share’? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On June 16, Atlantic Council Senior Advisor Harlan Ullman published an op-ed in the Hill warning of a potential “crisis point” for the US government if domestic immigration protests intensify while tensions escalate in the Middle East. He argues that convergence of crises at home and abroad could overwhelm policymakers and stain the US government’s ability to respond effectively.

International Advisory Board member

Harlan Ullman

Senior Advisor

The post Ullman in the Hill on how the simultaneity of crises threaten US national security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As the Trump administration navigates this chapter, the key will be to contain and defuse the situation as the regional players sort through the changed landscape. De-escalation in the near term is not a foregone conclusion. It will require heavy lifting from the US military, which remains indispensable in times of crisis.

Details of the battle damage are still emerging, and Israel, Iran, and the United States do not yet fully know what these attacks mean for Iran’s defensive and counter-strike capabilities. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s objectives may not be static: As he sees additional opportunities to set back Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, his campaign may expand and go on far longer, as was the case in the operations against Hamas and Hezbollah. Iran may be on its back foot, but it will likely be compelled to respond with its remaining capabilities, as it began to do over the weekend with its waves of missile strikes across Israel.

Usually, the United States has greater leverage and sway with its allies and partners than its adversaries, born from the military, economic, and diplomatic threads that each ally can pull to compel the other toward an outcome. In this friendly tug-of-war over national interests, the heavyweight United States pulls toward its preferred outcomes. However, in the unique case of Israel, the smaller partner may outpace US efforts to de-escalate if additional deliberate steps are not taken. 

Washington does have some leverage over a weakened Tehran. Iran does not want an all-out war with the United States. For this reason, Iran has historically relied on its proxy network of Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and Shia militia groups for indirect and small-scale attacks on US forces and interests. This helps explain why Israel wants to link arms with the United States now, signaling to Iran that an attack on Israel is an attack on the United States. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Iranian officials have played along, stating that the United States is complicit. That may be directed toward Iranian domestic audiences—and a warning for the United States to rein in Israel. 

Regardless of Iranian intent, the situation requires the US military to be in position to defend and respond to Iranian aggression. How then should the White House manage this spiral of escalation to avoid a wider regional war? Five initial steps are needed. 

1. Set the theater to defend US forces and Israel

The United States should continue to set the theater for Iranian responses—and it should telegraph how it is doing so. Ballistic missile defense-capable destroyers in the Eastern Mediterranean, more interceptors for air defense systems across the region, and additional air power in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean island Diego Garcia will position the US military for defending US forces and Israel, as well as providing options to strike Iran if necessary. Forces that have been deployed for extended periods should be backfilled with ready forces, and additional units can be placed on prepare-to-deploy orders. The force movements and heightened alert status, combined with clear messaging, can communicate to Iran that the price of attacking the United States is extraordinarily high, particularly given Iran’s significantly degraded proxy network and air defenses. Internally, there should be a conditions-based approach to redeploying the forces once the situation settles down.

The United States must also continue to help defend Israel itself, which is the clearest path to stabilizing the region. Surging additional US capabilities into the theater may embolden Israel to launch additional strikes on Iran, but the greater risk is not being in position to defend against attacks on US forces and blunt Iran’s subsequent attacks on Israel. 

2. Move from authorized departures to ordered departures

The White House should accelerate what it put in motion through voluntary departures from State Department facilities last week by moving to ordered departures at those same locations. Temporarily reducing the number of nonemergency personnel and dependents can reduce the demands on US forces to defend and evacuate those locations later. It also signals to the region that the price of escalation is a diminished US presence, which many US partners do not want, and it provides an incentive for these partners to work toward de-escalation.  

3. Refresh the plans for noncombatant evacuations (NEOs) from Israel and Jordan

The NEO plans have been refreshed repeatedly since October 7, 2023, though the in-extremis conditions that would precipitate large-scale evacuations have never been met. These worst-case scenario plans should be dusted off again, and US government officials should discuss internally what the trip wires would be to execute the NEOs, such as commercial airports losing functionality. The United States should also discuss NEO plans with allies and partners, who often expect assistance with their evacuations but too often do not communicate their assumptions about US assistance until late in the game. 

4. Prepare to strike Iran if Iran attacks the United States

The United States will need to strike forcefully if Iran does attack US forces or bases. To that end, the US military should refresh and expand response options that would exploit Iran’s newest vulnerabilities, such as military sites that are now without adequate air defenses or exposed headquarters that serve as nerve centers for IRGC operations. The Trump administration can choose how and when it responds, and some of the steps taken to set the theater for defense will help facilitate going on the offensive. 

5. Pace the crises across time and space

Any administration can only juggle a handful of crises at any given time. The Trump administration should consider which departments have comparative advantages in navigating which crises, given the finite bandwidth of senior leaders and high-demand US forces. The US military is uniquely and singularly manned, trained, and equipped to reduce the chance of a larger regional war that could have devastating human and economic costs for the United States—and the entire region. The White House should therefore prioritize de-escalating quickly in order to focus on other theaters and priorities. 

With steady, cool-headed leadership at this heated moment, the United States can reduce the possibility of a wider regional war that could spin out of control.

Caroline Zier is a nonresident senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She has over fifteen years of experience in national security and defense at the Department of Defense, most recently serving as the deputy chief of staff to former Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin.

The post How the US can reduce the risk of wider war in the Middle East appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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On June 13, Matthew Kroenig, Atlantic Council vice president and Scowcroft Center senior director, was quoted in the Wall Street Journal on how President Trump may choose to present Israel’s strikes on Iranian military and nuclear installations, as well as its military leadership, in light of his “peacemaker” pledge.

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

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On May 28, Caroline Zier, nonresident senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative, was published in the Military Times examining the Trump administration’s policy of using miliary personnel at the US southern border. Zier argues that the military’s “unprecedented” role at the border diverts time and resources from national security operations that “only the military can perform” like deterring China in the Indo-Pacific.

Fellow

Caroline Zier

Nonresident Senior Fellow

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Security & Defense

The post Zier in Military Times analyzes US military deployment at southern border appeared first on Atlantic Council.

One of the key demands detailed in the Russian memorandum is the requirement for Ukraine’s complete withdrawal from four Ukrainian provinces that Moscow claims as its own but has so far been unable to fully occupy. For Kyiv, this would mean abandoning dozens of towns and cities along with millions of Ukrainians to the horrors of indefinite Russian occupation. It would also dramatically weaken Ukraine’s defenses and leave the rest of the country dangerously exposed to further Russian aggression.

Handing over the city of Kherson and the surrounding region would be particularly disastrous for Ukraine’s future national security. This would grant Russia a foothold across the Dnipro River in the western half of Ukraine, placing Odesa and the country’s other Black Sea ports in immediate danger. The loss of Zaporizhzhia, one of Ukraine’s largest cities with a prewar population of around seven hundred thousand, is similarly unthinkable.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Territorial concessions are only one part of Russia’s comprehensive plan to undermine Ukrainian statehood. The memorandum presented in Istanbul calls for strict limits to be imposed on the size of Ukraine’s military along with restrictions on the categories of weapons the country is allowed to possess. Ukraine would also be banned from joining any military alliances or concluding bilateral security agreements with other nations. This would transform Ukraine into a disarmed and internationally isolated buffer state with no means to defend itself, leaving it entirely at Putin’s mercy.

Beyond the battlefield, Russia’s memorandum proposes a series of sweeping changes to Ukraine’s internal political and cultural landscape that would allow Moscow to reestablish its dominance over the country. Key demands include official status for the Russian language, the reinstatement of the Russian Orthodox Church’s legal privileges, and a wholesale rewriting of Ukrainian history in line with Kremlin narratives.

One of the most sinister aspects of the Russian peace proposal is the call for a complete ban on all so-called “nationalist” Ukrainian political parties. This rather vague wording is open to interpretation and could easily be used to silence Ukrainian politicians opposed to Russian influence. Given the Kremlin’s long record of labeling anything that contracts Russian imperial orthodoxies as “extremist” or “fascist,” the idea of outlawing “nationalist” political parties represents an obvious threat to Ukraine’s sovereignty and the country’s democratic political system.

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Moscow’s memorandum was presented at a time when Russia is escalating its invasion of Ukraine. In recent months, Russian drone and missile attacks on Ukrainian cities have increased significantly, leading to a sharp rise in the number of killed and wounded civilians. Along the front lines of the war, the Russian military is currently engaged in what most analysts believe are the early stages of a major summer offensive that seeks to break Ukrainian resistance. Russian troops are advancing in the east and have recently crossed the border in northern Ukraine to open a new front in the Sumy region.

The Ukrainian authorities cannot accept the punishing terms being proposed by Russia. Indeed, no sovereign state could do so and expect to survive. The real question is how the international community will respond. Russia’s memorandum is a blueprint for the end of Ukrainian statehood and the return of the country to Kremlin control. It makes a complete mockery of recent US-led calls for a compromise peace, and demonstrates beyond any reasonable doubt that Russia has no interest in ending the invasion.

This should be enough to persuade Western leaders that progress toward peace will only be possible if they increase the pressure on Putin. At present, the Russian leader clearly believes he is winning and is confident of outlasting the West in Ukraine. In order to change this calculus and force a rethink in Moscow, Kyiv’s partners must impose tougher sanctions on Russia while boosting military support for Ukraine. In other words, they must speak to Putin in the language of strength, which remains the only language he truly understands.

Russia’s recent memorandum sends an unambiguous signal that Moscow is undeterred by the current Western stance and remains fully committed to its maximalist goal of erasing Ukraine as a state and as a nation. If Western leaders wish to avoid this catastrophic outcome, they must convince Putin that the alternative to a negotiated peace is a Russian defeat.

Tetiana Kotelnykova is a graduate student at Yale University specializing in European and Russian Studies with a focus on conflict, postwar recovery, and regional geopolitics. She is the founder of Brave Generation, a New York-based nonprofit organization that supports young Ukrainians affected by war and invests in the next generation of Ukrainian leadership. She also leads the Ukrainian Recovery Youth Global Initiative.

Further reading

UkraineAlert Jun 5, 2025

Trump’s Russia policy must be rooted in realism

By Agnia Grigas

The Trump administration favors a realist approach to international relations, but a pragmatic assessment of Russia’s capabilities and objectives is needed to achieve the stated goal of bringing the war in Ukraine to an end, writes Agnia Grigas.

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UkraineAlert Jun 3, 2025

After Ukraine’s innovative airbase attacks, nowhere in Russia is safe

By David Kirichenko

Ukraine carried out one of the most audacious operations in modern military history on June 1, using swarms of smuggled drones to strike four Russian airbases simultaneously and destroy a significant portion of Putin’s bomber fleet, writes David Kirichenko.

Artificial Intelligence Conflict

UkraineAlert May 29, 2025

UN probe: Russia’s ‘human safari’ in Ukraine is a crime against humanity

By Peter Dickinson

UN investigators have concluded that a coordinated Russian campaign of deadly drone strikes targeting civilians in southern Ukraine’s Kherson region is a crime against humanity, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Drones

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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It’s causing a big reaction. On Wednesday, World Bank President Ajay Banga announced that the development bank’s board has lifted its longstanding ban on funding nuclear energy projects. The decision could surge funding for the emissions-free power plants in developing countries, and it comes amid a broader shift in attitudes toward atomic energy around the world. Below, the Atlantic Council’s top nuclear energy policy experts get to the core of the matter.

• Jennifer Gordon: Director of the Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative and the Daniel B. Poneman chair for nuclear energy policy at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.
• Lauren Hughes: Deputy director of the Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative.

The decision

• “This is not the bank’s first foray into nuclear power as a means of promoting sustainable economic growth and shared prosperity,” says Lauren. In 1959, the bank issued a forty-million-dollar loan to help finance construction of Italy’s first nuclear reactor. 
• The 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident contributed to the World Bank enacting a de facto ban on funding for nuclear power, Lauren explains. This ban was then reiterated in 2013, when the bank said that “safety of nuclear facilities and non-proliferation are not in the [World Bank Group’s] areas of expertise.” 
• This week’s reversal “follows a number of other similar decisions on nuclear energy,” Jennifer tells us, including the Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy that more than twenty countries signed in December 2023, as well as recent decisions by the European Investment Bank, Germany, and Canada to boost nuclear power. Taken together, these decisions “indicate that nuclear is coming back into favor and being recognized for its ability to provide reliable baseload power.” 

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The impact

• “Many emerging-market countries are interested in developing nuclear energy projects that could be prohibitively difficult to realize without financing,” Lauren explains, noting that upfront costs to build a power plant can run into the billions of dollars  
• Lauren calls the bank’s decision a “pragmatic approach toward nuclear energy,” which recognizes “that the demand for reliable, affordable, clean energy will only increase in the coming decades” as populations grow in Sub-Saharan Africa, India, and Southeast Asia.  

The frontier

• For the United States, the World Bank’s move “may indicate an eagerness to engage with the Trump administration on policy issues that the administration has indicated are at the top of its agenda,” Jennifer says. In late May, for example, the White House unveiled new executive orders on deploying advanced reactor technologies. 
• Lauren adds that World Bank financing could help the United States “be more competitive against state-backed financing offers, especially from Russia and China.” By extension, the World Bank could reinforce the efforts of agencies such as the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the US International Development Finance Corporation, and the US Trade and Development Agency that are involved in nuclear projects in developing countries, she notes.
• For Jennifer, the bank overturning its ban should be “viewed as the next frontier in unlocking funding to support new nuclear builds and leveling the playing field with Russia and China.” However, she adds, it’s “not the final frontier, because it could send a signal to other international financial institutions that they should follow suit and also support nuclear projects.” 

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Why is Carney calling for changes now? 

Speaking at the University of Toronto, Carney described the current era as a “hinge moment” in Canada’s history. As “threats from a more dangerous and divided world are unraveling the rules-based international order,” Carney is doing what many leaders of all political stripes in Canada have pledged and failed to do—increase military and defense spending. 

Recognizing the increasingly volatile international security environment that Canada finds itself in, Carney announced sweeping plans for the government of Canada to increase its defense spending to the NATO target of 2 percent of its GDP by March 2026, ahead of the goal set by the government of former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. Canada’s lagging defense spending has long drawn the ire of the United States and other NATO allies and served as a target for US President Donald Trump earlier this year. Carney likely timed this announcement for this weekend’s G7 Summit, during which Trump will travel to Alberta, and in advance of the NATO Summit in the Hague later this month. 

Aside from addressing short-term priorities with this month’s summitry, Carney also framed his announcement around the threats to Canada at this moment in history, stating, “a new imperialism threatens. Middle powers must compete for interests and attention, knowing that if they’re not at the table, they’re on the menu.”

What exactly is Canada doing on defense spending? 

Canada currently spends 1.37 percent of its GDP on defense, but the low spending numbers do not tell the full story of Canada’s defense woes. Ottawa only has one operational submarine, out of four, and only half of the Canada’s maritime and land vehicles are operational. 

Questions surround Canada’s ability to ramp up its domestic defense production at a scale needed to meet Carney’s new goals. The equipment used by the Canadian Armed Forces and Canada’s broader defense production as a whole are closely integrated with the United States. Despite this, Carney has pledged to diversify future defense spending away from an overreliance on the United States and look towards new partners, including Europe, as well as boosting its own capacity for domestic production.

Where will this increased spending go? 

In fiscal year 2025-26 alone, the Carney government will invest an additional $6.5 billion across the Department of National Defence (DND), the Canadian Armed Forces, and the Communications Security Establishment (Canada’s signals intelligence agency). The Canadian government aims to increase the number of full-time armed forces members and reservists alongside investing in the civilian workforce. Part of the spending increase will also come from moving the oversight of Canadian Coast Guard from the Ministries of Fisheries and Oceans to the DND. The investment strategy calls for further modernizing Canada’s military capabilities with a focus on the Arctic, such as Canada’s recent acquisition of a new over-the horizon radar system from Australia. To further Canada’s domestic defense production and innovation, the government plans to establish BOREALIS, the Bureau of Research, Engineering, and Advanced Leadership in Science, which will focus on focus on furthering research in frontier technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing.

How should the United States view Canada’s plans? 

Washington has already welcomed Ottawa’s announcement, with US Ambassador to Canada Pete Hoekstra posting on X that the plan is “an important step toward strengthening the Alliance and reinforcing our shared security.” However, a key part of Carney’s strategy is to diversify Canada’s defense investments and partnerships away from the United States. The purchase of the JORN radar system from Australia was Canberra’s biggest ever defense export and took the United States by surprise. Ottawa is considering bids from both South Korea and a joint German and Norwegian bid to purchase new submarines. Canada’s planned purchase of eighty-eight F-35 fighter jets from the United States is also being reconsidered, with the DND now potentially looking toward European suppliers. 

While Washington will welcome Ottawa’s clear, if long-delayed, commitment to investing in its national defense and security, the era when Canada buys heavily from the United States is likely over. As Carney stated, “it is time for Canada to chart its own path and assert itself on the international stage,” and Washington should not take for granted its potential role in Canada’s defense future.

The post Carney’s ‘hinge moment’ is about more than just Canadian defense spending. What does that mean for Washington? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

1. What impact would this proposal have on the Nord Stream gas pipelines? 

This package could put the final nail in Nord Stream 2’s coffin, providing a much overdue, decisive vision for the future of Russian pipeline flows to Europe. Ending this zombie project debate once and for all also sends a clear message to global liquefied natural gas producers, which may be hesitant to expand partnerships with the European buyers as long as a relapse to Russian gas dependence is a possibility. This checkmate move from the European Commission still needs approval from EU member states, as well as watertight language on sanctions implementation to prevent caveats or exemptions. Moreover, the Commissions’s bold action on Nord Stream 2 brings the Commission’s Roadmap to fully end EU dependency on Russian energy closer to reality, just as the roadmap’s legislative proposals are expected later this month.

—Olga Khakova is the deputy director for European energy security at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

***

The proposal is a welcome one to put an end to the questions about the restarting of the pipelines. The proposed rules would ban any EU operator from doing direct or indirect transactions for Nord Stream 1 or 2, making the operation of the pipelines impossible. More importantly, the proposal would end any rumors or quiet discussions around the future of the pipeline and shows the seriousness, at least in the Commission, around achieving energy independence from Russia. “There is no return to the past,” von der Leyen declared during Tuesday’s announcement. 

—Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

***

After nearly two static decades of Germany’s Gazpromphilic foreign policy, and statements emerging in recent weeks from German politicians from the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) indicating openness to a revival of Nord Stream, today’s EU announcement of Nord Stream sanctions is nothing short of astonishing. That’s because it amounts to a de facto approval by new German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. Since assuming the Chancellery, Merz has taken steps toward a true Zeitenwende that were lacking in Germany since that political approach to Russia had been first announced by his predecessor Olaf Scholz, with Merz stating clearly and resolutely in late May that under his leadership, the German government will “do everything to ensure that Nord Stream 2 cannot be put back into operation.” 
 
Merz doubled down on this rhetoric while sitting next to US President Donald Trump in the Oval Office last week, declaring Nord Stream to have been “a mistake.” Saying this next to Trump is especially important given recent reports that a US-based investor has sought to lobby the Trump administration to drop sanctions on Nord Stream to allow for American ownership of the pipelines. According to the investor, this move is an attempt to supposedly achieve the “de-Russification” of the projects—despite the logical incoherence of how such infrastructure could ever be truly “de-Russified” if it were still delivering Russian gas. 
 
If the EU is able to successfully get this sanctions package through the gauntlet of member state ratification—no small task with the likes of Hungary and Slovakia waiting in the wings to go to bat for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s energy interests in Brussels—it will be a major step toward finally ending Russia’s energy grip over European political and security interests. 
 
—Benjamin L. Schmitt is a senior fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Kleinman Center for Energy Policy and Perry World House. 

2. How much would lowering the oil price cap from $60 to $45 hurt Russia’s economy? 

That depends on how effectively the new price cap would be enforced and where the general price of crude would fluctuate. The impact would probably be significant but not as big as it would be if the United States could find a way to limit third-country purchases of Russian oil, either through US Senator Lindsey Graham’s bill or in another (and more practical) form. 

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland. 

***

Russia still relies on revenue from oil exports, so lowering the price cap could negatively affect how much money they can bring in. However, the price cap has been very difficult to enforce. In response to the price cap, Russia developed an expansive shadow fleet to export its oil, which created an additional challenge for Western sanctions enforcement authorities.  

That said, lowering the price cap would be welcome considering the price of Brent Crude as of today, $67.24 per barrel, which is very close to the $60 price cap. When the price cap first went into effect in 2022, the price of oil was over $100 per barrel. Reducing the price cap is an acknowledgement that oil prices have dropped considerably since it was first introduced and reflects a commitment to restrict Russia’s ability to generate revenue. 

—Kimberly Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. She previously served in the federal government for fifteen years, most recently as the acting associate director of the Treasury Department Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s Intelligence Division.

3. What else is in this sanctions package? 

The most interesting aspect of this package is the “transaction ban” on “financial operators in third countries that finance trade to Russia, in circumvention of sanctions.” That sounds a lot like secondary sanctions, which historically have been controversial in the EU. If this passes, it could significantly strengthen EU sanctions by extending their reach. 

—Kimberly Donovan

4. What are the chances of this proposal moving forward? 

It’s worth keeping in mind that this is still just a proposal, and there is a long way to go before it is finalized. These sanctions proposals require the unanimous support of the EU’s twenty-seven member states, which, in and of itself, is no simple process of negotiations. The proposal will likely face two immediate hurdles from the likes of Hungary and Slovakia, whose respective leaders have delayed or played spoiler on the previous efforts for political leverage until their demands were met. However, the fact that there have been seventeen successful rounds of sanctions in the past suggests that solutions, however messy, incomplete, or last-minute, are possible. There is an important transatlantic angle as well. The EU wants to move together with the United States on Russia. So European holdouts will certainly not want to be seen as roadblocks should the Trump administration decide, for example, to push for further sanctions on Russia. 

—Jörn Fleck 

***

I don’t know how much has been vetted with Hungary nor what kind of pressure the Commission is prepared to put on Budapest if it attempts to block the proposal. But the Commission seems serious about ramping up pressure and announcing steps before the G7 Summit, where they will have a chance to obtain Japanese and Canadian support, and thus to present the United States with some decisions. 

—Daniel Fried  

***

Brussels seems optimistic that the eighteenth sanctions package will pass. However, aspects of the sanctions package will need G7 support. This includes the proposal to reduce the price cap, which is why the Commission understandably announced the proposal in advance of G7 meetings this coming weekend in Canada. Further, support from Washington or lack thereof could sway how countries such as Hungary and Slovakia vote on the sanctions package. 

—Kimberly Donovan

5. How might Washington react to this proposal? 

That is a big question, and I can’t give a reliable answer. The European leaders at the G7 will have a chance to convince Trump that it is his own plan to end the war that the EU is backing, and that the United States ought to go all in to that end and agree to pressure Russia. But Trump, despite edging up toward imposing additional costs on Russia, has not yet done so, despite multiple opportunities and provocations from Putin. 

—Daniel Fried  

***

It’s unclear how Trump himself will react to the proposal. But what the US president should see in this proposal is a Europe that is a willing and serious partner. The administration has made clear that it expects Europe to step up for its own security and for Ukraine’s. This is part of Europe’s response to do just that. European leaders have been united on pushing for action on Russia given Moscow’s continued intransigence on cease-fire talks and devastating attacks on Ukraine. This proposal is another indication that Europe is putting real ideas on the table to boost US and Ukrainian leverage with Putin. 

—Jörn Fleck 

***

Members of Congress may welcome this package, as the spirit is consistent with the bill Graham introduced to get Putin to the negotiating table. However, we’ll have to wait and see how Trump reacts considering the stalled cease-fire talks and escalating violence on the battlefield. 

—Kimberly Donovan

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Located in the geographical center of Kyiv, Independence Square is known to locals and foreign guests alike by its Ukrainian-language name, Maidan Nezalezhnosti, or simply Maidan. Over the past three decades, Maidan has undergone a dramatic transformation that has seen it emerge from Ukraine’s post-Soviet identity crisis via two popular uprisings to become the sacred ground zero of a nation forged in the crucible of revolution and war.

Today, Maidan is an obligatory point of pilgrimage on the itinerary of all visitors to the Ukrainian capital. People come to Maidan in order to honor those who have died in the fight against Russia’s invasion, or just to soak up the atmosphere of an iconic location that has witnessed some of the most consequential political events of the twenty-first century.

It was not always this way. When the modern square first began to take shape in the nineteenth century, it was a relative backwater in an elegant and aged city where the center of gravity remained firmly fixed elsewhere. Tellingly, when Ukrainian officials gathered in Kyiv on January 22, 1919, to publicly sign the unification act between the Ukrainian People’s Republic and the West Ukrainian People’s Republic, they chose to stage this historic event on Sophia Square rather than Maidan.

As Kyiv rose from the ashes following World War II, the square became more architecturally impressive and gained in logistical importance, but it continued to lack the aura attached to the city’s true heirlooms. Instead, Maidan remained a fairly identikit Soviet public space noted for its large fountains and even larger Lenin monument.

Maidan first became associated with political activism during the dying days of the Soviet Empire in 1990 when it hosted a two-week student protest dubbed the Revolution on Granite that played a significant part in Ukraine’s independence struggle. At the time, it was known as October Revolution Square. Maidan would receive its current name on August 26, 1991, two days after the Ukrainian declaration of independence, but it would be many years before the square began to earn its current reputation as a genuine symbol of Ukrainian statehood.

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During the first decade or so of Ukrainian independence, Maidan was anything but inspiring. The square remained largely empty, with no monuments or memorials to celebrate the newly independent state. Instead, the cult of communism was replaced by crass commercialism. On the spot once occupied by Lenin, a giant TV screen was installed broadcasting an eclectic mix of adverts, pop videos, cage fights, and catwalk shows. Taxi drivers would line up nearby and watch absentmindedly while waiting for new fares.

High above Maidan, the skyline was dominated by the Hotel Moscow. In 2001, the Ukrainian authorities finally decided that this branding was probably inappropriate for a country looking to shake off the shackles of empire, and the hotel name was duly changed from Moscow to Ukraine. Likewise, a colossal Soviet hammer and sickle was allowed to loom large over Maidan until 2003, when it was belatedly removed from the facade of the Trade Union building. The continued prominence of the Soviet crest made a mockery of Independence Square and spoke volumes about the often ambiguous attitudes toward Ukrainian statehood that characterized the early post-Soviet period.

The first big turning point in Maidan’s transformation came following Ukraine’s November 2004 presidential election. Amid massive public anger over a crude Kremlin-backed bid to steal the vote, huge crowds flooded into Kyiv from across the country and congregated on Maidan, establishing a tent city and a round-the-clock presence. This protest movement lasted for over two months and came to be known as the Orange Revolution. Millions of Ukrainians participated. They eventually succeeded in overturning the rigged election and forcing a rerun which was won by the opposition candidate, representing a watershed moment in modern Ukrainian history.

Maidan itself was synonymous with the Orange Revolution and occupied a central position in the mythology that grew up around it. From that moment on, Maidan became not just a place but also an event. To stage a Maidan meant to organize a grassroots protest and hold power to account. This was a particularly terrifying concept for the neighboring Russian authorities. Dread of a Moscow Maidan soon began to haunt the Kremlin, feeding Putin’s obsession with Ukraine and laying the foundations for the horrors that were to follow. The Russian propaganda machine promptly adopted Maidan as a buzzword signifying wicked foreign plots, and continues to use it two decades later without any need for further explanation.

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Nine years after the Orange Revolution, Maidan would be the scene of a second Ukrainian revolution. This time, the spark came when Ukraine’s pro-Kremlin president, Viktor Yanukovych, pulled out of a long anticipated EU association agreement and unleashed the riot police against students who objected to this drastic geopolitical U-turn. Once again, millions of Ukrainians flocked to the capital and gathered on Maidan. This time, though, it would not be bloodless.

With strong backing from Russia, the Ukrainian authorities took a hard line approach to the protests, leading to weeks of running battles on Maidan and in the surrounding streets. The nadir came in late February 2014, when dozens of protesters were shot and killed in the city center. This Maidan massacre brought down the Yanukovych regime. With his support base evaporating, the disgraced Ukrainian president fled to Russia. Days later, Putin responded by invading Crimea. Russia’s war to extinguish Ukrainian statehood had begun.

The tragic events of February 2014 had a profound impact on Ukraine’s collective psyche and served to consecrate Maidan in the national imagination. Up until that point, the square had regularly hosted public holidays, pop concerts, and Christmas fairs. In the aftermath of the killings, such events were moved to other locations in the Ukrainian capital. Maidan itself would now be reserved for the most somber and significant occasions in the life of the nation, such as the funerals of soldiers, vigils for Ukrainians held captive in Russia, and memorials marking important Ukrainian anniversaries.

Since 2022, Maidan’s transformation has gained further momentum amid the shock and trauma of Russia’s full-scale invasion. During the initial stages of the war, people began planting flags on the square in memory of fallen soldiers. This impromptu memorial has since expanded organically to become a sea of flags and portraits commemorating those who have lost their lives in the defense of Ukraine. It is an authentic grassroots tribute that is entirely in keeping with the spirit of Maidan.

As Russia’s invasion has unfolded, Maidan’s role as the principal site for wartime mourning and reverence has served to confirm the square’s position at the heart of modern Ukraine’s national story. There could hardly be a more fitting location. After all, Vladimir Putin launched the current war because he viewed the emergence of an independent Ukraine as an intolerable threat to his own authoritarian regime and a potential catalyst for the next stage in Russia’s long retreat from empire.

Maidan embodies Putin’s darkest fears. The Russian dictator’s goal remains the destruction of Ukraine as a state and as a nation, but he is acutely aware that the country is slipping inexorably out of the Kremlin orbit. This is nowhere more evident than on Kyiv’s central square, which has become the ultimate symbol of Ukraine’s escape from empire and embrace of an independent identity.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

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The Abraham Accords—one of the signature foreign policy accomplishments of the first Trump administration—provide a valuable platform for harnessing these trends. But to achieve a more stable and prosperous Middle East consistent with the vision US President Donald Trump recently outlined in Riyadh, the accords must be adapted and strengthened. The United States and its partners cannot simply wait for the war in Gaza to end or for Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel. They must take steps now to strengthen the accords in order for them to provide an effective path forward for the Middle East. 

Where to start?

First, to deliver strategic benefits for both the region and the United States, accords countries must go beyond normalizing relations with Israel. They should build on normalization to actively commit to core principles related to religious tolerance, broad-based economic growth, and a forward-looking approach to tackling shared challenges in cooperation with the United States. 

Second, those principles should be operationalized through a flexible mini-lateral structure that transforms the accords from a loose label into an effective network of countries spanning the Middle East and neighboring regions. This structure could learn from the successes and challenges of the Negev Forum launched under then US President Joe Biden in 2022. To succeed, this new mini-lateral forum must help identify meaningful, broad-based areas of cooperation that regularly bring together senior officials from participating countries even as political differences between some of those countries persist. In this regard, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, is a useful model, as argued previously by the Atlantic Council’s Dan Shapiro.

At the same time, the accords countries must avoid a cumbersome bureaucratic structure that creates work without delivering results and is not conducive to the private-sector engagement that should remain central to the accords network. Moreover, this structure should seek to coordinate with civil society actors—universities, hospitals, and nongovernmental organizations—that can help build people-to-people ties across countries and cooperation from the ground up. Given enough time, this network might even provide functions ranging from a voting bloc in the United Nations to an economic corridor, building on promising initiatives such as the proposed India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). 

Third, countries in the Middle East—particularly Israel—must take a greater leadership role in operationalizing that network and ensuring that new members see tangible benefits. For instance, Israel could be much more active in sharing technological expertise, financing, and building partnerships that continue to strengthen relations long after the signing of an accord document. Reviving the Abraham Accords Caucus in the Knesset could help facilitate such leadership. The UAE, which has been a consistent champion of the accords, should continue its outreach, leveraging its leadership in strategic sectors such as emerging technology, food security, and renewable energy. For its part, the United States can and should provide strong diplomatic support for the accords. Yet, as Trump made clear in Riyadh, the momentum must come from the Middle East itself. 

Early returns: How the accords are already delivering strategic benefits

An important reason to double down on the accords now is that they are already delivering meaningful results toward a more stable Middle East. Advocates of the accords often use increased trade as a metric of success, but the strategic benefits, while harder to measure, are more significant. For example, the UAE is currently leveraging its growing partnership with Israel to mediate between Jerusalem and the new government in Syria, helping to avert a major military confrontation in the Middle East whose consequences could reverberate for decades. Such talks are only possible because of the trust Emirati and Israeli officials have built over the past five years, constructing lines of communication across what previously seemed like insurmountable divides. Moreover, the fact that Arab partners helped shoot down Iranian drones and missiles launched against Israel in April 2024 demonstrates the willingness of those partners to take steps previously considered unthinkable to prevent military escalation in the region. 

The Abraham Accords have also revived or enabled economic connectivity projects that better leverage the Middle East’s role as a link between Asia and Europe. Continued success in this area through initiatives such as IMEC could benefit the global economic landscape while expanding economic opportunity for Middle Eastern countries. For the United States, such projects provide an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and help reduce opportunities for Chinese exploitation in the region. As a result, the accords reinforce US economic leadership in the Middle East—and they should continue to, especially in critical sectors such as artificial intelligence and emerging technology, where Gulf countries are increasingly asserting a major role.

What comes next

Many in the US foreign policy community assume the Abraham Accords are on pause until Saudi Arabia joins the accords. This is a dangerous assumption that risks jeopardizing the potential of the accords to deliver transformative change for the region. It’s true that Saudi Arabia is unlikely to formally normalize relations with Israel in the immediate term: Saudi officials have stressed the need not just for an end to the war in Gaza but also consensus on a credible path to a Palestinian state, and the current political realities of the region make this extremely difficult. Nonetheless, there is significant work that can and should be done to reinforce the existing accords and lay the groundwork for their meaningful expansion to other countries.

The Trump administration should build on the accomplishments of Trump’s first term by working with US partners to revive a regionally led mini-lateral forum for the accords based on clearly articulated principles. The United States and its partners should use this forum to advance tangible initiatives that strengthen collaboration between both existing and prospective accords countries so that when the accords are expanded, they are building on a solid foundation. This should include Muslim-majority countries in areas neighboring the Middle East that have natural economic, political, and security ties with the region and thus can play a meaningful role in promoting stability and prosperity. In doing so, the Trump administration should reassure its partners that the US vision for the Abraham Accords is premised on the assumption that the Palestinian issue must be resolved in a manner that is acceptable to moderate Palestinians. Doing so is essential not just to secure Saudi Arabia’s eventual participation in the accords, but to resolve a persistent threat to the Trump administration’s vision for a more stable and prosperous Middle East.

Only if this work is done now will the United States and its partners be prepared to seize the potential the accords provide for greater regional change after the war in Gaza comes to a close.

Allison Minor is the director of the N7 Initiative, a partnership between the Jeffrey M. Talpins Foundation and the Atlantic Council. She previously served as the deputy US special envoy for Yemen and the director for the Arabian Peninsula at the US National Security Council.

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The roots of scarcity

Turkmenistan’s vulnerability to water stress is the highest in Central Asia, a precarious position resulting from a complex interplay of factors. Much of the country’s water infrastructure is a relic of the Soviet Union, including open canals and irrigation ditches that are tragically inefficient. Estimates suggest that anywhere between 30 percent and 60 percent of the water transported through these systems is lost to evaporation or seeps into the sandy soil before reaching its intended destination. These physical conditions are compounded by systemic mismanagement. A cohesive national strategy for water conservation and distribution remains elusive, hampered by a lack of coordination among governing bodies.

This inefficiency is particularly damaging given the demands placed upon the water supply, primarily by agriculture, which consumes an estimated 94 percent of the nation’s water resources. The heart of the problem lies in the legacy of Soviet-era planning: industrial production dedicated to cotton, a thirsty crop ill-suited to Turkmenistan’s naturally arid climate. This reliance on water-intensive agriculture depletes precious reserves. A shift toward drought-resistant crops, modern techniques such as drip irrigation, and greater agricultural diversification is long overdue to alleviate the immense pressure on the water supply.

Compounding these internal challenges are external pressures. Turkmenistan relies on the Amu Darya river, which flows along its border with Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, for roughly 90 percent of its water. The construction of Afghanistan’s Qosh Tepa Canal upstream represents a significant new threat. By diverting substantial amounts of water from the Amu Darya for its own agricultural ambitions, the canal project could reduce the flow reaching Turkmenistan, further straining an already stressed system. The absence of robust transboundary water-sharing agreements and effective diplomatic channels risks tensions, highlighting the urgent need for dialogue, potentially facilitated by neutral international mediators, to navigate this issue peacefully.

Overlaying all these factors is the undeniable impact of climate change. Projections indicate that temperatures in Turkmenistan are set to rise faster than the global average, inevitably leading to more frequent and severe droughts, further diminishing already scarce water resources and pushing the nation closer to the brink.

The human and environmental toll

The consequences of this escalating water scarcity are already being felt across Turkmenistan. Food insecurity is on the rise, with reports indicating that 12 percent of the population faces severe challenges in accessing sufficient food—among the highest rate among former Soviet nations. Access to safe drinking water is also becoming increasingly precarious. Residents across the country, including in the capital city of Ashgabat, report frequent water cuts and shortages. The tap water that is available is often of questionable quality, forcing many to rely on more expensive bottled water.

Reduced water flow and dying vegetation leave the soil vulnerable to erosion, intensifying the dust, sand, and salt storms that plague the region. In the northern Dashoguz province, vast tracts of agricultural land are severely affected by salt storms originating from the desiccated Aral Sea, posing significant risks to respiratory health and further degrading farmland. This vicious cycle of soil salinity, exacerbated by inefficient irrigation and poor drainage, diminishes air quality and agricultural productivity. Altogether, this creates an increasingly hostile environment for both people and wildlife.

The economic repercussions are also significant. Turkmenistan’s economy relies on natural gas exports, which constitute nearly 90 percent of its export revenue. However, the natural gas industry itself is water-intensive, requiring substantial amounts for cooling systems, equipment cleaning, and extraction processes. Water scarcity could directly impede the nation’s ability to maintain current natural gas production levels, potentially impacting national revenue and the funding of essential public services.

Furthermore, the unique ecosystems adapted to Turkmenistan’s arid conditions, including the vast Karakum Desert, are under threat. Rivers, wetlands, and oases—vital habitats for diverse flora, fauna, and migratory birds—risk shrinking or disappearing entirely, leading to biodiversity loss and pushing vulnerable species toward extinction.

Finally, the crisis is beginning to drive climate migration. Faced with failing crops, soil degradation, rising food prices, and dwindling agricultural employment (a sector that employs over 40 percent of the workforce), people are increasingly forced to migrate in search of better living conditions, both within the country and abroad. This displacement adds another layer of social and economic strain.

A call to action to maintain regional stability

The water crisis unfolding in Turkmenistan is not merely a domestic issue; its ripples will likely be felt regionally and globally. Declining agricultural output could increase Turkmenistan’s reliance on international food markets, potentially contributing to fluctuations in global food prices. More critically, the potent combination of environmental degradation, economic hardship, and potential social unrest fueled by water scarcity could destabilize the country and, by extension, the wider Central Asian region. History, including the the Syrian uprising, serves as a warning of how severe drought and resource mismanagement can exacerbate existing tensions and lead to conflict. Such instability could create power vacuums, ripe for large global powers.

Therefore, addressing Turkmenistan’s water challenge is a matter of international concern. Proactive engagement from the United States and the European Union could play a crucial role in promoting sustainable solutions and regional cooperation. In addition, supporting comprehensive research and data collection on water resources, climate impacts, and agricultural practices is essential for informed policymaking. The United States and the European Union should take the lead in facilitating regional dialogues involving Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Such initiatives will be critical for fostering transboundary cooperation and preventing conflicts over shared water resources such as the Amu Darya. Furthermore, technical assistance and funding from the United States and the European Union, potentially channeled through civil society organizations, could help implement sustainable water management practices on the ground—from promoting efficient irrigation techniques to supporting public education campaigns on water conservation.

Turkmenistan’s struggle with water scarcity is a powerful illustration of the interconnected challenges facing many parts of the world in the twenty-first century, where climate change, resource management, and geopolitical interests collide. Ignoring this looming crisis is not an option. Concerted action, grounded in cooperation and sustainable practices, is essential not only to secure a livable future for Turkmens but also to maintain stability in the region.

Rasul Satymov is a researcher with Progres Foundation with a focus on climate change, energy, and water issues in Turkmenistan.

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The G7 must seize this opportunity to advance a coherent, shared framework for digital policy, one that is grounded in trust, reinforced by standards, and aligned with democratic values. To do so, it can build on some of the insights from the Business Seven (B7), the official business engagement group of the G7. The theme of this year’s B7 Summit, which was held from May 14 to May 16, in Ottawa, Canada, was “Bolstering Economic Security and Resiliency.” The selection of this theme emphasized the importance of defending against threats and enhancing the ability of societies, governments, and businesses to adapt and recover.

In the spirit of that theme, the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center, in partnership with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative and the Europe Center, convened a private breakfast discussion alongside the B7 in Ottawa on May 15. The roundtable brought together government officials, business leaders, and civil society representatives to discuss how digital resilience can be strengthened within the G7 framework. The participants laid out foundational principles and practical approaches to building digital resilience that support economic security and long-term competitiveness. As G7 leaders gather for the summit in Kananaskis later this month, they should consider these insights on how its member states can work together to bolster their digital resilience.

1. Develop a common language for shared goals on digital sovereignty

When developing a common framework, definitions (or taxonomy) are critical. Participants emphasized that shared vocabulary is a prerequisite for meaningful cooperation. Discrepancies in how countries define concepts such as digital sovereignty can lead to fundamental misunderstandings in critical areas such as risk, which creates friction and confusion.

For example, a G7 country might frame sovereignty in terms of national control over infrastructure while another country, such as China, defines it as regulating the digital information environment. In that case, this misalignment will hinder cooperation from the outset. Specifying precise definitions of each government’s goals, including “trust,” “resilience,” and “digital sovereignty,” would enable governments and industry to align on priorities and respond more effectively to emerging standards. This definitional clarity is crucial for policymaking and a prerequisite for compliance, implementation, and interoperability across borders.

2. Build on existing multilateral and regional frameworks

Participants stressed the importance of building on existing progress toward digital resilience, both in and out of the G7, rather than discarding it in pursuit of novelty. The G7 and its partners already possess a strong foundation of digital policy initiatives. Key milestones such as the Hiroshima AI Process, launched under Japan’s 2023 G7 presidency, established International Guiding Principles and an International Code of Conduct for the development and use of artificial intelligence (AI) systems, which included frontier models. Prior to the Hiroshima AI Process, several consecutive G7 Summits committed to developing the data free flow with trust framework, which prioritizes enabling the free flow of data across borders while protecting privacy, national security, and intellectual property.

Beyond the G7, participants cited European Union (EU) partnerships as examples of forward-leaning policy environments that balance innovation with safeguards. These included the EU AI continent action plan, which aims to leverage the talent and research of European industries to strengthen digital competitiveness and bolster economic growth, as well as Horizon Europe, the EU’s primary financial program for research and innovation.

With these partnership frameworks already in place, G7 leaders should build on existing work and avoid seeking to design unique solutions that may become time-consuming—particularly when it comes to gaining political buy-in. Even in areas like AI and the use of data, where policymakers have observed rapid changes since last year’s summit, the B7 discussion participants emphasized that governments can leverage work they’ve already completed in designing and implementing existing standards. If prior technical standards and regulations are inapplicable or insufficient, policymakers can still learn lessons from an in-depth assessment, including by taking note of where they’ve fallen short of their goals.

3. Start new initiatives with small working groups and pilot projects  

Ensuring digital resilience requires managing inevitable trade-offs between national security, economic vitality, and open digital ecosystems. As one participant remarked, “the digital economy is the economy,” so policies shaping cyberspace must consider both national security and economic impacts. The G7 provides a platform for frank discussions among allies and partners about how to get these trade-offs right. But waiting for buy-in from all like-minded partners risks missed opportunities in the short term.

Participants noted that by starting with smaller forums, policymakers can build consensus that can lead to real progress. Pilot projects and working groups among smaller clusters of G7 countries could build momentum and inform scalable solutions. Participants emphasized that despite the contentious nature of some of the issues surrounding digital resilience, such as protectionism and market fragmentation, G7 governments are operating with a shared set of values. These values can motivate collaboration across the G7 on the many areas of common ground they already share, but they can also provide the basis for projects among smaller groups within the G7 to get new ideas off the ground.

A pivotal summit for digital resilience

As G7 leaders meet in Kananaskis and work toward a common framework that balances digital security and economic growth, a few key lessons can be garnered from this B7 meeting. G7 member states should prioritize developing a common taxonomy and building on the progress made on digital resilience both inside and outside the G7, all while remaining responsive to shifting geopolitical dynamics.

Disagreements among member states should be viewed not as a barrier, but as evidence of a maturing policy landscape. Constructive tension can drive refinement so long as partners are clear about their priorities. The G7’s unique value lies in its ability to forge alignment among diverse actors. False consensus only delays progress. It will take transparency, specificity, and trust to move the digital resilience agenda forward.

Sara Ann Brackett is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative.

Coley Felt is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center.

Raul Brens Jr. is the acting senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center.

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Some US trading partners may be tempted to celebrate and retreat from or slow the pace of negotiations with the United States, perhaps to wait and see how appellate courts rule. But these US partners should not breathe easy, as Trump can impose substantial tariffs under other authorities that are less susceptible to legal attack—with Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 likely foremost among these authorities. And, importantly, if tariffs are imposed under this authority, then they will be more difficult to reduce or remove in response to positive negotiations. Therefore, trading partners should see the recent court decisions as an opportunity to reach a more stable agreement with perhaps a more eager counterpart, rather than a justification to escape engagement with the Trump administration.

When Trump announced IEEPA tariffs in early April on imports from nearly every country around the world, virtually all of them lined up to seek an agreement with the United States that would reduce or eliminate these “reciprocal” tariffs. They joined Mexico and Canada, who had already been engaging on separate IEEPA tariffs that were announced in early February in response to drug trafficking. Since then, the United States and United Kingdom have announced a high-level framework, and substantial progress reportedly has been made with India, Vietnam, and others. More difficult conversations with the European Union are ongoing. And after a series of escalations, China too reached a temporary truce, reducing the reciprocal tariffs on China-origin goods to 10 percent for the time being. Goods from Mexico and Canada also received a reprieve of sorts, with the Trump administration quickly exempting goods entitled to preferential treatment under the rules of the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).

The president’s use of IEEPA to impose tariffs, which two courts ruled unlawful, was novel. While IEEPA is frequently invoked to institute sanctions, it had never previously been used to impose tariffs. But other congressional delegations of authority exist—namely, Section 301 and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962—and legal challenges to their use to impose tariffs have largely been unsuccessful. 

During his first term, for example, Trump imposed broad-based tariffs on China-origin goods under Section 301, following an investigation into China’s unfair intellectual property-related trade practices, including forced technology transfer. US President Joe Biden expanded those tariffs, and they remain in place today. Trump also imposed tariffs under Section 232 on steel and aluminum from around the world during his first term. Those tariffs remained throughout the Biden administration with some country-specific modifications or product-specific exclusions, and Trump strengthened and expanded those tariffs in the early days of his second term.

The Trump administration likely will use Section 232 as the basis for some sector-specific tariffs. Already, the Department of Commerce is conducting Section 232 investigations on a hefty list of imports, from timber and lumber to copper and trucks; from semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment to pharmaceuticals and pharmaceutical ingredients; and from processed critical minerals and derivative products to commercial aircraft and jet engines. But I will focus on Section 301 because that is the more likely authority if Trump is looking to replicate the IEEPA tariffs, or more precisely, the leverage those tariffs afforded his negotiators.

How does Section 301 work?

Section 301, implemented by the US Trade Representative (USTR), investigates whether acts, policies, or practices of a particular country are unjustified, unreasonable, or discriminatory, and burden or restrict US commerce. By statute, the investigation must conclude within one year, but there is no minimum amount of time it must take. In the past, USTR has published a detailed report outlining its findings and evidence. This helps legitimize the findings and aids in discussions with allies and partners around the world by socializing and substantiating the concerns. But it is not required, and it could be slimmed down or scrapped in pursuit of speed. 

There are, however, limits to how quickly a Section 301 investigation can proceed. USTR must take public notice and comment on the substance of the investigation and hold a hearing if requested. If there is an affirmative finding, USTR must also subject any proposed remedial actions (e.g., tariffs) to public notice and comment. And, under a 2022 CIT ruling that such determinations are subject to the Administrative Procedures Act, USTR must take the time to provide in writing its reasoning for rejecting substantial lines of argument raised by commenters. Once implemented, Section 301 tariffs can be modified if “appropriate,” a largely untested but no doubt expansive standard that suggests courts will show a great deal of deference to the USTR. But any proposed modifications too must be subjected to a notice and comment process. Trump almost certainly opted for IEEPA in the first place because it obviates the need for such a time-consuming process.

Moreover, unlike the global framing of Trump’s IEEPA tariffs and Section 232 findings, Section 301 focuses on the acts, policies, or practices of one particular country. There are two ways to broaden its scope to approximate the more far-reaching impact of the invalidated IEEPA tariffs. First, USTR could simply initiate a series of parallel Section 301 investigations into a common concern among several countries, as it did in 2020 with respect to digital services taxes of eleven different jurisdictions. Second, although it has never been used, Section 301 includes a provision that allows for remedies to apply on a “nondiscriminatory basis”—that is, globally—even though the investigation focused on the acts, policies, or practices of one particular country.

So, while Section 301 may entail more process and certain constraints, it provides a relatively straightforward pathway to broad-based tariffs. Notably, the statutory objective of remedies under Section 301 is the elimination of the investigated acts, policies, or practices. The statue explicitly states that the USTR is authorized to take action “against any goods or economic sector . . . without regard to whether or not such goods or economic sector were involved in the act, policy, or practice that is the subject of such action.” Thus, regardless of which unfair practices the USTR chooses to investigate, an affirmative finding would unlock broad powers to tariff any goods. And it closely resembles the “leverage” justification for tariffs that the CIT rejected as insufficient in the IEEPA context.

What Section 301 tariffs would mean for bilateral negotiations?

Trump has demonstrated a clear determination to alter terms of trade, and he has been equally committed to using tariffs not just as policy, but to shape and respond to negotiating dynamics. Should certain bilateral negotiations prove unsatisfactory, it is very likely that the Trump administration would pursue tariffs under a different authority like Section 301. US trading partners would be wise to try to avoid that result.

The speed that IEEPA enabled for imposing or increasing tariffs is a two-way street, meaning that the Trump administration could quickly employ removals, decreases, or exceptions in response to positive momentum in negotiations. Some may welcome the added process around Section 301 because it could slow the pace of change. But that same process would make Section 301 tariffs stickier once imposed. It could also create difficulty in comprehensively pulling down tariffs against a particular country should that partner make concessions the administration finds valuable but are not germane to the investigated acts, policies, or practices. The Section 301 and Section 232 tariffs from Trump’s first term have proven very durable.

What about other authorities to impose tariffs?

While Trump may proceed with sector-specific tariffs under Section 232, they are not a good fit for replicating the IEEPA tariffs because they focus on threats to national security from particular products. That makes it hard to tariff a broad range of products and limits flexibility to alter the scope or rate of tariffed products as negotiations and economic dynamics shift.

The CIT opinion pointed to Section 122 as an option to rectify goods trade deficits, but Section 122 tariffs are capped at 15 percent and can remain in effect for only 150 days. Those limitations severely undermine the leverage Trump covets.  

Finally, the administration could attempt to invoke Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (often referred to as the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act), which authorizes tariffs in response to a foreign country’s discrimination against US goods or the commerce of the United States. Section 338 not only predates the World Trade Organization, it predates the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which first established the principle of most favored nation treatment in 1947. 

Section 338 imposes no temporal limitation on tariffs, but it does provide for a maximum tariff rate of 50 percent. While it appears to require no real time-consuming investigation, it has never been used, and there are virtually no mentions of it anywhere in the public record after the establishment of the GATT. Thus, there is uncertainty from novelty, which is what did in IEEPA, at least for the time being. Moreover, the administration would need to make sense of how mechanically to apply this previously unused, nearly century-old authority. Given these uncertainties, the Trump administration may favor using this authority as a tacit threat in negotiations, but not actually invoking it and inviting judicial scrutiny.

The bottom line remains that Trump still has many tariff tools at his disposal and, if implemented, they may prove harder to pull back. Therefore, US trading partners would be better served to treat the recent court rulings as an opportunity to drive ongoing discussions to their conclusion. The uncertainty created by the court decisions, the time required to reasonably replicate a large swath of tariffs through other authorities such as Section 301, and the procedural constraints those other authorities impose on the president’s flexibility, should make the administration more eager to reach deals it approves of and that allow it to avoid those difficulties. Where trading partners remain engaged and determined, the urgency on both sides presents the best opportunity for a mutually agreeable deal, which will provide greater near-term predictability that all can celebrate.

Brian Janovitz is a partner at DLA Piper. He previously served as director for international economics at the National Security Council and National Economic Council and chief counsel for trade enforcement strategy and competitiveness at the Office of the US Trade Representative, where he led the Biden administration’s comprehensive review of Section 301 tariffs.

Trump Tariff Tracker

The second Trump administration has embarked on a novel and aggressive tariff policy to address a range of economic and national security concerns. This tracker monitors the evolution of these tariffs and provides expert context on the economic conditions driving their creation—along with their real-world impact.

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The Kremlin employs hybrid warfare tactics to remain below the threshold that would trigger a unified and potentially overwhelming European response. This has led to a surge in sabotage, cyberattacks, political interference, and disinformation campaigns across Europe, with a particular emphasis on countries closer to Russia.

Moscow’s hybrid war against Europe mirrors the tactics used by the Kremlin in Ukraine following the start of Russia’s invasion in 2014. Ukraine’s response to the often unprecedented challenges posed by Russian hybrid warfare offers important lessons for Kyiv’s European partners.

The Ukrainian experience highlights the gravity of the hybrid threat and the importance of an integrated response. The overall message to Western policymakers is clear: Moscow views hybrid warfare as an important Russian foreign policy tool and will continue expanding its campaign. Europe cannot afford to wait for Russian hybrid attacks to escalate further before building the advanced capabilities required to counter this threat.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

There have been growing reports of Russian hybrid war-style attacks across the EU since the onset of Russian aggression against Ukraine eleven years ago. This trend gained significant additional momentum following the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Typical incidents include cyberattacks targeting infrastructure, sabotage including arson attacks, and attempts to disrupt military aid destined for Ukraine. Moscow is also accused of investing billions of dollars in sophisticated social media campaigns to influence the outcome of elections across Europe. The Kremlin’s hybrid operations are concentrated in central and eastern Europe, with Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states among the primary targets.

None of this is new to Ukraine. For more than a decade, Ukrainians have been learning to cope with the full range of Russia’s hybrid warfare toolbox. Russia’s attack on Ukraine began in February 2014 when Russian soldiers without insignias took control of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula in a lightning operation that was accompanied by a massive wave of targeted disinformation.

Russia’s subsequent efforts to destabilize and subjugate the rest of Ukraine have involved a combination of conventional military aggression, sabotage, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and support for pro-Russian actors in Ukraine. Thanks to this prolonged exposure to Russian hybrid warfare, Ukraine has been able to develop countermeasures that have helped build resilience and reduce the impact of Russia’s hybrid operations.

Ukraine’s response has been a collaborative effort involving the Ukrainian government, civil society, and the private sector. In the cyber sphere, efforts to improve Ukraine’s digital security have played a key role, with the launch of the country’s popular Diia platform and the establishment of the Ministry of Digital Transformation helping to drive important digital governance reforms.

This has enhanced Ukraine’s ability to maintain public services amid acts of cyber aggression and has improved engagement with the population. Ukraine’s progress in the digital sphere has been recognized internationally, with the country climbing from the 102 spot to fifth position in the UN’s annual Online Services Index in the seven years between 2018 and 2025.

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Ukraine’s coordination structures, such as the Center for Strategic Communications and the Ministry of Digital Transformation, enable swift and well-coordinated responses across government, media, and digital channels. This offers a number of advantages in a hybrid war setting. For example, it allows the Ukrainian government to synchronize positions with proactive narrative-setting when countering the Kremlin’s disinformation campaigns.

Ukraine has also benefited from a decentralized approach involving digital volunteers, civil society, and public-private partnerships. A wide range of civic tech groups and open-source investigators are active in Ukraine detecting and countering Russian disinformation. These measures have made it possible to expose Russian narratives efficiently, coordinate messaging across government and civil society, and maintain coherence during military operations.

Since 2014, Ukraine has been able to reduce Russia’s overwhelming initial advantages on the information front of the hybrid war. While Russian disinformation tactics continue to evolve and remain a major aspect of the ongoing invasion, Ukraine has managed to increasingly leverage information to shape international opinion and influence diplomatic outcomes.

At present, the European response to Russia’s hybrid war lacks the institutional agility and coordination between public sector and civil society that is evident in Ukraine. Instead, the EU and NATO have developed a number of parallel structures such as NATO’s Joint Intelligence and Security Division and the EU’s East StratCom Task Force. While these agencies continue to make meaningful contributions to the fight back against Russian hybrid warfare, they have yet to demonstrate the kind of real-time operational coordination that has served Ukraine so well.

Ukraine’s model for combating Russian hybrid warfare can’t be replicated in full, but it could serve as a practical reference point for building more adaptive and integrated responses across the West. Given Ukraine’s unique experience, it might make sense to establish a trilateral consultative framework together with the EU and NATO to enable rapid hybrid threat evaluations and coordinate responses.

Ukraine’s long record of countering Russian hybrid warfare has also highlighted the role of civil society. Kyiv’s European partners should consider increasing support for initiatives such as investigative journalism, fact-checking platforms, and technical watchdogs that can serve as support elements in a broader European defense ecosystem. In an environment where information is increasingly weaponized, Ukraine’s experience has also underlined the need to embed media literacy into the education system to ensure European citizens are able to consume information critically and are less vulnerable to Russian propaganda.

Maksym Beznosiuk is a strategic policy specialist and director of UAinFocus, an independent platform connecting Ukrainian and international experts around key Ukrainian issues.

Further reading

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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Almost three months ago, Ukraine accepted a US proposal for a thirty-day unconditional ceasefire. So far, Russia has refused to do likewise. Instead, the Kremlin continues to demand a series of preconditions. Meanwhile, Russia has intensified its missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian civilian targets. When Trump recently backed Putin’s proposal for direct negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, the Russian leader then boycotted the subsequent Istanbul talks, sending only a lower-level delegation.

Within the Trump administration, key figures such as Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth have all articulated their support for a realist view of international relations. This implies sidestepping abstract ideological objectives and focusing on tangible power factors such as economic size, population, geography, and military strength.

The realist viewpoint is reflected in Hegseth’s assertion that Ukraine returning to its pre-2014 borders is “unrealistic.” It can also be seen in Trump’s statements that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy “does not have the cards” in negotiations with Russia, an assertion that seems far less certain in the wake of Ukraine’s successful recent strikes on Russia’s long-distance bombers.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Some advocates of foreign policy realism argue that the US should seek to accommodate Russia, even at Ukraine’s expense. However, this approach tends to exaggerate Russia’s strengths, while underestimating the importance of the Kremlin’s imperial objectives and the relevant fact that Russian national security doctrine identifies the US as its principal adversary. A more comprehensive realist analysis of Russia reveals that, despite its assertiveness, Moscow’s power is in fact often overstated, while its appetite for compromise is limited.

Compared to the United States, Europe, and NATO, Russia simply does not “hold the cards,” to use Trump’s phrase. Its $2 trillion economy ranks outside the world’s top ten, trailing behind the US, China, Germany, Japan, India, and others. Although Russia has weathered sanctions, the prolonged war since 2022 has left its economy overextended and vulnerable.

The Russian population of 145 million is shrinking and ranks ninth globally, far behind the US and the collective European Union. Militarily, Russia’s large conventional forces have under-performed during the invasion of Ukraine while sustaining heavy losses. Russia’s $146 billion military budget, though substantial relative to neighboring states, pales in comparison to the $968 billion US budget in 2023, or even the collective defense spending of EU member states.

Russia remains a formidable nuclear power and frequently reminds the international community of this fact. Since the very first days of the Ukraine invasion in February 2022, Putin and other Kremlin officials have engaged in regular nuclear saber-rattling. But while Russia is the only nuclear power to make such threats, Putin has repeatedly failed to act when his red lines have been crossed by the Ukrainians, and has been publicly warned by his Chinese allies not to cross the nuclear threshold.

Since 2022, Russia has lost much of its energy leverage and is no longer Europe’s key energy supplier. Meanwhile, the United States has consolidated its position as a leading global energy exporter, particularly in liquefied natural gas (LNG). This is enabling Europe to diversify away from Russia while starving the Kremlin of vital revenue and geopolitical influence.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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In realist terms, Russia’s power surpasses that of its immediate smaller neighbors but falls well short of the US or the European Union as a whole. Countries in Northern, Central, and Eastern Europe view Putin’s ambitions through a realist lens based on centuries of painful experience with Russian imperialism. They understand that Putin’s current goal of reasserting Moscow’s dominance over the territories of the former Soviet Union and Russian Empire is deeply rooted in the Kremlin’s perception of Russian national interests.

President Trump should not fall into the same trap as his predecessors. Past US administrations, from George W. Bush onward, have sought to normalize relations with Moscow but have consistently underestimated Russia’s enduring imperialist objectives. In 2001, Bush famously called Putin “trustworthy” and said he has been able to “get a sense of his soul.” And yet before the end of Bush’s second term, Putin had become increasingly hostile to the West and had invaded Georgia. US President Barack Obama then pursued a “reset” in relations with Russia, only for Putin to invade Ukraine in 2014.

US President Joe Biden initially adopted a similarly optimistic stance toward Moscow, emphasizing the importance of predictable relations with Russia. In May 2021, Biden canceled sanctions on the Kremlin’s Nord Stream II gas pipeline. The following month, he met Putin in Geneva for a bilateral summit that was widely viewed as a further concession to the Russian leader. Less than a year later, Putin launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Looking back, it is clear that US policy toward Russia has often been shaped by the optimism of incoming administrations rather than a sober, realist understanding of Moscow’s longstanding ambitions. A deeper grasp of Russia’s objectives and capabilities could help the Trump administration, alongside European leaders, to negotiate a ceasefire in Ukraine and achieve a durable peace. Approaching the Kremlin from a position of strength, through the implementation of new sanctions on Russia and sustained military support for Ukraine, would be essential tools in securing that peace.

Agnia Grigas is senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and author of “Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire.”

Further reading

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As the US-led peace initiative continues to falter, the unfolding summer campaigning season in Ukraine promises to be among the bloodiest of the entire war, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

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Russia’s emphasis on fiber optic drones is giving it a battlefield edge over Ukraine and may help Putin achieve a long hoped for breakthrough in his coming summer offensive, writes David Kirichenko.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

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European policymakers have reacted to Trump’s moves with shock and doubt about the US commitment to NATO, and some have stepped up their defense pledges accordingly. “We still believe that the ‘N’ in NATO stands for North Atlantic and that our European allies should maximize their comparative advantage on the continent,” US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said last week at the Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore. “And thanks to President Trump, they are stepping up. An alliance cannot be ironclad if in reality or perception it is seen as one-sided.”

For its part, the European Union (EU) has approved a €150 billion defense funding loan program and allowed its members to exceed normal debt limits for military expenditures. Even before the EU’s moves, allies such as Poland and the Baltic States—who Hegseth called “model allies” in Singapore—were ramping up spending and sounding the alarm over the threat they face from Russia. But too many European allies have not yet increased their defense spending sufficiently.

What explains this contrast? Leading NATO allies (France, Germany, Italy, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States) diverge from one another because they face different threats and levels of threat perception. These differences explain each ally’s major defense decisions (defense spending, military structure, and military posture) as well as the ally’s role in and relationship to NATO. I explore this issue more deeply in my forthcoming book on NATO, drawing from ninety-eight interviews with current and former policymakers.

NATO allies’ different threat perceptions can explain much of the current crisis within the Alliance, and they provide the backdrop for what could be a contentious summit.

The United States: China trumps Europe

The Trump administration sees China as the most significant state security threat to US interests. The 2025 Annual Threat Assessment says that “China stands out as the actor most capable of threatening US interests globally.” The administration’s Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance reportedly focuses on the threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan as one of two priorities for the Pentagon, along with combating drug cartels.

The Trump administration has cited the threat from China to explain its European security policy. Hegseth said in February that the United States could not remain the primary guarantor of European security, telling allied military leaders in Brussels: “The US is prioritizing deterring war with China in the Pacific, recognizing the reality of scarcity, and making the resourcing tradeoffs to ensure deterrence does not fail.” The Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance reportedly concludes that because of the focus on China, European allies must do more for their own defense.

This view of China can also explain the Trump administration’s policy toward Greenland, an autonomous territory of NATO ally Denmark. Melting sea ice means that Greenland’s location will be critical for those seeking to control Artic sea lanes and it is home to large quantities of rare-earth minerals. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has stressed that the United States would not use force to seize Greenland but only to protect it from encroachment by China.

This can also explain Trump’s significant, though inconsistent, turn toward Russia. Some have argued that the Trump administration is attempting a “reverse Kissinger,” aligning with Russia to weaken its ties to China. The Trump administration may even be turning toward Russia to pressure NATO allies into taking more responsibility for their own defense, as Victoria Coates, a former deputy national security advisor in Trump’s first term, has argued. Even though Trump has criticized Russian President Vladimir Putin, it is reasonable for European leaders to fear that a grand bargain between Washington and Moscow remains a distinct possibility.

Europe: Divided by diverse levels of threat

Europe is unable to defend itself without the United States. Europe lacks integrated air and missile defense, long-range precision strike, transport aircraft, as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. European allies are struggling to recruit, train, and equip sufficient troops for NATO’s new force model—doing so in the next decade without the United States would most likely be a bridge too far.

But even faced with these challenges, not every European NATO ally has shown the same level of urgency when it comes to increasing defense spending. The reason is that leading European allies face different threats and levels of threat, limiting the incentives of some allies to act. 

Meanwhile, from strategy documents and official statements, it is clear that Poland, Germany, France, and Britain all view Russia as their greatest security threat. However, they each have different levels of threat perception, which informs the differing approaches they have taken toward military spending.

Preserving a mutually beneficial relationship

The United States’ greater focus on China and push for Europeans to take more responsibility for their defense are likely irreversible trends. But the NATO Summit in The Hague later this month provides an opportunity for the United States and its European allies to reaffirm their commitments to the Alliance amid these shifting dynamics.

First, the Trump administration should use the summit to work with its European allies on a phased and structured exchange of responsibility for European security over the next decade. Under such a plan, the United States would work with European allies to develop defense capabilities they do not currently have while maintaining the commitment of the US nuclear deterrent.

Second, Trump should take the opportunity to reassure European allies. He should affirm that the United States would come to the aid of any NATO ally that is attacked. Trump should also state plainly that his administration will work with Denmark to bolster the defense of Greenland and that it does not intend to acquire the island by force.

Third, European countries should use the summit to announce further commitments on defense spending. Following through on such commitments will entail costly domestic tradeoffs. The present moment requires courage: European leaders must make the case that significantly more defense spending is necessary because of the threat Russia poses and the United States’ turn toward the Indo-Pacific. Italy’s government in particular will have a challenging task. Because Italians are focused on threats from the Mediterranean, officials in Rome will have to make the case that Russia’s threat to European security matters for Italy. European governments like Italy’s can also make a compelling case that spending more on defense may boost overall economic growth.

If NATO allies take these steps at this year’s summit, they can help build a future Europe more capable of defending itself and an Alliance that better serves both US and European interests.

Jason Davidson is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is also a professor of political science and international affairs and director of the Security and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Mary Washington in Fredericksburg, Virginia.

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A small group of nations established the International Maritime Organization in 1948 to create a modicum of global governance. Since then, IMO (as insiders call it) or the IMO (as most others call it) has fulfilled its task of functioning as a global parliament and secretariat for matters relating to ocean safety. Yet, like all other multilateral organizations, IMO depends on its member states’ goodwill and compliance. Today several large member states undermine the organization, and the United States left its negotiations over greenhouse gas reduction. IMO will continue to function as a steward of global ocean safety. But to achieve better maritime order, states should also join forces in coalitions of the willing or a maritime “elite league.” Countries in such formations could, for example, introduce stricter pollution or protection and indemnity (P&I) insurance rules.

Like many other organizations within the United Nations (UN), and the UN itself, IMO was established in the years immediately following World War II. Even with a Cold War rapidly forming, the world’s nations knew that they would need to share the oceans and that improving maritime safety was in everyone’s interest. Convening in Geneva in 1948, sixteen pioneering nations—ranging from Canada to Pakistan and including one country, Poland, from the emerging Soviet-led East bloc—formed the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO). ¹

The Convention on the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization stipulated that the new organization would provide “machinery for co-operation among Governments in the field of governmental regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds affecting shipping engaged in international trade, and to encourage the general adoption of the highest practicable standards in matters concerning maritime safety and efficiency of navigation. It would also “encourage the removal of discriminatory action and unnecessary restrictions by Governments affecting shipping engaged in international trade so as to promote the availability of shipping services to the commerce of the world without discrimination.”²

The IMCO’s mission was to facilitate safe and fair global shipping. It did so based on consultations and consensus-focused decisions by its members. The convention stipulated that “the functions of the Organization shall be consultative and advisory” and that the organization should “provide for the drafting of conventions, agreements, or other suitable instruments, and to recommend these to Governments and to intergovernmental organizations, and to convene such conferences as may be necessary.”³ That gave the IMCO’s secretariat no decision-making powers—decisions were to be made by the member states—and certainly no enforcement power.

In successfully founding the IMCO, the sixteen nations had proven that a shared maritime organization was possible even among nations that shared virtually nothing else. They were soon joined by a steady stream of other countries, with early joiners including nations as different as Austria and Myanmar.⁴

Mission: Facilitate safe and fair global shipping

The organization proved valuable. As Cold War power dynamics became more entrenched, global shipping continued to function, with ships able to call at any chosen port regardless of the port state’s geopolitical leanings, the ship’s flag state, or the ship’s country of ownership. Along the way, IMO’s members adopted a string of conventions that enhanced shipping safety, including the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter in 1972, Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) in 1974, and the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage in 1971 with an amended version in 1992.⁵ The latter forms the basis of the International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds, a London-based multilateral organization that administers two compensation to victims of oil spills. Another marquee agreement—the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation—was adopted in 1990.⁶

In 1982, having decided that the name IMCO was bulky and confusing, member states renamed the organization the International Maritime Organization. It has continued to oversee the safety of global shipping, and the cargo traveling by sea has continued to grow. In 1980, ships transported 3.7 billion tons of cargo on international voyages; by 2023, the volume had grown to 12.3 billion tons.⁷

Today IMO is the world’s default maritime organization, though crucially it is not the custodian of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), known as the constitution of the oceans. One hundred and seventy-six of the world’s nations now belong to IMO; the only ones that do not are landlocked countries that have very low gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (such as Burkina Faso, $887), a tiny population (such as Liechtenstein, 39,850 residents), or both.⁸ Taiwan, which has a large maritime industry but is barred from joining the United Nations system as China considers it a renegade province, is also not a member. The IMO Assembly, which approves IMO’s activities and budget and elects IMO’s executive organ, includes all the organization’s member states and meets every two years

Guy Platten, secretary general of the International Chamber of Shipping, said, “What IMO has achieved has been remarkable, things like the MARPOL Convention [the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships] and so many other conventions and instruments. The decision-making process does take time, and it’s quite tortuous at times, but the whole idea is that the organization tries to work on a consensus. That means compromises, but it’s pretty effective.”⁹ It has indeed been effective. Even though the 176 member states have widely divergent views and priorities, IMO has managed to become a global protector of safe shipping, albeit a slow-moving one that lacks enforcement powers. Instead, like other UN agencies, it relies on its member states to follow the rules to which they have committed themselves.

Geopolitics, greenhouse gases, and an abrupt US exit

In April 2025, the IMO Marine Environment Protection Committee convened in London to negotiate an agreement reducing the shipping sector’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The emissions account for about 3 percent of GHG emissions, and IMO member states had been debating and discussing stricter emission rules for several years. Intense negotiations at the April meeting eventually resulted in an agreement that “will progressively lower the annual greenhouse gas fuel intensity of marine fuels, and a greenhouse gas pricing mechanism requiring high-emitting ships to pay for their excess pollution.”¹⁰ The agreement is to be “mandatory for large ocean-going ships over 5,000 gross tonnage, which emit 85% of the total [carbon dioxide] emissions from international shipping.”

The agreement was adopted by a majority of member states (sixty-three, including the twenty-seven European Union (EU) members, the United Kingdom, Brazil, India, China, Norway and Singapore) voting in favor. Sixteen countries (including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Russia) voted against it, and twenty-five countries (including Argentina and Pacific Island states) abstained.¹¹ The agreement must be formally adopted by a two-thirds majority in October 2025; if that happens, it will enter into force in 2027.¹² However, an unusual event occurred during the negotiations. On instructions from Washington, the US delegation abruptly departed; the US government also sent a note to the other member states, urging them to reconsider their “support for the GHG emissions measures under consideration.” According to two people close to the process who spoke to the author, the US government privately put further pressure on countries to reject the agreement or abstain. Referring to the greenhouse gas emission proposal, the US démarche added, “Should such a blatantly unfair measure go forward, our government will consider reciprocal measures so as to offset any fees charged to U.S. ships and compensate the American people for any other economic harm from any adopted GHG emissions measures.”¹³

Brian Adrian Wessel, the director general of the Danish Maritime Authority and leader of the Danish negotiating team, said, “Geopolitics entered IMO with these negotiations. There was a coalition of oil-exporting states led by Saudi Arabia and a group of sanctioned states comprising Russia, Iran, Venezuela, and North Korea that opposed the agreement, and then the US de facto joined them in trying to block it. So it was left to the rest of the member states, including the EU and China, to work together to find a solution.”¹⁴

He added, “IMO stood its ground with a significant majority vote. In this day and age, a multilateral agreement on green transition is not a given in any way. The first maritime regulation on greenhouse gas emission, passed with a vast majority, that’s historic.”¹⁵

Platten said, “This is the first time in around fifteen years that an IMO agreement went to vote. It was quite a moment to be in the plenary hall when that happened. But nonetheless, we have an agreement now, which makes shipping the first industry to legislate to decarbonize, putting a carbon price for the first time, and some reward elements to it as well. What other industries have done anything like that? The answer is none whatsoever.”¹⁶ He continued, “IMO is one of the last UN bodies which is still functioning as a multinational body. I think that’s because shipping needs to be globally regulated. It cannot do anything else.”¹⁷

The deterioration of the global maritime order

The US departure from the negotiations, however, reflected a wider reality. The global maritime order, which nations and the maritime industry have painstakingly constructed over the last century, faces serious travails. To be sure, commitment to maritime treaties has never been complete. Some shipowners and flag states have been indifferent or reckless when it comes to pollution by their ships and, especially in recent years, countries have regularly violated UNCLOS. That was the case with the 1980s Tanker War between Iran and Iraq; the shadow maritime war targeting Iranian and Israeli merchant vessels in the Strait of Hormuz; the Houthis’ attacks on merchant shipping in the Red Sea; and China’s maritime harassment of civilian vessels in the South China Sea.

But nations and companies have largely adhered to IMO’s overwhelmingly technical conventions. One reason for this compliance is that better safety practices benefit everyone. Another is that any ship calling at a port is subject to port state control, the maritime equivalent of a safety inspection, which means that independent inspectors register any rule violations. Owners and flag states must address these deficiencies before ships can continue their journeys.

As the rules-based international order continues to deteriorate, commitment to IMO rules is also slipping. Even though the MARPOL Convention bars ocean pollution (whether involving oil or other substances) by merchant vessels, the world’s growing shadow fleet willingly and systematically accepts a disproportionate risk of oil spills.¹⁸ In May 2023, the shadow tanker Pablo exploded off the coast of Malaysia, causing oil spills in local waters, and other shadow vessels have spilled oil elsewhere.¹⁹ Despite such dangerous incidents, IMO has been unable to ensure compliance with its rules—even though its member states include several “flags of extreme convenience” (my term) that primarily flag shadow vessels. Insisting on compliance is made yet more difficult by the fact that shadow vessels don’t call at ports of Western countries, where post state controls are typically fully implemented, but instead sail straight to their destination or perform ship-to-ship transfers before returning to their ports of origin. “It’s very tempting to start saying, if they don’t play by the rules, why should we then play by the rules?” Wessel noted.²⁰

Response options for nations committed to maritime governance

IMO member states could introduce proposals aimed at curtailing dangerous shadow vessel practices or, for that matter, proxy group attacks on merchant shipping. Indeed, some IMO member states are teaming up to at least bring attention to systematic violations. “We try to work closely together where we see such issues, whether it’s in Asia or in our own neighborhood, and then take it into the IMO,” Wessel said.²¹Interview with the author, April 22, 2025.²² Yet most attempts at strengthening rules or creating new ones are likely to be unsuccessful, as nations benefiting from the practices would vote against the measures and encourage other countries to do the same.

“What IMO can do is act as a facilitator,” Platten said. “Everyone wants safe shipping, and that’s what IMO regulates. People make grand statements at IMO, whether it’s on the Ukraine issue or anything else, but ultimately it’s a technical body that decides on regulation for shipping. It’s never at its best when there’s political grandstanding. It’s much better when it gets on with things as it did with the greenhouse gas agreement, which is people working late, late, late into the night to try and find some landing ground.”²³

Within IMO, a significant number of countries around the world are indisputably committed to maintaining and enhancing maritime governance. By definition, shipping encompasses the whole world, and IMO remains irreplaceable as the forum through which the world’s nations can maintain standards. However, it can no longer be assumed that all members want to enhance the global maritime order.

The fact that IMO depends on its global membership for any action, and that leading nations now openly undermine the maritime order, means there is a gap in global maritime governance. It’s clearly in no country’s interest to impose more governance on itself while other countries use the world’s oceans impeded by fewer rules, but countries could team up in self-selecting groups to enhance maritime rules in their waters.

For example, while UNCLOS’s right to innocent passage is sacrosanct, countries affected by the shadow fleet could collectively adopt pollution rules that go beyond MARPOL. The countries that could initiate such an undertaking include coastal states in the Baltic Sea and the North Sea, as well as Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and other countries whose territorial waters and exclusive economic zones shadow vessels regularly traverse.

As the shadow fleet has also led to systematic subversion of maritime incident insurance (known as the P&I club system), coastal states in different parts of the world now share the seemingly intractable problem that suspected shadow vessels sail through their waters with insurance barely worth the paper on which it is written. They, too, can team up to adopt stricter insurance rules. Adopting stricter pollution rules, P&I insurance rules, or both would enhance maritime safety without detracting from IMO. In that way, they would resemble initiatives by NATO member states that have a regional focus and take place outside NATO but don’t undermine the Alliance. They include, most prominently, the Joint Expeditionary Forces, which encompass ten northern European countries.²⁴

Sailing in safer waters

The International Maritime Organization serves the world’s nations and the shipping industry well, but it is undermined by growing geopolitical tensions and decreasing commitment to global rules and institutions. While IMO can continue serving a crucial function as the world’s default maritime convener, nations committed to the maritime order can enhance safety in their waters by forming coalitions of the willing that share, for example, stricter rules on pollution or P&I insurance. That would make sailing in their waters more expensive. It would also, however, help nations committed to the maritime order establish a maritime “elite league” in whose waters all maritime participants would know that the highest standards apply.

Fellow

Elisabeth Braw

Senior Fellow

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative

NATO Resilience & Society

Threats to the global maritime order

Learn more about the Atlantic Council’s project Threats to the global maritime order: Protecting the freedom of the seas.

Report Jan 23, 2025

From Russia’s shadow fleet to China’s maritime claims: The freedom of the seas is under threat

By Elisabeth Braw

This report analyzes the deterioration of the global maritime order, focusing on rule violations in areas including maritime border alteration, harassment of civilian vessels, and disturbance of navigational tools

China Europe & Eurasia

Report Dec 6, 2024

The threats posed by the global shadow fleet—and how to stop it

By Elisabeth Braw

Since 2022 the number of aging ships whose ownership, insurance status, and safety is unknown has exploded, prompted by Russia’s reliance on this “dark fleet” to ship its oil in defiance of Western sanctions. What can be done about this environmental, economic, and safety threat on the high seas?

China Europe & Eurasia

Report Aug 9, 2024

What attacks on shipping mean for the global maritime order

By Elisabeth Braw

This report discusses the history of attacks on shipping, the rules implemented to keep shipping safe, and the new and serious threats posed by the Houthis and other actors. It also discusses steps Western governments and the shipping industry can take to reduce the harm posed by such attacks.

Europe & Eurasia Maritime Security

The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

Learn more

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On June 5, Imran Bayoumi, associate director of the GeoStrategy Initiative, co-authored an op-ed in the Washington Post with Greg Pollock, former acting deputy assistant secretary of defense, highlighting the importance of strong US-Canada relations for both countries’ economic and defense interests. They argue that one way to strengthen ties between the two neighbors is for Canada to boost its defense spending—particularly in the geopolitically critical Arctic region.

Staff

Imran Bayoumi

Associate Director

Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative GeoStrategy Initiative

The post Bayoumi in the Washington Post on strengthening US-Canada ties through defense cooperation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Imagine a world in which Ukraine, working alongside European and North American partners, so convincingly wields advanced technological and defense capabilities that Putin stops his murderous war and agrees to a sustainable peace. That also would send an unmistakable message of transatlantic common cause to Russia’s partners: China, North Korea, and Iran.

However, that outcome can only be achieved if the European Union (EU), after decades of neglect, turns Ukrainian inspiration and a flood of new defense spending announcements into real capabilities and technological innovation. It will also require that the Trump administration unambiguously back its European allies at the June 24-25 NATO Summit in The Hague as the Alliance makes new spending and defense production commitments.

‘A fusion of World War I and World War III’

The good news is that most NATO countries appear ready to agree at the summit to increase their defense spending to 3.5 percent of gross domestic product by 2035, along with an additional 1.5 percent for defense- and security-related infrastructure. For its part, the EU has already approved 800 billion euros in new defense spending across the bloc over the next four years.

The bad news comes in three categories: production, policies, and politics. First, even a great deal more money won’t necessarily result in the production, innovation, and capabilities required to deter Russia. Second, policies and regulations on both sides of the Atlantic provide impediments to effective defense industrial cooperation. Third, political strains and distrust have increased across the Atlantic over US President Donald Trump’s trade wars and his administration’s decision to withhold arms and intelligence from Ukraine for about a week in March. 

Trump’s phone call with Putin yesterday, after which he said without comment that the Russian leader felt a strong need to respond to Ukraine’s strikes inside Russia, didn’t help. Ukraine and its European partners would have preferred clear recognition that Putin started the war, has the power to end it, and should do so now.

Even with all of that said, Europe’s most immediate and important task is to demonstrate that it can provide for its own security, given the Trump administration’s understandable reluctance to do more for US allies than they are willing to do for themselves. 

“Ukraine has shown that modern warfare is a fusion of World War I and World War III—combining trench warfare with cutting-edge technologies,” write Ann Mettler and Mark Boris Andrijanič in a must-read piece in Euractiv. “Unless Europe learns to master both, its security, sovereignty, and very survival will be at stake.” 

Few know the stakes better than Mettler, a former director-general at the European Commission, and Andrijanič, a former Slovenian minister for digital transformation and a current Atlantic Council Europe Center senior fellow. They outline a compelling course of action to reverse EU security weaknesses.

“As Russia’s aggression edges closer to EU borders and the transatlantic alliance weakens,” they write, “Europe stands at an inflection point.” European defense budgets are finally increasing, they note, “but if past performance is any indication of future results, there is cause for concern.”

For example, despite hundreds of billions of euros of investments into digital and green agendas, the EU remains reliant on American software and Chinese hardware, from solar panels to batteries. “This reveals a harsh truth,” they write, “spending alone doesn’t guarantee innovation. And in defence, failure won’t just be costly—it could be fatal.” 

‘Something we should have done years ago’

I came away from a recent Atlantic Council delegation trip to Brussels, where we met with top NATO and EU defense planners, with new hope for European security but also growing concern about transatlantic division in the face of persistent Russian threats. 

It’s clear that Europe has been shocked into action by two leaders: Putin and Trump. The Russian president’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was a wake-up call for a complacent Europe. Yet it was only Trump’s return to the presidency this year that injected Europe with a greater sense of urgency.

It’s telling that Mettler and Andrijanič don’t include a transatlantic dimension in their proposals in Euractiv. I asked Andrijanič about this omission, and he said, “Unless Europe gets serious about defense, we can’t be a credible partner for the United States.” He added, “Suddenly we are doing something we should have done years ago. Europe is now laser-focused on developing as many critical capabilities as possible—and doing it fast.”

In their Euractiv article, Mettler and Andrijanič list as their priority the creation of a common market for defense, stretching from the EU to partners such as the United Kingdom, Norway, Switzerland, and, in particular, Ukraine. For the moment, the only European-headquartered company among the global top ten defense firms is the United Kingdom’s BAE Systems.

The authors also call for new EU regulatory guidance that would remove the stigma against defense and dual-use investments to unlock private and institutional capital. They also want to shake up Europe’s “sluggish defense procurement rules and procedures.” 

To achieve greater innovation, the authors want to create a European ecosystem of “established industry players, startups and scaleups, investors, governments, and research institutions.” One intriguing proposal is for a dedicated collaboration platform to create a “wall of drones” along Europe’s eastern flank, so that Ukraine’s weekend success isn’t a one-off but is underpinned by “a coordinated deployment of autonomous drone swarms for surveillance and defense.” 

The authors seize upon two successful US models to accelerate this European effort. One would be the creation of a European DARPA, modeled on the Pentagon’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which has focused on developing emerging technologies for national security. They would do that through transforming the existing European Defence Fund into “a better-resourced, more agile, and mission-driven institution.”

A second idea would be to use the US Defense Innovation Board, first chaired by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt, as a model for a European Defence Innovation Council. This high-level, independent group would provide strategic advice to the EU and member states on defense-related tech.

Write the authors, “The good news for Europe is that the world’s leading defence innovator is already among us, and on our side—Ukraine. Despite intense wartime pressures, the country has emerged as a frontrunner in drone technology, cyber warfare, and the integration of artificial intelligence on the battlefield. In contrast to Europe’s slow and costly model of incremental innovation, Ukraine excels in frugal innovation to rapidly deliver scalable, cost-effective, and highly impactful solutions.”

Two awful words

One way or the other, the upcoming NATO Summit will be one of historic importance. What’s positive is an Alliance-wide commitment, after pressure from Trump, for greater spending aimed at producing cutting-edge capabilities. What’s negative is insufficient recognition that transatlantic common cause on Ukraine and beyond is more crucial than ever.

Speaking to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Dayton, Ohio, last week, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte put it this way: “Russia has teamed up with China, North Korea, and Iran. They are expanding their militaries and their capabilities. They are preparing for long-term confrontation.”

Quoting Winston Churchill from 1936, Rutte asked, “Will there be time to put our defenses in order? . . . Will there be time to make these necessary efforts, or will the awful words ‘too late’ be recorded?” 

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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The Syrian president’s diplomatic visits to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Jordan, France, and Turkey seemed auspicious and held promising potential. However, his potential in-person attendance at the Arab Summit in person was the center of some controversy.

Baghdad’s position on the rapid developments in Syria is split between two camps: The official government and that of the powerful non-state actors.

The Iraqi government’s initial response to Syria was cautious, including the closure of border crossings and the deployment of troops to the 630-kilometer border with Syria. But Baghdad slowly shifted towards a more pragmatic approach and eventually sent its officials on formal visits to Syria, in a move that acknowledged the legitimacy of the new regime. These efforts culminated with the Iraqi prime minister’s April meeting with al-Sharaa in Doha, where he extended a formal invitation to the Arab Summit, which Baghdad hosted in mid-May.

Alternatively, Iran-affiliates in Iraq have vocally opposed such normalization efforts. Over fifty members of the Iraqi parliament, many of whom have close ties to the Shiite Coordination Framework, signed a petition to reject al-Sharaa’s Baghdad visit, and parliament member Mustafa Sanad even organized a protest against his presence at the summit. Additionally, militia leaders such as Qais al-Khazaali and Abu Ali al-Askari, who command militia groups that were active in Syria until recently, posted direct threats on their X accounts towards the Syrian president. Media platforms with Iranian affiliations have been working in parallel with politicians to promote a disinformation campaign about al-Sharaa’s criminal record in Iraq, by issuing fake documents and tampered proof of incarceration.

Iraqi militias have a long history of hostility towards some of the Sunni militant groups with which al-Sharaa was involved in previous years. These Islamist Jihadist groups rose to power in Iraq in 2014 and took over one third of Iraqi territories, subsequently the liberation of these areas was a lengthy and costly process for the Iraqis. Iraqi militias continue to use the same justification for their military intervention in Syria in the past years, which is the need to “protect” holy Shiite sites, and continue to insist that it remains a pressing issue even under the new regime.

Quiet hostilities and alliance of necessity

Under Baathist control, Syria had longstanding grievances with Iraq. Before the spark of turmoil in Syria, for example, Iraq’s former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki had accused Assad of sending militants and terrorists into the country. But economic ties, in part due to the movement of 1.2 million Iraqi refugees into Syria during the early aughts, softened hostilities. During this period, economic trade between Syria and Iraq reached its peak at four billion US dollars annually. At the time, 60 percent of Iraq’s imports came from Syria.

But this dynamic shifted drastically after 2011 with the eruption of the Arab Spring and the anti-Assad uprising in Syria. Iran seized the opportunity to broker a new relationship between the two countries, where political and security interests were tied and emphasized, and sectarian fault lines were deliberately exploited. Iraqi militias, along with Iranian forces and the Assad regime, took part in suppressing the rebels’ seizure of Syrian cities during these years. Over fifteen Iraqi militias, with just over 75,000 fighters, were estimated to have participated in battles in Syria over thirteen years. In parallel, Iraqi territories provided a safe land corridor for Iranian reinforcement and personnel traveling to Syria, and three domestic drug trafficking corridors from Syria and Iran to neighboring countries.

Economic relations endured despite the security shakeup. Even after 2011, Iraq continued to import agricultural products from Syria in addition to food, textiles, plastic goods, medicine, and many other commodities. Syrian products comprised 80 percent of Iraqi markets; however, this percentage declined to only 5 percent after December 2024.

The new reality and future prospects

Iraq underutilized its agricultural capacity for years and depended on Syria for food security. By solidifying economic relations with the new Syria through trade agreements, transportation infrastructure, and meaningful investments, Iraq can further multiply the fruits of cooperation and guarantee water, food, and fuel security. 

Since the historic overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria, Baghdad has sent three delegations with high-profile officials to meet with officials from the new government in Damascus.

The latest, in April, held the highest significance and marked the new Iraqi pragmatist approach to the recent developments with its neighbor. It included more specialized Iraqi officials like the head of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, along with representatives from the Department of Border Enforcement, the Ministry of Trade, and the Ministry of Oil.

This delegation directly addressed economic interests in Syria, most notably the Kirkuk-Baniyas oil pipeline. Iraq currently exports oil through Basra Sea ports, land, and the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline. However, resuming operations on a direct pipeline to the Mediterranean would result in substantial economic gains, increasing Iraq’s oil export capacity by 300,000 Bpd. Negotiating access for Iraq to the Syrian Mediterranean ports will diversify Iraq’s options in trade and the global supply chain. It will also decrease the costs of importing European goods and commodities to Iraq and other parts of the region.

Meanwhile, as the West slowly opens up to the new Syrian government, Iraq should also take part in the country’s efforts to rebuild as an influential neighbor. Iraq’s energy sector, in particular, is an institutionalized and mature one, and Iraq’s national oil companies can offer their investments in Syria’s natural resources. Iran’s power decline in the region not only left a political vacuum but also an economic one, too. And as Tehran’s expenditures in Syria ranged from thirty billion US dollars to above fifty billion dollars, and Iranian investments worth hundreds of millions of dollars were under construction at the time of regime change.

Additionally, Iraq hosts between 800 thousand to a million foreign workers, many of whom transfer their earnings in dollars back to their home countries— mostly southeast Asia—draining eight billion US dollars of foreign currency. Baghdad now has a golden opportunity to strengthen both its economy and regional ties by facilitating the legal entry and employment of Syrian workers into the private sector. As a source of affordable and skilled labor, Syrian workers can help meet domestic labor demands in the private sector, while their earnings, reinvested into the Syrian economy, can further deepen economic interdependence between the two countries.

The security question

However, stability must come first before economic prosperity.

While the international discourse is focused on minority rights and power-sharing guarantees, Iraq and Syria have a deeper understanding of the security challenges that are unique to them. The Iraqi-Syrian border witnessed the rise and fall of extremist groups that were behind some of the deadliest conflicts for civilians in recent years. The Iraqi government failed for years to secure the porous border with Syria and control illicit economic activities that thrived on the vulnerable periphery. Furthermore, the northern parts of both countries have suffered spillover effects of conflict between their neighbor, Turkey, and Kurdish rebel groups.

After the global coalition against the Islamic State (ISIS) successfully defeated the militant group, al-Hol prison and similar camps isolated ISIS families and the remnants from their surrounding populations. This ended up dragging many innocent civilians into these enclosures, including three thousand missing Yazidi women and girls who are believed to be entrapped in this camp and whose situation remains a pressing issue. Moreover, two thousand Assadist soldiers fled to Iraq in the first few hours of the regime’s fall, and were later returned to Syria by the Iraqi authorities.

Such incidents are likely to continue in Syria’s transitional period and can only be combated through cooperation with Iraq. Lastly, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s explicit comments about dividing Syria into four administrations to establish a so-called ‘David’s Corridor’ pose a direct threat to Iraq’s border integrity and internal security. Iraq—among other regional actors—must establish a joint approach to refute this hollow and short-sighted political agenda. A fragmented Syria risks becoming a persistent epicenter of regional instability.

Policy recommendations for the Iraqi government

At this turning point in the region’s history, Iraq has a rare opportunity to start a new chapter with Syria.

Welcoming the Syrian president in Baghdad to the Arab Summit could have served as the first practical step towards a new relationship, but this was not achieved due to continuous militia intimidation.  The threats made by non-state actors resulted in the withdrawals and cancellations of many heads of state from the summit, including al-Sharaa, and instead sent low-level delegations. The Iraqi government should implement mechanisms to regulate and hold accountable militias and other non-state actors whose public positions contradict official state policy and risk undermining Iraq’s diplomatic relations.

Opening effective channels of communication between the Iraqi and Syrian governments will be critical in efforts to stabilize and normalize. The Iraqi government should continue with regular, high-profile official visits to Syria. This will ensure Iraq’s input in critical and strategic decisions faced by the Syrian government and guarantee a seat at the transition table.

These communications should be inclusive beyond government officials and extend to civil society, local communities, and tribal or religious leaders. In the midst of the current storm of misinformation and disinformation around the situation in Syria, granular relationships will help local communities adapt and respond to rapid transitions, especially with population movement and voluntary return of refugees.

To truly deepen a partnership between the two countries, Iraq should also work closely with the new Syrian regime to establish a high-level security cooperation, including immediate investments in border crossings and towns, to prevent the resurgence of extremist groups and smuggling activities across the joint border. These areas were neglected and under non-state actors’ control for years, and government takeover will mean a regulated, taxed, and monitored movement of goods and travelers.

And to enable prosperity after ensuring security, Baghdad should continue to identify economic opportunities and solidify them with memoranda of understanding, trade agreements, and investment deals. In the six months since the regime change in Syria, there has been a significant investment momentum and capital interest from regional and international actors. Therefore, supporting the Syrian-Iraqi business council has become a pressing necessity, as the efforts to rebuild Syria are mounting through direct foreign investments, as the Syrian economy recovers after lifting the sanctions. Feedback from businessmen on both sides will provide input on market gaps, demand potential, stakeholder engagement, industry trends, and trade dynamics. All of which can be used as a blueprint for economic cooperation.

Part of this picture should include Baghdad legalizing the status of Syrians who wish to stay in Iraq as part of the labor force. Iraq’s Ministry of Labor should create a legal framework to incentivize Syrian skilled workers’ employment in the Iraqi private sector. Doing so will curb the influx of undocumented and unregulated immigrant workers from outside the region, limit foreign currency outflow, and meet the private sector employment needs.

Over the past thirteen years, Iraq’s role in Syria has been marked by hardship and complexity. Now, the current Iraqi administration holds the opportunity to turn a new page and help shape a future defined by peace and regional cooperation.

Shermine Serbest is an Iraqi researcher and international relations analyst. She leads many data-focused projects covering Iraq, Iran, and the Middle East, focusing on misinformation and disinformation and the political economy.

The post Why Iraq should build bridges with its ‘new’ neighbor, Syria appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Where should the US Congress put its attention?

The heterogenous nature of the Caribbean offers various opportunities to strengthen relations with the region and, by extension, advance US interests. From natural gas to geothermal energy, Caribbean countries offer new opportunities for US investment. Reducing crime and gang proliferation across the region can protect US citizens traveling abroad and stem the potential flow of illicit goods and services.

Energy security

The United States can strengthen its positioning in the Caribbean by supporting regional energy security. At current estimated reserves, Guyana, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago house almost 30 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, with further offshore exploration expected to increase the size of reserves. At the same time, other countries require reliable power generation–which can be provided by liquified natural gas (LNG) imports–to provide resilience to their electricity grids during natural disasters, improve economic competitiveness, and to underpin ambitions to add renewables to their energy matrix.

Here, the United States will find opportunities on three fronts. First, natural gas exploration opportunities, liquefaction infrastructure, and building pipelines and LNG storage are areas where US oil and gas companies and mid-size service-based companies can invest. Second, imported oil from Guyana, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago can be low-cost and competitive options vis a vis other suppliers to satisfy growing US energy demand and supplement domestic shale supply in Texas and Midwestern states. Finally, congressional members can work with the Southern Caribbean hydrocarbon producers to support energy security in Europe and lessen demand for Russian energy resources by increasing cargo exports to EU members.

Greater Caribbean energy security can also lead to lower electricity prices, which can benefit constituents of US congressional members traveling to the Caribbean and potentially reduce migration to the United States. Most of the region (except for Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago) pays some of the highest electricity in the Americas (see Figure 3), which is on average, double or triple what US consumers pay. At the same time, electricity costs can account for almost 70 percent of a hotel’s utility due to air conditioning, lighting, and heating, among others.

Therefore, to keep profits stable, the high costs translate to the consumer–in this case, US tourists. This means that by bringing down electricity costs and lowering the cost to travel and having overnight stays in the Caribbean, US tourists benefit and have more purchasing power to buy in-country goods (most of which are imported from the United States). Further, reducing electricity prices can stem Caribbean emigration flows to US shores given that high costs of living are a key migratory push factor.

Reducing violent crime and gang activity

Security concerns in the Caribbean are on the rise. Figure 4 shows that Caribbean countries have high homicide rates (per 100,000) relative to their Latin American neighbors. Rates have been on the rise due to increased gang proliferation and illegal imports of small arms–many of which originate from the United States. For example, countries like Trinidad and Tobago, declared a state of emergency late 2024 due to increased gang activity and the usage of high-powered assault weapons. Gang proliferation is also on the rise. While Caribbean countries do not house large gangs, smaller gangs pervade the region, using the informal ports of entry to move illicit guns, goods, and services. In 2021, Jamaica identified 379 different gangs with 140 named in 2023 for Trinidad and Tobago. The decentralized nature of criminal and gang networks in the region inhibits Caribbean governments and police forces’ abilities to combat gang operations. Further, gangs in the Caribbean, especially in Jamaica, are turf oriented. This allows smaller gangs to gain a foothold in local communities, sometimes acting as community leaders and providing needed social services and protection from rival gangs.

Addressing the Caribbean’s security challenges can protect US citizens traveling to the region and curb gang activity and illicit trafficking before they reach US shores. Travel destinations for US citizens, such as Jamaica and islands in the Eastern Caribbean are among the most violent in the region. Therefore, improving citizen safety in the Caribbean ensures US citizens’ safety as well. Given that gun-related activities are a primary driver of citizen insecurity, one solution is for US agencies to work closer with Caribbean defense and police forces to improve monitoring, tracking, and seizures of illegal small arms.

Further, stemming gang activity in the region can also disrupt transnational criminal organizations’ operations. Specifically, Caribbean countries are used as a transit point for drugs, many of which end up in the United States. Enhanced maritime security and interdiction in the Caribbean Sea can help interrupt illegal drug supply chains and weaken transnational criminal organizations. However, the capacity to monitor drug flows is a challenge. Partnerships with the United States to gain access to satellite imagery and drone technologies to identify drug shipment routes can provide Caribbean governments the needed tools to tackle drug flows.

Bottom lines

• The challenges facing Caribbean countries are growing and have consequences that are not constrained to the region’s geographic borders, likely to directly or indirectly affect US interests. This can be avoided if there are consistent and strong partnerships between the Caribbean and the United States. This can and should start with stronger US congressional engagement to the region.
• US congressional members should consider legislation that prioritizes a holistic strategy with appropriated resources to the Caribbean. While CBSI tackles security challenges, support is needed across the energy, infrastructure development, agricultural, and financial services, among others.
• Given the importance of the Caribbean to US interests, the House Foreign Affairs Committee should consider a hearing that highlights new opportunities to strengthen US interests in the Caribbean and the broader US-Caribbean partnership.
• Strengthening US-Caribbean ties start with building a foundation for a long-term partnership. US congressional engagement can help turn four-year policies into decades of friendship, all while protecting US interests along its “third border.”

Staff

Wazim Mowla

Fellow and Lead of the Caribbean Initiative

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Caribbean China

Staff

Maite Gonzalez Latorre

Program Assistant

Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

Americas Education

New Atlanticist Mar 25, 2025

The US needs to build a new Caribbean policy. Rubio’s trip to the region can be the first step.

By Wazim Mowla

US engagement with the Caribbean should prioritize energy investments and efforts to reduce violent crime in the region.

Caribbean Economy & Business

New Atlanticist Apr 29, 2025

What’s next for Trinidad and Tobago’s new prime minister?

By Wazim Mowla and Dale Ramlakhan

On April 28, Kamla Persad-Bissessar was elected as the next prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago. While she is returning to the role, she’ll find a country that is different from her first term.

Caribbean Elections

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

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The post US interests can benefit from stronger congressional ties with the Caribbean   appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In 2023, Brice Oligui Nguema, the former head of Gabon’s Republican Guard, took power in a bloodless coup. This coup was carried out just one day after aging President Ali Bongo was reelected in a contest that many within the country viewed as a fraudulent attempt by Bongo and his allies to perpetuate the nearly sixty-year political dynasty that began when his father took power in 1967.

While it would be easy to wrap this event in the same blanket as the many other West and Central African military coups between 2020 and 2024 that disrupted an unprecedented period of peaceful civilian rule across the region, Gabon’s situation is different in several ways.

The military coups and their aftermaths in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Niger have followed a similar pattern: They all occurred in poor and unprosperous countries; they were all followed by some sort of in-fighting or conflict within interim governments (and a second coup in the case of Burkina Faso); and the elections promised in all four countries have yet to take place.

By contrast, Gabon enjoys a comparatively enhanced level of national wealth and societal prosperity. With a population of just 2.3 million people and vast reserves of oil, gold, and manganese, Gabon boasts the second-highest gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in continental Sub-Saharan Africa. It also has the third-highest prosperity score among the region’s countries in our Freedom and Prosperity Indexes, which measure prosperity levels across 164 countries by tracking income, health, inequality, environmental health, the treatment of minorities, and education. While Gabon suffers from a level of income inequality that rivals other countries in the region, on the whole, it is more prosperous than its West and Central African counterparts. Furthermore, while Gabon’s coup did give way to an interim military government, there was little to no post-coup conflict. And Gabon held democratic elections on April 12, 2025, that, while not without significant flaws, were nevertheless acclaimed by local, regional, and international observers as peaceful, lawful, and fair.

Gabon is more prosperous than its neighbors

Turning the page on the Bongo dynasty

In the weeks leading up the first election since the 2023 coup, Nguema’s picture could be seen plastered all over the capital city of Libreville. After serving as interim president for nineteen months, he was officially elected president on April 12, winning more than 90 percent of the vote. Both before and after the election, Nguema pledged to “restore dignity to the Gabonese people” and to root out the country’s corruption, which the legal subindex of our Freedom Index indicates is among the worst in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Despite these popular goals, the president has not been without his detractors. Such high vote shares are often indicative of corruption, and critics of Nguema note that he has long been a part of the corrupt political system he pledges to dismantle and that he broke his promise to relinquish power after deposing Bongo. In fact, Nguema is Bongo’s cousin and recently allowed Bongo and his wife to relocate to Angola despite them facing ongoing (but unspecified) corruption charges.

And although voter turnout was high and local observers were largely satisfied with the integrity of the election, Nguema’s most prominent opponent—former Prime Minister Alain Claude Bilie-By-Nze—accused Nguema of taking advantage of state resources to fund his campaign.

Furthermore, his interim government adopted a new constitution in 2024 that the Africa Center for Strategic Studies argues grants too much power to the executive and specifically favored Nguema. For example, the new constitution prevented a major political opponent from running in the election by banning candidates over seventy years of age. It also broke from past tradition by including a clause that allows military members to run in elections, extended the length of presidential terms to seven years, and eliminated the position of prime minister altogether. During Nguema’s time leading the interim government, he also suspended all political parties in a move that critics say gave him a distinct electoral advantage.

While Nguema was greeted with scenes of celebration after carrying out the 2023 coup and won an election victory indicative of overwhelming public support, it remains to be seen whether he is willing and able to instigate meaningful democratic reforms.

Yet, even if competition was restricted in this election, the very fact that it happened and that the Gabonese people were able to peacefully vote for someone other than a member of the Bongo family shows that there is an appetite for change and a willingness to engage in the most fundamental act of democracy.

In short, the years since the coup have provided both reason to believe that a more democratic future in Gabon is possible and reason to fear that Nguema is simply replacing the Bongo family’s form of autocracy with his own.

What the data tell us

The Freedom and Prosperity Indexes highlight a number of trends indicating that a country’s surest path to prosperity involves improving political and economic freedom, as well as the rule of law. Conversely, the data tell us that restricting freedom is a proven way to diminish societal well-being.

When a country experiences a freedom shock—meaning the one-year drop in its Freedom Index score is among the top 20 percent globally since 1995—its progress on prosperity tends to stall or even reverse as time goes on.

A country’s prosperity tends to stall or decline after experiencing a freedom shock

The drop in Gabon’s freedom score from 2022 to 2023 was among the most severe freedom shocks ever recorded—within the top 5 percent of one-year declines over the past thirty years. This decline was driven by a sharp dip in the country’s political freedom score, which was in turn driven by an even sharper fall in its elections score, which measures the extent to which political leaders are chosen in open, clean, and fair elections.

Gabon’s political freedom has declined sharply in recent years

Furthermore, out of the forty-six countries in Sub-Saharan Africa for which we have data, Gabon ranks thirtieth in the judicial independence and effectiveness indicator and thirty-eighth in the legislative constraints on the executive indicator.

Gabon’s judicial independence is below the regional average

Gabon’s executive has fewer legislative constraints than the regional average

It is important to recognize that these issues were fomented by the Bongo regime. However, the disempowered nature of the judiciary and legislature and the recent broad decline in political freedom show that Nguema must act quickly to reverse course before declines in freedom hinder Gabon’s long-term progress on prosperity. The country’s freedom score has changed very little in the time that Nguema has held power as interim president, with political freedom in further, albeit minimal, decline.

Despite Gabon’s impressive prosperity levels and per capita GDP in relation to its neighbors and to the broader Sub-Saharan Africa region, over one-third of the population currently lives in poverty. The Bongo family was known for gorging themselves on resource wealth while much of the population was left to suffer. Despite its high overall prosperity score, Gabon ranks in the bottom third of all Sub-Saharan African countries in the inequality component of the Prosperity Index. It has the fourth-highest unemployment rate in Sub-Saharan Africa, with over 20 percent of the total labor force—and 40 percent of young people—currently unemployed. If Nguema falls back on the autocratic habits of his predecessor and chooses personal wealth over the well-being of his country, any hope for democracy in Gabon that followed the 2023 coup will quickly die out.

The path to enduring freedom and prosperity

The data clearly show that establishing democracy as the political norm will help Gabon set itself apart from its neighbors and enhance national prosperity.

To create a strong and vibrant democracy, Nguema must first come to terms with the idea that his tenure as president is not indefinite. He must also commit himself to empowering core institutions of democracy such as the legislative branch and courts, and he must protect the societal freedoms that are fundamental to thriving democracies. This should include allowing political parties to exist and organize and lifting targeted age limits for presidential candidates.

By committing to competitive democracy and political freedom, Nguema can most effectively enhance prosperity and, in particular, reduce the inequality that has plagued Gabon for so long. It is too early to tell for sure whether Nguema has assumed the presidency with the intention of institutionalizing democracy and reducing inequality in Gabon or with the intention of ruling as an autocrat. What is certain is that the end of the Bongo regime—and the democratic impetus provided by the national election—provides Nguema with the opportunity to turn Gabon into the success story that West and Central Africa has been yearning for. For the good of the people who elected him, Nguema should do everything in his power to capitalize on it.

Will Mortenson is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center.

Correction: This article was updated on June 4, 2025, to reflect the fact that Gabon is located in Central Africa, not West Africa.

The post Can Gabon become a beacon of democratic entrenchment for West and Central Africa? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In May, the Lebanese concluded country-wide municipal and mayoral elections—their first in nine years—on the heels of Joseph Aoun filling Beirut’s two-year presidential vacancy, and an uncharacteristically speedy appointment of a prime minister and cabinet.

Mere momentum should not be equated with long-term progress towards stabilization, particularly with respect to Hezbollah’s disarmament. The municipal election results did not demonstrate the prominent militant group’s outright dominance over Lebanon’s Shiites. However, Hezbollah nevertheless retains preponderant popularity among them and influence over their electoral and political choices. However, as Hezbollah dubbed them, these elections were a “promotional event” for the real prize: the May 2026 legislative elections. If the group can then expand upon its recent electoral success, and if Aoun’s interminable dialogue with Hezbollah over its arms ever becomes serious,  then it can leverage its popular and political weight to steer those discussions toward an outcome allowing it to retain its arms.

Unpacking the results

Hezbollah boasts that its sweep of the municipal and mayoral elections in Beirut, Baalbek-Hermel, and south Lebanon was a virtually unmitigated “tsunami.”

At face value, the group’s claims are true.  In south Lebanon’s Nabatieh and South Governorates, Hezbollah’s joint electoral list with the Amal Party, dubbed the “Development and Loyalty” list, ran unconstested and won 109 of 272 municipalities by default. In some municipalities, this victory was due to overwhelming local support for Amal and Hezbollah, and in others, to pressure from those parties forcing opponents to withdraw their candidacy or forgo running altogether.

The Amal-Hezbollah lists also took the overwhelming majority of the remaining municipalities, where the elections came down to a contest, with the exception of a handful of seats. But even there, the self-described Amal-Hezbollah Shiite Duo largely did not lose out to outright ideological opponents, apart from Amal’s loss of two municipal seats in Deir Al Zahrani to the Communist Party. Instead, in many cases, the group lost to familial or clan lists, otherwise seemingly neutral on the question of Hezbollah’s private arsenal.

In the Sidon District’s Zrarieh, for example, Development and Loyalty won only six of the fifteen contested seats against the opposition, development-focused “Build It Together” list.  But opposition figure Riad al-Asaad—who has previously bemoaned American-led attempts to weaken Hezbollah as “an Israeli goal” and who backed Build It Together— insisted that “competition [with Hezbollah] isn’t over the choice of resistance, but development.”

These successes replicated earlier wins in the Baalbek-Hermel Governorate, which witnessed significantly higher voter turnout over the last municipal elections in 2016. Here, Development and Loyalty won all eighty municipalities—twenty-eight by default, twenty-nine through electoral contests, and twenty-two where independent pro-Hezbollah lists competed with each other. In many cases here as well, the Amal-Hezbollah list faced off against ostensible independents, but who were nevertheless ideologically aligned with Hezbollah, as in Bednayel, where Development and Loyalty confronted the explicitly pro-Hezbollah “Loyalty to the Resistance” list, or in Brital, where the Hezbollah-Amal backed “Brital Families” list faced openly pro-Hezbollah “Loyalty and Development” list.

For example, Hezbollah-backed candidates swept the municipal council after a hard-fought electoral battle in the city of Baalbek. But voting numbers painted a more complex picture: of 37,142 eligible voters—22,573 of whom are Shiites—a range of 11,674-12,199 voted for Development and Loyalty, while the political opposition list “My City Baalbek” garnered 5,258-5,802 votes. The latter only attracted four hundred to 790 Shiites, compared with 11,290 Shiites for Development and Loyalty, demonstrating the continued loyalty of Hezbollah’s sectarian base. Meanwhile, Hezbollah increased its inroads into Baalbek’s Sunni population, drawing close to 1500 of their votes, and widened its victory margin over My City Baalbek from the 2016 municipal elections.

But these results, good as they are, were far from the unmitigated success that Hezbollah’s propaganda organs sought to spin. In a main Hezbollah stronghold like the city of Baalbek, the group should consider its victory margin too close for comfort, especially as voter turnout in the city itself, in sharp contrast to the District and Governorate level, stood at approximately 47.2 percent generally, and 53.51 percent among Shiites specifically. This was higher than 2016’s level of 44 percent turnout of 31,510 eligible voters. However, it was still low considering the group’s great efforts to encourage its base’s participation in an election painted as a referendum on Hezbollah’s arms and existence, occurring at a historical inflection point for Lebanon.

The electoral battles in the more populous South Lebanon and Nabatieh Governorates offered a starker warning to the group. These areas collectively witnessed similarly depressed voting levels—36.94 percent overall (43.17 percent in South Lebanon and 36.65 percent in Nabatieh) compared to 48.15 percent in 2016. Hezbollah’s results were also spottier at face value, with opposing lists, if not outright ideological opponents, making deeper inroads among the electorate despite ultimately failing to unseat the Hezbollah-Amal Duo.

The apathy factor

One plausible explanation is that Hezbollah has lost at least some of its ability to mobilize its loyal masses. This could stem, from, as some have alleged, growing Shiite discontent with the party, particularly over instigating the recent ruinous war with Israel—which could portend a massive backlash against Hezbollah coupled with sizable defections from its base’s ranks. But the materialization of this scenario depends on a complex set of currently absent factors, particularly the existence of a credible and unified Shiite opposition, with the means and ability to deliver on these people’s needs, and thus attract this alleged silent anti-Hezbollah majority.

It is more plausible that the depressed voter turnout had nothing to do with Hezbollah. After all, the silent—and allegedly anti-Hezbollah—majority of Lebanese southerners didn’t go out and vote for the group’s opponents either. They stayed home.

Therefore, rather than a silent vote against Hezbollah, their abstention seems to have stemmed from overall Lebanese political disillusionment and loss of hope in the system’s ability to bring about change, leading to complacency. In September of 2024, for example, Arab Barometer found 76 percent of all Lebanese “uninterested in politics,” while 45 percent described themselves as highly apathetic. Two years prior, 65 percent of Lebanese had even said they didn’t care if their country remained a democracy—more accurately, a procedural democracy—as long as it “can maintain order and stability.” 

Political apathy isn’t ideal for Hezbollah. But a Shiite population as politically quiescent and disinterested as the rest of the Lebanese would not undermine the group’s political power, and is thus preferable to an actively hostile one. This, coupled with other factors, like fear of being caught in the midst of Israel’s ongoing military actions that escalated in the days preceding the election, and the difficulty of traveling to south Lebanon for voters displaced by the recent war, could have also impacted voter turnout.

Delayed disarmament

The municipal elections were the last in several significant, post-war milestones during which Hezbollah needed to demonstrate that it remains the primary political and social representative of Lebanese Shiites. But this victory is fragile, delaying, for now, he group’s disarmament, despite the calls for such action gaining increasing momentum.  But delaying that prospect does not eliminate it altogether. That specter will continue to haunt Hezbollah unless and until it can expand its municipal election successes come 2026’s parliamentary plebiscite—sweeping all seats it contests while denying Shiite opposition figures any electoral victories, drive up the voting rate among its supporters, and broaden its share of the popular vote. It’s a tall order, but Hezbollah has long proven itself a learning organization, and it will use all the carrots and sticks at its disposal to achieve that result. Here, a combination of delivering on post-war reconstruction of predominantly Shiite areas damaged during the recent war with Israel, while cowing potential opponents with threats, legal action, and actual force, will prove critical to the group’s chances of success.

The question is, will its opponents likewise learn from their mistakes and failure to challenge the group’s Shiite hegemony at a time when they allege its sway over that sect is at its weakest ever—or will they once again rest on the laurels of their empty slogans and symbolic or imaginary triumphs, leaving the “Party of God” to once again be the victors?

David Daoud was a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs and a research analyst on Hezbollah and Lebanon at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI).

The post What Lebanon’s municipal election results mean for Hezbollah appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While Ukraine’s proposal laid out a fairly pragmatic vision based on battlefield realities and security concerns, Russia presented punitive peace terms that would reestablish Kremlin control over Kyiv and doom the postwar Ukrainian state to a slow but inevitable death. This uncompromising Russian position should serve as a wake-call for anyone who still believes Putin is negotiating in good faith. In reality, the Russian dictator is more determined than ever to destroy Ukraine, and is merely exploiting US-led peace talks in order to strengthen his hand and divide the West.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The demands unveiled by the Russian delegation this week in Istanbul came as no surprise and closely mirrored the conditions outlined on numerous prior occasions by Putin and other Kremlin leaders. Nevertheless, at a time when US President Donald Trump is publicly pressing for progress toward peace, the Russian decision to deliver such a maximalist memorandum sent a clear message of defiance to Washington DC.

As expected, Moscow reiterated its call for Ukraine to withdraw completely from four Ukrainian provinces that Russia currently claims as its own but has been unable to fully occupy. This would oblige the Ukrainian authorities to hand over a number of major cities and condemn millions of their compatriots to indefinite Russian occupation. Kyiv would also be expected to officially cede these regions together with Crimea, paving the way for international recognition of Russia’s conquests.

This crushing territorial settlement is only one aspect of Russia’s vision for the comprehensive dismantling of Ukrainian statehood. In line with Putin’s peace terms, Ukraine would be forced to accept limitations on the size of its army and on the categories of weapons it is allowed to possess. The country would be also be barred from joining any military blocs or concluding alliances with foreign nations. It does not take much imagination to guess what Putin has in mind for Ukraine once it has been successfully disarmed and internationally isolated.

Nor is that all. The Kremlin’s conditions actually go much further and aim to transform Ukraine from within in ways that would erase Ukrainian identity along with the country’s political independence. Moscow’s memorandum called on Ukraine to grant Russian the status of official state language, reinstate the privileges of the Russian Orthodox Church, and adopt a Kremlin-friendly version of Ukrainian history. Meanwhile, all so-called “nationalist” Ukrainian political parties would be banned, paving the way for the installation of a puppet regime in Kyiv.

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On the morning after this week’s bilateral meeting, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev confirmed the true objective of Russia’s participation in peace talks. “The Istanbul talks are not for striking a compromise peace on someone else’s delusional terms,” commented Medvedev, who currently serves as deputy chairman of Russia’s powerful National Security Council. Instead, Medvedev stated that Russia’s goal was to secure victory and ensure “the complete destruction of the neo-Nazi regime,” which is widely recognized as Kremlin code for the Ukrainian state. “That’s what the Russian memorandum published yesterday is about,” he noted.

Medvedev’s frank appraisal of the Russian position won him sarcastic praise from US Senator Lindsey Graham. “Congratulations to Mr. Medvedev for a rare moment of honesty coming from the Russian propaganda machine,” commented Trump ally Graham. “I appreciate you making it clear to the world that Putin and Russia are not remotely interested in peace.”

It is hard to argue with Graham’s assessment. For the past few months, Putin has gone out of his way to demonstrate that he has absolutely no intention of ending the war. While Ukraine has accepted a US proposal for an unconditional ceasefire, Putin has repeatedly refused to do so. Instead, he has engaged in transparent stalling tactics that make a mockery of the entire peace process.

Away from the negotiating table, Putin has dramatically increased drone and missile attacks on Ukrainian cities, killing and wounding hundreds of civilians. On the battlefield, his armies are currently engaged in the early stages what is shaping up to be one of the biggest Russian offensives of the entire war. These are not the actions of a man who seeks peace.

After this week’s fresh confirmation of Moscow’s undiminished imperial ambitions in Ukraine, it is now surely time to abandon any lingering delusions and accept that the Russian dictator will not stop until he is stopped. Putin believes he is on a messianic mission to extinguish Ukrainian statehood and revive the Russian Empire. He currently thinks he is winning this historic struggle and will not be swayed by Trump’s comparatively trivial talk of tariffs and trade deals.

The only thing that can change Putin’s mind is Western strength. As long as Putin is confident of eventual victory, he will continue. But if the alternative to a peace deal is a potentially crushing defeat, he may reconsider. To achieve this change, Western leaders must demonstrate a degree of collective resolve that has often been absent over the past three years. They must sanction Russia to the max and arm Ukraine to the teeth. This will require considerable political will and good old-fashioned courage in Western capitals. Ukraine will do the rest.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 29, 2025

UN probe: Russia’s ‘human safari’ in Ukraine is a crime against humanity

By Peter Dickinson

UN investigators have concluded that a coordinated Russian campaign of deadly drone strikes targeting civilians in southern Ukraine’s Kherson region is a crime against humanity, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Drones

UkraineAlert Jun 3, 2025

After Ukraine’s innovative airbase attacks, nowhere in Russia is safe

By David Kirichenko

Ukraine carried out one of the most audacious operations in modern military history on June 1, using swarms of smuggled drones to strike four Russian airbases simultaneously and destroy a significant portion of Putin’s bomber fleet, writes David Kirichenko.

Artificial Intelligence Conflict

UkraineAlert May 8, 2025

Russia’s coming summer offensive could be deadliest of the entire war

By Mykola Bielieskov

As the US-led peace initiative continues to falter, the unfolding summer campaigning season in Ukraine promises to be among the bloodiest of the entire war, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict European Union

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

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The post Putin’s punitive peace terms are a call for Ukraine’s complete capitulation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Sungmin Cho: For Lee, the economy comes first, but expect foreign policy shifts nonetheless

Kayla Orta: Lee’s “pragmatic” approach comes as Seoul faces a more hostile security environment

Shawn Creamer: Military spending and shipbuilding are two areas of engagement with the Trump administration

Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi: Lee seems poised to take a pragmatic and balanced approach to regional security

For Lee, the economy comes first, but expect foreign policy shifts nonetheless 

To understand Lee’s foreign policy orientation, it is more useful to compare his positions with that of former President Moon Jae-in, rather than that of Yoon, his conservative predecessor. 

Lee’s foreign policy will generally align with the Democratic Party’s traditional approach, promoting dialogue with North Korea and maintaining stable ties with China. But he is notably more pragmatic than Moon. While Moon emphasized peace and inter-Korean reconciliation, Lee advocates conditional dialogue with Pyongyang, taking a step-by-step approach toward denuclearization. His foreign policy advisers, Wi Sung-lac and Kim Hyun-chong, are known more as internationalists than nationalists, reinforcing Lee’s pragmatic stance. 

Lee prioritizes economic issues, and he has repeatedly stated that economic recovery is his top priority. During the campaign, for example, he pledged to establish an “Emergency Economic Taskforce” if elected. Given this focus, Lee is unlikely to pursue major foreign policy initiatives at first, avoiding Moon’s active diplomacy among Washington, Pyongyang, and Beijing. 

South Korea’s foreign policy shifts may instead stem from external developments, especially if US President Donald Trump reengages with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Lee would likely support a third Trump-Kim summit and would not oppose US troop reductions if Washington insists. While such moves could reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula in the short term, there is concern that North Korea might exploit weakened deterrence to launch limited attacks against South Korea whenever it sees fit, as occurred during the 2010 crises. 

Taiwan issues will test Lee’s pragmatism. Under US pressure for support, he will likely exercise strategic ambiguity to the maximum—quietly discussing contingency plans with Washington while avoiding public commitments. He will neither support nor oppose United States Forces Korea’s strategic flexibility. At the same time, Lee is likely to emphasize South Korea’s acknowledgment of the “One China” policy to maintain balance in its relations with Beijing. 

In sum, Lee’s foreign policy is marked by pragmatism and economic urgency, distinguishing him from Moon’s more ideological and nationalistic approach. 

—Sungmin Cho, PhD, is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Sungkyunkwan University.

Lee’s “pragmatic” approach comes as Seoul faces a more hostile security environment

Lee ran on the platform of a “pragmatic” foreign policy, but whether his administration will be able to rise above the nation’s entrenched partisan divides to strengthen South Korea’s geostrategic position within the Indo-Pacific region remains to be seen.

Six months to the day since Yoon declared martial law, South Korean citizens took to the voting booths to elect a new leader. Lee’s win over the People Power Party nominee Kim Moon-soo heralds another pendulum swing in South Korea’s political leadership. As the liberal party returns to the presidency, the battle to address South Korea’s domestic political turmoil is only just beginning, and the nation’s fierce partisan divide is likely to continue. 

The political aftermath of Yoon’s call for martial law shocked the nation, weakening confidence in South Korea’s decades-long democratic institutions. The next South Korean president will have a challenging five-year term ahead to reestablish public confidence in the government at home while simultaneously addressing South Korea’s foreign policy concerns abroad.

North Korea’s ongoing weapons of mass destruction and missile programs—and its expanded security partnerships with Russia and China—present an immediate and existential threat to South Korea. Seoul faces a more hostile security environment today than it did under Moon, Lee’s liberal predecessor who leaned into diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang. Many in South Korea are increasingly concerned about North Korea’s “irreversible” nuclear arms buildup and more than 70 percent of polled citizens consistently call for South Korea’s own nuclear armament in the near future. 

Amid growing regional insecurity, Seoul’s relationships with Washington and Tokyo will matter. Despite previous statements, Lee campaigned on continuing to strengthen South Korea–Japan relations, building upon his predecessor’s US–South Korea–Japan trilateral security cooperation to address the growing instability in the Indo-Pacific region. However, balancing proactive foreign policy and intensifying domestic demands, as previously seen, is not an easy task.

Overall, Lee’s “pragmatic” diplomacy may signal strategic policy investment in bridging the conservative-liberal political divide. Lee may yet step up foreign policy initiatives in South Korea’s interest, building upon his predecessor’s foreign policy agendas.

—Kayla T. Orta is a nonresident fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Military spending and shipbuilding are two areas of engagement with the Trump administration 

Lee’s election as president of South Korea is an opportunity to restore domestic political stability and resurrect Seoul’s reputation on the international stage following the martial law declaration, impeachment, and court drama surrounding the removal of Yoon from office. Domestic stability is made possible more from the political unity of the executive and legislative branches of government under the progressive Democratic Party than from a popular mandate. Political unity will likely allow the South Korean government to break out of partisan gridlock and make gains on efficient and effective governance. 

While Lee will have party unity, there is a sizable conservative opposition that maintains low degrees of trust in the more leftist elements of the Democratic Party, including the new president. Time will tell whether Lee governs more like the centrist candidate or the leftist opposition politician of his past. 

If the past is representative of the future, Lee will progressively evolve toward the center on foreign policy over his five-year term, as his Democratic Party predecessor Moon did. Moon learned, despite a troubled relationship with Trump, that South Korean sovereignty was best served by close alignment with the United States rather than an arrangement that subordinates it to the People’s Republic of China. Moreover, Moon learned that a deal with the Kim regime in North Korea would not be worth the paper it was printed on. Regrettably for peace and security in Northeast Asia, the Korea-Japan relationship will likely remain cool under Lee for the duration of his term based on the entrenched views of the Democratic Party.  

There is both risk and opportunity for Lee in South Korea’s alliance with the United States. Lee holds some strong cards if he plays them well. 

South Korea already funds its defense at 2.8 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP), and it has one of the most capable armed forces of all US allies. Lee should set in motion an increase in defense spending to above 3 percent of GDP in 2026 and chart a path for this to increase to at least 3.5 percent by 2030, demonstrating that South Korea is the US security partner of choice. Continued maturation of the Korean armed forces will also position South Korea to defend its interests in a very difficult neighborhood, while meeting alliance transformation benchmarks and increased Korean roles in combined defense. 

Second, Korean manufacturing is extremely strong, particularly in shipbuilding. Lee should leverage Korean dominance in shipbuilding to help Trump rebuild the US Navy, giving Trump a political win and assisting the United States in maintaining its global extended deterrence commitments. South Korean advanced manufacturing capacity offers additional opportunity for the United States and European rearmament efforts. Lee can leverage this assistance to advance Korea’s global economic interests on more favorable terms.   

There are also risks to the relationship with Washington, especially if Lee and Trump have a personality conflict. Lee will also find trouble with the US relationship if he seeks to deepen Korea’s relations with China or is overly antagonistic to Japan, the other major US ally in East Asia.      

—Shawn Creamer is a nonresident senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative, and Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Lee seems poised to take a pragmatic and balanced approach to regional security

Lee’s victory in Tuesday’s presidential election was expected, given his ability to court the centrist majority and the conservative camp’s feuds to field a united force. But while Lee’s election is a victory for the Democratic Party, his populist but realist orientation is likely to make him a different type of revisionist than his more ideological predecessor Moon. Still, given the controversies surrounding Lee, as well as uncertainties over his and the Democratic Party’s policies, the new administration will struggle to unite the deep divisions in South Korea.  

On the foreign policy and security front, it is possible that the new administration will take a balanced and pragmatic approach rather than a revisionist one. During the campaign, Lee talked about peace on the Korean Peninsula and restoring the 2018 military agreement with Pyongyang—trademark positions of the progressives. At the same time, he recognized the importance of the alliance with the United States and trilateral coordination with Japan—priorities for the conservatives. Even though much of this balanced approach was certainly part of Lee’s election strategy, it also reflects the strong recognition within South Korea about the importance of US-Japan-South Korea trilateral security coordination; threats posed by North Korea, China, and Russia; and the limited prospects of improving inter-Korean relations.  

While there are many uncertainties about the Lee administration, Tokyo and Washington should continue working with Seoul to ensure strong, resilient, and sustainable trilateral security cooperation, which is imperative for stability in the Indo-Pacific region.  

—Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi is a nonresident senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, an associate professor at Tokyo International University, and a senior adjunct fellow at Pacific Forum.

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This was his third visit to Saudi Arabia as prime minister, and the focus was on enhancing a relationship that has grown significantly in recent years.  Modi first went to the Kingdom in 2016 and then again in 2019, when the bilateral Strategic Partnership Council was established.  This mechanism has been used to facilitate approximately fifty deals, including construction, telecommunications, and tech projects, and to establish a joint committee to bring one hundred billion dollars of Saudi investments into India. 

With rising tensions between India and Pakistan, paired with the Israel war’s continuing destruction of Gaza, it’s natural that talk of India-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) relations has been muted lately.  However, the depth of Indian-Gulf relations, combined with recent momentum behind these partnerships, creates a strong foundation for increased India-Middle East integration over the coming decades.  

Asia–Gulf relations: Not just China

When we talk about Asia-Gulf relations, China tends to get the lion’s share of the attention.  India, however, is a major Gulf actor.  The non-resident Indian population in GCC countries reached nine million in 2024, accounting for 25 percent of Indian expatriates globally.  There are longstanding social, cultural, religious, and family connections between the people of the Arabian Peninsula and South Asia, and this familiarity supports growing political, economic, and increasingly strategic cooperation.

In contrast, China remains an important partner but one with fewer tangible cultural ties. It is perceived as a more transactional actor, whereas India is deeply enmeshed in the social fabric of the Gulf. 

The importance of these people-to-people connections gets augmented by the substantial economic relations.  India’s GDP hit 3.56 trillion dollars in 2023, up from 2.68 trillion dollars in 2020, and is expected to grow by 6.5 percent in 2024.  As a result, it consumes a lot more energy, and it is now the world’s third-largest consumer of oil, behind China and the United States.  The Gulf countries, naturally, play a significant role in India’s energy security.  Of the top five commodities exporters to India, the UAE is number one, Saudi Arabia is number two, and Iraq is number four.  The volume of trade is significant.  In 2023, India imported just under 103 billion dollars from the GCC, Iran, and Iraq, and exported 57 billion dollars, making it one of the most important trade partners for the Gulf. 

India’s footprint on the Arabian Peninsula

Lesser noticed are the growing strategic relations and the formalized development of bilateral mechanisms.  New Delhi and Riyadh signed a 2014 defense cooperation agreement, which allowed for “shared use and exchange of defense-related information, military training and education, as well as cooperation in areas varying from hydrography and security to logistics.”  Since then, there have been regular joint army, naval, and air force joint exercises, and a Joint Committee on Defence Cooperation has held six rounds of meetings.  On April 23-24, the Indian Army and Royal Saudi Land Forces held the first round of Army-to-Army Staff Talks to discuss strengthening defence ties. 

Oman has even denser security ties to India, signing a military protocol agreement in 1972 and a Memorandum of Understanding on defence cooperation in 2005.  During a 2018 visit to Muscat, Modi signed an access agreement for the Indian Navy to use Duqm port for logistics, support, and maintenance. 

The UAE is also ramping up defense and security relations with India. During an official visit to India last month, Minister of Defence Sheikh Hamdan bin Mohammed Al Maktoum built upon existing security-related mechanisms to formalize cooperation between their coast guards and defence industries.  The readout from their meeting stated that “the two sides agreed that defence cooperation should be scaled up to match the progress in trade and business.”

This is part of what is really India’s most highly developed Middle East relationship.  With dramatic effects, it signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with the UAE in 2022.  Bilateral trade in goods was 43.3 billion dollars in 2020 and is projected to surpass one hundred billion dollars this year.  The Emirates see India as an important feature of their drive to diversify international partnerships and their domestic economy.  Cooperation with India supports tech, skilled, and unskilled manpower, food, and medicine. 

Importantly, cooperation comes without the same kinds of geopolitical complications inherent in working with China.  According to an observer I recently spoke with, the only impediment to deeper India-UAE ties is the institutional capacity to keep pace with the demand for implementing and overseeing the wide range of projects that both sides want to pursue—the two governments need to develop more personnel to steer the bilateral relationship.  

This is to say that India is present in the Gulf with a depth and breadth that is not always realized from outside the region. India is becoming more confident in its role as a global actor with interests and influence beyond South Asia, and regional perceptions are shifting, with Gulf countries looking at New Delhi as a consequential partner on a growing set of issues.

The IMEC factor

The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is perhaps the most interesting manifestation of this burgeoning regional partnership. 

Announced during the G20 summit in September 2023, IMEC is a proposed set of projects that would link India, the Arabian Peninsula, Israel, and Europe.  China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was defined early as a set of corridors, so naturally, many see IMEC as a response to the BRI.  It does share the underlying logic of connecting markets and supply chains, but has a narrower focus.  Fairly or unfairly, BRI quickly became a buzzword for nearly everything in Chinese foreign policy.  IMEC, on the other hand, looks to build upon mostly existing physical infrastructure to develop three “connectivity verticals”: transport, digital, and energy.  The Arabian Peninsula is a central node in this, linking the Arabian Sea via rail networks to Israel’s Haifa Port on the Mediterranean, ultimately reaching the European market. 

Within the GCC, this is a very attractive idea that aligns with country-specific “Vision” development plans.  One of the most alluring futures that Gulf leaders plan for is a post-hydrocarbon economic model where new industries, fueled by foreign direct investment and partnerships with leading global technology companies, create jobs and political stability.  IMEC is seen as an ambitious set of projects that can contribute to this. 

While IMEC has strong support from India and most Gulf governments, progress on some elements of the corridor could face challenges in the immediate term, given tensions in the Middle East, particularly transport links between Saudi Arabia and Israel.  When IMEC was unveiled, the idea of Saudi Arabia connecting to Haifa via Jordan was increasingly plausible.  After nineteen months of brutal war in Gaza, the political costs have risen significantly for Riyadh.  Government and business leaders see tremendous potential in IMEC connectivity, but are intensely aware that public perceptions of Israel have hardened throughout the war. Still, other transport, digital, and energy elements of IMEC are viable in the current environment and continue to enjoy strong support from Indian, Gulf, and European partners. Beyond IMEC, we can expect to see more projects that address bilateral concerns, like energy and food security or tech cooperation, as Gulf countries find ways to increase engagement with India.

Opportunities for the United States

With GCC-US relations at a high point following President Donald Trump’s visit to Saudi, Qatar, and the UAE, growing momentum in GCC-India relations is in Washington’s interests as well.  An Indo-Pacific partner with a deep presence in the Gulf makes a more competitive environment for China, while supporting GCC efforts to build more dynamic and sustainable economies. 

With overlapping interests in energy security, maritime stability, and economic diversification, the US, India, and GCC should consider institutionalizing cooperation, such as a multilateral platform to enhance policy coordination, increase trust, and create a channel for project planning and strategic alignment.

Jonathan Fulton is a nonresident senior fellow for Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an associate professor of political science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi.

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Yet despite Saied’s apparent opposition to joining the Abraham Accords, his decision in November 2023 to halt the Tunisian parliament’s controversial bill criminalizing normalizing ties with Israel provided a glimpse into the president’s cost-benefit analysis over measures that could alienate the West completely. It signaled an opening, even if a very narrow one, that the possibility of Tunisian—Israel rapprochement might not be as far-fetched as experts predict, and that even a rogue actor like Saied sees the benefits in joining a Westernized coalition during times of war.  Yet in the long run, especially after the war in Gaza, Tunisia’s historical openness to the West might present an opportunity to advance normalization between the two countries.

Stubborn challenges: Israel and Tunisia’s rocky relations

Israel and Tunisia do not currently maintain any kind of formal relations, but this has not always been the case.

Beginning in the 1950s, under former Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba, limited ties developed between the two countries. These included informal connections and meetings between politicians from both sides, initiated by diplomats from each country. The relationship served mutual interests—Israel sought recognition from an Arab state, while Tunisia aimed to secure support for its development, particularly in sectors such as agriculture and tourism. Consequently, in the nineties, Tunisia and Israel established low-level diplomatic relations (culminating in the opening of “interest sections” in each other’s countries, serving as de facto embassies), making the relations between the countries formal.  

However, the Palestinian issue has long been a central element of Tunisia’s foreign policy, causing attrition between Israeli and Tunisian diplomatic relations. Tunis has long expressed solidarity with the Palestinian people and their struggle for self-determination and has historically defended the two-state solution. More importantly, Tunisia hosted the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters from 1982 to 1993 after Yasser Arafat was forced to flee Beirut, Lebanon, then under siege by the Israelis during the first Israel-Lebanon War. Tunis hosted the PLO headquarters until the Oslo Accords, when it relocated to Gaza and the West Bank.  

This period helped cement closeness between Tunisians to the Palestinian cause, a sentiment further solidified by Israel’s deadly aerial attack on Hammam Chot on the PLO headquarters in 1985, killing a number of civilians and causing further resentment among Tunisians. Tunisians never forgave Israel for what they perceived to be an illegal incursion on their territory.

In 2000, with the outbreak of the Second Intifada in Israel and Palestine, relations between Israel and Tunisia entered a period of further crisis, leading to the suspension of official ties. While the relationship had deteriorated significantly already, the outbreak of violence between Israelis and Palestinians rendered diplomatic efforts virtually impossible.

A continuation of the deteriorating relations underpinned the decades that followed. During Tunisia’s Jasmine revolution, Israel remained on the fence about improving ties with the new political forces, fearing the rise of an anti-Israel posture. Meanwhile, the Tunisians passed a new Constitution in 2014, underscoring its commitment to the Palestinian cause, and open letters signed by academics and researchers calling for criminalizing ties with Israel circulated among political forces.

Under Saied’s current rule, these tensions have escalated significantly, including when he rejected Israel’s 1948 borders and called for the “full liberation of Palestine,” while avoiding any overt condemnation of Hamas after its October 7, 2023, attacks on Israel. On some occasions, Saied adopted an overtly antisemitic posture, accusing “the Zionists” of plotting the deadly 2023 floods in  Libya that killed some four thousand people, a trope linked to the long-held antisemitic prejudice that Jews somehow control the world. His remarks sparked outrage across Israeli media.  

Tunisia’s foreign policy has recently shifted markedly into a more anti-Western stance, cozying up to Iran in the process.

In May 2024, Saied visited Tehran to pay respects to the late President Ebrahim Raisi, marking the first-ever visit of a Tunisian president to  Iran. That same month, rumors swirled in Italian and French news outlets of unusual air movements by Russian aircraft in the coastal city of Djerba, raising eyebrows at a potential Tunisia-Russian alignment. In August of the same year, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Tunis for the second time in over a year, pledging to help the country grapple with its wheat drought.

Why would Tunisia choose to normalize ties with Israel?

But there is even historical precedent to disrupt this trend.

Historically, Tunisia has tended to align more with the West than with the broader Arab world. However, its geographic location has made it essential to maintain strong relations with neighboring countries, particularly Algeria and Libya. While Tunisia has strategic interests in its ties with Algeria, especially in the areas of energy, trade, and finance, former Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali sought to moderate the country’s financial connections to Arab countries and aimed to avoid the kind of reliance on crude oil revenues seen in other Arab states in the region.

Beyond the more apparent economic and trade incentives for Tunisia to normalize relations with Israel, Tunis could also gain from reigniting this closer alignment with the West, particularly as Iran and Russia, with whom it has recently signaled an openness to closer ties, face mounting setbacks that may force them to turn inward. Both Moscow and Tehran have faced major setbacks on the international stage. The former is dealing with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and an exorbitant number of human losses, and the latter is temporarily retreating after receiving a significant blow from Israel during the ongoing regional war between Israel and Iranian proxies. Tunisia is far from being a strategic priority for either power, and these setbacks should worry Tunisia, which might be left on its own to deal with an increasing migration threat from sub-Saharan Africa and an impending economic crisis.  

Another factor that might lead Tunisia to normalize ties with Israel is the potential for hedging between regional powers. Tunisia is particularly susceptible to external influences from countries with greater international stature, particularly when looking at its ongoing relationship with Algeria. Algeria, for its part, has steadily been courting Tunisia by supporting Tunis economically and politically, including a 2022 grant worth 200 million dollars from President Abdelmadjid Tebboune to help with the country’s struggling economy, and offering leniency and cheaper prices on electricity and gas from the Transmed pipeline. Tunisia, grappling with high public debt and stagnant growth, and with the economy desperately reeling since the Covid-19 pandemic, has had little choice other than to accept Algeria’s offerings. Algeria’s rationale for influencing Tunisia stems from a need to counter perceived external Western interference—exacerbated by the signing of the Abraham Accords between its regional rival Morocco and Israel—which has heightened its sense of isolation and vulnerability.

Normalizing ties with Israel could allow Tunisia to hedge between regional powers to avoid full alignment with Algeria and maximize its personal gains. It would reduce Tunis’ risk of overdependence on Algeria, and limit the risk of collateral damage should the relationship sour and challenges emerge for Algeria itself.

Israel’s interest

Normalization between Israel and Tunisia could offer Israel several potential advantages. These include contributing to regional stability and peace, expanding international recognition and support, and possibly encouraging other countries to engage more openly with Israel. Additionally, normalization could pave the way for stronger ties in trade, tourism, and investments, especially in the field of agriculture and irrigation. It would also promote Israeli legitimacy in the region, reducing international efforts to isolate it, increasing its international standing, and opening new business opportunities in Arab markets.

From a strategic perspective, improved relations with Tunisia might also help limit Tunisia’s cooperation with countries hostile to Israel, such as Algeria, Libya, and Iran. It could even reduce the potential for renewed activity by terrorist groups operating in or from the region.

That said, many of these benefits are not unique to Tunisia—they reflect the broader advantages Israel could gain from normalizing relations with any additional Arab country.

Threats and pathways to improvement

On the other hand, normalizing with Israel poses a severe threat to Tunisia, which Saied may not be apt to overlook. Firstly, it will inevitably fracture its relationship with Algeria, alienating Tunis’ primary economic backer. Algeria has had no qualms in stressing its disdain for the Abraham Accords, recently reiterating its historic backing of a full Palestinian state, the support of which is enshrined in its constitution. Algeria would certainly take it personally and would do everything in its power to retaliate, including rescinding its economic partnership, nullifying diplomatic ties, and reinstating tighter controls on late payments.

Secondly, Saied will face severe internal backlash. Tunisians have been at the forefront of pro-Palestinian demonstrations, the likes of which the country has not witnessed since the 2011 revolution. In a time when Saied is tightening control over the country, he still understands the importance of maintaining public support, and normalizing ties with Israel may pit the population against him, lessening his power and legitimacy.  

While Israel perceives normalization with Tunisia as naturally beneficial, the same cannot be said in reverse, and normalization between the two does not seem feasible as long as the war in Gaza continues.

If the West wished to see normalization between these two countries prevail, it would have to provide Tunis with significant concessions. These could take the form of economic support through International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans with fewer austerity measures, or simple economic bailout packages with few strings attached.

However, such a decision carries significant risks, namely the potential erosion of the IMF’s credibility and legitimacy on the international stage. Additionally, the West, particularly the United States, can seek to leverage its ongoing military partnership with Tunisia to retain strategic influence.  This could involve conditioning Tunisian aid to agreements such as the obligation to maintain secrecy over military knowledge and capabilities, especially when dealing with enemies such as Iran. This could restrict Tunisia’s movement while placing greater value on Washington’s ongoing support.

Normalization between Arab countries and Israel is still a top foreign policy agenda for US President Donald Trump’s administration. While Israel’s war rages on in Gaza, Trump has made no secret of his wish to see Saudi Arabia join the Abraham Accords, a feat which will undoubtedly help him reach his objective of becoming the peacemaker of the century.

While the potential for these two countries to normalize may seem farfetched, there are many strategic benefits for both that go beyond what meets the eye. Analysts may do well to keep an eye out for potential signs of rapprochement, as even small shifts may signal deeper political changes in the region.

Alissa Pavia is the Associate Director of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Program.

Maayan Dagan is a visiting research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

The post Beyond the gridlock: The case for Tunisia-Israel normalization appeared first on Atlantic Council.

China dominates the rare-earth supply chain, with Beijing supplying about 60 percent of global rare-earths output and controlling up to 90 percent of refining capacity. For the United States, which needs neodymium and dysprosium for F‑35 fighter jet engines as badly as it needs lithium for electric vehicles, continued dependence on Beijing is impossible. The solution is not wishful “onshoring” to the United States alone; it is establishing a portfolio of reliable partners. Kazakhstan, already the world’s leading uranium producer and a top‑ten copper and zinc exporter, is a prime candidate for such a partnership.

Rare earths have become a geopolitical flashpoint. In practice, that means Beijing can throttle supply at will. In April, for example, China abruptly restricted exports of several important rare earths and permanent magnets—actions triggered by trade disputes with the United States under the pretext of “energy security.” US firms and strategists described the move as China’s latest attempt to weaponize its rare-earths dominance.

Supply shocks will recur, not recede. After Beijing halted exports of rare-earth refining technology to the United States in late 2023, it spent 2024 steadily ratcheting up export-license requirements on strategic rare-earth oxides or outright banning its exports. These moves culminated in April of this year, with Beijing placing export restrictions on seven heavy and medium rare-earth elements (samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium) on dual-use national-security grounds.

The United States has only just begun to free its high-tech supply chain dependence on China. Over the past few years, for example, US policymakers have launched some domestic projects and lured allies in Europe and Australia to develop alternatives, but many of those efforts are still nascent. New supply lines will take years to mature. Washington needs a long-term partnership strategy that goes beyond homespun mining; it needs countries capable of supplying rare earths at scale. Since 2020, Kazakhstan has ramped up rare-earth mining, increasing its exports nearly fivefold by 2024. Still, both in 2023 and 2024, 100 percent of its rare-earth output is exported to China—a telling indicator that the resource is there, but does not currently flow to the West. By moving swiftly, the United States could hedge against future Chinese disruptions—and help build a secure, diversified global supply chain for these critical minerals.

Kazakhstan’s rare earths

Unlike some prospective supplier countries, Kazakhstan already knows it has rare-earth wealth. In early April, geologists in the country announced the “Zhana Kazakhstan” discovery: an estimated twenty million metric tons of rare-earths‑bearing ore in the Karagandy region, including sizable heavy‑rare‑earth concentrations. If even 10 percent of the ore proves recoverable at today’s grades, that equates to around 200,000 tons of rare-earth oxide content—enough to meet current US neodymium magnet demand for a dozen years. If validated, the site would give Kazakhstan the world’s third‑largest rare-earth element reserves, trailing only China and Brazil. While promising, these preliminary findings are no sure thing and will require deeper study.

This find is not an outlier. Soviet‑era data and recent airborne surveys point to additional prospects across southern and eastern Kazakhstan. The geology has been there; what was missing was investor certainty. That is changing fast. In just the past few years, the government has opened scores of new exploration projects.

Kazakhstan is no newcomer to big mining. In 2024, the country led the world in uranium output (about 38 percent of global supply) and ranked among the top ten producers of copper and zinc. The national mining concern, Tau-Ken Samruk, consolidates dozens of mines and has global joint ventures in everything from gold to base metals. Kazakhstan’s energy and transport infrastructure likewise favors large-scale mining, as it already accounts for 14 percent of the country’s gross domestic product.

Kazakhstan’s “multivector” diplomacy also plays a factor. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev courts Beijing and Moscow, yet he also seeks deeper ties with Washington and Brussels to balance against those giants. That instinct makes Astana a willing partner for the United States, and a less risky one than conflict-scarred alternatives such as Myanmar and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. At the same time, the United States should not expect Kazakhstan to choose only Western partners over the major powers along its eastern and northern borders.

Since 2018, Astana has overhauled its subsoil code on a “first come, first served” model. New legislation helps promote fiscal stability, offers value-added tax holidays on exploration equipment, and caps royalties. As a result, majors from Rio Tinto to Fortescue have launched joint ventures, while US‑backed Cove Capital began drilling rare-earths targets near Arkalyk in 2024.

Kazakhstan also has an edge in infrastructure. The Middle Corridor rail‑and‑port network—which runs from western China through Kazakhstan to the Caspian Sea and onward to Europe—was expanded last year with European Union (EU) financing. Aktau’s Caspian port already handles uranium concentrate bound for Canada and France; rare-earths concentrates could follow the same route with minimal modification.

In short, Kazakhstan offers what many mining countries do not: favorable geology and the business environment and infrastructure to exploit it. Kazakhstan already has smelters and refineries for many ores, and it boasts production of advanced materials such as purified manganese sulfate and titanium metal. It even produces gallium (used in semiconductors) and recycles rhenium, though admittedly it still lacks deep processing for rare-earth oxides.

The way forward

Washington has learned the hard way that pledges alone won’t break Beijing’s monopoly, and its next move should elevate quiet deals into an explicit strategy. On the Kazakh side, top leaders have made it clear that developing mining for Western markets is a priority. For example, Tokayev has called critical minerals the country’s “new oil,” and he has signed a number of memoranda with foreign partners on exploration and processing. Kazakhstan’s September 2024 “Kazakh-German” forum alone produced twenty-three agreements in mining, including rare-earth joint ventures.

Here are the three critical steps Washington and Astana should take next:

1. Unlock normal trade by repealing the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and grant Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) to Kazakhstan. The United States should finish what H.R. 1024 has already teed up: removing Kazakhstan from the Soviet-era Jackson-Vanik Amendment and extend PNTR to Kazakhstan. Scrapping this relic costs no money, instantly signals strategic seriousness, and eliminates the legal ambiguity that still shadows US financing and offtake contracts with Kazakh mines. PNTR lets both sides write binding long-term supply agreements.
2. Set up a US–Kazakhstan rare-earth task force to drive the deals. The United States and Kazakhstan should co-chair a cabinet-level task force comprised of the US State Department and US Commerce Department, as well as Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Industry. This task force would set annual, public targets for the number of exploration licenses issued to Western consortia, the amount of pilot separation plants financed and built on Kazakh soil, and the export tonnage of heavy and medium rare-earth elements to non-Chinese markets. The task force could instruct the US International Development Finance Corporation and Export-Import Bank of the United States to prioritize Kazakh rare-earth projects, while Kazakhstan fast-tracks permitting and guarantees site security. Early co-location of processing near the mine head would lock in long-term offtake for US buyers and complement EU infrastructure money already pledged for the Aktau port.
3. Deploy a blended-finance and technology package along the full value chain. Washington should pair loan guarantees with technical assistance from the US Geological Survey, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and the Department of Energy’s Critical Materials Institute. Kazakhstan should match that support by streamlining visas for engineering teams and auctioning new mine blocks on transparent terms. The Pentagon’s National Defense Stockpile could start purchasing Kazakh oxides, while the Department of Energy and Nazarbayev University co-fund recycling research and development to close the loop at home.

To be sure, there are challenges ahead, and mining remains a difficult, uncertain venture. Bringing a greenfield rare-earths mine to commercial output can take more than a decade. But doing nothing cements Beijing’s leverage for that same decade and beyond. By acting now, Washington can buy future resilience and signal to market actors that rare-earths diversification is real.

Miras Zhiyenbayev is the advisor to the chairman of the board for international affairs and initiatives at Maqsut Narikbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan. He is also co-sponsoring the June 4 US-Central Asia Forum at the Atlantic Council.

The post How Kazakhstan can anchor a resilient rare‑earth supply chain for the West appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Daniel Fried: Nawrocki is well placed to encourage Trump to back Ukraine and European security

Aaron Korewa: Poland’s conservative nationalism is pro-American and pro-NATO

Marek Magierowski: Nawrocki’s politics defy hysterical labels

Danuta Hübner: Will the new president overcome Poland’s polarization?

Mark Scott: Social media was rampant in this election. But how much impact it had is unclear.

Nawrocki is well placed to encourage Trump to back Ukraine and European security

Some initial analysis may depict the Polish presidential election as a fight between democracy and autocracy, or between a pro-Trump and pro-European candidate. This seems exaggerated. The real challenge for Nawrocki will be deciding whether to find common ground with the Tusk government in the face of the threat from Russia and the need to work with the Trump administration on behalf of European and Ukrainian security. 

There are substantive grounds for at least some cooperation across partisan lines in Poland to help Ukraine resist Russian aggression and, to this end, to work with key European allies, such as Britain, France, and Germany, as well as with the United States. Unlike the Hungarian nationalist leader Viktor Orbán, Polish nationalists and outgoing President Andrzej Duda generally support Ukraine and resolutely oppose Russian aggression. In early 2022, for example, PiS party leader Jarosław Kaczyński publicly broke with Orbán over the latter’s lack of support for Ukraine at the time. Poland’s current rapid military buildup began during the previous PiS government and continued under the Tusk coalition. Both political camps support NATO and strong relations with the United States. 

The Trump administration backed Nawrocki during the election campaign. However unwise US official partisanship during an election might have been, this will give Nawrocki advantages as a perceived ideological ally making the case in Washington for continued US military presence in Poland and US support for NATO and Ukraine. Nawrocki may face challenges working with the European Union (EU), which is still a source of significant funding for Polish development and is trying to support military buildup in Europe, an objective Poles across the political spectrum tend to support. He will also have to contain the anti-German rhetoric common to much of the Polish nationalist right. Poland has had legitimate complaints about German policy toward Russia. But it has won those arguments, as many Germans themselves recognize; Nawrocki would do well to take the win and work with Germany to counter the Russian threat both countries face. 

Many Poles were supportive of Ukraine in the initial phases of the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022, providing extensive benefits to Ukrainian refugees and taking hundreds of thousands of them into their homes. While the presence of so many Ukrainian refugees has grown less popular over time, Polish support for Ukraine has remained steady. Still, influential Polish constituencies, such as farmers and some groups concerned with the difficult historical issues between Poles and Ukrainians, have been skeptical about the extent of Polish support for Ukraine. During the campaign, Nawrocki declared that he does not currently support Ukraine’s NATO accession. Now, Nawrocki will have to find a way to balance strategic and political imperatives on support for Ukraine. 

As president, Nawrocki will have to balance his campaign rhetoric and partisan interests with broader national interests. He’s hardly the first winning candidate to have to do so. 

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

Poland’s conservative nationalism is pro-American and pro-NATO 

The Poles showed their dissatisfaction with the current government and the political establishment. Nawrocki was an outsider and that paid off. He managed to attract the voters who chose far-right candidates in the first round, while Trzaskowski did not manage to mobilize enough of the voters who supported Tusk’s coalition in October 2023.  

For Europe, this could mean that Poland will become more inwardly focused. At the same time, Tusk has previously signaled that he believes beating populism requires addressing some of the issues that drive it. Expect Poland to take a turn for the right on matters such as migration and the European Green Deal.  

Nawrocki was the only candidate who visited US President Donald Trump in the White House and received his endorsement. In late May, the Conservative Political Action Conference, known as CPAC, also held a rally in the southeastern town of Rzeszów that featured US Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem. Nawrocki’s people made conscious outreach to the US administration. In Poland, the movement that backs Nawrocki is very pro-American and pro-NATO, unlike several other parties in Europe that stand for conservative nationalism. The optimistic scenario is that as president, Nawrocki will establish a connection with Trump that will prevent any plans to withdraw US troops from Poland. At the same time, Tusk’s government will continue forging partnerships with other relevant European states, such as France and the Nordic and Baltic countries.   

—Aaron Korewa is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Warsaw Office which is part of the Europe Center.

Nawrocki’s politics defy hysterical labels 

First and foremost, branding Nawrocki as “populist,” “hard-core Euroskeptic,” “far right,” “pro-Putin,” or “Trumpian” is preposterous. Polish politics is too complex to indulge in such simplistic terms. 

Poland’s president-elect is probably as “pro-Kremlin” as his entire political camp, which, while in power, provided Ukraine with hundreds of tanks, aircraft, howitzers, and communication gear, while pressuring all European partners to ramp up sanctions against Russia. 

Nawrocki is also as “Euroskeptic” as German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, given the attitude of both politicians toward migration policies and EU climate regulations. And he is as “Trumpian” as his Finnish soon-to-be counterpart Alexander Stubb, who charmingly played a spot of golf with the US president a few weeks ago. 

Nawrocki is doubtless a staunch conservative who adroitly capitalized on the nature of wide swaths of the Polish electorate, which, contrary to European trends, has remained—politically, socially, and emotionally—attached to the notion of freedom, sovereignty, tradition, and Christian values. The PiS-backed candidate has also largely banked on the rising unpopularity of Tusk’s government, especially among young voters (Nawrocki won the eighteen-to-twenty-nine-year-old cohort). 

Another major factor in Nawrocki’s win was the aristocratic style and aloofness of his rival, Trzaskowski, who was unable to connect with the working class and Poland’s rural constituency. This stood in contrast to Nawrocki, the former boxer and son of a toolmaker and a bookbinder. 

—Marek Magierowski is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and the director of strategy for the Poland program at the Freedom Institute in Warsaw. He previously served as Poland’s ambassador to the United States and to Israel.

Will the new president overcome Poland’s polarization?

Poles know that their vote can change the course of the history of their country. And they have known from day one of this presidential campaign that this election matters deeply for our future. However, as, sadly, the campaign was about preventing the other side from coming to power, it is an open question whether the president we have just elected will understand what is good for Poles in these times of uncertainty.  

Will our new president spare no effort to overcome the deep polarization of the Polish people? A polarized society is easy to manipulate and an easy target for Russian disinformation. This is the biggest challenge for the new president—understanding the importance of building bridges between Poles. It is an extremely difficult task, especially in times when many political careers have been built for decades on societal divisions. And I worry that this president-elect comes from a political tradition with little propensity to seek compromise. The presidency is an important part of the Polish system of checks and balances, and the new president will need to support the government in building a democratic Poland where everyone can live. 

Poles need a president who will understand that isolation has never done Poland any good, that the European Union is our place, and that it is crucial that Poland takes its share of responsibility for Europe. Will the new president support European efforts to build its defense capabilities and its security-based economic competitiveness? Will he work for peace on our continent?  

In addition, my hope is that the new president will work to keep the United States and Europe together. They need each other.  

—Danuta Hübner is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. She was Poland’s first-ever European commissioner, responsible first for trade, then with regional policy. She also established and oversaw the institutional structure to deliver Poland’s accession to the EU.

Social media was rampant in this election. But what impact did it have?

The narrow victory for Nawrocki in Poland’s presidential election is the latest example of why it’s hard to directly link any country’s electoral outcome with how voters engage with candidates, political operatives, and others across social media. There was a significant amount of hyper-partisan attacks across social media, from both sides, ahead of Sunday’s vote in the Central European country. There was also evidence—including via research from the Atlantic Council—that foreign governments attempted to sway voter outcomes.  

But how successful these efforts were, as well as the ongoing interventions from social media companies to possibly reduce such content’s impact, are almost impossible to quantify. Given the tightly run race, small shifts in voters’ behavior—potentially spurred on by what people may have seen in their online feeds—could have played a role. But, at this stage, that is more a theory than confirmed reality. 

The most recent Polish presidential election joins a growing list of both European and non-European elections in which social media and its impact on how people voted remain a black box. As much as EU policymakers have centered their attention on how the likes of TikTok and YouTube may have amplified anti-EU voices ahead of national elections, there has been a growing offline shift in public opinion across the bloc away from greater EU alignment that has nothing to do with the digital world. 

At best, this weekend’s vote is another example of how, in the middle of 2025, these digital platforms are now part of every country’s election cycle. But social media’s impact on such a closely fought election is mostly unknown. 

—Mark Scott is a senior resident fellow at the Digital Forensic Research Lab’s (DFRLab) Democracy + Tech Initiative within the Atlantic Council Technology Programs.

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The consensus at the Istanbul meeting was clear: The US-Turkey relationship was poised for further improvement. This expectation was based not only on the historically positive relationship between President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and President Trump, but also on their shared approach to foreign policy: pragmatic, transactional, and focused on strategic economic and security interests. Yet, four months later, the transatlantic security landscape has again undergone a dramatic shift.

Trump’s foreign policy signals a shift toward burden sharing among NATO allies, prompting European nations to assume greater defense responsibilities and reconsider US defense partnerships. This shift has forced European leaders to take greater responsibility for their own security needs, significantly increasing pressure on NATO members to boost defense spending to 5 percent of gross domestic product—a level that many European governments had previously resisted. As a result, European defense markets are undergoing a transformation. European countries, once heavily dependent on the United States for defense procurement, are now directing increased defense spending toward their domestic industries rather than US firms. This is evidenced by the decline in US defense stocks and the rise in European defense stocks in recent months.

For US defense firms, this presents both a challenge and an opportunity. If American companies want to remain competitive in the European market, they might be well-served to partner with Turkish firms to access European domestic procurement programs. Turkish defense firms, already well-integrated with NATO supply chains, provide an ideal platform for US companies to keep a foothold in Europe. Turkish manufacturers like Baykar, Aselsan, and Roketsan produce cost-effective, high-quality systems that European nations increasingly need. The Repkon USA partnership is just the first step, and other joint ventures could enable US firms to leverage Turkey’s industrial base while meeting Europe’s demand for non-American suppliers.

Over the past month, European defense stocks have outperformed US defense stocks due to concerns over NATO’s future following Trump’s remarks suggesting the United States might not defend allies that do not meet spending targets. This has driven European nations to accelerate defense investments, with spending projected to rise dramatically. Countries across Europe are prioritizing domestic production to reduce reliance on US suppliers, while Turkey is expanding its defense industrial base and exploring partnerships with US firms. As a result, US defense companies are seeing declines in value amid expectations that European nations will shift procurement away from direct US purchases in favor of European suppliers.

Turkey’s role as an energy hub and regional leader is becoming more critical, serving as a key transit point for resources from Iraq, the Caspian region, and the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe. The expected reopening of the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline (ITP) and the potential expansion of Trans-Caspian energy routes further reinforce Turkey’s strategic importance. In March, Turkey reinforced its regional energy leadership as Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar met with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani to discuss resuming Kurdish oil exports and exporting Basra oil via the Iraq-Turkey pipeline. With the United States revoking Iraq’s waiver to import Iranian electricity, talks also focused on expanding Turkey’s electricity and gas supplies to Iraq. In Erbil, Bayraktar and Kurdistan Region Prime Minister Masrour Barzani agreed to remove barriers to Kurdish oil exports through Turkey’s Ceyhan port. These efforts reflect Turkey’s strategy to deepen regional energy ties and enhance regional energy security. As US firms look to offset margin pressures at home, investment in Turkey’s energy sector will only increase, aligning with Ankara’s ambitions to diversify its energy partnerships and solidify its role as a key transit hub for Europe.

The Trump administration’s focus on reducing inflation by lowering oil prices has also had significant consequences for global energy markets. As expectations for cheaper oil rise, many US producers are hesitant to expand domestic drilling, knowing that lower prices will reduce their profit margins. Instead, US energy firms are seeking new markets abroad, with Turkey, Iraq, and Libya emerging as key investment destinations. Recent deals underscore this trend, including the Continental Resources-TPAO partnership, which will explore and develop unconventional energy resources, and the ExxonMobil-BOTAS liquified natural gas agreement, which expands gas trade between the two countries.

The US-Turkey relationship is evolving in response to shifting transatlantic dynamics in defense and energy. The withdrawal of US financial and intelligence support for Ukraine amid Trump’s ceasefire push, later restored, pushed European nations toward self-reliance, creating both risks and opportunities for American defense firms. To maintain access to European defense markets, US companies will need to adapt by forming strategic partnerships including with Turkish firms. At the same time, the changing energy landscape is driving American energy firms to invest in Turkey and the broader region, ensuring continued economic ties between the two nations. While geopolitical tensions remain, defense and energy cooperation offer a pragmatic path forward for US-Turkey relations in this new era.

Few things are simple in US-Turkish relations, and the current environment presents obstacles as well as opportunities. Tariff effects on transatlantic trade remain uncertain in the first half of 2025, including in the area of defense industrial cooperation, though for now it seems the 10 percent tariff on Turkey may end up being relatively advantageous compared to some markets. The instinct to localize and nationalize industrial production in both the United States and Turkey represents something of a headwind for larger projects. Domestic political unrest in Turkey may also create caution in Washington or hesitance among US firms out of concern over instability impacting Turkish markets or suppliers.

Yet these concerns, while real and significant, do not outweigh the glaring and growing need that prompted formation of the ATBR. Greater US-Turkey engagement is essential for maintaining US strategic influence in NATO, European defense markets, and regional energy security; that engagement also facilitates supply chain resilience and surge capacity for future military contingencies.

Congress would be wise to support deeper defense industrial cooperation, including joint production agreements, to keep US firms competitive in Europe and engaged with Turkey. Strengthening US investment in Turkey’s energy sector would bolster transatlantic energy security and reduce reliance on adversarial suppliers. Additionally, renewed high-level diplomatic and security dialogues would help counterbalance Russian and Chinese influence while ensuring long-term US economic and security interests. A stronger US-Turkey partnership is not just beneficial—it is in many ways a strategic necessity.

Gregory Bloom is a senior advisor at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Turkey Program. He also serves as the chief operating officer of Jones Group International (JGI).

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All of that changed on December 8, 2024, when Bashar al-Assad fled his palace in Damascus en route to a hurried and unexpected asylum in Russia. After a sudden and lightning-fast offensive, a coalition of armed opposition groups toppled Assad’s regime like a house of cards—in the space of ten days. All of a sudden, the international community has been presented with a historic and strategic opportunity to reshape the heart of the Middle East into a more stable, more integrated, and more constructive part of the region.

Syria’s ongoing transition is profoundly fragile. It faces enormous challenges, but it also presents the international community with a dilemma. Since day one, the transition has been led and dominated at the top by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a former affiliate of al-Qaeda that was originally born out of the Islamic State group’s predecessor movement, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). That historical baggage provides reason for pause when it comes to engaging Syria’s interim authorities.

However, the HTS of today is the outcome of nearly a decade of change. After splitting from ISIS in 2013, it went to war with the terror group. It publicly broke ties with al-Qaeda in 2016 and proceeded to facilitate the entry of thousands of soldiers into its territory by NATO member Turkey; agreed to and complied with a yearslong ceasefire brokered by Turkey and Russia; established a technocratic “salvation government” in northwest Syria that delivered a higher level of services than other regions of the country; launched crippling crackdowns on both ISIS and al-Qaeda; and began engaging with the international community behind closed doors. Throughout this formative post-2016 period, HTS’s ideology changed in ways that are arguably unprecedented in the history of the jihadist movement, with it not just turning away from global jihad, but turning against it—while embracing “revolution” and the green flag of Syria’s popular uprising.

Despite HTS and its leader Ahmed al-Sharaa being at the helm in Damascus, much of the international community has rushed to engage—calculating that contact and engagement offers a far greater chance of shaping the outcomes of a fragile transition than a policy of isolation. Initially, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland eased many sanctions linked to Syria’s economy, in the hope of breathing some life back into the country. For its part, the outgoing Biden administration introduced a six-month “general license” in January 2025, temporarily waiving some restrictive measures. But this had no effect in facilitating transactions with governing institutions in Syria.

After years of extraordinary conflict, Syria’s economy is broken and the humanitarian crisis worse than ever. Ninety percent of Syrians live under the poverty line; 70 percent of Syrians rely on aid; 99 percent of the Syrian pound’s value has been lost; 50 percent of the country’s basic infrastructure is destroyed; and fuel supplies have dropped to nearly zero. No matter who was running Syria’s transition, the prospects of successfully escaping such catastrophic conditions would be impossible without sanctions relief. Regional states—Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar, in particular—stand poised to flood Syria with investment, oil, electricity, and cash, but not while American sanctions prohibit them.

Taking advantage of the historic opportunity provided by Assad’s fall requires doing away with short-term tactical approaches and embracing a long-term view focused on Syrian and regional stability. On December 8, transitional authorities in Damascus were restricted only to HTS. Three months later, some things had changed: A national dialogue and conference had been held; broad committees had been formed to frame a constitutional declaration; and a transitional government was formed that significantly widened representation and technocratic rule in Syria’s ministries. The latter marked a significant broadening of government representation, with just four HTS members out of twenty-three ministers. More than half of the new cabinet members were educated and worked professionally in Europe and the United States. All in all, it marked a shift toward genuine, technocratic government.

Nevertheless, some instability continues. Deeply entrenched sociopolitical and sectarian tensions remain a source of acute concern, but a major spike in violence—as was seen on March 7-8, 2025—was short lived. A government-appointed investigative committee has been tasked with determining culpability for crimes. Meanwhile, structural issues relating to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), foreign fighters, and challenges posed by ISIS and an Alawite armed resistance all persist, but ultimately, a fragile transition still offers the best hope for gradual stabilization.

The United States and NATO face two options: to engage and conditionally support Syria’s transition in the hope that it will continue to consolidate control and broaden its representation; or to disengage and isolate the transition in favor or some other alternative. Neither is without risk, but the latter guarantees severe instability while the former aims to avoid it. President Trump’s announcement in Saudi Arabia in May 2025 that he intends to end all sanctions on Syria is a sign that strategic calculations are returning to the forefront of US policymaking on Syria. Subsequent public comments by Secretary of State Marco Rubio in front of Congress underlined that shift, as he suggested that if the United States did not lift sanctions, Syria was destined to collapse back into civil conflict. The key here will be time – how swiftly can executive waivers be issued to de facto remove sanctions restrictions on Syria’s economy? The EU’s decision on May 20 to lift all sanctions would suggest that things are set to move quickly. Should US diplomats return to Damascus, Syria could confidently be placed on a new trajectory of recovery.

Meanwhile, US Central Command (CENTCOM) has continued to play an instrumental role in facilitating negotiations between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Damascus, and in pressing the SDF to accept the framework agreement signed on March 11. Beginning in mid-December 2024, CENTCOM contact has included meetings with Sharaa and an established line of communication with the Defense and Interior ministries, through which counter-ISIS activities are coordinated, deconflicted, and planned. Since January 2024, at least eight ISIS plots have been foiled by the interim government in part due to intelligence provided by the United States. A surge in US drone strikes targeting legacy al-Qaeda operatives in Syria’s northwest in February 2025 was also almost certainly the result of a similar exchange.

With the United States determined to minimize its military and strategic investments in the Middle East and with NATO increasingly distracted by concerns in Europe, the prospect for stabilizing one of the thorniest and most destabilizing conflict theaters in recent history should be a no-brainer. Despite the risks and the many unknowns, prioritizing a strategy on Syria that is focused on shaping a stable and capable central government that is integrated into its neighborhood and capable of collectively resolving its own issues should be the only option on the table. That is the choice already made by Europe and the Middle East and the United States should follow suit. Should the Trump administration decisively join that track of engagement, the chances of Syria charting a course of stability will rise significantly.

Charles Lister is a senior fellow and head of the Syria Initiative at the Middle East Institute. Follow him on X at @Charles_Lister.

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Geopolitical shaping events

Momentous geopolitical events since our winter issue have included the advent of Donald Trump’s second term as US president, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, and the apparent revelation in Europe that conventional military defense is a sovereign responsibility that cannot be outsourced in perpetuity. These events have had significant implications for the security of NATO, Turkey, and the United States.

Trump’s return has had several immediate effects on the United States (and thus the global) security environment. His approach narrows the US global mission from maintaining a liberal world order to pursuing US national interests, while adopting a tone of strategic ambiguity toward both rivals and allies. He has simultaneously directed reform of the US military to reemphasize combat readiness and lethality while minimizing social or ideological programs. As commander in chief, Trump has directed US soldiers to conduct counterterror strikes in places like Somalia and Yemen even as his negotiators seek to defuse conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and elsewhere.

The fall of Bashar al-Assad after an eleven-day rebel offensive reshaped the strategic map of the Middle East. Iran lost a valuable strategic position in its multidimensional “resistance” against Israel and Western influence. Russia lost its sunk investment in Assad and a degree of its influence in the Middle East. Turkey has gained greater stability on its southern border, close defense and intelligence ties with the new Syrian authorities, and prospects for expanded regional trade and a leading role in Syrian reconstruction. The challenges of stabilizing Syria, and tensions between Israel and Turkey stemming from their respective threat perceptions, have no immediate or apparent solution, and will require deft diplomacy to manage.

Shifts that might have attracted more attention in other times were easy to miss, but still noteworthy in terms of global security. China and Russia took steps to bolster the military junta in Myanmar that is teetering on the edge of collapse against a rebel coalition. Battles between the Sudanese army (backed by Egypt, Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia) and the antigovernment Rapid Support Forces (supported by Russia and the United Arab Emirates) have shifted decisively in favor of the army, though not yet presaging an end to the civil war. The war in Ukraine grinds on amid serious attempts by Trump to forge a ceasefire. Early 2025 continues to be an era of persistent conflict and great power competition, but one with dramatic developments that will echo throughout this and future years.

Strategic alliance development

International patterns of alliance and armament over the past half-year have reflected the weight of geopolitical changes noted above. Deep and effective US support to Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression has led to a tighter convergence of what has been referred to as the axis of upheaval, with China, Iran, and North Korea sending weapons, supplies, and even soldiers to aid the Russian war effort. A dozen or more other countries have provided diplomatic support to Moscow, but these three have become critical suppliers of weapons and cash for the Kremlin. This is a trend that began before 2024, but has only accelerated in recent months.

The global arms market continues to shift in other significant ways. The United States in 2024 cemented its leading position in arms exports, accounting for 43 percent of global exports. Russian exports have sharply decreased as domestic production has been consumed by the ongoing war in Ukraine. Italy and Turkey have more than doubled their national shares of global exports over the past several years (2 percent to 4.8 percent for Italy and 0.8 percent to 1.7 percent for Turkey). Five Turkish defense firms rank among the one hundred largest in the world—and a sixth, Baykar, would almost certainly be high on the list if all of its sales data were publicly released. Only the United States, China, Germany, and the United Kingdom match or exceed this number. Of particular note has been the continued rise in demand for Turkish armaments from Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar.  

Europe, for its part, has shown signs of finally getting serious about developing its own conventional military deterrent vis-à-vis Russia—or at least talking about doing so. Shocked by Trump’s heavy-handed conditionality on future aid to Ukraine, Brussels and its member states have drawn up plans for massive new defense spending and other deterrent steps—if taxpayers and military-age youth prove willing. Yet the European Union’s initial formulation of deterrence against Russia independent of Washington and without integrating Turkish geography, military capabilities, and strategic resources does not inspire confidence, especially given the long years needed to restore defense industrial capacity even assuming consistent commitment. European firms and national leaders would do well to welcome Turkish contributions to European defense planning and resourcing both in NATO and in EU planning by following through on plans to sell Ankara Eurofighters and encouraging more collaboration like that between Italy’s Leonardo and Turkey’s Baykar.

While the past half year has demonstrated volatility at the geopolitical and political levels, it has brought multipolarity and diffusion of power at the strategic level. This has played out in the evolution of alliances and the flow of arms and trade more broadly. In mid-2024 dualistic constructs (autocracy versus democracy, the US-led Alliance against an axis of evil) retained some utility. The current environment is messier, with issue-specific coalitions and transactional diplomacy creating a kaleidoscope of rivals, partners, and targets that, for now at least, deny predictable patterns and lead some to question the credibility of the international system’s most potent actor.

Operational trends

As geopolitics and alliances continue to evolve, so, too, does war in operational terms. In a world with ongoing “hot wars” in Ukraine, the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere, several discernible trends can be identified. These include diminishing returns for artillery as seen in Ukraine, failure to achieve military victory through ground maneuver forces for Russia and Israel, and the fragility of lightly armed proxy forces in various theaters.

Russia since 2022 has compensated for shortcomings in its infantry, armor, and air forces through reliance on superior tube and rocket artillery, exacting a heavy toll on Ukrainian defenders in the process. Yet in late 2024, losses among Russian artillery units rose as Ukrainian drone tactics and counterbattery fire became more effective. While Russia still outproduces NATO in artillery ammunition and continues to fire it at prodigious rates, its advantage is decreasing in relative terms.

Russia has continued to advance at high cost to try and consolidate control over the nearly 20 percent of Ukrainian territory it occupies, but has failed to end the war via ground maneuver after three years. The difficulty of ending wars through ground maneuver even against inferior opponents can also be seen in Gaza, where operations which have continued for eighteen months are not yet meeting the stated war goals of military and political leaders. Both the Russian and Israeli campaigns reflect the historical difficulty of reconciling the political nature of conflict termination with the operational conduct of wars, and a resultant tendency for destructive wars to yield stalemate when that task remains incomplete.

The recent period produced impressive operational results in other cases, notably Israel’s campaign against Iran’s regional proxy network and the Sudanese army’s efforts to regain control of the national capital region from the insurgent Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia. In late 2024 Israel crippled Lebanese Hezbollah and struck Iranian-supported militia targets in Syria and Iraq during an audacious campaign involving air strikes, ground maneuver, and exploding cellphones. Between November 2024 and March 2025 the Sudanese Army routed the RSF from Khartoum and other areas in central Sudan. The RSF had been supported by a number of foreign sponsors, including the United Arab Emirates and several other regional countries, but ultimately failed to achieve local or regional legitimacy—as had the Iranian proxy groups in Lebanon and Syria, and arguably in Iraq and Yemen as well. The past several months have badly undermined the notion popular over the past decade that proxy wars can effectively “enable intervention on the cheap.”

Military technical developments on the horizon

Over the past several months sixth-generation fighter aircraft have moved from concept to reality. China flew two prototypes in December 2024, one produced by Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group and the other by AVIC Shenyang Aircraft. US prototypes for a Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) aircraft have been under evaluation since 2020, but in March 2025 the Boeing F-47 was officially selected as the program’s platform. A half-dozen other countries have done some sixth-generation work—integrating advanced stealth, artificial intelligence, manned-unmanned teaming, and other advanced technologies—though even for those with the deepest pockets, fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft will be mainstays for the foreseeable future.

Artificial intelligence is a growing element in military planning and readiness. While the United States and many of its allies have endorsed the Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy, many potential adversaries and rivals have not. Military applications for AI focus at present on information processing, threat identification, and decision-making, areas in which the United States has relative advantage. The Department of Defense’s Defense Innovation Unit is implementing a project, Thunderforge, to deploy such capabilities to headquarters in Asia and Europe. The military services each have designated units to test concepts and systems related to AI in the field. The drive to develop effective defenses against small unmanned aerial systems (UAS) has gained urgency with the continued broad proliferation of cheap, easy-to-use, lethal UAS around the world. The December 2024 Department of Defense adoption of a classified strategy to accelerate counter-UAS development signals the rising criticality of the need for cost-effective and combat-effective counters to the cheap and plentiful threat. This is an area ripe for technical development and fielding in the near future.

Adaptive Alliance

The shifting dynamics at all these levels—geopolitical, strategic, operational, and technical—shape the contours of defense and security challenges for the United States and its NATO allies. These are certainly challenging times, yet the Alliance has endured for over seven decades through other chaotic and difficult periods because the basic value proposition of mutual defense among the members remains sound. Secretary General Mark Rutte strikes the right tone with his assessment that “there is no alternative to NATO” for either the United States or its partners, and that despite frictions related to burden sharing, domestic politics, and sometimes divergent national interest, NATO’s summit in The Hague in late June will show the Alliance evolving rather than dissolving.

Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Turkey with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on X @RichOutzen.

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This interview has been lightly edited for style.

DJ: Thank you for your time in speaking with us. Israel and Turkey have had alternating close and tense relations for decades but maintained discrete contacts throughout the cyclical ups and downs. Are they still talking?

Zakheim: It’s hard to know because if they are talking it’s probably through intelligence channels, which get reported the least. My guess is that they probably are, if only to deconflict over Syria. There was a report commissioned by Prime Minister Netanyahu that said tensions over Syria could create a dangerous situation. Regional press reported a conclusion that the countries “could go to war,” but that’s not what the report said—just that the tensions were potentially quite serious. Turkish hard-right commentators from MHP [Milli Hareket Partisi, the National Movement Party, of Turkish nationalist] and HUDA PAR [Hür Dava Partisi, the Independent Cause Party, of Kurdish Islamist] have pretty much said the same thing; even President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has said similar things. The tensions are worse than what happened after the Mavi Marmara incident in some ways¹. The military and security establishments in both countries tend to be more realists and to seek de-escalation, though; so, they are probably still talking.

DJ: After the very tense period between 2009–2014, President Barack Obama and later Trump worked to ameliorate Turkey-Israel tensions, leading to a rapprochement of sorts. This contributed to a softening of tensions over time. Without US involvement, the two countries pursued a diplomatic reconciliation in 2023 that was interrupted by the Hamas attacks of October 7 and the Israeli response. Do the two countries need the United States as a mediator or are they better off together proceeding at their own pace and modalities?

Zakheim: Trump has offered to mediate between Israel and Turkey so as to improve their relationship. But Washington might be too distracted by the president’s other priorities. President Trump has focused on de-escalating the situation in Gaza, which could indirectly benefit Israel-Turkish tensions stemming in part from the conflict there. In addition, the Trump administration also has Ukraine, tariffs and trade, and a lot of things competing for the attention of the president and his key advisers. It is not surprising that Netanyahu raised Syria with President Trump, because Israelis take a different view of what’s going on there and are concerned about the Turkish role: They are not comfortable with what they see as growth in Turkish influence there. Discontent in Jerusalem can’t be ignored, though it appears that President Trump’s initial response was balanced and that Netanyahu didn’t get the backing for his position that he might have wanted.

DJ: Syria is a unique challenge between Israel and Turkey now because it essentially makes them neighbors—tense and distrustful neighbors—not just countries in the same region. How do both countries meet their minimum interests in Syria?

Zakheim: It shouldn’t be zero-sum between these two, because there are other players in the equation. The Iranians are still present in Syria to a degree, and the Russians of course hope to keep air and naval bases [there]. Israelis are divided as to whether it is good or bad for Russia to stay or go. It appears Netanyahu thinks it may not be a bad thing to use the Russians to balance Turkish influence. Then there is the question of Damascus, the transitional government, itself. Some think they haven’t really evolved from their roots in al-Qaeda, while others say Damascus—especially transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa—have been signaling moderation and reaching out to the West because they know that they need Western support. Where there are many players, a modus vivendi is possible, especially if Sharaa wants to move toward the West more than the Assad regime did. There is great fluidity in Syria now. The Kurdish factor still has to play out as well and the success or degree of their reintegration affects Ankara’s positioning. Abdullah Öcalan may want to disarm the movement he founded, the PKK [Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan, or Kurdish Workers’ Party], but it is possible that parts of the movement in Iraq or Syria do not². With so many possibilities, Jerusalem and Ankara both would do well to show flexibility.

DJ: Is Syria without Assad better for Israel than Syria with Assad?

Zakheim: I think it will very much depend on where the Syrian government goes. We haven’t heard the same sort of vitriol out of Damascus as under Assad, despite Israel taking more territory and conducting air attacks. It may be that the Israel-Syria border becomes a quiet border like it was under Hafez al-Assad as opposed to the more dangerous border that became the norm under Bashar and his backers, Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Bashar was a slimy figure to the Turks as well: He lied to Ankara and was problematic for Israel. It may well be that a government that proceeds the way al-Sharaa says he wants to go could be a plus for both Israel and Turkey.

DJ: How much of the current Turkey-Israel tension do you see as structural or systemic, and how much personal (i.e., a product of the combative Netanyahu-Erdoğan relationship)?

Zakheim: There is no doubt that the personalities don’t line up very well. For comparison, though, we can look at the relationship between Netanyahu and former President Joe Biden—they were not fond of one another, but the two countries remained close. It was Erdoğan who patched things up gradually with Netanyahu over a decade. Erdoğan is a realist, and he knows very well that Israel has a number of things to offer and is an important market. Remember that Turkey is developing a very high-tech military and other industries, and there are many areas where they might partner with Israel. There was over $1 billion in bilateral trade that has now been cut off—though some still comes through third countries. The fact remains that Erdoğan is a pragmatist. If Gaza is somehow settled, that is a way for trade relations to be restored, and these two countries are potentially very important partners for trade and security cooperation.

Overall, despite the ups and downs there is a degree of complementarity. Both leaders are survivors and have pragmatist streaks. Gaza is a place where the United States can clearly play a major role in reconciling interests. If there is reconstruction, Turkish companies, especially in infrastructure, can have a role. A Turkish constructive role in stabilizing Gaza could be a new pivot point. It is true that Erdoğan plays to his base, but both he and Netanyahu remain less vitriolic about “the other” country in the equation than the hardliners in their own coalitions.

Dov S. Zakheim is a member of the Atlantic Council Board of Directors. He was US undersecretary of defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer from 2001-04. He is a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and senior fellow at the CNA Corporation.

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The Atlantic Council in Turkey aims to promote and strengthen transatlantic engagement with the region by providing a high-level forum and pursuing programming to address the most important issues on energy, economics, security, and defense.

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The post Q&A with Dov Zakheim appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Dramatic events altered the geopolitical landscape, affecting Turkey, the United States, and NATO in late 2024 and early 2025. The election of Donald Trump as the forty seventh president of America, a ceasefire in Gaza after months of showdown between Israel and Iran’s Axis of Resistance, and the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria have challenged many assumptions and regional political-military considerations. The fifth issue of the Defense Journal assesses key dynamics as we enter a new era. The Defense Journal team examines the rise of the hyperwar concept via military applications of artificial intelligence and the frontier of development for robotic systems. We also look at trends in key US policy concerns in the region to the south of Turkey, including Israel and Syria. If the first months of the second Trump administration are any indication, rapid change and a high tempo in US foreign policy decisions affecting Washington, Ankara, and their shared interests across several regions is the new normal. The Editorial Team hopes you find these contributions interesting and useful.

Rich Outzen and Can Kasapoglu, Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY Co-managing editors

Honorary advisory board

The Defense Journal by Atlantic Council IN TURKEY‘s honorary advisory board provides vision and direction for the journal. We are honored to have Atlantic Council board directors Gen. Wesley K. Clark, former commander of US European Command; Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky, former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs; Gen. James L. Jones, former national security advisor to the President of the United States; Franklin D. Kramer, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute, former US Ambassador to NATO; and Dov S. Zakheim, former Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer for the Department of Defense.

Gen. Wesley K. Clark

Chairman and CEO of Wesley K. Clark & Associates & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO

Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky, Ph.D.

Senior Fellow at Harvard University JFK Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs; Board Director, Atlantic Council; former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs (2001-2009)

Gen. James L. Jones

President, Jones Group International and Executive Chairman Emeritus, Atlantic Council; former National Security Advisor to the President of the United States

Franklin D. Kramer

Distinguished Fellow & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Assistant Secretary of Defense

Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute

CEO, Cambridge Global Advisors & Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Permanent Representative to NATO

Dov S. Zakheim

Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Senior Fellow, CNA Corporation; Board Director, Atlantic Council; former US Under Secretary of Defense

Explore the journal

The Atlantic Council in Turkey aims to promote and strengthen transatlantic engagement with the region by providing a high-level forum and pursuing programming to address the most important issues on energy, economics, security, and defense.

Learn more

The post Transatlantic relations and a region in flux appeared first on Atlantic Council.

For more than a decade, Syria’s crisis has caused unimaginable suffering inside the country and a constant stream of strategically significant spillover effects across the Middle East and globally. However, this dynamic changed in late 2024, when armed opposition groups in Syria’s northwest launched a sudden and unprecedentedly sophisticated and disciplined offensive, capturing the city of Aleppo and triggering an implosion of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. In the space of ten days, Assad’s rule collapsed like a house of cards, dealing a crippling blow to Iran’s role in Syria and significantly weakening Russia’s influence. 

Now, for the first time in many years, Syria has a chance to recover and reintegrate into the international system. If the United States, Europe, Middle Eastern nations, and other stakeholders embrace the right approach, support the right policies, and encourage Syria’s transition to move in the appropriate direction, the world will benefit—and Syrians will find peace. The work of the Syria Strategy Project (SSP) and the policy recommendations in the report “Reimagining Syria: A roadmap for peace and prosperity beyond Assad” present a realistic and holistic vision for realizing that goal. 

This report is the result of intensive joint efforts by the Atlantic Council, the Middle East Institute (MEI), and the European Institute of Peace (EIP), which have been collaborating since March 2024 on the SSP. At its core, the project has involved a sustained process of engagement with subject-matter experts and policymakers in the United States, Europe, and across the Middle East to develop a realistic and holistic strategic vision for sustainably resolving Syria’s crisis. This process, held almost entirely behind closed doors, incorporated Syrian experts, civil society organizations, and other stakeholders at every step.

Mar 15, 2024

Syria Strategy Project

The Atlantic Council, Middle East Institute, and European Institute of Peace collaborate with subject matter experts and policymakers in the US, Europe, and the Middle East to develop a holistic strategy to sustainably forge a pathway to resolving Syria’s crisis.

Sep 5, 2019

Syria Project

Our work on Syria sheds light on the ongoing struggle of Syrians to fulfill their desire for democratic self-governance as the United States and the international community grapple with the aftermath of a devastating civil war, millions of refugees across the Middle East and Europe, and ongoing security and political challenges spilling over Syria’s borders.

Event Recap Mar 29, 2024

Launching the Syria Strategy Project

By JP Reppeto and Charles Johnson

On March 18, 2024, the Atlantic Council’s Syria Project, the Middle East Institute’s Syria Program, the European Institute of Peace, and Madaniya Civil Society Network launched the Syria Strategy, an intensive process of engagement with subject matter experts and policymakers in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East to develop a holistic strategy to […]

Civil Society Conflict

New Atlanticist May 13, 2025

Experts react: Trump just announced the removal of all US sanctions on Syria. What’s next? 

By Atlantic Council experts

Our experts provide their insights on how the removal of US sanctions on Syria would affect the country and the wider region.

Civil Society Economic Sanctions

New Atlanticist Dec 8, 2024

Experts react: Rebels have toppled the Assad regime. What’s next for Syria, the Middle East, and the world?

By Atlantic Council experts

Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad has been ousted as opposition forces quickly took the Syrian capital. Atlantic Council experts share their insights on the developments.

Conflict Corruption

Through our Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the Atlantic Council works with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region.

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The post The fall of Assad has opened a door. But can Syria seize the moment? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Currently, remittances are not taxed separately, as senders already pay income tax on the earnings they transfer to family and friends abroad. “The One, Big, Beautiful Bill” would upend that system—effectively taxing those transfers twice. But that’s not all. A tax on remittances—valued at $905 billion globally—would not only hit US households and low-income countries, where they can account for more than 30 percent of gross domestic product; it could also undermine key US national security and foreign policy priorities.

If the Senate passes the Republican budget bill, remittance senders and recipients—who already contend with high fees—will undoubtedly be hit the hardest. In 2024, the global average cost of sending two hundred dollars across borders was 6.4 percent. That’s more than double the United Nations’ sustainable development goal of 3 percent and exceeds the Group of Twenty (G20) target of 5 percent.

If overall remittance volumes were to fall, US remittance providers—the companies that enable the sending and receiving of these payments—would be adversely affected. The proposed legislation imposes new responsibilities for these remittance service companies—such as verifying the sender’s citizenship and enforcing new fee structures and reporting mechanisms—all of which impose new costs, compliance burdens, and risks for remittance providers. These additional requirements threaten to reduce operational efficiency and drive up consumer prices, especially as US companies currently dominate the remittance services sector, setting standards for transfer speed, cost, and security. A tax-driven shift in the market would hurt these companies’ profitability and competitiveness, undermining broader US economic interests. 

The risk of driving transactions underground

When it comes to national security, the United States already has a robust framework to monitor and regulate money and payment flows, including laws and infrastructure designed to combat financial crime. Remittance service companies are a central component of this framework, enabling state and federal law enforcement to track and pursue suspicious transfers and bad actors. 

Moreover, research shows that taxing remittances leads to increased use of underground or informal channels for sending money. That is, senders seek out alternatives—less regulated, less transparent, and less safe ways of transferring their money abroad. In fact, countries that have enacted punitive measures on cross-border payments and currency exchange have often undermined their own ability to combat financial crime, thereby weakening their economies and diminishing their foreign influence. 

Argentina serves as a revealing case study. Under previous leadership, the Argentine government imposed foreign exchange and capital controls that drove transactions into underground banking networks, making it far harder to trace illicit activity. These restrictions also weakened the already vulnerable economy, contributing to stagnation and inflation. President Javier Milei is now actively reversing these policies in favor of open and transparent capital flows and foreign currency exchange—reforms that significantly benefit both law enforcement and economic stability.

In the United States, the revenue generated by a federal tax on remittances would likely be less than 0.1 percent of the national budget. At the same time, it would reduce remittance volumes or push them underground, contradicting broader US national security goals and making US companies less competitive by increasing their cost of doing business. Accordingly, policymakers should reconsider the trade-offs and recognize that transparent, reliable remittance services serve the national interest of the United States.

A foreign policy tool hiding in plain sight

With respect to foreign policy and the ability to influence global development, remittances play a vital role—especially in an era of shrinking public-sector aid. Private remittance flows often reach communities and individuals more directly and efficiently than government-to-government assistance. US senders are often family members and friends of recipients, as well as faith-based and other humanitarian organizations. These flows ultimately contribute to stabilizing fragile economies, reducing the financial distress that often drives illegal migration. Additionally, remittances often support democratic activity and institutions in recipient countries, while also helping undermine autocratic governments by empowering citizens with resources independent of state control.

Because they account for one-sixth of all cross-border payments, remittances also reinforce the global dominance of the US dollar. A large portion of remittances is sent in—or exchanged into—US dollars, bolstering the currency’s central position in the international financial system and providing visibility into foreign transactions. This visibility, in turn, allows for the effective enforcement of anti–money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) policies, as well as sanctions enforcement in cases of illicit activity.

Given these strategic benefits, the United States should take concrete steps to better leverage remittances as a national security and foreign policy asset. This begins with adopting smart, forward-looking policies that strengthen remittance channels and maximize their impact.

First, US policymakers should not just protect, but also actively promote legal remittance channels to ensure that these funds can flow safely and efficiently. Rather than imposing restrictive measures such as new taxes, the United States should foster deeper collaboration between law enforcement and well-regulated remittance providers. Such cooperation would support the adoption of rapidly evolving compliance technologies that more effectively detect illicit financial flows.

Second, the United States should reduce the costs and friction associated with remittance transactions. This includes granting well-regulated US remittance providers direct access to national payments systems and modernizing AML and Bank Secrecy Act regulations to reflect the realities of digital transactions. Emerging technologies can improve financial crime detection—provided that regulators offer clear guidance and foster their adoption.

Third, the United States should leverage its presidency of the G20 in 2026 to establish a global working group that captures the complexity of remittances as a tool of foreign policy and national security. The G20 has traditionally provided targets for remittance payments. Additionally, a US-led working group could address the need for better global coordination to curb illicit flows, reduce frictions, and explore how remittances can complement official aid flows, especially in constrained fiscal environments. 

By recognizing and elevating the role of remittances, US policymakers can incorporate a powerful, underused asset into their broader foreign policy strategy—one that supports both domestic prosperity and global stability.

Ananya Kumar is the deputy director for future of money at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

The author thanks Daniel Gorfine for his contributions to this article.

The post A tax on remittances could hurt US households—and national security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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China: There is no cooling off this trade war

European Union: New US tariffs unaffected by the courts could have the biggest bite

United Kingdom: The UK-US deal continues to provide certainty and some unique advantages

Mexico, Canada, and the Americas: While some countries may be in less of a rush, USMCA negotiations will ramp up

India: Its special position means New Delhi should press ahead on a deal

China

European Union

United Kingdom

Mexico, Canada, and the Americas

India

Trump Tariff Tracker

The second Trump administration has embarked on a novel and aggressive tariff policy to address a range of economic and national security concerns. This tracker monitors the evolution of these tariffs and provides expert context on the economic conditions driving their creation—along with their real-world impact.

The post Experts react: How the world is responding to the courtroom drama around Trump’s tariffs appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the coming years, the US-South Korea (Republic of Korea, or ROK) alliance is likely to be tested in at least three fundamental ways: by a concerning growth in North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile weapons program; by changes to ROK defense capabilities and structures, including the establishment of ROK Strategic Command (ROKSTRATCOM); and by potential strategy and policy changes under new US and ROK political administrations.

Though the alliance may rise to the challenges of these tests to emerge stronger, these factors could potentially prevent the United States and the Republic of Korea from leveraging the mutual benefits that come from being integrated into a unified wartime command system and the long-standing ideal of a US-ROK bilateral agreement that emphasizes mutual defense. The United States will need to continue to adapt its approach, account for its ally’s perspectives, and plan for the inevitable change to the status quo on the Korean Peninsula.

A second North Korean enrichment facility heightens security concerns in Seoul

The first test for the alliance is the continuing growth of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Current estimates suggest Pyongyang has enough fissile material to build up to 90 nuclear warheads, which generates compelling security concerns that could create tension among two longtime and staunch allies—the United States and the Republic of Korea. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has placed increasing importance on the regime’s nuclear weapons development in the last decade, portraying nuclear weapons as not only defensive but providing the means to win in conflict. In September 2022, North Korea promulgated a new law that laid out a much broader approach to the use of nuclear weapons, including their employment in various conditions.  

In 2023, Kim updated Article 58 of the state’s constitution to “ensure the country’s right to existence and development, deter war and protect regional and global peace by rapidly developing nuclear weapons to a higher level.” In September 2024, North Korean state media released photos for the first time of a suspected second uranium enrichment facility and Kim called for a higher number of more capable centrifuges to boost his plans to “exponentially” increase nuclear warhead production. Further, 2025 marks the final year for Kim to achieve the military capability development goals laid out in his five-year plan.

North Korea has a nuclear dyad with land- and sea-based nuclear weapons, and it is developing new technologies, including hypersonic gliding flight warheads and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, consistent with Kim’s drive to rapidly develop nuclear weapons and the five-year plan. North Korea’s Strategic Forces have short-range, medium-range, intermediate-range, and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), along with 200 road-mobile launchers. North Korea’s continued development of its rail-based ballistic system shows the regime’s efforts to diversify launch platforms, including various vehicles and ground launch pads and potentially submarines, and increase the survivability of its force. While Kim’s ability to strike the US homeland with North Korean ICBMs only grows with additional testing and the introduction and testing of its solid-fuel ICBM in 2023, the regime is also hard at work improving the efficacy of its precision-guided tactical nuclear weapons, which are designed to significantly damage South Korea and US forces on the peninsula, as well as create response challenges for the alliance.

In addition, North Korea is moving forward on its sea-based deterrent. It has ballistic missiles and what it terms ”strategic” (alluding to long range and nuclear capability) cruise missiles for both developmental, missile-firing submarines and underwater platforms. Its tactical nuclear attack submarine, the Hero Kim Kun Ok, is designed to launch tactical nuclear weapons from underwater. In January 2024, the regime tested its underwater unmanned nuclear weapon system, the Haeil-5-23, as a purported response to the trilateral US-ROK-Japan maritime exercise. In January 2025, the regime tested an underwater-to-surface strategic guided cruise missile while also vowing to respond to the United States with the “toughest counteraction.”

Ultimately, North Korea wants to halt US-ROK joint (and multinational) military exercises and to splinter an alliance of seventy-plus-years between the two nations. Its determined and bellicose approach has the potential to highlight the asymmetry of what’s at stake between the United States and the ROK and, if unchecked, sow fear and doubt into the fabric of the alliance.

Would South Korea go nuclear? A shift in ROK defense architecture

The second test of the alliance follows changes in the ROK’s defense architecture and capabilities, including the advent of the ROK Strategic Command (ROKSTRATCOM), which may increase potential areas for divergence among allies even as the changes show the ROK’s increasing capability and willingness to take greater responsibility for its own defense. ROKSTRATCOM’s establishment may be an opportunity rather than just a challenge and it is perhaps more a response to an increasingly serious threat from North Korea than a shortfall in the US-ROK alliance. It nevertheless highlights that South Koreans may not feel US extended deterrence guarantees are sufficient given the growing North Korean threat.

Plans to establish ROKSTRATCOM were underway for over two years by the time of the command’s official establishment on October 1, 2024, yet many Americans either did not pay attention or believe there was a need for such a command on the Korean Peninsula. After all, the United States, South Korea’s strongest ally, has been with the ROK since the Korean War began in 1950. The two countries also have a long-standing Mutual Defense Treaty, signed shortly after the Korean War Armistice. So, for some observers, South Korea’s need for such a command was questionable. The United States already commits to defending South Korea, most visibly with 28,500 military personnel present on the peninsula and contributing to the Combined Forces Command, US Forces Korea, and the United Nations Command. Regular joint exercises and strategic activities, such as a port visit of the USS Kentucky ballistic missile submarine to Busan, also bolster this presence.

Importantly, though, ROKSTRATCOM does not clearly fall under the combined alliance wartime command construct under a bi-national Combined Forces Command that has been in place since 1978. ROKSTRATCOM is instead an independent ROK-controlled command, currently led by ROK Air Force Lieutenant General Jin Young Seung, and it is still under development exactly how this new command will align and coordinate with CFC and other alliance constructs like the bilateral Military Committee.

Operationally, ROKSTRATCOM resides under the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, serving as an integrator of ROK armed forces’ strategic weapons systems from each military branch. In July 2024, a former ROK minister of defense expressed the administration’s vision of the command:

The strategic command will be a unit that leads the development of nuclear and conventional integrated operational concepts and plans and combat development in new areas such as space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum in conjunction with the operation of the ROK-US Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG).

According to a news report citing the South Korean Ministry of National Defense, the command “would also give the orders to subordinate military assets to strike enemy targets or intercept hostile missiles as part of the Kill Chain strategy and the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation [KMPR] plan.” (See the ministry’s 2022 white paper for more information about the kill chain strategy and the KMPR plan.)

It is more than just command and control that is changing, however. South Korea’s independent strike capabilities are increasing. South Korea unveiled its most powerful conventional weapon, the Hyunmoo-5, referring to it as an “ultra-high-power ballistic missile.” The high-yield Hyunmoo-5 appears to be intended as a ROKSTRATCOM capability, integral to reinforcing ROK messages of an “overwhelming response” to any North Korea nuclear attack. It remains to be seen, however, how the command will contribute these forces to a conflict on the Korean Peninsula—and this calls into question the previously relied upon unified command system.

The establishment of ROKSTRATCOM is a historic event and time will tell if capabilities breed intentions. It appears South Korea is not willing to take the option of having nuclear weapons off the table despite the US nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence commitments. As the ROK continues to grapple with its current and future defense challenges, the United States should take care to be an integral part of this ROK process, thereby ensuring a better understanding of the intentions of allies, enhancing the alliance, and deterring North Korea from strategic attack.

New presidents in Washington and Seoul portend policy changes

The third test involves expected changes by the new Trump administration to US policies and strategies affecting the alliance, along with potential adjustments by the imminent new South Korean administration to its approach toward the alliance and to defense issues more broadly. Coupled with divisive domestic politics in both the United States and South Korea, these developments could potentially open old wounds and create new points of contention within the alliance. As the new US administration begins to set its tone for foreign policy for the rest of its term, many South Koreans seem hopeful, but uncertain. Meanwhile, South Korean media reports and commentaries are examining the implications of rumored US force reductions in Korea and other potential changes to US policy and strategy affecting the alliance as either challenges or opportunities.  

South Korea will soon have its own new president, after the martial law declaration by Yoon and his removal from office resulted in elections set for June 3. A new ROK president may well inject more uncertainty into the state of South Korean affairs, which could affect the alliance, as the country works to self-heal from Yoon’s surprising martial law announcement and the subsequent fallout.

Meanwhile, there are lingering questions about whether South Korea will eventually develop its own nuclear weapons. While many Americans empathize with South Korea’s undesirable position, its creation of ROKSTRATCOM and varied calls by ROK officials for nuclear weapons are concerning for US assurance efforts and, potentially, its nonproliferation policy. Would South Korea really go nuclear? Given the tense nuclear-armed neighborhood that surrounds the small country, and North Korea’s continued refusal to give up its nuclear weapons, many ask, “Why not?” Others, however, argue South Korea “cannot” or would “never” do so because it is a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). However, the NPT has a get-out-of-jail free card in Article X. According to a 2005 Arms Control Today article by the late arms control experts George Bunn and John B. Rhinelander:

Article X of the NPT provides a “right” to withdraw from the treaty if the withdrawing party “decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this [t]reaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.” It also requires that a withdrawing state-party give three months’ notice.

South Korean public discussion of a nuclear latency capability and indigenous nuclear weapons has been growing, with some officials publicly expressing the desire to keep the option open or to actually build nuclear weapons. Most recently, the People Power Party presidential candidate, Kim Moon Soo, announced that, if elected, he would pursue a nuclear latency capability—meaning that South Korea would be much closer to being able to build nuclear weapons on short notice. This indicates South Korea’s unease with relying on the United States as the only nuclear weapons responder to a growing North Korean nuclear arsenal.

Conclusion

These new hurdles—a more capable and threatening nuclear North Korea; a shift in South Korea’s defense architecture, including a unilateral strategic command; and presidential-level political changes—will inevitably strain the alliance, but may also present opportunities. The US-ROK alliance has remained ironclad, with more than seven decades of experience and adaptation, underpinned by a commitment to each other’s mutual defense. Now it is up to both countries to learn from their past while developing new approaches to the changing status quo. No matter who wins the ROK presidential election, the continued strength of the US-ROK alliance matters in the face of threats confronting both the United States and South Korea. Early and in-depth engagement by Washington with the new South Korean president to begin charting a new course for the alliance will ensure the US-ROK alliance emerges even stronger and more equipped to enhance each country’s interests, as well as underpin stability in the region.

Heather Kearney is a nonresident fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She is also a senior Indo-Pacific analyst in the Joint Exercise, Training, and Assessments Directorate at United States Strategic Command. As a senior analyst for risk of strategic deterrence failure, she leads a team dedicated to assessing trends in the environment in order to inform strategic risk assessments.

Amanda Mortwedt Oh is a USSTRATCOM liaison officer in the Office of Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Policy, Strategic Stability, in the Joint Staff J-5 Directorate. She focuses her research on Northeast Asia and strategic deterrence and was most recently a Fall 2024 Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Policy Fellow. She is the previous director of international outreach and development at the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) and has published several articles and reports on North Korea’s prison camps and human rights issues. She is also a lawyer in the US Army Reserve Judge Advocate General’s Corps.

Disclaimer: The views presented in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of US Strategic Command, the US Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US government.

The Tiger Project, an Atlantic Council effort, develops new insights and actionable recommendations for the United States, as well as its allies and partners, to deter and counter aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Explore our collection of work, including expert commentary, multimedia content, and in-depth analysis, on strategic defense and deterrence issues in the region.

Report May 12, 2025

A rising nuclear double-threat in East Asia: Insights from our Guardian Tiger I and II tabletop exercises

By Markus Garlauskas, Lauren D. Gilbert, Kyoko Imai

A decade from now, the United States will face even tougher challenges in the Indo-Pacific than it does today. With this in mind, the Atlantic Council’s Guardian Tiger tabletop exercise series is preparing mid-level government and military leaders to address such threats.

Arms Control China

Report Nov 9, 2023

Deterrence is crumbling in Korea: How we can fix it

By Markus Garlauskas, Lauren D. Gilbert

Conventional wisdom in the United States holds that deterrence in Korea is strong, but this widespread confidence is based on a backward look at long-standing assumptions that are no longer tenable, along with rapidly shifting politico-military conditions. This report explains the urgent actions required to get ahead of these changes and maintain effective deterrence.

China Indo-Pacific

Issue Brief Jan 31, 2024

A US-South Korea alliance strategic memo on deterrence

By Markus Garlauskas, Lauren D. Gilbert

With North Korea’s rapidly advancing military technology, aggressive nuclear policy changes, and deepening ties with the PRC making deterrence on the Korean Peninsula increasingly more complex, this is how the US and South Korea can shore up cooperative deterrence and boost alliance resilience.

China Defense Policy

The Indo-Pacific Security Initiative (IPSI) informs and shapes the strategies, plans, and policies of the United States and its allies and partners to address the most important rising security challenges in the Indo-Pacific, including China’s growing threat to the international order and North Korea’s destabilizing nuclear weapons advancements. IPSI produces innovative analysis, conducts tabletop exercises, hosts public and private convenings, and engages with US, allied, and partner governments, militaries, media, other key private and public-sector stakeholders, and publics.

Learn more

The post New presidents and new nuclear developments test the United States–Republic of Korea alliance appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ahead of this pivotal moment, the United States can act now to support a democratic electoral process in Cameroon and help the country navigate what unfolds after the vote.

Cameroonian President Paul Biya, now ninety-two years old and having held power since 1982, is one of Africa’s longest-ruling leaders. Over the course of his decades in office, elections have been routinely marred by fraud allegations and repression. In the country’s first multiparty elections, held in 1992, Biya clung to power amid accusations of rigging, and opposition leader John Fru Ndi was placed under house arrest during ensuing protests. More recently, in the 2018 election, Biya was declared the winner and credited with 71 percent of the vote, but there were irregularities: Turnout in the conflict-torn Anglophone regions was barely 10 percent. Protests over the result led to mass arrests of opposition supporters. Despite concerns about his age and health, Biya is expected to run again, presenting himself as the guarantor of stability. However, public clamoring for change has grown loud: Catholic bishops have urged Biya to step aside, and even a pro-government newspaper opined that the long-time leader “deserves a rest” in favor of new leadership.

Biya’s ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) and its allies are closing ranks to preserve power. Throughout 2024, several CPDM elites and patronage partners have pressed Biya to seek another term, touting his experience and warning that the country could suffer instability if he steps down. They are again mobilizing a broad coalition of smaller parties to back Biya, as in past elections. Meanwhile, intense behind-the-scenes jockeying is underway over who might succeed the aging president in a post-Biya scenario. Various power brokers have been floated as successors. Talk about one such name, Biya’s son Franck, has raised fears of an undemocratic dynastic transition. The uncertainty around succession is a significant risk factor, a ticking time bomb that could trigger factional infighting if not managed transparently.

The opposition sees 2025 as a rare chance to finally end decades of one-person rule. Over thirty opposition parties have allied to unify behind a single candidate, Maurice Kamto, aiming to overcome Cameroon’s one-round, first-past-the-post system that has historically favored the incumbent. Kamto—a former minister who insists he won the 2018 election—is campaigning on anti-corruption and reform, tapping into public yearning for change. Yet the regime has moved aggressively to undercut this challenge. Early this year, authorities banned two opposition coalitions, calling them “illegal” and “clandestine” associations, driving Kamto’s alliance underground. Legal obstacles are piling up: Election law requires a candidate’s party to hold parliamentary seats, but the Cameroon Renaissance Movement (MRC), Kamto’s party, has none after it encouraged Cameroonians to boycott a flawed 2020 legislative vote. In a brazen step, the CPDM-dominated government postponed the next legislative elections to 2026, denying the opposition any chance to gain seats before the presidential race.

Meanwhile, harassment of those who dissent continues unabated—activists and journalists are detained on spurious charges, peaceful protests are barred, and media outlets critical of the regime are silenced. These tactics cast doubt on whether the 2025 polls will be free or fair, absent significant pressure for a level playing field. Nevertheless, civil society and youth activists have been mobilizing: In 2024, they led mass voter registration drives to encourage turnout, signaling a grassroots appetite for change despite the odds.

The stakes extend beyond who wins. They encompass Cameroon’s stability, economy, and regional security. A flawed election could inflame simmering conflicts and public frustrations. The Anglophone Crisis in the country’s Northwest and Southwest regions has already killed over six thousand people and displaced nearly 700,000 internally, with around 100,000 more fleeing to Nigeria as refugees. Separatist militants reject the upcoming election and have violently enforced boycotts in those regions before, leaving a significant portion of the population disenfranchised.

Elsewhere, a contested outcome or a result marred by repression could spark unrest among a young population increasingly fed up with corruption and lack of opportunity. Ethno-regional tensions might also flare if a perceived power grab fuels resentment among communities who feel excluded. By contrast, a credible election and peaceful outcome would give the next government a mandate to address these crises, from pursuing a political solution to the Anglophone conflict to focusing the military on the Boko Haram insurgency in the Far North region. Cameroon is richly endowed with oil, timber, and fertile land, but its economic potential has been blunted by graft and mismanagement. Decades of kleptocratic governance have left over half the population impoverished. Another seven years of business-as-usual would likely deepen economic malaise and alienation, whereas a new commitment among leadership to reform could attract investment and better harness Cameroon’s resources for development.

International actors are watching closely, as Cameroon’s trajectory will impact Central African stability. France—Cameroon’s former colonial ruler—has backed Biya in the past, though French officials now avoid openly taking sides. The United States and European Union (EU) regularly urge fair elections and respect for human rights (the United States, for example, cut some military aid due to abuses in Anglophone regions). Still, their security cooperation interests temper Western leverage.

Meanwhile, other external players are exploiting the situation: Russian-linked media in Cameroon spread anti-Western narratives to bolster Biya’s regime. Regional governments, many led by entrenched leaders, generally prefer Biya to stay in power and are unlikely to press for change, prioritizing stability over democracy.

Ultimately, Cameroon’s future will be decided at home. A genuinely free and fair election would bolster Cameroon’s international standing and unlock greater foreign support, whereas a blatantly rigged vote may isolate the regime and sow internal turmoil.

Cameroon’s vote is about more than the country’s democratic future: As one analysis noted, it is part of a broader test of whether Africa’s elections will uphold democratic norms or contribute to a slide backward. Here is how the United States can help support democracy in Cameroon during this pivotal election year:

• Use diplomacy to promote a free and fair election: The United States should convince Cameroonian leaders, both publicly and privately, to uphold democratic norms in the 2025 vote. Diplomatic engagement should emphasize that opposition candidates must be allowed to compete freely, international observers should be admitted, and security forces must refrain from violence. Coordinating these messages with allies (France, the EU, and the African Union) will increase impact and help deter electoral misconduct.
• Leverage aid and security ties: Washington should tie aspects of its assistance to Cameroon’s electoral conduct and respect for human rights. The prospect of continued military aid and business engagement can be made conditional on the regime permitting a transparent election and avoiding crackdowns. Conversely, a blatantly fraudulent or violent process should prompt targeted consequences (such as visa bans or aid suspensions). By calibrating incentives and penalties, the United States can encourage accountability without undermining vital counterterrorism cooperation.
• Support election monitoring and civic engagement: To reduce the risk of fraud or unrest, the United States should back robust election-observation and civil-society initiatives. This includes supporting credible international and domestic observers and assisting local groups in voter education and parallel vote tabulation. Such efforts—coordinated with other partners—will bolster public confidence in the process, deter manipulation, and empower Cameroonians to defend their votes peacefully.
• Plan for post-election stability and reforms: The United States should prepare to help Cameroon navigate the vote’s aftermath. If the election results are disputed or violence looms, Washington (with African partners and United Nations agencies) can offer to facilitate dialogue or mediation to prevent escalation. In any outcome, the United States should encourage the winning candidate to pursue inclusive reforms—for example, an inclusive national dialogue to address the Anglophone Crisis and to introduce tangible anticorruption measures. Targeted US support (diplomatic partnership, technical aid, and peacebuilding programs) can be leveraged to help achieve these steps, reinforcing that long-term US partnership will deepen if Cameroon advances stability, inclusivity, and good governance.

Jude Mutah is a policy expert and practitioner in democracy support, peacebuilding, and governance, with over a decade of experience across Africa. He holds a Doctorate in Public Administration from the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Baltimore.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The post How the United States can support Cameroon as it faces its next democratic test appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Members of the UN Commission determined that Russia was engaged in the deliberate targeting of civilians and concluded that the drone attacks were “widespread, systematic, and conducted as part of a coordinated state policy.” The report detailed how civilians were targeted “in various circumstances, mainly when they were outdoors, both on foot or while using any type of vehicles,” and noted that on a number of occasions ambulances had been struck by drones in an apparent bid to prevent them from reaching victims and providing vital medical assistance.

During the ten-month period covered by the United Nations probe, Russian drones killed almost 150 Ukrainian civilians in and around Kherson, while leaving hundreds more injured. The constant threat of attack has created a pervasive climate of fear throughout the region, with people afraid to leave their homes. Terrified locals say they feel hunted and refer to the drone attacks as a “human safari.”

In addition to daily drone strikes, Russia has sought to maximize the psychological pressure on residents of the Kherson region via social media channels. UN investigators reported that video footage of drone attacks on Ukrainian civilians is regularly disseminated on Russian Telegram channels, some of which have thousands of subscribers. This video footage shows drone strikes along with the resulting deaths and destruction in the style of video games, often accompanied by background music. Meanwhile, menacing messages posted on Telegram call on Ukrainians to flee the region. “Get out of the city before the leaves fall, you who are destined to die,” read one message quoted in the UN report.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

This is not the first time UN investigators have accused Russia of committing crimes against humanity in Ukraine. A March 2025 UN report reached a similar conclusion regarding the Kremlin’s large-scale program of detentions and deportations targeting Ukrainians living under Russian occupation. “The evidence gathered led the Commission to conclude that the enforced disappearances against civilians were perpetrated pursuant to a coordinated state policy and amount to crimes against humanity,” the report stated.

Meanwhile, the International Criminal Court in The Hague has issued a number of arrest warrants for senior Russian officials in relation to alleged war crimes committed in Ukraine including the targeted bombing of civilians and critical civilian infrastructure. The most high-profile ICC arrest warrant is for Vladimir Putin himself, who is wanted for his alleged involvement in the mass abduction of Ukrainian children.

At least 20,000 Ukrainian children are believed to have been kidnapped since the start of the full-scale invasion and taken to Russia, where they are subjected to indoctrination to rob them of their Ukrainian heritage and impose a Russian national identity. The nature and scale of these mass abductions may qualify as an act of genocide according to the 1948 United Nations Genocide Convention.

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Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

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Russia’s deadly “human safari” drone campaign against the civilian population in southern Ukraine’s Kherson region is part of the Kremlin’s strategy to make the area unlivable. The city of Kherson was occupied by the advancing Russian army during the first days of the full-scale invasion and was officially annexed by Russia in September 2022. However, Kherson and the surrounding area were liberated by the Ukrainian military soon after. The scenes of joy that accompanied the liberation of Kherson were deeply humiliating for Putin, who had personally proclaimed the city to be “forever” Russian just weeks earlier.

This setback forced Putin’s invading army to retreat across the Dnipro River, creating a major physical obstacle for the Russian invasion and limiting the occupied zone of Ukraine to the eastern half of the country. Nevertheless, Moscow continues to insist that Kherson and the surrounding region are now part of the Russian Federation and must be handed over within the framework of a future peace deal.

Ukraine has completely ruled out any such concessions. This is hardly surprising. While some temporary territorial compromises may prove possible during peace negotiations, Ukraine’s stance on Kherson is unlikely to change. After all, allowing the renewed Russian occupation of Kherson would be suicidal for Kyiv. It would present Russia with a priceless foothold across the Dnipro River that could be used as a gateway to seize Ukraine’s Black Sea ports and complete the conquest of the country.

For now, Russia appears to have little chance of seizing Kherson militarily or of acquiring the city at the negotiating table. Instead, Moscow seems to be intent on terrorizing local residents and forcing them to flee. Putin claims that the population of the Kherson region are Russians, but he has no qualms about his soldiers using drones to hunt and kill them mercilessly. This tells you all you need to know about Putin’s cynical posturing as the protector of the Russian people in Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 8, 2025

Russia’s coming summer offensive could be deadliest of the entire war

By Mykola Bielieskov

As the US-led peace initiative continues to falter, the unfolding summer campaigning season in Ukraine promises to be among the bloodiest of the entire war, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict European Union

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Russia’s ongoing campaign to destroy Ukraine as a state and as a nation is taking place in front of the watching world and makes a complete mockery of US-led efforts to broker some kind of compromise peace, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert May 29, 2025

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By David Kirichenko

Russia’s emphasis on fiber optic drones is giving it a battlefield edge over Ukraine and may help Putin achieve a long hoped for breakthrough in his coming summer offensive, writes David Kirichenko.

Conflict Defense Industry

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

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The post UN probe: Russia’s ‘human safari’ in Ukraine is a crime against humanity appeared first on Atlantic Council.

To illuminate what this all means, we reached out to Shalom Lipner, a former adviser to seven consecutive Israeli prime ministers, including Netanyahu, to get a sense of how the Israeli political landscape has shifted after more than six hundred days of war.

1. What is the state of play in Israeli politics right now? 

The Israeli public square is a bubbling cauldron, with multiple challenges—foreign and domestic—negatively impacting the prospects of Netanyahu’s majority. His government has demonstrated remarkable resilience over these past twenty months of multifront warfare, rebounding relatively quickly after October 7, 2023, to put Israel’s enemies (including Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon) on the defensive. However, the pressing need to make strategic decisions is exposing fissures that now threaten the stability of Netanyahu’s governing coalition.

Netanyahu’s next moves on Gaza and Iran—two theaters of operation where he appears increasingly misaligned with the Trump administration—could exacerbate those pressures, compelling him to choose between the support of the United States and that of his key coalition partners. More immediately, a potential revolt within the ranks of his government, whose ultra-Orthodox members have issued an ultimatum that they will bolt unless their demands for a military draft exemption are met next week, could create a cascade that triggers early elections. Adding to this volatility, Netanyahu’s cross-examination by the prosecution in his corruption trials will begin next week.

2. How do current divisions compare with pre-October 7 divisions in Israeli politics? 

The horrors of October 7 had a chilling effect on the Israeli population, instantly sidelining the disputes—most prominent among them, issues relating to plans for an overhaul of the judiciary—that had paralyzed the country, with precedence shifting to the critical functions of national defense and rehabilitation. Israelis mobilized to meet those tasks, with civil society often filling vacuums in service left by a crippled bureaucracy.  

With the passage of time, however, as many crises have since been downgraded or become routine, a “new normal” has created space for pre-October 7 divisions to resurge with a vengeance. This has been most evident in the resumption of divisive government initiatives to circumscribe the mandate of the courts and to assert absolute control over senior appointments. After more than eighteen months of combat, many in Israel believe that when Israelis do ultimately return to the polls, a fault line will be apparent. On one side will be those who have contributed tangibly to the war effort, with many spending hundreds of days on Israel Defense Force reserve duty. On the other side will be those who have evaded such responsibilities.

3. What does this mean for Netanyahu’s government? 

In this state of affairs, an embattled Netanyahu is maneuvering to keep his coalition afloat, requiring him to keep its various components satisfied—notwithstanding assessments that most of them have no viable alternative to his leadership. To that end, the prime minister has rejected all solutions for Gaza that would enable Hamas to remain in the territory and, in the interim, to have a hand in administering the distribution of humanitarian aid. Netanyahu’s support for a lenient conscription bill fits into this category as well.  

The success of his juggling act is far from guaranteed, however. His government has faced growing pushback from the international community—including, but not limited to, arrest warrants by the International Criminal Court; consideration of targeted sanctions by the United Kingdom, France, and Canada; and a review of the European Union’s association agreement with Israel. This has compounded the stakes of his gambit, possibly exacting an untenable cost for Israel that could encourage a shift in course.

4. What does this mean for US-Israel relations? 

Mounting criticism from many of Israel’s traditional friends has only heightened its reliance on Washington. Not only does the United States continue to provide the overwhelming bulk of diplomatic and military assistance afforded to Israel, but Trump administration officials are also playing the lead role in ongoing mediation with Israel’s adversaries. Reportedly, however, Netanyahu has been flustered by a series of events that suggest that Trump’s objectives could actually imperil Israel’s situation.

Emerging details of negotiations that Steve Witkoff, the Trump’s Middle East envoy, has been conducting with Hamas and Iran have been a cause of concern in Jerusalem. Similar consternation was manifest when an end to US hostilities with the Houthis exempted Israel, and when the United States extended its embrace to the new Syrian regime. Netanyahu has repeatedly dispatched messengers to present Israel’s case before administration principals, but the differences between their approaches are unmistakable and could spark a wider breach in the bilateral relationship at an extremely precarious juncture.

5. How might this impact what comes next in the war? 

The United States holds most of the cards in this scenario, as well as the agency to deploy them. If Witkoff produces a deal with Hamas that meets Trump’s minimum expectations, Netanyahu will have little choice but to overcome his reservations and accept its terms—and hope that he can persuade enough of his coalition to do likewise. The other, more dangerous option would be to risk running afoul of the White House and being subjected to a similar Oval Office reception as the presidents of Ukraine and South Africa, something which would broadcast Israel’s new vulnerability to the world.

Netanyahu is walking on even more fragile eggshells regarding Iran. Trump has stated that it “would be inappropriate” for Israel to attack Iran “right now because we’re very close to a solution.” The possibility of just such a strike—especially if Israel were to determine that Iran’s path to a nuclear weapon was imminent and unimpeded—cannot be ruled out unequivocally. In that event, however, and in its aftermath, a rupture with Trump could have disastrous consequences for Israel.

Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow for Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. From 1990 to 2016, he served seven consecutive premiers at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem.

The post Five questions (and expert answers) on the state of the Netanyahu government appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the October 2023 parliamentary elections, current Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s center-right Civic Coalition (KO) ended eight years of rule by the national-conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party and formed a broad government consisting of centrists, liberals, socialists, and greens.

However, Tusk does not command a three-fifths majority in the Sejm (the lower house of parliament), which is needed to override any potential presidential veto. President Andrzej Duda, formally from PiS, has delayed or blocked many of the prime minister’s domestic legislative reforms. But now, Duda’s two terms are up.

Two candidates will face off in a final round: Rafał Trzaskowski, the mayor of Warsaw from KO, and Karol Nawrocki, head of the Institute for National Remembrance, who is tied to PiS.

Ahead of the second round, Aaron Korewa, director of the Atlantic Council’s Warsaw Office, breaks down the race and the potential impacts on Poland’s foreign policy.

How has the race unfolded so far?

The Poles voted in the first round on May 18. Trzaskowski, who was long considered the clear favorite, only managed to get slightly ahead of Nawrocki, securing 31.4 percent against Nawrocki’s 29.5 percent. To complicate things for Trzaskowski, the two next places were taken by Sławomir Mentzen of the far-right Confederation party (14.8 percent) and the very far-right Grzegorz Braun (6.3 percent). Mentzen has expressed skepticism towards both the European Union (EU) and aid for Ukraine, whereas Braun openly takes pro-Kremlin and anti-Semitic positions. As no candidate reached over 50 percent, the race proceeded to a second round. Those who voted for Mentzen and Braun are generally believed to be more likely to vote for Nawrocki than Trzaskowski in the second round.

Voter turnout was high by Polish standards: 67.3 percent. Young voters mainly went for Mentzen or Adrian Zandberg, from the leftist Razem party. Poland, like the rest of the Western world, is seeing backlash against established parties and elites. PiS has for a long time been able to capitalize on such sentiments, but less so now that it held power recently and (technically) still holds the Presidential Palace.

In the initial stages of the campaign, foreign policy was rarely discussed. This is because unlike in most European countries, the two main rivals—KO and PiS—in many ways share the same positions on strong support for NATO and transatlantic ties; they also both oppose Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Poland became a leading champion of Ukraine’s cause under the PiS government led by former Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki. Since Tusk took over in 2023, this has largely continued. On the other hand, within Polish society, the initial outpouring of support for Ukraine and its people seen in 2022 has soured somewhat. That is mainly due to fatigue with the large number of refugees but also resentment that Ukraine has not moved fast enough to address historical issues such as the infamous Volhynia massacre of Polish civilians by Ukrainian nationalist partisan forces during World War II. The Confederation and the parties to its right seem to have been able to capitalize on this, which prompted Nawrocki to use anti-Ukraine rhetoric himself in the final stages of the first round.

US President Donald Trump did not become a central issue in the Polish election. This is likely because nearly all parties recognize the role strong transatlantic ties play for Poland’s national security—approximately ten thousand US troops are currently stationed in Poland. Nawrocki was the only candidate who traveled to Washington to meet Trump, and he claims to have received the US president’s endorsement, but this occurred around early May holidays in Poland when voters tend to tune out news. Thus, the effect on the result of the first round was probably limited.

How do the first-round outcomes set the stage for the second round?

In recent polls, Trzaskowski and Nawrocki are neck and neck. Despite the combined vote for the right being around 52 percent, there’s no guarantee that those who voted for Mentzen and Braun will automatically support Nawrocki. PiS has traditionally received support from elderly, religious, and rural voters. PiS is clearly on the right when it comes to social issues but also proposes government support programs for the poor and disadvantaged. The Confederation, on the other hand, is economically libertarian and has young, well-off men as their base. Braun’s electorate is largely made up of ultra-Catholics, but they may also stay at home if their candidate is not on the ballot.

Polls also show that many voters who supported the parties in Tusk’s coalition in the October 2023 parliamentary election skipped the first round in this presidential election, which is likely due to dissatisfaction with the government. In recent days, Trzaskowski has been successful in reaching out to other members of the Tusk coalition. On Sunday, he held a march in Warsaw that saw about 140,000 participants and several speeches by former presidential candidates from the left and liberal side. Nawrocki held a march in Warsaw the same day, but his was smaller and only featured speakers from PiS. Last Friday, Trzaskowski and Nawrocki faced off in a final debate, where Trzaskowski strived to expose Nawrocki’s lack of experience. Finally, each of the candidates appeared on Mentzen’s YouTube channel, where they were asked to sign an eight-point pledge to satisfy the demands of Mentzen’s voters. Nawrocki agreed to all the points, including one saying that he would not sign the law ratifying Ukraine’s accession to NATO. Trzaskowski disagreed on that and on other points, but did not attack Mentzen or his voters in doing so.

In the final stages of the campaign, Trzaskowski’s card is that he’s likely seen as more “presidential.” But he’s also closely tied to Tusk as the deputy head of KO, and if the final round becomes a referendum on the government, Trzaskowski would be in trouble. Yet a high voter turnout would likely favor him. From his messaging, Trzaskowski also seems to have picked up on the fact that voters list healthcare and secure borders as the most important issues.

Nawrocki has the “man of the people” image down and can ride on the current right-wing “wave,” but he is inexperienced and comes off as somewhat unnatural in front of cameras. He is a historian and a former boxer, but it recently surfaced that he also engaged in soccer hooliganism in the past, once a major problem in Poland. Nawrocki has recently played up that he would have a better relationship with Trump if elected. At the Conservative Political Action Conference in Poland this week, US Department of Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem echoed this theme.

How will the outcome impact Poland’s foreign policy?

Whereas KO and PiS generally agree on NATO, transatlantic ties, and Russia, they sharply differ on the EU. KO is strongly pro-EU; before returning as prime minister, Tusk served as president of the European Council. Trzaskowski was a member of the European Parliament and a deputy foreign affairs minister responsible for EU affairs. PiS is not against Polish EU membership but is clearly Euroskeptic and pays lip service to muscular Polish nationalism that sees Brussels and Berlin (often intertwined) as threats to Polish sovereignty. A Trzaskowski win could play a part in Poland rising to a prominent position in the EU. A win for Nawrocki could disrupt it.

As for relations with the United States, Nawrocki has established a channel to Trump and is ideologically more in line with the “MAGA” wing of the Republican Party. But Trzaskowski has lived in the United States and has also established contacts with US politicians from across the aisle. He has made several appearances on US media outlets, most recently FOX Business.

Under Trzaskowski, Polish support for Ukraine will certainly continue. But it’s harder to say what will happen should Nawrocki win. PiS is not pro-Russia by any means, but Nawrocki has already used some anti-Ukraine rhetoric in his bid to attract the voters of Mentzen and Braun. In this scenario, expect no Polish blocking of Western aid to Ukraine but probably no leadership in expanding such aid either.

For foreign policy in general, Trzaskowski may bring domestic stability and an end to the political logjam of the past two years. A win for Nawrocki could mean more gridlock, forcing the Polish government to focus inward. There are even rumors that in this scenario, some of Tusk’s coalition partners may jump ship, prompting a new cycle of elections.

—Aaron Korewa is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Warsaw Office, which is part of the Europe Center.

Online Event Thu, June 5, 2025 • 9:00 am ET

Warsaw Week 2025

At this year’s Warsaw Week—the Europe Center’s annual flagship conference—experts and officials gather in Poland to highlight the importance of relations between the United States and Europe.

Central Europe Eastern Europe Europe & Eurasia NATO

New Atlanticist Mar 14, 2025

Why Poland’s president wants US nuclear weapons

By Marek Magierowski

President Andrzej Duda said this week that US nuclear weapons should be deployed in his country. To understand why, look at not just Poland’s security but also its politics.

Central Europe Nuclear Deterrence

New Atlanticist Jan 6, 2025

What to expect from Poland’s EU presidency and its focus on ‘Security, Europe!’

By Aaron Korewa

Poland sought a leadership role in Europe, and now it has one as it takes up the six-month presidency of the Council of the European Union.

European Union Poland

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#AtlanticDebrief – What is Poland’s future foreign policy vision? | A debrief from Rafał Trzaskowski

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The post Your primer on the Polish presidential election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ukraine is currently fighting for national survival against Russia’s ongoing invasion. Once this battle is won, the most important challenge facing the country will be judicial reform. If Ukraine is to emerge in the postwar years as a stable and prosperous European democracy, the process of recovery and renewal must be based on the firm foundations of a strong justice system. This is not a mere slogan; it is an absolute necessity.

Judicial reform is the key to the country’s entire future economic development. Investors will not come to Ukraine if contracts cannot be enforced or if property rights can be bought and sold through corruption. That is the message Ukraine’s international partners have been repeating consistently for many years. With the massive task of postwar rebuilding looming on the horizon, this message is now arguably truer than ever.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Once the war ends, Ukraine can expect to receive unprecedented international support as foreign governments seek to participate in what promises to be Europe’s largest reconstruction initiative since the years following World War II. While donor funding from partner countries is likely to be very significant, this will not be nearly enough to cover the estimated rebuilding price tag of around half a trillion US dollars. Instead, much of this money must come from the private sector. However, unless Ukraine has a transparent, reliable, and efficient justice system, private capital will stay away.

If Ukraine hopes to become a success story, it needs courts that can settle disputes fairly, whatever the issue. If legal cases are tainted by bias or drag on for years, this will serve as a major red flag to all potential investors. For this reason, Ukraine’s courts should be recognized as a key element of the country’s infrastructure that is every bit as vital to national recovery as roads or power lines. After all, the justice system serves as the legal framework that makes it possible to build everything else.

Eurasia Center events

Online Event Tue, June 17, 2025 • 1:00 pm ET

Drones, defense, and diplomacy: Negotiations and the battlefield in Ukraine

Conflict Defense Technologies Europe & Eurasia Politics & Diplomacy

Despite the ongoing war, Ukraine has made real progress in recent years toward meaningful judicial reform. This has included the reform of key institutions like the High Court of Justice, along with the launch of new processes to improve the selection of Constitutional Court judges. It is now crucial to build on this momentum.

Judicial reform must be deep, deliberate, and closely tied to Ukraine’s European future. With this in mind, it is important to maintain the current dialogue with the Venice Commission and use its recommendations to shape genuine change. One of the most effective tools to help achieve this change is the participation of international experts. Their role is not to control the process, but rather to help ensure fairness, transparency, and accountability.

As Ukraine looks to create the conditions for national reconstruction, one judicial reform initiative currently being backed by the Ukrainian parliament is the creation of specialized courts to handle issues like land rights and construction disputes. These courts could help speed up vital cases and take pressure off the existing judicial system.

Work is also continuing toward greater digitalization within the justice system, from electronic courts to online case tracking. Much more can be done in this direction. Other tech savvy countries such as Estonia and Singapore are currently leading the way in digital justice. Ukraine can build something just as bold using tools like blockchain and AI. The expanded use of technology can improve the efficiency of Ukraine’s courts, while also boosting trust levels and leading to greater transparency.

Creating a fully functioning and internationally credible justice system is the necessary starting point for everything else Ukrainians want to achieve, from economic strength and prosperity to the rule of law and a greater sense of national security. It can encourage investors to bet on Ukraine, and can help persuade Ukrainians currently living abroad to return home. Ultimately, judicial reform can serve as a national anchor confirming Ukraine’s place in the heart of Europe.

Amid the horror and the trauma of Russia’s ongoing invasion, Ukrainians now have a once-in-a-generation opportunity to achieve transformational change in the country’s justice system. We must not miss this chance.

Oleksandr Vasiuk is a member of the Ukrainian parliament for the Servant of the People party and head of the Ukraine-USA Strategic Partnership cross-party association.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 8, 2025

Russia’s coming summer offensive could be deadliest of the entire war

By Mykola Bielieskov

As the US-led peace initiative continues to falter, the unfolding summer campaigning season in Ukraine promises to be among the bloodiest of the entire war, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

Conflict European Union

UkraineAlert May 21, 2025

Putin aims to destroy Ukraine and has zero interest in a compromise peace

By Peter Dickinson

Russia’s ongoing campaign to destroy Ukraine as a state and as a nation is taking place in front of the watching world and makes a complete mockery of US-led efforts to broker some kind of compromise peace, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Disinformation

UkraineAlert May 13, 2025

Drone superpower: Ukrainian wartime innovation offers lessons for NATO

By David Kirichenko

Today’s Ukraine is now a drone superpower with an innovative domestic defense industry that can provide its NATO allies with important lessons in the realities of twenty-first century warfare, writes David Kirichenko.

Conflict Defense Industry

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Read more from UkraineAlert

UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in promoting stability, democratic values and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and Turkey in the West to the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia in the East.

Learn more

The post Judicial reform must be at the heart of Ukraine’s postwar recovery appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On May 29, Andrew Michta, senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative, was published in 19FortyFive on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ambition to restore “Russia’s imperial dominion.” He argues the Trump administration has failed to bring an end to the war in Ukraine because it does not fully grasp Putin’s worldview and warns that diminishing support for Ukraine and NATO would hand him a strategic victory. Michta’s piece was featured in RealClearDefense and featured in RealClearWorld.    

Staff

Andrew A. Michta

Senior Fellow, GeoStrategy Initiative

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

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The post Michta in 19FortyFive, RealClearDefense, and RealClearWorld on Putin’s strategic objectives in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As global dynamics evolve, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are becoming increasingly important partners for the member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The region offers valuable assets, policy alignment in key areas, and opportunities for enhanced collaboration on shared challenges. 

This report outlines how deeper OECD–LAC engagement can contribute to mutual prosperity, resilience, and global stability.

The region’s assets support global economic security

LAC countries contribute significantly to global food and energy security, climate action, and economic resilience. The region plays an important role in clean energy development, particularly through renewable energy and emerging green hydrogen projects. It is a major global supplier of critical minerals—such as lithium, copper, and nickel—essential for the clean energy transition. LAC’s agricultural output is also vital to meeting increasing global food demand. Furthermore, its rich biodiversity and freshwater resources are essential to addressing long-term environmental and climate-related challenges.

Latin America and the Caribbean are home to a high concentration of electoral democracies and market-oriented economies, which share many of the values and institutional frameworks upheld by OECD countries. These shared principles form the basis for long-term partnership. In multilateral forums, LAC countries have acted as constructive and pragmatic voices, helping to bridge perspectives between developed and developing countries.

However, as the region continues to navigate growing interest from global powers, particularly through increased trade and investment from China, there is a clear call for OECD countries to reaffirm and deepen their engagement.

Key recommendations:

• Build resilient and responsible critical mineral supply chains by formalizing an OECD–LAC Critical Minerals Partnership that promotes investment, technology transfer, Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) standards, and infrastructure development to support sustainable mining and industrial upgrading across the region.
• Enhance global food security through targeted cooperation in agritech innovation, rural infrastructure, and trade logistics. Strategic investment in transport corridors, cold chains, and climate-smart agriculture can boost productivity and resilience in LAC’s agricultural sector, benefitting global markets.
• Strengthen global value-chain resilience by leveraging LAC’s trade agreements and geographic proximity to OECD markets. A dedicated OECD–LAC Value Chain Initiative could identify areas of comparative advantage, streamline regulations, and support industrial diversification in key sectors.

Issue Brief Dec 12, 2023

Galvanizing Spain’s presidency for the next chapter

By Ignacia Ulloa Peters, Diego Area, Felipe Félix Méndez

Spain’s presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2023 was a unique opportunity to deepen partnerships between the Euro-Americas. Through shared values, common interests, and complementary capabilities, the EU, US, and LAC have the potential to advance lasting solutions to the most pressing challenges facing these regions and the world.

Economy & Business Energy & Environment

New Atlanticist Sep 8, 2024

Argentina’s foreign minister: Why my country wants to join the OECD

By Diana Mondino

In seeking to join the OECD, Argentina is on a path to economic reforms and reputational benefits that can restore investor confidence in the country, writes Argentina’s minister of foreign affairs.

Americas Economy & Business

New Atlanticist Nov 19, 2024

How Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina approached this year’s G20

By Ignacio Albe

Disparate national priorities among Latin America’s three G20 members threaten to stand in the way of a common agenda.

Brazil Climate Change & Climate Action

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

Learn more

The post Why Latin America and the Caribbean matter for OECD countries appeared first on Atlantic Council.

It depends on your definition of “emergency.” Donald Trump, in his self-declared “liberation day” on April 2, didn’t just impose tariffs on virtually the entire world. He did it by using a novel legal theory and expanding the use of decades-old legislation called the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) in a way no US president had done before. Now, with those tariffs on pause but set to come into effect in early July, a federal court ruled Wednesday that Trump’s use of that law was unconstitutional. Is this the end of the trade wars? Not at all, according to our experts. Below, they issue their verdict on what trade tools Trump could turn to next and what these developments mean for every country in the thick of negotiations with the administration.

• Josh Lipsky (@joshualipsky): Chair of international economics and senior director at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center, and former adviser to the International Monetary Fund
• Barbara C. Matthews: Nonresident senior fellow at the GeoEconomics Center and former US Treasury attaché to the European Union

Case law

• The administration will appeal the ruling, and Josh expects an appeals court to issue a stay, meaning the tariffs would return. But this case is almost certainly headed to the US Supreme Court in the coming months. 
• Josh calls the decision “a setback for the administration,” which asked for this court to take the case. The unanimous ruling included judges appointed by Trump and former US President Ronald Reagan.  
• But Barbara notes that the ruling “is limited in scope and provides many mechanisms” for the Trump administration to “accomplish the same goals.” Specifically, “the court’s rationale supporting White House tariff tools as remedies for balance-of-payments issues potentially renders the April 2 tariffs on relatively firm ground compared with the January 2025 fentanyl tariffs against Mexico, China, and Canada.” That’s because Trump justified the April 2 reciprocal tariffs as rectifying US trade deficits with all countries participating in the global trading system. 
• The court was more definitive, Barbara tells us, about the fentanyl tariffs, ruling that both the declared emergency and Trump’s remedy were overly broad. The appeal process will need to address “whether (or not) Congress may delegate its tariff authority, whether Congress limited the scope of national emergency determinations by the White House when it enacted IEEPA,” and “whether tariffs imposed to address a national emergency must be narrowly tailored in relation to the nature of the emergency, the time horizon for the tariffs, or both.” 

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Backup plans

• While appeals play out, the administration will have several tools at its disposal to continue its current tariff policy. First, Wednesday’s decision agrees with a 1975 court ruling that Congress may provide the executive branch with “limited authority” to impose tariffs. The ruling then asserts that the authorities granted to the White House under IEEPA are more narrow than those under its predecessor statute, the Trading with the Enemy Act. The decision then “provided a blueprint for how the Trump administration can continue using tariffs to address both geoeconomic imbalances and a wide range of national emergencies with greater precision,” says Barbara.
• While it appeals Wednesday’s ruling, the White House could narrow the scope, timing, or legal foundation for the fentanyl tariffs and the reciprocal tariffs under IEEPA, Barbara says. Such a move would require the administration to admit at least tacitly that the executive branch’s emergency and tariff authorities can be limited by judicial decision. Josh adds that the administration could follow the court’s decision and rely on sections 122 and 338 of the Trade Act, involving balance of payments, to support the April 2 reciprocal tariffs.
• While the ruling was a surprise, Josh notes that a not fully appreciated move in April, in which the administration shifted semiconductors and consumer electronics tariffs to section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, was a signal that the administration wanted stronger legal footing for some of its toughest levies on China. “In hindsight, that move was more of a tactical retreat. Because that process is well under way, it gives [the administration] a powerful new tariff that could come over the summer.” 
• Barbara agrees, noting that Trump has already used “traditional” methods of section 232 and section 301 for other tariffs unaffected by the ruling, such as those on automobiles. Such moves, however, would extend the timeline for trade negotiations and potentially intensify policy volatility until late this year or early 2026. 

Trade war and trade peace

• This news comes as countries are racing to strike deals with the administration ahead of a July deadline for the return of the reciprocal tariffs. Josh expects that “other countries will now try to slow-walk their negotiations,” resulting in fewer deals ahead of that July deadline and an August deadline to conclude tariff negotiations with China. 
• This decision also impacts congressional budget negotiations ahead of an August deadline to raise the debt ceiling. A Republican budget bill garnered enough votes to pass the House thanks in part to optimistic projections for tariff revenue, Josh points out, which is now in jeopardy. As negotiations turn to the Senate, “keep an eye on the bond market, which already has not reacted well to the bill’s deficit impact,” he adds. 
• Barbara notes that Congress could choose to use this budget bill to ratify the fentanyl and April 2 tariffs, which could satisfy aspects of the trade court’s ruling, but “any such legislation likely also would face legal challenge.” 
• “All of this adds up to more uncertainty—not less,” Josh adds. “Businesses will be unable to make any long-term investment decisions, and the idea that tariffs are going only lower from here may be a miscalculation. Markets seem jubilant that the president may not have as much tariff authority as he thought, but the hangover is coming soon. Trump has many trade tools still at his disposal, and he will not want his core international economic agenda overturned by three judges from a lower court.”  

Trump Tariff Tracker

The second Trump administration has embarked on a novel and aggressive tariff policy to address a range of economic and national security concerns. This tracker monitors the evolution of these tariffs and provides expert context on the economic conditions driving their creation—along with their real-world impact.

The post Will Trump’s tariffs survive US courts? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

So far, the Taliban has adopted more than two hundred decrees targeting women and girls. The bans and restrictions affect all aspects of life—from banning girls’ education past the seventh grade and limiting women’s employment to curtailing their freedom of movement and social engagement. To implement these decrees, Taliban authorities exercise broad discretionary powers to interpret and enforce the law, relying on a range of extrajudicial methods such as physical coercion, social control, and public intimidation.

In effect, the Taliban regime has employed the instruments of lawmaking and law enforcement to establish a system of control and oppression of women that amounts to gender apartheid. The system was reinforced with the adoption of the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice Law on August 21, 2024. While women’s rights and freedoms were already curtailed by earlier Taliban decrees, the adoption and implementation of this law has had far-reaching consequences, stripping women of even more basic rights and personal autonomy and exacerbating their economic dependence and social isolation.

To combat the Taliban’s institutionalization of gender apartheid in Afghanistan, international actors and civil society groups should document both the regime’s human rights abuses and the system of lawmaking and law enforcement that produces them. Documentation strategies should be geared toward supporting ongoing cases at international courts and catalyzing further accountability processes. An international investigative mechanism, modeled on the United Nations’ (UN) International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism for Syria (IIIM), can help to hold the Taliban accountable for implementing gender apartheid and the specific rules and tools they use to maintain that system.

From constitutional order to rule by executive fiat

Prior to the Taliban takeover, the legitimacy and legality of the Afghan state were vested in the 2004 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, which served as the supreme law of the country for seventeen years.

The Constitution was preceded by a Constitutional Loya Jirga or “grand council,” held in 2003, and was approved by consensus in January 2004. It provided an overarching legal framework for the relationship between the Afghan government and Afghan citizens and stipulated a set of constitutional principles and rights, such as separation of powers, due process of law, freedom from persecution, and freedom of expression.

In the new order created by the Taliban, by contrast, there is no constitution or equivalent supreme law. Laws and regulations are issued by the Taliban’s leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, by his leadership council, and by a host of public officials and religious authorities in an ad hoc manner. Sometimes they take the form of written decrees, such as the “Virtue and Vice” law, but often they are only issued verbally. For example, officials from the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice set the law in declarations and conference speeches, while clerics do so in sermons—bypassing any formal process of lawmaking and ignoring basic requirements that laws must be general, prospective, clear, and stable.

Lawmaking and law enforcement as instruments of control and oppression

In the absence of a constitutional framework that anchors the legal order, regulates the exercise of state power, and protects the rights of citizens, Taliban law draws on a range of other sources. They include extremist religious ideology rooted in a rigid—and contested—interpretation of Sharia law, which has been influenced by the Deobandi school of thought, as well as patriarchal tribal norms and practices.

These sources inform and justify the system of control and oppression of women that has emerged and expanded under Taliban rule, which includes bans and restrictions on women’s education, employment, and a range of fundamental rights and freedoms. While the system is built on a multiplicity of verbal and written decrees and directives, the Taliban is aware that its effectiveness depends on more systematic codification and consolidation. This may explain the broad remit of the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice Law, which, inter alia:

• Bans women from travelling without a male guardian and denies them access to parks, gyms, and other public spaces.
• Requires women to cover their faces and bodies in public; for example, Article 13(8) stipulates: “If an adult woman leaves her home for an essential need, she must cover her voice, face, and body.”
• Declares that women’s voices are awrah (private), which means that women should not be heard in public.

The law’s sweeping, vague language gives the Taliban broad discretionary powers to interpret its provisions, creating ample space for abuses. Article 17, for example, requires media outlets to adhere to religious guidelines, prohibiting any content that may be deemed contrary to Sharia law, without clarifying what that means in practice. Taliban forces are tasked with ensuring compliance with the law—especially by women—and violations are punished with warnings, fines, flogging, and imprisonment. Article 17 gives them broad surveillance and enforcement powers: “Taliban forces are present in markets, streets, universities, offices, and public transportation to ensure that people, particularly women, comply with the imposed laws.”

Such provisions of the “Virtue and Vice” law have further strengthened the core characteristics of law enforcement under the Taliban. An array of authorities—Taliban officials and forces, imams, and other religious figures—are exercising broad discretionary powers to enforce a growing number of vaguely defined rules in arbitrary ways, free from due process constraints and safeguards such as judicial review. Any attempt to resist or circumvent the regime’s bans and restrictions is met with a brutal response, often involving punishment on the spot. Human rights groups have publicized several cases of female activists being detained, disappeared, or killed for protesting Taliban laws. They have documented cases of women getting arrested for secretly teaching young girls and have reported on women being flogged for minor infringements and entire families being ostracized or punished for resisting Taliban edicts. The “Virtue and Vice” law reinforced this brutal system of arbitrary law enforcement with new written edicts that Taliban authorities could use to justify human rights abuses.

Pushing back on gender apartheid: Documentation and accountability strategies

Afghan women are already living in a system of pervasive control and oppression that is best described as gender apartheid. Left unchecked, the Taliban will further institutionalize and entrench that system, making it even more difficult to challenge and reverse in the future. International actors—including international organizations, concerned states, human rights groups, and Afghans in the diaspora—must take appropriate steps to prevent that outcome.

Documentation and accountability strategies offer a path forward. Documenting human rights abuses is critical but given their widespread and systematic character, it must be complimented with documentation of Taliban lawmaking and law enforcement—the rules and practices that produce these abuses. And it must involve structural investigations to show how egregious abuses of power and human rights violations are not byproducts of the system of gender apartheid in Afghanistan but are rather its very means and ends, central to maintaining the system.

Building robust documentation can support ongoing accountability processes and initiatives, such as the case against the Taliban at the International Criminal Court for gender persecution as a crime against humanity. It can also strengthen an anticipated case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In January, Germany, the Netherlands, Australia, and Canada announced that they intend to sue the Taliban at the ICJ for gross violations of women’s rights, invoking the interjurisdictional clause of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.

The experiences of other countries affected by widespread and systematic repression and human rights abuses suggest that documentation efforts can open other, potentially unforeseen pathways to accountability—when such efforts are scaled up and institutionalized. Afghanistan needs an international investigative mechanism modeled on the IIIM for Syria. The Syrian IIIM was established by the UN General Assembly—bypassing the Security Council—and has contributed to a spike in universal jurisdiction prosecutions of Syrian offenders for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

An IIIM for Afghanistan can serve both as a catalyst and repository for gender apartheid documentation. It can also help build structural investigations and prepare criminal cases for prosecution when jurisdictions are able and willing to take up such cases in the future. This would create a vital resource and build momentum for the growing movement to criminalize gender apartheid in international law and ensure that its architects are held to account.

Wesna Saidy is a poet and researcher with a degree in law and political science, focusing on human rights and gender justice in Afghanistan. She is a fellow at the Civic Engagement Project focusing on documentation.

Iavor Rangelov, PhD, is a research fellow at the London School of Economics and has extensive experience with documentation, justice, and accountability strategies in the Balkans, Central Asia, East Africa, the Middle East and Latin America.

This article is part of the Inside the Taliban’s Gender Apartheid series, a joint project of the Civic Engagement Project and the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project.

The post How the Taliban is using law for gender apartheid, and how to push back appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On May 29, Jamie Metzl, nonresident senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative, appeared on Fox News’ Brian Kilmeade Show to discuss antisemitism on college campuses and the Trump administration’s student visa policies. He argued that policymakers must address the rise of malign influence on US campuses while ensuring that universities remain engines of economic growth by supporting cutting-edge scientific and technological research. Metzl’s segment begins at 12:25.

Fellow

Jamie Metzl

Nonresident Senior Fellow for Technology and National Security

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Technologies

The post Metzl featured on Fox News on antisemitism, student visa policy, and US competitiveness appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On May 29, Jamie Metzl, nonresident senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative, appeared on CNN’s NewsNight with Abby Phillip to discuss US visa policy. He emphasized the importance of thoroughly vetting individuals entering the country while also highlighting the need to retain top global talent. Metzl noted that doing so is critical to maintaining US competitiveness, particularly in the context of growing strategic competition with China, which he described as a new “cold war.”

Fellow

Jamie Metzl

Nonresident Senior Fellow for Technology and National Security

GeoStrategy Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Technologies

The post Metzl discusses US student visa policy on CNN’s NewsNight appeared first on Atlantic Council.

If Trump wants to stop Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war, and he has made that an administration priority, then he should reflect on what it took to finally stop Serbian President Slobodan Milošević in 1995—after nearly four years of killing and more than 100,000 dead, including the massacre at Srebrenica, Europe’s worst genocide since the Holocaust.

A deal required relentless US diplomatic engagement backed by a demonstrated military threat and carried out alongside unified European allies. It also took twenty-one days of intensive negotiations in Dayton—not involving then US President Bill Clinton until the end—while all parties were cloistered from media and outside influences at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base.

Marking the Dayton anniversary, Ohio Congressman Mike Turner brought the NATO Parliamentary Assembly here last week, gathering delegates from the thirty-two allies as well as from partner countries. They joined leaders from the Western Balkans, assorted experts, and even the Sarajevo Philharmonic, which performed for participants in a giant hangar stocked with presidential aircraft in the National Museum of the US Air Force.

Though I came to commemorate history, I left having interrogated its architects. My aim was to gain clues that might help the Trump administration in its still-fruitless quest for an end to Russia’s war on Ukraine. 

It would be easy to discount the lessons for Ukraine and Russia now, where the stakes are so much higher, from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia then. Nuclear-armed Russia has two hundred times the land mass of Serbia and more than twenty times its population. And Ukraine, with its pre-war population of forty million and France-sized territory, is more than ten times larger in geographic size and population than Bosnia-Herzegovina. In my view, that makes the lessons only more compelling.           

The first lesson? “Peace agreements are extremely rare,” former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt, the European Union’s special representative at the talks thirty years ago, said in a session of former officials that I moderated. “In modern European history, there are only two really: Dayton and the Good Friday Agreement,” which in 1998 ended a thirty-year conflict in Northern Ireland known as “the Troubles.”

Both were forged in the aftermath of horrific violence, which is also the case in Ukraine. Yet both also required something that is still lacking today: determined, focused, and creative US leadership in lockstep with European partners. Both also succeeded through disciplined diplomacy, military leverage, and the unglamorous work of compromise.

Beyond that, winning peace in Dayton demanded US credibility but not neutrality. At Dayton, the United States was not an impartial mediator but rather a focused powerbroker, using whatever muscle was necessary to shape the outcome. No lasting deal can reward Putin’s aggression, just as Dayton didn’t knuckle under to reward Milošević.

Another lesson is that building peace is as crucial as ending war. Dayton and Belfast were both followed by years of international engagement, economic aid, and security commitments. Peace might have collapsed had those efforts not continued.

Most importantly, the United States led but did not go it alone. Peace that endures requires multilateral support. Dayton hasn’t worked perfectly, but without the European Union and NATO it wouldn’t have worked at all. “Only when the international actors can get together with a uniform message and policy can results be achieved,” said Bildt, who is also an Atlantic Council International Advisory Board member. “There was success in Dayton, yes. But it should also be said that there was massive failure prior to Dayton due to disagreements across the Atlantic, disagreements in Europe, and disagreements in the United States.”

US General Wesley Clark, who at the time was the military right hand to Richard Holbrooke, the chief US negotiator, took away a different lesson: “Don’t be timid,” Clark, a member of the Atlantic Council Board of Directors, said to the NATO parliamentarians. “We are going to have to be unified. And we are going to have to be forceful enough to convince Putin he will not win. Right now, he thinks he’s winning.”

In a slap across the face of Trump’s efforts to broker peace, Putin from last Friday to Sunday launched what Ukrainian officials called the largest combined aerial assault of the conflict, including some nine hundred drones and dozens of missiles of various types. That prompted a frustrated Trump to write on Truth Social about Putin that “something has happened to him. He has gone absolutely CRAZY!” The US president added that “missiles and drones are being shot into Cities in Ukraine, for no reason whatsoever.” 

The problem is that there’s nothing crazy about Putin’s calculations, and his reasons are obvious. He’s trying to wear down Ukraine and its partners, and he’s betting that he has more staying power. He sees US military and diplomatic support in retreat, European efforts as insufficient, and Ukraine as weary. Trump has belatedly acknowledged that Putin has been “tapping” him along. 

With all that in mind, Washington will have to try far harder now than it did then to change a murderous despot’s mind—or resign itself to accepting Putin’s ongoing war and its ambition to redraw the European map. 

Until Washington stood up to Milošević in 1995, Clark said, the Serb leader thought he could pull the wool over Europe’s eyes with his small army overrunning Bosnia. When he bid farewell to Milošević at the end of the talks, Clark remembers the Balkan leader saying, “We Serbs never had a chance against your NATO, your airplanes, your missiles.”

Speaking with me at the same NATO session, Christopher R. Hill, who was part of the Holbrooke delegation in Dayton, added another important lesson—that the parties must be ready to end the war. “I am not sure Russia is ready for peace,” he said. “They should be, but they don’t seem to be. I think until they are, we have got to help Ukraine because a hundred years from now . . . our grandchildren, our great-grandchildren, will be thinking about what we did to deal with this crisis.”

The Dayton Accords were not perfect, but they were proof of what US leadership can achieve when properly applied. Speaking in Bosnia-Herzegovina shortly after the agreement was finalized, the then US president explained why the United States had chosen to lead, rather than cut and run from the European conflict. 

“Around the world, people look to America not just because of our size and strength but because of what we stand for and what we’re willing to stand against,” Clinton said. “And though it imposes extra burdens on us, people trust us to help them share in the blessings of peace. We can’t be everywhere . . . But where we can make a difference, where our values and our interests are at stake, we must act.”

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

The post Dispatch from Dayton: What Trump can learn about ending war appeared first on Atlantic Council.

I have written about the Nippon deal numerous times, always emphasizing the commercial benefits of the deal, the ways in which Japanese investment in the US steel industry is a net positive for US national-security concerns, and the dangers of blocking the transaction. The big question now, beyond the specific details of the Nippon deal, is if the CFIUS process itself has changed in ways that will affect future deals.

Rather than indicate that CFIUS has returned to its narrow national-security mandate, the Nippon deal suggests that the Trump administration is willing to use CFIUS authorities to intervene in private transactions for political and industrial policy objectives.

First, the terms of the deal, while still scant, suggest that most of the terms mirror what was already on the table, just with a different public relations spin. In an attempt to head off criticism of the transaction, Nippon clarified that US Steel would retain its name and Pittsburgh headquarters and a majority US-citizen board. As public pressure against the deal mounted, Nippon also committed to invest substantially in upgrading US capacity and promised to not offshore US production. 

Second, what may be different from Nippon’s previous offer is what US Senator David McCormick (R-PA) is describing as a “golden share.” This arrangement would likely give the US government direct control over a certain number of board seats, though no specific details of the arrangement have been disclosed. Despite the use of the term “share,” there doesn’t seem to be any indication that the US government would take an ownership stake in the company. While CFIUS mitigation agreements have in the past provided the US government with some authority to maintain minimum standards for key personnel post-merger, it would be a substantial increase in the use of CFIUS authorities to create an open-ended requirement for the US government to approve board members in an active and ongoing manner. 

Depending on the final wording of the arrangement and the manner in which CFIUS implements it, government control over board members could be used for broad industrial policy practices. CFIUS is supposed to analyze proposed cross-border acquisitions for discrete national-security risks and to only intervene if it finds a risk to national security that arises from the transaction under review. Its mechanisms for intervention are a mitigation agreement or a recommendation that the president prohibit the investment. CFIUS was not envisioned as a tool to manage US industries’ strategic competitiveness broadly, but the United States’ expanded interest in critical supply chains has substantially blurred the line between strategic industrial policy considerations and narrow national-security concerns. 

If the US government began imposing strict production requirements on Nippon, that would mark a substantial drift toward statist production management measures. Moreover, the embrace of a more forward-leaning mitigation stance would mirror the French approach to foreign investment review since 2014. As a reflection of how that has played out, Paris imposed mitigation measures on 53 percent of authorized transactions in 2022. More to the point, it would run counter to the White House’s America First Investment Policy, which explicitly calls for the end of “overly bureaucratic, complex, and open-ended ‘mitigation’ agreements” in favor of ones that “consist of concrete actions that companies can complete within a specific time, rather than perpetual and expensive compliance obligations.” 

Finally, Trump, who announced a celebratory rally in Pittsburgh along with the agreement, and Biden, who touted his decision on the campaign trail, set a concerning precedent by openly politicizing the Nippon Steel deal. In 1975, US President Gerald Ford established CFIUS through Executive Order 11858. Originally little more than a data-seeking exercise, CFIUS was explicitly formed to depoliticize foreign direct investment (FDI) at a time when some members of Congress were increasingly alarmed about the security implications of investments from oil-rich nations. Over the years, the four major overhauls of CFIUS authorities in 1988, 1992, 2007, and 2018 have all, to varying degrees, featured a tug-of-war between a Congress that sought more oversight over FDI for a mixture of security and political reasons and an executive branch that generally tried to keep FDI from becoming a political football. 

If CFIUS reviews become simply political talking points—rather than being based on factual merits—and if firms think that they must mollify the US president in order to be allowed to invest in the United States, then the Nippon Steel deal will be remembered as the transaction that confirmed the fifty-year attempt to depoliticize FDI into the United States has failed.

Sarah Bauerle Danzman is a nonresident senior fellow with the GeoEconomics Center’s Economic Statecraft Initiative.

The post Does the Nippon Steel deal reflect a new normal for foreign investment in the US? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The park is set to be developed with Abu Dhabi-based Miral on Yas Island. It will be Disney’s seventh global resort, its first new resort in over fifteen years, and its most technologically advanced. Positioned within a four-hour flight of one-third of the world’s population, including markets in South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, the park represents more than a commercial expansion—this is no simple tale of castles, rides, and performances.

As Disney CEO Robert A. Iger noted, the park will be “authentically Disney and distinctly Emirati”.

Disneyland Abu Dhabi is best understood as a strategic milestone in the United Arab Emirates’ soft power playbook: a carefully choreographed effort to rebrand the country’s global image and elevate its influence through culture, education, and international partnerships, rather than through coercive means. The UAE seeks to downplay its reputation as “Little Sparta,” known for throwing its weight around in the region in places like Yemen, where the UAE’s military role is blamed for heightening divisions in that country and prolonging the civil war. It also signals deepening ties with the United States, projecting trust amid shifting regional alliances.

Soft power by design

The concept of “soft power”, coined by political scientist Joseph Nye, refers to a nation’s ability to influence others through attraction rather than coercion. It’s about shaping preferences by “winning hearts and minds”. In the twenty-first century, culture, branding, and narrative have become as critical to international influence as military assets or economic might.

The UAE was one of the first Gulf countries to recognize this shift and institutionalize it. In 2017, it launched a national Soft Power Strategy aimed at enhancing the country’s reputation and extending its influence overseas. The strategy outlined a comprehensive approach, leveraging economic success, cultural heritage, humanitarian aid, and a commitment to tolerance to construct an appealing and recognizable national brand.

“Our goal is to engrain the UAE’s position in the world, and in people’s hearts”, explained H.H. Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed at the strategy’s unveiling.

Few initiatives embody this strategy as vividly as Disneyland Abu Dhabi.

The UAE’s leadership sees cultural infrastructure not merely as a tourism booster but as a pillar of national soft power. Hosting a Disney park sends a clear message: The UAE is safe, modern, and family-friendly, trusted enough to house one of the world’s most iconic entertainment institutions.

This blending of Disney magic with local Emirati culture speaks to the UAE’s strategic intent to localize Western symbols of culture while showcasing its own heritage. The location is no accident either: Yas Island is already home to big-name theme parks: Warner Bros. World, Ferrari World, and SeaWorld Abu Dhabi.

Beyond oil: A new national brand

Behind the soft power lies a very concrete strategic imperative: economic diversification. Like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the UAE faces a future in which oil revenues alone can no longer sustain national growth. However, it has moved earlier and more decisively in its effort to transition from a hydrocarbon economy to one based on knowledge and services.

Expanding the leisure and tourism sectors is central to that vision. These sectors attract foreign income, create jobs, and strengthen non-oil sectors. The UAE has identified tourism and the creative economy as key pillars for a sustainable future, and Disneyland ticks all those boxes.

These projects also have a domestic dimension as instruments of legitimacy. For the Emirati leadership, ventures like Disneyland help reinforce a social contract at home: the ruling family delivers ever-greater prosperity, pride, and global recognition, and in return, the public acquiesces to their unelected governance.

In that sense, Disneyland is not just an economic asset, but a tool of statecraft.

Building a cultural hub: From Louvre to Disneyland

Over the past decade, the UAE has transformed a once-empty stretch of sand into a “branded entertainment Mecca”. Disneyland Abu Dhabi is the latest addition to a growing portfolio of landmarks that position the country as a global hub for arts, dialogue, and innovation.

The 2017 opening of the Louvre Abu Dhabi, the first Louvre outside France, marked a milestone in cultural diplomacy, made possible by Emirati funding and a landmark agreement with Paris. Nearby, the Guggenheim Abu Dhabi, set to be the largest of its kind, is under construction, further anchoring Saadiyat Island’s status as a beacon of global art tourism.

The UAE has also positioned itself as a crossroads of religious and cultural dialogue. In 2019, during the country’s “Year of Tolerance”, Abu Dhabi hosted Pope Francis for a historic mass. In 2023, it inaugurated the Abrahamic Family House, a single complex housing a mosque, church, and synagogue. Dubai’s Expo 2020, which drew over twenty-four million visits and brought together 192 countries under the theme “Connecting Minds, Creating the Future”, further reinforced the UAE’s brand as a meeting point of civilizations and ideas.

These projects also carry implicit diplomatic weight. Hosting globally recognized institutions strengthens bilateral relationships and signals strategic alignment. The French government’s support for the Louvre Abu Dhabi and the US presence through NYU Abu Dhabi endorses the Emirati vision and its capacity to serve as a trusted cultural and knowledge partner.

US-Emirati relations: trust and verify

The arrival of Disneyland in Abu Dhabi carries symbolic weight for US-UAE relations. For decades, the UAE has been one of Washington’s closest regional partners, hosting US troops and welcoming major US investments.

Yet the relationship has faced moments of strain. In 2021, former US President Joe Biden’s administration paused a $23 billion arms deal, including F-35 fighter jets, citing concerns about the UAE’s role in Yemen and its growing ties with China, particularly through Huawei’s 5G technology. In response, Emirati officials questioned US reliability and reportedly explored Chinese defense alternatives.

Still, both countries have taken steps to reaffirm trust. In September 2024, Biden designated the UAE a “Major Defense Partner”, a title previously granted only to India. The move signaled renewed strategic alignment and paved the way for closer cooperation on advanced technology and security.

In this context, Disney’s expansion into the Emirates carries significance beyond business. A flagship American brand is staking its future on the UAE as a stable and profitable partner. This is a soft power gesture that strengthens cultural ties and introduces a new generation of visitors to an American-inflected vision of the Gulf. Ultimately, it underscores that enduring alliances are built not only on shared interests but also on shared experiences.

A contest of charisma

Abu Dhabi’s Disney deal doesn’t occur in a vacuum; it’s part of a wider regional race for soft power among the Gulf’s wealthiest monarchies: the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.

Just as Saudi Arabia’s NEOM project positions the Kingdom as a futuristic Disneyland, Abu Dhabi anchors the UAE’s claim to cultural openness and tourism supremacy.

Qatar has long leveraged its global media platforms, most notably Al Jazeera, alongside its major investments in sports diplomacy, including the landmark 2022 FIFA World Cup, to project a narrative of innovation to global audiences. Saudi Arabia, under the banner of “Vision 2030”, is undergoing a rapid soft power transformation of its own, emphasizing heritage tourism, mega-projects like NEOM and Qiddiya, and the hosting of international cultural and sporting events to reshape its image and diversify its economy.

What sets the UAE apart is the early institutionalization and coherence of its soft power strategy. Qatar’s media strategy often amplifies contentious political narratives and maintains affiliations with radical movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, and Saudi Arabia’s reforms are very much ventures in progress. The UAE, on the other hand, has adopted a non-confrontational, globally inclusive narrative. Its soft power posturing is framed around these non-confrontational values: tolerance, intercultural dialogue, and sustainability, making its image more relatable and exportable to international audiences. Crucially, the UAE aims not only to attract attention but to project long-term reliability, a prized trait in an increasingly volatile region.

The results are telling: according to the 2025 Brand Finance index, the UAE ranks 10th globally in soft power, well ahead of Saudi Arabia and Qatar and even surpassing several global powers such as Russia and South Korea. More than mere rivalry, this signals a broader Gulf rebranding trend—one in which soft power is no longer a luxury but a strategic necessity for geopolitical resilience in the post-oil era.

Risks and realities

Of course, not everything is enchanted.

Theme parks in the Gulf have historically underperformed financially, and Disneyland’s presence won’t erase expected concerns over labor conditions in the UAE, particularly with regard to migrant workers, who make up 88 percent of the country’s population. Critics may accuse Disney of whitewashing this reality, echoing similar debates about its operations in China.

But soft power doesn’t require perfection; it requires attraction, and few countries have embraced this insight as effectively as the UAE.

Whether this strategy will yield enduring geopolitical “happily ever afters” remains to be seen. But one thing is clear: in a region often defined by hard power rivalries, Abu Dhabi has chosen to compete through visibility, credibility, and imagination.

And who better than Mickey Mouse to help carry that message?

Amit Yarom is an incoming graduate student at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. He is a foreign policy expert and researcher, specializing in the Arabian Gulf.

The post Mickey goes to the Gulf: The UAE’s wish upon a soft power star appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Throughout occupied Ukraine, the Russian authorities are seeking to consolidate their control by eradicating all traces of Ukrainian statehood and national identity while imposing a reign of terror on the civilian population. If these Russian occupation policies are allowed to pass unchallenged in the international arena, it will set a disastrous precedent for the use of force against civilians and the weaponization of national identity in other contested regions globally.

From the very first days of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, it was clear that Russia intended to entrench itself firmly in occupied regions of Ukraine. Russian troops often arrived armed with lists of local community leaders including elected officials, journalists, activists, religious figures, and military veterans. Those who refused to cooperate were likely to be detained before disappearing into a vast network of Russian prisons and camps.

Ukrainian detainees are being systematically subjected to torture and other human rights abuses, according to an international investigation led by the French group Forbidden Stories together with thirteen media outlets including Britain’s Guardian newspaper, the Washington Post, and Le Monde. While it is not possible to calculate exactly how many Ukrainian civilians have been abducted in the occupied regions, UN officials have concluded that the large scale and systematic nature of the disappearances qualifies as a crime against humanity.

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Those who remain in areas of Ukraine under Kremlin control face a regime of forced russification encompassing everything from language and the media to education and religion. Place names have been changed to reflect the new Russian realities, with the curriculum in local schools transformed in line with the Kremlin’s anti-Ukrainian imperial dogmas. Parents who attempt to shield their children from classroom indoctrination are being threatened with loss of custody.

Ukrainian residents in the occupied regions of the country have also come under increasing pressure from the Kremlin to accept Russian citizenship. Anyone who refuses to take a Russian passport risks losing access to a range of essential services including healthcare. They also face restrictions on property rights along with the ability to run a business and use banking services.

This passport campaign has intensified significantly in recent months, with Russian President Vladimir Putin issuing a decree announcing that Ukrainians living under Russian occupation have until September 2025 to accept Russian citizenship or face possible deportation from their own homes. Understandably, Moscow’s ruthless tactics are proving difficult to resist. Kremlin officials claim that by March 2025, Russian passports had been issued to approximately 3.5 million people in occupied Ukraine.

Moscow is accused of engaging in religious persecution throughout the occupied regions, with all Christian denominations other that the Kremlin-linked Russian Orthodox Church facing various degrees of restrictive measures and oppression. Ukrainian Foreign Ministry officials stated in spring 2025 that the Russian occupation authorities have killed dozens of clergy members over the past three years while damaging or destroying hundreds of churches.

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Russia has been careful to prevent information about conditions in occupied Ukraine from reaching the outside world. All independent media sources have been shut down throughout the occupied regions, and have been replaced by new Kremlin-controlled outlets. Individual journalists have frequently been among those targeted for oppressive measures including physical abuse and imprisonment.

One of the few reporters to shed light on the horrors unfolding in Russian-occupied Ukraine was Ukrainian journalist Viktoriia Roshchyna, who visited areas under occupation on multiple occasions before being captured by the Russian authorities in summer 2023. Roshchyna died after a year in Russian captivity. When her body was returned to Ukraine in early 2025, it showed signs of torture.

From a military standpoint, it may not currently be feasible to liberate all of the Ukrainian regions held by Moscow. Nevertheless, the crimes being committed by the Kremlin in occupied Ukraine are unprecedented in modern European history and cannot be ignored.

It is vital that the human rights of Ukrainians living under Russian occupation feature prominently in any peace process. This includes the rights of those currently being held in Russian jails. Ukraine’s Western partners must maintain or increase sanctions pressure, while also expanding support for Ukrainian civil society and raising awareness about Russia’s actions among international audiences.

Looking ahead, longer term investments are also needed to help document war crimes and support Ukrainian victims of the Russian occupation. Ultimately, the most meaningful response to Russia’s campaign against Ukrainian identity is to make sure Ukraine is in a position to not only survive but thrive as an independent European nation.

Kateryna Odarchenko is a partner at SIC Group Ukraine.

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